diff --git "a/case_linked_guide_diffs.json" "b/case_linked_guide_diffs.json" --- "a/case_linked_guide_diffs.json" +++ "b/case_linked_guide_diffs.json" @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:7246/20", "case_name": "A.H. and Others v. Germany", @@ -41,6 +43,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:20081/19", "case_name": "Buhuceanu and Others v. Romania", @@ -74,6 +78,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:47833/20", "case_name": "Lenis v. Greece (dec.)", @@ -107,6 +113,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:75135/14", "case_name": "Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine", @@ -140,6 +148,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:39954/09|3465/17", "case_name": "Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia", @@ -173,6 +183,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:53568/18|54741/18", "case_name": "O.H. and G.H. v. Germany", @@ -206,6 +218,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:54006/20", "case_name": "R.K. v. Hungary", @@ -239,6 +253,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:10934/21", "case_name": "Semenya v. Switzerland*", @@ -272,9 +288,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-13", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-04-05__2024-06-13.json", "case_key": "apps:28834/19", - "case_name": "Lapunov v. Russia, no.28834/19;", + "case_name": "Lapunov v. Russia", "application_numbers": "28834/19", "judgment_year": "2023", "citation_change": "added", @@ -283,14 +301,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF LAPUNOV v. RUSSIA", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", - "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 2, + "linked_sections": "I.A: The relevant threshold|I.C: The specific duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence and investigate discriminatory motives", + "linked_change_types": "citation_updated|paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A|a:4|b:4|I.C|a:None|b:24", + "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "According to the Court's case-law ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 and trigger the related obligations. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, its duration, its physical and mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim ( Stasi v. France, 2011, § 75), it being noted, however, that any physical force by a State agent not made strictly necessary by the person's conduct would equally fall within the scope of (and violate) Article 3 of the Convention ( Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], 2015, § 101). Furthermore, Article 3 cannot be limited to acts of physical ill-treatment; it also covers the infliction of psychological suffering. Hence, the treatment can be categorised as degrading when it arouses in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them ( Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020, § 42).", + "post_text": "According to the Court's case-law ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 and trigger the related obligations. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, its duration, its physical and mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim ( Stasi v. France, 2011, § 75), it being noted, however, that any physical force by a State agent not made strictly necessary by the person's conduct would equally fall within the scope of (and violate) Article 3 of the Convention ( Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], 2015, § 101). Furthermore, Article 3 cannot be limited to acts of physical ill-treatment; it also covers the infliction of psychological suffering. Hence, the treatment can be categorised as degrading when it arouses in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them ( Aghdgomelas hvili and Japaridze v. Georgia Lapunov v. Russia, 2020, § 42;, 2023, § 108).\n\nIn Lapunov v. Russia, 2023, the applicant's detailed and consistent statements that he had been abducted and ill-treated by the Chechen authorities on account of his sexual orientation were corroborated by information collected by the press and public bodies about the so-called \"anti-gay purge\" of 2017, and the general context of human rights and those of LGBTIpersons in Chechnya. The Government had failed to provide convincing explanations capable of refuting those allegations and had thus failed to discharge their burden of proof to prove the contrary. The ill-treatment to which the applicant was subjected by State agents amounted to torture and resulted in a violation of the substantive limb of Article 3 of the Convention (§ 110). Moreover, there had been a systemic failure to investigate unacknowledged detentions and disappearances in Chechnya in respect of complaints under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, which led to a violation of the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention (§ 118). Besides, the applicant had been subjected to targeted violence solely on account of his sexual orientation, which was an aggravating factor, and characterised as a hate crime in the relevant international material. Thus, the violation under Article 3 was motivated by homophobic attitudes, in light of the level of intolerance towards LGBTIpersons in Chechnya, which led to a finding of a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention (§§ 119-121). In addition, the applicant's arbitrary detention had no legal grounds and was not officially acknowledged, which was in beach of Article 5 of the Convention (§§ 127-129).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240405124507/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_lgbti_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240613074526/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_lgbti_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/0a61f8f7ceb0/20240405124507__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -305,6 +323,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-13", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-04-05__2024-06-13.json", "case_key": "apps:11454/17", "case_name": "Przybyszewska and others v. Poland", @@ -338,6 +358,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-13", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-04-05__2024-06-13.json", "case_key": "apps:58358/14", "case_name": "Romanov and others v. Russia", @@ -355,8 +377,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_removed|paragraph_added|citation_updated", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A|a:6|b:6|I.C|a:None|b:25|III.B.§4|a:114|b:116", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match|citation_field_name_match", - "pre_text": "Conversely, in Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015, §§ 70-71, the Court noted that the applicants had been the target of hate speech and aggressive behaviour when they were attacked during a march to mark the International Day Against Homophobia in Tbilsi. The applicants had been surrounded by an angry mob that outnumbered them and was uttering death threats and randomly resorting to physical assaults, demonstrating the reality of the threats, and that a clearly distinguishable homophobic bias played the role of an aggravating factor in a situation which was already one of intense fear and anxiety. The Court considered that the aim of that verbal - and sporadically physical - abuse was evidently to frighten the applicants so that they would desist from their public expression of support for the LGBT community. The Court thus found that the treatment of the applicants aroused in them feelings of fear, anguish and insecurity incompatible with respect for their human dignity and which reached the threshold of severity within the meaning of Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, which were ultimately considered to have been violated (See other examples, Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020, § 49; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016, § 119, Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021, §§ 60-61, Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, § 97, referred to below) .\n\nThe Court has repeatedly held that the State must act as the ultimate guarantor of the principles of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. Genuine, effective freedom of peaceful assembly cannot, therefore, be reduced to a mere duty on the part of the State not to interfere: a purely negative conception would not be compatible with the object and purpose of Article 11 of the Convention. This provision sometimes requires positive measures to be taken, even in the sphere of relations between individuals. That positive obligation is of particular importance for persons holding unpopular views or belonging to minorities, because they are more vulnerable to victimisation ( Berkman v. Russia, 2020, § 46; Baczkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007, § 64; Zhdanov and Others v. Russia, 2019, §§ 162-163). According to the Court's case-law, freedom of assembly, as enshrined in Article 11, protects a demonstration that may annoy or cause offence to persons opposed to the ideas or claims that the demonstration is seeking to promote. The participants must nevertheless be able to hold the demonstration without having to fear that they will be subjected to physical violence by their opponents ( Berkman v. Russia, 2020, § 54; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021, § 140). It is thus the duty of Contracting States to take reasonable and appropriate measures to enable lawful demonstrations to proceed peacefully. Indeed, failure to protect demonstrators from homophobic violence also amounts to a violation of the State's positive obligations under Article 14 of the Convention .", - "post_text": "Conversely, in, 2015, §§ 70-71, the Court noted that the applicants had been the target of hate speech and aggressive behaviour when they were attacked during a march to mark the International Day Against Homophobia in Tbilisi. The applicants had been surrounded by an angry mob that outnumbered them and was uttering death threats and randomly resorting to physical assaults, demonstrating the reality of the threats, and that a clearly distinguishable homophobic bias played the role of an aggravating factor in a situation which was already one of intense fear and anxiety. The Court considered that the aim of that verbal - and sporadically physical - abuse was evidently to frighten the applicants so that they would desist from their public expression of support for the LGBT community. The Court thus found that the treatment of the applicants aroused in them feelings of fear, anguish and insecurity incompatible with respect for their human dignity and which reached the threshold of severity within the meaning of Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, which were ultimately considered to have been violated (see other examples, Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020, § 49; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016, § 119, Women' s Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021, §§ 60-61, Oganezova v. Armenia Romanov and others v. Russia ., 2022, § 97, referred to below;, 2023, § 68)\n\nLikewise, in Romanov and others v. Russia, 2023, the applicants were subjected to homophobic acts of violence by private individuals and were apprehended and detained unlawfully during peaceful demonstrations in support of LGBTI rights. The authorities should have foreseen the risks associated with mass events related to the socially sensitive topic of supporting the LGBTI community, given the hostile attitudes of parts of Russian society towards this issue. Besides, serious threats had circulated prior to the demonstration. Thus, there has been a violation of Article 3 (substantive and procedural) in the light of Article 14 of the Convention, since the authorities had failed to protect the applicant from violence (§ 72) and failed to conduct an effective investigation (§ 79).\n\nThe Court has repeatedly held that the State must act as the ultimate guarantor of the principles of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. Genuine, effective freedom of peaceful assembly cannot, therefore, be reduced to a mere duty on the part of the State not to interfere: a purely negative conception would not be compatible with the object and purpose of Article 11 of the Convention. This provision sometimes requires positive measures to be taken, even in the sphere of relations between individuals. That positive obligation is of particular importance for persons holding unpopular views or belonging to minorities, because they are more vulnerable to victimisation ( Berkman v. Russia, 2020, § 46; Ba czkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007, § 64; Zhdanov and Others v. Russia, 2019, §§ 162-163; Romanov and others v. Russia, 2023, §71). According to the Court's case- law, freedom of assembly, as enshrined in Article 11, protects a demonstration that may annoy or cause offence to persons opposed to the ideas or claims that the demonstration is seeking to promote. The participants must nevertheless be able to hold the demonstration without having to fear that they will be subjected to physical violence by their opponents ( Berkman v. Russia, 2020, § 54; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021, § 140). It is thus the duty of Contracting States to take reasonable and appropriate measures to enable lawful demonstrations to proceed peacefully. Indeed, failure to protect demonstrators from homophobic violence also amounts to a violation of the State's positive obligations under Article 14 of the Convention 20 .", + "pre_text": "Conversely, in Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015, §§ 70-71, the Court noted that the applicants had been the target of hate speech and aggressive behaviour when they were attacked during a march to mark the International Day Against Homophobia in Tbilsi. The applicants had been surrounded by an angry mob that outnumbered them and was uttering death threats and randomly resorting to physical assaults, demonstrating the reality of the threats, and that a clearly distinguishable homophobic bias played the role of an aggravating factor in a situation which was already one of intense fear and anxiety. The Court considered that the aim of that verbal - and sporadically physical - abuse was evidently to frighten the applicants so that they would desist from their public expression of support for the LGBTcommunity. The Court thus found that the treatment of the applicants aroused in them feelings of fear, anguish and insecurity incompatible with respect for their human dignity and which reached the threshold of severity within the meaning of Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, which were ultimately considered to have been violated (See other examples, Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020, § 49; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016, § 119, Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021, §§ 60-61, Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, § 97, referred to below) .\n\nThe Court has repeatedly held that the State must act as the ultimate guarantor of the principles of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. Genuine, effective freedom of peaceful assembly cannot, therefore, be reduced to a mere duty on the part of the State not to interfere: a purely negative conception would not be compatible with the object and purpose of Article 11 of the Convention. This provision sometimes requires positive measures to be taken, even in the sphere of relations between individuals. That positive obligation is of particular importance for persons holding unpopular views or belonging to minorities, because they are more vulnerable to victimisation ( Berkman v. Russia, 2020, § 46; Baczkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007, § 64; Zhdanov and Others v. Russia, 2019, §§ 162-163). According to the Court's case-law, freedom of assembly, as enshrined in Article 11, protects a demonstration that may annoy or cause offence to persons opposed to the ideas or claims that the demonstration is seeking to promote. The participants must nevertheless be able to hold the demonstration without having to fear that they will be subjected to physical violence by their opponents ( Berkman v. Russia, 2020, § 54; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021, § 140). It is thus the duty of Contracting States to take reasonable and appropriate measures to enable lawful demonstrations to proceed peacefully. Indeed, failure to protect demonstrators from homophobic violence also amounts to a violation of the State's positive obligations under Article 14 of the Convention .", + "post_text": "Conversely, in, 2015, §§ 70-71, the Court noted that the applicants had been the target of hate speech and aggressive behaviour when they were attacked during a march to mark the International Day Against Homophobia in Tbilisi. The applicants had been surrounded by an angry mob that outnumbered them and was uttering death threats and randomly resorting to physical assaults, demonstrating the reality of the threats, and that a clearly distinguishable homophobic bias played the role of an aggravating factor in a situation which was already one of intense fear and anxiety. The Court considered that the aim of that verbal - and sporadically physical - abuse was evidently to frighten the applicants so that they would desist from their public expression of support for the LGBTcommunity. The Court thus found that the treatment of the applicants aroused in them feelings of fear, anguish and insecurity incompatible with respect for their human dignity and which reached the threshold of severity within the meaning of Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, which were ultimately considered to have been violated (see other examples, Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020, § 49; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016, § 119, Women' s Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021, §§ 60-61, Oganezova v. Armenia Romanov and others v. Russia ., 2022, § 97, referred to below;, 2023, § 68)\n\nLikewise, in Romanov and others v. Russia, 2023, the applicants were subjected to homophobic acts of violence by private individuals and were apprehended and detained unlawfully during peaceful demonstrations in support of LGBTIrights. The authorities should have foreseen the risks associated with mass events related to the socially sensitive topic of supporting the LGBTIcommunity, given the hostile attitudes of parts of Russian society towards this issue. Besides, serious threats had circulated prior to the demonstration. Thus, there has been a violation of Article 3 (substantive and procedural) in the light of Article 14 of the Convention, since the authorities had failed to protect the applicant from violence (§ 72) and failed to conduct an effective investigation (§ 79).\n\nThe Court has repeatedly held that the State must act as the ultimate guarantor of the principles of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. Genuine, effective freedom of peaceful assembly cannot, therefore, be reduced to a mere duty on the part of the State not to interfere: a purely negative conception would not be compatible with the object and purpose of Article 11 of the Convention. This provision sometimes requires positive measures to be taken, even in the sphere of relations between individuals. That positive obligation is of particular importance for persons holding unpopular views or belonging to minorities, because they are more vulnerable to victimisation ( Berkman v. Russia, 2020, § 46; Ba czkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007, § 64; Zhdanov and Others v. Russia, 2019, §§ 162-163; Romanov and others v. Russia, 2023, §71). According to the Court's case- law, freedom of assembly, as enshrined in Article 11, protects a demonstration that may annoy or cause offence to persons opposed to the ideas or claims that the demonstration is seeking to promote. The participants must nevertheless be able to hold the demonstration without having to fear that they will be subjected to physical violence by their opponents ( Berkman v. Russia, 2020, § 54; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021, § 140). It is thus the duty of Contracting States to take reasonable and appropriate measures to enable lawful demonstrations to proceed peacefully. Indeed, failure to protect demonstrators from homophobic violence also amounts to a violation of the State's positive obligations under Article 14 of the Convention 20 .", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240405124507/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_lgbti_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240613074526/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_lgbti_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/0a61f8f7ceb0/20240405124507__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -371,6 +393,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-13", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-04-05__2024-06-13.json", "case_key": "apps:59963/21", "case_name": "Zanola v. Italy (dec.)", @@ -404,6 +428,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:49014/16", "case_name": "A.K. v. Russia", @@ -421,7 +447,7 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_updated|citation_added|reformulation", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.1|a:42|b:44|IV.A.2|a:123|b:130|IV.A.3|a:127|b:134|IV.B.6|a:150|b:156", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "The Court has held that the concept of \"private life\" is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person, including his or her sexual life X and Y v. the Netherlands (, 1985, § 22). It can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's physical and social identity ( Y.Y v. Turkey, 2015, § 56). Elements such as, for example, gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life fall within the personal sphere protected by Article 8 ( Sousa Goucha v. Portugal, 2016, § 27 ; B. v. France, 1992, § 63 ; Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 41 ; Beizaras and L evickas v. Lithuania, 2020, § 109; Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, 1999, § 71). Article 8 also protects the right to personal development and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world ( Schlumpf v. Switzerland, 2009, § 77).\n\nJust like differences based on gender, differences based on sexual orientation require particularly serious reasons by way of justification ( Karner v. Austria, 2003, § 37; L. and v. v. Austria, Vallianatos and Others v. Greece 2003, § 45; [GC], 2013, § 77).\n\nWhere a difference in treatment is based on sex or sexual orientation the State's margin of appreciation is narrow ( Karner v. Austria, 2003, § 41; Kozak v. Poland, 2010, § 92). Differences based solely on considerations of sexual orientation are unacceptable under the Convention ( Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999, § 36; E.B. v. France [GC], 2008, §§ 93 and 96; X and Others v. Austria, [GC], 2013, § 99; Pajić v. Croatia, 2016, § 84; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, § 114; Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine, 2023, § 62).\n\nThe Court has held that a restrictive interpretation of the concept of \"family member\" (which excludes homosexual partners who cannot get married or enter into a civil partnership under the law of the receiving State) results in homosexual couples facing an insurmountable obstacle to obtaining Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy a residence permit for family reasons (, 2016, § 83). In particular, according to the Court, a homosexual couple who cannot obtain legal recognition of their union (because it is not provided for in the law of the receiving State) is not in an analogous situation to that of an unmarried heterosexual couple who chose not to regularise their union. Thus, a failure to apply different treatment to such homosexual couples may be in breach of Article 14 of the Convention (ibid., § 98).", + "pre_text": "The Court has held that the concept of \"private life\" is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person, including his or her sexual life X and Y v. the Netherlands (, 1985, § 22). It can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's physical and social identity ( Y.Y v. Turkey, 2015, § 56). Elements such as, for example, gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life fall within the personal sphere protected by Article 8 ( Sousa Goucha v. Portugal, 2016, § 27 ; B. v. France, 1992, § 63 ; Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 41 ; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, § 109; Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, 1999, § 71). Article 8 also protects the right to personal development and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world ( Schlumpf v. Switzerland, 2009, § 77).\n\nJust like differences based on gender, differences based on sexual orientation require particularly serious reasons by way of justification ( Karner v. Austria, 2003, § 37; L. and v. v. Austria, Vallianatos and Others v. Greece 2003, § 45; [GC], 2013, § 77).\n\nWhere a difference in treatment is based on sex or sexual orientation the State's margin of appreciation is narrow ( Karner v. Austria, 2003, § 41; Kozak v. Poland, 2010, § 92). Differences based solely on considerations of sexual orientation are unacceptable under the Convention ( Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999, § 36; E.B. v. France [GC], 2008, §§ 93 and 96; X and Others v. Austria, [GC], 2013, § 99; Pajić v. Croatia, 2016, § 84; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, § 114; Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine, 2023, § 62).\n\nThe Court has held that a restrictive interpretation of the concept of \"family member\" (which excludes homosexual partners who cannot get married or enter into a civil partnership under the law of the receiving State) results in homosexual couples facing an insurmountable obstacle to obtaining Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy a residence permit for family reasons (, 2016, § 83). In particular, according to the Court, a homosexual couple who cannot obtain legal recognition of their union (because it is not provided for in the law of the receiving State) is not in an analogous situation to that of an unmarried heterosexual couple who chose not to regularise their union. Thus, a failure to apply different treatment to such homosexual couples may be in breach of Article 14 of the Convention (ibid., § 98).", "post_text": "The Court has held that the concept of \"private life\" is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person, including his or her sexual life ( X and Y v. the Netherlands, 1985, § 22). It can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's physical and social identity ( Y.Y v. Turkey, 2015, § 56). Elements such as, for example, gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life fall within the personal sphere protected by Article 8 ( Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 41; B. v. France, 1992, § 63; Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, 1999, § 71; Sousa Goucha v. Portugal, 2016, § 27 ; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, § 109; A.K. v. Russia, 2024, § 30; W.W. v. Poland, 2024, § 82). Article 8 also protects the right to personal development and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world ( Schlumpf v. Switzerland, 2009, § 77).\n\nJust like differences based on gender, differences based on sexual orientation require particularly serious reasons by way of justification ( Karner v. Austria, 2003, § 37; L. and v. v. Austria, 2003, § 45; Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], 2013, § 77, A.K. v. Russia, 2024, § 34).\n\nWhere a difference in treatment is based on sex or sexual orientation the State's margin of appreciation is narrow ( Karner v. Austria, 2003, § 41; Kozak v. Poland, 2010, § 92). Differences based solely on considerations of sexual orientation are unacceptable under the Convention ( Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999, § 36; E.B. v. France [GC], 2008, §§ 93 and 96; X and Others v. Austria, [GC], 2013, § 99; Pajić v. Croatia, 2016, § 84; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, § 114; Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine, 2023, § 62; A.K. v. Russia, 2024, § 34).\n\nIn A.K. v. Russia, 2024, the dismissal of a teacher for posting photos on social media showing affection to intimate partners was considered by the Court to be a disproportionate interference with her rights under Article 8 of the Convention. First, the Court held that the dismissal of a teacher with appropriate qualifications, of good repute with students and parents and without a prior history of complaints could not have been the necessary, sole, and immediate sanction for the images whether they had stayed private or became public (§ 40). Moreover, the dismissal amounted to a difference in treatment based solely on considerations of sexual orientation without particularly convincing and weighty reasons (§ 45). The school administration's position and the judicial decisions referred explicitly to \"lesbian scenes\" and \"lesbian content\", \"unethically close same - sex relations\" and \"non - traditional sexual orientation\" ( § 43). The Court reiterated that an individual's sexual orientation may not be isolated from the private and public expressions of it, which are evidently protected elements of an individual's private life. The posting of travel and partying photos showing affection towards intimate partners is a commonplace practice on social media. Consequently, the authorities'hostile reaction was unmistakably driven by the lack of acceptance of the applicant's sexuality, and was, therefore, patently discriminatory (§ 44). The Court found accordingly a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240613074526/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_lgbti_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250612193940/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_lgbti_rights_eng", @@ -437,6 +463,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:8825/22|19130/22", "case_name": "Bazhenov and Semkin v. Russia*", @@ -455,7 +483,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.B.8|a:None|b:166", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "In Bazhenov and Semkin v. Russia *, 2025, the domestic authorities were found to have failed to discharge their positive obligation to adequately respond to the non-consensual dissemination of the applicants' private data, including information on their sexual orientation, by private individuals on social networks. They did not investigate in an effective manner whether the data dissemination had been motivated by homophobic attitudes (§§ 72-75 and 78) and they disregarded the vulnerability of the LGBTI community in Russia and their need for special protection (§§ 77-78). The applicants had suffered discrimination on the grounds of their sexual orientation and there was therefore a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention (§§ 78-79).", + "post_text": "In Bazhenov and Semkin v. Russia *, 2025, the domestic authorities were found to have failed to discharge their positive obligation to adequately respond to the non-consensual dissemination of the applicants' private data, including information on their sexual orientation, by private individuals on social networks. They did not investigate in an effective manner whether the data dissemination had been motivated by homophobic attitudes (§§ 72-75 and 78) and they disregarded the vulnerability of the LGBTIcommunity in Russia and their need for special protection (§§ 77-78). The applicants had suffered discrimination on the grounds of their sexual orientation and there was therefore a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention (§§ 78-79).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240613074526/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_lgbti_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250612193940/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_lgbti_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/0a61f8f7ceb0/20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -470,6 +498,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:40861/22", "case_name": "Hanovs v. Latvia", @@ -488,7 +518,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.C|a:None|b:26|I.C|a:12|b:12|I.C|a:13|b:13|I.C|a:14|b:14", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "The authorities' have a specific duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence. In particular, when the prima facie domestic authorities are confronted with indications of violence motivated or at least influenced by the victim's sexual orientation, this requires the effective application of domestic criminal-law mechanisms capable of elucidating the possible hate motive with homophobic overtones behind the violent incident and of identifying and, if appropriate, adequately punishing those responsible ( Sabalić v. Croatia, 2021, § 105).\n\nThe authorities' duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence, as well as to investigate the existence of a possible link between a discriminatory motive and the act of violence, can fall under the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention, but may also be seen to form part of the authorities' positive responsibilities under Article 14 of the Convention to secure the fundamental value enshrined in Article 3 without discrimination (ibid., § 91; Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015, §§ 63-64; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania 2016, § 106; Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020, § 36, Genderdoc- M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021, § 34, and Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021, § 57, discussed below, where the Court proceeded to a simultaneous examination under Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention 1 ).\n\nThe Court has held that, without a strict approach from the law-enforcement authorities, prejudice-motivated crimes would unavoidably be treated on an equal footing with ordinary cases without such overtones, and the resultant indifference would be tantamount to official acquiescence to, or even connivance with, hate crimes ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015, § 77, with further references, and Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, § 106). Thus, according to the Court, treating violence and brutality arising from discriminatory attitudes on an equal footing with violence occurring in cases that have no such overtones would be turning a blind eye to the specific nature of acts that are particularly destructive of fundamental rights. Moreover, a failure to make a distinction in the way situations that are essentially different are handled may constitute unjustified treatment irreconcilable with Article 14 of the Convention ( Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020, § 44).", - "post_text": "In Hanovs v. Latvia, 2024, the applicant and his partner were verbally and physically assaulted by private individuals in a public space, with the intent of intimidating them from publicly expressing their affection. The Court considered that such an attack, triggered by expressions of affection, constituted an affront to human dignity by targeting universal expressions of love and companionship (§ 42). Such attacks, motivated by displays of affection, profoundly affected the private lives of individuals by compromising their ability to live authentically and compelling them to conceal essential aspects of their private lives to avoid harm (§ 43). Even if the discriminatory motive for the attack was not in doubt, domestic authorities only resorted to administrative-offence proceedings and the perpetrator was neither charged nor prosecuted (§ 51). Consequently, there was a failure by the domestic authorities to provide a robust response to an attack motivated by the applicant's sexual orientation, fostering a sense of impunity for hate-motivated offences rather than affirming a clear and uncompromising stance against such acts (§ 52). This kind of failure to address can normalise hostility towards LGBTI individuals, perpetuate a culture of intolerance and discrimination and encourage further acts of a similar nature (§ 53). Thus, the Court concluded that the State had failed to provide adequate protection for the applicant's dignity and private life by ensuring the effective prosecution of the attack against him, in breach of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 14.\n\nThe authorities'have a specific duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence. In particular, when the domestic authorities are confronted with prima facie indications of violence motivated or at least influenced by the victim's sexual orientation, this requires the effective application of domestic criminal-law mechanisms capable of elucidating the possible hate motive with homophobic overtones behind the violent incident and of identifying and, if appropriate, adequately punishing those responsible ( Sabalić v. Croatia, 2021, § 105, Hanovs v. Latvia, 2024, § 48).\n\nThe authorities'duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence, as well as to investigate the existence of a possible link between a discriminatory motive and the act of violence, can fall under the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention, but may also be seen to form part of the authorities'positive responsibilities under Article 14 of the Convention to secure the fundamental value enshrined in Article 3 without discrimination (ibid., § 91; Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015, §§ 63-64; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania 2016, § 106; Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020, § 36, Genderdoc- M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021, § 34; see also Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021, § 57, and Karter v. Ukraine, 2024, § 77, where the Court proceeded to a simultaneous examination under Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention 1 ). Furthermore, the Court recently reiterated that this duty may also manifest as a positive obligation to ensure the enjoyment of rights enshrined in Article 8 ( Hanovs v. Latvia, 2024, § 38, discussed below, where the Court proceeded to a simultaneous examination under Articles 3 and 8 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention).\n\nThe Court has held that, without a strict approach from the law-enforcement authorities, prejudice-motivated crimes would unavoidably be treated on an equal footing with ordinary cases without such overtones, and the resultant indifference would be tantamount to official acquiescence to, or even connivance with, hate crimes ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015, § 77, with further references, as well as Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, § 106 and Hanovs v. Latvia, 2024, § 46). Thus, according to the Court, treating violence and brutality arising from discriminatory attitudes on an equal footing with violence occurring in cases that have no such overtones would be turning a blind eye to the specific nature of acts that are particularly destructive of fundamental rights. Moreover, a failure to make a distinction in the way situations that are essentially different are handled may constitute unjustified treatment irreconcilable with Article 14 of the Convention ( Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020, § 44, Karter v. Ukraine, 2024, § 76).", + "post_text": "In Hanovs v. Latvia, 2024, the applicant and his partner were verbally and physically assaulted by private individuals in a public space, with the intent of intimidating them from publicly expressing their affection. The Court considered that such an attack, triggered by expressions of affection, constituted an affront to human dignity by targeting universal expressions of love and companionship (§ 42). Such attacks, motivated by displays of affection, profoundly affected the private lives of individuals by compromising their ability to live authentically and compelling them to conceal essential aspects of their private lives to avoid harm (§ 43). Even if the discriminatory motive for the attack was not in doubt, domestic authorities only resorted to administrative-offence proceedings and the perpetrator was neither charged nor prosecuted (§ 51). Consequently, there was a failure by the domestic authorities to provide a robust response to an attack motivated by the applicant's sexual orientation, fostering a sense of impunity for hate-motivated offences rather than affirming a clear and uncompromising stance against such acts (§ 52). This kind of failure to address can normalise hostility towards LGBTIindividuals, perpetuate a culture of intolerance and discrimination and encourage further acts of a similar nature (§ 53). Thus, the Court concluded that the State had failed to provide adequate protection for the applicant's dignity and private life by ensuring the effective prosecution of the attack against him, in breach of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 14.\n\nThe authorities'have a specific duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence. In particular, when the domestic authorities are confronted with prima facie indications of violence motivated or at least influenced by the victim's sexual orientation, this requires the effective application of domestic criminal-law mechanisms capable of elucidating the possible hate motive with homophobic overtones behind the violent incident and of identifying and, if appropriate, adequately punishing those responsible ( Sabalić v. Croatia, 2021, § 105, Hanovs v. Latvia, 2024, § 48).\n\nThe authorities'duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence, as well as to investigate the existence of a possible link between a discriminatory motive and the act of violence, can fall under the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention, but may also be seen to form part of the authorities'positive responsibilities under Article 14 of the Convention to secure the fundamental value enshrined in Article 3 without discrimination (ibid., § 91; Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015, §§ 63-64; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania 2016, § 106; Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020, § 36, Genderdoc- M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021, § 34; see also Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021, § 57, and Karter v. Ukraine, 2024, § 77, where the Court proceeded to a simultaneous examination under Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention 1 ). Furthermore, the Court recently reiterated that this duty may also manifest as a positive obligation to ensure the enjoyment of rights enshrined in Article 8 ( Hanovs v. Latvia, 2024, § 38, discussed below, where the Court proceeded to a simultaneous examination under Articles 3 and 8 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention).\n\nThe Court has held that, without a strict approach from the law-enforcement authorities, prejudice-motivated crimes would unavoidably be treated on an equal footing with ordinary cases without such overtones, and the resultant indifference would be tantamount to official acquiescence to, or even connivance with, hate crimes ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015, § 77, with further references, as well as Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, § 106 and Hanovs v. Latvia, 2024, § 46). Thus, according to the Court, treating violence and brutality arising from discriminatory attitudes on an equal footing with violence occurring in cases that have no such overtones would be turning a blind eye to the specific nature of acts that are particularly destructive of fundamental rights. Moreover, a failure to make a distinction in the way situations that are essentially different are handled may constitute unjustified treatment irreconcilable with Article 14 of the Convention ( Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020, § 44, Karter v. Ukraine, 2024, § 76).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240613074526/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_lgbti_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250612193940/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_lgbti_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/0a61f8f7ceb0/20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -503,6 +533,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:18179/17", "case_name": "Karter v. Ukraine", @@ -536,6 +568,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:33421/16", "case_name": "Klimova and Others v. Russia*", @@ -569,6 +603,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:59180/15", "case_name": "Minasyan and Others v. Armenia*", @@ -587,7 +623,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.B.8|a:164|b:167", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "In Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007, the decisions refusing the applicants' request for permission to hold the demonstrations against homophobia had been given by the municipal authorities on the Mayor's behalf after he had already made public his opinion on the matter. The Court found that his opinions may have affected the decision-making process and consequently infringed in a discriminatory manner the applicants' right to freedom of assembly (ibid., § 100).", - "post_text": "The case of Minasyan and Others v. Armenia *, 2025, concerned an online newspaper article targeting LGBTI rights activists following their public comments challenging a statement of the Armenian Eurovision jury member criticising the victory of a gay cross-dressing man in 2014. The impugned article had been motivated by hostility against LGBTI persons and had attacked applicants because of their activism (§ 54). The author of the article had expressly incited the public to commit harmful discriminatory acts against them (§ 66). The Court found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14, because the domestic courts had failed to recognise the article's hostile tone, intentions and impact on the applicants' Convention rights, as well as the discriminatory nature of the impugned statements. The domestic courts also failed to carry out the requisite balancing of the competing rights in line with the Court's case -law (§§ 69-71). Furthermore, the manner in which the only civil remedy available to the applicants had been interpreted and applied in practice had failed to provide them with protection against hate speech and discrimination (§ 71).", + "post_text": "The case of Minasyan and Others v. Armenia *, 2025, concerned an online newspaper article targeting LGBTIrights activists following their public comments challenging a statement of the Armenian Eurovision jury member criticising the victory of a gay cross-dressing man in 2014. The impugned article had been motivated by hostility against LGBTIpersons and had attacked applicants because of their activism (§ 54). The author of the article had expressly incited the public to commit harmful discriminatory acts against them (§ 66). The Court found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14, because the domestic courts had failed to recognise the article's hostile tone, intentions and impact on the applicants' Convention rights, as well as the discriminatory nature of the impugned statements. The domestic courts also failed to carry out the requisite balancing of the competing rights in line with the Court's case -law (§§ 69-71). Furthermore, the manner in which the only civil remedy available to the applicants had been interpreted and applied in practice had failed to provide them with protection against hate speech and discrimination (§ 71).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240613074526/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_lgbti_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250612193940/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_lgbti_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/0a61f8f7ceb0/20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -602,6 +638,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:46808/16", "case_name": "R.F. and Others v. Germany", @@ -620,7 +658,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.B.2.5|a:None|b:91", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "In R.F. and Others v. Germany, 2024, the domestic authorities refused to register the first applicant as the second biological (as opposed to adoptive) mother of a child conceived through IVF with her egg but carried to term by her registered partner. Nevertheless, the Court found that the applicants' family life had been ensured in that they did not experience any difficulties in living as a family on a daily basis (§§ 69-73). The first applicant's private life had been ensured even though she had to follow the adoption procedure (§§ 75-78). The private life of the child had also been ensured since the adoption had been carried out without particular difficulties and since the first applicant had previously held certain parental prerogatives, albeit derived from her legal union with the second applicant (§§ 91-94). There was therefore no violation of Article 8 of the Convention.", + "post_text": "In R.F. and Others v. Germany, 2024, the domestic authorities refused to register the first applicant as the second biological (as opposed to adoptive) mother of a child conceived through IVFwith her egg but carried to term by her registered partner. Nevertheless, the Court found that the applicants' family life had been ensured in that they did not experience any difficulties in living as a family on a daily basis (§§ 69-73). The first applicant's private life had been ensured even though she had to follow the adoption procedure (§§ 75-78). The private life of the child had also been ensured since the adoption had been carried out without particular difficulties and since the first applicant had previously held certain parental prerogatives, albeit derived from her legal union with the second applicant (§§ 91-94). There was therefore no violation of Article 8 of the Convention.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240613074526/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_lgbti_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250612193940/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_lgbti_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/0a61f8f7ceb0/20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -635,6 +673,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:16206/19", "case_name": "Savinovskikh and Others v. Russia", @@ -652,8 +692,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added|paragraph_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.1|a:43|b:45|II.A.2|a:45|b:47|II.B.2.5|a:None|b:93", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "The notion of family life is an autonomous concept. Consequently, whether or not \"family life\" exists is essentially a question of fact depending upon the real existence in practice of close personal ties. The Court will therefore look at de facto family ties. For example, the Court found that there was family life in the context of a female to male transsexual who had undergone gender reassignment surgery and who had lived with a female, who had given birth to a child by Artificial Insemination by Donor (AID), a procedure the couple had jointly applied for. In those circumstances, the Court de facto X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, considered that family ties linked the three applicants ( 1997, § 37). The relationship between two women who were living together and had entered into a civil partnership, with a child conceived by one of them by means of assisted reproduction but who was being brought up by both of them, also constituted \"family life\" within the meaning of Article 8 of the Gas and Dubois v. France Convention ( (dec.), 2010). The same applied to the relationship with the child of one of them, which they were raising together ( X and O thers v. Austria [GC], 2013, § 96; Boeckel and Gessner-Boeckel v. Germany (dec.), 2013, § 27; S.W. and Others v. Austria (dec.), 2022, § 43). The Court has also considered in this context that the relationship between the non-biological \"parent\" (or \"sibling\") and the child persists even after the break down of the relationship between the couple and continues to constitute family life ( Honner v. France, 2020, § 51; C.E. and Others v. France, 2022, §§ 49-52). More recently, the Court has also found that two applicants, a same-sex couple living in Iceland, who were the intended parents of the third applicant, a child born by way of gestational surrogacy in the United States and having no biological link with either of them constituted family life since they had bonded for over four years (all of the third applicant's life), also via a foster Valdís Fjölnisdóttir and Others care arrangement, and they regarded each other as parents and child ( v. Iceland, 2021, §§ 58-62, see also D.B. and Others v. Switzerland, 2022).\n\nThe Court has examined various cases of interference (negative obligations) with the private and/or family life of LGBTI applicants under Article 8. It held, for example, that the legislation prohibiting homosexual acts committed in private between consenting males constituted a continuing interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life (which included his sexual life - a Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, ; Norris v. Ireland most intimate aspect of private life) ( 1981, § 41, 1998, § 38; Modinos v. Cyprus, 1993, § 24). Similarly, the existence of legislation prohibiting consensual sexual acts between more than two men in private and a consequent conviction for gross indecency also constituted an interference with the right to respect for private life ( A.D.T. v. the United Kingdom, 2000, § 26).", - "post_text": "The notion of family life is an autonomous concept. Consequently, whether or not \"family life\" exists is essentially a question of fact depending upon the real existence in practice of close personal ties. The Court will therefore look at de facto family ties. For example, the Court found that there was family life in the context of a female to male transsexual who had undergone gender reassignment surgery and who had lived with a female, who had given birth to a child by Artificial Insemination by Donor (AID), a procedure the couple had jointly applied for. In those circumstances, the Court considered that de facto family ties linked the three applicants ( X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 37). The relationship between two women who were living together and had entered into a civil partnership, with a child conceived by one of them by means of assisted reproduction but who was being brought up by both of them, also constituted \"family life\" within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention ( Gas and Dubois v. France (dec.), 2010). The same applied to the relationship with the child of one of them, which they were raising together ( X and Others v. Austria [GC], 2013, § 96; Boeckel and Gessner-Boeckel v. Germany (dec.), 2013, § 27; S.W. and Others v. Austria (dec.), 2022, § 43). The Court has also considered in this context that the relationship between the non-biological \"parent\" (or \"sibling\") and the child persists even after the break down of the relationship between the couple and continues to constitute family life ( Honner v. France, 2020, § 51; C.E. and Others v. France, 2022, §§ 49-52). More recently, the Court has also found that two applicants, a same-sex couple living in Iceland, who were the intended parents of the third applicant, a child born by way of gestational surrogacy in the United States and having no biological link with either of them constituted family life since they had bonded for over four years (all of the third applicant's life), also via a foster care arrangement, and they regarded each other as parents and child ( Valdís Fjölnisdóttir and Others v. Iceland, 2021, §§ 58-62, see also D.B. and Others v. Switzerland, 2022). Lastly, the Court held that a relationship between the applicant, a transgender man, and two fostered children placed in his care during many months, had amounted to family life, despite the lack of a biological relationship between them, given the close emotional bond that had developed ( Savinovskikh and Others v. Russia, 2024, § 68).\n\nThe Court has examined various cases of interference (negative obligations) with the private and/or family life of LGBTI applicants under Article 8. It held, for example, that the legislation prohibiting homosexual acts committed in private between consenting males constituted a continuing interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life (which included his sexual life - a most intimate aspect of private life) ( Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 41 ; Norris v. Ireland, 1998, § 38; Modinos v. Cyprus, 1993, § 24). Similarly, the existence of legislation prohibiting consensual sexual acts between more than two men in private and a consequent conviction for gross indecency also constituted an interference with the right to respect for private life ( A.D.T. v. the United Kingdom, 2000, § 26). More recently, the Court has held that refusing to allow a transgender person to continue prescribed hormone therapy after her transfer in a new prison constituted an interference with the applicant's rights to respect for her private life ( W.W. v. Poland, 2024, § 87). A decision to terminate custody and foster care agreement of a transgender person on the basis of his change of gender identity was also found to amount to an interference with the right to respect for family life ( Savinovskikh and Others v. Russia, 2024, § 69).\n\nIn Savinovskikh and Others v. Russia, 2024, the domestic authorities decided to terminate the custody and foster care agreement of a transgender person in respect of two minors on the basis of his \"transsexualism\" and change of gender identity. The Court observed that the decision in question was not supported by any individualised expert examination of the applicant and the children or any scientific study regarding the impact of a change of gender identity on the children's psychological health and development (§ 73). As the reasoning of the domestic courts relied primarily on the legal impossibility of same-sex couples'being accepted as foster parents and on the traditions and mentality of Russian society, the Court found that the domestic authorities failed in their duty to conduct an in-depth examination of the entire family situation and to make a balanced and reasonable assessment of the respective interests of each person with a constant concern for determining what the best solution would be for the children and concluded that there had been a violation of Article 8 (§§ 76 and 78).", + "pre_text": "The notion of family life is an autonomous concept. Consequently, whether or not \"family life\" exists is essentially a question of fact depending upon the real existence in practice of close personal ties. The Court will therefore look at de facto family ties. For example, the Court found that there was family life in the context of a female to male transsexual who had undergone gender reassignment surgery and who had lived with a female, who had given birth to a child by Artificial Insemination by Donor (AID), a procedure the couple had jointly applied for. In those circumstances, the Court de facto X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, considered that family ties linked the three applicants ( 1997, § 37). The relationship between two women who were living together and had entered into a civil partnership, with a child conceived by one of them by means of assisted reproduction but who was being brought up by both of them, also constituted \"family life\" within the meaning of Article 8 of the Gas and Dubois v. France Convention ( (dec.), 2010). The same applied to the relationship with the child of one of them, which they were raising together ( X and Others v. Austria [GC], 2013, § 96; Boeckel and Gessner-Boeckel v. Germany (dec.), 2013, § 27; S.W. and Others v. Austria (dec.), 2022, § 43). The Court has also considered in this context that the relationship between the non-biological \"parent\" (or \"sibling\") and the child persists even after the break down of the relationship between the couple and continues to constitute family life ( Honner v. France, 2020, § 51; C.E. and Others v. France, 2022, §§ 49-52). More recently, the Court has also found that two applicants, a same-sex couple living in Iceland, who were the intended parents of the third applicant, a child born by way of gestational surrogacy in the United States and having no biological link with either of them constituted family life since they had bonded for over four years (all of the third applicant's life), also via a foster Valdís Fjölnisdóttir and Others care arrangement, and they regarded each other as parents and child ( v. Iceland, 2021, §§ 58-62, see also D.B. and Others v. Switzerland, 2022).\n\nThe Court has examined various cases of interference (negative obligations) with the private and/or family life of LGBTIapplicants under Article 8. It held, for example, that the legislation prohibiting homosexual acts committed in private between consenting males constituted a continuing interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life (which included his sexual life - a Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, ; Norris v. Ireland most intimate aspect of private life) ( 1981, § 41, 1998, § 38; Modinos v. Cyprus, 1993, § 24). Similarly, the existence of legislation prohibiting consensual sexual acts between more than two men in private and a consequent conviction for gross indecency also constituted an interference with the right to respect for private life ( A.D.T. v. the United Kingdom, 2000, § 26).", + "post_text": "The notion of family life is an autonomous concept. Consequently, whether or not \"family life\" exists is essentially a question of fact depending upon the real existence in practice of close personal ties. The Court will therefore look at de facto family ties. For example, the Court found that there was family life in the context of a female to male transsexual who had undergone gender reassignment surgery and who had lived with a female, who had given birth to a child by Artificial Insemination by Donor (AID), a procedure the couple had jointly applied for. In those circumstances, the Court considered that de facto family ties linked the three applicants ( X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 37). The relationship between two women who were living together and had entered into a civil partnership, with a child conceived by one of them by means of assisted reproduction but who was being brought up by both of them, also constituted \"family life\" within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention ( Gas and Dubois v. France (dec.), 2010). The same applied to the relationship with the child of one of them, which they were raising together ( X and Others v. Austria [GC], 2013, § 96; Boeckel and Gessner-Boeckel v. Germany (dec.), 2013, § 27; S.W. and Others v. Austria (dec.), 2022, § 43). The Court has also considered in this context that the relationship between the non-biological \"parent\" (or \"sibling\") and the child persists even after the break down of the relationship between the couple and continues to constitute family life ( Honner v. France, 2020, § 51; C.E. and Others v. France, 2022, §§ 49-52). More recently, the Court has also found that two applicants, a same-sex couple living in Iceland, who were the intended parents of the third applicant, a child born by way of gestational surrogacy in the United States and having no biological link with either of them constituted family life since they had bonded for over four years (all of the third applicant's life), also via a foster care arrangement, and they regarded each other as parents and child ( Valdís Fjölnisdóttir and Others v. Iceland, 2021, §§ 58-62, see also D.B. and Others v. Switzerland, 2022). Lastly, the Court held that a relationship between the applicant, a transgender man, and two fostered children placed in his care during many months, had amounted to family life, despite the lack of a biological relationship between them, given the close emotional bond that had developed ( Savinovskikh and Others v. Russia, 2024, § 68).\n\nThe Court has examined various cases of interference (negative obligations) with the private and/or family life of LGBTIapplicants under Article 8. It held, for example, that the legislation prohibiting homosexual acts committed in private between consenting males constituted a continuing interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life (which included his sexual life - a most intimate aspect of private life) ( Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 41 ; Norris v. Ireland, 1998, § 38; Modinos v. Cyprus, 1993, § 24). Similarly, the existence of legislation prohibiting consensual sexual acts between more than two men in private and a consequent conviction for gross indecency also constituted an interference with the right to respect for private life ( A.D.T. v. the United Kingdom, 2000, § 26). More recently, the Court has held that refusing to allow a transgender person to continue prescribed hormone therapy after her transfer in a new prison constituted an interference with the applicant's rights to respect for her private life ( W.W. v. Poland, 2024, § 87). Adecision to terminate custody and foster care agreement of a transgender person on the basis of his change of gender identity was also found to amount to an interference with the right to respect for family life ( Savinovskikh and Others v. Russia, 2024, § 69).\n\nIn Savinovskikh and Others v. Russia, 2024, the domestic authorities decided to terminate the custody and foster care agreement of a transgender person in respect of two minors on the basis of his \"transsexualism\" and change of gender identity. The Court observed that the decision in question was not supported by any individualised expert examination of the applicant and the children or any scientific study regarding the impact of a change of gender identity on the children's psychological health and development (§ 73). As the reasoning of the domestic courts relied primarily on the legal impossibility of same-sex couples'being accepted as foster parents and on the traditions and mentality of Russian society, the Court found that the domestic authorities failed in their duty to conduct an in-depth examination of the entire family situation and to make a balanced and reasonable assessment of the respective interests of each person with a constant concern for determining what the best solution would be for the children and concluded that there had been a violation of Article 8 (§§ 76 and 78).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240613074526/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_lgbti_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250612193940/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_lgbti_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/0a61f8f7ceb0/20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -668,6 +708,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:32678/18", "case_name": "Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia", @@ -686,7 +728,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.A.4|a:None|b:114", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "Principles governing the Contracting States' positive obligations under Article 10 of the Convention were set out in the case of Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia, 2024, §§ 14-15. That case concerned repeated disruptions - telephone bomb threats and other false alarms - of film screenings at an annual international LGBTI film festival. The failure by the authorities for years to secure the safe and uninterrupted conduct of this festival amounted to a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The authorities had been unwilling to assess the disruptions as a whole rather than as a number of isolated incidents, and to take adequate steps to curtail or to put an end to the harassment, thereby inspiring the perpetrators to commit further similar acts and convincing them of their impunity (§§ 18-21).", + "post_text": "Principles governing the Contracting States' positive obligations under Article 10 of the Convention were set out in the case of Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia, 2024, §§ 14-15. That case concerned repeated disruptions - telephone bomb threats and other false alarms - of film screenings at an annual international LGBTIfilm festival. The failure by the authorities for years to secure the safe and uninterrupted conduct of this festival amounted to a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The authorities had been unwilling to assess the disruptions as a whole rather than as a number of isolated incidents, and to take adequate steps to curtail or to put an end to the harassment, thereby inspiring the perpetrators to commit further similar acts and convincing them of their impunity (§§ 18-21).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240613074526/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_lgbti_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250612193940/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_lgbti_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/0a61f8f7ceb0/20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -701,6 +743,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:31842/20", "case_name": "W.W. v. Poland", @@ -718,8 +762,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_updated|citation_added|paragraph_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.1|a:42|b:44|II.A.2|a:45|b:47|II.B.1|a:57|b:59|II.B.1.c|a:None|b:77", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "The Court has held that the concept of \"private life\" is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person, including his or her sexual life X and Y v. the Netherlands (, 1985, § 22). It can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's physical and social identity ( Y.Y v. Turkey, 2015, § 56). Elements such as, for example, gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life fall within the personal sphere protected by Article 8 ( Sousa Goucha v. Portugal, 2016, § 27 ; B. v. France, 1992, § 63 ; Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 41 ; Beizaras and L evickas v. Lithuania, 2020, § 109; Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, 1999, § 71). Article 8 also protects the right to personal development and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world ( Schlumpf v. Switzerland, 2009, § 77).\n\nThe Court has examined various cases of interference (negative obligations) with the private and/or family life of LGBTI applicants under Article 8. It held, for example, that the legislation prohibiting homosexual acts committed in private between consenting males constituted a continuing interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life (which included his sexual life - a Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, ; Norris v. Ireland most intimate aspect of private life) ( 1981, § 41, 1998, § 38; Modinos v. Cyprus, 1993, § 24). Similarly, the existence of legislation prohibiting consensual sexual acts between more than two men in private and a consequent conviction for gross indecency also constituted an interference with the right to respect for private life ( A.D.T. v. the United Kingdom, 2000, § 26).\n\nThe notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of the guarantees of Article 8 of the Convention. This has led the Court to recognise, in the context of the Van application of that provision to transgender persons, that it includes a right to self-determination ( Kück v. Germany, 2003, § 69; Schlumpf v. Switzerlan d, 2009, § 100), of which the freedom to define one's gender identity is one of the most basic essentials ( Van Kück v. Germany, 2003, § 73; Y.Y v. Turkey, 2015, § 102). The right of transgender persons to personal development and to physical and Van Kück v. Germany Schlumpf moral security is thus guaranteed by Article 8 (, 2003, § 69; v. Switzerland, 2009, § 100; Y.Y v. Turke y, 2015, § 58). The right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the Convention applies fully to gender identity, as a component of personal identity. This holds true for all individuals, irrespective of whether an individual has undergone gender reassignment surgery ( A.P., Garçon and Nicot v. France, 2017, §§ 94-95, S.V. v. Italy, 2018, §§ 56-58).", - "post_text": "The Court has held that the concept of \"private life\" is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person, including his or her sexual life ( X and Y v. the Netherlands, 1985, § 22). It can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's physical and social identity ( Y.Y v. Turkey, 2015, § 56). Elements such as, for example, gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life fall within the personal sphere protected by Article 8 ( Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 41; B. v. France, 1992, § 63; Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, 1999, § 71; Sousa Goucha v. Portugal, 2016, § 27 ; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, § 109; A.K. v. Russia, 2024, § 30; W.W. v. Poland, 2024, § 82). Article 8 also protects the right to personal development and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world ( Schlumpf v. Switzerland, 2009, § 77).\n\nThe Court has examined various cases of interference (negative obligations) with the private and/or family life of LGBTI applicants under Article 8. It held, for example, that the legislation prohibiting homosexual acts committed in private between consenting males constituted a continuing interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life (which included his sexual life - a most intimate aspect of private life) ( Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 41 ; Norris v. Ireland, 1998, § 38; Modinos v. Cyprus, 1993, § 24). Similarly, the existence of legislation prohibiting consensual sexual acts between more than two men in private and a consequent conviction for gross indecency also constituted an interference with the right to respect for private life ( A.D.T. v. the United Kingdom, 2000, § 26). More recently, the Court has held that refusing to allow a transgender person to continue prescribed hormone therapy after her transfer in a new prison constituted an interference with the applicant's rights to respect for her private life ( W.W. v. Poland, 2024, § 87). A decision to terminate custody and foster care agreement of a transgender person on the basis of his change of gender identity was also found to amount to an interference with the right to respect for family life ( Savinovskikh and Others v. Russia, 2024, § 69).\n\nThe notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of the guarantees of Article 8 of the Convention. This has led the Court to recognise, in the context of the application of that provision to transgender persons, that it includes a right to self-determination ( Van Kück v. Germany, 2003, § 69; Schlumpf v. Switzerland, 2009, § 100), of which the freedom to define one's gender identity is one of the most basic essentials ( Van Kück v. Germany, 2003, § 73; Y.Y v. Turkey, 2015, § 102, W.W. v. Poland, 2024, § 83). The right of transgender persons to personal development and to physical and moral security is thus guaranteed by Article 8 ( Van Kück v. Germany, 2003, § 69; Schlumpf v. Switzerland, 2009, § 100; Y.Y v. Turkey, 2015, § 58). The right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the Convention applies fully to gender identity, as a component of personal identity ( W.W. v. Poland, 2024, § 82). This holds true for all individuals, irrespective of whether an individual has undergone gender reassignment surgery ( A.P., Garçon and Nicot v. France, 2017, §§ 94-95, S.V. v. Italy, 2018, §§ 56-58).\n\nIn W.W. v. Poland, 2024, the Court considered that a decision, taken by prison authorities, to prevent the applicant from continuing the hormone replacement therapy associated with her gender reassignment, which she had initially been allowed to undergo in facilities where she was previously detained, involved an interference with her right to respect for private life (§ 87). This decision touched upon the applicant's freedom to define her gender identity, one of the most basic essentials of self-determination. Given the numerous and painful interventions involved in gender reassignment and the level of commitment and conviction required to achieve a change in social gender role, it could not be suggested that there was anything arbitrary or capricious in the decision taken by a person to undergo such a procedure (§ 91). The Court observed that the prescribed hormone treatment had beneficial effects on the applicant's physical and mental health and that it had been an appropriate medical treatment in her case (§ 93). Furthermore, the Court noted that allowing the applicant to continue the therapy would not have caused any technical or financial difficulties for the prison authorities, as the applicant bore the cost of the medications (§ 94). Bearing in mind the applicant's particular vulnerability as an imprisoned transgender person undergoing a gender reassignment procedure requiring enhanced protection, the Court concluded that the authorities had failed to strike a fair balance between competing interests at stake (§ 96).", + "pre_text": "The Court has held that the concept of \"private life\" is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person, including his or her sexual life X and Y v. the Netherlands (, 1985, § 22). It can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's physical and social identity ( Y.Y v. Turkey, 2015, § 56). Elements such as, for example, gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life fall within the personal sphere protected by Article 8 ( Sousa Goucha v. Portugal, 2016, § 27 ; B. v. France, 1992, § 63 ; Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 41 ; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, § 109; Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, 1999, § 71). Article 8 also protects the right to personal development and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world ( Schlumpf v. Switzerland, 2009, § 77).\n\nThe Court has examined various cases of interference (negative obligations) with the private and/or family life of LGBTIapplicants under Article 8. It held, for example, that the legislation prohibiting homosexual acts committed in private between consenting males constituted a continuing interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life (which included his sexual life - a Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, ; Norris v. Ireland most intimate aspect of private life) ( 1981, § 41, 1998, § 38; Modinos v. Cyprus, 1993, § 24). Similarly, the existence of legislation prohibiting consensual sexual acts between more than two men in private and a consequent conviction for gross indecency also constituted an interference with the right to respect for private life ( A.D.T. v. the United Kingdom, 2000, § 26).\n\nThe notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of the guarantees of Article 8 of the Convention. This has led the Court to recognise, in the context of the Van application of that provision to transgender persons, that it includes a right to self-determination ( Kück v. Germany, 2003, § 69; Schlumpf v. Switzerlan d, 2009, § 100), of which the freedom to define one's gender identity is one of the most basic essentials ( Van Kück v. Germany, 2003, § 73; Y.Y v. Turkey, 2015, § 102). The right of transgender persons to personal development and to physical and Van Kück v. Germany Schlumpf moral security is thus guaranteed by Article 8 (, 2003, § 69; v. Switzerland, 2009, § 100; Y.Y v. Turke y, 2015, § 58). The right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the Convention applies fully to gender identity, as a component of personal identity. This holds true for all individuals, irrespective of whether an individual has undergone gender reassignment surgery ( A.P., Garçon and Nicot v. France, 2017, §§ 94-95, S.V. v. Italy, 2018, §§ 56-58).", + "post_text": "The Court has held that the concept of \"private life\" is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person, including his or her sexual life ( X and Y v. the Netherlands, 1985, § 22). It can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's physical and social identity ( Y.Y v. Turkey, 2015, § 56). Elements such as, for example, gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life fall within the personal sphere protected by Article 8 ( Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 41; B. v. France, 1992, § 63; Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, 1999, § 71; Sousa Goucha v. Portugal, 2016, § 27 ; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, § 109; A.K. v. Russia, 2024, § 30; W.W. v. Poland, 2024, § 82). Article 8 also protects the right to personal development and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world ( Schlumpf v. Switzerland, 2009, § 77).\n\nThe Court has examined various cases of interference (negative obligations) with the private and/or family life of LGBTIapplicants under Article 8. It held, for example, that the legislation prohibiting homosexual acts committed in private between consenting males constituted a continuing interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life (which included his sexual life - a most intimate aspect of private life) ( Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 41 ; Norris v. Ireland, 1998, § 38; Modinos v. Cyprus, 1993, § 24). Similarly, the existence of legislation prohibiting consensual sexual acts between more than two men in private and a consequent conviction for gross indecency also constituted an interference with the right to respect for private life ( A.D.T. v. the United Kingdom, 2000, § 26). More recently, the Court has held that refusing to allow a transgender person to continue prescribed hormone therapy after her transfer in a new prison constituted an interference with the applicant's rights to respect for her private life ( W.W. v. Poland, 2024, § 87). Adecision to terminate custody and foster care agreement of a transgender person on the basis of his change of gender identity was also found to amount to an interference with the right to respect for family life ( Savinovskikh and Others v. Russia, 2024, § 69).\n\nThe notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of the guarantees of Article 8 of the Convention. This has led the Court to recognise, in the context of the application of that provision to transgender persons, that it includes a right to self-determination ( Van Kück v. Germany, 2003, § 69; Schlumpf v. Switzerland, 2009, § 100), of which the freedom to define one's gender identity is one of the most basic essentials ( Van Kück v. Germany, 2003, § 73; Y.Y v. Turkey, 2015, § 102, W.W. v. Poland, 2024, § 83). The right of transgender persons to personal development and to physical and moral security is thus guaranteed by Article 8 ( Van Kück v. Germany, 2003, § 69; Schlumpf v. Switzerland, 2009, § 100; Y.Y v. Turkey, 2015, § 58). The right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the Convention applies fully to gender identity, as a component of personal identity ( W.W. v. Poland, 2024, § 82). This holds true for all individuals, irrespective of whether an individual has undergone gender reassignment surgery ( A.P., Garçon and Nicot v. France, 2017, §§ 94-95, S.V. v. Italy, 2018, §§ 56-58).\n\nIn W.W. v. Poland, 2024, the Court considered that a decision, taken by prison authorities, to prevent the applicant from continuing the hormone replacement therapy associated with her gender reassignment, which she had initially been allowed to undergo in facilities where she was previously detained, involved an interference with her right to respect for private life (§ 87). This decision touched upon the applicant's freedom to define her gender identity, one of the most basic essentials of self-determination. Given the numerous and painful interventions involved in gender reassignment and the level of commitment and conviction required to achieve a change in social gender role, it could not be suggested that there was anything arbitrary or capricious in the decision taken by a person to undergo such a procedure (§ 91). The Court observed that the prescribed hormone treatment had beneficial effects on the applicant's physical and mental health and that it had been an appropriate medical treatment in her case (§ 93). Furthermore, the Court noted that allowing the applicant to continue the therapy would not have caused any technical or financial difficulties for the prison authorities, as the applicant bore the cost of the medications (§ 94). Bearing in mind the applicant's particular vulnerability as an imprisoned transgender person undergoing a gender reassignment procedure requiring enhanced protection, the Court concluded that the authorities had failed to strike a fair balance between competing interests at stake (§ 96).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240613074526/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_lgbti_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250612193940/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_lgbti_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/0a61f8f7ceb0/20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -734,6 +778,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:226/18", "case_name": "Yevstifeyev and Others v. Russia", @@ -745,14 +791,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF YEVSTIFEYEV AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 2, + "linked_sections": "I.C: The specific duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence and investigate discriminatory motives|IV.B.8: Positive obligations under Article 14", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.C|a:None|b:27|IV.B.8|a:None|b:171", + "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "In Yevstifeyev and Others v. Russia, 2024, the domestic authorities had failed to comply with their positive obligation to adequately respond to homophobic physical threats and verbal assault, by a politician against the first three applicants at a rally, in violation of Article 14 combined with Article 8 of the Convention (§§ 69-77).\n\nIn Yevstifeyev and Others v. Russia *, 2024, a video, created and published on social networks by a well-known comic actor and television presenter, had been put online shortly before a national vote on Constitutional amendments and had clearly been a parody of another video calling on the public to vote for them. It was found to be a provocative political satire on a matter of public interest contributing to a political debate which, taken as a whole and in context, could not reasonably have appeared to have had as its purpose the propagation of homophobic views and ideas. It had not therefore reached the \"threshold of severity\" required to affect the \"private life\" of individual members of the LGBTIcommunity. The applicant could not therefore be considered a victim of the alleged violations of Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention (§§ 49-60).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240613074526/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_lgbti_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250612193940/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_lgbti_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/0a61f8f7ceb0/20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -767,6 +813,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-08-07", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0bd62693ae9f/diff_2023-09-23__2024-08-07.json", "case_key": "apps:58811/18", "case_name": "Güngen v. Türkiye (dec.)", @@ -800,6 +848,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-08-07", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0bd62693ae9f/diff_2023-09-23__2024-08-07.json", "case_key": "apps:68958/17", "case_name": "Myslihaka and Others v. Albania", @@ -818,7 +868,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.B|a:None|b:29", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "In Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3) [GC], 2012, however, the Court examined a voting ban which applied only to persons convicted of certain well-determined offences or to a custodial sentence exceeding a statutory threshold. The legislature had been careful to adjust the duration of this measure according to the specific features of each case. It had also adjusted the duration of the ban depending on the sentence imposed and therefore, indirectly, on the gravity of the sentence. Many of the convicted prisoners had retained the possibility of voting in legislative elections. In addition, this system had been complemented by the possibility for convicts affected by a permanent ban to recover their voting rights. The Italian system was not therefore marked by excessive rigidity. The Court thus held that there had been no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. A similar situation arose in Myslihaka and Others v. Albania, 2023, where serving prisoners convicted of serious criminal offences were banned from voting in the 2017 parliamentary elections. The restriction of the prisoners' right to vote was found to be proportionate because it had been conditional on the nature and the gravity of the offences.", + "post_text": "In Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3) [GC], 2012, however, the Court examined a voting ban which applied only to persons convicted of certain well-determined offences or to a custodial sentence exceeding a statutory threshold. The legislature had been careful to adjust the duration of this measure according to the specific features of each case. It had also adjusted the duration of the ban depending on the sentence imposed and therefore, indirectly, on the gravity of the sentence. Many of the convicted prisoners had retained the possibility of voting in legislative elections. In addition, this system had been complemented by the possibility for convicts affected by a permanent ban to recover their voting rights. The Italian system was not therefore marked by excessive rigidity. The Court thus held that there had been no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. Asimilar situation arose in Myslihaka and Others v. Albania, 2023, where serving prisoners convicted of serious criminal offences were banned from voting in the 2017 parliamentary elections. The restriction of the prisoners' right to vote was found to be proportionate because it had been conditional on the nature and the gravity of the offences.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923144330/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_3_protocol_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240807014915/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_3_protocol_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/0bd62693ae9f/20230923144330__guide_art_3_protocol_1_eng.pdf", @@ -833,6 +883,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-10-30", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0bd62693ae9f/diff_2024-08-07__2024-10-30.json", "case_key": "apps:24159/22|25751/22", "case_name": "Guðmundur Gunnarsson and Magnús Davíð Norðdahl v. Iceland", @@ -866,6 +918,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-10-30", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0bd62693ae9f/diff_2024-08-07__2024-10-30.json", "case_key": "apps:55159/16", "case_name": "Kokëdhima v. Albania", @@ -899,9 +953,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-10-30", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0bd62693ae9f/diff_2024-08-07__2024-10-30.json", "case_key": "apps:42221/18", - "case_name": "Ždanoka v. Latvia (no. 2),* no. 42221/18", + "case_name": "Ždanoka v. Latvia (no. 2)", "application_numbers": "42221/18", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -910,14 +966,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF ŽDANOKA v. LATVIA (No. 2)", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "III.B: Importance of context", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.B|a:None|b:66", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "Ždanoka v. Latvia (no. 2), 2024* follows-up on the Grand Chamber judgment of Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], 2006, (referenced in paragraph 64 above). In 2018, following a request by the applicant for a review of the constitutionality of the provision restricting the right to stand for election of persons who had actively participated in the CPLafter 13 January 1991, the Constitutional Court confirmed its constitutionality but narrowed the restriction to those active participants who \"[had] endangered and still continued to endanger the independence of the Latvian State and the principles of a democratic State governed by the rule of law\". In that year' s parliamentary elections, the applicant's name was removed from the list of candidates after the Central Electoral Commission had found that the restriction, as interpreted by the Constitutional Court, applied in her situation. At the outset, the Court emphasised the context: Latvia was a neighbour of Russia, a State that had recently invaded and controlled parts of Georgia and Ukraine in \"a clearly discernible trend of events\" subsequent to the 2006 Grand Chamber judgment. While the Latvian parliament had rejected proposals to lift the restriction on three occasions and while in other circumstances the Court might consider this limited action as unjustified and capable of tipping the balance in favour of finding a violation, it could not reach such a conclusion in the specific and sensitive context of the case, given that the \" greater stability\" enjoyed by Latvia (and Europe in general), and referred to by the Grand Chamber in the 2006 judgment, no longer existed. Since that judgment Latvia increasingly had legitimate reasons to fear for its security, territorial integrity and democratic order, and the restriction therefore had to be assessed in the light of the wider margin of appreciation to be afforded to it in this matter. The Constitutional Court's interpretation of the impugned restriction was, in view of the developments, within its interpretative authority and not arbitrary or unreasonable, while the subsequent proceedings before the electoral commission and the appellate court on the application of the impugned restriction and the applicant's disqualification afforded her sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240807014915/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_3_protocol_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20241030214015/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_3_protocol_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/0bd62693ae9f/20240807014915__guide_art_3_protocol_1_eng.pdf", @@ -932,6 +988,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-20", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0bd62693ae9f/diff_2024-10-30__2025-12-20.json", "case_key": "apps:15653/22", "case_name": "Bradshaw and Others v. the United Kingdom", @@ -965,6 +1023,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-20", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0bd62693ae9f/diff_2024-10-30__2025-12-20.json", "case_key": "apps:29780/20|33702/20|48537/20", "case_name": "Costa i Rosselló and Others v. Spain (dec.)", @@ -998,6 +1058,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-20", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0bd62693ae9f/diff_2024-10-30__2025-12-20.json", "case_key": "apps:44131/18", "case_name": "Golikov and Others v. Russia [Committee]", @@ -1031,6 +1093,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-20", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0bd62693ae9f/diff_2024-10-30__2025-12-20.json", "case_key": "apps:32648/22", "case_name": "Shlosberg v. Russia", @@ -1064,6 +1128,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-20", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0bd62693ae9f/diff_2024-10-30__2025-12-20.json", "case_key": "apps:79340/16", "case_name": "Tomenko v. Ukraine", @@ -1097,6 +1163,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:6180/15", "case_name": "Ayyubzade v. Azerbaijan", @@ -1114,8 +1182,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.D|a:25|b:26|II.E|a:27|b:28", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Allegations of improper motives or ulterior purposes underlying restrictions of Convention rights are sometimes raised and examined under substantive provisions of the Convention. ▪ Article 5 § 1: If there is some manifest irregularity which, seen in context, shows that a deprivation of liberty was chiefly meant for an ulterior purpose, the Court finds an absence of a legitimate ground for the deprivation of liberty and accordingly a breach of Article 5 § 1. Such was the case where:  the applicants were detained on vague or fabricated charges or their detention was extended in order to prevent or punish their participation in rallies ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, §§ 52-57; Hakobyan and Others v. Armenia, 2012, § 123; Nemtsov v. Russia, 2014, § 103; Gafgaz Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2015, §§ 107-108; Kasparov v. Russia, 2016, §§ 50-56; Huseynli and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2016, §§ 146-147; Ibrahimov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2016, §§ 126-127; Navalnyy and Yashin v. Russia, 2014, §§ 92-95);  the authorities manipulated procedures to delay having to obtain judicial authorisation for the detention, as required under domestic law ( Oleksiy Mykhaylovych Zakharkin v. Ukraine, 2010, §§ 86-88), or in order to proceed with a disguised extradition ( Bozano v. France, 1986, §§ 59-60; Nowak v. Ukraine, 2011, § 58; Azimov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 163 and 165; Eshonkulov v. Russia, 2015, § 65);  the applicant was illegally abducted and surrendered to another State ( Iskandarov v. Russia, 2010, §§ 109-115 and 148-151);  the authorities summoned asylum-seekers to complete their asylum request, thereby seeking to gain their trust with a view to arresting and subsequently deporting them ( Čonka v. Belgium, 2002, § 41);  citizens of another State were indiscriminately arrested with a view to being deported en masse as a measure of reprisal ( Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], 2014, §§ 185-186);  the applicant was arrested and detained with a view to acquiring leverage over the criminal proceedings against his brother ( Giorgi Nikolaishvili v. Georgia, 2009, § 57);  the applicant was apprehended as a witness - although the investigator's real intent was to charge him as a defendant - in order to change the venue of the detention proceedings to a more convenient one ( Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 142). ▪ Article 6: In Jordan v. the United Kingdom, 2004, criminal proceedings against the applicant were stayed on health grounds, providing, inter alia, that he did not engage in any activities either political, social or personal, which would demonstrate that he was in fact able to stand trial irrespective of his medical condition. The Court examined whether this condition was an instance of a prohibition on political activity \"in return\" f or the dropping of criminal charges. In Nikëhasani v. Albania, 2022, the Court examined various complaints of a prosecutor who had been dismissed due to serious doubts as to her financial propriety based on findings of a vetting process. The Court, in particular, rejected her allegation that the manner in which the vetting proceedings had been conducted pursued an ulterior purpose of persecuting her for, essentially, her husband's political views or activities (§ 77). ▪ Article 10: In NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], 2022, the Court examined, inter alia, whether the revocation of the broadcasting licence of a TV channel after a breach of the statutory requirement of political pluralism had sought to hinder it from expressing critical views of the government, or had pursued any other ulterior purpose (§ 222). ▪ Article 11: In The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden - PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 2), 2011, the Court examined whether a refusal to register the applicant party sought to penalise it on account of the views or policies it promoted (§§ 85-89). ▪ Article 14 in conjunction with Article 11: In Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007, the Court examined whether the refusal to allow a protest march against homophobia was influenced by the mayor's publicly expressed homophobic opinions (§§ 97 and 100).\n\nWhere the parties'submissions under Article 18 are essentially the same as their arguments regarding the alleged interference with the applicant's rights under the relevant substantive provisions of the Convention, the Court has no grounds to conclude that the complaint under Article 18 represents a fundamental aspect of the case ( Razvozzhayev v. Russia and Ukraine and Udaltsov v. Russia, 2019, § 305). Thus, before embarking on the analysis of a complaint under Article 18, the Court will first ascertain whether the crux of it has been already examined under the relevant substantive provision ( Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 204; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), 2020, § 622; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 401; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 103; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 317). Where this has been the case, the Court will generally consider that the complaint under Article 18 does not raise any separate issue ( Navalnyy and Gunko v. Russia, 2020, §§ 96-98; Staykov v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 120-121). The Court may also prefer such a course of action even after having established, in another case brought by the same applicant, a pattern of misuse of power indicative of personal targeting of the applicant concerned ( Navalnyy and Others v. Russia, 2022, § 18). Alternatively, the Court may find no violation of this provision ( Udaltsov v. Russia, 2020, §§ 195-196).", - "post_text": "Allegations of improper motives or ulterior purposes underlying restrictions of Convention rights are sometimes raised and examined under substantive provisions of the Convention. ▪ Article 5 § 1: If there is some manifest irregularity which, seen in context, shows that a deprivation of liberty was chiefly meant for an ulterior purpose, the Court finds an absence of a legitimate ground for the deprivation of liberty and accordingly a breach of Article 5 § 1. Such was the case where:  the applicants were detained on vague or fabricated charges or their detention was extended in order to prevent or punish their participation in rallies ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, §§ 52-57; Hakobyan and Others v. Armenia, 2012, § 123; Nemtsov v. Russia, 2014, § 103; Gafgaz Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2015, §§ 107-108; Kasparov v. Russia, 2016, §§ 50-56; Huseynli and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2016, §§ 146-147; Ibrahimov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2016, §§ 126-127; Navalnyy and Yashin v. Russia, 2014, §§ 92-95);  the authorities manipulated procedures to delay having to obtain judicial authorisation for the detention, as required under domestic law ( Oleksiy Mykhaylovych Zakharkin v. Ukraine, 2010, §§ 86-88), or in order to proceed with a disguised extradition ( Bozano v. France, 1986, §§ 59-60; Nowak v. Ukraine, 2011, § 58; Azimov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 163 and 165; Eshonkulov v. Russia, 2015, § 65);  the applicant was illegally abducted and surrendered to another State ( Iskandarov v. Russia, 2010, §§ 109-115 and 148-151);  the authorities summoned asylum-seekers to complete their asylum request, thereby seeking to gain their trust with a view to arresting and subsequently deporting them ( Čonka v. Belgium, 2002, § 41);  citizens of another State were indiscriminately arrested with a view to being deported en masse as a measure of reprisal ( Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], 2014, §§ 185-186);  the applicant was arrested and detained with a view to acquiring leverage over the criminal proceedings against his brother ( Giorgi Nikolaishvili v. Georgia, 2009, § 57);  the applicant was apprehended as a witness - although the investigator's real intent was to charge him as a defendant - in order to change the venue of the detention proceedings to a more convenient one ( Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 142);  the criminal proceedings against the applicant followed the same pattern of misuse of power as the proceedings against other government critics and civil society activists, which the Court had previously found to be in breach of Article 18; the Court relied on this consideration to conclude that the applicant had not been deprived of his liberty on a \"reasonable suspicion\" of having committed a crimin al offence, within the meaning of Article 5 § 1(c) ( Ayyubzade v. Azerbaijan, 2023, §§ 48-54). ▪ Article 6: In Jordan v. the United Kingdom, 2004, criminal proceedings against the applicant were stayed on health grounds, providing, inter alia, that he did not engage in any activities either political, social or personal, which would demonstrate that he was in fact able to stand trial irrespective of his medical condition. The Court examined whether this condition was an instance of a prohibition on political activity \"in return\" for the dropping of criminal charges. In Nikëhasani v. Albania, 2022, the Court examined various complaints of a prosecutor who had been dismissed due to serious doubts as to her financial propriety based on findings of a vetting process. The Court, in particular, rejected her allegation that the manner in which the vetting proceedings had been conducted pursued an ulterior purpose of persecuting her for, essentially, her husband's political views or activities (§ 77). ▪ Article 10: In NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], 2022, the Court examined, inter alia, whether the revocation of the broadcasting licence of a TV channel after a breach of the statutory requirement of political pluralism had sought to hinder it from expressing critical views of the government, or had pursued any other ulterior purpose (§ 222). ▪ Article 11: In The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden - PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 2), 2011, the Court examined whether a refusal to register the applicant party sought to penalise it on account of the views or policies it promoted (§§ 85-89). ▪ Article 14 in conjunction with Article 11: In Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007, the Court examined whether the refusal to allow a protest march against homophobia was influenced by the mayor's publicly expressed homophobic opinions (§§ 97 and 100).\n\nWhere the parties'submissions under Article 18 are essentially the same as their arguments regarding the alleged interference with the applicant's rights under the relevant substantive provisions of the Convention, the Court has no grounds to conclude that the complaint under Article 18 represents a fundamental aspect of the case ( Razvozzhayev v. Russia and Ukraine and Udaltsov v. Russia, 2019, § 305). Thus, before embarking on the analysis of a complaint under Article 18, the Court will first ascertain whether the crux of it has been already examined under the relevant substantive provision ( Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 204; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), 2020, § 622; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 401; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 103; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 317). Where this has been the case, the Court will generally consider that the complaint under Article 18 does not raise any separate issue ( Navalnyy and Gunko v. Russia, 2020, §§ 96-98; Staykov v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 120-121). The Court may also prefer such a course of action even after having established, in another case brought by the same applicant, a pattern of misuse of power indicative of personal targeting of the applicant concerned ( Navalnyy and Others v. Russia, 2022, § 18). The Court may also find no separate issue under Article 18 after having established, in its finding under the relevant substantive provision, that the applicant's case followed the same pattern of misuse of power as identified in the Court's previous judgments against the State concerned ( Ayyubzade v. Azerbaijan, 2023, § 60). Alternatively, the Court may find no violation of Article 18 ( Udaltsov v. Russia, 2020, §§ 195-196).", + "pre_text": "Allegations of improper motives or ulterior purposes underlying restrictions of Convention rights are sometimes raised and examined under substantive provisions of the Convention. ▪ Article 5 § 1: If there is some manifest irregularity which, seen in context, shows that a deprivation of liberty was chiefly meant for an ulterior purpose, the Court finds an absence of a legitimate ground for the deprivation of liberty and accordingly a breach of Article 5 § 1. Such was the case where:  the applicants were detained on vague or fabricated charges or their detention was extended in order to prevent or punish their participation in rallies ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, §§ 52-57; Hakobyan and Others v. Armenia, 2012, § 123; Nemtsov v. Russia, 2014, § 103; Gafgaz Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2015, §§ 107-108; Kasparov v. Russia, 2016, §§ 50-56; Huseynli and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2016, §§ 146-147; Ibrahimov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2016, §§ 126-127; Navalnyy and Yashin v. Russia, 2014, §§ 92-95);  the authorities manipulated procedures to delay having to obtain judicial authorisation for the detention, as required under domestic law ( Oleksiy Mykhaylovych Zakharkin v. Ukraine, 2010, §§ 86-88), or in order to proceed with a disguised extradition ( Bozano v. France, 1986, §§ 59-60; Nowak v. Ukraine, 2011, § 58; Azimov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 163 and 165; Eshonkulov v. Russia, 2015, § 65);  the applicant was illegally abducted and surrendered to another State ( Iskandarov v. Russia, 2010, §§ 109-115 and 148-151);  the authorities summoned asylum-seekers to complete their asylum request, thereby seeking to gain their trust with a view to arresting and subsequently deporting them ( Čonka v. Belgium, 2002, § 41);  citizens of another State were indiscriminately arrested with a view to being deported en masse as a measure of reprisal ( Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], 2014, §§ 185-186);  the applicant was arrested and detained with a view to acquiring leverage over the criminal proceedings against his brother ( Giorgi Nikolaishvili v. Georgia, 2009, § 57);  the applicant was apprehended as a witness - although the investigator's real intent was to charge him as a defendant - in order to change the venue of the detention proceedings to a more convenient one ( Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 142). ▪ Article 6: In Jordan v. the United Kingdom, 2004, criminal proceedings against the applicant were stayed on health grounds, providing, inter alia, that he did not engage in any activities either political, social or personal, which would demonstrate that he was in fact able to stand trial irrespective of his medical condition. The Court examined whether this condition was an instance of a prohibition on political activity \"in return\" f or the dropping of criminal charges. In Nikëhasani v. Albania, 2022, the Court examined various complaints of a prosecutor who had been dismissed due to serious doubts as to her financial propriety based on findings of a vetting process. The Court, in particular, rejected her allegation that the manner in which the vetting proceedings had been conducted pursued an ulterior purpose of persecuting her for, essentially, her husband's political views or activities (§ 77). ▪ Article 10: In NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], 2022, the Court examined, inter alia, whether the revocation of the broadcasting licence of a TVchannel after a breach of the statutory requirement of political pluralism had sought to hinder it from expressing critical views of the government, or had pursued any other ulterior purpose (§ 222). ▪ Article 11: In The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden - PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 2), 2011, the Court examined whether a refusal to register the applicant party sought to penalise it on account of the views or policies it promoted (§§ 85-89). ▪ Article 14 in conjunction with Article 11: In Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007, the Court examined whether the refusal to allow a protest march against homophobia was influenced by the mayor's publicly expressed homophobic opinions (§§ 97 and 100).\n\nWhere the parties'submissions under Article 18 are essentially the same as their arguments regarding the alleged interference with the applicant's rights under the relevant substantive provisions of the Convention, the Court has no grounds to conclude that the complaint under Article 18 represents a fundamental aspect of the case ( Razvozzhayev v. Russia and Ukraine and Udaltsov v. Russia, 2019, § 305). Thus, before embarking on the analysis of a complaint under Article 18, the Court will first ascertain whether the crux of it has been already examined under the relevant substantive provision ( Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 204; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), 2020, § 622; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 401; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 103; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 317). Where this has been the case, the Court will generally consider that the complaint under Article 18 does not raise any separate issue ( Navalnyy and Gunko v. Russia, 2020, §§ 96-98; Staykov v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 120-121). The Court may also prefer such a course of action even after having established, in another case brought by the same applicant, a pattern of misuse of power indicative of personal targeting of the applicant concerned ( Navalnyy and Others v. Russia, 2022, § 18). Alternatively, the Court may find no violation of this provision ( Udaltsov v. Russia, 2020, §§ 195-196).", + "post_text": "Allegations of improper motives or ulterior purposes underlying restrictions of Convention rights are sometimes raised and examined under substantive provisions of the Convention. ▪ Article 5 § 1: If there is some manifest irregularity which, seen in context, shows that a deprivation of liberty was chiefly meant for an ulterior purpose, the Court finds an absence of a legitimate ground for the deprivation of liberty and accordingly a breach of Article 5 § 1. Such was the case where:  the applicants were detained on vague or fabricated charges or their detention was extended in order to prevent or punish their participation in rallies ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, §§ 52-57; Hakobyan and Others v. Armenia, 2012, § 123; Nemtsov v. Russia, 2014, § 103; Gafgaz Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2015, §§ 107-108; Kasparov v. Russia, 2016, §§ 50-56; Huseynli and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2016, §§ 146-147; Ibrahimov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2016, §§ 126-127; Navalnyy and Yashin v. Russia, 2014, §§ 92-95);  the authorities manipulated procedures to delay having to obtain judicial authorisation for the detention, as required under domestic law ( Oleksiy Mykhaylovych Zakharkin v. Ukraine, 2010, §§ 86-88), or in order to proceed with a disguised extradition ( Bozano v. France, 1986, §§ 59-60; Nowak v. Ukraine, 2011, § 58; Azimov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 163 and 165; Eshonkulov v. Russia, 2015, § 65);  the applicant was illegally abducted and surrendered to another State ( Iskandarov v. Russia, 2010, §§ 109-115 and 148-151);  the authorities summoned asylum-seekers to complete their asylum request, thereby seeking to gain their trust with a view to arresting and subsequently deporting them ( Čonka v. Belgium, 2002, § 41);  citizens of another State were indiscriminately arrested with a view to being deported en masse as a measure of reprisal ( Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], 2014, §§ 185-186);  the applicant was arrested and detained with a view to acquiring leverage over the criminal proceedings against his brother ( Giorgi Nikolaishvili v. Georgia, 2009, § 57);  the applicant was apprehended as a witness - although the investigator's real intent was to charge him as a defendant - in order to change the venue of the detention proceedings to a more convenient one ( Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 142);  the criminal proceedings against the applicant followed the same pattern of misuse of power as the proceedings against other government critics and civil society activists, which the Court had previously found to be in breach of Article 18; the Court relied on this consideration to conclude that the applicant had not been deprived of his liberty on a \"reasonable suspicion\" of having committed a crimin al offence, within the meaning of Article 5 § 1(c) ( Ayyubzade v. Azerbaijan, 2023, §§ 48-54). ▪ Article 6: In Jordan v. the United Kingdom, 2004, criminal proceedings against the applicant were stayed on health grounds, providing, inter alia, that he did not engage in any activities either political, social or personal, which would demonstrate that he was in fact able to stand trial irrespective of his medical condition. The Court examined whether this condition was an instance of a prohibition on political activity \"in return\" for the dropping of criminal charges. In Nikëhasani v. Albania, 2022, the Court examined various complaints of a prosecutor who had been dismissed due to serious doubts as to her financial propriety based on findings of a vetting process. The Court, in particular, rejected her allegation that the manner in which the vetting proceedings had been conducted pursued an ulterior purpose of persecuting her for, essentially, her husband's political views or activities (§ 77). ▪ Article 10: In NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], 2022, the Court examined, inter alia, whether the revocation of the broadcasting licence of a TVchannel after a breach of the statutory requirement of political pluralism had sought to hinder it from expressing critical views of the government, or had pursued any other ulterior purpose (§ 222). ▪ Article 11: In The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden - PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 2), 2011, the Court examined whether a refusal to register the applicant party sought to penalise it on account of the views or policies it promoted (§§ 85-89). ▪ Article 14 in conjunction with Article 11: In Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007, the Court examined whether the refusal to allow a protest march against homophobia was influenced by the mayor's publicly expressed homophobic opinions (§§ 97 and 100).\n\nWhere the parties'submissions under Article 18 are essentially the same as their arguments regarding the alleged interference with the applicant's rights under the relevant substantive provisions of the Convention, the Court has no grounds to conclude that the complaint under Article 18 represents a fundamental aspect of the case ( Razvozzhayev v. Russia and Ukraine and Udaltsov v. Russia, 2019, § 305). Thus, before embarking on the analysis of a complaint under Article 18, the Court will first ascertain whether the crux of it has been already examined under the relevant substantive provision ( Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 204; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), 2020, § 622; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 401; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 103; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 317). Where this has been the case, the Court will generally consider that the complaint under Article 18 does not raise any separate issue ( Navalnyy and Gunko v. Russia, 2020, §§ 96-98; Staykov v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 120-121). The Court may also prefer such a course of action even after having established, in another case brought by the same applicant, a pattern of misuse of power indicative of personal targeting of the applicant concerned ( Navalnyy and Others v. Russia, 2022, § 18). The Court may also find no separate issue under Article 18 after having established, in its finding under the relevant substantive provision, that the applicant's case followed the same pattern of misuse of power as identified in the Court's previous judgments against the State concerned ( Ayyubzade v. Azerbaijan, 2023, § 60). Alternatively, the Court may find no violation of Article 18 ( Udaltsov v. Russia, 2020, §§ 195-196).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923100034/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_18_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217124840/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_18_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/0faa41c7c031/20230923100034__guide_art_18_eng.pdf", @@ -1130,6 +1198,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:39611/18", "case_name": "Georgia v. Russia (IV) (dec.)", @@ -1163,6 +1233,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:54003/20", "case_name": "Kogan and Others v. Russia", @@ -1180,8 +1252,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added|paragraph_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A|a:12|b:13|II.B|a:16|b:17|II.C|a:20|b:21|II.C|a:24|b:25|II.E|a:26|b:27|III.A|a:35|b:36|III.B.§4|a:40|b:41|III.D.§4|a:None|b:89|IV.A|a:98|b:100|IV.A|a:99|b:101|IV.A|a:103|b:105|IV.C|a:None|b:121|IV.C|a:118|b:120|IV.D.a|a:None|b:144", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "In a similar way to Article 14, Article 18 of the Convention has no independent existence; it can only be applied in conjunction with an Article of the Convention or the Protocols thereto which sets out or qualifies the rights and freedoms that the High Contracting Parties have undertaken to secure to those under their jurisdiction ( Kamma v. the Netherlands, Commission's report, 1974, p. 9; Gusinskiy v. Russia, § 73; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 49; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, § 663; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 105; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 294; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 137; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 153; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 113; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 93; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 116; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 198; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 164; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 84; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 421; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 191; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 306).\n\nA violation of Article 18 can only arise where the right or freedom which has been interfered with is subject to restrictions permitted under the Convention ( Kamma v. the Netherlands, Commission's report, 1974, p. 9; Oates v. Poland (dec.), 2000; Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 73); in other words when it is a qualified right ( Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 265, 271 and 290; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 93; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 116; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 164; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 84; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), 2020, § 620; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 421; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 98; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 193; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 308).\n\nThe Convention organs have examined complaints under Article 18 in conjunction with the provisions listed below: ▪ Article 5 of the Convention: Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 78; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 53; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 110; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 114; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 301; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 144; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 163; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 110; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 318-354; Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), 2007; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 105; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 127; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 86; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 225; Batiashvili v. Georgia, 2019, § 103; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 71; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 158; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 119; and Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 195; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 402; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 235; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 194 ; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 228; Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 135; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 640; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 142; Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 131); ▪ Article 5 § 3 in fine ( Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 80); ▪ Article 6 of the Convention: Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, §§ 105-109; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011, § 16; and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010, §§ 310-314; ▪ Article 8 of the Convention: Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011, § 16; Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010, §§ 310-314; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), 2020, §§ 624-626); Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 136; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 338; ▪ Article 9 of the Convention: C.R. v. Switzerland (dec.), 1999; ▪ Article 10 of the Convention: Şener v. Turkey, 2000, §§ 59-62; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 235; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 194 ; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 214; ▪ Article 11 of the Convention: Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; ▪ Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: Isik v. Turkey, decision Commission, 1995; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, §§ 663-666; Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Rustavi 2 Broadcasting Company Ltd and Others v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 316-317; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 97-98; ▪ Article 2 of Protocol no. 4: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 97-98.\n\nThe Court has thus far found a breach of Article 18 in conjunction with: ▪ Article 5 ( Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], § 176; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 99; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 71; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 158; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 120; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 195; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 438; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 640; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 142); ▪ Article 5 § 3 in fine : Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 80; ▪ Article 8 ( Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 338); ▪ Article 10 ( Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 214); ▪ Article 11 ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176) ; ▪ Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 111; ▪ Article 2 of Protocol no. 4: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 111.\n\nThe mere fact that a restriction of a Convention right or freedom does not meet all the requirements of the clause that permits it does not necessarily raise an issue under Article 18. Separate examination of a complaint under that Article is only warranted if the claim that a restriction has been applied for a purpose not prescribed by the Convention appears to be a fundamental aspect of the case ( Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 291; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 421; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 97; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 120; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 199; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 164; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 92; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 198 ; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 63; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 150; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 112; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 186; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 252; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 211; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 234; Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 68; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 194, 203; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 309).\n\nThe Court has examined allegations of the following ulterior purposes: ▪ intimidation and putting pressure on the applicant with a view to obtaining information or other advantages ( Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 76; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 53; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 353; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 116 ); ▪ punishing and silencing the applicant and/or impeding his/her activities ( Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), 2007; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 109; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 299; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 143; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 162; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 104; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 125; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 215; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 70; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 157; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 119; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 194; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 249; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 207; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 238; Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 133; Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 79; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 110; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 213; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 141; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 337); ▪ political and/or economic motivation behind criminal prosecution and other relevant proceedings ( Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, § 665; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, § 889; Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, § 109; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 114; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 332; Batiashvili v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 101-103; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 203; Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 130; Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 123); ▪ suppression of political pluralism and limiting freedom of political debate ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC],2018, § 175; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 98; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 437; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, § 639).\n\nSimilarly, in Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, in view of its finding as to the unlawfulness of the impugned interference, the Court did not consider it necessary to examine the question of whether it had pursued a legitimate aim under Article 8 taken alone. However, for the purposes of its examination of the applicant's complaint under Article 18 in conjunction with Article 8, the Court was prepared to assume that the measures against the applicant had pursued the legitimate aim relied upon by the Government. The Court therefore proceeded on the basis of the plurality of purposes ( Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, §§ 318-321).\n\nThe Court will not restrict itself to direct proof in relation to complaints under Article 18 or apply a special standard of proof to such allegations ( Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 282 and 310; contrast Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 260; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 116; Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, § 109; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, § 603; Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, § 899; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 98; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 120; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 204; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 165; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 215; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 422; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 237). Indeed, depending on the circumstances of the case, an ulterior purpose cannot always be proved by pointing to a particularly inculpatory piece of evidence, which clearly reveals an actual reason behind the authorities'action (for example, a written document as in Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004), or a specific isolated incident ( Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 132), or the fact that the applicant was interviewed in connection with events not related to the ongoing criminal case ( Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 125; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 222).\n\nFinally, circumstantial evidence in this context means information about the primary facts, or contextual facts or sequences of events which can form the basis for inferences about the primary facts ( Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 142; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 158; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 317; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 215; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 422; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 202; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 316).\n\nReports or statements by international observers, non-governmental organisations or the media, or the decisions of other national or international courts are often taken into account, in particular, to shed light on the facts, or to corroborate findings made by the Court ( Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 148; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 317; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 95; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 118; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 205; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 165; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 215; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, §§ 422, 424 and 434; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 202; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 139; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 316).\n\nThe Court has regard to the applicant's specific status and activities ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 174; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, §§ 208; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 231; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 66; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 153; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 115; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 189; and Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 257; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 424; Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 73; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 138). At the same time, the absence of a particular political status, such as that of an opposition leader or a public official, does not rule out political motivation behind the contested measures. The Court has established political purposes in cases concerning detention of well-known civil society activists and NGO leaders, critical of elections or involved in protests against the government ( Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 103, and Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 124).", - "post_text": "In a similar way to Article 14, Article 18 of the Convention has no independent existence; it can only be applied in conjunction with an Article of the Convention or the Protocols thereto which sets out or qualifies the rights and freedoms that the High Contracting Parties have undertaken to secure to those under their jurisdiction ( Kamma v. the Netherlands, Commission's report, 1974, p. 9; Gusinskiy v. Russia, § 73; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 49; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, § 663; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 105; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 294; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 137; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 153; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 113; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 93; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 116; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 198; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 164; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 84; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 421; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 191; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 306; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 67).\n\nA violation of Article 18 can only arise where the right or freedom which has been interfered with is subject to restrictions permitted under the Convention ( Kamma v. the Netherlands, Commission's report, 1974, p. 9; Oates v. Poland (dec.), 2000; Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 73); in other words when it is a qualified right ( Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 265, 271 and 290; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 93; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 116; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 164; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 84; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), 2020, § 620; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 421; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 98; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 193; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 308; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 67).\n\nThe Convention organs have examined complaints under Article 18 in conjunction with the provisions listed below: ▪ Article 5 of the Convention: Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 78; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 53; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 110; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 114; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 301; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 144; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 163; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 110; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 318-354; Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), 2007; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 105; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 127; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 86; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 225; Batiashvili v. Georgia, 2019, § 103; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 71; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 158; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 119; and Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 195; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 402; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 235; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 194 ; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 228; Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 135; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 640; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 142; Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 131); ▪ Article 5 § 3 in fine ( Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 80); ▪ Article 6 of the Convention: Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, §§ 105-109; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011, § 16; and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010, §§ 310-314; ▪ Article 8 of the Convention: Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011, § 16; Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010, §§ 310-314; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), 2020, §§ 624-626); Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 136; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 338; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 77; ▪ Article 9 of the Convention: C.R. v. Switzerland (dec.), 1999; ▪ Article 10 of the Convention: Şener v. Turkey, 2000, §§ 59-62; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 235; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 194 ; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 214; ▪ Article 11 of the Convention: Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; ▪ Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: Isik v. Turkey, decision Commission, 1995; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, §§ 663-666; Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Rustavi 2 Broadcasting Company Ltd and Others v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 316-317; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 97-98; ▪ Article 2 of Protocol no. 4: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 97-98.\n\nThe Court has thus far found a breach of Article 18 in conjunction with: ▪ Article 5 ( Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], § 176; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 99; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 71; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 158; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 120; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 195; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 438; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 640; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 142); ▪ Article 5 § 3 in fine : Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 80; ▪ Article 8 ( Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 338; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 78); ▪ Article 10 ( Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 214); ▪ Article 11 ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176) ; ▪ Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 111; ▪ Article 2 of Protocol no. 4: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 111.\n\nThe mere fact that a restriction of a Convention right or freedom does not meet all the requirements of the clause that permits it does not necessarily raise an issue under Article 18. Separate examination of a complaint under that Article is only warranted if the claim that a restriction has been applied for a purpose not prescribed by the Convention appears to be a fundamental aspect of the case ( Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 291; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 421; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 97; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 120; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 199; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 164; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 92; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 198 ; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 63; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 150; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 112; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 186; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 252; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 211; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 234; Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 68; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 194, 203; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 309, Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 69).\n\nThe Court has examined allegations of the following ulterior purposes: ▪ intimidation and putting pressure on the applicant with a view to obtaining information or other advantages ( Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 76; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 53; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 353; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 116 ); ▪ punishing and silencing the applicant and/or impeding his/her activities ( Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), 2007; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 109; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 299; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 143; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 162; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 104; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 125; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 215; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 70; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 157; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 119; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 194; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 249; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 207; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 238; Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 133; Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 79; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 110; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 213; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 141; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 337; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 77); ▪ political and/or economic motivation behind criminal prosecution and other relevant proceedings ( Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, § 665; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, § 889; Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, § 109; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 114; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 332; Batiashvili v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 101-103; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 203; Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 130; Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 123); ▪ suppression of political pluralism and limiting freedom of political debate ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC],2018, § 175; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 98; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 437; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, § 639).\n\nSimilarly, in Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, in view of its finding as to the unlawfulness of the impugned interference, the Court did not consider it necessary to examine the question of whether it had pursued a legitimate aim under Article 8 taken alone. However, for the purposes of its examination of the applicant's complaint under Article 18 in conjunction with Article 8, the Court was prepared to assume that the measures against the applicant had pursued the legitimate aim relied upon by the Government. The Court therefore proceeded on the basis of the plurality of purposes ( Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, §§ 318-321; see also Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 59 and 77).\n\nIn Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, the Court found a violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 8 on account of the unjustified revocation, on undisclosed national security grounds, of a residence permit of a prominent human rights defender. In view of several indications of the pressure on the applicant lawyers in connection with their work, the Court concluded that the predominant purpose of that measure was to punish them for, and prevent them from continuing, their human rights activities in Russia ( Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 77).\n\nThe Court will not restrict itself to direct proof in relation to complaints under Article 18 or apply a special standard of proof to such allegations ( Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 282 and 310; contrast Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 260; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 116; Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, § 109; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, § 603; Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, § 899; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 98; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 120; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 204; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 165; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 215; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 422; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 237; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 68). Indeed, depending on the circumstances of the case, an ulterior purpose cannot always be proved by pointing to a particularly inculpatory piece of evidence, which clearly reveals an actual reason behind the authorities'action (for example, a written document as in Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004), or a specific isolated incident ( Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 132), or the fact that the applicant was interviewed in connection with events not related to the ongoing criminal case ( Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 125; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 222).\n\nFinally, circumstantial evidence in this context means information about the primary facts, or contextual facts or sequences of events which can form the basis for inferences about the primary facts ( Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 142; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 158; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 317; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 215; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 422; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 202; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 316; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 68).\n\nReports or statements by international observers, non-governmental organisations or the media, or the decisions of other national or international courts are often taken into account, in particular, to shed light on the facts, or to corroborate findings made by the Court ( Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 148; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 317; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 95; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 118; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 205; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 165; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 215; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, §§ 422, 424 and 434; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 202; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 139; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 316; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 68).\n\nIn this context, the Court takes into account indications of pressure on the part of the authorities and/or State-supported media in connection with the applicant's status and activities. The Court further examines the relevant proceedings in order to establish whether procedural defects taken together are indicative of an ulterior purpose behind the contested measure. The Court also relies on the overall context and the political and social climate concerning the relevant group or category of actors ( Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 71-76).\n\nThe Court has regard to the applicant's specific status and activities ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 174; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, §§ 208; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 231; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 66; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 153; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 115; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 189; and Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 257; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 424; Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 73; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 138; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 70). At the same time, the absence of a particular political status, such as that of an opposition leader or a public official, does not rule out political motivation behind the contested measures. The Court has established political purposes in cases concerning detention of well-known civil society activists and NGO leaders, critical of elections or involved in protests against the government ( Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 103, and Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 124).\n\nIn Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, the Court concluded that when revoking a residence permit, the authorities had predominantly pursued the purpose of punishing the applicant lawyers for, and preventing them from, continuing their human rights activities in Russia. The Court particularly focussed on the indications of pressure and hostility in connection with the applicants'work: strong negative bias on the part of State-supported media outlets; the authorities'lack of action in response to threats received by the applicants; as well as contacts with a representative of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and law-enforcement activities directed at the NGO headed by one of the applicants and its partner organisations. Further, the identified procedural defects taken together indicated that the applicant concerned by the revocation decision had faced an insurmountable obstacle to challenge it, which revealed the authorities'intent to deprive her of the legal grounds to remain in Russia. Seen against the background of the overall hostile context in which civil society actors had been operating in the past years in Russia, the established ulterior purpose went clearly against the values of the Convention and was of particular gravity, given the prominent role of human rights defenders in a democratic society. The Court therefore found a violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 8 (§§ 70-78).", + "pre_text": "In a similar way to Article 14, Article 18 of the Convention has no independent existence; it can only be applied in conjunction with an Article of the Convention or the Protocols thereto which sets out or qualifies the rights and freedoms that the High Contracting Parties have undertaken to secure to those under their jurisdiction ( Kamma v. the Netherlands, Commission's report, 1974, p. 9; Gusinskiy v. Russia, § 73; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 49; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, § 663; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 105; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 294; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 137; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 153; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 113; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 93; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 116; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 198; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 164; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 84; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 421; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 191; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 306).\n\nAviolation of Article 18 can only arise where the right or freedom which has been interfered with is subject to restrictions permitted under the Convention ( Kamma v. the Netherlands, Commission's report, 1974, p. 9; Oates v. Poland (dec.), 2000; Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 73); in other words when it is a qualified right ( Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 265, 271 and 290; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 93; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 116; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 164; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 84; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), 2020, § 620; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 421; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 98; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 193; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 308).\n\nThe Convention organs have examined complaints under Article 18 in conjunction with the provisions listed below: ▪ Article 5 of the Convention: Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 78; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 53; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 110; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 114; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 301; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 144; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 163; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 110; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 318-354; Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), 2007; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 105; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 127; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 86; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 225; Batiashvili v. Georgia, 2019, § 103; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 71; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 158; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 119; and Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 195; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 402; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 235; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 194 ; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 228; Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 135; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 640; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 142; Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 131); ▪ Article 5 § 3 in fine ( Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 80); ▪ Article 6 of the Convention: Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, §§ 105-109; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011, § 16; and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010, §§ 310-314; ▪ Article 8 of the Convention: Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011, § 16; Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010, §§ 310-314; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), 2020, §§ 624-626); Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 136; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 338; ▪ Article 9 of the Convention: C.R. v. Switzerland (dec.), 1999; ▪ Article 10 of the Convention: Şener v. Turkey, 2000, §§ 59-62; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 235; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 194 ; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 214; ▪ Article 11 of the Convention: Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; ▪ Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: Isik v. Turkey, decision Commission, 1995; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, §§ 663-666; Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Rustavi 2 Broadcasting Company Ltd and Others v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 316-317; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 97-98; ▪ Article 2 of Protocol no. 4: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 97-98.\n\nThe Court has thus far found a breach of Article 18 in conjunction with: ▪ Article 5 ( Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], § 176; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 99; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 71; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 158; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 120; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 195; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 438; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 640; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 142); ▪ Article 5 § 3 in fine : Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 80; ▪ Article 8 ( Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 338); ▪ Article 10 ( Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 214); ▪ Article 11 ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176) ; ▪ Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 111; ▪ Article 2 of Protocol no. 4: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 111.\n\nThe mere fact that a restriction of a Convention right or freedom does not meet all the requirements of the clause that permits it does not necessarily raise an issue under Article 18. Separate examination of a complaint under that Article is only warranted if the claim that a restriction has been applied for a purpose not prescribed by the Convention appears to be a fundamental aspect of the case ( Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 291; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 421; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 97; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 120; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 199; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 164; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 92; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 198 ; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 63; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 150; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 112; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 186; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 252; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 211; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 234; Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 68; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 194, 203; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 309).\n\nThe Court has examined allegations of the following ulterior purposes: ▪ intimidation and putting pressure on the applicant with a view to obtaining information or other advantages ( Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 76; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 53; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 353; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 116 ); ▪ punishing and silencing the applicant and/or impeding his/her activities ( Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), 2007; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 109; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 299; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 143; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 162; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 104; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 125; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 215; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 70; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 157; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 119; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 194; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 249; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 207; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 238; Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 133; Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 79; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 110; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 213; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 141; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 337); ▪ political and/or economic motivation behind criminal prosecution and other relevant proceedings ( Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, § 665; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, § 889; Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, § 109; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 114; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 332; Batiashvili v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 101-103; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 203; Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 130; Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 123); ▪ suppression of political pluralism and limiting freedom of political debate ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC],2018, § 175; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 98; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 437; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, § 639).\n\nSimilarly, in Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, in view of its finding as to the unlawfulness of the impugned interference, the Court did not consider it necessary to examine the question of whether it had pursued a legitimate aim under Article 8 taken alone. However, for the purposes of its examination of the applicant's complaint under Article 18 in conjunction with Article 8, the Court was prepared to assume that the measures against the applicant had pursued the legitimate aim relied upon by the Government. The Court therefore proceeded on the basis of the plurality of purposes ( Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, §§ 318-321).\n\nThe Court will not restrict itself to direct proof in relation to complaints under Article 18 or apply a special standard of proof to such allegations ( Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 282 and 310; contrast Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 260; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 116; Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, § 109; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, § 603; Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, § 899; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 98; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 120; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 204; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 165; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 215; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 422; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 237). Indeed, depending on the circumstances of the case, an ulterior purpose cannot always be proved by pointing to a particularly inculpatory piece of evidence, which clearly reveals an actual reason behind the authorities'action (for example, a written document as in Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004), or a specific isolated incident ( Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 132), or the fact that the applicant was interviewed in connection with events not related to the ongoing criminal case ( Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 125; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 222).\n\nFinally, circumstantial evidence in this context means information about the primary facts, or contextual facts or sequences of events which can form the basis for inferences about the primary facts ( Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 142; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 158; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 317; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 215; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 422; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 202; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 316).\n\nReports or statements by international observers, non-governmental organisations or the media, or the decisions of other national or international courts are often taken into account, in particular, to shed light on the facts, or to corroborate findings made by the Court ( Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 148; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 317; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 95; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 118; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 205; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 165; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 215; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, §§ 422, 424 and 434; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 202; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 139; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 316).\n\nThe Court has regard to the applicant's specific status and activities ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 174; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, §§ 208; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 231; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 66; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 153; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 115; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 189; and Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 257; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 424; Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 73; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 138). At the same time, the absence of a particular political status, such as that of an opposition leader or a public official, does not rule out political motivation behind the contested measures. The Court has established political purposes in cases concerning detention of well-known civil society activists and NGOleaders, critical of elections or involved in protests against the government ( Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 103, and Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 124).", + "post_text": "In a similar way to Article 14, Article 18 of the Convention has no independent existence; it can only be applied in conjunction with an Article of the Convention or the Protocols thereto which sets out or qualifies the rights and freedoms that the High Contracting Parties have undertaken to secure to those under their jurisdiction ( Kamma v. the Netherlands, Commission's report, 1974, p. 9; Gusinskiy v. Russia, § 73; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 49; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, § 663; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 105; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 294; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 137; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 153; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 113; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 93; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 116; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 198; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 164; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 84; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 421; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 191; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 306; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 67).\n\nAviolation of Article 18 can only arise where the right or freedom which has been interfered with is subject to restrictions permitted under the Convention ( Kamma v. the Netherlands, Commission's report, 1974, p. 9; Oates v. Poland (dec.), 2000; Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 73); in other words when it is a qualified right ( Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 265, 271 and 290; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 93; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 116; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 164; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 84; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), 2020, § 620; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 421; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 98; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 193; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 308; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 67).\n\nThe Convention organs have examined complaints under Article 18 in conjunction with the provisions listed below: ▪ Article 5 of the Convention: Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 78; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 53; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 110; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 114; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 301; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 144; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 163; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 110; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 318-354; Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), 2007; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 105; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 127; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 86; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 225; Batiashvili v. Georgia, 2019, § 103; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 71; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 158; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 119; and Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 195; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 402; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 235; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 194 ; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 228; Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 135; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 640; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 142; Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 131); ▪ Article 5 § 3 in fine ( Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 80); ▪ Article 6 of the Convention: Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, §§ 105-109; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011, § 16; and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010, §§ 310-314; ▪ Article 8 of the Convention: Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011, § 16; Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010, §§ 310-314; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), 2020, §§ 624-626); Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 136; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 338; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 77; ▪ Article 9 of the Convention: C.R. v. Switzerland (dec.), 1999; ▪ Article 10 of the Convention: Şener v. Turkey, 2000, §§ 59-62; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 235; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 194 ; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 214; ▪ Article 11 of the Convention: Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; ▪ Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: Isik v. Turkey, decision Commission, 1995; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, §§ 663-666; Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Rustavi 2 Broadcasting Company Ltd and Others v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 316-317; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 97-98; ▪ Article 2 of Protocol no. 4: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 97-98.\n\nThe Court has thus far found a breach of Article 18 in conjunction with: ▪ Article 5 ( Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], § 176; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 99; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 71; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 158; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 120; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 195; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 438; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 640; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 142); ▪ Article 5 § 3 in fine : Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 80; ▪ Article 8 ( Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 338; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 78); ▪ Article 10 ( Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 214); ▪ Article 11 ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176) ; ▪ Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 111; ▪ Article 2 of Protocol no. 4: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 111.\n\nThe mere fact that a restriction of a Convention right or freedom does not meet all the requirements of the clause that permits it does not necessarily raise an issue under Article 18. Separate examination of a complaint under that Article is only warranted if the claim that a restriction has been applied for a purpose not prescribed by the Convention appears to be a fundamental aspect of the case ( Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 291; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 421; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 97; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 120; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 199; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 164; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 92; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 198 ; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 63; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 150; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 112; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 186; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 252; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 211; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 234; Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 68; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 194, 203; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 309, Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 69).\n\nThe Court has examined allegations of the following ulterior purposes: ▪ intimidation and putting pressure on the applicant with a view to obtaining information or other advantages ( Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 76; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 53; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 353; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 116 ); ▪ punishing and silencing the applicant and/or impeding his/her activities ( Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), 2007; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 109; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 299; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 143; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 162; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 104; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 125; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 215; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 70; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 157; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 119; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 194; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 249; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 207; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 238; Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 133; Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 79; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 110; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 213; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 141; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 337; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 77); ▪ political and/or economic motivation behind criminal prosecution and other relevant proceedings ( Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, § 665; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, § 889; Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, § 109; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 114; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 332; Batiashvili v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 101-103; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 203; Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 130; Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 123); ��� suppression of political pluralism and limiting freedom of political debate ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC],2018, § 175; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 98; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 437; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, § 639).\n\nSimilarly, in Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, in view of its finding as to the unlawfulness of the impugned interference, the Court did not consider it necessary to examine the question of whether it had pursued a legitimate aim under Article 8 taken alone. However, for the purposes of its examination of the applicant's complaint under Article 18 in conjunction with Article 8, the Court was prepared to assume that the measures against the applicant had pursued the legitimate aim relied upon by the Government. The Court therefore proceeded on the basis of the plurality of purposes ( Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, §§ 318-321; see also Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 59 and 77).\n\nIn Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, the Court found a violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 8 on account of the unjustified revocation, on undisclosed national security grounds, of a residence permit of a prominent human rights defender. In view of several indications of the pressure on the applicant lawyers in connection with their work, the Court concluded that the predominant purpose of that measure was to punish them for, and prevent them from continuing, their human rights activities in Russia ( Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 77).\n\nThe Court will not restrict itself to direct proof in relation to complaints under Article 18 or apply a special standard of proof to such allegations ( Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 282 and 310; contrast Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 260; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 116; Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, § 109; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, § 603; Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, § 899; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 98; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 120; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 204; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 165; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 215; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 422; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 237; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 68). Indeed, depending on the circumstances of the case, an ulterior purpose cannot always be proved by pointing to a particularly inculpatory piece of evidence, which clearly reveals an actual reason behind the authorities'action (for example, a written document as in Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004), or a specific isolated incident ( Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 132), or the fact that the applicant was interviewed in connection with events not related to the ongoing criminal case ( Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 125; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 222).\n\nFinally, circumstantial evidence in this context means information about the primary facts, or contextual facts or sequences of events which can form the basis for inferences about the primary facts ( Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 142; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 158; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 317; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 215; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 422; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 202; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 316; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 68).\n\nReports or statements by international observers, non-governmental organisations or the media, or the decisions of other national or international courts are often taken into account, in particular, to shed light on the facts, or to corroborate findings made by the Court ( Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 148; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 317; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 95; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 118; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 205; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 165; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 215; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, §§ 422, 424 and 434; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 202; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 139; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 316; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 68).\n\nIn this context, the Court takes into account indications of pressure on the part of the authorities and/or State-supported media in connection with the applicant's status and activities. The Court further examines the relevant proceedings in order to establish whether procedural defects taken together are indicative of an ulterior purpose behind the contested measure. The Court also relies on the overall context and the political and social climate concerning the relevant group or category of actors ( Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 71-76).\n\nThe Court has regard to the applicant's specific status and activities ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 174; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, §§ 208; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 231; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 66; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 153; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 115; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 189; and Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 257; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 424; Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 73; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 138; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 70). At the same time, the absence of a particular political status, such as that of an opposition leader or a public official, does not rule out political motivation behind the contested measures. The Court has established political purposes in cases concerning detention of well-known civil society activists and NGOleaders, critical of elections or involved in protests against the government ( Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 103, and Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 124).\n\nIn Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, the Court concluded that when revoking a residence permit, the authorities had predominantly pursued the purpose of punishing the applicant lawyers for, and preventing them from, continuing their human rights activities in Russia. The Court particularly focussed on the indications of pressure and hostility in connection with the applicants'work: strong negative bias on the part of State-supported media outlets; the authorities'lack of action in response to threats received by the applicants; as well as contacts with a representative of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and law-enforcement activities directed at the NGOheaded by one of the applicants and its partner organisations. Further, the identified procedural defects taken together indicated that the applicant concerned by the revocation decision had faced an insurmountable obstacle to challenge it, which revealed the authorities'intent to deprive her of the legal grounds to remain in Russia. Seen against the background of the overall hostile context in which civil society actors had been operating in the past years in Russia, the established ulterior purpose went clearly against the values of the Convention and was of particular gravity, given the prominent role of human rights defenders in a democratic society. The Court therefore found a violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 8 (§§ 70-78).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923100034/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_18_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217124840/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_18_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/0faa41c7c031/20230923100034__guide_art_18_eng.pdf", @@ -1196,6 +1268,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2024-02-17__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:13668/21", "case_name": "Melia v. Georgia", @@ -1229,6 +1303,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-04-03", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2024-04-09__2025-04-03.json", "case_key": "apps:11027/22", "case_name": "Kezerashvili v. Georgia", @@ -1262,6 +1338,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-04-03", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2024-04-09__2025-04-03.json", "case_key": "apps:20958/14|38334/18", "case_name": "Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC]", @@ -1295,6 +1373,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-10-27", "from_version": "31 August 2022", "to_version": "28 February 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2022-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json", "case_key": "apps:35511/20", "case_name": "Gherardi Martiri v. San Marino", @@ -1328,6 +1408,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-10-27", "from_version": "31 August 2022", "to_version": "28 February 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2022-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json", "case_key": "apps:24384/19|44234/20", "case_name": "H.F. and Others v. France [GC]", @@ -1361,6 +1443,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-10-27", "from_version": "31 August 2022", "to_version": "28 February 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2022-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json", "case_key": "apps:976/20", "case_name": "Hoppen and trade union of AB Amber Grid employees v. Lithuania", @@ -1378,8 +1462,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "§1.A.3.c|a:35|b:43", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "As regards non-governmental organisations, the Court does not grant \"victim\" status to associations whose interests are not at stake, even if the interests of their members - or some of them - could be at stake. In addition, \" victim \" status is not granted to NGOs even if the associations have been founded for the sole purpose of defending the rights of the alleged9 victims ( Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, § 90 and § 93 and the references cited therein; see also Kalfagiannis and Pospert v. Greece (dec.), §§ 49-51, concerning a federation of trade unions representing media employees; Yusufeli İlçesini Güzelleştirme Yaşatma Kültür Varlıklarını Koruma Derneği v. Turkey (dec.), §§ 42-44, concerning a non-governmental organisation created with a view to defending the residents of an area where a dam was being built, and Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 25-26, concerning a non-governmental organisation representing the interests of LGBT persons. See, by contrast, AsDAC c. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 21-37, concerning a non- governmental organisation set up for the collective management of intellectual property rights of its members and its victim status in relation to an Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 complaint, and Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland, §§ 36-42, concerning a non- governmental organization set up to defend the interests of workers, especially in the sphere of trade union freedoms, in relation to an Article 11 complaint). However, it should be noted that under certain circumstances NGOs (instead of the applicants) can take part in domestic proceedings, defending the applicants'interests. This does not deprive the applicants, who have not participated in the domestic proceedings, of their victim status ( Gorraiz Lizarraga and Others v. Spain, §§ 37-39; Centre of Societies for Krishna Consciousness in Russia and Frolov v. Russia, § 30; for the interplay between victim status under Article 34 and exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 see Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, §§ 78-81; Thibaut v. France (dec.), §§ 26-31).", - "post_text": "As regards non-governmental organisations, the Court does not grant \"victim\" status to associations whose interests are not at stake, even if the interests of their members - or some of them - could be at stake. In addition, \" victim \" status is not granted to NGOs even if the associations have been founded for the sole purpose of defending the rights of the allegedvictims ( Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, 2013, § 90 and § 93 and the references cited therein; see also Kalfagiannis and Pospert v. Greece (dec.), 2020, §§ 49-51, concerning a federation of trade unions representing media employees; Yusufeli İlçesini Güzelleştirme Yaşatma Kültür Varlıklarını Koruma Derneği v. Turkey (dec.), §§ 42-44, concerning a non-governmental organisation created with a view to defending the residents of an area where a dam was being built, and Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021, §§ 25-26, concerning a non-governmental organisation representing the interests of LGBT persons. See, by contrast, AsDAC c. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 21-37, concerning a non-governmental organisation set up for the collective management of intellectual property rights of its members and its victim status in relation to an Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 complaint; Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland, 2022, §§ 36-42, concerning a non-governmental organization set up to defend the interests of workers, especially in the sphere of trade union freedoms, in relation to an Article 11 complaint), and Hoppen and trade union of AB Amber Grid employees v. Lithuania, 2023, § 153, concerning a trade union that complained that the dismissal of one of its members had negatively affected its own freedom of association).", + "pre_text": "As regards non-governmental organisations, the Court does not grant \"victim\" status to associations whose interests are not at stake, even if the interests of their members - or some of them - could be at stake. In addition, \" victim \" status is not granted to NGOs even if the associations have been founded for the sole purpose of defending the rights of the alleged9 victims ( Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, § 90 and § 93 and the references cited therein; see also Kalfagiannis and Pospert v. Greece (dec.), §§ 49-51, concerning a federation of trade unions representing media employees; Yusufeli İlçesini Güzelleştirme Yaşatma Kültür Varlıklarını Koruma Derneği v. Turkey (dec.), §§ 42-44, concerning a non-governmental organisation created with a view to defending the residents of an area where a dam was being built, and Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 25-26, concerning a non-governmental organisation representing the interests of LGBTpersons. See, by contrast, AsDAC c. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 21-37, concerning a non- governmental organisation set up for the collective management of intellectual property rights of its members and its victim status in relation to an Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 complaint, and Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland, §§ 36-42, concerning a non- governmental organization set up to defend the interests of workers, especially in the sphere of trade union freedoms, in relation to an Article 11 complaint). However, it should be noted that under certain circumstances NGOs (instead of the applicants) can take part in domestic proceedings, defending the applicants'interests. This does not deprive the applicants, who have not participated in the domestic proceedings, of their victim status ( Gorraiz Lizarraga and Others v. Spain, §§ 37-39; Centre of Societies for Krishna Consciousness in Russia and Frolov v. Russia, § 30; for the interplay between victim status under Article 34 and exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 see Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, §§ 78-81; Thibaut v. France (dec.), §§ 26-31).", + "post_text": "As regards non-governmental organisations, the Court does not grant \"victim\" status to associations whose interests are not at stake, even if the interests of their members - or some of them - could be at stake. In addition, \" victim \" status is not granted to NGOs even if the associations have been founded for the sole purpose of defending the rights of the allegedvictims ( Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, 2013, § 90 and § 93 and the references cited therein; see also Kalfagiannis and Pospert v. Greece (dec.), 2020, §§ 49-51, concerning a federation of trade unions representing media employees; Yusufeli İlçesini Güzelleştirme Yaşatma Kültür Varlıklarını Koruma Derneği v. Turkey (dec.), §§ 42-44, concerning a non-governmental organisation created with a view to defending the residents of an area where a dam was being built, and Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021, §§ 25-26, concerning a non-governmental organisation representing the interests of LGBTpersons. See, by contrast, AsDAC c. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 21-37, concerning a non-governmental organisation set up for the collective management of intellectual property rights of its members and its victim status in relation to an Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 complaint; Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland, 2022, §§ 36-42, concerning a non-governmental organization set up to defend the interests of workers, especially in the sphere of trade union freedoms, in relation to an Article 11 complaint), and Hoppen and trade union of AB Amber Grid employees v. Lithuania, 2023, § 153, concerning a trade union that complained that the dismissal of one of its members had negatively affected its own freedom of association).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230627221844/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231027002911/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/154b01c3289a/20230627221844__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf", @@ -1394,6 +1478,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-10-27", "from_version": "31 August 2022", "to_version": "28 February 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2022-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json", "case_key": "apps:2809/18", "case_name": "Kaganovskyy v. Ukraine", @@ -1427,6 +1513,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-10-27", "from_version": "31 August 2022", "to_version": "28 February 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2022-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json", "case_key": "apps:383/12", "case_name": "Khural and Zeynalov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2)", @@ -1460,6 +1548,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-10-27", "from_version": "31 August 2022", "to_version": "28 February 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2022-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json", "case_key": "apps:23158/20", "case_name": "Makarashvili and Others v. Georgia", @@ -1493,6 +1583,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-10-27", "from_version": "31 August 2022", "to_version": "28 February 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2022-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json", "case_key": "apps:38358/22", "case_name": "Orhan v. Türkiye (dec.)", @@ -1526,6 +1618,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-10-27", "from_version": "31 August 2022", "to_version": "28 February 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2022-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json", "case_key": "apps:26922/19", "case_name": "P.C. v. Ireland", @@ -1559,6 +1653,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-10-27", "from_version": "31 August 2022", "to_version": "28 February 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2022-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json", "case_key": "apps:1210/10", "case_name": "Sorbalo v. Moldova (dec.)", @@ -1592,6 +1688,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-10-27", "from_version": "31 August 2022", "to_version": "28 February 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2022-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json", "case_key": "apps:8019/16|43800/14|28525/20", "case_name": "Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.)", @@ -1610,7 +1708,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.B.1|a:244|b:294", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "Where complaints concern actions that have taken place outside the territory of a Contracting State, the Government may raise a preliminary objection that the application is incompatible ratione loci with the provisions of the Convention ( Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), § 55; Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, § 203; Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], §§ 79 and 111; Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey, §§ 170-174; Hanan v. Germany [GC], §§ 104-113). Such an objection will be examined under Article 1 of the Convention (for the scope of the concept of \"jurisdiction\" under this Article, see for instance, N.D. and N.T. Spain [GC], §§ 102-103; Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], § 75; Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey, §§ 178-197; Hanan v. Germany [GC], §§ 132-142; see also point II.A.2 above). Even if the Government do not raise an objection, the Court can of its own motion examine the matter ( Vasiliciuc v. the Republic of Moldova, § 22; Stephens v. Malta (no. 1), § 45).", - "post_text": "Where complaints concern actions that have taken place outside the territory of a Contracting State, the Government may raise a preliminary objection that the application is incompatible ratione loci with the provisions of the Convention ( Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 1995, § 55; Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, 2010, § 203; Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, §§ 79 and 111; Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey, §§ 170-174; Hanan v. Germany [GC], 2021, §§ 104-113). Such an objection will be examined under Article 1 of the Convention 10 (for the scope of the concept of \"jurisdiction\" under this Article, see for instance, N.D. and N.T. Spain [GC], §§ 102-103; Banković and O thers v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], 2001, § 75; Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey, §§ 178-197; Hanan v. Germany [GC], 2021, §§ 132-142; Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, §§ 547-564; see also point II.A.2 above). Even if the Government do not raise an objection, the Court can of its own motion examine the matter ( Vasiliciuc v. the Republic of Moldova, § 22; Stephens v. Malta (no. 1), § 45).", + "post_text": "Where complaints concern actions that have taken place outside the territory of a Contracting State, the Government may raise a preliminary objection that the application is incompatible ratione loci with the provisions of the Convention ( Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 1995, § 55; Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, 2010, § 203; Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, §§ 79 and 111; Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey, §§ 170-174; Hanan v. Germany [GC], 2021, §§ 104-113). Such an objection will be examined under Article 1 of the Convention 10 (for the scope of the concept of \"jurisdiction\" under this Article, see for instance, N.D. and N.T. Spain [GC], §§ 102-103; Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], 2001, § 75; Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey, §§ 178-197; Hanan v. Germany [GC], 2021, §§ 132-142; Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, §§ 547-564; see also point II.A.2 above). Even if the Government do not raise an objection, the Court can of its own motion examine the matter ( Vasiliciuc v. the Republic of Moldova, § 22; Stephens v. Malta (no. 1), § 45).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230627221844/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231027002911/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/154b01c3289a/20230627221844__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf", @@ -1625,6 +1723,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-10-27", "from_version": "31 August 2022", "to_version": "28 February 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2022-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json", "case_key": "apps:52414/99", "case_name": "Ciobanu v. Romania (dec.)", @@ -1658,6 +1758,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-10-27", "from_version": "31 August 2022", "to_version": "28 February 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2022-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json", "case_key": "apps:39745/02", "case_name": "Cooperativa Agricola Slobozia-Hanesei v. Moldova", @@ -1691,6 +1793,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-10-27", "from_version": "31 August 2022", "to_version": "28 February 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2022-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json", "case_key": "apps:12977/09", "case_name": "Dudek v. Germany (dec.)", @@ -1724,6 +1828,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-10-27", "from_version": "31 August 2022", "to_version": "28 February 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2022-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json", "case_key": "apps:3127/09", "case_name": "Flisar v. Slovenia", @@ -1757,6 +1863,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-10-27", "from_version": "31 August 2022", "to_version": "28 February 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2022-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json", "case_key": "apps:36755/06", "case_name": "Fomin v. Moldova", @@ -1790,6 +1898,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-10-27", "from_version": "31 August 2022", "to_version": "28 February 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2022-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json", "case_key": "apps:21156/93", "case_name": "G.J. v. Luxembourg", @@ -1823,6 +1933,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-10-27", "from_version": "31 August 2022", "to_version": "28 February 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2022-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json", "case_key": "apps:2794/05|40345/05", "case_name": "Kaya and Polat v. Turkey (dec.)", @@ -1856,6 +1968,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-10-27", "from_version": "31 August 2022", "to_version": "28 February 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2022-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json", "case_key": "apps:67259/14", "case_name": "Selami and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", @@ -1889,6 +2003,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-10-27", "from_version": "31 August 2022", "to_version": "28 February 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2022-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json", "case_key": "apps:34602/16", "case_name": "Strazimiri v. Albania", @@ -1922,6 +2038,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-12", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json", "case_key": "apps:4188/21", "case_name": "A.M. and Others v. Poland (dec.)", @@ -1955,6 +2073,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-12", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json", "case_key": "apps:22515/14", "case_name": "Bryan and Others v. Russia", @@ -1972,8 +2092,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.D.2.a|a:237|b:241|§1.A.3.e|a:53|b:54", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "For example, if the complainants before the two institutions are not identical the \"application\" to the Court cannot be considered as being \"substantially the same as a matter that has ... been submitted to another procedure of international investigati on or settlement\" ( Folgerø and Others v. Norway (dec.), 2006). Thus, the Court found that it was not precluded from examining the application before it when the other international procedure was initiated by a non-governmental organisation ( Celniku v. Greece, 2007, §§ 39-41; Illiu and Others v. Belgium (dec.), 2009) or by a Confederation of Unions which it was affiliated to ( Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası v. Turkey, 2012, § 38) and not by the applicants themselves. In Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, UN Special Rapporteurs and the Vice-Chair of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) had sent a letter to Turkey containing an \"urgent appeal\", in the context of special proceedings introduced by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, which could give rise to the opening of a procedure. However, since the WGAD had not opened such a procedure and since neither the applicant nor his close relatives had lodged any appeal before the UN bodies, the \"application\" was not \"substantially the same\" (§§ 92-94; see also Taner Kılıç v. Turkey (no. 2), 2022, § 62-63).\n\nThe applicant would remain a victim if the authorities have failed to acknowledge either expressly or in substance that there has been a violation of the applicant's rights ( Albayrak v. Turkey, 2008, § 33; Jensen v. Denmark (dec.), 2001) even if the latter received some compensation ( Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 88).", - "post_text": "For example, if the complainants before the two institutions are not identical the \"application\" to the Court can not be considered as being \"substantially the same as a matter that has ... been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement\" ( Folgerø and Others v. Norway (dec.), 2006). Thus, the Court found that it was not precluded from examining the application before it when the other international procedure was initiated by a non-governmental organisation ( Celniku v. Greece, 2007, §§ 39-41; Illiu and Others v. Belgium (dec.), 2009), or by a Confederation of Unions which it was affiliated to ( Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası v. Turkey, 2012, § 38), or by a Government acting on their own behalf in an inter-governmental procedure ( Bryan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 40), and not by the applicants themselves. In Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, UN Special Rapporteurs and the Vice-Chair of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) had sent a letter to Turkey containing an \"urgent appeal\", in the context of special proceedings introduced by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, which could give rise to the opening of a procedure. However, since the WGAD had not opened such a procedure and since neither the applicant nor his close relatives had lodged any appeal before the UN bodies, the \"application\" was not \"substantially the same\" ( §§ 92-94; see also Taner Kılıç v. Turkey (no. 2), 2022, § 62-63).\n\nThe applicant would remain a victim if the authorities have failed to acknowledge either expressly or in substance that there has been a violation of the applicant's rights ( Albayrak v. Turkey, 2008, § 33; Jensen v. Denmark (dec.), 2001) even if the latter received some compensation ( Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 88; Bryan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 45).", + "pre_text": "For example, if the complainants before the two institutions are not identical the \"application\" to the Court cannot be considered as being \"substantially the same as a matter that has ... been submitted to another procedure of international investigati on or settlement\" ( Folgerø and Others v. Norway (dec.), 2006). Thus, the Court found that it was not precluded from examining the application before it when the other international procedure was initiated by a non-governmental organisation ( Celniku v. Greece, 2007, §§ 39-41; Illiu and Others v. Belgium (dec.), 2009) or by a Confederation of Unions which it was affiliated to ( Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası v. Turkey, 2012, § 38) and not by the applicants themselves. In Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, UN Special Rapporteurs and the Vice-Chair of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) had sent a letter to Turkey containing an \"urgent appeal\", in the context of special proceedings introduced by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, which could give rise to the opening of a procedure. However, since the WGADhad not opened such a procedure and since neither the applicant nor his close relatives had lodged any appeal before the UNbodies, the \"application\" was not \"substantially the same\" (§§ 92-94; see also Taner Kılıç v. Turkey (no. 2), 2022, § 62-63).\n\nThe applicant would remain a victim if the authorities have failed to acknowledge either expressly or in substance that there has been a violation of the applicant's rights ( Albayrak v. Turkey, 2008, § 33; Jensen v. Denmark (dec.), 2001) even if the latter received some compensation ( Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 88).", + "post_text": "For example, if the complainants before the two institutions are not identical the \"application\" to the Court can not be considered as being \"substantially the same as a matter that has ... been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement\" ( Folgerø and Others v. Norway (dec.), 2006). Thus, the Court found that it was not precluded from examining the application before it when the other international procedure was initiated by a non-governmental organisation ( Celniku v. Greece, 2007, §§ 39-41; Illiu and Others v. Belgium (dec.), 2009), or by a Confederation of Unions which it was affiliated to ( Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası v. Turkey, 2012, § 38), or by a Government acting on their own behalf in an inter-governmental procedure ( Bryan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 40), and not by the applicants themselves. In Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, UN Special Rapporteurs and the Vice-Chair of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) had sent a letter to Turkey containing an \"urgent appeal\", in the context of special proceedings introduced by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, which could give rise to the opening of a procedure. However, since the WGADhad not opened such a procedure and since neither the applicant nor his close relatives had lodged any appeal before the UNbodies, the \"application\" was not \"substantially the same\" ( §§ 92-94; see also Taner Kılıç v. Turkey (no. 2), 2022, § 62-63).\n\nThe applicant would remain a victim if the authorities have failed to acknowledge either expressly or in substance that there has been a violation of the applicant's rights ( Albayrak v. Turkey, 2008, § 33; Jensen v. Denmark (dec.), 2001) even if the latter received some compensation ( Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 88; Bryan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 45).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231027002911/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231212091045/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/154b01c3289a/20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf", @@ -1988,6 +2108,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-12", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json", "case_key": "apps:46412/21", "case_name": "Calvi and C.G. v. Italy", @@ -2021,6 +2143,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-12", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json", "case_key": "apps:4704/19", "case_name": "Chennouf and Others v. France (dec.)", @@ -2054,6 +2178,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-12", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json", "case_key": "apps:1574/12", "case_name": "Chief Rabbinate of the Jewish Community of Izmir v. Türkiye", @@ -2072,7 +2198,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "§1.A.2.b|a:None|b:22", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "A religious organisation without aformally recognised legal personality in domestic law, whose capacity to take legal action and acquire real estate had never been questioned internally by administrative authorities or courts, may lodge an application under Article 34 ( Chief Rabbinate of the Jewish Community of Izmir v. Türkiye, 2023, §§ 43-46).", + "post_text": "Areligious organisation without aformally recognised legal personality in domestic law, whose capacity to take legal action and acquire real estate had never been questioned internally by administrative authorities or courts, may lodge an application under Article 34 ( Chief Rabbinate of the Jewish Community of Izmir v. Türkiye, 2023, §§ 43-46).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231027002911/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231212091045/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/154b01c3289a/20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf", @@ -2087,6 +2213,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-12", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json", "case_key": "apps:52132/19", "case_name": "Croatian Radio-Television v. Croatia", @@ -2105,7 +2233,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "§1.A.2.b|a:None|b:20", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "In order to determine whether any given legal person other than a territorial authority falls within that category, account must be taken of its legal status and, where appropriate, the rights that status gives it, the nature of the activity it carries out and the context in which it is carried out, and the degree of its independence from the political authorities ( Radio France and Others v. France (dec.), 2003, § 26; Kotov v. Russia [GC], 2012, § 93; Slovenia v. Croatia [GC] (dec.), 2020, § 61). For public-law entities which do not exercise any governmental powers or public-service broadcasters, see The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 1994, § 49; Radio France and Others v. France (dec.), 2003, §§ 24-26; Österreichischer Rundfunk v. Austria, 2004, §§ 46-53; Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft and publisuisse SA v. Switzerland, 2020, §§ 46-48; Croatian Radio-Television v. Croatia, 2023, §§ 98-", + "post_text": "In order to determine whether any given legal person other than a territorial authority falls within that category, account must be taken of its legal status and, where appropriate, the rights that status gives it, the nature of the activity it carries out and the context in which it is carried out, and the degree of its independence from the political authorities ( Radio France and Others v. France (dec.), 2003, § 26; Kotov v. Russia [GC], 2012, § 93; Slovenia v. Croatia [GC] (dec.), 2020, § 61). For public-law entities which do not exercise any governmental powers or public-service broadcasters, see The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 1994, § 49; Radio France and Others v. France (dec.), 2003, §§ 24-26; Österreichischer Rundfunk v. Austria, 2004, §§ 46-53; Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft and publisuisse SA v. Switzerland, 2020, §§ 46-48; Croatian Radio-Television v. Croatia, 2023, §§ 98", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231027002911/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231212091045/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/154b01c3289a/20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf", @@ -2120,6 +2248,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-12", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json", "case_key": "apps:2394/22", "case_name": "Ferrara and Others v. Italy (dec.)", @@ -2153,6 +2283,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-12", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json", "case_key": "apps:24827/14", "case_name": "Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC]", @@ -2186,6 +2318,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-12", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json", "case_key": "apps:19750/13", "case_name": "Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC]", @@ -2204,7 +2338,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A.2.d|a:114|b:115|I.B.4.d|a:None|b:202|I.B.4.d|a:None|b:204", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "In sum, the mere fact that an applicant has submitted his or her case to the relevant court does not of itself constitute compliance with the requirements of Article 35 § 1, as even in those jurisdictions where the domestic courts are able, or even obliged, to examine the case of their own motion, applicants are not dispensed from the obligation to raise before them the complaint subsequently made to the Court. Thus, in order properly to exhaust domestic remedies it is not sufficient for a violation of the Convention to be \"evident\" from the facts of the case or the applicant' s submissions. Rather, the applicant must actually have complained (expressly or in substance) about it in a manner which leaves no doubt that the same complaint that is subsequently submitted to the Court was indeed raised at the domestic level ( Farzaliyev v. Azerbaijan, § 55; Peacock v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2016, § 38).", - "post_text": "In sum, the mere fact that an applicant has submitted his or her case to the relevant court does not of itself constitute compliance with the requirements of Article 35 § 1. Even in those jurisdictions where the domestic courts are able, or even obliged, to examine the case of their own motion (that is, to apply the principle of jura novit curia ), applicants are not dispensed from raising before them a complaint which they may intend to subsequently make to the Court (see, among other authorities, Kandarakis v. Greece, 2020, § 77), it being understood that for the purposes of exhaustion of domestic remedies the Court must take into account not only the facts but also the legal arguments presented domestically (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 117; Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 171). it must be borne in mind that the Court has no power to substitute itself for the applicant and formulate new complaints simply on the basis of the arguments and facts advanced ( Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 91). Thus, in order properly to exhaust domestic remedies it is not sufficient for a violation of the Convention to be \"evident\" from the facts of the case or the applicant's submissions. Rather, the applicant must actually have complained (expressly or in substance) about it in a manner which leaves no doubt that the same complaint that was subsequently submitted to the Court had indeed been raised at the domestic level ( Peacock v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2016, § 38; Farzaliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 55; Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 90; Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 145 and 172).\n\nHowever, it must be borne in mind that the Court has no power to substitute itself for the applicant and formulate new complaints simply on the basis of the arguments and facts advanced ( Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 91). Since the Court can base its decision only on the facts complained of, it is not sufficient that a violation of the Convention is \"evident\" from the facts of the case or the applicant's submissions. Rather, the applicant must complain that a certain act or omission entailed a violation of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto, in a manner which should not leave the Court to second-guess whether a certain complaint was raised or not ( Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 90; Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 145). Therefore, ambiguous phrases or isolated words do not suffice to accept that a particular complaint has been raised ( Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, §§ 82-85; Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 146).\n\nA difference must be made between complaints (that is, the arguments pointing to the cause or the fact constitutive of the alleged violations of the Convention) clearly formulated as such, and a mere secondary argument in support of a complaint ( Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, §§ 94-95).", + "post_text": "In sum, the mere fact that an applicant has submitted his or her case to the relevant court does not of itself constitute compliance with the requirements of Article 35 § 1. Even in those jurisdictions where the domestic courts are able, or even obliged, to examine the case of their own motion (that is, to apply the principle of jura novit curia ), applicants are not dispensed from raising before them a complaint which they may intend to subsequently make to the Court (see, among other authorities, Kandarakis v. Greece, 2020, § 77), it being understood that for the purposes of exhaustion of domestic remedies the Court must take into account not only the facts but also the legal arguments presented domestically (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 117; Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 171). it must be borne in mind that the Court has no power to substitute itself for the applicant and formulate new complaints simply on the basis of the arguments and facts advanced ( Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 91). Thus, in order properly to exhaust domestic remedies it is not sufficient for a violation of the Convention to be \"evident\" from the facts of the case or the applicant's submissions. Rather, the applicant must actually have complained (expressly or in substance) about it in a manner which leaves no doubt that the same complaint that was subsequently submitted to the Court had indeed been raised at the domestic level ( Peacock v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2016, § 38; Farzaliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 55; Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 90; Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 145 and 172).\n\nHowever, it must be borne in mind that the Court has no power to substitute itself for the applicant and formulate new complaints simply on the basis of the arguments and facts advanced ( Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 91). Since the Court can base its decision only on the facts complained of, it is not sufficient that a violation of the Convention is \"evident\" from the facts of the case or the applicant's submissions. Rather, the applicant must complain that a certain act or omission entailed a violation of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto, in a manner which should not leave the Court to second-guess whether a certain complaint was raised or not ( Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 90; Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 145). Therefore, ambiguous phrases or isolated words do not suffice to accept that a particular complaint has been raised ( Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, §§ 82-85; Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 146).\n\nAdifference must be made between complaints (that is, the arguments pointing to the cause or the fact constitutive of the alleged violations of the Convention) clearly formulated as such, and a mere secondary argument in support of a complaint ( Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, §§ 94-95).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231027002911/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231212091045/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/154b01c3289a/20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf", @@ -2219,6 +2353,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-12", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json", "case_key": "apps:48345/12", "case_name": "Kandarakis v. Greece", @@ -2252,6 +2388,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-12", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json", "case_key": "apps:53030/19", "case_name": "Kitanovska and Barbulovski v. North Macedonia", @@ -2285,6 +2423,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-12", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json", "case_key": "apps:29999/04|41424/04", "case_name": "Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia", @@ -2318,6 +2458,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-12", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json", "case_key": "apps:27094/20", "case_name": "Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye", @@ -2351,6 +2493,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-12", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json", "case_key": "apps:22060/20", "case_name": "Sperisen v. Switzerland", @@ -2384,6 +2528,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-12", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json", "case_key": "apps:54421/21", "case_name": "Szaxon v. Hungary (dec.)", @@ -2417,6 +2563,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-12", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json", "case_key": "apps:2758/05", "case_name": "Gaziyev v. Azerbaijan (dec)", @@ -2450,6 +2598,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-12", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json", "case_key": "name:van oosterwijck v belgium::1980", "case_name": "Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium", @@ -2483,6 +2633,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-26", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json", "case_key": "apps:24382/15", "case_name": "Asgarova and Veselova v. Armenia (dec.)", @@ -2516,6 +2668,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-26", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json", "case_key": "apps:38692/16", "case_name": "Blazheski v. North Macedonia (dec.)", @@ -2549,6 +2703,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-26", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json", "case_key": "apps:9987/14", "case_name": "Boronenkov v. Ukraine (dec.)", @@ -2582,6 +2738,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-26", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json", "case_key": "apps:37364/10", "case_name": "Boškoćević v. Serbia", @@ -2600,7 +2758,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "§2.B.1|a:None|b:88|§2.B.1|a:None|b:91", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "The domestic authorities must refrain from putting any form of pressure on applicants to withdraw or modify their complaints. According to the Court, pressure may take the form of direct coercion and flagrant acts of intimidation in respect of applicants or potential applicants, their families or their legal representatives, but also improper indirect acts or contacts designed to dissuade or discourage applicants from pursuing a Convention remedy (Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], 2005, § 102). The Court examines the dissuasive effect on the exercise of the right of individual application (Colibaba v. Moldova, 2007, § 68). Whether or not contacts between the authorities and an applicant are tantamount to unacceptable practices from the standpoint of Article 34 must be determined in the light of the particular circumstances of the case (Boškoćević v. Serbia, 2024, § 65). A failure by the respondent Government to comply with their procedural obligation under Article 34 does not necessarily require that the alleged interference should have actually restricted, or had any appreciable impact on, the exercise of the right of individual petition. The procedural obligations under Articles 34 and 38 of the Convention must be enforced irrespective of the eventual outcome of the proceedings, and in such a manner as to avoid any actual or potential chilling effect on applicants or their representatives (Mehmet Ali Ayhan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 41).\n\nSome noteworthy examples: ▪ as regards interrogation by the authorities concerning the application: Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 1996, § 105; Tanrıkulu v. Turkey [GC], 1999, § 131; ▪ threats of criminal proceedings against the applicant's lawyer: Kurt v. Turkey, 1998, §§ 159-65; complaint by the authorities against the lawyer in the domestic proceedings: McShane v. the United Kingdom, 2002, § 151; disciplinary and other measures against the applicant's lawyers: Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 929-33; ▪ police questioning of the applicants' lawyer concerning the signature of a power of attorney (M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 62, 64, and §§ 325-336); police questioning of the applicant's lawyer and translator concerning the claim for just satisfaction: Fedotova v. Russia, 2006, §§ 49-51; regarding an inquiry ordered by the Government's representative: Ryabov v. Russia, 2008, §§ 53-65; ▪ inability of the applicant's lawyer and doctor to meet: Boicenco v. Moldova, 2006, §§ 158-59; ▪ measures limiting an applicant's contacts with her/his representative: Shtukaturov v. Russia, 2008, § 140, where a ban on a lawyer's visits, coupled with a ban on telephone calls and correspondence, was held to be incompatible with the respondent State's obligations under Article 34, and Zakharkin v. Russia, 2010, §§ 157-60, where the applicant's contacts with his representative before the Court had been restricted on the grounds that the representative in question was not a professional advocate and did not belong to any Bar association; ▪ interception of letters sent to the detained applicants by their legal representatives enclosing forms of authority to be completed for the purpose of lodging and then subsequently finalising their application with the Court: Mehmet Ali Ayhan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 39-45 and the references cited therein; ▪ failure to respect the confidentiality of lawyer-applicant discussions in a meeting room: Oferta Plus SRL v. Moldova, 2006, § 156; ▪ threats by the prison authorities: Petra v. Romania, 1998, § 44; ▪ refusal by the prison authorities to forward an application to the Court on the ground of non- exhaustion of domestic remedies: Nurmagomedov v. Russia, 2007, § 61; ▪ pressure put on a witness in a case before the Court concerning conditions of detention: Novinskiy v. Russia, 2009, §§ 119 et seq.; ▪ dissuasive remarks by the prison authorities combined with unjustified omissions and delays in providing the prisoner with writing materials for his correspondence and with the documents necessary for his application to the Court: Gagiu v. Romania, 2009, §§ 94 et seq.; ▪ the authorities' refusal to provide an imprisoned applicant with copies of documents required for his application to the Court: Naydyon v. Ukraine, 2010, § 68; Vasiliy Ivashchenko v. Ukraine, 2012, §§ 107-10; ▪ loss by prison authorities of irreplaceable papers relating to prisoner's application to the Court: Buldakov v. Russia, 2011, §§ 48-50; ▪ intimidation and pressuring of an applicant by the authorities in connection with the case before the Court: Lopata v. Russia, 2010, §§ 154-60; ▪ threats of dismissal from a job at a statutory corporation which cannot be regarded as \"non- governmental\" for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention, for having applied to the Court, and pressuring the applicant into submitting to his employer copies of all relevant correspondence with the Court (Boškoćević v. Serbia, 2024, §§ 58-62, 65-67).", + "post_text": "The domestic authorities must refrain from putting any form of pressure on applicants to withdraw or modify their complaints. According to the Court, pressure may take the form of direct coercion and flagrant acts of intimidation in respect of applicants or potential applicants, their families or their legal representatives, but also improper indirect acts or contacts designed to dissuade or discourage applicants from pursuing a Convention remedy (Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], 2005, § 102). The Court examines the dissuasive effect on the exercise of the right of individual application (Colibaba v. Moldova, 2007, § 68). Whether or not contacts between the authorities and an applicant are tantamount to unacceptable practices from the standpoint of Article 34 must be determined in the light of the particular circumstances of the case (Boškoćević v. Serbia, 2024, § 65). Afailure by the respondent Government to comply with their procedural obligation under Article 34 does not necessarily require that the alleged interference should have actually restricted, or had any appreciable impact on, the exercise of the right of individual petition. The procedural obligations under Articles 34 and 38 of the Convention must be enforced irrespective of the eventual outcome of the proceedings, and in such a manner as to avoid any actual or potential chilling effect on applicants or their representatives (Mehmet Ali Ayhan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 41).\n\nSome noteworthy examples: ▪ as regards interrogation by the authorities concerning the application: Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 1996, § 105; Tanrıkulu v. Turkey [GC], 1999, § 131; ▪ threats of criminal proceedings against the applicant's lawyer: Kurt v. Turkey, 1998, §§ 159-65; complaint by the authorities against the lawyer in the domestic proceedings: McShane v. the United Kingdom, 2002, § 151; disciplinary and other measures against the applicant's lawyers: Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 929-33; ▪ police questioning of the applicants' lawyer concerning the signature of a power of attorney (M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 62, 64, and §§ 325-336); police questioning of the applicant's lawyer and translator concerning the claim for just satisfaction: Fedotova v. Russia, 2006, §§ 49-51; regarding an inquiry ordered by the Government's representative: Ryabov v. Russia, 2008, §§ 53-65; ▪ inability of the applicant's lawyer and doctor to meet: Boicenco v. Moldova, 2006, §§ 158-59; ▪ measures limiting an applicant's contacts with her/his representative: Shtukaturov v. Russia, 2008, § 140, where a ban on a lawyer's visits, coupled with a ban on telephone calls and correspondence, was held to be incompatible with the respondent State's obligations under Article 34, and Zakharkin v. Russia, 2010, §§ 157-60, where the applicant's contacts with his representative before the Court had been restricted on the grounds that the representative in question was not a professional advocate and did not belong to any Bar association; ▪ interception of letters sent to the detained applicants by their legal representatives enclosing forms of authority to be completed for the purpose of lodging and then subsequently finalising their application with the Court: Mehmet Ali Ayhan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 39-45 and the references cited therein; ▪ failure to respect the confidentiality of lawyer-applicant discussions in a meeting room: Oferta Plus SRL v. Moldova, 2006, § 156; ▪ threats by the prison authorities: Petra v. Romania, 1998, § 44; ▪ refusal by the prison authorities to forward an application to the Court on the ground of non- exhaustion of domestic remedies: Nurmagomedov v. Russia, 2007, § 61; ▪ pressure put on a witness in a case before the Court concerning conditions of detention: Novinskiy v. Russia, 2009, §§ 119 et seq.; ▪ dissuasive remarks by the prison authorities combined with unjustified omissions and delays in providing the prisoner with writing materials for his correspondence and with the documents necessary for his application to the Court: Gagiu v. Romania, 2009, §§ 94 et seq.; ▪ the authorities' refusal to provide an imprisoned applicant with copies of documents required for his application to the Court: Naydyon v. Ukraine, 2010, § 68; Vasiliy Ivashchenko v. Ukraine, 2012, §§ 107-10; ▪ loss by prison authorities of irreplaceable papers relating to prisoner's application to the Court: Buldakov v. Russia, 2011, §§ 48-50; ▪ intimidation and pressuring of an applicant by the authorities in connection with the case before the Court: Lopata v. Russia, 2010, §§ 154-60; ▪ threats of dismissal from a job at a statutory corporation which cannot be regarded as \"non- governmental\" for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention, for having applied to the Court, and pressuring the applicant into submitting to his employer copies of all relevant correspondence with the Court (Boškoćević v. Serbia, 2024, §§ 58-62, 65-67).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231212091045/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250126230921/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/154b01c3289a/20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf", @@ -2615,6 +2773,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-26", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json", "case_key": "apps:7189/21", "case_name": "Carême v. France [GC] (dec.)", @@ -2648,6 +2808,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-26", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json", "case_key": "apps:18536/18", "case_name": "Gernelle and S.A. Société d'Exploitation de l'Hebdomadaire Le Point v. France (dec.)", @@ -2681,6 +2843,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-26", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json", "case_key": "apps:33050/18", "case_name": "Ghazaryan and Bayramyan v. Azerbaijan, 2023", @@ -2714,6 +2878,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-26", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json", "case_key": "apps:24159/22|25751/22", "case_name": "Guðmundur Gunnarsson and Magnús Davíð Norðdahl v. Iceland", @@ -2747,6 +2913,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-26", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json", "case_key": "apps:2059/16", "case_name": "Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan (dec.)", @@ -2780,6 +2948,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-26", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json", "case_key": "apps:32439/19", "case_name": "Leroy and Others v. France", @@ -2813,6 +2983,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-26", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json", "case_key": "apps:31592/18", "case_name": "M.C. v. Türkiye", @@ -2846,6 +3018,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-26", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json", "case_key": "apps:21714/22", "case_name": "Mamić v. Croatia (dec.)", @@ -2879,6 +3053,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-26", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json", "case_key": "apps:3324/19", "case_name": "Mehmet Zeki Doğan v. Türkiye (no. 2)", @@ -2912,6 +3088,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-26", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json", "case_key": "apps:14139/21", "case_name": "Narbutas v. Lithuania", @@ -2945,6 +3123,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-26", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json", "case_key": "apps:42126/15|42127/15", "case_name": "O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia", @@ -2978,6 +3158,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-26", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json", "case_key": "apps:56551/11", "case_name": "Petrović v. Serbia (dec.)", @@ -3011,6 +3193,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-26", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json", "case_key": "apps:17131/19", "case_name": "Tamazount and Others v. France", @@ -3044,6 +3228,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-26", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json", "case_key": "apps:48998/14", "case_name": "Varyan v. Armenia", @@ -3077,6 +3263,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-26", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json", "case_key": "apps:49812/09", "case_name": "Vegotex International S.A. v. Belgium [GC]", @@ -3110,6 +3298,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-26", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json", "case_key": "apps:53600/20", "case_name": "Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC]", @@ -3143,6 +3333,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-26", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json", "case_key": "apps:14179/21", "case_name": "Victoria Cassar (dec.)", @@ -3176,6 +3368,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-26", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json", "case_key": "apps:41701/16", "case_name": "Y.T. v. Bulgaria (revision)", @@ -3209,9 +3403,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-26", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json", "case_key": "apps:21881/20", - "case_name": "Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland,* no. 21881/20", + "case_name": "Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland", "application_numbers": "21881/20", "judgment_year": "2022", "citation_change": "removed", @@ -3220,14 +3416,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF COMMUNAUTÉ GENEVOISE D'ACTION SYNDICALE (CGAS) v. SWITZERLAND", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", - "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 2, + "linked_sections": "I.A.2.f: Availability and effectiveness|§2.A.3.c: Indirect victim", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_deleted|reformulation", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A.2.f|a:134|b:None|§2.A.3.c|a:44|b:45", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "The Court must take realistic account not only of formal remedies available in the domestic legal system, but also of the general legal and political context in which they operate as well as the personal circumstances of the applicant (Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 1996, §§ 68-69; Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia, 2005, §§ 116-117; Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], 2015, § 119; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, §§ 117-119; Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland,* 2022, §§ 55-59). It must examine whether, in all the circumstances of the case, the applicant did everything that could reasonably be expected of him or her to exhaust domestic remedies (D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, §§ 116-122). For instance, an applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies when he failed to use the remedy - which could not be regarded as obviously futile -suggested by the domestic court, which guided him as to the further concrete steps to be taken (P. v. Ukraine (dec.), 2019, §§ 52-55). In a case where the enforcement of a judgment ordering urgent rehousing was delayed and achieved after the requisite deadline, an action for damages against the State in order to challenge the lengthy non- enforcement of the judgment can be considered an effective remedy even if it was enforced after the application had been lodged with the Court (Bouhamla v. France (dec.), 2019, §§ 35-44).\n\nAs regards non-governmental organisations, the Court does not grant \"victim\" status to associations whose interests are not at stake, even if the interests of their members - or some of them - could be at stake. In addition, \"victim\" status is not granted to NGOs even if the associations have been founded for the sole purpose of defending the rights of the allegedvictims (Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, 2013, § 90 and § 93 and the references cited therein; see also Kalfagiannis and Pospert v. Greece (dec.), 2020, §§ 49-51, concerning a federation of trade unions representing media employees; Yusufeli İlçesini Güzelleştirme Yaşatma Kültür Varlıklarını Koruma Derneği v. Turkey (dec.), 2021, §§ 42-44, concerning a non-governmental organisation created with a view to defending the residents of an area where a dam was being built, and Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021, §§ 25-26, concerning a non-governmental organisation representing the interests of LGBTpersons. See, by contrast, AsDAC c. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 21-37, concerning a non- governmental organisation set up for the collective management of intellectual property rights of its members and its victim status in relation to an Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 complaint; Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland,* 2022, §§ 36-42, concerning a non- governmental organization set up to defend the interests of workers, especially in the sphere of trade union freedoms, in relation to an Article 11 complaint), and Hoppen and trade union of AB Amber Grid employees v. Lithuania, 2023, § 153, concerning a trade union that complained that the dismissal of one of its members had negatively affected its own freedom of association).", + "post_text": "As regards non-governmental organisations, the Court does not grant \"victim\" status to associations whose interests are not at stake, even if the interests of their members - or some of them - could be at stake. In addition, \"victim\" status is not granted to NGOs even if the associations have been founded for the sole purpose of defending the rights of the alleged victims (Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, 2013, § 90 and § 93 and the references cited therein; see also Kalfagiannis and Pospert v. Greece (dec.), 2020, §§ 49-51, concerning a federation of trade unions representing media employees; Yusufeli İlçesini Güzelleştirme Yaşatma Kültür Varlıklarını Koruma Derneği v. Turkey (dec.), 2021, §§ 42-44, concerning a non-governmental organisation created with a view to defending the residents of an area where a dam was being built, and Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021, §§ 25-26, concerning a non-governmental organisation representing the interests of LGBTpersons. See, by contrast, AsDAC c. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 21-37, concerning a non- governmental organisation set up for the collective management of intellectual property rights of its members and its victim status in relation to an Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 complaint; and Hoppen and trade union of AB Amber Grid employees v. Lithuania, 2023, § 153, concerning a trade union that complained that the dismissal of one of its members had negatively affected its own freedom of association).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231212091045/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250126230921/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/154b01c3289a/20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf", @@ -3242,6 +3438,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-04-13", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-01-26__2025-04-13.json", "case_key": "apps:21881/20", "case_name": "Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland [GC]", @@ -3275,6 +3473,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-04-13", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-01-26__2025-04-13.json", "case_key": "apps:58358/14", "case_name": "Romanov and Others v. Russia", @@ -3308,6 +3508,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:40519/15", "case_name": "Borislav Tonchev v. Bulgaria", @@ -3341,6 +3543,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:25373/16", "case_name": "E.T. v. the Republic of Moldova", @@ -3374,6 +3578,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:32806/09", "case_name": "Egić v. Croatia", @@ -3407,6 +3613,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:12058/21", "case_name": "Eldar Hasanov v. Azerbaijan", @@ -3425,7 +3633,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "§1.B.2.a|a:None|b:96|§1.B.2.a|a:94|b:94|§1.B.2.a|a:95|b:95", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "The Government must demonstrate to the Court that the interim measure was complied with or, in an exceptional case, that there was an objective impediment which prevented compliance and that the Government took all reasonable steps to remove the impediment and to keep the Court informed about the situation (see, for example, A.N.H. v. Finland (dec.), 2013, § 27).\n\nSome examples: ▪ failure to secure a timely meeting between an asylum-seeker in detention and a lawyer despite the interim measure indicated under Rule 39 in this respect: D.B. v. Turkey, 2010, § 67; ▪ transfer of detainees to Iraqi authorities in contravention of interim measure: Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, 2010, §§ 162-65; ▪ expulsion of the first applicant in contravention of interim measure: Kamaliyevy v. Russia, 2010, §§ 75-79; ▪ inadvertent but not irremediable failure to comply with interim measure indicated in respect of Article 8: Hamidovic v. Italy (dec.), 2011; ▪ failure to comply with interim measure requiring a prisoner's placement in specialised medical institution: Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia, 2011, §§ 100-05, or an unjustified delay in complying with such measure: Sy v. Italy, 2022, §§ 167-174; ▪ failure to comply with interim measure indicated by the Court on account of a real risk of torture if extradited: Mannai v. Italy, 2012, §§ 54-57; Labsi v. Slovakia, 2012, §§ 149-51; ▪ secret transfer of a person at risk of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan and in respect of whom an interim measure was in force: Abdulkhakov v. Russia, 2012, §§ 226-31; ▪ forcible transfer of person to Tajikistan with a real risk of ill-treatment and circumvention of interim measures: Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 218-19; see also failure by Russian authorities to protect a Tajik national in their custody from forcible repatriation to Tajikistan in breach of interim measure: Nizomkhon Dzhurayev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 157-59. ▪ preparation of an expulsion in a way that deliberately created a situation whereby the applicant would have great difficulty in submitting a request for an interim measure to the Court: M.A. v. France, 2018, § 70.", - "post_text": "A significant delay on the part of the authorities in complying with an interim measure, which results in the applicant being put at risk of the kind of treatment that the measure was aimed at protecting him against, constitutes a failure by the State to comply with its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention ( Eldar Hasanov v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 171 and the references cited therein, and §§ 179-183).\n\nIt is not open to a Contracting State to substitute its own judgment for that of the Court in verifying whether there were grounds for indicating the interim measure ( Paladi v. Moldova [GC], 2009, § 90). Rather, the Government must demonstrate to the Court that the interim measure was complied with or, in an exceptional case, that there was an objective impediment which prevented compliance and that the Government took all reasonable steps to remove the impediment and to keep the Court informed about the situation (see, for example, A.N.H. v. Finland (dec.), 2013, § 27). In particular, they must demonstrate their assertion that the applicant's own conduct has created a serious and objective impediment to compliance with the interim measures and inform the Court of any possible impediments in a timely manner ( Eldar Hasanov v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 177).\n\nSome examples: ▪ failure to secure a timely meeting between an asylum-seeker in detention and a lawyer despite the interim measure indicated under Rule 39 in this respect: D.B. v. Turkey, 2010, § 67; ▪ transfer of detainees to Iraqi authorities in contravention of interim measure: Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, 2010, §§ 162-65; ▪ expulsion of the first applicant in contravention of interim measure: Kamaliyevy v. Russia, 2010, §§ 75-79; ▪ inadvertent but not irremediable failure to comply with interim measure indicated in respect of Article 8: Hamidovic v. Italy (dec.), 2011; ▪ failure to comply with interim measure requiring a prisoner's placement in specialised medical institution: Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia, 2011, §§ 100-05, or an unjustified delay in complying with such measure: Sy v. Italy, 2022, §§ 167-174; ▪ failure to comply with initial interim measures indicated by the Court to ensure the applicant's transfer to a prison medical facility for a comprehensive medical examination and, if necessary, carrying out urgent interventions, and excessively long delays in complying with subsequent such measures ( Eldar Hasanov v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 183). ▪ failure to comply with interim measure indicated by the Court on account of a real risk of torture if extradited: Mannai v. Italy, 2012, §§ 54-57; Labsi v. Slovakia, 2012, §§ 149-51; ▪ secret transfer of a person at risk of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan and in respect of whom an interim measure was in force: Abdulkhakov v. Russia, 2012, §§ 226-31; ▪ forcible transfer of person to Tajikistan with a real risk of ill-treatment and circumvention of interim measures: Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 218-19; see also failure by Russian authorities to protect a Tajik national in their custody from forcible repatriation to Tajikistan in breach of interim measure: Nizomkhon Dzhurayev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 157-59. ▪ preparation of an expulsion in a way that deliberately created a situation whereby the applicant would have great difficulty in submitting a request for an interim measure to the Court: M.A. v. France, 2018, § 70.", + "post_text": "Asignificant delay on the part of the authorities in complying with an interim measure, which results in the applicant being put at risk of the kind of treatment that the measure was aimed at protecting him against, constitutes a failure by the State to comply with its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention ( Eldar Hasanov v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 171 and the references cited therein, and §§ 179-183).\n\nIt is not open to a Contracting State to substitute its own judgment for that of the Court in verifying whether there were grounds for indicating the interim measure ( Paladi v. Moldova [GC], 2009, § 90). Rather, the Government must demonstrate to the Court that the interim measure was complied with or, in an exceptional case, that there was an objective impediment which prevented compliance and that the Government took all reasonable steps to remove the impediment and to keep the Court informed about the situation (see, for example, A.N.H. v. Finland (dec.), 2013, § 27). In particular, they must demonstrate their assertion that the applicant's own conduct has created a serious and objective impediment to compliance with the interim measures and inform the Court of any possible impediments in a timely manner ( Eldar Hasanov v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 177).\n\nSome examples: ▪ failure to secure a timely meeting between an asylum-seeker in detention and a lawyer despite the interim measure indicated under Rule 39 in this respect: D.B. v. Turkey, 2010, § 67; ▪ transfer of detainees to Iraqi authorities in contravention of interim measure: Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, 2010, §§ 162-65; ▪ expulsion of the first applicant in contravention of interim measure: Kamaliyevy v. Russia, 2010, §§ 75-79; ▪ inadvertent but not irremediable failure to comply with interim measure indicated in respect of Article 8: Hamidovic v. Italy (dec.), 2011; ▪ failure to comply with interim measure requiring a prisoner's placement in specialised medical institution: Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia, 2011, §§ 100-05, or an unjustified delay in complying with such measure: Sy v. Italy, 2022, §§ 167-174; ▪ failure to comply with initial interim measures indicated by the Court to ensure the applicant's transfer to a prison medical facility for a comprehensive medical examination and, if necessary, carrying out urgent interventions, and excessively long delays in complying with subsequent such measures ( Eldar Hasanov v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 183). ▪ failure to comply with interim measure indicated by the Court on account of a real risk of torture if extradited: Mannai v. Italy, 2012, §§ 54-57; Labsi v. Slovakia, 2012, §§ 149-51; ▪ secret transfer of a person at risk of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan and in respect of whom an interim measure was in force: Abdulkhakov v. Russia, 2012, §§ 226-31; ▪ forcible transfer of person to Tajikistan with a real risk of ill-treatment and circumvention of interim measures: Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 218-19; see also failure by Russian authorities to protect a Tajik national in their custody from forcible repatriation to Tajikistan in breach of interim measure: Nizomkhon Dzhurayev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 157-59. ▪ preparation of an expulsion in a way that deliberately created a situation whereby the applicant would have great difficulty in submitting a request for an interim measure to the Court: M.A. v. France, 2018, § 70.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250413114857/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250604184157/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/154b01c3289a/20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf", @@ -3440,6 +3648,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:25344/20", "case_name": "Friedrich and Others v. Poland", @@ -3473,6 +3683,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:13337/19", "case_name": "H.T. v. Germany and Greece", @@ -3506,6 +3718,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:16974/14", "case_name": "Kaczmarek v. Poland", @@ -3523,8 +3737,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.B.3|a:397|b:399", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "However, the applicant's subjective perception cannot alone suffice to conclude that he or she suffered a significant disadvantage. The subjective perception must be justified on objective grounds ( Ladygin v. Russia (dec.), 2011). A violation of the Convention may concern important questions of principle and thus cause a significant disadvantage regardless of pecuniary interest ( Korolev v. Russia (dec.), 2010; Biržietis v. Lithuania, 2016; Karelin v. Russia, 2016). In Giuran v. Romania, 2011, §§ 17-25, the Court found that the applicant had suffered a significant disadvantage because the proceedings concerned a question of principle for him, namely his right to respect for his possessions and for his home. This was despite the fact that the domestic proceedings which were the subject of the complaint were aimed at the recovery of stolen goods worth 350 euros (EUR) from the applicant's own apartment. Similarly, in Konstantin Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2015, §§ 46-47, the Court took into account the fact that the fine concerned a question of principle for the applicant, namely the respect for his position as a lawyer in the exercise of his professional activities.", - "post_text": "However, the applicant's subjective perception cannot alone suffice to conclude that he or she suffered a significant disadvantage. The subjective perception must be justified on objective grounds ( Ladygin v. Russia (dec.), 2011). A violation of the Convention may concern important questions of principle and thus cause a significant disadvantage regardless of pecuniary interest ( Korolev v. Russia (dec.), 2010; Biržietis v. Lithuania, 2016; Karelin v. Russia, 2016). In Giuran v. Romania, 2011, §§ 17-25, the Court found that the applicant had suffered a significant disadvantage because the proceedings concerned a question of principle for him, namely his right to respect for his possessions and for his home (see also, for instance, Kaczmarek v. Poland, 2024, § 56). This was despite the fact that the domestic proceedings which were the subject of the complaint were aimed at the recovery of stolen goods worth 350 euros (EUR) from the applicant's own apartment. Similarly, in Konstantin Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2015, §§ 46-47, the Court took into account the fact that the fine concerned a question of principle for the applicant, namely the respect for his position as a lawyer in the exercise of his professional activities.", + "pre_text": "However, the applicant's subjective perception cannot alone suffice to conclude that he or she suffered a significant disadvantage. The subjective perception must be justified on objective grounds ( Ladygin v. Russia (dec.), 2011). Aviolation of the Convention may concern important questions of principle and thus cause a significant disadvantage regardless of pecuniary interest ( Korolev v. Russia (dec.), 2010; Biržietis v. Lithuania, 2016; Karelin v. Russia, 2016). In Giuran v. Romania, 2011, §§ 17-25, the Court found that the applicant had suffered a significant disadvantage because the proceedings concerned a question of principle for him, namely his right to respect for his possessions and for his home. This was despite the fact that the domestic proceedings which were the subject of the complaint were aimed at the recovery of stolen goods worth 350 euros (EUR) from the applicant's own apartment. Similarly, in Konstantin Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2015, §§ 46-47, the Court took into account the fact that the fine concerned a question of principle for the applicant, namely the respect for his position as a lawyer in the exercise of his professional activities.", + "post_text": "However, the applicant's subjective perception cannot alone suffice to conclude that he or she suffered a significant disadvantage. The subjective perception must be justified on objective grounds ( Ladygin v. Russia (dec.), 2011). Aviolation of the Convention may concern important questions of principle and thus cause a significant disadvantage regardless of pecuniary interest ( Korolev v. Russia (dec.), 2010; Biržietis v. Lithuania, 2016; Karelin v. Russia, 2016). In Giuran v. Romania, 2011, §§ 17-25, the Court found that the applicant had suffered a significant disadvantage because the proceedings concerned a question of principle for him, namely his right to respect for his possessions and for his home (see also, for instance, Kaczmarek v. Poland, 2024, § 56). This was despite the fact that the domestic proceedings which were the subject of the complaint were aimed at the recovery of stolen goods worth 350 euros (EUR) from the applicant's own apartment. Similarly, in Konstantin Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2015, §§ 46-47, the Court took into account the fact that the fine concerned a question of principle for the applicant, namely the respect for his position as a lawyer in the exercise of his professional activities.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250413114857/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250604184157/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/154b01c3289a/20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf", @@ -3539,6 +3753,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:56658/22", "case_name": "Secară v. Romania (dec.)", @@ -3556,8 +3772,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A.1|a:111|b:112|I.A.2.e|a:122|b:123|I.A.2.e|a:123|b:124|I.B.2.a|a:178|b:180|I.B.2.a|a:180|b:182", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Determining whether a domestic procedure constitutes an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 35 § 1, which an applicant must exhaust and which should therefore be taken into account for the purposes of the four-month time-limit, depends on a number of factors, notably the applicant's complaint, the scope of the obligations of the State under that particular Convention provision, the available remedies in the respondent State and the specific circumstances of the case ( Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], 2017, § 134; see, also, Kozacıoğlu v. Turkey [GC], 2009, § 40 and D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 116).\n\nApplicants are only obliged to exhaust domestic remedies which are available in theory and in practice at the relevant time and which they can directly institute themselves - that is to say, remedies that are accessible, capable of providing redress in respect of their complaints and offering reasonable prospects of success ( Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], 2006, § 46; Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, § 75; see also the Court's subsidiary consideration in S.A.S. v. France [GC], 2014, § 61, regarding reasonable prospects of success of an appeal on points of law on the basis of Article 9 of the Convention).\n\nDiscretionary or extraordinary remedies need not be used, for example requesting a court to review its decision ( Çınar v. Turkey (dec.), 2003; Prystavska v. Ukraine (dec.), 2002), or requesting the reopening of proceedings, except in special circumstances where, for example, it is established under domestic law that such a request does in fact constitute an effective remedy ( K.S. and K.S. AG v. Switzerland, Commission decision, 1994; Shibendra Dev v. Sweden (dec.), 2014, §§ 41-43, 45 and 48), or where the quashing of a judgment that has acquired legal force is the only means by which the respondent State can put matters right through its own legal system ( Kiiskinen and Kovalainen v. Finland (dec.), 1999; Nikula v. Finland (dec.), 2000; Dinchev v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2017, §§ 27-29). Similarly, an appeal to a higher authority does not constitute an effective remedy ( Horvat v. Croatia, 2001, § 47; Hartman v. the Czech Republic, 2003, § 66); nor does a remedy that is not directly accessible to the applicant but is dependent on the exercise of discretion by an intermediary ( Tănase v. Moldova [GC], 2010, § 122). In particular, in criminal matters, an appeal to a higher prosecutor is an effective remedy only if it is not merely a hierarchical appeal and if the person making it has a personal right to have it examined ( Aspiotis v. Greece (dec.), 2022, § 52, and, a contrario, Belevitskiy c. Russia, 2007, §§ 59-60). A complaint to the Ministry amounts to a hierarchical complaint and is not considered an effective remedy ( Polyakh and Others v. Ukraine, 2019, § 135; Milovanović v. Serbia, 2019, § 104). Regarding the effectiveness in the case in question of an appeal that does not in principle have to be used (Ombudsman), see the reasoning in Egmez v. Cyprus, 2000, §§ 66-73. Lastly, a domestic remedy which is not subject to any precise time-limit and thus creates uncertainty cannot be regarded as effective ( Williams v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2009, and the references cited therein; Nicholas v. Cyprus, 2018, §§ 38-39).\n\nDetermining whether a domestic procedure constitutes an effective remedy, which an applicant must exhaust and which should therefore be taken into account for the purposes of the four-month time-limit, depends on a number of factors, notably the applicant's complaint, the scope of the obligations of the State under that particular Convention provision, the available remedies in the respondent State and the specific circumstances of the case. For example, it will differ in cases concerning unlawful use of force by State agents compared to cases concerning medical negligence ( Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], 2017, §§ 134-137). For a case concerning covert surveillance measures, see Hambardzumyan v. Armenia, 2019, §§ 52-53.\n\nAs a rule Article 35 § 1 does not require applicants to have applied for the reopening of proceedings or to have used similar extraordinary remedies and does not allow the four-month time- limit to be extended on the grounds that such remedies have been used ( Berdzenishvili v. Russia (dec.), 2004; Tucka v. the United Kingdom (no. 1) (dec.), 2011; Haász and Szabó v. Hungary, 2015, §§ 36-37). However, if an extraordinary remedy is the only judicial remedy available to the applicant, the four- month time-limit may be calculated from the date of the decision given regarding that remedy ( Ahtinen v. Finland (dec.), 2005; Tomaszewscy v. Poland, 2014, §§ 117-119).", - "post_text": "Determining whether a domestic procedure constitutes an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 35 § 1, which an applicant must exhaust and which should therefore be taken into account for the purposes of the four-month time-limit, depends on a number of factors, notably the applicant's complaint, the scope of the obligations of the State under that particular Convention provision, the available remedies in the respondent State and the specific circumstances of the case ( Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], 2017, § 134; see, also, Kozacıoğlu v. Turkey [GC], 2009, § 40 and D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 116; Secară v. Romania (dec.), 2025, §§ 30-38).\n\nApplicants are only obliged to exhaust domestic remedies which are available in theory and in practice at the relevant time and which they can directly institute themselves - that is to say, remedies that are accessible, capable of providing redress in respect of their complaints and offering reasonable prospects of success ( Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], 2006, § 46; Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, § 75; see also the Court's subsidiary consideration in S.A.S. v. France [GC], 2014, § 61, regarding reasonable prospects of success of an appeal on points of law on the basis of Article 9 of the Convention; and, as concerns the relevance of an appeal on points of law on the basis of Article 6 of the Convention, Secară v. Romania (dec.), 2025, § 35).\n\nDiscretionary or extraordinary remedies need not be used, for example requesting a court to review its decision ( Çınar v. Turkey (dec.), 2003; Prystavska v. Ukraine (dec.), 2002), or requesting the reopening of proceedings, except in special circumstances where, for example, it is established under domestic law that such a request does in fact constitute an effective remedy ( K.S. and K.S. AG v. Switzerland, Commission decision, 1994; Shibendra Dev v. Sweden (dec.), 2014, §§ 41-43, 45 and 48), or where the quashing of a judgment that has acquired legal force is the only means by which the respondent State can put matters right through its own legal system ( Kiiskinen and Kovalainen v. Finland (dec.), 1999; Nikula v. Finland (dec.), 2000; Dinchev v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2017, §§ 27-29). On the other hand, the characterisation of the remedy in the domestic legal system as an extraordinary remedy does not necessarily render it ineffective, its relevance for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 depending on the specific circumstances of the case ( Secară v. Romania (dec.), 2025, §§ 31-36). Similarly, an appeal to a higher authority does not constitute an effective remedy ( Horvat v. Croatia, 2001, § 47; Hartman v. the Czech Republic, 2003, § 66); nor does a remedy that is not directly accessible to the applicant but is dependent on the exercise of discretion by an intermediary ( Tănas e v. Moldova [GC], 2010, § 122). In particular, in criminal matters, an appeal to a higher prosecutor is an effective remedy only if it is not merely a hierarchical appeal and if the person making it has a personal right to have it examined ( Aspiotis v. Greece (dec.), 2022, § 52, and, a contrario, Belevitskiy c. Russia, 2007, §§ 59-60). A complaint to the Ministry amounts to a hierarchical complaint and is not considered an effective remedy ( Polyakh and Others v. Ukraine, 2019, § 135; Milovanović v. Serbia, 2019, § 104). Regarding the effectiveness in the case in question of an appeal that does not in principle have to be used (Ombudsman), see the reasoning in Egmez v. Cyprus, 2000, §§ 66-73. Lastly, a domestic remedy which is not subject to any precise time-limit and thus creates uncertainty cannot be regarded as effective ( Williams v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2009, and the references cited therein; Nicholas v. Cyprus, 2018, §§ 38-39).\n\nDetermining whether a domestic procedure constitutes an effective remedy, which an applicant must exhaust and which should therefore be taken into account for the purposes of the four-month time-limit, depends on a number of factors, notably the applicant's complaint, the scope of the obligations of the State under that particular Convention provision, the available remedies in the respondent State and the specific circumstances of the case ( Secară v. Romania (dec.), 2025, §§ 35-36). For example, it will differ in cases concerning unlawful use of force by State agents compared to cases concerning medical negligence ( Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], 2017, §§ 134-137). For a case concerning covert surveillance measures, see Hambardzumyan v. Armenia, 2019, §§ 52-53.\n\nAs a rule Article 35 § 1 does not require applicants to have applied for the reopening of proceedings or to have used similar extraordinary remedies and does not allow the four-month time- limit to be extended on the grounds that such remedies have been used ( Berdzenishvili v. Russia (dec.), 2004; Tucka v. the United Kingdom (no. 1) (dec.), 2011; Haász and Szabó v. Hungary, 2015, §§ 36-37; see also for an extraordinary remedy intended solely to rectify situations of manifest unlawfulness and strictly limited to five grounds of appeal, Secară v. Romania (dec.), 2025, §§ 32-38). However, if an extraordinary remedy is the only judicial remedy available to the applicant, the four-month time- limit may be calculated from the date of the decision given regarding that remedy ( Ahtinen v. Finland (dec.), 2005; Tomaszewscy v. Poland, 2014, §§ 117-119).", + "pre_text": "Determining whether a domestic procedure constitutes an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 35 § 1, which an applicant must exhaust and which should therefore be taken into account for the purposes of the four-month time-limit, depends on a number of factors, notably the applicant's complaint, the scope of the obligations of the State under that particular Convention provision, the available remedies in the respondent State and the specific circumstances of the case ( Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], 2017, § 134; see, also, Kozacıoğlu v. Turkey [GC], 2009, § 40 and D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 116).\n\nApplicants are only obliged to exhaust domestic remedies which are available in theory and in practice at the relevant time and which they can directly institute themselves - that is to say, remedies that are accessible, capable of providing redress in respect of their complaints and offering reasonable prospects of success ( Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], 2006, § 46; Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, § 75; see also the Court's subsidiary consideration in S.A.S. v. France [GC], 2014, § 61, regarding reasonable prospects of success of an appeal on points of law on the basis of Article 9 of the Convention).\n\nDiscretionary or extraordinary remedies need not be used, for example requesting a court to review its decision ( Çınar v. Turkey (dec.), 2003; Prystavska v. Ukraine (dec.), 2002), or requesting the reopening of proceedings, except in special circumstances where, for example, it is established under domestic law that such a request does in fact constitute an effective remedy ( K.S. and K.S. AG v. Switzerland, Commission decision, 1994; Shibendra Dev v. Sweden (dec.), 2014, §§ 41-43, 45 and 48), or where the quashing of a judgment that has acquired legal force is the only means by which the respondent State can put matters right through its own legal system ( Kiiskinen and Kovalainen v. Finland (dec.), 1999; Nikula v. Finland (dec.), 2000; Dinchev v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2017, §§ 27-29). Similarly, an appeal to a higher authority does not constitute an effective remedy ( Horvat v. Croatia, 2001, § 47; Hartman v. the Czech Republic, 2003, § 66); nor does a remedy that is not directly accessible to the applicant but is dependent on the exercise of discretion by an intermediary ( Tănase v. Moldova [GC], 2010, § 122). In particular, in criminal matters, an appeal to a higher prosecutor is an effective remedy only if it is not merely a hierarchical appeal and if the person making it has a personal right to have it examined ( Aspiotis v. Greece (dec.), 2022, § 52, and, a contrario, Belevitskiy c. Russia, 2007, §§ 59-60). Acomplaint to the Ministry amounts to a hierarchical complaint and is not considered an effective remedy ( Polyakh and Others v. Ukraine, 2019, § 135; Milovanović v. Serbia, 2019, § 104). Regarding the effectiveness in the case in question of an appeal that does not in principle have to be used (Ombudsman), see the reasoning in Egmez v. Cyprus, 2000, §§ 66-73. Lastly, a domestic remedy which is not subject to any precise time-limit and thus creates uncertainty cannot be regarded as effective ( Williams v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2009, and the references cited therein; Nicholas v. Cyprus, 2018, §§ 38-39).\n\nDetermining whether a domestic procedure constitutes an effective remedy, which an applicant must exhaust and which should therefore be taken into account for the purposes of the four-month time-limit, depends on a number of factors, notably the applicant's complaint, the scope of the obligations of the State under that particular Convention provision, the available remedies in the respondent State and the specific circumstances of the case. For example, it will differ in cases concerning unlawful use of force by State agents compared to cases concerning medical negligence ( Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], 2017, §§ 134-137). For a case concerning covert surveillance measures, see Hambardzumyan v. Armenia, 2019, §§ 52-53.\n\nAs a rule Article 35 § 1 does not require applicants to have applied for the reopening of proceedings or to have used similar extraordinary remedies and does not allow the four-month time- limit to be extended on the grounds that such remedies have been used ( Berdzenishvili v. Russia (dec.), 2004; Tucka v. the United Kingdom (no. 1) (dec.), 2011; Haász and Szabó v. Hungary, 2015, §§ 36-37). However, if an extraordinary remedy is the only judicial remedy available to the applicant, the four- month time-limit may be calculated from the date of the decision given regarding that remedy ( Ahtinen v. Finland (dec.), 2005; Tomaszewscy v. Poland, 2014, §§ 117-119).", + "post_text": "Determining whether a domestic procedure constitutes an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 35 § 1, which an applicant must exhaust and which should therefore be taken into account for the purposes of the four-month time-limit, depends on a number of factors, notably the applicant's complaint, the scope of the obligations of the State under that particular Convention provision, the available remedies in the respondent State and the specific circumstances of the case ( Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], 2017, § 134; see, also, Kozacıoğlu v. Turkey [GC], 2009, § 40 and D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 116; Secară v. Romania (dec.), 2025, §§ 30-38).\n\nApplicants are only obliged to exhaust domestic remedies which are available in theory and in practice at the relevant time and which they can directly institute themselves - that is to say, remedies that are accessible, capable of providing redress in respect of their complaints and offering reasonable prospects of success ( Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], 2006, § 46; Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, § 75; see also the Court's subsidiary consideration in S.A.S. v. France [GC], 2014, § 61, regarding reasonable prospects of success of an appeal on points of law on the basis of Article 9 of the Convention; and, as concerns the relevance of an appeal on points of law on the basis of Article 6 of the Convention, Secară v. Romania (dec.), 2025, § 35).\n\nDiscretionary or extraordinary remedies need not be used, for example requesting a court to review its decision ( Çınar v. Turkey (dec.), 2003; Prystavska v. Ukraine (dec.), 2002), or requesting the reopening of proceedings, except in special circumstances where, for example, it is established under domestic law that such a request does in fact constitute an effective remedy ( K.S. and K.S. AG v. Switzerland, Commission decision, 1994; Shibendra Dev v. Sweden (dec.), 2014, §§ 41-43, 45 and 48), or where the quashing of a judgment that has acquired legal force is the only means by which the respondent State can put matters right through its own legal system ( Kiiskinen and Kovalainen v. Finland (dec.), 1999; Nikula v. Finland (dec.), 2000; Dinchev v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2017, §§ 27-29). On the other hand, the characterisation of the remedy in the domestic legal system as an extraordinary remedy does not necessarily render it ineffective, its relevance for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 depending on the specific circumstances of the case ( Secară v. Romania (dec.), 2025, §§ 31-36). Similarly, an appeal to a higher authority does not constitute an effective remedy ( Horvat v. Croatia, 2001, § 47; Hartman v. the Czech Republic, 2003, § 66); nor does a remedy that is not directly accessible to the applicant but is dependent on the exercise of discretion by an intermediary ( Tănas e v. Moldova [GC], 2010, § 122). In particular, in criminal matters, an appeal to a higher prosecutor is an effective remedy only if it is not merely a hierarchical appeal and if the person making it has a personal right to have it examined ( Aspiotis v. Greece (dec.), 2022, § 52, and, a contrario, Belevitskiy c. Russia, 2007, §§ 59-60). Acomplaint to the Ministry amounts to a hierarchical complaint and is not considered an effective remedy ( Polyakh and Others v. Ukraine, 2019, § 135; Milovanović v. Serbia, 2019, § 104). Regarding the effectiveness in the case in question of an appeal that does not in principle have to be used (Ombudsman), see the reasoning in Egmez v. Cyprus, 2000, §§ 66-73. Lastly, a domestic remedy which is not subject to any precise time-limit and thus creates uncertainty cannot be regarded as effective ( Williams v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2009, and the references cited therein; Nicholas v. Cyprus, 2018, §§ 38-39).\n\nDetermining whether a domestic procedure constitutes an effective remedy, which an applicant must exhaust and which should therefore be taken into account for the purposes of the four-month time-limit, depends on a number of factors, notably the applicant's complaint, the scope of the obligations of the State under that particular Convention provision, the available remedies in the respondent State and the specific circumstances of the case ( Secară v. Romania (dec.), 2025, §§ 35-36). For example, it will differ in cases concerning unlawful use of force by State agents compared to cases concerning medical negligence ( Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], 2017, §§ 134-137). For a case concerning covert surveillance measures, see Hambardzumyan v. Armenia, 2019, §§ 52-53.\n\nAs a rule Article 35 § 1 does not require applicants to have applied for the reopening of proceedings or to have used similar extraordinary remedies and does not allow the four-month time- limit to be extended on the grounds that such remedies have been used ( Berdzenishvili v. Russia (dec.), 2004; Tucka v. the United Kingdom (no. 1) (dec.), 2011; Haász and Szabó v. Hungary, 2015, §§ 36-37; see also for an extraordinary remedy intended solely to rectify situations of manifest unlawfulness and strictly limited to five grounds of appeal, Secară v. Romania (dec.), 2025, §§ 32-38). However, if an extraordinary remedy is the only judicial remedy available to the applicant, the four-month time- limit may be calculated from the date of the decision given regarding that remedy ( Ahtinen v. Finland (dec.), 2005; Tomaszewscy v. Poland, 2014, §§ 117-119).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250413114857/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250604184157/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/154b01c3289a/20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf", @@ -3572,6 +3788,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:10103/20", "case_name": "Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland", @@ -3605,6 +3823,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:64387/14", "case_name": "Stoyanov and Tabakov v. Bulgaria (no. 2)", @@ -3638,6 +3858,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:15830/16", "case_name": "Tverdokhlebova v. Ukraine", @@ -3656,7 +3878,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.E.2|a:258|b:260", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "An intention to mislead the Court must always be established with sufficient certainty ( Melnik v. Ukraine, 2006, §§ 58-60; Nold v. Germany, 2006, § 87; Miszczyński v. Poland (dec.), 2011; Gross v. Switzerland [GC], 2014, § 28; S.L. and J.L. v. Croatia, 2015, §§ 48-49; Bagdonavicius and Others v. Russia, 2016, §§ 64-65; Yusufeli İlçesini Güzelleştirme Yaşatma Kültür Varlıklarını Koruma Derneği v. Turkey (dec.), 2021, §§ 29-30). Parties can submit arguments which are rejected by the Court without such contentious submissions being regarded as an abuse of the right of individual application ( Hoti v. Croatia ), 2018, § 92.", - "post_text": "An intention to mislead the Court must always be established with sufficient certainty ( Melnik v. Ukraine, 2006, §§ 58-60; Nold v. Germany, 2006, § 87; Miszczyński v. Poland (dec.), 2011; Gross v. Switzerland [GC], 2014, § 28; S.L. and J.L. v. Croatia, 2015, §§ 48-49; Bagdonavicius and Others v. Russia, 2016, §§ 64-65; Y usufeli İlçesini Güzelleştirme Yaşatma Kültür Varlıklarını Koruma Derneği v. Turkey (dec.), 2021, §§ 29-30; Tverdokhlebova v. Ukraine,* 2025, § 33). Parties can submit arguments which are rejected by the Court without such contentious submissions being regarded as an abuse of the right of individual application ( Hoti v. Croatia ), 2018, § 92.", + "post_text": "An intention to mislead the Court must always be established with sufficient certainty ( Melnik v. Ukraine, 2006, §§ 58-60; Nold v. Germany, 2006, § 87; Miszczyński v. Poland (dec.), 2011; Gross v. Switzerland [GC], 2014, § 28; S.L. and J.L. v. Croatia, 2015, §§ 48-49; Bagdonavicius and Others v. Russia, 2016, §§ 64-65; Yusufeli İlçesini Güzelleştirme Yaşatma Kültür Varlıklarını Koruma Derneği v. Turkey (dec.), 2021, §§ 29-30; Tverdokhlebova v. Ukraine,* 2025, § 33). Parties can submit arguments which are rejected by the Court without such contentious submissions being regarded as an abuse of the right of individual application ( Hoti v. Croatia ), 2018, § 92.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250413114857/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250604184157/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/154b01c3289a/20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf", @@ -3671,6 +3893,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:29582/09", "case_name": "Yakut Republican Trade-Union Federation v. Russia", @@ -3704,6 +3928,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-02", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json", "case_key": "apps:55737/16", "case_name": "Bogdan Shevchuk v. Ukraine", @@ -3737,6 +3963,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-02", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json", "case_key": "apps:65087/19", "case_name": "Cangı and Others v. Türkiye (no. 2)", @@ -3770,6 +3998,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-02", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json", "case_key": "apps:17710/15", "case_name": "Cioffi v. Italy", @@ -3803,6 +4033,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-02", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json", "case_key": "apps:7535/21|58894/21", "case_name": "Darko Špehar v. Croatia and Danijel Gojković v. Croatia (dec.)", @@ -3836,9 +4068,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-02", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json", "case_key": "apps:36057/18", - "case_name": "Farhad Mehdiyev c. Azerbaïdjan, no 36057/18", + "case_name": "Farhad Mehdiyev c. Azerbaïdjan", "application_numbers": "36057/18", "judgment_year": "2025", "citation_change": "added", @@ -3869,6 +4103,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-02", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json", "case_key": "apps:2474/21", "case_name": "Garand and Others v. France", @@ -3902,6 +4138,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-02", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json", "case_key": "apps:4326/18", "case_name": "Girginova v. Bulgaria", @@ -3935,6 +4173,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-02", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json", "case_key": "apps:3473/19", "case_name": "Gündüz v. Türkiye (dec.)", @@ -3968,6 +4208,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-02", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json", "case_key": "apps:13959/20", "case_name": "Jewish Community of Thessaloniki v. Greece", @@ -4001,6 +4243,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-02", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json", "case_key": "apps:59144/16", "case_name": "K.M. v. North Macedonia", @@ -4034,6 +4278,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-02", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json", "case_key": "apps:29791/21", "case_name": "Kári Orrason and Others v. Iceland", @@ -4067,6 +4313,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-02", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json", "case_key": "apps:56605/19|25424/23", "case_name": "Kotnik and Jukič v. Slovenia (dec.)", @@ -4100,6 +4348,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-02", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json", "case_key": "apps:3613/19", "case_name": "Lembergs v. Latvia (dec.)", @@ -4133,9 +4383,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-02", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json", "case_key": "apps:5855/23", - "case_name": "Mamaladze v. Georgia (dec.), 5855/23", + "case_name": "Mamaladze v. Georgia (dec.)", "application_numbers": "5855/23", "judgment_year": "2025", "citation_change": "added", @@ -4144,14 +4396,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "4", "hudoc_doctype": "HEDEC", "hudoc_docname": "MAMALADZE v. GEORGIA", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", - "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "§1.B.1: Principles and examples", + "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "§1.B.1|a:92|b:93", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "The circumstances of the case may make the alleged interference with the right of individual application less serious ( Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia (striking out) [GC], 2007, §§ 118 et seq.). See also Holland v. Sweden (dec.), 2010, where the Court found that the destruction of tape recordings from a court hearing in accordance with Swedish law before the expiry of the six-month time-limit for lodging an application with the Court did not hinder the applicant from effectively exercising his right of petition; Farcaş v. Romania (dec.), 2010, where the Court considered that the alleged inability of the physically disabled applicant to exhaust domestic remedies, owing to lack of special facilities providing access to public services, did not hinder him from effectively exercising his right of petition; Yepishin v. Russia, 2013, §§ 73-77, where the Court considered that the prison administration's refusal to pay postage for dispatch of prisoner's letters to the Court did not hinder the applicant from effectively exercising his right of petition; Yam v. the United Kingdom, 2020, §§ 79-83, where the Court considered that the domestic authorities'decision not to disclose in camera material in the absence of a request from the Court did not hinder the applicant from effectively exercising his right of petition because there had been a meaningful independent scrutiny of the asserted basis for the continuing need for confidentiality.", + "post_text": "The circumstances of the case may make the alleged interference with the right of individual application less serious ( Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia (striking out) [GC], 2007, §§ 118 et seq.). See also Holland v. Sweden (dec.), 2010, where the Court found that the destruction of tape recordings from a court hearing in accordance with Swedish law before the expiry of the six-month time-limit for lodging an application with the Court did not hinder the applicant from effectively exercising his right of petition; Farcaş v. Romania (dec.), 2010, where the Court considered that the alleged inability of the physically disabled applicant to exhaust domestic remedies, owing to lack of special facilities providing access to public services, did not hinder him from effectively exercising his right of petition; Yepishin v. Russia, 2013, §§ 73-77, where the Court considered that the prison administration's refusal to pay postage for dispatch of prisoner's letters to the Court did not hinder the applicant from effectively exercising his right of petition; Yam v. the United Kingdom, 2020, §§ 79-83, where the Court considered that the domestic authorities'decision not to disclose in camera material in the absence of a request from the Court did not hinder the applicant from effectively exercising his right of petition because there had been a meaningful independent scrutiny of the asserted basis for the continuing need for confidentiality; Mamaladze v. Georgia (dec.), 2025, §§ 42-49, where the Court considered that the dissemination, by an anonymous source, of a massive amount of material - containing transcripts of hundreds of individuals'private exchanges including those involving the applicant and his lawyer but not the interactions between them, pre- and post-dating the submission of his initial application to the Court -, could not be regarded as sufficient, in and of itself, for the applicant to form a genuine belief held on reasonable grounds that his discussions with his lawyer were being listened to, all the more so given his ability to successfully pursue his initial application before the Court.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250604184157/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20251202174715/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/154b01c3289a/20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf", @@ -4166,6 +4418,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-02", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json", "case_key": "apps:63386/16", "case_name": "Mansouri v. Italy (dec.) [GC]", @@ -4184,7 +4438,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A.2.f|a:None|b:134", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "In the case of Mansouri v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2025, §§ 84-117, the applicant complained about the lawfulness of his alleged deprivation of liberty on board of an Italian cruise ship and about the conditions of his confinement on the basis of an order refusing him entry to Italy. After an assessment of the domestic case-law that the Government had submitted to the Committee of Ministers as part of the execution procedure pertaining to the Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, the Court concluded that, even though these decisions had been delivered after the events in the present case, they demonstrated with a sufficient degree of certainty that the compensatory remedy was capable of holding the State authorities to account for unlawful deprivation of liberty in various regards and, where appropriate, could award compensation. Moreover, the applicant could have pursued a compensatory remedy against the shipowner or the captain. Given that the deprivation of liberty alleged by the applicant had already come to an end when he lodged his application, the compensatory remedy was effective ( Mansouri v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2025, §§ 95-101). The Court also examined the possibility for the applicant to apply to the ordinary courts for interim relief and noted that this remedy empowered the courts to order urgent provisional measures for the preservation of a right that was likely to be breached, or to prevent imminent and irreparable damage. If the applicant had had any doubts as to the possibility of obtaining interim relief entailing his release, it had been for him to dispel those doubts by applying to the domestic courts ( ibid. §§ 103-10). In sum, the applicant had failed to exhaust available and effective remedies. Lastly, the Court noted that the present case was closely connected to issues that fell within the ambit of EU law and that the circumstances alleged by the applicant had formed part of the process of refusing admission to national territory, which was governed by the provisions of the Schengen Borders Code and Annex V thereto. In light of the functioning of the system for policing the external borders of the Schengen Area, the return by the carrier of a third-country national who did not fulfil all the entry conditions formed an integral part of the process of refusing admission to national territory and originated in the refusal-of-entry order. In the absence of proceedings before them, the Italian courts had not had the opportunity to examine, whether on the basis of arguments put forward by the parties or of the courts'own motion, any issue as to the interpretation of the provisions of the Schengen Borders Code and Annex V thereto or its compatibility with fundamental rights, while seeking, if appropriate, a preliminary ruling from the CJEU.", + "post_text": "In the case of Mansouri v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2025, §§ 84-117, the applicant complained about the lawfulness of his alleged deprivation of liberty on board of an Italian cruise ship and about the conditions of his confinement on the basis of an order refusing him entry to Italy. After an assessment of the domestic case-law that the Government had submitted to the Committee of Ministers as part of the execution procedure pertaining to the Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, the Court concluded that, even though these decisions had been delivered after the events in the present case, they demonstrated with a sufficient degree of certainty that the compensatory remedy was capable of holding the State authorities to account for unlawful deprivation of liberty in various regards and, where appropriate, could award compensation. Moreover, the applicant could have pursued a compensatory remedy against the shipowner or the captain. Given that the deprivation of liberty alleged by the applicant had already come to an end when he lodged his application, the compensatory remedy was effective ( Mansouri v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2025, §§ 95-101). The Court also examined the possibility for the applicant to apply to the ordinary courts for interim relief and noted that this remedy empowered the courts to order urgent provisional measures for the preservation of a right that was likely to be breached, or to prevent imminent and irreparable damage. If the applicant had had any doubts as to the possibility of obtaining interim relief entailing his release, it had been for him to dispel those doubts by applying to the domestic courts ( ibid. §§ 103-10). In sum, the applicant had failed to exhaust available and effective remedies. Lastly, the Court noted that the present case was closely connected to issues that fell within the ambit of EUlaw and that the circumstances alleged by the applicant had formed part of the process of refusing admission to national territory, which was governed by the provisions of the Schengen Borders Code and Annex Vthereto. In light of the functioning of the system for policing the external borders of the Schengen Area, the return by the carrier of a third-country national who did not fulfil all the entry conditions formed an integral part of the process of refusing admission to national territory and originated in the refusal-of-entry order. In the absence of proceedings before them, the Italian courts had not had the opportunity to examine, whether on the basis of arguments put forward by the parties or of the courts'own motion, any issue as to the interpretation of the provisions of the Schengen Borders Code and Annex Vthereto or its compatibility with fundamental rights, while seeking, if appropriate, a preliminary ruling from the CJEU.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250604184157/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20251202174715/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/154b01c3289a/20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf", @@ -4199,9 +4453,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-02", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json", "case_key": "apps:47506/20", - "case_name": "Masse v. France (dec.), no 47506/20", + "case_name": "Masse v. France (dec.)", "application_numbers": "47506/20", "judgment_year": "2025", "citation_change": "added", @@ -4232,6 +4488,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-02", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json", "case_key": "apps:75000/17", "case_name": "Milashina and Others v. Russia", @@ -4265,6 +4523,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-02", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json", "case_key": "apps:12908/23|24544/23", "case_name": "Paic v. Sweden and Wernersson v. Sweden (dec.)", @@ -4298,6 +4558,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-02", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json", "case_key": "apps:30085/13", "case_name": "Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova", @@ -4331,6 +4593,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-02", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json", "case_key": "apps:13609/20", "case_name": "Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (no. 4)", @@ -4364,6 +4628,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-02", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json", "case_key": "apps:10934/21", "case_name": "Semenya v. Switzerland [GC]", @@ -4381,7 +4647,7 @@ "linked_change_types": "section_moved_modified", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.2|a:209|b:297", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "T he scope of a case \"referred to\" the Court in the exercise of the right of individual application is determined by the applicant 's complaint or \"claim\" - which is the term used in Article 34 ( Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 109). A complaint is characterised by the facts alleged in it and not merely by the legal grounds or arguments relied on ( Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], 2009, § 54); Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 110-126). By virtue of the jura novit curia principle the Court is not bound by the legal grounds adduced by the applicant under the Convention and the Protocols thereto and has the power to decide on the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of a complaint by examining it under Articles or provisions of the Convention that are different from those relied upon by the applicant ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, §§ 62-66, where the Court observed that the factual elements of the complaints under Article 18 were present in all the initial applications although the applicant had only relied on this provision in two of them, and therefore dismissed the Government's objection that parts of these complaints had been introduced out of time, that is to say, during the Grand Chamber proceedings).", + "pre_text": "T he scope of a case \"referred to\" the Court in the exercise of the right of individual application is determined by the applicant 's complaint or \"claim\" - which is the term used in Article 34 ( Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 109). Acomplaint is characterised by the facts alleged in it and not merely by the legal grounds or arguments relied on ( Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], 2009, § 54); Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 110-126). By virtue of the jura novit curia principle the Court is not bound by the legal grounds adduced by the applicant under the Convention and the Protocols thereto and has the power to decide on the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of a complaint by examining it under Articles or provisions of the Convention that are different from those relied upon by the applicant ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, §§ 62-66, where the Court observed that the factual elements of the complaints under Article 18 were present in all the initial applications although the applicant had only relied on this provision in two of them, and therefore dismissed the Government's objection that parts of these complaints had been introduced out of time, that is to say, during the Grand Chamber proceedings).", "post_text": "In the case Semenya v. Switzerland [GC], 2025, §§ 128-35, the applicant, a professional athlete, complained about the dismissal, by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, of a civil-law appeal she had made against the award of the Court of Arbitration for Sport rejecting her complaint concerning non- State regulations requiring her to lower her natural testosterone level in order to compete in the woman's category in international competitions. The Court confirmed the principle, established in Markovic and Others v. Italy [GC], 2006, §§ 53-54, according to which, even if the facts giving rise to a case took place outside the territory of the respondent State, the latter's jurisdiction is established from the moment an individual brings a civil action before the courts of that State when domestic law recognises the possibility of bringing such an action and, a priori, the right claimed has the characteristics required by that provision. In the context of this civil action, the person concerned therefore falls within the jurisdiction of that State with regard to respect of the rights guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. However, the reasoning set out above applies only to procedural obligations that are autonomous and separable from the substantive aspect of the case (another example being the procedural aspect of Article 2 relating to the right to life; see Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey [GC], 2019, §§ 188-89). The Court emphasised that it is only in very exceptional circumstances that it may conclude that a State has extraterritorial jurisdiction over the substantive aspect of such a case. With regard, in particular, to the criterion of \"control over the person of the applicant\" as the basis for establishing the extraterritorial jurisdiction of a State within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, the Court specified that this requires control over the person of the applicant himself and not simply \"control over his interests protected by the Convention\". It considered that the absence of any other remedies at the applicant's disposal was not a sufficient argument to create a jurisdictional link ( Semenya v. Switzerland [GC], 2025, § 150).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250604184157/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20251202174715/https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/Admissibility_guide_ENG", @@ -4397,6 +4663,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-02", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json", "case_key": "apps:79549/16", "case_name": "Taşdemir v. Türkiye (dec.)", @@ -4430,6 +4698,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-02", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json", "case_key": "apps:76634/16", "case_name": "Wulffaert and Wulffaert Beheer NV v. Belgium", @@ -4463,6 +4733,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:20725/20", "case_name": "Allée v. France", @@ -4496,6 +4768,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:39822/98", "case_name": "Altın v. Turkey (dec.)", @@ -4529,6 +4803,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:30655/09", "case_name": "Ana Ioniţă v. Romania", @@ -4562,6 +4838,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:20755/08", "case_name": "Azadliq and Zayidov v. Azerbaijan", @@ -4595,6 +4873,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:28369/07", "case_name": "Balenović v. Croatia (dec.)", @@ -4628,6 +4908,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:49001/07", "case_name": "Bathellier v. France (dec.)", @@ -4661,6 +4943,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:77419/16", "case_name": "Biancardi v. Italy", @@ -4694,6 +4978,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:9602/18", "case_name": "Bild GmbH & Co. KG v. Germany", @@ -4712,7 +4998,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.B.2.b.§49.§51.§54|a:None|b:263", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "In the case of Bild GmbH & Co. KG v. Germany, 2023, a news outlet shared unblurred CCTV footage of a police officer using force during an arrest but did not allege any misconduct on the part of the officer. Tthe Court observed that, in the absence of such misconduct allegations, civil servants retain a legitimate interest in protecting their private life against false portrayals of abuse of office. Therefore, courts should balance the relevant public interest against the specific adverse consequences that publication of an officer's image may have on his or her private or family life (§ 35). Such balancing must take place regardless of whether the coverage is positive or negative, since in any case the public has an interest in news coverage of police use of force (§ 42).", + "post_text": "In the case of Bild GmbH & Co. KG v. Germany, 2023, a news outlet shared unblurred CCTVfootage of a police officer using force during an arrest but did not allege any misconduct on the part of the officer. Tthe Court observed that, in the absence of such misconduct allegations, civil servants retain a legitimate interest in protecting their private life against false portrayals of abuse of office. Therefore, courts should balance the relevant public interest against the specific adverse consequences that publication of an officer's image may have on his or her private or family life (§ 35). Such balancing must take place regardless of whether the coverage is positive or negative, since in any case the public has an interest in news coverage of police use of force (§ 42).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230912000014/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_10_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930062921/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_10_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1900da194ee4/20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf", @@ -4727,6 +5013,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:13003/04", "case_name": "Catalan v. Romania", @@ -4760,6 +5048,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:48340/20", "case_name": "Dede c. Türkiye", @@ -4793,6 +5083,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:15158/19", "case_name": "Drozd v. Poland", @@ -4826,6 +5118,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:84048/17|84051/17", "case_name": "Eigirdas and VĮ \"Demokratijos plėtros fondas\" v. Lithuania", @@ -4859,6 +5153,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:27926/21", "case_name": "Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain", @@ -4892,6 +5188,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:30237/18", "case_name": "Gapoņenko v. Latvia (dec.)", @@ -4925,6 +5223,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:67783/13", "case_name": "Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2)", @@ -4943,7 +5243,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A|a:None|b:30|III.A|a:None|b:64|XI.A|a:None|b:567|XI.A|a:None|b:568|XI.B.2|a:None|b:590", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "The Court would not exclude the possibility that certain categories of expression may not be covered by the protection of Article 10 of the Convention. In particular, an offensive statement may fall outside the protection of freedom of expression where its sole intent is to insult. (Rujak v. Croatia (dec.), §§ 27-32). However, it is only by a careful examination of the context in which the offending, insulting or aggressive words appear that one can draw a meaningful distinction between shocking and offensive language which is protected by Article 10 of the Convention and language which amounts to wanton denigration - for example, where the sole intent of the offensive statement is to insult - thereby falling outside the protection of Article 10 (Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023, § 27). In particular, the Court found that the expressions, which the domestic authorities had considered to have been gratuitously offensive and insulting towards the national flag, fell within the scope of Article 10 (Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, 2023, § 20).\n\nFor example, the following situations may be considered under the Court's case-law as forms of interference with the right to freedom of expression: ▪ a criminal conviction (Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], § 59), combined with a fine (Kasabova v. Bulgaria, 2011; Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023) or imprisonment (Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania [GC], 2004); ▪ an order to pay damages (Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, § 51), even where these are symbolic (Paturel v. France, § 49); ▪ a conviction, even where execution is suspended (Otegi Mondragon v. Spain, § 60); ▪ the mere fact of having been investigated in criminal proceedings, or the real risk of being investigated on the basis of legislation that had been unclearly drafted and was also interpreted unclearly by the national courts (Altuğ Taner Akçam v. Turkey, 2011); ▪ a prohibition on publication (Cumhuriyet Vakfı and Others v. Turkey, 2013); ▪ the confiscation of a publication (Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976); ▪ seizure by the prison administration of newspapers and magazines sent to an imprisoned applicant by his relatives, and of a radio in his possession (Rodionov v. Russia); ▪ a refusal to grant a broadcasting frequency (Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy); ▪ a judicial decision preventing a person from receiving transmissions from telecommunications satellites (Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden, 2008, § 32); ▪ a ban on an advertisement (Barthold v. Germany, 1985); ▪ an order to disclose journalistic sources (Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, 1996), even where the order has not been enforced (Financial Times Ltd and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2009, § 56) or where the source has already come forward and the journalist was compelled to give evidence against him (Becker v. Norway, 2017); ▪ the refusal to grant authorisation to film inside a prison when preparing a television programme and to interview one of the detainees (Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft SRG v. Switzerland); the refusal to grant access to a reception centre for asylum seekers to obtain statements about the living conditions therein (Szurovecz v. Hungary); ▪ the arrest and detention of protestors (Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom, § 92; Açık and Others v. Turkey, 2009, § 40); ▪ written warnings sent by the prosecutor's office to the officials of an NGO which had organised public demonstrations against a law (Karastelev and Others v. Russia, 2020, §§ 70-76); ▪ withdrawal of accreditation to study archives, used by a journalist in preparing press articles (Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020, § 55); ▪ withdrawal of the applicant's parliamentary immunity through the constitutional amendment (Kerestecioğlu Demir v. Turkey, 2021, § 67); ▪ a caution issued by a mass-media regulator in respect of a publisher, a non-governmental organisation, and the founder, a joint-stock company, for dissemination of \"extremist material\" in relation to an article with quotations from a manifesto of a controversial nationalist group and with symbols resembling Nazi symbols (RID Novaya Gazeta and ZAO Novaya Gazeta v. Russia, §§ 60-66); ▪ revocation of broadcasting licence of a TV channel (NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], § 150); ▪ deletion by an appellate court of certain statements made by the applicant's lawyer in written submissions before that court (Sàrl Gator v. Monaco, § 38).\n\nAs a matter of general principle, the \"necessity\" of any restriction on the exercise of freedom of expression must be convincingly established (Sürek and Özdemir v. Turkey [GC], § 57; Dilipak v. Turkey, 2015, § 63; Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023, § 25). The Court must determine whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify the restriction are \"relevant and sufficient\" (Barthold v. Germany, 1985, § 55; Lingens v. Austria, § 40; Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023, § 26).\n\nWith particular regard to the disclosure of information received in confidence, the Court has emphasised that the concepts of \"national security\" and \"public safety\" need to be applied with restraint and to be interpreted restrictively and should be brought into play only where it has been 15 See also the Case-law Guide on Terrorism. shown to be necessary to suppress release of the information for the purposes of protecting national security and public safety (Stoll v. Switzerland [GC], § 54; Görmüş and Others v. Turkey, 2016, § 37). Likewise, in the context of cases concerning expression alleged to stir up, promote or justify violence, hatred or intolerance, the Court has considered that the legitimate aim of \"prevention of disorder\" may not be invoked unless it has been demonstrated that the impugned statements statements were capable of leading or actually led to disorder - for instance in the form of public disturbances - and that in acting to suppress them, the relevant authorities had that in mind (Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], §§ 152-153; compare also Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023, § 30; and contrast Sanchez v. France [GC], § 144).\n\nIn the case of Savva Terentyev v. Russia, concerning the imposition of a prison sentence on a blogger convicted of offensive comments on the Internet against police officers, the Court noted the offensive, insulting and virulent wording of the applicant's comments. However, it considered that these statements could not be regarded as an attempt to incite hatred or provoke violence against the police officers and thus as posing a clear and imminent danger which would have required the applicant's conviction. The Court stressed, in particular, that the applicant was neither a well-known blogger or a popular user of social media and that, accordingly, he did not have the status of an influential figure (§ 81). In a similar context where the use of derogatory language was at stake, the Court stressed that, although certain remarks may be perceived as offensive or insulting by particular individuals or groups, such sentiments, albeit understandable, could not alone set the limits of freedom of expression. It is only by a careful examination of the context in which the offending, insulting or aggressive words appear that one can draw a meaningful distinction between shocking and offensive language which is protected by Article 10 of the Convention and language which amounts to wanton denigration - for example, where the sole intent of the offensive statement is to insult - thereby falling outside the protection of freedom of expression. (Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023, §§ 27-29).", + "post_text": "The Court would not exclude the possibility that certain categories of expression may not be covered by the protection of Article 10 of the Convention. In particular, an offensive statement may fall outside the protection of freedom of expression where its sole intent is to insult. (Rujak v. Croatia (dec.), §§ 27-32). However, it is only by a careful examination of the context in which the offending, insulting or aggressive words appear that one can draw a meaningful distinction between shocking and offensive language which is protected by Article 10 of the Convention and language which amounts to wanton denigration - for example, where the sole intent of the offensive statement is to insult - thereby falling outside the protection of Article 10 (Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023, § 27). In particular, the Court found that the expressions, which the domestic authorities had considered to have been gratuitously offensive and insulting towards the national flag, fell within the scope of Article 10 (Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, 2023, § 20).\n\nFor example, the following situations may be considered under the Court's case-law as forms of interference with the right to freedom of expression: ▪ a criminal conviction (Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], § 59), combined with a fine (Kasabova v. Bulgaria, 2011; Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023) or imprisonment (Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania [GC], 2004); ▪ an order to pay damages (Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, § 51), even where these are symbolic (Paturel v. France, § 49); ▪ a conviction, even where execution is suspended (Otegi Mondragon v. Spain, § 60); ▪ the mere fact of having been investigated in criminal proceedings, or the real risk of being investigated on the basis of legislation that had been unclearly drafted and was also interpreted unclearly by the national courts (Altuğ Taner Akçam v. Turkey, 2011); ▪ a prohibition on publication (Cumhuriyet Vakfı and Others v. Turkey, 2013); ▪ the confiscation of a publication (Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976); ▪ seizure by the prison administration of newspapers and magazines sent to an imprisoned applicant by his relatives, and of a radio in his possession (Rodionov v. Russia); ▪ a refusal to grant a broadcasting frequency (Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy); ▪ a judicial decision preventing a person from receiving transmissions from telecommunications satellites (Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden, 2008, § 32); ▪ a ban on an advertisement (Barthold v. Germany, 1985); ▪ an order to disclose journalistic sources (Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, 1996), even where the order has not been enforced (Financial Times Ltd and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2009, § 56) or where the source has already come forward and the journalist was compelled to give evidence against him (Becker v. Norway, 2017); ▪ the refusal to grant authorisation to film inside a prison when preparing a television programme and to interview one of the detainees (Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft SRG v. Switzerland); the refusal to grant access to a reception centre for asylum seekers to obtain statements about the living conditions therein (Szurovecz v. Hungary); ▪ the arrest and detention of protestors (Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom, § 92; Açık and Others v. Turkey, 2009, § 40); ▪ written warnings sent by the prosecutor's office to the officials of an NGOwhich had organised public demonstrations against a law (Karastelev and Others v. Russia, 2020, §§ 70-76); ▪ withdrawal of accreditation to study archives, used by a journalist in preparing press articles (Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020, § 55); ▪ withdrawal of the applicant's parliamentary immunity through the constitutional amendment (Kerestecioğlu Demir v. Turkey, 2021, § 67); ▪ a caution issued by a mass-media regulator in respect of a publisher, a non-governmental organisation, and the founder, a joint-stock company, for dissemination of \"extremist material\" in relation to an article with quotations from a manifesto of a controversial nationalist group and with symbols resembling Nazi symbols (RID Novaya Gazeta and ZAO Novaya Gazeta v. Russia, §§ 60-66); ▪ revocation of broadcasting licence of a TVchannel (NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], § 150); ▪ deletion by an appellate court of certain statements made by the applicant's lawyer in written submissions before that court (Sàrl Gator v. Monaco, § 38).\n\nAs a matter of general principle, the \"necessity\" of any restriction on the exercise of freedom of expression must be convincingly established (Sürek and Özdemir v. Turkey [GC], § 57; Dilipak v. Turkey, 2015, § 63; Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023, § 25). The Court must determine whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify the restriction are \"relevant and sufficient\" (Barthold v. Germany, 1985, § 55; Lingens v. Austria, § 40; Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023, § 26).\n\nWith particular regard to the disclosure of information received in confidence, the Court has emphasised that the concepts of \"national security\" and \"public safety\" need to be applied with restraint and to be interpreted restrictively and should be brought into play only where it has been 15 See also the Case-law Guide on Terrorism. shown to be necessary to suppress release of the information for the purposes of protecting national security and public safety (Stoll v. Switzerland [GC], § 54; Görmüş and Others v. Turkey, 2016, § 37). Likewise, in the context of cases concerning expression alleged to stir up, promote or justify violence, hatred or intolerance, the Court has considered that the legitimate aim of \"prevention of disorder\" may not be invoked unless it has been demonstrated that the impugned statements statements were capable of leading or actually led to disorder - for instance in the form of public disturbances - and that in acting to suppress them, the relevant authorities had that in mind (Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], §§ 152-153; compare also Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023, § 30; and contrast Sanchez v. France [GC], § 144).\n\nIn the case of Savva Terentyev v. Russia, concerning the imposition of a prison sentence on a blogger convicted of offensive comments on the Internet against police officers, the Court noted the offensive, insulting and virulent wording of the applicant's comments. However, it considered that these statements could not be regarded as an attempt to incite hatred or provoke violence against the police officers and thus as posing a clear and imminent danger which would have required the applicant's conviction. The Court stressed, in particular, that the applicant was neither a well-known blogger or a popular user of social media and that, accordingly, he did not have the status of an influential figure (§ 81). In a similar context where the use of derogatory language was at stake, the Court stressed that, although certain remarks may be perceived as offensive or insulting by particular individuals or groups, such sentiments, albeit understandable, could not alone set the limits of freedom of expression. It is only by a careful examination of the context in which the offending, insulting or aggressive words appear that one can draw a meaningful distinction between shocking and offensive language which is protected by Article 10 of the Convention and language which amounts to wanton denigration - for example, where the sole intent of the offensive statement is to insult - thereby falling outside the protection of freedom of expression. (Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023, §§ 27-29).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230912000014/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_10_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930062921/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_10_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1900da194ee4/20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf", @@ -4958,6 +5258,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:1519/20", "case_name": "Glukhin v. Russia", @@ -4991,6 +5293,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:48135/08", "case_name": "Gollnisch v. France (dec.)", @@ -5024,6 +5328,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:965/12", "case_name": "Guz v. Poland", @@ -5057,6 +5363,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:57292/16", "case_name": "Hurbain v. Belgium [GC]", @@ -5090,6 +5398,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:8696/09", "case_name": "Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.)", @@ -5123,6 +5433,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:25285/15", "case_name": "Karaca v. Türkiye", @@ -5156,6 +5468,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:26870/04", "case_name": "Kern v. German (dec.)", @@ -5189,6 +5503,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:9406/05", "case_name": "Kunitsyna v. Russia", @@ -5222,6 +5538,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:64659/11|24133/13", "case_name": "Makraduli v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", @@ -5255,6 +5573,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:26360/19", "case_name": "Manole v. the Republic of Moldova", @@ -5288,6 +5608,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:36705/16", "case_name": "Margari v. Greece", @@ -5321,6 +5643,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:51706/11", "case_name": "Marunić v. Croatia", @@ -5354,6 +5678,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:45066/17", "case_name": "Mesić v. Croatia (no. 2)", @@ -5387,6 +5713,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:24108/15", "case_name": "Mestan v. Bulgaria", @@ -5420,6 +5748,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:40072/13", "case_name": "Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria", @@ -5453,6 +5783,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:80857/17", "case_name": "Mitov and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.)", @@ -5486,6 +5818,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:27574/02", "case_name": "Otto v. Germany (dec.)", @@ -5519,6 +5853,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:28955/06|28957/06|28959/06|28964/06", "case_name": "Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC]", @@ -5552,6 +5888,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:64209/01", "case_name": "Peev v. Bulgaria", @@ -5585,6 +5923,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:39793/98", "case_name": "Petersen v. Germany (dec.)", @@ -5618,6 +5958,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:67369/16", "case_name": "Radio Broadcasting Company B92 AD v. Serbia", @@ -5651,6 +5993,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:23443/23", "case_name": "Ramadan v. France (dec.)", @@ -5684,6 +6028,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:5420/16", "case_name": "Rogalski v. Poland", @@ -5717,6 +6063,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:57942/10", "case_name": "Rujak v. Croatia (dec.)", @@ -5750,6 +6098,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:45581/15", "case_name": "Sanchez v. France [GC]", @@ -5768,7 +6118,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.B|a:8|b:8|III.B.1|a:None|b:70|III.B.1|a:None|b:71|XI.A|a:None|b:568|XI.A|a:None|b:569|XIII.A.1|a:None|b:668|XIII.B.1|a:None|b:682|XIII.B.7|a:None|b:715", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "Indissociable from democracy, freedom of expression is enshrined in a number of national, European1, international and regional2 instruments which promote this political system, recognised as the only one capable of guaranteeing the protection of human rights. In its interpretation of Article 10 of the Convention, the Court has held that \"freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of [democratic] society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man\" (Handyside v. the United Kingdom, § 49).", - "post_text": "Indissociable from democracy, freedom of expression is enshrined in a number of national, European1, international and regional2 instruments which promote this political system, recognised as the only one capable of guaranteeing the protection of human rights. In its interpretation of Article 10 of the Convention, the Court has held that \"freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of [democratic] society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man\" (Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, § 49; Sanchez v. France [GC], § 145).\n\nThe Court has held that a norm cannot be regarded as a \"law\" unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his or her conduct and that he or she must be able - if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. However, it went on to state that these consequences do not need to be foreseeable with absolute certainty, as experience showed that to be unattainable (Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], § 131; Sanchez v. France [GC], § 125). Whilst certainty is desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity, and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice (Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], § 41; Bouton v. France, 2022, § 33; Sanchez v. France [GC], § 125). A margin of doubt in relation to borderline facts does not therefore,,,of itself, make a legal provision unforeseeable in its application. Nor does the mere fact that a provision is capable of more than one construction mean that it fails to meet the requirement of \"foreseeability\" for the purposes of the Convention. The role of adjudication, vested in the courts, serves precisely to dissipate such interpretational doubts as remain, taking into account the changes in everyday practice (ibid., § 126).\n\nThe Court has also considered that an individual cannot claim that a legal provision lacks foreseeability simply because it is applied for the first time in his or her case (Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], § 150; Tête v. France, § 52; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, § 58). Thus, the Court found that the application of legal provisions, on the basis of which the applicant, a politician, had been convicted in criminal proceedings as a \"producer\" for third-party comments posted on the \"wall\" of his personal Facebook account, had met the \"quality of law\" requirements (Sanchez v. France [GC], §§ 132-142).\n\nWith particular regard to the disclosure of information received in confidence, the Court has emphasised that the concepts of \"national security\" and \"public safety\" need to be applied with restraint and to be interpreted restrictively and should be brought into play only where it has been 15 See also the Case-law Guide on Terrorism. shown to be necessary to suppress release of the information for the purposes of protecting national security and public safety (Stoll v. Switzerland [GC], § 54; Görmüş and Others v. Turkey, 2016, § 37). Likewise, in the context of cases concerning expression alleged to stir up, promote or justify violence, hatred or intolerance, the Court has considered that the legitimate aim of \"prevention of disorder\" may not be invoked unless it has been demonstrated that the impugned statements statements were capable of leading or actually led to disorder - for instance in the form of public disturbances - and that in acting to suppress them, the relevant authorities had that in mind (Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], §§ 152-153; compare also Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023, § 30; and contrast Sanchez v. France [GC], § 144).\n\nOn the one hand, the Court has consistently held that there is little scope under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention for restrictions on political speech or debate (Brasilier v. France, 2006, § 41; Sanchez v. France [GC], § 146) or on debate on matters of public interest (Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC], § 61; Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], § 46; Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, § 58).\n\nThe Court has noted on several occasions that user-generated expressive activity on the Internet provides an unprecedented platform for the exercise of freedom of expression (Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], 2015, § 110; Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, 2015, § 52; Sanchez v. France [GC], § 159), holding that, in view of its accessibility and its capacity to store and communicate vast amounts of information, the Internet plays an important role in enhancing the public's access to news and facilitating the dissemination of information generally (Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], 2015, § 133; Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (no. 1 and no. 2), § 27).\n\nThe general principles applicable to offline publications also apply online. For example: - the Court considers that where private or personal information is published on the Internet, such as a person's name or a description of them, the need to preserve confidentiality in this regard can no longer constitute an overriding requirement, in that this information has ceased to be confidential and is in the public domain. In such cases, it is the protection of family life and reputation which comes to the fore and must be ensured (Aleksey Ovchinnikov v. Russia, 2010, §§ 49-50); - the Court found that a webmaster's criminal conviction for public insult against a mayor in respect of comments published on the Internet site of an association chaired by him had been excessive, noting in particular that the comments in question related to expression by the representative body of an association, which was conveying the claims made by its members on a subject of general interest in the context of challenging a municipal policy (Renaud v. France, § 40); - equally, the Court found a breach of the Convention where an NGO was held liable for having described a politician's speech as \"verbal racism\" (GRA Stiftung gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus v. Switzerland, 2018); - in contrast, although animal and environmental protection is undeniably in the public interest, the Court held that it had been proportionate to issue an injunction which prevented an animal rights organisation from publishing on the Internet a poster campaign featuring photos of concentration camp inmates alongside pictures of animals reared in intensive farming conditions (PETA Deutschland v. Germany); - in addition, whatever the medium used, statements which incite to racial discrimination and hatred do not enjoy the protection offered by Article 10 § 2; the Court has held that the conviction of a website's owner - who was also a politician - for disseminating xenophobic comments corresponded to the pressing social need to protect the rights of the immigrant community (Féret v. Belgium, 2009, § 78; see also Willem v. France, concerning the conviction of an elected representative for comments inciting to discrimination, which were repeated on the municipality's website; and Sanchez v. France [GC], concerning a criminal conviction of a politician for xenophobic remarks posted by third persons on the \"wall\" of his persona Facebook account during an election campaign); - equally, the online publication of personal attacks which go beyond a legitimate battle of ideas are not protected by Article 10 § 2 (Tierbefreier e.V. v. Germany, § 56).\n\nIn the case of Sanchez v. France [GC] the Court addressed, for the first time, the question of the liability of users of social networks on account of comments by third parties. In this case, the applicant a politician, was held criminal liable for xenophobic remarks posted by other users on the \"wall\" of his personal Facebook account during an election campaign. The Court underlined, in particular, that the applicant's Facebook \"wall\" was not comparable to a \"large professionally managed Internet news portal run on a commercial basis\", and rather approached the case in the light of \"duties and responsibilities\" attributable to politicians when they decided use social networks for political purposes, in particular for an election campaign, by opening fora that were accessible to the public on the Internet in order to receive their reactions and comments (§ 180). In this context, the Court emphasised the fact that an account holder could not claim any right to impunity in his or her use of electronic resources made available on the Internet and that such a person had a duty to act within the confines of conduct that could reasonably be expected of him or her (§ 190). In the latter connection, a degree of notoriety was a relevant factor: a private individual of limited notoriety and representativeness would have fewer duties than a local politician and a candidate standing for election to local office, who in turn would have a lesser burden than a national figure for whom the requirements would necessarily be even heavier, on account of the weight and scope accorded to his or her words and the resources to which he or she would enjoy greater access in order to intervene efficiently on social media platforms (§ 201).", + "post_text": "Indissociable from democracy, freedom of expression is enshrined in a number of national, European1, international and regional2 instruments which promote this political system, recognised as the only one capable of guaranteeing the protection of human rights. In its interpretation of Article 10 of the Convention, the Court has held that \"freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of [democratic] society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man\" (Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, § 49; Sanchez v. France [GC], § 145).\n\nThe Court has held that a norm cannot be regarded as a \"law\" unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his or her conduct and that he or she must be able - if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. However, it went on to state that these consequences do not need to be foreseeable with absolute certainty, as experience showed that to be unattainable (Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], § 131; Sanchez v. France [GC], § 125). Whilst certainty is desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity, and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice (Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], § 41; Bouton v. France, 2022, § 33; Sanchez v. France [GC], § 125). Amargin of doubt in relation to borderline facts does not therefore,,,of itself, make a legal provision unforeseeable in its application. Nor does the mere fact that a provision is capable of more than one construction mean that it fails to meet the requirement of \"foreseeability\" for the purposes of the Convention. The role of adjudication, vested in the courts, serves precisely to dissipate such interpretational doubts as remain, taking into account the changes in everyday practice (ibid., § 126).\n\nThe Court has also considered that an individual cannot claim that a legal provision lacks foreseeability simply because it is applied for the first time in his or her case (Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], § 150; Tête v. France, § 52; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, § 58). Thus, the Court found that the application of legal provisions, on the basis of which the applicant, a politician, had been convicted in criminal proceedings as a \"producer\" for third-party comments posted on the \"wall\" of his personal Facebook account, had met the \"quality of law\" requirements (Sanchez v. France [GC], §§ 132-142).\n\nWith particular regard to the disclosure of information received in confidence, the Court has emphasised that the concepts of \"national security\" and \"public safety\" need to be applied with restraint and to be interpreted restrictively and should be brought into play only where it has been 15 See also the Case-law Guide on Terrorism. shown to be necessary to suppress release of the information for the purposes of protecting national security and public safety (Stoll v. Switzerland [GC], § 54; Görmüş and Others v. Turkey, 2016, § 37). Likewise, in the context of cases concerning expression alleged to stir up, promote or justify violence, hatred or intolerance, the Court has considered that the legitimate aim of \"prevention of disorder\" may not be invoked unless it has been demonstrated that the impugned statements statements were capable of leading or actually led to disorder - for instance in the form of public disturbances - and that in acting to suppress them, the relevant authorities had that in mind (Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], §§ 152-153; compare also Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023, § 30; and contrast Sanchez v. France [GC], § 144).\n\nOn the one hand, the Court has consistently held that there is little scope under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention for restrictions on political speech or debate (Brasilier v. France, 2006, § 41; Sanchez v. France [GC], § 146) or on debate on matters of public interest (Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC], § 61; Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], § 46; Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, § 58).\n\nThe Court has noted on several occasions that user-generated expressive activity on the Internet provides an unprecedented platform for the exercise of freedom of expression (Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], 2015, § 110; Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, 2015, § 52; Sanchez v. France [GC], § 159), holding that, in view of its accessibility and its capacity to store and communicate vast amounts of information, the Internet plays an important role in enhancing the public's access to news and facilitating the dissemination of information generally (Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], 2015, § 133; Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (no. 1 and no. 2), § 27).\n\nThe general principles applicable to offline publications also apply online. For example: - the Court considers that where private or personal information is published on the Internet, such as a person's name or a description of them, the need to preserve confidentiality in this regard can no longer constitute an overriding requirement, in that this information has ceased to be confidential and is in the public domain. In such cases, it is the protection of family life and reputation which comes to the fore and must be ensured (Aleksey Ovchinnikov v. Russia, 2010, §§ 49-50); - the Court found that a webmaster's criminal conviction for public insult against a mayor in respect of comments published on the Internet site of an association chaired by him had been excessive, noting in particular that the comments in question related to expression by the representative body of an association, which was conveying the claims made by its members on a subject of general interest in the context of challenging a municipal policy (Renaud v. France, § 40); - equally, the Court found a breach of the Convention where an NGOwas held liable for having described a politician's speech as \"verbal racism\" (GRA Stiftung gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus v. Switzerland, 2018); - in contrast, although animal and environmental protection is undeniably in the public interest, the Court held that it had been proportionate to issue an injunction which prevented an animal rights organisation from publishing on the Internet a poster campaign featuring photos of concentration camp inmates alongside pictures of animals reared in intensive farming conditions (PETA Deutschland v. Germany); - in addition, whatever the medium used, statements which incite to racial discrimination and hatred do not enjoy the protection offered by Article 10 § 2; the Court has held that the conviction of a website's owner - who was also a politician - for disseminating xenophobic comments corresponded to the pressing social need to protect the rights of the immigrant community (Féret v. Belgium, 2009, § 78; see also Willem v. France, concerning the conviction of an elected representative for comments inciting to discrimination, which were repeated on the municipality's website; and Sanchez v. France [GC], concerning a criminal conviction of a politician for xenophobic remarks posted by third persons on the \"wall\" of his persona Facebook account during an election campaign); - equally, the online publication of personal attacks which go beyond a legitimate battle of ideas are not protected by Article 10 § 2 (Tierbefreier e.V. v. Germany, § 56).\n\nIn the case of Sanchez v. France [GC] the Court addressed, for the first time, the question of the liability of users of social networks on account of comments by third parties. In this case, the applicant a politician, was held criminal liable for xenophobic remarks posted by other users on the \"wall\" of his personal Facebook account during an election campaign. The Court underlined, in particular, that the applicant's Facebook \"wall\" was not comparable to a \"large professionally managed Internet news portal run on a commercial basis\", and rather approached the case in the light of \"duties and responsibilities\" attributable to politicians when they decided use social networks for political purposes, in particular for an election campaign, by opening fora that were accessible to the public on the Internet in order to receive their reactions and comments (§ 180). In this context, the Court emphasised the fact that an account holder could not claim any right to impunity in his or her use of electronic resources made available on the Internet and that such a person had a duty to act within the confines of conduct that could reasonably be expected of him or her (§ 190). In the latter connection, a degree of notoriety was a relevant factor: a private individual of limited notoriety and representativeness would have fewer duties than a local politician and a candidate standing for election to local office, who in turn would have a lesser burden than a national figure for whom the requirements would necessarily be even heavier, on account of the weight and scope accorded to his or her words and the resources to which he or she would enjoy greater access in order to intervene efficiently on social media platforms (§ 201).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230912000014/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_10_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930062921/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_10_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1900da194ee4/20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf", @@ -5783,6 +6133,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:18287/18", "case_name": "Sàrl Gator v. Monaco", @@ -5801,7 +6153,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.A|a:None|b:64", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "For example, the following situations may be considered under the Court's case-law as forms of interference with the right to freedom of expression: ▪ a criminal conviction (Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], § 59), combined with a fine (Kasabova v. Bulgaria, 2011; Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023) or imprisonment (Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania [GC], 2004); ▪ an order to pay damages (Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, § 51), even where these are symbolic (Paturel v. France, § 49); ▪ a conviction, even where execution is suspended (Otegi Mondragon v. Spain, § 60); ▪ the mere fact of having been investigated in criminal proceedings, or the real risk of being investigated on the basis of legislation that had been unclearly drafted and was also interpreted unclearly by the national courts (Altuğ Taner Akçam v. Turkey, 2011); ▪ a prohibition on publication (Cumhuriyet Vakfı and Others v. Turkey, 2013); ▪ the confiscation of a publication (Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976); ▪ seizure by the prison administration of newspapers and magazines sent to an imprisoned applicant by his relatives, and of a radio in his possession (Rodionov v. Russia); ▪ a refusal to grant a broadcasting frequency (Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy); ▪ a judicial decision preventing a person from receiving transmissions from telecommunications satellites (Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden, 2008, § 32); ▪ a ban on an advertisement (Barthold v. Germany, 1985); ▪ an order to disclose journalistic sources (Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, 1996), even where the order has not been enforced (Financial Times Ltd and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2009, § 56) or where the source has already come forward and the journalist was compelled to give evidence against him (Becker v. Norway, 2017); ▪ the refusal to grant authorisation to film inside a prison when preparing a television programme and to interview one of the detainees (Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft SRG v. Switzerland); the refusal to grant access to a reception centre for asylum seekers to obtain statements about the living conditions therein (Szurovecz v. Hungary); ▪ the arrest and detention of protestors (Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom, § 92; Açık and Others v. Turkey, 2009, § 40); ▪ written warnings sent by the prosecutor's office to the officials of an NGO which had organised public demonstrations against a law (Karastelev and Others v. Russia, 2020, §§ 70-76); ▪ withdrawal of accreditation to study archives, used by a journalist in preparing press articles (Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020, § 55); ▪ withdrawal of the applicant's parliamentary immunity through the constitutional amendment (Kerestecioğlu Demir v. Turkey, 2021, § 67); ▪ a caution issued by a mass-media regulator in respect of a publisher, a non-governmental organisation, and the founder, a joint-stock company, for dissemination of \"extremist material\" in relation to an article with quotations from a manifesto of a controversial nationalist group and with symbols resembling Nazi symbols (RID Novaya Gazeta and ZAO Novaya Gazeta v. Russia, §§ 60-66); ▪ revocation of broadcasting licence of a TV channel (NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], § 150); ▪ deletion by an appellate court of certain statements made by the applicant's lawyer in written submissions before that court (Sàrl Gator v. Monaco, § 38).", + "post_text": "For example, the following situations may be considered under the Court's case-law as forms of interference with the right to freedom of expression: ▪ a criminal conviction (Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], § 59), combined with a fine (Kasabova v. Bulgaria, 2011; Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023) or imprisonment (Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania [GC], 2004); ▪ an order to pay damages (Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, § 51), even where these are symbolic (Paturel v. France, § 49); ▪ a conviction, even where execution is suspended (Otegi Mondragon v. Spain, § 60); ▪ the mere fact of having been investigated in criminal proceedings, or the real risk of being investigated on the basis of legislation that had been unclearly drafted and was also interpreted unclearly by the national courts (Altuğ Taner Akçam v. Turkey, 2011); ▪ a prohibition on publication (Cumhuriyet Vakfı and Others v. Turkey, 2013); ▪ the confiscation of a publication (Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976); ▪ seizure by the prison administration of newspapers and magazines sent to an imprisoned applicant by his relatives, and of a radio in his possession (Rodionov v. Russia); ▪ a refusal to grant a broadcasting frequency (Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy); ▪ a judicial decision preventing a person from receiving transmissions from telecommunications satellites (Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden, 2008, § 32); ▪ a ban on an advertisement (Barthold v. Germany, 1985); ▪ an order to disclose journalistic sources (Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, 1996), even where the order has not been enforced (Financial Times Ltd and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2009, § 56) or where the source has already come forward and the journalist was compelled to give evidence against him (Becker v. Norway, 2017); ▪ the refusal to grant authorisation to film inside a prison when preparing a television programme and to interview one of the detainees (Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft SRG v. Switzerland); the refusal to grant access to a reception centre for asylum seekers to obtain statements about the living conditions therein (Szurovecz v. Hungary); ▪ the arrest and detention of protestors (Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom, § 92; Açık and Others v. Turkey, 2009, § 40); ▪ written warnings sent by the prosecutor's office to the officials of an NGOwhich had organised public demonstrations against a law (Karastelev and Others v. Russia, 2020, §§ 70-76); ▪ withdrawal of accreditation to study archives, used by a journalist in preparing press articles (Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020, § 55); ▪ withdrawal of the applicant's parliamentary immunity through the constitutional amendment (Kerestecioğlu Demir v. Turkey, 2021, § 67); ▪ a caution issued by a mass-media regulator in respect of a publisher, a non-governmental organisation, and the founder, a joint-stock company, for dissemination of \"extremist material\" in relation to an article with quotations from a manifesto of a controversial nationalist group and with symbols resembling Nazi symbols (RID Novaya Gazeta and ZAO Novaya Gazeta v. Russia, §§ 60-66); ▪ revocation of broadcasting licence of a TVchannel (NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], § 150); ▪ deletion by an appellate court of certain statements made by the applicant's lawyer in written submissions before that court (Sàrl Gator v. Monaco, § 38).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230912000014/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_10_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930062921/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_10_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1900da194ee4/20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf", @@ -5816,6 +6168,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:29856/13", "case_name": "SIC - Sociedade Independente de Comunicação v. Portugal", @@ -5849,6 +6203,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:11002/07", "case_name": "Skwirut v. Poland (dec.)", @@ -5882,6 +6238,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:20422/15", "case_name": "Staniszewski v. Poland", @@ -5915,6 +6273,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:46396/14", "case_name": "Udovychenko v. Ukraine", @@ -5948,6 +6308,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:36658/18", "case_name": "Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria", @@ -5981,6 +6343,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:50495/08", "case_name": "Altintaş v. Turkey", @@ -6014,6 +6378,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:53628/10", "case_name": "Bartnik v. Poland (dec.) [committee]", @@ -6047,6 +6413,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:11854/85", "case_name": "Clavel v. Switzerland", @@ -6080,6 +6448,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:34896/97", "case_name": "Craxi v. Italy (no. 1)", @@ -6113,6 +6483,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:8918/05", "case_name": "Grebneva and Alisimchik v. Russia", @@ -6146,6 +6518,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:32849/96", "case_name": "Grupo Interpres SA v. Spain", @@ -6179,6 +6553,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:47238/19", "case_name": "Almeida Arroja v. Portugal", @@ -6212,6 +6588,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:20007/22", "case_name": "Bielau v. Austria", @@ -6245,6 +6623,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:2933/03", "case_name": "Cox v. Turkey", @@ -6278,6 +6658,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:15028/16", "case_name": "Hrachya Harutyunyan v. Armenia", @@ -6311,6 +6693,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:12174/22", "case_name": "Kirkorov v. Lithuania (dec.)", @@ -6329,7 +6713,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.A|a:None|b:63|XI.A|a:None|b:577", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "It is worth noting that Article 10 rights are secured \"regardless of frontiers\", that is no distinction shall be drawn between its exercise by nationals and foreigners. This principle implies that States may only restrict information received from abroad within the confines of the justifications set out in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention ( Cox v. Turkey, 2010, § 31; Kirkorov v. Lithuania (dec.), 2024, § 53).\n\nThe \"national security\" and \"public order\" aims have also been used to justify entry bans on foreigners. A popular Russian performer and producer was prohibited from entering Lithuania not because of isolated statements or speeches but because of the local authorities assessment that he was the Russian Federation 's \"tool of soft power\" ( Kirkorov v. Lithuania (dec.), 2024, § 59).", + "post_text": "It is worth noting that Article 10 rights are secured \"regardless of frontiers\", that is no distinction shall be drawn between its exercise by nationals and foreigners. This principle implies that States may only restrict information received from abroad within the confines of the justifications set out in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention ( Cox v. Turkey, 2010, § 31; Kirkorov v. Lithuania (dec.), 2024, § 53).\n\nThe \"national security\" and \"public order\" aims have also been used to justify entry bans on foreigners. Apopular Russian performer and producer was prohibited from entering Lithuania not because of isolated statements or speeches but because of the local authorities assessment that he was the Russian Federation 's \"tool of soft power\" ( Kirkorov v. Lithuania (dec.), 2024, § 59).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930062921/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_10_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250115221400/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_10_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1900da194ee4/20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf", @@ -6344,6 +6728,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:36681/23", "case_name": "Lutgen v. Luxembourg", @@ -6377,6 +6763,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:15076/17", "case_name": "Mária Somogyi v. Hungary", @@ -6410,6 +6798,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:13801/07", "case_name": "Marin Kostov v. Bulgaria", @@ -6443,6 +6833,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:15450/03", "case_name": "Müdür Duman v. Turkey", @@ -6476,6 +6868,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:42442/08", "case_name": "Mura v. Poland (dec.)", @@ -6509,6 +6903,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:15379/13", "case_name": "National Youth Council of Moldova v. the Republic of Moldova", @@ -6526,8 +6922,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "minor_edit|citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "V.A|a:314|b:315|XI.B.2|a:583|b:585", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Although the press is at the origin of the concept of \"public watchdog\", the Court also recognises that NGOs play the same role ( Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 103; Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], § 86; Cangi v. Turkey, 2019, § 35). In particular, the Court considers that the public watchdog role played by NGOs is \"of similar importance to that of the press\" ( Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 103; Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, § 89; Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary [GC], § 166). In the Court's view, in a comparable way to the press, an NGO performing a public watchdog role is likely to have greater impact when reporting on irregularities of public officials, and will often dispose of greater means of verifying and corroborating the veracity of criticism than would be the case of an individual reporting on what he or she has observed personally ( Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], § 87).\n\nAnother factor has been whether the statements, fairly construed and seen in their immediate or wider context, could be seen as a direct or indirect call for violence or as a justification of violence, hatred or intolerance ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], § 206; see, inter alia, Incal v. Turkey, 1998, § 50; Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC], § 62; Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, § 64; Gündüz v. Turkey, 2003, §§ 48 and 51; Soulas and Others v. France, §§ 39-41 and 43; Balsytė - Lideikienė v. Lithuania, 2008, §§ 79-80; Féret v. Belgium, 2009, §§ 69-73 and 78; Hizb ut-Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012, § 73; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 107-112; Fáber v. Hungary, 2012, §§ 52 and 56-58; Vona v. Hungary, §§ 64-67; Lilliendal v. Iceland (dec.), §§ 36-39).", - "post_text": "Although the press is at the origin of the concept of \"public watchdog\", the Court also recognises that NGOs play the same role ( Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 103; Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], 2017, § 86; Cangi v. Turkey, 2019, § 35; National Youth Council of Moldova v. the Republic of Moldova, 2024, § 73). In particular, the Court considers that the public watchdog role played by NGOs is \"of similar importance to that of the press\" ( Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 103; Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, 2005, § 89; Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 166). In the Court's view, in a comparable way to the press, an NGO performing a public watchdog role is likely to have greater impact when reporting on irregularities of public officials, and will often dispose of greater means of verifying and corroborating the veracity of criticism than would be the case of an individual reporting on what he or she has observed personally ( Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], 2017, § 87).\n\nAnother factor has been whether the statements, fairly construed and seen in their immediate or wider context, could be seen as a direct or indirect call for violence or as a justification of violence, hatred or intolerance ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, § 206; see, inter alia, Incal v. Turkey, 1998, § 50; Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC], 1999, § 62; Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, 2000, § 64; Gündüz v. Turkey, 2003, §§ 48 and 51; Soulas and Others v. France, 2008, §§ 39-41 and 43; Balsytė - Lideikienė v. Lithuania, 2008, §§ 79-80; Féret v. Belgium, 2009, §§ 69-73 and 78; Hizb ut-Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012, § 73; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 107-112; Fáber v. Hungary, 2012, §§ 52 and 56-58; Vona v. Hungary, 2013, §§ 64-67; Lilliendal v. Iceland (dec.), 2020, §§ 36-39). In particular, in the case of a purportedly offensive billboard advertisement published by an NGO, the Court has stated that it is important to look at the broader social context in which the advertisement was published. In this case, the Court found that there was no incitement to hatred or intolerance conveyed by the advertisement, and that it contained an intelligible albeit exaggerated anti-discrimination message ( National Youth Council of Moldova v. the Republic of Moldova, 2024, §§ 78-79).", + "pre_text": "Although the press is at the origin of the concept of \"public watchdog\", the Court also recognises that NGOs play the same role ( Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 103; Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], § 86; Cangi v. Turkey, 2019, § 35). In particular, the Court considers that the public watchdog role played by NGOs is \"of similar importance to that of the press\" ( Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 103; Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, § 89; Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary [GC], § 166). In the Court's view, in a comparable way to the press, an NGOperforming a public watchdog role is likely to have greater impact when reporting on irregularities of public officials, and will often dispose of greater means of verifying and corroborating the veracity of criticism than would be the case of an individual reporting on what he or she has observed personally ( Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], § 87).\n\nAnother factor has been whether the statements, fairly construed and seen in their immediate or wider context, could be seen as a direct or indirect call for violence or as a justification of violence, hatred or intolerance ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], § 206; see, inter alia, Incal v. Turkey, 1998, § 50; Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC], § 62; Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, § 64; Gündüz v. Turkey, 2003, §§ 48 and 51; Soulas and Others v. France, §§ 39-41 and 43; Balsytė - Lideikienė v. Lithuania, 2008, §§ 79-80; Féret v. Belgium, 2009, §§ 69-73 and 78; Hizb ut-Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012, § 73; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 107-112; Fáber v. Hungary, 2012, §§ 52 and 56-58; Vona v. Hungary, §§ 64-67; Lilliendal v. Iceland (dec.), §§ 36-39).", + "post_text": "Although the press is at the origin of the concept of \"public watchdog\", the Court also recognises that NGOs play the same role ( Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 103; Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], 2017, § 86; Cangi v. Turkey, 2019, § 35; National Youth Council of Moldova v. the Republic of Moldova, 2024, § 73). In particular, the Court considers that the public watchdog role played by NGOs is \"of similar importance to that of the press\" ( Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 103; Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, 2005, § 89; Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 166). In the Court's view, in a comparable way to the press, an NGOperforming a public watchdog role is likely to have greater impact when reporting on irregularities of public officials, and will often dispose of greater means of verifying and corroborating the veracity of criticism than would be the case of an individual reporting on what he or she has observed personally ( Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], 2017, § 87).\n\nAnother factor has been whether the statements, fairly construed and seen in their immediate or wider context, could be seen as a direct or indirect call for violence or as a justification of violence, hatred or intolerance ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, § 206; see, inter alia, Incal v. Turkey, 1998, § 50; Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC], 1999, § 62; Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, 2000, § 64; Gündüz v. Turkey, 2003, §§ 48 and 51; Soulas and Others v. France, 2008, §§ 39-41 and 43; Balsytė - Lideikienė v. Lithuania, 2008, §§ 79-80; Féret v. Belgium, 2009, §§ 69-73 and 78; Hizb ut-Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012, § 73; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 107-112; Fáber v. Hungary, 2012, §§ 52 and 56-58; Vona v. Hungary, 2013, §§ 64-67; Lilliendal v. Iceland (dec.), 2020, §§ 36-39). In particular, in the case of a purportedly offensive billboard advertisement published by an NGO, the Court has stated that it is important to look at the broader social context in which the advertisement was published. In this case, the Court found that there was no incitement to hatred or intolerance conveyed by the advertisement, and that it contained an intelligible albeit exaggerated anti-discrimination message ( National Youth Council of Moldova v. the Republic of Moldova, 2024, §§ 78-79).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930062921/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_10_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250115221400/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_10_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1900da194ee4/20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf", @@ -6542,6 +6938,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:44230/06", "case_name": "Petropavlovskis v. Latvia", @@ -6575,6 +6973,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:56138/18", "case_name": "RFE/RL Inc. and Others v. Azerbaijan", @@ -6608,6 +7008,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:26826/16", "case_name": "Ringier Axel Springer Slovakia, a.s. v. Slovakia (no. 4)", @@ -6626,7 +7028,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.B.3|a:57|b:57", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "In particular, it has dismissed the preliminary objection under the significant disadvantage criterion in a number of cases, including: ▪ Eon v. France, 2013, where the Court had regard to the national debate in France on whether insulting the head of State should remain a criminal offence and the wider issue of whether that offence was compatible with the Convention (§§ 34-36). ▪ Margulev v. Russia, where the Court had regard to the fact that the applicant had experienced a chilling effect as a result of the defamation proceedings against the editorial board of a newspaper in which he had expressed his personal opinions and also to the essential role of a free press in ensuring the proper functioning of a democratic society (§ 42; see also Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020, § 39; Panioglu v. Romania, § 75; Ringier Axel Springer Slovakia, a.s. v. Slovakia (no. 4), §§ 26-30). ▪ Tőkés v. Romania, where the Court had regard to the fact that the applicant wished to show his belonging to a minority and given the political sensitivity of minority rights in a democratic sociey (§§ 54-55). ▪ Handzhiyski v. Bulgaria, 2021, where the Court noted that, although the fine imposed on the applicant in that case had not been criminal in nature and had been modest in its amount, the practical and in particular the pecuniary effects on the applicant could not be the sole criterion for assessing whether he had suffered a \"significant disadvantage\". It pointed out that his complaint under Article 10 had concerned a proper exercise of his right to freedom of expression on a matter of public interest, being thus a point of principle for him, and had raised issues of general importance: whether a political protest carried out in the manner chosen by the applicant - by profaning a public monument without damaging it - could amount to a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of expression (§ 36). ▪ Gachechiladze v. Georgia, 2021, § 40; and Šeks v. Croatia, § 50, where the Court considered that the applicants'complaints had concerned important questions of principle and had gone beyond the scope of their relevant cases.", - "post_text": "In particular, it has dismissed the preliminary objection under the significant disadvantage criterion in a number of cases, including: ▪ Eon v. France, 2013, where the Court had regard to the national debate in France on whether insulting the head of State should remain a criminal offence and the wider issue of whether that offence was compatible with the Convention (§§ 34-36). ▪ Margulev v. Russia, 2019, where the Court had regard to the fact that the applicant had experienced a chilling effect as a result of the defamation proceedings against the editorial board of a newspaper in which he had expressed his personal opinions and also to the essential role of a free press in ensuring the proper functioning of a democratic society (§ 42; see also Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020, § 39; Panioglu v. Romania, 2020, § 75; Ringier Axel Springer Slovakia, a.s. v. Slovakia (no. 4), 2021, §§ 26-30). ▪ Tőkés v. Romania, 2021, where the Court had regard to the fact that the applicant wished to show his belonging to a minority and given the political sensitivity of minority rights in a democratic sociey (§§ 54-55). ▪ Handzhiyski v. Bulgaria, 2021, where the Court noted that, although the fine imposed on the applicant in that case had not been criminal in nature and had been modest in its amount, the practical and in particular the pecuniary effects on the applicant could not be the sole criterion for assessing whether he had suffered a \"significant disadvantage\". It pointed out that his complaint under Article 10 had concerned a proper exercise of his right to freedom of expression on a matter of public interest, being thus a point of principle for him, and had raised issues of general importance: whether a political protest carried out in the manner chosen by the applicant - by profaning a public monument without damaging it - could amount to a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of expression (§ 36). ▪ Gachechiladze v. Georgia, 2021, § 40; and Šeks v. Croatia, 2022, § 50, where the Court considered that the applicants'complaints had concerned important questions of principle and had gone beyond the scope of their relevant cases. ▪ Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, 2024, § 26, where the Court considered that the decision to deny access to certain information requested by the applicant NGO had undermined the very core of its activity given the fact that the main area of that activity was gathering information, sharing it with the public and contributing to public debate.", + "post_text": "In particular, it has dismissed the preliminary objection under the significant disadvantage criterion in a number of cases, including: ▪ Eon v. France, 2013, where the Court had regard to the national debate in France on whether insulting the head of State should remain a criminal offence and the wider issue of whether that offence was compatible with the Convention (§§ 34-36). ▪ Margulev v. Russia, 2019, where the Court had regard to the fact that the applicant had experienced a chilling effect as a result of the defamation proceedings against the editorial board of a newspaper in which he had expressed his personal opinions and also to the essential role of a free press in ensuring the proper functioning of a democratic society (§ 42; see also Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020, § 39; Panioglu v. Romania, 2020, § 75; Ringier Axel Springer Slovakia, a.s. v. Slovakia (no. 4), 2021, §§ 26-30). ▪ Tőkés v. Romania, 2021, where the Court had regard to the fact that the applicant wished to show his belonging to a minority and given the political sensitivity of minority rights in a democratic sociey (§§ 54-55). ▪ Handzhiyski v. Bulgaria, 2021, where the Court noted that, although the fine imposed on the applicant in that case had not been criminal in nature and had been modest in its amount, the practical and in particular the pecuniary effects on the applicant could not be the sole criterion for assessing whether he had suffered a \"significant disadvantage\". It pointed out that his complaint under Article 10 had concerned a proper exercise of his right to freedom of expression on a matter of public interest, being thus a point of principle for him, and had raised issues of general importance: whether a political protest carried out in the manner chosen by the applicant - by profaning a public monument without damaging it - could amount to a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of expression (§ 36). ▪ Gachechiladze v. Georgia, 2021, § 40; and Šeks v. Croatia, 2022, § 50, where the Court considered that the applicants'complaints had concerned important questions of principle and had gone beyond the scope of their relevant cases. ▪ Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, 2024, § 26, where the Court considered that the decision to deny access to certain information requested by the applicant NGOhad undermined the very core of its activity given the fact that the main area of that activity was gathering information, sharing it with the public and contributing to public debate.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930062921/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_10_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250115221400/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_10_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1900da194ee4/20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf", @@ -6641,6 +7043,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:42982/08", "case_name": "Savelyev v. Russia (dec.)", @@ -6674,6 +7078,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:10103/20", "case_name": "Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland", @@ -6692,7 +7098,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.B.3|a:57|b:57|IX.B.1|a:448|b:449|IX.B.2|a:455|b:456|IX.B.3|a:461|b:462|IX.C|a:474|b:475|X.B.4.d|a:553|b:554", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "In particular, it has dismissed the preliminary objection under the significant disadvantage criterion in a number of cases, including: ▪ Eon v. France, 2013, where the Court had regard to the national debate in France on whether insulting the head of State should remain a criminal offence and the wider issue of whether that offence was compatible with the Convention (§§ 34-36). ▪ Margulev v. Russia, where the Court had regard to the fact that the applicant had experienced a chilling effect as a result of the defamation proceedings against the editorial board of a newspaper in which he had expressed his personal opinions and also to the essential role of a free press in ensuring the proper functioning of a democratic society (§ 42; see also Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020, § 39; Panioglu v. Romania, § 75; Ringier Axel Springer Slovakia, a.s. v. Slovakia (no. 4), §§ 26-30). ▪ Tőkés v. Romania, where the Court had regard to the fact that the applicant wished to show his belonging to a minority and given the political sensitivity of minority rights in a democratic sociey (§§ 54-55). ▪ Handzhiyski v. Bulgaria, 2021, where the Court noted that, although the fine imposed on the applicant in that case had not been criminal in nature and had been modest in its amount, the practical and in particular the pecuniary effects on the applicant could not be the sole criterion for assessing whether he had suffered a \"significant disadvantage\". It pointed out that his complaint under Article 10 had concerned a proper exercise of his right to freedom of expression on a matter of public interest, being thus a point of principle for him, and had raised issues of general importance: whether a political protest carried out in the manner chosen by the applicant - by profaning a public monument without damaging it - could amount to a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of expression (§ 36). ▪ Gachechiladze v. Georgia, 2021, § 40; and Šeks v. Croatia, § 50, where the Court considered that the applicants'complaints had concerned important questions of principle and had gone beyond the scope of their relevant cases.\n\nIt must be ascertained whether access to the information sought was an essential element of the exercise of freedom of expression. Thus, the Court has placed emphasis on whether the gathering of the information was a relevant preparatory step in journalistic activities or in other activities creating a forum for, or constituting an essential element of, public debate (for an NGO, see Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, §§ 27-28; for journalists, Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria, § 36; Roşiianu v. Romania, § 63).\n\nBy way of illustration, the following may come within the categories of information considered to be in the public interest: ▪ \"Factual information concerning the use of electronic surveillance measures\" ( Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, § 24); ▪ \"Information about a constitutional complaint\" and \"on a matter of public importance\" ( Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, §§ 37-38). ▪ \"Original documentary sources for legitimate historical research\" ( Kenedi v. Hungary, 2009, § 43). ▪ Decisions concerning real property transaction commissions ( Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria, § 42); ▪ \"Titles of legal acts issued by the head of State, which, apparently, were part of the law in Ukraine\" ( Yuriy Chumak v. Ukraine, § 30); ▪ Information regarding the number of formal emplyees and informal collaborators of the German Foreign Intelligence Service, and how many of those were formerly members of Nazi organisations ( Saure v. Germany (dec.), §§ 4 and 36); ▪ Classified documents from the archives of the Office of the President of the Republic of Croatia which the applicant needed for writing a book about the creation of the Croatian State ( Šeks v. Croatia, §§ 5 and 38).\n\nThe Court has recognised that this role is played by journalists ( Roşiianu v. Romania, § 61; Saure v. Germany (dec.), § 35) and NGOs whose activities are related to matters of public interest ( Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary ; Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria ; Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia ; Association BURESTOP 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 88).\n\nThe procedural safeguards provided in a decision-making procedure are also a factor to be taken into account when assessing the proportionality of an interference. At the same time, the extent of those safeguards may differ depending on the context of a particular case. In particular, the Court held that in the context of national security - a sphere which traditionally forms part of the inner core of State sovereignty - the competent authorities may not be expected to give the same amount of details in their reasoning as, for instance, in ordinary civil or administrative cases. Providing detailed reasons for refusing declassification of top-secret documents may easily run counter to the very purpose for which that information had been classified in the first place ( Šeks v. Croatia, § 71). On the other hand, since access to accurate and reliable information concerning the management of radioactive waste - a project representing a major environmental risk - was of particular importance, it was important that the decisions delivered by the authorities in an adversarial procedure were detailed and well- reasoned ( Association BURESTOP 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 115).\n\nIn a case concerning a letter sent by a detained applicant to a regional court, the Court drew a clear distinction between criticism and insult. In the Court's view, where an individual's sole intent is to insult a court or the judges on its bench, it would not in principle constitute a violation of Article 10 were an appropriate punishment to be imposed. However, the heavy prison sentence imposed was found to exceed the seriousness of the offence, particularly given that the applicant had not previously been convicted of a similar offence and the letter had not been brought to the attention of the public ( Skałka v. Poland, §§ 39-42).", - "post_text": "In particular, it has dismissed the preliminary objection under the significant disadvantage criterion in a number of cases, including: ▪ Eon v. France, 2013, where the Court had regard to the national debate in France on whether insulting the head of State should remain a criminal offence and the wider issue of whether that offence was compatible with the Convention (§§ 34-36). ▪ Margulev v. Russia, 2019, where the Court had regard to the fact that the applicant had experienced a chilling effect as a result of the defamation proceedings against the editorial board of a newspaper in which he had expressed his personal opinions and also to the essential role of a free press in ensuring the proper functioning of a democratic society (§ 42; see also Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020, § 39; Panioglu v. Romania, 2020, § 75; Ringier Axel Springer Slovakia, a.s. v. Slovakia (no. 4), 2021, §§ 26-30). ▪ Tőkés v. Romania, 2021, where the Court had regard to the fact that the applicant wished to show his belonging to a minority and given the political sensitivity of minority rights in a democratic sociey (§§ 54-55). ▪ Handzhiyski v. Bulgaria, 2021, where the Court noted that, although the fine imposed on the applicant in that case had not been criminal in nature and had been modest in its amount, the practical and in particular the pecuniary effects on the applicant could not be the sole criterion for assessing whether he had suffered a \"significant disadvantage\". It pointed out that his complaint under Article 10 had concerned a proper exercise of his right to freedom of expression on a matter of public interest, being thus a point of principle for him, and had raised issues of general importance: whether a political protest carried out in the manner chosen by the applicant - by profaning a public monument without damaging it - could amount to a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of expression (§ 36). ▪ Gachechiladze v. Georgia, 2021, § 40; and Šeks v. Croatia, 2022, § 50, where the Court considered that the applicants'complaints had concerned important questions of principle and had gone beyond the scope of their relevant cases. ▪ Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, 2024, § 26, where the Court considered that the decision to deny access to certain information requested by the applicant NGO had undermined the very core of its activity given the fact that the main area of that activity was gathering information, sharing it with the public and contributing to public debate.\n\nIt must be ascertained whether access to the information sought was an essential element of the exercise of freedom of expression. Thus, the Court has placed emphasis on whether the gathering of the information was a relevant preparatory step in journalistic activities or in other activities creating a forum for, or constituting an essential element of, public debate (for an NGO, see Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, 2009, §§ 27-28; Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, 2024, § 60; for journalists, Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria, 2013, § 36; Roşiianu v. Romania, 2014, § 63; for academic researchers, Suprun and Others v. Russia, 2024, § 73).\n\nBy way of illustration, the following may come within the categories of information considered to be in the public interest: ▪ \"Factual information concerning the use of electronic surveillance measures\" ( Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, 2013, § 24); ▪ \"Information about a constitutional complaint\" and \"on a matter of public importance\" ( Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, 2009, §§ 37-38). ▪ \"Original documentary sources for legitimate historical research\" ( Kenedi v. Hungary, 2009, § 43). ▪ Decisions concerning real property transaction commissions ( Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria, 2013, § 42); ▪ \"Titles of legal acts issued by the head of State, which, apparently, were part of the law in Ukraine\" ( Yuriy Chumak v. Ukraine, 2021, § 30); ▪ Information regarding the number of formal employees and informal collaborators of the German Foreign Intelligence Service, and how many of those were formerly members of Nazi organisations ( Saure v. Germany (dec.), 2021, §§ 4 and 36); ▪ Classified documents from the archives of the Office of the President of the Republic of Croatia which the applicant needed for writing a book about the creation of the Croatian State ( Šeks v. Croatia, 2022, §§ 5 and 38); ▪ Information from the meeting diaries of the president and vice-president of the Constitutional Court of Poland, concerning their meetings held during a specified period of time, particularly given the political context at that time ( Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, 2024, §§ 61-64).\n\nThe Court has recognised that this role is played by journalists ( Roşiianu v. Romania, 2014, § 61; Saure v. Germany (dec.), 2021, § 35) and NGOs whose activities are related to matters of public interest ( Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, 2009; Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria, 2013; Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, 2013; Association BURESTOP 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 88; Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, 2024, § 65).\n\nThe procedural safeguards provided in a decision-making procedure are also a factor to be taken into account when assessing the proportionality of an interference. At the same time, the extent of those safeguards may differ depending on the context of a particular case. In particular, the Court held that in the context of national security - a sphere which traditionally forms part of the inner core of State sovereignty - the competent authorities may not be expected to give the same amount of details in their reasoning as, for instance, in ordinary civil or administrative cases. Providing detailed reasons for refusing declassification of top-secret documents may easily run counter to the very purpose for which that information had been classified in the first place ( Šeks v. Croatia, 2022, § 71). On the other hand, since access to accurate and reliable information concerning the management of radioactive waste - a project representing a major environmental risk - was of particular importance, it was important that the decisions delivered by the authorities in an adversarial procedure were detailed and well-reasoned ( Association BURESTOP 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 115). Where the Government failed to present to present any argument, either in the domestic proceedings or in their observations, to show that the denial of information sought by the applicant NGO had pursued any legitimate aim or had been \"necessary in a democratic society\", the Court noted that it was precluded from further assessing the legitimate aim of the refusal and from analysing whether the interference with the applicant NGO's right was proportionate in the circumstances of the case, and it found a violation of Article 10 in that respect ( Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, 2024, §§ 76-78).\n\nIn a case concerning a letter sent by a detained applicant to a regional court, the Court drew a clear distinction between criticism and insult. In the Court's view, where an individual's sole intent is to insult a court or the judges on its bench, it would not in principle constitute a violation of Article 10 were an appropriate punishment to be imposed. However, the heavy prison sentence imposed was found to exceed the seriousness of the offence, particularly given that the applicant had not previously been convicted of a similar offence and the letter had not been brought to the attention of the public ( Skałka v. Poland, 2003, §§ 39-42).", + "post_text": "In particular, it has dismissed the preliminary objection under the significant disadvantage criterion in a number of cases, including: ▪ Eon v. France, 2013, where the Court had regard to the national debate in France on whether insulting the head of State should remain a criminal offence and the wider issue of whether that offence was compatible with the Convention (§§ 34-36). ▪ Margulev v. Russia, 2019, where the Court had regard to the fact that the applicant had experienced a chilling effect as a result of the defamation proceedings against the editorial board of a newspaper in which he had expressed his personal opinions and also to the essential role of a free press in ensuring the proper functioning of a democratic society (§ 42; see also Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020, § 39; Panioglu v. Romania, 2020, § 75; Ringier Axel Springer Slovakia, a.s. v. Slovakia (no. 4), 2021, §§ 26-30). ▪ Tőkés v. Romania, 2021, where the Court had regard to the fact that the applicant wished to show his belonging to a minority and given the political sensitivity of minority rights in a democratic sociey (§§ 54-55). ▪ Handzhiyski v. Bulgaria, 2021, where the Court noted that, although the fine imposed on the applicant in that case had not been criminal in nature and had been modest in its amount, the practical and in particular the pecuniary effects on the applicant could not be the sole criterion for assessing whether he had suffered a \"significant disadvantage\". It pointed out that his complaint under Article 10 had concerned a proper exercise of his right to freedom of expression on a matter of public interest, being thus a point of principle for him, and had raised issues of general importance: whether a political protest carried out in the manner chosen by the applicant - by profaning a public monument without damaging it - could amount to a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of expression (§ 36). ▪ Gachechiladze v. Georgia, 2021, § 40; and Šeks v. Croatia, 2022, § 50, where the Court considered that the applicants'complaints had concerned important questions of principle and had gone beyond the scope of their relevant cases. ▪ Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, 2024, § 26, where the Court considered that the decision to deny access to certain information requested by the applicant NGOhad undermined the very core of its activity given the fact that the main area of that activity was gathering information, sharing it with the public and contributing to public debate.\n\nIt must be ascertained whether access to the information sought was an essential element of the exercise of freedom of expression. Thus, the Court has placed emphasis on whether the gathering of the information was a relevant preparatory step in journalistic activities or in other activities creating a forum for, or constituting an essential element of, public debate (for an NGO, see Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, 2009, §§ 27-28; Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, 2024, § 60; for journalists, Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria, 2013, § 36; Roşiianu v. Romania, 2014, § 63; for academic researchers, Suprun and Others v. Russia, 2024, § 73).\n\nBy way of illustration, the following may come within the categories of information considered to be in the public interest: ▪ \"Factual information concerning the use of electronic surveillance measures\" ( Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, 2013, § 24); ▪ \"Information about a constitutional complaint\" and \"on a matter of public importance\" ( Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, 2009, §§ 37-38). ▪ \"Original documentary sources for legitimate historical research\" ( Kenedi v. Hungary, 2009, § 43). ▪ Decisions concerning real property transaction commissions ( Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria, 2013, § 42); ▪ \"Titles of legal acts issued by the head of State, which, apparently, were part of the law in Ukraine\" ( Yuriy Chumak v. Ukraine, 2021, § 30); ▪ Information regarding the number of formal employees and informal collaborators of the German Foreign Intelligence Service, and how many of those were formerly members of Nazi organisations ( Saure v. Germany (dec.), 2021, §§ 4 and 36); ▪ Classified documents from the archives of the Office of the President of the Republic of Croatia which the applicant needed for writing a book about the creation of the Croatian State ( Šeks v. Croatia, 2022, §§ 5 and 38); ▪ Information from the meeting diaries of the president and vice-president of the Constitutional Court of Poland, concerning their meetings held during a specified period of time, particularly given the political context at that time ( Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, 2024, §§ 61-64).\n\nThe Court has recognised that this role is played by journalists ( Roşiianu v. Romania, 2014, § 61; Saure v. Germany (dec.), 2021, § 35) and NGOs whose activities are related to matters of public interest ( Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, 2009; Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria, 2013; Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, 2013; Association BURESTOP 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 88; Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, 2024, § 65).\n\nThe procedural safeguards provided in a decision-making procedure are also a factor to be taken into account when assessing the proportionality of an interference. At the same time, the extent of those safeguards may differ depending on the context of a particular case. In particular, the Court held that in the context of national security - a sphere which traditionally forms part of the inner core of State sovereignty - the competent authorities may not be expected to give the same amount of details in their reasoning as, for instance, in ordinary civil or administrative cases. Providing detailed reasons for refusing declassification of top-secret documents may easily run counter to the very purpose for which that information had been classified in the first place ( Šeks v. Croatia, 2022, § 71). On the other hand, since access to accurate and reliable information concerning the management of radioactive waste - a project representing a major environmental risk - was of particular importance, it was important that the decisions delivered by the authorities in an adversarial procedure were detailed and well-reasoned ( Association BURESTOP 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 115). Where the Government failed to present to present any argument, either in the domestic proceedings or in their observations, to show that the denial of information sought by the applicant NGOhad pursued any legitimate aim or had been \"necessary in a democratic society\", the Court noted that it was precluded from further assessing the legitimate aim of the refusal and from analysing whether the interference with the applicant NGO's right was proportionate in the circumstances of the case, and it found a violation of Article 10 in that respect ( Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, 2024, §§ 76-78).\n\nIn a case concerning a letter sent by a detained applicant to a regional court, the Court drew a clear distinction between criticism and insult. In the Court's view, where an individual's sole intent is to insult a court or the judges on its bench, it would not in principle constitute a violation of Article 10 were an appropriate punishment to be imposed. However, the heavy prison sentence imposed was found to exceed the seriousness of the offence, particularly given that the applicant had not previously been convicted of a similar offence and the letter had not been brought to the attention of the public ( Skałka v. Poland, 2003, §§ 39-42).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930062921/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_10_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250115221400/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_10_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1900da194ee4/20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf", @@ -6707,6 +7113,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:58029/12", "case_name": "Suprun and Others v. Russia", @@ -6740,6 +7148,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "name:leander v sweden::1987", "case_name": "Leander v. Sweden", @@ -6773,6 +7183,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:23868/94|23869/94", "case_name": "Loersch and Nouvelle Association du Courrier v. Switzerland", @@ -6806,13 +7218,15 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:46809/99", "case_name": "Loiseau v. France (dec.)", "application_numbers": "46809/99", "judgment_year": "2003", "citation_change": "removed", - "citation_text": "Loiseau v. France (dec.), no. 46809/99, ECHR 2003 XII (extracts)", + "citation_text": "Loiseau v. France (dec.), no. 46809/99, ECHR 2003-XII (extracts)", "hudoc_itemid": "001-68066", "hudoc_importance_level": "1", "hudoc_doctype": "HEDEC", @@ -6839,6 +7253,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:33502/07|30599/10", "case_name": "Marinova and Others v. Bulgaria", @@ -6872,6 +7288,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:27881/95", "case_name": "Nurminen and Others v. Finland", @@ -6905,6 +7323,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:32555/96", "case_name": "Roche v. the United Kingdom [GC]", @@ -6938,6 +7358,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:48534/10|19532/15", "case_name": "Rodina v. Latvia", @@ -6971,6 +7393,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:19101/03", "case_name": "Sdružení Jihočeské Matky v. the Czech Republic (dec.)", @@ -7004,6 +7428,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:32240/96", "case_name": "Tele 1 Privatfernsehgesellschaft mbH v. Austria", @@ -7037,6 +7463,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-15", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json", "case_key": "apps:75109/01|12639/02", "case_name": "Viorel Burzo v. Romania", @@ -7070,6 +7498,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json", "case_key": "apps:41675/12", "case_name": "Aghajanyan v. Armenia", @@ -7103,6 +7533,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json", "case_key": "apps:1847/21", "case_name": "Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania", @@ -7120,8 +7552,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added|paragraph_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.B.1|a:71|b:74|III.B.1|a:72|b:75|XIII.B.7|a:None|b:724", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "The Court has held that a norm cannot be regarded as a \"law\" unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his or her conduct and that he or she must be able - if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. However, it went on to state that these consequences do not need to be foreseeable with absolute certainty, as experience showed that to be unattainable ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, § 131; Sanchez v. France [GC], 2023, § 125). Whilst certainty is desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity, and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice ( Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], 2007, § 41; Bouton v. France, 2022, § 33; Sanchez v. France [GC], 2023, § 125). A margin of doubt in relation to borderline facts does not therefore,,,of itself, make a legal provision unforeseeable in its application. Nor does the mere fact that a provision is capable of more than one construction mean that it fails to meet the requirement of \"foreseeability\" for the purposes of the Convention. The role of adjudication, vested in the courts, serves precisely to dissipate such interpretational doubts as remain, taking into account the changes in everyday practice ( ibid ., § 126).\n\nThe Court has also considered that an individual cannot claim that a legal provision lacks foreseeability simply because it is applied for the first time in his or her case ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 150; Tête v. France, 2020, § 52; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 58). Thus, the Court found that the application of legal provisions, on the basis of which the applicant, a politician, had been convicted in criminal proceedings as a \"producer\" for third - party comments posted on the \"wall\" of his personal Facebook account, had met the \"quality of law\" requirements ( Sanchez v. France [GC], 2023, §§ 132-142).", - "post_text": "The Court has held that a norm cannot be regarded as a \"law\" unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his or her conduct and that he or she must be able - if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. However, it went on to state that these consequences do not need to be foreseeable with absolute certainty, as experience showed that to be unattainable ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, § 131; Sanchez v. France [GC], 2023, § 125). Whilst certainty is desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity, and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice ( Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], 2007, § 41; Bouton v. France, 2022, § 33; Sanchez v. France [GC], 2023, § 125; Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania, 2025, § 90). A margin of doubt in relation to borderline facts does not therefore, of itself, make a legal provision unforeseeable in its application. Nor does the mere fact that a provision is capable of more than one construction mean that it fails to meet the requirement of \"foreseeability\" for the purposes of the Convention. Th e role of adjudication, vested in the courts, serves precisely to dissipate such interpretational doubts as remain, taking into account the changes in everyday practice ( Sanchez v. France [GC], 2023, § 126).\n\nThe Court has also considered that an individual cannot claim that a legal provision lacks foreseeability simply because it is applied for the first time in his or her case ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 150; Tête v. France, 2020, § 52; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 58), or because it is open to more than one interpretation ( Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania, 2025, § 129). Thus, the Court found that the application of legal provisions, on the basis of which the applicant, a politician, had been convicted in criminal proceedings as a \"producer\" for third -party comments posted on the \"wall\" of his personal Facebook account, had met the \"quality of law\" requirements ( Sanchez v. France [GC], 2023, §§ 132-142). At the same time, the Court emphasised that legal provisions imposing liability for third parties'comments made on a private individual 's Internet account should be \"particularly precise\" ( Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania, 2025, § 127).\n\nThe Court took a strict stance regarding liability for third parties'comments of social networks users who are private individuals. It emphasised, in particular, that legal provisions imposing such liability should be \"particularly precise\" ( Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania, 2025, § 127). In this case, where the applicant - a well-known opera fan and blogger - had been held liable in civil proceedings, in particular, for third parties'comments on his Facebook page concerning his post about a conflict in the Bucharest National Opera, the Court observed that the relevant legal provisions were of a very general nature, contained no indication of any obligation on the applicant, as the owner of a Facebook page, to monitor messages posted by third parties; nor did they provide any further details regarding the circumstances in which the owner of such a page could be required to carry out such monitoring or regarding measures to be taken following such monitoring, or regarding the conditions that would define fault in that context ( Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania, 2025, § 128). Noting also the divergent interpretation of those provisions by the national courts at three levels of jurisdiction, the Court concluded that national law could not be considered to have been sufficiently clear and precise to enable the applicant to enjoy his freedom of expression as required by the rule of law in a democratic society, and thus the interference in question could not be said to have been \"prescribed by law\" ( Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania, 2025, §§ 130-34).", + "pre_text": "The Court has held that a norm cannot be regarded as a \"law\" unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his or her conduct and that he or she must be able - if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. However, it went on to state that these consequences do not need to be foreseeable with absolute certainty, as experience showed that to be unattainable ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, § 131; Sanchez v. France [GC], 2023, § 125). Whilst certainty is desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity, and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice ( Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], 2007, § 41; Bouton v. France, 2022, § 33; Sanchez v. France [GC], 2023, § 125). Amargin of doubt in relation to borderline facts does not therefore,,,of itself, make a legal provision unforeseeable in its application. Nor does the mere fact that a provision is capable of more than one construction mean that it fails to meet the requirement of \"foreseeability\" for the purposes of the Convention. The role of adjudication, vested in the courts, serves precisely to dissipate such interpretational doubts as remain, taking into account the changes in everyday practice ( ibid ., § 126).\n\nThe Court has also considered that an individual cannot claim that a legal provision lacks foreseeability simply because it is applied for the first time in his or her case ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 150; Tête v. France, 2020, § 52; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 58). Thus, the Court found that the application of legal provisions, on the basis of which the applicant, a politician, had been convicted in criminal proceedings as a \"producer\" for third - party comments posted on the \"wall\" of his personal Facebook account, had met the \"quality of law\" requirements ( Sanchez v. France [GC], 2023, §§ 132-142).", + "post_text": "The Court has held that a norm cannot be regarded as a \"law\" unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his or her conduct and that he or she must be able - if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. However, it went on to state that these consequences do not need to be foreseeable with absolute certainty, as experience showed that to be unattainable ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, § 131; Sanchez v. France [GC], 2023, § 125). Whilst certainty is desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity, and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice ( Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], 2007, § 41; Bouton v. France, 2022, § 33; Sanchez v. France [GC], 2023, § 125; Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania, 2025, § 90). Amargin of doubt in relation to borderline facts does not therefore, of itself, make a legal provision unforeseeable in its application. Nor does the mere fact that a provision is capable of more than one construction mean that it fails to meet the requirement of \"foreseeability\" for the purposes of the Convention. Th e role of adjudication, vested in the courts, serves precisely to dissipate such interpretational doubts as remain, taking into account the changes in everyday practice ( Sanchez v. France [GC], 2023, § 126).\n\nThe Court has also considered that an individual cannot claim that a legal provision lacks foreseeability simply because it is applied for the first time in his or her case ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 150; Tête v. France, 2020, § 52; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 58), or because it is open to more than one interpretation ( Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania, 2025, § 129). Thus, the Court found that the application of legal provisions, on the basis of which the applicant, a politician, had been convicted in criminal proceedings as a \"producer\" for third -party comments posted on the \"wall\" of his personal Facebook account, had met the \"quality of law\" requirements ( Sanchez v. France [GC], 2023, §§ 132-142). At the same time, the Court emphasised that legal provisions imposing liability for third parties'comments made on a private individual 's Internet account should be \"particularly precise\" ( Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania, 2025, § 127).\n\nThe Court took a strict stance regarding liability for third parties'comments of social networks users who are private individuals. It emphasised, in particular, that legal provisions imposing such liability should be \"particularly precise\" ( Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania, 2025, § 127). In this case, where the applicant - a well-known opera fan and blogger - had been held liable in civil proceedings, in particular, for third parties'comments on his Facebook page concerning his post about a conflict in the Bucharest National Opera, the Court observed that the relevant legal provisions were of a very general nature, contained no indication of any obligation on the applicant, as the owner of a Facebook page, to monitor messages posted by third parties; nor did they provide any further details regarding the circumstances in which the owner of such a page could be required to carry out such monitoring or regarding measures to be taken following such monitoring, or regarding the conditions that would define fault in that context ( Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania, 2025, § 128). Noting also the divergent interpretation of those provisions by the national courts at three levels of jurisdiction, the Court concluded that national law could not be considered to have been sufficiently clear and precise to enable the applicant to enjoy his freedom of expression as required by the rule of law in a democratic society, and thus the interference in question could not be said to have been \"prescribed by law\" ( Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania, 2025, §§ 130-34).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250115221400/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_10_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250918162301/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_10_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1900da194ee4/20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf", @@ -7136,6 +7568,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json", "case_key": "apps:44306/98", "case_name": "Appleby and Others v. the United Kingdom", @@ -7169,6 +7603,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json", "case_key": "apps:4110/20", "case_name": "Boronyák v. Hungary", @@ -7202,6 +7638,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json", "case_key": "apps:11575/24", "case_name": "Borzykh v. Ukraine (dec.)", @@ -7235,6 +7673,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json", "case_key": "apps:29780/20", "case_name": "Costa i Rosselló and Others v. Spain (dec.)", @@ -7268,6 +7708,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json", "case_key": "apps:24738/19", "case_name": "Gaši and Others v. Serbia", @@ -7301,6 +7743,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json", "case_key": "apps:39446/16", "case_name": "Kobaliya and Others v. Russia", @@ -7334,6 +7778,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json", "case_key": "apps:257/12", "case_name": "Objective Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and Others v. Azerbaijan", @@ -7351,8 +7797,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added|citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "XIV.D|a:None|b:767|XIV.D|a:758|b:763|XIV.D|a:760|b:765", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Under the third sentence of Article 10 § 1, States may regulate by means of a licensing system the way in which broadcasting is organised in their territories, particularly in its technical aspects ( Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 139). The granting of a licence may also be made conditional on other considerations, such as the nature and objectives of a proposed channel, its potential audience at national, regional or local level, the rights and needs of a specific audience and the obligations deriving from international legal instruments ( Demuth v. Switzerland, 2002, § 33; Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 139).\n\nThe Court has held, in numerous cases, that the refusal to grant a broadcasting licence (see, among many other examples, Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria, 1993, § 27; Radio ABC v. Austria, 1997, § 27; United Christian Broadcasters Ltd v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2000; Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Elenkov v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 42), to authorise the broadcasting of a television programme ( Leveque v. France (dec.), 1999; Demuth v. Switzerland, 2002, § 30) or to revoke the broadcasting licence of a TV channel ( NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], 2022, § 150), constituted interference with the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Article 10 § 1 of the Convention.", - "post_text": "As regards the \"lawfulness\" requirement concerning specifically licen sing procedures, the Court has emphasised, in particular, that the manner in which the licensing criteria are applied in the licensing process must provide sufficient guarantees against arbitrariness, including proper reasoning by the licensing authority of its decision denying a broadcasting licence ( Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Elenkov v. Bulgaria, 2007, §§ 49-51; Objective Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2025, § 75). Thus, in Objective Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2025, concerning the refusal by the relevant national licensing authority to grant the applicants a radio broadcasting licence following a call for tenders, the Court found that the interference had not been \"prescribed by law\" (§ 87). It pointed, in particular, to the licensing authority's failure to provide a duly reasoned decision, which would include reasoning in respect of the selection criteria, as well as to that authority's virtually unlimited discretionary powers to choose decisive factors for awarding the licence (§§ 77-78). Such a licensing procedure did not provide adequate protection against arbitrary interference by a public authority with the right to freedom of expression (§ 82). In this case, the Court also considered it necessary to address the manner of the appointment of members of the national licensing authority noting that one of those had been a relative of the director of the winning bidder. That apparent conflict of interest had never been disclosed, seriously undermining thereby the licensing authority's impartiality and rendering arbitrary the entire licensing procedure (§§ 83-86).\n\nUnder the third sentence of Article 10 § 1, States may regulate by means of a licensing system the way in which broadcasting is organised in their territories, particularly in its technical aspects ( Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 139). The granting of a licence may also be made conditional on other considerations, such as the nature and objectives of a proposed channel, its potential audience at national, regional or local level, the rights and needs of a specific audience and the obligations deriving from international legal instruments ( Demuth v. Switzerland, 2002, § 33; Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 139; Objective Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2025, § 72).\n\nThe Court has held, in numerous cases, that the refusal to grant a broadcasting licence (see, among many other examples, Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria, 1993, § 27; Radio ABC v. Austria, 1997, § 27; United Christian Broadcasters Ltd v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2000; Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Elenkov v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 42; Objective Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2025, § 70), to authorise the broadcasting of a television programme ( Leveque v. France (dec.), 1999; Demuth v. Switzerland, 2002, § 30) or to revoke the broadcasting licence of a TV channel ( NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], 2022, § 150), constituted interference with the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Article 10 § 1 of the Convention.", + "pre_text": "Under the third sentence of Article 10 § 1, States may regulate by means of a licensing system the way in which broadcasting is organised in their territories, particularly in its technical aspects ( Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 139). The granting of a licence may also be made conditional on other considerations, such as the nature and objectives of a proposed channel, its potential audience at national, regional or local level, the rights and needs of a specific audience and the obligations deriving from international legal instruments ( Demuth v. Switzerland, 2002, § 33; Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 139).\n\nThe Court has held, in numerous cases, that the refusal to grant a broadcasting licence (see, among many other examples, Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria, 1993, § 27; Radio ABC v. Austria, 1997, § 27; United Christian Broadcasters Ltd v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2000; Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Elenkov v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 42), to authorise the broadcasting of a television programme ( Leveque v. France (dec.), 1999; Demuth v. Switzerland, 2002, § 30) or to revoke the broadcasting licence of a TVchannel ( NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], 2022, § 150), constituted interference with the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Article 10 § 1 of the Convention.", + "post_text": "As regards the \"lawfulness\" requirement concerning specifically licen sing procedures, the Court has emphasised, in particular, that the manner in which the licensing criteria are applied in the licensing process must provide sufficient guarantees against arbitrariness, including proper reasoning by the licensing authority of its decision denying a broadcasting licence ( Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Elenkov v. Bulgaria, 2007, §§ 49-51; Objective Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2025, § 75). Thus, in Objective Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2025, concerning the refusal by the relevant national licensing authority to grant the applicants a radio broadcasting licence following a call for tenders, the Court found that the interference had not been \"prescribed by law\" (§ 87). It pointed, in particular, to the licensing authority's failure to provide a duly reasoned decision, which would include reasoning in respect of the selection criteria, as well as to that authority's virtually unlimited discretionary powers to choose decisive factors for awarding the licence (§§ 77-78). Such a licensing procedure did not provide adequate protection against arbitrary interference by a public authority with the right to freedom of expression (§ 82). In this case, the Court also considered it necessary to address the manner of the appointment of members of the national licensing authority noting that one of those had been a relative of the director of the winning bidder. That apparent conflict of interest had never been disclosed, seriously undermining thereby the licensing authority's impartiality and rendering arbitrary the entire licensing procedure (§§ 83-86).\n\nUnder the third sentence of Article 10 § 1, States may regulate by means of a licensing system the way in which broadcasting is organised in their territories, particularly in its technical aspects ( Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 139). The granting of a licence may also be made conditional on other considerations, such as the nature and objectives of a proposed channel, its potential audience at national, regional or local level, the rights and needs of a specific audience and the obligations deriving from international legal instruments ( Demuth v. Switzerland, 2002, § 33; Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 139; Objective Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2025, § 72).\n\nThe Court has held, in numerous cases, that the refusal to grant a broadcasting licence (see, among many other examples, Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria, 1993, § 27; Radio ABC v. Austria, 1997, § 27; United Christian Broadcasters Ltd v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2000; Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Elenkov v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 42; Objective Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2025, § 70), to authorise the broadcasting of a television programme ( Leveque v. France (dec.), 1999; Demuth v. Switzerland, 2002, § 30) or to revoke the broadcasting licence of a TVchannel ( NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], 2022, § 150), constituted interference with the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Article 10 § 1 of the Convention.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250115221400/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_10_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250918162301/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_10_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1900da194ee4/20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf", @@ -7367,6 +7813,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json", "case_key": "apps:56310/15", "case_name": "P. v. Poland", @@ -7400,6 +7848,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json", "case_key": "apps:28955/06", "case_name": "Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC]", @@ -7433,6 +7883,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json", "case_key": "apps:32678/18", "case_name": "Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia", @@ -7466,6 +7918,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json", "case_key": "apps:28955/06|28957/06|28959/06|28964/06", "case_name": "Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC]", @@ -7499,6 +7953,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:22619/14", "case_name": "Alif Ahmadov and Others v. Azerbaijan", @@ -7532,6 +7988,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:37706/17", "case_name": "Bagirova and Others v. Azerbaijan", @@ -7549,8 +8007,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.B.1.a|a:102|b:103", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "In a case where a municipality issued an order, under an expedited procedure for the possession of the applicant company's land, took physical possession of that land and began road-building works, the subsequent judgment retrospectively authorising the unlawful possession by public authorities, deprived the applicant company of the possibility of obtaining restitution of its land. The effect of the judgment amounted to a deprivation of its \"possessions\" ( Belvedere Alberghiera S.r.l. v.Italy, 2000, § 54). The loss of 40 per cent and 100 per cent of the value of the plots of land combined with the partial loss of physical access to them as a result of the construction of a dam was also held to amount to a de facto expropriation ( Aygun v. Turkey, 2011, § 39). A similar conclusion was drawn in respect of an unlawful demolition of a building ( Zammit and Vassallo v. Malta, 2019, § 54).", - "post_text": "In a case where a municipality issued an order, under an expedited procedure for the possession of the applicant company's land, took physical possession of that land and began road-building works, the subsequent judgment retrospectively authorising the unlawful possession by public authorities, deprived the applicant company of the possibility of obtaining restitution of its land. The effect of the judgment amounted to a deprivation of its \"possessions\" ( Belvedere Alberghiera S.r.l. v.Italy, 2000, § 54). In Bagirova and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2023, §§ 46 and 53, the Court held that the domestic procedure for the expropriation of privately-owned property was not followed. Furthermore, the loss of 40 per cent and 100 per cent of the value of the plots of land combined with the partial loss of physical access to them as a result of the construction of a dam was also held to amount to a de facto expropriation ( Aygun v. Turkey, 2011, § 39). A similar conclusion was drawn in respect of an unlawful demolition of a building ( Zammit and Vassallo v. Malta, 2019, § 54). Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property", + "pre_text": "In a case where a municipality issued an order, under an expedited procedure for the possession of the applicant company's land, took physical possession of that land and began road-building works, the subsequent judgment retrospectively authorising the unlawful possession by public authorities, deprived the applicant company of the possibility of obtaining restitution of its land. The effect of the judgment amounted to a deprivation of its \"possessions\" ( Belvedere Alberghiera S.r.l. v.Italy, 2000, § 54). The loss of 40 per cent and 100 per cent of the value of the plots of land combined with the partial loss of physical access to them as a result of the construction of a dam was also held to amount to a de facto expropriation ( Aygun v. Turkey, 2011, § 39). Asimilar conclusion was drawn in respect of an unlawful demolition of a building ( Zammit and Vassallo v. Malta, 2019, § 54).", + "post_text": "In a case where a municipality issued an order, under an expedited procedure for the possession of the applicant company's land, took physical possession of that land and began road-building works, the subsequent judgment retrospectively authorising the unlawful possession by public authorities, deprived the applicant company of the possibility of obtaining restitution of its land. The effect of the judgment amounted to a deprivation of its \"possessions\" ( Belvedere Alberghiera S.r.l. v.Italy, 2000, § 54). In Bagirova and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2023, §§ 46 and 53, the Court held that the domestic procedure for the expropriation of privately-owned property was not followed. Furthermore, the loss of 40 per cent and 100 per cent of the value of the plots of land combined with the partial loss of physical access to them as a result of the construction of a dam was also held to amount to a de facto expropriation ( Aygun v. Turkey, 2011, § 39). Asimilar conclusion was drawn in respect of an unlawful demolition of a building ( Zammit and Vassallo v. Malta, 2019, § 54). Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923134648/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217094618/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1b1f8de345be/20230923134648__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf", @@ -7565,6 +8023,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:61721/19|5496/20|21318/20|33522/20|43039/20|55448/20", "case_name": "Kubát and Others v. the Czech Republic", @@ -7598,6 +8058,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:31390/18", "case_name": "Petrescu and Others v. Romania (dec.)", @@ -7631,6 +8093,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:15553/15", "case_name": "S.C. Zorina International S.R.L. v. Romania", @@ -7664,6 +8128,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:56774/18", "case_name": "UAB AmberCore DC and UAB Arcus Novus v. Lithuania", @@ -7697,6 +8163,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:3405/21", "case_name": "Zaghini v. San Marino", @@ -7730,6 +8198,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-08-28", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json", "case_key": "apps:22716/12", "case_name": "Andrzej Ruciński v. Poland", @@ -7763,6 +8233,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-08-28", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json", "case_key": "apps:46201/16|47379/18", "case_name": "Associations of Communally-owned Forestry Proprietors Porceni Pleșa and Piciorul Bătrân Banciu v. Romania", @@ -7796,6 +8268,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-08-28", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json", "case_key": "apps:4558/20", "case_name": "BCR Banca pentru locuințe S.A. v. Romania, (dec.)", @@ -7803,10 +8277,10 @@ "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", "citation_text": "BCR Banca pentru locuințe S.A. v. Romania, (dec.), no. 4558/20, 11 January 2024", - "hudoc_itemid": "", - "hudoc_importance_level": "", - "hudoc_doctype": "", - "hudoc_docname": "", + "hudoc_itemid": "001-230366", + "hudoc_importance_level": "4", + "hudoc_doctype": "HEDEC", + "hudoc_docname": "BCR BANCA PENTRU LOCUINȚE S.A. v. ROMANIA", "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", "linked_paragraph_count": 1, "linked_sections": "II.A.1.i: Legitimate expectations", @@ -7829,6 +8303,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-08-28", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json", "case_key": "apps:59065/21", "case_name": "Bernotas v. Lithuania", @@ -7862,6 +8338,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-08-28", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json", "case_key": "apps:71200/17", "case_name": "Brazauskienė v. Lithuania (dec.)", @@ -7895,6 +8373,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-08-28", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json", "case_key": "apps:33545/14", "case_name": "Eólica de S. Julião, Lda v. Portugal (dec.)", @@ -7928,9 +8408,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-08-28", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json", "case_key": "apps:25240/20", - "case_name": "Gyulumyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.) no.25240/20", + "case_name": "Gyulumyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.)", "application_numbers": "25240/20", "judgment_year": "2023", "citation_change": "added", @@ -7961,6 +8443,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-08-28", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json", "case_key": "apps:14157/18", "case_name": "Jarre v. France", @@ -7994,6 +8478,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-08-28", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json", "case_key": "apps:35648/10", "case_name": "Locascia and Others v. Italy", @@ -8027,6 +8513,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-08-28", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json", "case_key": "apps:31620/15", "case_name": "Naskov and Others v. North Macedonia", @@ -8060,39 +8548,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-08-28", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", - "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json", - "case_key": "name:national provincial building society leeds permanent building society and yorkshire building::unknown", - "case_name": "National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building", - "application_numbers": "", - "judgment_year": "", - "citation_change": "added", - "citation_text": "National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building", - "hudoc_itemid": "", - "hudoc_importance_level": "", - "hudoc_doctype": "", - "hudoc_docname": "", - "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", - "linked_paragraph_count": 3, - "linked_sections": "II.A.1.c: Different types of “possessions” and other proprietary interests i. Claims and judgment debts|II.B.2: Principle of lawfulness|II.B.4.d: Issues concerning the applicant", - "linked_change_types": "unchanged|citation_updated", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.1.c|a:28|b:30|II.B.2|a:130|b:135|II.B.4.d|a:177|b:183", - "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "By way of contrast, the Court excluded the applicability of the notion of \"legitimate expectation\" to an established claim that could not succeed owing to foreseeable legislative intervention ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 69).\n\nIn the context of Article 6 of the Convention, the principle of the rule of law and the notion of a fair trial preclude, except for compelling public interest reasons, interference by the legislature with the administration of justice designed to influence the judicial determination of a dispute ( Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, 1994, § 49; National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 112; Zielinski and Pradal and Gonzalez and Others v. France [GC], 1999, § 57; Azienda Agricola Silverfunghi S.a.s. and Others v. Italy, 2014, § 76). Nevertheless, when examined under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, laws with retrospective effect which were found to constitute legislative interference still conformed to the lawfulness requirement of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( Maggio and Others v. Italy, 2011, § 60, Arras and Others v. Italy, 2012, § 81; Azienda Agricola Silverfunghi S.a.s. and Others v. Italy, 2014, § 104; Tokel v. Turkey, 2021, § 76). Measures of control of use effected on the basis of laws enacted posterior Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property to facts giving rise to the interference are not as such unlawful ( Saliba v. Malta, 2005, §§ 39-40), if these laws were not enacted specifically with the purpose of influencing the outcome of an individual case. Neither the Convention nor its protocols preclude the legislature from interfering with existing contracts with retroactive effect ( Mellacher and Others v. Austria, 1989, § 50; Bäck v. Finland, 2004, § 68).\n\nOne of the significant factors for the balancing test under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is whether the applicant attempted to take advantage of a weakness or a loophole in the system ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 109; OGIS-Institut Stanislas, OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and Others v. France, 2004, §§ 69 and 71). Similarly, in G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property 2018, § 301, the Court noted that the degree of culpability or negligence on the part of the applicants or, at the very least, the relationship between their conduct and the offence in question may be taken into account in order to assess whether a confiscation was proportionate. A person's qualification as an accountant was one of the decisive reasons for deciding that reimbursing excess contributions without interest was proportionate ( Taşkaya v. Turkey (dec.), 2018, §§ 49-50). In certain cases the applicant's personal vulnerability is also taken into consideration, as in Pyrantienė v. Lithuania, 2013, § 62, where the applicant was of pensionable age and suffered from long-term disability). An obligation imposed on the applicant to repay benefits already received in reliance on an administrative decision, in her good faith and where the authorities had made a mistake, while not taking into account her health and financial situation, was considered to be disproportionate ( Čakarević v. Croatia, 2018, §§ 82-90; see also Casarin v. Italy, 2021, § 74).", - "post_text": "By way of contrast, the Court excluded the applicability of the notion of \"legitimate expectation\" to an established claim that could not succeed owing to foreseeable legislative intervention ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 69).\n\nIn the context of Article 6 of the Convention, the principle of the rule of law and the notion of a fair trial preclude, except for compelling public interest reasons, interference by the legislature with the administration of justice designed to influence the judicial determination of a dispute ( Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, 1994, § 49; National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 112; Zielinski and Pradal and Gonzalez and Others v. France [GC], 1999, § 57; Azienda Agricola Silverfunghi S.a.s. and Others v. Italy, 2014, § 76). Nevertheless, when examined under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, laws with retrospective effect which were found to constitute legislative interference still conformed to the Maggio and Others v. Italy Arras lawfulness requirement of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (, 2011, § 60, and Others v. Italy, 2012, § 81; Azienda Agricola Silverfunghi S.a.s. and Others v. Italy, 2014, § 104; Tokel v. Turkey, 2021, § 76). Measures of control of use effected on the basis of laws enacted posterior Saliba v. Malta to facts giving rise to the interference are not as such unlawful (, 2005, §§ 39-40), if these laws were not enacted specifically with the purpose of influencing the outcome of an individual case. Neither the Convention nor its protocols preclude the legislature from interfering with existing contracts with retroactive effect ( Mellacher and Others v. Austria, 1989, § 50; Bäck v. Finland, 2004, § 68).\n\nOne of the significant factors for the balancing test under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is whether the applicant attempted to take advantage of a weakness or a loophole in the system ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom OGIS-Institut Stanislas, OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and, 1997, § 109; Others v. France, 2004, §§ 69 and 71). Similarly, in G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, § 301, the Court noted that the degree of culpability or negligence on the part of the applicants or, at the very least, the relationship between their conduct and the offence in question may be taken into account in order to assess whether a confiscation was proportionate. A person's qualification as an accountant was one of the decisive reasons for deciding that reimbursing excess contributions without interest was proportionate ( Taşkaya v. Turkey (dec.), 2018, §§ 49-50). In certain cases the Pyrantienė v. Lithuania applicant's personal vulnerability is also taken into consideration, as in, 2013, § 62, where the applicant was of pensionable age and suffered from long-term disability). An obligation imposed on the applicant to repay benefits already received in reliance on an administrative decision, in her good faith and where the authorities had made a mistake, while not taking into account her health and financial situation, was considered to be disproportionate ( Čakarević v. Croatia, 2018, §§ 82-90; see also Casarin v. Italy, 2021, § 74). Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property", - "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217094618/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng", - "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240828212851/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng", - "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1b1f8de345be/20240217094618__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf", - "to_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1b1f8de345be/20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf" - }, - { - "guide_id": "1b1f8de345be", - "guide_title": "Article 1 Protocol 1", - "from_snapshot": "20240217094618__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf", - "to_snapshot": "20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf", - "from_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", - "to_snapshot_date": "2024-08-28", - "from_version": "31 August 2023", - "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json", "case_key": "apps:20445/15|59246/17", "case_name": "Salento Energy S.r.l. and Nuovo Sole S.r.l. v. Italy (dec.)", @@ -8126,6 +8583,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-08-28", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json", "case_key": "apps:24300/20", "case_name": "Sàrl Couttolenc Frères v. France", @@ -8159,6 +8618,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-08-28", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json", "case_key": "apps:26604/16", "case_name": "Waldner v. France", @@ -8192,6 +8653,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-08-28", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json", "case_key": "apps:51391/19", "case_name": "Wiegandová v. the Czech Republic", @@ -8225,6 +8688,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:41028/20", "case_name": "Alperin v. Ukraine", @@ -8258,6 +8723,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:50527/20", "case_name": "Amerisoc Center S.R.L. v. Luxembourg", @@ -8275,8 +8742,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_updated|paragraph_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.B.4.a|a:164|b:170|III.J|a:None|b:411", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "In cases where the applicants did not have the possibility of effectively challenging the measure, the Court has found that an excessive burden had been borne by them ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 49; Könyv - Tár Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2018, § 59; and Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 215). The Court checks whether the procedure applied provided the applicant a fair possibility of defending his or her interests ( Bäck v. Finland, 2004, § 63). A violation was found on account of a refusal by the receiver of a credit union to grant its directors access to the union's accounting documents to enable Družstevni Záložna Pria and Others v. the Czech Republic them to show that it was financially sound (, 2008, §§ 94-95). The fact of whether major arguments advanced by the applicants were carefully examined by the authorities is also relevant ( Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 2008, § 74; Novoseletskiy v. Ukraine, 2005, § 111; Bistrović v. Croatia, 2007, § 37). The operation of unchallengeable Papachelas v. Greece presumptions of benefit resulting from expropriation ( [GC], 1999, §§ 53-54), and presumptions used in the context of calculating compensation for expropriation ( Katikaridis and Others v. Greece, 1996, § 49; Efstathiou and Michailidis & Co. Motel Amerika v. Greece, 2003, § 33) were held against the Governments.", - "post_text": "In cases where the applicants did not have the possibility of effectively challenging the measure, the Court has found that an excessive burden had been borne by them ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 49; Könyv-Tár Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2018, § 59; Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 215; and Amerisoc Center S.R.L. v. Luxembourg, 2024, § 61). The Court checks whether the procedure applied provided the applicant a fair possibility of defending his or her interests ( Bäck v. Finland, 2004, § 63). A violation was found on account of a refusal by the receiver of a credit union to grant its directors access to the union's accounting documents to enable them to show that it was financially sound ( Družstevni Záložna Pria and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2008, §§ 94-95). The fact of whether major arguments advanced by the applicants were carefully examined by the authorities is also relevant ( Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 2008, § 74; Novoseletskiy v. Ukraine, 2005, § 111; Bistrović v. Croatia, 2007, § 37). In this respect, the mandatory nature of the confiscation which left no discretion to the domestic authorities to assess the proportionality of the measure, deprived the applicant of any reasonable opportunity to challenge it effectively ( Yaylalı v. Serbia, 2024, §§ 56-58). Furthermore, the operation of unchallengeable presumptions of benefit resulting from expropriation ( Papachelas v. Greece [GC], 1999, §§ 53-54), and presumptions used in the context of calculating compensation for expropriation ( Katikaridis and Others v. Greece, 1996, § 49; Efstathiou and Michailidis & Co. Motel Amerika v. Greece, 2003, § 33) were held against the Governments. ).\n\nIn this connection, even where a measure had been ordered in the context of a request for international mutual legal assistance issued by another State, the national authorities have the obligation to apply the principles of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in substance, and to do so with regard to the particular characteristics and mechanisms of international mutual legal assistance ( Amerisoc Center S.R.L. v. Luxembourg, 2024, § 55). In that case, which concerned the seizure of the applicant company's bank assets in Luxembourg, following an international request for assistance issued by Peruvian authorities, the Court found that the national courts had not afforded the applicant company a reasonable opportunity to put its case through adversarial proceedings, considering that this situation had resulted, in first place, from the law on international mutual legal assistance, which did not provide that information about the seizure order had to be communicated to the relevant bank client and, secondly, from the national court's decision not to examine the applicant's arguments . This conclusion was strengthened by the fact that the issue at hand was not examined by the Peruvian authorities either ( ibid ., §§ 58-59). Thus, in the absence of a remedy by which to challenge the seizure of the applicant company's assets in an effective manner, the Court found that the measure was disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued ( ibid ., § 61). Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property", + "pre_text": "In cases where the applicants did not have the possibility of effectively challenging the measure, the Court has found that an excessive burden had been borne by them ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 49; Könyv - Tár Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2018, § 59; and Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 215). The Court checks whether the procedure applied provided the applicant a fair possibility of defending his or her interests ( Bäck v. Finland, 2004, § 63). Aviolation was found on account of a refusal by the receiver of a credit union to grant its directors access to the union's accounting documents to enable Družstevni Záložna Pria and Others v. the Czech Republic them to show that it was financially sound (, 2008, §§ 94-95). The fact of whether major arguments advanced by the applicants were carefully examined by the authorities is also relevant ( Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 2008, § 74; Novoseletskiy v. Ukraine, 2005, § 111; Bistrović v. Croatia, 2007, § 37). The operation of unchallengeable Papachelas v. Greece presumptions of benefit resulting from expropriation ( [GC], 1999, §§ 53-54), and presumptions used in the context of calculating compensation for expropriation ( Katikaridis and Others v. Greece, 1996, § 49; Efstathiou and Michailidis & Co. Motel Amerika v. Greece, 2003, § 33) were held against the Governments.", + "post_text": "In cases where the applicants did not have the possibility of effectively challenging the measure, the Court has found that an excessive burden had been borne by them ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 49; Könyv-Tár Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2018, § 59; Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 215; and Amerisoc Center S.R.L. v. Luxembourg, 2024, § 61). The Court checks whether the procedure applied provided the applicant a fair possibility of defending his or her interests ( Bäck v. Finland, 2004, § 63). Aviolation was found on account of a refusal by the receiver of a credit union to grant its directors access to the union's accounting documents to enable them to show that it was financially sound ( Družstevni Záložna Pria and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2008, §§ 94-95). The fact of whether major arguments advanced by the applicants were carefully examined by the authorities is also relevant ( Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 2008, § 74; Novoseletskiy v. Ukraine, 2005, § 111; Bistrović v. Croatia, 2007, § 37). In this respect, the mandatory nature of the confiscation which left no discretion to the domestic authorities to assess the proportionality of the measure, deprived the applicant of any reasonable opportunity to challenge it effectively ( Yaylalı v. Serbia, 2024, §§ 56-58). Furthermore, the operation of unchallengeable presumptions of benefit resulting from expropriation ( Papachelas v. Greece [GC], 1999, §§ 53-54), and presumptions used in the context of calculating compensation for expropriation ( Katikaridis and Others v. Greece, 1996, § 49; Efstathiou and Michailidis & Co. Motel Amerika v. Greece, 2003, § 33) were held against the Governments. ).\n\nIn this connection, even where a measure had been ordered in the context of a request for international mutual legal assistance issued by another State, the national authorities have the obligation to apply the principles of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in substance, and to do so with regard to the particular characteristics and mechanisms of international mutual legal assistance ( Amerisoc Center S.R.L. v. Luxembourg, 2024, § 55). In that case, which concerned the seizure of the applicant company's bank assets in Luxembourg, following an international request for assistance issued by Peruvian authorities, the Court found that the national courts had not afforded the applicant company a reasonable opportunity to put its case through adversarial proceedings, considering that this situation had resulted, in first place, from the law on international mutual legal assistance, which did not provide that information about the seizure order had to be communicated to the relevant bank client and, secondly, from the national court's decision not to examine the applicant's arguments . This conclusion was strengthened by the fact that the issue at hand was not examined by the Peruvian authorities either ( ibid ., §§ 58-59). Thus, in the absence of a remedy by which to challenge the seizure of the applicant company's assets in an effective manner, the Court found that the measure was disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued ( ibid ., § 61). Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240828212851/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250612193940/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1b1f8de345be/20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf", @@ -8291,6 +8758,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:33189/21", "case_name": "Çatak and Others v. Türkiye", @@ -8324,6 +8793,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:27849/15|33358/15", "case_name": "Drozdyk and Mikula v. Ukraine", @@ -8357,6 +8828,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:75088/17", "case_name": "Energyworks Cartagena S.L. v. Spain (dec.)", @@ -8390,6 +8863,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:47284/16|84604/17", "case_name": "Episcopo and Bassani v. Italy", @@ -8423,6 +8898,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:25311/17", "case_name": "Immoreks Makedonija Doo Skopje v. North Macedonia (dec.)", @@ -8441,7 +8918,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.1.i|a:24|b:25", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "No legitimate expectation arises in a situation where the applicant relies on the mere fact that members of the respondent Government made political statements favourable to the applicant's restitution claims ( Bata v. Czech Republic (dec.), 2008, § 77), or on a programmatic statement in a statute, referring to a future statute which ultimately was not adopted ( Zamoyski-Brisson v. Poland (dec.), 2017, § 78) or in relation to the applicants' claim for financial aid, as the relevant national law clearly made the \"right\" to obtain financial aid conditional on the availability of sufficient emergency funds, without providing for any rules on the amounts to be granted and the distribution of the Traina Berto and Alfonsetti v. Italy emergency fund's limited financial resources ( (dec.), 2022, §§ 45-46). Similarly, no legitimate expectation arises in relation to State aid unlawfully distributed to private individuals via a building society ( BCR Banca pentru locuințe S.A. v. Romania (dec.), 2024, §§ 127-139).", - "post_text": "No legitimate expectation arises in a situation where the applicant relies on the mere fact that members of the respondent Government made political statements favourable to the applicant's restitution claims ( Bata v. Czech Republic (dec.), 2008, § 77), or on a programmatic statement in a statute, referring to a future statute which ultimately was not adopted ( Zamoyski-Brisson v. Poland (dec.), 2017, § 78) or in relation to the applicants'claim for financial aid, as the relevant national law clearly made the \"right\" to obtain financial aid conditional on the availability of sufficient emergency funds, without providing for any rules on the amounts to be granted and the distribution Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property of the emergency fund's limited financial resources ( Traina Berto and Alfonsetti v. Italy (dec.), 2022, §§ 45-46). Similarly, no legitimate expectation arises in relation to State aid unlawfully distributed to private individuals via a building society ( BCR Banca pentru locuințe S.A. v. Romania (dec.), 2024, §§ 127-139). Lastly, there is no legitimate expectation of a deduction of VAT previously paid by an applicant company to its suppliers when the applicant company had knowledge of their failure to comply with their VAT-relate d obligations and had the means to enforce the suppliers' compliance, regardless of whether or not the applicant company fully complied with its own VAT-related obligations ( Immoreks Makedonija Doo Skopje v. North Macedonia (dec.), 2024, §§ 32-35 and 41).", + "post_text": "No legitimate expectation arises in a situation where the applicant relies on the mere fact that members of the respondent Government made political statements favourable to the applicant's restitution claims ( Bata v. Czech Republic (dec.), 2008, § 77), or on a programmatic statement in a statute, referring to a future statute which ultimately was not adopted ( Zamoyski-Brisson v. Poland (dec.), 2017, § 78) or in relation to the applicants'claim for financial aid, as the relevant national law clearly made the \"right\" to obtain financial aid conditional on the availability of sufficient emergency funds, without providing for any rules on the amounts to be granted and the distribution Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property of the emergency fund's limited financial resources ( Traina Berto and Alfonsetti v. Italy (dec.), 2022, §§ 45-46). Similarly, no legitimate expectation arises in relation to State aid unlawfully distributed to private individuals via a building society ( BCR Banca pentru locuințe S.A. v. Romania (dec.), 2024, §§ 127-139). Lastly, there is no legitimate expectation of a deduction of VATpreviously paid by an applicant company to its suppliers when the applicant company had knowledge of their failure to comply with their VAT-relate d obligations and had the means to enforce the suppliers' compliance, regardless of whether or not the applicant company fully complied with its own VAT-related obligations ( Immoreks Makedonija Doo Skopje v. North Macedonia (dec.), 2024, §§ 32-35 and 41).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240828212851/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250612193940/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1b1f8de345be/20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf", @@ -8456,6 +8933,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:32879/18", "case_name": "Ioannides v. Cyprus", @@ -8489,6 +8968,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:61721/19", "case_name": "Kubát and Others v. the Czech Republic", @@ -8522,6 +9003,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:57002/11", "case_name": "Mandev and Others v. Bulgaria", @@ -8555,6 +9038,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:25189/21", "case_name": "Melandri v. San Marino", @@ -8588,6 +9073,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:24460/16", "case_name": "Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan", @@ -8605,8 +9092,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.B.3|a:141|b:145|II.B.4.a|a:166|b:172|III.H|a:393|b:402", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "The following purposes have been found by the Court to fall within the notion of public interest within the meaning of this provision: elimination of social injustice in the housing sector ( James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 45; Grozdanić and Gršković Grozdanić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102- Maria Azzopardi v. Malta 103; see also, 2022, §§ 53 and 60 for the provision of residential homes in ‐ the context of the State's economic and planning policies); combating the effects of a foreign-currency loan crisis particularly in the context of preventing mass homelessness ( Béla Németh v. Hungary, 2020, §§ 42-45); nationalisation of specific industries ( Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, §§ 9 and 109); regulation of the energy sector ( Salento Energy S.r.l. and Nuovo Sole S.r.l. v. Italy (dec.), 2024, § 37);adoption of land and city development plans ( Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 1982, § 69); Cooperativa La Laurentina v. Italy, 2001, § 94; securing land in connection with the Skibińscy v. Poland implementation of the local land development plan (, 2006, § 86); prevention of tax evasion ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 39); road traffic safety ( Pannon Plakát Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2022, § 48); measures to combat drug trafficking and smuggling ( Butler v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2002; protection of the interests of the victims of the crime ( Šeiko v. Lithuania, 2020, § 31); measures Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden to restrict the consumption of alcohol (, 1989, § 62); protection of morals ( Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, § 62); control of legitimate origin of cars brought into circulation ( Sildedzis v. Poland, 2005, § 50); confiscation of monies acquired unlawfully ( Honecker and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2001; the prevention of collusive practices and the protection of the public purse and promotion of fair competition ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, § 78); transition from a socialist to a free-market economy ( Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], 2018, §§ 103 and 105); and the smooth operation of the justice system, with further references to the importance of administering justice without delays which might jeopardise its effectiveness and credibility ( Konstantin Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2015, § 64). However, in view of the contractual relationship between the applicants and the debtor which was of a purely business-law nature, the Court did not retain the protection of consumers as a legitimate aim Katona and Závarský v. Slovakia in the circumstances of the case (, 2023, § 59).\n\nA failure on the part of the national authorities to carry out the balancing exercise between the private interests involved in the case and the public interest may also be held against the respondent State ( Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 2008, § 74). A violation was found in a case where all life savings generated by employment were confiscated from a person who had obtained that employment using a false passport. The domestic courts failed to examine whether the confiscation order had maintained a fair balance between the property rights and the public interest. Hence, the failure by a domestic court to make the proportionality analysis can result in a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( Paulet v. the United Kingdom, 2014, §§ 68-69). Similarly, an automatic, general and inflexible Uzan and Others v. Turkey protective measure of uncertain duration can result in a violation (, 2019, § 193).\n\nAlso in the context of tax proceedings, the Court attaches importance to the availability of procedural safeguards in the relevant proceedings (compare Agosi v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 55). Fair balance was upset in cases where the national authorities, in the absence of any indication of direct involvement by an individual or entity in fraudulent abuse of a VAT chain of supply, or knowledge thereof, nevertheless penalised the fully compliant recipient of a VAT-taxable supply for the actions or inactions of a supplier over which it had no control and in relation to which it had no means of monitoring or securing compliance ( \"Bulves\" AD v. Bulgaria, 2009, §§ 67-71).", - "post_text": "The following purposes have been found by the Court to fall within the notion of public interest within the meaning of this provision: elimination of social injustice in the housing sector ( James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 45; Grozdanić and Gršković ‐ Grozdanić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-103; see also Maria Azzopardi v. Malta, 2022, §§ 53 and 60 for the provision of residential homes in the context of the State's economic and planning policies); combating the effects of a foreign-currency loan crisis particularly in the context of preventing mass homelessness ( Béla Németh v. Hungary, 2020, §§ 42-45); nationalisation of specific industries ( Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, §§ 9 and 109); regulation of the energy sector ( Salento Energy S.r.l. and Nuovo Sole S.r.l. v. Italy (dec.), 2024, § 37); adoption of land and city development plans ( Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 1982, § 69); Cooperativa La Laurentina v. Italy, 2001, § 94; securing land in connection with the implementation of the local land development plan ( Skibińscy v. Poland, 2006, § 86); prevention of tax evasion ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 39); securing payment of a tax debt ( Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 58); road traffic safety ( Pannon Plakát Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2022, § 48); measures to combat drug trafficking and smuggling ( Butler v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2002); protection of cultural heritage against unlawful exportation from the country of origin or ensuring its recovery and return therein ( The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 342); protection of the interests of the victims of the crime ( Šeiko v. Lithuania, 2020, § 31); measures to restrict the consumption of alcohol ( Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden, 1989, § 62); protection of morals ( Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, § 62); control of legitimate origin of cars brought into circulation ( Sildedzis v. Poland, 2005, § 50); confiscation of monies acquired unlawfully ( Honecker and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2001; the prevention of collusive practices and the protection of the public purse and promotion of fair competition ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, § 78); transition from a socialist to a free-market economy ( Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], 2018, §§ 103 and 105); and the smooth operation of the justice system, with further references to the importance of administering justice without delays which might jeopardise its effectiveness and credibility ( Konstantin Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2015, § 64). However, in view of the contractual relationship between the applicants and the debtor which was of a purely business-law nature, the Court did not retain the protection of consumers as a legitimate aim in the circumstances of the case ( Katona and Závarský v. Slovakia, 2023, § 59).\n\nA failure on the part of the national authorities to carry out the balancing exercise between the private interests involved in the case and the public interest may also be held against the respondent State ( Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 2008, § 74). A violation was found in a case where all life savings generated by employment were confiscated from a person who had obtained that employment using a false passport. The domestic courts failed to examine whether the confiscation order had maintained a fair balance between the property rights and the public interest. Hence, the failure by a domestic court to make the proportionality analysis can result in a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( Paulet v. the United Kingdom, 2014, §§ 68-69; see also Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 64, in respect of the freezing of a publishing house 's bank accounts by tax authorities, without a proportionality assessment). Similarly, an automatic, general and inflexible protective measure of uncertain duration can result in a violation ( Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 193).\n\nAlso in the context of tax proceedings, the Court attaches importance to the availability of procedural safeguards in the relevant proceedings (compare Agosi v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 55). In that respect, the Court found the freezing of a company's bank accounts by tax authorities for an indefinite period of time, without any possibility of its review at regular intervals, to be in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 65). Furthermore, the fair balance was upset in cases where the national authorities, in the absence of any indication of direct involvement by an individual or entity in fraudulent abuse of a VAT chain of supply, or knowledge thereof, nevertheless penalised the fully compliant recipient of a VAT-taxable supply for the actions or inactions of a supplier over which it had no control and in relation to which it had no means of monitoring or securing compliance ( \"Bulves\" AD v. Bulgaria, 2009, §§ 67-71). Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property", + "pre_text": "The following purposes have been found by the Court to fall within the notion of public interest within the meaning of this provision: elimination of social injustice in the housing sector ( James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 45; Grozdanić and Gršković Grozdanić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102- Maria Azzopardi v. Malta 103; see also, 2022, §§ 53 and 60 for the provision of residential homes in ‐ the context of the State's economic and planning policies); combating the effects of a foreign-currency loan crisis particularly in the context of preventing mass homelessness ( Béla Németh v. Hungary, 2020, §§ 42-45); nationalisation of specific industries ( Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, §§ 9 and 109); regulation of the energy sector ( Salento Energy S.r.l. and Nuovo Sole S.r.l. v. Italy (dec.), 2024, § 37);adoption of land and city development plans ( Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 1982, § 69); Cooperativa La Laurentina v. Italy, 2001, § 94; securing land in connection with the Skibińscy v. Poland implementation of the local land development plan (, 2006, § 86); prevention of tax evasion ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 39); road traffic safety ( Pannon Plakát Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2022, § 48); measures to combat drug trafficking and smuggling ( Butler v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2002; protection of the interests of the victims of the crime ( Šeiko v. Lithuania, 2020, § 31); measures Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden to restrict the consumption of alcohol (, 1989, § 62); protection of morals ( Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, § 62); control of legitimate origin of cars brought into circulation ( Sildedzis v. Poland, 2005, § 50); confiscation of monies acquired unlawfully ( Honecker and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2001; the prevention of collusive practices and the protection of the public purse and promotion of fair competition ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, § 78); transition from a socialist to a free-market economy ( Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], 2018, §§ 103 and 105); and the smooth operation of the justice system, with further references to the importance of administering justice without delays which might jeopardise its effectiveness and credibility ( Konstantin Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2015, § 64). However, in view of the contractual relationship between the applicants and the debtor which was of a purely business-law nature, the Court did not retain the protection of consumers as a legitimate aim Katona and Závarský v. Slovakia in the circumstances of the case (, 2023, § 59).\n\nAfailure on the part of the national authorities to carry out the balancing exercise between the private interests involved in the case and the public interest may also be held against the respondent State ( Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 2008, § 74). Aviolation was found in a case where all life savings generated by employment were confiscated from a person who had obtained that employment using a false passport. The domestic courts failed to examine whether the confiscation order had maintained a fair balance between the property rights and the public interest. Hence, the failure by a domestic court to make the proportionality analysis can result in a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( Paulet v. the United Kingdom, 2014, §§ 68-69). Similarly, an automatic, general and inflexible Uzan and Others v. Turkey protective measure of uncertain duration can result in a violation (, 2019, § 193).\n\nAlso in the context of tax proceedings, the Court attaches importance to the availability of procedural safeguards in the relevant proceedings (compare Agosi v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 55). Fair balance was upset in cases where the national authorities, in the absence of any indication of direct involvement by an individual or entity in fraudulent abuse of a VATchain of supply, or knowledge thereof, nevertheless penalised the fully compliant recipient of a VAT-taxable supply for the actions or inactions of a supplier over which it had no control and in relation to which it had no means of monitoring or securing compliance ( \"Bulves\" AD v. Bulgaria, 2009, §§ 67-71).", + "post_text": "The following purposes have been found by the Court to fall within the notion of public interest within the meaning of this provision: elimination of social injustice in the housing sector ( James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 45; Grozdanić and Gršković ‐ Grozdanić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-103; see also Maria Azzopardi v. Malta, 2022, §§ 53 and 60 for the provision of residential homes in the context of the State's economic and planning policies); combating the effects of a foreign-currency loan crisis particularly in the context of preventing mass homelessness ( Béla Németh v. Hungary, 2020, §§ 42-45); nationalisation of specific industries ( Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, §§ 9 and 109); regulation of the energy sector ( Salento Energy S.r.l. and Nuovo Sole S.r.l. v. Italy (dec.), 2024, § 37); adoption of land and city development plans ( Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 1982, § 69); Cooperativa La Laurentina v. Italy, 2001, § 94; securing land in connection with the implementation of the local land development plan ( Skibińscy v. Poland, 2006, § 86); prevention of tax evasion ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 39); securing payment of a tax debt ( Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 58); road traffic safety ( Pannon Plakát Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2022, § 48); measures to combat drug trafficking and smuggling ( Butler v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2002); protection of cultural heritage against unlawful exportation from the country of origin or ensuring its recovery and return therein ( The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 342); protection of the interests of the victims of the crime ( Šeiko v. Lithuania, 2020, § 31); measures to restrict the consumption of alcohol ( Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden, 1989, § 62); protection of morals ( Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, § 62); control of legitimate origin of cars brought into circulation ( Sildedzis v. Poland, 2005, § 50); confiscation of monies acquired unlawfully ( Honecker and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2001; the prevention of collusive practices and the protection of the public purse and promotion of fair competition ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, § 78); transition from a socialist to a free-market economy ( Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], 2018, §§ 103 and 105); and the smooth operation of the justice system, with further references to the importance of administering justice without delays which might jeopardise its effectiveness and credibility ( Konstantin Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2015, § 64). However, in view of the contractual relationship between the applicants and the debtor which was of a purely business-law nature, the Court did not retain the protection of consumers as a legitimate aim in the circumstances of the case ( Katona and Závarský v. Slovakia, 2023, § 59).\n\nAfailure on the part of the national authorities to carry out the balancing exercise between the private interests involved in the case and the public interest may also be held against the respondent State ( Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 2008, § 74). Aviolation was found in a case where all life savings generated by employment were confiscated from a person who had obtained that employment using a false passport. The domestic courts failed to examine whether the confiscation order had maintained a fair balance between the property rights and the public interest. Hence, the failure by a domestic court to make the proportionality analysis can result in a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( Paulet v. the United Kingdom, 2014, §§ 68-69; see also Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 64, in respect of the freezing of a publishing house 's bank accounts by tax authorities, without a proportionality assessment). Similarly, an automatic, general and inflexible protective measure of uncertain duration can result in a violation ( Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 193).\n\nAlso in the context of tax proceedings, the Court attaches importance to the availability of procedural safeguards in the relevant proceedings (compare Agosi v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 55). In that respect, the Court found the freezing of a company's bank accounts by tax authorities for an indefinite period of time, without any possibility of its review at regular intervals, to be in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 65). Furthermore, the fair balance was upset in cases where the national authorities, in the absence of any indication of direct involvement by an individual or entity in fraudulent abuse of a VATchain of supply, or knowledge thereof, nevertheless penalised the fully compliant recipient of a VAT-taxable supply for the actions or inactions of a supplier over which it had no control and in relation to which it had no means of monitoring or securing compliance ( \"Bulves\" AD v. Bulgaria, 2009, §§ 67-71). Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240828212851/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250612193940/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1b1f8de345be/20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf", @@ -8621,6 +9108,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:17131/19", "case_name": "Tamazount and others v. France", @@ -8639,7 +9128,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.C.2|a:228|b:237", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "State responsibility for the failure to provide an adequate remedial action has been found in the Păduraru v. Romania context of enforcement of judgment debts: restitution of property (, 2005, § 112); payment of compensation for expropriation ( Almeida Garrett, Mascarenhas Falcão and Others v. Portugal, 2000, §§ 109-111); enforcement of court orders for the eviction of tenants and the repossession of dwellings ( Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], 1999, §§ 43-59; Matheus v. France, 2005, Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property §§ 69-71; Lo Tufo v. Italy, 2005, § 53; Prodan v. Moldova, 2004, § 61). State responsibility was also invoked in Papachela and AMAZON S.A. v. Greece, 2020, §§ 57-58 and 62-64, in which the Greek Government failed to evict migrants and others who had taken over a hotel belonging to the applicants despite a court order to the contrary.", - "post_text": "State responsibility for the failure to provide an adequate remedial action has been found in the context of enforcement of judgment debts: restitution of property ( Păduraru v. Romania, 2005, § 112); payment of compensation for expropriation ( Almeida Garrett, Mascarenhas Falcão and Others v. Portugal, 2000, §§ 109-111); enforcement of court orders for the eviction of tenants and the repossession of dwellings ( Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], 1999, §§ 43-59; Matheus v. France, 2005, §§ 69-71; Lo Tufo v. Italy, 2005, § 53; Prodan v. Moldova, 2004, § 61), and also as regards Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property compensation for the living conditions in a harki reception camp ( Tamazount and others v. France, 2024, § 164). S tate responsibility was also invoked in Papachela and AMAZON S.A. v. Greece, 2020, §§ 57-58 and 62-64, in which the Greek Government failed to evict migrants and others who had taken over a hotel belonging to the applicants despite a court order to the contrary.", + "post_text": "State responsibility for the failure to provide an adequate remedial action has been found in the context of enforcement of judgment debts: restitution of property ( Păduraru v. Romania, 2005, § 112); payment of compensation for expropriation ( Almeida Garrett, Mascarenhas Falcão and Others v. Portugal, 2000, §§ 109-111); enforcement of court orders for the eviction of tenants and the repossession of dwellings ( Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], 1999, §§ 43-59; Matheus v. France, 2005, §§ 69-71; Lo Tufo v. Italy, 2005, § 53; Prodan v. Moldova, 2004, § 61), and also as regards Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property compensation for the living conditions in a harki reception camp ( Tamazount and others v. France, 2024, § 164). State responsibility was also invoked in Papachela and AMAZON S.A. v. Greece, 2020, §§ 57-58 and 62-64, in which the Greek Government failed to evict migrants and others who had taken over a hotel belonging to the applicants despite a court order to the contrary.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240828212851/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250612193940/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1b1f8de345be/20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf", @@ -8654,6 +9143,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:35271/19", "case_name": "The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy", @@ -8671,8 +9162,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added|paragraph_added|citation_updated", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.1.a|a:6|b:6|II.B.1|a:95|b:96|II.B.1.c|a:None|b:123|II.B.2|a:None|b:130|II.B.3|a:141|b:145|II.B.4|a:None|b:164|II.B.4.d|a:183|b:190", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "The fact that the domestic laws of a State do not recognise a particular interest as a \"right\" or even a \"property right\" does not necessarily prevent the interest in question, in some circumstances, from being regarded as a \"possession\" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( Depalle v. France [GC], 2010, § 68, in respect of a revocable and precarious right to occupancy of a public property on Öneryıldız v. Turkey account of a lapse of time; [GC], 2004, § 129, in respect of the applicant's proprietary interest in his unauthorised dwelling). A long-standing tolerance on the part of the authorities has also conferred property rights on applicants in respect of a disputed plot of land ( Kosmas and Others v. Greece, 2017, §§ 68-71; see also Arnavutkoy Greek Orthodox Taksiarhis Church Foundation v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 45-46, concerning the property of a religious foundation for which the applicant had no proper title but which was mentioned in its founding document). Furthermore, the domestic law ordering the expropriation of a plot of land in certain circumstances, with the right to Kutlu and Others v. Turkey compensation, was considered to have created a proprietary interest (, 2016, § 58).\n\nIn some cases it is more difficult for the Court to qualify a measure or a series of measures as either deprivation or control of use of property, essentially because it cannot be easily assimilated to measures qualified in the existing case-law or because the series of measures consists of disparate decisions belonging to various branches of domestic law. In such cases it will probably analyse the circumstances of the case under the general principle of the first sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. This will apply in particular to situations where not just one decision, but a combination of various measures/decisions affected the applicant's property ( Ðokić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, §§ 55-56 - a contract of purchase in respect of a flat legally valid, applicant registered as an owner, but unable to have the flat restored to him; and Matos e Silva, Lda., and Others v. Portugal, 1996, § 85 - in the absence of a formal expropriation decision restrictions on the right to property stemmed from Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property the reduced ability to dispose of it and from the damage caused by the fact that expropriation was contemplated; but the applicants continued to work the land). In a case where the applicants complained that their rights had been violated on account of the discrepancy between the assessments of the market value of expropriated property for the purposes of the determination of compensation and for the purposes of inheritance tax in respect of the same property, expropriation and taxation were examined separately and no violation was found. However, the combined effect of Jokela both measures was examined under the first rule and resulted in a finding of a violation ( v. Finland, 2002, §§ 61-65).\n\nThe following purposes have been found by the Court to fall within the notion of public interest within the meaning of this provision: elimination of social injustice in the housing sector ( James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 45; Grozdanić and Gršković Grozdanić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102- Maria Azzopardi v. Malta 103; see also, 2022, §§ 53 and 60 for the provision of residential homes in ‐ the context of the State's economic and planning policies); combating the effects of a foreign-currency loan crisis particularly in the context of preventing mass homelessness ( Béla Németh v. Hungary, 2020, §§ 42-45); nationalisation of specific industries ( Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, §§ 9 and 109); regulation of the energy sector ( Salento Energy S.r.l. and Nuovo Sole S.r.l. v. Italy (dec.), 2024, § 37);adoption of land and city development plans ( Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 1982, § 69); Cooperativa La Laurentina v. Italy, 2001, § 94; securing land in connection with the Skibińscy v. Poland implementation of the local land development plan (, 2006, § 86); prevention of tax evasion ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 39); road traffic safety ( Pannon Plakát Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2022, § 48); measures to combat drug trafficking and smuggling ( Butler v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2002; protection of the interests of the victims of the crime ( Šeiko v. Lithuania, 2020, § 31); measures Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden to restrict the consumption of alcohol (, 1989, § 62); protection of morals ( Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, § 62); control of legitimate origin of cars brought into circulation ( Sildedzis v. Poland, 2005, § 50); confiscation of monies acquired unlawfully ( Honecker and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2001; the prevention of collusive practices and the protection of the public purse and promotion of fair competition ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, § 78); transition from a socialist to a free-market economy ( Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], 2018, §§ 103 and 105); and the smooth operation of the justice system, with further references to the importance of administering justice without delays which might jeopardise its effectiveness and credibility ( Konstantin Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2015, § 64). However, in view of the contractual relationship between the applicants and the debtor which was of a purely business-law nature, the Court did not retain the protection of consumers as a legitimate aim Katona and Závarský v. Slovakia in the circumstances of the case (, 2023, § 59).\n\nOne of the significant factors for the balancing test under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is whether the applicant attempted to take advantage of a weakness or a loophole in the system ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom OGIS-Institut Stanislas, OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and, 1997, § 109; Others v. France, 2004, §§ 69 and 71). Similarly, in G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, § 301, the Court noted that the degree of culpability or negligence on the part of the applicants or, at the very least, the relationship between their conduct and the offence in question may be taken into account in order to assess whether a confiscation was proportionate. A person's qualification as an accountant was one of the decisive reasons for deciding that reimbursing excess contributions without interest was proportionate ( Taşkaya v. Turkey (dec.), 2018, §§ 49-50). In certain cases the Pyrantienė v. Lithuania applicant's personal vulnerability is also taken into consideration, as in, 2013, § 62, where the applicant was of pensionable age and suffered from long-term disability). An obligation imposed on the applicant to repay benefits already received in reliance on an administrative decision, in her good faith and where the authorities had made a mistake, while not taking into account her health and financial situation, was considered to be disproportionate ( Čakarević v. Croatia, 2018, §§ 82-90; see also Casarin v. Italy, 2021, § 74). Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property", - "post_text": "The fact that the domestic laws of a State do not recognise a particular interest as a \"right\" or even a \"property right\" does not necessarily prevent the interest in question, i n some circumstances, from being regarded as a \"possession\" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( Depalle v. France [GC], 2010, § 68, in respect of a revocable and precarious right to occupancy of a public property on account of a lapse of time; Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 129, in respect of the applicant's proprietary interest in his unauthorised dwelling; The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 264, in respect of inviting the applicant, in its capacity as a current possessor of the cultural item, to participate in domestic proceedings). A long-standing tolerance on the part of the authorities has also conferred property rights on applicants in respect of a disputed plot of land ( Kosmas and Others v. Greece, 2017, §§ 68-71; see also Arnavutkoy Greek Orthodox Taksiarhis Church Foundation v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 45-46, concerning the property of a religious foundation for which the applicant had no proper title but which was mentioned in its founding document; and The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 265, in respect of the length of time that passed conferring on the applicant a proprietary interest that was sufficiently established and weighty to amount to a \" possession \" of the art work). Furthermore, the domestic law ordering the expropriation of a plot of land in certain circumstances, with the right to compensation, was considered to have created a proprietary interest ( Kutlu and Others v. Turkey, 2016, § 58). Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property\n\nIn some cases it is more difficult for the Court to qualify a measure or a series of measures as either deprivation or control of use of property, essentially because it cannot be easily assimilated to measures qualified in the existing case-law or because the series of measures consists of disparate decisions belonging to various branches of domestic law. In such cases it will probably analyse the circumstances of the case under the general principle of the first sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. This will apply in particular to situations where not just one decision, but a combination of various measures/decisions affected the applicant's property ( Ðokić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, §§ 55-56 - a contract of purchase in respect of a flat legally valid, applicant registered as an owner, but unable to have the flat restored to him; Matos e Silva, Lda., and Others v. Portugal, 1996, § 85 - in the absence of a formal expropriation decision restrictions on the right to property stemmed from the reduced ability to dispose of it and from the damage caused by the fact that expropriation was contemplated; but the applicants continued to work the land; and The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 278 - the recovery of an unlawfully exported cultural object through a measure that, although adopted within criminal proceedings, had civil effects). In a case where the applicants complained that their rights had been violated on account of the discrepancy between the assessments of the market value of expropriated property for the purposes of the determination of compensation and for the purposes of inheritance tax in respect of the same property, expropriation and taxation were examined separately and no violation was found. However, the combined effect of both measures was examined under the first rule and resulted in a finding of a violation ( Jokela v. Finland, 2002, §§ 61-65).\n\nIn The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, §§ 273-277, the Court was satisfied that a confiscation order, adopted in respect of a cultural item located abroad although not enforced yet, limited the applicant Trust's capacity to fully dispose of the item and, accordingly, considered that its mere issuance amounted to an interference with that applicant's proprietary interests protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It found that the general rule was applicable.\n\nThe Court further clarified in The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 306, that, in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 cases, the foreseeability of the legal basis allowing for measures of interference must be assessed with reference to the moment when the interference at stake took place, that is the moment of the issuance of the contested measure. This stance was confirmed in Episcopo and Bassani v. Italy, 2024, §§ 154-156, where the Court assessed the degree of foreseeability of a confiscation order of the applicant's assets, considered to be the direct proceeds of crime, which order was made despite the discontinuation of the proceedings due to the expiry of the statute of limitation. The Court found that, at the material time, the established case-law considered that the measure of confiscation could not be applied after an offence had ceased to be punishable and that it was only later that the Court of Cassation started to recognise that the measure of confiscation could, in fact, be applied in such a situation and, even then, the issue was subject to divergent case-law for several years.\n\nThe following purposes have been found by the Court to fall within the notion of public interest within the meaning of this provision: elimination of social injustice in the housing sector ( James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 45; Grozdanić and Gršković ‐ Grozdanić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-103; see also Maria Azzopardi v. Malta, 2022, §§ 53 and 60 for the provision of residential homes in the context of the State's economic and planning policies); combating the effects of a foreign-currency loan crisis particularly in the context of preventing mass homelessness ( Béla Németh v. Hungary, 2020, §§ 42-45); nationalisation of specific industries ( Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, §§ 9 and 109); regulation of the energy sector ( Salento Energy S.r.l. and Nuovo Sole S.r.l. v. Italy (dec.), 2024, § 37); adoption of land and city development plans ( Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 1982, § 69); Cooperativa La Laurentina v. Italy, 2001, § 94; securing land in connection with the implementation of the local land development plan ( Skibińscy v. Poland, 2006, § 86); prevention of tax evasion ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 39); securing payment of a tax debt ( Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 58); road traffic safety ( Pannon Plakát Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2022, § 48); measures to combat drug trafficking and smuggling ( Butler v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2002); protection of cultural heritage against unlawful exportation from the country of origin or ensuring its recovery and return therein ( The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 342); protection of the interests of the victims of the crime ( Šeiko v. Lithuania, 2020, § 31); measures to restrict the consumption of alcohol ( Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden, 1989, § 62); protection of morals ( Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, § 62); control of legitimate origin of cars brought into circulation ( Sildedzis v. Poland, 2005, § 50); confiscation of monies acquired unlawfully ( Honecker and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2001; the prevention of collusive practices and the protection of the public purse and promotion of fair competition ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, § 78); transition from a socialist to a free-market economy ( Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], 2018, §§ 103 and 105); and the smooth operation of the justice system, with further references to the importance of administering justice without delays which might jeopardise its effectiveness and credibility ( Konstantin Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2015, § 64). However, in view of the contractual relationship between the applicants and the debtor which was of a purely business-law nature, the Court did not retain the protection of consumers as a legitimate aim in the circumstances of the case ( Katona and Závarský v. Slovakia, 2023, § 59).\n\nAnother example is the case of The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024 §§ 407-408, where the Court noted a wide margin of discretion as to what is \"in accordance with the general interest\", particularly where cultural heritage issues are concerned, the strong consensus in international and European law with regard to the need to protect cultural objects from unlawful exportation and to return them to their country of origin, the applicant's negligent conduct, as well as the very exceptional legal vacuum in which the domestic authorities found themselves to hold there had been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.\n\nOne of the significant factors for the balancing test under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is whether the applicant attempted to take advantage of a weakness or a loophole in the system ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 109; OGIS-Institut Stanislas, OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and Others v. France, 2004, §§ 69 and 71). Similarly, in G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, § 301, the Court noted that the degree of culpability or negligence on the part of the applicants or, at the very least, the relationship between their conduct and the offence in question may be taken into account in order to assess whether a confiscation was proportionate (see also The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 408). A person's qualification as an accountant was one of the decisive reasons for deciding that reimbursing excess contributions without interest was proportionate ( Taşkaya v. Turkey (dec.), 2018, §§ 49-50). In UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania, 2025, § 223, the Court observed that the domestic courts had thoroughly assessed the overall conduct of the applicant companies, in the extraordinary situation created by the public health crisis of Covid-19, which companies had acted in bad faith and had sought to take advantage of the public health emergency in order to make an excessive profit.", + "pre_text": "The fact that the domestic laws of a State do not recognise a particular interest as a \"right\" or even a \"property right\" does not necessarily prevent the interest in question, in some circumstances, from being regarded as a \"possession\" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( Depalle v. France [GC], 2010, § 68, in respect of a revocable and precarious right to occupancy of a public property on Öneryıldız v. Turkey account of a lapse of time; [GC], 2004, § 129, in respect of the applicant's proprietary interest in his unauthorised dwelling). Along-standing tolerance on the part of the authorities has also conferred property rights on applicants in respect of a disputed plot of land ( Kosmas and Others v. Greece, 2017, §§ 68-71; see also Arnavutkoy Greek Orthodox Taksiarhis Church Foundation v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 45-46, concerning the property of a religious foundation for which the applicant had no proper title but which was mentioned in its founding document). Furthermore, the domestic law ordering the expropriation of a plot of land in certain circumstances, with the right to Kutlu and Others v. Turkey compensation, was considered to have created a proprietary interest (, 2016, § 58).\n\nIn some cases it is more difficult for the Court to qualify a measure or a series of measures as either deprivation or control of use of property, essentially because it cannot be easily assimilated to measures qualified in the existing case-law or because the series of measures consists of disparate decisions belonging to various branches of domestic law. In such cases it will probably analyse the circumstances of the case under the general principle of the first sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. This will apply in particular to situations where not just one decision, but a combination of various measures/decisions affected the applicant's property ( Ðokić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, §§ 55-56 - a contract of purchase in respect of a flat legally valid, applicant registered as an owner, but unable to have the flat restored to him; and Matos e Silva, Lda., and Others v. Portugal, 1996, § 85 - in the absence of a formal expropriation decision restrictions on the right to property stemmed from Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property the reduced ability to dispose of it and from the damage caused by the fact that expropriation was contemplated; but the applicants continued to work the land). In a case where the applicants complained that their rights had been violated on account of the discrepancy between the assessments of the market value of expropriated property for the purposes of the determination of compensation and for the purposes of inheritance tax in respect of the same property, expropriation and taxation were examined separately and no violation was found. However, the combined effect of Jokela both measures was examined under the first rule and resulted in a finding of a violation ( v. Finland, 2002, §§ 61-65).\n\nThe following purposes have been found by the Court to fall within the notion of public interest within the meaning of this provision: elimination of social injustice in the housing sector ( James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 45; Grozdanić and Gršković Grozdanić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102- Maria Azzopardi v. Malta 103; see also, 2022, §§ 53 and 60 for the provision of residential homes in ‐ the context of the State's economic and planning policies); combating the effects of a foreign-currency loan crisis particularly in the context of preventing mass homelessness ( Béla Németh v. Hungary, 2020, §§ 42-45); nationalisation of specific industries ( Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, §§ 9 and 109); regulation of the energy sector ( Salento Energy S.r.l. and Nuovo Sole S.r.l. v. Italy (dec.), 2024, § 37);adoption of land and city development plans ( Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 1982, § 69); Cooperativa La Laurentina v. Italy, 2001, § 94; securing land in connection with the Skibińscy v. Poland implementation of the local land development plan (, 2006, § 86); prevention of tax evasion ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 39); road traffic safety ( Pannon Plakát Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2022, § 48); measures to combat drug trafficking and smuggling ( Butler v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2002; protection of the interests of the victims of the crime ( Šeiko v. Lithuania, 2020, § 31); measures Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden to restrict the consumption of alcohol (, 1989, § 62); protection of morals ( Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, § 62); control of legitimate origin of cars brought into circulation ( Sildedzis v. Poland, 2005, § 50); confiscation of monies acquired unlawfully ( Honecker and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2001; the prevention of collusive practices and the protection of the public purse and promotion of fair competition ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, § 78); transition from a socialist to a free-market economy ( Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], 2018, §§ 103 and 105); and the smooth operation of the justice system, with further references to the importance of administering justice without delays which might jeopardise its effectiveness and credibility ( Konstantin Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2015, § 64). However, in view of the contractual relationship between the applicants and the debtor which was of a purely business-law nature, the Court did not retain the protection of consumers as a legitimate aim Katona and Závarský v. Slovakia in the circumstances of the case (, 2023, § 59).\n\nOne of the significant factors for the balancing test under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is whether the applicant attempted to take advantage of a weakness or a loophole in the system ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom OGIS-Institut Stanislas, OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and, 1997, § 109; Others v. France, 2004, §§ 69 and 71). Similarly, in G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, § 301, the Court noted that the degree of culpability or negligence on the part of the applicants or, at the very least, the relationship between their conduct and the offence in question may be taken into account in order to assess whether a confiscation was proportionate. Aperson's qualification as an accountant was one of the decisive reasons for deciding that reimbursing excess contributions without interest was proportionate ( Taşkaya v. Turkey (dec.), 2018, §§ 49-50). In certain cases the Pyrantienė v. Lithuania applicant's personal vulnerability is also taken into consideration, as in, 2013, § 62, where the applicant was of pensionable age and suffered from long-term disability). An obligation imposed on the applicant to repay benefits already received in reliance on an administrative decision, in her good faith and where the authorities had made a mistake, while not taking into account her health and financial situation, was considered to be disproportionate ( Čakarević v. Croatia, 2018, §§ 82-90; see also Casarin v. Italy, 2021, § 74). Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property", + "post_text": "The fact that the domestic laws of a State do not recognise a particular interest as a \"right\" or even a \"property right\" does not necessarily prevent the interest in question, i n some circumstances, from being regarded as a \"possession\" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( Depalle v. France [GC], 2010, § 68, in respect of a revocable and precarious right to occupancy of a public property on account of a lapse of time; Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 129, in respect of the applicant's proprietary interest in his unauthorised dwelling; The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 264, in respect of inviting the applicant, in its capacity as a current possessor of the cultural item, to participate in domestic proceedings). Along-standing tolerance on the part of the authorities has also conferred property rights on applicants in respect of a disputed plot of land ( Kosmas and Others v. Greece, 2017, §§ 68-71; see also Arnavutkoy Greek Orthodox Taksiarhis Church Foundation v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 45-46, concerning the property of a religious foundation for which the applicant had no proper title but which was mentioned in its founding document; and The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 265, in respect of the length of time that passed conferring on the applicant a proprietary interest that was sufficiently established and weighty to amount to a \" possession \" of the art work). Furthermore, the domestic law ordering the expropriation of a plot of land in certain circumstances, with the right to compensation, was considered to have created a proprietary interest ( Kutlu and Others v. Turkey, 2016, § 58). Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property\n\nIn some cases it is more difficult for the Court to qualify a measure or a series of measures as either deprivation or control of use of property, essentially because it cannot be easily assimilated to measures qualified in the existing case-law or because the series of measures consists of disparate decisions belonging to various branches of domestic law. In such cases it will probably analyse the circumstances of the case under the general principle of the first sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. This will apply in particular to situations where not just one decision, but a combination of various measures/decisions affected the applicant's property ( Ðokić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, §§ 55-56 - a contract of purchase in respect of a flat legally valid, applicant registered as an owner, but unable to have the flat restored to him; Matos e Silva, Lda., and Others v. Portugal, 1996, § 85 - in the absence of a formal expropriation decision restrictions on the right to property stemmed from the reduced ability to dispose of it and from the damage caused by the fact that expropriation was contemplated; but the applicants continued to work the land; and The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 278 - the recovery of an unlawfully exported cultural object through a measure that, although adopted within criminal proceedings, had civil effects). In a case where the applicants complained that their rights had been violated on account of the discrepancy between the assessments of the market value of expropriated property for the purposes of the determination of compensation and for the purposes of inheritance tax in respect of the same property, expropriation and taxation were examined separately and no violation was found. However, the combined effect of both measures was examined under the first rule and resulted in a finding of a violation ( Jokela v. Finland, 2002, §§ 61-65).\n\nIn The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, §§ 273-277, the Court was satisfied that a confiscation order, adopted in respect of a cultural item located abroad although not enforced yet, limited the applicant Trust's capacity to fully dispose of the item and, accordingly, considered that its mere issuance amounted to an interference with that applicant's proprietary interests protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It found that the general rule was applicable.\n\nThe Court further clarified in The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 306, that, in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 cases, the foreseeability of the legal basis allowing for measures of interference must be assessed with reference to the moment when the interference at stake took place, that is the moment of the issuance of the contested measure. This stance was confirmed in Episcopo and Bassani v. Italy, 2024, §§ 154-156, where the Court assessed the degree of foreseeability of a confiscation order of the applicant's assets, considered to be the direct proceeds of crime, which order was made despite the discontinuation of the proceedings due to the expiry of the statute of limitation. The Court found that, at the material time, the established case-law considered that the measure of confiscation could not be applied after an offence had ceased to be punishable and that it was only later that the Court of Cassation started to recognise that the measure of confiscation could, in fact, be applied in such a situation and, even then, the issue was subject to divergent case-law for several years.\n\nThe following purposes have been found by the Court to fall within the notion of public interest within the meaning of this provision: elimination of social injustice in the housing sector ( James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 45; Grozdanić and Gršković ‐ Grozdanić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-103; see also Maria Azzopardi v. Malta, 2022, §§ 53 and 60 for the provision of residential homes in the context of the State's economic and planning policies); combating the effects of a foreign-currency loan crisis particularly in the context of preventing mass homelessness ( Béla Németh v. Hungary, 2020, §§ 42-45); nationalisation of specific industries ( Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, §§ 9 and 109); regulation of the energy sector ( Salento Energy S.r.l. and Nuovo Sole S.r.l. v. Italy (dec.), 2024, § 37); adoption of land and city development plans ( Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 1982, § 69); Cooperativa La Laurentina v. Italy, 2001, § 94; securing land in connection with the implementation of the local land development plan ( Skibińscy v. Poland, 2006, § 86); prevention of tax evasion ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 39); securing payment of a tax debt ( Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 58); road traffic safety ( Pannon Plakát Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2022, § 48); measures to combat drug trafficking and smuggling ( Butler v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2002); protection of cultural heritage against unlawful exportation from the country of origin or ensuring its recovery and return therein ( The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 342); protection of the interests of the victims of the crime ( Šeiko v. Lithuania, 2020, § 31); measures to restrict the consumption of alcohol ( Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden, 1989, § 62); protection of morals ( Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, § 62); control of legitimate origin of cars brought into circulation ( Sildedzis v. Poland, 2005, § 50); confiscation of monies acquired unlawfully ( Honecker and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2001; the prevention of collusive practices and the protection of the public purse and promotion of fair competition ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, § 78); transition from a socialist to a free-market economy ( Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], 2018, §§ 103 and 105); and the smooth operation of the justice system, with further references to the importance of administering justice without delays which might jeopardise its effectiveness and credibility ( Konstantin Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2015, § 64). However, in view of the contractual relationship between the applicants and the debtor which was of a purely business-law nature, the Court did not retain the protection of consumers as a legitimate aim in the circumstances of the case ( Katona and Závarský v. Slovakia, 2023, § 59).\n\nAnother example is the case of The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024 §§ 407-408, where the Court noted a wide margin of discretion as to what is \"in accordance with the general interest\", particularly where cultural heritage issues are concerned, the strong consensus in international and European law with regard to the need to protect cultural objects from unlawful exportation and to return them to their country of origin, the applicant's negligent conduct, as well as the very exceptional legal vacuum in which the domestic authorities found themselves to hold there had been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.\n\nOne of the significant factors for the balancing test under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is whether the applicant attempted to take advantage of a weakness or a loophole in the system ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 109; OGIS-Institut Stanislas, OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and Others v. France, 2004, §§ 69 and 71). Similarly, in G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, § 301, the Court noted that the degree of culpability or negligence on the part of the applicants or, at the very least, the relationship between their conduct and the offence in question may be taken into account in order to assess whether a confiscation was proportionate (see also The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 408). Aperson's qualification as an accountant was one of the decisive reasons for deciding that reimbursing excess contributions without interest was proportionate ( Taşkaya v. Turkey (dec.), 2018, §§ 49-50). In UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania, 2025, § 223, the Court observed that the domestic courts had thoroughly assessed the overall conduct of the applicant companies, in the extraordinary situation created by the public health crisis of Covid-19, which companies had acted in bad faith and had sought to take advantage of the public health emergency in order to make an excessive profit.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240828212851/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250612193940/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1b1f8de345be/20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf", @@ -8687,6 +9178,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:46264/22|50184/22", "case_name": "UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania", @@ -8704,8 +9197,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added|reformulation|paragraph_added|citation_updated", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.1.a|a:8|b:8|II.B.4|a:159|b:163|II.B.4.b|a:None|b:177|II.B.4.d|a:183|b:190", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "The fact that a right to property is revocable in certain circumstances does not prevent it from being considered as a \"possession\" protected by Article 1, at least until its revocation ( Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 75; Krstić v. Serbia, 2013, § 83; Čakarević v. Croatia, 2018, § 52; Moskal v. Poland, 2009, § 40; Grobelny v. Poland, 2020, § 58). For instance, in Beyeler v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 104-105, the Court found the existence of a proprietary interest protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, even though the contract for the purchase of a painting was considered null and void by the national authorities, on the grounds that the applicant had been in possession of the painting for several years, that he had been considered de facto by the authorities as having a proprietary interest in it and that he had received compensation (see also below the chapter on Social welfare cases). Similarly, the Court has also held that a procurement contract may constitute a \"possession\" within the meaning of the Protocol, even if the contract was subsequently annulled ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 64-65).\n\nFor instance, in the case Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 81 and 86, the Court noted that the margin of appreciation enjoyed by Contracting States, when the issue involves an assessment of candidates for public procurement and as regards the policy choices as to the mandatory or discretionary exclusion of candidates, is quite broad, though the fair balance principle must still apply.\n\nOne of the significant factors for the balancing test under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is whether the applicant attempted to take advantage of a weakness or a loophole in the system ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom OGIS-Institut Stanislas, OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and, 1997, § 109; Others v. France, 2004, §§ 69 and 71). Similarly, in G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, § 301, the Court noted that the degree of culpability or negligence on the part of the applicants or, at the very least, the relationship between their conduct and the offence in question may be taken into account in order to assess whether a confiscation was proportionate. A person's qualification as an accountant was one of the decisive reasons for deciding that reimbursing excess contributions without interest was proportionate ( Taşkaya v. Turkey (dec.), 2018, §§ 49-50). In certain cases the Pyrantienė v. Lithuania applicant's personal vulnerability is also taken into consideration, as in, 2013, § 62, where the applicant was of pensionable age and suffered from long-term disability). An obligation imposed on the applicant to repay benefits already received in reliance on an administrative decision, in her good faith and where the authorities had made a mistake, while not taking into account her health and financial situation, was considered to be disproportionate ( Čakarević v. Croatia, 2018, §§ 82-90; see also Casarin v. Italy, 2021, § 74). Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property", - "post_text": "The fact that a right to property is revocable in certain circumstances does not prevent it from being considered as a \"possession\" protected by Article 1, at least until its revocation ( Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 75; Krstić v. Serbia, 2013, § 83; Čakarević v. Croatia, 2018, § 52; Moskal v. Poland, 2009, § 40; Grobelny v. Poland, 2020, § 58). For instance, in Beyeler v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 104-105, the Court found the existence of a proprietary interest protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, even though the contract for the purchase of a painting was considered null and void by the national authorities, on the grounds that the applicant had been in possession of the painting for several years, that he had been considered de facto by the authorities as having a proprietary interest in it and that he had received compensation (see also below the chapter on Social welfare cases). Similarly, the Court has also held that a procurement contract may constitute a \"possession\" within the meaning of the Protocol, even if the contract was subsequently annulled ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 64-65; UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania, 2025, §§ 173-174).\n\nFor instance, in the context of public procurement, the Court held that the margin of appreciation of Contracting States is substantially broader, when the issues involves an assessment of candidates for public procurement and as regards the policy choices as to the mandatory or discretionary exclusion of candidates ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 81 and 86). The Court further extended this finding to cases concerning the choices facing the Contracting States with regard to the obligations imposed on participants in public procurement procedures and the consequences of failures to fulfil those obligations ( UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania, 2025, § 214).\n\nFurthermore, in UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania, 2025, § 232, the Court held - in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic - that the absence of financial sanctions on the public entity responsible for ensuring compliance with public procurement law was not, in itself, sufficient to render the interference with the applicant' companies' property rights disproportionate. Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property\n\nOne of the significant factors for the balancing test under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is whether the applicant attempted to take advantage of a weakness or a loophole in the system ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 109; OGIS-Institut Stanislas, OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and Others v. France, 2004, §§ 69 and 71). Similarly, in G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, § 301, the Court noted that the degree of culpability or negligence on the part of the applicants or, at the very least, the relationship between their conduct and the offence in question may be taken into account in order to assess whether a confiscation was proportionate (see also The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 408). A person's qualification as an accountant was one of the decisive reasons for deciding that reimbursing excess contributions without interest was proportionate ( Taşkaya v. Turkey (dec.), 2018, §§ 49-50). In UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania, 2025, § 223, the Court observed that the domestic courts had thoroughly assessed the overall conduct of the applicant companies, in the extraordinary situation created by the public health crisis of Covid-19, which companies had acted in bad faith and had sought to take advantage of the public health emergency in order to make an excessive profit.", + "pre_text": "The fact that a right to property is revocable in certain circumstances does not prevent it from being considered as a \"possession\" protected by Article 1, at least until its revocation ( Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 75; Krstić v. Serbia, 2013, § 83; Čakarević v. Croatia, 2018, § 52; Moskal v. Poland, 2009, § 40; Grobelny v. Poland, 2020, § 58). For instance, in Beyeler v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 104-105, the Court found the existence of a proprietary interest protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, even though the contract for the purchase of a painting was considered null and void by the national authorities, on the grounds that the applicant had been in possession of the painting for several years, that he had been considered de facto by the authorities as having a proprietary interest in it and that he had received compensation (see also below the chapter on Social welfare cases). Similarly, the Court has also held that a procurement contract may constitute a \"possession\" within the meaning of the Protocol, even if the contract was subsequently annulled ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 64-65).\n\nFor instance, in the case Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 81 and 86, the Court noted that the margin of appreciation enjoyed by Contracting States, when the issue involves an assessment of candidates for public procurement and as regards the policy choices as to the mandatory or discretionary exclusion of candidates, is quite broad, though the fair balance principle must still apply.\n\nOne of the significant factors for the balancing test under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is whether the applicant attempted to take advantage of a weakness or a loophole in the system ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom OGIS-Institut Stanislas, OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and, 1997, § 109; Others v. France, 2004, §§ 69 and 71). Similarly, in G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, § 301, the Court noted that the degree of culpability or negligence on the part of the applicants or, at the very least, the relationship between their conduct and the offence in question may be taken into account in order to assess whether a confiscation was proportionate. Aperson's qualification as an accountant was one of the decisive reasons for deciding that reimbursing excess contributions without interest was proportionate ( Taşkaya v. Turkey (dec.), 2018, §§ 49-50). In certain cases the Pyrantienė v. Lithuania applicant's personal vulnerability is also taken into consideration, as in, 2013, § 62, where the applicant was of pensionable age and suffered from long-term disability). An obligation imposed on the applicant to repay benefits already received in reliance on an administrative decision, in her good faith and where the authorities had made a mistake, while not taking into account her health and financial situation, was considered to be disproportionate ( Čakarević v. Croatia, 2018, §§ 82-90; see also Casarin v. Italy, 2021, § 74). Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property", + "post_text": "The fact that a right to property is revocable in certain circumstances does not prevent it from being considered as a \"possession\" protected by Article 1, at least until its revocation ( Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 75; Krstić v. Serbia, 2013, § 83; Čakarević v. Croatia, 2018, § 52; Moskal v. Poland, 2009, § 40; Grobelny v. Poland, 2020, § 58). For instance, in Beyeler v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 104-105, the Court found the existence of a proprietary interest protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, even though the contract for the purchase of a painting was considered null and void by the national authorities, on the grounds that the applicant had been in possession of the painting for several years, that he had been considered de facto by the authorities as having a proprietary interest in it and that he had received compensation (see also below the chapter on Social welfare cases). Similarly, the Court has also held that a procurement contract may constitute a \"possession\" within the meaning of the Protocol, even if the contract was subsequently annulled ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 64-65; UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania, 2025, §§ 173-174).\n\nFor instance, in the context of public procurement, the Court held that the margin of appreciation of Contracting States is substantially broader, when the issues involves an assessment of candidates for public procurement and as regards the policy choices as to the mandatory or discretionary exclusion of candidates ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 81 and 86). The Court further extended this finding to cases concerning the choices facing the Contracting States with regard to the obligations imposed on participants in public procurement procedures and the consequences of failures to fulfil those obligations ( UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania, 2025, § 214).\n\nFurthermore, in UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania, 2025, § 232, the Court held - in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic - that the absence of financial sanctions on the public entity responsible for ensuring compliance with public procurement law was not, in itself, sufficient to render the interference with the applicant' companies' property rights disproportionate. Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property\n\nOne of the significant factors for the balancing test under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is whether the applicant attempted to take advantage of a weakness or a loophole in the system ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 109; OGIS-Institut Stanislas, OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and Others v. France, 2004, §§ 69 and 71). Similarly, in G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, § 301, the Court noted that the degree of culpability or negligence on the part of the applicants or, at the very least, the relationship between their conduct and the offence in question may be taken into account in order to assess whether a confiscation was proportionate (see also The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 408). Aperson's qualification as an accountant was one of the decisive reasons for deciding that reimbursing excess contributions without interest was proportionate ( Taşkaya v. Turkey (dec.), 2018, §§ 49-50). In UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania, 2025, § 223, the Court observed that the domestic courts had thoroughly assessed the overall conduct of the applicant companies, in the extraordinary situation created by the public health crisis of Covid-19, which companies had acted in bad faith and had sought to take advantage of the public health emergency in order to make an excessive profit.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240828212851/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250612193940/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1b1f8de345be/20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf", @@ -8720,6 +9213,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:15887/15", "case_name": "Yaylalı v. Serbia", @@ -8737,8 +9232,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added|citation_updated|reformulation", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.1.b|a:None|b:17|II.B.2|a:125|b:127|II.B.4.a|a:164|b:170|II.B.4.d|a:186|b:194", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "The principle of lawfulness also presupposes that the applicable provisions of domestic law are sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in their application ( Lekić v. Slovenia, 2018, § 95; Beyeler v. Italy [GC], 2000, § 109; Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 42; Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 110; Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], 2014, § 103; Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. and di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 187; Hutten- Czapska v. Poland [GC], 2005, § 163; Vistiņš and Perepjolkins v. Latvia [GC], 2012, §§ 96-97; Imeri v. Croatia, 2021, § 69; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan Godlevskaya v. Russia Taganrog LRO, 2021, § 67;, 2021, §§ 50 and 61-63; and Others v. Russia, 2022, §§ 281-282).\n\nIn cases where the applicants did not have the possibility of effectively challenging the measure, the Court has found that an excessive burden had been borne by them ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 49; Könyv - Tár Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2018, § 59; and Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 215). The Court checks whether the procedure applied provided the applicant a fair possibility of defending his or her interests ( Bäck v. Finland, 2004, § 63). A violation was found on account of a refusal by the receiver of a credit union to grant its directors access to the union's accounting documents to enable Družstevni Záložna Pria and Others v. the Czech Republic them to show that it was financially sound (, 2008, §§ 94-95). The fact of whether major arguments advanced by the applicants were carefully examined by the authorities is also relevant ( Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 2008, § 74; Novoseletskiy v. Ukraine, 2005, § 111; Bistrović v. Croatia, 2007, § 37). The operation of unchallengeable Papachelas v. Greece presumptions of benefit resulting from expropriation ( [GC], 1999, §§ 53-54), and presumptions used in the context of calculating compensation for expropriation ( Katikaridis and Others v. Greece, 1996, § 49; Efstathiou and Michailidis & Co. Motel Amerika v. Greece, 2003, § 33) were held against the Governments.\n\nIn Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 212 the Court took into account the absence of evidence to suggest that the applicants could have been involved in any fraud.", - "post_text": "Similarly, as to the confiscation of lawfully acquired jewellery belonging to the applicant's wife and the imposition of a fine due to a failure to declare the jewellery to customs authorities while transiting through the country, the Court held that it was not in a position to call into question the Constitutional Court's finding that the bracelets were in the applicant's \"possession\". It thus accepted the applicant's victim status ( Yaylalı v. Serbia, 2024, §§ 31-33).\n\nThe principle of lawfulness also presupposes that the applicable provisions of domestic law are sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in their application ( Lekić v. Slovenia, 2018, § 95; Beyeler v. Italy [GC], 2000, § 109; Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 42; Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 110; Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], 2014, § 103; Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. and di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 187; Hutten-Czapska v. Poland [GC], 2005, § 163; Vistiņš and Perepjolkins v. Latvia [GC], 2012, §§ 96-97; Imeri v. Croatia, 2021, § 69; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 67; Godlevskaya v. Russia, 2021, §§ 50 and 61-63; Taganrog LRO and Others v. Russia, 2022, §§ 281-282). The Court may also consider it appropriate not to address the issue of the lawfulness of an impugned measure, even when the domestic authorities failed to rule on it, when the applicant, although legally represented, did not raise this issue before Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property those authorities and even when, before the Court, the applicants only made a passing reference without providing any arguments as to the precision of foreseeability of the statutory provisions ( Yaylalı v. Serbia, 2024, §§ 44-45).\n\nIn cases where the applicants did not have the possibility of effectively challenging the measure, the Court has found that an excessive burden had been borne by them ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 49; Könyv-Tár Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2018, § 59; Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 215; and Amerisoc Center S.R.L. v. Luxembourg, 2024, § 61). The Court checks whether the procedure applied provided the applicant a fair possibility of defending his or her interests ( Bäck v. Finland, 2004, § 63). A violation was found on account of a refusal by the receiver of a credit union to grant its directors access to the union's accounting documents to enable them to show that it was financially sound ( Družstevni Záložna Pria and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2008, §§ 94-95). The fact of whether major arguments advanced by the applicants were carefully examined by the authorities is also relevant ( Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 2008, § 74; Novoseletskiy v. Ukraine, 2005, § 111; Bistrović v. Croatia, 2007, § 37). In this respect, the mandatory nature of the confiscation which left no discretion to the domestic authorities to assess the proportionality of the measure, deprived the applicant of any reasonable opportunity to challenge it effectively ( Yaylalı v. Serbia, 2024, §§ 56-58). Furthermore, the operation of unchallengeable presumptions of benefit resulting from expropriation ( Papachelas v. Greece [GC], 1999, §§ 53-54), and presumptions used in the context of calculating compensation for expropriation ( Katikaridis and Others v. Greece, 1996, § 49; Efstathiou and Michailidis & Co. Motel Amerika v. Greece, 2003, § 33) were held against the Governments. ).\n\nThe automatic, general and i nflexible nature of the interferences with an applicant's possessions, without any regular individual scrutiny, may also be taken into account by the Court. In Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 212, concerning the preventive attachment of assets belonging to managers or relatives of executives of an insolvent bank, the Court noted the absence of evidence to suggest that the applicants could have been personally implicated in any fraud. Similarly, in Yaylalı v. Serbia, 2024, § 57, in respect of a mandatory confiscation of the applicant's gold jewellery given his failure to declare it, the automatic nature of the measure deprived the applicant of any reasonable opportunity to put his case to the relevant authorities.", + "pre_text": "The principle of lawfulness also presupposes that the applicable provisions of domestic law are sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in their application ( Lekić v. Slovenia, 2018, § 95; Beyeler v. Italy [GC], 2000, § 109; Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 42; Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 110; Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], 2014, § 103; Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. and di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 187; Hutten- Czapska v. Poland [GC], 2005, § 163; Vistiņš and Perepjolkins v. Latvia [GC], 2012, §§ 96-97; Imeri v. Croatia, 2021, § 69; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan Godlevskaya v. Russia Taganrog LRO, 2021, § 67;, 2021, §§ 50 and 61-63; and Others v. Russia, 2022, §§ 281-282).\n\nIn cases where the applicants did not have the possibility of effectively challenging the measure, the Court has found that an excessive burden had been borne by them ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 49; Könyv - Tár Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2018, § 59; and Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 215). The Court checks whether the procedure applied provided the applicant a fair possibility of defending his or her interests ( Bäck v. Finland, 2004, § 63). Aviolation was found on account of a refusal by the receiver of a credit union to grant its directors access to the union's accounting documents to enable Družstevni Záložna Pria and Others v. the Czech Republic them to show that it was financially sound (, 2008, §§ 94-95). The fact of whether major arguments advanced by the applicants were carefully examined by the authorities is also relevant ( Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 2008, § 74; Novoseletskiy v. Ukraine, 2005, § 111; Bistrović v. Croatia, 2007, § 37). The operation of unchallengeable Papachelas v. Greece presumptions of benefit resulting from expropriation ( [GC], 1999, §§ 53-54), and presumptions used in the context of calculating compensation for expropriation ( Katikaridis and Others v. Greece, 1996, § 49; Efstathiou and Michailidis & Co. Motel Amerika v. Greece, 2003, § 33) were held against the Governments.\n\nIn Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 212 the Court took into account the absence of evidence to suggest that the applicants could have been involved in any fraud.", + "post_text": "Similarly, as to the confiscation of lawfully acquired jewellery belonging to the applicant's wife and the imposition of a fine due to a failure to declare the jewellery to customs authorities while transiting through the country, the Court held that it was not in a position to call into question the Constitutional Court's finding that the bracelets were in the applicant's \"possession\". It thus accepted the applicant's victim status ( Yaylalı v. Serbia, 2024, §§ 31-33).\n\nThe principle of lawfulness also presupposes that the applicable provisions of domestic law are sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in their application ( Lekić v. Slovenia, 2018, § 95; Beyeler v. Italy [GC], 2000, § 109; Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 42; Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 110; Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], 2014, § 103; Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. and di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 187; Hutten-Czapska v. Poland [GC], 2005, § 163; Vistiņš and Perepjolkins v. Latvia [GC], 2012, §§ 96-97; Imeri v. Croatia, 2021, § 69; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 67; Godlevskaya v. Russia, 2021, §§ 50 and 61-63; Taganrog LRO and Others v. Russia, 2022, §§ 281-282). The Court may also consider it appropriate not to address the issue of the lawfulness of an impugned measure, even when the domestic authorities failed to rule on it, when the applicant, although legally represented, did not raise this issue before Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property those authorities and even when, before the Court, the applicants only made a passing reference without providing any arguments as to the precision of foreseeability of the statutory provisions ( Yaylalı v. Serbia, 2024, §§ 44-45).\n\nIn cases where the applicants did not have the possibility of effectively challenging the measure, the Court has found that an excessive burden had been borne by them ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 49; Könyv-Tár Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2018, § 59; Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 215; and Amerisoc Center S.R.L. v. Luxembourg, 2024, § 61). The Court checks whether the procedure applied provided the applicant a fair possibility of defending his or her interests ( Bäck v. Finland, 2004, § 63). Aviolation was found on account of a refusal by the receiver of a credit union to grant its directors access to the union's accounting documents to enable them to show that it was financially sound ( Družstevni Záložna Pria and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2008, §§ 94-95). The fact of whether major arguments advanced by the applicants were carefully examined by the authorities is also relevant ( Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 2008, § 74; Novoseletskiy v. Ukraine, 2005, § 111; Bistrović v. Croatia, 2007, § 37). In this respect, the mandatory nature of the confiscation which left no discretion to the domestic authorities to assess the proportionality of the measure, deprived the applicant of any reasonable opportunity to challenge it effectively ( Yaylalı v. Serbia, 2024, §§ 56-58). Furthermore, the operation of unchallengeable presumptions of benefit resulting from expropriation ( Papachelas v. Greece [GC], 1999, §§ 53-54), and presumptions used in the context of calculating compensation for expropriation ( Katikaridis and Others v. Greece, 1996, § 49; Efstathiou and Michailidis & Co. Motel Amerika v. Greece, 2003, § 33) were held against the Governments. ).\n\nThe automatic, general and i nflexible nature of the interferences with an applicant's possessions, without any regular individual scrutiny, may also be taken into account by the Court. In Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 212, concerning the preventive attachment of assets belonging to managers or relatives of executives of an insolvent bank, the Court noted the absence of evidence to suggest that the applicants could have been personally implicated in any fraud. Similarly, in Yaylalı v. Serbia, 2024, § 57, in respect of a mandatory confiscation of the applicant's gold jewellery given his failure to declare it, the automatic nature of the measure deprived the applicant of any reasonable opportunity to put his case to the relevant authorities.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240828212851/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250612193940/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1b1f8de345be/20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf", @@ -8753,6 +9248,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:61721/19|5496/20|21318/20|33522/20|43039/20|55448/20", "case_name": "Kubát and Others v. the Czech Republic", @@ -8786,6 +9283,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-01-04", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json", "case_key": "apps:69080/13", "case_name": "Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia", @@ -8804,7 +9303,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.F|a:341|b:421|III.F|a:344|b:431|III.F|a:359|b:423|III.J|a:409|b:489", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "The Commission and the Court have dealt with a number of cases concerning different types of social security/State benefits, including pension rights. For a comprehensive recapitulation of the relevant case-law, see Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC], 2016, §§ 80-89, Yavaş and Others v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 39-43.\n\nAs to the obligation to adhere to an old-age pension scheme, the Court considered in Ackermann and Fuhrmann v. Germany (dec.), 2013, whether the obligatory contributions imposed an excessive burden on the applicants and declared the case manifestly ill-founded. It had regard to the fact that the contribution amounted to approximately 19 per cent of their gross income and was paid in equal shares by applicants and their employers.\n\nThe Court accepted the distinction that some Contracting States draw, for pension purposes, between civil servants and private employees ( Matheis v. Germany (dec.), 2005, concerning a survivor's pension); Ackermann and Fuhrmann v. Germany (dec.), 2013; Valkov and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 117; Panfile v. Romania (dec.), 2012, § 28; and more recently, Giavi v. Greece, 2013, § 52; Fábián v. Hungary [GC], 2017, §§ 131-132). The logic behind this approach is to be found in the structural differences between the two systems, which in turn justifies different regulations ( Matheis v. Germany (dec.), 2005, and more generally on the differences between various categories of insured persons, Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2010, § 84) (see the sub-chapter on Article 14 for Fábián v. Hungary [GC], 2017).\n\nThe Court observed in Gogitidze and Others v. Georgia, 2015, § 105, that common European and even universal legal standards can be said to exist which encourage, in the first place, the confiscation of property linked to serious criminal offences such as corruption, money laundering, drug offences and so on, without the prior existence of a criminal conviction. Secondly, the onus of proving the lawful origin of the property presumed to have been wrongfully acquired may legitimately be shifted onto the respondents in such non-criminal proceedings for confiscation, including civil proceedings in rem . Thirdly, confiscation measures may be applied, not only to the direct proceeds of crime but also to property, including any incomes and other indirect benefits, obtained by converting or transforming the direct proceeds of crime or intermingling them with other, possibly lawful, assets. Finally, confiscation measures may be applied, not only to persons directly suspected of criminal offences, but also to any third parties with ownership rights without the requisite bona fide with a view to disguising their wrongful role in amassing the wealth in question.", - "post_text": "The Court treats confiscation mainly as a control of the use of property within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, ( Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, § 63; Agosi v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 51; Karapetyan v. Georgia, 2020, § 32; Aktiva DOO v. Serbia, 2021, § 78; Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia, 2025, § 94), even though confiscation, by its very nature, deprives a person of ownership.\n\nIn Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia, 2025, § 103, concerning the confiscation of sums of cash that the applicants had failed to declare when crossing Serbia's borders, the Court left the issue of lawfulness open and proceeded to examine the proportionality of the interference. The Court pointed to the narrow review carried out by the domestic courts and found the legislative framework to be too broad. Moreover, the domestic courts, including the Constitutional Court, failed to dispel interpretational doubt as to the applicable provision of domestic law, to conduct a meaningful analysis as to what sanctions had been necessary in each case and to ensure the requisite fair balance between the competing interests ( Ibid., §§ 107-123; see also Imeri v. Croatia, 2021, in the chapter below on the Law of the European Union).\n\nThe same approach was taken in situations where confiscation measures were implemented independently of a criminal charge because the assets concerned were considered as unlawfully acquired, their lawful origin had not been demonstrated, or they had been the instruments of crime ( Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 27; Riela and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2001; Sun v. Russia, 2009, § 25; Arcuri and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2001; C.M. v. France (dec.), 2001; Air Canada v. the United Kingdom, 1995, § 34; Gogitidze and Others v. Georgia, 2015, §§ 94 and 97, concerning a confiscation applied in civil proceedings; Balsamo v. San Marino, 2019, § 81, concerning money laundering proceedings; Ulemek v. Serbia (dec.), 2021, §§ 62-68, concerning subsequent proceedings instituted under a law on seizure and confiscation of the proceeds from crime which was not considered to be criminal in nature; and, Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia, 2025, § 94, concerning the confiscation of the entire or substantial part of the applicant's cash carried across the border without a customs declaration).\n\nIn Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia, 2025, § 113, concerning the confiscation of the applicant's cash carried across the border without a customs declaration, the Court noted that the decisions to confiscate the entire amounts of undeclared cash (or a significant portion thereof) also appeared to be at odds with the requirement, existing in many Contracting States and EU law, that the severity of a penalty, even in order to be lawful, must not be disproportionate to the offence in question.", + "post_text": "The Court treats confiscation mainly as a control of the use of property within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, ( Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, § 63; Agosi v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 51; Karapetyan v. Georgia, 2020, § 32; Aktiva DOO v. Serbia, 2021, § 78; Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia, 2025, § 94), even though confiscation, by its very nature, deprives a person of ownership.\n\nIn Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia, 2025, § 103, concerning the confiscation of sums of cash that the applicants had failed to declare when crossing Serbia's borders, the Court left the issue of lawfulness open and proceeded to examine the proportionality of the interference. The Court pointed to the narrow review carried out by the domestic courts and found the legislative framework to be too broad. Moreover, the domestic courts, including the Constitutional Court, failed to dispel interpretational doubt as to the applicable provision of domestic law, to conduct a meaningful analysis as to what sanctions had been necessary in each case and to ensure the requisite fair balance between the competing interests ( Ibid., §§ 107-123; see also Imeri v. Croatia, 2021, in the chapter below on the Law of the European Union).\n\nThe same approach was taken in situations where confiscation measures were implemented independently of a criminal charge because the assets concerned were considered as unlawfully acquired, their lawful origin had not been demonstrated, or they had been the instruments of crime ( Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 27; Riela and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2001; Sun v. Russia, 2009, § 25; Arcuri and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2001; C.M. v. France (dec.), 2001; Air Canada v. the United Kingdom, 1995, § 34; Gogitidze and Others v. Georgia, 2015, §§ 94 and 97, concerning a confiscation applied in civil proceedings; Balsamo v. San Marino, 2019, § 81, concerning money laundering proceedings; Ulemek v. Serbia (dec.), 2021, §§ 62-68, concerning subsequent proceedings instituted under a law on seizure and confiscation of the proceeds from crime which was not considered to be criminal in nature; and, Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia, 2025, § 94, concerning the confiscation of the entire or substantial part of the applicant's cash carried across the border without a customs declaration).\n\nIn Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia, 2025, § 113, concerning the confiscation of the applicant's cash carried across the border without a customs declaration, the Court noted that the decisions to confiscate the entire amounts of undeclared cash (or a significant portion thereof) also appeared to be at odds with the requirement, existing in many Contracting States and EUlaw, that the severity of a penalty, even in order to be lawful, must not be disproportionate to the offence in question.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250612193940/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20260104030038/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1b1f8de345be/20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf", @@ -8819,6 +9318,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-01-04", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json", "case_key": "apps:56630/22", "case_name": "Arjocu v. Romania (dec.)", @@ -8852,6 +9353,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-01-04", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json", "case_key": "apps:84568/17", "case_name": "Bilyavska v. Ukraine", @@ -8885,6 +9388,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-01-04", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json", "case_key": "apps:17985/18", "case_name": "Păcurar v. Romania", @@ -8918,6 +9423,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-01-04", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json", "case_key": "apps:12432/22", "case_name": "Radelić v. Croatia", @@ -8951,6 +9458,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-01-04", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json", "case_key": "apps:38785/18", "case_name": "Radobuljac v. Croatia (no. 2)", @@ -8984,6 +9493,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-01-04", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json", "case_key": "apps:30085/13", "case_name": "Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova", @@ -9001,8 +9512,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "minor_edit|paragraph_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.B.1|a:96|b:96|II.B.4.a|a:170|b:170|II.D.3.4|a:None|b:273", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "In some cases it is more difficult for the Court to qualify a measure or a series of measures as either deprivation or control of use of property, essentially because it cannot be easily assimilated to measures qualified in the existing case-law or because the series of measures consists of disparate decisions belonging to various branches of domestic law. In such cases it will probably analyse the circumstances of the case under the general principle of the first sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. This will apply in particular to situations where not just one decision, but a combination of various measures/decisions affected the applicant's property ( Ðokić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, §§ 55-56 - a contract of purchase in respect of a flat legally valid, applicant registered as an owner, but unable to have the flat restored to him; Matos e Silva, Lda., and Others v. Portugal, 1996, § 85 - in the absence of a formal expropriation decision restrictions on the right to property stemmed from the reduced ability to dispose of it and from the damage caused by the fact that expropriation was contemplated; but the applicants continued to work the land; and The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 278 - the recovery of an unlawfully exported cultural object through a measure that, although adopted within criminal proceedings, had civil effects). In a case where the applicants complained that their rights had been violated on account of the discrepancy between the assessments of the market value of expropriated property for the purposes of the determination of compensation and for the purposes of inheritance tax in respect of the same property, expropriation and taxation were examined separately and no violation was found. However, the combined effect of both measures was examined under the first rule and resulted in a finding of a violation ( Jokela v. Finland, 2002, §§ 61-65).\n\nIn cases where the applicants did not have the possibility of effectively challenging the measure, the Court has found that an excessive burden had been borne by them ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 49; Könyv-Tár Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2018, § 59; Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 215; and Amerisoc Center S.R.L. v. Luxembourg, 2024, § 61). The Court checks whether the procedure applied provided the applicant a fair possibility of defending his or her interests ( Bäck v. Finland, 2004, § 63). A violation was found on account of a refusal by the receiver of a credit union to grant its directors access to the union's accounting documents to enable them to show that it was financially sound ( Družstevni Záložna Pria and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2008, §§ 94-95). The fact of whether major arguments advanced by the applicants were carefully examined by the authorities is also relevant ( Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 2008, § 74; Novoseletskiy v. Ukraine, 2005, § 111; Bistrović v. Croatia, 2007, § 37). In this respect, the mandatory nature of the confiscation which left no discretion to the domestic authorities to assess the proportionality of the measure, deprived the applicant of any reasonable opportunity to challenge it effectively ( Yaylalı v. Serbia, 2024, §§ 56-58). Furthermore, the operation of unchallengeable presumptions of benefit resulting from expropriation ( Papachelas v. Greece [GC], 1999, §§ 53-54), and presumptions used in the context of calculating compensation for expropriation ( Katikaridis and Others v. Greece, 1996, § 49; Efstathiou and Michailidis & Co. Motel Amerika v. Greece, 2003, § 33) were held against the Governments. ).", - "post_text": "In some cases it is more difficult for the Court to qualify a measure or a series of measures as either deprivation or control of use of property, essentially because it cannot be easily assimilated to measures qualified in the existing case-law or because the series of measures consists of disparate decisions belonging to various branches of domestic law. In such cases it will probably analyse the circumstances of the case under the general principle of the first sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. This will apply in particular to situations where not just one decision, but a combination of various measures/decisions affected the applicant's property ( Ðokić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, §§ 55-56 - a contract of purchase in respect of a flat legally valid, applicant registered as an owner, but unable to have the flat restored to him; Matos e Silva, Lda., and Others v. Portugal, 1996, § 85 - in the absence of a formal expropriation decision restrictions on the right to property stemmed from the reduced ability to dispose of it and from the damage caused by the fact that expropriation was contemplated; but the applicants continued to work the land; The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 278 - the recovery of an unlawfully exported cultural object through a measure that, although adopted within criminal proceedings, had civil effects; and Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, 2025, §§ 56-57, - the enforcement of an order to pay compensation resulting in the sale of the applicant company's property, all without its knowledge, and the lack of assessment of the proportionality of the compensation by the domestic courts). In a case where the applicants complained that their rights had been violated on account of the discrepancy between the assessments of the market value of expropriated property for the purposes of the determination of compensation and for the purposes of inheritance tax in respect of the same property, expropriation and taxation were examined separately and no violation was found. However, the combined effect of both measures was examined under the first rule and resulted in a finding of a violation ( Jokela v. Finland, 2002, §§ 61-65).\n\nIn cases where the applicants did not have the possibility of effectively challenging the measure, the Court has found that an excessive burden had been borne by them ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 49; Könyv-Tár Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2018, § 59; Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 215; and Amerisoc Center S.R.L. v. Luxembourg, 2024, § 61). The Court checks whether the procedure applied provided the applicant a fair possibility of defending his or her interests ( Bäck v. Finland, 2004, § 63). For instance, a A violation was found on account of a refusal by the receiver of a credit union to grant its directors access to the union's accounting documents to enable them to show that it was financially sound ( Družstevni Záložna Pria and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2008, §§ 94-95) or on account of a domestic court's order to pay compensation resulting in the sale of the applicant company's property, all without its knowledge ( Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, 2025, §§ 56-59). The fact of whether major arguments advanced by the applicants were carefully examined by the authorities is Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property also relevant ( Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 2008, § 74; Novoseletskiy v. Ukraine, 2005, § 111; Bistrović v. Croatia, 2007, § 37). In this respect, the mandatory nature of the confiscation which left no discretion to the domestic authorities to assess the proportionality of the measure, deprived the applicant of any reasonable opportunity to challenge it effectively ( Yaylalı v. Serbia, 2024, §§ 56-58). Furthermore, the operation of unchallengeable presumptions of benefit resulting from expropriation ( Papachelas v. Greece [GC], 1999, §§ 53-54), and presumptions used in the context of calculating compensation for expropriation ( Katikaridis and Others v. Greece, 1996, § 49; Efstathiou and Michailidis & Co. Motel Amerika v. Greece, 2003, § 33) were held against the Governments. ).\n\nIn addition, in a case where the enforcement of an order to pay compensation resulted in the sale of the applicant company's property, all without its knowledge, and where the domestic courts made no attempt to analyse the applicant company's arguments despite their being specific, relevant and important for the outcome of the case, the Court concluded that the State had failed to fulfil its duty to set up a proper forum for the applicant company to assert its rights effectively. It found both a violation of Article 6 and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention ( Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, 2025, §§ 47-48 and 58-59).", + "pre_text": "In some cases it is more difficult for the Court to qualify a measure or a series of measures as either deprivation or control of use of property, essentially because it cannot be easily assimilated to measures qualified in the existing case-law or because the series of measures consists of disparate decisions belonging to various branches of domestic law. In such cases it will probably analyse the circumstances of the case under the general principle of the first sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. This will apply in particular to situations where not just one decision, but a combination of various measures/decisions affected the applicant's property ( Ðokić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, §§ 55-56 - a contract of purchase in respect of a flat legally valid, applicant registered as an owner, but unable to have the flat restored to him; Matos e Silva, Lda., and Others v. Portugal, 1996, § 85 - in the absence of a formal expropriation decision restrictions on the right to property stemmed from the reduced ability to dispose of it and from the damage caused by the fact that expropriation was contemplated; but the applicants continued to work the land; and The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 278 - the recovery of an unlawfully exported cultural object through a measure that, although adopted within criminal proceedings, had civil effects). In a case where the applicants complained that their rights had been violated on account of the discrepancy between the assessments of the market value of expropriated property for the purposes of the determination of compensation and for the purposes of inheritance tax in respect of the same property, expropriation and taxation were examined separately and no violation was found. However, the combined effect of both measures was examined under the first rule and resulted in a finding of a violation ( Jokela v. Finland, 2002, §§ 61-65).\n\nIn cases where the applicants did not have the possibility of effectively challenging the measure, the Court has found that an excessive burden had been borne by them ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 49; Könyv-Tár Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2018, § 59; Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 215; and Amerisoc Center S.R.L. v. Luxembourg, 2024, § 61). The Court checks whether the procedure applied provided the applicant a fair possibility of defending his or her interests ( Bäck v. Finland, 2004, § 63). Aviolation was found on account of a refusal by the receiver of a credit union to grant its directors access to the union's accounting documents to enable them to show that it was financially sound ( Družstevni Záložna Pria and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2008, §§ 94-95). The fact of whether major arguments advanced by the applicants were carefully examined by the authorities is also relevant ( Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 2008, § 74; Novoseletskiy v. Ukraine, 2005, § 111; Bistrović v. Croatia, 2007, § 37). In this respect, the mandatory nature of the confiscation which left no discretion to the domestic authorities to assess the proportionality of the measure, deprived the applicant of any reasonable opportunity to challenge it effectively ( Yaylalı v. Serbia, 2024, §§ 56-58). Furthermore, the operation of unchallengeable presumptions of benefit resulting from expropriation ( Papachelas v. Greece [GC], 1999, §§ 53-54), and presumptions used in the context of calculating compensation for expropriation ( Katikaridis and Others v. Greece, 1996, § 49; Efstathiou and Michailidis & Co. Motel Amerika v. Greece, 2003, § 33) were held against the Governments. ).", + "post_text": "In some cases it is more difficult for the Court to qualify a measure or a series of measures as either deprivation or control of use of property, essentially because it cannot be easily assimilated to measures qualified in the existing case-law or because the series of measures consists of disparate decisions belonging to various branches of domestic law. In such cases it will probably analyse the circumstances of the case under the general principle of the first sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. This will apply in particular to situations where not just one decision, but a combination of various measures/decisions affected the applicant's property ( Ðokić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, §§ 55-56 - a contract of purchase in respect of a flat legally valid, applicant registered as an owner, but unable to have the flat restored to him; Matos e Silva, Lda., and Others v. Portugal, 1996, § 85 - in the absence of a formal expropriation decision restrictions on the right to property stemmed from the reduced ability to dispose of it and from the damage caused by the fact that expropriation was contemplated; but the applicants continued to work the land; The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 278 - the recovery of an unlawfully exported cultural object through a measure that, although adopted within criminal proceedings, had civil effects; and Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, 2025, §§ 56-57, - the enforcement of an order to pay compensation resulting in the sale of the applicant company's property, all without its knowledge, and the lack of assessment of the proportionality of the compensation by the domestic courts). In a case where the applicants complained that their rights had been violated on account of the discrepancy between the assessments of the market value of expropriated property for the purposes of the determination of compensation and for the purposes of inheritance tax in respect of the same property, expropriation and taxation were examined separately and no violation was found. However, the combined effect of both measures was examined under the first rule and resulted in a finding of a violation ( Jokela v. Finland, 2002, §§ 61-65).\n\nIn cases where the applicants did not have the possibility of effectively challenging the measure, the Court has found that an excessive burden had been borne by them ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 49; Könyv-Tár Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2018, § 59; Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 215; and Amerisoc Center S.R.L. v. Luxembourg, 2024, § 61). The Court checks whether the procedure applied provided the applicant a fair possibility of defending his or her interests ( Bäck v. Finland, 2004, § 63). For instance, a Aviolation was found on account of a refusal by the receiver of a credit union to grant its directors access to the union's accounting documents to enable them to show that it was financially sound ( Družstevni Záložna Pria and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2008, §§ 94-95) or on account of a domestic court's order to pay compensation resulting in the sale of the applicant company's property, all without its knowledge ( Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, 2025, §§ 56-59). The fact of whether major arguments advanced by the applicants were carefully examined by the authorities is Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property also relevant ( Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 2008, § 74; Novoseletskiy v. Ukraine, 2005, § 111; Bistrović v. Croatia, 2007, § 37). In this respect, the mandatory nature of the confiscation which left no discretion to the domestic authorities to assess the proportionality of the measure, deprived the applicant of any reasonable opportunity to challenge it effectively ( Yaylalı v. Serbia, 2024, §§ 56-58). Furthermore, the operation of unchallengeable presumptions of benefit resulting from expropriation ( Papachelas v. Greece [GC], 1999, §§ 53-54), and presumptions used in the context of calculating compensation for expropriation ( Katikaridis and Others v. Greece, 1996, § 49; Efstathiou and Michailidis & Co. Motel Amerika v. Greece, 2003, § 33) were held against the Governments. ).\n\nIn addition, in a case where the enforcement of an order to pay compensation resulted in the sale of the applicant company's property, all without its knowledge, and where the domestic courts made no attempt to analyse the applicant company's arguments despite their being specific, relevant and important for the outcome of the case, the Court concluded that the State had failed to fulfil its duty to set up a proper forum for the applicant company to assert its rights effectively. It found both a violation of Article 6 and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention ( Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, 2025, §§ 47-48 and 58-59).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250612193940/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20260104030038/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1b1f8de345be/20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf", @@ -9017,6 +9528,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-01-04", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json", "case_key": "apps:8019/16", "case_name": "Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC]", @@ -9048,8 +9561,10 @@ "to_snapshot": "20251025084811__guide_terrorism_eng.pdf", "from_snapshot_date": "2023-09-23", "to_snapshot_date": "2025-10-25", - "from_version": "unknown (20230923180420__guide_terrorism_eng.pdf)", - "to_version": "unknown (20251025084811__guide_terrorism_eng.pdf)", + "from_version": "31 August 2023", + "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1d874b186d3e/diff_2023-09-23__2025-10-25.json", "case_key": "apps:6383/17", "case_name": "Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania", @@ -9067,8 +9582,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.E.4|a:48|b:48", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "In the case of Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, 2018, the applicant submitted that the national authorities had allowed US intelligence agents to transfer him to Lithuanian territory in the framework of the secret \"extra ordinary rendition \" programme and to subject him to ill-treatment and arbitrary detention in a CIA secret prison. The applicant also complained that no effective investigation had been initiated into his allegations. In this case the Court had had to establish the facts itself because the applicant was still being detained by the US authorities. It found a violation of Article 3 on account, firstly, of the lack of an effective investigation into the applicant's allegations, and secondly, of the State's complicity in the CIA's actions. It also found a violation of Articles 5, 8, and 13 read in conjunction with Article 3. More specifically, the Court noted that the Lithuanian authorities had known that the CIA had a secret prison in their territory, that it had detained the applicant for over a year and that it had subjected the latter to treatment contrary to Article 3. Furthermore, the national authorities had permitted the applicant's transfer to another US detention site in Afghanistan (see also Nasr and Ghali v. Italy, 2016, and Al Nashiri v. Poland, 2014).", - "post_text": "In the case of Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, 2018, the applicant submitted that the national authorities had allowed US intelligence agents to transfer him to Lithuanian territory in the framework of the secret \"extraordinary rendition \" programme and to subject him to ill-treatment and arbitrary detention in a CIA secret prison. The applicant also complained that no effective investigation had been initiated into his allegations. In this case the Court had had to establish the facts itself because the applicant was still being detained by the US authorities. It found a violation of Article 3 on account, firstly, of the lack of an effective investigation into the applicant's allegations, and secondly, of the State's complicity in the CIA's actions. It also found a violation of Articles 5, 8, and 13 read in conjunction with Article 3. More specifically, the Court noted that the Lithuanian authorities had known that the CIA had a secret prison in their territory, that it had detained the applicant for over a year and that it had subjected the latter to treatment contrary to Article 3. Furthermore, the national authorities had permitted the applicant's transfer to another US detention site in Afghanistan (see also Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania, 2024, Nasr and Ghali v. Italy, 2016, and Al Nashiri v. Poland, 2014).", + "pre_text": "In the case of Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, 2018, the applicant submitted that the national authorities had allowed USintelligence agents to transfer him to Lithuanian territory in the framework of the secret \"extra ordinary rendition \" programme and to subject him to ill-treatment and arbitrary detention in a CIAsecret prison. The applicant also complained that no effective investigation had been initiated into his allegations. In this case the Court had had to establish the facts itself because the applicant was still being detained by the USauthorities. It found a violation of Article 3 on account, firstly, of the lack of an effective investigation into the applicant's allegations, and secondly, of the State's complicity in the CIA's actions. It also found a violation of Articles 5, 8, and 13 read in conjunction with Article 3. More specifically, the Court noted that the Lithuanian authorities had known that the CIAhad a secret prison in their territory, that it had detained the applicant for over a year and that it had subjected the latter to treatment contrary to Article 3. Furthermore, the national authorities had permitted the applicant's transfer to another USdetention site in Afghanistan (see also Nasr and Ghali v. Italy, 2016, and Al Nashiri v. Poland, 2014).", + "post_text": "In the case of Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, 2018, the applicant submitted that the national authorities had allowed USintelligence agents to transfer him to Lithuanian territory in the framework of the secret \"extraordinary rendition \" programme and to subject him to ill-treatment and arbitrary detention in a CIAsecret prison. The applicant also complained that no effective investigation had been initiated into his allegations. In this case the Court had had to establish the facts itself because the applicant was still being detained by the USauthorities. It found a violation of Article 3 on account, firstly, of the lack of an effective investigation into the applicant's allegations, and secondly, of the State's complicity in the CIA's actions. It also found a violation of Articles 5, 8, and 13 read in conjunction with Article 3. More specifically, the Court noted that the Lithuanian authorities had known that the CIAhad a secret prison in their territory, that it had detained the applicant for over a year and that it had subjected the latter to treatment contrary to Article 3. Furthermore, the national authorities had permitted the applicant's transfer to another USdetention site in Afghanistan (see also Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania, 2024, Nasr and Ghali v. Italy, 2016, and Al Nashiri v. Poland, 2014).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923180420/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_terrorism_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20251025084811/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_terrorism_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1d874b186d3e/20230923180420__guide_terrorism_eng.pdf", @@ -9081,8 +9596,10 @@ "to_snapshot": "20251025084811__guide_terrorism_eng.pdf", "from_snapshot_date": "2023-09-23", "to_snapshot_date": "2025-10-25", - "from_version": "unknown (20230923180420__guide_terrorism_eng.pdf)", - "to_version": "unknown (20251025084811__guide_terrorism_eng.pdf)", + "from_version": "31 August 2023", + "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1d874b186d3e/diff_2023-09-23__2025-10-25.json", "case_key": "apps:34749/16|79607/17", "case_name": "Domenjoud v. France", @@ -9114,8 +9631,10 @@ "to_snapshot": "20251025084811__guide_terrorism_eng.pdf", "from_snapshot_date": "2023-09-23", "to_snapshot_date": "2025-10-25", - "from_version": "unknown (20230923180420__guide_terrorism_eng.pdf)", - "to_version": "unknown (20251025084811__guide_terrorism_eng.pdf)", + "from_version": "31 August 2023", + "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1d874b186d3e/diff_2023-09-23__2025-10-25.json", "case_key": "apps:31913/21", "case_name": "M.B. v. France", @@ -9134,7 +9653,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.A|a:None|b:83", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "The Court assessed an order for the administrative control and monitoring of an individual ( mesure individuelle de contrôle administratif et de surveillance - \"MICAS\") in M.B. v. France, 2024. The authorities issued the MICAS order in respect of the applicant on counter-terrorism grounds in 2020, prohibiting the applicant from leaving an area corresponding to four departments of the Paris region and requiring him to report daily to the police station nearest to his home for two months and eight days. Assessing the legal basis for a MICAS order, the Court found the law to be clear, as it was strictly limited to the fight against terrorism, was addressed to a relatively small number of individuals, and could not entail house arrest but only prohibit leaving a given territory and an obligation to report to the police daily. Furthermore, for a MICAS order to be issued, the authorities had to demonstrate, cumulatively, substantial grounds to believe that a person's conduct poses a particula rly grave threat to public safety and order, and that that person had links to terrorism in one of the ways defined by the law. It noted that such a measure could only be justified by concrete and tangible acts or behaviours. The Court also found that the law provided sufficient safeguards against abuse, as it regulated the duration of a MICAS, its terms and the obligations stemming from it and provided for periodic review. The MICAS order had to be reasoned and was amenable to judicial review within a particularly short period (§§ 52-56).", + "post_text": "The Court assessed an order for the administrative control and monitoring of an individual ( mesure individuelle de contrôle administratif et de surveillance - \"MICAS\") in M.B. v. France, 2024. The authorities issued the MICASorder in respect of the applicant on counter-terrorism grounds in 2020, prohibiting the applicant from leaving an area corresponding to four departments of the Paris region and requiring him to report daily to the police station nearest to his home for two months and eight days. Assessing the legal basis for a MICASorder, the Court found the law to be clear, as it was strictly limited to the fight against terrorism, was addressed to a relatively small number of individuals, and could not entail house arrest but only prohibit leaving a given territory and an obligation to report to the police daily. Furthermore, for a MICASorder to be issued, the authorities had to demonstrate, cumulatively, substantial grounds to believe that a person's conduct poses a particula rly grave threat to public safety and order, and that that person had links to terrorism in one of the ways defined by the law. It noted that such a measure could only be justified by concrete and tangible acts or behaviours. The Court also found that the law provided sufficient safeguards against abuse, as it regulated the duration of a MICAS, its terms and the obligations stemming from it and provided for periodic review. The MICASorder had to be reasoned and was amenable to judicial review within a particularly short period (§§ 52-56).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923180420/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_terrorism_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20251025084811/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_terrorism_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1d874b186d3e/20230923180420__guide_terrorism_eng.pdf", @@ -9149,9 +9668,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-06", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1e58f64bfb7a/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json", "case_key": "apps:27094/20", - "case_name": "Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye,* no. 27094/20", + "case_name": "Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye", "application_numbers": "27094/20", "judgment_year": "2023", "citation_change": "added", @@ -9160,14 +9681,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF NURCAN BAYRAKTAR v. TÜRKİYE", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", - "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "I.A.5: Divorce", + "linked_change_types": "citation_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A.5|a:50|b:50", + "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "In F. v. Switzerland, 1987, the Court found that the prohibition period imposed on the party at fault in the event of a divorce granted on the ground of adultery, which may range from one to three years, affected the very essence of the right to marry and was disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. On the other hand, in K.M. v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision, 1997, a limitation requiring compliance with the domestic law requirement that there should be a valid dissolution of a prior marriage did not amount to an unreasonable restriction on the right to re-marry.", + "post_text": "In F. v. Switzerland, 1987, the Court found that the prohibition period imposed on the party at fault in the event of a divorce granted on the ground of adultery, which may range from one to three years, affected the very essence of the right to marry and was disproportionate to the legitimate aim  pursued. In Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye, 2023, the Court found that the refusal to exempt a woman, without her undergoing a medical examination to prove that she was not pregnant, from the 300-day waiting period imposed on divorced women wishing to remarry constituted discrimination on the grounds of sex in breach of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 12. Even assuming that determining parentage constituted a legitimate aim in the pursuit of which the waiting period in question had been imposed on divorced women, the Court found it pointless and ineffective while noting the sexist stereotypes relied on by the domestic court, namely that women had a duty to society on account of their potential role as mother and their capacity to give birth.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923091656/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_12_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231206112748/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_12_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/1e58f64bfb7a/20230923091656__guide_art_12_eng.pdf", @@ -9182,6 +9703,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-06", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1e58f64bfb7a/diff_2023-12-06__2025-09-06.json", "case_key": "apps:6167/73", "case_name": "X v. Federal Republic of Germany", @@ -9215,6 +9738,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-06", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/1e58f64bfb7a/diff_2023-12-06__2025-09-06.json", "case_key": "apps:2300/64", "case_name": "X v. Federal Republic of Germany", @@ -9248,9 +9773,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:1162/22", - "case_name": "Auray and Others v. France,* no. 1162/22", + "case_name": "Auray and Others v. France", "application_numbers": "1162/22", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -9259,14 +9786,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF AURAY AND OTHERS v. FRANCE", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", - "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "I.E: Deprivation of liberty outside formal arrest and detention", + "linked_change_types": "citation_removed", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.E|a:19|b:19", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "The question of applicability of Article 5 has arisen in a variety of circumstances, including: ▪ the placement of individuals in psychiatric or social care institutions ( De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, 1971; Nielsen v. Denmark, 1988; H.M. v. Switzerland, 2002; H.L. v. the United Kingdom, 2004; Storck v. Germany, 2005; A. and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011; Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012); ▪ taking of an individual by paramedics and police officers to hospitals ( Aftanache v. Romania, 2020); ▪ confinement in airport transit zones ( Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019; Amuur v. France, 1996; Shamsa v. Poland, 2003; Mogoş and Others v. Romania (dec.), 2004; Mahdid and Haddar v. Austria (dec.), 2005; Riad and Idiab v. Belgium, 2008); ▪ confinement in land border transit zones ( Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019; R.R. and Others v. Hungary, 2021); ▪ questioning in a police station ( Cazan v. Romania, 2016; I.I. v. Bulgaria, 2005; Osypenko v. Ukraine, 2010; Salayev v. Azerbaijan, 2010; Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2010; Creangă v. Romania [GC], 2012); ▪ placement in a police car to draw up an administrative-offence report ( Zelčs v. Latvia, 2020); ▪ stops and searches by the police ( Foka v. Turkey, 2008; Gillan and Quinton v. the United Kingdom, 2010; Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011); ▪ ( house search Stănculeanu v. Romania, 2018); ▪ police escorting ( Rozhkov v. Russia (no. 2), 2017; Tsvetkova and Others v. Russia, 2018); ▪ crowd control measures adopted by the police on public order grounds ( Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012); ▪ house arrest ( Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], 2016; Mancini v. Italy, 2001; Lavents v. Latvia, 2002; Nikolova v. Bulgaria (no. 2), 2004; Dacosta Silva v. Spain, 2006). ▪ holding sea-migrants in reception facilities and on ships ( Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016); ▪ keeping irregular migrants in asylum hotspot facilities ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018). ▪ national lockdown on account of the Covid-19 pandemic ( Terheş v. Romania (dec), 2021).", + "post_text": "The question of applicability of Article 5 has arisen in a variety of circumstances, including:  the placement of individuals in psychiatric or social care institutions ( De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, 1971; Nielsen v. Denmark, 1988; H.M. v. Switzerland, 2002; H.L. v. the United Kingdom, 2004; Storck v. Germany, 2005; A. and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011; Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012);  taking of an individual by paramedics and police officers to hospitals ( Aftanache v. Romania, 2020);  confinement in airport transit zones ( Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019; Amuur v. France, 1996; Shamsa v. Poland, 2003; Mogoş and Others v. Romania (dec.), 2004; Mahdid and Haddar v. Austria Riad and Idiab v. Belgium (dec.), 2005;, 2008);  confinement in land border transit zones ( Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019; R.R. and Others v. Hungary, 2021);  questioning in a police station ( Cazan v. Romania, 2016; I.I. v. Bulgaria, 2005; Osypenko v. Ukraine Salayev v. Azerbaijan Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan Creangă, 2010;, 2010;, 2010; v. Romania [GC], 2012);  placement in a police car to draw up an administrative-offence report ( Zelčs v. Latvia, 2020);  stops and searches by the police ( Foka v. Turkey, 2008; Gillan and Quinton v. the United Kingdom, 2010; Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011);  house search ( Stănculeanu v. Romania, 2018);  police escorting ( Rozhkov v. Russia (no. 2), 2017; Tsvetkova and Others v. Russia, 2018);  Austin and Others crowd control measures adopted by the police on public order grounds ( v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012; Auray and Others v. France, * 2024);  Buza dji v. the Republic of Moldova Mancini v. Italy Lavents house arrest ( [GC], 2016;, 2001; v. Latvia, 2002; Nikolova v. Bulgaria (no. 2), 2004; Dacosta Silva v. Spain, 2006).  Khlaifia and Others v. Italy holding sea-migrants in reception facilities and on ships ( [GC], 2016);  keeping irregular migrants in asylum hotspot facilities ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018).  Terheş v. Romania national lockdown on account of the Covid-19 pandemic ( (dec), 2021).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923032746/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_5_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409165434/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_5_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/22935893a6e6/20230923032746__guide_art_5_eng.pdf", @@ -9281,6 +9808,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:10207/21|10209/21", "case_name": "Demirtaş and Yüksekdağ Şenoğlu v. Türkiye", @@ -9299,7 +9828,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.D.4|a:None|b:270", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "A key element of an individual's right to effective assistance by a lawyer is the confidentiality of information exchanged between them. While the Court has tolerated certain restrictions imposed on lawyer-client contacts in cases of terrorism and organised crime, derogations from the fundamental principle of respect for lawyer-client confidentiality can only be allowed in exceptional cases and must Demirtaş and Yüksekdağ be accompanied by adequate and sufficient safeguards against abuse ( Şenoğlu v. Türkiye, 2023, §§ 104-106, where the applicants were deprived of effective legal assistance in order to appeal against their pre-trial detention on account of the surveillance by the prison authorities of their meetings with their lawyers and the seizure of documents exchanged between them).", + "post_text": "Akey element of an individual's right to effective assistance by a lawyer is the confidentiality of information exchanged between them. While the Court has tolerated certain restrictions imposed on lawyer-client contacts in cases of terrorism and organised crime, derogations from the fundamental principle of respect for lawyer-client confidentiality can only be allowed in exceptional cases and must Demirtaş and Yüksekdağ be accompanied by adequate and sufficient safeguards against abuse ( Şenoğlu v. Türkiye, 2023, §§ 104-106, where the applicants were deprived of effective legal assistance in order to appeal against their pre-trial detention on account of the surveillance by the prison authorities of their meetings with their lawyers and the seizure of documents exchanged between them).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923032746/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_5_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409165434/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_5_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/22935893a6e6/20230923032746__guide_art_5_eng.pdf", @@ -9314,6 +9843,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:25285/15", "case_name": "Karaca v. Türkiye", @@ -9347,6 +9878,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:61808/19", "case_name": "Yılmaz Aydemir v. Türkiye", @@ -9380,6 +9913,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json", "case_key": "apps:59/17", "case_name": "Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye", @@ -9413,6 +9948,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json", "case_key": "apps:24607/20", "case_name": "B.A. v. Cyprus", @@ -9446,6 +9983,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json", "case_key": "apps:38283/18", "case_name": "Bogay and Others v. Ukraine", @@ -9479,6 +10018,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json", "case_key": "apps:42975/19", "case_name": "Coulibaly v. Belgium*", @@ -9512,6 +10053,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json", "case_key": "apps:19358/17", "case_name": "Cramesteter v. Italy", @@ -9530,7 +10073,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.B|a:30|b:30", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "For example, the Court found that there had been a violation of Article 5 where the authorities had failed to lodge an application for extension of a detention order within the time-limit prescribed by law ( G.K. v. Poland, 2004, § 76). By contrast, an alleged breach of a circular concerning the manner in which inquiries had to be conducted into certain types of offences did not invalidate the domestic legal basis for arrest and subsequent detention ( Talat Tepe v. Turkey, 2004, § 62). Where the trial court had refused to release the applicant despite the Constitutional Court's decision finding his detention to be unlawful, the applicant's continued pre-trial detention could not be regarded as \"in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law\" ( Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 118; Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 139).", - "post_text": "For example, the Court found that there had been a violation of Article 5 where the authorities had failed to lodge an application for extension of a detention order within the time-limit prescribed by law ( G.K. v. Poland, 2004, § 76). By contrast, an alleged breach of a circular concerning the manner in which inquiries had to be conducted into certain types of offences did not invalidate the domestic legal basis for arrest and subsequent detention ( Talat Tepe v. Turkey, 2004, § 62). Where the trial court had refused to release the applicant despite the Constitutional Court's decision finding his detention to be unlawful, the applicant's continued pre-trial detention could not be regarded as \"in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law\" ( Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 118; Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 139). A breach of Article 5 § 1 was found also where the applicant was kept in a psychiatric facility beyond the period provided for by domestic law introduced after the detention order was issued, the unlawfulness of his detention having been acknowledged by the domestic courts ( Cramesteter v. Italy, 2024, §§ 53-56).", + "post_text": "For example, the Court found that there had been a violation of Article 5 where the authorities had failed to lodge an application for extension of a detention order within the time-limit prescribed by law ( G.K. v. Poland, 2004, § 76). By contrast, an alleged breach of a circular concerning the manner in which inquiries had to be conducted into certain types of offences did not invalidate the domestic legal basis for arrest and subsequent detention ( Talat Tepe v. Turkey, 2004, § 62). Where the trial court had refused to release the applicant despite the Constitutional Court's decision finding his detention to be unlawful, the applicant's continued pre-trial detention could not be regarded as \"in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law\" ( Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 118; Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 139). Abreach of Article 5 § 1 was found also where the applicant was kept in a psychiatric facility beyond the period provided for by domestic law introduced after the detention order was issued, the unlawfulness of his detention having been acknowledged by the domestic courts ( Cramesteter v. Italy, 2024, §§ 53-56).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409165434/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_5_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20251128111224/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_5_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/22935893a6e6/20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf", @@ -9545,6 +10088,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json", "case_key": "apps:615/21", "case_name": "Cviková v. Slovakia", @@ -9578,6 +10123,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json", "case_key": "apps:34749/16|79607/17", "case_name": "Domenjoud v. France", @@ -9611,6 +10158,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json", "case_key": "apps:5297/16", "case_name": "Ishkhanyan v. Armenia", @@ -9644,6 +10193,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json", "case_key": "apps:1766/23", "case_name": "J.B. and Others v. Malta", @@ -9677,6 +10228,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json", "case_key": "apps:20183/21", "case_name": "Lazăr v. Romania", @@ -9710,25 +10263,27 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json", - "case_key": "apps:38239/22", - "case_name": "M.B. v. Spain", - "application_numbers": "38239/22", - "judgment_year": "2025", + "case_key": "apps:71008/16", + "case_name": "M.B. v. the Netherlands", + "application_numbers": "71008/16", + "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", - "citation_text": "M.B. v. Spain, no. 38239/22, 6 February 2025", - "hudoc_itemid": "001-241578", - "hudoc_importance_level": "4", + "citation_text": "M.B. v. the Netherlands, no. 71008/16, 23 April 2024", + "hudoc_itemid": "001-233213", + "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", - "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF M.B. v. SPAIN", + "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF M.B. v. THE NETHERLANDS", "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", "linked_paragraph_count": 1, - "linked_sections": "III.E.3: Detention of persons of unsound mind", - "linked_change_types": "citation_updated", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.E.3|a:123|b:124", - "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "The relevant time at which a person must be reliably established to be of unsound mind, for the requirements of sub-paragraph (e) of Article 5 § 1, is the date of the adoption of the measure depriving that person of his liberty as a result of that condition ( Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 2018, § 134; O.H. v. Germany, 2011, § 78). However, changes, if any, to the mental condition of the detainee following the adoption if the detention order must be taken into account ( Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 2018, § 134). Medical expert reports relied on by the authorities must therefore be sufficiently recent ( Kadusic v. S witzerland, 2018, §§ 44 and 55).", - "post_text": "The relevant time at which a person must be reliably established to be of \" unsound mind \", for the requirements of sub-paragraph (e) of Article 5 § 1, is the date of the adoption of the measure depriving that person of his liberty as a result of that condition ( M.B. v. Spain, 2025, §§ 73 and 78; Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 2018, § 134; O.H. v. Germany, 2011, § 78). However, changes, if any, to the mental condition of the detainee following the adoption if the detention order must be taken into account ( Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 2018, § 134). Medical expert reports relied on by the authorities must therefore be sufficiently recent ( Kadusic v. Switzerland, 2018, §§ 44 and 55).", + "linked_sections": "III.F.1: Detention to prevent unauthorised entry into country", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.F.1|a:None|b:144", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "", + "post_text": "While the passage of time is not decisive for assessing whether detention falls under the scope of the first limb, it remains relevant for determining whether a sufficiently close connection exists between the immigration detention and the prevention of unauthorised entry. Strict scrutiny is needed when more time has lapsed and the person is in the meantime physically present on the territory of a State ( M.B. v. the Netherlands, 2024, §§ 74-75, where the applicant's immigration detention on public order grounds following his criminal law detention on terrorism related charges was found to be arbitrary; see also B.A. v. Cyprus, 2024, §§ 62-64, where the detention of an asylum- seeker on national security grounds was equally considered not to have been closely connected with the aim of preventing unauthorised entry).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409165434/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_5_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20251128111224/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_5_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/22935893a6e6/20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf", @@ -9743,25 +10298,27 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json", - "case_key": "apps:71008/16", - "case_name": "M.B. v. the Netherlands", - "application_numbers": "71008/16", - "judgment_year": "2024", + "case_key": "apps:38239/22", + "case_name": "M.B. v. Spain", + "application_numbers": "38239/22", + "judgment_year": "2025", "citation_change": "added", - "citation_text": "M.B. v. the Netherlands, no. 71008/16, 23 April 2024", - "hudoc_itemid": "001-233213", - "hudoc_importance_level": "3", + "citation_text": "M.B. v. Spain, no. 38239/22, 6 February 2025", + "hudoc_itemid": "001-241578", + "hudoc_importance_level": "4", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", - "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF M.B. v. THE NETHERLANDS", + "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF M.B. v. SPAIN", "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", "linked_paragraph_count": 1, - "linked_sections": "III.F.1: Detention to prevent unauthorised entry into country", - "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.F.1|a:None|b:144", - "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "While the passage of time is not decisive for assessing whether detention falls under the scope of the first limb, it remains relevant for determining whether a sufficiently close connection exists between the immigration detention and the prevention of unauthorised entry. Strict scrutiny is needed when more time has lapsed and the person is in the meantime physically present on the territory of a State ( M.B. v. the Netherlands, 2024, §§ 74-75, where the applicant's immigration detention on public order grounds following his criminal law detention on terrorism related charges was found to be arbitrary; see also B.A. v. Cyprus, 2024, §§ 62-64, where the detention of an asylum- seeker on national security grounds was equally considered not to have been closely connected with the aim of preventing unauthorised entry).", + "linked_sections": "III.E.3: Detention of persons of unsound mind", + "linked_change_types": "citation_updated", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.E.3|a:123|b:124", + "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "The relevant time at which a person must be reliably established to be of unsound mind, for the requirements of sub-paragraph (e) of Article 5 § 1, is the date of the adoption of the measure depriving that person of his liberty as a result of that condition ( Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 2018, § 134; O.H. v. Germany, 2011, § 78). However, changes, if any, to the mental condition of the detainee following the adoption if the detention order must be taken into account ( Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 2018, § 134). Medical expert reports relied on by the authorities must therefore be sufficiently recent ( Kadusic v. Switzerland, 2018, §§ 44 and 55).", + "post_text": "The relevant time at which a person must be reliably established to be of \" unsound mind \", for the requirements of sub-paragraph (e) of Article 5 § 1, is the date of the adoption of the measure depriving that person of his liberty as a result of that condition ( M.B. v. Spain, 2025, §§ 73 and 78; Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 2018, § 134; O.H. v. Germany, 2011, § 78). However, changes, if any, to the mental condition of the detainee following the adoption if the detention order must be taken into account ( Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 2018, § 134). Medical expert reports relied on by the authorities must therefore be sufficiently recent ( Kadusic v. Switzerland, 2018, §§ 44 and 55).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409165434/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_5_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20251128111224/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_5_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/22935893a6e6/20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf", @@ -9776,6 +10333,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json", "case_key": "apps:30814/22", "case_name": "Martinez Fernandez v. Hungary", @@ -9809,6 +10368,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json", "case_key": "apps:19124/21|20085/21", "case_name": "Matthews and Johnson v. Romania", @@ -9842,6 +10403,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json", "case_key": "apps:13609/20", "case_name": "Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (no. 4)*", @@ -9875,6 +10438,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json", "case_key": "apps:13375/18", "case_name": "Siedlecka v. Poland*", @@ -9908,6 +10473,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json", "case_key": "apps:13968/22", "case_name": "Spišák v. the Czech Republic", @@ -9941,6 +10508,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json", "case_key": "apps:21180/15", "case_name": "Spivak v. Ukraine", @@ -9958,8 +10527,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.D.3|a:257|b:264", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "A person of unsound mind who is compulsorily confined in a psychiatric institution for a lengthy period is entitled to take proceedings \"at reasonable intervals\" to put in issue the lawfulness of his detention ( M.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2013, § 77, for a summary of the applicable principles). A system of periodic review in which the initiative lies solely with the authorities is not sufficient on its X. v. Finland Raudevs v. Latvia own (, 2012, § 170;, 2013, § 82).", - "post_text": "A person of unsound mind who is compulsorily confined in a psychiatric institution for a lengthy period is entitled to take proceedings \"at reasonable intervals\" to put in issue the lawfulness of his detention ( M.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2013, § 77, for a summary of the applicable principles). A system of periodic review in which the initiative lies solely with the authorities is not sufficient on its own ( X. v. Finland, 2012, § 170; Raudevs v. Latvia, 2013, § 82; and Spivak v. Ukraine, 2025, §§ 136-138, where the Court found that, in addition to the general lack of opportunity for psychiatric patients to initiate a review of their confinement at the material time, the periodic ex officio judicial review in hearings held in the applicant's forced absence was marked by a manifest lack of diligence and was incompatible with the basic requirements of justice (§§ 140-148).", + "pre_text": "Aperson of unsound mind who is compulsorily confined in a psychiatric institution for a lengthy period is entitled to take proceedings \"at reasonable intervals\" to put in issue the lawfulness of his detention ( M.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2013, § 77, for a summary of the applicable principles). Asystem of periodic review in which the initiative lies solely with the authorities is not sufficient on its X. v. Finland Raudevs v. Latvia own (, 2012, § 170;, 2013, § 82).", + "post_text": "Aperson of unsound mind who is compulsorily confined in a psychiatric institution for a lengthy period is entitled to take proceedings \"at reasonable intervals\" to put in issue the lawfulness of his detention ( M.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2013, § 77, for a summary of the applicable principles). Asystem of periodic review in which the initiative lies solely with the authorities is not sufficient on its own ( X. v. Finland, 2012, § 170; Raudevs v. Latvia, 2013, § 82; and Spivak v. Ukraine, 2025, §§ 136-138, where the Court found that, in addition to the general lack of opportunity for psychiatric patients to initiate a review of their confinement at the material time, the periodic ex officio judicial review in hearings held in the applicant's forced absence was marked by a manifest lack of diligence and was incompatible with the basic requirements of justice (§§ 140-148).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409165434/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_5_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20251128111224/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_5_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/22935893a6e6/20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf", @@ -9974,6 +10543,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-29", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-29.json", "case_key": "apps:31172/19", "case_name": "Jehovah's Witnesses v. Finland", @@ -10007,6 +10578,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-29", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-29.json", "case_key": "apps:27227/17", "case_name": "Ossewaarde v. Russia", @@ -10040,6 +10613,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-13", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-03-29__2024-09-13.json", "case_key": "apps:16760/22", "case_name": "Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*", @@ -10058,7 +10633,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.B|a:16|b:16|I.D.1|a:None|b:39|I.D.1|a:None|b:50|I.D.1|a:None|b:53|I.D.1|a:36|b:37|II.B.3|a:None|b:102|II.B.3|a:None|b:105", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "If a personal or collective conviction is to benefit from the right to \"freedom of thought, conscience and religion\" it must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. Provided this condition is satisfied, the State's duty of neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any power on the State's part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways in which those beliefs are expressed (Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2013, § 81). Therefore, it is not the Court's task to enter into any controversy in that sphere or to determine what principles and beliefs are to be considered central to any given religion or to enter into any other sort of interpretation of religious questions (İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2016, § 69; Kovaļkovs v. Latvia (dec.), 2012, § 60). In particular, a debate among religious scholars concerning the historical foundations of a given religion and the merits of the demands of its followers does not suffice to deny the religious nature of those beliefs (Ancient Baltic religious association \"Romuva\" v. Lithuania, 2021, §§ 118-119). Hence in referring, for the purposes of its reasoning, to specific religious terms and concepts, the Court does not attach any particular significance to those terms beyond the finding that Article 9 is applicable to them (ibid. [GC], § 69). As a general rule, the fact that there is a debate within the religious community in question regarding the basic precepts of its faith and its demands vis-à-vis the State changes nothing for the purposes of the application of Article 9 (ibid. [GC], § 134).\n\nUnder the terms of Article 9 § 2 of the Convention, the legitimate aims liable to justify interference in an individual's manifestation of his religion or beliefs are public safety, the protection of public order, health and morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This enumeration of legitimate aims is strictly exhaustive and the definition of the aims is necessarily restrictive; if a limitation of this freedom is to be compatible with the Convention it must, in particular, pursue an aim that can be linked to one of those listed in this provision (Svyato- Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, 2007, §§ 132 and 137; S.A.S. v. France [GC], 2014, § 113).", - "post_text": "If a personal or collective conviction is to benefit from the right to \"freedom of thought, conscience and religion\" it must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. Provided this condition is satisfied, the State's duty of neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any power on the State's part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways in which those beliefs are expressed (Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2013, § 81). Therefore, it is not the Court's task to enter into any controversy in that sphere or to determine what principles and beliefs are to be considered central to any given religion or to enter into any other sort of interpretation of religious questions (İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2016, § 69; Kovaļkovs v. Latvia (dec.), 2012, § 60; Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, 2024, § 86). In particular, a debate among religious scholars concerning the historical foundations of a given religion and the merits of the demands of its followers does not suffice to deny the religious nature of those beliefs (Ancient Baltic religious association \"Romuva\" v. Lithuania, 2021, §§ 118-119). Hence in referring, for the purposes of its reasoning, to specific religious terms and concepts, the Court does not attach any particular significance to those terms beyond the finding that Article 9 is applicable to them (ibid. [GC], § 69). As a general rule, the fact that there is a debate within the religious community in question regarding the basic precepts of its faith and its demands vis-à-vis the State changes nothing for the purposes of the application of Article 9 (ibid. [GC], § 134).\n\nThe protection of animal welfare can be linked to the concept of \"public morals\" within the meaning of Article 9 § 2 of the Convention. Unlike the law of the European Union (EU), which established animal welfare as a general-interest objective under EU law, the Convention does not seek to protect animal welfare as such; accordingly, Article 9 § 2 does not contain an explicit reference to the protection of animal welfare in the exhaustive list of legitimate aims. However, \"public morals\" cannot be understood as being intended solely to protect human dignity in the sphere of relations between individuals. Having regard to the fact that the Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions and the notions currently prevailing in democratic States; that this \"living instrument\" doctrine concerns not only the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention but also the reasons justifying the limitations that might be imposed on them, in view of societal and legislative developments since the Convention was adopted; that the concept of \"morals\" is inherently evolutive; that the Convention is not indifferent to the living environment of individuals covered by its protection; and that the protection of animal welfare is an ethical value to which contemporary democratic societies attach growing importance, it must be concluded that a respondent Government can rely on \"public morals\" as a legitimate aim in support of a measure aimed at reducing an animal's suffering at the point of its slaughter (Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, 2024, §§ 92-101).\n\nIn cases where the Court is not called upon to balance two rights which are of equal value under the Convention - for example, if the interference is intended to protect animal welfare, which, in contrast to European Union law, is not one of the \"goods\" or values protected as such by the Convention - it is for the Court to assess whether the interference with freedom of religion is justified in principle and whether it is proportionate in the light of the legitimate aim pursued, having regard to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national authorities in this area (Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, 2024, § 107).\n\nIn addition, the quality of the parliamentary and judicial scrutiny of the necessity of the measure carried out at national level is of particular importance, in particular in determining the application of the relevant margin of appreciation. When a general rule is in issue, it is particularly important to consider the quality of the parliamentary scrutiny; this includes, among other aspects, the scale of the consultation of the groups affected by the disputed measure and the efforts made by the legislatures to evaluate its impact on the fundamental right relied upon and to weigh up the competing rights and interests in the course of a throughout legislative process. With regard to judicial scrutiny, where the domestic courts have, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity which governs the Convention, ruled on the case before them by providing sufficiently detailed reasons in the light of the principles set out in its case-law, the Court will require strong reasons to substitute its own assessment for that of the domestic courts (Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, 2024, §§ 108-111).\n\nUnder the terms of Article 9 § 2 of the Convention, the legitimate aims liable to justify interference in an individual's manifestation of his religion or beliefs are public safety, the protection of public order, health and morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This enumeration of legitimate aims is strictly exhaustive and the definition of the aims is necessarily restrictive; if a limitation of this freedom is to be compatible with the Convention it must, in particular, pursue an aim that can be linked to one of those listed in this provision (Svyato- Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, 2007, §§ 132 and 137; S.A.S. v. France [GC], 2014, § 113; Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, 2024, § 91).\n\nThe observance of dietary laws dictated by a religion or a philosophical system is a \"practice\" which is protected by Article 9 § 1 of the Convention (Cha'are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France [GC], 2000, §§ 73-74; Jakóbski v. Poland, 2010; Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, 2024, § 65). In two cases the Court found a violation of Article 9 owing to a prison administration's refusal to provide the applicants, prisoners of Buddhist faith, with meat-free meals, even though such an arrangement would not have been an excessive burden on the prisons in question (Jakóbski v. Poland, 2010; Vartic v. Romania (no. 2), 2013). In the second of these cited cases, in particular, the applicant had only been able to obtain a diet for sick prisoners which contained meat. The Court noted that the applicant had very little scope for receiving food which complied with his religion, especially after the Minister of Justice prohibited food parcels being received by post (ibid., §§ 47-50).\n\nThe Court has also found no violation of Article 9, taken separately or in conjunction with Article 14, with regard to the obligation, imposed by the Belgian regional parliaments, to stun animals prior to ritual slaughter. In the relevant case, the Flemish Region and the Walloon Region had ended the religious exception to that obligation, replacing it with an obligation to use a reversible stunning procedure which could not result in the animal's death where slaughter was of a ritual nature. In contrast, the religious exception continued to apply in the Brussels-Capital Region, where the regional Parliament had examined but rejected draft legislation on abolishing the exception. The Belgian Constitutional Court had confirmed the constitutionality of the contested decrees, on the basis, inter alia, of a judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJUE) which had concluded that the relevant provisions of EU law (in particular, the Charter of Fundamental Rights), did not preclude national legislation which required, in the context of ritual slaughter, a reversible stunning procedure which would not result in the animal's death. The Court acknowledged that in the given case there had been an interference with the freedom of religion of the applicants (several Muslim organisations and several Muslim or Jewish believers), but that this interference pursued the legitimate aim of protection of \"public morals\", encompassing, among other concepts, animal welfare. Having regard to the margin of appreciation accorded to the State in this area, to the quality and coherence of the parliamentary scrutiny and the subsequent two-tier judicial scrutiny (by the CJUE and the Constitutional Court), and to the fact that the applicants could still obtain meat from animals slaughtered in line with the Jewish or Muslim rites and without stunning, from the Brussels-Capital Region or from abroad, the Court held that the interference complained of was not disproportionate. Lastly, the Court concluded that there had been no discrimination contrary to Article 14, whether between the Jewish or Muslim believers and hunters or fishermen (since the conditions for killing the animal differed substantially), between the Jewish or Muslim believers and the rest of the population, and between the Jewish believers and the Muslim believers (Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, 2024, § 65).", + "post_text": "If a personal or collective conviction is to benefit from the right to \"freedom of thought, conscience and religion\" it must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. Provided this condition is satisfied, the State's duty of neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any power on the State's part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways in which those beliefs are expressed (Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2013, § 81). Therefore, it is not the Court's task to enter into any controversy in that sphere or to determine what principles and beliefs are to be considered central to any given religion or to enter into any other sort of interpretation of religious questions (İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2016, § 69; Kovaļkovs v. Latvia (dec.), 2012, § 60; Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, 2024, § 86). In particular, a debate among religious scholars concerning the historical foundations of a given religion and the merits of the demands of its followers does not suffice to deny the religious nature of those beliefs (Ancient Baltic religious association \"Romuva\" v. Lithuania, 2021, §§ 118-119). Hence in referring, for the purposes of its reasoning, to specific religious terms and concepts, the Court does not attach any particular significance to those terms beyond the finding that Article 9 is applicable to them (ibid. [GC], § 69). As a general rule, the fact that there is a debate within the religious community in question regarding the basic precepts of its faith and its demands vis-à-vis the State changes nothing for the purposes of the application of Article 9 (ibid. [GC], § 134).\n\nThe protection of animal welfare can be linked to the concept of \"public morals\" within the meaning of Article 9 § 2 of the Convention. Unlike the law of the European Union (EU), which established animal welfare as a general-interest objective under EUlaw, the Convention does not seek to protect animal welfare as such; accordingly, Article 9 § 2 does not contain an explicit reference to the protection of animal welfare in the exhaustive list of legitimate aims. However, \"public morals\" cannot be understood as being intended solely to protect human dignity in the sphere of relations between individuals. Having regard to the fact that the Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions and the notions currently prevailing in democratic States; that this \"living instrument\" doctrine concerns not only the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention but also the reasons justifying the limitations that might be imposed on them, in view of societal and legislative developments since the Convention was adopted; that the concept of \"morals\" is inherently evolutive; that the Convention is not indifferent to the living environment of individuals covered by its protection; and that the protection of animal welfare is an ethical value to which contemporary democratic societies attach growing importance, it must be concluded that a respondent Government can rely on \"public morals\" as a legitimate aim in support of a measure aimed at reducing an animal's suffering at the point of its slaughter (Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, 2024, §§ 92-101).\n\nIn cases where the Court is not called upon to balance two rights which are of equal value under the Convention - for example, if the interference is intended to protect animal welfare, which, in contrast to European Union law, is not one of the \"goods\" or values protected as such by the Convention - it is for the Court to assess whether the interference with freedom of religion is justified in principle and whether it is proportionate in the light of the legitimate aim pursued, having regard to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national authorities in this area (Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, 2024, § 107).\n\nIn addition, the quality of the parliamentary and judicial scrutiny of the necessity of the measure carried out at national level is of particular importance, in particular in determining the application of the relevant margin of appreciation. When a general rule is in issue, it is particularly important to consider the quality of the parliamentary scrutiny; this includes, among other aspects, the scale of the consultation of the groups affected by the disputed measure and the efforts made by the legislatures to evaluate its impact on the fundamental right relied upon and to weigh up the competing rights and interests in the course of a throughout legislative process. With regard to judicial scrutiny, where the domestic courts have, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity which governs the Convention, ruled on the case before them by providing sufficiently detailed reasons in the light of the principles set out in its case-law, the Court will require strong reasons to substitute its own assessment for that of the domestic courts (Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, 2024, §§ 108-111).\n\nUnder the terms of Article 9 § 2 of the Convention, the legitimate aims liable to justify interference in an individual's manifestation of his religion or beliefs are public safety, the protection of public order, health and morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This enumeration of legitimate aims is strictly exhaustive and the definition of the aims is necessarily restrictive; if a limitation of this freedom is to be compatible with the Convention it must, in particular, pursue an aim that can be linked to one of those listed in this provision (Svyato- Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, 2007, §§ 132 and 137; S.A.S. v. France [GC], 2014, § 113; Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, 2024, § 91).\n\nThe observance of dietary laws dictated by a religion or a philosophical system is a \"practice\" which is protected by Article 9 § 1 of the Convention (Cha'are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France [GC], 2000, §§ 73-74; Jakóbski v. Poland, 2010; Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, 2024, § 65). In two cases the Court found a violation of Article 9 owing to a prison administration's refusal to provide the applicants, prisoners of Buddhist faith, with meat-free meals, even though such an arrangement would not have been an excessive burden on the prisons in question (Jakóbski v. Poland, 2010; Vartic v. Romania (no. 2), 2013). In the second of these cited cases, in particular, the applicant had only been able to obtain a diet for sick prisoners which contained meat. The Court noted that the applicant had very little scope for receiving food which complied with his religion, especially after the Minister of Justice prohibited food parcels being received by post (ibid., §§ 47-50).\n\nThe Court has also found no violation of Article 9, taken separately or in conjunction with Article 14, with regard to the obligation, imposed by the Belgian regional parliaments, to stun animals prior to ritual slaughter. In the relevant case, the Flemish Region and the Walloon Region had ended the religious exception to that obligation, replacing it with an obligation to use a reversible stunning procedure which could not result in the animal's death where slaughter was of a ritual nature. In contrast, the religious exception continued to apply in the Brussels-Capital Region, where the regional Parliament had examined but rejected draft legislation on abolishing the exception. The Belgian Constitutional Court had confirmed the constitutionality of the contested decrees, on the basis, inter alia, of a judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJUE) which had concluded that the relevant provisions of EUlaw (in particular, the Charter of Fundamental Rights), did not preclude national legislation which required, in the context of ritual slaughter, a reversible stunning procedure which would not result in the animal's death. The Court acknowledged that in the given case there had been an interference with the freedom of religion of the applicants (several Muslim organisations and several Muslim or Jewish believers), but that this interference pursued the legitimate aim of protection of \"public morals\", encompassing, among other concepts, animal welfare. Having regard to the margin of appreciation accorded to the State in this area, to the quality and coherence of the parliamentary scrutiny and the subsequent two-tier judicial scrutiny (by the CJUE and the Constitutional Court), and to the fact that the applicants could still obtain meat from animals slaughtered in line with the Jewish or Muslim rites and without stunning, from the Brussels-Capital Region or from abroad, the Court held that the interference complained of was not disproportionate. Lastly, the Court concluded that there had been no discrimination contrary to Article 14, whether between the Jewish or Muslim believers and hunters or fishermen (since the conditions for killing the animal differed substantially), between the Jewish or Muslim believers and the rest of the population, and between the Jewish believers and the Muslim believers (Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, 2024, § 65).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240329075624/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_9_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240913070507/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_9_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/2fbc08fc30bd/20240329075624__guide_art_9_eng.pdf", @@ -10073,6 +10648,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-13", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-03-29__2024-09-13.json", "case_key": "apps:24225/19", "case_name": "Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia", @@ -10106,6 +10683,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-13", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-03-29__2024-09-13.json", "case_key": "apps:43082/14", "case_name": "Hamzayan v. Armenia*", @@ -10139,6 +10718,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-13", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-03-29__2024-09-13.json", "case_key": "apps:34015/17|26896/18", "case_name": "Sardar Babayev v. Azerbaijan", @@ -10172,6 +10753,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-06", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-09-13__2025-05-06.json", "case_key": "apps:64220/19", "case_name": "Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria", @@ -10205,6 +10788,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-06", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-09-13__2025-05-06.json", "case_key": "apps:18382/15", "case_name": "Kanatli v. Türkiye", @@ -10238,6 +10823,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-06", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-09-13__2025-05-06.json", "case_key": "apps:50681/20", "case_name": "Mikyas and Others v. Belgium (dec.)", @@ -10271,9 +10858,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-31", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2025-05-06__2025-05-31.json", "case_key": "apps:25636/22", - "case_name": "Lindholm and the Estate after Leif Lindholm v. Denmark, no 25636/22", + "case_name": "Lindholm and the Estate after Leif Lindholm v. Denmark", "application_numbers": "25636/22", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -10287,7 +10876,7 @@ "linked_sections": "I.E: Overlaps between the safeguards of Article 9 and the other Convention provisions", "linked_change_types": "citation_updated", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.E|a:61|b:61", - "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match", + "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "By its very nature, the substantive content of Article 9 of the Convention may sometimes overlap with the content of other provisions of the Convention; in other words, one and the same complaint submitted to the Court can sometimes come under more than one article. In such cases the Court usually opts for assessing the complaint under only one article, which it considers more relevant in the light of the specific circumstances of the case; however, in so doing, it also bears the other article(s) in mind and interprets the article which it had opted to consider in the light of the latter. In any event, the Convention must be read as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions ( Aygün v. Belgium, 2022, § 71). The articles most likely to be involved alongside Article 9 for the same facts and the same complaints are as follows: (a) Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (right to a fair trial, particularly the right of access to a tribunal). In a case concerning a refusal by the Greek Court of Cassation to recognise the legal personality of the Cathedral of the Roman Catholic diocese of Crete, thereby denying it locus standi to protect its property, the Court decided to assess the applicant body's complaints solely under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention rather than under Article 9 ( Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, 1997, §§ 33 and 50). Similarly, in a case of an alleged failure to enforce a final judgment acknowledging the right of a parish and its members to bury their dead in the local cemetery in accordance with their specific rites, the Court decided to consider the complaint solely under Article 6 § 1 ( Greek Catholic Parish of Pesceana v. Romania (dec.), 2015, § 43); (b) Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private and/or family life). The Court has considered applications: ▪ solely under Article 8, on its own or in conjunction with Article 14: for example, as regards a decision by the domestic courts to establish the under-age children's residence with one of the parents essentially because the other parent was a Jehovah's Witness ( Hoffmann v. Austria, 1993; Palau-Martinez v. France, 2003; Ismailova v. Russia, 2007). The Court pointed out that the practical arrangements for exercising parental authority over children defined by the domestic courts could not, as such, infringe an applicant's freedom to manifest his or her religion ( Deschomets v. France (dec.), 2006); ▪ under Article 8, read in the light of Article 9: as regards the transfer of a civil servant because of his religious convictions, which were known to others but nonetheless were solely a private matter, and also his wife's religious behaviour ( Sodan v. Turkey, 2016, § 30), or the fostering-out of children, disregarding the biological parents'wishes, particularly as regards preserving the children's connection with their cultural and religious roots ( Abdi Ibrahim v. Norway [GC], 2021, §§ 134-142; Kılıc v. Austria, 2023, §§ 106-107 and 145); ▪ under Article 9, taken alone: as regards the placement of a child in a foster family without ensuring that the latter respected her religious opinions and those of her family or origin, where the complaint came from the child herself ( Loste v. France, 2022, § 110); ▪ under Articles 8 and 9, examined jointly: as regards the refusal to grant the applicants'request to transfer their sons'bodies to their country of origin, so that they could be buried in accordance with their religious beliefs ( Aygün v. Belgium, 2022, §§ 51, 60 and 91-92); ▪ under Article 14 taken together with Article 8, read in the light of Article 9: concerning a revocable and reviewable order prohibiting a father from actively involving his young daughter in his religious practice, although no restriction had been imposed with regard to the mother's religion ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 30). ▪ under Articles 8, 9 and 14 taken together: as regards inaction by the police and the other national authorities when confronted by insults and verbal abuse, barricading of buildings and other similar discriminatory activities by the local population against members of a religious minority ( Georgia Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia, 2023, § 79). (c) Article 10 (freedom of expression). The Court considered applications: ▪ solely under Article 10: for example, as regards a prohibition imposed by the competent State body on an independent radio station broadcasting a paid advertisement of a religious nature ( Murphy v. Ireland, 2003), of the refusal by the competent body to grant a broadcasting licence for a radio station with Christian religious programming ( Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Anatoliy Elenkov v. Bulgaria, 2007). Thus, in so far as the applicant complains of interference with the expression of his beliefs and opinions by broadcasting information, Article 10 constitutes a lex specialis in relation to Article 9, so that a separate assessment under the latter is unnecessary ( Balsytė - Lideikienė v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005). This is also the case with regard to the collection and processing of personal data by a religious organisation or by its members for the purpose of missionary activity ( Jehovah's Witnesses v. Finland, 2023, § 62). ▪ under Article 10 read in the light of Article 9: for example, as regards a prohibition on publishing and distributing religious books ( Ibragim Ibragimov and Others v. Russia, 2018, § 78), or the withdrawal of a distribution permit for such material and proceedings brought against the persons involved in their distribution ( Taganrog LRO and Others v. Russia, 2022, § 218); also, the official designation of texts published by a religious organisation or on its internet site as \"extremist\" (ibid., §§ 197, 207, 224-226 and 233). (d) Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association). The Court has considered applications: ▪ solely under Article 9: for example, as regards a complaint submitted by a conscientious objector who did not belong to any religious or pacifist organisation, and who relied on Article 11 to allege that the rejection of his request for exemption from military service constituted a breach of his negative freedom not to be a follower of a particular religion or a member of any kind of organisation ( Papavasilakis v. Greece, 2016, §§ 34-35), or an administrative fine imposed on an applicant for having organised Bible meetings in his home without first notifying the authorities ( Ossewaarde v. Russia, 2023, § 29); ▪ under Article 9 as interpreted in the light of Article 11: for example as regards State interference in a dispute between two rival groups within the same religious community ( Hassan and Tchaouch v. Bulgaria [GC], 2000, § 65), the dissolution of a religious organisation ( Jehovah's Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia, 2010, §§ 102-103), the protracted refusal to recognise the legal personality of a religious community ( Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, 2008, § 60), or measures to prevent a religious association from building a place of worship on a plot of land which it owned ( The Religious Denomination of Jehovah's Witnesses in Bulgaria v. Bulgaria, 2020, § 80); ▪ under Article 9 as interpreted in the light of Articles 11 and 6 § 1: for example as regards a refusal by the domestic authorities to register changes to the statutes of a religious organisation geared to ratifying the organisation's change of denomination ( Svyato- Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, 2007, § 152); ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of association) as interpreted in the light of Article 9 - for example as regards a refusal to register a religious organisation ( Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese (Greek- Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Peć Patriarchy) v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2017, § 61), or to renew its registration ( Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 2006, §§ 74-75; Bektashi Community and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2018, § 46). See, to converse effect, the judgments in the cases of Genov v. Bulgaria, 2017, § 38, Metodiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2017, § 26; Christian Religious Organization of Jehovah's Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia, 2022, § 45; and Ilyin and Others v. Ukraine, 2022, § 41, in which the Court decided to examine the refusal to register a religious organisation under Article 9, read in the light of Article 11; ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of assembly) as interpreted in the light of Article 9 - for example as regards a refusal to renew the registration of a religious organisation ( Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 2006, §§ 74-75); ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of assembly) as interpreted in the light of Article 9: for example as regards a denial of access for a group practising Neo-Druidism to the historic site of Stonehenge to celebrate the summer solstice ( Pendragon v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 19 October 1998; to converse effect, see also Chappell v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 14 July 1987), or a refusal by the domestic authorities to allow adherents of a minority religious movement to hold public meetings to promote their faith ( Centre of Societies for Krishna Consciousness in Russia and Frolov v. Russia, 2021, § 46); (e) Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property). The Court has chosen to consider cases solely under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: for example as regards the obligation on landowners who are personally opposed to hunting to tolerate it on their land ( Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], 1999; Herrmann v. Germany [GC], 2012); (f) Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (right of parents to respect for their religious and philosophical convictions in the framework of their children's education). The Court has chosen to consider cases ▪ solely under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1: for example as regards the administration of compulsory classes in religious culture and morals in State schools, and the restricted opportunities for administering such classes ( Mansur Yalçın and Others v. Turkey, 2014), or a refusal by educational authorities to grant children complete exemption from compulsory classes on Christianity ( Folgerø and Others v. Norway [GC], 2007); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 9 of the Convention taken alone, finding no violation of the former on the basis of an elaborate argumentation and no violation of the latter with simple reference to that argumentation ( Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 1976); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 as interpreted in the light of Article 9: for example as regards the compulsory presence of crucifixes in classrooms in State schools ( Lautsi and Others v. Italy [GC], 2011); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 for the parents and Article 9 of the Convention for the child, as regards punishment inflicted by a head teacher on a pupil for refusing to take part in a school parade ( Valsamis v. Greece, 1996), or participation by a student in a religious ceremony at school without his parents'consent ( Perovy v. Russia, 2020). ▪ solely under Article 9: for example, as regards a refusal to exempt the applicants'children from compulsory mixed swimming lessons ( Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v. Switzerland, 2017, §§ 35 and 90) - essentially because the respondent State, Switzerland, had not ratified Protocol No. 1.", "post_text": "By its very nature, the substantive content of Article 9 of the Convention may sometimes overlap with the content of other provisions of the Convention; in other words, one and the same complaint submitted to the Court can sometimes come under more than one article. In such cases the Court usually opts for assessing the complaint under only one article, which it considers more relevant in the light of the specific circumstances of the case; however, in so doing, it also bears the other article(s) in mind and interprets the Article which it had opted to consider in the light of the latter. In any event, the Convention must be read as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions ( Aygün v. Belgium, 2022, § 71). The Articles most likely to be involved alongside Article 9 for the same facts and the same complaints are as follows: (a) Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (right to a fair trial, particularly the right of access to a tribunal). In a case concerning a refusal by the Greek Court of Cassation to recognise the legal personality of the Cathedral of the Roman Catholic diocese of Crete, thereby denying it locus standi to protect its property, the Court decided to assess the applicant body's complaints solely under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention rather than under Article 9 ( Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, 1997, §§ 33 and 50). Similarly, in a case of an alleged failure to enforce a final judgment acknowledging the right of a parish and its members to bury their dead in the local cemetery in accordance with their specific rites, the Court decided to consider the complaint solely under Article 6 § 1 ( Greek Catholic Parish of Pesceana v. Romania (dec.), 2015, § 43); (b) Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private and/or family life). The Court has considered applications: ▪ solely under Article 8, on its own or in conjunction with Article 14: for example, as regards a decision by the domestic courts to establish the under-age children's residence with one of the parents essentially because the other parent was a Jehovah's Witness ( Hoffmann v. Austria, 1993; Palau-Martinez v. France, 2003; Ismailova v. Russia, 2007). The Court pointed out that the practical arrangements for exercising parental authority over children defined by the domestic courts could not, as such, infringe an applicant's freedom to manifest his or her religion ( Deschomets v. France (dec.), 2006); ▪ under Article 8, read in the light of Article 9: as regards the transfer of a civil servant because of his religious convictions, which were known to others but nonetheless were solely a private matter, and also his wife's religious behaviour ( Sodan v. Turkey, 2016, § 30), or the fostering-out of children, disregarding the biological parents'wishes, particularly as regards preserving the children's connection with their cultural and religious roots ( Abdi Ibrahim v. Norway [GC], 2021, §§ 134-142; Kılıc v. Austria, 2023, §§ 106-107 and 145), or the refusal of blood transfusions by Jehovah's Witnesses, a question principally pertaining to autonomy and self-determination, in which the issue at stake was broader than freedom of religion ( Pindo Mulla v. Spain [GC], 2024, §§ 97-98; Lindholm and the Estate after Leif Lindholm v. Denmark, 2024, § 62); ▪ under Article 9, taken alone: as regards the placement of a child in a foster family without ensuring that the latter respected her religious opinions and those of her family or origin, where the complaint came from the child herself ( Loste v. France, 2022, § 110); ▪ under Articles 8 and 9, examined jointly: as regards the refusal to grant the applicants'request to transfer their sons'bodies to their country of origin, so that they could be buried in accordance with their religious beliefs ( Aygün v. Belgium, 2022, §§ 51, 60 and 91-92); ▪ under Article 14 taken together with Article 8, read in the light of Article 9: concerning a revocable and reviewable order prohibiting a father from actively involving his young daughter in his religious practice, although no restriction had been imposed with regard to the mother's religion ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 30). ▪ under Articles 8, 9 and 14 taken together: as regards inaction by the police and the other national authorities when confronted by insults and verbal abuse, barricading of buildings and other similar discriminatory activities by the local population against members of a religious minority ( Georgia Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia, 2023, § 79). (c) Article 10 (freedom of expression). The Court considered applications: ▪ solely under Article 10: for example, as regards a prohibition imposed by the competent State body on an independent radio station broadcasting a paid advertisement of a religious nature ( Murphy v. Ireland, 2003), of the refusal by the competent body to grant a broadcasting licence for a radio station with Christian religious programming ( Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Anatoliy Elenkov v. Bulgaria, 2007). Thus, in so far as the applicant complains of interference with the expression of his beliefs and opinions by broadcasting information, Article 10 constitutes a lex specialis in relation to Article 9, so that a separate assessment under the latter is unnecessary ( Balsytė - Lideikienė v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005). This is also the case with regard to the collection and processing of personal data by a religious organisation or by its members for the purpose of missionary activity ( Jehovah's Witnesses v. Finland, 2023, § 62). ▪ under Article 10 read in the light of Article 9: for example, as regards a prohibition on publishing and distributing religious books ( Ibragim Ibragimov and Others v. Russia, 2018, § 78), or the withdrawal of a distribution permit for such material and proceedings brought against the persons involved in their distribution ( Taganrog LRO and Others v. Russia, 2022, § 218); also, the official designation of texts published by a religious organisation or on its internet site as \"extremist\" ( ibid ., §§ 197, 207, 224-226 and 233). (d) Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association). The Court has considered applications: ▪ solely under Article 9: for example, as regards a complaint submitted by a conscientious objector who did not belong to any religious or pacifist organisation, and who relied on Article 11 to allege that the rejection of his request for exemption from military service constituted a breach of his negative freedom not to be a follower of a particular religion or a member of any kind of organisation ( Papavasilakis v. Greece, 2016, §§ 34-35), or an administrative fine imposed on an applicant for having organised Bible meetings in his home without first notifying the authorities ( Ossewaarde v. Russia, 2023, § 29); ▪ under Article 9 as interpreted in the light of Article 11: for example as regards State interference in a dispute between two rival groups within the same religious community ( Hassan and Tchaouch v. Bulgaria [GC], 2000, § 65), the dissolution of a religious organisation ( Jehovah's Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia, 2010, §§ 102-103), the protracted refusal to recognise the legal personality of a religious community ( Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, 2008, § 60), or measures to prevent a religious association from building a place of worship on a plot of land which it owned ( The Religious Denomination of Jehovah's Witnesses in Bulgaria v. Bulgaria, 2020, § 80); ▪ under Article 9 as interpreted in the light of Articles 11 and 6 § 1: for example as regards a refusal by the domestic authorities to register changes to the statutes of a religious organisation geared to ratifying the organisation's change of denomination ( Svyato- Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, 2007, § 152); ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of association) as interpreted in the light of Article 9 - for example as regards a refusal to register a religious organisation ( Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese (Greek- Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Peć Patriarchy) v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2017, § 61), or to renew its registration ( Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 2006, §§ 74-75; Bektashi Community and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2018, § 46). See, to converse effect, the judgments in the cases of Genov v. Bulgaria, 2017, § 38, Metodiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2017, § 26; Christian Religious Organization of Jehovah's Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia, 2022, § 45; and Ilyin and Others v. Ukraine, 2022, § 41, in which the Court decided to examine the refusal to register a religious organisation under Article 9, read in the light of Article 11; ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of assembly) as interpreted in the light of Article 9 - for example as regards a refusal to renew the registration of a religious organisation ( Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 2006, §§ 74-75); ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of assembly) as interpreted in the light of Article 9: for example as regards a denial of access for a group practising Neo-Druidism to the historic site of Stonehenge to celebrate the summer solstice ( Pendragon v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 19 October 1998; to converse effect, see also Chappell v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 14 July 1987), or a refusal by the domestic authorities to allow adherents of a minority religious movement to hold public meetings to promote their faith ( Centre of Societies for Krishna Consciousness in Russia and Frolov v. Russia, 2021, § 46); (e) Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property). The Court has chosen to consider cases solely under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: for example as regards the obligation on landowners who are personally opposed to hunting to tolerate it on their land ( Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], 1999; Herrmann v. Germany [GC], 2012); (f) Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (right of parents to respect for their religious and philosophical convictions in the framework of their children's education). The Court has chosen to consider cases ▪ solely under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1: for example as regards the administration of compulsory classes in religious culture and morals in State schools, and the restricted opportunities for administering such classes ( Mansur Yalçın and Others v. Turkey, 2014), or a refusal by educational authorities to grant children complete exemption from compulsory classes on Christianity ( Folgerø and Others v. Norway [GC], 2007); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 9 of the Convention taken alone, finding no violation of the former on the basis of an elaborate argumentation and no violation of the latter with simple reference to that argumentation ( Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 1976); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 as interpreted in the light of Article 9: for example as regards the compulsory presence of crucifixes in classrooms in State schools ( Lautsi and Others v. Italy [GC], 2011); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 for the parents and Article 9 of the Convention for the child, as regards punishment inflicted by a head teacher on a pupil for refusing to take part in a school parade ( Valsamis v. Greece, 1996), or participation by a student in a religious ceremony at school without his parents'consent ( Perovy v. Russia, 2020). ▪ solely under Article 9: for example, as regards a refusal to exempt the applicants'children from compulsory mixed swimming lessons ( Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v. Switzerland, 2017, §§ 35 and 90) - essentially because the respondent State, Switzerland, had not ratified Protocol No. 1.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250506182911/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_9_eng", @@ -10304,6 +10893,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-31", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2025-05-06__2025-05-31.json", "case_key": "apps:15541/20", "case_name": "Pindo Mulla v. Spain [GC]", @@ -10337,6 +10928,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-22", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2025-05-31__2025-11-22.json", "case_key": "apps:81028/17", "case_name": "Rafiyev v. Azerbaijan*", @@ -10370,6 +10963,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-22", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2025-05-31__2025-11-22.json", "case_key": "apps:8019/16", "case_name": "Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC]", @@ -10388,7 +10983,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.B|a:15|b:15|I.F|a:None|b:64|I.F|a:None|b:65", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "In that connection, the Court points out that the Convention is designed to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective. The right enshrined in Article 9 would be highly theoretical and illusory if the degree of discretion granted to States allowed them to interpret the notion of religious denomination so restrictively as to deprive a non-traditional and minority form of a religion of legal protection. Such limitative definitions have a direct impact on the exercise of the right to freedom of religion and are liable to curtail the exercise of that right by denying the religious nature of a faith. At all events, these definitions may not be interpreted to the detriment of non-traditional forms of religion ( İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2016, § 114, and Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria, 2024, § 48). In addition, it would be fundamentally inconsistent with the logic of Article 9 to limit the rights guaranteed under that provision solely to the religions and registered religious organisations recognised by the State, and to followers of them ( Hamzayan v. Armenia, 2024).", - "post_text": "In that connection, the Court points out that the Convention is designed to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective. The right enshrined in Article 9 would be highly theoretical and illusory if the degree of discretion granted to States allowed them to interpret the notion of religious denomination so restrictively as to deprive a non-traditional and minority form of a religion of legal protection. Such limitative definitions have a direct impact on the exercise of the right to freedom of religion and are liable to curtail the exercise of that right by denying the religious nature of a faith. At all events, these definitions may not be interpreted to the detriment of non-traditional forms of religion ( İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2016, § 114, and Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria, 2024, § 48). In addition, it would be fundamentally inconsistent with the logic of Article 9 to limit the rights guaranteed under that provision solely to the religions and registered religious organisations recognised by the State, and to followers of them ( Hamzayan v. Armenia, 2024). It is questionable whether any law purporting to limit the right guaranteed by Article 9 to manifest one's religion to the followers of registered religious organisations only would satisfy the \"lawfulness\" requirement in light of the fundamental inconsistency of such a law with the requirements of that provision ( Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025, § 1275).\n\nIn the context of a military conflict, the Court has indicated that it must be kept in mind that the obligation to respect the religious convictions and practices of persons in occupied territory has already been codified in Article 46 of the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (\"the Hague Regulations\"), and that respect for convictions and religious practices is recognised in Article 75(1) of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977 (\"AP I\") as a fundamental guarantee for all persons who are in the power of a party to the conflict. Moreover, Article 15 AP I codifies the obligation to respect and protect civilian religious personnel in all circumstances. Serious violations of freedom of religion under Article 9 can therefore also breach the requirements of international humanitarian law ( Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025, §§ 1267-69).\n\nThus, the Court found a violation of Article 9 in the context of the armed conflict in Ukraine, encompassing the events in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (in the east of Ukraine), which began in the spring of 2014, and the events throughout Ukraine from 24 February 2022 (the start of the full-scale military invasion by the Russian Federation). More precisely, it established the existence of an administrative practice of intimidation, harassment and persecution of religious groups, aside from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. The Court found that since 2014 freedom of religion has been significantly curtailed in the occupied territories and that this had continued after the 2022 invasion. Reported acts included, inter alia, the harassment and prosecution of religious figures of other religions or Christian churches as well as civilians engaging in worship in the context of those religions and churches, in breach of the requirements of international humanitarian law; seizure of places of worship by separatists; ill-treatment, abduction and, in some cases the killing of religious leaders; banning of religious material deemed to be \"extremist\" by separatist administrations and institutions, with Members of the Jehovah's Witnesses particularly targeted; introduction of formal requirements for the mandatory registration and operation of religious groups which were applied restrictively to refuse registration to a number of religious organisations on undisclosed grounds; banning religious organisations as \"extremist\" organisations and seizing, destroying and banning, their religious material and publications; seizing immovable property; prosecution of religious leaders and parishioners for organising or attending illegal gatherings. \" Extremism laws\" and other provisions purporting to ban \"sects\" had been applied in newly occupied territories to justify the confiscation of religious material and prevent religious worship by those outside the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate community. Furthermore, in 2022 the Russian occupation administration had \"nationalised\" property from religious communities and repurposed it for their own ends. The Court held that the unlawful deprivation of liberty, ill-treatment, torture and extrajudicial killing of civilians on account of their belonging to or practising their religion, plainly could not be justified under Article 9 § 2. As to the other measures taken, the Court found that they were not \"prescribed by law\". In addition, it was unlikely that the measures taken in pursuance of purported legal acts proscribing extremism would satisfy the \"quality of law\" requirement inherent in \"lawfulness\" on account of the absence of safeguards to protect agains t an excessively broad interpretation of the concept of \"extremism\" by the separatist entities and other occupation authorities. It was also questionable whether a law, purporting to limit the right to manifest one's religion to the followers of registered religious organisations only, would satisfy the \"lawfulness\" requirement in light of the fundamental inconsistency of such a law with the requirements of Article 9 of the Convention ( Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025, § 1267-77).", + "post_text": "In that connection, the Court points out that the Convention is designed to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective. The right enshrined in Article 9 would be highly theoretical and illusory if the degree of discretion granted to States allowed them to interpret the notion of religious denomination so restrictively as to deprive a non-traditional and minority form of a religion of legal protection. Such limitative definitions have a direct impact on the exercise of the right to freedom of religion and are liable to curtail the exercise of that right by denying the religious nature of a faith. At all events, these definitions may not be interpreted to the detriment of non-traditional forms of religion ( İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2016, § 114, and Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria, 2024, § 48). In addition, it would be fundamentally inconsistent with the logic of Article 9 to limit the rights guaranteed under that provision solely to the religions and registered religious organisations recognised by the State, and to followers of them ( Hamzayan v. Armenia, 2024). It is questionable whether any law purporting to limit the right guaranteed by Article 9 to manifest one's religion to the followers of registered religious organisations only would satisfy the \"lawfulness\" requirement in light of the fundamental inconsistency of such a law with the requirements of that provision ( Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025, § 1275).\n\nIn the context of a military conflict, the Court has indicated that it must be kept in mind that the obligation to respect the religious convictions and practices of persons in occupied territory has already been codified in Article 46 of the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (\"the Hague Regulations\"), and that respect for convictions and religious practices is recognised in Article 75(1) of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977 (\"AP I\") as a fundamental guarantee for all persons who are in the power of a party to the conflict. Moreover, Article 15 AP Icodifies the obligation to respect and protect civilian religious personnel in all circumstances. Serious violations of freedom of religion under Article 9 can therefore also breach the requirements of international humanitarian law ( Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025, §§ 1267-69).\n\nThus, the Court found a violation of Article 9 in the context of the armed conflict in Ukraine, encompassing the events in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (in the east of Ukraine), which began in the spring of 2014, and the events throughout Ukraine from 24 February 2022 (the start of the full-scale military invasion by the Russian Federation). More precisely, it established the existence of an administrative practice of intimidation, harassment and persecution of religious groups, aside from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. The Court found that since 2014 freedom of religion has been significantly curtailed in the occupied territories and that this had continued after the 2022 invasion. Reported acts included, inter alia, the harassment and prosecution of religious figures of other religions or Christian churches as well as civilians engaging in worship in the context of those religions and churches, in breach of the requirements of international humanitarian law; seizure of places of worship by separatists; ill-treatment, abduction and, in some cases the killing of religious leaders; banning of religious material deemed to be \"extremist\" by separatist administrations and institutions, with Members of the Jehovah's Witnesses particularly targeted; introduction of formal requirements for the mandatory registration and operation of religious groups which were applied restrictively to refuse registration to a number of religious organisations on undisclosed grounds; banning religious organisations as \"extremist\" organisations and seizing, destroying and banning, their religious material and publications; seizing immovable property; prosecution of religious leaders and parishioners for organising or attending illegal gatherings. \" Extremism laws\" and other provisions purporting to ban \"sects\" had been applied in newly occupied territories to justify the confiscation of religious material and prevent religious worship by those outside the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate community. Furthermore, in 2022 the Russian occupation administration had \"nationalised\" property from religious communities and repurposed it for their own ends. The Court held that the unlawful deprivation of liberty, ill-treatment, torture and extrajudicial killing of civilians on account of their belonging to or practising their religion, plainly could not be justified under Article 9 § 2. As to the other measures taken, the Court found that they were not \"prescribed by law\". In addition, it was unlikely that the measures taken in pursuance of purported legal acts proscribing extremism would satisfy the \"quality of law\" requirement inherent in \"lawfulness\" on account of the absence of safeguards to protect agains t an excessively broad interpretation of the concept of \"extremism\" by the separatist entities and other occupation authorities. It was also questionable whether a law, purporting to limit the right to manifest one's religion to the followers of registered religious organisations only, would satisfy the \"lawfulness\" requirement in light of the fundamental inconsistency of such a law with the requirements of Article 9 of the Convention ( Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025, § 1267-77).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250531233030/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_9_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20251122212600/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_9_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/2fbc08fc30bd/20250531233030__guide_art_9_eng.pdf", @@ -10403,6 +10998,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:15736/22", "case_name": "Alppi v. Finland (dec.)", @@ -10436,6 +11033,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:17053/20", "case_name": "Bavčar v. Slovenia", @@ -10469,6 +11068,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:3016/16", "case_name": "Bogdan v. Ukraine", @@ -10487,7 +11088,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "VI.B.3.c.i.§117|a:None|b:489", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "In any event, it is in the first place the trial court's duty to establish in a convincing manner whether or not an applicant's confessions and waivers of legal assistance were voluntary. Any flaw in respect of the confessions and waivers should be rectified in order for the proceedings as a whole to be considered fair. A failure to examine the circumstances surrounding an applicant's waiver would be tantamount to depriving the applicant of the possibility of remedying a situation, contrary to the requirements of the Convention (Türk v. Turkey, 2017, §§ 53-54; Rodionov v. Russia, 2018, § 167). Drug withdrawal symptoms constitute a form of vulnerability which may, in principle, cast doubt on the validity of a waiver of the right to a lawyer and which imposes upon the domestic courts the duty to establish whether, despite this vulnerability, the waiver was voluntary (Bogdan v. Ukraine,* 2024, §§ 57-69, § 75).", + "post_text": "In any event, it is in the first place the trial court's duty to establish in a convincing manner whether or not an applicant's confessions and waivers of legal assistance were voluntary. Any flaw in respect of the confessions and waivers should be rectified in order for the proceedings as a whole to be considered fair. Afailure to examine the circumstances surrounding an applicant's waiver would be tantamount to depriving the applicant of the possibility of remedying a situation, contrary to the requirements of the Convention (Türk v. Turkey, 2017, §§ 53-54; Rodionov v. Russia, 2018, § 167). Drug withdrawal symptoms constitute a form of vulnerability which may, in principle, cast doubt on the validity of a waiver of the right to a lawyer and which imposes upon the domestic courts the duty to establish whether, despite this vulnerability, the waiver was voluntary (Bogdan v. Ukraine,* 2024, §§ 57-69, § 75).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230911235812/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409165839/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/4026b1621d4a/20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf", @@ -10502,6 +11103,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:31349/20", "case_name": "Chkhartishvili v. Georgia", @@ -10535,6 +11138,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:67414/11", "case_name": "Cupiał v. Poland", @@ -10568,6 +11173,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:25852/18", "case_name": "Deliktaş v. Türkiye", @@ -10601,6 +11208,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:19990/20", "case_name": "Erik Adamčo v. Slovakia", @@ -10634,6 +11243,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:1269/13", "case_name": "European Air Transport Leipzig GmbH v. Belgium", @@ -10667,9 +11278,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:28232/22", - "case_name": "Figurka v. Ukraine,* no. 28232/22", + "case_name": "Figurka v. Ukraine", "application_numbers": "28232/22", "judgment_year": "2023", "citation_change": "added", @@ -10678,14 +11291,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF FIGURKA v. UKRAINE", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "IV.C.2.b.i.§40: a The exercise of different judicial functions", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.C.2.b.i.§40|a:None|b:137", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "The absence of a prosecutor during the criminal trial, which may put the judge in the position of the prosecuting authority while conducting the questioning and adducing evidence against an applicant, raises another issue concerning impartiality. In this regard, the Court has explained that the judge is the ultimate guardian of the proceedings and that it is normally the task of a public authority in case of public prosecution to present and substantiate the criminal charge with a view to adversarial argument with the other parties. Therefore, confusing the two roles in the proceedings is a potential breach of the requirement of impartiality under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (Karelin v. Russia, 2016, §§ 51-85; see, by contrast, Makarashvili and Others v. Georgia, 2022, § 59, where, under domestic law, even in the absence of a prosecutor at trial, the author of the administrative-offence report on the basis of which the proceedings are instituted (the police officer) acts as a party to those proceedings; and Figurka v. Ukraine,* 2023, §§ 30-44, where the appeal court did not take up, or was not put in a position requiring it to take, the role of a prosecuting party).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230911235812/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409165839/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/4026b1621d4a/20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf", @@ -10700,6 +11313,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:57378/18", "case_name": "Georgiou v. Greece", @@ -10718,7 +11333,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "V.A.3.§52|a:None|b:212", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "In Baydar v. the Netherlands, 2018 (§§ 45-53), in the context of a decision by the domestic superior court refusing to refer a question to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for a preliminary ruling (the relevant principles set out in the context of the civil limb in Dhahbi v. Italy, 2014, § 31), the Court had regard to the principle according to which courts of cassation comply with their obligation to provide sufficient reasoning when they base themselves on a specific legal provision, without further reasoning, in dismissing cassation appeals which do not have any prospects of success (Talmane v. Latvia, 2016, § 29). It held that this case-law was in line with the principles set out in Dhahbi v. Italy, 2014, and concluded that a reference to the relevant legal provision by the superior court, with an indication that there was no need to seek a preliminary ruling since the matter did not raise a legal issue that needed to be determined, provided for an implied acknowledgment that a referral to the CJEU could not lead to a different outcome in the case. The Court thus considered that this satisfied the requirement of a sufficient reasoning under Article 6 § 1. By contrast, in Georgiou v. Greece, 2023, §§ 22-26, the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 in relation to the Court of Cassation's failure to examine, without giving any reasons, the applicant's request to seek a preliminary ruling from the CJEU.", + "post_text": "In Baydar v. the Netherlands, 2018 (§§ 45-53), in the context of a decision by the domestic superior court refusing to refer a question to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for a preliminary ruling (the relevant principles set out in the context of the civil limb in Dhahbi v. Italy, 2014, § 31), the Court had regard to the principle according to which courts of cassation comply with their obligation to provide sufficient reasoning when they base themselves on a specific legal provision, without further reasoning, in dismissing cassation appeals which do not have any prospects of success (Talmane v. Latvia, 2016, § 29). It held that this case-law was in line with the principles set out in Dhahbi v. Italy, 2014, and concluded that a reference to the relevant legal provision by the superior court, with an indication that there was no need to seek a preliminary ruling since the matter did not raise a legal issue that needed to be determined, provided for an implied acknowledgment that a referral to the CJEUcould not lead to a different outcome in the case. The Court thus considered that this satisfied the requirement of a sufficient reasoning under Article 6 § 1. By contrast, in Georgiou v. Greece, 2023, §§ 22-26, the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 in relation to the Court of Cassation's failure to examine, without giving any reasons, the applicant's request to seek a preliminary ruling from the CJEU.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230911235812/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409165839/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/4026b1621d4a/20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf", @@ -10733,6 +11348,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:19750/13", "case_name": "Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC]", @@ -10766,6 +11383,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:10644/17", "case_name": "Hamdani v. Switzerland", @@ -10799,6 +11418,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:16783/20", "case_name": "Irodotou v. Cyprus", @@ -10817,7 +11438,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A|a:None|b:7", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "In the absence of special circumstances, a complaint relating to Article 6 of the Convention is declared inadmissible as premature when it concerns criminal proceedings pending before the domestic courts (Sperisen v. Switzerland, 2023, § 48). A person may not claim to be a victim of a violation of his or her right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention which, according to him or her, occurred in the course of proceedings in which he or she was acquitted or which were discontinued (Khlyustov v. Russia, 2013, § 103; see, however, Kerimoğlu v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 44-57, as regards the loss of victim status once it has been acquired). The dismissal of charges against an applicant deprives him or her of the victim status for the alleged breaches of the Article 6 rights (Batmaz v. Turkey, 2014, § 36; see Panju v. Belgium (No. 2), 2023, §§ 75, in the length of proceedings context, see, by contrast, Irodotou v. Cyprus, 2023, § 63). Moreover, the Court has held that an applicant cannot complain of a breach of his or her Article 6 rights if the domestic courts only applied a measure suspending the pronouncement of a criminal sanction against him or her (Kerman v. Turkey, 2016, §§ 100-106).", + "post_text": "In the absence of special circumstances, a complaint relating to Article 6 of the Convention is declared inadmissible as premature when it concerns criminal proceedings pending before the domestic courts (Sperisen v. Switzerland, 2023, § 48). Aperson may not claim to be a victim of a violation of his or her right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention which, according to him or her, occurred in the course of proceedings in which he or she was acquitted or which were discontinued (Khlyustov v. Russia, 2013, § 103; see, however, Kerimoğlu v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 44-57, as regards the loss of victim status once it has been acquired). The dismissal of charges against an applicant deprives him or her of the victim status for the alleged breaches of the Article 6 rights (Batmaz v. Turkey, 2014, § 36; see Panju v. Belgium (No. 2), 2023, §§ 75, in the length of proceedings context, see, by contrast, Irodotou v. Cyprus, 2023, § 63). Moreover, the Court has held that an applicant cannot complain of a breach of his or her Article 6 rights if the domestic courts only applied a measure suspending the pronouncement of a criminal sanction against him or her (Kerman v. Turkey, 2016, §§ 100-106).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230911235812/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409165839/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/4026b1621d4a/20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf", @@ -10832,9 +11453,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:42180/19", - "case_name": "Jakutavičius v. Lithuania,* no. 42180/19", + "case_name": "Jakutavičius v. Lithuania", "application_numbers": "42180/19", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -10843,14 +11466,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF JAKUTAVIČIUS v. LITHUANIA", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "II.B.5: Different stages of criminal proceedings, ancillary proceedings and subsequent remedies", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.B.5|a:None|b:57", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "The criminal limb of Article 6 § 1 does not apply to the proceedings relating to the costs and expenses of the criminal proceedings. In such proceedings, Article 6 § 1 may apply in its civil limb (Jakutavičius v. Lithuania,* 2024, §§ 55-60; see also Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.), 2023, §§ 26-28, where Article 6 § 1 did not apply due to the absence of a right under the relevant domestic law).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230911235812/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409165839/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/4026b1621d4a/20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf", @@ -10865,6 +11488,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:47834/19", "case_name": "Lalik v. Poland", @@ -10898,9 +11523,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:60569/09", - "case_name": "Leka v. Albania,* no. 60569/09", + "case_name": "Leka v. Albania", "application_numbers": "60569/09", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -10909,14 +11536,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF LEKA v. ALBANIA", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "VI.B.1.c: Reclassification of the charge", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "VI.B.1.c|a:None|b:422", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "Areclassification of the offence is considered to be sufficiently foreseeable to the accused if it concerns an element which is intrinsic to the accusation (De Salvador Torres v. Spain, 1996, § 33; Sadak and Others v. Turkey (no. 1), 2001, §§ 52 and 56; Juha Nuutinen v. Finland, 2007, § 32). Whether the elements of the reclassified offence were debated in the proceedings is a further relevant consideration (Penev v. Bulgaria, 2010, § 41; Leka v. Albania,* 2024, § 78).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230911235812/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409165839/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/4026b1621d4a/20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf", @@ -10931,6 +11558,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:3324/19", "case_name": "Mehmet Zeki Doğan v. Türkiye (no. 2)", @@ -10964,9 +11593,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:39712/16", - "case_name": "Nadir Yıldırım and Others v. Türkiye,* no. 39712/16", + "case_name": "Nadir Yıldırım and Others v. Türkiye", "application_numbers": "39712/16", "judgment_year": "2023", "citation_change": "added", @@ -10975,14 +11606,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "4", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF NADİR YILDIRIM AND OTHERS v. TÜRKİYE", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "VI.A.2.a: Statements by judicial authorities", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "VI.A.2.a|a:None|b:382", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "The presumption of innocence will be violated if a judicial decision concerning a person charged with a criminal offence reflects an opinion that he is guilty before he has been proved guilty according to law. In this connection, the lack of intention to breach the right to the presumption of innocence cannot rule out a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention (Avaz Zeynalov v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 69). It suffices, even in the absence of any formal finding, that there is some reasoning suggesting that the court regards the accused as guilty (see, as the leading authority, Minelli v. Switzerland, 1983, § 37; and, more recently, Nerattini v. Greece, 2008, § 23; Didu v. Romania, 2009, § 41; Gutsanovi v. Bulgaria, 2013, §§ 202-203). Apremature expression of such an opinion by the tribunal itself will inevitably fall foul of this presumption (Nešťák v. Slovakia, 2007, § 88; Garycki v. Poland, 2007, § 66). Thus, an expression of \"firm conviction that the applicant had again committed an offence\" during the proceedings for suspension of a prison sentence on probation violated Article 6 § 2 (El Kaada v. Germany, 2015, §§ 61-63). Similarly, a breach of the presumption of innocence was found in relation to the wording used by the trial court president in investigatory reports drawn up for the lifting of the applicants' parliamentary immunity, which applicants had been elected as members of Parliament while criminal proceedings were pending against them (Nadir Yıldırım and Others v. Türkiye,* 2023, §§ 71-76).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230911235812/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409165839/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/4026b1621d4a/20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf", @@ -10997,6 +11628,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:43627/16|71667/16", "case_name": "Okropiridze v. Georgia", @@ -11030,9 +11663,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:48309/17", - "case_name": "Orhan Şahin v. Türkiye,* no. 48309/17", + "case_name": "Orhan Şahin v. Türkiye", "application_numbers": "48309/17", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -11041,14 +11676,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF ORHAN ŞAHİN v. TÜRKİYE", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "V.A.7: The principle of immediacy", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "V.A.7|a:None|b:275", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "In Cerovšek and Božičnik v. Slovenia (2017, §§ 37-48) the Court found a violation of Article 6 because the reasons for the verdicts against the applicants, that is, their conviction and sentence, had not given by the single judge who had pronounced them but by other judges, who had not participated in the trial (see also Svanidze v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 34-38, concerning the replacement of the trial judge by a substitute judge who did not participate in the examination of evidence; and Orhan Şahin v. Türkiye,* 2024, §§ 57-62, where none of the judges on the three-judge bench, that ultimately convicted the applicant following a re-trial had taken part in the earlier stages of the criminal proceedings against the applicant or had heard evidence from the witness whose statements were central to the applicant's conviction).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230911235812/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409165839/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/4026b1621d4a/20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf", @@ -11063,6 +11698,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:49072/21", "case_name": "Panju v. Belgium (no. 2)", @@ -11081,7 +11718,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A|a:None|b:7", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "In the absence of special circumstances, a complaint relating to Article 6 of the Convention is declared inadmissible as premature when it concerns criminal proceedings pending before the domestic courts (Sperisen v. Switzerland, 2023, § 48). A person may not claim to be a victim of a violation of his or her right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention which, according to him or her, occurred in the course of proceedings in which he or she was acquitted or which were discontinued (Khlyustov v. Russia, 2013, § 103; see, however, Kerimoğlu v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 44-57, as regards the loss of victim status once it has been acquired). The dismissal of charges against an applicant deprives him or her of the victim status for the alleged breaches of the Article 6 rights (Batmaz v. Turkey, 2014, § 36; see Panju v. Belgium (No. 2), 2023, §§ 75, in the length of proceedings context, see, by contrast, Irodotou v. Cyprus, 2023, § 63). Moreover, the Court has held that an applicant cannot complain of a breach of his or her Article 6 rights if the domestic courts only applied a measure suspending the pronouncement of a criminal sanction against him or her (Kerman v. Turkey, 2016, §§ 100-106).", + "post_text": "In the absence of special circumstances, a complaint relating to Article 6 of the Convention is declared inadmissible as premature when it concerns criminal proceedings pending before the domestic courts (Sperisen v. Switzerland, 2023, § 48). Aperson may not claim to be a victim of a violation of his or her right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention which, according to him or her, occurred in the course of proceedings in which he or she was acquitted or which were discontinued (Khlyustov v. Russia, 2013, § 103; see, however, Kerimoğlu v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 44-57, as regards the loss of victim status once it has been acquired). The dismissal of charges against an applicant deprives him or her of the victim status for the alleged breaches of the Article 6 rights (Batmaz v. Turkey, 2014, § 36; see Panju v. Belgium (No. 2), 2023, §§ 75, in the length of proceedings context, see, by contrast, Irodotou v. Cyprus, 2023, § 63). Moreover, the Court has held that an applicant cannot complain of a breach of his or her Article 6 rights if the domestic courts only applied a measure suspending the pronouncement of a criminal sanction against him or her (Kerman v. Turkey, 2016, §§ 100-106).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230911235812/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409165839/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/4026b1621d4a/20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf", @@ -11096,6 +11733,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:39272/15", "case_name": "Repeşco and Repeşcu v. the Republic of Moldova", @@ -11129,6 +11768,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:20148/09", "case_name": "Rigolio v. Italy", @@ -11162,6 +11803,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:44764/16", "case_name": "Roccella v. Italy", @@ -11195,6 +11838,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:38744/21", "case_name": "Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.)", @@ -11228,9 +11873,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:19920/20", - "case_name": "Škoberne v. Slovenia,* no. 19920/20", + "case_name": "Škoberne v. Slovenia", "application_numbers": "19920/20", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -11239,14 +11886,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF ŠKOBERNE v. SLOVENIA", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "VI.B.4.c: Right to call witnesses for the defence", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "VI.B.4.c|a:None|b:565", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "In Kikabidze v. Georgia, 2021, §§ 56-60, the Court examined a situation where the defence application to admit a list of witnesses to be called on behalf of the defence into evidence was rejected on procedural grounds because the defence had produced the list after the expiry of the relevant time-limit. The de facto outcome of that decision was that in the course of the jury trial - introduced in the domestic legal order shortly before the trial in the applicant's case - not a single witness was heard on behalf of the defence. The Court found that state of affairs troubling, particularly given the nature of the subject matter of the criminal case (an aggravated murder committed in prison in the presence of some seventy prisoners), the absence of evidence other than witnesses, and the fact that the case was decided by a jury. The Court therefore considered that, from the point of view of the Convention requirements of fair trial, and the applicant's right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him, the decision to exclude all witnesses proposed by the defence had to be motivated by weighty reasons going beyond the issue of the applicant's compliance with a procedural time-limit. On the facts of the case, the Court found that the presiding judge's rejection of the defence witness list in its entirety resulted from a rigid and restrictive application of domestic law to the applicant's detriment, which was particularly troubling given the absence of established judicial practice following implementation of the cardinal reform of the criminal procedure shortly before the applicant's trial (see also Škoberne v. Slovenia,* 2024, §§ 104-111; see, by contrast, Rusishvili v. Georgia, §§ 49-52).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230911235812/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409165839/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/4026b1621d4a/20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf", @@ -11261,9 +11908,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:56440/15", - "case_name": "Snijders v. the Netherlands,* no. 56440/15", + "case_name": "Snijders v. the Netherlands", "application_numbers": "56440/15", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -11272,14 +11921,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "4", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF SNIJDERS v. THE NETHERLANDS", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "VI.B.4.b.§131.§132: a Anonymous witnesses", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "VI.B.4.b.§131.§132|a:None|b:548", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "If the anonymity of prosecution witnesses is maintained, the defence will be faced with difficulties which criminal proceedings should not normally involve. In such cases, the handicap faced by the defence must be sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the judicial authorities (Doorson v. the Netherlands, 1996, § 72; Van Mechelen and Others v. the Netherlands, 1997, § 54; Haas v. Germany (dec.), 2005; Asani v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2018, § 37). In cases where the statement of an absent witness was considered the sole or decisive evidence or where such evidence carried significant weight, the Court must subject the proceedings in which a statement of anonymous witness is used in evidence to the most searching scrutiny. In view of this, the Court must be satisfied that there are sufficient counterbalancing factors, including the existence of strong procedural safeguards, to permit a fair and proper assessment of the reliability of that evidence to take place (Snijders v. the Netherlands,* 2024, § 67).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230911235812/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409165839/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/4026b1621d4a/20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf", @@ -11294,6 +11943,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:22060/20", "case_name": "Sperisen v. Switzerland", @@ -11312,7 +11963,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A|a:None|b:7", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "In the absence of special circumstances, a complaint relating to Article 6 of the Convention is declared inadmissible as premature when it concerns criminal proceedings pending before the domestic courts (Sperisen v. Switzerland, 2023, § 48). A person may not claim to be a victim of a violation of his or her right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention which, according to him or her, occurred in the course of proceedings in which he or she was acquitted or which were discontinued (Khlyustov v. Russia, 2013, § 103; see, however, Kerimoğlu v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 44-57, as regards the loss of victim status once it has been acquired). The dismissal of charges against an applicant deprives him or her of the victim status for the alleged breaches of the Article 6 rights (Batmaz v. Turkey, 2014, § 36; see Panju v. Belgium (No. 2), 2023, §§ 75, in the length of proceedings context, see, by contrast, Irodotou v. Cyprus, 2023, § 63). Moreover, the Court has held that an applicant cannot complain of a breach of his or her Article 6 rights if the domestic courts only applied a measure suspending the pronouncement of a criminal sanction against him or her (Kerman v. Turkey, 2016, §§ 100-106).", + "post_text": "In the absence of special circumstances, a complaint relating to Article 6 of the Convention is declared inadmissible as premature when it concerns criminal proceedings pending before the domestic courts (Sperisen v. Switzerland, 2023, § 48). Aperson may not claim to be a victim of a violation of his or her right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention which, according to him or her, occurred in the course of proceedings in which he or she was acquitted or which were discontinued (Khlyustov v. Russia, 2013, § 103; see, however, Kerimoğlu v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 44-57, as regards the loss of victim status once it has been acquired). The dismissal of charges against an applicant deprives him or her of the victim status for the alleged breaches of the Article 6 rights (Batmaz v. Turkey, 2014, § 36; see Panju v. Belgium (No. 2), 2023, §§ 75, in the length of proceedings context, see, by contrast, Irodotou v. Cyprus, 2023, § 63). Moreover, the Court has held that an applicant cannot complain of a breach of his or her Article 6 rights if the domestic courts only applied a measure suspending the pronouncement of a criminal sanction against him or her (Kerman v. Turkey, 2016, §§ 100-106).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230911235812/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409165839/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/4026b1621d4a/20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf", @@ -11327,6 +11978,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:57818/18", "case_name": "Strassenmeyer v. Germany", @@ -11360,6 +12013,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:25551/18", "case_name": "Tadić v. Croatia", @@ -11393,6 +12048,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:21181/19|51751/20", "case_name": "Tuleya v. Poland", @@ -11426,6 +12083,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:58073/17", "case_name": "U.Y. v. Türkiye", @@ -11459,9 +12118,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:22431/20", - "case_name": "Ugulava v. Georgia (No. 2),* no. 22431/20", + "case_name": "Ugulava v. Georgia (No. 2)", "application_numbers": "22431/20", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -11470,14 +12131,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF UGULAVA v. GEORGIA (No. 2)", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "IV.C.2.b.i.§40: a The exercise of different judicial functions", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.C.2.b.i.§40|a:None|b:134", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "In Ugulava v. Georgia (No. 2),* 2024, §§ 57-65, the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 in relation to the inclusion of a former Prosecutor General on the Supreme Court bench that had ruled on the applicant's points-of-law appeal. The Court noted that the judge at issue held the position of Prosecutor General when the applicant's case was examined by the appeal court and the appeal on points-of-law was prepared by the General Prosecutor's Office. In this connection, the Court had regard to the Prosecutor General's role and extensive powers within the prosecution service, as well as the high-profile nature of the trial conducted in a politically sensitive context.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230911235812/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409165839/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/4026b1621d4a/20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf", @@ -11492,6 +12153,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:15669/20", "case_name": "Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC]", @@ -11525,6 +12188,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:62199/19", "case_name": "Bosev v. Bulgaria", @@ -11542,8 +12207,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A|a:7|b:7", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "In the absence of special circumstances, a complaint relating to Article 6 of the Convention is declared inadmissible as premature when it concerns criminal proceedings pending before the domestic courts ( Sperisen v. Switzerland, 2023, § 48). A person may not claim to be a victim of a violation of his or her right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention which, according to him or her, occurred in the course of proceedings in which he or she was acquitted or which were discontinued ( Khlyustov v. Russia, 2013, § 103; see, however, Kerimoğlu v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 44-57, as regards the loss of victim status once it has been acquired). The dismissal of charges against an applicant deprives him or her of the victim status for the alleged breaches of the Article 6 rights Batmaz v. Turkey Panju v. Belgium (No. 2) (, 2014, § 36; see, 2023, §§ 75, in the length of proceedings context, see, by contrast, Irodotou v. Cyprus, 2023, § 63). Moreover, the Court has held that an applicant cannot complain of a breach of his or her Article 6 rights if the domestic courts only applied a measure suspending the pronouncement of a criminal sanction against him or her ( Kerman v. Turkey, 2016, §§ 100-106).", - "post_text": "In the absence of special circumstances, a complaint relating to Article 6 of the Convention is declared inadmissible as premature when it concerns criminal proceedings pending before the domestic courts ( Sperisen v. Switzerland, 2023, § 48); see also Bosev v. Bulgaria,* 2024, § 42). A person may not claim to be a victim of a violation of his or her right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention which, according to him or her, occurred in the course of proceedings in which he or she was acquitted or which were discontinued ( Khlyustov v. Russia, 2013, § 103; see, however, Kerimoğlu v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 44-57, as regards the loss of victim status once it has been acquired). The dismissal of charges against an applicant deprives him or her of the victim status for the alleged breaches of the Article 6 rights ( Batmaz v. Turkey, 2014, § 36; see Panju v. Belgium (No. 2), 2023, §§ 75, in the length of proceedings context, see, by contrast, Irodotou v. Cyprus, 2023, § 63). Moreover, the Court has held that an applicant cannot complain of a breach of his or her Article 6 rights if the domestic courts only applied a measure suspending the pronouncement of a criminal sanction against him or her ( Kerman v. Turkey, 2016, §§ 100-106).", + "pre_text": "In the absence of special circumstances, a complaint relating to Article 6 of the Convention is declared inadmissible as premature when it concerns criminal proceedings pending before the domestic courts ( Sperisen v. Switzerland, 2023, § 48). Aperson may not claim to be a victim of a violation of his or her right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention which, according to him or her, occurred in the course of proceedings in which he or she was acquitted or which were discontinued ( Khlyustov v. Russia, 2013, § 103; see, however, Kerimoğlu v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 44-57, as regards the loss of victim status once it has been acquired). The dismissal of charges against an applicant deprives him or her of the victim status for the alleged breaches of the Article 6 rights Batmaz v. Turkey Panju v. Belgium (No. 2) (, 2014, § 36; see, 2023, §§ 75, in the length of proceedings context, see, by contrast, Irodotou v. Cyprus, 2023, § 63). Moreover, the Court has held that an applicant cannot complain of a breach of his or her Article 6 rights if the domestic courts only applied a measure suspending the pronouncement of a criminal sanction against him or her ( Kerman v. Turkey, 2016, §§ 100-106).", + "post_text": "In the absence of special circumstances, a complaint relating to Article 6 of the Convention is declared inadmissible as premature when it concerns criminal proceedings pending before the domestic courts ( Sperisen v. Switzerland, 2023, § 48); see also Bosev v. Bulgaria,* 2024, § 42). Aperson may not claim to be a victim of a violation of his or her right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention which, according to him or her, occurred in the course of proceedings in which he or she was acquitted or which were discontinued ( Khlyustov v. Russia, 2013, § 103; see, however, Kerimoğlu v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 44-57, as regards the loss of victim status once it has been acquired). The dismissal of charges against an applicant deprives him or her of the victim status for the alleged breaches of the Article 6 rights ( Batmaz v. Turkey, 2014, § 36; see Panju v. Belgium (No. 2), 2023, §§ 75, in the length of proceedings context, see, by contrast, Irodotou v. Cyprus, 2023, § 63). Moreover, the Court has held that an applicant cannot complain of a breach of his or her Article 6 rights if the domestic courts only applied a measure suspending the pronouncement of a criminal sanction against him or her ( Kerman v. Turkey, 2016, §§ 100-106).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409165839/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930062643/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/4026b1621d4a/20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf", @@ -11558,9 +12223,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:49904/21", - "case_name": "Gravier v. France,* no. 49904/21", + "case_name": "Gravier v. France", "application_numbers": "49904/21", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -11569,14 +12236,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "4", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF GRAVIER v. FRANCE", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", - "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "VI.A.2: Prejudicial statements", + "linked_change_types": "citation_removed", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "VI.A.2|a:381|b:385", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "The voicing of suspicions regarding an accused's innocence is conceivable as long as the conclusion of criminal proceedings has not resulted in a decision on the merits of the accusation ( Sekanina v. Austria, 1993, § 30). However, once an acquittal has become final, the voicing of any Rushiti v. Austria suspicions of guilt is incompatible with the presumption of innocence (, 2000, § 31; O. v. Norway, 2003, § 39; Geerings v. the Netherlands, 2007, § 49; Paraponiaris v. Greece, 2008, § 32; Marinoni v. Italy, 2021, §§ 48 and 59). Nevertheless, in this context, in cases of unfortunate language the Court has considered it necessary to look at the context of the proceedings as a whole and their special features. These features became decisive factors in the assessment of whether that statement gave rise to a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. The Court considered that these features were also applicable where the language of a judgment might be misunderstood but can, on the basis of a correct assessment of the domestic law context, not be qualified as a statement of criminal guilt ( Fleischner v. Germany, 2019, § 65, and Milachikj v. North Macedonia, 2021, §§ 38-40; by contrast, Pasquini v. San Marino (no. 2), 2020, where the impugned statements amounted to an unequivocal imputation of criminal liability that could not be explained by the particular domestic context; see also Felix Guţu v. the Republic of Moldova, 2020).", + "post_text": "In cases of unfortunate language the Court has considered it necessary to look at the context of the proceedings as a whole and their special features. These features became decisive factors in the assessment of whether that statement gave rise to a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. The Court considered that these features were also applicable where the language of a judgment might be misunderstood but can, on the basis of a correct assessment of the domestic law context, not be qualified as a statement of criminal guilt ( Fleischner v. Germany, 2019, § 65, and Milachikj v. North Macedonia, 2021, §§ 38-40; by contrast, Pasquini v. San Marino (no. 2), 2020, and Gravier v. France,* 2024, where the impugned statements amounted to an unequivocal imputation of criminal liability that could not be explained by the particular domestic context; see also Felix Guţu v. the Republic of Moldova, 2020).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409165839/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930062643/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/4026b1621d4a/20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf", @@ -11591,9 +12258,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:59464/21|13079/22", - "case_name": "Khachapuridze and Khachidze v. Georgia,* nos. 59464/21 and 13079/22", + "case_name": "Khachapuridze and Khachidze v. Georgia", "application_numbers": "59464/21|13079/22", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -11602,14 +12271,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF KHACHAPURIDZE AND KHACHIDZE v. GEORGIA", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", - "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 2, + "linked_sections": "V.B.2.b: Presence at the trial", + "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "V.B.2.b|a:309|b:311|V.B.2.b|a:310|b:312", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "Lastly, an issue with regard to the requirement of presence at the hearing arises when an accused Idalov v. Russia is prevented from taking part in his trial on the grounds of his improper behaviour ( [GC], 2012, § 175; Marguš v. Croatia [GC], 2014, § 90; Ananyev v. Russia, 2009, § 43; Suslov and Batikyan v. Ukraine, 2022, §§ 135-141; Chkhartishvili v. Georgia, 2023, §§ 32-38).\n\nIn this context, the Court has held that it is essential for the proper administration of justice that dignity, order and decorum be observed in the courtroom as the hallmarks of judicial proceedings. The flagrant disregard by a defendant of elementary standards of proper conduct neither can, nor should, be tolerated. However, when an applicant's behaviour might be of such a nature as to justify his removal and the continuation of his trial in his absence, it is incumbent on the presiding judge to establish that the applicant could have reasonably foreseen what the consequences of his ongoing conduct would be prior to the decision to order his removal from the courtroom ( Idalov v. Russia [GC], 2012, §§ 176-177). Moreover, the relevant consideration is whether the applicant's lawyer was able to exercise the rights of the defence in the applicant's absence ( Marguš v. Croatia [GC], 2014, § 90) and whether the matter was addressed and if appropriate remedied in the appeal proceedings ( Idalov v. Russia [GC], 2012, § 179).", + "post_text": "Lastly, an issue with regard to the requirement of presence at the hearing arises when an accused is prevented from taking part in his trial on the grounds of his improper behaviour ( Idalov v. Russia [GC], 2012, § 175; Marguš v. Croatia [GC], 2014, § 90; Ananyev v. Russia, 2009, § 43; Suslov and Batikyan v. Ukraine, 2022, §§ 135-141; Chkhartishvili v. Georgia, 2023, §§ 32-38; see also, in the context of online hearings, Khachapuridze and Khachidze v. Georgia,* 2024, §§ 134-141).\n\nIn this context, the Court has held that it is essential for the proper administration of justice that dignity, order and decorum be observed in the courtroom as the hallmarks of judicial proceedings. The flagrant disregard by a defendant of elementary standards of proper conduct neither can, nor should, be tolerated. However, when an applicant's behaviour might be of such a nature as to justify his removal and the continuation of his trial in his absence, it is incumbent on the presiding judge to establish that the applicant could have reasonably foreseen what the consequences of his ongoing conduct would be prior to the decision to order his removal from the courtroom ( Idalov v. Russia [GC], 2012, §§ 176-177; see Khachapuridze and Khachidze v. Georgia,* 2024, § 139, where, in the context of an online hearing, the Court noted that the applicant could have been \"muted\" if he continued with the disruptive behaviour). Moreover, the relevant consideration is whether the applicant's lawyer was able to exercise the rights of the defence in the applicant's absence ( Marguš v. Croatia [GC], 2014, § 90) and whether the matter was addressed and if appropriate remedied in the appeal proceedings ( Idalov v. Russia [GC], 2012, § 179).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409165839/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930062643/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/4026b1621d4a/20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf", @@ -11624,6 +12293,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:13459/15", "case_name": "L.T. v. Ukraine", @@ -11657,6 +12328,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:32483/19|35049/19", "case_name": "Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom [GC]", @@ -11675,7 +12348,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "VI.A.1.c|a:371|b:373|VI.A.1.c|a:372|b:374|VI.A.1.c|a:373|b:375|VI.A.2|a:None|b:384", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "The presumption of innocence also protects individuals who have been acquitted of a criminal charge, or in respect of whom criminal proceedings have been discontinued, from being treated by public officials and authorities as though they are in fact guilty of the offence with which they have been charged. Without protection to ensure respect for the acquittal or the discontinuation decision in any other proceedings, the guarantees of Article 6 § 2 could risk becoming theoretical and illusory. What is also at stake once the criminal proceedings have concluded is the person's reputation and the way in which that person is perceived by the public ( Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 94). To a certain extent, the protection afforded under Article 6 § 2 in this connection may overlap with the G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy protection afforded by Article 8 ( (merits) [GC], 2018, § 314).\n\nWhenever the question of the applicability of Article 6 § 2 arises in the context of subsequent proceedings, the applicant must demonstrate the existence of a link between the concluded criminal proceedings and the subsequent proceedings. Such a link is likely to be present, for example, where the subsequent proceedings require an examination of the outcome of the prior criminal proceedings and, in particular, where they oblige the court to analyse the criminal judgment; to engage in a review or evaluation of the evidence in the criminal file; to assess the applicant's participation in some or all of the events leading to the criminal charge; or to comment on the subsisting indications of the applicant's possible guilt ( Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 104; see also Martínez Agirre and Others v. Spain (dec.), 2019, §§ 46-52, where no link was established between the subsequent compensation proceedings and the earlier criminal investigations).\n\nThe Court has considered the applicability of Article 6 § 2 to judicial decisions taken following the conclusion of criminal proceedings concerning, inter alia ( Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 98 with further references):  a former accused's obligation to bear court costs and prosecution costs;  a former accused's request for compensation for detention on remand or other inconvenience caused by the criminal proceedings, it being understood that Article 6 § 2 does not guarantee the right to compensation for pre-trial detention in the case of dismissal of charges or acquittal, and thus the mere refusal of compensation does not in itself raise an issue from the perspective of the presumption of innocence ( Cheema v. Belgium, 2016, § 23);  a former accused's request for defence costs (see further Lutz v. Germany, 1987, § 59, where the Court held that neither Article 6 § 2 nor any other provision of the Convention gives a person charged with a criminal offence a right to reimbursement of his costs where proceedings taken against him are discontinued);  a former accused's request for compensation for damage caused by an unlawful or wrongful investigation or prosecution;  imposition of civil liability to pay compensation to the victim;  refusal of civil claims lodged by the applicant against insurers;  maintenance in force of a child care order, after the prosecution decided not to bring charges against the parent for child abuse;  disciplinary or dismissal issues ( Teodor v. Romania, 2013, §§ 42-46, concerning civil dismissal proceedings; U.Y. v. Türkiye, 2023, § 33);  revocation of the applicant's right to social housing;  request for conditional release from prison ( Müller v. Germany, 2014, § 35);  proceedings for reopening of criminal proceedings, following the Court's finding of a violation of the Convention in an earlier case, where the applicants were treated as convicted persons and their criminal record for the initial conviction was kept ( Dicle and Sadak v. Turkey, 2015, §§ 61-66);  confiscation of an applicant's land even though the criminal case against him had been dismissed as statute-barred ( G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, §§ 314-318);  conviction in the subsequent administrative proceedings (qualified as \"criminal\" within the autonomous meaning of the Convention) following an applicant's acquittal on the same charges in the criminal proceedings ( Kapetanios and Others v. Greece, 2015, § 88);  dismissal by domestic courts of an applicant's appeal against the prosecutor's decision considering that he was guilty of the offences for which he had been indicted even though the criminal proceedings initiated against him had been discontinued as time-barred ( Caraian v. Romania, 2015, §§ 74-77).", - "post_text": "The presumption of innocence also protects individuals who have been acquitted of a criminal charge, or in respect of whom criminal proceedings have been discontinued, from being treated by public officials and authorities as though they are in fact guilty of the offence with which they have been charged. Without protection to ensure respect for the acquittal or the discontinuation decision in any other proceedings, the guarantees of Article 6 § 2 could risk becoming theoretical and illusory. What is also at stake once the criminal proceedings have concluded is the person's reputation and the way in which that person is perceived by the public ( Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 94). To a certain extent, the protection afforded under Article 6 § 2 in this connection may overlap with the protection afforded by Article 8 ( G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, § 314; see also Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2024, § 109).\n\nWhenever the question of the applicability of Article 6 § 2 arises in the context of subsequent proceedings, the applicant must demonstrate the existence of a link between the concluded criminal proceedings and the subsequent proceedings. Such a link is likely to be present, for example, where the subsequent proceedings require an examination of the outcome of the prior criminal proceedings and, in particular, where they oblige the court to analyse the criminal judgment; to engage in a review or evaluation of the evidence in the criminal file; to assess the applicant's participation in some or all of the events leading to the criminal charge; or to comment on the subsisting indications of the applicant's possible guilt ( Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 104; Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2024, § 122; see also Martínez Agirre and Others v. Spain (dec.), 2019, §§ 46-52, where no link was established between the subsequent compensation proceedings and the earlier criminal investigations).\n\nThe Court has considered the applicability of Article 6 § 2 to judicial decisions taken following the conclusion of criminal proceedings concerning, inter alia ( Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 98, and Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2024, § 107, with further references): ▪ a former accused's obligation to bear court costs and prosecution costs; ▪ a former accused's request for compensation for detention on remand or other inconvenience caused by the criminal proceedings, it being understood that Article 6 § 2 does not guarantee the right to compensation for pre-trial detention in the case of dismissal of charges or acquittal, and thus the mere refusal of compensation does not in itself raise an issue from the perspective of the presumption of innocence ( Cheema v. Belgium, 2016, § 23); ▪ a former accused's request for defence costs (see further Lutz v. Germany, 1987, § 59, where the Court held that neither Article 6 § 2 nor any other provision of the Convention gives a person charged with a criminal offence a right to reimbursement of his costs where proceedings taken against him are discontinued); ▪ a former accused's request for compensation for damage caused by an unlawful or wrongful investigation or prosecution; ▪ imposition of civil liability to pay compensation to the victim; ▪ refusal of civil claims lodged by the applicant against insurers; ▪ maintenance in force of a child care order, after the prosecution decided not to bring charges against the parent for child abuse; ▪ disciplinary or dismissal issues ( Teodor v. Romania, 2013, §§ 42-46, concerning civil dismissal proceedings; U.Y. v. Türkiye, 2023, § 33); ▪ revocation of the applicant's right to social housing; ▪ request for conditional release from prison ( Müller v. Germany, 2014, § 35); ▪ proceedings for reopening of criminal proceedings, following the Court's finding of a violation of the Convention in an earlier case, where the applicants were treated as convicted persons and their criminal record for the initial conviction was kept ( Dicle and Sadak v. Turkey, 2015, §§ 61-66); ▪ confiscation of an applicant's land even though the criminal case against him had been dismissed as statute-barred ( G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, §§ 314-318); ▪ conviction in the subsequent administrative proceedings (qualified as \" criminal \" within the autonomous meaning of the Convention) following an applicant's acquittal on the same charges in the criminal proceedings ( Kapetanios and Others v. Greece, 2015, § 88); ▪ dismissal by domestic courts of an applicant's appeal against the prosecutor's decision considering that he was guilty of the offences for which he had been indicted even though the criminal proceedings initiated against him had been discontinued as time-barred ( Caraian v. Romania, 2015, §§ 74-77).\n\nHowever, in Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2024, §§ 167-169, the Court decided to abandon the distinction made between the discontinuation of the proceedings and acquittal. It held that regardless of the nature of the subsequent linked proceedings, and regardless of whether the criminal proceedings ended in an acquittal or a discontinuance, the decisions and reasoning of the domestic courts or other authorities in those subsequent linked proceedings, when considered as a whole, and in the context of the exercise which they are required by domestic law to undertake, will violate Article 6 § 2 of the Convention in its second aspect if they amounted to the imputation of criminal liability to the applicant. To impute criminal liability to a person is to reflect an opinion that he or she is guilty to the criminal standard of the commission of a criminal offence. The Court explained that this approach reflected the fact that at national level judges may be required, outside the context of a criminal charge, to sit in cases arising out of the same facts as a previous criminal charge which did not result in a conviction. The protection afforded by Article 6 § 2 in its second aspect should not be interpreted in such a way as to preclude national courts in subsequent proceedings - in which they are exercising a different function to that of the criminal judge, in accordance with the relevant provisions of domestic law - from engaging with the same facts as were decided in the previous criminal proceedings, provided that in doing so they do not impute criminal liability to the person concerned. A person who was acquitted or in respect of whom criminal proceedings were discontinued will remain subject to the ordinary application of domestic rules as to evidence and the standard of proof outside criminal trials.", + "post_text": "The presumption of innocence also protects individuals who have been acquitted of a criminal charge, or in respect of whom criminal proceedings have been discontinued, from being treated by public officials and authorities as though they are in fact guilty of the offence with which they have been charged. Without protection to ensure respect for the acquittal or the discontinuation decision in any other proceedings, the guarantees of Article 6 § 2 could risk becoming theoretical and illusory. What is also at stake once the criminal proceedings have concluded is the person's reputation and the way in which that person is perceived by the public ( Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 94). To a certain extent, the protection afforded under Article 6 § 2 in this connection may overlap with the protection afforded by Article 8 ( G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, § 314; see also Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2024, § 109).\n\nWhenever the question of the applicability of Article 6 § 2 arises in the context of subsequent proceedings, the applicant must demonstrate the existence of a link between the concluded criminal proceedings and the subsequent proceedings. Such a link is likely to be present, for example, where the subsequent proceedings require an examination of the outcome of the prior criminal proceedings and, in particular, where they oblige the court to analyse the criminal judgment; to engage in a review or evaluation of the evidence in the criminal file; to assess the applicant's participation in some or all of the events leading to the criminal charge; or to comment on the subsisting indications of the applicant's possible guilt ( Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 104; Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2024, § 122; see also Martínez Agirre and Others v. Spain (dec.), 2019, §§ 46-52, where no link was established between the subsequent compensation proceedings and the earlier criminal investigations).\n\nThe Court has considered the applicability of Article 6 § 2 to judicial decisions taken following the conclusion of criminal proceedings concerning, inter alia ( Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 98, and Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2024, § 107, with further references): ▪ a former accused's obligation to bear court costs and prosecution costs; ▪ a former accused's request for compensation for detention on remand or other inconvenience caused by the criminal proceedings, it being understood that Article 6 § 2 does not guarantee the right to compensation for pre-trial detention in the case of dismissal of charges or acquittal, and thus the mere refusal of compensation does not in itself raise an issue from the perspective of the presumption of innocence ( Cheema v. Belgium, 2016, § 23); ▪ a former accused's request for defence costs (see further Lutz v. Germany, 1987, § 59, where the Court held that neither Article 6 § 2 nor any other provision of the Convention gives a person charged with a criminal offence a right to reimbursement of his costs where proceedings taken against him are discontinued); ▪ a former accused's request for compensation for damage caused by an unlawful or wrongful investigation or prosecution; ▪ imposition of civil liability to pay compensation to the victim; ▪ refusal of civil claims lodged by the applicant against insurers; ▪ maintenance in force of a child care order, after the prosecution decided not to bring charges against the parent for child abuse; ▪ disciplinary or dismissal issues ( Teodor v. Romania, 2013, §§ 42-46, concerning civil dismissal proceedings; U.Y. v. Türkiye, 2023, § 33); ▪ revocation of the applicant's right to social housing; ▪ request for conditional release from prison ( Müller v. Germany, 2014, § 35); ▪ proceedings for reopening of criminal proceedings, following the Court's finding of a violation of the Convention in an earlier case, where the applicants were treated as convicted persons and their criminal record for the initial conviction was kept ( Dicle and Sadak v. Turkey, 2015, §§ 61-66); ▪ confiscation of an applicant's land even though the criminal case against him had been dismissed as statute-barred ( G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, §§ 314-318); ▪ conviction in the subsequent administrative proceedings (qualified as \" criminal \" within the autonomous meaning of the Convention) following an applicant's acquittal on the same charges in the criminal proceedings ( Kapetanios and Others v. Greece, 2015, § 88); ▪ dismissal by domestic courts of an applicant's appeal against the prosecutor's decision considering that he was guilty of the offences for which he had been indicted even though the criminal proceedings initiated against him had been discontinued as time-barred ( Caraian v. Romania, 2015, §§ 74-77).\n\nHowever, in Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2024, §§ 167-169, the Court decided to abandon the distinction made between the discontinuation of the proceedings and acquittal. It held that regardless of the nature of the subsequent linked proceedings, and regardless of whether the criminal proceedings ended in an acquittal or a discontinuance, the decisions and reasoning of the domestic courts or other authorities in those subsequent linked proceedings, when considered as a whole, and in the context of the exercise which they are required by domestic law to undertake, will violate Article 6 § 2 of the Convention in its second aspect if they amounted to the imputation of criminal liability to the applicant. To impute criminal liability to a person is to reflect an opinion that he or she is guilty to the criminal standard of the commission of a criminal offence. The Court explained that this approach reflected the fact that at national level judges may be required, outside the context of a criminal charge, to sit in cases arising out of the same facts as a previous criminal charge which did not result in a conviction. The protection afforded by Article 6 § 2 in its second aspect should not be interpreted in such a way as to preclude national courts in subsequent proceedings - in which they are exercising a different function to that of the criminal judge, in accordance with the relevant provisions of domestic law - from engaging with the same facts as were decided in the previous criminal proceedings, provided that in doing so they do not impute criminal liability to the person concerned. Aperson who was acquitted or in respect of whom criminal proceedings were discontinued will remain subject to the ordinary application of domestic rules as to evidence and the standard of proof outside criminal trials.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409165839/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930062643/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/4026b1621d4a/20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf", @@ -11690,6 +12363,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:52855/19", "case_name": "Rytikov v. Ukraine", @@ -11723,6 +12398,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:6232/20|22394/20", "case_name": "Saakashvili v. Georgia", @@ -11756,6 +12433,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:39300/18", "case_name": "Sacharuk v. Lithuania", @@ -11789,13 +12468,15 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:44681/21|17256/22", - "case_name": "Tsulukidze and Rusulashvili v. G eorgia,* nos. 44681/21 and 17256/22", + "case_name": "Tsulukidze and Rusulashvili v. Georgia", "application_numbers": "44681/21|17256/22", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", - "citation_text": "Tsulukidze and Rusulashvili v. G eorgia,* nos. 44681/21 and 17256/22, 29 August 2024", + "citation_text": "Tsulukidze and Rusulashvili v. Georgia,* nos. 44681/21 and 17256/22, 29 August 2024", "hudoc_itemid": "001-235473", "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", @@ -11822,6 +12503,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:16678/22", "case_name": "C.O. v. Germany", @@ -11855,6 +12538,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:21766/22", "case_name": "Cavca v. the Republic of Moldova", @@ -11888,6 +12573,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:36013/13", "case_name": "Cosovan v. the Republic of Moldova (no. 2)", @@ -11921,6 +12608,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:30970/19", "case_name": "Espírito Santo Silva Salgado v. Portugal", @@ -11954,6 +12643,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:61280/21", "case_name": "Ezeoke v. the United Kingdom*", @@ -11987,6 +12678,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:11553/21", "case_name": "Gaydashevskyy v. Ukraine", @@ -12020,6 +12713,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:34916/16", "case_name": "Gomes Costa v. Portugal*", @@ -12053,6 +12748,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:11027/22", "case_name": "Kezerashvili v. Georgia", @@ -12086,6 +12783,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:42760/16", "case_name": "Machalický v. the Czech Republic", @@ -12119,6 +12818,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:37324/16", "case_name": "Miron v. Romania", @@ -12152,6 +12853,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:20440/18", "case_name": "Severin v. Romania", @@ -12185,6 +12888,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:20224/18", "case_name": "Union des Mutuelles d'Assurances Monceau v. France (dec.)", @@ -12218,6 +12923,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:9308/18", "case_name": "Vasile Pruteanu and Others v. Romania", @@ -12251,6 +12958,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:26760/22", "case_name": "Zahariev v. North Macedonia", @@ -12284,6 +12993,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-12", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json", "case_key": "apps:63277/19", "case_name": "Zakrzweski v. Poland", @@ -12317,6 +13028,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:21492/17", "case_name": "Anna Maria Ciccone v. Italy", @@ -12350,6 +13063,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:54241/12", "case_name": "Bagnall v. the United Kingdom (dec.)", @@ -12383,6 +13098,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:34067/23", "case_name": "Bouša v. the Czech Republic (dec.)", @@ -12416,6 +13133,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:59494/09", "case_name": "Briggs-Price v. the United Kingdom (dec.)", @@ -12449,6 +13168,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:42881/18", "case_name": "Bülent Bekdemir v. Türkiye", @@ -12482,6 +13203,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:38110/18", "case_name": "Engels v. Belgium", @@ -12515,6 +13238,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:56712/21", "case_name": "F.S.M. v. Spain", @@ -12548,6 +13273,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:52302/19", "case_name": "Federici v. France", @@ -12581,6 +13308,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:47186/21", "case_name": "Gorše v. Slovenia", @@ -12614,6 +13343,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:58671/12", "case_name": "Koli v. the United Kingdom (dec.)", @@ -12647,6 +13378,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:23963/21", "case_name": "Krpelík v. the Czech Republic", @@ -12664,8 +13397,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", "linked_paragraph_refs": "VI.B.3.c|a:495|b:496", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "A suspect cannot be found to have waived one's right to legal assistance if one has not promptly received information about this right after arrest ( Simeonovi v. Bulgaria [GC], 2017, § 118). Similarly, in the context of procedural action taken without relevant procedural safeguards, waiver of the right to a lawyer by signing a pre-printed p hrase \"No lawyer sought\" is of questionable value for the purpose of demonstrating the unequivocal character of the waiver by an applicant ( Bozkaya v. Turkey, 2017, § 48; Rodionov v. Russia, 2018, § 155; contrast with Sklyar v. Russia, 2017, §§ 22-25, where the applicant clearly waived his right to a lawyer on the record). A possible earlier waiver, even if validly made, will no longer be considered valid if an applicant subsequently made an explicit request to access a lawyer ( Artur Parkhomenko v. Ukraine, 2017, § 81). Moreover, if an applicant has been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment by the police, it cannot be considered that in such circumstances he or she validly waived his right of access to a lawyer ( Turbylev v. Russia, 2015, § 96).", - "post_text": "A suspect cannot be found to have waived one's right to legal assistance if one has not promptly received information about this right after arrest ( Simeonovi v. Bulgaria [GC], 2017, § 118). Similarly, in the context of procedural action taken without relevant procedural safeguards, waiver of the right to a lawyer by signing a pre-printed p hrase \"No lawyer sought\" is of questionable value for the purpose of demonstrating the unequivocal character of the waiver by an applicant ( Bozkaya v. Turkey, 2017, § 48; Rodionov v. Russia, 2018, § 155; contrast with Sklyar v. Russia, 2017, §§ 22-25, where the applicant clearly waived his right to a lawyer on the record). A possible earlier waiver, even if validly made, will no longer be considered valid if an applicant subsequently made an explicit request to access a lawyer ( Artur Parkhomenko v. Ukraine, 2017, § 81). Moreover, if an applicant has been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment by the police, it cannot be considered that in such circumstances he or she validly waived his right of access to a lawyer ( Turbylev v. Russia, 2015, § 96). Where the applicant suffered from intellectual disabilities and information about his right to a lawyer had been provided only on pre-printed forms formulated in a complex way by references to domestic legal provisions, the Court concluded that the waiver of the right to legal representation had not been attended by minimum safeguards commensurate with its importance ( Krpelík v. the Czech Republic, 2025, §§ 79-88).", + "pre_text": "Asuspect cannot be found to have waived one's right to legal assistance if one has not promptly received information about this right after arrest ( Simeonovi v. Bulgaria [GC], 2017, § 118). Similarly, in the context of procedural action taken without relevant procedural safeguards, waiver of the right to a lawyer by signing a pre-printed p hrase \"No lawyer sought\" is of questionable value for the purpose of demonstrating the unequivocal character of the waiver by an applicant ( Bozkaya v. Turkey, 2017, § 48; Rodionov v. Russia, 2018, § 155; contrast with Sklyar v. Russia, 2017, §§ 22-25, where the applicant clearly waived his right to a lawyer on the record). Apossible earlier waiver, even if validly made, will no longer be considered valid if an applicant subsequently made an explicit request to access a lawyer ( Artur Parkhomenko v. Ukraine, 2017, § 81). Moreover, if an applicant has been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment by the police, it cannot be considered that in such circumstances he or she validly waived his right of access to a lawyer ( Turbylev v. Russia, 2015, § 96).", + "post_text": "Asuspect cannot be found to have waived one's right to legal assistance if one has not promptly received information about this right after arrest ( Simeonovi v. Bulgaria [GC], 2017, § 118). Similarly, in the context of procedural action taken without relevant procedural safeguards, waiver of the right to a lawyer by signing a pre-printed p hrase \"No lawyer sought\" is of questionable value for the purpose of demonstrating the unequivocal character of the waiver by an applicant ( Bozkaya v. Turkey, 2017, § 48; Rodionov v. Russia, 2018, § 155; contrast with Sklyar v. Russia, 2017, §§ 22-25, where the applicant clearly waived his right to a lawyer on the record). Apossible earlier waiver, even if validly made, will no longer be considered valid if an applicant subsequently made an explicit request to access a lawyer ( Artur Parkhomenko v. Ukraine, 2017, § 81). Moreover, if an applicant has been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment by the police, it cannot be considered that in such circumstances he or she validly waived his right of access to a lawyer ( Turbylev v. Russia, 2015, § 96). Where the applicant suffered from intellectual disabilities and information about his right to a lawyer had been provided only on pre-printed forms formulated in a complex way by references to domestic legal provisions, the Court concluded that the waiver of the right to legal representation had not been attended by minimum safeguards commensurate with its importance ( Krpelík v. the Czech Republic, 2025, §§ 79-88).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250612193940/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20260217143525/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_criminal_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/4026b1621d4a/20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf", @@ -12680,6 +13413,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:42635/20", "case_name": "Leost v. France (dec.)", @@ -12713,6 +13448,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:32324/22", "case_name": "Ravier v. France", @@ -12746,17 +13483,19 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json", - "case_key": "name:sharma v the united kingdom dec::2025", + "case_key": "name:sharma v united kingdom dec::2025", "case_name": "Sharma v. the United Kingdom (dec.)", "application_numbers": "", "judgment_year": "2025", "citation_change": "added", "citation_text": "Sharma v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 1 July 2025", - "hudoc_itemid": "001-244754", - "hudoc_importance_level": "4", - "hudoc_doctype": "HEDEC", - "hudoc_docname": "SHARMA v. THE UNITED KINGDOM", + "hudoc_itemid": "", + "hudoc_importance_level": "", + "hudoc_doctype": "", + "hudoc_docname": "", "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", "linked_paragraph_count": 1, "linked_sections": "VI.A.1.a: Criminal proceedings", @@ -12779,6 +13518,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:16497/20", "case_name": "Sytnyk v. Ukraine", @@ -12812,6 +13553,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:15736/16", "case_name": "Vachik Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia", @@ -12845,6 +13588,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-18", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-18.json", "case_key": "apps:36418/20", "case_name": "Navalnyy v. Russia (No. 3)", @@ -12878,6 +13623,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-18", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-18.json", "case_key": "apps:43146/15", "case_name": "Nemtsova v. Russia", @@ -12911,6 +13658,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-18", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-18.json", "case_key": "apps:5049/14|5122/14", "case_name": "Pitsiladi and Vasilellis v. Greece", @@ -12944,6 +13693,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-18", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-18.json", "case_key": "apps:56070/18", "case_name": "Stoyanova v. Bulgaria", @@ -12977,6 +13728,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-18", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-18.json", "case_key": "apps:56070/08", "case_name": "Stoyanova v. Bulgaria", @@ -13010,6 +13763,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-22", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json", "case_key": "apps:2264/12", "case_name": "Ainis and Others v. Italy", @@ -13043,6 +13798,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-22", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json", "case_key": "apps:6383/17", "case_name": "Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania", @@ -13076,6 +13833,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-22", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json", "case_key": "apps:3566/16", "case_name": "Alkhatib and Others v. Greece", @@ -13109,6 +13868,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-22", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json", "case_key": "apps:29906/14", "case_name": "Dimaksyan v. Armenia", @@ -13127,7 +13888,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.B|a:12|b:13|IV.F.2|a:169|b:174", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "Thus, the Court has found positive obligations to arise under Article 2 in a number of different contexts, such as, for example:  in the context of healthcare ( Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], 2022; Vo v. France [GC], 2004);  in the context of dangerous activities, including industrial or environmental disasters Öneryıldız v. Turkey Budayeva and Others v. Russia, Kolyadenko and ( [GC], 2004; 2008,; Others v. Russia, 2012,; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014; M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015);  in the context of incidents on board a ship ( Leray and Others v. France (dec.), 2001), on trains ( Kalender v. Turkey, 2009), on a construction site ( Pereira Henriques v. Luxembourg, 2006), Koceski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at a playground ( (dec.), 2013); or at a school ( Ilbeyi Kemaloğlu and Meriye Kemaloğlu v. Turkey, 2012);  Rajkowska v. Poland Anna Todorova v. Bulgaria in the context of road safety ( (dec.), 2007;, 2011); the provision of emergency services ( Furdík v. Slovakia (dec.), 2008); or diving operations in deep sea ( Vilnes and Others v. Norway, 2013);  in the context of medical care and assistance given to vulnerable persons institutionalised in State facilities ( Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, 2013; Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania Dumpe v. Latvia [GC], 2014; (dec.), 201).  In the context of the State's failure to properly secure an area mined by the military ( Paşa and Erkan Erol v. Turkey Albekov and Others v. Russia, 2006;, 2008); to secure and supervise a firing range containing unexploded ordonance ( Oruk v. Turkey, 2014); and to react promptly to a disappearance in life-threatening circumstances ( Osmanoğlu v. Turkey, 2008; Dodov v. Bulgaria, 2008).  In the context of an operation to rescue migrants who were drowning while trying to cross borders at sea ( Safi and Others v. Greece, 2022) or a river ( Alhowais v. Hungary, 2023).\n\nThe Court has found the investigation inadequate when, for example:  the investigation into a fatal shooting by the police during an attempted arrest had been undermined by shortcomings such as the failure to test the hands of officers in question for gunshot residue; to stage a reconstruction of the incident; to examine their weapons or ammunition; the lack of an adequate pictorial record of the trauma caused to the victim's body by the fatal bullet; and the failure to separate the officers involved in the incident before their questioning ( Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], 2007, §§ 326-332);  the forensic investigation was defective ( Tanlı v. Turkey, 2001, § 153);  the authorities accepted the version of facts presented by the accused State agents without hearing any further witnesses ( Özalp and Others v. Turkey, 2004, § 45) or placed heavy reliance on the report prepared by them ( İkincisoy v. Turkey, 2004, § 78);  no investigation had been conducted into the flight log which constituted a key element in the possible identification and prosecution of those responsible for the bombing of civilian Benzer and Others v. Turkey villages by military aircraft (, 2013, § 196);  the investigation into the contract killing of an investigative journalist focused only on a Mazepa and Others v. Russia single line of inquiry without exploring other allegations (, 2018, §§ 77-79).", - "post_text": "Thus, the Court has found positive obligations to arise under Article 2 in a number of different contexts, such as, for example: ▪ in the context of healthcare ( Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], 2002; Vo v. France [GC], 2004); ▪ in the context of dangerous activities, including industrial or environmental disasters ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008; Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014; M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015; Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023; Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, 2023); ▪ in the context of incidents on board a ship ( Leray and Others v. France (dec.), 2001), on trains ( Kalender v. Turkey, 2009), on a construction site ( Pereira Henriques v. Luxembourg, 2006), at a playground ( Koceski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), 2013); or at a school ( Ilbeyi K emaloğlu and Meriye Kemaloğlu v. Turkey, 2012); ▪ in the context of road safety ( Rajkowska v. Poland (dec.), 2007; Anna Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2011); the provision of emergency services ( Furdík v. Slovakia (dec.), 2008); or diving operations in deep sea ( Vilnes and Others v. Norway, 2013); ▪ in the context of medical care and assistance given to vulnerable persons institutionalised in State facilities ( Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, 2013; Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], 2014; Dumpe v. Latvia (dec.), 2018); ▪ in the context of the State's failure to properly secure an area mined by the military ( Paşa and Erkan Erol v. Turkey, 2006; Albekov and Others v. Russia, 2008); to secure and supervise a firing range containing unexploded ordonance ( Oruk v. Turkey, 2014); and to react promptly to a disappearance in life-threatening circumstances ( Osmanoğlu v. Turkey, 2008; Dodov v. Bulgaria, 2008); ▪ in the context of an operation to rescue migrants who were drowning while trying to cross borders at sea ( Safi and Others v. Greece, 2022) or a river ( Alhowais v. Hungary, 2023); ▪ in the context of emergency medical assistance to military servicemen ( Dimaksyan v. Armenia, 2023).\n\nThe Court has found the investigation inadequate when, for example: ▪ the investigation into a fatal shooting by the police during an attempted arrest had been undermined by shortcomings such as the failure to test the hands of officers in question for gunshot residue; to stage a reconstruction of the incident; to examine their weapons or ammunition; the lack of an adequate pictorial record of the trauma caused to the victim's body by the fatal bullet; and the failure to separate the officers involved in the incident before their questioning ( Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], 2007, §§ 326-332); ▪ the forensic investigation was defective ( Tanlı v. Turkey, 2001, § 153); ▪ the authorities accepted the version of facts presented by the accused State agents without hearing any further witnesses ( Özalp and Others v. Turkey, 2004, § 45) or placed heavy reliance on the report prepared by them ( İkincisoy v. Turkey, 2004, § 78); ▪ no investigation had been conducted into the flight log which constituted a key element in the possible identification and prosecution of those responsible for the bombing of civilian villages by military aircraft ( Benzer and Others v. Turkey, 2013, § 196); ▪ the investigation into the contract killing of an investigative journalist focused only on a single line of inquiry without exploring other allegations ( Mazepa and Others v. Russia, 2018, §§ 77-79); ▪ the investigation into the circumstances leading to the death of the applicant's son following his accidental shooting by a fellow conscript during his military service failed to elucidate some important factual matters, such as the overall time taken for the hospital transfer as well as the nature and origins of a number of injuries detected during the autopsy ( Dimaksyan v. Armenia, 2023, § 102).", + "post_text": "Thus, the Court has found positive obligations to arise under Article 2 in a number of different contexts, such as, for example: ▪ in the context of healthcare ( Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], 2002; Vo v. France [GC], 2004); ▪ in the context of dangerous activities, including industrial or environmental disasters ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008; Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014; M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015; Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023; Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, 2023); ▪ in the context of incidents on board a ship ( Leray and Others v. France (dec.), 2001), on trains ( Kalender v. Turkey, 2009), on a construction site ( Pereira Henriques v. Luxembourg, 2006), at a playground ( Koceski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), 2013); or at a school ( Ilbeyi Kemaloğlu and Meriye Kemaloğlu v. Turkey, 2012); ▪ in the context of road safety ( Rajkowska v. Poland (dec.), 2007; Anna Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2011); the provision of emergency services ( Furdík v. Slovakia (dec.), 2008); or diving operations in deep sea ( Vilnes and Others v. Norway, 2013); ▪ in the context of medical care and assistance given to vulnerable persons institutionalised in State facilities ( Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, 2013; Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], 2014; Dumpe v. Latvia (dec.), 2018); ▪ in the context of the State's failure to properly secure an area mined by the military ( Paşa and Erkan Erol v. Turkey, 2006; Albekov and Others v. Russia, 2008); to secure and supervise a firing range containing unexploded ordonance ( Oruk v. Turkey, 2014); and to react promptly to a disappearance in life-threatening circumstances ( Osmanoğlu v. Turkey, 2008; Dodov v. Bulgaria, 2008); ▪ in the context of an operation to rescue migrants who were drowning while trying to cross borders at sea ( Safi and Others v. Greece, 2022) or a river ( Alhowais v. Hungary, 2023); ▪ in the context of emergency medical assistance to military servicemen ( Dimaksyan v. Armenia, 2023).\n\nThe Court has found the investigation inadequate when, for example: ▪ the investigation into a fatal shooting by the police during an attempted arrest had been undermined by shortcomings such as the failure to test the hands of officers in question for gunshot residue; to stage a reconstruction of the incident; to examine their weapons or ammunition; the lack of an adequate pictorial record of the trauma caused to the victim's body by the fatal bullet; and the failure to separate the officers involved in the incident before their questioning ( Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], 2007, §§ 326-332); ▪ the forensic investigation was defective ( Tanlı v. Turkey, 2001, § 153); ▪ the authorities accepted the version of facts presented by the accused State agents without hearing any further witnesses ( Özalp and Others v. Turkey, 2004, § 45) or placed heavy reliance on the report prepared by them ( İkincisoy v. Turkey, 2004, § 78); ▪ no investigation had been conducted into the flight log which constituted a key element in the possible identification and prosecution of those responsible for the bombing of civilian villages by military aircraft ( Benzer and Others v. Turkey, 2013, § 196); ▪ the investigation into the contract killing of an investigative journalist focused only on a single line of inquiry without exploring other allegations ( Mazepa and Others v. Russia, 2018, §§ 77-79); ▪ the investigation into the circumstances leading to the death of the applicant's son following his accidental shooting by a fellow conscript during his military service failed to elucidate some important factual matters, such as the overall time taken for the hospital transfer as well as the nature and origins of a number of injuries detected during the autopsy ( Dimaksyan v. Armenia, 2023, § 102).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231218132744/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_2_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250122170132/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_2_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/415c8994e0ed/20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf", @@ -13142,6 +13903,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-22", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json", "case_key": "apps:63543/09", "case_name": "Durdaj and Others v. Albania", @@ -13160,7 +13923,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.B|a:12|b:13|IV.F.3|a:174|b:179|IV.L.1|a:214|b:219", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "Thus, the Court has found positive obligations to arise under Article 2 in a number of different contexts, such as, for example:  in the context of healthcare ( Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], 2022; Vo v. France [GC], 2004);  in the context of dangerous activities, including industrial or environmental disasters Öneryıldız v. Turkey Budayeva and Others v. Russia, Kolyadenko and ( [GC], 2004; 2008,; Others v. Russia, 2012,; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014; M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015);  in the context of incidents on board a ship ( Leray and Others v. France (dec.), 2001), on trains ( Kalender v. Turkey, 2009), on a construction site ( Pereira Henriques v. Luxembourg, 2006), Koceski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at a playground ( (dec.), 2013); or at a school ( Ilbeyi Kemaloğlu and Meriye Kemaloğlu v. Turkey, 2012);  Rajkowska v. Poland Anna Todorova v. Bulgaria in the context of road safety ( (dec.), 2007;, 2011); the provision of emergency services ( Furdík v. Slovakia (dec.), 2008); or diving operations in deep sea ( Vilnes and Others v. Norway, 2013);  in the context of medical care and assistance given to vulnerable persons institutionalised in State facilities ( Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, 2013; Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania Dumpe v. Latvia [GC], 2014; (dec.), 201).  In the context of the State's failure to properly secure an area mined by the military ( Paşa and Erkan Erol v. Turkey Albekov and Others v. Russia, 2006;, 2008); to secure and supervise a firing range containing unexploded ordonance ( Oruk v. Turkey, 2014); and to react promptly to a disappearance in life-threatening circumstances ( Osmanoğlu v. Turkey, 2008; Dodov v. Bulgaria, 2008).  In the context of an operation to rescue migrants who were drowning while trying to cross borders at sea ( Safi and Others v. Greece, 2022) or a river ( Alhowais v. Hungary, 2023).\n\nThe Court has found that the domestic authorities have,, failed to investigate with sufficient promptness and reasonable expedition in the following cases:  Kelly and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 136: the inquest proceedings into the killing of the applicants' relatives by the security forces in an operation commenced eight years after the deaths;  Nafiye Çetin and Others v. Turkey, 2009, § 42: the criminal proceedings instituted with a view to elucidating the facts and identify and punish those responsible for the death of their relative in police custody were pending for almost fifteen years;  Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], 2014, § 348: the investigation into the killing of Mr Mocanu during 1990 demonstrations against the Romanian regime was pending, overall, for more than twenty-three years;  Hemsworth v. the United Kingdom, 2013, § 74: the inquest hearing began 13 years after the killing of the applicants' relatives allegedly by security forces in Northern Ireland;  Jelić v. Croatia, 2014, § 91: the investigation into the abduction and killing of the applicant's husband in 1991 was plagued by inexplicable delays;  Mazepa and Others v. Russia, 2018, § 81: the investigation into the contract killing of an investigative journalist, notably, as regards the identity of the persons who had commissioned the crime, was still pending after more than eleven years.\n\nNevertheless, even in the context of non-intentional infringements of the right to life, there may be exceptional circumstances where an effective criminal investigation is necessary to satisfy the requirement of Article 2 of the Convention ( Cevrioğlu v. Turkey, 2016, § 54; Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], 2017, § 215). The Court has found such exceptional circumstances to arise in cases where the negligence which led to an infringement of the right to life went, inter alia, beyond a mere error of judgment or carelessness. Such as for example:  in the context of dangerous industrial activities ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 71);  in the context of a denial of healthcare ( Asiye Genç v. Turkey, 2015, § 73);  in the context of military activities ( Oruk v. Turkey, 2014, §§ 50 and 65);  Sinim v. Turkey in the context of transportation of dangerous goods (, 2017, §§ 62-64);  in the context of road safety ( Smiljanić v. Croatia, 2021, § 93);  in the context of police inaction in a domestic violence case ( Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021, §§ 59-60; see also Penati v. Italy, 2021, §§ 158-162, where the Court has also required a criminal investigation into the killing of a child by his father during a protected contact session organized by the social welfare department).", - "post_text": "Thus, the Court has found positive obligations to arise under Article 2 in a number of different contexts, such as, for example: ▪ in the context of healthcare ( Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], 2002; Vo v. France [GC], 2004); ▪ in the context of dangerous activities, including industrial or environmental disasters ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008; Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014; M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015; Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023; Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, 2023); ▪ in the context of incidents on board a ship ( Leray and Others v. France (dec.), 2001), on trains ( Kalender v. Turkey, 2009), on a construction site ( Pereira Henriques v. Luxembourg, 2006), at a playground ( Koceski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), 2013); or at a school ( Ilbeyi K emaloğlu and Meriye Kemaloğlu v. Turkey, 2012); ▪ in the context of road safety ( Rajkowska v. Poland (dec.), 2007; Anna Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2011); the provision of emergency services ( Furdík v. Slovakia (dec.), 2008); or diving operations in deep sea ( Vilnes and Others v. Norway, 2013); ▪ in the context of medical care and assistance given to vulnerable persons institutionalised in State facilities ( Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, 2013; Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], 2014; Dumpe v. Latvia (dec.), 2018); ▪ in the context of the State's failure to properly secure an area mined by the military ( Paşa and Erkan Erol v. Turkey, 2006; Albekov and Others v. Russia, 2008); to secure and supervise a firing range containing unexploded ordonance ( Oruk v. Turkey, 2014); and to react promptly to a disappearance in life-threatening circumstances ( Osmanoğlu v. Turkey, 2008; Dodov v. Bulgaria, 2008); ▪ in the context of an operation to rescue migrants who were drowning while trying to cross borders at sea ( Safi and Others v. Greece, 2022) or a river ( Alhowais v. Hungary, 2023); ▪ in the context of emergency medical assistance to military servicemen ( Dimaksyan v. Armenia, 2023).\n\nThe Court has found that the domestic authorities have, inter alia, failed to investigate with sufficient promptness and reasonable expedition in the following cases: ▪ Kelly and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 136: the inquest proceedings into the killing of the applicants'relatives by the security forces in an operation commenced eight years after the deaths; ▪ Nafiye Çetin and Others v. Turkey, 2009, § 42: the criminal proceedings instituted with a view to elucidating the facts and identify and punish those responsible for the death of their relative in police custody were pending for almost fifteen years; ▪ Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], 2014, § 348: the investigation into the killing of Mr Mocanu during 1990 demonstrations against the Romanian regime was pending, overall, for more than twenty-three years; ▪ Hemsworth v. the United Kingdom, 2013, § 74: the inquest hearing began 13 years after the killing of the applicants'relatives allegedly by security forces in Northern Ireland; ▪ Jelić v. Croatia, 2014, § 91: the investigation into the abduction and killing of the applicant's husband in 1991 was plagued by inexplicable delays; ▪ Mazepa and Others v. Russia, 2018, § 81: the investigation into the contract killing of an investigative journalist, notably, as regards the identity of the persons who had commissioned the crime, was still pending after more than eleven years; ▪ Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023, § 235: the criminal proceedings against a high level State official, concerning his role in the explosion of a weapon decommissioning facility that resulted in deaths and grievous bodily injuries, were still pending more than fourteen years after the events.\n\nNevertheless, even in the context of non-intentional infringements of the right to life, there may be exceptional circumstances where an effective criminal investigation is necessary to satisfy the requirement of Article 2 of the Convention ( Cevrioğlu v. Turkey, 2016, § 54; Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], 2017, § 215). The Court has found such exceptional circumstances to arise in cases where the negligence which led to an infringement of the right to life went, inter alia, beyond a mere error of judgment or carelessness. Such as for example: ▪ in the context of dangerous industrial activities ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 71; Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023, § 184); ▪ in the context of a denial of healthcare ( Asiye Genç v. Turkey, 2015, § 73); ▪ in the context of military activities ( Oruk v. Turkey, 2014, §§ 50 and 65); ▪ in the context of transportation of dangerous goods ( Sinim v. Turkey, 2017, §§ 62-64); ▪ in the context of road safety ( Smiljanić v. Croatia, 2021, § 93); ▪ in the context of police inaction in a domestic violence case ( Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021, §§ 59-60; see also Penati v. Italy, 2021, §§ 158-162, where the Court has also required a criminal investigation into the killing of a child by his father during a protected contact session organized by the social welfare department).", + "post_text": "Thus, the Court has found positive obligations to arise under Article 2 in a number of different contexts, such as, for example: ▪ in the context of healthcare ( Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], 2002; Vo v. France [GC], 2004); ▪ in the context of dangerous activities, including industrial or environmental disasters ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008; Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014; M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015; Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023; Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, 2023); ▪ in the context of incidents on board a ship ( Leray and Others v. France (dec.), 2001), on trains ( Kalender v. Turkey, 2009), on a construction site ( Pereira Henriques v. Luxembourg, 2006), at a playground ( Koceski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), 2013); or at a school ( Ilbeyi Kemaloğlu and Meriye Kemaloğlu v. Turkey, 2012); ▪ in the context of road safety ( Rajkowska v. Poland (dec.), 2007; Anna Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2011); the provision of emergency services ( Furdík v. Slovakia (dec.), 2008); or diving operations in deep sea ( Vilnes and Others v. Norway, 2013); ▪ in the context of medical care and assistance given to vulnerable persons institutionalised in State facilities ( Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, 2013; Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], 2014; Dumpe v. Latvia (dec.), 2018); ▪ in the context of the State's failure to properly secure an area mined by the military ( Paşa and Erkan Erol v. Turkey, 2006; Albekov and Others v. Russia, 2008); to secure and supervise a firing range containing unexploded ordonance ( Oruk v. Turkey, 2014); and to react promptly to a disappearance in life-threatening circumstances ( Osmanoğlu v. Turkey, 2008; Dodov v. Bulgaria, 2008); ▪ in the context of an operation to rescue migrants who were drowning while trying to cross borders at sea ( Safi and Others v. Greece, 2022) or a river ( Alhowais v. Hungary, 2023); ▪ in the context of emergency medical assistance to military servicemen ( Dimaksyan v. Armenia, 2023).\n\nThe Court has found that the domestic authorities have, inter alia, failed to investigate with sufficient promptness and reasonable expedition in the following cases: ▪ Kelly and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 136: the inquest proceedings into the killing of the applicants'relatives by the security forces in an operation commenced eight years after the deaths; ▪ Nafiye Çetin and Others v. Turkey, 2009, § 42: the criminal proceedings instituted with a view to elucidating the facts and identify and punish those responsible for the death of their relative in police custody were pending for almost fifteen years; ▪ Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], 2014, § 348: the investigation into the killing of Mr Mocanu during 1990 demonstrations against the Romanian regime was pending, overall, for more than twenty-three years; ▪ Hemsworth v. the United Kingdom, 2013, § 74: the inquest hearing began 13 years after the killing of the applicants'relatives allegedly by security forces in Northern Ireland; ▪ Jelić v. Croatia, 2014, § 91: the investigation into the abduction and killing of the applicant's husband in 1991 was plagued by inexplicable delays; ▪ Mazepa and Others v. Russia, 2018, § 81: the investigation into the contract killing of an investigative journalist, notably, as regards the identity of the persons who had commissioned the crime, was still pending after more than eleven years; ▪ Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023, § 235: the criminal proceedings against a high level State official, concerning his role in the explosion of a weapon decommissioning facility that resulted in deaths and grievous bodily injuries, were still pending more than fourteen years after the events.\n\nNevertheless, even in the context of non-intentional infringements of the right to life, there may be exceptional circumstances where an effective criminal investigation is necessary to satisfy the requirement of Article 2 of the Convention ( Cevrioğlu v. Turkey, 2016, § 54; Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], 2017, § 215). The Court has found such exceptional circumstances to arise in cases where the negligence which led to an infringement of the right to life went, inter alia, beyond a mere error of judgment or carelessness. Such as for example: ▪ in the context of dangerous industrial activities ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 71; Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023, § 184); ▪ in the context of a denial of healthcare ( Asiye Genç v. Turkey, 2015, § 73); ▪ in the context of military activities ( Oruk v. Turkey, 2014, §§ 50 and 65); ▪ in the context of transportation of dangerous goods ( Sinim v. Turkey, 2017, §§ 62-64); ▪ in the context of road safety ( Smiljanić v. Croatia, 2021, § 93); ▪ in the context of police inaction in a domestic violence case ( Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021, §§ 59-60; see also Penati v. Italy, 2021, §§ 158-162, where the Court has also required a criminal investigation into the killing of a child by his father during a protected contact session organized by the social welfare department).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231218132744/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_2_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250122170132/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_2_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/415c8994e0ed/20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf", @@ -13175,6 +13938,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-22", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json", "case_key": "apps:42749/19", "case_name": "Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye", @@ -13193,7 +13958,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.B|a:12|b:13|II.C.3|a:None|b:45", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "Thus, the Court has found positive obligations to arise under Article 2 in a number of different contexts, such as, for example:  in the context of healthcare ( Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], 2022; Vo v. France [GC], 2004);  in the context of dangerous activities, including industrial or environmental disasters Öneryıldız v. Turkey Budayeva and Others v. Russia, Kolyadenko and ( [GC], 2004; 2008,; Others v. Russia, 2012,; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014; M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015);  in the context of incidents on board a ship ( Leray and Others v. France (dec.), 2001), on trains ( Kalender v. Turkey, 2009), on a construction site ( Pereira Henriques v. Luxembourg, 2006), Koceski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at a playground ( (dec.), 2013); or at a school ( Ilbeyi Kemaloğlu and Meriye Kemaloğlu v. Turkey, 2012);  Rajkowska v. Poland Anna Todorova v. Bulgaria in the context of road safety ( (dec.), 2007;, 2011); the provision of emergency services ( Furdík v. Slovakia (dec.), 2008); or diving operations in deep sea ( Vilnes and Others v. Norway, 2013);  in the context of medical care and assistance given to vulnerable persons institutionalised in State facilities ( Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, 2013; Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania Dumpe v. Latvia [GC], 2014; (dec.), 201).  In the context of the State's failure to properly secure an area mined by the military ( Paşa and Erkan Erol v. Turkey Albekov and Others v. Russia, 2006;, 2008); to secure and supervise a firing range containing unexploded ordonance ( Oruk v. Turkey, 2014); and to react promptly to a disappearance in life-threatening circumstances ( Osmanoğlu v. Turkey, 2008; Dodov v. Bulgaria, 2008).  In the context of an operation to rescue migrants who were drowning while trying to cross borders at sea ( Safi and Others v. Greece, 2022) or a river ( Alhowais v. Hungary, 2023).", - "post_text": "Thus, the Court has found positive obligations to arise under Article 2 in a number of different contexts, such as, for example: ▪ in the context of healthcare ( Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], 2002; Vo v. France [GC], 2004); ▪ in the context of dangerous activities, including industrial or environmental disasters ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008; Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014; M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015; Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023; Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, 2023); ▪ in the context of incidents on board a ship ( Leray and Others v. France (dec.), 2001), on trains ( Kalender v. Turkey, 2009), on a construction site ( Pereira Henriques v. Luxembourg, 2006), at a playground ( Koceski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), 2013); or at a school ( Ilbeyi K emaloğlu and Meriye Kemaloğlu v. Turkey, 2012); ▪ in the context of road safety ( Rajkowska v. Poland (dec.), 2007; Anna Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2011); the provision of emergency services ( Furdík v. Slovakia (dec.), 2008); or diving operations in deep sea ( Vilnes and Others v. Norway, 2013); ▪ in the context of medical care and assistance given to vulnerable persons institutionalised in State facilities ( Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, 2013; Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], 2014; Dumpe v. Latvia (dec.), 2018); ▪ in the context of the State's failure to properly secure an area mined by the military ( Paşa and Erkan Erol v. Turkey, 2006; Albekov and Others v. Russia, 2008); to secure and supervise a firing range containing unexploded ordonance ( Oruk v. Turkey, 2014); and to react promptly to a disappearance in life-threatening circumstances ( Osmanoğlu v. Turkey, 2008; Dodov v. Bulgaria, 2008); ▪ in the context of an operation to rescue migrants who were drowning while trying to cross borders at sea ( Safi and Others v. Greece, 2022) or a river ( Alhowais v. Hungary, 2023); ▪ in the context of emergency medical assistance to military servicemen ( Dimaksyan v. Armenia, 2023).\n\nWhile States have no control over natural events such as earthquakes, it is nonetheless the responsibility of States to ensure the prevention of foreseeable natural risks and to adopt measures aimed at reducing their effects in order to minimise their catastrophic dimension. In this respect, the scope of the obligation of prevention, which remains an obligation of means, consists of strengthening the State's capacity to deal with this type of natural and violent phenomenon ( Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, 2023, § 128).", + "post_text": "Thus, the Court has found positive obligations to arise under Article 2 in a number of different contexts, such as, for example: ▪ in the context of healthcare ( Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], 2002; Vo v. France [GC], 2004); ▪ in the context of dangerous activities, including industrial or environmental disasters ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008; Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014; M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015; Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023; Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, 2023); ▪ in the context of incidents on board a ship ( Leray and Others v. France (dec.), 2001), on trains ( Kalender v. Turkey, 2009), on a construction site ( Pereira Henriques v. Luxembourg, 2006), at a playground ( Koceski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), 2013); or at a school ( Ilbeyi Kemaloğlu and Meriye Kemaloğlu v. Turkey, 2012); ▪ in the context of road safety ( Rajkowska v. Poland (dec.), 2007; Anna Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2011); the provision of emergency services ( Furdík v. Slovakia (dec.), 2008); or diving operations in deep sea ( Vilnes and Others v. Norway, 2013); ▪ in the context of medical care and assistance given to vulnerable persons institutionalised in State facilities ( Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, 2013; Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], 2014; Dumpe v. Latvia (dec.), 2018); ▪ in the context of the State's failure to properly secure an area mined by the military ( Paşa and Erkan Erol v. Turkey, 2006; Albekov and Others v. Russia, 2008); to secure and supervise a firing range containing unexploded ordonance ( Oruk v. Turkey, 2014); and to react promptly to a disappearance in life-threatening circumstances ( Osmanoğlu v. Turkey, 2008; Dodov v. Bulgaria, 2008); ▪ in the context of an operation to rescue migrants who were drowning while trying to cross borders at sea ( Safi and Others v. Greece, 2022) or a river ( Alhowais v. Hungary, 2023); ▪ in the context of emergency medical assistance to military servicemen ( Dimaksyan v. Armenia, 2023).\n\nWhile States have no control over natural events such as earthquakes, it is nonetheless the responsibility of States to ensure the prevention of foreseeable natural risks and to adopt measures aimed at reducing their effects in order to minimise their catastrophic dimension. In this respect, the scope of the obligation of prevention, which remains an obligation of means, consists of strengthening the State's capacity to deal with this type of natural and violent phenomenon ( Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, 2023, § 128).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231218132744/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_2_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250122170132/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_2_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/415c8994e0ed/20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf", @@ -13208,6 +13973,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-22", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json", "case_key": "apps:67351/13", "case_name": "Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia", @@ -13241,9 +14008,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-22", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json", "case_key": "apps:55009/20", - "case_name": "Huci v. Romania, no.55009/20", + "case_name": "Huci v. Romania", "application_numbers": "55009/20", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -13257,7 +14026,7 @@ "linked_sections": "IV.L.2.b: Cases concerning accidents", "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.L.2.b|a:226|b:231", - "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match", + "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "By contrast, the Court considered that there was no failure to provide a mechanism whereby criminal, disciplinary or civil responsibility of persons who may be held answerable could be established in:  Furdík v. Slovakia (dec.), 2008, (death of a climber);  Koceski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), 2013, § 28 (death of a child in a playground when heavy concrete pillars fell on top of her);  Cavit Tınarlıoğlu v. Turkey, 2016, § 125 (serious injuries sustained by an applicant when he was struck by a motor boat while swimming in a bathing area that had not been cordoned off);  Mikhno v. Ukraine, 2016, § 151 (military aircraft crash killing spectators at a public air show);  Çakmak v. Turkey (dec.), 2017, § 34 (electrocution of the applicants' relative while picking up pinecones from a tree in the garden of a primary school);  Aktaş v. Turkey (dec.), 2019, § 29 (death of the applicant's son when his motorcycle collided with a pickup truck).", "post_text": "By contrast, the Court considered that there was no failure to provide a mechanism whereby criminal, disciplinary or civil responsibility of persons who may be held answerable could be established in: ▪ Furdík v. Slovakia (dec.), 2008, (death of a climber); ▪ Koceski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), 2013, § 28 (death of a child in a playground when heavy concrete pillars fell on top of her); ▪ Cavit Tınarlıoğlu v. Turkey, 2016, § 125 (serious injuries sustained by an applicant when he was struck by a motor boat while swimming in a bathing area that had not been cordoned off); ▪ Mikhno v. Ukraine, 2016, § 151 (military aircraft crash killing spectators at a public air show); ▪ Çakmak v. Turkey (dec.), 2017, § 34 (electrocution of the applicants'relative while picking up pinecones from a tree in the garden of a primary school); ▪ Aktaş v. Turkey (dec.), 2019, § 29 (death of the applicant's son when his motorcycle collided with a pickup truck). ▪ Huci v. Romania, 2024, §§ 59-60 (death of the applicants'relative in a crash of an uncertified small ultralight motorised airplane during a test flight).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231218132744/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_2_eng", @@ -13274,6 +14043,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-22", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json", "case_key": "apps:21882/09|6189/10", "case_name": "Israilov v. Russia", @@ -13307,9 +14078,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-22", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json", "case_key": "apps:23093/20", - "case_name": "Selçuk v. Türkiye,no.23093/20", + "case_name": "Selçuk v. Türkiye", "application_numbers": "23093/20", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -13323,7 +14096,7 @@ "linked_sections": "I.C: Applicability of Article 2 in near death situations|II.C.1: Protection of persons from lethal use of force by non-State actors", "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.C|a:4|b:4|II.C.1|a:25|b:26", - "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match", + "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "The Court has emphasised on many occasions that Article 2 of the Convention may come into play even if a person whose right to life was allegedly breached did not die. In particular, the Court has held that in exceptional circumstances, depending on considerations such as the degree and type of force used and the nature of the injuries, use of force by State agents which does not result in death may disclose a violation of Article 2 of the Convention, if the behaviour of the State agents, by its very nature, puts the applicant's life at serious risk even though the latter survives ( Makaratzis v. Greece [GC], 2004, § 55; Soare and Others v. Romania, 2011, §§ 108-109; Trévalec v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 55-61). In all other cases where a person is assaulted or ill-treated by State agents, their complaints will rather fall to be examined under Article 3 of the Convention ( Makaratzis v. Greece [GC], 2004, § 51; İlhan v. Turkey [GC], 2000, § 76). In cases concerning applicants who survived a potentially lethal attack by non-State actors, the Court has adopted a similar approach to the one taken in respect of cases concerning use of force by State agents ( Yotova v. Bulgaria, 2012, § 69).\n\nThe Court has also applied the aforementioned principles to cases giving rise to an obligation to afford general protection to society in certain specific contexts, such as:  murder committed by convicts on prison leave or placed under a semi-custodial regime ( Mastromatteo v. Italy [GC], 2002, § 69);  killing by convicted murderer following his release on licence ( Choreftakis and Choreftaki v. Greece, 2012, §§ 48-49);  killing by an off-duty police officer ( Gorovenky and Bugara v. Ukraine, 2012, § 32);  murder of a lawyer by her client's mentally disturbed husband ( Bljakaj and Others v. Croatia, 2014, § 121);  killings perpetrated during a large-scale hostage-taking by terrorists ( Tagayeva and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 482-492; by contrast, Finogenov and Others v. Russia (dec.), 2010, § 173).", "post_text": "The Court has emphasised on many occasions that Article 2 of the Convention may come into play even if a person whose right to life was allegedly breached did not die. In particular, the Court has held that in exceptional circumstances, depending on considerations such as the degree and type of force used and the nature of the injuries, use of force by State agents which does not result in death may disclose a violation of Article 2 of the Convention, if the behaviour of the State agents, by its very nature, puts the applicant's life at serious risk even though the latter survives ( Makaratzis v. Greece [GC], 2004, § 55; Soare and Others v. Romania, 2011, §§ 108-109; Trévalec v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 55-61). In all other cases where a person is assaulted or ill-treated by State agents, their complaints will rather fall to be examined under Article 3 of the Convention ( Makaratzis v. Greece [GC], 2004, § 51; İlhan v. Turkey [GC], 2000, § 76). In cases concerning applicants who survived a potentially lethal attack by non-State actors, the Court has adopted a similar approach to the one taken in respect of cases concerning use of force by State agents ( Yotova v. Bulgaria, 2012, § 69; see also Selçuk v. Türkiye, 2024, § 73).\n\nThe Court has also applied the aforementioned principles to cases giving rise to an obligation to afford general protection to society in certain specific contexts, such as: ▪ murder committed by convicts on prison leave or placed under a semi-custodial regime ( Mastromatteo v. Italy [GC], 2002, § 69); ▪ killing by convicted murderer following his release on licence ( Choreftakis and Choreftaki v. Greece, 2012, §§ 48-49); ▪ killing by an off-duty police officer ( Gorovenky and Bugara v. Ukraine, 2012, § 32); ▪ murder of a lawyer by her client's mentally disturbed husband ( Bljakaj and Others v. Croatia, 2014, § 121); ▪ killings perpetrated during a large-scale hostage-taking by terrorists ( Tagayeva and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 482-492; by contrast, Finogenov and Others v. Russia (dec.), 2010, § 173); ▪ injuries sustained by the applicant in the course of a demonstration following a terrorist attack where a hundred people died ( Selçuk v. Türkiye, 2024, §§ 96-97).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231218132744/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_2_eng", @@ -13340,6 +14113,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-22", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json", "case_key": "apps:47909/19", "case_name": "T.V. v. Croatia", @@ -13373,6 +14148,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-22", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json", "case_key": "apps:20958/14|38334/18", "case_name": "Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), [GC]", @@ -13406,6 +14183,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-22", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json", "case_key": "apps:26074/18", "case_name": "V v. the Czech Republic", @@ -13439,6 +14218,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-01-22", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json", "case_key": "apps:53600/20", "case_name": "Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland, [GC]", @@ -13472,6 +14253,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-19", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-01-22__2025-06-19.json", "case_key": "apps:1718/21", "case_name": "A.P. v. Austria", @@ -13505,6 +14288,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-19", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-01-22__2025-06-19.json", "case_key": "apps:9375/20", "case_name": "Bagirova v. Azerbaijan", @@ -13538,6 +14323,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-19", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-01-22__2025-06-19.json", "case_key": "apps:39742/14", "case_name": "Cannavacciuolo and Others v Italy", @@ -13571,9 +14358,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-19", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-01-22__2025-06-19.json", "case_key": "apps:5576/19", - "case_name": "Ceyhan v. Türkiye, no 5576/19", + "case_name": "Ceyhan v. Türkiye", "application_numbers": "5576/19", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -13587,7 +14376,7 @@ "linked_sections": "IV.L.1: General principles", "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.L.1|a:219|b:219", - "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match", + "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "Nevertheless, even in the context of non-intentional infringements of the right to life, there may be exceptional circumstances where an effective criminal investigation is necessary to satisfy the requirement of Article 2 of the Convention ( Cevrioğlu v. Turkey, 2016, § 54; Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], 2017, § 215). The Court has found such exceptional circumstances to arise in cases where the negligence which led to an infringement of the right to life went, inter alia, beyond a mere error of judgment or carelessness. Such as for example: ▪ in the context of dangerous industrial activities ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 71; Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023, § 184); ▪ in the context of a denial of healthcare ( Asiye Genç v. Turkey, 2015, § 73); ▪ in the context of military activities ( Oruk v. Turkey, 2014, §§ 50 and 65); ▪ in the context of transportation of dangerous goods ( Sinim v. Turkey, 2017, §§ 62-64); ▪ in the context of road safety ( Smiljanić v. Croatia, 2021, § 93); ▪ in the context of police inaction in a domestic violence case ( Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021, §§ 59-60; see also Penati v. Italy, 2021, §§ 158-162, where the Court has also required a criminal investigation into the killing of a child by his father during a protected contact session organized by the social welfare department).", "post_text": "Nevertheless, even in the context of non-intentional infringements of the right to life, there may be exceptional circumstances where an effective criminal investigation is necessary to satisfy the requirement of Article 2 of the Convention ( Cevrioğlu v. Turkey, 2016, § 54; Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], 2017, § 215). The Court has found such exceptional circumstances to arise in cases where the negligence which led to an infringement of the right to life went, inter alia, beyond a mere error of judgment or carelessness. Such as for example: ▪ in the context of dangerous industrial activities ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 71; Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023, § 184); ▪ in the context of a denial of healthcare ( Asiye Genç v. Turkey, 2015, § 73); ▪ in the context of military activities ( Oruk v. Turkey, 2014, §§ 50 and 65) see also Ceyhan v. Türkiye, 2024, §§ 85-87; ▪ in the context of transportation of dangerous goods ( Sinim v. Turkey, 2017, §§ 62-64); ▪ in the context of road safety ( Smiljanić v. Croatia, 2021, § 93); ▪ in the context of police inaction in a domestic violence case ( Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021, §§ 59-60; see also Penati v. Italy, 2021, §§ 158-162, where the Court has also required a criminal investigation into the killing of a child by his father during a protected contact session organized by the social welfare department).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250122170132/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_2_eng", @@ -13604,9 +14393,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-19", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-01-22__2025-06-19.json", "case_key": "apps:22525/21|47626/21", - "case_name": "Fraisse and Others v France, nos 22525/21 and 47626/21", + "case_name": "Fraisse and Others v France", "application_numbers": "22525/21|47626/21", "judgment_year": "2025", "citation_change": "added", @@ -13620,7 +14411,7 @@ "linked_sections": "IV.F.2: Adequacy", "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.F.2|a:175|b:175", - "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match", + "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "By contrast, having regard to the various steps undertaken by the domestic authorities, the Court did not find an issue with respect to the adequacy of the investigation in: ▪ Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey [GC], 2015, § 209, which concerned the investigation into the death of the applicants'son and brother during his military service; ▪ Armani Da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2016, § 286, which concerned the investigation into the fatal shooting of person mistakenly identified as a suspected terrorist; ▪ Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], 2011, § 309, which concerned the investigation into the fatal shooting of a demonstrator by a member of the security forces during a G8 summit; ▪ Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2011, §§ 64-66, which concerned the investigation into the disappearance of the applicant's husband during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. ▪ Tunç v. Turkey (dec.), 2022, §§ 96-97, which concerned the authorities'investigation into the disappearance of the applicants'relative, against whom criminal proceedings were pending for his alleged involvement in a terrorist organisation.", "post_text": "By contrast, having regard to the various steps undertaken by the domestic authorities, the Court did not find an issue with respect to the adequacy of the investigation in: ▪ Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey [GC], 2015, § 209, which concerned the investigation into the death of the applicants'son and brother during his military service; ▪ Armani Da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2016, § 286, which concerned the investigation into the fatal shooting of person mistakenly identified as a suspected terrorist; ▪ Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], 2011, § 309, which concerned the investigation into the fatal shooting of a demonstrator by a member of the security forces during a G8 summit; ▪ Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2011, §§ 64-66, which concerned the investigation into the disappearance of the applicant's husband during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina; ▪ Tunç v. Turkey (dec.), 2022, §§ 96-97, which concerned the authorities'investigation into the disappearance of the applicants'relative, against whom criminal proceedings were pending for his alleged involvement in a terrorist organisation; ▪ Fraisse and Others v. France, 2025, §§ 161-162, which concerned the investigation into the death of a student as a result of an explosion of a stun grenade launched by a gendarme during violence clashes between protesters and mobile gendarmes forces.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250122170132/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_2_eng", @@ -13637,9 +14428,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-19", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-01-22__2025-06-19.json", "case_key": "apps:41208/21", - "case_name": "Ghaoui v. France, no 41208/21", + "case_name": "Ghaoui v. France", "application_numbers": "41208/21", "judgment_year": "2025", "citation_change": "added", @@ -13670,6 +14463,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-19", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-01-22__2025-06-19.json", "case_key": "apps:57507/19", "case_name": "Svrtan v. Croatia", @@ -13703,6 +14498,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-15", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-06-19__2025-12-15.json", "case_key": "apps:22776/18", "case_name": "Almukhlas and Al-Maliki v. Greece", @@ -13736,6 +14533,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-15", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-06-19__2025-12-15.json", "case_key": "apps:35950/20", "case_name": "Hasani v. Sweden", @@ -13769,6 +14568,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-15", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-06-19__2025-12-15.json", "case_key": "apps:51781/22", "case_name": "Kalkan v. Denmark", @@ -13802,6 +14603,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-15", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-06-19__2025-12-15.json", "case_key": "apps:56114/18", "case_name": "N.D. v. Switzerland", @@ -13835,6 +14638,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-15", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-06-19__2025-12-15.json", "case_key": "apps:8019/16", "case_name": "Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC]", @@ -13868,6 +14673,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-29", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-29.json", "case_key": "apps:28186/19|29092/19", "case_name": "Jasuitis and Šimaitis v. Lithuania", @@ -13901,6 +14708,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-29", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-29.json", "case_key": "apps:34634/18|43546/18", "case_name": "Total S.A. and Vitol S.A. v. France", @@ -13934,6 +14743,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-29", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-29.json", "case_key": "apps:15669/20", "case_name": "Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC]", @@ -13951,7 +14762,7 @@ "linked_change_types": "minor_edit|citation_added|reformulation", "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.B.1|a:29|b:29|III.B.2|a:37|b:37|III.B.2|a:42|b:42|VII|a:65|b:65", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "It follows that in principle, there can only be a \"penalty\" within the meaning of Article 7 if an element of personal liability has been established in respect of the perpetrator of the offence. There is a clear correlation between the degree of foreseeability of a criminal-law provision and the personal liability of the offender. Thus Article 7 requires a mental link disclosing an element of liability in the conduct of the actual perpetrator of the offence if a penalty is to be imposed ( G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], §§ 242 and 246). There may, however, be certain forms of objective liability stemming from presumptions of liability, provided they comply with the Convention, particularly Article 6 § 2 ( ibid ., § 243).\n\nAs regards the compatibility of the domestic judicial interpretation with the essence of the offence, the Court must determine whether that interpretation was in line with the wording of the provision of the criminal legislation in question as read in its context, and whether or not it was unreasonable (see, among many other authorities, Jorgic v. Germany, §§ 104-108, as regards the crime of genocide). The Court has also stressed that that conduct does not fall outside the scope of the criminal law merely because it also constitutes a disciplinary offence ( Norman v. the United Kingdom, § 68).\n\nThe Court has found that the foreseeability requirement was not met in cases of an extensive interpretation of criminal law to the accused's disadvantage ( in malam partem ), both where that interpretation stems from an unforeseeable case-law reversal ( Dragotoniu and Militaru-Pidhorni v. Romania, §§ 39-48) or from an interpretation by analogy which is incompatible with the essence of the offence (for example, the conviction for genocide in Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania [GC], §§ 179-186), and where there has been an extensive and unforeseeable interpretation of an offence to the accused's disadvantage that is incompatible with the very essence of that offence ( Navalnyye v. Russia, § 68; Parmak and Bakir v. Turkey, § 76; Tristan v. Moldova *, § 67). It may also find against a State on the grounds of a conviction for an offence resulting from case-law development consolidated after the commission of that offence (for example, the offence of aiding and abetting a mafia-type organisation from the outside in Contrada v. Italy (no. 3), §§ 64-76), or the case of a conviction based on an ambiguous domestic law provision which had offered divergent interpretations ( Žaja v. Croatia, §§ 99-106). In that connection, an inconsistent case-law lacks the required precision to avoid all risk of arbitrariness and enable individuals to foresee the consequences of their actions ( ibid., § 103).\n\nUnder Article 46 of the Convention the Contracting Parties undertook to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties, execution being supervised by the Committee of Ministers. A respondent State which is found to have violated the Convention or the Protocols thereto is required not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction (Article 41 of the Convention) but also to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in their domestic legal order to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to redress so far as possible the effects. Furthermore, it is understood that the respondent State remains free to choose the means by which it will discharge its legal obligation under Article 46 of the Convention, provided that such means are compatible with the conclusions set out in the Court's judgment ( Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], § 249).", + "pre_text": "It follows that in principle, there can only be a \"penalty\" within the meaning of Article 7 if an element of personal liability has been established in respect of the perpetrator of the offence. There is a clear correlation between the degree of foreseeability of a criminal-law provision and the personal liability of the offender. Thus Article 7 requires a mental link disclosing an element of liability in the conduct of the actual perpetrator of the offence if a penalty is to be imposed ( G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], §§ 242 and 246). There may, however, be certain forms of objective liability stemming from presumptions of liability, provided they comply with the Convention, particularly Article 6 § 2 ( ibid ., § 243).\n\nAs regards the compatibility of the domestic judicial interpretation with the essence of the offence, the Court must determine whether that interpretation was in line with the wording of the provision of the criminal legislation in question as read in its context, and whether or not it was unreasonable (see, among many other authorities, Jorgic v. Germany, §§ 104-108, as regards the crime of genocide). The Court has also stressed that that conduct does not fall outside the scope of the criminal law merely because it also constitutes a disciplinary offence ( Norman v. the United Kingdom, § 68).\n\nThe Court has found that the foreseeability requirement was not met in cases of an extensive interpretation of criminal law to the accused's disadvantage ( in malam partem ), both where that interpretation stems from an unforeseeable case-law reversal ( Dragotoniu and Militaru-Pidhorni v. Romania, §§ 39-48) or from an interpretation by analogy which is incompatible with the essence of the offence (for example, the conviction for genocide in Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania [GC], §§ 179-186), and where there has been an extensive and unforeseeable interpretation of an offence to the accused's disadvantage that is incompatible with the very essence of that offence ( Navalnyye v. Russia, § 68; Parmak and Bakir v. Turkey, § 76; Tristan v. Moldova *, § 67). It may also find against a State on the grounds of a conviction for an offence resulting from case-law development consolidated after the commission of that offence (for example, the offence of aiding and abetting a mafia-type organisation from the outside in Contrada v. Italy (no. 3), §§ 64-76), or the case of a conviction based on an ambiguous domestic law provision which had offered divergent interpretations ( Žaja v. Croatia, §§ 99-106). In that connection, an inconsistent case-law lacks the required precision to avoid all risk of arbitrariness and enable individuals to foresee the consequences of their actions ( ibid., § 103).\n\nUnder Article 46 of the Convention the Contracting Parties undertook to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties, execution being supervised by the Committee of Ministers. Arespondent State which is found to have violated the Convention or the Protocols thereto is required not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction (Article 41 of the Convention) but also to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in their domestic legal order to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to redress so far as possible the effects. Furthermore, it is understood that the respondent State remains free to choose the means by which it will discharge its legal obligation under Article 46 of the Convention, provided that such means are compatible with the conclusions set out in the Court's judgment ( Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], § 249).", "post_text": "It follows that in principle, there can only be a \"penalty\" within the meaning of Article 7 if an element of personal liability has been established in respect of the perpetrator of the offence. There is a clear correlation between the degree of foreseeability of a criminal-law provision and the personal liability of the offender. Thus Article 7 requires a mental link disclosing an element of liability in the conduct of the actual perpetrator of the offence if a penalty is to be imposed ( G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, §§ 242 and 246; Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, §§ 264 and 268). There may, however, be certain forms of objective liability stemming from presumptions of liability, provided they comply with the Convention, particularly Article 6 § 2 ( ibid ., § 243).\n\nAs regards the compatibility of the domestic judicial interpretation with the essence of the offence, the Court must determine whether that interpretation was in line with the wording of the provision of the criminal legislation in question as read in its context, and whether or not it was unreasonable ( Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, §§ 255-268, as regards the crime of membership of an armed terrorist organisation; Jorgic v. Germany, 2007, §§ 104-108, as regards the crime of genocide; Total S.A. and Vitol S.A. v. France, 2023, §§ 58-71, as regards the crime of bribing foreign public officials; Jasuitis and Šimaitis v. Lithuania, 2023, §§ 119-140, as regards the crime of trafficking in human beings). The Court has also stressed that that conduct does not fall outside the scope of the criminal law merely because it also constitutes a disciplinary offence ( Norman v. the United Kingdom, 2021, § 68).\n\nThe Court has found that the foreseeability requirement was not met in cases of an extensive interpretation of criminal law to the accused's disadvantage ( in malam partem ), both where that interpretation stems from an unforeseeable case-law reversal ( Dragotoniu and Militaru-Pidhorni v. Romania, 2007, §§ 39-48) or from an interpretation by analogy which is incompatible with the essence of the offence (for example, the conviction for genocide in Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania [GC], 2015, §§ 179-186), and where there has been an extensive and unforeseeable interpretation of an offence to the accused's disadvantage that is incompatible with the very essence of that offence ( Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, § 271; Navalnyye v. Russia, 2017, § 68; Parmak and Bakir v. Turkey, 2019, § 76; Tristan v. Moldova, 2023, § 67). It may also find against a State on the grounds of a conviction for an offence resulting from case-law development consolidated after the commission of that offence (for example, the offence of aiding and abetting a mafia-type organisation from the outside in Contrada v. Italy (no. 3), 2015, §§ 64-76), or the case of a conviction based on an ambiguous domestic law provision which had offered divergent interpretations ( Žaja v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 99-106). In that connection, an inconsistent case-law lacks the required precision to avoid all risk of arbitrariness and enable individuals to foresee the consequences of their actions ( ibid., § 103).\n\nIn the context of the execution of judgments in accordance with Article 46 of the Convention, a judgment in which the Court finds a breach of the Convention imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation to put an end to the breach found and make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing before the breach. The Court's judgments are, however, essentially declaratory in nature. Accordingly, the Contracting States that are parties to a case are in principle free to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the means whereby they will comply with a judgment in which the Court has found a breach - including any general and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in their domestic legal order -, provided that the execution is carried out in good faith and in a manner compatible with the \"conclusions and spirit\" of the judgment ( Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, § 404).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923043629/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_7_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240329131345/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_7_eng", @@ -13967,9 +14778,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2024-03-29__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:71250/16", - "case_name": "Cesarano v. Italy, 71250/16", + "case_name": "Cesarano v. Italy", "application_numbers": "71250/16", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -13983,7 +14796,7 @@ "linked_sections": "V: Principle of retrospective application of more favourable criminal law", "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "V|a:62|b:62", - "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match", + "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "In determining whether a law passed after an offence has allegedly been committed is more or less favourable to the accused than the law that was in force at the time of the alleged commission of the offence, regard must be had to the specific circumstances of the case - the principle of concretisation ( Advisory opinion concerning the use of the \"blanket reference\" or \"legislation by reference\" technique in the definition of an offence and the standards of comparison between the criminal law in force at the time of the commission of the offence and the amended criminal law, [GC], 2020, §§ 86-92).", "post_text": "In determining whether a law passed after an offence has allegedly been committed is more or less favourable to the accused than the law that was in force at the time of the alleged commission of the offence, regard must be had to the specific circumstances of the case - the principle of concretisation ( Advisory opinion concerning the use of the \"blanket reference\" or \"legislation by reference\" technique in the definition of an offence and the standards of comparison between the criminal law in force at the time of the commission of the offence and the amended criminal law, [GC], 2020, §§ 86-92; Cesarano v. Italy, 2024, §§ 63 and 84).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240329131345/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_7_eng", @@ -14000,6 +14813,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2024-03-29__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:38998/20", "case_name": "Delga v. France", @@ -14033,9 +14848,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2024-03-29__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:47269/18", - "case_name": "Garofalo and Others v. Italy (dec.), 47269/18 and 3 others", + "case_name": "Garofalo and Others v. Italy (dec.)", "application_numbers": "47269/18", "judgment_year": "2025", "citation_change": "added", @@ -14044,14 +14861,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "", "hudoc_doctype": "", "hudoc_docname": "", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", - "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "II.D.1: General considerations", + "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.D.1|a:15|b:15", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "Conversely, the following are excluded from the concept of \"penalty\" : ▪ preventive measures (including mandatory hospitalisation) imposed on a person lacking criminal responsibility ( Berland v. France, 2015, §§ 39-47); ▪ preventive detention ordered by a trial court following conviction for serious criminal offences, whose conditions of execution were substantially altered under a new legislative framework with a view to treating the prisoner's mental disorder (in particular, in a specialised centre rather than an ordinary prison), such that the measure evolved over time and no longer constituted a penalty ( Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 2018, §§ 210-236) ; ▪ inclusion of an individual on a police or judicial register of sex or violent offenders for preventive and deterrent purposes ( Adamson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 1999; Gardel v. France, 2009, §§ 39-47); ▪ DNAprofiling of convicted persons by the authorities ( Van der Velden v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2006); ▪ detention geared to preventing an individual from engaging in unlawful activities, in view of its preventive nature ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 19); ▪ prohibition of residence (imposed in addition to a prison sentence) following a criminal conviction, the ban being treated as equivalent to a public-order measure ( Renna v. France, 1997, Commission decision; see, mutatis mutandis, under the criminal head of Article 6 § 1, Maaouia v. France [GC], 2000, § 39); ▪ an administrative expulsion order or prohibition of residence ( Vikulov and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2004; C.G. and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2007); ▪ transfer of a sentenced person to another country under the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, which measure is geared to promoting the person's social reintegration into his country of origin ( Szabó v. Sweden (dec.), 2006; Giza v. Poland (dec.), 2010, § 30, as regards the surrender of a sentenced person under the EU Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the procedure for surrenders between Member States,); ▪ a preventive property confiscation order based on suspected belonging to mafia-type organisations, which order was not conditional upon any prior criminal conviction ( M. v. Italy, Commission decision of 1991); ▪ special police surveillance or house arrest of a dangerous person designed to prevent the perpetration of criminal offences ( Mucci v. Italy, Commission decision of 1998; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 43, as regards the criminal aspect of Article 6 § 1); ▪ administrative surveillance for preventive purposes, after convicted persons had served their sentences, as well as subsequent restrictions on their freedom of movement and reporting obligations ( Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, §§ 70-82); ▪ a confiscation order imposed in the framework of criminal proceedings against third parties ( Yildirim v. Italy (dec.), 2003; Bowler International Unit v. France, 2009, §§ 65-68); ▪ a confiscation of assets considered to have illicit origins imposed at the end of the criminal proceedings against the applicants, despite their acquittal on money laundering charges ( Balsamo v. San Marino, 2019, §§ 60-65); ▪ a forfeiture of criminal assets following conviction, ordered in a separate set of proceedings, and considered to be comparable to a civil forfeiture in rem ( Ulemek v. Serbia (dec.), 2021, §§ 46-57); ▪ revocation of an MP's parliamentary mandate and declaration that he had become ineligible following the dissolution of a political party ( Sobac ı v. Turkey (dec.), 2007); ▪ disqualification from standing for election and removal from elected office (Parliament) on account of a final criminal conviction for corruption ( Galan v. Italy (dec.), 2021, §§ 70-97); ▪ impeachment and declaration of ineligibility against a President following impeachment proceedings for serious violation of the Constitution ( Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, §§ 65-68); ▪ suspension of a civil servant's pension rights following disciplinary proceedings ( Haioun v. France (dec.), 2004); ▪ three weekends in solitary confinement ( A. v. Spain, Commission decision of 13 October 1986; Payet v. France, 2011, §§ 94-100, under the criminal aspect of Article 6); ▪ social isolation of a prisoner owing to the fact that the applicant was the only inmate of the prison, in respect of which the Court found that this was such an extraordinary measure that a State could not be reasonably expected to provide details in its legislation on the regime to be applied in such cases ( Öcalan v. Turkey (no. 2), 2001, § 187); ▪ a tax reassessment following the forfeiture of favourable tax treatment, where no penalty had been imposed on the applicant company ( Société Oxygène Plus v. France (dec.), 2016, §§ 40-51); ▪ revocation of license to act as a liquidator in insolvency proceedings ( Rola v. Slovenia, 2019, §§ 60-66); ▪ disciplinary suspension in a professional sports context ( Platini v. Switzerland (dec.), 2020, §§ 44-49).", + "post_text": "Conversely, the following are excluded from the concept of \"penalty\" : ▪ preventive measures (including mandatory hospitalisation) imposed on a person lacking criminal responsibility ( Berland v. France, 2015, §§ 39-47); ▪ preventive detention ordered by a trial court following conviction for serious criminal offences, whose conditions of execution were substantially altered under a new legislative framework with a view to treating the prisoner's mental disorder (in particular, in a specialised centre rather than an ordinary prison), such that the measure evolved over time and no longer constituted a penalty ( Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 2018, §§ 210-236) ; ▪ inclusion of an individual on a police or judicial register of sex or violent offenders for preventive and deterrent purposes ( Adamson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 1999; Gardel v. France, 2009, §§ 39-47); ▪ DNAprofiling of convicted persons by the authorities ( Van der Velden v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2006); ▪ detention geared to preventing an individual from engaging in unlawful activities, in view of its preventive nature ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 19); ▪ prohibition of residence (imposed in addition to a prison sentence) following a criminal conviction, the ban being treated as equivalent to a public-order measure ( Renna v. France, 1997, Commission decision; see, mutatis mutandis, under the criminal head of Article 6 § 1, Maaouia v. France [GC], 2000, § 39); ▪ an administrative expulsion order or prohibition of residence ( Vikulov and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2004; C.G. and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2007); ▪ transfer of a sentenced person to another country under the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, which measure is geared to promoting the person's social reintegration into his country of origin ( Szabó v. Sweden (dec.), 2006; Giza v. Poland (dec.), 2010, § 30, as regards the surrender of a sentenced person under the EU Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the procedure for surrenders between Member States,); ▪ a preventive property confiscation order based on suspected belonging to mafia-type organisations, which order was not conditional upon any prior criminal conviction ( Garofalo and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2025, §§ 80-82 and 99-141); ▪ special police surveillance or house arrest of a dangerous person designed to prevent the perpetration of criminal offences ( Mucci v. Italy, Commission decision of 1998; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 43, as regards the criminal aspect of Article 6 § 1); ▪ administrative surveillance for preventive purposes, after convicted persons had served their sentences, as well as subsequent restrictions on their freedom of movement and reporting obligations ( Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, §§ 70-82); ▪ a confiscation order imposed in the framework of criminal proceedings against third parties ( Yildirim v. Italy (dec.), 2003; Bowler International Unit v. France, 2009, §§ 65-68); ▪ a confiscation of assets considered to have illicit origins imposed at the end of the criminal proceedings against the applicants, despite their acquittal on money laundering charges ( Balsamo v. San Marino, 2019, §§ 60-65); ▪ a forfeiture of criminal assets following conviction, ordered in a separate set of proceedings, and considered to be comparable to a civil forfeiture in rem ( Ulemek v. Serbia (dec.), 2021, §§ 46-57); ▪ revocation of an MP's parliamentary mandate and declaration that he had become ineligible following the dissolution of a political party ( Sobac ı v. Turkey (dec.), 2007); ▪ disqualification from standing for election and removal from elected office (Parliament) on account of a final criminal conviction for corruption ( Galan v. Italy (dec.), 2021, §§ 70-97); ▪ impeachment and declaration of ineligibility against a President following impeachment proceedings for serious violation of the Constitution ( Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, §§ 65-68); ▪ suspension of a civil servant's pension rights following disciplinary proceedings ( Haioun v. France (dec.), 2004); ▪ three weekends in solitary confinement ( A. v. Spain, Commission decision of 13 October 1986; Payet v. France, 2011, §§ 94-100, under the criminal aspect of Article 6); ▪ social isolation of a prisoner owing to the fact that the applicant was the only inmate of the prison, in respect of which the Court found that this was such an extraordinary measure that a State could not be reasonably expected to provide details in its legislation on the regime to be applied in such cases ( Öcalan v. Turkey (no. 2), 2001, § 187); ▪ a tax reassessment following the forfeiture of favourable tax treatment, where no penalty had been imposed on the applicant company ( Société Oxygène Plus v. France (dec.), 2016, §§ 40-51); ▪ revocation of license to act as a liquidator in insolvency proceedings ( Rola v. Slovenia, 2019, §§ 60-66); ▪ disciplinary suspension in a professional sports context ( Platini v. Switzerland (dec.), 2020, §§ 44-49); ▪ demolition order issued by a criminal judge in view of its predominantly restorative nature under national law ( Longo (dec.), 2024, §§ 62-68).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240329131345/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_7_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250604140804/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_7_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/41c295afbaa0/20240329131345__guide_art_7_eng.pdf", @@ -14066,6 +14883,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2024-03-29__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:35780/18", "case_name": "Longo v. Italy (dec.)", @@ -14099,6 +14918,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2024-03-29__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:6232/20|22394/20", "case_name": "Saakashvili v. Georgia", @@ -14132,6 +14953,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2024-03-29__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:39300/18", "case_name": "Sacharuk v. Lithuania", @@ -14165,6 +14988,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2024-03-29__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:12386/86", "case_name": "M. v. Italy", @@ -14182,8 +15007,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.D.1|a:15|b:15", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Conversely, the following are excluded from the concept of \"penalty\" : ▪ preventive measures (including mandatory hospitalisation) imposed on a person lacking criminal responsibility ( Berland v. France, 2015, §§ 39-47); ▪ preventive detention ordered by a trial court following conviction for serious criminal offences, whose conditions of execution were substantially altered under a new legislative framework with a view to treating the prisoner's mental disorder (in particular, in a specialised centre rather than an ordinary prison), such that the measure evolved over time and no longer constituted a penalty ( Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 2018, §§ 210-236) ; ▪ inclusion of an individual on a police or judicial register of sex or violent offenders for preventive and deterrent purposes ( Adamson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 1999; Gardel v. France, 2009, §§ 39-47); ▪ DNA profiling of convicted persons by the authorities ( Van der Velden v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2006); ▪ detention geared to preventing an individual from engaging in unlawful activities, in view of its preventive nature ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 19); ▪ prohibition of residence (imposed in addition to a prison sentence) following a criminal conviction, the ban being treated as equivalent to a public-order measure ( Renna v. France, 1997, Commission decision; see, mutatis mutandis, under the criminal head of Article 6 § 1, Maaouia v. France [GC], 2000, § 39); ▪ an administrative expulsion order or prohibition of residence ( Vikulov and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2004; C.G. and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2007); ▪ transfer of a sentenced person to another country under the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, which measure is geared to promoting the person's social reintegration into his country of origin ( Szabó v. Sweden (dec.), 2006; Giza v. Poland (dec.), 2010, § 30, as regards the surrender of a sentenced person under the EU Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the procedure for surrenders between Member States,); ▪ a preventive property confiscation order based on suspected belonging to mafia-type organisations, which order was not conditional upon any prior criminal conviction ( M. v. Italy, Commission decision of 1991); ▪ special police surveillance or house arrest of a dangerous person designed to prevent the perpetration of criminal offences ( Mucci v. Italy, Commission decision of 1998; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 43, as regards the criminal aspect of Article 6 § 1); ▪ administrative surveillance for preventive purposes, after convicted persons had served their sentences, as well as subsequent restrictions on their freedom of movement and reporting obligations ( Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, §§ 70-82); ▪ a confiscation order imposed in the framework of criminal proceedings against third parties ( Yildirim v. Italy (dec.), 2003; Bowler International Unit v. France, 2009, §§ 65-68); ▪ a confiscation of assets considered to have illicit origins imposed at the end of the criminal proceedings against the applicants, despite their acquittal on money laundering charges ( Balsamo v. San Marino, 2019, §§ 60-65); ▪ a forfeiture of criminal assets following conviction, ordered in a separate set of proceedings, and considered to be comparable to a civil forfeiture in rem ( Ulemek v. Serbia (dec.), 2021, §§ 46-57); ▪ revocation of an MP's parliamentary mandate and declaration that he had become ineligible following the dissolution of a political party ( Sobac ı v. Turkey (dec.), 2007); ▪ disqualification from standing for election and removal from elected office (Parliament) on account of a final criminal conviction for corruption ( Galan v. Italy (dec.), 2021, §§ 70-97); ▪ impeachment and declaration of ineligibility against a President following impeachment proceedings for serious violation of the Constitution ( Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, §§ 65-68); ▪ suspension of a civil servant's pension rights following disciplinary proceedings ( Haioun v. France (dec.), 2004); ▪ three weekends in solitary confinement ( A. v. Spain, Commission decision of 13 October 1986; Payet v. France, 2011, §§ 94-100, under the criminal aspect of Article 6); ▪ social isolation of a prisoner owing to the fact that the applicant was the only inmate of the prison, in respect of which the Court found that this was such an extraordinary measure that a State could not be reasonably expected to provide details in its legislation on the regime to be applied in such cases ( Öcalan v. Turkey (no. 2), 2001, § 187); ▪ a tax reassessment following the forfeiture of favourable tax treatment, where no penalty had been imposed on the applicant company ( Société Oxygène Plus v. France (dec.), 2016, §§ 40-51); ▪ revocation of license to act as a liquidator in insolvency proceedings ( Rola v. Slovenia, 2019, §§ 60-66); ▪ disciplinary suspension in a professional sports context ( Platini v. Switzerland (dec.), 2020, §§ 44-49).", - "post_text": "Conversely, the following are excluded from the concept of \"penalty\" : ▪ preventive measures (including mandatory hospitalisation) imposed on a person lacking criminal responsibility ( Berland v. France, 2015, §§ 39-47); ▪ preventive detention ordered by a trial court following conviction for serious criminal offences, whose conditions of execution were substantially altered under a new legislative framework with a view to treating the prisoner's mental disorder (in particular, in a specialised centre rather than an ordinary prison), such that the measure evolved over time and no longer constituted a penalty ( Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 2018, §§ 210-236) ; ▪ inclusion of an individual on a police or judicial register of sex or violent offenders for preventive and deterrent purposes ( Adamson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 1999; Gardel v. France, 2009, §§ 39-47); ▪ DNA profiling of convicted persons by the authorities ( Van der Velden v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2006); ▪ detention geared to preventing an individual from engaging in unlawful activities, in view of its preventive nature ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 19); ▪ prohibition of residence (imposed in addition to a prison sentence) following a criminal conviction, the ban being treated as equivalent to a public-order measure ( Renna v. France, 1997, Commission decision; see, mutatis mutandis, under the criminal head of Article 6 § 1, Maaouia v. France [GC], 2000, § 39); ▪ an administrative expulsion order or prohibition of residence ( Vikulov and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2004; C.G. and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2007); ▪ transfer of a sentenced person to another country under the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, which measure is geared to promoting the person's social reintegration into his country of origin ( Szabó v. Sweden (dec.), 2006; Giza v. Poland (dec.), 2010, § 30, as regards the surrender of a sentenced person under the EU Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the procedure for surrenders between Member States,); ▪ a preventive property confiscation order based on suspected belonging to mafia-type organisations, which order was not conditional upon any prior criminal conviction ( Garofalo and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2025, §§ 80-82 and 99-141); ▪ special police surveillance or house arrest of a dangerous person designed to prevent the perpetration of criminal offences ( Mucci v. Italy, Commission decision of 1998; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 43, as regards the criminal aspect of Article 6 § 1); ▪ administrative surveillance for preventive purposes, after convicted persons had served their sentences, as well as subsequent restrictions on their freedom of movement and reporting obligations ( Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, §§ 70-82); ▪ a confiscation order imposed in the framework of criminal proceedings against third parties ( Yildirim v. Italy (dec.), 2003; Bowler International Unit v. France, 2009, §§ 65-68); ▪ a confiscation of assets considered to have illicit origins imposed at the end of the criminal proceedings against the applicants, despite their acquittal on money laundering charges ( Balsamo v. San Marino, 2019, §§ 60-65); ▪ a forfeiture of criminal assets following conviction, ordered in a separate set of proceedings, and considered to be comparable to a civil forfeiture in rem ( Ulemek v. Serbia (dec.), 2021, §§ 46-57); ▪ revocation of an MP's parliamentary mandate and declaration that he had become ineligible following the dissolution of a political party ( Sobac ı v. Turkey (dec.), 2007); ▪ disqualification from standing for election and removal from elected office (Parliament) on account of a final criminal conviction for corruption ( Galan v. Italy (dec.), 2021, §§ 70-97); ▪ impeachment and declaration of ineligibility against a President following impeachment proceedings for serious violation of the Constitution ( Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, §§ 65-68); ▪ suspension of a civil servant's pension rights following disciplinary proceedings ( Haioun v. France (dec.), 2004); ▪ three weekends in solitary confinement ( A. v. Spain, Commission decision of 13 October 1986; Payet v. France, 2011, §§ 94-100, under the criminal aspect of Article 6); ▪ social isolation of a prisoner owing to the fact that the applicant was the only inmate of the prison, in respect of which the Court found that this was such an extraordinary measure that a State could not be reasonably expected to provide details in its legislation on the regime to be applied in such cases ( Öcalan v. Turkey (no. 2), 2001, § 187); ▪ a tax reassessment following the forfeiture of favourable tax treatment, where no penalty had been imposed on the applicant company ( Société Oxygène Plus v. France (dec.), 2016, §§ 40-51); ▪ revocation of license to act as a liquidator in insolvency proceedings ( Rola v. Slovenia, 2019, §§ 60-66); ▪ disciplinary suspension in a professional sports context ( Platini v. Switzerland (dec.), 2020, §§ 44-49); ▪ demolition order issued by a criminal judge in view of its predominantly restorative nature under national law ( Longo (dec.), 2024, §§ 62-68).", + "pre_text": "Conversely, the following are excluded from the concept of \"penalty\" : ▪ preventive measures (including mandatory hospitalisation) imposed on a person lacking criminal responsibility ( Berland v. France, 2015, §§ 39-47); ▪ preventive detention ordered by a trial court following conviction for serious criminal offences, whose conditions of execution were substantially altered under a new legislative framework with a view to treating the prisoner's mental disorder (in particular, in a specialised centre rather than an ordinary prison), such that the measure evolved over time and no longer constituted a penalty ( Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 2018, §§ 210-236) ; ▪ inclusion of an individual on a police or judicial register of sex or violent offenders for preventive and deterrent purposes ( Adamson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 1999; Gardel v. France, 2009, §§ 39-47); ▪ DNAprofiling of convicted persons by the authorities ( Van der Velden v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2006); ▪ detention geared to preventing an individual from engaging in unlawful activities, in view of its preventive nature ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 19); ▪ prohibition of residence (imposed in addition to a prison sentence) following a criminal conviction, the ban being treated as equivalent to a public-order measure ( Renna v. France, 1997, Commission decision; see, mutatis mutandis, under the criminal head of Article 6 § 1, Maaouia v. France [GC], 2000, § 39); ▪ an administrative expulsion order or prohibition of residence ( Vikulov and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2004; C.G. and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2007); ▪ transfer of a sentenced person to another country under the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, which measure is geared to promoting the person's social reintegration into his country of origin ( Szabó v. Sweden (dec.), 2006; Giza v. Poland (dec.), 2010, § 30, as regards the surrender of a sentenced person under the EU Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the procedure for surrenders between Member States,); ▪ a preventive property confiscation order based on suspected belonging to mafia-type organisations, which order was not conditional upon any prior criminal conviction ( M. v. Italy, Commission decision of 1991); ▪ special police surveillance or house arrest of a dangerous person designed to prevent the perpetration of criminal offences ( Mucci v. Italy, Commission decision of 1998; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 43, as regards the criminal aspect of Article 6 § 1); ▪ administrative surveillance for preventive purposes, after convicted persons had served their sentences, as well as subsequent restrictions on their freedom of movement and reporting obligations ( Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, §§ 70-82); ▪ a confiscation order imposed in the framework of criminal proceedings against third parties ( Yildirim v. Italy (dec.), 2003; Bowler International Unit v. France, 2009, §§ 65-68); ▪ a confiscation of assets considered to have illicit origins imposed at the end of the criminal proceedings against the applicants, despite their acquittal on money laundering charges ( Balsamo v. San Marino, 2019, §§ 60-65); ▪ a forfeiture of criminal assets following conviction, ordered in a separate set of proceedings, and considered to be comparable to a civil forfeiture in rem ( Ulemek v. Serbia (dec.), 2021, §§ 46-57); ▪ revocation of an MP's parliamentary mandate and declaration that he had become ineligible following the dissolution of a political party ( Sobac ı v. Turkey (dec.), 2007); ▪ disqualification from standing for election and removal from elected office (Parliament) on account of a final criminal conviction for corruption ( Galan v. Italy (dec.), 2021, §§ 70-97); ▪ impeachment and declaration of ineligibility against a President following impeachment proceedings for serious violation of the Constitution ( Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, §§ 65-68); ▪ suspension of a civil servant's pension rights following disciplinary proceedings ( Haioun v. France (dec.), 2004); ▪ three weekends in solitary confinement ( A. v. Spain, Commission decision of 13 October 1986; Payet v. France, 2011, §§ 94-100, under the criminal aspect of Article 6); ▪ social isolation of a prisoner owing to the fact that the applicant was the only inmate of the prison, in respect of which the Court found that this was such an extraordinary measure that a State could not be reasonably expected to provide details in its legislation on the regime to be applied in such cases ( Öcalan v. Turkey (no. 2), 2001, § 187); ▪ a tax reassessment following the forfeiture of favourable tax treatment, where no penalty had been imposed on the applicant company ( Société Oxygène Plus v. France (dec.), 2016, §§ 40-51); ▪ revocation of license to act as a liquidator in insolvency proceedings ( Rola v. Slovenia, 2019, §§ 60-66); ▪ disciplinary suspension in a professional sports context ( Platini v. Switzerland (dec.), 2020, §§ 44-49).", + "post_text": "Conversely, the following are excluded from the concept of \"penalty\" : ▪ preventive measures (including mandatory hospitalisation) imposed on a person lacking criminal responsibility ( Berland v. France, 2015, §§ 39-47); ▪ preventive detention ordered by a trial court following conviction for serious criminal offences, whose conditions of execution were substantially altered under a new legislative framework with a view to treating the prisoner's mental disorder (in particular, in a specialised centre rather than an ordinary prison), such that the measure evolved over time and no longer constituted a penalty ( Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 2018, §§ 210-236) ; ▪ inclusion of an individual on a police or judicial register of sex or violent offenders for preventive and deterrent purposes ( Adamson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 1999; Gardel v. France, 2009, §§ 39-47); ▪ DNAprofiling of convicted persons by the authorities ( Van der Velden v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2006); ▪ detention geared to preventing an individual from engaging in unlawful activities, in view of its preventive nature ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 19); ▪ prohibition of residence (imposed in addition to a prison sentence) following a criminal conviction, the ban being treated as equivalent to a public-order measure ( Renna v. France, 1997, Commission decision; see, mutatis mutandis, under the criminal head of Article 6 § 1, Maaouia v. France [GC], 2000, § 39); ▪ an administrative expulsion order or prohibition of residence ( Vikulov and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2004; C.G. and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2007); ▪ transfer of a sentenced person to another country under the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, which measure is geared to promoting the person's social reintegration into his country of origin ( Szabó v. Sweden (dec.), 2006; Giza v. Poland (dec.), 2010, § 30, as regards the surrender of a sentenced person under the EU Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the procedure for surrenders between Member States,); ▪ a preventive property confiscation order based on suspected belonging to mafia-type organisations, which order was not conditional upon any prior criminal conviction ( Garofalo and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2025, §§ 80-82 and 99-141); ▪ special police surveillance or house arrest of a dangerous person designed to prevent the perpetration of criminal offences ( Mucci v. Italy, Commission decision of 1998; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 43, as regards the criminal aspect of Article 6 § 1); ▪ administrative surveillance for preventive purposes, after convicted persons had served their sentences, as well as subsequent restrictions on their freedom of movement and reporting obligations ( Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, §§ 70-82); ▪ a confiscation order imposed in the framework of criminal proceedings against third parties ( Yildirim v. Italy (dec.), 2003; Bowler International Unit v. France, 2009, §§ 65-68); ▪ a confiscation of assets considered to have illicit origins imposed at the end of the criminal proceedings against the applicants, despite their acquittal on money laundering charges ( Balsamo v. San Marino, 2019, §§ 60-65); ▪ a forfeiture of criminal assets following conviction, ordered in a separate set of proceedings, and considered to be comparable to a civil forfeiture in rem ( Ulemek v. Serbia (dec.), 2021, §§ 46-57); ▪ revocation of an MP's parliamentary mandate and declaration that he had become ineligible following the dissolution of a political party ( Sobac ı v. Turkey (dec.), 2007); ▪ disqualification from standing for election and removal from elected office (Parliament) on account of a final criminal conviction for corruption ( Galan v. Italy (dec.), 2021, §§ 70-97); ▪ impeachment and declaration of ineligibility against a President following impeachment proceedings for serious violation of the Constitution ( Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, §§ 65-68); ▪ suspension of a civil servant's pension rights following disciplinary proceedings ( Haioun v. France (dec.), 2004); ▪ three weekends in solitary confinement ( A. v. Spain, Commission decision of 13 October 1986; Payet v. France, 2011, §§ 94-100, under the criminal aspect of Article 6); ▪ social isolation of a prisoner owing to the fact that the applicant was the only inmate of the prison, in respect of which the Court found that this was such an extraordinary measure that a State could not be reasonably expected to provide details in its legislation on the regime to be applied in such cases ( Öcalan v. Turkey (no. 2), 2001, § 187); ▪ a tax reassessment following the forfeiture of favourable tax treatment, where no penalty had been imposed on the applicant company ( Société Oxygène Plus v. France (dec.), 2016, §§ 40-51); ▪ revocation of license to act as a liquidator in insolvency proceedings ( Rola v. Slovenia, 2019, §§ 60-66); ▪ disciplinary suspension in a professional sports context ( Platini v. Switzerland (dec.), 2020, §§ 44-49); ▪ demolition order issued by a criminal judge in view of its predominantly restorative nature under national law ( Longo (dec.), 2024, §§ 62-68).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240329131345/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_7_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250604140804/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_7_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/41c295afbaa0/20240329131345__guide_art_7_eng.pdf", @@ -14198,6 +15023,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-06", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/54e38e09f96e/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json", "case_key": "apps:24408/16", "case_name": "Szolcsán v. Hungary", @@ -14215,8 +15042,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.C.3|a:58|b:61", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "However, the mere enrolment in schools of Roma children does not suffice for a finding of compliance with Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. In this connection, the Court has relied extensively on reports by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) ( Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC]; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC]). The enrolment must also take place in satisfactory conditions. The Court accepted that a State's decision to retain the special-school system was motivated by the desire to find a solution for children with special educational needs (ibid., § 198). Similarly, temporary placement of children in a separate class on the ground that they lack an adequate command of the language is not, as such, automatically in breach of Article 14 ( Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], § 157). However, the misplacement of Roma children in special schools has a long history across Europe ( Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, § 115). Consequently, schooling arrangements for Roma children must be attended by safeguards that ensure that the State takes into account their special needs ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], § 207; Sampanis and Others v. Greece, § 103). The decision must be transparent and based on clearly defined criteria, not only ethnic origin (ibid., § 89; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], § 182). Lastly, such measures cannot be regarded as reasonable and proportionate where they result in an education which compounds the difficulties of Roma children and compromises their subsequent personal development instead of tackling their real problems or helping them to integrate into the ordinary schools and develop the skills that would facilitate life among the majority population ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, § 207). A lack of discriminatory intent is not sufficient. The States are under a positive obligation to take positive effective measures against segregation ( Lavida and Others v. Greece, § 73; Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 77-78).", - "post_text": "However, the mere enrolment in schools of Roma children does not suffice for a finding of compliance with Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. In this connection, the Court has relied extensively on reports by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) ( Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007). The enrolment must also take place in satisfactory conditions. The Court accepted that a State's decision to retain the special-school system was motivated by the desire to find a solution for children with special educational needs (ibid., § 198). Similarly, temporary placement of children in a separate class on the ground that they lack an adequate command of the language is not, as such, automatically in breach of Article 14 ( Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010, § 157). However, the misplacement of Roma children in special schools has a long history across Europe ( Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 2013, § 115). Consequently, schooling arrangements for Roma children must be attended by safeguards that ensure that the State takes into account their special needs ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 207; Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008, § 103). The decision must be transparent and based on clearly defined criteria, not only ethnic origin (ibid., § 89; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010, § 182). Lastly, such measures cannot be regarded as reasonable and proportionate where they result in an education which compounds the difficulties of Roma children and compromises their subsequent personal development instead of tackling their real problems or helping them to integrate into the ordinary schools and develop the skills that would facilitate life among the majority population ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, § 207). A lack of discriminatory intent is not sufficient. The States are under a positive obligation to take positive effective measures against segregation ( Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013, § 73; Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 77-78; Szolcsán v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 55-59).", + "pre_text": "However, the mere enrolment in schools of Roma children does not suffice for a finding of compliance with Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. In this connection, the Court has relied extensively on reports by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) ( Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC]; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC]). The enrolment must also take place in satisfactory conditions. The Court accepted that a State's decision to retain the special-school system was motivated by the desire to find a solution for children with special educational needs (ibid., § 198). Similarly, temporary placement of children in a separate class on the ground that they lack an adequate command of the language is not, as such, automatically in breach of Article 14 ( Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], § 157). However, the misplacement of Roma children in special schools has a long history across Europe ( Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, § 115). Consequently, schooling arrangements for Roma children must be attended by safeguards that ensure that the State takes into account their special needs ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], § 207; Sampanis and Others v. Greece, § 103). The decision must be transparent and based on clearly defined criteria, not only ethnic origin (ibid., § 89; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], § 182). Lastly, such measures cannot be regarded as reasonable and proportionate where they result in an education which compounds the difficulties of Roma children and compromises their subsequent personal development instead of tackling their real problems or helping them to integrate into the ordinary schools and develop the skills that would facilitate life among the majority population ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, § 207). Alack of discriminatory intent is not sufficient. The States are under a positive obligation to take positive effective measures against segregation ( Lavida and Others v. Greece, § 73; Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 77-78).", + "post_text": "However, the mere enrolment in schools of Roma children does not suffice for a finding of compliance with Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. In this connection, the Court has relied extensively on reports by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) ( Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007). The enrolment must also take place in satisfactory conditions. The Court accepted that a State's decision to retain the special-school system was motivated by the desire to find a solution for children with special educational needs (ibid., § 198). Similarly, temporary placement of children in a separate class on the ground that they lack an adequate command of the language is not, as such, automatically in breach of Article 14 ( Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010, § 157). However, the misplacement of Roma children in special schools has a long history across Europe ( Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 2013, § 115). Consequently, schooling arrangements for Roma children must be attended by safeguards that ensure that the State takes into account their special needs ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 207; Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008, § 103). The decision must be transparent and based on clearly defined criteria, not only ethnic origin (ibid., § 89; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010, § 182). Lastly, such measures cannot be regarded as reasonable and proportionate where they result in an education which compounds the difficulties of Roma children and compromises their subsequent personal development instead of tackling their real problems or helping them to integrate into the ordinary schools and develop the skills that would facilitate life among the majority population ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, § 207). Alack of discriminatory intent is not sufficient. The States are under a positive obligation to take positive effective measures against segregation ( Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013, § 73; Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 77-78; Szolcsán v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 55-59).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923140435/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231206105032/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/54e38e09f96e/20230923140435__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf", @@ -14231,6 +15058,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-06", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/54e38e09f96e/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json", "case_key": "apps:46519/20", "case_name": "T.H. v. Bulgaria", @@ -14264,6 +15093,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-06", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/54e38e09f96e/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json", "case_key": "apps:66763/17", "case_name": "Telek v. Türkiye", @@ -14297,6 +15128,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-06", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/54e38e09f96e/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json", "case_key": "apps:51188/99", "case_name": "Jiménez Alonso and Jiménez Merino v. Spain (dec.)", @@ -14330,23 +15163,25 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/54e38e09f96e/diff_2023-12-06__2024-03-30.json", "case_key": "apps:56928/19", - "case_name": "Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 56928/19 and 2 others", + "case_name": "Valiullina and Others v. Latvia", "application_numbers": "56928/19", "judgment_year": "2023", "citation_change": "added", "citation_text": "Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 56928/19 and 2 others, 14 September 2023", - "hudoc_itemid": "", - "hudoc_importance_level": "", - "hudoc_doctype": "", - "hudoc_docname": "", + "hudoc_itemid": "001-226485", + "hudoc_importance_level": "3", + "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", + "hudoc_docname": "VALIULLINA AND OTHERS v. LATVIA", "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", "linked_paragraph_count": 1, "linked_sections": "II.B.1: Language", "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.B.1|a:None|b:19", - "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match", + "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", "post_text": "However, the Court has found that the right enshrined in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 does not guarantee education in a specific language; it guarantees the right to receive education in a national language, i.e. an official language of the country in question ( Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 2023, § 135). Thus in the case of Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 2023 (§ 135), as Latvian was the sole official language of the State, the applicants were not entitled, by relying on Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, to complain of a reduction in the use of Russian as a language of instruction in Latvian State schools. They had not submitted any specific arguments in support of their allegation that the restrictions had had a negative impact on the possibility for them to receive an education. The Court also found that the legislative reform which had, in State schools, increased the proportion of subjects to be taught in Latvian and reduced the use of Russian did not breach Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 ( Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 2023, §§ 145-215).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231206105032/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng", @@ -14363,6 +15198,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-04-24", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/54e38e09f96e/diff_2024-03-30__2025-04-24.json", "case_key": "apps:50942/20|2022/21", "case_name": "Djeri and Others v. Latvia", @@ -14396,6 +15233,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-04-24", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/54e38e09f96e/diff_2024-03-30__2025-04-24.json", "case_key": "apps:225/20", "case_name": "Džibuti and Others v. Latvia", @@ -14429,6 +15268,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-04-24", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/54e38e09f96e/diff_2024-03-30__2025-04-24.json", "case_key": "apps:37614/22", "case_name": "S. v. the Czech Republic", @@ -14446,8 +15287,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added|unchanged|minor_edit", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A|a:12|b:12|II.B.8|a:46|b:46|II.C.1|a:54|b:54|II.C.3|a:60|b:60|II.C.3|a:62|b:62", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 concerns elementary schooling ( Sulak v. Turkey, Commission decision, 1996) but also secondary education ( Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 2001, § 278), higher education ( Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], 2005, § 141; Mürsel Eren v. Turkey, 2006, § 41) and specialised courses including doctoral studies ( Telek v. Türkiye, 2023, §§ 133-134). Primary and secondary education is of fundamental importance for each child's personal development and future success ( Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 144). The holders of the right guaranteed in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 are children, but also adults, or indeed any person wishing to benefit from the right to education ( Velyo Velev v. Bulgaria, 2014).\n\nA fine imposed on a parent and the exclusion of her children from nursery school for not complying with the legal obligation to vaccinate children had not entailed a violation of Article 8 of the Convention ( Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2021). The Court thus found that it did not need to examine the applications separately under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.\n\nIn the case of Sanlısoy v. Turkey (dec.), 2016, the applicant had complained of a discriminatory breach of his right to education on account of his autism. After examining the facts of the case and the minor's situation, the Court found that there had not been a systemic denial of the applicant's right to education on account of his autism or a failure by the State to fulfil its obligations under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 taken together with Article 14 of the Convention. It thus dismissed the application. The same conclusion was reached in Dupin v. France (dec.), 2018, concerning an autistic child who had been denied admission to a mainstream school and directed to a specialised institution. However, the inability for an autistic child to receive the specialised learning support to which she was entitled by law, during her first two years of primary school, had entailed a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 ( G.L. v. Italy, 2020). The national authorities had not determined the child's real needs or the possible solutions to allow her to attend primary school in conditions that were equivalent as far as possible to those enjoyed by other pupils, without imposing a disproportionate or undue burden on the administration.\n\nThe Court has addressed in many cases the difficulties relating to the education of Roma children in a number of European States ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 205). As a result of their turbulent history and constant uprooting the Roma have become a specific type of disadvantaged and vulnerable minority. They therefore require special protection and this protection extends to the sphere of education (ibid., § 182).\n\nHowever, the mere enrolment in schools of Roma children does not suffice for a finding of compliance with Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. In this connection, the Court has relied extensively on reports by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) ( Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007). The enrolment must also take place in satisfactory conditions. The Court accepted that a State's decision to retain the special-school system was motivated by the desire to find a solution for children with special educational needs (ibid., § 198). Similarly, temporary placement of children in a separate class on the ground that they lack an adequate command of the language is not, as such, automatically in breach of Article 14 ( Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010, § 157). However, the misplacement of Roma children in special schools has a long history across Europe ( Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 2013, § 115). Consequently, schooling arrangements for Roma children must be attended by safeguards that ensure that the State takes into account their special needs ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 207; Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008, § 103). The decision must be transparent and based on clearly defined criteria, not only ethnic origin (ibid., § 89; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010, § 182). Lastly, such measures cannot be regarded as reasonable and proportionate where they result in an education which compounds the difficulties of Roma children and compromises their subsequent personal development instead of tackling their real problems or helping them to integrate into the ordinary schools and develop the skills that would facilitate life among the majority population ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, § 207). A lack of discriminatory intent is not sufficient. The States are under a positive obligation to take positive effective measures against segregation ( Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013, § 73; Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 77-78; Szolcsán v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 55-59).", - "post_text": "Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 concerns mandatory schooling at pre-school level (see Djeri and Others v. Latvia, 2024, §§ 118 and 122, while the Court also found there that voluntary schooling at that level, for children of between one and a half and five, where the emphasis was on their care and overall development, did not fall within its scope ( ibid., §§ 118-119 and 121); see also the reference to preschool under Article 8 in the case of Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], §§ 306-307, 2021); primary schools ( Sulak v. Turkey, Commission decision, 1996); but also secondary education ( Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 2001, § 278), higher education ( Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], 2005, § 141; Mürsel Eren v. Turkey, 2006, § 41) and specialised courses including doctoral studies ( Telek v. Türkiye, 2023, §§ 133-134). Primary and secondary education is of fundamental importance for each child's personal development and future success ( Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 144). The holders of the right guaranteed in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 are children, but also adults, or indeed any person wishing to benefit from the right to education ( Velyo Velev v. Bulgaria, 2014).\n\nA fine imposed on a parent and the exclusion of her children from nursery school for not complying with the legal obligation to vaccinate children had not entailed a violation of Article 8 of the Convention ( Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2021). The Court thus found that it did not need to examine the applications separately under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.\n\nIn the case of Sanlısoy v. Turkey (dec.), 2016, the applicant had complained of a discriminatory breach of his right to education on account of his autism. After examining the facts of the case and the minor's situation, the Court found that there had not been a systemic denial of the applicant's right to education on account of his autism or a failure by the State to fulfil its obligations under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 taken together with Article 14 of the Convention. It thus dismissed the application. The same conclusion was reached in Dupin v. France (dec.), 2018, concerning an autistic child who had been denied admission to a mainstream school and directed to a specialised institution. Similarly, in a case of an autistic child enrolled in a mainstream primary school without his parents being clear about his disability and without them displaying due cooperation, the Court noted that supportive measures had been adopted by the school once the applicant's educational needs had been identified and concluded that the school could not be blamed for not having been sufficiently diligent in securing him equivalent conditions, as far as possible, to those enjoyed by other children ( S. v. the Czech Republic, 2024, §§ 45-54). However, the inability for an autistic child to receive the specialised learning support to which she was entitled by law, during her first two years of primary school, had entailed a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 ( G.L. v. Italy, 2020). The national authorities had not determined the child's real needs or the possible solutions to allow her to attend primary school in conditions that were equivalent as far as possible to those enjoyed by other pupils, without imposing a disproportionate or undue burden on the administration.\n\nThe Court has addressed in many cases the difficulties relating to the education of Roma children in a number of European States ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 205). As a result of their turbulent history and constant uprooting the Roma have become a specific type of disadvantaged and vulnerable minority. They therefore require special protection and this protection extends to the sphere of education (ibid., § 182).\n\nHowever, the mere enrolment in schools of Roma children does not suffice for a finding of compliance with Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. In this connection, the Court has relied extensively on reports by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) ( Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007). The enrolment must also take place in satisfactory conditions. The Court accepted that a State's decision to retain the special-school system was motivated by the desire to find a solution for children with special educational needs (ibid., § 198). Similarly, temporary placement of children in a separate class on the ground that they lack an adequate command of the language is not, as such, automatically in breach of Article 14 ( Oršuš and Oth ers v. Croatia [GC], 2010, § 157). However, the misplacement of Roma children in special schools has a long history across Europe ( Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 2013, § 115). Consequently, schooling arrangements for Roma children must be attended by safeguards that ensure that the State takes into account their special needs ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 207; Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008, § 85). The decision must be transparent and based on clearly defined criteria, not only ethnic origin (ibid., § 89; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010, § 182). Lastly, such measures cannot be regarded as reasonable and proportionate where they result in an education which compounds the difficulties of Roma children and compromises their subsequent personal development instead of tackling their real problems or helping them to integrate into the ordinary schools and develop the skills that would facilitate life among the majority population ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, § 207). A lack of discriminatory intent is not sufficient. The States are under a positive obligation to take positive effective measures against segregation ( Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013, § 73; Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 77-78; Szolcsán v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 55-59).", + "pre_text": "Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 concerns elementary schooling ( Sulak v. Turkey, Commission decision, 1996) but also secondary education ( Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 2001, § 278), higher education ( Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], 2005, § 141; Mürsel Eren v. Turkey, 2006, § 41) and specialised courses including doctoral studies ( Telek v. Türkiye, 2023, §§ 133-134). Primary and secondary education is of fundamental importance for each child's personal development and future success ( Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 144). The holders of the right guaranteed in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 are children, but also adults, or indeed any person wishing to benefit from the right to education ( Velyo Velev v. Bulgaria, 2014).\n\nAfine imposed on a parent and the exclusion of her children from nursery school for not complying with the legal obligation to vaccinate children had not entailed a violation of Article 8 of the Convention ( Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2021). The Court thus found that it did not need to examine the applications separately under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.\n\nIn the case of Sanlısoy v. Turkey (dec.), 2016, the applicant had complained of a discriminatory breach of his right to education on account of his autism. After examining the facts of the case and the minor's situation, the Court found that there had not been a systemic denial of the applicant's right to education on account of his autism or a failure by the State to fulfil its obligations under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 taken together with Article 14 of the Convention. It thus dismissed the application. The same conclusion was reached in Dupin v. France (dec.), 2018, concerning an autistic child who had been denied admission to a mainstream school and directed to a specialised institution. However, the inability for an autistic child to receive the specialised learning support to which she was entitled by law, during her first two years of primary school, had entailed a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 ( G.L. v. Italy, 2020). The national authorities had not determined the child's real needs or the possible solutions to allow her to attend primary school in conditions that were equivalent as far as possible to those enjoyed by other pupils, without imposing a disproportionate or undue burden on the administration.\n\nThe Court has addressed in many cases the difficulties relating to the education of Roma children in a number of European States ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 205). As a result of their turbulent history and constant uprooting the Roma have become a specific type of disadvantaged and vulnerable minority. They therefore require special protection and this protection extends to the sphere of education (ibid., § 182).\n\nHowever, the mere enrolment in schools of Roma children does not suffice for a finding of compliance with Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. In this connection, the Court has relied extensively on reports by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) ( Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007). The enrolment must also take place in satisfactory conditions. The Court accepted that a State's decision to retain the special-school system was motivated by the desire to find a solution for children with special educational needs (ibid., § 198). Similarly, temporary placement of children in a separate class on the ground that they lack an adequate command of the language is not, as such, automatically in breach of Article 14 ( Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010, § 157). However, the misplacement of Roma children in special schools has a long history across Europe ( Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 2013, § 115). Consequently, schooling arrangements for Roma children must be attended by safeguards that ensure that the State takes into account their special needs ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 207; Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008, § 103). The decision must be transparent and based on clearly defined criteria, not only ethnic origin (ibid., § 89; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010, § 182). Lastly, such measures cannot be regarded as reasonable and proportionate where they result in an education which compounds the difficulties of Roma children and compromises their subsequent personal development instead of tackling their real problems or helping them to integrate into the ordinary schools and develop the skills that would facilitate life among the majority population ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, § 207). Alack of discriminatory intent is not sufficient. The States are under a positive obligation to take positive effective measures against segregation ( Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013, § 73; Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 77-78; Szolcsán v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 55-59).", + "post_text": "Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 concerns mandatory schooling at pre-school level (see Djeri and Others v. Latvia, 2024, §§ 118 and 122, while the Court also found there that voluntary schooling at that level, for children of between one and a half and five, where the emphasis was on their care and overall development, did not fall within its scope ( ibid., §§ 118-119 and 121); see also the reference to preschool under Article 8 in the case of Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], §§ 306-307, 2021); primary schools ( Sulak v. Turkey, Commission decision, 1996); but also secondary education ( Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 2001, § 278), higher education ( Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], 2005, § 141; Mürsel Eren v. Turkey, 2006, § 41) and specialised courses including doctoral studies ( Telek v. Türkiye, 2023, §§ 133-134). Primary and secondary education is of fundamental importance for each child's personal development and future success ( Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 144). The holders of the right guaranteed in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 are children, but also adults, or indeed any person wishing to benefit from the right to education ( Velyo Velev v. Bulgaria, 2014).\n\nAfine imposed on a parent and the exclusion of her children from nursery school for not complying with the legal obligation to vaccinate children had not entailed a violation of Article 8 of the Convention ( Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2021). The Court thus found that it did not need to examine the applications separately under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.\n\nIn the case of Sanlısoy v. Turkey (dec.), 2016, the applicant had complained of a discriminatory breach of his right to education on account of his autism. After examining the facts of the case and the minor's situation, the Court found that there had not been a systemic denial of the applicant's right to education on account of his autism or a failure by the State to fulfil its obligations under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 taken together with Article 14 of the Convention. It thus dismissed the application. The same conclusion was reached in Dupin v. France (dec.), 2018, concerning an autistic child who had been denied admission to a mainstream school and directed to a specialised institution. Similarly, in a case of an autistic child enrolled in a mainstream primary school without his parents being clear about his disability and without them displaying due cooperation, the Court noted that supportive measures had been adopted by the school once the applicant's educational needs had been identified and concluded that the school could not be blamed for not having been sufficiently diligent in securing him equivalent conditions, as far as possible, to those enjoyed by other children ( S. v. the Czech Republic, 2024, §§ 45-54). However, the inability for an autistic child to receive the specialised learning support to which she was entitled by law, during her first two years of primary school, had entailed a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 ( G.L. v. Italy, 2020). The national authorities had not determined the child's real needs or the possible solutions to allow her to attend primary school in conditions that were equivalent as far as possible to those enjoyed by other pupils, without imposing a disproportionate or undue burden on the administration.\n\nThe Court has addressed in many cases the difficulties relating to the education of Roma children in a number of European States ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 205). As a result of their turbulent history and constant uprooting the Roma have become a specific type of disadvantaged and vulnerable minority. They therefore require special protection and this protection extends to the sphere of education (ibid., § 182).\n\nHowever, the mere enrolment in schools of Roma children does not suffice for a finding of compliance with Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. In this connection, the Court has relied extensively on reports by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) ( Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007). The enrolment must also take place in satisfactory conditions. The Court accepted that a State's decision to retain the special-school system was motivated by the desire to find a solution for children with special educational needs (ibid., § 198). Similarly, temporary placement of children in a separate class on the ground that they lack an adequate command of the language is not, as such, automatically in breach of Article 14 ( Oršuš and Oth ers v. Croatia [GC], 2010, § 157). However, the misplacement of Roma children in special schools has a long history across Europe ( Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 2013, § 115). Consequently, schooling arrangements for Roma children must be attended by safeguards that ensure that the State takes into account their special needs ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 207; Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008, § 85). The decision must be transparent and based on clearly defined criteria, not only ethnic origin (ibid., § 89; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010, § 182). Lastly, such measures cannot be regarded as reasonable and proportionate where they result in an education which compounds the difficulties of Roma children and compromises their subsequent personal development instead of tackling their real problems or helping them to integrate into the ordinary schools and develop the skills that would facilitate life among the majority population ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, § 207). Alack of discriminatory intent is not sufficient. The States are under a positive obligation to take positive effective measures against segregation ( Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013, § 73; Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 77-78; Szolcsán v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 55-59).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240330184031/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250424203515/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/54e38e09f96e/20240330184031__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf", @@ -14462,6 +15303,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:31349/20", "case_name": "Chkhartishvili v. Georgia", @@ -14495,6 +15338,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:62239/12", "case_name": "Kaymak and Others v. Türkiye", @@ -14528,6 +15373,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:58262/10", "case_name": "Kazan v. Türkiye", @@ -14561,6 +15408,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:2134/23", "case_name": "Pivkina and Others v. Russia (dec.)", @@ -14594,9 +15443,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:37949/18", - "case_name": "Andrey Rylkov Foundation and Others v. Russia,* nos. 37949/18 and 83 others", + "case_name": "Andrey Rylkov Foundation and Others v. Russia", "application_numbers": "37949/18", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -14605,14 +15456,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "", "hudoc_doctype": "", "hudoc_docname": "", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "II.D.1: Prescribed by law", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.D.1|a:None|b:157", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "In Andrey Rylkov Foundation and Others v. Russia,* 2024, the Court similarly found that the law on \"undesirable organisations\" failed to satisfy the \"prescribed by law\" criterion as it was not formulated with sufficient precision to enable the applicant organisations to foresee that their lawful actions would result in their designation as \"undesirable\" and a prohibition of their activities in Russia. In addition, there were no effective judicial safeguards against the essentially unrestricted discretion granted to the executive authorities (§§ 89-95).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240405192605/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_11_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930063355/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_11_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/684d373b17e9/20240405192605__guide_art_11_eng.pdf", @@ -14627,6 +15478,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:26821/17", "case_name": "Association of People of Silesian Nationality (in liquidation) v. Poland", @@ -14660,6 +15513,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:1162/22", "case_name": "Auray and Others v. France", @@ -14677,8 +15532,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.E.1|a:51|b:52", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "A refusal to allow an individual to travel for the purpose of attending a meeting amounts to an interference as well ( Djavit An v. Turkey, 2003, §§ 61-62; see also Kasparov v. Russia, 2016, § 67, and Alıcı and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 48, both concerning the applicants'unjustified deprivation of liberty on their way to demonstrations preventing them from taking part in the events). So too do measures taken by the authorities during a rally, such as its dispersal or the arrest of those taking part in it, and penalties imposed for having taken part in ( Kasparov and Others v. Russia, 2013, § 84; Gafgaz Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2015, § 50). Police applying force against peaceful participants during the dispersal of an assembly or for maintaining public order constitutes an interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly ( Laguna Guzman v. Spain, 2020, § 42; Zakharov and Varzhabetyan v. Russia, 2020, § 88).", - "post_text": "A refusal to allow an individual to travel for the purpose of attending a meeting amounts to an interference as well ( Djavit An v. Turkey, 2003, §§ 61-62; see also Kasparov v. Russia, 2016, § 67, and Alıcı and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 48, both concerning the applicants'unjustified deprivation of liberty on their way to demonstrations preventing them from taking part in the events; see also Auray and Others v. France, 2024, §§ 65-74 and 84-95, concerning the applicants prevented from attending an assembly by the police applying the \"kettling\" technique ). So too do measures taken by the authorities during a rally, such as its dispersal or the arrest of those taking part in it, and penalties imposed for having taken part in ( Kasparov and Others v. Russia, 2013, § 84; Gafgaz Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2015, § 50). Police applying force against peaceful participants during the dispersal of an assembly or for maintaining public order constitutes an interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly ( Laguna Guzman v. Spain, 2020, § 42; Zakharov and Varzhabetyan v. Russia, 2020, § 88).", + "pre_text": "Arefusal to allow an individual to travel for the purpose of attending a meeting amounts to an interference as well ( Djavit An v. Turkey, 2003, §§ 61-62; see also Kasparov v. Russia, 2016, § 67, and Alıcı and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 48, both concerning the applicants'unjustified deprivation of liberty on their way to demonstrations preventing them from taking part in the events). So too do measures taken by the authorities during a rally, such as its dispersal or the arrest of those taking part in it, and penalties imposed for having taken part in ( Kasparov and Others v. Russia, 2013, § 84; Gafgaz Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2015, § 50). Police applying force against peaceful participants during the dispersal of an assembly or for maintaining public order constitutes an interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly ( Laguna Guzman v. Spain, 2020, § 42; Zakharov and Varzhabetyan v. Russia, 2020, § 88).", + "post_text": "Arefusal to allow an individual to travel for the purpose of attending a meeting amounts to an interference as well ( Djavit An v. Turkey, 2003, §§ 61-62; see also Kasparov v. Russia, 2016, § 67, and Alıcı and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 48, both concerning the applicants'unjustified deprivation of liberty on their way to demonstrations preventing them from taking part in the events; see also Auray and Others v. France, 2024, §§ 65-74 and 84-95, concerning the applicants prevented from attending an assembly by the police applying the \"kettling\" technique ). So too do measures taken by the authorities during a rally, such as its dispersal or the arrest of those taking part in it, and penalties imposed for having taken part in ( Kasparov and Others v. Russia, 2013, § 84; Gafgaz Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2015, § 50). Police applying force against peaceful participants during the dispersal of an assembly or for maintaining public order constitutes an interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly ( Laguna Guzman v. Spain, 2020, § 42; Zakharov and Varzhabetyan v. Russia, 2020, § 88).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240405192605/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_11_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930063355/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_11_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/684d373b17e9/20240405192605__guide_art_11_eng.pdf", @@ -14693,6 +15548,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:9987/14", "case_name": "Boronenkov v. Ukraine (dec.)", @@ -14726,9 +15583,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:21286/15", - "case_name": "Dianova and Others v. Russia,* nos. 21286/15 and 4 others", + "case_name": "Dianova and Others v. Russia", "application_numbers": "21286/15", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -14737,14 +15596,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "", "hudoc_doctype": "", "hudoc_docname": "", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 2, + "linked_sections": "I.B.2: Assembly as a form of expression and expression of opinion during assembly: Articles 10 and|I.E.2.a: Prescribed by law", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.B.2|a:None|b:9|I.E.2.a|a:None|b:59", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "The Court has attached importance to the fact that those taking part in an assembly are not only seeking to express their opinion, but to do so together with others ( Primov and Others v. Russia, 2014, § 91). Demonstrations carried out by a solo participant are therefore examined under Article 10, taking into account, where appropriate, the general principles established in the context of Article 11 ( Novikova and Others v. Russia, 2016, § 91). Afive-day huger strike in a public place intended as a solo demonstration but being joined by two others, fell within the notion of \"peaceful assembly\" under Article 11 ( Dianova and Others v. Russia,* § 63).\n\nAccordingly, the domestic legal provisions allowing the executive to propose a change of location, time or manner of conduct of public events and lacking adequate and effective legal safeguards against arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of those powers were found not to meet the Convention \"quality of law\" requirements in Lashmankin and Others v. Russia (2017, § 430). In the same vein, the executive authorities'wide discretion in deciding what behaviour constituted a \" public event \" subject to official notification in the absence of criteria distinguishing it from an informal gathering, led the Court to doubt that the administrative law-enforcement measures for non-compliance with the noti fication procedure were \"prescribed by law\" ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, §§ 117-118; see also Dianova and Others v. Russia,* §§ 66-68).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240405192605/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_11_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930063355/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_11_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/684d373b17e9/20240405192605__guide_art_11_eng.pdf", @@ -14759,6 +15618,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:10443/12", "case_name": "Geylani and Others v. Türkiye", @@ -14792,6 +15653,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:59433/18", "case_name": "Humpert and Others v. Germany [GC]", @@ -14825,6 +15688,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:11214/19", "case_name": "Internationale Humanitäre Hilfsorganisation e. v. v. Germany", @@ -14858,6 +15723,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:56896/17", "case_name": "Laurijsen and Others v. the Netherlands", @@ -14891,6 +15758,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:26604/16", "case_name": "Waldner v. France", @@ -14924,6 +15793,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:15669/20", "case_name": "Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC]", @@ -14957,6 +15828,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-10", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json", "case_key": "apps:55789/19", "case_name": "Almaz and Others v. Türkiye (dec.)", @@ -14964,10 +15837,10 @@ "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", "citation_text": "Almaz and Others v. Türkiye (dec.), nos. 55789/19 and 3 others, 19 November 2024", - "hudoc_itemid": "", - "hudoc_importance_level": "", - "hudoc_doctype": "", - "hudoc_docname": "", + "hudoc_itemid": "001-238771", + "hudoc_importance_level": "3", + "hudoc_doctype": "HFDEC", + "hudoc_docname": "ALMAZ AND OTHERS v. TURKEY", "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", "linked_paragraph_count": 1, "linked_sections": "III.H: Right to strike", @@ -14990,6 +15863,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-10", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json", "case_key": "apps:35834/22", "case_name": "Bodson and Others v. Belgium", @@ -15023,6 +15898,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-10", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json", "case_key": "apps:38283/18", "case_name": "Bogay and Others v. Ukraine", @@ -15056,6 +15933,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-10", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json", "case_key": "apps:49363/20", "case_name": "Central Unitaria de Traballadores/as v. Spain", @@ -15089,9 +15968,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-10", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json", "case_key": "apps:50763/22", - "case_name": "Ercan and Others v. Türkiye (dec.), 50763/22", + "case_name": "Ercan and Others v. Türkiye (dec.)", "application_numbers": "50763/22", "judgment_year": "2025", "citation_change": "added", @@ -15100,14 +15981,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "", "hudoc_doctype": "", "hudoc_docname": "", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "III.H: Right to strike", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.H|a:None|b:283", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "Strike action is protected by Article 11 only in so far as it is called by trade-union organisations and considered as being effectively - and not merely presumed to be - part of trade-union activity ( Barış and Others v. Turkey (dec.), 2021, § 45). In addition, there has to be a link between such action and the professional interests of trade-union members ( Almaz and Others v. Türkiye (dec.), 2024, §§ 62-63; Kaya v. Türkiye (dec.), §§ 58-59; and Ercan and Others v. Türkiye (dec.), 2025, §§ 61-64, where Article 11 was found to be inapplicable to industrial action about matters of general or political interest, but not intended to defend the applicants'own professional or socio-economic interests).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930063355/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_11_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20251210133318/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_11_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/684d373b17e9/20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf", @@ -15122,6 +16003,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-10", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json", "case_key": "apps:45401/15", "case_name": "Harutyunyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.)", @@ -15155,6 +16038,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-10", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json", "case_key": "apps:52977/19", "case_name": "Hellgren v. Finland", @@ -15188,6 +16073,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-10", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json", "case_key": "apps:51194/19", "case_name": "Kaya v. Türkiye (dec.)", @@ -15221,6 +16108,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-10", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json", "case_key": "apps:46852/21", "case_name": "Matchavariani v. Georgia", @@ -15254,6 +16143,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-10", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json", "case_key": "apps:29760/21|33931/21", "case_name": "Mzhavanadze and Rukhadze v. Georgia", @@ -15271,8 +16162,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.F.2|a:100|b:104", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Consequently, the absence of prior authorisation and the ensuing \"unlawfulness\" of the action do not give carte blanche to the authorities; they are still restricted by the proportionality requirement of Article 11 ( Primov and Others v. Russia, 2014, § 119). Thus, it should be established why the demonstration was not authorised in the first place, what the public interest at stake was, and what risks were represented by the demonstration. The method used by the police for discouraging the protestors, containing them in a particular place or dispersing the demonstration, is also an important factor in assessing the proportionality of the interference ( ibid .). A decision whether to disperse a political rally must be based on due recognition of the privileged protection under the Convention of political speech, debate on questions of public interest and the peaceful manifestation on such matters, and remain within the authorities'narrow margin of appreciation in restricting political speech ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 133).", - "post_text": "Consequently, the absence of prior authorisation and the ensuing \"unlawfulness\" of the action do not give carte blanche to the authorities; they are still restricted by the proportionality requirement of Article 11 ( Primov and Others v. Russia, 2014, § 119). Thus, it should be established why the demonstration was not authorised in the first place, what the public interest at stake was, and what risks were represented by the demonstration. The method used by the police for discouraging the protestors, containing them in a particular place or dispersing the demonstration, is also an important factor in assessing the proportionality of the interference ( ibid .). A decision whether to disperse a political rally must be based on due recognition of the privileged protection under the Convention of political speech, debate on questions of public interest and the peaceful manifestation on such matters, and remain within the authorities'narrow margin of appreciation in restricting political speech ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 133; see also Mzhavanadze and Rukhadze v. Georgia, 2025, § 77).", + "pre_text": "Consequently, the absence of prior authorisation and the ensuing \"unlawfulness\" of the action do not give carte blanche to the authorities; they are still restricted by the proportionality requirement of Article 11 ( Primov and Others v. Russia, 2014, § 119). Thus, it should be established why the demonstration was not authorised in the first place, what the public interest at stake was, and what risks were represented by the demonstration. The method used by the police for discouraging the protestors, containing them in a particular place or dispersing the demonstration, is also an important factor in assessing the proportionality of the interference ( ibid .). Adecision whether to disperse a political rally must be based on due recognition of the privileged protection under the Convention of political speech, debate on questions of public interest and the peaceful manifestation on such matters, and remain within the authorities'narrow margin of appreciation in restricting political speech ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 133).", + "post_text": "Consequently, the absence of prior authorisation and the ensuing \"unlawfulness\" of the action do not give carte blanche to the authorities; they are still restricted by the proportionality requirement of Article 11 ( Primov and Others v. Russia, 2014, § 119). Thus, it should be established why the demonstration was not authorised in the first place, what the public interest at stake was, and what risks were represented by the demonstration. The method used by the police for discouraging the protestors, containing them in a particular place or dispersing the demonstration, is also an important factor in assessing the proportionality of the interference ( ibid .). Adecision whether to disperse a political rally must be based on due recognition of the privileged protection under the Convention of political speech, debate on questions of public interest and the peaceful manifestation on such matters, and remain within the authorities'narrow margin of appreciation in restricting political speech ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 133; see also Mzhavanadze and Rukhadze v. Georgia, 2025, § 77).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930063355/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_11_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20251210133318/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_11_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/684d373b17e9/20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf", @@ -15287,6 +16178,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-10", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json", "case_key": "apps:2623/16|2299/16", "case_name": "Rodina and Borisova v. Latvia", @@ -15320,6 +16213,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-10", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json", "case_key": "apps:44241/20", "case_name": "Russ v. Germany", @@ -15337,8 +16232,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.B.2|a:11|b:11", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Non-violent acts committed during an assembly are protected by Article 11. Roadblocks and other physical conduct purposely obstructing traffic and the ordinary course of life were considered to fall within the terms of Article 11 ( Barraco v. France, 2009, § 39; Lucas v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2003), although the Court noted that such acts were not at the core of the freedom of peaceful assembly as protected by Article 11 of the Convention ( Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC], 2015, § 97). Installation of a banner on a wall during a demonstration was examined under Article 11 alone ( Akarsubaşı and Alçiçek v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 31-33; cf. Olga Kudrina v. Russia, 2021, § 49, where similar actions were examined under Article 10 when they were combined with throwing political leaflets out of the window), as was the making of public statements to the press near judicial buildings in defiance of the legislative ban on doing so ( Öğrü v. Turkey, 2017, § 13). Likewise, a series of protest actions including a press conference, a procession and a sit-in, all linked to a single campaign, was examined under Article 11 ( Hakim Aydin v. Turkey, 2020, § 50). In Ekrem Can and Others v. Turkey, 2022, the protest at the courthouse - where the applicants had opened a banner, chanted slogans and thrown leaflets, thereby disrupting an essential public service - namely the orderly administration of justice (§ 91) - was examined under Article 11 considered in the light of Article 10. The Court noted that the applicants'complaint concerned not only the fact that they had been prevented from making a statement, but predominantly the police intervention resulting in their forcible removal from the premises, (§ 68). A penalty for shouting slogans and holding banners during a demonstration on account of their content is considered an interference with the right to freedom of peaceful assembly under Article 11 ( Kemal Çetin v. Turkey, 2020, § 26).", - "post_text": "Non-violent acts committed during an assembly are protected by Article 11. Roadblocks and other physical conduct purposely obstructing traffic and the ordinary course of life were considered to fall within the terms of Article 11 ( Barraco v. France, 2009, § 39; Lucas v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2003), although the Court noted that such acts were not at the core of the freedom of peaceful assembly as protected by Article 11 of the Convention ( Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC], 2015, § 97). Installation of a banner on a wall during a demonstration was examined under Article 11 alone ( Akarsubaşı and Alçiçek v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 31-33; cf. Olga Kudrina v. Russia, 2021, § 49, where similar actions were examined under Article 10 when they were combined with throwing political leaflets out of the window), as was the making of public statements to the press near judicial buildings in defiance of the legislative ban on doing so ( Öğrü v. Turkey, 2017, § 13). Likewise, a series of protest actions including a press conference, a procession and a sit-in, all linked to a single campaign, was examined under Article 11 ( Hakim Aydin v. Turkey, 2020, § 50). In Ekrem Can and Others v. Turkey, 2022, the protest at the courthouse - where the applicants had opened a banner, chanted slogans and thrown leaflets, thereby disrupting an essential public service - namely the orderly administration of justice (§ 91) - was examined under Article 11 considered in the light of Article 10. The Court noted that the applicants'complaint concerned not only the fact that they had been prevented from making a statement, but predominantly the police intervention resulting in their forcible removal from the premises, (§ 68). A penalty for shouting slogans and holding banners during a demonstration on account of their content is considered an interference with the right to freedom of peaceful assembly under Article 11 ( Kemal Çetin v. Turkey, 2020, § 26). In Russ v. Germany (2025, § 35) a criminal conviction for wearing a plastic visor with an inscription during a peaceful demonstration was examined under Article 11, read in the light of Article 10, since it was the wearing of the visor (a prohibited \"protective weapon\" in a demonstration) rather than the inscription which had been sanctioned.", + "pre_text": "Non-violent acts committed during an assembly are protected by Article 11. Roadblocks and other physical conduct purposely obstructing traffic and the ordinary course of life were considered to fall within the terms of Article 11 ( Barraco v. France, 2009, § 39; Lucas v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2003), although the Court noted that such acts were not at the core of the freedom of peaceful assembly as protected by Article 11 of the Convention ( Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC], 2015, § 97). Installation of a banner on a wall during a demonstration was examined under Article 11 alone ( Akarsubaşı and Alçiçek v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 31-33; cf. Olga Kudrina v. Russia, 2021, § 49, where similar actions were examined under Article 10 when they were combined with throwing political leaflets out of the window), as was the making of public statements to the press near judicial buildings in defiance of the legislative ban on doing so ( Öğrü v. Turkey, 2017, § 13). Likewise, a series of protest actions including a press conference, a procession and a sit-in, all linked to a single campaign, was examined under Article 11 ( Hakim Aydin v. Turkey, 2020, § 50). In Ekrem Can and Others v. Turkey, 2022, the protest at the courthouse - where the applicants had opened a banner, chanted slogans and thrown leaflets, thereby disrupting an essential public service - namely the orderly administration of justice (§ 91) - was examined under Article 11 considered in the light of Article 10. The Court noted that the applicants'complaint concerned not only the fact that they had been prevented from making a statement, but predominantly the police intervention resulting in their forcible removal from the premises, (§ 68). Apenalty for shouting slogans and holding banners during a demonstration on account of their content is considered an interference with the right to freedom of peaceful assembly under Article 11 ( Kemal Çetin v. Turkey, 2020, § 26).", + "post_text": "Non-violent acts committed during an assembly are protected by Article 11. Roadblocks and other physical conduct purposely obstructing traffic and the ordinary course of life were considered to fall within the terms of Article 11 ( Barraco v. France, 2009, § 39; Lucas v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2003), although the Court noted that such acts were not at the core of the freedom of peaceful assembly as protected by Article 11 of the Convention ( Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC], 2015, § 97). Installation of a banner on a wall during a demonstration was examined under Article 11 alone ( Akarsubaşı and Alçiçek v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 31-33; cf. Olga Kudrina v. Russia, 2021, § 49, where similar actions were examined under Article 10 when they were combined with throwing political leaflets out of the window), as was the making of public statements to the press near judicial buildings in defiance of the legislative ban on doing so ( Öğrü v. Turkey, 2017, § 13). Likewise, a series of protest actions including a press conference, a procession and a sit-in, all linked to a single campaign, was examined under Article 11 ( Hakim Aydin v. Turkey, 2020, § 50). In Ekrem Can and Others v. Turkey, 2022, the protest at the courthouse - where the applicants had opened a banner, chanted slogans and thrown leaflets, thereby disrupting an essential public service - namely the orderly administration of justice (§ 91) - was examined under Article 11 considered in the light of Article 10. The Court noted that the applicants'complaint concerned not only the fact that they had been prevented from making a statement, but predominantly the police intervention resulting in their forcible removal from the premises, (§ 68). Apenalty for shouting slogans and holding banners during a demonstration on account of their content is considered an interference with the right to freedom of peaceful assembly under Article 11 ( Kemal Çetin v. Turkey, 2020, § 26). In Russ v. Germany (2025, § 35) a criminal conviction for wearing a plastic visor with an inscription during a peaceful demonstration was examined under Article 11, read in the light of Article 10, since it was the wearing of the visor (a prohibited \"protective weapon\" in a demonstration) rather than the inscription which had been sanctioned.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930063355/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_11_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20251210133318/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_11_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/684d373b17e9/20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf", @@ -15353,6 +16248,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-10", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json", "case_key": "apps:34724/18", "case_name": "Sagir and Others v. Greece", @@ -15386,6 +16283,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-10", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json", "case_key": "apps:39056/22", "case_name": "Selishcheva and Others v. Russia", @@ -15419,6 +16318,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-29", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/6d86f7b0f9c7/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-29.json", "case_key": "apps:19961/17", "case_name": "C.Y. v. Belgium", @@ -15452,6 +16353,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-29", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/6d86f7b0f9c7/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-29.json", "case_key": "apps:17412/16", "case_name": "Vasile Sorin Marin v. Romania", @@ -15485,6 +16388,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:47833/20", "case_name": "Lenis v. Greece (dec.)", @@ -15503,7 +16408,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.2|a:18|b:18|II.B.1|a:22|b:22|II.B.4|a:29|b:29|II.B.5|a:None|b:40|II.B.5|a:None|b:41|II.B.6|a:None|b:45|II.C.1|a:49|b:52|II.C.5|a:69|b:72|II.C.6|a:None|b:77|II.C.6|a:None|b:80|II.C.6|a:71|b:74|II.C.6|a:72|b:75|II.C.6|a:77|b:82|II.C.6|a:78|b:83|III.B.1|a:None|b:108|III.E.3|a:147|b:173", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "In so far as it refers to groups and individuals, the purpose of Article 17 is to make it impossible for them to derive from the Convention a right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at destroying any of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 7 of \"the Law\" part; Orban and Others v. France, 2009, § 33; Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, § 87; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 30; Šimunić v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, § 37; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 92).\n\nArticle 17 is relevant where an applicant seeks to deflect a Convention provision from its real purpose by taking advantage of the right it guarantees in order to justify, promote or perform acts that: ▪ are contrary to the text and spirit of the Convention ( M'Bala M'Bala v. France (dec.), 2015; Garaudy v. France (dec.), 2003; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; W.P. and Others v. Poland (dec.), 2004; Witzsch v. Germany (no. 2) (dec.), 2005; Pastörs v. Germany, 2019, § 46); ▪ are incompatible with democracy and/or other fundamental values of the Convention ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, § 114; Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; Norwood v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 48; Romanov v. Ukraine [Committee], 2020, § 164; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 138); ▪ infringe the rights and freedoms recognised therein ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 7 of \"the Law\" part; Varela Geis v. Spain, 2013, § 40; Molnar v. Romania (dec.), 2012).\n\nArticle 17 prevents applicants from relying on the Convention in order to perform, promote and/or justify acts amounting to or characterised by: ▪ hatred ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, §§ 115 and 230; Molnar v. Romania (dec.), 2012; Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017; Lilliendahl v. Iceland (dec.), 2020, § 39); ▪ violence ( Hizb ut-Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012, § 73; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013, § 106; Kaptan v. Switzerland (dec.), 2001; Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017; Romanov v. Ukraine [Committee], 2020, §§ 163-166); ▪ xenophobia and racial discrimination ( Jersild v. Denmark, 1994, § 35; Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1979; Féret v. Belgium, 2009; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 134); ▪ anti-Semitism ( Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; W.P. and Others v. Poland (dec.), 2004); ▪ islamophobia ( Norwood v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004; Seurot v. France (dec.), 2004; Soulas and Others v. France, 2008; Zemmour v. France, 2022); ▪ terrorism and war crimes ( Orban and Others v. France, 2009, § 35; Leroy v. France, 2008, § 27; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, §§ 46-47); ▪ negation and revision of clearly established historical facts, such as the Holocaust ( Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 1998, § 47; M'Bala M'Bala v. France (dec.), 2015; Garaudy v. France (dec.), 2003; Witzsch v. Germany (no. 2) (dec.), 2005); ▪ contempt for victims of the Holocaust, of a war and/or of a totalitarian regime ( Witzsch v. Germany (no. 2) (dec.), 2005; Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, 2010, § 81; Vajnai v. Hungary, 2008, § 25; Fáber v. Hungary, 2012, § 58; Pastörs v. Germany [Committee], 2019, § 39); ▪ totalitarian ideology and other political ideas incompatible with democracy ( Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 1998, § 53; Vona v. Hungary, 2013, § 36; Vajnai v. Hungary, 2008, § 25; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 108-113; Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2003, § 132; Schimanek v. Austria (dec.), 2000; Kühnen v. Germany, Commission decision, 1988; German Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957).\n\nWhere an applicant is essentially seeking to use a substantive Convention provision as a basis for a right to perform any act or to engage in any activity aimed at destroying any of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention, the Court applies Article 17 and rejects his or her complaint as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 ( Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017, § 37; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013).\n\nThe Convention bodies have thus far applied Article 17 in conjunction with the following substantive provisions: ▪ Article 9 ( Hizb ut-Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; German Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957; Vasilyev and Others v. Russia [Committee], 2020); ▪ Article 10 ( Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017; M'Bala M'Bala v. France (dec.), 2015; Hizb ut-Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; German Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957; Norwood v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004; Garaudy v. France (dec.), 2003; Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1979; Witzsch v. Germany (no. 2) (dec.), 2005; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018; Romanov v. Ukraine [Committee], 2020; Vasilyev and Others v. Russia [Committee], 2020). ▪ Article 11 ( Hizb ut-Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; W.P. and Others v. Poland (dec.), 2004; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 139; German Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957; Vasilyev and Others v. Russia [Committee], 2020); ▪ Article 13 in conjunction with Article 14 ( Hizb ut-Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012); ▪ Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 9, 10 and/or 11 ( Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; Norwood v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004; Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; W.P. and Others v. Poland (dec.), 2004; Vasilyev and Others v. Russia [Committee], 2020); ▪ Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 ( Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1979).\n\nArticle 17 is only applicable on an exceptional basis and in extreme cases ( Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, § 87 in fine ; Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, § 114; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 46; Šimunić v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, § 38; Pastörs v. Germany, 2019, § 37; Z.B. v. France, 2021, § 24; Zemmour v. France, 2022, § 26). The threshold for its applicability is therefore high ( Lilliendahl v. Iceland (dec.), 2020, § 26).\n\nArticle 17 should only be resorted to if it is immediately clear that the applicant attempted to rely on the Convention to engage in an activity or perform acts that are clearly contrary to the values of the Convention and aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms laid down in it ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, §§ 114-115; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 31; Šimunić v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, § 38; Pastörs v. Germany, 2019, § 37; Lilliendahl v. Iceland (dec.), 2020, §§ 25-26; Z.B. v. France, 2021, § 26; Zemmour v. France, 2022, § 26). In other words, it should be applied if prima facie the applicant's conduct reveals an act aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention or an intention to engage in such an act ( Vona v. Hungary, 2013, § 38).\n\nAt the same time, the shocking and controversial character of the impugned act or statement is not sufficient per se to reach the threshold for the applicability of Article 17 ( Zemmour v. France, 2022, § 28).\n\nThe cases where Article 17 was applied directly can be characterised by the following features: ▪ a general and vehement attack on a particular group ( Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017, § 33), for instance, linking the group as a whole with a particular grave criminal act ( Norwood v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004); ▪ radical and far-reaching character of the prohibited aims and measures proposed in pursuit thereof ( Hizb ut-Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012, § 73; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 106-112; Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1979; Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; German Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957; Romanov v. Ukraine [Committee], 2020, § 163; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, §§ 131 and 133); ▪ repetitive and/or systematic displays of prohibited aims ( Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017, § 33; Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; M'Bala M'Bala v. France (dec.), 2015, § 37; Garaudy v. France (dec.), 2003; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 45; see also the analysis in Z.B. v. France, 2021, § 26).\n\nIn Féret v. Belgium, 2009, the applicant, chairman of an extreme right-wing party, was convicted on account of the distribution, in an electoral campaign, of leaflets presenting non-European immigrant communities as criminally-minded and keen to exploit the benefits they derived from living in Belgium, and seeking to make fun of them. The leaflets carried slogans including \"Stand up against the Islamification of Belgium\", \"Stop the sham integration policy\" and \"Send non -European job- seekers home\". In the Court' s view, the contents of the impugned leaflets did not justify the application of Article 17. However, the interference with the applicant's freedom of expression did not entail a breach of Article 10. Fostering the exclusion of foreigners was a fundamental attack on their rights. Political speech that stirred hatred based on religious, ethnic or cultural prejudices was a threat to social peace and political stability in democratic States, especially in the electoral context, where the impact of racist or xenophobic comments grew more harmful. Insults, ridicule or defamation aimed at specific population groups or incitation to discrimination, as in the instant case, sufficed for the authorities to give priority to fighting hate speech.", - "post_text": "In so far as it refers to groups and individuals, the purpose of Article 17 is to make it impossible for them to derive from the Convention a right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3) destroying any of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention (, 1961, § 7 of \"the Law\" part; Orban and Others v. France, 2009, § 33; Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, § 87; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 30; Šimunić v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, § 37; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 92; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 38).\n\nArticle 17 is relevant where an applicant seeks to deflect a Convention provision from its real purpose by taking advantage of the right it guarantees in order to justify, promote or perform acts that:  M'Bala M'Bala v. France are contrary to the text and spirit of the Convention ( (dec.), 2015; Garaudy v. France (dec.), 2003; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; W.P. and Others v. Poland (dec.), 2004; Witzsch v. Germany (no. 2) (dec.), 2005; Pastörs v. Germany, 2019, § 46);  are incompatible with democracy and/or other fundamental values of the Convention Perinçek v. Switzerland Pavel Ivanov v. Russia Norwood ( [GC], 2015, § 114; (dec.), 2007; v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 48; Romanov v. Ukraine [Committee], 2020, § 164; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 138; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 57);  infringe the rights and freedoms recognised therein ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 7 of \"the Law\" part; Varela Geis v. Spain, 2013, § 40; Molnar v. Romania (dec.), 2012).\n\nArticle 17 prevents applicants from relying on the Convention in order to perform, promote and/or justify acts amounting to or characterised by:  hatred ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, §§ 115 and 230; Molnar v. Romania (dec.), 2012; Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017; Lilliendahl v. Iceland (dec.), 2020, § 39; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 56);  violence ( Hizb ut - Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012, § 73; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013, § 106; Kaptan v. Switzerland (dec.), 2001; Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017; Romanov v. Ukraine [Committee], 2020, §§ 163-166; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 56);  xenophobia and racial discrimination ( Jersild v. Denmark, 1994, § 35; Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1979; Féret v. Belgium, 2009; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 134);  anti-Semitism ( Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; W.P. and Others v. Poland (dec.), 2004);  islamophobia ( Norwood v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004; Seurot v. France (dec.), 2004; Soulas and Others v. France, 2008; Zemmour v. France, 2022);  terrorism and war crimes ( Orban and Others v. France, 2009, § 35; Leroy v. France, 2008, Roj TV A/S v. Denmark § 27; (dec.), 2018, §§ 46-47);  negation and revision of clearly established historical facts, such as the Holocaust ( Lehideux and Isorni v. France M'Bala M'Bala v. France Garaudy v. France, 1998, § 47; (dec.), 2015; (dec.), 2003; Witzsch v. Germany (no. 2) (dec.), 2005);  Witzsch contempt for victims of the Holocaust, of a war and/or of a totalitarian regime ( v. Germany (no. 2) (dec.), 2005; Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, 2010, § 81; Vajnai v. Hungary, 2008, § 25; Fáber v. Hungary, 2012, § 58; Pastörs v. Germany [Committee], 2019, § 39);  totalitarian ideology and other political ideas incompatible with democracy ( Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 1998, § 53; Vona v. Hungary, 2013, § 36; Vajnai v. Hungary, 2008, § 25; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party), 2013, §§ 108-113; and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2003, § 132; Schimanek v. Austria (dec.), 2000; Kühnen v. Germany, Commission decision, 1988; German Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957).\n\nThe Court also has regard to the character of the group targeted by the impugned conduct or speech, notably whether the targeted group requires enhanced protection on account of its low acceptance in the particular national context and/or the marginalisation and victimisation to which such a group has historically been, and continues to be, subjected (for example, gender and sexual minorities) ( Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 51).\n\nThe Court also takes into consideration the question of whether the impugned acts relate directly to an issue of high importance in modern European society (for example, the protection of people's dignity and human value irrespective of sexual orientation)( Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 55).\n\nA relevant consideration in this respect is also the applicant's power to influence. In Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, when applying directly Article 17, the Court took into account the applicant's ability to influence many people, in view of his position as a senior official of the Orthodox Church to which the majority of the Greek population belongs (§§ 49 and 50).\n\nWhere an applicant is essentially seeking to use a substantive Convention provision as a basis for a right to perform any act or to engage in any activity aimed at destroying any of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention, the Court applies Article 17 and rejects his or her complaint as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 Pavel Ivanov v. Russia Belkacem v. Belgium Kasymakhunov and and 4 ( (dec.), 2007; (dec.), 2017, § 37; Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 58).\n\nThe Convention bodies have thus far applied Article 17 in conjunction with the following substantive provisions:  Article 9 ( Hizb ut - Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; German Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957; Vasilyev and Others v. Russia [Committee], 2020);  Article 10 ( Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017; M'Bala M'Bala v. France Hizb ut - Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2015; (dec.), 2012; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; German Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957; Norwood v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004; Garaudy v. France Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2003;, Commission decision, 1979; Witzsch v. Germany (no. 2) (dec.), 2005; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018; Romanov v. Ukraine [Committee], 2020; Vasilyev and Others v. Russia [Committee], 2020; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023).  Article 11 ( Hizb ut - Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; W.P. and Others v. Poland (dec.), 2004; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 139; German Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957; Vasilyev and Others v. Russia [Committee], 2020);  Article 13 in conjunction with Article 14 ( Hizb ut - Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012);  Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 9, 10 and/or 11 ( v. Russia, 2013; Norwood v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004; Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; W.P. and Others v. Poland (dec.), 2004; Vasilyev and Others v. Russia [Committee], 2020);  Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 ( Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1979).\n\nThe applicant's intention, or the purpose pursued by him/her, is a particularly relevant consideration for determining whether Article 17 is applicable. The Court takes into account the domestic courts' assessment of this point ( Kilin v. Russia, 2021, § 72; Pastörs v. Germany, 2019, § 46; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, §§ 43 and 46-47) or the lack thereof ( Mukhin v. Russia, 2021, §§ 156 and 183). In this connection, the Court examines whether the domestic courts based their findings on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts ( Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 44).\n\nIn order to justify the application of Article 17, the display of prohibited aims should take its gravest forms ( Lilliendahl v. Iceland (dec.), 2020, §§ 34 and 39; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 56; Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 74). It should be sufficiently serious ( Soulas and Others v. France, 2008, § 48) and unequivocal ( Leroy v. France, 2008, § 27; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 134).\n\nArticle 17 is only applicable on an exceptional basis and in extreme cases ( Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, § 87 in fine ; Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, § 114; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 46; Šimunić v. Croatia Pastörs v. Germany Z.B. v. France (dec.), 2019, § 38;, 2019, § 37;, 2021, § 24; Zemmour v. France, 2022, § 26; Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria, 2023, § 78; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 52). The threshold for its applicability is therefore high ( Lilliendahl v. Iceland (dec.), 2020, § 26).\n\nArticle 17 should only be resorted to if it is immediately clear that the applicant attempted to rely on the Convention to engage in an activity or perform acts that are clearly contrary to the values of the Convention and aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms laid down in it ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, §§ 114-115; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 31; Šimunić v. Croatia Pastörs v. Germany Lilliendahl v. Iceland Z.B. (dec.), 2019, § 38;, 2019, § 37; (dec.), 2020, §§ 25-26; v. France, 2021, § 26; Zemmour v. France, 2022, § 26; Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria, 2023, § 78; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, §§ 52-53). In other words, it should be applied if prima facie the applicant's conduct reveals an act aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention Vona v. Hungary or an intention to engage in such an act (, 2013, § 38).\n\nAt the same time, the shocking and controversial character of the impugned act or statement is per se Zemmour v. France not sufficient to reach the threshold for the applicability of Article 17 (, 2022, § 28). The Court verifies whether the impugned statements go beyond the expression of opinion, even in offending, hostile, or aggressive terms ( Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 47).\n\nThe cases where Article 17 was applied directly can be characterised by the following features:  a general and vehement attack on a particular group ( Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017, § 33), for instance, denying the entire group their human nature, coupled with incitement to violence ( Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, §§ 47 and 54) or linking the group as a whole with a particular grave criminal act ( Norwood v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004);  radical and far-reaching character of the prohibited aims and measures proposed in pursuit thereof ( Hizb ut - Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012, § 73; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 106-112; Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, Pavel Ivanov v. Russia German Communist Party Commission decision, 1979; (dec.), 2007; (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957; Romanov v. Ukraine [Committee], 2020, § 163; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, §§ 131 and 133);  repetitive and/or systematic displays of prohibited aims ( Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017, § 33; Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; M'Bala M'Bala v. France (dec.), 2015, § 37; Garaudy v. France Roj TV A/S v. Denmark Z.B. (dec.), 2003; (dec.), 2018, § 45; see also the analysis in v. France, 2021, § 26).\n\nIn Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, the Court held that the applicant, a senior official of the Greek Orthodox Church, could not rely on Article 10, by reason of Article 17, when challenging his conviction on account of dehumanising homophobic statements coupled with multiple incitements to violence.\n\nIn Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, the Court held that the online statements of a senior official of the Greek Orthodox Church, which denied LGBTI people their human nature and called for violence, amounted to the gravest from of hate speech. Taking into account the applicant's power to influence many people and the risk of harmful consequences, the Court, by virtue of Article 17, rejected the applicant's complaint under Article 10 regarding his conviction for such speech.", + "post_text": "In so far as it refers to groups and individuals, the purpose of Article 17 is to make it impossible for them to derive from the Convention a right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3) destroying any of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention (, 1961, § 7 of \"the Law\" part; Orban and Others v. France, 2009, § 33; Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, § 87; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 30; Šimunić v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, § 37; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 92; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 38).\n\nArticle 17 is relevant where an applicant seeks to deflect a Convention provision from its real purpose by taking advantage of the right it guarantees in order to justify, promote or perform acts that:  M'Bala M'Bala v. France are contrary to the text and spirit of the Convention ( (dec.), 2015; Garaudy v. France (dec.), 2003; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; W.P. and Others v. Poland (dec.), 2004; Witzsch v. Germany (no. 2) (dec.), 2005; Pastörs v. Germany, 2019, § 46);  are incompatible with democracy and/or other fundamental values of the Convention Perinçek v. Switzerland Pavel Ivanov v. Russia Norwood ( [GC], 2015, § 114; (dec.), 2007; v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 48; Romanov v. Ukraine [Committee], 2020, § 164; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 138; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 57);  infringe the rights and freedoms recognised therein ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 7 of \"the Law\" part; Varela Geis v. Spain, 2013, § 40; Molnar v. Romania (dec.), 2012).\n\nArticle 17 prevents applicants from relying on the Convention in order to perform, promote and/or justify acts amounting to or characterised by:  hatred ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, §§ 115 and 230; Molnar v. Romania (dec.), 2012; Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017; Lilliendahl v. Iceland (dec.), 2020, § 39; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 56);  violence ( Hizb ut - Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012, § 73; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013, § 106; Kaptan v. Switzerland (dec.), 2001; Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017; Romanov v. Ukraine [Committee], 2020, §§ 163-166; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 56);  xenophobia and racial discrimination ( Jersild v. Denmark, 1994, § 35; Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1979; Féret v. Belgium, 2009; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 134);  anti-Semitism ( Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; W.P. and Others v. Poland (dec.), 2004);  islamophobia ( Norwood v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004; Seurot v. France (dec.), 2004; Soulas and Others v. France, 2008; Zemmour v. France, 2022);  terrorism and war crimes ( Orban and Others v. France, 2009, § 35; Leroy v. France, 2008, Roj TV A/S v. Denmark § 27; (dec.), 2018, §§ 46-47);  negation and revision of clearly established historical facts, such as the Holocaust ( Lehideux and Isorni v. France M'Bala M'Bala v. France Garaudy v. France, 1998, § 47; (dec.), 2015; (dec.), 2003; Witzsch v. Germany (no. 2) (dec.), 2005);  Witzsch contempt for victims of the Holocaust, of a war and/or of a totalitarian regime ( v. Germany (no. 2) (dec.), 2005; Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, 2010, § 81; Vajnai v. Hungary, 2008, § 25; Fáber v. Hungary, 2012, § 58; Pastörs v. Germany [Committee], 2019, § 39);  totalitarian ideology and other political ideas incompatible with democracy ( Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 1998, § 53; Vona v. Hungary, 2013, § 36; Vajnai v. Hungary, 2008, § 25; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party), 2013, §§ 108-113; and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2003, § 132; Schimanek v. Austria (dec.), 2000; Kühnen v. Germany, Commission decision, 1988; German Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957).\n\nThe Court also has regard to the character of the group targeted by the impugned conduct or speech, notably whether the targeted group requires enhanced protection on account of its low acceptance in the particular national context and/or the marginalisation and victimisation to which such a group has historically been, and continues to be, subjected (for example, gender and sexual minorities) ( Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 51).\n\nThe Court also takes into consideration the question of whether the impugned acts relate directly to an issue of high importance in modern European society (for example, the protection of people's dignity and human value irrespective of sexual orientation)( Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 55).\n\nArelevant consideration in this respect is also the applicant's power to influence. In Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, when applying directly Article 17, the Court took into account the applicant's ability to influence many people, in view of his position as a senior official of the Orthodox Church to which the majority of the Greek population belongs (§§ 49 and 50).\n\nWhere an applicant is essentially seeking to use a substantive Convention provision as a basis for a right to perform any act or to engage in any activity aimed at destroying any of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention, the Court applies Article 17 and rejects his or her complaint as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 Pavel Ivanov v. Russia Belkacem v. Belgium Kasymakhunov and and 4 ( (dec.), 2007; (dec.), 2017, § 37; Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 58).\n\nThe Convention bodies have thus far applied Article 17 in conjunction with the following substantive provisions:  Article 9 ( Hizb ut - Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; German Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957; Vasilyev and Others v. Russia [Committee], 2020);  Article 10 ( Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017; M'Bala M'Bala v. France Hizb ut - Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2015; (dec.), 2012; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; German Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957; Norwood v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004; Garaudy v. France Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2003;, Commission decision, 1979; Witzsch v. Germany (no. 2) (dec.), 2005; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018; Romanov v. Ukraine [Committee], 2020; Vasilyev and Others v. Russia [Committee], 2020; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023).  Article 11 ( Hizb ut - Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; W.P. and Others v. Poland (dec.), 2004; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 139; German Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957; Vasilyev and Others v. Russia [Committee], 2020);  Article 13 in conjunction with Article 14 ( Hizb ut - Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012);  Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 9, 10 and/or 11 ( v. Russia, 2013; Norwood v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004; Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; W.P. and Others v. Poland (dec.), 2004; Vasilyev and Others v. Russia [Committee], 2020);  Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 ( Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1979).\n\nThe applicant's intention, or the purpose pursued by him/her, is a particularly relevant consideration for determining whether Article 17 is applicable. The Court takes into account the domestic courts' assessment of this point ( Kilin v. Russia, 2021, § 72; Pastörs v. Germany, 2019, § 46; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, §§ 43 and 46-47) or the lack thereof ( Mukhin v. Russia, 2021, §§ 156 and 183). In this connection, the Court examines whether the domestic courts based their findings on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts ( Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 44).\n\nIn order to justify the application of Article 17, the display of prohibited aims should take its gravest forms ( Lilliendahl v. Iceland (dec.), 2020, §§ 34 and 39; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 56; Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 74). It should be sufficiently serious ( Soulas and Others v. France, 2008, § 48) and unequivocal ( Leroy v. France, 2008, § 27; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 134).\n\nArticle 17 is only applicable on an exceptional basis and in extreme cases ( Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, § 87 in fine ; Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, § 114; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 46; Šimunić v. Croatia Pastörs v. Germany Z.B. v. France (dec.), 2019, § 38;, 2019, § 37;, 2021, § 24; Zemmour v. France, 2022, § 26; Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria, 2023, § 78; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 52). The threshold for its applicability is therefore high ( Lilliendahl v. Iceland (dec.), 2020, § 26).\n\nArticle 17 should only be resorted to if it is immediately clear that the applicant attempted to rely on the Convention to engage in an activity or perform acts that are clearly contrary to the values of the Convention and aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms laid down in it ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, §§ 114-115; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 31; Šimunić v. Croatia Pastörs v. Germany Lilliendahl v. Iceland Z.B. (dec.), 2019, § 38;, 2019, § 37; (dec.), 2020, §§ 25-26; v. France, 2021, § 26; Zemmour v. France, 2022, § 26; Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria, 2023, § 78; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, §§ 52-53). In other words, it should be applied if prima facie the applicant's conduct reveals an act aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention Vona v. Hungary or an intention to engage in such an act (, 2013, § 38).\n\nAt the same time, the shocking and controversial character of the impugned act or statement is per se Zemmour v. France not sufficient to reach the threshold for the applicability of Article 17 (, 2022, § 28). The Court verifies whether the impugned statements go beyond the expression of opinion, even in offending, hostile, or aggressive terms ( Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 47).\n\nThe cases where Article 17 was applied directly can be characterised by the following features:  a general and vehement attack on a particular group ( Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017, § 33), for instance, denying the entire group their human nature, coupled with incitement to violence ( Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, §§ 47 and 54) or linking the group as a whole with a particular grave criminal act ( Norwood v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004);  radical and far-reaching character of the prohibited aims and measures proposed in pursuit thereof ( Hizb ut - Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012, § 73; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 106-112; Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, Pavel Ivanov v. Russia German Communist Party Commission decision, 1979; (dec.), 2007; (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957; Romanov v. Ukraine [Committee], 2020, § 163; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, §§ 131 and 133);  repetitive and/or systematic displays of prohibited aims ( Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017, § 33; Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; M'Bala M'Bala v. France (dec.), 2015, § 37; Garaudy v. France Roj TV A/S v. Denmark Z.B. (dec.), 2003; (dec.), 2018, § 45; see also the analysis in v. France, 2021, § 26).\n\nIn Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, the Court held that the applicant, a senior official of the Greek Orthodox Church, could not rely on Article 10, by reason of Article 17, when challenging his conviction on account of dehumanising homophobic statements coupled with multiple incitements to violence.\n\nIn Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, the Court held that the online statements of a senior official of the Greek Orthodox Church, which denied LGBTIpeople their human nature and called for violence, amounted to the gravest from of hate speech. Taking into account the applicant's power to influence many people and the risk of harmful consequences, the Court, by virtue of Article 17, rejected the applicant's complaint under Article 10 regarding his conviction for such speech.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923094714/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_17_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409183827/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_17_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/726c25db1ffb/20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf", @@ -15518,6 +16423,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:39954/09|3465/17", "case_name": "Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia", @@ -15551,6 +16458,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:36658/18", "case_name": "Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria", @@ -15584,6 +16493,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/762f0abff297/diff_2023-09-23__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:28186/19|29092/19", "case_name": "Jasuitis and Šimaitis v. Lithuania", @@ -15617,6 +16528,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/762f0abff297/diff_2023-09-23__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:18269/18", "case_name": "Krachunova v. Bulgaria", @@ -15650,6 +16563,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-11-14", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-14.json", "case_key": "apps:22515/14", "case_name": "Bryan and Others v. Russia*", @@ -15683,6 +16598,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-11-14", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-14.json", "case_key": "apps:39611/18", "case_name": "Georgia v. Russia (IV) (dec.)", @@ -15716,6 +16633,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-11-14", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-14.json", "case_key": "apps:29999/04|41424/04", "case_name": "Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia", @@ -15749,6 +16668,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-12-19", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:46454/11", "case_name": "Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania", @@ -15766,8 +16687,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "§1|a:9|b:9", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Whether the acts which form the basis of the applicant's complaints fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent State and whether that State is in fact responsible for those acts under the Convention are very different questions; the latter more typically falls to be determined by the Court at the merits stage ( Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 1995, §§ 61 and 64). A distinction must also be drawn between the issue of jurisdiction, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, and that of the imputability of the alleged violation to the actions or omissions of the respondent State, the latter issue being examined from the angle of the application's compatibility ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention ( Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 1996, § 52). The Court usually considers the notions of imputability and responsibility as going together, the State only engaging its responsibility under the Convention if the alleged violation could be imputed to it. In some specific cases, however, the Court is careful to distinguish between the two notions and to examine them separately ( Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], 2004, § 144).", - "post_text": "Whether the acts which form the basis of the applicant's complaints fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent State and whether that State is in fact responsible for those acts under the Convention are very different questions; the latter more typically falls to be determined by the Court at the merits stage ( Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 1995, §§ 61 and 64; Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 others (dec.) [GC], 2024, § 178). A distinction must also be drawn between the issue of jurisdiction, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, and that of the imputability of the alleged violation to the actions or omissions of the respondent State, the latter issue being examined from the angle of the application's compatibility ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention ( Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 1996, § 52). Questions of responsibility and imputability are often intrinsically linked to the establishment of the facts of the case and the assessment of evidence; the Court will thus address these issues in the light of its findings on the particular facts of the case ( Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 411 and 584-585; Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 127, 157 and 161-163). The Court usually considers the notions of imputability and responsibility as going together, such that the State's responsibility under the Convention is only engaged if the alleged violation could be attributed to it. In some specific cases, however, the Court is careful to distinguish between the two notions and to examine them separately ( Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], 2004, § 144).", + "pre_text": "Whether the acts which form the basis of the applicant's complaints fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent State and whether that State is in fact responsible for those acts under the Convention are very different questions; the latter more typically falls to be determined by the Court at the merits stage ( Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 1995, §§ 61 and 64). Adistinction must also be drawn between the issue of jurisdiction, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, and that of the imputability of the alleged violation to the actions or omissions of the respondent State, the latter issue being examined from the angle of the application's compatibility ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention ( Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 1996, § 52). The Court usually considers the notions of imputability and responsibility as going together, the State only engaging its responsibility under the Convention if the alleged violation could be imputed to it. In some specific cases, however, the Court is careful to distinguish between the two notions and to examine them separately ( Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], 2004, § 144).", + "post_text": "Whether the acts which form the basis of the applicant's complaints fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent State and whether that State is in fact responsible for those acts under the Convention are very different questions; the latter more typically falls to be determined by the Court at the merits stage ( Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 1995, §§ 61 and 64; Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 others (dec.) [GC], 2024, § 178). Adistinction must also be drawn between the issue of jurisdiction, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, and that of the imputability of the alleged violation to the actions or omissions of the respondent State, the latter issue being examined from the angle of the application's compatibility ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention ( Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 1996, § 52). Questions of responsibility and imputability are often intrinsically linked to the establishment of the facts of the case and the assessment of evidence; the Court will thus address these issues in the light of its findings on the particular facts of the case ( Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 411 and 584-585; Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 127, 157 and 161-163). The Court usually considers the notions of imputability and responsibility as going together, such that the State's responsibility under the Convention is only engaged if the alleged violation could be attributed to it. In some specific cases, however, the Court is careful to distinguish between the two notions and to examine them separately ( Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], 2004, § 144).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231114174510/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20241219144949/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7a059e452dbd/20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf", @@ -15782,6 +16703,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-12-19", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:6383/17", "case_name": "Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania", @@ -15799,8 +16722,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "§1|a:9|b:9", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Whether the acts which form the basis of the applicant's complaints fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent State and whether that State is in fact responsible for those acts under the Convention are very different questions; the latter more typically falls to be determined by the Court at the merits stage ( Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 1995, §§ 61 and 64). A distinction must also be drawn between the issue of jurisdiction, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, and that of the imputability of the alleged violation to the actions or omissions of the respondent State, the latter issue being examined from the angle of the application's compatibility ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention ( Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 1996, § 52). The Court usually considers the notions of imputability and responsibility as going together, the State only engaging its responsibility under the Convention if the alleged violation could be imputed to it. In some specific cases, however, the Court is careful to distinguish between the two notions and to examine them separately ( Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], 2004, § 144).", - "post_text": "Whether the acts which form the basis of the applicant's complaints fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent State and whether that State is in fact responsible for those acts under the Convention are very different questions; the latter more typically falls to be determined by the Court at the merits stage ( Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 1995, §§ 61 and 64; Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 others (dec.) [GC], 2024, § 178). A distinction must also be drawn between the issue of jurisdiction, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, and that of the imputability of the alleged violation to the actions or omissions of the respondent State, the latter issue being examined from the angle of the application's compatibility ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention ( Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 1996, § 52). Questions of responsibility and imputability are often intrinsically linked to the establishment of the facts of the case and the assessment of evidence; the Court will thus address these issues in the light of its findings on the particular facts of the case ( Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 411 and 584-585; Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 127, 157 and 161-163). The Court usually considers the notions of imputability and responsibility as going together, such that the State's responsibility under the Convention is only engaged if the alleged violation could be attributed to it. In some specific cases, however, the Court is careful to distinguish between the two notions and to examine them separately ( Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], 2004, § 144).", + "pre_text": "Whether the acts which form the basis of the applicant's complaints fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent State and whether that State is in fact responsible for those acts under the Convention are very different questions; the latter more typically falls to be determined by the Court at the merits stage ( Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 1995, §§ 61 and 64). Adistinction must also be drawn between the issue of jurisdiction, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, and that of the imputability of the alleged violation to the actions or omissions of the respondent State, the latter issue being examined from the angle of the application's compatibility ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention ( Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 1996, § 52). The Court usually considers the notions of imputability and responsibility as going together, the State only engaging its responsibility under the Convention if the alleged violation could be imputed to it. In some specific cases, however, the Court is careful to distinguish between the two notions and to examine them separately ( Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], 2004, § 144).", + "post_text": "Whether the acts which form the basis of the applicant's complaints fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent State and whether that State is in fact responsible for those acts under the Convention are very different questions; the latter more typically falls to be determined by the Court at the merits stage ( Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 1995, §§ 61 and 64; Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 others (dec.) [GC], 2024, § 178). Adistinction must also be drawn between the issue of jurisdiction, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, and that of the imputability of the alleged violation to the actions or omissions of the respondent State, the latter issue being examined from the angle of the application's compatibility ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention ( Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 1996, § 52). Questions of responsibility and imputability are often intrinsically linked to the establishment of the facts of the case and the assessment of evidence; the Court will thus address these issues in the light of its findings on the particular facts of the case ( Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 411 and 584-585; Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 127, 157 and 161-163). The Court usually considers the notions of imputability and responsibility as going together, such that the State's responsibility under the Convention is only engaged if the alleged violation could be attributed to it. In some specific cases, however, the Court is careful to distinguish between the two notions and to examine them separately ( Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], 2004, § 144).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231114174510/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20241219144949/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7a059e452dbd/20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf", @@ -15815,6 +16738,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-12-19", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:25589/16", "case_name": "Aliyev v. Armenia (dec.)", @@ -15848,6 +16773,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-12-19", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:25576/16", "case_name": "Allahverdiyev v. Armenia (dec.)", @@ -15865,8 +16792,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added|minor_edit", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.B.1.c|a:None|b:68|I.B.3.§4|a:116|b:123", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Finally, the fourth situation examined by the Court concerned the responsibility of Armenia for acts committed in the \"Republic of Nagorno- Karabakh\" established in an area of Azerbaijan. At the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast ( the \" NKAO \" ) had been an autonomous province situated within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic ( \" the Azerbaijan SSR \" ). There had been no common border between the NKAO and the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (\"the Armenian SSR\"), which had been separated by Azerbaijani territory. In 1988 armed hostilities broke out in this region. In September 1991 - shortly after Azerbaijan had proclaimed its independence from the Soviet Union - the NKAO soviet announced the foundation of the \"Nagorno -Karabakh Republic \" ( \"the NKR \" ), comprising the NKAO and the Shahumyan district of Azerbaijan. Following a referendum held in December 1991 (and boycotted by the Azeri population) in which 99.9 % of voters had come down in favour of the secession of the \" NKR \", the latter reaffirmed its independence from Azerbaijan in January 1992. After that the conflict gradually escalated into full-scale war. By the end of 1993 the ethnic Armenian troops had gained control over almost the entire territory of the former NKAO and seven adjacent Azerbaijani regions. In May 1994 the belligerents signed a ceasefire agreement, which is still in force. The self-proclaimed independence of the \" NKR \" has not been recognised by any State or international organisation ( Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], 2015, §§ 12-31; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, §§ 14-28).", - "post_text": "Subsequently, in a number o f cases against Armenia and Azerbaijan, concerning the \"Four -Day War\" of 2016, brought by individuals living in the war zone, either on the territory of the \"Republic of Nagorno- Karabakh\", or close to the line of contact (but within the internationally recognised territory of Azerbaijan), the Court reached the same conclusion as in the case of Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, cited above. As regards the \"Republic of Nagorno - Karabakh\" it noted that Azerbaijan no longer controlled it since the first Nagorno-Karabakh war of 1992-1994. It had involved heavy shelling of towns and villages on either side of the line of contact for four days, resulting in many dead, wounded and temporarily homeless people as well as considerable damage to property and infrastructure on both sides. In these circumstances, and without any indication to the contrary, it was not a situation of \"effective control\" over an area . The active phase of hostilities under examination in the present case concerned bombing and artillery shelling by the armed forces on both sides of the conflict, seeking to put the enemy force hors de combat and capture territory. The factual elements of the case did not reveal any instance of control over or proximity to the alleged victims of a violation. In these circumstances, there could not be said to have been \"State agent authority and control\" over those individuals. The Court thus found that neither Armenia nor Azerbaij an had \"jurisdiction\" within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention ( Allahverdiyev v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, §§ 28-33; Aliyev v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, §§ 24-29; Ohanyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2023, §§ 30-37; Hakobyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2023, §§ 28-35).\n\nFinally, the fourth situation examined by the Court concerned the responsibility of Armenia for acts committed in the former \"Republic of Nagorno- Karabakh\" established in an area of Azerbaijan. At the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast ( the \" NKAO \" ) had been an autonomous province situated within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic ( \" the Azerbaijan SSR \" ). There had been no common border between the NKAO and the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (\"the Armenian SSR\"), which had been separated by Azerbaijani territory. In 1988 armed hostilities broke out in this region. In September 1991 - shortly after Azerbaijan had proclaimed its independence from the Soviet Union - the NKAO soviet announced the foundation of the \"Nagorno -Karabakh Republic \" ( \"the NKR \" ), comprising the NKAO and the Shahumyan district of Azerbaijan. Following a referendum held in December 1991 (and boycotted by the Azeri population) in which 99.9 % of voters had come down in favour of the secession of the \" NKR \", the latter reaffirmed its independence from Azerbaijan in January 1992. After that the conflict gradually escalated into full-scale war. By the end of 1993 the ethnic Armenian troops had gained control over almost the entire territory of the former NKAO and seven adjacent Azerbaijani regions. In May 1994 the belligerents signed a ceasefire agreement. The self-proclaimed independence of the \" NKR \" had not been recognised by any State or international organisation ( Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], 2015, §§ 12-31; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, §§ 14-28). Later on, in the night of 1 to 2 April 2016, violent armed clashes broke out near the contact line between the \"NKR\" and Azerbaijan ( sometimes referred to as the \"Four - Day War\" ). They lasted until 5 April 2016, but other clashes occurred later in the month ( Allahverdiyev v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, § 5; Hakobyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2023, § 5).", + "pre_text": "Finally, the fourth situation examined by the Court concerned the responsibility of Armenia for acts committed in the \"Republic of Nagorno- Karabakh\" established in an area of Azerbaijan. At the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast ( the \" NKAO \" ) had been an autonomous province situated within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic ( \" the Azerbaijan SSR \" ). There had been no common border between the NKAO and the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (\"the Armenian SSR\"), which had been separated by Azerbaijani territory. In 1988 armed hostilities broke out in this region. In September 1991 - shortly after Azerbaijan had proclaimed its independence from the Soviet Union - the NKAOsoviet announced the foundation of the \"Nagorno -Karabakh Republic \" ( \"the NKR \" ), comprising the NKAO and the Shahumyan district of Azerbaijan. Following a referendum held in December 1991 (and boycotted by the Azeri population) in which 99.9 % of voters had come down in favour of the secession of the \" NKR \", the latter reaffirmed its independence from Azerbaijan in January 1992. After that the conflict gradually escalated into full-scale war. By the end of 1993 the ethnic Armenian troops had gained control over almost the entire territory of the former NKAO and seven adjacent Azerbaijani regions. In May 1994 the belligerents signed a ceasefire agreement, which is still in force. The self-proclaimed independence of the \" NKR \" has not been recognised by any State or international organisation ( Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], 2015, §§ 12-31; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, §§ 14-28).", + "post_text": "Subsequently, in a number o f cases against Armenia and Azerbaijan, concerning the \"Four -Day War\" of 2016, brought by individuals living in the war zone, either on the territory of the \"Republic of Nagorno- Karabakh\", or close to the line of contact (but within the internationally recognised territory of Azerbaijan), the Court reached the same conclusion as in the case of Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, cited above. As regards the \"Republic of Nagorno - Karabakh\" it noted that Azerbaijan no longer controlled it since the first Nagorno-Karabakh war of 1992-1994. It had involved heavy shelling of towns and villages on either side of the line of contact for four days, resulting in many dead, wounded and temporarily homeless people as well as considerable damage to property and infrastructure on both sides. In these circumstances, and without any indication to the contrary, it was not a situation of \"effective control\" over an area . The active phase of hostilities under examination in the present case concerned bombing and artillery shelling by the armed forces on both sides of the conflict, seeking to put the enemy force hors de combat and capture territory. The factual elements of the case did not reveal any instance of control over or proximity to the alleged victims of a violation. In these circumstances, there could not be said to have been \"State agent authority and control\" over those individuals. The Court thus found that neither Armenia nor Azerbaij an had \"jurisdiction\" within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention ( Allahverdiyev v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, §§ 28-33; Aliyev v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, §§ 24-29; Ohanyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2023, §§ 30-37; Hakobyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2023, §§ 28-35).\n\nFinally, the fourth situation examined by the Court concerned the responsibility of Armenia for acts committed in the former \"Republic of Nagorno- Karabakh\" established in an area of Azerbaijan. At the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast ( the \" NKAO \" ) had been an autonomous province situated within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic ( \" the Azerbaijan SSR \" ). There had been no common border between the NKAO and the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (\"the Armenian SSR\"), which had been separated by Azerbaijani territory. In 1988 armed hostilities broke out in this region. In September 1991 - shortly after Azerbaijan had proclaimed its independence from the Soviet Union - the NKAOsoviet announced the foundation of the \"Nagorno -Karabakh Republic \" ( \"the NKR \" ), comprising the NKAO and the Shahumyan district of Azerbaijan. Following a referendum held in December 1991 (and boycotted by the Azeri population) in which 99.9 % of voters had come down in favour of the secession of the \" NKR \", the latter reaffirmed its independence from Azerbaijan in January 1992. After that the conflict gradually escalated into full-scale war. By the end of 1993 the ethnic Armenian troops had gained control over almost the entire territory of the former NKAO and seven adjacent Azerbaijani regions. In May 1994 the belligerents signed a ceasefire agreement. The self-proclaimed independence of the \" NKR \" had not been recognised by any State or international organisation ( Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], 2015, §§ 12-31; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, §§ 14-28). Later on, in the night of 1 to 2 April 2016, violent armed clashes broke out near the contact line between the \"NKR\" and Azerbaijan ( sometimes referred to as the \"Four - Day War\" ). They lasted until 5 April 2016, but other clashes occurred later in the month ( Allahverdiyev v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, § 5; Hakobyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2023, § 5).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231114174510/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20241219144949/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7a059e452dbd/20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf", @@ -15881,6 +16808,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-12-19", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:22302/10", "case_name": "Arlewin v. Sweden", @@ -15899,7 +16828,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A.6|a:None|b:53", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "In the case of Arlewin v. Sweden, 2016, the applicant had brought, in the Swedish courts, a private prosecution for gross defamation against the anchorman of a television programme in which accusations had been made against him. His claim had been rejected for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the programme, even though it had been recorded in Sweden and broadcast live to a Swedish audience, had been transmitted by a company registered in the United Kingdom and was thus considered not to have emanated from Sweden. According to the Swedish courts, it was the United Kingdom, not Sweden, which had jurisdiction to deal with the applicant's defamation proceedings as, under the \"country of origin principle\" laid down by the EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive, jurisdiction had to be determined primarily with reference to the country where the broadcaster's head office was located and where its editorial decisions were taken. Taking the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (right of access to a court), the Court joined the question of the respondent State's jurisdiction to the merits and examined whether the Swedish courts had had good reason to consider that they lacked jurisdiction. Rejecting their interpretation of EU law, it found that Swedish jurisdiction was not barred by a binding provision of EU law. The Court further noted that the content, production and broadcasting of the television programme as well as its implications had very strong connections to Sweden. There had, therefore, been a prima facie obligation on Sweden to secure the applicant's right of access to court. The fact that the applicant might have had access to a court in a different country did not affect Sweden's responsibility under Article 1 of the Convention. The Court thus dismissed the admissibility objection raised by the respondent Government and, on the merits, found a violation of Article 6 § 1.", + "post_text": "In the case of Arlewin v. Sweden, 2016, the applicant had brought, in the Swedish courts, a private prosecution for gross defamation against the anchorman of a television programme in which accusations had been made against him. His claim had been rejected for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the programme, even though it had been recorded in Sweden and broadcast live to a Swedish audience, had been transmitted by a company registered in the United Kingdom and was thus considered not to have emanated from Sweden. According to the Swedish courts, it was the United Kingdom, not Sweden, which had jurisdiction to deal with the applicant's defamation proceedings as, under the \"country of origin principle\" laid down by the EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive, jurisdiction had to be determined primarily with reference to the country where the broadcaster's head office was located and where its editorial decisions were taken. Taking the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (right of access to a court), the Court joined the question of the respondent State's jurisdiction to the merits and examined whether the Swedish courts had had good reason to consider that they lacked jurisdiction. Rejecting their interpretation of EUlaw, it found that Swedish jurisdiction was not barred by a binding provision of EUlaw. The Court further noted that the content, production and broadcasting of the television programme as well as its implications had very strong connections to Sweden. There had, therefore, been a prima facie obligation on Sweden to secure the applicant's right of access to court. The fact that the applicant might have had access to a court in a different country did not affect Sweden's responsibility under Article 1 of the Convention. The Court thus dismissed the admissibility objection raised by the respondent Government and, on the merits, found a violation of Article 6 § 1.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231114174510/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20241219144949/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7a059e452dbd/20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf", @@ -15914,6 +16843,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-12-19", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:58170/13", "case_name": "Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC]", @@ -15932,7 +16863,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A.6|a:None|b:54", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "In the case of Wieder and Guarnieri v. the United Kingdom, 2023, the Court ruled for the first time on the application of the territoriality principle in cases of interception, extraction, filtering, storage, analysis and dissemination of electronic communications from and/or to a country other than the respondent State. Two researchers living in the USA and Germany had complained that such measures had been taken against them by the UK intelligence services. Referring to its analysis of the UK's bulk interception of communications in Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2021, the Court reiterated that the principal interference with the rights of the sender or recipient was the searching, examination and use of the intercepted communications. All these actions had been carried out by the UK intelligence agencies acting within United Kingdom territory. The Court rejected the Government's contention that any interference could not be separated from the person of each applicant and would therefore have produced effects only where they themselves were located. In its case-law on Articles 6 § 1 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 the Court had always considered that an interference occurred where the possession was interfered with, rather than where the owner was located. In the circumstances, the interference with the applicants'rights therefore fell within the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent State ( Wieder and Guarnieri v. the United Kingdom, 2023, §§ 88-95).", + "post_text": "In the case of Wieder and Guarnieri v. the United Kingdom, 2023, the Court ruled for the first time on the application of the territoriality principle in cases of interception, extraction, filtering, storage, analysis and dissemination of electronic communications from and/or to a country other than the respondent State. Two researchers living in the USA and Germany had complained that such measures had been taken against them by the UKintelligence services. Referring to its analysis of the UK's bulk interception of communications in Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2021, the Court reiterated that the principal interference with the rights of the sender or recipient was the searching, examination and use of the intercepted communications. All these actions had been carried out by the UKintelligence agencies acting within United Kingdom territory. The Court rejected the Government's contention that any interference could not be separated from the person of each applicant and would therefore have produced effects only where they themselves were located. In its case-law on Articles 6 § 1 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 the Court had always considered that an interference occurred where the possession was interfered with, rather than where the owner was located. In the circumstances, the interference with the applicants'rights therefore fell within the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent State ( Wieder and Guarnieri v. the United Kingdom, 2023, §§ 88-95).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231114174510/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20241219144949/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7a059e452dbd/20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf", @@ -15947,6 +16878,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-12-19", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:2327/20", "case_name": "Couso Permuy v. Spain", @@ -15964,8 +16897,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A.4|a:37|b:38", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Thus, even if the events at the origin of a court case occurred outside the territory of the respondent State, where a person brings a civil action concerning those events before the courts of that State there is an undeniable \" jurisdictional link \" for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention, to the extent that the rights secured under Article 6 § 1 are at stake - obviously without prejudice to the outcome of proceedings ( Marković and Others v. Italy [GC], 2006, § 54; see also Chagos Islanders v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2012, § 66). Indeed, if the domestic law recognises a right to bring an action and if the right claimed is one which prima facie possesses the characteristics required by Article 6 of the Convention, the Court sees no reason why such domestic proceedings should not be subjected to the same level of scrutiny as any other proceedings brought at the national level. Even though the extraterritorial nature of the events alleged to have been at the origin of an action may have an effect on the applicability of Article 6 and the final outcome of the proceedings, it cannot under any circumstances affect the jurisdiction ratione loci and ratione personae of the State concerned. If civil proceedings are brought in the domestic courts, the State is required by Article 1 of the Convention to secure in those proceedings respect for the rights protected by Article 6 ( Marković and Others v. Italy [GC], 2006, §§ 53-54). In the cited case, the Court had examined the objection as to incompatibility ratione loci raised by the respondent Government, to the effect that the civil action brought by the applicants before the Italian courts had concerned events of an extraterritorial nature (an air strike by NATO forces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).", - "post_text": "Thus, even if the events at the origin of a court case occurred outside the territory of the respondent State, where a person brings a civil action concerning those events before the courts of that State there is an undeniable \" jurisdictional link \" for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention, to the extent that the rights secured under Article 6 § 1 are at stake - obviously without prejudice to the outcome of proceedings ( Marković and Others v. Italy [GC], 2006, § 54; Couso Permuy v. Spain *, 2024, § 99; see also Chagos Islanders v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2012, § 66). Indeed, if the domestic law recognises a right to bring an action and if the right claimed is one which prima facie possesses the characteristics required by Article 6 of the Convention, the Court sees no reason why such domestic proceedings should not be subjected to the same level of scrutiny as any other proceedings brought at the national level. Even though the extraterritorial nature of the events alleged to have been at the origin of an action may have an effect on the applicability of Article 6 and the final outcome of the proceedings, it cannot under any circumstances affect the jurisdiction ratione loci and ratione personae of the State concerned. If civil proceedings are brought in the domestic courts, the State is required by Article 1 of the Convention to secure in those proceedings respect for the rights protected by Article 6 ( Marković and Others v. Italy [GC], 2006, §§ 53-54). In the cited case, the Court had examined the objection as to incompatibility ratione loci raised by the respondent Government, to the effect that the civil action brought by the applicants before the Italian courts had concerned events of an extraterritorial nature (an air strike by NATO forces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).", + "pre_text": "Thus, even if the events at the origin of a court case occurred outside the territory of the respondent State, where a person brings a civil action concerning those events before the courts of that State there is an undeniable \" jurisdictional link \" for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention, to the extent that the rights secured under Article 6 § 1 are at stake - obviously without prejudice to the outcome of proceedings ( Marković and Others v. Italy [GC], 2006, § 54; see also Chagos Islanders v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2012, § 66). Indeed, if the domestic law recognises a right to bring an action and if the right claimed is one which prima facie possesses the characteristics required by Article 6 of the Convention, the Court sees no reason why such domestic proceedings should not be subjected to the same level of scrutiny as any other proceedings brought at the national level. Even though the extraterritorial nature of the events alleged to have been at the origin of an action may have an effect on the applicability of Article 6 and the final outcome of the proceedings, it cannot under any circumstances affect the jurisdiction ratione loci and ratione personae of the State concerned. If civil proceedings are brought in the domestic courts, the State is required by Article 1 of the Convention to secure in those proceedings respect for the rights protected by Article 6 ( Marković and Others v. Italy [GC], 2006, §§ 53-54). In the cited case, the Court had examined the objection as to incompatibility ratione loci raised by the respondent Government, to the effect that the civil action brought by the applicants before the Italian courts had concerned events of an extraterritorial nature (an air strike by NATOforces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).", + "post_text": "Thus, even if the events at the origin of a court case occurred outside the territory of the respondent State, where a person brings a civil action concerning those events before the courts of that State there is an undeniable \" jurisdictional link \" for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention, to the extent that the rights secured under Article 6 § 1 are at stake - obviously without prejudice to the outcome of proceedings ( Marković and Others v. Italy [GC], 2006, § 54; Couso Permuy v. Spain *, 2024, § 99; see also Chagos Islanders v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2012, § 66). Indeed, if the domestic law recognises a right to bring an action and if the right claimed is one which prima facie possesses the characteristics required by Article 6 of the Convention, the Court sees no reason why such domestic proceedings should not be subjected to the same level of scrutiny as any other proceedings brought at the national level. Even though the extraterritorial nature of the events alleged to have been at the origin of an action may have an effect on the applicability of Article 6 and the final outcome of the proceedings, it cannot under any circumstances affect the jurisdiction ratione loci and ratione personae of the State concerned. If civil proceedings are brought in the domestic courts, the State is required by Article 1 of the Convention to secure in those proceedings respect for the rights protected by Article 6 ( Marković and Others v. Italy [GC], 2006, §§ 53-54). In the cited case, the Court had examined the objection as to incompatibility ratione loci raised by the respondent Government, to the effect that the civil action brought by the applicants before the Italian courts had concerned events of an extraterritorial nature (an air strike by NATOforces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231114174510/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20241219144949/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7a059e452dbd/20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf", @@ -15980,6 +16913,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-12-19", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:29906/14", "case_name": "Dimaksyan v. Armenia", @@ -16013,6 +16948,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-12-19", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:39371/20", "case_name": "Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 others (dec.) [GC]", @@ -16030,8 +16967,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added|minor_edit|citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A.1|a:None|b:30|I.B.2.a|a:None|b:72|I.B.2.b|a:70|b:76|I.B.4|a:None|b:136|§1|a:9|b:9", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "The Court found that Belgium had no jurisdiction over four Syrian nationals who had unsuccessfully applied for visas at the Belgian Embassy in Lebanon, relying on the risk of ill- treatment in their country of origin. First of all, the applicants were not Belgian nationals seeking to benefit from the protection of their embassy. Secondly, at no time did the diplomatic agents exercise de facto control over the applicants. The latter freely chose to present themselves at the Belgian embassy in Beirut, and to submit their visa applications there - as indeed they could have chosen to approach any other embassy; they were then free to leave the premises of the Belgian embassy without any hindrance ( M.N. and Others v. Belgium (dec.) [GC], 2020, § 118). In this connection, it is irrelevant that the diplomatic agents had, as in the present case, merely a \"letter box\" role, or to ascertain who was responsible for taking the decisions, whether the Belgian authorities in the national territory or the diplomatic agents posted abroad ( ibid ., § 114).\n\nWhether the acts which form the basis of the applicant's complaints fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent State and whether that State is in fact responsible for those acts under the Convention are very different questions; the latter more typically falls to be determined by the Court at the merits stage ( Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 1995, §§ 61 and 64). A distinction must also be drawn between the issue of jurisdiction, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, and that of the imputability of the alleged violation to the actions or omissions of the respondent State, the latter issue being examined from the angle of the application's compatibility ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention ( Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 1996, § 52). The Court usually considers the notions of imputability and responsibility as going together, the State only engaging its responsibility under the Convention if the alleged violation could be imputed to it. In some specific cases, however, the Court is careful to distinguish between the two notions and to examine them separately ( Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], 2004, § 144).", - "post_text": "In the specific context of the State's positive obligations in matters of climate change, the Court found that individuals living on the territory of a Contracting Party were within its jurisdiction for such purposes. The issue of responsibility, however, is a separate matter to be examined, if necessary, in relation to the merits of the complaint ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, § 287, 9 April 2024; Duarte Agostinho and Others v Portugal and 32 Others (dec.) [GC], 2024, § 178).\n\nIn response to reliance by applicants on a test of \"control over the applicant's Convention interests\", the Court found that extraterritorial jurisdiction required control over the person himself or herself rather than the person's interests as such. It did not consider that the scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction could be expanded in such a manner, which would entail a radical departure from established principles under Article 1 ( Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Others (dec.) [GC], 2024, §§ 205-206).\n\nThe Court found that Belgium had no jurisdiction over four Syrian nationals who had unsuccessfully applied for visas at the Belgian Embassy in Lebanon, relying on the risk of ill- treatment in their country of origin. First of all, the applicants were not Belgian nationals seeking to benefit from the protection of their embassy. Secondly, at no time did the diplomatic agents exercise de facto control over the applicants. The latter freely chose to present themselves at the Belgian embassy in Beirut, and to submit their visa applications there - as indeed they could have chosen to approach any other embassy; they were then free to leave the premises of the Belgian embassy without any hindrance ( M.N. and Others v. Belgium (dec.) [GC], 2020, § 118). In this connection, it is irrelevant that the diplomatic agents had, as in th e present case, merely a \"letter box\" role, or to ascertain who was responsible for taking the decisions, whether the Belgian authorities in the national territory or the diplomatic agents posted abroad ( ibid ., § 114). The Court subsequently explained that its reference to \"exceptional circumstances\" had not been intended to establish a distinct jurisdictional test. Within the specific context of that case, in which the applicants had sought to rely on a combination of supposed substantive and procedural links to Belgium, it was noted that an assessment of any \"exceptional circumstances\" require d the Court \" to explore the nature of the link between the applicants and the respondent State and to ascertain whether the latter effectively exercised authority or control over them\". In other words, the assessment was ultimately one of effective authority or control over the applicants, in line with established case-law ( Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Others (dec.) [GC], 2024, § 188).\n\nIn the case of Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Others (dec.) [GC], 2024, a group of Portuguese nationals resident in Portugal alleged a violation of various Articles of the Convention owing to the existing, and serious future, impacts of climate change imputable to their home country and thirty-two other Contracting States, and specifically those in relation to heatwaves, wildfires and smoke from wildfires, which affected their lives, well-being, mental health and the amenities of their homes. The Court found that all the applicants were under the (territorial) jurisdiction of Portugal but not under that of the other respondent States. The existing case-law provided no basis for establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction of the other States, even taking account of developments in the existing case-law on such jurisdiction as put forward by the applicants, relying on a number of \"exceptional circumstances\" and \"special features\". Noting the specific characteristics of climate - change cases as a universal and cross-border issue, the Court found that they could not in themselves serve as a basis for creating by way of judicial interpretation a novel ground for extraterritorial jurisdiction or as justification for expanding on the existing grounds. First, it was not possible to consider that the proposed positive obligations of States in the field of climate change could be a sufficient ground for holding that the State had jurisdiction over individuals outside its territory or otherwise outside its authority and control. Further, the fact that through their Portuguese nationality the applicants also enjoyed EU citizenship could not serve to establish a jurisdictional link between them and the twenty-six respondent States that were also EU member States. Secondly, the Convention was not designed to provide general protection of the environment as such or specifically adapted to deal with this particular aspect. Accepting the applicants'argument to the contrary would entail a radical departure from the rationale of the Convention protection system, which was primarily and fundamentally based on the principles of territorial jurisdiction and subsidiarity. Thirdly, as regards the applicants'reliance on a test of \"control over the applicants' Convention interests\", according to the Court' s established case-law, extraterritorial jurisdiction as conceived under Article 1 of the Convention required control over the person himself or herself rather than the person's interests as such. Reliance on such a criterion for establishing the State's extraterritorial jurisdiction would lead to a critical lack of foreseeability of the Convention's reach and to an untenable level of uncertainty for States (ibid., §§ 181-213).\n\nWhether the acts which form the basis of the applicant's complaints fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent State and whether that State is in fact responsible for those acts under the Convention are very different questions; the latter more typically falls to be determined by the Court at the merits stage ( Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 1995, §§ 61 and 64; Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 others (dec.) [GC], 2024, § 178). A distinction must also be drawn between the issue of jurisdiction, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, and that of the imputability of the alleged violation to the actions or omissions of the respondent State, the latter issue being examined from the angle of the application's compatibility ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention ( Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 1996, § 52). Questions of responsibility and imputability are often intrinsically linked to the establishment of the facts of the case and the assessment of evidence; the Court will thus address these issues in the light of its findings on the particular facts of the case ( Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 411 and 584-585; Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 127, 157 and 161-163). The Court usually considers the notions of imputability and responsibility as going together, such that the State's responsibility under the Convention is only engaged if the alleged violation could be attributed to it. In some specific cases, however, the Court is careful to distinguish between the two notions and to examine them separately ( Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], 2004, § 144).", + "pre_text": "The Court found that Belgium had no jurisdiction over four Syrian nationals who had unsuccessfully applied for visas at the Belgian Embassy in Lebanon, relying on the risk of ill- treatment in their country of origin. First of all, the applicants were not Belgian nationals seeking to benefit from the protection of their embassy. Secondly, at no time did the diplomatic agents exercise de facto control over the applicants. The latter freely chose to present themselves at the Belgian embassy in Beirut, and to submit their visa applications there - as indeed they could have chosen to approach any other embassy; they were then free to leave the premises of the Belgian embassy without any hindrance ( M.N. and Others v. Belgium (dec.) [GC], 2020, § 118). In this connection, it is irrelevant that the diplomatic agents had, as in the present case, merely a \"letter box\" role, or to ascertain who was responsible for taking the decisions, whether the Belgian authorities in the national territory or the diplomatic agents posted abroad ( ibid ., § 114).\n\nWhether the acts which form the basis of the applicant's complaints fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent State and whether that State is in fact responsible for those acts under the Convention are very different questions; the latter more typically falls to be determined by the Court at the merits stage ( Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 1995, §§ 61 and 64). Adistinction must also be drawn between the issue of jurisdiction, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, and that of the imputability of the alleged violation to the actions or omissions of the respondent State, the latter issue being examined from the angle of the application's compatibility ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention ( Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 1996, § 52). The Court usually considers the notions of imputability and responsibility as going together, the State only engaging its responsibility under the Convention if the alleged violation could be imputed to it. In some specific cases, however, the Court is careful to distinguish between the two notions and to examine them separately ( Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], 2004, § 144).", + "post_text": "In the specific context of the State's positive obligations in matters of climate change, the Court found that individuals living on the territory of a Contracting Party were within its jurisdiction for such purposes. The issue of responsibility, however, is a separate matter to be examined, if necessary, in relation to the merits of the complaint ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, § 287, 9 April 2024; Duarte Agostinho and Others v Portugal and 32 Others (dec.) [GC], 2024, § 178).\n\nIn response to reliance by applicants on a test of \"control over the applicant's Convention interests\", the Court found that extraterritorial jurisdiction required control over the person himself or herself rather than the person's interests as such. It did not consider that the scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction could be expanded in such a manner, which would entail a radical departure from established principles under Article 1 ( Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Others (dec.) [GC], 2024, §§ 205-206).\n\nThe Court found that Belgium had no jurisdiction over four Syrian nationals who had unsuccessfully applied for visas at the Belgian Embassy in Lebanon, relying on the risk of ill- treatment in their country of origin. First of all, the applicants were not Belgian nationals seeking to benefit from the protection of their embassy. Secondly, at no time did the diplomatic agents exercise de facto control over the applicants. The latter freely chose to present themselves at the Belgian embassy in Beirut, and to submit their visa applications there - as indeed they could have chosen to approach any other embassy; they were then free to leave the premises of the Belgian embassy without any hindrance ( M.N. and Others v. Belgium (dec.) [GC], 2020, § 118). In this connection, it is irrelevant that the diplomatic agents had, as in th e present case, merely a \"letter box\" role, or to ascertain who was responsible for taking the decisions, whether the Belgian authorities in the national territory or the diplomatic agents posted abroad ( ibid ., § 114). The Court subsequently explained that its reference to \"exceptional circumstances\" had not been intended to establish a distinct jurisdictional test. Within the specific context of that case, in which the applicants had sought to rely on a combination of supposed substantive and procedural links to Belgium, it was noted that an assessment of any \"exceptional circumstances\" require d the Court \" to explore the nature of the link between the applicants and the respondent State and to ascertain whether the latter effectively exercised authority or control over them\". In other words, the assessment was ultimately one of effective authority or control over the applicants, in line with established case-law ( Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Others (dec.) [GC], 2024, § 188).\n\nIn the case of Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Others (dec.) [GC], 2024, a group of Portuguese nationals resident in Portugal alleged a violation of various Articles of the Convention owing to the existing, and serious future, impacts of climate change imputable to their home country and thirty-two other Contracting States, and specifically those in relation to heatwaves, wildfires and smoke from wildfires, which affected their lives, well-being, mental health and the amenities of their homes. The Court found that all the applicants were under the (territorial) jurisdiction of Portugal but not under that of the other respondent States. The existing case-law provided no basis for establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction of the other States, even taking account of developments in the existing case-law on such jurisdiction as put forward by the applicants, relying on a number of \"exceptional circumstances\" and \"special features\". Noting the specific characteristics of climate - change cases as a universal and cross-border issue, the Court found that they could not in themselves serve as a basis for creating by way of judicial interpretation a novel ground for extraterritorial jurisdiction or as justification for expanding on the existing grounds. First, it was not possible to consider that the proposed positive obligations of States in the field of climate change could be a sufficient ground for holding that the State had jurisdiction over individuals outside its territory or otherwise outside its authority and control. Further, the fact that through their Portuguese nationality the applicants also enjoyed EUcitizenship could not serve to establish a jurisdictional link between them and the twenty-six respondent States that were also EUmember States. Secondly, the Convention was not designed to provide general protection of the environment as such or specifically adapted to deal with this particular aspect. Accepting the applicants'argument to the contrary would entail a radical departure from the rationale of the Convention protection system, which was primarily and fundamentally based on the principles of territorial jurisdiction and subsidiarity. Thirdly, as regards the applicants'reliance on a test of \"control over the applicants' Convention interests\", according to the Court' s established case-law, extraterritorial jurisdiction as conceived under Article 1 of the Convention required control over the person himself or herself rather than the person's interests as such. Reliance on such a criterion for establishing the State's extraterritorial jurisdiction would lead to a critical lack of foreseeability of the Convention's reach and to an untenable level of uncertainty for States (ibid., §§ 181-213).\n\nWhether the acts which form the basis of the applicant's complaints fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent State and whether that State is in fact responsible for those acts under the Convention are very different questions; the latter more typically falls to be determined by the Court at the merits stage ( Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 1995, §§ 61 and 64; Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 others (dec.) [GC], 2024, § 178). Adistinction must also be drawn between the issue of jurisdiction, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, and that of the imputability of the alleged violation to the actions or omissions of the respondent State, the latter issue being examined from the angle of the application's compatibility ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention ( Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 1996, § 52). Questions of responsibility and imputability are often intrinsically linked to the establishment of the facts of the case and the assessment of evidence; the Court will thus address these issues in the light of its findings on the particular facts of the case ( Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 411 and 584-585; Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 127, 157 and 161-163). The Court usually considers the notions of imputability and responsibility as going together, such that the State's responsibility under the Convention is only engaged if the alleged violation could be attributed to it. In some specific cases, however, the Court is careful to distinguish between the two notions and to examine them separately ( Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], 2004, § 144).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231114174510/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20241219144949/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7a059e452dbd/20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf", @@ -16046,6 +16983,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-12-19", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:42224/11", "case_name": "Eriomenco v. Republic of Moldova and Russia", @@ -16079,6 +17018,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-12-19", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:25344/20", "case_name": "Friedrich and Others v. Poland", @@ -16112,6 +17053,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-12-19", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:7432/17", "case_name": "Gurbanov v. Armenia", @@ -16145,6 +17088,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-12-19", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:74566/16|74573/16", "case_name": "Hakobyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.)", @@ -16162,8 +17107,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added|minor_edit", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.B.1.c|a:None|b:68|I.B.3.§4|a:116|b:123", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Finally, the fourth situation examined by the Court concerned the responsibility of Armenia for acts committed in the \"Republic of Nagorno- Karabakh\" established in an area of Azerbaijan. At the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast ( the \" NKAO \" ) had been an autonomous province situated within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic ( \" the Azerbaijan SSR \" ). There had been no common border between the NKAO and the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (\"the Armenian SSR\"), which had been separated by Azerbaijani territory. In 1988 armed hostilities broke out in this region. In September 1991 - shortly after Azerbaijan had proclaimed its independence from the Soviet Union - the NKAO soviet announced the foundation of the \"Nagorno -Karabakh Republic \" ( \"the NKR \" ), comprising the NKAO and the Shahumyan district of Azerbaijan. Following a referendum held in December 1991 (and boycotted by the Azeri population) in which 99.9 % of voters had come down in favour of the secession of the \" NKR \", the latter reaffirmed its independence from Azerbaijan in January 1992. After that the conflict gradually escalated into full-scale war. By the end of 1993 the ethnic Armenian troops had gained control over almost the entire territory of the former NKAO and seven adjacent Azerbaijani regions. In May 1994 the belligerents signed a ceasefire agreement, which is still in force. The self-proclaimed independence of the \" NKR \" has not been recognised by any State or international organisation ( Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], 2015, §§ 12-31; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, §§ 14-28).", - "post_text": "Subsequently, in a number o f cases against Armenia and Azerbaijan, concerning the \"Four -Day War\" of 2016, brought by individuals living in the war zone, either on the territory of the \"Republic of Nagorno- Karabakh\", or close to the line of contact (but within the internationally recognised territory of Azerbaijan), the Court reached the same conclusion as in the case of Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, cited above. As regards the \"Republic of Nagorno - Karabakh\" it noted that Azerbaijan no longer controlled it since the first Nagorno-Karabakh war of 1992-1994. It had involved heavy shelling of towns and villages on either side of the line of contact for four days, resulting in many dead, wounded and temporarily homeless people as well as considerable damage to property and infrastructure on both sides. In these circumstances, and without any indication to the contrary, it was not a situation of \"effective control\" over an area . The active phase of hostilities under examination in the present case concerned bombing and artillery shelling by the armed forces on both sides of the conflict, seeking to put the enemy force hors de combat and capture territory. The factual elements of the case did not reveal any instance of control over or proximity to the alleged victims of a violation. In these circumstances, there could not be said to have been \"State agent authority and control\" over those individuals. The Court thus found that neither Armenia nor Azerbaij an had \"jurisdiction\" within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention ( Allahverdiyev v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, §§ 28-33; Aliyev v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, §§ 24-29; Ohanyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2023, §§ 30-37; Hakobyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2023, §§ 28-35).\n\nFinally, the fourth situation examined by the Court concerned the responsibility of Armenia for acts committed in the former \"Republic of Nagorno- Karabakh\" established in an area of Azerbaijan. At the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast ( the \" NKAO \" ) had been an autonomous province situated within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic ( \" the Azerbaijan SSR \" ). There had been no common border between the NKAO and the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (\"the Armenian SSR\"), which had been separated by Azerbaijani territory. In 1988 armed hostilities broke out in this region. In September 1991 - shortly after Azerbaijan had proclaimed its independence from the Soviet Union - the NKAO soviet announced the foundation of the \"Nagorno -Karabakh Republic \" ( \"the NKR \" ), comprising the NKAO and the Shahumyan district of Azerbaijan. Following a referendum held in December 1991 (and boycotted by the Azeri population) in which 99.9 % of voters had come down in favour of the secession of the \" NKR \", the latter reaffirmed its independence from Azerbaijan in January 1992. After that the conflict gradually escalated into full-scale war. By the end of 1993 the ethnic Armenian troops had gained control over almost the entire territory of the former NKAO and seven adjacent Azerbaijani regions. In May 1994 the belligerents signed a ceasefire agreement. The self-proclaimed independence of the \" NKR \" had not been recognised by any State or international organisation ( Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], 2015, §§ 12-31; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, §§ 14-28). Later on, in the night of 1 to 2 April 2016, violent armed clashes broke out near the contact line between the \"NKR\" and Azerbaijan ( sometimes referred to as the \"Four - Day War\" ). They lasted until 5 April 2016, but other clashes occurred later in the month ( Allahverdiyev v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, § 5; Hakobyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2023, § 5).", + "pre_text": "Finally, the fourth situation examined by the Court concerned the responsibility of Armenia for acts committed in the \"Republic of Nagorno- Karabakh\" established in an area of Azerbaijan. At the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast ( the \" NKAO \" ) had been an autonomous province situated within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic ( \" the Azerbaijan SSR \" ). There had been no common border between the NKAO and the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (\"the Armenian SSR\"), which had been separated by Azerbaijani territory. In 1988 armed hostilities broke out in this region. In September 1991 - shortly after Azerbaijan had proclaimed its independence from the Soviet Union - the NKAOsoviet announced the foundation of the \"Nagorno -Karabakh Republic \" ( \"the NKR \" ), comprising the NKAO and the Shahumyan district of Azerbaijan. Following a referendum held in December 1991 (and boycotted by the Azeri population) in which 99.9 % of voters had come down in favour of the secession of the \" NKR \", the latter reaffirmed its independence from Azerbaijan in January 1992. After that the conflict gradually escalated into full-scale war. By the end of 1993 the ethnic Armenian troops had gained control over almost the entire territory of the former NKAO and seven adjacent Azerbaijani regions. In May 1994 the belligerents signed a ceasefire agreement, which is still in force. The self-proclaimed independence of the \" NKR \" has not been recognised by any State or international organisation ( Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], 2015, §§ 12-31; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, §§ 14-28).", + "post_text": "Subsequently, in a number o f cases against Armenia and Azerbaijan, concerning the \"Four -Day War\" of 2016, brought by individuals living in the war zone, either on the territory of the \"Republic of Nagorno- Karabakh\", or close to the line of contact (but within the internationally recognised territory of Azerbaijan), the Court reached the same conclusion as in the case of Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, cited above. As regards the \"Republic of Nagorno - Karabakh\" it noted that Azerbaijan no longer controlled it since the first Nagorno-Karabakh war of 1992-1994. It had involved heavy shelling of towns and villages on either side of the line of contact for four days, resulting in many dead, wounded and temporarily homeless people as well as considerable damage to property and infrastructure on both sides. In these circumstances, and without any indication to the contrary, it was not a situation of \"effective control\" over an area . The active phase of hostilities under examination in the present case concerned bombing and artillery shelling by the armed forces on both sides of the conflict, seeking to put the enemy force hors de combat and capture territory. The factual elements of the case did not reveal any instance of control over or proximity to the alleged victims of a violation. In these circumstances, there could not be said to have been \"State agent authority and control\" over those individuals. The Court thus found that neither Armenia nor Azerbaij an had \"jurisdiction\" within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention ( Allahverdiyev v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, §§ 28-33; Aliyev v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, §§ 24-29; Ohanyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2023, §§ 30-37; Hakobyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2023, §§ 28-35).\n\nFinally, the fourth situation examined by the Court concerned the responsibility of Armenia for acts committed in the former \"Republic of Nagorno- Karabakh\" established in an area of Azerbaijan. At the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast ( the \" NKAO \" ) had been an autonomous province situated within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic ( \" the Azerbaijan SSR \" ). There had been no common border between the NKAO and the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (\"the Armenian SSR\"), which had been separated by Azerbaijani territory. In 1988 armed hostilities broke out in this region. In September 1991 - shortly after Azerbaijan had proclaimed its independence from the Soviet Union - the NKAOsoviet announced the foundation of the \"Nagorno -Karabakh Republic \" ( \"the NKR \" ), comprising the NKAO and the Shahumyan district of Azerbaijan. Following a referendum held in December 1991 (and boycotted by the Azeri population) in which 99.9 % of voters had come down in favour of the secession of the \" NKR \", the latter reaffirmed its independence from Azerbaijan in January 1992. After that the conflict gradually escalated into full-scale war. By the end of 1993 the ethnic Armenian troops had gained control over almost the entire territory of the former NKAO and seven adjacent Azerbaijani regions. In May 1994 the belligerents signed a ceasefire agreement. The self-proclaimed independence of the \" NKR \" had not been recognised by any State or international organisation ( Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], 2015, §§ 12-31; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, §§ 14-28). Later on, in the night of 1 to 2 April 2016, violent armed clashes broke out near the contact line between the \"NKR\" and Azerbaijan ( sometimes referred to as the \"Four - Day War\" ). They lasted until 5 April 2016, but other clashes occurred later in the month ( Allahverdiyev v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, § 5; Hakobyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2023, § 5).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231114174510/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20241219144949/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7a059e452dbd/20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf", @@ -16178,6 +17123,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-12-19", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:43082/14", "case_name": "Hamzayan v. Armenia", @@ -16211,6 +17158,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-12-19", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:67351/13", "case_name": "Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia", @@ -16244,6 +17193,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-12-19", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:21882/09|6189/10", "case_name": "Israilov v. Russia", @@ -16277,6 +17228,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-12-19", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:40926/16|73942/17", "case_name": "Lypovchenko and Halabudenco v. Republic of Moldova and Russia", @@ -16310,6 +17263,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-12-19", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:3963/18", "case_name": "Matkava and Others v. Russia", @@ -16343,6 +17298,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-12-19", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:42126/15|42127/15", "case_name": "O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia", @@ -16376,6 +17333,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-12-19", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:74508/16", "case_name": "Ohanyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.)", @@ -16409,6 +17368,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-12-19", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:35271/19", "case_name": "The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy", @@ -16442,6 +17403,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-12-19", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:48998/14", "case_name": "Varyan v. Armenia", @@ -16475,6 +17438,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-12-19", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:64371/16|64407/16", "case_name": "Wieder and Guarnieri v. the United Kingdom", @@ -16493,7 +17458,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A.6|a:None|b:54", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "In the case of Wieder and Guarnieri v. the United Kingdom, 2023, the Court ruled for the first time on the application of the territoriality principle in cases of interception, extraction, filtering, storage, analysis and dissemination of electronic communications from and/or to a country other than the respondent State. Two researchers living in the USA and Germany had complained that such measures had been taken against them by the UK intelligence services. Referring to its analysis of the UK's bulk interception of communications in Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2021, the Court reiterated that the principal interference with the rights of the sender or recipient was the searching, examination and use of the intercepted communications. All these actions had been carried out by the UK intelligence agencies acting within United Kingdom territory. The Court rejected the Government's contention that any interference could not be separated from the person of each applicant and would therefore have produced effects only where they themselves were located. In its case-law on Articles 6 § 1 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 the Court had always considered that an interference occurred where the possession was interfered with, rather than where the owner was located. In the circumstances, the interference with the applicants'rights therefore fell within the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent State ( Wieder and Guarnieri v. the United Kingdom, 2023, §§ 88-95).", + "post_text": "In the case of Wieder and Guarnieri v. the United Kingdom, 2023, the Court ruled for the first time on the application of the territoriality principle in cases of interception, extraction, filtering, storage, analysis and dissemination of electronic communications from and/or to a country other than the respondent State. Two researchers living in the USA and Germany had complained that such measures had been taken against them by the UKintelligence services. Referring to its analysis of the UK's bulk interception of communications in Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2021, the Court reiterated that the principal interference with the rights of the sender or recipient was the searching, examination and use of the intercepted communications. All these actions had been carried out by the UKintelligence agencies acting within United Kingdom territory. The Court rejected the Government's contention that any interference could not be separated from the person of each applicant and would therefore have produced effects only where they themselves were located. In its case-law on Articles 6 § 1 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 the Court had always considered that an interference occurred where the possession was interfered with, rather than where the owner was located. In the circumstances, the interference with the applicants'rights therefore fell within the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent State ( Wieder and Guarnieri v. the United Kingdom, 2023, §§ 88-95).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231114174510/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20241219144949/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7a059e452dbd/20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf", @@ -16508,6 +17473,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2024-12-19__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:44715/20|47930/21", "case_name": "A.L. v. France and E.J. v. France (dec.)", @@ -16526,7 +17493,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A.6|a:None|b:56", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "The joined cases A.L. v. France and E.J. v. France (dec.), 2024, concerned EncroChat, an encrypted mobile-phone communication tool of which 66,000 copies had been distributed covertly between 2016 and 2020 in 122 countries. The French authorities had retrieved data from terminals linked to the EncroChat network and had then transmitted them to the UK law-enforcement authorities pursuant to a European Investigation Order (EIO). The French Government had raised an objection of inadmissibility alleging that the facts of the case fell outside the jurisdiction of France. The Court noted that the impugned data had been retrieved by means of a remote data hack conducted in the context of investigations that had been entrusted to French investigators acting under the authority of French judges and prosecutors; the retrieval operations had been conducted from French territory and the hack had been launched from a server located there. The retrieval measure was thus attributable to France. The fact that the retrieval operation had produced part of its effects outside this territory, by enabling remote access to data from handsets located abroad, did not affect this finding. The data pertaining to EncroChat users located in the United Kingdom had been collected by the French investigators prior to their transfer to the UK National Crime Agency, on the instructions of a French prosecutor. The fact that the EncroChat users located in the United Kingdom had been identified only after enforcement of the EIO did not release France from its responsibility under Article 1. It had not been submitted that the retrieved data had been stored outside France. The facts thus fell within the respondent State's jurisdiction ( ibid., §§ 100-105).", + "post_text": "The joined cases A.L. v. France and E.J. v. France (dec.), 2024, concerned EncroChat, an encrypted mobile-phone communication tool of which 66,000 copies had been distributed covertly between 2016 and 2020 in 122 countries. The French authorities had retrieved data from terminals linked to the EncroChat network and had then transmitted them to the UKlaw-enforcement authorities pursuant to a European Investigation Order (EIO). The French Government had raised an objection of inadmissibility alleging that the facts of the case fell outside the jurisdiction of France. The Court noted that the impugned data had been retrieved by means of a remote data hack conducted in the context of investigations that had been entrusted to French investigators acting under the authority of French judges and prosecutors; the retrieval operations had been conducted from French territory and the hack had been launched from a server located there. The retrieval measure was thus attributable to France. The fact that the retrieval operation had produced part of its effects outside this territory, by enabling remote access to data from handsets located abroad, did not affect this finding. The data pertaining to EncroChat users located in the United Kingdom had been collected by the French investigators prior to their transfer to the UK National Crime Agency, on the instructions of a French prosecutor. The fact that the EncroChat users located in the United Kingdom had been identified only after enforcement of the EIOdid not release France from its responsibility under Article 1. It had not been submitted that the retrieved data had been stored outside France. The facts thus fell within the respondent State's jurisdiction ( ibid., §§ 100-105).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20241219144949/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250626081924/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7a059e452dbd/20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf", @@ -16541,9 +17508,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2024-12-19__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:32879/18", - "case_name": "Ioannides v. Cyprus, 32879/18", + "case_name": "Ioannides v. Cyprus", "application_numbers": "32879/18", "judgment_year": "2025", "citation_change": "added", @@ -16553,13 +17522,13 @@ "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF IOANNIDES v. CYPRUS", "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", - "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_paragraph_count": 4, "linked_sections": "I.B.3.b: Jurisdiction of a State undergoing foreign military action (or military action unrecognised by the international community) within its territory", - "linked_change_types": "citation_added", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.B.3.b|a:134|b:136", - "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match", - "pre_text": "Furthermore, the Court has held that the efforts expended by the \" passive \" State in question to honour the six above-mentioned obligations should be constant and relevant ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 348-352; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 111; Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 148). However, the question whether the State in question has fulfilled its positive obligations as defined by the Court's case-law must be decided in the light of the individual case rather than with reference to Article 1 of the Convention (see, for example, Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 398-410; O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 60).", - "post_text": "Furthermore, the Court has held that the efforts expended by the \" passive \" State in question to honour the six above-mentioned obligations should be constant and relevant ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 348-352; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 111; Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 148). However, the question whether the State in question has fulfilled its positive obligations as defined by the Court's case-law must be decided in the light of the individual case rather than with reference to Article 1 of the Convention (see, for example, Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 398-410; O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 60). Ioannides v. Cyprus, 2025, § 79).", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added|minor_edit|citation_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.B.3.b|a:None|b:137|I.B.3.b|a:127|b:129|I.B.3.b|a:132|b:134|I.B.3.b|a:134|b:136", + "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "The responsibility of a \" passive \" Contracting State, that is to say a State which is undergoing military action launched by another State (whether or not a Party to the Convention) or by a local regime unrecognised by the international community, follows a different logic from that of an \" active \" State. The Court does not seek to establish whether or not that State holds \" jurisdiction \", because it is deemed to exercise the latter normally throughout its territory; the Court therefore always starts from the presumption that the facts of the case fall within the jurisdiction of the \" passive \" State. On the other hand, in exceptional circumstances, where the State is unable to exercise its authority in a part of its territory, that presumption may be limited . In other words, there is a presumption of jurisdiction (or competence), and the Court must determine whether there are any valid reasons to rebut that presumption ( Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], 2004, § 139).\n\nWhen a Contracting State is prevented from exercising authority over its whole territory due to an exceptional factual situation, it does not cease to have jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention over the part of its territory which is temporarily beyond its control ( Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, § 130; Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 317; O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 60). Such a factual situation nonetheless has the effect of reducing the scope of that jurisdiction, in that the commitment entered into by the Contracting State under Article 1 must be examined by the Court solely in the light of the State's positive obligations in respect of persons present in its territory. The State in question must endeavour, with all the legal and diplomatic means available to it vis-à-vis foreign States and international organisations, to continue to guarantee the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention. Although it is not for the Court to indicate which measures the authorities should take in order to comply with their obligations most effectively, it must verify that the measures actually taken were appropriate and sufficient in the present case. When faced with a partial or total failure to act, the Court's task is to determine to what extent a minimum effort was nevertheless possible and whether it should have been made. Determining that question is especially necessary in cases concerning an alleged infringement of absolute rights such as those guaranteed by Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 333-334).\n\nFurthermore, the Court has held that the efforts expended by the \" passive \" State in question to honour the six above-mentioned obligations should be constant and relevant ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 348-352; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 111; Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 148). However, the question whether the State in question has fulfilled its positive obligations as defined by the Court's case-law must be decided in the light of the individual case rather than with reference to Article 1 of the Convention (see, for example, Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 398-410; O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 60).", + "post_text": "Thus for example in the case of Ioannides v. Cyprus, 2025, the applicant was the owner of a house situated in the buffer zone (created after the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974) inaccessible to the public and not under the effective control of Cyprus. This house had been, at least for a while, occupied by the UNpeacekeeping force (UNFICYP). The Court found that the property had, without doubt, fallen within the jurisdiction of Cyprus. However, the scope of that jurisdiction had to be assessed in relation to each of the applicant's specific complaints and by making a distinction between situations where the lack of effective control by the State over part of its territory left only positive obligations there, and situations where the existence of full control over the individuals concerned entailed its direct responsibility ( ibid., §§ 79-80). Ruling on the merits, the Court found no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (right to the protection of property) on account of the applicant's inability to access the house in question, on the ground that, having only positive obligations as described above, Cyprus had taken all the measures which were still in its power and in accordance with its obligations under international law, in particular by cooperating with UNFICYP ( ibid., §§ 101-104). However, the Court found a violation of the same provision on account of the refusal by Cyprus to pay the applicant any rent for the occupation of her house by UNFICYP, Cyprus having agreed to the use of the house and having remained free to decide on the conditions. The alleged interference was thus directly attributable to the respondent State ( ibid., §§ 105-107).\n\nThe responsibility of a \" passive \" Contracting State, that is to say a State which is undergoing military action launched by another State (whether or not a Party to the Convention) or by a local regime unrecognised by the international community, follows a different logic from that of an \" active \" State. The Court does not seek to establish whether or not that State holds \" jurisdiction \", because it is deemed to exercise the latter normally throughout its territory; the Court therefore always starts from the presumption that the facts of the case fall within the jurisdiction of the \" passive \" State ( Ioannides v. Cyprus *, 2025, § 75). On the other hand, in exceptional circumstances, where the State is unable to exercise its authority in a part of its territory, that presumption may be limited . In other words, there is a presumption of jurisdiction (or competence), and the Court must determine whether there are any valid reasons to rebut that presumption ( Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], 2004, § 139).\n\nWhen a Contracting State is prevented from exercising authority over its whole territory due to an exceptional factual situation, it does not cease to have jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention over the part of its territory which is temporarily beyond its control ( Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, § 130; Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 317; O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 60; Taganova and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2024, § 213 ; Ioannides v. Cyprus *, 2025, § 75). Thus, in a case concerning the inability of the applicants to dispose of their property in the region of Abkhazia, after leaving it behind when the hostilities began in that region in the early 1990s, the Court found that, as it was recognised in international law as being part of Georgia, Abkhazia fell within the jurisdiction of that State ( Taganova and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2024, §§ 213-214). Such a factual situation nonetheless has the effect of reducing the scope of that jurisdiction, in that the commitment entered into by the Contracting State under Article 1 must be examined by the Court solely in the light of the State's positive obligations in respect of persons present in its territory. The State in question must endeavour, with all the legal and diplomatic means available to it vis-à-vis foreign States and international organisations, to continue to guarantee the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention. Although it is not for the Court to indicate which measures the authorities should take in order to comply with their obligations most effectively, it must verify that the measures actually taken were appropriate and sufficient in the present case. When faced with a partial or total failure to act, the Court's task is to determine to what extent a minimum effort was nevertheless possible and whether it should have been made. Determining that question is especially necessary in cases concerning an alleged infringement of absolute rights such as those guaranteed by Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 333-334).\n\nFurthermore, the Court has held that the efforts expended by the \" passive \" State in question to honour the six above-mentioned obligations should be constant and relevant ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 348-352; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 111; Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 148). However, the question whether the State in question has fulfilled its positive obligations as defined by the Court's case-law must be decided in the light of the individual case rather than with reference to Article 1 of the Convention (see, for example, Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 398-410; O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 60). Ioannides v. Cyprus, 2025, § 79).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20241219144949/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250626081924/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7a059e452dbd/20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf", @@ -16574,6 +17543,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2024-12-19__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:51448/15", "case_name": "Petrosyan v. Armenia", @@ -16607,6 +17578,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2024-12-19__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:32514/22", "case_name": "Petrović and Others v. Croatia*", @@ -16640,6 +17613,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2024-12-19__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:18102/04", "case_name": "Taganova and Others v. Georgia and Russia", @@ -16673,6 +17648,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2024-12-19__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:53600/20", "case_name": "Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC]", @@ -16706,6 +17683,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7b2999efc3b7/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:21329/18", "case_name": "J.A. and Others v. Italy", @@ -16739,6 +17718,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7b2999efc3b7/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:56417/19|44245/20", "case_name": "S.S. and Others v. Hungary", @@ -16772,6 +17753,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7b2999efc3b7/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:54029/17", "case_name": "Sherov and Others v. Poland", @@ -16805,6 +17788,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7b2999efc3b7/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json", "case_key": "apps:39090/20", "case_name": "M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus", @@ -16838,6 +17823,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7b2999efc3b7/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json", "case_key": "apps:60778/19", "case_name": "M.D. and Others v. Hungary", @@ -16871,9 +17858,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:24074/19", - "case_name": "Canavcı and Others v. Türkiye,* nos. 24074/19 and 2 others", + "case_name": "Canavcı and Others v. Türkiye", "application_numbers": "24074/19", "judgment_year": "2023", "citation_change": "added", @@ -16882,14 +17871,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "", "hudoc_doctype": "", "hudoc_docname": "", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "VIII.A: Access to legal advice", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "VIII.A|a:None|b:285", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "In Canavcı and Others v. Türkiye,* 2023, §§ 91-109, in relation to the monitoring and recording (, including by means of ethical devices), of the prisoners'meetings with their lawyers, the Court found a violation of Article 8 on the grounds that the discretion enjoyed by the public prosecutors in imposing restrictions on the applicants' communication with their lawyers was not subject to any conditions, that the scope of that discretion and the manner of its exercise were not defined and that no other specific guarantees were provided in that regard. In these circumstances, the Court considered that the adoption of the impugned measures against the applicants, although enforced for a limited period and during the state of emergency in Türkiye, was liable to be arbitrary and incompatible with the requirement of lawfulness.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923174222/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240405074848/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7ff3d5fc46dd/20230923174222__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -16904,9 +17893,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:76680/17", - "case_name": "D v. Latvia,* no. 76680/17", + "case_name": "D v. Latvia", "application_numbers": "76680/17", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -16915,14 +17906,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF D v. LATVIA", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "V.D: Inter-prisoner violence", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "V.D|a:None|b:216", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "In D v. Latvia,* 2024, §§ 49-52, even in the absence of physical ill-treatment, the Court found Article 3 to be applicable in relation to the existence of an informal prison hierarchy and the applicant's position in the lowest caste of that hierarchy. The Court had regard, in particular, to the physical and symbolic separation faced by prisoners in the category to which the applicant belong. They faced many arbitrary restrictions on using shared resources, had separate benches, toilets, and dining areas and were not allowed to queue with other prisoners for the shop or medical care, they were also banned from joining in sports or using common showers, their beds were less comfortable and located towards the periphery of shared spaces, and they were tasked with performing menial jobs, such as cleaning and doing laundry for the other inmates. The Court found that such physical and symbolic separation has had the effect of sending a potent message of inferiority, thereby undermining the human dignity of prisoners in the applicant's situ ation, and thus constituted degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923174222/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240405074848/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7ff3d5fc46dd/20230923174222__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -16937,6 +17928,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:27753/19", "case_name": "El-Asmar v. Denmark", @@ -16970,9 +17963,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:60846/19", - "case_name": "Halit Kara v. Türkiye,* no. 60846/19", + "case_name": "Halit Kara v. Türkiye", "application_numbers": "60846/19", "judgment_year": "2023", "citation_change": "added", @@ -16981,14 +17976,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF HALİT KARA v. TÜRKİYE", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", - "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "III.A: Family contacts and visits", + "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.A|a:77|b:77", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "In this context a distinction is to be drawn between the application of a special prison regime or special visiting arrangements during the criminal investigations, where the measures could reasonably be considered necessary in order to achieve the legitimate aim pursued, and the extended application of such regime. To that end, the necessity of extending the application of the special regime needs to be assessed with the greatest care by the relevant authorities ( Enea v. Italy [GC], 2009, §§ 125-131; Khoroshenko v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 124). The Court has also stressed that Article 8 of the Convention requires the States to take into account the interests of the prisoner and his or her family members and to evaluate them not in terms of broad generalities but in relation to the specific situation ( Deltuva v. Lithuania, 2023, § 42).", + "post_text": "In this context a distinction is to be drawn between the application of a special prison regime or special visiting arrangements during the criminal investigations, where the measures could reasonably be considered necessary in order to achieve the legitimate aim pursued, and the extended application of such regime. To that end, the necessity of extending the application of the special regime needs to be assessed with the greatest care by the relevant authorities ( Enea v. Italy [GC], 2009, §§ 125-131; Khoroshenko v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 124). The Court has also stressed that Article 8 of the Convention requires the States to take into account the interests of the prisoner and his or her family members and to evaluate them not in terms of broad generalities but in relation to the specific situation ( Deltuva v. Lithuania, 2023, § 42; see also, for instance, Halit Kara v. Türkiye,* 2023, §§ 51-60).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923174222/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240405074848/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7ff3d5fc46dd/20230923174222__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -17003,9 +17998,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:35614/19", - "case_name": "İlerde and Others v. Türkiye,* nos. 35614/19 and 10 others", + "case_name": "İlerde and Others v. Türkiye,", "application_numbers": "35614/19", "judgment_year": "2023", "citation_change": "added", @@ -17014,14 +18011,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "", "hudoc_doctype": "", "hudoc_docname": "", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", - "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "II.C: Accommodation", + "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.C|a:34|b:34", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "As regards the methodology for the calculation of the minimum personal space allocated to a detainee in multi-occupancy accommodation, the Court relies on the CPT's methodology on the matter according to which the in-cell sanitary facility should not be counted in the overall surface area of the cell. On the other hand, calculation of the available surface area in the cell includes space occupied by furniture. What is important in this assessment is whether detainees had a possibility to move around within the cell normally ( Muršić v. Croatia, 2016, § 114; see also Lautaru and Seed v. Greece, 2020, § 54, where a kitchenette is calculated in the overall surface area of the cell).", + "post_text": "As regards the methodology for the calculation of the minimum personal space allocated to a detainee in multi-occupancy accommodation, the Court relies on the CPT's methodology on the matter according to which the in-cell sanitary facility should not be counted in the overall surface area of the cell. On the other hand, calculation of the available surface area in the cell includes space occupied by furniture. What is important in this assessment is whether detainees had a possibility to move around within the cell normally ( Muršić v. Croatia, 2016, § 114; see also Lautaru and Seed v. Greece, 2020, § 54, where a kitchenette is calculated in the overall surface area of the cell; and İlerde and Others v. Türkiye,* 2023, §§ 173-175, individual outdoor yard annexed to each cell and available during daylight hours as well as the sanitary facilities, were excluded from calculation of floor space for each prisoner).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923174222/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240405074848/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7ff3d5fc46dd/20230923174222__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -17036,9 +18033,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:30138/21", - "case_name": "Miranda Magro v. Portugal,* no. 30138/21", + "case_name": "Miranda Magro v. Portugal", "application_numbers": "30138/21", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -17047,14 +18046,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF MIRANDA MAGRO v. PORTUGAL", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", - "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "IV.D: Mental health care", + "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.D|a:151|b:152", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "In this connection, the Court has accepted that the mere fact that an individual was not placed in an appropriate facility did not automatically render his or her detention unlawful, a certain delay in admission to a clinic or hospital being acceptable if it is related to a disparity between the available and required capacity of mental institutions. Nevertheless, a significant delay in admission to such institutions and thus in treatment of the person concerned will obviously affect the prospects of the treatment's success, and may entail a breach of Article 5 ( Pankiewicz v. Poland, 2008, § 45, where the Court held that a delay of two months and twenty-five days was excessive, given the harmful effects on the applicant's health of his compulsory confinement in an ordinary detention centre; see also Sy v. Italy, 2022, §§ 82-89 and 134-135, concerning the detention for two years in an ordinary prison of a person suffering from personality disorder and bipolar disorder, in poor conditions and without any overall therapeutic strategy to treat his condition).", + "post_text": "In this connection, the Court has accepted that the mere fact that an individual was not placed in an appropriate facility did not automatically render his or her detention unlawful, a certain delay in admission to a clinic or hospital being acceptable if it is related to a disparity between the available and required capacity of mental institutions. Nevertheless, a significant delay in admission to such institutions and thus in treatment of the person concerned will obviously affect the prospects of the treatment's success, and may entail a breach of Article 5 ( Pankiewicz v. Poland, 2008, § 45, where the Court held that a delay of two months and twenty-five days was excessive, given the harmful effects on the applicant's health of his compulsory confinement in an ordinary detention centre; see also Sy v. Italy, 2022, §§ 82-89 and 134-135, concerning the detention for two years in an ordinary prison of a person suffering from personality disorder and bipolar disorder, in poor conditions and without any overall therapeutic strategy to treat his condition; see further Miranda Magro v. Portugal,* 2024, §§ 75-82 and 91-96).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923174222/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240405074848/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7ff3d5fc46dd/20230923174222__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -17069,6 +18068,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:68958/17", "case_name": "Myslihaka and Others v. Albania", @@ -17102,9 +18103,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:14139/21", - "case_name": "Narbutas v. Lithuania,* no. 14139/21", + "case_name": "Narbutas v. Lithuania", "application_numbers": "14139/21", "judgment_year": "2023", "citation_change": "added", @@ -17113,14 +18116,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF NARBUTAS v. LITHUANIA", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "IV.A: General principles", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.A|a:None|b:110", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "Further, Article 3 imposes an obligation on the State to protect the physical well-being of persons deprived of their liberty by, among other things, providing them with the requisite medical care ( Kudła v. Poland [GC], 2000, § 94; Paladi v. Moldova [GC], 2009, § 71; Blokhin v. Russia [GC], 2016, § 136). Thus, the Court has held on many occasions that lack of appropriate medical care may amount to treatment contrary to Article 3 ( Ibid. ; Wenerski v. Poland, 2009, §§ 56-65). This may also concern restrictions imposed on an applicant's access to healthcare in the context of house arrest ( Narbutas v. Lithuania,* 2023, §§ 170-177).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923174222/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240405074848/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7ff3d5fc46dd/20230923174222__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -17135,9 +18138,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:35943/18", - "case_name": "Pintus v. Italy,* no. 35943/18", + "case_name": "Pintus v. Italy", "application_numbers": "35943/18", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -17146,14 +18151,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF PINTUS v. ITALY", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", - "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "IV.A: General principles", + "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.A|a:108|b:108", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "Under Article 2, the Court has stressed that this provision enjoins the States not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also lays down a positive obligation on the States to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within their jurisdiction. In the context of prisoners, the Court has previously had occasion to emphasise that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and that the authorities are under a duty to protect them ( Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2017, § 53). The obligation to protect the life of individuals in custody implies an obligation for the authorities to provide them with the medical care necessary to safeguard their life ( Jasinskis v. Latvia, 2010, § 60; Hilmioğlu v. Turkey (dec.), 2020, § 70).", + "post_text": "Under Article 2, the Court has stressed that this provision enjoins the States not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also lays down a positive obligation on the States to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within their jurisdiction. In the context of prisoners, the Court has previously had occasion to emphasise that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and that the authorities are under a duty to protect them ( Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2017, § 53). The obligation to protect the life of individuals in custody implies an obligation for the authorities to provide them with the medical care necessary to safeguard their life ( Jasinskis v. Latvia, 2010, § 60; Hilmioğlu v. Turkey (dec.), 2020, § 70), which, in the circumstances of a case, may also include adequate mental health care and treatment ( Pintus v Italy,* 2024, §§ 46-54).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923174222/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240405074848/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7ff3d5fc46dd/20230923174222__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -17168,6 +18173,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:3501/20", "case_name": "Schmidt and Šmigol v. Estonia", @@ -17201,6 +18208,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:26104/19", "case_name": "Stott v. the United Kingdom", @@ -17234,9 +18243,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:4312/13", - "case_name": "Tarricone v. Italy,* no. 4312/13", + "case_name": "Tarricone v. Italy", "application_numbers": "4312/13", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -17245,14 +18256,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF TARRICONE v. ITALY", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", - "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "IV.D: Mental health care", + "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.D|a:146|b:147", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "As regards the treatment of prisoners with mental health problems, the Court has consistently held that Article 3 of the Convention requires States to ensure that the health and well-being of prisoners are adequately secured by, among other things, providing them with the requisite medical assistance ( S ławomir Musiał v. Poland, 2009, § 87). In this context, obligations under Article 3 may go so far as to impose an obligation on the State to transfer mentally ill prisoners to special facilities in order to receive adequate treatment ( Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], 2016, § 105; Raffray Taddei v. France, 2010, § 63).", + "post_text": "As regards the treatment of prisoners with mental health problems, the Court has consistently held that Article 3 of the Convention requires States to ensure that the health and well-being of prisoners are adequately secured by, among other things, providing them with the requisite medical assistance ( S ławomir Musiał v. Poland, 2009, § 87; Tarricone v. Italy,* 2024, §§ 71-80). In this context, obligations under Article 3 may go so far as to impose an obligation on the State to transfer mentally ill prisoners to special facilities in order to receive adequate treatment ( Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], 2016, § 105; Raffray Taddei v. France, 2010, § 63).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923174222/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240405074848/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7ff3d5fc46dd/20230923174222__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -17267,6 +18278,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-05", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json", "case_key": "apps:37522/16", "case_name": "Vukušić v. Croatia", @@ -17300,9 +18313,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-28.json", "case_key": "apps:45709/20", - "case_name": "Bechi v. Romania,* no. 45709/20", + "case_name": "Bechi v. Romania", "application_numbers": "45709/20", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -17311,14 +18326,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF BECHI v. ROMANIA", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "XV: Prohibition of discrimination", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "XV|a:None|b:359", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "By contrast, in Bechi v. Romania,* 2024, §§ 56-65, the Court found that the placement of a HIVpositive prisoner in prison hospital was necessitated by the particular circumstances characterising Romanian prisons as found by the CPT (severe overcrowding, poor material and hygienic conditions, a lack of medical confidentiality and high levels of prejudice against people living with HIV) and that his placement there was aimed at offering him greater comfort and regular follow-up treatment. In this connection, the Court stressed that any differential treatment vis-à-vis ordinary detainees was aimed at providing the applicant with better conditions tailored to his medical needs and well-being, which amounted to an objective and reasonable justification within the meaning of Article 14 of the Convention.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240405074848/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240928174327/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7ff3d5fc46dd/20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -17333,6 +18348,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-28.json", "case_key": "apps:26564/16", "case_name": "Clasens v. Belgium", @@ -17366,6 +18383,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-28.json", "case_key": "apps:32439/19", "case_name": "Leroy and Others v. France", @@ -17399,9 +18418,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-28.json", "case_key": "apps:28791/10", - "case_name": "Namık Yüksel v. Türkiye,* no. 28791/10", + "case_name": "Namık Yüksel v. Türkiye", "application_numbers": "28791/10", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -17410,14 +18431,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF NAMIK YÜKSEL v. TÜRKİYE", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "III.A: Family contacts and visits", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.A|a:None|b:83", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "By contrast, in Namık Yüksel v. Türkiye,* 2024, § 61, the Court found no violation of Article 8 regarding restrictions imposed on the applicant's contact with his four-year-old son staying with his wife in the same prison. The Court considered that the domestic authorities, by allowing the applicant to have one hour weekly non-contact visits with son and one hour monthly contact visits with wife and son, had taken all necessary steps that could have been reasonably expected of them to ensure the applicant's contact with the child.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240405074848/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240928174327/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7ff3d5fc46dd/20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -17432,9 +18453,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-28.json", "case_key": "apps:8826/20", - "case_name": "Namazli v. Azerbaijan,* no. 8826/20", + "case_name": "Namazli v. Azerbaijan", "application_numbers": "8826/20", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -17443,14 +18466,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "4", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF NAMAZLI v. AZERBAIJAN", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "VIII.A: Access to legal advice", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "VIII.A|a:None|b:285", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "The authorities must ensure confidentiality of communication between a prisoner and his or her lawyer, which may extend to other legal representatives (A.B. v. the Netherlands, 2002, § 86). Thus, for instance, the Court has found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention as regardsthe inspection of a lawyer's documents by prison staff before and after meeting his client in prison in the absence of any suspicion of wrongdoing and in a situation where such inspection was not regulated by a clear and detailed framework or safeguards against possible abuse or arbitrariness (Namazli v. Azerbaijan,* 2024, §§ 42-54).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240405074848/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240928174327/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7ff3d5fc46dd/20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -17465,9 +18488,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-28.json", "case_key": "apps:35402/20", - "case_name": "Sahraoui and Others v. France,* no. 35402/20", + "case_name": "Sahraoui and Others v. France", "application_numbers": "35402/20", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -17476,14 +18501,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF SAHRAOUI AND OTHERS v. FRANCE", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "IV.E: Drug addiction", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.E|a:None|b:167", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "Similarly, in Sahraoui and Others v. France,* 2024, §§ 70-74, the Court found that the death of a drug addict as a result of his serious chronic health conditions, which had first manifested themselves even prior to the applicant's imprisonment, and the misuse by the applicant of prescribed psychotropic medication in prison, which he had spontaneously and clandestinely procured (by either smuggling or stealing) from another inmate, did not suggest that there had been an omission in his supervision by the authorities within the meaning of Article 2 of the Convention.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240405074848/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240928174327/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7ff3d5fc46dd/20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -17498,6 +18523,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-28.json", "case_key": "apps:17/19", "case_name": "Spînu v. Romania (No. 2) (dec.)", @@ -17531,9 +18558,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-28.json", "case_key": "apps:38129/15", - "case_name": "Temporale v. Italy,* no. 38129/15", + "case_name": "Temporale v. Italy", "application_numbers": "38129/15", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -17542,14 +18571,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "4", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF TEMPORALE v. ITALY", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "IV.D: Mental health care", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.D|a:None|b:149", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "In determining whether the detention of an ill person is compatible with Article 3 of the Convention, the Court takes into consideration the individual's health and the effect of the manner of execution of his or her detention on him or her. It has held that the conditions of detention must under no circumstances arouse in the person deprived of his liberty feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing him and possibly breaking his physical and moral resistance. On this point, the Court has recognised that detainees with mental disorders are more vulnerable than ordinary detainees, and that certain requirements of prison life pose a greater risk that their health will suffer, exacerbating the risk that they suffer from a feeling of inferiority, and are necessarily a source of stress and anxiety. Such a situation calls for an increased vigilance in reviewing whether the Convention has been complied with (Rooman v. Belgium [GC], 2019, § 145). The assessment of the situation of these particular individuals also has to take into consideration the vulnerability of those persons and, in some cases, their inability to complain coherently or at all about how they are affected by any particular treatment (Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], 2016, § 106; Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 1992, § 82; Aerts v. Belgium, 1998, § 66). Moreover, if the domestic authorities decide to place an individual suffering from serious health problems, including mental disorders, in detention, they have a duty of special care to ensure that the conditions of detention correspond to the specific needs of the person concerned (Temporale v. Italy,* 2024, § 79).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240405074848/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240928174327/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7ff3d5fc46dd/20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -17564,9 +18593,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-28.json", "case_key": "apps:31842/20", - "case_name": "W.W. v. Poland,* no. 31842/20", + "case_name": "W.W. v. Poland", "application_numbers": "31842/20", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -17575,14 +18606,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF W.W. v. POLAND", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "VII.E: Other special categories of detainees", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "VII.E|a:None|b:283", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "In W.W. v. Poland,* 2024, §§ 91-95 the Court found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention regarding the refusal to allow a transgender person to continue hormone therapy in prison - which had earlier been granted to her in another prison - and instead obliging her to undergo further medical assessments. The Court considered that the impugned decision touched on the applicant's freedom to define her gender identity, one of the most basic essentials of self-determination. In the case at issue, there were strong elements before the domestic authorities indicating that hormone therapy was an appropriate medical treatment for the applicant's state of health with a beneficial effect on her. Thus, a disproportionate burden was placed on the applicant to prove the necessity of the prescribed medical treatment by undergoing an additional medical consultation. The Court also noted that the applicant was particularly vulnerable as an imprisoned transgender person undergoing a gender reassignment procedure, thus requiring enhanced protection from the authorities.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240405074848/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240928174327/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7ff3d5fc46dd/20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -17597,6 +18628,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-28.json", "case_key": "apps:22321/19", "case_name": "Wick v. Germany", @@ -17630,9 +18663,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-28", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-28.json", "case_key": "apps:17389/20", - "case_name": "Yasak v. Türkiye,* no. 17389/20", + "case_name": "Yasak v. Türkiye", "application_numbers": "17389/20", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -17641,14 +18676,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF YASAK v. TÜRKİYE", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", - "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "II.E: Clothing and bedding", + "linked_change_types": "reformulation", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.E|a:45|b:45", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "An issue of inadequate bedding often arises in the context of a wider problem of prison overcrowding. The Court's case-law endorses the principle of one prisoner one bed. In many cases the Court has found a breach of Article 3 of the Convention where prisoners did not have an individual sleeping place and had to take turns to sleep (Ananyev and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 146, with further references). The Court therefore stressed that each detainee must have an individual sleeping place in the cell (Ibid., § 148(a)). It also important to bear in mind the hygiene requirements related to adequate bedding.6", + "post_text": "An issue of inadequate bedding often arises in the context of a wider problem of prison overcrowding. The Court's case-law endorses the principle of one prisoner one bed. In many cases the Court has found a breach of Article 3 of the Convention where prisoners did not have an individual sleeping place and had to take turns to sleep (Ananyev and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 146, with further references). The Court therefore stressed that each detainee must have an individual sleeping place in the cell (Ibid., § 148(a)). It also important to bear in mind the hygiene requirements related to adequate bedding.6 However, the fact that a prisoner may need to sleep on a mattress placed on the floor is not, taken in isolation, sufficient to amount to a violation of Article 3 (Yasak v. Türkiye,* 2024, §§ 113-114).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240405074848/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240928174327/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_prisoners_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/7ff3d5fc46dd/20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -17663,6 +18698,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-01", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/8ad6b528df3f/diff_2024-12-05__2025-06-01.json", "case_key": "apps:29359/22", "case_name": "Salay v. Slovakia*", @@ -17696,6 +18733,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-01", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/8ad6b528df3f/diff_2024-12-05__2025-06-01.json", "case_key": "apps:27746/22|28291/22", "case_name": "X and Others v. Slovenia", @@ -17729,6 +18768,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:56064/16", "case_name": "Aktay v. Türkiye (dec.)", @@ -17747,7 +18788,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A.1|a:None|b:12|I.E|a:None|b:93", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "Disciplinary proceedings that do not directly interfere with the right to continue to practise a profession, since such an outcome requires the institution of separate proceedings, are likewise not \"decisive\" for the purposes of Article 6 ( M arušić v. Croatia (dec.), 2017, §§ 74-75; see, in a different context, Morawska v. Poland (dec.), 2020, § 72). In Aktay v. Türkiye (dec.), 2024, §§ 36 - 46, the applicant complained that the imposition of a disciplinary fine for professional misconduct in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court had affected his rights to practise as a lawyer and had affected his professional reputation. The Court did not accept this argument finding that no other measures, besides the fine as such, has been taken against the applicant, and the effect of that incident on his reputation was minimal. Most importantly, the Court noted that that the disciplinary measure taken by the Constitutional Court was of a procedural nature, aimed at ensuring the proper administration of justice, and did not involve the determination of civil rights or obligations: the fact that there was a \"pecuniary\" element was not in itself sufficient to attract the applicability of Article 6 § 1 under its \"civil\" head.\n\nMerely showing that a dispute is \"pecuniary\" in nature is not in itself sufficient to attract the applicability of Article 6 § 1 under its civil head ( Ferrazzini v. Italy [GC], 2001, § 25). Thus, a procedural measure, imposed by a court in the interests of the proper administration of justice, does not by itself attract protection of Article 6 under its \"civil\" head, even if it involves a pecuniary fine (see Aktay v. Türkiye (dec.), 2024, §§ 36 - 46).", + "post_text": "Disciplinary proceedings that do not directly interfere with the right to continue to practise a profession, since such an outcome requires the institution of separate proceedings, are likewise not \"decisive\" for the purposes of Article 6 ( Marušić v. Croatia (dec.), 2017, §§ 74-75; see, in a different context, Morawska v. Poland (dec.), 2020, § 72). In Aktay v. Türkiye (dec.), 2024, §§ 36 - 46, the applicant complained that the imposition of a disciplinary fine for professional misconduct in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court had affected his rights to practise as a lawyer and had affected his professional reputation. The Court did not accept this argument finding that no other measures, besides the fine as such, has been taken against the applicant, and the effect of that incident on his reputation was minimal. Most importantly, the Court noted that that the disciplinary measure taken by the Constitutional Court was of a procedural nature, aimed at ensuring the proper administration of justice, and did not involve the determination of civil rights or obligations: the fact that there was a \"pecuniary\" element was not in itself sufficient to attract the applicability of Article 6 § 1 under its \"civil\" head.\n\nMerely showing that a dispute is \"pecuniary\" in nature is not in itself sufficient to attract the applicability of Article 6 § 1 under its civil head ( Ferrazzini v. Italy [GC], 2001, § 25). Thus, a procedural measure, imposed by a court in the interests of the proper administration of justice, does not by itself attract protection of Article 6 under its \"civil\" head, even if it involves a pecuniary fine (see Aktay v. Türkiye (dec.), 2024, §§ 36 - 46).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240218053355/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930062548/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/96d370a07ab1/20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf", @@ -17762,6 +18803,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:48173/18", "case_name": "Cangı and Others v. Türkiye", @@ -17795,6 +18838,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:39247/14", "case_name": "Davchev v. Bulgaria (dec.)", @@ -17828,6 +18873,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:25240/20", "case_name": "Gyulumyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.)", @@ -17861,6 +18908,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:49439/21", "case_name": "Hanževački v. Croatia", @@ -17894,6 +18943,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:42180/19", "case_name": "Jakutavičius v. Lithuania", @@ -17927,6 +18978,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:4976/20", "case_name": "Jann-Zwicker and Jann v. Switzerland", @@ -17960,6 +19013,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:72173/17", "case_name": "Legros and Others v. France", @@ -17977,7 +19032,7 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added|reformulation", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.1|a:40|b:136|II.A.1|a:126|b:140|II.A.1|a:131|b:142", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Litigants are nevertheless required to act with the requisite diligence ( Kamenova v. Bulgaria, 2018, §§ 52-55; compare Çela v. Albania, 2022, § 39).  The Court held in Ivanova and Ivashova v. Russia, 2017, that the national courts should not interpret domestic law in an inflexible manner with the effect of imposing an obligation with which litigants could not possibly comply. Requiring an appeal to be lodged within one month of the date on which the registry drew up a full copy of the court's decision - rather than the point at which the appellant actually had knowledge of the decision - amounted to making the expiry of the relevant deadline dependent on a factor entirely outside the appellant's control. The Court found that the right of appeal should have become effective from the point at which the applicant could effectively apprise herself of the full text of the decision.  limitation periods for bringing a claim (see, regarding harm to physical integrity, the case-law references cited in paragraphs 53-55 of Sanofi Pasteur v. France, 2020, including Howald Moor and Others v. Switzerland, 2014, §§ 79-80; Yagtzilar and Others v. Greece, 2001, § 27; see also the cases cited in Loste v. France, 2022, §§ 68-70). For example, the Court has found a violation of the right of access to a court in a number of cases in which the discontinuation of criminal proceedings and the resulting failure to examine a civil claim were due to a lack of diligence on the national authorities'part ( Atanasova v. Bulgaria, 2008, §§ 35-47). Excessive delays in the examination of a claim may also render the right of access to a court meaningless ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013).  the granting of leave to appeal out of time and the resulting acceptance of an ordinary appeal lodged after a significant period of time, for reasons that do not appear especially convincing, may entail a breach of the principle of legal certainty and the right to a court ( Magomedov and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 87-89, where late appeals benefiting the competent authorities were accepted following the extension without any valid reason of the time-limit for appealing).  the length of preliminary investigations, attributable to the authorities, preventing the applicant from joining criminal proceedings as a civil party claiming damages or from making a civil compensation claim ( Petrella v. Italy, 2021, §§ 51-53 and references cited).  delay by the national authorities in examining an application by the applicant (challenging the selection procedure for a post for which she had applied), with the result that the proceedings were terminated on the grounds that there was no legal interest in pursuing the application as the administrative decision at issue had expired ( Frezadou v. Greece, 2018, § 47 - compare and contrast with Sailing Club of Chalkidiki \"I Kelyfos\" v. Greece, 2019, § 72). More generally, in exceptional cases where proceedings are kept pending for an excessive period, this may impair the right of access to a court ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013, § 57). The unjustified lack of a decision for a particularly lengthy period by the court dealing with the case may be regarded as a denial of justice; the remedy used by the applicant may thus become deprived of all effectiveness where the court concerned does not manage to settle the dispute in good time, as required by the circumstances of the case and what is at stake ( Sailing Club of Chalkidiki \"I Kelyfos\" v. Greece, 2019, § 60). ▪ by issues relating to jurisdiction (see, for example, Arlewin v. Sweden, 2016, concerning a television programme broadcast from another European Union country) or an excessively restrictive interpretation of the scope of an association's stated aim, depriving it of its right of access to a court ( Association Burestop 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 71). Furthermore, where an action for damages is brought against it, the State has a positive obligation to facilitate the identification of the respondent authority ( Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-71). ▪ by issues of evidence, where the requirements for the burden of proof are overly rigid ( Tence v. Slovenia, 2016, §§ 35-38); concerning formalism in the presentation of evidence, see Efstratiou and Others v. Greece, 2020, §§ 44 et seq. ▪ by the existence of procedural bars preventing or limiting the possibilities of applying to a court:  a particularly strict interpretation by the domestic courts of a procedural rule (excessive formalism) may deprive applicants of their right of access to a court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 97; Pérez de Rada Cavanilles v. Spain, 1998, § 49; Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Sotiris and Nikos Koutras ATTEE v. Greece, 2000, § 20; Běleš and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 50; RTBF v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 71-72 and 74; Miessen v. Belgium, 2016, §§ 72-74; Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, § 34; and for a constitutional court, Dos Santos Calado and Others v. Portugal, 2020, §§ 118-130), bearing in mind that an unreasonable construction of a procedural requirement impairs the right to effective judicial protection ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 37). The general principles established in Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 80-99, also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the procedural rules of a court called upon to rule at first and last instance (see Makrylakis v. Greece, 2022, §§ 36, 38-50, which emphasises the specificity of a situation where the case is examined by a single court, § 49). As regards the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion after an appeal has been lodged, this raises an issue concerning the principle of legal certainty ( Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, §§ 35-45); see also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40).  consideration of the value of the subject matter of the dispute (ratione valoris admissibility threshold) in order to determine the jurisdiction of a higher court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], § 73, §§ 85-86);  the requirements linked to execution of an earlier ruling may impair the right of access to a court, for instance where the applicant's lack of funds makes it impossible for him even to begin to comply with the earlier judgment ( Annoni di Gussola and Others v. France, 2000, § 56; compare with Arvanitakis v. France (dec.), 2000);  procedural rules barring certain subjects of law from taking court proceedings ( The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 1994, § 83; Philis v. Greece (no. 1), 1991, § 65; Lupaş and Others v. Romania, 2006, §§ 64-67; and, regarding adults lacking capacity, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012, §§ 241-45; Nataliya Mikhaylenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 40; Nikolyan v. Armenia, 2019; and compare with R.P. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ by the limits of the judicial review available, for example where a complaint to the administrative courts against a presidential decree could only give rise to a review of compliance with external formalities in the adoption of the decree, whereas the applicant's complaint called for an examination of the merits and of the internal legality of the decree ( Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 153-154, concerning the premature removal of a prosecutor), and a fortiori by the unavailability of a judicial review (see Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, §§ 76-77, concerning the automatic temporary suspension of a judge pending the examination of her appeal against a decision to remove her from office). In the context of family-law disputes, in Plazzi v. Switzerland (§§ 44-67) and Roth v. Switzerland, 2022, (§ 77), concerning the cancellation without judicial review of the suspensive effect of appeals by fathers, thereby enabling their children to leave the country with their mothers and removing the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, the Court found a violation, emphasising that the urgency invoked had not been serious enough to justify preventing the fathers from applying to a court before the cancellation of suspensive effect became applicable (see Plazzi v. Switzerland, 2022, §§ 58-59, and the special nature of proceedings under family law). ▪ In Xavier Lucas v. France, 2022, by giving precedence to the rule that applications to the Court of Appeal had to be made electronically (e-justice), while disregarding the practical hurdles faced by the applicant in doing so, the Court of Cassation had adopted a formalistic approach which was not necessary to ensure legal certainty or the proper administration of justice and which was therefore \"excessive\" (§ 57).\n\nIn the specific circumstances of a case, the practical and effective nature of the right of access to a court may be impaired, for instance: ▪ by the prohibitive cost of the proceedings in view of the individual's financial capacity:  the excessive amount of security for costs in the context of an application to join criminal proceedings as a civil party ( Aït-Mouhoub v. France, 1998, §§ 57-58; García Manibardo v. Spain, 2000, §§ 38-45);  excessive court fees ( Kreuz v. Poland, 2001, §§ 60-67; Podbielski and PPU Polpure v. Poland, 2005, §§ 65-66; Weissman and Others v. Romania, 2006, § 42; Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-70, and conversely, Reuther v. Germany (dec.), 2003). In these cases the Court considered the question of court fees that had been imposed prior to the institution of civil proceedings and had had the effect of hindering access to a court at first instance or at a subsequent stage of the proceedings for applicants who were unable to pay (contrast Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, 1995, §§ 62-67, regarding the payment of a security as a precondition for lodging an appeal). The Court has pointed out that where there is a possibility of an exemption from stamp duty for a court application following an assessment of the applicant's financial situation, the authorities must give a decision promptly ( Laçi v. Albania, 2021, §§ 53-60), and diligence is also expected of the applicant ( Elcomp sp. z o.o. v. Poland, 2021, § 41). If the State has a system for calculating court fees linked to the amount in dispute, in order to comply with Article 6 the system must be sufficiently flexible to allow for the possibility of total or partial exemption from payment or a reduction in the amount payable (see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 39 and 40, and see §§ 41-45, where the applicant company had been forced to abandon its appeal because it was unable to pay the fees imposed on it). In Stankov v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 53, the Court held that substantial court fees imposed at the end of proceedings could also amount to a restriction on the right to a court (see, more specifically, for cases concerning the excessive length of proceedings, an acquittal or unjustified pre-trial detention, §§ 59 and 62, and a claim for compensation for assault, Čolić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 58-59); see also, regarding the refusal to reimburse legal costs, Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 68-69 and § 74; and compare with proceedings challenging the costs payable following judicial proceedings, Taratukhin v. Russia (dec.), 2020, §§ 36 et seq. For a recent summary of the case-law, see Benghezal v. France, 2022, §§ 43-45. In cases concerning court fees, regard should also be had to the litigant's conduct ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 120) or the manifest lack of any prospect of success of an action ( Marić v. Croatia (dec.), 2020, §§ 58 and 60, concerning the obligation to bear the full costs of the State's representation, and § 52, concerning the obligation for the losing party to pay litigation costs (the \"loser pays\" rule)); see also Stankiewicz v. Poland, 2006, §§ 62 et seq.; Klauz v. Croatia, 2013, §§ 77 et seq.; and Cindrić and Bešlić v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 119-123). With regard to litigation costs for proceedings that did not give rise to a decision on the merits, see Karahasanoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 136-137. Lastly, the Court has objected to the rule whereby each party has to bear its own costs regardless of the outcome of the proceedings ( Zustović v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-106, and see also §§ 99-100 for the State's duty to bear the cost of its errors in that context); it also examined the rule that each party was to bear its own costs without exception in Dragan Kovačević v. Croatia, 2022, §§ 67-85, and stressed the importance of giving reasons for a decision refusing to reimburse the costs incurred by the successful party (§ 83). For the imposition of excessive court fees on a commercial company, see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 39.  The imposition of fines in order to prevent a build-up of cases before the courts and to ensure the proper administration of justice is not, as such, incompatible with the right of access to a court. However, the amount of such fines is an important factor to take into account ( Sace Elektrik Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş. v. Turkey, 2013, §§ 26 et seq., concerning a mandatory fine of 10% of the bid in the event of an unsuccessful attempt to challenge a public auction). ▪ by issues relating to time-limits:  the time taken to hear an appeal leading to its being declared inadmissible ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2006, § 26). For the unforeseeable application of a new time-limit introduced after the lodging of a complaint, in breach of the principle of legal certainty, see Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-\n\nIn Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 on account of the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion for an appeal to the Supreme Court after the appeal had been lodged (§ 45). Referring to the principle of legal certainty, the Court found that the emergence of the new criterion had not been foreseeable for the applicant (§§ 38-39) and that she had therefore been unable to remedy any potential effects of the application of the new criterion (§§ 40-43). See also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 39-40.", + "pre_text": "Litigants are nevertheless required to act with the requisite diligence ( Kamenova v. Bulgaria, 2018, §§ 52-55; compare Çela v. Albania, 2022, § 39).  The Court held in Ivanova and Ivashova v. Russia, 2017, that the national courts should not interpret domestic law in an inflexible manner with the effect of imposing an obligation with which litigants could not possibly comply. Requiring an appeal to be lodged within one month of the date on which the registry drew up a full copy of the court's decision - rather than the point at which the appellant actually had knowledge of the decision - amounted to making the expiry of the relevant deadline dependent on a factor entirely outside the appellant's control. The Court found that the right of appeal should have become effective from the point at which the applicant could effectively apprise herself of the full text of the decision.  limitation periods for bringing a claim (see, regarding harm to physical integrity, the case-law references cited in paragraphs 53-55 of Sanofi Pasteur v. France, 2020, including Howald Moor and Others v. Switzerland, 2014, §§ 79-80; Yagtzilar and Others v. Greece, 2001, § 27; see also the cases cited in Loste v. France, 2022, §§ 68-70). For example, the Court has found a violation of the right of access to a court in a number of cases in which the discontinuation of criminal proceedings and the resulting failure to examine a civil claim were due to a lack of diligence on the national authorities'part ( Atanasova v. Bulgaria, 2008, §§ 35-47). Excessive delays in the examination of a claim may also render the right of access to a court meaningless ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013).  the granting of leave to appeal out of time and the resulting acceptance of an ordinary appeal lodged after a significant period of time, for reasons that do not appear especially convincing, may entail a breach of the principle of legal certainty and the right to a court ( Magomedov and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 87-89, where late appeals benefiting the competent authorities were accepted following the extension without any valid reason of the time-limit for appealing).  the length of preliminary investigations, attributable to the authorities, preventing the applicant from joining criminal proceedings as a civil party claiming damages or from making a civil compensation claim ( Petrella v. Italy, 2021, §§ 51-53 and references cited).  delay by the national authorities in examining an application by the applicant (challenging the selection procedure for a post for which she had applied), with the result that the proceedings were terminated on the grounds that there was no legal interest in pursuing the application as the administrative decision at issue had expired ( Frezadou v. Greece, 2018, § 47 - compare and contrast with Sailing Club of Chalkidiki \"I Kelyfos\" v. Greece, 2019, § 72). More generally, in exceptional cases where proceedings are kept pending for an excessive period, this may impair the right of access to a court ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013, § 57). The unjustified lack of a decision for a particularly lengthy period by the court dealing with the case may be regarded as a denial of justice; the remedy used by the applicant may thus become deprived of all effectiveness where the court concerned does not manage to settle the dispute in good time, as required by the circumstances of the case and what is at stake ( Sailing Club of Chalkidiki \"I Kelyfos\" v. Greece, 2019, § 60). ▪ by issues relating to jurisdiction (see, for example, Arlewin v. Sweden, 2016, concerning a television programme broadcast from another European Union country) or an excessively restrictive interpretation of the scope of an association's stated aim, depriving it of its right of access to a court ( Association Burestop 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 71). Furthermore, where an action for damages is brought against it, the State has a positive obligation to facilitate the identification of the respondent authority ( Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-71). ▪ by issues of evidence, where the requirements for the burden of proof are overly rigid ( Tence v. Slovenia, 2016, §§ 35-38); concerning formalism in the presentation of evidence, see Efstratiou and Others v. Greece, 2020, §§ 44 et seq. ▪ by the existence of procedural bars preventing or limiting the possibilities of applying to a court:  a particularly strict interpretation by the domestic courts of a procedural rule (excessive formalism) may deprive applicants of their right of access to a court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 97; Pérez de Rada Cavanilles v. Spain, 1998, § 49; Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Sotiris and Nikos Koutras ATTEE v. Greece, 2000, § 20; Běleš and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 50; RTBF v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 71-72 and 74; Miessen v. Belgium, 2016, §§ 72-74; Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, § 34; and for a constitutional court, Dos Santos Calado and Others v. Portugal, 2020, §§ 118-130), bearing in mind that an unreasonable construction of a procedural requirement impairs the right to effective judicial protection ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 37). The general principles established in Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 80-99, also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the procedural rules of a court called upon to rule at first and last instance (see Makrylakis v. Greece, 2022, §§ 36, 38-50, which emphasises the specificity of a situation where the case is examined by a single court, § 49). As regards the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion after an appeal has been lodged, this raises an issue concerning the principle of legal certainty ( Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, §§ 35-45); see also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40).  consideration of the value of the subject matter of the dispute (ratione valoris admissibility threshold) in order to determine the jurisdiction of a higher court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], § 73, §§ 85-86);  the requirements linked to execution of an earlier ruling may impair the right of access to a court, for instance where the applicant's lack of funds makes it impossible for him even to begin to comply with the earlier judgment ( Annoni di Gussola and Others v. France, 2000, § 56; compare with Arvanitakis v. France (dec.), 2000);  procedural rules barring certain subjects of law from taking court proceedings ( The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 1994, § 83; Philis v. Greece (no. 1), 1991, § 65; Lupaş and Others v. Romania, 2006, §§ 64-67; and, regarding adults lacking capacity, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012, §§ 241-45; Nataliya Mikhaylenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 40; Nikolyan v. Armenia, 2019; and compare with R.P. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ by the limits of the judicial review available, for example where a complaint to the administrative courts against a presidential decree could only give rise to a review of compliance with external formalities in the adoption of the decree, whereas the applicant's complaint called for an examination of the merits and of the internal legality of the decree ( Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 153-154, concerning the premature removal of a prosecutor), and a fortiori by the unavailability of a judicial review (see Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, §§ 76-77, concerning the automatic temporary suspension of a judge pending the examination of her appeal against a decision to remove her from office). In the context of family-law disputes, in Plazzi v. Switzerland (§§ 44-67) and Roth v. Switzerland, 2022, (§ 77), concerning the cancellation without judicial review of the suspensive effect of appeals by fathers, thereby enabling their children to leave the country with their mothers and removing the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, the Court found a violation, emphasising that the urgency invoked had not been serious enough to justify preventing the fathers from applying to a court before the cancellation of suspensive effect became applicable (see Plazzi v. Switzerland, 2022, §§ 58-59, and the special nature of proceedings under family law). ▪ In Xavier Lucas v. France, 2022, by giving precedence to the rule that applications to the Court of Appeal had to be made electronically (e-justice), while disregarding the practical hurdles faced by the applicant in doing so, the Court of Cassation had adopted a formalistic approach which was not necessary to ensure legal certainty or the proper administration of justice and which was therefore \"excessive\" (§ 57).\n\nIn the specific circumstances of a case, the practical and effective nature of the right of access to a court may be impaired, for instance: ▪ by the prohibitive cost of the proceedings in view of the individual's financial capacity:  the excessive amount of security for costs in the context of an application to join criminal proceedings as a civil party ( Aït-Mouhoub v. France, 1998, §§ 57-58; García Manibardo v. Spain, 2000, §§ 38-45);  excessive court fees ( Kreuz v. Poland, 2001, §§ 60-67; Podbielski and PPU Polpure v. Poland, 2005, §§ 65-66; Weissman and Others v. Romania, 2006, § 42; Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-70, and conversely, Reuther v. Germany (dec.), 2003). In these cases the Court considered the question of court fees that had been imposed prior to the institution of civil proceedings and had had the effect of hindering access to a court at first instance or at a subsequent stage of the proceedings for applicants who were unable to pay (contrast Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, 1995, §§ 62-67, regarding the payment of a security as a precondition for lodging an appeal). The Court has pointed out that where there is a possibility of an exemption from stamp duty for a court application following an assessment of the applicant's financial situation, the authorities must give a decision promptly ( Laçi v. Albania, 2021, §§ 53-60), and diligence is also expected of the applicant ( Elcomp sp. z o.o. v. Poland, 2021, § 41). If the State has a system for calculating court fees linked to the amount in dispute, in order to comply with Article 6 the system must be sufficiently flexible to allow for the possibility of total or partial exemption from payment or a reduction in the amount payable (see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 39 and 40, and see §§ 41-45, where the applicant company had been forced to abandon its appeal because it was unable to pay the fees imposed on it). In Stankov v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 53, the Court held that substantial court fees imposed at the end of proceedings could also amount to a restriction on the right to a court (see, more specifically, for cases concerning the excessive length of proceedings, an acquittal or unjustified pre-trial detention, §§ 59 and 62, and a claim for compensation for assault, Čolić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 58-59); see also, regarding the refusal to reimburse legal costs, Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 68-69 and § 74; and compare with proceedings challenging the costs payable following judicial proceedings, Taratukhin v. Russia (dec.), 2020, §§ 36 et seq. For a recent summary of the case-law, see Benghezal v. France, 2022, §§ 43-45. In cases concerning court fees, regard should also be had to the litigant's conduct ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 120) or the manifest lack of any prospect of success of an action ( Marić v. Croatia (dec.), 2020, §§ 58 and 60, concerning the obligation to bear the full costs of the State's representation, and § 52, concerning the obligation for the losing party to pay litigation costs (the \"loser pays\" rule)); see also Stankiewicz v. Poland, 2006, §§ 62 et seq.; Klauz v. Croatia, 2013, §§ 77 et seq.; and Cindrić and Bešlić v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 119-123). With regard to litigation costs for proceedings that did not give rise to a decision on the merits, see Karahasanoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 136-137. Lastly, the Court has objected to the rule whereby each party has to bear its own costs regardless of the outcome of the proceedings ( Zustović v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-106, and see also §§ 99-100 for the State's duty to bear the cost of its errors in that context); it also examined the rule that each party was to bear its own costs without exception in Dragan Kovačević v. Croatia, 2022, §§ 67-85, and stressed the importance of giving reasons for a decision refusing to reimburse the costs incurred by the successful party (§ 83). For the imposition of excessive court fees on a commercial company, see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 39.  The imposition of fines in order to prevent a build-up of cases before the courts and to ensure the proper administration of justice is not, as such, incompatible with the right of access to a court. However, the amount of such fines is an important factor to take into account ( Sace Elektrik Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş. v. Turkey, 2013, §§ 26 et seq., concerning a mandatory fine of 10% of the bid in the event of an unsuccessful attempt to challenge a public auction). ▪ by issues relating to time-limits:  the time taken to hear an appeal leading to its being declared inadmissible ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2006, § 26). For the unforeseeable application of a new time-limit introduced after the lodging of a complaint, in breach of the principle of legal certainty, see Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34\n\nIn Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 on account of the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion for an appeal to the Supreme Court after the appeal had been lodged (§ 45). Referring to the principle of legal certainty, the Court found that the emergence of the new criterion had not been foreseeable for the applicant (§§ 38-39) and that she had therefore been unable to remedy any potential effects of the application of the new criterion (§§ 40-43). See also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 39-40.", "post_text": "In the specific circumstances of a case, the practical and effective nature of the right of access to a court may be impaired, for instance: ▪ by the prohibitive cost of the proceedings in view of the individual's financial capacity:  the excessive amount of security for costs in the context of an application to join criminal proceedings as a civil party ( Aït-Mouhoub v. France, 1998, §§ 57-58; García Manibardo v. Spain, 2000, §§ 38-45);  excessive court fees ( Kreuz v. Poland, 2001, §§ 60-67; Podbielski and PPU Polpure v. Poland, 2005, §§ 65-66; Weissman and Others v. Romania, 2006, § 42; Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-70, and conversely, Reuther v. Germany (dec.), 2003). In these cases the Court considered the question of court fees that had been imposed prior to the institution of civil proceedings and had had the effect of hindering access to a court at first instance or at a subsequent stage of the proceedings for applicants who were unable to pay (contrast Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, 1995, §§ 62-67, regarding the payment of a security as a precondition for lodging an appeal). The Court has pointed out that where there is a possibility of an exemption from stamp duty for a court application following an assessment of the applicant's financial situation, the authorities must give a decision promptly ( Laçi v. Albania, 2021, §§ 53-60), and diligence is also expected of the applicant ( Elcomp sp. z o.o. v. Poland, 2021, § 41). If the State has a system for calculating court fees linked to the amount in dispute, in order to comply with Article 6 the system must be sufficiently flexible to allow for the possibility of total or partial exemption from payment or a reduction in the amount payable (see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 39 and 40, and see §§ 41-45, where the applicant company had been forced to abandon its appeal because it was unable to pay the fees imposed on it). In Stankov v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 53, the Court held that substantial court fees imposed at the end of proceedings could also amount to a restriction on the right to a court (see, more specifically, for cases concerning the excessive length of proceedings, an acquittal or unjustified pre-trial detention, §§ 59 and 62, and a claim for compensation for assault, Čolić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 58-59); see also, regarding the refusal to reimburse legal costs, Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 68-69 and § 74; and compare with proceedings challenging the costs payable following judicial proceedings, Taratukhin v. Russia (dec.), 2020, §§ 36 et seq. For a recent summary of the case-law, see Benghezal v. France, 2022, §§ 43-45. In cases concerning court fees, regard should also be had to the litigant's conduct ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 120) or the manifest lack of any prospect of success of an action ( Marić v. Croatia (dec.), 2020, §§ 58 and 60, concerning the obligation to bear the full costs of the State's representation, and § 52, concerning the obligation for the losing party to pay litigation costs (the \"loser pays\" rule)); see also Stankiewicz v. Poland, 2006, §§ 62 et seq.; Klauz v. Croatia, 2013, §§ 77 et seq.; and Cindrić and Bešlić v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 119-123). With regard to litigation costs for proceedings that did not give rise to a decision on the merits, see Karahasanoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 136-137. Lastly, the Court has objected to the rule whereby each party has to bear its own costs regardless of the outcome of the proceedings ( Zustović v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-106, and see also §§ 99-100 for the State's duty to bear the cost of its errors in that context); it also examined the rule that each party was to bear its own costs without exception in Dragan Kovačević v. Croatia, 2022, §§ 67-85, and stressed the importance of giving reasons for a decision refusing to reimburse the costs incurred by the successful party (§ 83). However, the Court found no violation of Article 6 on account of a rule of domestic law which provided that costs of the litigation should be reimbursed to a party acquitted in the administrative proceedings only in cases where the relevant authorities had acted unlawfully ( Jakutavičius v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 80 - 86). The Court noted that the applicant himself had contributed to the decision of the police to impose a sanction: although that sanction had later been annulled, the Court was unable to find that the applicant had been made to bear the mistakes of the State authorities. Thus, the fact that the applicant had to cover his own costs in the administrative-law proceedings did not violate his right of access to a court ( ibid ., §§ 84 - 85; compare with Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.), 2023, concerning the absence in domestic law of an arguable right to obtain reimbursement of costs incurred by a defendant acquitted in a criminal case). For the imposition of excessive court fees on a commercial company, see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 39.  The imposition of fines in order to prevent a build-up of cases before the courts and to ensure the proper administration of justice is not, as such, incompatible with the right of access to a court. However, the amount of such fines is an important factor to take into account ( Sace Elektrik Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş. v. Turkey, 2013, §§ 26 et seq., concerning a mandatory fine of 10% of the bid in the event of an unsuccessful attempt to challenge a public auction). ▪ by issues relating to time-limits:  the time taken to hear an appeal leading to its being declared inadmissible ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2006, § 26). For the unforeseeable application of a new time-limit introduced after the lodging of a complaint, in breach of the principle of legal certainty, see Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149 - 165. Litigants are nevertheless required to act with the requisite diligence ( Kamenova v. Bulgaria, 2018, §§ 52-55; compare Çela v. Albania, 2022, § 39).  The Court held in Ivanova and Ivashova v. Russia, 2017, that the national courts should not interpret domestic law in an inflexible manner with the effect of imposing an obligation with which litigants could not possibly comply. Requiring an appeal to be lodged within one month of the date on which the registry drew up a full copy of the court's decision - rather than the point at which the appellant actually had knowledge of the decision - amounted to making the expiry of the relevant deadline dependent on a factor entirely outside the appellant's control. The Court found that the right of appeal should have become effective from the point at which the applicant could effectively apprise herself of the full text of the decision.  limitation periods for bringing a claim (see, regarding harm to physical integrity, the case-law references cited in paragraphs 53-55 of Sanofi Pasteur v. France, 2020, including Howald Moor and Others v. Switzerland, 2014, §§ 79-80; Yagtzilar and Others v. Greece, 2001, § 27; see also the cases cited in Loste v. France, 2022, §§ 68-70). For example, the Court has found a violation of the right of access to a court in a number of cases in which the discontinuation of criminal proceedings and the resulting failure to examine a civil claim were due to a lack of diligence on the national authorities'part ( Atanasova v. Bulgaria, 2008, §§ 35-47). Excessive delays in the examination of a claim may also render the right of access to a court meaningless ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013).  the granting of leave to appeal out of time and the resulting acceptance of an ordinary appeal lodged after a significant period of time, for reasons that do not appear especially convincing, may entail a breach of the principle of legal certainty and the right to a court ( Magomedov and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 87-89, where late appeals benefiting the competent authorities were accepted following the extension without any valid reason of the time-limit for appealing).  the length of preliminary investigations, attributable to the authorities, preventing the applicant from joining criminal proceedings as a civil party claiming damages or from making a civil compensation claim ( Petrella v. Italy, 2021, §§ 51-53 and references cited).  delay by the national authorities in examining an application by the applicant (challenging the selection procedure for a post for which she had applied), with the result that the proceedings were terminated on the grounds that there was no legal interest in pursuing the application as the administrative decision at issue had expired ( Frezadou v. Greece, 2018, § 47 - compare and contrast with Sailing Club of Chalkidiki \"I Kelyfos\" v. Greece, 2019, § 72). More generally, in exceptional cases where proceedings are kept pending for an excessive period, this may impair the right of access to a court ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013, § 57). The unjustified lack of a decision for a particularly lengthy period by the court dealing with the case may be regarded as a denial of justice; the remedy used by the applicant may thus become deprived of all effectiveness where the court concerned does not manage to settle the dispute in good time, as required by the circumstances of the case and what is at stake ( Sailing Club of Chalkidiki \"I Kelyfos\" v. Greece, 2019, § 60). ▪ by issues relating to jurisdiction (see, for example, Arlewin v. Sweden, 2016, concerning a television programme broadcast from another European Union country) or an excessively restrictive interpretation of the scope of an association's stated aim, depriving it of its right of access to a court ( Association Burestop 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 71). Furthermore, where an action for damages is brought against it, the State has a positive obligation to facilitate the identification of the respondent authority ( Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-71). ▪ by issues of evidence, where the requirements for the burden of proof are overly rigid ( Tence v. Slovenia, 2016, §§ 35-38); concerning formalism in the presentation of evidence, see Efstratiou and Others v. Greece, 2020, §§ 44 et seq. ▪ by the existence of procedural bars preventing or limiting the possibilities of applying to a court:  a particularly strict interpretation by the domestic courts of a procedural rule (excessive formalism) may deprive applicants of their right of access to a court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 97; Pérez de Rada Cavanilles v. Spain, 1998, § 49; Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Sotiris and Nikos Koutras ATTEE v. Greece, 2000, § 20; Běleš and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 50; RTBF v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 71-72 and 74; Miessen v. Belgium, 2016, §§ 72-74; Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, § 34; and for a constitutional court, Dos Santos Calado and Others v. Portugal, 2020, §§ 118-130), bearing in mind that an unreasonable construction of a procedural requirement impairs the right to effective judicial protection ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 37). The general principles established in Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 80-99, also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the procedural rules of a court called upon to rule at first and last instance (see Makrylakis v. Greece, 2022, §§ 36, 38-50, which emphasises the specificity of a situation where the case is examined by a single court, § 49). As regards the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion after an appeal has been lodged, this raises an issue concerning the principle of legal certainty ( Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, §§ 35-45); see also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149 - 165).  consideration of the value of the subject matter of the dispute (ratione valoris admissibility threshold) in order to determine the jurisdiction of a higher court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], § 73, §§ 85-86);  the requirements linked to execution of an earlier ruling may impair the right of access to a court, for instance where the applicant's lack of funds makes it impossible for him even to begin to comply with the earlier judgment ( Annoni di Gussola and Others v. France, 2000, § 56; compare with Arvanitakis v. France (dec.), 2000);  procedural rules barring certain subjects of law from taking court proceedings ( The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 1994, § 83; Philis v. Greece (no. 1), 1991, § 65; Lupaş and Others v. Romania, 2006, §§ 64-67; and, regarding adults lacking capacity, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012, §§ 241-45; Nataliya Mikhaylenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 40; Nikolyan v. Armenia, 2019; and compare with R.P. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ by the limits of the judicial review available, for example where a complaint to the administrative courts against a presidential decree could only give rise to a review of compliance with external formalities in the adoption of the decree, whereas the applicant's complaint called for an examination of the merits and of the internal legality of the decree ( Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 153-154, concerning the premature removal of a prosecutor), and a fortiori by the unavailability of a judicial review (see Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, §§ 76-77, concerning the automatic temporary suspension of a judge pending the examination of her appeal against a decision to remove her from office). In the context of family-law disputes, in Plazzi v. Switzerland (§§ 44-67) and Roth v. Switzerland, 2022, (§ 77), concerning the cancellation without judicial review of the suspensive effect of appeals by fathers, thereby enabling their children to leave the country with their mothers and removing the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, the Court found a violation, emphasising that the urgency invoked had not been serious enough to justify preventing the fathers from applying to a court before the cancellation of suspensive effect became applicable (see Plazzi v. Switzerland, 2022, §§ 58-59, and the special nature of proceedings under family law). ▪ In Xavier Lucas v. France, 2022, by giving precedence to the rule that applications to the Court of Appeal had to be made electronically (e-justice), while disregarding the practical hurdles faced by the applicant in doing so, the Court of Cassation had adopted a formalistic approach which was not necessary to ensure legal certainty or the proper administration of justice and which was therefore \"excessive\" (§ 57).\n\nThe requirement of \"foreseeability\" does not necessarily mean that every restriction or procedural condtition for introducing a case or lodging an appeal should always be clearly formulated in the law itself: judge-made restrictions may also be acceptable. Thus, in Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 134 - 148, the applicants'appeals against various administrative acts were rejected as belated with reference to a judgment of the French Conseil d'État which had introduced a time-limit for such appeals. This new time-limit was a reversal of the previously existing case-law under which appeals against that particular category of administrative acts could have been introduced and accepted for examination indefinitely. The new rule, formulated by the Conseil d'État, made such appeals inadmissible if they were introduced after a \" reasonable period \", generally of one year from the moment when the litigant became aware of the contested act. That time-limit could be extended in the particular circumstances, on a case-by-case basis. The Court noted that the time-limit introduced by the Conseil d'État was sufficiently long, that this new rule served the interests of legal certainty and good administration of justice, and that it allowed for exceptions. The Court concluded that this manner of formulating restrictions to the right of access to court was not incompatible with Article 6 of the Convention (§ 148). By contrast, the Court found a violation of Article 6 on account of the retroactive application of this new rule to the proceedings which had already been underway when this rule had been formulated (§§ 149 - 162). The Court noted, in particular, that such development could not have been foreseen by the applicants, and that, although this new time-limit was subject to extension, the reasons for obtaining such an extension had not been defined in the case-law at the time. The Government failed to explain why the introduction of this new time-limit could not have been postponed (§ 160). The Court concluded that the application of this new inadmissibility criteria to the applicants'complaints pending before the administrative courts had breached their right of access to court.\n\nIn Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 on account of the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion for an appeal to the Supreme Court after the appeal had been lodged (§ 45). Referring to the principle of legal certainty, the Court found that the emergence of the new criterion had not been foreseeable for the applicant (§§ 38-39) and that she had therefore been unable to remedy any potential effects of the application of the new criterion (§§ 40-43). Similarly, in Hanževački v. Croatia, §§ 36-41, the Court concluded that an unforeseeable retroactive imposition of a procedural condition for lodging a constitutional complaint - a condition which the applicant could no longer fulfil - impaired the applicant's right to a court to such an extent that the very essence of that right was impaired. See also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 39-40, and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149 - 165.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240218053355/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930062548/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", @@ -17993,6 +19048,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:4465/18", "case_name": "Molchanova v. Ukraine (dec.)", @@ -18026,6 +19083,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:25226/18", "case_name": "Pająk and Others v. Poland", @@ -18059,6 +19118,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:66292/14", "case_name": "Pengezov v. Bulgaria", @@ -18092,9 +19153,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:38744/21", - "case_name": "Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.) no. 38744/21", + "case_name": "Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.)", "application_numbers": "38744/21", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -18103,14 +19166,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "4", "hudoc_doctype": "HEDEC", "hudoc_docname": "ROUSOUNIDOU v. CYPRUS", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", - "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 2, + "linked_sections": "II.A.1: A right that is practical and effective|II.C.1: Granting of legal aid", + "linked_change_types": "citation_added|paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.1|a:40|b:136|II.C.1|a:None|b:183", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "Litigants are nevertheless required to act with the requisite diligence ( Kamenova v. Bulgaria, 2018, §§ 52-55; compare Çela v. Albania, 2022, § 39).  The Court held in Ivanova and Ivashova v. Russia, 2017, that the national courts should not interpret domestic law in an inflexible manner with the effect of imposing an obligation with which litigants could not possibly comply. Requiring an appeal to be lodged within one month of the date on which the registry drew up a full copy of the court's decision - rather than the point at which the appellant actually had knowledge of the decision - amounted to making the expiry of the relevant deadline dependent on a factor entirely outside the appellant's control. The Court found that the right of appeal should have become effective from the point at which the applicant could effectively apprise herself of the full text of the decision.  limitation periods for bringing a claim (see, regarding harm to physical integrity, the case-law references cited in paragraphs 53-55 of Sanofi Pasteur v. France, 2020, including Howald Moor and Others v. Switzerland, 2014, §§ 79-80; Yagtzilar and Others v. Greece, 2001, § 27; see also the cases cited in Loste v. France, 2022, §§ 68-70). For example, the Court has found a violation of the right of access to a court in a number of cases in which the discontinuation of criminal proceedings and the resulting failure to examine a civil claim were due to a lack of diligence on the national authorities'part ( Atanasova v. Bulgaria, 2008, §§ 35-47). Excessive delays in the examination of a claim may also render the right of access to a court meaningless ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013).  the granting of leave to appeal out of time and the resulting acceptance of an ordinary appeal lodged after a significant period of time, for reasons that do not appear especially convincing, may entail a breach of the principle of legal certainty and the right to a court ( Magomedov and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 87-89, where late appeals benefiting the competent authorities were accepted following the extension without any valid reason of the time-limit for appealing).  the length of preliminary investigations, attributable to the authorities, preventing the applicant from joining criminal proceedings as a civil party claiming damages or from making a civil compensation claim ( Petrella v. Italy, 2021, §§ 51-53 and references cited).  delay by the national authorities in examining an application by the applicant (challenging the selection procedure for a post for which she had applied), with the result that the proceedings were terminated on the grounds that there was no legal interest in pursuing the application as the administrative decision at issue had expired ( Frezadou v. Greece, 2018, § 47 - compare and contrast with Sailing Club of Chalkidiki \"I Kelyfos\" v. Greece, 2019, § 72). More generally, in exceptional cases where proceedings are kept pending for an excessive period, this may impair the right of access to a court ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013, § 57). The unjustified lack of a decision for a particularly lengthy period by the court dealing with the case may be regarded as a denial of justice; the remedy used by the applicant may thus become deprived of all effectiveness where the court concerned does not manage to settle the dispute in good time, as required by the circumstances of the case and what is at stake ( Sailing Club of Chalkidiki \"I Kelyfos\" v. Greece, 2019, § 60). ▪ by issues relating to jurisdiction (see, for example, Arlewin v. Sweden, 2016, concerning a television programme broadcast from another European Union country) or an excessively restrictive interpretation of the scope of an association's stated aim, depriving it of its right of access to a court ( Association Burestop 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 71). Furthermore, where an action for damages is brought against it, the State has a positive obligation to facilitate the identification of the respondent authority ( Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-71). ▪ by issues of evidence, where the requirements for the burden of proof are overly rigid ( Tence v. Slovenia, 2016, §§ 35-38); concerning formalism in the presentation of evidence, see Efstratiou and Others v. Greece, 2020, §§ 44 et seq. ▪ by the existence of procedural bars preventing or limiting the possibilities of applying to a court:  a particularly strict interpretation by the domestic courts of a procedural rule (excessive formalism) may deprive applicants of their right of access to a court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 97; Pérez de Rada Cavanilles v. Spain, 1998, § 49; Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Sotiris and Nikos Koutras ATTEE v. Greece, 2000, § 20; Běleš and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 50; RTBF v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 71-72 and 74; Miessen v. Belgium, 2016, §§ 72-74; Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, § 34; and for a constitutional court, Dos Santos Calado and Others v. Portugal, 2020, §§ 118-130), bearing in mind that an unreasonable construction of a procedural requirement impairs the right to effective judicial protection ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 37). The general principles established in Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 80-99, also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the procedural rules of a court called upon to rule at first and last instance (see Makrylakis v. Greece, 2022, §§ 36, 38-50, which emphasises the specificity of a situation where the case is examined by a single court, § 49). As regards the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion after an appeal has been lodged, this raises an issue concerning the principle of legal certainty ( Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, §§ 35-45); see also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40).  consideration of the value of the subject matter of the dispute (ratione valoris admissibility threshold) in order to determine the jurisdiction of a higher court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], § 73, §§ 85-86);  the requirements linked to execution of an earlier ruling may impair the right of access to a court, for instance where the applicant's lack of funds makes it impossible for him even to begin to comply with the earlier judgment ( Annoni di Gussola and Others v. France, 2000, § 56; compare with Arvanitakis v. France (dec.), 2000);  procedural rules barring certain subjects of law from taking court proceedings ( The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 1994, § 83; Philis v. Greece (no. 1), 1991, § 65; Lupaş and Others v. Romania, 2006, §§ 64-67; and, regarding adults lacking capacity, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012, §§ 241-45; Nataliya Mikhaylenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 40; Nikolyan v. Armenia, 2019; and compare with R.P. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ by the limits of the judicial review available, for example where a complaint to the administrative courts against a presidential decree could only give rise to a review of compliance with external formalities in the adoption of the decree, whereas the applicant's complaint called for an examination of the merits and of the internal legality of the decree ( Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 153-154, concerning the premature removal of a prosecutor), and a fortiori by the unavailability of a judicial review (see Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, §§ 76-77, concerning the automatic temporary suspension of a judge pending the examination of her appeal against a decision to remove her from office). In the context of family-law disputes, in Plazzi v. Switzerland (§§ 44-67) and Roth v. Switzerland, 2022, (§ 77), concerning the cancellation without judicial review of the suspensive effect of appeals by fathers, thereby enabling their children to leave the country with their mothers and removing the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, the Court found a violation, emphasising that the urgency invoked had not been serious enough to justify preventing the fathers from applying to a court before the cancellation of suspensive effect became applicable (see Plazzi v. Switzerland, 2022, §§ 58-59, and the special nature of proceedings under family law). ▪ In Xavier Lucas v. France, 2022, by giving precedence to the rule that applications to the Court of Appeal had to be made electronically (e-justice), while disregarding the practical hurdles faced by the applicant in doing so, the Court of Cassation had adopted a formalistic approach which was not necessary to ensure legal certainty or the proper administration of justice and which was therefore \"excessive\" (§ 57).", + "post_text": "In the specific circumstances of a case, the practical and effective nature of the right of access to a court may be impaired, for instance: ▪ by the prohibitive cost of the proceedings in view of the individual's financial capacity:  the excessive amount of security for costs in the context of an application to join criminal proceedings as a civil party ( Aït-Mouhoub v. France, 1998, §§ 57-58; García Manibardo v. Spain, 2000, §§ 38-45);  excessive court fees ( Kreuz v. Poland, 2001, §§ 60-67; Podbielski and PPU Polpure v. Poland, 2005, §§ 65-66; Weissman and Others v. Romania, 2006, § 42; Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-70, and conversely, Reuther v. Germany (dec.), 2003). In these cases the Court considered the question of court fees that had been imposed prior to the institution of civil proceedings and had had the effect of hindering access to a court at first instance or at a subsequent stage of the proceedings for applicants who were unable to pay (contrast Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, 1995, §§ 62-67, regarding the payment of a security as a precondition for lodging an appeal). The Court has pointed out that where there is a possibility of an exemption from stamp duty for a court application following an assessment of the applicant's financial situation, the authorities must give a decision promptly ( Laçi v. Albania, 2021, §§ 53-60), and diligence is also expected of the applicant ( Elcomp sp. z o.o. v. Poland, 2021, § 41). If the State has a system for calculating court fees linked to the amount in dispute, in order to comply with Article 6 the system must be sufficiently flexible to allow for the possibility of total or partial exemption from payment or a reduction in the amount payable (see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 39 and 40, and see §§ 41-45, where the applicant company had been forced to abandon its appeal because it was unable to pay the fees imposed on it). In Stankov v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 53, the Court held that substantial court fees imposed at the end of proceedings could also amount to a restriction on the right to a court (see, more specifically, for cases concerning the excessive length of proceedings, an acquittal or unjustified pre-trial detention, §§ 59 and 62, and a claim for compensation for assault, Čolić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 58-59); see also, regarding the refusal to reimburse legal costs, Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 68-69 and § 74; and compare with proceedings challenging the costs payable following judicial proceedings, Taratukhin v. Russia (dec.), 2020, §§ 36 et seq. For a recent summary of the case-law, see Benghezal v. France, 2022, §§ 43-45. In cases concerning court fees, regard should also be had to the litigant's conduct ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 120) or the manifest lack of any prospect of success of an action ( Marić v. Croatia (dec.), 2020, §§ 58 and 60, concerning the obligation to bear the full costs of the State's representation, and § 52, concerning the obligation for the losing party to pay litigation costs (the \"loser pays\" rule)); see also Stankiewicz v. Poland, 2006, §§ 62 et seq.; Klauz v. Croatia, 2013, §§ 77 et seq.; and Cindrić and Bešlić v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 119-123). With regard to litigation costs for proceedings that did not give rise to a decision on the merits, see Karahasanoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 136-137. Lastly, the Court has objected to the rule whereby each party has to bear its own costs regardless of the outcome of the proceedings ( Zustović v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-106, and see also §§ 99-100 for the State's duty to bear the cost of its errors in that context); it also examined the rule that each party was to bear its own costs without exception in Dragan Kovačević v. Croatia, 2022, §§ 67-85, and stressed the importance of giving reasons for a decision refusing to reimburse the costs incurred by the successful party (§ 83). However, the Court found no violation of Article 6 on account of a rule of domestic law which provided that costs of the litigation should be reimbursed to a party acquitted in the administrative proceedings only in cases where the relevant authorities had acted unlawfully ( Jakutavičius v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 80 - 86). The Court noted that the applicant himself had contributed to the decision of the police to impose a sanction: although that sanction had later been annulled, the Court was unable to find that the applicant had been made to bear the mistakes of the State authorities. Thus, the fact that the applicant had to cover his own costs in the administrative-law proceedings did not violate his right of access to a court ( ibid ., §§ 84 - 85; compare with Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.), 2023, concerning the absence in domestic law of an arguable right to obtain reimbursement of costs incurred by a defendant acquitted in a criminal case). For the imposition of excessive court fees on a commercial company, see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 39.  The imposition of fines in order to prevent a build-up of cases before the courts and to ensure the proper administration of justice is not, as such, incompatible with the right of access to a court. However, the amount of such fines is an important factor to take into account ( Sace Elektrik Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş. v. Turkey, 2013, §§ 26 et seq., concerning a mandatory fine of 10% of the bid in the event of an unsuccessful attempt to challenge a public auction). ▪ by issues relating to time-limits:  the time taken to hear an appeal leading to its being declared inadmissible ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2006, § 26). For the unforeseeable application of a new time-limit introduced after the lodging of a complaint, in breach of the principle of legal certainty, see Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149 - 165. Litigants are nevertheless required to act with the requisite diligence ( Kamenova v. Bulgaria, 2018, §§ 52-55; compare Çela v. Albania, 2022, § 39).  The Court held in Ivanova and Ivashova v. Russia, 2017, that the national courts should not interpret domestic law in an inflexible manner with the effect of imposing an obligation with which litigants could not possibly comply. Requiring an appeal to be lodged within one month of the date on which the registry drew up a full copy of the court's decision - rather than the point at which the appellant actually had knowledge of the decision - amounted to making the expiry of the relevant deadline dependent on a factor entirely outside the appellant's control. The Court found that the right of appeal should have become effective from the point at which the applicant could effectively apprise herself of the full text of the decision.  limitation periods for bringing a claim (see, regarding harm to physical integrity, the case-law references cited in paragraphs 53-55 of Sanofi Pasteur v. France, 2020, including Howald Moor and Others v. Switzerland, 2014, §§ 79-80; Yagtzilar and Others v. Greece, 2001, § 27; see also the cases cited in Loste v. France, 2022, §§ 68-70). For example, the Court has found a violation of the right of access to a court in a number of cases in which the discontinuation of criminal proceedings and the resulting failure to examine a civil claim were due to a lack of diligence on the national authorities'part ( Atanasova v. Bulgaria, 2008, §§ 35-47). Excessive delays in the examination of a claim may also render the right of access to a court meaningless ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013).  the granting of leave to appeal out of time and the resulting acceptance of an ordinary appeal lodged after a significant period of time, for reasons that do not appear especially convincing, may entail a breach of the principle of legal certainty and the right to a court ( Magomedov and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 87-89, where late appeals benefiting the competent authorities were accepted following the extension without any valid reason of the time-limit for appealing).  the length of preliminary investigations, attributable to the authorities, preventing the applicant from joining criminal proceedings as a civil party claiming damages or from making a civil compensation claim ( Petrella v. Italy, 2021, §§ 51-53 and references cited).  delay by the national authorities in examining an application by the applicant (challenging the selection procedure for a post for which she had applied), with the result that the proceedings were terminated on the grounds that there was no legal interest in pursuing the application as the administrative decision at issue had expired ( Frezadou v. Greece, 2018, § 47 - compare and contrast with Sailing Club of Chalkidiki \"I Kelyfos\" v. Greece, 2019, § 72). More generally, in exceptional cases where proceedings are kept pending for an excessive period, this may impair the right of access to a court ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013, § 57). The unjustified lack of a decision for a particularly lengthy period by the court dealing with the case may be regarded as a denial of justice; the remedy used by the applicant may thus become deprived of all effectiveness where the court concerned does not manage to settle the dispute in good time, as required by the circumstances of the case and what is at stake ( Sailing Club of Chalkidiki \"I Kelyfos\" v. Greece, 2019, § 60). ▪ by issues relating to jurisdiction (see, for example, Arlewin v. Sweden, 2016, concerning a television programme broadcast from another European Union country) or an excessively restrictive interpretation of the scope of an association's stated aim, depriving it of its right of access to a court ( Association Burestop 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 71). Furthermore, where an action for damages is brought against it, the State has a positive obligation to facilitate the identification of the respondent authority ( Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-71). ▪ by issues of evidence, where the requirements for the burden of proof are overly rigid ( Tence v. Slovenia, 2016, §§ 35-38); concerning formalism in the presentation of evidence, see Efstratiou and Others v. Greece, 2020, §§ 44 et seq. ▪ by the existence of procedural bars preventing or limiting the possibilities of applying to a court:  a particularly strict interpretation by the domestic courts of a procedural rule (excessive formalism) may deprive applicants of their right of access to a court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 97; Pérez de Rada Cavanilles v. Spain, 1998, § 49; Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Sotiris and Nikos Koutras ATTEE v. Greece, 2000, § 20; Běleš and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 50; RTBF v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 71-72 and 74; Miessen v. Belgium, 2016, §§ 72-74; Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, § 34; and for a constitutional court, Dos Santos Calado and Others v. Portugal, 2020, §§ 118-130), bearing in mind that an unreasonable construction of a procedural requirement impairs the right to effective judicial protection ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 37). The general principles established in Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 80-99, also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the procedural rules of a court called upon to rule at first and last instance (see Makrylakis v. Greece, 2022, §§ 36, 38-50, which emphasises the specificity of a situation where the case is examined by a single court, § 49). As regards the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion after an appeal has been lodged, this raises an issue concerning the principle of legal certainty ( Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, §§ 35-45); see also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149 - 165).  consideration of the value of the subject matter of the dispute (ratione valoris admissibility threshold) in order to determine the jurisdiction of a higher court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], § 73, §§ 85-86);  the requirements linked to execution of an earlier ruling may impair the right of access to a court, for instance where the applicant's lack of funds makes it impossible for him even to begin to comply with the earlier judgment ( Annoni di Gussola and Others v. France, 2000, § 56; compare with Arvanitakis v. France (dec.), 2000);  procedural rules barring certain subjects of law from taking court proceedings ( The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 1994, § 83; Philis v. Greece (no. 1), 1991, § 65; Lupaş and Others v. Romania, 2006, §§ 64-67; and, regarding adults lacking capacity, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012, §§ 241-45; Nataliya Mikhaylenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 40; Nikolyan v. Armenia, 2019; and compare with R.P. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ by the limits of the judicial review available, for example where a complaint to the administrative courts against a presidential decree could only give rise to a review of compliance with external formalities in the adoption of the decree, whereas the applicant's complaint called for an examination of the merits and of the internal legality of the decree ( Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 153-154, concerning the premature removal of a prosecutor), and a fortiori by the unavailability of a judicial review (see Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, §§ 76-77, concerning the automatic temporary suspension of a judge pending the examination of her appeal against a decision to remove her from office). In the context of family-law disputes, in Plazzi v. Switzerland (§§ 44-67) and Roth v. Switzerland, 2022, (§ 77), concerning the cancellation without judicial review of the suspensive effect of appeals by fathers, thereby enabling their children to leave the country with their mothers and removing the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, the Court found a violation, emphasising that the urgency invoked had not been serious enough to justify preventing the fathers from applying to a court before the cancellation of suspensive effect became applicable (see Plazzi v. Switzerland, 2022, §§ 58-59, and the special nature of proceedings under family law). ▪ In Xavier Lucas v. France, 2022, by giving precedence to the rule that applications to the Court of Appeal had to be made electronically (e-justice), while disregarding the practical hurdles faced by the applicant in doing so, the Court of Cassation had adopted a formalistic approach which was not necessary to ensure legal certainty or the proper administration of justice and which was therefore \"excessive\" (§ 57).\n\nWhere national law does not provide for the right of the defendant in criminal proceedings to obtain reimbursement of the legal costs incurred in those proceedings, even following acquittal, no \"defendable right\" exists, and, therefore, Article 6, under its \"civil limb\", is inapplicable to the proceedings related to the recovery of such costs ( Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.), 2024, §§ 23 - 29; see also in this respect the Guide on Article 6 criminal, in particular Section VI-B-3 on the legal assistance and Section VI-A-1-b on the obligation of the accused to bear costs from the standpoint of the respect for the presumption of innocense).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240218053355/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930062548/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/96d370a07ab1/20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf", @@ -18125,6 +19188,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:19371/22", "case_name": "Stoianoglo v. the Republic of Moldova", @@ -18158,6 +19223,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:24269/18", "case_name": "Stylianidis v. Cyprus (dec.)", @@ -18191,6 +19258,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:41236/18", "case_name": "Syndicat National Des Journalistes and Others v. France", @@ -18224,6 +19293,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:70267/17", "case_name": "Țîmpău v. Romania", @@ -18257,6 +19328,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:46131/19", "case_name": "Toivanen v. Finland", @@ -18290,6 +19363,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:50849/21", "case_name": "Wałęsa v. Poland", @@ -18308,7 +19383,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.A.4.b|a:None|b:257|III.C.2.i|a:None|b:301", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "Whether or not an extraordinary reopening of the case violates the principle of res judicata depends, not only on the nature of the purported error which the reopening seeks to correct, but also on who seeks the reopening, at what moment in time, for what reason, who decides on it, and with what effect. In the case of Wałęsa v. Poland, 2023, the Court developed a test to analyse the reopening proceedings. The Prosecutor General obtained the reopening of a case decided in the final instance seven years earlier, which concerned certain allegations against the former President of Poland, Lech Wałęsa. The Court, first of all, noted that the power of reopening of this high-profile case was entrusted by law to the Prosecutor General who was at the same time the Minister of Justice, and who, in this role, wielded considerable authority over the courts and the bodies of judicial governance. This created \"more than a hypothetical risk\" that this legal remedy might in practice become a tool of political supervision over court judgments by the executive (§ 231), the Court noting that the Prosecutor General had a personal political interest in the outcome of the case (§§ 253 - 254). The second element assessed by the Court in this regard was the grounds for lodging the extraordinary appeal. The Court observed that the reopening of a case for the sake of restoring \"social justice\", which was a generic and vague term, opened the door to possible arbitrariness, misuse of that legal remedy and abuse of process. Similarly, reference to \"an obvious contradiction between significant findings of the court and the content of evidence collected in the case\" transformed the e xtraordinary review chamber into a court of a third or even fourth degree of jurisdiction, thus revealing the nature of the extraordinary appeal as an \"ordinary appeal in disguise\" (§§ 232 - 235). The third element analysed by the Court was the timing of the extraordinary appeal: under the transitional provisions of the law, it could have been introduced in civil cases without virtually any time-limit, even in respect of the proceedings closed over twenty years before the legislation took effect, which the Court found to be incompatible with the requirements of the rule of law (§§ 236 - 237). The fourth element criticized by the Court was the broad power of review which the extraordinary appeal chamber had, and which permitted it to review not only the questions of law but also the facts of the case, which practically allowed it to extinguish the entirety of finally terminated proceedings (§ 238). Finally, the Court noted that the extraordinary review had been entrusted to a body which cannot be considered a \"tribunal\" in Convention terms, due to the gross irregularities in the process of its formation (§ 239). Having applied those criteria to the facts of the case (§§ 240 - 256), the Court concluded that the departure from the principles of res judicata had not been justified by \"circumstances of a substantial and compelling character\" .\n\nThe composition of the body which appoints judges, namely the National Council of the Judiciary, the NCJ, has been at the center of the Court's attention in a number of cases concerning Poland. In the first cases of this group the system of judicial appointments was analysed not under the heading of \"independence\" but through the prism of the guarantee of the \"tribunal established by law\" (see, for example, Reczkowicz v. Poland, 2021, § 284, which concerned the legitimacy of the court which dealt with the applicant's case), or, alternatively, in the light of the guarantee of \"access to court\" (see, for example, Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, §§ 344 - 350, which concerned the impossibility for a member of the NCJ to obtain judicial review of the early termination of his mandate). In these cases the Court noted the negative effects of the 2017 judicial reform on the independence of the NCJ and of the Polish judiciary in general ( Reczkowicz v. Poland, 2021, § 274, and Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, § 348). The Court also observed (in Reczkowicz, §§ 280-281 and 284, and later in Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 214), that the underlying institutional problems are the same both in terms of compliance with the requirement of \"established by law\" and of the independence of the courts which dealt with the applicants'cases. Finally, in the case of Tuleya v. Poland, 2023, the Court found a breach of \" the right to an independent and impartial tribunal established by law \" (§ 345). In a nutshell, the Court concluded that both the independence of the judges of the Supreme Court and the condtition of a tribunal \"established by law\" were compromised because of the lack of independence of the NCJ which appointed those judges. Following the 2017 reform, the judicial community had been deprived of the right to delegate judicial members to the NCJ, a right afforded to it under the previous legislation and recognised by international standards, and \"the legislative and executive powers had a chieved a decisive influence on the composition of the NCJ\" (see Tuleya v. Poland, 2023, § 337, in respect of the independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court; see also Wałęsa v. Poland, 2023, in respect of the independence of the Extraordinary Review Chamber of the Supreme Court, §§ 168 - 176).", + "post_text": "Whether or not an extraordinary reopening of the case violates the principle of res judicata depends, not only on the nature of the purported error which the reopening seeks to correct, but also on who seeks the reopening, at what moment in time, for what reason, who decides on it, and with what effect. In the case of Wałęsa v. Poland, 2023, the Court developed a test to analyse the reopening proceedings. The Prosecutor General obtained the reopening of a case decided in the final instance seven years earlier, which concerned certain allegations against the former President of Poland, Lech Wałęsa. The Court, first of all, noted that the power of reopening of this high-profile case was entrusted by law to the Prosecutor General who was at the same time the Minister of Justice, and who, in this role, wielded considerable authority over the courts and the bodies of judicial governance. This created \"more than a hypothetical risk\" that this legal remedy might in practice become a tool of political supervision over court judgments by the executive (§ 231), the Court noting that the Prosecutor General had a personal political interest in the outcome of the case (§§ 253 - 254). The second element assessed by the Court in this regard was the grounds for lodging the extraordinary appeal. The Court observed that the reopening of a case for the sake of restoring \"social justice\", which was a generic and vague term, opened the door to possible arbitrariness, misuse of that legal remedy and abuse of process. Similarly, reference to \"an obvious contradiction between significant findings of the court and the content of evidence collected in the case\" transformed the e xtraordinary review chamber into a court of a third or even fourth degree of jurisdiction, thus revealing the nature of the extraordinary appeal as an \"ordinary appeal in disguise\" (§§ 232 - 235). The third element analysed by the Court was the timing of the extraordinary appeal: under the transitional provisions of the law, it could have been introduced in civil cases without virtually any time-limit, even in respect of the proceedings closed over twenty years before the legislation took effect, which the Court found to be incompatible with the requirements of the rule of law (§§ 236 - 237). The fourth element criticized by the Court was the broad power of review which the extraordinary appeal chamber had, and which permitted it to review not only the questions of law but also the facts of the case, which practically allowed it to extinguish the entirety of finally terminated proceedings (§ 238). Finally, the Court noted that the extraordinary review had been entrusted to a body which cannot be considered a \"tribunal\" in Convention terms, due to the gross irregularities in the process of its formation (§ 239). Having applied those criteria to the facts of the case (§§ 240 - 256), the Court concluded that the departure from the principles of res judicata had not been justified by \"circumstances of a substantial and compelling character\" .\n\nThe composition of the body which appoints judges, namely the National Council of the Judiciary, the NCJ, has been at the center of the Court's attention in a number of cases concerning Poland. In the first cases of this group the system of judicial appointments was analysed not under the heading of \"independence\" but through the prism of the guarantee of the \"tribunal established by law\" (see, for example, Reczkowicz v. Poland, 2021, § 284, which concerned the legitimacy of the court which dealt with the applicant's case), or, alternatively, in the light of the guarantee of \"access to court\" (see, for example, Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, §§ 344 - 350, which concerned the impossibility for a member of the NCJ to obtain judicial review of the early termination of his mandate). In these cases the Court noted the negative effects of the 2017 judicial reform on the independence of the NCJ and of the Polish judiciary in general ( Reczkowicz v. Poland, 2021, § 274, and Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, § 348). The Court also observed (in Reczkowicz, §§ 280-281 and 284, and later in Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 214), that the underlying institutional problems are the same both in terms of compliance with the requirement of \"established by law\" and of the independence of the courts which dealt with the applicants'cases. Finally, in the case of Tuleya v. Poland, 2023, the Court found a breach of \" the right to an independent and impartial tribunal established by law \" (§ 345). In a nutshell, the Court concluded that both the independence of the judges of the Supreme Court and the condtition of a tribunal \"established by law\" were compromised because of the lack of independence of the NCJwhich appointed those judges. Following the 2017 reform, the judicial community had been deprived of the right to delegate judicial members to the NCJ, a right afforded to it under the previous legislation and recognised by international standards, and \"the legislative and executive powers had a chieved a decisive influence on the composition of the NCJ\" (see Tuleya v. Poland, 2023, § 337, in respect of the independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court; see also Wałęsa v. Poland, 2023, in respect of the independence of the Extraordinary Review Chamber of the Supreme Court, §§ 168 - 176).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240218053355/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930062548/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/96d370a07ab1/20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf", @@ -18323,6 +19398,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:45681/99", "case_name": "Gutfreund v. France", @@ -18356,6 +19433,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:48045/15", "case_name": "Benghezal v. France", @@ -18389,6 +19468,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:21766/22", "case_name": "Cavca v. the Republic of Moldova", @@ -18422,6 +19503,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:8928/13", "case_name": "Centrum Handlowe Agora SP. Z O.O. v. Poland (dec.)", @@ -18455,6 +19538,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:15771/20|53712/21", "case_name": "Chambeau and Streiff v. France (dec.)", @@ -18488,6 +19573,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:2327/20", "case_name": "Couso Permuy v. Spain", @@ -18521,6 +19608,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:25373/16", "case_name": "E.T. v. the Republic of Moldova", @@ -18554,6 +19643,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:6319/21", "case_name": "Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC]", @@ -18587,6 +19678,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:64220/19", "case_name": "Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria", @@ -18620,6 +19713,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:78664/17", "case_name": "Justine v. France", @@ -18653,6 +19748,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:84388/17", "case_name": "Kural v. Türkiye", @@ -18686,6 +19783,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:58901/19", "case_name": "Kurkut and Others v. Türkiye", @@ -18719,6 +19818,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:47070/20", "case_name": "Levrault v. Monaco (dec.)", @@ -18737,7 +19838,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A.1|a:None|b:18|I.C.2|a:73|b:83", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "In Bilgen v. Turkey, 2021, the Court clarified the conditions for the applicability of Article 6 (civil limb) to complaints by judges of a lack of access to a court (see the first condition of the Vilho Eskelinen test) in order to challenge a unilateral decision affecting their professional life (a transfer). The Court had regard to the importance of safeguarding the autonomy and independence of the judiciary for the preservation of the rule of law. Accordingly, in disputes of this kind it had to determine whether the national judicial system ensured the protection of judges against a potentially arbitrary decision affecting their career or professional status (in this case, a transfer to a lower court - see §§ 57-59, §§ 61-63). The dispute thus concerned their \"right\", within the meaning of the Convention (drawing inspiration from international sources), to be protected against an arbitrary transfer or appointment (§ 64).", - "post_text": "In Levrault v. Monaco (dec.), 2024, the applicant - a detached French judge seconded to work in Monaco - complained that his secondment had not been extended, contrary to the usual practice and to a positive preliminary opinion of the competent Monegasque authority. The Court noted, however, that such secondments took place in the context of diplomatic relations, were not binding on the authorities of Monaco and did not create a \"right\" for the applicant. The Court also noted ( § 57) that a \"right\" for the applicant can be deduced neither from the constitutional principles guaranteeing judicial independence (given a very specific legislative framework of temporary secondments) nor from the particular context in which the applicant exercised his original mandate, nor from the \"interests of service\" to which the applicant referred. Onl y a sovereign act by the Government of Monaco could create such a right: no such act had ever been issued. The Court concluded that Article 6 was not applicable. The applicability of Article 6 to interim proceedings (i.e. those which are not directly decisive for the main subject-matter of the case) is discussed in sub-section D below.\n\nIn Bilgen v. Turkey, 2021, the Court clarified the conditions for the applicability of Article 6 (civil limb) to complaints by judges of a lack of access to a court (see the first condition of the Vilho Eskelinen test) in order to challenge a unilateral decision affecting their professional life (a transfer). The Court had regard to the importance of safeguarding the autonomy and independence of the judiciary for the preservation of the rule of law. Accordingly, in disputes of this kind it had to determine whether the national judicial system ensured the protection of judges against a potentially arbitrary decision affecting their career or professional status (in this case, a transfer to a lower court - see §§ 57-59, §§ 61-63). The dispute thus concerned their \"right\", within the meaning of the Convention (drawing inspiration from international sources), to be protected against an arbitrary transfer or appointment (§ 64). However, compare this approach to Levrault v. Monaco (dec.), 2024, which concerned the extension of the term of office of a French judge seconded to work in Monaco. The Court noted that the secondments had taken place in the context of diplomatic relations which did not bind the Monegasque authorities/ did not create a \"right\" for the ap plicant and neither could the existence of a \"right\" be deduced from the constitutional principles guaranteeing judicial independence.", + "post_text": "In Levrault v. Monaco (dec.), 2024, the applicant - a detached French judge seconded to work in Monaco - complained that his secondment had not been extended, contrary to the usual practice and to a positive preliminary opinion of the competent Monegasque authority. The Court noted, however, that such secondments took place in the context of diplomatic relations, were not binding on the authorities of Monaco and did not create a \"right\" for the applicant. The Court also noted ( § 57) that a \"right\" for the applicant can be deduced neither from the constitutional principles guaranteeing judicial independence (given a very specific legislative framework of temporary secondments) nor from the particular context in which the applicant exercised his original mandate, nor from the \"interests of service\" to which the applicant referred. Onl y a sovereign act by the Government of Monaco could create such a right: no such act had ever been issued. The Court concluded that Article 6 was not applicable. The applicability of Article 6 to interim proceedings (i.e. those which are not directly decisive for the main subject-matter of the case) is discussed in sub-section Dbelow.\n\nIn Bilgen v. Turkey, 2021, the Court clarified the conditions for the applicability of Article 6 (civil limb) to complaints by judges of a lack of access to a court (see the first condition of the Vilho Eskelinen test) in order to challenge a unilateral decision affecting their professional life (a transfer). The Court had regard to the importance of safeguarding the autonomy and independence of the judiciary for the preservation of the rule of law. Accordingly, in disputes of this kind it had to determine whether the national judicial system ensured the protection of judges against a potentially arbitrary decision affecting their career or professional status (in this case, a transfer to a lower court - see §§ 57-59, §§ 61-63). The dispute thus concerned their \"right\", within the meaning of the Convention (drawing inspiration from international sources), to be protected against an arbitrary transfer or appointment (§ 64). However, compare this approach to Levrault v. Monaco (dec.), 2024, which concerned the extension of the term of office of a French judge seconded to work in Monaco. The Court noted that the secondments had taken place in the context of diplomatic relations which did not bind the Monegasque authorities/ did not create a \"right\" for the ap plicant and neither could the existence of a \"right\" be deduced from the constitutional principles guaranteeing judicial independence.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930062548/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250626081847/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/96d370a07ab1/20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf", @@ -18752,6 +19853,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:31029/15", "case_name": "Loizides v. Cyprus", @@ -18770,7 +19873,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.1|a:145|b:157", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "Furthermore, Article 6 § 1 guarantees not only the right to institute proceedings but also the right to obtain a determination of the dispute by a court ( Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], 2016, § 86; Kutić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 25 and 32, regarding the staying of proceedings; Aćimović v. Croatia, 2003, § 41; Beneficio Cappella Paolini v. San Marino, 2004, § 29 concerning a denial of justice; Marini v. Albania, 2007, §§ 118-123, concerning a refusal to take a final decision on the applicant's constitutional appeal as a result of a tied vote, and Gogić v. Croatia, 2020, §§ 40-41, concerning the consequences of errors by the judicial authorities).", - "post_text": "Furthermore, Article 6 § 1 guarantees not only the right to institute proceedings but also the right to obtain a determination of the dispute by a court ( Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], 2016, § 86; Kutić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 25 and 32, regarding the staying of proceedings; Aćimović v. Croatia, 2003, § 41; Beneficio Cappella Paolini v. San Marino, 2004, § 29 concerning a denial of justice; Marini v. Albania, 2007, §§ 118-123, concerning a refusal to take a final decision on the applicant's constitutional appeal as a result of a tied vote, and Gogić v. Croatia, 2020, §§ 40-41, concerning the consequences of errors by the judicial authorities). A tied vote does not constitute a violation of Article 6 of itself - for example, where a tied vote results in a rejection of an appeal and the grounds for the rejection can be deduced from the judges'opinions expressed during the vote, the Court concluded that Article 6 was not breached ( Loizides v. Cyprus, 2022, §§ 41-50). However, in Meli and Swinkels Family Brewers N.V. v. Albania, 2024, the tied vote was not accompanied by any description of the Constitutional Court's reasoning (the decision only indicated the results of the voting). Since the crux of the applicants'complaint before the Constitutional Court was precisely the lack of proper reasoning by the lower courts'judgments, the Court did not accept the Government's argument that the Constitutional Court should be deemed to have endorsed the reasoning of the lower courts (§ 73). ‐", + "post_text": "Furthermore, Article 6 § 1 guarantees not only the right to institute proceedings but also the right to obtain a determination of the dispute by a court ( Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], 2016, § 86; Kutić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 25 and 32, regarding the staying of proceedings; Aćimović v. Croatia, 2003, § 41; Beneficio Cappella Paolini v. San Marino, 2004, § 29 concerning a denial of justice; Marini v. Albania, 2007, §§ 118-123, concerning a refusal to take a final decision on the applicant's constitutional appeal as a result of a tied vote, and Gogić v. Croatia, 2020, §§ 40-41, concerning the consequences of errors by the judicial authorities). Atied vote does not constitute a violation of Article 6 of itself - for example, where a tied vote results in a rejection of an appeal and the grounds for the rejection can be deduced from the judges'opinions expressed during the vote, the Court concluded that Article 6 was not breached ( Loizides v. Cyprus, 2022, §§ 41-50). However, in Meli and Swinkels Family Brewers N.V. v. Albania, 2024, the tied vote was not accompanied by any description of the Constitutional Court's reasoning (the decision only indicated the results of the voting). Since the crux of the applicants'complaint before the Constitutional Court was precisely the lack of proper reasoning by the lower courts'judgments, the Court did not accept the Government's argument that the Constitutional Court should be deemed to have endorsed the reasoning of the lower courts (§ 73). ‐", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930062548/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250626081847/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/96d370a07ab1/20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf", @@ -18785,6 +19888,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:13303/21", "case_name": "M.M. v. France (dec.)", @@ -18802,8 +19907,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_removed", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.2|a:163|b:178", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Jurisdictional immunity of foreign States: the grant of immunity is to be seen not as qualifying a substantive right but as a procedural bar on the national courts'power to determine the right ( J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 58-59). A foreign State may waive its right to immunity before the courts of another State by giving clear and unequivocal consent ( Ndayegamiye-Mporamazina v. Switzerland, 2019, §§ 57 and 59). In cases where the application of the principle of State immunity from jurisdiction restricts the exercise of the right of access to a court, it must be ascertained whether the circumstances of the case justify such restriction (for example, Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany [GC], 2001, §§ 51-70). The restriction must pursue a legitimate aim and be proportionate to that aim ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, § 59; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, §§ 51-54). The grant of sovereign immunity to a State in civil proceedings pursues the \"legitimate aim\" of complying with international law to promote comity and good relations between States ( Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 34; Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 54; Treska v. Albania and Italy (dec.), 2006; J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, § 60). As to whether the measure taken is proportionate (see the summary of the principles in J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 61 and 63), it may in some cases impair the very essence of the individual's right of access to a court ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, § 74; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, § 49; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, 2016, § 95), while in other cases it may not ( Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 67; Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 39; McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], 2001, § 38; and more recently, J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, § 75, where the Court found that the national court had not departed from the generally recognised rules of international law on State immunity). In the absence of an alternative remedy, there is not ipso facto a violation of the right of access to a court ( Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2013), although the Court found that the existence of an alternative would be desirable in the specific circumstances of the case of J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021 (§ 71). ▪ State immunity from jurisdiction has been circumscribed by developments in customary international law.  Thus, the Court has noted a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of employment-related disputes, with the exception, however, of those concerning the recruitment of embassy staff ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, §§ 63 et seq.; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, §§ 53-54 and 57-58; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, 2016, § 89, concerning the dismissal of embassy staff members; see also Wallishauser v. Austria, 2012, concerning the service of a summons in proceedings against a foreign State relating to salary arrears). As regards disputes concerning a contract of employment concluded between embassies or permanent missions and their support staff, the Court has always protected both nationals of the forum State (the State where the work is performed) and non-nationals living there ( Ndayegamiye- Mporamazina v. Switzerland, 2019, §§ 49 and 61 and references cited). This consistent approach is in line with codified international custom: in principle, a foreign State cannot rely on immunity from jurisdiction in the context of a dispute concerning a contract of employment executed in the territory of the forum State. However, there are exceptions to that principle, in particular where \"the employee is a national of the employer State at the time when the proceeding is instituted, unless this person has his or her permanent residence in the State of the forum\" ( ibid., §§ 61-63). In the case cited, unlike the previous cases, the applicant was a national of the employer State (Burundi) when she brought her case before the Swiss courts, and was not permanently resident in the forum State (Switzerland), where she worked at the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Burundi to the United Nations. The observance by Switzerland of the Republic of Burundi's immunity from jurisdiction in respect of the applicant's claim of unfair dismissal was compatible with the generally recognised rules of international law on State immunity (§ 66).  A restrictive approach to immunity may also be taken in relation to commercial transactions between the State and foreign private individuals ( Oleynikov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 61 and 66). ▪ On the other hand, the Court noted in 2001 that, while there appeared to be a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of personal injury caused by an act or omission within the forum State, that practice was by no means universal ( McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], 2001, § 38). ▪ In J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, the Court did not uphold the applicants'argument that State immunity from jurisdiction could not be maintained in cases involving inhuman or degrading treatment (see §§ 64 et seq., including the summary of precedents concerning other serious violations of human rights law, international humanitarian law, or jus cogens norms). In addition, the Court held in 2014 that while there was some emerging support in favour of a special rule or exception in public international law in cases concerning civil claims for torture lodged against foreign State officials, the bulk of the authority was to the effect that the State's right to immunity could not be circumvented by suing its servants or agents instead ( Jones and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2014, §§ 213-15, concerning the refusal to consider the applicants'civil claim in respect of torture allegations on account of the immunity invoked by the State in question and its officials). ▪ State immunity from execution is not in itself contrary to Article 6 § 1. The Court noted in 2005 that all the international legal instruments governing State immunity set forth the general principle that, subject to certain strictly delimited exceptions, foreign States enjoyed immunity from execution in the territory of the forum State ( Manoilescu and Dobrescu v. Romania and Russia (dec.), 2005, § 73). By way of illustration, the Court held in 2002 that \"although the Greek courts ordered the German State to pay damages to the applicants, this did not necessarily oblige the Greek State to ensure that the applicants could recover their debt through enforcement proceedings in Greece\" ( Kalogeropoulou and Others v. Greece and Germany (dec.), 2002). These decisions are valid in relation to the state of international law at the relevant time and do not preclude future developments in that law.", - "post_text": "Jurisdictional immunity of foreign States: the grant of immunity is to be seen not as qualifying a substantive right but as a procedural bar on the national courts'power to determine the right ( J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 58-59). A foreign State may waive its right to immunity before the courts of another State by giving clear and unequivocal consent ( Ndayegamiye-Mporamazina v. Switzerland, 2019, §§ 57 and 59). In cases where the application of the principle of State immunity from jurisdiction restricts the exercise of the right of access to a court, it must be ascertained whether the circumstances of the case justify such restriction (for example, Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany [GC], 2001, §§ 51-70). The restriction must pursue a legitimate aim and be proportionate to that aim ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, § 59; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, §§ 51-54). The grant of sovereign immunity to a State in civil proceedings pursues the \"legitimate aim\" of complying with international law to promote comity and good relations between States ( Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 34; Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 54; Treska v. Albania and Italy (dec.), 2006; J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, § 60). As to whether the measure taken is proportionate (see the summary of the principles in J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 61 and 63), it may in some cases impair the very essence of the individual's right of access to a court ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, § 74; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, § 49; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, 2016, § 95), while in other cases it may not ( Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 67; Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 39; McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], 2001, § 38; and more recently, J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, § 75, where the Court found that the national court had not departed from the generally recognised rules of international law on State immunity). In the absence of an alternative remedy, there is not ipso facto a violation of the right of access to a court ( Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2013), although the Court found that the existence of an alternative would be desirable in the specific circumstances of the case of J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021 (§ 71). M.M. v. France (dec.), 2024 concerned the refusal of the French courts to institute criminal proceedings against an acting foreign head of State for torture committed in that State, given his immunity from foreign prosecution, the Court found that such immunity did not prevent the applicant from re-introducing a complaint against this head of State after the end of his mandate or before an international court (§ 88), and that, although the criminal proceedings in which the applicant presented his civil claims have been not been pursued, the matter has been examined by the courts at several levels of jurisdiction (§ 89). ▪ State immunity from jurisdiction has been circumscribed by developments in customary international law.  Thus, the Court has noted a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of employment-related disputes, with the exception, however, of those concerning the recruitment of embassy staff ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, §§ 63 et seq.; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, §§ 53-54 and 57-58; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, 2016, § 89, concerning the dismissal of embassy staff members; see also Wallishauser v. Austria, 2012, concerning the service of a summons in proceedings against a foreign State relating to salary arrears). As regards disputes concerning a contract of employment concluded between embassies or permanent missions and their support staff, the Court has always protected both nationals of the forum State (the State where the work is performed) and non-nationals living there ( Ndayegamiye-Mporamazina v. Switzerland, 2019, §§ 49 and 61 and references cited). This consistent approach is in line with codified international custom: in principle, a foreign State cannot rely on immunity from jurisdiction in the context of a dispute concerning a contract of employment executed in the territory of the forum State. Ho wever, there are exceptions to that principle, in particular where \"the employee is a national of the employer State at the time when the proceeding is instituted, unless this person has his or her permanent residence in the State of the forum\" ( ibid., §§ 61-63). In the case cited, unlike the previous cases, the applicant was a national of the employer State (Burundi) when she brought her case before the Swiss courts, and was not permanently resident in the forum State (Switzerland), where she worked at the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Burundi to the United Nations. The observance by Switzerland of the Republic of Burundi's immunity from jurisdiction in respect of the applicant's claim of unfair dismissal was compatible with the generally recognised rules of international law on State immunity (§ 66).  A restrictive approach to immunity may also be taken in relation to commercial transactions between the State and foreign private individuals ( Oleynikov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 61 and 66). ▪ On the other hand, the Court noted in 2001 that, while there appeared to be a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of personal injury caused by an act or omission within the forum State, that practice was by no means universal ( McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], 2001, § 38). ▪ In J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, the Court did not uphold the applicants'argument that State immunity from jurisdiction could not be maintained in cases involving inhuman or degrading treatment (see §§ 64 et seq., including the summary of precedents concerning other serious violations of human rights law, international humanitarian law, or jus cogens norms). In addition, the Court held in 2014 that while there was some emerging support in favour of a special rule or exception in public international law in cases concerning civil claims for torture lodged against foreign State officials, the bulk of the authority was to the effect that the State's right to immunity could not be circumvented by suing its servants or agents instead ( Jones and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2014, §§ 213-15, concerning the refusal to consider the applicants'civil claim in respect of torture allegations on account of the immunity invoked by the State in question and its officials). In Sassi and Benchellali v. France (dec.), 2024, the Court confirmed thisapproach: despite the special status of the prohibition of torture in the international law, international law still grants immunity to the State or agents of the State against tort actions related to the acts of torture. The Court added that, although the French investigative authorities in the end discontinued the criminal prosecution of the American officials allegedly responsible for the ill-treatment of the applicant (who had been detained in the Guantanamo military base prison, with reference to the immunity of the persons indicated as possible defendants, the authorities had taken steps to investigate the case and the question of immunity had been discussed at all levels jurisdiction, including the Court of Cassation (§ 64). ▪ State immunity from execution is not in itself contrary to Article 6 § 1. The Court noted in 2005 that all the international legal instruments governing State immunity set forth the general principle that, subject to certain strictly delimited exceptions, foreign States enjoyed immunity from execution in the territory of the forum State ( Manoilescu and Dobrescu v. Romania and Russia (dec.), 2005, § 73). By way of illustration, the Court held in 2002 that \"although the Greek courts ordered the German Sta te to pay damages to the applicants, this did not necessarily oblige the Greek State to ensure that the applicants could recover their debt through enforcement proceedings in Greece\" ( Kalogeropoulou and Others v. Greece and Germany (dec.), 2002). These decisions are valid in relation to the state of international law at the relevant time and do not preclude future developments in that law.", + "pre_text": "Jurisdictional immunity of foreign States: the grant of immunity is to be seen not as qualifying a substantive right but as a procedural bar on the national courts'power to determine the right ( J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 58-59). Aforeign State may waive its right to immunity before the courts of another State by giving clear and unequivocal consent ( Ndayegamiye-Mporamazina v. Switzerland, 2019, §§ 57 and 59). In cases where the application of the principle of State immunity from jurisdiction restricts the exercise of the right of access to a court, it must be ascertained whether the circumstances of the case justify such restriction (for example, Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany [GC], 2001, §§ 51-70). The restriction must pursue a legitimate aim and be proportionate to that aim ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, § 59; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, §§ 51-54). The grant of sovereign immunity to a State in civil proceedings pursues the \"legitimate aim\" of complying with international law to promote comity and good relations between States ( Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 34; Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 54; Treska v. Albania and Italy (dec.), 2006; J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, § 60). As to whether the measure taken is proportionate (see the summary of the principles in J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 61 and 63), it may in some cases impair the very essence of the individual's right of access to a court ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, § 74; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, § 49; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, 2016, § 95), while in other cases it may not ( Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 67; Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 39; McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], 2001, § 38; and more recently, J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, § 75, where the Court found that the national court had not departed from the generally recognised rules of international law on State immunity). In the absence of an alternative remedy, there is not ipso facto a violation of the right of access to a court ( Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2013), although the Court found that the existence of an alternative would be desirable in the specific circumstances of the case of J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021 (§ 71). ▪ State immunity from jurisdiction has been circumscribed by developments in customary international law.  Thus, the Court has noted a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of employment-related disputes, with the exception, however, of those concerning the recruitment of embassy staff ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, §§ 63 et seq.; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, §§ 53-54 and 57-58; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, 2016, § 89, concerning the dismissal of embassy staff members; see also Wallishauser v. Austria, 2012, concerning the service of a summons in proceedings against a foreign State relating to salary arrears). As regards disputes concerning a contract of employment concluded between embassies or permanent missions and their support staff, the Court has always protected both nationals of the forum State (the State where the work is performed) and non-nationals living there ( Ndayegamiye- Mporamazina v. Switzerland, 2019, ��§ 49 and 61 and references cited). This consistent approach is in line with codified international custom: in principle, a foreign State cannot rely on immunity from jurisdiction in the context of a dispute concerning a contract of employment executed in the territory of the forum State. However, there are exceptions to that principle, in particular where \"the employee is a national of the employer State at the time when the proceeding is instituted, unless this person has his or her permanent residence in the State of the forum\" ( ibid., §§ 61-63). In the case cited, unlike the previous cases, the applicant was a national of the employer State (Burundi) when she brought her case before the Swiss courts, and was not permanently resident in the forum State (Switzerland), where she worked at the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Burundi to the United Nations. The observance by Switzerland of the Republic of Burundi's immunity from jurisdiction in respect of the applicant's claim of unfair dismissal was compatible with the generally recognised rules of international law on State immunity (§ 66).  Arestrictive approach to immunity may also be taken in relation to commercial transactions between the State and foreign private individuals ( Oleynikov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 61 and 66). ▪ On the other hand, the Court noted in 2001 that, while there appeared to be a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of personal injury caused by an act or omission within the forum State, that practice was by no means universal ( McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], 2001, § 38). ▪ In J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, the Court did not uphold the applicants'argument that State immunity from jurisdiction could not be maintained in cases involving inhuman or degrading treatment (see §§ 64 et seq., including the summary of precedents concerning other serious violations of human rights law, international humanitarian law, or jus cogens norms). In addition, the Court held in 2014 that while there was some emerging support in favour of a special rule or exception in public international law in cases concerning civil claims for torture lodged against foreign State officials, the bulk of the authority was to the effect that the State's right to immunity could not be circumvented by suing its servants or agents instead ( Jones and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2014, §§ 213-15, concerning the refusal to consider the applicants'civil claim in respect of torture allegations on account of the immunity invoked by the State in question and its officials). ▪ State immunity from execution is not in itself contrary to Article 6 § 1. The Court noted in 2005 that all the international legal instruments governing State immunity set forth the general principle that, subject to certain strictly delimited exceptions, foreign States enjoyed immunity from execution in the territory of the forum State ( Manoilescu and Dobrescu v. Romania and Russia (dec.), 2005, § 73). By way of illustration, the Court held in 2002 that \"although the Greek courts ordered the German State to pay damages to the applicants, this did not necessarily oblige the Greek State to ensure that the applicants could recover their debt through enforcement proceedings in Greece\" ( Kalogeropoulou and Others v. Greece and Germany (dec.), 2002). These decisions are valid in relation to the state of international law at the relevant time and do not preclude future developments in that law.", + "post_text": "Jurisdictional immunity of foreign States: the grant of immunity is to be seen not as qualifying a substantive right but as a procedural bar on the national courts'power to determine the right ( J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 58-59). Aforeign State may waive its right to immunity before the courts of another State by giving clear and unequivocal consent ( Ndayegamiye-Mporamazina v. Switzerland, 2019, §§ 57 and 59). In cases where the application of the principle of State immunity from jurisdiction restricts the exercise of the right of access to a court, it must be ascertained whether the circumstances of the case justify such restriction (for example, Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany [GC], 2001, §§ 51-70). The restriction must pursue a legitimate aim and be proportionate to that aim ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, § 59; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, §§ 51-54). The grant of sovereign immunity to a State in civil proceedings pursues the \"legitimate aim\" of complying with international law to promote comity and good relations between States ( Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 34; Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 54; Treska v. Albania and Italy (dec.), 2006; J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, § 60). As to whether the measure taken is proportionate (see the summary of the principles in J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 61 and 63), it may in some cases impair the very essence of the individual's right of access to a court ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, § 74; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, § 49; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, 2016, § 95), while in other cases it may not ( Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 67; Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 39; McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], 2001, § 38; and more recently, J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, § 75, where the Court found that the national court had not departed from the generally recognised rules of international law on State immunity). In the absence of an alternative remedy, there is not ipso facto a violation of the right of access to a court ( Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2013), although the Court found that the existence of an alternative would be desirable in the specific circumstances of the case of J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021 (§ 71). M.M. v. France (dec.), 2024 concerned the refusal of the French courts to institute criminal proceedings against an acting foreign head of State for torture committed in that State, given his immunity from foreign prosecution, the Court found that such immunity did not prevent the applicant from re-introducing a complaint against this head of State after the end of his mandate or before an international court (§ 88), and that, although the criminal proceedings in which the applicant presented his civil claims have been not been pursued, the matter has been examined by the courts at several levels of jurisdiction (§ 89). ▪ State immunity from jurisdiction has been circumscribed by developments in customary international law.  Thus, the Court has noted a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of employment-related disputes, with the exception, however, of those concerning the recruitment of embassy staff ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, §§ 63 et seq.; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, §§ 53-54 and 57-58; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, 2016, § 89, concerning the dismissal of embassy staff members; see also Wallishauser v. Austria, 2012, concerning the service of a summons in proceedings against a foreign State relating to salary arrears). As regards disputes concerning a contract of employment concluded between embassies or permanent missions and their support staff, the Court has always protected both nationals of the forum State (the State where the work is performed) and non-nationals living there ( Ndayegamiye-Mporamazina v. Switzerland, 2019, §§ 49 and 61 and references cited). This consistent approach is in line with codified international custom: in principle, a foreign State cannot rely on immunity from jurisdiction in the context of a dispute concerning a contract of employment executed in the territory of the forum State. Ho wever, there are exceptions to that principle, in particular where \"the employee is a national of the employer State at the time when the proceeding is instituted, unless this person has his or her permanent residence in the State of the forum\" ( ibid., §§ 61-63). In the case cited, unlike the previous cases, the applicant was a national of the employer State (Burundi) when she brought her case before the Swiss courts, and was not permanently resident in the forum State (Switzerland), where she worked at the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Burundi to the United Nations. The observance by Switzerland of the Republic of Burundi's immunity from jurisdiction in respect of the applicant's claim of unfair dismissal was compatible with the generally recognised rules of international law on State immunity (§ 66).  Arestrictive approach to immunity may also be taken in relation to commercial transactions between the State and foreign private individuals ( Oleynikov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 61 and 66). ▪ On the other hand, the Court noted in 2001 that, while there appeared to be a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of personal injury caused by an act or omission within the forum State, that practice was by no means universal ( McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], 2001, § 38). ▪ In J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, the Court did not uphold the applicants'argument that State immunity from jurisdiction could not be maintained in cases involving inhuman or degrading treatment (see §§ 64 et seq., including the summary of precedents concerning other serious violations of human rights law, international humanitarian law, or jus cogens norms). In addition, the Court held in 2014 that while there was some emerging support in favour of a special rule or exception in public international law in cases concerning civil claims for torture lodged against foreign State officials, the bulk of the authority was to the effect that the State's right to immunity could not be circumvented by suing its servants or agents instead ( Jones and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2014, §§ 213-15, concerning the refusal to consider the applicants'civil claim in respect of torture allegations on account of the immunity invoked by the State in question and its officials). In Sassi and Benchellali v. France (dec.), 2024, the Court confirmed thisapproach: despite the special status of the prohibition of torture in the international law, international law still grants immunity to the State or agents of the State against tort actions related to the acts of torture. The Court added that, although the French investigative authorities in the end discontinued the criminal prosecution of the American officials allegedly responsible for the ill-treatment of the applicant (who had been detained in the Guantanamo military base prison, with reference to the immunity of the persons indicated as possible defendants, the authorities had taken steps to investigate the case and the question of immunity had been discussed at all levels jurisdiction, including the Court of Cassation (§ 64). ▪ State immunity from execution is not in itself contrary to Article 6 § 1. The Court noted in 2005 that all the international legal instruments governing State immunity set forth the general principle that, subject to certain strictly delimited exceptions, foreign States enjoyed immunity from execution in the territory of the forum State ( Manoilescu and Dobrescu v. Romania and Russia (dec.), 2005, § 73). By way of illustration, the Court held in 2002 that \"although the Greek courts ordered the German Sta te to pay damages to the applicants, this did not necessarily oblige the Greek State to ensure that the applicants could recover their debt through enforcement proceedings in Greece\" ( Kalogeropoulou and Others v. Greece and Germany (dec.), 2002). These decisions are valid in relation to the state of international law at the relevant time and do not preclude future developments in that law.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930062548/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250626081847/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/96d370a07ab1/20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf", @@ -18818,6 +19923,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:41373/21|48801/21", "case_name": "Meli and Swinkels Family Brewers N.V. v. Albania", @@ -18836,7 +19943,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.1|a:145|b:157", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "Furthermore, Article 6 § 1 guarantees not only the right to institute proceedings but also the right to obtain a determination of the dispute by a court ( Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], 2016, § 86; Kutić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 25 and 32, regarding the staying of proceedings; Aćimović v. Croatia, 2003, § 41; Beneficio Cappella Paolini v. San Marino, 2004, § 29 concerning a denial of justice; Marini v. Albania, 2007, §§ 118-123, concerning a refusal to take a final decision on the applicant's constitutional appeal as a result of a tied vote, and Gogić v. Croatia, 2020, §§ 40-41, concerning the consequences of errors by the judicial authorities).", - "post_text": "Furthermore, Article 6 § 1 guarantees not only the right to institute proceedings but also the right to obtain a determination of the dispute by a court ( Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], 2016, § 86; Kutić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 25 and 32, regarding the staying of proceedings; Aćimović v. Croatia, 2003, § 41; Beneficio Cappella Paolini v. San Marino, 2004, § 29 concerning a denial of justice; Marini v. Albania, 2007, §§ 118-123, concerning a refusal to take a final decision on the applicant's constitutional appeal as a result of a tied vote, and Gogić v. Croatia, 2020, §§ 40-41, concerning the consequences of errors by the judicial authorities). A tied vote does not constitute a violation of Article 6 of itself - for example, where a tied vote results in a rejection of an appeal and the grounds for the rejection can be deduced from the judges'opinions expressed during the vote, the Court concluded that Article 6 was not breached ( Loizides v. Cyprus, 2022, §§ 41-50). However, in Meli and Swinkels Family Brewers N.V. v. Albania, 2024, the tied vote was not accompanied by any description of the Constitutional Court's reasoning (the decision only indicated the results of the voting). Since the crux of the applicants'complaint before the Constitutional Court was precisely the lack of proper reasoning by the lower courts'judgments, the Court did not accept the Government's argument that the Constitutional Court should be deemed to have endorsed the reasoning of the lower courts (§ 73). ‐", + "post_text": "Furthermore, Article 6 § 1 guarantees not only the right to institute proceedings but also the right to obtain a determination of the dispute by a court ( Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], 2016, § 86; Kutić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 25 and 32, regarding the staying of proceedings; Aćimović v. Croatia, 2003, § 41; Beneficio Cappella Paolini v. San Marino, 2004, § 29 concerning a denial of justice; Marini v. Albania, 2007, §§ 118-123, concerning a refusal to take a final decision on the applicant's constitutional appeal as a result of a tied vote, and Gogić v. Croatia, 2020, §§ 40-41, concerning the consequences of errors by the judicial authorities). Atied vote does not constitute a violation of Article 6 of itself - for example, where a tied vote results in a rejection of an appeal and the grounds for the rejection can be deduced from the judges'opinions expressed during the vote, the Court concluded that Article 6 was not breached ( Loizides v. Cyprus, 2022, §§ 41-50). However, in Meli and Swinkels Family Brewers N.V. v. Albania, 2024, the tied vote was not accompanied by any description of the Constitutional Court's reasoning (the decision only indicated the results of the voting). Since the crux of the applicants'complaint before the Constitutional Court was precisely the lack of proper reasoning by the lower courts'judgments, the Court did not accept the Government's argument that the Constitutional Court should be deemed to have endorsed the reasoning of the lower courts (§ 73). ‐", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930062548/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250626081847/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/96d370a07ab1/20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf", @@ -18851,6 +19958,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:60272/21", "case_name": "Moskalj v. Croatia", @@ -18884,6 +19993,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:37943/17", "case_name": "Patricolo and Others v. Italy", @@ -18917,6 +20028,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:40825/98", "case_name": "Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria", @@ -18950,6 +20063,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:35884/21|35886/21", "case_name": "Sassi and Benchellali v. France (dec.)", @@ -18967,8 +20082,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_removed", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.2|a:163|b:178", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Jurisdictional immunity of foreign States: the grant of immunity is to be seen not as qualifying a substantive right but as a procedural bar on the national courts'power to determine the right ( J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 58-59). A foreign State may waive its right to immunity before the courts of another State by giving clear and unequivocal consent ( Ndayegamiye-Mporamazina v. Switzerland, 2019, §§ 57 and 59). In cases where the application of the principle of State immunity from jurisdiction restricts the exercise of the right of access to a court, it must be ascertained whether the circumstances of the case justify such restriction (for example, Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany [GC], 2001, §§ 51-70). The restriction must pursue a legitimate aim and be proportionate to that aim ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, § 59; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, §§ 51-54). The grant of sovereign immunity to a State in civil proceedings pursues the \"legitimate aim\" of complying with international law to promote comity and good relations between States ( Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 34; Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 54; Treska v. Albania and Italy (dec.), 2006; J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, § 60). As to whether the measure taken is proportionate (see the summary of the principles in J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §�� 61 and 63), it may in some cases impair the very essence of the individual's right of access to a court ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, § 74; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, § 49; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, 2016, § 95), while in other cases it may not ( Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 67; Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 39; McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], 2001, § 38; and more recently, J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, § 75, where the Court found that the national court had not departed from the generally recognised rules of international law on State immunity). In the absence of an alternative remedy, there is not ipso facto a violation of the right of access to a court ( Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2013), although the Court found that the existence of an alternative would be desirable in the specific circumstances of the case of J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021 (§ 71). ▪ State immunity from jurisdiction has been circumscribed by developments in customary international law.  Thus, the Court has noted a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of employment-related disputes, with the exception, however, of those concerning the recruitment of embassy staff ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, §§ 63 et seq.; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, §§ 53-54 and 57-58; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, 2016, § 89, concerning the dismissal of embassy staff members; see also Wallishauser v. Austria, 2012, concerning the service of a summons in proceedings against a foreign State relating to salary arrears). As regards disputes concerning a contract of employment concluded between embassies or permanent missions and their support staff, the Court has always protected both nationals of the forum State (the State where the work is performed) and non-nationals living there ( Ndayegamiye- Mporamazina v. Switzerland, 2019, §§ 49 and 61 and references cited). This consistent approach is in line with codified international custom: in principle, a foreign State cannot rely on immunity from jurisdiction in the context of a dispute concerning a contract of employment executed in the territory of the forum State. However, there are exceptions to that principle, in particular where \"the employee is a national of the employer State at the time when the proceeding is instituted, unless this person has his or her permanent residence in the State of the forum\" ( ibid., §§ 61-63). In the case cited, unlike the previous cases, the applicant was a national of the employer State (Burundi) when she brought her case before the Swiss courts, and was not permanently resident in the forum State (Switzerland), where she worked at the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Burundi to the United Nations. The observance by Switzerland of the Republic of Burundi's immunity from jurisdiction in respect of the applicant's claim of unfair dismissal was compatible with the generally recognised rules of international law on State immunity (§ 66).  A restrictive approach to immunity may also be taken in relation to commercial transactions between the State and foreign private individuals ( Oleynikov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 61 and 66). ▪ On the other hand, the Court noted in 2001 that, while there appeared to be a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of personal injury caused by an act or omission within the forum State, that practice was by no means universal ( McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], 2001, § 38). ▪ In J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, the Court did not uphold the applicants'argument that State immunity from jurisdiction could not be maintained in cases involving inhuman or degrading treatment (see §§ 64 et seq., including the summary of precedents concerning other serious violations of human rights law, international humanitarian law, or jus cogens norms). In addition, the Court held in 2014 that while there was some emerging support in favour of a special rule or exception in public international law in cases concerning civil claims for torture lodged against foreign State officials, the bulk of the authority was to the effect that the State's right to immunity could not be circumvented by suing its servants or agents instead ( Jones and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2014, §§ 213-15, concerning the refusal to consider the applicants'civil claim in respect of torture allegations on account of the immunity invoked by the State in question and its officials). ▪ State immunity from execution is not in itself contrary to Article 6 § 1. The Court noted in 2005 that all the international legal instruments governing State immunity set forth the general principle that, subject to certain strictly delimited exceptions, foreign States enjoyed immunity from execution in the territory of the forum State ( Manoilescu and Dobrescu v. Romania and Russia (dec.), 2005, § 73). By way of illustration, the Court held in 2002 that \"although the Greek courts ordered the German State to pay damages to the applicants, this did not necessarily oblige the Greek State to ensure that the applicants could recover their debt through enforcement proceedings in Greece\" ( Kalogeropoulou and Others v. Greece and Germany (dec.), 2002). These decisions are valid in relation to the state of international law at the relevant time and do not preclude future developments in that law.", - "post_text": "Jurisdictional immunity of foreign States: the grant of immunity is to be seen not as qualifying a substantive right but as a procedural bar on the national courts'power to determine the right ( J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 58-59). A foreign State may waive its right to immunity before the courts of another State by giving clear and unequivocal consent ( Ndayegamiye-Mporamazina v. Switzerland, 2019, §§ 57 and 59). In cases where the application of the principle of State immunity from jurisdiction restricts the exercise of the right of access to a court, it must be ascertained whether the circumstances of the case justify such restriction (for example, Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany [GC], 2001, §§ 51-70). The restriction must pursue a legitimate aim and be proportionate to that aim ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, § 59; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, §§ 51-54). The grant of sovereign immunity to a State in civil proceedings pursues the \"legitimate aim\" of complying with international law to promote comity and good relations between States ( Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 34; Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 54; Treska v. Albania and Italy (dec.), 2006; J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, § 60). As to whether the measure taken is proportionate (see the summary of the principles in J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 61 and 63), it may in some cases impair the very essence of the individual's right of access to a court ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, § 74; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, § 49; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, 2016, § 95), while in other cases it may not ( Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 67; Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 39; McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], 2001, § 38; and more recently, J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, § 75, where the Court found that the national court had not departed from the generally recognised rules of international law on State immunity). In the absence of an alternative remedy, there is not ipso facto a violation of the right of access to a court ( Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2013), although the Court found that the existence of an alternative would be desirable in the specific circumstances of the case of J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021 (§ 71). M.M. v. France (dec.), 2024 concerned the refusal of the French courts to institute criminal proceedings against an acting foreign head of State for torture committed in that State, given his immunity from foreign prosecution, the Court found that such immunity did not prevent the applicant from re-introducing a complaint against this head of State after the end of his mandate or before an international court (§ 88), and that, although the criminal proceedings in which the applicant presented his civil claims have been not been pursued, the matter has been examined by the courts at several levels of jurisdiction (§ 89). ▪ State immunity from jurisdiction has been circumscribed by developments in customary international law.  Thus, the Court has noted a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of employment-related disputes, with the exception, however, of those concerning the recruitment of embassy staff ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, §§ 63 et seq.; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, §§ 53-54 and 57-58; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, 2016, § 89, concerning the dismissal of embassy staff members; see also Wallishauser v. Austria, 2012, concerning the service of a summons in proceedings against a foreign State relating to salary arrears). As regards disputes concerning a contract of employment concluded between embassies or permanent missions and their support staff, the Court has always protected both nationals of the forum State (the State where the work is performed) and non-nationals living there ( Ndayegamiye-Mporamazina v. Switzerland, 2019, §§ 49 and 61 and references cited). This consistent approach is in line with codified international custom: in principle, a foreign State cannot rely on immunity from jurisdiction in the context of a dispute concerning a contract of employment executed in the territory of the forum State. Ho wever, there are exceptions to that principle, in particular where \"the employee is a national of the employer State at the time when the proceeding is instituted, unless this person has his or her permanent residence in the State of the forum\" ( ibid., §§ 61-63). In the case cited, unlike the previous cases, the applicant was a national of the employer State (Burundi) when she brought her case before the Swiss courts, and was not permanently resident in the forum State (Switzerland), where she worked at the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Burundi to the United Nations. The observance by Switzerland of the Republic of Burundi's immunity from jurisdiction in respect of the applicant's claim of unfair dismissal was compatible with the generally recognised rules of international law on State immunity (§ 66).  A restrictive approach to immunity may also be taken in relation to commercial transactions between the State and foreign private individuals ( Oleynikov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 61 and 66). ▪ On the other hand, the Court noted in 2001 that, while there appeared to be a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of personal injury caused by an act or omission within the forum State, that practice was by no means universal ( McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], 2001, § 38). ▪ In J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, the Court did not uphold the applicants'argument that State immunity from jurisdiction could not be maintained in cases involving inhuman or degrading treatment (see §§ 64 et seq., including the summary of precedents concerning other serious violations of human rights law, international humanitarian law, or jus cogens norms). In addition, the Court held in 2014 that while there was some emerging support in favour of a special rule or exception in public international law in cases concerning civil claims for torture lodged against foreign State officials, the bulk of the authority was to the effect that the State's right to immunity could not be circumvented by suing its servants or agents instead ( Jones and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2014, §§ 213-15, concerning the refusal to consider the applicants'civil claim in respect of torture allegations on account of the immunity invoked by the State in question and its officials). In Sassi and Benchellali v. France (dec.), 2024, the Court confirmed thisapproach: despite the special status of the prohibition of torture in the international law, international law still grants immunity to the State or agents of the State against tort actions related to the acts of torture. The Court added that, although the French investigative authorities in the end discontinued the criminal prosecution of the American officials allegedly responsible for the ill-treatment of the applicant (who had been detained in the Guantanamo military base prison, with reference to the immunity of the persons indicated as possible defendants, the authorities had taken steps to investigate the case and the question of immunity had been discussed at all levels jurisdiction, including the Court of Cassation (§ 64). ▪ State immunity from execution is not in itself contrary to Article 6 § 1. The Court noted in 2005 that all the international legal instruments governing State immunity set forth the general principle that, subject to certain strictly delimited exceptions, foreign States enjoyed immunity from execution in the territory of the forum State ( Manoilescu and Dobrescu v. Romania and Russia (dec.), 2005, § 73). By way of illustration, the Court held in 2002 that \"although the Greek courts ordered the German Sta te to pay damages to the applicants, this did not necessarily oblige the Greek State to ensure that the applicants could recover their debt through enforcement proceedings in Greece\" ( Kalogeropoulou and Others v. Greece and Germany (dec.), 2002). These decisions are valid in relation to the state of international law at the relevant time and do not preclude future developments in that law.", + "pre_text": "Jurisdictional immunity of foreign States: the grant of immunity is to be seen not as qualifying a substantive right but as a procedural bar on the national courts'power to determine the right ( J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 58-59). Aforeign State may waive its right to immunity before the courts of another State by giving clear and unequivocal consent ( Ndayegamiye-Mporamazina v. Switzerland, 2019, §§ 57 and 59). In cases where the application of the principle of State immunity from jurisdiction restricts the exercise of the right of access to a court, it must be ascertained whether the circumstances of the case justify such restriction (for example, Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany [GC], 2001, §§ 51-70). The restriction must pursue a legitimate aim and be proportionate to that aim ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, § 59; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, §§ 51-54). The grant of sovereign immunity to a State in civil proceedings pursues the \"legitimate aim\" of complying with international law to promote comity and good relations between States ( Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 34; Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 54; Treska v. Albania and Italy (dec.), 2006; J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, § 60). As to whether the measure taken is proportionate (see the summary of the principles in J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 61 and 63), it may in some cases impair the very essence of the individual's right of access to a court ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, § 74; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, § 49; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, 2016, § 95), while in other cases it may not ( Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 67; Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 39; McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], 2001, § 38; and more recently, J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, § 75, where the Court found that the national court had not departed from the generally recognised rules of international law on State immunity). In the absence of an alternative remedy, there is not ipso facto a violation of the right of access to a court ( Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2013), although the Court found that the existence of an alternative would be desirable in the specific circumstances of the case of J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021 (§ 71). ▪ State immunity from jurisdiction has been circumscribed by developments in customary international law.  Thus, the Court has noted a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of employment-related disputes, with the exception, however, of those concerning the recruitment of embassy staff ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, §§ 63 et seq.; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, §§ 53-54 and 57-58; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, 2016, § 89, concerning the dismissal of embassy staff members; see also Wallishauser v. Austria, 2012, concerning the service of a summons in proceedings against a foreign State relating to salary arrears). As regards disputes concerning a contract of employment concluded between embassies or permanent missions and their support staff, the Court has always protected both nationals of the forum State (the State where the work is performed) and non-nationals living there ( Ndayegamiye- Mporamazina v. Switzerland, 2019, §§ 49 and 61 and references cited). This consistent approach is in line with codified international custom: in principle, a foreign State cannot rely on immunity from jurisdiction in the context of a dispute concerning a contract of employment executed in the territory of the forum State. However, there are exceptions to that principle, in particular where \"the employee is a national of the employer State at the time when the proceeding is instituted, unless this person has his or her permanent residence in the State of the forum\" ( ibid., §§ 61-63). In the case cited, unlike the previous cases, the applicant was a national of the employer State (Burundi) when she brought her case before the Swiss courts, and was not permanently resident in the forum State (Switzerland), where she worked at the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Burundi to the United Nations. The observance by Switzerland of the Republic of Burundi's immunity from jurisdiction in respect of the applicant's claim of unfair dismissal was compatible with the generally recognised rules of international law on State immunity (§ 66).  Arestrictive approach to immunity may also be taken in relation to commercial transactions between the State and foreign private individuals ( Oleynikov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 61 and 66). ▪ On the other hand, the Court noted in 2001 that, while there appeared to be a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of personal injury caused by an act or omission within the forum State, that practice was by no means universal ( McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], 2001, § 38). ▪ In J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, the Court did not uphold the applicants'argument that State immunity from jurisdiction could not be maintained in cases involving inhuman or degrading treatment (see §§ 64 et seq., including the summary of precedents concerning other serious violations of human rights law, international humanitarian law, or jus cogens norms). In addition, the Court held in 2014 that while there was some emerging support in favour of a special rule or exception in public international law in cases concerning civil claims for torture lodged against foreign State officials, the bulk of the authority was to the effect that the State's right to immunity could not be circumvented by suing its servants or agents instead ( Jones and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2014, §§ 213-15, concerning the refusal to consider the applicants'civil claim in respect of torture allegations on account of the immunity invoked by the State in question and its officials). ▪ State immunity from execution is not in itself contrary to Article 6 § 1. The Court noted in 2005 that all the international legal instruments governing State immunity set forth the general principle that, subject to certain strictly delimited exceptions, foreign States enjoyed immunity from execution in the territory of the forum State ( Manoilescu and Dobrescu v. Romania and Russia (dec.), 2005, § 73). By way of illustration, the Court held in 2002 that \"although the Greek courts ordered the German State to pay damages to the applicants, this did not necessarily oblige the Greek State to ensure that the applicants could recover their debt through enforcement proceedings in Greece\" ( Kalogeropoulou and Others v. Greece and Germany (dec.), 2002). These decisions are valid in relation to the state of international law at the relevant time and do not preclude future developments in that law.", + "post_text": "Jurisdictional immunity of foreign States: the grant of immunity is to be seen not as qualifying a substantive right but as a procedural bar on the national courts'power to determine the right ( J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 58-59). Aforeign State may waive its right to immunity before the courts of another State by giving clear and unequivocal consent ( Ndayegamiye-Mporamazina v. Switzerland, 2019, §§ 57 and 59). In cases where the application of the principle of State immunity from jurisdiction restricts the exercise of the right of access to a court, it must be ascertained whether the circumstances of the case justify such restriction (for example, Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany [GC], 2001, §§ 51-70). The restriction must pursue a legitimate aim and be proportionate to that aim ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, § 59; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, §§ 51-54). The grant of sovereign immunity to a State in civil proceedings pursues the \"legitimate aim\" of complying with international law to promote comity and good relations between States ( Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 34; Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 54; Treska v. Albania and Italy (dec.), 2006; J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, § 60). As to whether the measure taken is proportionate (see the summary of the principles in J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 61 and 63), it may in some cases impair the very essence of the individual's right of access to a court ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, § 74; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, § 49; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, 2016, § 95), while in other cases it may not ( Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 67; Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 39; McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], 2001, § 38; and more recently, J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, § 75, where the Court found that the national court had not departed from the generally recognised rules of international law on State immunity). In the absence of an alternative remedy, there is not ipso facto a violation of the right of access to a court ( Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2013), although the Court found that the existence of an alternative would be desirable in the specific circumstances of the case of J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021 (§ 71). M.M. v. France (dec.), 2024 concerned the refusal of the French courts to institute criminal proceedings against an acting foreign head of State for torture committed in that State, given his immunity from foreign prosecution, the Court found that such immunity did not prevent the applicant from re-introducing a complaint against this head of State after the end of his mandate or before an international court (§ 88), and that, although the criminal proceedings in which the applicant presented his civil claims have been not been pursued, the matter has been examined by the courts at several levels of jurisdiction (§ 89). ▪ State immunity from jurisdiction has been circumscribed by developments in customary international law.  Thus, the Court has noted a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of employment-related disputes, with the exception, however, of those concerning the recruitment of embassy staff ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, §§ 63 et seq.; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, §§ 53-54 and 57-58; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, 2016, § 89, concerning the dismissal of embassy staff members; see also Wallishauser v. Austria, 2012, concerning the service of a summons in proceedings against a foreign State relating to salary arrears). As regards disputes concerning a contract of employment concluded between embassies or permanent missions and their support staff, the Court has always protected both nationals of the forum State (the State where the work is performed) and non-nationals living there ( Ndayegamiye-Mporamazina v. Switzerland, 2019, §§ 49 and 61 and references cited). This consistent approach is in line with codified international custom: in principle, a foreign State cannot rely on immunity from jurisdiction in the context of a dispute concerning a contract of employment executed in the territory of the forum State. Ho wever, there are exceptions to that principle, in particular where \"the employee is a national of the employer State at the time when the proceeding is instituted, unless this person has his or her permanent residence in the State of the forum\" ( ibid., §§ 61-63). In the case cited, unlike the previous cases, the applicant was a national of the employer State (Burundi) when she brought her case before the Swiss courts, and was not permanently resident in the forum State (Switzerland), where she worked at the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Burundi to the United Nations. The observance by Switzerland of the Republic of Burundi's immunity from jurisdiction in respect of the applicant's claim of unfair dismissal was compatible with the generally recognised rules of international law on State immunity (§ 66).  Arestrictive approach to immunity may also be taken in relation to commercial transactions between the State and foreign private individuals ( Oleynikov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 61 and 66). ▪ On the other hand, the Court noted in 2001 that, while there appeared to be a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of personal injury caused by an act or omission within the forum State, that practice was by no means universal ( McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], 2001, § 38). ▪ In J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, the Court did not uphold the applicants'argument that State immunity from jurisdiction could not be maintained in cases involving inhuman or degrading treatment (see §§ 64 et seq., including the summary of precedents concerning other serious violations of human rights law, international humanitarian law, or jus cogens norms). In addition, the Court held in 2014 that while there was some emerging support in favour of a special rule or exception in public international law in cases concerning civil claims for torture lodged against foreign State officials, the bulk of the authority was to the effect that the State's right to immunity could not be circumvented by suing its servants or agents instead ( Jones and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2014, §§ 213-15, concerning the refusal to consider the applicants'civil claim in respect of torture allegations on account of the immunity invoked by the State in question and its officials). In Sassi and Benchellali v. France (dec.), 2024, the Court confirmed thisapproach: despite the special status of the prohibition of torture in the international law, international law still grants immunity to the State or agents of the State against tort actions related to the acts of torture. The Court added that, although the French investigative authorities in the end discontinued the criminal prosecution of the American officials allegedly responsible for the ill-treatment of the applicant (who had been detained in the Guantanamo military base prison, with reference to the immunity of the persons indicated as possible defendants, the authorities had taken steps to investigate the case and the question of immunity had been discussed at all levels jurisdiction, including the Court of Cassation (§ 64). ▪ State immunity from execution is not in itself contrary to Article 6 § 1. The Court noted in 2005 that all the international legal instruments governing State immunity set forth the general principle that, subject to certain strictly delimited exceptions, foreign States enjoyed immunity from execution in the territory of the forum State ( Manoilescu and Dobrescu v. Romania and Russia (dec.), 2005, § 73). By way of illustration, the Court held in 2002 that \"although the Greek courts ordered the German Sta te to pay damages to the applicants, this did not necessarily oblige the Greek State to ensure that the applicants could recover their debt through enforcement proceedings in Greece\" ( Kalogeropoulou and Others v. Greece and Germany (dec.), 2002). These decisions are valid in relation to the state of international law at the relevant time and do not preclude future developments in that law.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930062548/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250626081847/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/96d370a07ab1/20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf", @@ -18983,6 +20098,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:20140/23", "case_name": "Suren Antonyan v. Armenia", @@ -19000,8 +20117,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added|minor_edit|paragraph_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.A.1|a:194|b:211|III.A.1|a:199|b:216|III.A.2|a:None|b:219|III.A.3|a:208|b:226|III.C.2|a:286|b:305|III.C.2.3|a:None|b:329|III.C.2.d|a:297|b:316|III.C.2.i|a:None|b:321", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "For the purposes of Article 6 § 1 a \"tribunal\" need not be a court of law integrated within the standard judicial machinery of the country concerned ( Xhoxhaj v. Albania, 2021, § 284, concerning a body set up to re-evaluate the ability of judges and prosecutors to perform their functions; Ali Rıza and Others v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 194-195 and 202-204, and Mutu and Pechstein v. Switzerland, 2018, § 139, concerning arbitration). It may be set up to deal with a specific subject matter which can be appropriately administered outside the ordinary court system. What is important to ensure compliance with Article 6 § 1 are the guarantees, both substantive and procedural, which are in place ( Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], 2020; Rolf Gustafson v. Sweden, 1997, § 45). Thus, a body that does not observe the procedural safeguards under Article 6 cannot be regarded as a \"tribunal\" established by law ( Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 99-105, concerning disciplinary proceedings for judges).\n\nLastly, the Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], 2020, judgment added that the very notion of a \"tribunal\" implied that it should be composed of judges selected on the basis of merit - that is, judges who fulfil the requirements of technical competence and moral integrity to perform the judicial functions required of it in a State governed by the rule of law (§§ 220-221). A rigorous process for the appointment of ordinary judges is of paramount importance to ensure that the most qualified candidates in both these respects are appointed to judicial posts. The higher a \" tribunal \" is placed in the judicial hierarchy, the more demanding the applicable selection criteria should be. Furthermore, non-professional judges may be subject to different selection criteria, particularly when it comes to the requisite technical competencies. Such merit-based selection not only ensures the technical capacity of a judicial body to deliver justice as a \"tribunal\", but it is a lso crucial in terms of ensuring public confidence in the judiciary and serves as a supplementary guarantee of the personal independence of judges (§ 222) - see also Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 80, concerning professors of law).\n\nWhere an administrative body determining disputes over \"civil rights and obligations\" does not satisfy all the requirements of Article 6 § 1, no violation of the Convention can be found if the proceedings before that body are \"subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of Article 6 § 1\", that is, if any structural or procedural shortcomings identified in the proceedings before the administrative authority are remedied in the course of the subsequent review by a judicial body with full jurisdiction ( Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, § 132; Peleki v. Greece, 2020, §§ 58-60; Thierry v. France (dec.), 2023, §§ 27 and 34-41). Thus, where Article 6 § 1 is applicable to disciplinary proceedings, the Convention requires implementation of at least one of the two following mechanisms: either the professional disciplinary bodies themselves comply with the requirements of that Article, or they do not so comply but are subject to subsequent review by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of that Article ( Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 61 and the case-law references cited).\n\nAlthough the notion of the separation of powers between the political organs of government and the judiciary has assumed growing importance in the Court's case-law, neither Article 6 nor any other provision of the Convention requires States to comply with any theoretical constitutional concepts regarding the permissible limits of the powers'interaction. The question is always whether, in a given case, the requirements of the Convention are met ( Kleyn and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], 2003, § 193; Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá [GC], 2018, § 144). Indeed, the notion of independence of a tribunal entails the existence of procedural safeguards to separate the judiciary from other powers ( Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], 2020, § 215). Moreover, in assessing the independence of a court within the meaning of Article 6 § 1, regard must be had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members, a question which pertains to the domain of the establishment of a \"tribunal\" (§ 232, emphasising the interaction between the requirements of \"independence\", \" impartialit y\" and a \" tribunal established by law\" ). With regard to the separation of powers and the necessity of safeguarding the independence of the judiciary ( Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 75), the Court has been attentive to the need to protect members of the judiciary against measures potentially undermining their independence and autonomy, including from the standpoint of the applicability of Article 6 § 1 and access to a court (see the summary of principles in Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, §§ 298 and 300-309, which apply not only to judges'adjudicating role but also to other official functions closely connected with the judicial system, such as membership of the National Council of the Judiciary, §§ 303-307; see also Bilgen v. Turkey, 2021, § 58 in fine ) and in relation to a hearing in disciplinary proceedings ( Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, § 196). Whatever system is chosen by member States, they must abide by their obligation to secure judicial independence. Where a judicial council has been established, the State authorities should be under an obligation to ensure its independence from the executive and legislative powers, especially in order to safeguard the integrity of the judicial appointment process. The removal, or threat of removal, of a judicial member of the National Council of the Judiciary during his or her term of office has the potential to affect the personal independence of that member in the exercise of his or her duties ( Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, §§ 300-309). Additionally, the presence, even in a merely passive role, of a member of the government within a body empowered to impose disciplinary sanctions on judges is in itself highly problematic in terms of the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, and particularly the requirement that the disciplinary body be independent. The presence of the Prosecutor General within a body concerned with the disciplining of judges is problematic with regard to the impartiality and independence requirements under Article 6. As to the process for selecting professors of law for appointment to the Supreme Judicial Council (in French - Conseil supérieur de la magistrature, CSM ), it must provide sufficient guarantees of independence ( Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 75-76, concerning the presence of ex officio members of the CSM, including the Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General, and of professors of law, who had been selected without sufficient guarantees of independence).\n\nThe fact that judges appealing against decisions of the High Council of the Judiciary (or equivalent body) come under the authority of the same body as regards their careers and disciplinary proceedings against them has been examined in the cases of Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, § 79 and Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, 2013, § 130 (violations), and Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, §§ 157-165 (no violation). The Court assessed and compared the disciplinary systems for the judiciary in the States concerned in order to determin e whether there were any \"serious structural deficiencies\" or \"an appearance of bias within the disciplinary body for the judiciary\" ( Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, §§ 157-160) and whether the requirement of independence was complied with ( ibid., §§ 161-163). See also above concerning the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council.", - "post_text": "For the purposes of Article 6 § 1 a \"tribunal\" need not be a court of law integrated within the standard judicial machinery of the country concerned ( Xhoxhaj v. Albania, 2021, § 284, concerning a body set up to re-evaluate the ability of judges and prosecutors to perform their functions; Ali Rıza and Others v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 194-195 and 202-204, and Mutu and Pechstein v. Switzerland, 2018, § 139, concerning arbitration; Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, 2025, §§ 101-104, concerning the Supreme Judicial Council which examined disciplinary cases against judges and which possessed all of the characteristics of a tribunal in disciplinary matters). It may be set up to deal with a specific subject matter which can be appropriately administered outside the ordinary court system. What is important to ensure compliance with Article 6 § 1 are the guarantees, both substantive and procedural, which are in place ( Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], 2020; Rolf Gustafson v. Sweden, 1997, § 45). Thus, a body that does not observe the procedural safeguards under Article 6 cannot be regarded as a \"tribunal\" established by law ( Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 99-105, concerning disciplinary proceedings for judges).\n\nLastly, the Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], 2020, judgment added that the very notion of a \"tribunal\" implied that it should be composed of judges selected on the basis of merit - that is, judges who fulfil the requirements of technical competence and moral integrity to perform the judicial functions required of it in a State governed by the rule of law (§§ 220-221). A rigorous process for the appointment of ordinary judges is of paramount importance to ensure that the most qualified candidates in both these respects are appointed to judicial posts. The higher a \" tribunal \" is placed in the judicial hierarchy, the more demanding the applicable selection criteria should be. Furthermore, non-professional judges may be subject to different selection criteria, particularly when it comes to the requisite technical competencies. Such merit-based selection not only ensures the technical capacity of a judicial body to deliver justice as a \"tribunal\", but it is also crucial in terms of ensuring public confidence in the judiciary and serves as a supplementary guarantee of the personal independence of judges (§ 222) - see also Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 80, concerning professors of law; compare with Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, 23 January 2025, §§ 105 - 119, where the Court examined the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council as a whole, including the manner of election of its lay members).\n\nArticle 6 1 does not require the State to set up a second degree of jurisdiction in civil matters. Thus, in Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, 2025, the applicant, a judge, had his disciplinary case decided by the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), acting as a court and no appeal was possible against the decision of the SJC. The Court concluded that the absence of an appellate review of the disciplinary decisions of the SJC had not violated the applicant access to a \"court\" under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (§§ 124-128).\n\nWhere an administrative body determining disputes over \"civil rights and obligations\" does not satisfy all the requirements of Article 6 § 1, no violation of the Convention can be found if the proceedings before that body are \"subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of Article 6 § 1\", that is, if any structural or procedural shortcomings identified in the proceedings before the administrative authority are remedied in the course of the subsequent review by a judicial body with full jurisdiction ( Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, § 132; Peleki v. Greece, 2020, §§ 58-60; Thierry v. France (dec.), 2023, §§ 27 and 34-41). Thus, where Article 6 § 1 is applicable to disciplinary proceedings, the Convention requires implementation of at least one of the two following mechanisms: either the professional disciplinary bodies themselves comply with the requirements of that Article, or they do not so comply but are subject to subsequent review by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of that Article ( Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 61 and the case-law references cited). See Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, 2025, where the Court concluded that where a disciplinary authority - the Supreme Judicial Council (the SJC) - has all attributes of a tribunal - Article 6 cannot be interpreted as also requiring an appeal to a court of law even though the impartiality of the SJC was at issue (see §§ 101 - 104, and 124 - 129).\n\nAlthough the notion of the separation of powers between the political organs of government and the judiciary has assumed growing importance in the Court's case-law, neither Article 6 nor any other provision of the Convention requires States to comply with any theoretical constitutional concepts regarding the permissible limits of the powers'interaction. The question is always whether, in a given case, the requirements of the Convention are met ( Kleyn and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], 2003, § 193; Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá [GC], 2018, § 144). Indeed, the notion of independence of a tribunal entails the existence of procedural safeguards to separate the judiciary from other powers ( Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], 2020, § 215). Moreover, in assessing the independence of a court within the meaning of Article 6 § 1, regard must be had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members, a question which pertains to the domain of the establishment of a \"tribunal\" (§ 232, emphasising the interaction between the requirements of \"independence\", \" impartialit y\" and a \" tribunal established by law\" ). 20 With regard to the separation of powers and the necessity of safeguarding the independence of the judiciary ( Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 75), the Court has been attentive to the need to protect members of the judiciary against measures potentially undermining their independence and autonomy, including from the standpoint of the applicability of Article 6 § 1 and access to a court (see the summary of principles in Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, §§ 298 and 300-309, which apply not only to judges'adjudicating role but also to other official functions closely connected with the judicial system, such as membership of the National Council of the Judiciary, §§ 303-307; see also Bilgen v. Turkey, 2021, § 58 in fine) and in relation to a hearing in disciplinary proceedings ( Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, § 196). Whatever system is chosen by member States, they must abide by their obligation to secure judicial independence. Where a judicial council has been established, the State authorities should be under an obligation to ensure its independence from the executive and legislative powers, especially in order to safeguard the integrity of the judicial appointment process. The removal, or threat of removal, of a judicial member of the National Council of the Judiciary during his or her term of office has the potential to affect the personal independence of that member in the exercise of his or her duties ( Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, §§ 300-309). Additionally, the presence, even in a merely passive role, of a member of the government within a body empowered to impose disciplinary sanctions on judges is in itself highly problematic in terms of the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, and particularly the requirement that the disciplinary body be independent. The presence of the Prosecutor General within a body concerned with the disciplining of judges is problematic with regard to the impartiality and independence requirements under Article 6. As to the process for selecting professors of law for appointment to the Supreme Judicial Council (in French- Conseil supérieur de la magistrature, CSM ), it must provide sufficient guarantees of independence ( Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 75-76, concerning the presence of ex officio members of the CSM, including the Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General, and of professors of law, who had been selected without sufficient guarantees of independence; compare with Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, 2025, where the Court was satisfied that the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council, together with the manner of appointment of its non-judge members, provided sufficient guarantees of the independence of the body).\n\nIn a case where it had been alleged that doubts as to the impartiality of one or more judges sitting on a bench was sufficient to find that the bench as a whole had lacked impartiality, the Court found that, in view of the secrecy of the deliberations, it was impossible to ascertain the actual influence of the judge or judges concerned on the collegial work of the bench in question, and hence the partiality of one judge might likely raise legitimate doubt about the impartiality of the whole composition ( Morice v. France [GC], 2015, § 89; Mitrinovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2015, § 46; Stoimenovikj and Miloshevikj v. North Macedonia, 2021, § 39; see also, mutatis mutandis, Otegi Mondragon and Others v. Spain, 2018, § 67; Sigríður Elín Sigfúsdóttir v. Iceland, 2020, § 57 and, for the case of two members of a bench, Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 78. However, see In Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, 2025, the Court noted that the judge at issue was the chair of the disciplinary court and the rapporteur in the applicant's case leading the discussions, and that the applicants'request seeking recusal of the Chair had been not been seriously examined by that court (§§ 139 and 140).\n\nThe fact that judges appealing against decisions of the High Council of the Judiciary (or equivalent body) come under the authority of the same body as regards their careers and disciplinary proceedings against them has been examined in the cases of Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, § 79 and Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, 2013, § 130 (violations), and Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, §§ 157-165 (no violation). The Court assessed and compared the disciplinary systems for the judiciary in the States concerned in order to determine whether there were any \"serious structural deficiencies\" or \"an appearance of bias within the disciplinary body for the judiciary\" ( Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, §§ 157-160) and whether the requirement of independence was complied with ( ibid., §§ 161-163). Note that High Councils of the Judiciary or similar bodies can also carry out the role of disciplinary courts: Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, 2025, §§ 101 - 104. See also above concerning the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council.\n\nThe composition of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), acting as a court in disciplinary matters, was examined in Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, 2025. The SJC was composed of five judicial members (judges elected by their peers) and five lay members, elected by the Parliament. While that composition ensured sufficient independence of the SJC, the Court noted certain flaws in the process of nomination of lay members of the SJC: the procedure could be more transparent, inclusive and certain additional requirements related to political neutrality of the candidates could be welcome. However, despite those flaws the current model of the SJC was found to offer sufficient safeguards: the judges elected by their peers represented half of the SJC; in contrast to certain soft-law instruments, the Convention does not require that judicial members be in a \"substantial majority\" in such bodies, so the minimal standard of judicial representation had been complied with; there were strict eligibility requirements related to the professional qualifications and experience of the candidates; candidates underwent integrity checks and could be questioned in a plenary Parliament session; and the National Assembly could elect a non-judicial member only with three-fifths of the votes. The Court further stressed that the members of the SJC were elected for a or a fixed term of five years: their irremovability during this term was guaranteed by law; they could not engage in any paid secondary activity; they received the same social guarantees as judges; they were bound by the rules of conduct for judges; and they did not depend on either the executive or the legislature. The SJC itself had enjoyed managerial and budgetary autonomy and the Chairman of the SJC played a predominantly administrative role having no powers vis-à-vis individual members (§§ 105 - 119). The Court concluded that the SJC did not lack independence.", + "pre_text": "For the purposes of Article 6 § 1 a \"tribunal\" need not be a court of law integrated within the standard judicial machinery of the country concerned ( Xhoxhaj v. Albania, 2021, § 284, concerning a body set up to re-evaluate the ability of judges and prosecutors to perform their functions; Ali Rıza and Others v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 194-195 and 202-204, and Mutu and Pechstein v. Switzerland, 2018, § 139, concerning arbitration). It may be set up to deal with a specific subject matter which can be appropriately administered outside the ordinary court system. What is important to ensure compliance with Article 6 § 1 are the guarantees, both substantive and procedural, which are in place ( Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], 2020; Rolf Gustafson v. Sweden, 1997, § 45). Thus, a body that does not observe the procedural safeguards under Article 6 cannot be regarded as a \"tribunal\" established by law ( Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 99-105, concerning disciplinary proceedings for judges).\n\nLastly, the Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], 2020, judgment added that the very notion of a \"tribunal\" implied that it should be composed of judges selected on the basis of merit - that is, judges who fulfil the requirements of technical competence and moral integrity to perform the judicial functions required of it in a State governed by the rule of law (§§ 220-221). Arigorous process for the appointment of ordinary judges is of paramount importance to ensure that the most qualified candidates in both these respects are appointed to judicial posts. The higher a \" tribunal \" is placed in the judicial hierarchy, the more demanding the applicable selection criteria should be. Furthermore, non-professional judges may be subject to different selection criteria, particularly when it comes to the requisite technical competencies. Such merit-based selection not only ensures the technical capacity of a judicial body to deliver justice as a \"tribunal\", but it is a lso crucial in terms of ensuring public confidence in the judiciary and serves as a supplementary guarantee of the personal independence of judges (§ 222) - see also Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 80, concerning professors of law).\n\nWhere an administrative body determining disputes over \"civil rights and obligations\" does not satisfy all the requirements of Article 6 § 1, no violation of the Convention can be found if the proceedings before that body are \"subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of Article 6 § 1\", that is, if any structural or procedural shortcomings identified in the proceedings before the administrative authority are remedied in the course of the subsequent review by a judicial body with full jurisdiction ( Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, § 132; Peleki v. Greece, 2020, §§ 58-60; Thierry v. France (dec.), 2023, §§ 27 and 34-41). Thus, where Article 6 § 1 is applicable to disciplinary proceedings, the Convention requires implementation of at least one of the two following mechanisms: either the professional disciplinary bodies themselves comply with the requirements of that Article, or they do not so comply but are subject to subsequent review by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of that Article ( Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 61 and the case-law references cited).\n\nAlthough the notion of the separation of powers between the political organs of government and the judiciary has assumed growing importance in the Court's case-law, neither Article 6 nor any other provision of the Convention requires States to comply with any theoretical constitutional concepts regarding the permissible limits of the powers'interaction. The question is always whether, in a given case, the requirements of the Convention are met ( Kleyn and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], 2003, § 193; Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá [GC], 2018, § 144). Indeed, the notion of independence of a tribunal entails the existence of procedural safeguards to separate the judiciary from other powers ( Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], 2020, § 215). Moreover, in assessing the independence of a court within the meaning of Article 6 § 1, regard must be had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members, a question which pertains to the domain of the establishment of a \"tribunal\" (§ 232, emphasising the interaction between the requirements of \"independence\", \" impartialit y\" and a \" tribunal established by law\" ). With regard to the separation of powers and the necessity of safeguarding the independence of the judiciary ( Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 75), the Court has been attentive to the need to protect members of the judiciary against measures potentially undermining their independence and autonomy, including from the standpoint of the applicability of Article 6 § 1 and access to a court (see the summary of principles in Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, §§ 298 and 300-309, which apply not only to judges'adjudicating role but also to other official functions closely connected with the judicial system, such as membership of the National Council of the Judiciary, §§ 303-307; see also Bilgen v. Turkey, 2021, § 58 in fine ) and in relation to a hearing in disciplinary proceedings ( Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, § 196). Whatever system is chosen by member States, they must abide by their obligation to secure judicial independence. Where a judicial council has been established, the State authorities should be under an obligation to ensure its independence from the executive and legislative powers, especially in order to safeguard the integrity of the judicial appointment process. The removal, or threat of removal, of a judicial member of the National Council of the Judiciary during his or her term of office has the potential to affect the personal independence of that member in the exercise of his or her duties ( Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, §§ 300-309). Additionally, the presence, even in a merely passive role, of a member of the government within a body empowered to impose disciplinary sanctions on judges is in itself highly problematic in terms of the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, and particularly the requirement that the disciplinary body be independent. The presence of the Prosecutor General within a body concerned with the disciplining of judges is problematic with regard to the impartiality and independence requirements under Article 6. As to the process for selecting professors of law for appointment to the Supreme Judicial Council (in French - Conseil supérieur de la magistrature, CSM ), it must provide sufficient guarantees of independence ( Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 75-76, concerning the presence of ex officio members of the CSM, including the Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General, and of professors of law, who had been selected without sufficient guarantees of independence).\n\nThe fact that judges appealing against decisions of the High Council of the Judiciary (or equivalent body) come under the authority of the same body as regards their careers and disciplinary proceedings against them has been examined in the cases of Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, § 79 and Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, 2013, § 130 (violations), and Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, §§ 157-165 (no violation). The Court assessed and compared the disciplinary systems for the judiciary in the States concerned in order to determin e whether there were any \"serious structural deficiencies\" or \"an appearance of bias within the disciplinary body for the judiciary\" ( Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, §§ 157-160) and whether the requirement of independence was complied with ( ibid., §§ 161-163). See also above concerning the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council.", + "post_text": "For the purposes of Article 6 § 1 a \"tribunal\" need not be a court of law integrated within the standard judicial machinery of the country concerned ( Xhoxhaj v. Albania, 2021, § 284, concerning a body set up to re-evaluate the ability of judges and prosecutors to perform their functions; Ali Rıza and Others v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 194-195 and 202-204, and Mutu and Pechstein v. Switzerland, 2018, § 139, concerning arbitration; Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, 2025, §§ 101-104, concerning the Supreme Judicial Council which examined disciplinary cases against judges and which possessed all of the characteristics of a tribunal in disciplinary matters). It may be set up to deal with a specific subject matter which can be appropriately administered outside the ordinary court system. What is important to ensure compliance with Article 6 § 1 are the guarantees, both substantive and procedural, which are in place ( Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], 2020; Rolf Gustafson v. Sweden, 1997, § 45). Thus, a body that does not observe the procedural safeguards under Article 6 cannot be regarded as a \"tribunal\" established by law ( Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 99-105, concerning disciplinary proceedings for judges).\n\nLastly, the Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], 2020, judgment added that the very notion of a \"tribunal\" implied that it should be composed of judges selected on the basis of merit - that is, judges who fulfil the requirements of technical competence and moral integrity to perform the judicial functions required of it in a State governed by the rule of law (§§ 220-221). Arigorous process for the appointment of ordinary judges is of paramount importance to ensure that the most qualified candidates in both these respects are appointed to judicial posts. The higher a \" tribunal \" is placed in the judicial hierarchy, the more demanding the applicable selection criteria should be. Furthermore, non-professional judges may be subject to different selection criteria, particularly when it comes to the requisite technical competencies. Such merit-based selection not only ensures the technical capacity of a judicial body to deliver justice as a \"tribunal\", but it is also crucial in terms of ensuring public confidence in the judiciary and serves as a supplementary guarantee of the personal independence of judges (§ 222) - see also Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 80, concerning professors of law; compare with Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, 23 January 2025, §§ 105 - 119, where the Court examined the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council as a whole, including the manner of election of its lay members).\n\nArticle 6 1 does not require the State to set up a second degree of jurisdiction in civil matters. Thus, in Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, 2025, the applicant, a judge, had his disciplinary case decided by the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), acting as a court and no appeal was possible against the decision of the SJC. The Court concluded that the absence of an appellate review of the disciplinary decisions of the SJChad not violated the applicant access to a \"court\" under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (§§ 124-128).\n\nWhere an administrative body determining disputes over \"civil rights and obligations\" does not satisfy all the requirements of Article 6 § 1, no violation of the Convention can be found if the proceedings before that body are \"subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of Article 6 § 1\", that is, if any structural or procedural shortcomings identified in the proceedings before the administrative authority are remedied in the course of the subsequent review by a judicial body with full jurisdiction ( Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, § 132; Peleki v. Greece, 2020, §§ 58-60; Thierry v. France (dec.), 2023, §§ 27 and 34-41). Thus, where Article 6 § 1 is applicable to disciplinary proceedings, the Convention requires implementation of at least one of the two following mechanisms: either the professional disciplinary bodies themselves comply with the requirements of that Article, or they do not so comply but are subject to subsequent review by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of that Article ( Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 61 and the case-law references cited). See Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, 2025, where the Court concluded that where a disciplinary authority - the Supreme Judicial Council (the SJC) - has all attributes of a tribunal - Article 6 cannot be interpreted as also requiring an appeal to a court of law even though the impartiality of the SJCwas at issue (see §§ 101 - 104, and 124 - 129).\n\nAlthough the notion of the separation of powers between the political organs of government and the judiciary has assumed growing importance in the Court's case-law, neither Article 6 nor any other provision of the Convention requires States to comply with any theoretical constitutional concepts regarding the permissible limits of the powers'interaction. The question is always whether, in a given case, the requirements of the Convention are met ( Kleyn and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], 2003, § 193; Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá [GC], 2018, § 144). Indeed, the notion of independence of a tribunal entails the existence of procedural safeguards to separate the judiciary from other powers ( Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], 2020, § 215). Moreover, in assessing the independence of a court within the meaning of Article 6 § 1, regard must be had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members, a question which pertains to the domain of the establishment of a \"tribunal\" (§ 232, emphasising the interaction between the requirements of \"independence\", \" impartialit y\" and a \" tribunal established by law\" ). 20 With regard to the separation of powers and the necessity of safeguarding the independence of the judiciary ( Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 75), the Court has been attentive to the need to protect members of the judiciary against measures potentially undermining their independence and autonomy, including from the standpoint of the applicability of Article 6 § 1 and access to a court (see the summary of principles in Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, §§ 298 and 300-309, which apply not only to judges'adjudicating role but also to other official functions closely connected with the judicial system, such as membership of the National Council of the Judiciary, §§ 303-307; see also Bilgen v. Turkey, 2021, § 58 in fine) and in relation to a hearing in disciplinary proceedings ( Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, § 196). Whatever system is chosen by member States, they must abide by their obligation to secure judicial independence. Where a judicial council has been established, the State authorities should be under an obligation to ensure its independence from the executive and legislative powers, especially in order to safeguard the integrity of the judicial appointment process. The removal, or threat of removal, of a judicial member of the National Council of the Judiciary during his or her term of office has the potential to affect the personal independence of that member in the exercise of his or her duties ( Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, §§ 300-309). Additionally, the presence, even in a merely passive role, of a member of the government within a body empowered to impose disciplinary sanctions on judges is in itself highly problematic in terms of the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, and particularly the requirement that the disciplinary body be independent. The presence of the Prosecutor General within a body concerned with the disciplining of judges is problematic with regard to the impartiality and independence requirements under Article 6. As to the process for selecting professors of law for appointment to the Supreme Judicial Council (in French- Conseil supérieur de la magistrature, CSM ), it must provide sufficient guarantees of independence ( Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 75-76, concerning the presence of ex officio members of the CSM, including the Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General, and of professors of law, who had been selected without sufficient guarantees of independence; compare with Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, 2025, where the Court was satisfied that the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council, together with the manner of appointment of its non-judge members, provided sufficient guarantees of the independence of the body).\n\nIn a case where it had been alleged that doubts as to the impartiality of one or more judges sitting on a bench was sufficient to find that the bench as a whole had lacked impartiality, the Court found that, in view of the secrecy of the deliberations, it was impossible to ascertain the actual influence of the judge or judges concerned on the collegial work of the bench in question, and hence the partiality of one judge might likely raise legitimate doubt about the impartiality of the whole composition ( Morice v. France [GC], 2015, § 89; Mitrinovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2015, § 46; Stoimenovikj and Miloshevikj v. North Macedonia, 2021, § 39; see also, mutatis mutandis, Otegi Mondragon and Others v. Spain, 2018, § 67; Sigríður Elín Sigfúsdóttir v. Iceland, 2020, § 57 and, for the case of two members of a bench, Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 78. However, see In Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, 2025, the Court noted that the judge at issue was the chair of the disciplinary court and the rapporteur in the applicant's case leading the discussions, and that the applicants'request seeking recusal of the Chair had been not been seriously examined by that court (§§ 139 and 140).\n\nThe fact that judges appealing against decisions of the High Council of the Judiciary (or equivalent body) come under the authority of the same body as regards their careers and disciplinary proceedings against them has been examined in the cases of Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, § 79 and Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, 2013, § 130 (violations), and Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, §§ 157-165 (no violation). The Court assessed and compared the disciplinary systems for the judiciary in the States concerned in order to determine whether there were any \"serious structural deficiencies\" or \"an appearance of bias within the disciplinary body for the judiciary\" ( Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, §§ 157-160) and whether the requirement of independence was complied with ( ibid., §§ 161-163). Note that High Councils of the Judiciary or similar bodies can also carry out the role of disciplinary courts: Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, 2025, §§ 101 - 104. See also above concerning the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council.\n\nThe composition of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), acting as a court in disciplinary matters, was examined in Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, 2025. The SJCwas composed of five judicial members (judges elected by their peers) and five lay members, elected by the Parliament. While that composition ensured sufficient independence of the SJC, the Court noted certain flaws in the process of nomination of lay members of the SJC: the procedure could be more transparent, inclusive and certain additional requirements related to political neutrality of the candidates could be welcome. However, despite those flaws the current model of the SJCwas found to offer sufficient safeguards: the judges elected by their peers represented half of the SJC; in contrast to certain soft-law instruments, the Convention does not require that judicial members be in a \"substantial majority\" in such bodies, so the minimal standard of judicial representation had been complied with; there were strict eligibility requirements related to the professional qualifications and experience of the candidates; candidates underwent integrity checks and could be questioned in a plenary Parliament session; and the National Assembly could elect a non-judicial member only with three-fifths of the votes. The Court further stressed that the members of the SJCwere elected for a or a fixed term of five years: their irremovability during this term was guaranteed by law; they could not engage in any paid secondary activity; they received the same social guarantees as judges; they were bound by the rules of conduct for judges; and they did not depend on either the executive or the legislature. The SJCitself had enjoyed managerial and budgetary autonomy and the Chairman of the SJCplayed a predominantly administrative role having no powers vis-à-vis individual members (§§ 105 - 119). The Court concluded that the SJCdid not lack independence.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930062548/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250626081847/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/96d370a07ab1/20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf", @@ -19016,6 +20133,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:17131/19", "case_name": "Tamazount and others v. France", @@ -19049,6 +20168,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:46514/15", "case_name": "TMMOB and Karakuş Candan v. Türkiye", @@ -19082,6 +20203,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:44681/21|17256/22", "case_name": "Tsulukidze and Rusulashvili v. Georgia", @@ -19115,9 +20238,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:10233/20", - "case_name": "Ukrkava, TOV v. Ukraine,* no. 10233/20", + "case_name": "Ukrkava, TOV v. Ukraine", "application_numbers": "10233/20", "judgment_year": "2025", "citation_change": "added", @@ -19126,14 +20251,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF UKRKAVA, TOV v. UKRAINE", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", - "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "IV.A.3.b: Scope and limits of the Court ’ s supervision", + "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.A.3.b|a:407|b:430", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "The aribtrariness of the domestic court's conclusions may take the form of a failure to engage with important legal arguments relevant for the outcome of the case. Thus, in the case of Aykhan Akhundov v. Azerbaijan, 2023, the applicant's title to real estate was annulled by the Azerbaijani courts with reference to some irregularities in the property title of a company from whom the applicant had acquired that property several years before. In reaching that conclusion, the Azerbaijani courts failed to address the question of time-limits which could have barred a counterclaim introduced by the company (§ 96) and had also misinterpreted or failed to consider the position of a State authority (competent for the registration of real estate) which supported the applicant's claims (§ 103). Lastly, in this context, a lack of judicial coordination and diligence may have had an undeniable impact on the applicant's fate ( Tel v. Turkey, 2017, § 67). In conclusion, a \"denial of justice\" will occur if no reasons are provided or the reasons given are based on a \"manifest\" factual or legal error committed by the domestic court ( Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, § 77, referring to Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [GC], 2017, § 85, in the criminal sphere).", + "post_text": "The arbitrariness of the domestic court's conclusions may take the form of a failure to engage with important legal arguments relevant for the outcome of the case. Thus, in the case of Aykhan Akhundov v. Azerbaijan, 2023, the applicant's title to real estate was annulled by the Azerbaijani courts with reference to some irregularities in the property title of a company from whom the applicant had acquired that property several years before. In reaching that conclusion, the Azerbaijani courts failed to address the question of time-limits which could have barred a counterclaim introduced by the company (§ 96) and had also misinterpreted or failed to consider the position of a State authority (competent for the registration of real estate) which supported the applicant's claims (§ 103). Lastly, in this context, a lack of judicial coordination and diligence may have had an undeniable impact on the applicant's fate ( Tel v. Turkey, 2017, § 67). In Ukrkava, TOV v. Ukraine,* 2025, the applicant company complained that the Supreme Court had refused to apply a clear and unambiguous provision of domestic law regarding the time-limits applicable to certain notary-endorsed writs. While the applicant company argued that the opposing party (a bank) has missed the time-limit for enforcing the writ set for disputes between legal persons in the Notary Act, the Supreme Court decided that, for the sake of uniformity, the time-limit should be the same, for legal and natural persons, as under the civil code. The Court stressed that, in principle, a superior national court may legitimately operate a change of interpretation if justified by important considerations and if applied with due regard to its effects on pre-existing situations. However, in the case at hand the considerations of \"uniformity\" were not sufficient to jus tify such a departure from the clear text of the law, and the Supreme Court failed to demonstrate any negative effects of the difference between the time-limits for bringing claims under the relevant civil legislation and under the Notary Act. The Court concluded that the reinterpretation of the unequivocal provisions of the Notary Act on time- limits \"rendered the outcome of the proceedings unforeseeable and was contrary to the principle of legal certainty\", in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (§§ 46 - 50). In conclusion, a \"denial of justice\" will occur if no reasons are provided or the reasons given are based on a \"manifest\" factual or legal error committed by the domestic court ( Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, § 77, referring to Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [GC], 2017, § 85, in the criminal sphere).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930062548/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250626081847/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/96d370a07ab1/20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf", @@ -19148,6 +20273,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:53600/20", "case_name": "Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC]", @@ -19181,6 +20308,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:22321/19", "case_name": "Wick v. Germany", @@ -19214,6 +20343,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:27746/22|28291/22", "case_name": "X and Others v. Slovenia", @@ -19247,6 +20378,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:38127/22", "case_name": "Zafferani and Others v. San Marino", @@ -19280,6 +20413,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json", "case_key": "apps:57246/21", "case_name": "Zouboulidis v. Greece (no. 3)", @@ -19298,7 +20433,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A.2|a:None|b:28|IV.A.3.c|a:None|b:444", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "In Zouboulidis v. Greece (no. 3), 2024, the Court examined whether the right to claim damages for a judicial error existed in the domestic legal order. In 1998 the applicant's appeal in a civil case was declared inadmissible. In 2007 the Court found a breach of Article 6 (access to court) on account of an overly formalistic application of the admissibility criteria in those proceedings. Soon afterwards the applicant sued the State for damages for the judicial error in the original proceedings. He argued that, if that error had not taken place, he would have been paid a certain service-related benefit. The administrative courts (two instances) applying, by analogy, the law on State liability for damages, found that the applicant had a right to compensation but only in the case of a \" manifest error \" . Since the error of the Greek courts in the original proceedings was not \"manifest\", the applicant' s claim for damages was dismissed on the merits. In 2021 the Supreme Administrative Court (the SAC) reversed those judgments, finding that the administrative courts had had no jurisdiction to examine such claims because Greek law at the time did not provide for the right to be compensated for a judicial, even though such compensation might have been required by the Constitution. The law only established rules on the liability of other State bodies for misconduct and should not have been applied by analogy to the misconduct of the judiciary. The Court noted that administrative courts at two instances had considered the applicant's case on the merits, and, as regards the position of the SAC, if the relevant legislation on State liability for the judicial errors was enacted, the case would have been considered on the merits (§ 37). The narrow approach by the SAC did not remove arguability of the applicant's claim. The Court concluded that, in such conditions, Article 6 was applicable to the proceedings at issue.\n\nInconsistency of domestic case-law has been examined by the Court, not only under the heading of \"fairness\", but sometimes under the heading of \"access to court\". Thus, in Zouboulidis v. Greece (no. 3) the applicant brought proceedings before the administrative court claiming damages for a judicial error which had happened in another set of legal proceedings. At the time, the law provided for compensation for damage caused by manifest misconduct by other State authorities and not the courts. In a series of judgments, this law has been applied by analogy to judicial errors: in the applicant's case the courts at two instances did the same. However, the Supreme Administrative Court refused to apply the law by analogy and concluded that there was a gap in the legislation since the legislator had failed to establish conditions for compensation for damage caused by the judiciary and that, in absence of such specific regulations, the administrative courts had no jurisdiction to examine such claims. The Court found that the applicant's right of access to court had been violated because the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court excluded any further possibility for the applicant to pursue his claims and because for more than seven years this legislative gap has been known to the domestic courts but have not been remedied by the legislature (§§ 75 - 84).", + "post_text": "In Zouboulidis v. Greece (no. 3), 2024, the Court examined whether the right to claim damages for a judicial error existed in the domestic legal order. In 1998 the applicant's appeal in a civil case was declared inadmissible. In 2007 the Court found a breach of Article 6 (access to court) on account of an overly formalistic application of the admissibility criteria in those proceedings. Soon afterwards the applicant sued the State for damages for the judicial error in the original proceedings. He argued that, if that error had not taken place, he would have been paid a certain service-related benefit. The administrative courts (two instances) applying, by analogy, the law on State liability for damages, found that the applicant had a right to compensation but only in the case of a \" manifest error \" . Since the error of the Greek courts in the original proceedings was not \"manifest\", the applicant' s claim for damages was dismissed on the merits. In 2021 the Supreme Administrative Court (the SAC) reversed those judgments, finding that the administrative courts had had no jurisdiction to examine such claims because Greek law at the time did not provide for the right to be compensated for a judicial, even though such compensation might have been required by the Constitution. The law only established rules on the liability of other State bodies for misconduct and should not have been applied by analogy to the misconduct of the judiciary. The Court noted that administrative courts at two instances had considered the applicant's case on the merits, and, as regards the position of the SAC, if the relevant legislation on State liability for the judicial errors was enacted, the case would have been considered on the merits (§ 37). The narrow approach by the SACdid not remove arguability of the applicant's claim. The Court concluded that, in such conditions, Article 6 was applicable to the proceedings at issue.\n\nInconsistency of domestic case-law has been examined by the Court, not only under the heading of \"fairness\", but sometimes under the heading of \"access to court\". Thus, in Zouboulidis v. Greece (no. 3) the applicant brought proceedings before the administrative court claiming damages for a judicial error which had happened in another set of legal proceedings. At the time, the law provided for compensation for damage caused by manifest misconduct by other State authorities and not the courts. In a series of judgments, this law has been applied by analogy to judicial errors: in the applicant's case the courts at two instances did the same. However, the Supreme Administrative Court refused to apply the law by analogy and concluded that there was a gap in the legislation since the legislator had failed to establish conditions for compensation for damage caused by the judiciary and that, in absence of such specific regulations, the administrative courts had no jurisdiction to examine such claims. The Court found that the applicant's right of access to court had been violated because the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court excluded any further possibility for the applicant to pursue his claims and because for more than seven years this legislative gap has been known to the domestic courts but have not been remedied by the legislature (§§ 75 - 84).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930062548/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250626081847/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/96d370a07ab1/20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf", @@ -19313,6 +20448,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:4986/24", "case_name": "A and B v. Malta", @@ -19346,6 +20483,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:27455/22", "case_name": "Doynov v. Bulgaria", @@ -19379,6 +20518,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:22077/19", "case_name": "Green v. the United Kingdom", @@ -19396,8 +20537,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.2|a:179|b:179", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Parliamentary immunity: it is a long-standing practice for States generally to confer varying degrees of immunity on parliamentarians, with the aim of allowing free speech for representatives of the people and preventing partisan complaints from interfering with parliamentary functions (see the summary of the relevant principles in Bakoyanni v. Greece, 2022, §§ 58-62; C.G.I.L. and Cofferati v. Italy (no. 2), 2010, § 44). Hence, parliamentary immunity may be compatible with Article 6, provided that it: ▪ pursues legitimate aims: protecting free speech in Parliament and maintaining the separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary ( A. v. the United Kingdom, 2002, §§ 75-77 and 79); ▪ is not disproportionate to the aims sought to be achieved (if the person concerned has reasonable alternative means to protect effectively his or her rights ( ibid., § 86) and immunity attaches only to the exercise of parliamentary functions ( ibid., § 84; Zollmann v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2010). A lack of any clear connection with parliamentary activity calls for a narrow interpretation of the concept of proportionality between the aim sought to be achieved and the means employed ( Cordova v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, § 64; Syngelidis v. Greece, 2010, § 44 and the case-law references cited). Individuals'right of access to a court cannot be restricted in a manner incompatible with Article 6 § 1 whenever the impugned remarks were made by a member of Parliament ( Cordova v. Italy (no. 1), 2003, § 63; C.G.I.L. and Cofferati v. Italy (no. 2), 2010, §§ 46-50, where, in addition, the victims did not have any reasonable alternative means to protect their rights).", - "post_text": "Parliamentary immunity: it is a long-standing practice for States generally to confer varying degrees of immunity on parliamentarians, with the aim of allowing free speech for representatives of the people and preventing partisan complaints from interfering with parliamentary functions (see the summary of the relevant principles in Bakoyanni v. Greece, 2022, §§ 58-62; C.G.I.L. and Cofferati v. Italy (no. 2), 2010, § 44). The regulation of parliamentary immunity belongs to the realm of parliamentary law, in respect of which a wide margin of appreciation is left to member States ( Green v. the United Kingdom, 2025, § 77). Hence, parliamentary immunity may be compatible with Article 6, provided that it: ▪ pursues legitimate aims: protecting free speech in Parliament and maintaining the separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary ( A. v. the United Kingdom, 2002, §§ 75-77 and 79); ▪ is not disproportionate to the aims sought to be achieved (if the person concerned has reasonable alternative means to protect effectively his or her rights ( ibid., § 86) and immunity attaches only to the exercise of parliamentary functions ( ibid., § 84; Zollmann v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2010). A lack of any clear connection with parliamentary activity calls for a narrow interpretation of the concept of proportionality between the aim sought to be achieved and the means employed ( Cordova v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, § 64; Syngelidis v. Greece, 2010, § 44 and the case-law references cited). Individuals'right of access to a court cannot be restricted in a manner incompatible with Article 6 §1 whenever the impugned remarks were made by a member of Parliament ( Cordova v. Italy (no. 1), 2003, § 63; C.G.I.L. and Cofferati v. Italy (no. 2), 2010, §§ 46-50, where, in addition, the victims did not have any reasonable alternative means to protect their rights). For the Court to compel national authorities to provide for a legal remedy against the use of parliamentary privilege would be incompatible with the wide margin of appreciation afforded to member States in such matters ( Green v. the United Kingdom, 2025, § 101).", + "pre_text": "Parliamentary immunity: it is a long-standing practice for States generally to confer varying degrees of immunity on parliamentarians, with the aim of allowing free speech for representatives of the people and preventing partisan complaints from interfering with parliamentary functions (see the summary of the relevant principles in Bakoyanni v. Greece, 2022, §§ 58-62; C.G.I.L. and Cofferati v. Italy (no. 2), 2010, § 44). Hence, parliamentary immunity may be compatible with Article 6, provided that it: ▪ pursues legitimate aims: protecting free speech in Parliament and maintaining the separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary ( A. v. the United Kingdom, 2002, §§ 75-77 and 79); ▪ is not disproportionate to the aims sought to be achieved (if the person concerned has reasonable alternative means to protect effectively his or her rights ( ibid., § 86) and immunity attaches only to the exercise of parliamentary functions ( ibid., § 84; Zollmann v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2010). Alack of any clear connection with parliamentary activity calls for a narrow interpretation of the concept of proportionality between the aim sought to be achieved and the means employed ( Cordova v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, § 64; Syngelidis v. Greece, 2010, § 44 and the case-law references cited). Individuals'right of access to a court cannot be restricted in a manner incompatible with Article 6 § 1 whenever the impugned remarks were made by a member of Parliament ( Cordova v. Italy (no. 1), 2003, § 63; C.G.I.L. and Cofferati v. Italy (no. 2), 2010, §§ 46-50, where, in addition, the victims did not have any reasonable alternative means to protect their rights).", + "post_text": "Parliamentary immunity: it is a long-standing practice for States generally to confer varying degrees of immunity on parliamentarians, with the aim of allowing free speech for representatives of the people and preventing partisan complaints from interfering with parliamentary functions (see the summary of the relevant principles in Bakoyanni v. Greece, 2022, §§ 58-62; C.G.I.L. and Cofferati v. Italy (no. 2), 2010, § 44). The regulation of parliamentary immunity belongs to the realm of parliamentary law, in respect of which a wide margin of appreciation is left to member States ( Green v. the United Kingdom, 2025, § 77). Hence, parliamentary immunity may be compatible with Article 6, provided that it: ▪ pursues legitimate aims: protecting free speech in Parliament and maintaining the separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary ( A. v. the United Kingdom, 2002, §§ 75-77 and 79); ▪ is not disproportionate to the aims sought to be achieved (if the person concerned has reasonable alternative means to protect effectively his or her rights ( ibid., § 86) and immunity attaches only to the exercise of parliamentary functions ( ibid., § 84; Zollmann v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2010). Alack of any clear connection with parliamentary activity calls for a narrow interpretation of the concept of proportionality between the aim sought to be achieved and the means employed ( Cordova v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, § 64; Syngelidis v. Greece, 2010, § 44 and the case-law references cited). Individuals'right of access to a court cannot be restricted in a manner incompatible with Article 6 §1 whenever the impugned remarks were made by a member of Parliament ( Cordova v. Italy (no. 1), 2003, § 63; C.G.I.L. and Cofferati v. Italy (no. 2), 2010, §§ 46-50, where, in addition, the victims did not have any reasonable alternative means to protect their rights). For the Court to compel national authorities to provide for a legal remedy against the use of parliamentary privilege would be incompatible with the wide margin of appreciation afforded to member States in such matters ( Green v. the United Kingdom, 2025, § 101).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250626081847/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20260217135653/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/96d370a07ab1/20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf", @@ -19412,6 +20553,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:41120/17", "case_name": "K.V. Mediterranean Tours Limited v. Türkiye", @@ -19445,6 +20588,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:84056/17", "case_name": "Kroi and Nocka v. Albania", @@ -19478,6 +20623,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:30671/08", "case_name": "Maširević v. Serbia", @@ -19511,6 +20658,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:7428/17", "case_name": "Mustafa and Mustafova v. Bulgaria", @@ -19544,6 +20693,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:56297/21", "case_name": "Sadomski v. Poland", @@ -19577,6 +20728,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:58751/00", "case_name": "Schreiber and Boetsch v. France (dec.)", @@ -19610,6 +20763,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:30085/13", "case_name": "Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova", @@ -19627,8 +20782,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.A.4|a:451|b:452|IV.A.4.5|a:455|b:456|IV.A.7|a:494|b:495", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "A failure to observe the adversarial principle may be remedied by the appellate body, as long as it has \"full jurisdiction\" within the meaning of the case -law. Similarly, a procedural shortcoming on the part of an appellate court may be corrected by the lower court to which the case has been remitted ( Köksoy v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 36-39).\n\nContent: maintaining a \"fair balance\" between the parties. Equality of arms im plies that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case - including his evidence - under conditions that do not place him at a \" substantial disadvantage \" vis-à-vis the other party ( Kress v. France [GC], 2001, § 72; Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greec e, 1994, § 46; Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2017, § 146; Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands, 1993, § 33). ▪ This principle, which covers all aspects of procedural law in the Contracting States, is also applicable in the specific sphere of service of judicial documents on the parties, although Article 6 § 1 cannot be interpreted as prescribing a specific form of service of documents ( Avotiņš v. Latvia [GC], 2016, § 119). ▪ It is inadmissible for one party to make submissions to a court without the knowledge of the other and on which the latter has no opportunity to comment. It is a matter for the parties alone to assess whether a submission deserves a reaction ( APEH Üldözötteinek Szövetsége and Others v. Hungary, 2000, § 42) and more recently Janáček v. the Czech Republic, 2023, § 53. See also the limits mentioned above. ▪ However, if observations submitted to the court are not communicated to either of the parties there will be no infringement of equality of arms as such ( Kress v. France [GC], 2001, § 73), but rather of the broader fairness of the proceedings ( Nideröst-Huber v. Switzerland, 1997, §§ 23-24; Clinique des Acacias and Others v. France, 2005, §§ 36-37).\n\nHowever, where a party's submission is decisive for the outcome of the proceedings, it requires a specific and express reply ( Ruiz Torija v. Spain, 1994, § 30; Hiro Balani v. Spain, 1994, § 28; and compare Petrović and Others v. Montenegro, 2018, § 43).", - "post_text": "A failure to observe the adversarial principle may be remedied by the appellate body, as long as it has \"full jurisdiction\" within the meaning of the case -law. Similarly, a procedural shortcoming on the part of an appellate court may be corrected by the lower court to which the case has been remitted ( Köksoy v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 36-39). See also Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 38 - 41, concerning the absence of the applicant company in the first-instance court proceedings, which have been remedied in the appellate proceedings.\n\nContent: maintaining a \"fair balance\" between the parties. Equality of arms implies that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case - including his evidence - under conditions that do not place him at a \" substantial disadvantage \" vis-à-vis the other party ( Kress v. France [GC], 2001, § 72; Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greec e, 1994, § 46; Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2017, § 146; Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands, 1993, § 33; Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, 2025, § 36). ▪ This principle, which covers all aspects of procedural law in the Contracting States, is also applicable in the specific sphere of service of judicial documents on the parties, although Article 6 §1 cannot be interpreted as prescribing a specific form of service of documents ( Avotiņš v. Latvia [GC], 2016, § 119). ▪ It is inadmissible for one party to make submissions to a court without the knowledge of the other and on which the latter has no opportunity to comment. It is a matter for the parties alone to assess whether a submission deserves a reaction ( APEH Üldözötteinek Szövetsége and Others v. Hungary, 2000, § 42) and more recently Janáček v. the Czech Republic, 2023, § 53. See also the limits mentioned above. ▪ However, if observations submitted to the court are not communicated to either of the parties there will be no infringement of equality of arms as such ( Kress v. France [GC], 2001, § 73), but rather of the broader fairness of the proceedings ( Nideröst-Huber v. Switzerland, 1997, §§ 23-24; Clinique des Acacias and Others v. France, 2005, §§ 36-37).\n\nHowever, where a party's submission is decisive for the outcome of the proceedings, it requires a specific and express reply ( Ruiz Torija v. Spain, 1994, § 30; Hiro Balani v. Spain, 1994, § 28; Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, 2025, § 47; and compare Petrović and Others v. Montenegro, 2018, § 43).", + "pre_text": "Afailure to observe the adversarial principle may be remedied by the appellate body, as long as it has \"full jurisdiction\" within the meaning of the case -law. Similarly, a procedural shortcoming on the part of an appellate court may be corrected by the lower court to which the case has been remitted ( Köksoy v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 36-39).\n\nContent: maintaining a \"fair balance\" between the parties. Equality of arms im plies that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case - including his evidence - under conditions that do not place him at a \" substantial disadvantage \" vis-à-vis the other party ( Kress v. France [GC], 2001, § 72; Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greec e, 1994, § 46; Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2017, § 146; Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands, 1993, § 33). ▪ This principle, which covers all aspects of procedural law in the Contracting States, is also applicable in the specific sphere of service of judicial documents on the parties, although Article 6 § 1 cannot be interpreted as prescribing a specific form of service of documents ( Avotiņš v. Latvia [GC], 2016, § 119). ▪ It is inadmissible for one party to make submissions to a court without the knowledge of the other and on which the latter has no opportunity to comment. It is a matter for the parties alone to assess whether a submission deserves a reaction ( APEH Üldözötteinek Szövetsége and Others v. Hungary, 2000, § 42) and more recently Janáček v. the Czech Republic, 2023, § 53. See also the limits mentioned above. ▪ However, if observations submitted to the court are not communicated to either of the parties there will be no infringement of equality of arms as such ( Kress v. France [GC], 2001, § 73), but rather of the broader fairness of the proceedings ( Nideröst-Huber v. Switzerland, 1997, §§ 23-24; Clinique des Acacias and Others v. France, 2005, §§ 36-37).\n\nHowever, where a party's submission is decisive for the outcome of the proceedings, it requires a specific and express reply ( Ruiz Torija v. Spain, 1994, § 30; Hiro Balani v. Spain, 1994, § 28; and compare Petrović and Others v. Montenegro, 2018, § 43).", + "post_text": "Afailure to observe the adversarial principle may be remedied by the appellate body, as long as it has \"full jurisdiction\" within the meaning of the case -law. Similarly, a procedural shortcoming on the part of an appellate court may be corrected by the lower court to which the case has been remitted ( Köksoy v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 36-39). See also Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 38 - 41, concerning the absence of the applicant company in the first-instance court proceedings, which have been remedied in the appellate proceedings.\n\nContent: maintaining a \"fair balance\" between the parties. Equality of arms implies that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case - including his evidence - under conditions that do not place him at a \" substantial disadvantage \" vis-à-vis the other party ( Kress v. France [GC], 2001, § 72; Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greec e, 1994, § 46; Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2017, § 146; Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands, 1993, § 33; Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, 2025, § 36). ▪ This principle, which covers all aspects of procedural law in the Contracting States, is also applicable in the specific sphere of service of judicial documents on the parties, although Article 6 §1 cannot be interpreted as prescribing a specific form of service of documents ( Avotiņš v. Latvia [GC], 2016, § 119). ▪ It is inadmissible for one party to make submissions to a court without the knowledge of the other and on which the latter has no opportunity to comment. It is a matter for the parties alone to assess whether a submission deserves a reaction ( APEH Üldözötteinek Szövetsége and Others v. Hungary, 2000, § 42) and more recently Janáček v. the Czech Republic, 2023, § 53. See also the limits mentioned above. ▪ However, if observations submitted to the court are not communicated to either of the parties there will be no infringement of equality of arms as such ( Kress v. France [GC], 2001, § 73), but rather of the broader fairness of the proceedings ( Nideröst-Huber v. Switzerland, 1997, §§ 23-24; Clinique des Acacias and Others v. France, 2005, §§ 36-37).\n\nHowever, where a party's submission is decisive for the outcome of the proceedings, it requires a specific and express reply ( Ruiz Torija v. Spain, 1994, § 30; Hiro Balani v. Spain, 1994, § 28; Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, 2025, § 47; and compare Petrović and Others v. Montenegro, 2018, § 43).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250626081847/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20260217135653/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/96d370a07ab1/20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf", @@ -19643,6 +20798,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:10934/21", "case_name": "Semenya v. Switzerland [GC]", @@ -19661,7 +20818,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.B.1|a:187|b:187|II.B.2|a:None|b:191|II.B.2|a:188|b:188", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "In the Contracting States'domestic legal systems, a waiver of a person's right to have his or case heard by a court or tribunal is frequently encountered in civil matters, notably in the shape of arbitration clauses in contracts. The waiver, which has undeniable advantages for the individual concerned as well as for the administration of justice, does not in principle offend against the Convention ( Deweer v. Belgium, 1980, § 49; Pastore v. Italy (dec.), 1999). Article 6 does not therefore preclude the setting up of arbitration tribunals in order to settle certain disputes ( Transado-Transportes Fluviais Do Sado, S.A. v. Portugal (dec.), 2003). The parties to a case are free to decide that the ordinary courts are not required to deal with certain disputes potentially arising from the performance of a contract. In accepting an arbitration clause, the parties voluntarily waive certain rights enshrined in the Convention ( Eiffage S.A. and Others v. Switzerland (dec.), 2009; Tabbane v. Switzerland (dec.), 2016, § 27). There may be a legitimate reason for limiting the right to direct individual access to an arbitration tribunal ( Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 197).\n\nPersons may waive their right to a court in favour of arbitration, provided that such waiver is permissible and is established freely and unequivocally ( Suda v. the Czech Republic, 2010, §§ 48-49 and case-law references cited; Tabbane v. Switzerland (dec.), 2016, §§ 26-27 and 30). In a democratic society too great an importance attaches to the right to a court for its benefit to be forfeited solely by reason of the fact that an individual is a party to a settlement reached in the course of a procedure ancillary to court proceedings ( Suda v. the Czech Republic, 2010, § 48). The waiver must be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate to its importance ( Eiffage S.A. and Others v. Switzerland (dec.), 2009; Tabbane v. Switzerland (dec.), 2016, § 31).", - "post_text": "In the Contracting States'domestic legal systems, a waiver of a person's right to have his or case heard by a court or tribunal is frequently encountered in civil matters, notably in the shape of arbitration clauses in contracts. The waiver, which has undeniable advantages for the individual concerned as well as for the administration of justice, does not in principle offend against the Convention ( Deweer v. Belgium, 1980, § 49; Pastore v. Italy (dec.), 1999). Article 6 does not therefore preclude the setting up of arbitration tribunals in order to settle certain disputes ( Transado-Transportes Fluviais Do Sado, S.A. v. Portugal (dec.), 2003; Semenya v. Switzerland [GC], 2025, § 195; however, see further in Semenya on the question of the compulsory nature of certain arbitration clauses, which may require a \"particular rigour\" in the examination of the arbitration awards by the ordinary courts of law - see §§ 199 - 210). The parties to a case are free to decide that the ordinary courts are not required to deal with certain disputes potentially arising from the performance of a contract. In accepting an arbitration clause, the parties voluntarily waive certain rights enshrined in the Convention ( Semenya v. Switzerland [GC], 2025, § 197 and case-law references cited; Eiffage S.A. and Others v. Switzerland (dec.), 2009). There may be a legitimate reason for limiting the right to direct individual access to an arbitration tribunal ( Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 197).\n\nIn the field of international sports competition, the fact that arbitration is imposed by a private entity rather than by law is not sufficient to give rise to a violation of Article 6 §1. However, it is necessary to have regard to the fact that sports arbitration occurs in the context of structural imbalance characterising the relationship between sportspersons and the sport governing bodies: the latter are in a position to dictate conditions in their relationship with sportspersons, in that they regulate international sports competitions, are able to impose the mandatory and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), and exercise structural control over the international sports arbitration system. Therefore, in a situation where the CAS's exclusive jurisdiction is imposed on a sportsperson by a sport governing body, the arbitration procedure should afford the safeguards provided for in Article 6 §1 ( Semenya v. Switzerland [GC], 2025, §§ 199-205). Where the \"civil\" right at stake corresponds under domestic law to fundamental rights, respect for the right to a fair hearing requires a \" particularly rigorous \" examination of the applicant's case by the ordinary courts of law which are entitled to conduct the review of the decision of the arbitration tribunal (§ 209). Applying those principles, the Court considered that, in examining the complaint brought by the applicant - a professional athlete with differences of sex development and concerning regulations by a sport governing body requiring her to lower her natural testosterone level in order to compete in women's category in international competitions - the Federal Supreme Court 's review of the CAS award from the standpoint of its compatibility with the requirements of the domestic public policy ( ordre public) did not fulfil the requirements of particular rigour, not least owing to its very restrictive interpretation of the notion of public policy (§ 238).\n\nPersons may waive their right to a court in favour of arbitration, provided that such waiver is established freely, lawfully and unequivocally ( Semenya v. Switzerland [GC], 2025, § 197; Suda v. the Czech Republic, 2010, §§ 48-49 and case-law references cited). In a democratic society too great an importance attaches to the right to a court for its benefit to be forfeited solely by reason of the fact that an individual is a party to a settlement reached in the course of a procedure ancillary to court proceedings ( Suda v. the Czech Republic, 2010, § 48). The waiver must be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate to its importance ( Semenya v. Switzerland [GC], 2025, § 197 and case-law references cited; Eiffage S.A. and Others v. Switzerland (dec.), 2009).", + "post_text": "In the Contracting States'domestic legal systems, a waiver of a person's right to have his or case heard by a court or tribunal is frequently encountered in civil matters, notably in the shape of arbitration clauses in contracts. The waiver, which has undeniable advantages for the individual concerned as well as for the administration of justice, does not in principle offend against the Convention ( Deweer v. Belgium, 1980, § 49; Pastore v. Italy (dec.), 1999). Article 6 does not therefore preclude the setting up of arbitration tribunals in order to settle certain disputes ( Transado-Transportes Fluviais Do Sado, S.A. v. Portugal (dec.), 2003; Semenya v. Switzerland [GC], 2025, § 195; however, see further in Semenya on the question of the compulsory nature of certain arbitration clauses, which may require a \"particular rigour\" in the examination of the arbitration awards by the ordinary courts of law - see §§ 199 - 210). The parties to a case are free to decide that the ordinary courts are not required to deal with certain disputes potentially arising from the performance of a contract. In accepting an arbitration clause, the parties voluntarily waive certain rights enshrined in the Convention ( Semenya v. Switzerland [GC], 2025, § 197 and case-law references cited; Eiffage S.A. and Others v. Switzerland (dec.), 2009). There may be a legitimate reason for limiting the right to direct individual access to an arbitration tribunal ( Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 197).\n\nIn the field of international sports competition, the fact that arbitration is imposed by a private entity rather than by law is not sufficient to give rise to a violation of Article 6 §1. However, it is necessary to have regard to the fact that sports arbitration occurs in the context of structural imbalance characterising the relationship between sportspersons and the sport governing bodies: the latter are in a position to dictate conditions in their relationship with sportspersons, in that they regulate international sports competitions, are able to impose the mandatory and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), and exercise structural control over the international sports arbitration system. Therefore, in a situation where the CAS's exclusive jurisdiction is imposed on a sportsperson by a sport governing body, the arbitration procedure should afford the safeguards provided for in Article 6 §1 ( Semenya v. Switzerland [GC], 2025, §§ 199-205). Where the \"civil\" right at stake corresponds under domestic law to fundamental rights, respect for the right to a fair hearing requires a \" particularly rigorous \" examination of the applicant's case by the ordinary courts of law which are entitled to conduct the review of the decision of the arbitration tribunal (§ 209). Applying those principles, the Court considered that, in examining the complaint brought by the applicant - a professional athlete with differences of sex development and concerning regulations by a sport governing body requiring her to lower her natural testosterone level in order to compete in women's category in international competitions - the Federal Supreme Court 's review of the CASaward from the standpoint of its compatibility with the requirements of the domestic public policy ( ordre public) did not fulfil the requirements of particular rigour, not least owing to its very restrictive interpretation of the notion of public policy (§ 238).\n\nPersons may waive their right to a court in favour of arbitration, provided that such waiver is established freely, lawfully and unequivocally ( Semenya v. Switzerland [GC], 2025, § 197; Suda v. the Czech Republic, 2010, §§ 48-49 and case-law references cited). In a democratic society too great an importance attaches to the right to a court for its benefit to be forfeited solely by reason of the fact that an individual is a party to a settlement reached in the course of a procedure ancillary to court proceedings ( Suda v. the Czech Republic, 2010, § 48). The waiver must be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate to its importance ( Semenya v. Switzerland [GC], 2025, § 197 and case-law references cited; Eiffage S.A. and Others v. Switzerland (dec.), 2009).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250626081847/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20260217135653/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/96d370a07ab1/20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf", @@ -19676,6 +20833,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:16497/20", "case_name": "Sytnyk v. Ukraine", @@ -19693,8 +20852,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.A.3.b|a:429|b:430|IV.A.7|a:489|b:490", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "That being so, it is extremely rare for the Court to question under Article 6 § 1 the national courts'assessment on the grounds that their findings might be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable ( Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], 2015, §§ 61-65). This was the case, for example, in Dulaurans v. France, 2000, § 38 (see also Tel v. Turkey, 2017, § 76), where the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 because of a \"manifest error of judgment\" -that is, an error of fact or law by the national court that is so \"evident\" as to be characterised as \"manifest\" in the sense that no reasonable court could ever have made it, as underlined in Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], 2015, § 61; Khamidov v. Russia, 2007, § 170, where the proceedings complained of had been \"grossly arbitrary\"; Anđelković v. Serbia, 2013, § 24, and Lazarević v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2020, § 32, where there had been a \"denial of justice\"; Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], 2015, where the domestic court 's reasoning was regarded as being \"grossly arbitrary\" or as entailing a \"denial of justice\": see § § 63-65 and the cases cited above, and Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 77-78 (and contrast, for example, Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, § 82, and Société anonyme d'habitations à loyers modérés Terre et Famille v. France (dec.), 2004). In Baljak and Others v. Croatia, 2021, the Court found that the domestic courts'conclusions had been \"manifestly unreasonable\", referring in particular to its case-law under Article 2 of the Convention and the fact that the courts had imposed an unattainable standard of proof on the applicants (§ 41). Along similar lines, in Carmel Saliba v. Malta, 2016, the Court found it unacceptable for a judgment to be given against an applicant in civil proceedings without any convincing reasons, on the basis of inconsistent and conflicting evidence, while disregarding the applicant's counter-arguments (§ 79).\n\nThe guarantees enshrined in Article 6 § 1 include the obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions ( H. v. Belgium, 1987, § 53, and for a summary of the principles, Zayidov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2022, § 91). A reasoned decision shows the parties that their case has truly been heard, and thus contributes to a greater acceptance of the decision ( Magnin v. France (dec.), 2012, § 29). A failure of a national court to address important legal arguments or to give reasons was also analysed under the heading of \"arbitrariness\" ( Aykhan Akhundov v. Azerbaijan, 2023, §§ 105 et seq.).", - "post_text": "That being so, it is extremely rare for the Court to question under Article 6 §1 the national courts'assessment on the grounds that their findings might be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable ( Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], 2015, §§ 61-65; see also, in the context of the administrative offence proceedings, Sytnyk v. Ukraine, 2025, §§ 77-82. This was the case, for example, in Dulaurans v. France, 2000, § 38 (see also Tel v. Turkey, 2017, § 76), where the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 because of a \"manifest error of judgment\" -that is, an error of fact or law by the national court that is so \"evident\" as to be characterised as \"manifest\" in the sense that no reasonable court could ever have made it, as underlined in Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], 2015, § 61; Khamidov v. Russia, 2007, § 170, where the proceedings complained of had been \"grossly arbitrary\"; Anđelković v. Serbia, 2013, § 24, and Lazarević v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2020, § 32, where there had been a \"denial of justice\"; Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], 2015, where the domestic court 's reasoning was regarded as being \"grossly arbitrary\" or as entailing a \"denial of justice\": see § § 63-65 and the cases cited above, and Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 77-78 (and contrast, for example, Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, § 82, and Société anonyme d'habitations à loyers modérés Terre et Famille v. France (dec.), 2004). In Baljak and Others v. Croatia, 2021, the Court found that the domestic courts'conclusions had been \"manifestly unreasonable\", referring in particular to its case-law under Article 2 of the Convention and the fact that the courts had imposed an unattainable standard of proof on the applicants (§ 41). Along similar lines, in Carmel Saliba v. Malta, 2016, the Court found it unacceptable for a judgment to be given against an applicant in civil proceedings without any convincing reasons, on the basis of inconsistent and conflicting evidence, while disregarding the applicant's counter-arguments (§ 79). In Sytnyk v. Ukraine, 2025, the Court considered that, by accepting a witness' statements as decisive evidence to convict the applicant, without addressing any of the latter's serious arguments putting in doubt its reliability, and by disregarding the defence witness evidence, the domestic courts had distributed the burden of proof in an arbitrary matter and deprived the applicant of any practical opportunity to effectively challenge the charges against him (§ 80).\n\nThe guarantees enshrined in Article 6 §1 include the obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions ( H. v. Belgium, 1987, § 53, and for a summary of the principles, Zayidov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2022, § 91). A reasoned decision shows the parties that their case has truly been heard, and thus contributes to a greater acceptance of the decision ( Magnin v. France (dec.), 2012, § 29). A failure of a national court to address important legal arguments or to give reasons was also analysed under the heading of \"arbitrariness\" ( Aykhan Akhundov v. Azerbaijan, 2023, §§ 105 et seq.; Sytnyk v. Ukraine, 2025, § 80).", + "pre_text": "That being so, it is extremely rare for the Court to question under Article 6 § 1 the national courts'assessment on the grounds that their findings might be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable ( Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], 2015, §§ 61-65). This was the case, for example, in Dulaurans v. France, 2000, § 38 (see also Tel v. Turkey, 2017, § 76), where the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 because of a \"manifest error of judgment\" -that is, an error of fact or law by the national court that is so \"evident\" as to be characterised as \"manifest\" in the sense that no reasonable court could ever have made it, as underlined in Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], 2015, § 61; Khamidov v. Russia, 2007, § 170, where the proceedings complained of had been \"grossly arbitrary\"; Anđelković v. Serbia, 2013, § 24, and Lazarević v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2020, § 32, where there had been a \"denial of justice\"; Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], 2015, where the domestic court 's reasoning was regarded as being \"grossly arbitrary\" or as entailing a \"denial of justice\": see § § 63-65 and the cases cited above, and Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 77-78 (and contrast, for example, Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, § 82, and Société anonyme d'habitations à loyers modérés Terre et Famille v. France (dec.), 2004). In Baljak and Others v. Croatia, 2021, the Court found that the domestic courts'conclusions had been \"manifestly unreasonable\", referring in particular to its case-law under Article 2 of the Convention and the fact that the courts had imposed an unattainable standard of proof on the applicants (§ 41). Along similar lines, in Carmel Saliba v. Malta, 2016, the Court found it unacceptable for a judgment to be given against an applicant in civil proceedings without any convincing reasons, on the basis of inconsistent and conflicting evidence, while disregarding the applicant's counter-arguments (§ 79).\n\nThe guarantees enshrined in Article 6 § 1 include the obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions ( H. v. Belgium, 1987, § 53, and for a summary of the principles, Zayidov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2022, § 91). Areasoned decision shows the parties that their case has truly been heard, and thus contributes to a greater acceptance of the decision ( Magnin v. France (dec.), 2012, § 29). Afailure of a national court to address important legal arguments or to give reasons was also analysed under the heading of \"arbitrariness\" ( Aykhan Akhundov v. Azerbaijan, 2023, §§ 105 et seq.).", + "post_text": "That being so, it is extremely rare for the Court to question under Article 6 §1 the national courts'assessment on the grounds that their findings might be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable ( Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], 2015, §§ 61-65; see also, in the context of the administrative offence proceedings, Sytnyk v. Ukraine, 2025, §§ 77-82. This was the case, for example, in Dulaurans v. France, 2000, § 38 (see also Tel v. Turkey, 2017, § 76), where the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 because of a \"manifest error of judgment\" -that is, an error of fact or law by the national court that is so \"evident\" as to be characterised as \"manifest\" in the sense that no reasonable court could ever have made it, as underlined in Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], 2015, § 61; Khamidov v. Russia, 2007, § 170, where the proceedings complained of had been \"grossly arbitrary\"; Anđelković v. Serbia, 2013, § 24, and Lazarević v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2020, § 32, where there had been a \"denial of justice\"; Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], 2015, where the domestic court 's reasoning was regarded as being \"grossly arbitrary\" or as entailing a \"denial of justice\": see § § 63-65 and the cases cited above, and Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 77-78 (and contrast, for example, Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, § 82, and Société anonyme d'habitations à loyers modérés Terre et Famille v. France (dec.), 2004). In Baljak and Others v. Croatia, 2021, the Court found that the domestic courts'conclusions had been \"manifestly unreasonable\", referring in particular to its case-law under Article 2 of the Convention and the fact that the courts had imposed an unattainable standard of proof on the applicants (§ 41). Along similar lines, in Carmel Saliba v. Malta, 2016, the Court found it unacceptable for a judgment to be given against an applicant in civil proceedings without any convincing reasons, on the basis of inconsistent and conflicting evidence, while disregarding the applicant's counter-arguments (§ 79). In Sytnyk v. Ukraine, 2025, the Court considered that, by accepting a witness' statements as decisive evidence to convict the applicant, without addressing any of the latter's serious arguments putting in doubt its reliability, and by disregarding the defence witness evidence, the domestic courts had distributed the burden of proof in an arbitrary matter and deprived the applicant of any practical opportunity to effectively challenge the charges against him (§ 80).\n\nThe guarantees enshrined in Article 6 §1 include the obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions ( H. v. Belgium, 1987, § 53, and for a summary of the principles, Zayidov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2022, § 91). Areasoned decision shows the parties that their case has truly been heard, and thus contributes to a greater acceptance of the decision ( Magnin v. France (dec.), 2012, § 29). Afailure of a national court to address important legal arguments or to give reasons was also analysed under the heading of \"arbitrariness\" ( Aykhan Akhundov v. Azerbaijan, 2023, §§ 105 et seq.; Sytnyk v. Ukraine, 2025, § 80).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250626081847/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20260217135653/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_6_civil_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/96d370a07ab1/20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf", @@ -19709,6 +20868,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:15736/16", "case_name": "Vachik Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia", @@ -19742,6 +20903,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:3964/05", "case_name": "Apay v. Turkey", @@ -19775,6 +20938,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json", "case_key": "name:debled v belgium::1994", "case_name": "Debled v. Belgium", @@ -19808,6 +20973,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "name:a and b v france::2023", "case_name": "A and B v. France", @@ -19826,7 +20993,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.D.c|a:None|b:362", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "In the context of medically assisted reproduction, the Court found no violation of Article 8 when the intended father successfully contested the recognition of his paternity of a child conceived via IVF using gametes and an egg from donors (the second applicant), while the divorce proceedings from his spouse (the first applicant) were ongoing ( A and B v. France, 2023). The Court reiterated that the margin of appreciation was wider in matters concerning the legal status of a child than in matters concerning the relationship between parents and children, and it was a \"significant one\" in matters concerning the balancing of competing interests (§ 47). The Court found that the domestic courts gave relevant and sufficient reasons for their decisions which took into account the child's best interest (§§ 50-57).", + "post_text": "In the context of medically assisted reproduction, the Court found no violation of Article 8 when the intended father successfully contested the recognition of his paternity of a child conceived via IVFusing gametes and an egg from donors (the second applicant), while the divorce proceedings from his spouse (the first applicant) were ongoing ( A and B v. France, 2023). The Court reiterated that the margin of appreciation was wider in matters concerning the legal status of a child than in matters concerning the relationship between parents and children, and it was a \"significant one\" in matters concerning the balancing of competing interests (§ 47). The Court found that the domestic courts gave relevant and sufficient reasons for their decisions which took into account the child's best interest (§§ 50-57).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923050459/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217085228/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -19841,6 +21008,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:7246/20", "case_name": "A.H. and Others v. Germany", @@ -19858,8 +21027,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "reformulation", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.D.7|a:286|b:295", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Under Article 8, protection is given to the personal sphere of each individual, including the right to establish details of their identity as individual human beings ( Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2002, § 90; see also Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], 2014,). For a detailed analysis of the Court's case-law on this topic, see the Case-law Guide on the Rights of LGBTI persons .", - "post_text": "Under Article 8, protection is given to the personal sphere of each individual, including the right ( to establish details of their identity as individual human beings Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2002, § 90; see also Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], 2014).However, the State's margin of appreciation may be wider where the complaint does not concern the entry in an official document concerning the applicant personally but rather information on a birth certificates relating to others. In this regard, the Court has held that the legal impossibility for a transgender parent's current gender to be indicated on the birth certificate of a child conceived after gender reclassification did not violate Article 8 of the Convention ( O.H. and G.H. v. Germany and A.H. and Others v. Germany, 2023). For a detailed analysis of the Court's case-law on this topic, see the Case-law Guide on the Rights of LGBTI persons .", + "pre_text": "Under Article 8, protection is given to the personal sphere of each individual, including the right to establish details of their identity as individual human beings ( Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2002, § 90; see also Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], 2014,). For a detailed analysis of the Court's case-law on this topic, see the Case-law Guide on the Rights of LGBTIpersons .", + "post_text": "Under Article 8, protection is given to the personal sphere of each individual, including the right ( to establish details of their identity as individual human beings Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2002, § 90; see also Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], 2014).However, the State's margin of appreciation may be wider where the complaint does not concern the entry in an official document concerning the applicant personally but rather information on a birth certificates relating to others. In this regard, the Court has held that the legal impossibility for a transgender parent's current gender to be indicated on the birth certificate of a child conceived after gender reclassification did not violate Article 8 of the Convention ( O.H. and G.H. v. Germany and A.H. and Others v. Germany, 2023). For a detailed analysis of the Court's case-law on this topic, see the Case-law Guide on the Rights of LGBTIpersons .", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923050459/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217085228/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -19874,6 +21043,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:P16-2022-001", "case_name": "Advisory opinion on the procedural status and rights of a biological parent in proceedings for the adoption of an adult [GC]", @@ -19881,10 +21052,10 @@ "judgment_year": "2023", "citation_change": "added", "citation_text": "Advisory opinion on the procedural status and rights of a biological parent in proceedings for the adoption of an adult [GC], request no. P16-2022-001, Supreme Court of Finland, 13 April 2023", - "hudoc_itemid": "003-7623141-11823148", + "hudoc_itemid": "003-8260170-11620836", "hudoc_importance_level": "1", - "hudoc_doctype": "ADVPRO16OPENG", - "hudoc_docname": "Advisory opinion on the procedural status and rights of a biological parent in proceedings for the adoption of an adult", + "hudoc_doctype": "ADVPRO16OPARM", + "hudoc_docname": "Advisory opinion on the procedural status and rights of a biological parent in proceedings for the adoption of an adult - [Armenian Translation] by the Office of the Representative on International Legal matters of the Republic of Armenia", "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", "linked_paragraph_count": 2, "linked_sections": "II.D.11: Marital and parental status|III.A: Definition of family life and the meaning of family", @@ -19907,6 +21078,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:22619/14", "case_name": "Alif Ahmadov and Others v. Azerbaijan", @@ -19940,6 +21113,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:13258/18", "case_name": "B.F. and Others v. Switzerland", @@ -19973,6 +21148,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:47196/21", "case_name": "C v. Italy*", @@ -19990,8 +21167,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "minor_edit|unchanged|paragraph_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A|a:4|b:4|I.F.b|a:42|b:44|I.F.c|a:49|b:51|I.F.e|a:62|b:64|II.D.3|a:None|b:287|II.D.3|a:274|b:282|III.D.d|a:359|b:370", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "While Article 8 contains no explicit procedural requirements, the decision-making process involved in measures of interference must be fair and ensure due respect for the interests safeguarded by Article 8 ( Fernández Martínez v. Spain [GC], 2014, § 147). In this connection, the Court may have regard to the length of the authorities'decision-making process and any related judicial proceeding s ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, §§ 56-57).\n\nHowever, in some cases where family life is at stake and the applicants invoked Articles 6 and 8, the Court has decided to examine the facts solely under Article 8 (see, for instance, T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 53). According to the Court, the procedural aspect of Article 8 requires the decision-making process leading to measures of interference to be fair and to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded by the Article ( Soares de Melo v. Portugal, 2016, § 65; Santos Nunes v. Portugal, 2012, § 56; Havelka and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2007, §§ 34-35; Wallová and Walla v. the Czech Republic, 2006, § 47; Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, § 56; McMichael v. the United Kingdom, 1995, § 87; and Mehmet Ulusoy and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 109). Therefore, the Court may also have regard, under Article 8, to the form and length of the decision-making process ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 57; Macready v. the Czech Republic, 2010, § 41; and for special attention and priority treatment called for in the context of sexual abuse in order to ensure the protection of the child, see N.Ç. v. Turkey, 2021). Also, the State has to take all appropriate measures to reunite parents and children ( Santos Nunes v. Portugal, 2012, § 56).\n\nArticle 8 has been interpreted and applied in the light of Article 9, for instance in the case of Abdi Ibrahim v. Norway [GC], 2021, § 142 and T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 30.\n\nA refusal to grant full parental and custody rights in respect of a child, based solely or decisively on considerations regarding sexual orientation, is not acceptable under the Convention ( X. v. Poland 6, 2021). Where withdrawal of parental authority had been based on a distinction essentially deriving from religious considerations, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 ( Hoffmann v. Austria, 1993, § 36, concerning the withdrawal of parental rights from the applicant after she divorced the father of their two children because she was a Jehovah's Witness; see also T.C. v. Italy, 2022, in which the Court found that an order preventing the father of a child from actively involving her in his religion (he had become a Jehovah's Witness after separating from the child's mother) did not violate Article 14 read together with Article 8 because the applicant was not treated differently from the mother on the basis of religion (§§ 40-52). In Cînța v. Romania, 2020, the domestic courts had placed restrictions on the applicant's contact-rights in respect of his daughter. The Court found a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 because the domestic courts had based their decisions on the applicant's mental disorder, without assessing the impact of the mental illness on his caring skills or the child's safety.\n\nRespect for private life requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as individual human beings, which includes the legal parent-child relationship ( Mennesson v. France, 2014, § 96). Therefore, Article 8 protects children born to a surrogate mother outside the member State in question, whose legal parents according to the foreign State could not register as such under domestic law (see, for a summary of the principle, for instance, D v. France, 2020, §§ 45-54). The Court does not require that States legalise surrogacy and, furthermore, States may demand proof of parentage for children born to surrogates before issuing the child's identity papers. However, the child's right to respect for his or her private life requires that domestic law provide a possibility of recognition of the legal relationship between a child born through a surrogacy arrangement abroad and the intended father, where he is the biological father ( Mennesson v. France, 2014; Labassee v. France, 2014; Foulon and Bouvet v. France, 2016).\n\nIn cases concerning a parent's relationship with his or her child, there is a duty to exercise exceptional diligence in view of the risk that the passage of time may result in a de facto determination of the matter ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 58). This duty, which is decisive in assessing whether a case has been heard within a reasonable time as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, also forms part of the procedural requirements implicit in Article 8 ( Ribić v. Croatia, 2015, § 92; Paparrigopoulos v. Greece, 2022, § 49). In assessing what is considered to be in the best interests of the child, the potential negative long-term consequences of losing contact with the child's parents and the positive duty to take measures to facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible have to be sufficiently weighed in the balance. It is imperative to consider the long-term effects which a permanent separation of a child from its natural mother might have ( Jansen v. Norway, 2018, § 104). As the Court pointed out in this case, the risk of abduction of the applicant's child by her father (and hence the issue of the child's protection) should not prevail over addressing sufficiently the mother's contact-rights with her child (§ 103).", - "post_text": "While Article 8 contains no explicit procedural requirements, the decision-making process involved in measures of interference must be fair and ensure due respect for the interests safeguarded by Article 8 ( Fernández Martínez v. Spain [GC], 2014, § 147). In this connection, the Court may have s regard to the length of the authorities'decision-making process and any related judicial proceeding ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, §§ 56-57).\n\nHowever, in some cases where family life is at stake and the applicants invoked Articles 6 and 8, the Court has decided to examine the facts solely under Article 8 (see, for instance, T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 53). According to the Court, the procedural aspect of Article 8 requires the decision-making process leading to measures of interference to be fair and to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded by the Article ( Soares de Melo v. Portugal, 2016, § 65; Santos Nunes v. Portugal, 2012, § 56; Havelka and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2007, §§ 34-35; Wallová and Walla v. the Czech Republic, 2006, § 47; Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, § 56; McMichael v. the United Kingdom, 1995, § 87; and Mehmet Ulusoy and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 109). Therefore, the Court may also have regard, under Article 8, to the form and length of the decision-making process ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 57; Macready v. the Czech Republic, 2010, § 41; and for special attention and priority treatment called for in the context of sexual abuse in order to ensure the protection of the child, see N.Ç. v. Turkey, 2021). Also, the State has to take all appropriate measures to reunite parents and children ( Santos Nunes v. Portugal, 2012, § 56).\n\nArticle 8 has been interpreted and applied in the light of Article 9, for instance in the case of Abdi Ibrahim v. Norway [GC], 2021, § 142 and T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 30.\n\nA refusal to grant full parental and custody rights in respect of a child, based solely or decisively on considerations regarding sexual orientation, is not acceptable under the Convention ( X. v. Poland 6, 2021). Where withdrawal of parental authority had been based on a distinction essentially deriving from religious considerations, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 ( Hoffmann v. Austria, 1993, § 36, concerning the withdrawal of parental rights from the applicant after she divorced the father of their two children because she was a Jehovah's Witness; see also T.C. v. Italy, 2022, in which the Court found that an order preventing the father of a child from actively involving her in his religion (he had become a Jehovah's Witness after separating from the child's mother) did not violate Article 14 read together with Article 8 because the applicant was not treated differently from the mother on the basis of religion (§§ 40-52). In Cînța v. Romania, 2020, the domestic courts had placed restrictions on the applicant's contact-rights in respect of his daughter. The Court found a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 because the domestic courts had based their decisions on the applicant's mental disorder, without assessing the impact of the mental illness on his caring skills or the child's safety.\n\nIn C v. Italy*, 2023, which was brought on behalf of a child born via surrogacy arrangements, the Court found a breach of the applicant's right to respect for her private life in so far as the domestic courts refused to enter, in the Italian register of births, the name of her biological father, as recorded in the applicant's foreign birth certificate. As far as the intended mother was concerned, the Court found that, since she had the right, under the domestic law, to adopt the child born via surrogacy, the refusal to enter the foreign birth certificate in the register of births did not constitute violation of the child's right to respect for her private life.\n\nRespect for private life requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as individual human beings, which includes the legal parent-child relationship ( Mennesson v. France, 2014, § 96). Therefore, Article 8 protects children born to a surrogate mother outside the member State in question, whose legal parents according to the foreign State could not register as such under domestic law (see, for a summary of the principle, for instance, D v. France, 2020, §§ 45-54). The Court does not require that States legalise surrogacy and, furthermore, States may demand proof of parentage for children born to surrogates before issuing the child's identity papers. However, the child's right to respect for his or her private life requires that domestic law provide a possibility of recognition of the legal relationship between a child born through a surrogacy arrangement abroad and the intended father, where he is the biological father ( Mennesson v. France, 2014; Labassee v. France, 2014; Foulon and Bouvet v. France, 2016; C v. Italy*, 2023).\n\nIn cases concerning a parent's relationship with his or her child, there is a duty to exercise exceptional diligence in view of the risk that the passage of time may result in a de facto determination of the matter ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 58). This duty, which is decisive in assessing whether a case has been heard within a reasonable time as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, also forms part of the procedural requirements implicit in Article 8 ( Ribić v. Croatia, 2015, § 92; Paparrigopoulos v. Greece, 2022, § 49). In assessing what is considered to be in the best interests of the child, the potential negative long-term consequences of losing contact with the child's parents and the positive duty to take measures to facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible have to be sufficiently weighed in the balance. It is imperative to consider the long-term effects which a permanent separation of a child from its natural mother might have ( Jansen v. Norway, 2018, § 104). As the Court pointed out in this case, the risk of abduction of the applicant's child by her father (and hence the issue of the child's protection) should not prevail over addressing sufficiently the mother's contact-rights with her child (§ 103).", + "pre_text": "While Article 8 contains no explicit procedural requirements, the decision-making process involved in measures of interference must be fair and ensure due respect for the interests safeguarded by Article 8 ( Fernández Martínez v. Spain [GC], 2014, § 147). In this connection, the Court may have regard to the length of the authorities'decision-making process and any related judicial proceeding s ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, §§ 56-57).\n\nHowever, in some cases where family life is at stake and the applicants invoked Articles 6 and 8, the Court has decided to examine the facts solely under Article 8 (see, for instance, T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 53). According to the Court, the procedural aspect of Article 8 requires the decision-making process leading to measures of interference to be fair and to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded by the Article ( Soares de Melo v. Portugal, 2016, § 65; Santos Nunes v. Portugal, 2012, § 56; Havelka and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2007, §§ 34-35; Wallová and Walla v. the Czech Republic, 2006, § 47; Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, § 56; McMichael v. the United Kingdom, 1995, § 87; and Mehmet Ulusoy and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 109). Therefore, the Court may also have regard, under Article 8, to the form and length of the decision-making process ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 57; Macready v. the Czech Republic, 2010, § 41; and for special attention and priority treatment called for in the context of sexual abuse in order to ensure the protection of the child, see N.Ç. v. Turkey, 2021). Also, the State has to take all appropriate measures to reunite parents and children ( Santos Nunes v. Portugal, 2012, § 56).\n\nArticle 8 has been interpreted and applied in the light of Article 9, for instance in the case of Abdi Ibrahim v. Norway [GC], 2021, § 142 and T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 30.\n\nArefusal to grant full parental and custody rights in respect of a child, based solely or decisively on considerations regarding sexual orientation, is not acceptable under the Convention ( X. v. Poland 6, 2021). Where withdrawal of parental authority had been based on a distinction essentially deriving from religious considerations, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 ( Hoffmann v. Austria, 1993, § 36, concerning the withdrawal of parental rights from the applicant after she divorced the father of their two children because she was a Jehovah's Witness; see also T.C. v. Italy, 2022, in which the Court found that an order preventing the father of a child from actively involving her in his religion (he had become a Jehovah's Witness after separating from the child's mother) did not violate Article 14 read together with Article 8 because the applicant was not treated differently from the mother on the basis of religion (§§ 40-52). In Cînța v. Romania, 2020, the domestic courts had placed restrictions on the applicant's contact-rights in respect of his daughter. The Court found a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 because the domestic courts had based their decisions on the applicant's mental disorder, without assessing the impact of the mental illness on his caring skills or the child's safety.\n\nRespect for private life requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as individual human beings, which includes the legal parent-child relationship ( Mennesson v. France, 2014, § 96). Therefore, Article 8 protects children born to a surrogate mother outside the member State in question, whose legal parents according to the foreign State could not register as such under domestic law (see, for a summary of the principle, for instance, D v. France, 2020, §§ 45-54). The Court does not require that States legalise surrogacy and, furthermore, States may demand proof of parentage for children born to surrogates before issuing the child's identity papers. However, the child's right to respect for his or her private life requires that domestic law provide a possibility of recognition of the legal relationship between a child born through a surrogacy arrangement abroad and the intended father, where he is the biological father ( Mennesson v. France, 2014; Labassee v. France, 2014; Foulon and Bouvet v. France, 2016).\n\nIn cases concerning a parent's relationship with his or her child, there is a duty to exercise exceptional diligence in view of the risk that the passage of time may result in a de facto determination of the matter ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 58). This duty, which is decisive in assessing whether a case has been heard within a reasonable time as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, also forms part of the procedural requirements implicit in Article 8 ( Ribić v. Croatia, 2015, § 92; Paparrigopoulos v. Greece, 2022, § 49). In assessing what is considered to be in the best interests of the child, the potential negative long-term consequences of losing contact with the child's parents and the positive duty to take measures to facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible have to be sufficiently weighed in the balance. It is imperative to consider the long-term effects which a permanent separation of a child from its natural mother might have ( Jansen v. Norway, 2018, § 104). As the Court pointed out in this case, the risk of abduction of the applicant's child by her father (and hence the issue of the child's protection) should not prevail over addressing sufficiently the mother's contact-rights with her child (§ 103).", + "post_text": "While Article 8 contains no explicit procedural requirements, the decision-making process involved in measures of interference must be fair and ensure due respect for the interests safeguarded by Article 8 ( Fernández Martínez v. Spain [GC], 2014, § 147). In this connection, the Court may have s regard to the length of the authorities'decision-making process and any related judicial proceeding ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, §§ 56-57).\n\nHowever, in some cases where family life is at stake and the applicants invoked Articles 6 and 8, the Court has decided to examine the facts solely under Article 8 (see, for instance, T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 53). According to the Court, the procedural aspect of Article 8 requires the decision-making process leading to measures of interference to be fair and to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded by the Article ( Soares de Melo v. Portugal, 2016, § 65; Santos Nunes v. Portugal, 2012, § 56; Havelka and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2007, §§ 34-35; Wallová and Walla v. the Czech Republic, 2006, § 47; Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, § 56; McMichael v. the United Kingdom, 1995, § 87; and Mehmet Ulusoy and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 109). Therefore, the Court may also have regard, under Article 8, to the form and length of the decision-making process ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 57; Macready v. the Czech Republic, 2010, § 41; and for special attention and priority treatment called for in the context of sexual abuse in order to ensure the protection of the child, see N.Ç. v. Turkey, 2021). Also, the State has to take all appropriate measures to reunite parents and children ( Santos Nunes v. Portugal, 2012, § 56).\n\nArticle 8 has been interpreted and applied in the light of Article 9, for instance in the case of Abdi Ibrahim v. Norway [GC], 2021, § 142 and T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 30.\n\nArefusal to grant full parental and custody rights in respect of a child, based solely or decisively on considerations regarding sexual orientation, is not acceptable under the Convention ( X. v. Poland 6, 2021). Where withdrawal of parental authority had been based on a distinction essentially deriving from religious considerations, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 ( Hoffmann v. Austria, 1993, § 36, concerning the withdrawal of parental rights from the applicant after she divorced the father of their two children because she was a Jehovah's Witness; see also T.C. v. Italy, 2022, in which the Court found that an order preventing the father of a child from actively involving her in his religion (he had become a Jehovah's Witness after separating from the child's mother) did not violate Article 14 read together with Article 8 because the applicant was not treated differently from the mother on the basis of religion (§§ 40-52). In Cînța v. Romania, 2020, the domestic courts had placed restrictions on the applicant's contact-rights in respect of his daughter. The Court found a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 because the domestic courts had based their decisions on the applicant's mental disorder, without assessing the impact of the mental illness on his caring skills or the child's safety.\n\nIn C v. Italy*, 2023, which was brought on behalf of a child born via surrogacy arrangements, the Court found a breach of the applicant's right to respect for her private life in so far as the domestic courts refused to enter, in the Italian register of births, the name of her biological father, as recorded in the applicant's foreign birth certificate. As far as the intended mother was concerned, the Court found that, since she had the right, under the domestic law, to adopt the child born via surrogacy, the refusal to enter the foreign birth certificate in the register of births did not constitute violation of the child's right to respect for her private life.\n\nRespect for private life requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as individual human beings, which includes the legal parent-child relationship ( Mennesson v. France, 2014, § 96). Therefore, Article 8 protects children born to a surrogate mother outside the member State in question, whose legal parents according to the foreign State could not register as such under domestic law (see, for a summary of the principle, for instance, D v. France, 2020, §§ 45-54). The Court does not require that States legalise surrogacy and, furthermore, States may demand proof of parentage for children born to surrogates before issuing the child's identity papers. However, the child's right to respect for his or her private life requires that domestic law provide a possibility of recognition of the legal relationship between a child born through a surrogacy arrangement abroad and the intended father, where he is the biological father ( Mennesson v. France, 2014; Labassee v. France, 2014; Foulon and Bouvet v. France, 2016; C v. Italy*, 2023).\n\nIn cases concerning a parent's relationship with his or her child, there is a duty to exercise exceptional diligence in view of the risk that the passage of time may result in a de facto determination of the matter ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 58). This duty, which is decisive in assessing whether a case has been heard within a reasonable time as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, also forms part of the procedural requirements implicit in Article 8 ( Ribić v. Croatia, 2015, § 92; Paparrigopoulos v. Greece, 2022, § 49). In assessing what is considered to be in the best interests of the child, the potential negative long-term consequences of losing contact with the child's parents and the positive duty to take measures to facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible have to be sufficiently weighed in the balance. It is imperative to consider the long-term effects which a permanent separation of a child from its natural mother might have ( Jansen v. Norway, 2018, § 104). As the Court pointed out in this case, the risk of abduction of the applicant's child by her father (and hence the issue of the child's protection) should not prevail over addressing sufficiently the mother's contact-rights with her child (§ 103).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923050459/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217085228/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -20006,6 +21183,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:46412/21", "case_name": "Calvi and C.G. v. Italy", @@ -20039,6 +21218,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:44033/17", "case_name": "D.H. and Others v. North Macedonia", @@ -20072,6 +21253,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:21768/19", "case_name": "Ghadamian v. Switzerland", @@ -20105,6 +21288,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:11519/20", "case_name": "Glukhin v. Russia", @@ -20122,8 +21307,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.C|a:17|b:17|I.C|a:22|b:23", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "The national law must be clear, foreseeable, and adequately accessible ( Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1983, § 87; for an instruction issued by the Chief Prosecutor, see Vasil Vasilev v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 92-94; for instructions issued by the Ministry of Justice, see Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 83-99). It must be sufficiently foreseeable to enable individuals to act in accordance with the law ( Lebois v. Bulgaria, 2017, §§ 66-67 with further references therein, as regards internal orders in prison), and it must demarcate clearly the scope of discretion for public authorities. For example, as the Court articulated in the surveillance context (see the outline of the requirements in Falzarano v. Italy (dec.), 2021, §§ 27-29), the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication of the conditions and circumstances in which the authorities are empowered to resort to any measures of secret surveillance and collection of data ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, § 68). In Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, the Court found a violation of Article 8 due to the lack of clarity and precision in the domestic legal provisions that had served as the legal basis of the applicant's surveillance by her insurance company after an accident.\n\nA finding that the measure in question was not \"in accordance with the law\" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the int erference in question pursued a \"legitimate aim\" or was \"necessary in a democratic society\" ( M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be \"in accordance with the law\", as a result of an unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 ( Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been \" neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society \" (§§ 62-63).", - "post_text": "The national law must be clear, foreseeable, and adequately accessible ( Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1983, § 87; for an instruction issued by the Chief Prosecutor, see Vasil Vasilev v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 92-94; for instructions issued by the Ministry of Justice, see Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 83-99). It must be sufficiently foreseeable to enable individuals to act in accordance with the law ( Lebois v. Bulgaria, 2017, §§ 66-67 with further references therein, as regards internal orders in prison), and it must demarcate clearly the scope of discretion for public authorities. For example, as the Court articulated in the surveillance context (see the outline of the requirements in Falzarano v. Italy (dec.), 2021, §§ 27-29), the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication of the conditions and circumstances in which the authorities are empowered to resort to any measures of secret surveillance and collection of data ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, § 68). In Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, the Court found a violation of Article 8 due to the lack of clarity and precision in the domestic legal provisions that had served as the legal basis of the applicant's surveillance by her insurance company after an accident. In Glukhin v. Russia, 2023 (§§ 82-83), the Court expressed strong doubts that the domestic legal provisions which authorised the processing of biometric personal data, including with the aid of facial recognition technology, \"in connection with the administration of justice\" met the \"quality of law\" requirement since they were widely formulated and would appear to allow the processing of such data in connection with any type of judicial proceedings. F or the \"quality of law\" requirement to be met in the context of implementing facial recognition technology, it was essential to have detailed rules governing the scope and application of measures as well as strong safeguards against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness. The need for safeguards will be all the greater where the use of live facial recognition technology is concerned.\n\nA finding that the measure in question was not \"in accordance with the law\" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a \"legitimate aim\" or was \"necessary in a democratic society\" ( M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be \"in accordance with the law\", as a result of a n unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 ( Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been \" neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society \" (§§ 62-63). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be \"in accordance with the law\" was so closely linked to the \"necessary in a democratic society\" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78).", + "pre_text": "The national law must be clear, foreseeable, and adequately accessible ( Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1983, § 87; for an instruction issued by the Chief Prosecutor, see Vasil Vasilev v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 92-94; for instructions issued by the Ministry of Justice, see Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 83-99). It must be sufficiently foreseeable to enable individuals to act in accordance with the law ( Lebois v. Bulgaria, 2017, §§ 66-67 with further references therein, as regards internal orders in prison), and it must demarcate clearly the scope of discretion for public authorities. For example, as the Court articulated in the surveillance context (see the outline of the requirements in Falzarano v. Italy (dec.), 2021, §§ 27-29), the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication of the conditions and circumstances in which the authorities are empowered to resort to any measures of secret surveillance and collection of data ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, § 68). In Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, the Court found a violation of Article 8 due to the lack of clarity and precision in the domestic legal provisions that had served as the legal basis of the applicant's surveillance by her insurance company after an accident.\n\nAfinding that the measure in question was not \"in accordance with the law\" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the int erference in question pursued a \"legitimate aim\" or was \"necessary in a democratic society\" ( M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be \"in accordance with the law\", as a result of an unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 ( Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been \" neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society \" (§§ 62-63).", + "post_text": "The national law must be clear, foreseeable, and adequately accessible ( Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1983, § 87; for an instruction issued by the Chief Prosecutor, see Vasil Vasilev v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 92-94; for instructions issued by the Ministry of Justice, see Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 83-99). It must be sufficiently foreseeable to enable individuals to act in accordance with the law ( Lebois v. Bulgaria, 2017, §§ 66-67 with further references therein, as regards internal orders in prison), and it must demarcate clearly the scope of discretion for public authorities. For example, as the Court articulated in the surveillance context (see the outline of the requirements in Falzarano v. Italy (dec.), 2021, §§ 27-29), the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication of the conditions and circumstances in which the authorities are empowered to resort to any measures of secret surveillance and collection of data ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, § 68). In Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, the Court found a violation of Article 8 due to the lack of clarity and precision in the domestic legal provisions that had served as the legal basis of the applicant's surveillance by her insurance company after an accident. In Glukhin v. Russia, 2023 (§§ 82-83), the Court expressed strong doubts that the domestic legal provisions which authorised the processing of biometric personal data, including with the aid of facial recognition technology, \"in connection with the administration of justice\" met the \"quality of law\" requirement since they were widely formulated and would appear to allow the processing of such data in connection with any type of judicial proceedings. F or the \"quality of law\" requirement to be met in the context of implementing facial recognition technology, it was essential to have detailed rules governing the scope and application of measures as well as strong safeguards against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness. The need for safeguards will be all the greater where the use of live facial recognition technology is concerned.\n\nAfinding that the measure in question was not \"in accordance with the law\" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a \"legitimate aim\" or was \"necessary in a democratic society\" ( M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be \"in accordance with the law\", as a result of a n unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 ( Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been \" neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society \" (§§ 62-63). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be \"in accordance with the law\" was so closely linked to the \"necessary in a democratic society\" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923050459/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217085228/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -20138,6 +21323,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:66015/17", "case_name": "Jírová and Others v. the Czech Republic", @@ -20171,6 +21358,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:36345/16", "case_name": "L.B. v. Hungary [GC]", @@ -20204,6 +21393,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:36705/16", "case_name": "Margari v. Greece", @@ -20237,6 +21428,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:14709/07", "case_name": "Mayboroda v. Ukraine", @@ -20270,6 +21463,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:7336/11", "case_name": "Negru v. the Republic of Moldova", @@ -20303,6 +21498,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:39954/09|3465/17", "case_name": "Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia", @@ -20321,7 +21518,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.F.e|a:57|b:59|II.A.1|a:87|b:90", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "In Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, the applicants, two young men, posted a photograph of themselves kissing on a public Facebook page. This online post received hundreds of virulently homophobic comments. Although the applicants requested it, the prosecutors and domestic courts refused to prosecute, finding that the applicants'behaviour had been \"eccentric\" and did not correspond to \"traditional family values\" in the country. The Court stated that the hateful comments against the applicants and the homosexual community in general were instigated by a bigoted attitude towards that community and that the very same discriminatory state of mind was at the core of the failure on the part of the relevant public authorities to discharge their positive obligation to investigate in an effective manner whether those comments constituted incitement to hatred and violence. The Court concluded that the applicants had suffered discrimination on the ground of their sexual orientation (§§ 106-116, § 129). In Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021, the Court reiterated the obligation on the authorities'part to offer adequate protection in respect of the applicants'dignity (§ 127). As a matter of principle, in Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, the Court recalled the authorities'duty to prevent hate-motivated violence on the part of private individuals as well as to investigate the existence of a possible link between a discriminatory motive and the act of violence (whether physical or verbal) could constitute positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 and could also be seen to as part of the authorities'positive responsibilities under Article 14 of the Convention to secure the fundamental values protected by Articles 3 and 8 without discrimination.\n\nThe applicability of Article 8 has been determined, in some contexts, by a severity test: see, for example, the relevant case-law on environmental issues ; an attack on a person's reputation, dismissal, demotion, non-admission to a profession or other similarly unfavourable measures, in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, §§ 111-112 and 115-117, with further references therein (see also, by way of examples, Polyakh and Others v. Ukraine, 2019, §§ 207-211; Vučina v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, §§ 44-50; Convertito and Others v. Romania, 2020; Platini v. Switzerland (dec.), 2020; M.L. v. Slovakia, 2021, § 24; Budimir v. Croatia, 2021, § 47); acts or measures of a private individual which adversely affect the physical and psychological integrity of another ( Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], 2019, § 128, in relation to a road-traffic accident; C. v. Romania, 2022, with regard to sexual harassment, §§ 50-54); and individual psychological well-being and dignity in Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 109 and 117 (see in some other fields, for instance, S.-H. v. Poland (dec.), 2021). Not every act or measure which may be said to affect adversely the moral integrity of a person necessarily gives rise to such an interference. However, once a measure is found to have seriously affected the applicant's private life, the complaint will be compatible ratione materiae with the Convention and an issue of the \"right to respect for private life\" will arise. In this regard, the question of applicability and the existence of interference with the right to respect for private life are often inextricably linked ( Vučina v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, § 32).", - "post_text": "In Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, the applicants, two young men, posted a photograph of themselves kissing on a public Facebook page. This online post received hundreds of virulently homophobic comments. Although the applicants requested it, the prosecutors and domestic courts refused to prosecute, finding that the applicants'behaviour had been \"eccentric\" and did not correspond to \"traditional family values\" in the country. The Court stated that the hateful comments against the applicants and the homosexual community in general were instigated by a bigoted attitude towards that community and that the very same discriminatory state of mind was at the core of the failure on the part of the relevant public authorities to discharge their positive obligation to investigate in an effective manner whether those comments constituted incitement to hatred and violence. The Court concluded that the applicants had suffered discrimination on the ground of their sexual orientation (§§ 106-116, § 129). In Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021, the Court reiterated the obligation on the authorities'part to offer adequate protection in respect of the applicants'dignity (§ 127). As a matter of principle, in Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, the Court recalled the authorities'duty to prevent hate-motivated violence on the part of private individuals as well as to investigate the existence of a possible link between a discriminatory motive and the act of violence (whether physical or verbal) could constitute positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 and could also be seen to as part of the authorities'positive responsibilities under Article 14 of the Convention to secure the fundamental values protected by Articles 3 and 8 without discrimination. In Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023, the applicants, members of the LGBTI community, complained about negative public statements made by public officials about the LGBTI community. The Court found that the applicants may claim to be victims despite the fact that they had not been directly targeted by the contested statements (§ 57). Bearing in mind the history of public hostility towards the LGBTI community in Russia and the increase in homophobic hate crimes, including violent crimes, at the material time, the openly homophobic content and particularly aggressive and hostile tone of the statements, as well as the fact that they were made by influential public figures holding official posts and were published in popular newspapers with a large readership, the Court considered that the contested statements reached the \"threshold of severity\" required to be considered to affect the \"private life\" of members of the group (§§ 59 -62).\n\nThe applicability of Article 8 has been determined, in some contexts, by a severity test: see, for example, the relevant case-law on environmental issues ; an attack on a person's reputation, dismissal, demotion, non-admission to a profession or other similarly unfavourable measures, in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, §§ 111-112 and 115-117, with further references therein (see also, by way of examples, Polyakh and Others v. Ukraine, 2019, §§ 207-211; Vučina v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, §§ 44-50; Convertito and Others v. Romania, 2020; Platini v. Switzerland (dec.), 2020; M.L. v. Slovakia, 2021, § 24; Budimir v. Croatia, 2021, § 47); acts or measures of a private individual which adversely affect the physical and psychological integrity of another ( Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], 2019, § 128, in relation to a road-traffic accident; C. v. Romania, 2022, with regard to sexual harassment, §§ 50-54); and individual psychological well-being and dignity in Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 109 and 117; Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 59-62 22 (see in some other fields, for instance, S.-H. v. Poland (dec.), 2021). Not every act or measure which may be said to affect adversely the moral integrity of a person necessarily gives rise to such an interference. However, once a measure is found to have seriously affected the applicant's private life, the complaint will be compatible ratione materiae with the Convention and an issue of the \"right to respect for private life\" will arise. In this regard, the question of applicability and the existence of interference with the right to respect for private life are often inextricably linked ( Vučina v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, § 32).", + "post_text": "In Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, the applicants, two young men, posted a photograph of themselves kissing on a public Facebook page. This online post received hundreds of virulently homophobic comments. Although the applicants requested it, the prosecutors and domestic courts refused to prosecute, finding that the applicants'behaviour had been \"eccentric\" and did not correspond to \"traditional family values\" in the country. The Court stated that the hateful comments against the applicants and the homosexual community in general were instigated by a bigoted attitude towards that community and that the very same discriminatory state of mind was at the core of the failure on the part of the relevant public authorities to discharge their positive obligation to investigate in an effective manner whether those comments constituted incitement to hatred and violence. The Court concluded that the applicants had suffered discrimination on the ground of their sexual orientation (§§ 106-116, § 129). In Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021, the Court reiterated the obligation on the authorities'part to offer adequate protection in respect of the applicants'dignity (§ 127). As a matter of principle, in Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, the Court recalled the authorities'duty to prevent hate-motivated violence on the part of private individuals as well as to investigate the existence of a possible link between a discriminatory motive and the act of violence (whether physical or verbal) could constitute positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 and could also be seen to as part of the authorities'positive responsibilities under Article 14 of the Convention to secure the fundamental values protected by Articles 3 and 8 without discrimination. In Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023, the applicants, members of the LGBTIcommunity, complained about negative public statements made by public officials about the LGBTIcommunity. The Court found that the applicants may claim to be victims despite the fact that they had not been directly targeted by the contested statements (§ 57). Bearing in mind the history of public hostility towards the LGBTIcommunity in Russia and the increase in homophobic hate crimes, including violent crimes, at the material time, the openly homophobic content and particularly aggressive and hostile tone of the statements, as well as the fact that they were made by influential public figures holding official posts and were published in popular newspapers with a large readership, the Court considered that the contested statements reached the \"threshold of severity\" required to be considered to affect the \"private life\" of members of the group (§§ 59 -62).\n\nThe applicability of Article 8 has been determined, in some contexts, by a severity test: see, for example, the relevant case-law on environmental issues ; an attack on a person's reputation, dismissal, demotion, non-admission to a profession or other similarly unfavourable measures, in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, §§ 111-112 and 115-117, with further references therein (see also, by way of examples, Polyakh and Others v. Ukraine, 2019, §§ 207-211; Vučina v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, §§ 44-50; Convertito and Others v. Romania, 2020; Platini v. Switzerland (dec.), 2020; M.L. v. Slovakia, 2021, § 24; Budimir v. Croatia, 2021, § 47); acts or measures of a private individual which adversely affect the physical and psychological integrity of another ( Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], 2019, § 128, in relation to a road-traffic accident; C. v. Romania, 2022, with regard to sexual harassment, §§ 50-54); and individual psychological well-being and dignity in Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 109 and 117; Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 59-62 22 (see in some other fields, for instance, S.-H. v. Poland (dec.), 2021). Not every act or measure which may be said to affect adversely the moral integrity of a person necessarily gives rise to such an interference. However, once a measure is found to have seriously affected the applicant's private life, the complaint will be compatible ratione materiae with the Convention and an issue of the \"right to respect for private life\" will arise. In this regard, the question of applicability and the existence of interference with the right to respect for private life are often inextricably linked ( Vučina v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, § 32).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923050459/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217085228/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -20336,6 +21533,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:53568/18|54741/18", "case_name": "O.H. and G.H. v. Germany", @@ -20353,8 +21552,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "reformulation", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.D.7|a:286|b:295", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Under Article 8, protection is given to the personal sphere of each individual, including the right to establish details of their identity as individual human beings ( Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2002, § 90; see also Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], 2014,). For a detailed analysis of the Court's case-law on this topic, see the Case-law Guide on the Rights of LGBTI persons .", - "post_text": "Under Article 8, protection is given to the personal sphere of each individual, including the right ( to establish details of their identity as individual human beings Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2002, § 90; see also Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], 2014).However, the State's margin of appreciation may be wider where the complaint does not concern the entry in an official document concerning the applicant personally but rather information on a birth certificates relating to others. In this regard, the Court has held that the legal impossibility for a transgender parent's current gender to be indicated on the birth certificate of a child conceived after gender reclassification did not violate Article 8 of the Convention ( O.H. and G.H. v. Germany and A.H. and Others v. Germany, 2023). For a detailed analysis of the Court's case-law on this topic, see the Case-law Guide on the Rights of LGBTI persons .", + "pre_text": "Under Article 8, protection is given to the personal sphere of each individual, including the right to establish details of their identity as individual human beings ( Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2002, § 90; see also Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], 2014,). For a detailed analysis of the Court's case-law on this topic, see the Case-law Guide on the Rights of LGBTIpersons .", + "post_text": "Under Article 8, protection is given to the personal sphere of each individual, including the right ( to establish details of their identity as individual human beings Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2002, § 90; see also Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], 2014).However, the State's margin of appreciation may be wider where the complaint does not concern the entry in an official document concerning the applicant personally but rather information on a birth certificates relating to others. In this regard, the Court has held that the legal impossibility for a transgender parent's current gender to be indicated on the birth certificate of a child conceived after gender reclassification did not violate Article 8 of the Convention ( O.H. and G.H. v. Germany and A.H. and Others v. Germany, 2023). For a detailed analysis of the Court's case-law on this topic, see the Case-law Guide on the Rights of LGBTIpersons .", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923050459/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217085228/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -20369,6 +21568,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:34467/15", "case_name": "Sârbu v. Romania", @@ -20402,6 +21603,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:10934/21", "case_name": "Semenya v. Switzerland*", @@ -20435,6 +21638,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:30782/16", "case_name": "Simonova v. Bulgaria", @@ -20468,6 +21673,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:19162/19", "case_name": "UAB Kesko Senukai Lithuania v. Lithuania", @@ -20501,6 +21708,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:23851/20|24360/20", "case_name": "X and others v. Ireland", @@ -20518,8 +21727,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.D.6|a:426|b:438", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Complaints concerning social welfare benefits may fall within the ambit of family life for the purposes of Article 8 if the subject matter of the alleged disadvantage constitutes one of the modalities of exercising the right to respect for family life, in the sense that the measures seek to promote family life and necessarily affect the way in which it is organised. A range of factors are relevant for determining the nature of the benefit in question and they should be examined as a whole. These will include, in particular: the aim of the benefit, as determined by the Court in the light of the legislation concerned; the criteria for awarding, calculating and terminating the benefit as set forth in the relevant statutory provisions; the effects on the way in which family life is organised, as envisaged by the legislation; and the practical repercussions of the benefit, given the applicant's individual circumstances and family life throughout the period during which the benefit is paid ( Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022, § 72; Berisha v. Switzerland (dec.), 2023, §§ 39-45). Diffifculties of a purely financial nature are not encompassed in the right to respect for private life ( ibid., (dec.), 2023, §§ 46-49).", - "post_text": "Complaints concerning social welfare benefits may fall within the ambit of family life for the purposes of Article 8 if the subject matter of the alleged disadvantage constitutes one of the modalities of exercising the right to respect for family life, in the sense that the measures seek to promote family life and necessarily affect the way in which it is organised. A range of factors are relevant for determining the nature of the benefit in question and they should be examined as a whole. These will include, in particular: the aim of the benefit, as determined by the Court in the light of the legislation concerned; the criteria for awarding, calculating and terminating the benefit as set forth in the relevant statutory provisions; the effects on the way in which family life is organised, as envisaged by the legislation; and the practical repercussions of the benefit, given the applicant's individual circumstances and family life throughout the period during which the benefit is paid ( Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022, § 72; Berisha v. Switzerland (dec.), 2023, §§ 39-45; X and others v. Ireland, 2023, §§ 73-75). Diffifculties of a purely financial nature are not encompassed in the right to respect for private life ( ibid., (dec.), 2023, §§ 46-49).", + "pre_text": "Complaints concerning social welfare benefits may fall within the ambit of family life for the purposes of Article 8 if the subject matter of the alleged disadvantage constitutes one of the modalities of exercising the right to respect for family life, in the sense that the measures seek to promote family life and necessarily affect the way in which it is organised. Arange of factors are relevant for determining the nature of the benefit in question and they should be examined as a whole. These will include, in particular: the aim of the benefit, as determined by the Court in the light of the legislation concerned; the criteria for awarding, calculating and terminating the benefit as set forth in the relevant statutory provisions; the effects on the way in which family life is organised, as envisaged by the legislation; and the practical repercussions of the benefit, given the applicant's individual circumstances and family life throughout the period during which the benefit is paid ( Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022, § 72; Berisha v. Switzerland (dec.), 2023, §§ 39-45). Diffifculties of a purely financial nature are not encompassed in the right to respect for private life ( ibid., (dec.), 2023, §§ 46-49).", + "post_text": "Complaints concerning social welfare benefits may fall within the ambit of family life for the purposes of Article 8 if the subject matter of the alleged disadvantage constitutes one of the modalities of exercising the right to respect for family life, in the sense that the measures seek to promote family life and necessarily affect the way in which it is organised. Arange of factors are relevant for determining the nature of the benefit in question and they should be examined as a whole. These will include, in particular: the aim of the benefit, as determined by the Court in the light of the legislation concerned; the criteria for awarding, calculating and terminating the benefit as set forth in the relevant statutory provisions; the effects on the way in which family life is organised, as envisaged by the legislation; and the practical repercussions of the benefit, given the applicant's individual circumstances and family life throughout the period during which the benefit is paid ( Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022, § 72; Berisha v. Switzerland (dec.), 2023, §§ 39-45; X and others v. Ireland, 2023, §§ 73-75). Diffifculties of a purely financial nature are not encompassed in the right to respect for private life ( ibid., (dec.), 2023, §§ 46-49).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923050459/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217085228/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -20534,6 +21743,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:56578/11", "case_name": "A.A.K. v. Türkiye", @@ -20567,6 +21778,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:17791/22", "case_name": "A and Others v. Italy", @@ -20600,6 +21813,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:26504/20", "case_name": "Anagnostakis v. Greece", @@ -20633,6 +21848,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:22296/20|37138/20", "case_name": "Baret and Caballero v. France", @@ -20666,6 +21883,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:3000/16|7189/16", "case_name": "Beljic and Others v. Croatia", @@ -20699,6 +21918,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:56513/17|56515/17", "case_name": "C.P. and M.N. v. France", @@ -20732,6 +21953,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:18843/20", "case_name": "Cherrier v. France*", @@ -20765,6 +21988,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:14925/18", "case_name": "Colombier v. France", @@ -20798,6 +22023,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:53162/21", "case_name": "Diaconeasa v. Romania", @@ -20815,8 +22042,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "section_moved_modified", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.B.5|a:159|b:163", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Regarding access to health care for people with disabilities, the Court declared a case inadmissible in which a severely disabled individual sought a robotic arm to assist his mobility ( Sentges v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2003). The Court did, however, find that reducing the level of care given to a woman with limited mobility violated Article 8, but only for a limited period during which the UK did not comply with its own laws ( McDonald v. the United Kingdom, 2014). In Jivan v. Romania, 2022, which concerned the authorities failure to classify an elderly and disabled man as requiring a personal carer, the Court did not consider that the State had struck a fair balance between the competing public and private interests at stake (§ 51).", - "post_text": "Regarding access to health care for people with disabilities, the Court declared a case inadmissible in which a severely disabled individual sought a robotic arm to assist his mobility ( Sentges v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2003). The Court did, however, find that reducing the level of care given to a woman with limited mobility violated Article 8, but only for a limited period during which the UK did not comply with its own laws ( McDonald v. the United Kingdom, 2014). In Jivan v. Romania, 2022, which concerned the authorities failure to classify an elderly and disabled man as requiring a personal carer, the Court did not consider that the State had struck a fair balance between the competing public and private interests at stake (§ 51; see also Diaconeasa v. Romania, 2024, § 64).", + "pre_text": "Regarding access to health care for people with disabilities, the Court declared a case inadmissible in which a severely disabled individual sought a robotic arm to assist his mobility ( Sentges v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2003). The Court did, however, find that reducing the level of care given to a woman with limited mobility violated Article 8, but only for a limited period during which the UKdid not comply with its own laws ( McDonald v. the United Kingdom, 2014). In Jivan v. Romania, 2022, which concerned the authorities failure to classify an elderly and disabled man as requiring a personal carer, the Court did not consider that the State had struck a fair balance between the competing public and private interests at stake (§ 51).", + "post_text": "Regarding access to health care for people with disabilities, the Court declared a case inadmissible in which a severely disabled individual sought a robotic arm to assist his mobility ( Sentges v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2003). The Court did, however, find that reducing the level of care given to a woman with limited mobility violated Article 8, but only for a limited period during which the UKdid not comply with its own laws ( McDonald v. the United Kingdom, 2014). In Jivan v. Romania, 2022, which concerned the authorities failure to classify an elderly and disabled man as requiring a personal carer, the Court did not consider that the State had struck a fair balance between the competing public and private interests at stake (§ 51; see also Diaconeasa v. Romania, 2024, § 64).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217085228/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240618070506/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -20831,6 +22058,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:3041/19", "case_name": "G.T.B. v. Spain", @@ -20864,6 +22093,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:21424/16|45728/17", "case_name": "Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France", @@ -20897,6 +22128,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:7432/17", "case_name": "Gurbanov v. Armenia", @@ -20930,6 +22163,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:25240/20", "case_name": "Gyulumyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.)", @@ -20963,6 +22198,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:37031/21", "case_name": "I.V. v. Estonia", @@ -20996,6 +22233,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:17780/18", "case_name": "Ismayilzade v. Azerbaijan", @@ -21029,6 +22268,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:16974/14", "case_name": "Kaczmarek v. Poland", @@ -21062,6 +22303,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:40209/20", "case_name": "Koilova and Babulkova v. Bulgaria", @@ -21079,8 +22322,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_updated", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.F.e|a:58|b:60", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "For instance, concerning same-sex couples, the Court has attached importance to the continuing international movement towards the legal recognition of same-sex unions ( Oliari and Others v. Italy, 2016, §§ 178 and 180-185), but leaves open the option for States to restrict access to marriage to different-sex couples ( Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010, § 108). See also the Case-Law Guide on Rights of LGBTI persons .", - "post_text": "For instance, concerning same-sex couples, the Court has attached importance to the continuing international movement towards the legal recognition of same-sex unions ( Oliari and Others v. Italy, 2016, §§ 178 and 180-185; Koilova and Babulkova v. Bulgaria, 2023), but leaves open the option for Schalk and Kopf v. Austria States to restrict access to marriage to different-sex couples (, 2010, § 108). See also the Case- Law Guide on Rights of LGBTI persons .", + "pre_text": "For instance, concerning same-sex couples, the Court has attached importance to the continuing international movement towards the legal recognition of same-sex unions ( Oliari and Others v. Italy, 2016, §§ 178 and 180-185), but leaves open the option for States to restrict access to marriage to different-sex couples ( Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010, § 108). See also the Case-Law Guide on Rights of LGBTIpersons .", + "post_text": "For instance, concerning same-sex couples, the Court has attached importance to the continuing international movement towards the legal recognition of same-sex unions ( Oliari and Others v. Italy, 2016, §§ 178 and 180-185; Koilova and Babulkova v. Bulgaria, 2023), but leaves open the option for Schalk and Kopf v. Austria States to restrict access to marriage to different-sex couples (, 2010, § 108). See also the Case- Law Guide on Rights of LGBTIpersons .", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217085228/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240618070506/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -21095,6 +22338,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:17254/11", "case_name": "Krasicki v. Poland", @@ -21128,6 +22373,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:55351/17", "case_name": "Luca v. the Republic of Moldova", @@ -21145,8 +22392,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "minor_edit|citation_removed", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.B.1|a:128|b:132|III.D.d|a:366|b:380|III.D.d|a:371|b:385", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "In cases of domestic violence, the Court also holds States responsible for protecting victims, particularly when the risks of violence are known by State officers and when officers fail to enforce measures designed to protect victims of violence ( Levchuk v. Ukraine, 2020; Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, 2008; A v. Croatia, 2010; Hajduová v. Slovakia, 2010; Kalucza v. Hungary, 2012; B. v. Moldova, 2013). The State also has a positive responsibility to protect children from witnessing domestic violence in their homes ( Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013). The Court will also apply its child custody and care jurisprudence (see below), with particular deference to removal decisions based on patterns of domestic violence in the home ( Y.C. v. the United Kingdom, 2012). In Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, the Court emphasised the need to comprehensively address the phenomenon of domestic violence in all its forms. In examining the applicant's ' allegations of cyberbullying and her request to have the family computer searched, it found that the national authorities had been overly formalistic in dismissing any connection with the domestic violence which she had already reported to them. The applicant had been obliged to submit a new complaint alleging a breach of the confidentiality of her correspondence. In dealing with it separately, the authorities had failed to take into consideration the various forms that domestic violence could take. The case of Volodina v. Russia (no. 2), 2021, concerned the applicant's complaint that the authorities had failed to protect her against repeated cyberviolence by her partner, who had created fake profiles in her name, had published her intimate photos, had tracked her movements with the use of a GPS device, and had sent her death threats via social media. The Court found, in particular, that even though they had the legal tools to prosecute the applicant's partner, the authorities had not conducted an effective investigation and had at no point envisaged taking appropriate measures to protect her. They had thus failed in their obligation to protect her against serious abuse.\n\nThe Court has found that the failure to disclose relevant documents to parents during the procedures instituted by the authorities in placing and maintaining a child in care meant that the decision-makingprocess determining the custody and access arrangements did not afford the requisite protection of the parents'interests as safeguarded by Article 8 ( T.P. and K.M. v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 73). The refusal to order an independent psychological report and the absence of a hearing before a regional court insufficiently involved the applicant in the decision-making process regarding his parental access and thereby violated the applicant's rights under Article 8 ( Elsholz v. Germany [GC], 2000, § 53). In Petrov and X v. Russia, 2018, there was an insufficient examination of a father's application for a residence order and no relevant and sufficient reasons were adduced for a decision to make the residence order in favour of the child's mother, in violation of Article 8 (see §§ 105-114 and the review of the case-law therein). In Bierski v. Poland, 2022, the Court found the respondent State to be in breach of its positive obligation under Article 8 to take measures aimed at re-establishing contact between the applicant and his son, who had been declared incapacitated. Once the applicant's son had turned eighteen, his mother was appointed as a guardian and refused to allow the applicant's contact to continue, and the applicant had no standing before the domestic courts to protect his family life with his son (§§ 46-54).\n\nStates must also provide measures to ensure that custody determinations and parental rights are enforced ( Raw and Others v. France, 2013; Vorozhba v. Russia, 2014, § 97; Malec v. Poland, 2016, § 78). This may, if necessary, include investigation into the whereabouts of the child whose location has been hidden by the other parent ( Hromadka and Hromadkova v. Russia, 2014, § 168). The Court also found that in placing reliance on a series of automatic and stereotyped measures in order to secure the exercise of the father's contact rights in respect of his child, the domestic courts had not taken the appropriate measures to establish a meaningful relationship between the applicant and his child and to make the full exercise of his contact rights possible ( Giorgioni v. Italy, 2016, §§ 75-77; Macready v. the Czech Republic, 2010, § 66; Bondavalli v. Italy, 2015, §§ 81-84). Likewise, a violation was found where no new independent psychiatric evidence concerning the applicant had been taken for around 10 years ( Cincimino v. Italy, 2016, §§ 73-75). Another violation was found in the case where, over seven years, the applicant was unable to exercise his contact rights under the conditions set by the courts, owing to the opposition of the child's mother and the lack of appropriate measures taken by the domestic courts ( Strumia v. Italy, 2016, §§ 122-125). The role of the domestic courts is thus to ascertain what steps can be taken to overcome existing barriers and to facilitate contact between the child and the noncustodial parent; for example, the fact that the domestic courts had failed to consider any means that would have assisted an applicant in overcoming the barriers arising from his disability (deafness with communication by sign language, while his son was also deaf but could communicate orally) led the Court to find a violation ( Kacper Nowakowski v. Poland, 2017, § 95).", - "post_text": "In cases of domestic violence, the Court also holds States responsible for protecting victims, particularly when the risks of violence are known by State officers and when officers fail to enforce measures designed to protect victims of violence ( Levchuk v. Ukraine, 2020; Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, 2008; A v. Croatia, 2010; Hajduová v. Slovakia, 2010; Kalucza v. Hungary, 2012; B. v. Moldova, 2013). The State also has a positive responsibility to protect children from witnessing domestic violence in their homes ( Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013). The Court will also apply its child custody and care jurisprudence (see below), with particular deference to removal decisions based on patterns of domestic violence in the home ( Y.C. v. the United Kingdom, 2012; Luca v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023). In Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, the Court emphasised the need to comprehensively address the phenomenon of domestic violence in all its forms. In examining the applicant's' allegations of cyberbullying and her request to have the family computer searched, it found that the national authorities had been overly formalistic in dismissing any connection with the domestic violence which she had already reported to them. The applicant had been obliged to submit a new complaint alleging a breach of the confidentiality of her correspondence. In dealing with it separately, the authorities had failed to take into consideration the various forms that domestic violence could take. The case of Volodina v. Russia (no. 2), 2021, concerned the applicant's complaint that the authorities had failed to protect her against repeated cyberviolence by her partner, who had created fake profiles in her name, had published her intimate photos, had tracked her movements with the use of a GPS device, and had sent her death threats via social media. The Court found, in particular, that even though they had the legal tools to prosecute the applicant's partner, the authorities had not conducted an effective investigation and had at no point envisaged taking appropriate measures to protect her. They had thus failed in their obligation to protect her against serious abuse.\n\nThe Court has found that the failure to disclose relevant documents to parents during the procedures instituted by the authorities in placing and maintaining a child in care meant that the decision-making process determining the custody and access arrangements did not afford the requisite protection of the parents' interests as safeguarded by Article 8 ( T.P. and K.M. v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 73). The refusal to order an independent psychological report and the absence of a hearing before a regional court insufficiently involved the applicant in the decision-making process Elsholz regarding his parental access and thereby violated the applicant's rights under Article 8 ( v. Germany [GC], 2000, § 53). In Petrov and X v. Russia, 2018, there was an insufficient examination of a father's application for a residence order and no relevant and sufficient reasons were adduced for a decision to make the residence order in favour of the child's mother, in violation of Article 8 (see §§ 105-114 and the review of the case-law therein). In Bierski v. Poland, 2022, the Court found the respondent State to be in breach of its positive obligation under Article 8 to take measures aimed at re-establishing contact between the applicant and his son, who had been declared incapacitated. Once the applicant's son had turned eighteen, his mother was appointed as a guardian and refused to allow the applicant's contact to continue, and the applicant had no standing before the domestic courts to protect his family life with his son (§§ 46-54). The court has also found that the failure of the domestic authorities to take into account incidents of domestic violence in the determination of child contact rights and, consequently, their failure to take prompt measures to support the applicant, victim of domestic violence, in maintaining contact with her children, breached their Article 8 obligations ( Luca v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 90-95).\n\nStates must also provide measures to ensure that custody determinations and parental rights Raw and Others v. France Vorozhba v. Russia Malec v. Poland are enforced (, 2013;, 2014, § 97;, 2016, § 78). This may, if necessary, include investigation into the whereabouts of the child whose location has been hidden by the other parent ( Hromadka and Hromadkova v. Russia, 2014, § 168). The Court also found that in placing reliance on a series of automatic and stereotyped measures in order to secure the exercise of the father's contact rights in respect of his child, the domestic courts had not taken the appropriate measures to establish a meaningful relationship between the applicant and his child and to make the full exercise of his contact rights possible ( Giorgioni v. Italy, 2016, §§ 75-77; Macready v. the Czech Republic, 2010, § 66; Bondavalli v. Italy, 2015, §§ 81-84). Likewise, a violation was found where no new independent psychiatric evidence concerning the applicant had been taken for around 10 years ( Cincimino v. Italy, 2016, §§ 73-75). Another violation was found in the case where, over seven years, the applicant was unable to exercise his contact rights under the conditions set by the courts, owing to the opposition of the child's mother and the lack of appropriate measures taken by the domestic courts ( Strumia v. Italy, 2016, §§ 122-125; see also Luca v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 90-94). The role of the domestic courts is thus to ascertain what steps can be taken to overcome existing barriers and to facilitate contact between the child and the noncustodial parent; for example, the fact that the domestic courts had failed to consider any means that would have assisted an applicant in overcoming the barriers arising from his disability (deafness with communication by sign language, while his son was also deaf but could communicate orally) led the Court to find a violation ( Kacper Nowakowski v. Poland, 2017, § 95).", + "pre_text": "In cases of domestic violence, the Court also holds States responsible for protecting victims, particularly when the risks of violence are known by State officers and when officers fail to enforce measures designed to protect victims of violence ( Levchuk v. Ukraine, 2020; Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, 2008; A v. Croatia, 2010; Hajduová v. Slovakia, 2010; Kalucza v. Hungary, 2012; B. v. Moldova, 2013). The State also has a positive responsibility to protect children from witnessing domestic violence in their homes ( Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013). The Court will also apply its child custody and care jurisprudence (see below), with particular deference to removal decisions based on patterns of domestic violence in the home ( Y.C. v. the United Kingdom, 2012). In Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, the Court emphasised the need to comprehensively address the phenomenon of domestic violence in all its forms. In examining the applicant's ' allegations of cyberbullying and her request to have the family computer searched, it found that the national authorities had been overly formalistic in dismissing any connection with the domestic violence which she had already reported to them. The applicant had been obliged to submit a new complaint alleging a breach of the confidentiality of her correspondence. In dealing with it separately, the authorities had failed to take into consideration the various forms that domestic violence could take. The case of Volodina v. Russia (no. 2), 2021, concerned the applicant's complaint that the authorities had failed to protect her against repeated cyberviolence by her partner, who had created fake profiles in her name, had published her intimate photos, had tracked her movements with the use of a GPSdevice, and had sent her death threats via social media. The Court found, in particular, that even though they had the legal tools to prosecute the applicant's partner, the authorities had not conducted an effective investigation and had at no point envisaged taking appropriate measures to protect her. They had thus failed in their obligation to protect her against serious abuse.\n\nThe Court has found that the failure to disclose relevant documents to parents during the procedures instituted by the authorities in placing and maintaining a child in care meant that the decision-makingprocess determining the custody and access arrangements did not afford the requisite protection of the parents'interests as safeguarded by Article 8 ( T.P. and K.M. v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 73). The refusal to order an independent psychological report and the absence of a hearing before a regional court insufficiently involved the applicant in the decision-making process regarding his parental access and thereby violated the applicant's rights under Article 8 ( Elsholz v. Germany [GC], 2000, § 53). In Petrov and X v. Russia, 2018, there was an insufficient examination of a father's application for a residence order and no relevant and sufficient reasons were adduced for a decision to make the residence order in favour of the child's mother, in violation of Article 8 (see §§ 105-114 and the review of the case-law therein). In Bierski v. Poland, 2022, the Court found the respondent State to be in breach of its positive obligation under Article 8 to take measures aimed at re-establishing contact between the applicant and his son, who had been declared incapacitated. Once the applicant's son had turned eighteen, his mother was appointed as a guardian and refused to allow the applicant's contact to continue, and the applicant had no standing before the domestic courts to protect his family life with his son (§§ 46-54).\n\nStates must also provide measures to ensure that custody determinations and parental rights are enforced ( Raw and Others v. France, 2013; Vorozhba v. Russia, 2014, § 97; Malec v. Poland, 2016, § 78). This may, if necessary, include investigation into the whereabouts of the child whose location has been hidden by the other parent ( Hromadka and Hromadkova v. Russia, 2014, § 168). The Court also found that in placing reliance on a series of automatic and stereotyped measures in order to secure the exercise of the father's contact rights in respect of his child, the domestic courts had not taken the appropriate measures to establish a meaningful relationship between the applicant and his child and to make the full exercise of his contact rights possible ( Giorgioni v. Italy, 2016, §§ 75-77; Macready v. the Czech Republic, 2010, § 66; Bondavalli v. Italy, 2015, §§ 81-84). Likewise, a violation was found where no new independent psychiatric evidence concerning the applicant had been taken for around 10 years ( Cincimino v. Italy, 2016, §§ 73-75). Another violation was found in the case where, over seven years, the applicant was unable to exercise his contact rights under the conditions set by the courts, owing to the opposition of the child's mother and the lack of appropriate measures taken by the domestic courts ( Strumia v. Italy, 2016, §§ 122-125). The role of the domestic courts is thus to ascertain what steps can be taken to overcome existing barriers and to facilitate contact between the child and the noncustodial parent; for example, the fact that the domestic courts had failed to consider any means that would have assisted an applicant in overcoming the barriers arising from his disability (deafness with communication by sign language, while his son was also deaf but could communicate orally) led the Court to find a violation ( Kacper Nowakowski v. Poland, 2017, § 95).", + "post_text": "In cases of domestic violence, the Court also holds States responsible for protecting victims, particularly when the risks of violence are known by State officers and when officers fail to enforce measures designed to protect victims of violence ( Levchuk v. Ukraine, 2020; Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, 2008; A v. Croatia, 2010; Hajduová v. Slovakia, 2010; Kalucza v. Hungary, 2012; B. v. Moldova, 2013). The State also has a positive responsibility to protect children from witnessing domestic violence in their homes ( Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013). The Court will also apply its child custody and care jurisprudence (see below), with particular deference to removal decisions based on patterns of domestic violence in the home ( Y.C. v. the United Kingdom, 2012; Luca v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023). In Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, the Court emphasised the need to comprehensively address the phenomenon of domestic violence in all its forms. In examining the applicant's' allegations of cyberbullying and her request to have the family computer searched, it found that the national authorities had been overly formalistic in dismissing any connection with the domestic violence which she had already reported to them. The applicant had been obliged to submit a new complaint alleging a breach of the confidentiality of her correspondence. In dealing with it separately, the authorities had failed to take into consideration the various forms that domestic violence could take. The case of Volodina v. Russia (no. 2), 2021, concerned the applicant's complaint that the authorities had failed to protect her against repeated cyberviolence by her partner, who had created fake profiles in her name, had published her intimate photos, had tracked her movements with the use of a GPSdevice, and had sent her death threats via social media. The Court found, in particular, that even though they had the legal tools to prosecute the applicant's partner, the authorities had not conducted an effective investigation and had at no point envisaged taking appropriate measures to protect her. They had thus failed in their obligation to protect her against serious abuse.\n\nThe Court has found that the failure to disclose relevant documents to parents during the procedures instituted by the authorities in placing and maintaining a child in care meant that the decision-making process determining the custody and access arrangements did not afford the requisite protection of the parents' interests as safeguarded by Article 8 ( T.P. and K.M. v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 73). The refusal to order an independent psychological report and the absence of a hearing before a regional court insufficiently involved the applicant in the decision-making process Elsholz regarding his parental access and thereby violated the applicant's rights under Article 8 ( v. Germany [GC], 2000, § 53). In Petrov and X v. Russia, 2018, there was an insufficient examination of a father's application for a residence order and no relevant and sufficient reasons were adduced for a decision to make the residence order in favour of the child's mother, in violation of Article 8 (see §§ 105-114 and the review of the case-law therein). In Bierski v. Poland, 2022, the Court found the respondent State to be in breach of its positive obligation under Article 8 to take measures aimed at re-establishing contact between the applicant and his son, who had been declared incapacitated. Once the applicant's son had turned eighteen, his mother was appointed as a guardian and refused to allow the applicant's contact to continue, and the applicant had no standing before the domestic courts to protect his family life with his son (§§ 46-54). The court has also found that the failure of the domestic authorities to take into account incidents of domestic violence in the determination of child contact rights and, consequently, their failure to take prompt measures to support the applicant, victim of domestic violence, in maintaining contact with her children, breached their Article 8 obligations ( Luca v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 90-95).\n\nStates must also provide measures to ensure that custody determinations and parental rights Raw and Others v. France Vorozhba v. Russia Malec v. Poland are enforced (, 2013;, 2014, § 97;, 2016, § 78). This may, if necessary, include investigation into the whereabouts of the child whose location has been hidden by the other parent ( Hromadka and Hromadkova v. Russia, 2014, § 168). The Court also found that in placing reliance on a series of automatic and stereotyped measures in order to secure the exercise of the father's contact rights in respect of his child, the domestic courts had not taken the appropriate measures to establish a meaningful relationship between the applicant and his child and to make the full exercise of his contact rights possible ( Giorgioni v. Italy, 2016, §§ 75-77; Macready v. the Czech Republic, 2010, § 66; Bondavalli v. Italy, 2015, §§ 81-84). Likewise, a violation was found where no new independent psychiatric evidence concerning the applicant had been taken for around 10 years ( Cincimino v. Italy, 2016, §§ 73-75). Another violation was found in the case where, over seven years, the applicant was unable to exercise his contact rights under the conditions set by the courts, owing to the opposition of the child's mother and the lack of appropriate measures taken by the domestic courts ( Strumia v. Italy, 2016, §§ 122-125; see also Luca v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 90-94). The role of the domestic courts is thus to ascertain what steps can be taken to overcome existing barriers and to facilitate contact between the child and the noncustodial parent; for example, the fact that the domestic courts had failed to consider any means that would have assisted an applicant in overcoming the barriers arising from his disability (deafness with communication by sign language, while his son was also deaf but could communicate orally) led the Court to find a violation ( Kacper Nowakowski v. Poland, 2017, § 95).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217085228/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240618070506/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -21161,6 +22408,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:40119/21", "case_name": "M.L. v. Poland", @@ -21178,7 +22427,7 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_updated|citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.1|a:101|b:105|II.B.2|a:132|b:136|II.B.2|a:133|b:137", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "In sum, there is a general acknowledgment in the Court's case-law under Article 8 of the importance of privacy and the values to which it relates (see, for instance, Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, § 95). These values include, among others, well-being and dignity ( Hudorovič and Others v. Slovenia, 2020, §§ 112-116 on living conditions; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, § 117 on psychological dignity), health issues/medical treatment ( Y.P. v. Russia, 2022, §§ 42, 50), personality development ( Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], 2012, § 95) or the right to self-determination ( Pretty v. the United Kingdom, 2002, § 61), physical ( J.L. v. Italy, 2021, § 118), physical and psychological integrity ( Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2021, § 261; Söderman v. Sweden, [GC], § 80; Paketova and Others v. Bulgaria, 2022, § 154), personal identity, of which gender identity was one component ( Y v. France, 2023, §§ 47, 75), relations with other human beings ( Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 159, Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France [GC], 2015, § 83), and the right to respect for the decisions both to have and not to have a child ( A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], 2010, § 212); aspects of social identity ( Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, § 53, including the emotional bonds created and developed between an adult and a child in situations other than the classic situations of kinship, Jessica Marchi v. Italy, 2021, § 62), the protection of personal data 23 ( M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2018, § 87; Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, § 31; Drelon v. France, 2022, § 79; Florindo de Almeida Vasconcelos Gramaxo v. Portugal, 2022, §§ 95-96) and a person's image ( Reklos and Davourlis v. Greece, 2009, § 38). It also covers personal information which individuals can legitimately expect should not be published without their consent ( M.P. v. Portugal, 2021, §§ 33-34) and may extend to certain situations after death ( Polat v. Austria, 2021, § 48 and the references therein).\n\nThe Court has found that the prohibition of abortion when sought for reasons of health and/or wellbeing falls within the scope of the right to respect for one's private life and accordingly within Article 8 ( A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], 2010, §§ 214 and 245). In particular, the Court held in this context that the State's obligations include both the provision of a regulatory framework of adjudication and enforcement machinery protecting individuals'rights, and the implementation, where appropriate, of specific measures ( ibid., § 245; Tysiąc v. Poland, 2007, § 110; R.R. v. Poland, 2011, § 184). Indeed, once the State, acting within its limits of appreciation, adopts statutory regulations allowing abortion in some situations, the legal framework derived for this purpose should be shaped in a coherent manner which allows the different legitimate interests involved to be taken into account adequately and in accordance with the obligations deriving from the Convention ( A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], 2010, § 249; R. R. v. Poland, § 187; P. and S. v. Poland, 2012, § 99; T ysiąc v. Poland, 2007, § 116).\n\nIn P. and S. v. Poland, 2012, the Court reiterated that the notion of private life within the meaning of Article 8 applies both to decisions to become and not to become a parent (see also Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2007, § 71; R.R. v. Poland, 2011, § 180; Dickson v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2007, § 66; Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 163 and 215). In fact, the concept of \"private life\" does not exclude the emotional bonds created and developed between an adult and a child in situations other than the classic situations of kinship. This type of bond also pertains to individuals'life and social identity. In certain cases involving a relationship between adults and a child where there are no biological or legal ties the facts may nonetheless fall within the scope of \"private life\" ( Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 161).", + "pre_text": "In sum, there is a general acknowledgment in the Court's case-law under Article 8 of the importance of privacy and the values to which it relates (see, for instance, Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, § 95). These values include, among others, well-being and dignity ( Hudorovič and Others v. Slovenia, 2020, §§ 112-116 on living conditions; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, § 117 on psychological dignity), health issues/medical treatment ( Y.P. v. Russia, 2022, §§ 42, 50), personality development ( Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], 2012, § 95) or the right to self-determination ( Pretty v. the United Kingdom, 2002, § 61), physical ( J.L. v. Italy, 2021, § 118), physical and psychological integrity ( Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2021, § 261; Söderman v. Sweden, [GC], § 80; Paketova and Others v. Bulgaria, 2022, § 154), personal identity, of which gender identity was one component ( Y v. France, 2023, §§ 47, 75), relations with other human beings ( Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 159, Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France [GC], 2015, § 83), and the right to respect for the decisions both to have and not to have a child ( A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], 2010, § 212); aspects of social identity ( Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, § 53, including the emotional bonds created and developed between an adult and a child in situations other than the classic situations of kinship, Jessica Marchi v. Italy, 2021, § 62), the protection of personal data 23 ( M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2018, § 87; Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, § 31; Drelon v. France, 2022, § 79; Florindo de Almeida Vasconcelos Gramaxo v. Portugal, 2022, §§ 95-96) and a person's image ( Reklos and Davourlis v. Greece, 2009, § 38). It also covers personal information which individuals can legitimately expect should not be published without their consent ( M.P. v. Portugal, 2021, §§ 33-34) and may extend to certain situations after death ( Polat v. Austria, 2021, § 48 and the references therein).\n\nThe Court has found that the prohibition of abortion when sought for reasons of health and/or wellbeing falls within the scope of the right to respect for one's private life and accordingly within Article 8 ( A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], 2010, §§ 214 and 245). In particular, the Court held in this context that the State's obligations include both the provision of a regulatory framework of adjudication and enforcement machinery protecting individuals'rights, and the implementation, where appropriate, of specific measures ( ibid., § 245; Tysiąc v. Poland, 2007, § 110; R.R. v. Poland, 2011, § 184). Indeed, once the State, acting within its limits of appreciation, adopts statutory regulations allowing abortion in some situations, the legal framework derived for this purpose should be shaped in a coherent manner which allows the different legitimate interests involved to be taken into account adequately and in accordance with the obligations deriving from the Convention ( A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], 2010, § 249; R. R. v. Poland, § 187; P. and S. v. Poland, 2012, § 99; Tysiąc v. Poland, 2007, § 116).\n\nIn P. and S. v. Poland, 2012, the Court reiterated that the notion of private life within the meaning of Article 8 applies both to decisions to become and not to become a parent (see also Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2007, § 71; R.R. v. Poland, 2011, § 180; Dickson v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2007, § 66; Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 163 and 215). In fact, the concept of \"private life\" does not exclude the emotional bonds created and developed between an adult and a child in situations other than the classic situations of kinship. This type of bond also pertains to individuals'life and social identity. In certain cases involving a relationship between adults and a child where there are no biological or legal ties the facts may nonetheless fall within the scope of \"private life\" ( Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 161).", "post_text": "In sum, there is a general acknowledgment in the Court's case-law under Article 8 of the importance of privacy and the values to which it relates (see, for instance, Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, § 95). These values include, among others, well-being and dignity ( Hudorovič and Others v. Slovenia Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 112-116 on living conditions;, 2020, § 117 on psychological dignity), health issues/medical treatment ( Y.P. v. Russia, 2022, §§ 42, 50), personality development ( Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], 2012, § 95) or the right to self-determination Pretty v. the United Kingdom J.L. v. Italy (, 2002, § 61), physical (, 2021, § 118), physical and psychological integrity ( Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2021, § 261; Söderman v. Sweden, [GC], § 80; Paketova and Others v. Bulgaria, 2022, § 154), personal identity, of which gender identity was one component ( Y v. France, 2023, §§ 47, 75), relations with other human beings Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France ( [GC], 2017, § 159, [GC], 2015, § 83), and the right to respect for the decisions both to have and not to have a child ( A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], 2010, § 212; M.L. v. Poland, 2023, § 91); aspects of social identity ( Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, § 53, including the emotional bonds created and developed between an adult and a child in situations other than the classic situations of kinship, Jessica Marchi v. Italy, 2021, § 62), the protection of personal data 23 ( M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2018, § 87; Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, § 31; Drelon v. France, 2022, § 79; Florindo de Almeida Vasconcelos Gramaxo v. Portugal, 2022, §§ 95-96) Reklos and Davourlis v. Greece, and a person's image ( 2009, § 38). It also covers personal information which individuals can legitimately expect should not be published without their consent ( M.P. v. Portugal, 2021, §§ 33-34) and may extend to certain situations after death ( Polat v. Austria, 2021, § 48 and the references therein).\n\nThe Court has found that the prohibition of abortion when sought for reasons of health and/or well-being falls within the scope of the right to respect for one's private life and accordingly within Article 8 ( A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], 2010, §§ 214 and 245; M.L. v. Poland, 2023, §§ 93-94). In particular, the Court held in this context that the State's obligations include both the provision of a regulatory framework of adjudication and enforcement machinery protecting individuals' rights, and the implementation, where appropriate, of specific measures ( A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], 2010, § 245; Tysiąc v. Poland, 2007, § 110; R.R. v. Poland, 2011, § 184). Indeed, once the State, acting within its limits of appreciation, adopts statutory regulations allowing abortion in some situations, the legal framework derived for this purpose should be shaped in a coherent manner which allows the different legitimate interests involved to be taken into account adequately and in accordance with the obligations deriving from the Convention ( A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], 2010, § 249; R. R. v. Poland, § 187; P. and S. v. Poland Tysiąc v. Poland, 2012, § 99;, 2007, § 116).\n\nIn P. and S. v. Poland, 2012, the Court reiterated that the notion of private life within the meaning of Article 8 applies both to decisions to become and not to become a parent (see also Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2007, § 71; R.R. v. Poland, 2011, § 180; Dickson v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2007, § 66; Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 163 and 215; M.L. v. Poland, 2023, § 91). In fact, the concept of \"private life\" does not exclude the emotional bonds created and developed between an adult and a child in situations other than the classic situations of kinship. This type of bond also pertains to individuals' life and social identity. In certain cases involving a relationship between adults and a child where there are no biological or legal ties the facts may nonetheless fall within the scope of \"private life\" ( Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 161).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217085228/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240618070506/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", @@ -21194,6 +22443,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:62020/14", "case_name": "Moldovan v. Ukraine*", @@ -21212,7 +22463,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.1|a:None|b:92|II.D.1|a:None|b:284|III.D.6|a:437|b:452", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match|citation_field_name_match", "pre_text": "\" Family life \" does not include only social, moral or cultural relations; it also comprises interests of a material kind ( Belli and Arquier-Martinez v. Switzerland, 2018, § 59; Di Trizio v. Switzerland, 2016, § 60), as is shown by, among other things, maintenance obligations and the position occupied in the domestic legal systems of the majority of the Contracting States by the institution of the reserved portion of an estate (in French, \"réserve héréditaire\"). The Court has thus accepted that the right of succession between children and parents, and between grandchildren and grandparents, is so closely related to family life that it comes within the ambit of Article 8 ( Marckx v. Belgium, 1979, § 52; Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra, 2004, § 26). According to Şerife Yiğit v. Turkey [GC], 2010, questions of inheritance and voluntary dispositions between near relatives appear to be intimately connected with family life (§ 95) (see also Makarčeva v. Lithuania, 2021, § 58). Article 8 does not, however, require that a child should be entitled to be recognised as the heir of a deceased person for inheritance purposes ( Haas v. the Netherlands, 2004, § 43).", - "post_text": "in addition, the right of a child born out of wedlock to determine the legal relationship between him or her and his or her natural parent, even if the latter has died, falls within the scope of concept Mikulić v. Croatia Moldovan v. Ukraine* of \"private life\" (, 2002, § 53;, 2024, §§ 32 and 35).\n\nThe Court has stated on a number of occasions that DNA testing to establish paternity now constitutes a simple and very reliable method and that \"its probative value substantially outweighs any other evidence presented by the parties to prove or disprove the fact of an intimate relationship\" ( Moldovan v. Ukraine, 2024, § 47). Whilst it is not compulsory for States to DNA test alleged fathers, the legal system must provide alternative means enabling an independent authority to speedily determine a paternity claim. For example in Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 52-55, the applicant was born out of an extramarital relationship and complained that the Croatian judicial system had been inefficient in determining the issue of paternity, leaving her uncertain as to her personal identity. In that case the Court held that the inefficiency of the domestic courts had left the applicant in a state of prolonged uncertainty as to her personal identity. The Croatian authorities had therefore failed to secure to the applicant the \"respect\" for her private life to which she was entitled under the ibid. Moldovan v. Ukraine Convention (, § 68). Likewise, in, 2024, §§ 46, 52-53, the applicant was unable to have the paternity of his biological father recognised by the national courts despite the fact that the DNA test had confirmed parentage. The domestic courts refused to consider the DNA test results as conclusive evidence, with reference to the then Family Code of 1969 which made proof of cohabitation indispensable for the recognition of paternity. The Court observed that the effects of such an approach were comparable with those of inflexible time-limits or other procedural limitations which made it impossible to establish or challenge paternity, in particular using new testing methods. It concluded that that approach of the domestic courts, combined with their failure to deal with the DNA evidence with sufficient thoroughness, amounted to a breach of their positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention.\n\n\"Family life\" does not include only social, moral or cultural relations; it also comprises interests of a material kind ( Belli and Arquier - Martinez v. Switzerland, 2018, § 59; Di Trizio v. Switzerland, 2016, § 60), as is shown by, among other things, maintenance obligations and the position occupied in the domestic legal systems of the majority of the Contracting States by the institution of the reserved portion of an estate (in French, \"réserve héréditaire\"). The Court has thus accepted that the right of succession between children and parents, and between grandchildren and grandparents, is so closely related to family life that it comes within the ambit of Article 8 ( Marckx v. Belgium, 1979, § 52; Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra, 2004, § 26; Colombier v. France, 2024, § 35). According to Şerife Yiğit v. Turkey [GC], 2010, questions of inheritance and voluntary dispositions between near relatives Makarčeva v. Lithuania appear to be intimately connected with family life (§ 95) (see also, 2021, § 58). Article 8 does not, however, require that a child should be entitled to be recognised as the heir of a deceased person for inheritance purposes ( Haas v. the Netherlands, 2004, § 43). Conversely, where the applicant, who had sought to have the paternity of his deceased biological father recognised, had claimed before the domestic courts that he wished to inherit from his father but also sought to show that the deceased had maintained relations with him and his mother, the Court considered that the right claimed by the applicant disclosed sufficient relevant elements to fall within the scope of \"private Moldovan v. Ukraine life\" (, 2024, § 35).", + "post_text": "in addition, the right of a child born out of wedlock to determine the legal relationship between him or her and his or her natural parent, even if the latter has died, falls within the scope of concept Mikulić v. Croatia Moldovan v. Ukraine* of \"private life\" (, 2002, § 53;, 2024, §§ 32 and 35).\n\nThe Court has stated on a number of occasions that DNAtesting to establish paternity now constitutes a simple and very reliable method and that \"its probative value substantially outweighs any other evidence presented by the parties to prove or disprove the fact of an intimate relationship\" ( Moldovan v. Ukraine, 2024, § 47). Whilst it is not compulsory for States to DNAtest alleged fathers, the legal system must provide alternative means enabling an independent authority to speedily determine a paternity claim. For example in Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 52-55, the applicant was born out of an extramarital relationship and complained that the Croatian judicial system had been inefficient in determining the issue of paternity, leaving her uncertain as to her personal identity. In that case the Court held that the inefficiency of the domestic courts had left the applicant in a state of prolonged uncertainty as to her personal identity. The Croatian authorities had therefore failed to secure to the applicant the \"respect\" for her private life to which she was entitled under the ibid. Moldovan v. Ukraine Convention (, § 68). Likewise, in, 2024, §§ 46, 52-53, the applicant was unable to have the paternity of his biological father recognised by the national courts despite the fact that the DNAtest had confirmed parentage. The domestic courts refused to consider the DNAtest results as conclusive evidence, with reference to the then Family Code of 1969 which made proof of cohabitation indispensable for the recognition of paternity. The Court observed that the effects of such an approach were comparable with those of inflexible time-limits or other procedural limitations which made it impossible to establish or challenge paternity, in particular using new testing methods. It concluded that that approach of the domestic courts, combined with their failure to deal with the DNAevidence with sufficient thoroughness, amounted to a breach of their positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention.\n\n\"Family life\" does not include only social, moral or cultural relations; it also comprises interests of a material kind ( Belli and Arquier - Martinez v. Switzerland, 2018, § 59; Di Trizio v. Switzerland, 2016, § 60), as is shown by, among other things, maintenance obligations and the position occupied in the domestic legal systems of the majority of the Contracting States by the institution of the reserved portion of an estate (in French, \"réserve héréditaire\"). The Court has thus accepted that the right of succession between children and parents, and between grandchildren and grandparents, is so closely related to family life that it comes within the ambit of Article 8 ( Marckx v. Belgium, 1979, § 52; Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra, 2004, § 26; Colombier v. France, 2024, § 35). According to Şerife Yiğit v. Turkey [GC], 2010, questions of inheritance and voluntary dispositions between near relatives Makarčeva v. Lithuania appear to be intimately connected with family life (§ 95) (see also, 2021, § 58). Article 8 does not, however, require that a child should be entitled to be recognised as the heir of a deceased person for inheritance purposes ( Haas v. the Netherlands, 2004, § 43). Conversely, where the applicant, who had sought to have the paternity of his deceased biological father recognised, had claimed before the domestic courts that he wished to inherit from his father but also sought to show that the deceased had maintained relations with him and his mother, the Court considered that the right claimed by the applicant disclosed sufficient relevant elements to fall within the scope of \"private Moldovan v. Ukraine life\" (, 2024, § 35).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217085228/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240618070506/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -21227,6 +22478,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:49066/12", "case_name": "Nafornita v. The Republic of Moldova", @@ -21260,6 +22513,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:54366/08", "case_name": "Naltakyan v. Russia", @@ -21277,8 +22532,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added|paragraph_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.A|a:319|b:329|III.D.c|a:None|b:373", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "A child born of a marital relationship is ipso jure part of that \"family\" unit from the moment and by the very fact of his or her birth ( Berrehab v. the Netherlands, 1988, § 21). Thus, there exists between the child and its parents a bond amounting to family life. The existence or non-existence of \"family life\" within the meaning of Article 8 is a question of fact depending upon the real existence in practice of close personal ties, for instance the demonstrable interest and commitment by the father to the child both before and after birth ( L. v. the Netherlands, 2004, § 36).", - "post_text": "A child born of a marital relationship is ipso jure part of that \"family\" unit from the moment and by the very fact of his or her birth ( Berrehab v. the Netherlands, 1988, § 21; Naltakyan v. Russia, 2021, §§ 157-58). Thus, there exists between the child and its parents a bond amounting to family life. The existence or non-existence of \"family life\" within the meaning of Article 8 is a question of fact depending upon the real existence in practice of close personal ties, for instance the demonstrable interest and commitment by the father to the child both before and after birth ( L. v. the Netherlands, 2004, § 36).\n\nIn two cases where natural fathers had unsuccessfully attempted to have adoption of their children by third persons - which had been ordered for reasons outside of those fathers' control and without their knowledge, let alone consent - annulled, the Court reproached the domestic authorities' lack of diligence, and, in particular, failure to establish all relevant circumstances before allowing the adoption ( Uzbyakov v. Russia, 2020, §§ 116-18; I.V. v. Estonia, 2023, §§ 88, 103-106) as well as the excessive formalism in the subsequent examination of those fathers' requests for annulment of the adoption orders. In the latter respect, the Court observed that the domestic courts' reliance on the absence under domestic law of formal grounds for revoking the adoption orders could not be regarded as a \"sufficient\" consideration in seeking to strike a fair balance between the competing interests at stake ( Uzbyakov v. Russia, 2020, §§ 122-23, 126; I.V. v. Estonia, 2023, §§ 114-15; see also as regards the failure of the domestic courts to perform an in-depth examination of all relevant facts in a similar Naltakyan v. Russia context,, 2021, §§ 185-92).", + "pre_text": "Achild born of a marital relationship is ipso jure part of that \"family\" unit from the moment and by the very fact of his or her birth ( Berrehab v. the Netherlands, 1988, § 21). Thus, there exists between the child and its parents a bond amounting to family life. The existence or non-existence of \"family life\" within the meaning of Article 8 is a question of fact depending upon the real existence in practice of close personal ties, for instance the demonstrable interest and commitment by the father to the child both before and after birth ( L. v. the Netherlands, 2004, § 36).", + "post_text": "Achild born of a marital relationship is ipso jure part of that \"family\" unit from the moment and by the very fact of his or her birth ( Berrehab v. the Netherlands, 1988, § 21; Naltakyan v. Russia, 2021, §§ 157-58). Thus, there exists between the child and its parents a bond amounting to family life. The existence or non-existence of \"family life\" within the meaning of Article 8 is a question of fact depending upon the real existence in practice of close personal ties, for instance the demonstrable interest and commitment by the father to the child both before and after birth ( L. v. the Netherlands, 2004, § 36).\n\nIn two cases where natural fathers had unsuccessfully attempted to have adoption of their children by third persons - which had been ordered for reasons outside of those fathers' control and without their knowledge, let alone consent - annulled, the Court reproached the domestic authorities' lack of diligence, and, in particular, failure to establish all relevant circumstances before allowing the adoption ( Uzbyakov v. Russia, 2020, §§ 116-18; I.V. v. Estonia, 2023, §§ 88, 103-106) as well as the excessive formalism in the subsequent examination of those fathers' requests for annulment of the adoption orders. In the latter respect, the Court observed that the domestic courts' reliance on the absence under domestic law of formal grounds for revoking the adoption orders could not be regarded as a \"sufficient\" consideration in seeking to strike a fair balance between the competing interests at stake ( Uzbyakov v. Russia, 2020, §§ 122-23, 126; I.V. v. Estonia, 2023, §§ 114-15; see also as regards the failure of the domestic courts to perform an in-depth examination of all relevant facts in a similar Naltakyan v. Russia context,, 2021, §§ 185-92).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217085228/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240618070506/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -21293,6 +22548,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:25226/18", "case_name": "Pająk and Others v. Poland", @@ -21326,6 +22583,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:66292/14", "case_name": "Pengezov v. Bulgaria", @@ -21359,6 +22618,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:33696/19", "case_name": "Podchasov v. Russia", @@ -21376,8 +22637,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added|section_moved_modified|paragraph_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.C|a:23|b:24|II.C|a:190|b:196|II.C.6|a:None|b:239|II.C.6|a:None|b:240|II.C.7|a:645|b:248", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "A finding that the measure in question was not \"in accordance with the law\" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a \"legitimate aim\" or was \"necessary in a democratic society\" ( M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be \"in accordance with the law\", as a result of a n unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 ( Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been \" neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society \" (§§ 62-63). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be \"in accordance with the law\" was so closely linked to the \"necessary in a democratic society\" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78).\n\nAs regards online activities, information associated with specific dynamic IP addresses facilitating the identification of the author of such activities, constitutes, in principle, personal data which are not accessible to the public. The use of such data may therefore fall within the scope of Article 8 ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 107-108). In that regard, the fact that the applicant had not concealed his dynamic IP address had not been a decisive factor for assessing whether his expectation of privacy had been reasonable (§ 116). Conversely, the anonymity linked to online activities is an important factor which must be taken into account (§ 117).\n\nIt should be noted that in cases where the legislation permitting secret surveillance is itself contested, the lawfulness of the interference is closely related to the question whether the \"necessity\" test has been complied with, and it is therefore appropriate to address jointly the \"in accordance with the law\" and \"necessity\" requirements ( Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84). The \"quality of law\" in this sense implies that the domestic law must not only be accessible and foreseeable in its application, it must also ensure that secret surveillance measures are applied only when \"necessary in a democratic society\", in particular by providing for adequate and effective safeguards and guarantees against abuse ( Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 236). In the case cited, it was not disputed that the interceptions of mobile telephone communications had a basis in domestic law and pursued legitimate aims for the purposes of Article 8 § 2, namely the protection of national security and public safety, the prevention of crime and the protection of the economic wellbeing of the country. However, that is not enough. It is necessary also to assess the accessibility of the domestic law, the scope and duration of the secret surveillance measures, the procedures to be followed for storing, accessing, examining, using, communicating and destroying the intercepted data, the authorisation procedures, the arrangements for supervising the implementation of the measures, and any notification mechanisms and the remedies provided for by national law ( ibid., §§ 238-301), but also to verify, in so far as the available information permits, whether any shortcomings have an impact on the actual operation of the system of secret surveillance which exists ( Association for European Integration and Human Rights, and Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 92; see also, as regards bulk regimes, Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden [GC], 2022, § 274 and Big Brother Watch and Others v. The United Kingdom [GC], 2021, § 360).", - "post_text": "A finding that the measure in question was not \"in accordance with the law\" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a \"legitimate aim\" or was \"necessary in a democratic society\" ( M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be \"in accordance with the law\", as a result of an unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 ( Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been \"neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society\" (§§ 62-63). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be \"in accordance with the law\" was so closely linked to the \"necessary in a democratic society\" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 66).\n\nUsers of telecommunications and Internet services must have a guarantee that their own privacy will be respected, although such a guarantee cannot be absolute and must yield on occasion to other legitimate imperatives, such as the prevention of disorder and crime or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others ( Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 65). In particular, as regards online activities, information associated with specific dynamic IP addresses facilitating the identification of the author of such activities, constitutes, in principle, personal data which are not accessible to the public. The use of such data may therefore fall within the scope of Article 8 ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 107-108). In that regard, the fact that the applicant had not concealed his dynamic IP address had not been a decisive factor for assessing whether his expectation of privacy had been reasonable (§ 116). Conversely, the anonymity linked to online activities is an important factor which must be taken into account (§ 117).\n\nThe mere existence of legislation which allows a system for the secret monitoring of communications entails a threat of surveillance for all those to whom the legislation may be applied Weber and Saravia v. Germany ( (dec.), 2006, § 78). While domestic legislatures and national authorities enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in which to assess what system of surveillance is required, the Contracting States do not enjoy unlimited discretion to subject persons within their jurisdiction to secret surveillance ( Zoltán Varga v. Slovakia, 2021, § 151). The Court has affirmed that the Contracting States may not, in the name of the struggle against espionage and terrorism, adopt whatever measures they deem appropriate; rather, whatever system of surveillance is adopted, there must be adequate and effective guarantees against abuse ( Weber and Saravia v. Germany (dec.), Podchasov v. Russia 2006, § 106; see also, 2024, § 62). Powers of secret surveillance of citizens are tolerable only in so far as strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic institutions ( Klass and Others v. Germany, 1978, § 42; Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, 2016, §§ 72-73). Such interference must be supported by relevant and sufficient reasons and must be proportionate to the legitimate aim or aims pursued ( Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others v. Sweden, 2006, § 88).\n\nThe Court found the recording of a conversation by a remote radio-transmitting device during a police covert operation without procedural safeguards to be a violation ( Bykov v. Russia [GC], 2009, Oleynik v. Russia §§ 81 and 83;, 2016, §§ 75-79). Similarly, the systematic collection and storing of data by security services on particular individuals constituted an interference with these persons' private lives, even if such data were collected in a public place ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 59; P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, §§ 57-59) or concerned exclusively the person's professional or public activities ( Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, §§ 65-67; Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44). The Court has also held that the use in criminal proceedings against an applicant, of recordings made by a co-accused at the registered office of the applicant's company, interfered with his rights under Article 8 ( Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, § 39-43). In the context of a collection, through a GPS device attached to a person's car, and storage of data concerning that person's whereabouts and movements Uzun v. Germany in the public sphere was also found to constitute an interference with private life (, 2010, §§ 51-53). A storage of Internet communications and related communications data required by law, even if carried out by private actors (Internet communications organisers), will be attributable to Podchasov v. Russia the relevant State and thus will amount to an interference (, 2024, § 51).\n\nTapping and other forms of interception of telephone conversations represent a serious interference with private life and correspondence (see, for instance Dragojević v. Croatia, 2015, §§ 94-98) and must accordingly be based on a law that is precise. It is essential to have clear, detailed rules on the subject, especially as the technology available for use is continually becoming more Kruslin v. France sophisticated (, 1990, § 33). When balancing the respondent State's interest in protecting its national security through secret surveillance measures against the seriousness of the interference with an applicant's right to respect for his or her private life, the national authorities enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in choosing the means for achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national security. However, there must be adequate and effective safeguards against abuse. The Court thus takes into account the circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope and duration of the possible measures, the grounds required for ordering them, the authorities competent to authorise, carry out and supervise them, and the kind of remedy provided by the national law ( Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 232; İrfan Güzel v. Turkey, 2017, § 85, Ekimdzhiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2022, §§ 418 and 419[f]; see also Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2021; Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden [GC], 2022; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, §§).", + "pre_text": "Afinding that the measure in question was not \"in accordance with the law\" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a \"legitimate aim\" or was \"necessary in a democratic society\" ( M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be \"in accordance with the law\", as a result of a n unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 ( Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been \" neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society \" (§§ 62-63). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be \"in accordance with the law\" was so closely linked to the \"necessary in a democratic society\" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78).\n\nAs regards online activities, information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses facilitating the identification of the author of such activities, constitutes, in principle, personal data which are not accessible to the public. The use of such data may therefore fall within the scope of Article 8 ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 107-108). In that regard, the fact that the applicant had not concealed his dynamic IPaddress had not been a decisive factor for assessing whether his expectation of privacy had been reasonable (§ 116). Conversely, the anonymity linked to online activities is an important factor which must be taken into account (§ 117).\n\nIt should be noted that in cases where the legislation permitting secret surveillance is itself contested, the lawfulness of the interference is closely related to the question whether the \"necessity\" test has been complied with, and it is therefore appropriate to address jointly the \"in accordance with the law\" and \"necessity\" requirements ( Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84). The \"quality of law\" in this sense implies that the domestic law must not only be accessible and foreseeable in its application, it must also ensure that secret surveillance measures are applied only when \"necessary in a democratic society\", in particular by providing for adequate and effective safeguards and guarantees against abuse ( Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 236). In the case cited, it was not disputed that the interceptions of mobile telephone communications had a basis in domestic law and pursued legitimate aims for the purposes of Article 8 § 2, namely the protection of national security and public safety, the prevention of crime and the protection of the economic wellbeing of the country. However, that is not enough. It is necessary also to assess the accessibility of the domestic law, the scope and duration of the secret surveillance measures, the procedures to be followed for storing, accessing, examining, using, communicating and destroying the intercepted data, the authorisation procedures, the arrangements for supervising the implementation of the measures, and any notification mechanisms and the remedies provided for by national law ( ibid., §§ 238-301), but also to verify, in so far as the available information permits, whether any shortcomings have an impact on the actual operation of the system of secret surveillance which exists ( Association for European Integration and Human Rights, and Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 92; see also, as regards bulk regimes, Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden [GC], 2022, § 274 and Big Brother Watch and Others v. The United Kingdom [GC], 2021, § 360).", + "post_text": "Afinding that the measure in question was not \"in accordance with the law\" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a \"legitimate aim\" or was \"necessary in a democratic society\" ( M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be \"in accordance with the law\", as a result of an unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 ( Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been \"neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society\" (§§ 62-63). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be \"in accordance with the law\" was so closely linked to the \"necessary in a democratic society\" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 66).\n\nUsers of telecommunications and Internet services must have a guarantee that their own privacy will be respected, although such a guarantee cannot be absolute and must yield on occasion to other legitimate imperatives, such as the prevention of disorder and crime or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others ( Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 65). In particular, as regards online activities, information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses facilitating the identification of the author of such activities, constitutes, in principle, personal data which are not accessible to the public. The use of such data may therefore fall within the scope of Article 8 ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 107-108). In that regard, the fact that the applicant had not concealed his dynamic IPaddress had not been a decisive factor for assessing whether his expectation of privacy had been reasonable (§ 116). Conversely, the anonymity linked to online activities is an important factor which must be taken into account (§ 117).\n\nThe mere existence of legislation which allows a system for the secret monitoring of communications entails a threat of surveillance for all those to whom the legislation may be applied Weber and Saravia v. Germany ( (dec.), 2006, § 78). While domestic legislatures and national authorities enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in which to assess what system of surveillance is required, the Contracting States do not enjoy unlimited discretion to subject persons within their jurisdiction to secret surveillance ( Zoltán Varga v. Slovakia, 2021, § 151). The Court has affirmed that the Contracting States may not, in the name of the struggle against espionage and terrorism, adopt whatever measures they deem appropriate; rather, whatever system of surveillance is adopted, there must be adequate and effective guarantees against abuse ( Weber and Saravia v. Germany (dec.), Podchasov v. Russia 2006, § 106; see also, 2024, § 62). Powers of secret surveillance of citizens are tolerable only in so far as strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic institutions ( Klass and Others v. Germany, 1978, § 42; Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, 2016, §§ 72-73). Such interference must be supported by relevant and sufficient reasons and must be proportionate to the legitimate aim or aims pursued ( Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others v. Sweden, 2006, § 88).\n\nThe Court found the recording of a conversation by a remote radio-transmitting device during a police covert operation without procedural safeguards to be a violation ( Bykov v. Russia [GC], 2009, Oleynik v. Russia §§ 81 and 83;, 2016, §§ 75-79). Similarly, the systematic collection and storing of data by security services on particular individuals constituted an interference with these persons' private lives, even if such data were collected in a public place ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 59; P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, §§ 57-59) or concerned exclusively the person's professional or public activities ( Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, §§ 65-67; Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44). The Court has also held that the use in criminal proceedings against an applicant, of recordings made by a co-accused at the registered office of the applicant's company, interfered with his rights under Article 8 ( Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, § 39-43). In the context of a collection, through a GPSdevice attached to a person's car, and storage of data concerning that person's whereabouts and movements Uzun v. Germany in the public sphere was also found to constitute an interference with private life (, 2010, §§ 51-53). Astorage of Internet communications and related communications data required by law, even if carried out by private actors (Internet communications organisers), will be attributable to Podchasov v. Russia the relevant State and thus will amount to an interference (, 2024, § 51).\n\nTapping and other forms of interception of telephone conversations represent a serious interference with private life and correspondence (see, for instance Dragojević v. Croatia, 2015, §§ 94-98) and must accordingly be based on a law that is precise. It is essential to have clear, detailed rules on the subject, especially as the technology available for use is continually becoming more Kruslin v. France sophisticated (, 1990, § 33). When balancing the respondent State's interest in protecting its national security through secret surveillance measures against the seriousness of the interference with an applicant's right to respect for his or her private life, the national authorities enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in choosing the means for achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national security. However, there must be adequate and effective safeguards against abuse. The Court thus takes into account the circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope and duration of the possible measures, the grounds required for ordering them, the authorities competent to authorise, carry out and supervise them, and the kind of remedy provided by the national law ( Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 232; İrfan Güzel v. Turkey, 2017, § 85, Ekimdzhiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2022, §§ 418 and 419[f]; see also Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2021; Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden [GC], 2022; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, §§).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217085228/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240618070506/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -21392,25 +22653,27 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", - "case_key": "apps:8165/03|70267/17", - "case_name": "Tığ v. Turkey (dec.)", - "application_numbers": "8165/03|70267/17", - "judgment_year": "2005", + "case_key": "apps:42541/18", + "case_name": "Tena Arregui v. Spain", + "application_numbers": "42541/18", + "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", - "citation_text": "Tığ v. Turkey (dec.), no. 8165/03, 24 May 2005 Ţîmpău v. Romania, no. 70267/17, 5 December 2023", - "hudoc_itemid": "001-69258", + "citation_text": "Tena Arregui v. Spain, no. 42541/18, 11 January 2024", + "hudoc_itemid": "001-229933", "hudoc_importance_level": "3", - "hudoc_doctype": "HFDEC", - "hudoc_docname": "TIĞ c. TURQUIE", + "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", + "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF TENA ARREGUI v. SPAIN", "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", - "linked_paragraph_count": 1, - "linked_sections": "II.D.5: Desired appearance", - "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.D.5|a:289|b:298", - "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "The Court has established that personal choices as to an individual's desired appearance, whether in public or in private, relate to the expression of his or her personality and thus fall within the notion of private life. This has included a haircut ( Popa v. Romania (dec.), 2013, §§ 32-33), denial of access to a university for wearing a beard ( Tığ v. Turkey (dec.), 2005), a ban on wearing clothing designed to conceal the face in public places for women wishing to wear a fullface veil for reasons related to their beliefs ( S.A.S. v. France [GC], 2014, §§ 106-107), and appearing naked in public places ( Gough v. the United Kingdom, 2014, §§ 182-184). However, it is important to note that in each of these cases, the Court found the restriction on personal appearance to be proportionate. The absolute prohibition on growing a beard in prison was considered a violation of Article 8 because that the Government had failed to demonstrate the existence of a pressing social need to justify an absolute prohibition ( Biržietis v. Lithuania, 2016, §§ 54 and 57-58).", - "post_text": "The Court has established that personal choices as to an individual's desired appearance, whether in public or in private, relate to the expression of his or her personality and thus fall within the notion of private life. This has included a haircut ( Popa v. Romania (dec.), 2013, §§ 32-33), denial of access to a university for wearing a beard ( Tığ v. Turkey (dec.), 2005), a ban on wearing clothing designed to conceal the face in public places for women wishing to wear a fullface veil for reasons related to their beliefs ( S.A.S. v. France [GC], 2014, §§ 106-107), and appearing naked in public places Gough v. the United Kingdom (, 2014, §§ 182-184). However, it is important to note that in each of these cases, the Court found the restriction on personal appearance to be proportionate. The absolute prohibition on growing a beard in prison was considered a violation of Article 8 because that the Government had failed to demonstrate the existence of a pressing social need to justify an absolute prohibition ( Biržietis v. Lithuania, 2016, §§ 54 and 57-58).", + "linked_paragraph_count": 2, + "linked_sections": "III.V.1: Scope of the concept of “correspondence”|III.V.2: Positive obligations", + "linked_change_types": "section_moved_modified", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.V.1|a:528|b:543|III.V.2|a:534|b:549", + "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "Technologies also come within the scope of Article 8, in particular data from a smart phone/lap top and/or the mirror image copy of it ( Saber v. Norway, 2020, § 48; Särgava v. Estonia, 2021), electronic messages (emails) ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 41; Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 72; for emails exchanged with correspondents on a casual dating site, see M.P. v. Portugal, 2021, § 34), Internet use ( Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 81 and Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, §§ 41-42), and data stored on computer servers ( Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria, 2007, § 45), including hard drives ( Petri Sallinen and Others v. Finland, 2005, § 71) and floppy disks ( Iliya Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2008, § 42).\n\nTo date, the Court has identified several positive obligations for States in connection with the right to respect for correspondence, for instance: ▪ the State's positive obligation when it comes to communications of a non-professional nature in the workplace ( Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 113 and 115-120). ▪ an obligation to prevent disclosure into the public domain of private conversations ( Craxi v. Italy (no 2), §§ 68-76; mutatis mutandis, M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022, § 57 ); ▪ an obligation to provide prisoners with the necessary materials to correspond with the Court in Strasbourg ( Cotleţ v. Romania, 2003, §§ 60-65; Gagiu v. Romania, 2009, §§ 91-92); ▪ an obligation to execute a Constitutional Court judgment ordering the destruction of audio cassettes containing recordings of telephone conversations between a lawyer and his client ( Chadimová v. the Czech Republic, 2006, § 146); ▪ an obligation to strike a fair balance between the right to respect for correspondence and the right to freedom of expression ( Benediktsdóttir v. Iceland (dec.), 2009); and ▪ an obligation to investigate the violation of the confidentiality of the applicant's correspondence in the context of domestic violence ( Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, where the applicant's former husband had improperly consulted her electronic accounts, including her Facebook account, and had made copies of her private conversations, documents and photographs). ▪ an obligation to protect the confidentiality of emails exchanged by the applicant on a dating website, produced without her consent by her ex-husband in civil proceedings regarding parental responsibility and divorce ( M.P. v. Portugal, 2021, § 44).", + "post_text": "Technologies also come within the scope of Article 8, in particular data from a smart phone/lap Saber v. Norway Särgava v. Estonia top and/or the mirror image copy of it (, 2020, § 48;, 2021), electronic messages (emails) ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 41; Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 72; Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 31; for emails exchanged with correspondents on a casual dating site, see M.P. v. Portugal, 2021, § 34), Internet use ( Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 81 and Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, §§ 41-42), and data stored on computer servers ( Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria, 2007, § 45), including hard drives ( Petri Sallinen and Others v. Finland, 2005, § 71) and floppy disks ( Iliya Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2008, § 42). Christie v. the\n\nTo date, the Court has identified several positive obligations for States in connection with the right to respect for correspondence, for instance:  the State's positive obligation when it comes to communications of a non-professional nature in the workplace ( Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 113 and 115-120);  an obligation to prevent disclosure into the public domain of private conversations ( Craxi v. Italy (no 2), §§ 68-76; mutatis mutandis, M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022, § 57 );  an obligation to provide prisoners with the necessary materials to correspond with the Court in Strasbourg ( Cotleţ v. Romania, 2003, §§ 60-65; Gagiu v. Romania, 2009, §§ 91-92);  an obligation to execute a Constitutional Court judgment ordering the destruction of audio cassettes containing recordings of telephone conversations between a lawyer and his client ( Chadimová v. the Czech Republic, 2006, § 146);  an obligation to strike a fair balance between the right to respect for correspondence and the right to freedom of expression ( Benediktsdóttir v. Iceland (dec.), 2009);  a positive obligation in the context of monitoring by a political party of emails of its members ( Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 35)  an obligation to investigate the violation of the confidentiality of the applicant's correspondence in the context of domestic violence ( Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, where the applicant's former husband had improperly consulted her electronic accounts, including her Facebook account, and had made copies of her private conversations, documents and photographs);  an obligation to protect the confidentiality of emails exchanged by the applicant on a dating website, produced without her consent by her ex-husband in civil proceedings regarding parental responsibility and divorce ( M.P. v. Portugal, 2021, § 44).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217085228/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240618070506/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -21425,25 +22688,27 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", - "case_key": "apps:42541/18", - "case_name": "Tena Arregui v. Spain", - "application_numbers": "42541/18", - "judgment_year": "2024", + "case_key": "apps:70267/17", + "case_name": "Ţîmpău v. Romania", + "application_numbers": "70267/17", + "judgment_year": "2023", "citation_change": "added", - "citation_text": "Tena Arregui v. Spain, no. 42541/18, 11 January 2024", - "hudoc_itemid": "001-229933", + "citation_text": "Ţîmpău v. Romania, no. 70267/17, 5 December 2023", + "hudoc_itemid": "001-229318", "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", - "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF TENA ARREGUI v. SPAIN", + "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF ŢÎMPĂU v. ROMANIA", "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", "linked_paragraph_count": 2, - "linked_sections": "III.V.1: Scope of the concept of “correspondence”|III.V.2: Positive obligations", - "linked_change_types": "section_moved_modified", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.V.1|a:528|b:543|III.V.2|a:534|b:549", + "linked_sections": "II.A.2: Professional and business activities|II.C.2: Protection of individual reputation; defamation", + "linked_change_types": "citation_updated|paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.2|a:106|b:110|II.C.2|a:None|b:221", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Technologies also come within the scope of Article 8, in particular data from a smart phone/lap top and/or the mirror image copy of it ( Saber v. Norway, 2020, § 48; Särgava v. Estonia, 2021), electronic messages (emails) ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 41; Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 72; for emails exchanged with correspondents on a casual dating site, see M.P. v. Portugal, 2021, § 34), Internet use ( Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 81 and Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, §§ 41-42), and data stored on computer servers ( Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria, 2007, § 45), including hard drives ( Petri Sallinen and Others v. Finland, 2005, § 71) and floppy disks ( Iliya Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2008, § 42).\n\nTo date, the Court has identified several positive obligations for States in connection with the right to respect for correspondence, for instance: ▪ the State's positive obligation when it comes to communications of a non-professional nature in the workplace ( Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 113 and 115-120). ▪ an obligation to prevent disclosure into the public domain of private conversations ( Craxi v. Italy (no 2), §§ 68-76; mutatis mutandis, M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022, § 57 ); ▪ an obligation to provide prisoners with the necessary materials to correspond with the Court in Strasbourg ( Cotleţ v. Romania, 2003, §§ 60-65; Gagiu v. Romania, 2009, §§ 91-92); ▪ an obligation to execute a Constitutional Court judgment ordering the destruction of audio cassettes containing recordings of telephone conversations between a lawyer and his client ( Chadimová v. the Czech Republic, 2006, § 146); ▪ an obligation to strike a fair balance between the right to respect for correspondence and the right to freedom of expression ( Benediktsdóttir v. Iceland (dec.), 2009); and ▪ an obligation to investigate the violation of the confidentiality of the applicant's correspondence in the context of domestic violence ( Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, where the applicant's former husband had improperly consulted her electronic accounts, including her Facebook account, and had made copies of her private conversations, documents and photographs). ▪ an obligation to protect the confidentiality of emails exchanged by the applicant on a dating website, produced without her consent by her ex-husband in civil proceedings regarding parental responsibility and divorce ( M.P. v. Portugal, 2021, § 44).", - "post_text": "Technologies also come within the scope of Article 8, in particular data from a smart phone/lap Saber v. Norway Särgava v. Estonia top and/or the mirror image copy of it (, 2020, § 48;, 2021), electronic messages (emails) ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 41; Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 72; Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 31; for emails exchanged with correspondents on a casual dating site, see M.P. v. Portugal, 2021, § 34), Internet use ( Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 81 and Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, §§ 41-42), and data stored on computer servers ( Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria, 2007, § 45), including hard drives ( Petri Sallinen and Others v. Finland, 2005, § 71) and floppy disks ( Iliya Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2008, § 42). Christie v. the\n\nTo date, the Court has identified several positive obligations for States in connection with the right to respect for correspondence, for instance:  the State's positive obligation when it comes to communications of a non-professional nature in the workplace ( Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 113 and 115-120);  an obligation to prevent disclosure into the public domain of private conversations ( Craxi v. Italy (no 2), §§ 68-76; mutatis mutandis, M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022, § 57 );  an obligation to provide prisoners with the necessary materials to correspond with the Court in Strasbourg ( Cotleţ v. Romania, 2003, §§ 60-65; Gagiu v. Romania, 2009, §§ 91-92);  an obligation to execute a Constitutional Court judgment ordering the destruction of audio cassettes containing recordings of telephone conversations between a lawyer and his client ( Chadimová v. the Czech Republic, 2006, § 146);  an obligation to strike a fair balance between the right to respect for correspondence and the right to freedom of expression ( Benediktsdóttir v. Iceland (dec.), 2009);  a positive obligation in the context of monitoring by a political party of emails of its members ( Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 35)  an obligation to investigate the violation of the confidentiality of the applicant's correspondence in the context of domestic violence ( Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, where the applicant's former husband had improperly consulted her electronic accounts, including her Facebook account, and had made copies of her private conversations, documents and photographs);  an obligation to protect the confidentiality of emails exchanged by the applicant on a dating website, produced without her consent by her ex-husband in civil proceedings regarding parental responsibility and divorce ( M.P. v. Portugal, 2021, § 44).", + "pre_text": "More recently, in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, the Court, recalling a number of relevant precedents (§§ 101, 104-105, 108 and 109), set out the principles by which to assess whether employment- related disputes fall within the scope of \"private life\" under Article 8 (§ § 115-117; see also J.B. and Others v. Hungary (dec.), 2018, §§ 127-129). The Court held that there are some typical aspects of private life which may be affected in such disputes by dismissal, demotion, non-admission to a profession or other similarly unfavourable measures. In this case, the applicant was dismissed from his post as the president of a court on the basis of a failure to perform his administrative duties (managerial skills) properly. Whilst he was dismissed as president, he remained a judge in the same court. The Court did not find Article 8 applicable in this case. This was because, according to the Court, the decision concerned only his managerial skills while his professional role as a judge was not touched upon. Further, the decision did not affect his future career as a judge and neither did the decision call into question the moral or ethical aspect of his personality and character. In summary, in this situation, the dismissal had limited negative effects on the applicant's private life and did not cross the \"threshold of seriousness\" for an issue to be raised under Article 8 ( Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, §§ 126-133; see also Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, §§ 83-92, Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2012, §§ 136-145 including on the pecuniary aspect, and Gražulevičiūtė v. Lithuania, 2021, §§ 101-110, in which the Court found that disciplinary proceedings did not reach the \"threshold of seriousness\" required to engage Article 8 ; see also in another context, Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021). Following Denisov, employment-related disputes will generally only engage Article 8 either where a person loses a job because of something he of she did in private life (reason-based approach) or when the loss of job impacts on private life (consequence-based approach) (§§ 115-117). Thereafter, the consequence-based approach was applied to the prospective employment context (the consequences of a decision for the applicant's employment prospects in the civil service, and more specifically on her chances of obtaining a post as a research assistant in a public university, see Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 55-62). The test was found to have been met in the case of Constitutional Court judges dismissed for \"breach of oath\", since their dismissal had a serious impact on their inner circle, given the ensuing pecuniary losses, and on their reputation, given that the grounds for the dismissal directly concerned their personal integrity and professional competence ( Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 86). It was also found to have been met in the case of a judge suspended for over two years for having undermined the authority of the court by investigating the independence of a first instance judge ( Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, §§ 228-237).", + "post_text": "More recently, in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, the Court, recalling a number of relevant precedents (§§ 101, 104-105, 108 and 109), set out the principles by which to assess whether employment-related disputes fall within the scope of \"private life\" under Article 8 (§§ 115-117; see also J.B. and Others v. Hungary (dec.), 2018, §§ 127-129). The Court held that there are some typical aspects of private life which may be affected in such disputes by dismissal, demotion, non-admission to a profession or other similarly unfavourable measures. In this case, the applicant was dismissed from his post as the president of a court on the basis of a failure to perform his administrative duties (managerial skills) properly. Whilst he was dismissed as president, he remained a judge in the same court. The Court did not find Article 8 applicable in this case. This was because, according to the Court, the decision concerned only his managerial skills while his professional role as a judge was not touched upon. Further, the decision did not affect his future career as a judge and neither did the decision call into question the moral or ethical aspect of his personality and character. In summary, in this situation, the dismissal had limited negative effects on the applicant's private life and did not cross the \"threshold of seriousness\" for an issue to be raised under Article 8 ( Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, Camelia Bogdan v. Romania Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria §§ 126-133; see also, 2020, §§ 83-92,, 2012, §§ 136-145 including on the pecuniary aspect, and Gražulevičiūtė v. Lithuania, 2021, §§ 101-110, in which the Court found that disciplinary proceedings did not reach the \"threshold of seriousness\" required to engage Article 8; see also in another context, Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, Denisov 2021). Following, employment-related disputes will generally only engage Article 8 either where a person loses a job because of something he or she did in private life (reason-based approach) or when the loss of job impacts on private life (consequence-based approach) (§§ 115-117). Thereafter, the consequence-based approach was applied to the prospective employment context (the consequences of a decision for the applicant's employment prospects in the civil service, and more specifically on her chances of obtaining a post as a research assistant in a public university, see Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 55-62). The test was found to have been met in the case of Constitutional Court judges dismissed for \"breach of oath\", since their dismissal had a serious impact on their inner circle, given the ensuing pecuniary losses, and on their reputation, given that the grounds for the dismissal directly concerned their personal integrity and professional competence ( Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 86). It was also found to have been met in the case of a judge suspended for over two years for having undermined the authority of the court by investigating the independence of a first instance judge ( Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, §§ 228-237) and in the case of a judge suspended for over two years following his indictment on charges unrelated to his judicial Pengezov v. Bulgaria duties (, 2023, §§ 67-72). It was also found to have been met in the case of female judges who were forced into early retirement ( Pająk and Others v. Poland, 2023, §§ 214-20). However, it was not found to have been met where Constitutional Court judges, originally appointed with life Gyulumyan and tenure, had their terms of office terminated as a result of a constitutional reform ( Others v. Armenia, 2023). The Court also found that the test had been met in the case of a lay teacher of Orthodox religion at a secondary public school whose employment had been automatically terminated after the withdrawal of her endorsement by an Archbishop ( Ţîmpău v. Romania, 2023).\n\nWhen balancing privacy rights under Article 8 with other Convention rights, the Court has found that the State is called upon to guarantee both rights and if the protection of one leads to an interference with the other, to choose adequate means to make this interference proportionate to the aim pursued ( Fernández Martínez v. Spain [GC], 2014, § 123). This case concerned the right to private/family life and the right of religious organisations to autonomy. The Court found that the refusal to renew the contract of a teacher of Catholic religion and morals after he publicly revealed his position as a \"married priest\" did not violate Article 8 (§ 89). The Court reached the same conclusion in a case where the employment of a lay teacher of Orthodox religion was automatically terminated following the withdrawal of her endorsement by the local Archbishop ( Ţîmpău v. Romania, 2023). As for a parent suspected of child abuse, the Court found that a failure to adequately investigate the unauthorised disclosure of confidential information or to protect the applicant's reputation and right to be presumed innocent (Article 6 § 2) violated Article 8 ( Ageyevy v. Russia, 2013, § 155).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217085228/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240618070506/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -21458,6 +22723,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:71160/13", "case_name": "Uzbyakov v. Russia", @@ -21491,6 +22758,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:9525/19", "case_name": "Vagdalt v. Hungary", @@ -21524,6 +22793,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:53600/20", "case_name": "Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC]", @@ -21557,6 +22828,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:59252/19", "case_name": "Vinškovský v. the Czech Republic (dec.)", @@ -21590,6 +22863,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:43868/18|25883/21", "case_name": "Wa Baile v. Switzerland", @@ -21623,6 +22898,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "9 April 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", "case_key": "apps:50849/21", "case_name": "Wałęsa v. Poland", @@ -21641,40 +22918,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.F.b|a:None|b:51", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "In Wałęsa v. Poland, 2023, the Court examined the lawfulness of an interference with the applicant's private life (reputation) caused by the reversal by the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court (\"CERPA\") of a final civil defamation judgment in the applicant's favour delivered ten years earlier, following an extraordinary appeal by the Prosecutor General. The Court relied on its findings in respect of Article 6 that CERPA did not have the attributes of a \"tribunal\" that was \"lawful\" for the purposes of the Convention and concluded that the interference complained of could not be considered \"in accordance with the law\" (§ 290).", - "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217085228/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", - "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240618070506/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", - "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", - "to_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf" - }, - { - "guide_id": "99cd2ce32cf8", - "guide_title": "Article 8", - "from_snapshot": "20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", - "to_snapshot": "20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", - "from_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", - "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-18", - "from_version": "31 August 2023", - "to_version": "9 April 2024", - "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json", - "case_key": "apps:8165/03", - "case_name": "Tığ v. Turkey (dec.)", - "application_numbers": "8165/03", - "judgment_year": "2005", - "citation_change": "removed", - "citation_text": "Tığ v. Turkey (dec.), no. 8165/03, 24 May 2005", - "hudoc_itemid": "001-69258", - "hudoc_importance_level": "3", - "hudoc_doctype": "HFDEC", - "hudoc_docname": "TIĞ c. TURQUIE", - "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", - "linked_paragraph_count": 1, - "linked_sections": "II.D.5: Desired appearance", - "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.D.5|a:289|b:298", - "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "The Court has established that personal choices as to an individual's desired appearance, whether in public or in private, relate to the expression of his or her personality and thus fall within the notion of private life. This has included a haircut ( Popa v. Romania (dec.), 2013, §§ 32-33), denial of access to a university for wearing a beard ( Tığ v. Turkey (dec.), 2005), a ban on wearing clothing designed to conceal the face in public places for women wishing to wear a fullface veil for reasons related to their beliefs ( S.A.S. v. France [GC], 2014, §§ 106-107), and appearing naked in public places ( Gough v. the United Kingdom, 2014, §§ 182-184). However, it is important to note that in each of these cases, the Court found the restriction on personal appearance to be proportionate. The absolute prohibition on growing a beard in prison was considered a violation of Article 8 because that the Government had failed to demonstrate the existence of a pressing social need to justify an absolute prohibition ( Biržietis v. Lithuania, 2016, §§ 54 and 57-58).", - "post_text": "The Court has established that personal choices as to an individual's desired appearance, whether in public or in private, relate to the expression of his or her personality and thus fall within the notion of private life. This has included a haircut ( Popa v. Romania (dec.), 2013, §§ 32-33), denial of access to a university for wearing a beard ( Tığ v. Turkey (dec.), 2005), a ban on wearing clothing designed to conceal the face in public places for women wishing to wear a fullface veil for reasons related to their beliefs ( S.A.S. v. France [GC], 2014, §§ 106-107), and appearing naked in public places Gough v. the United Kingdom (, 2014, §§ 182-184). However, it is important to note that in each of these cases, the Court found the restriction on personal appearance to be proportionate. The absolute prohibition on growing a beard in prison was considered a violation of Article 8 because that the Government had failed to demonstrate the existence of a pressing social need to justify an absolute prohibition ( Biržietis v. Lithuania, 2016, §§ 54 and 57-58).", + "post_text": "In Wałęsa v. Poland, 2023, the Court examined the lawfulness of an interference with the applicant's private life (reputation) caused by the reversal by the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court (\"CERPA\") of a final civil defamation judgment in the applicant's favour delivered ten years earlier, following an extraordinary appeal by the Prosecutor General. The Court relied on its findings in respect of Article 6 that CERPAdid not have the attributes of a \"tribunal\" that was \"lawful\" for the purposes of the Convention and concluded that the interference complained of could not be considered \"in accordance with the law\" (§ 290).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217085228/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240618070506/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -21689,6 +22933,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:49014/16", "case_name": "A.K. v. Russia", @@ -21722,6 +22968,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:29295/22", "case_name": "Abo v. Estonia (dec.)", @@ -21755,6 +23003,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:28540/20", "case_name": "Ahmed v. the United Kingdom (dec.)", @@ -21788,6 +23038,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:81249/17", "case_name": "Allouche v. France", @@ -21805,8 +23057,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.F.e|a:61|b:61", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "In Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, the applicants, two young men, posted a photograph of themselves kissing on a public Facebook page. This online post received hundreds of virulently homophobic comments. Although the applicants requested it, the prosecutors and domestic courts refused to prosecute, finding that the applicants' behaviour had been \"eccentric\" and did not correspond to \"traditional family values\" in the country. The Court stated that the hateful comments against the applicants and the homosexual community in general were instigated by a bigoted attitude towards that community and that the very same discriminatory state of mind was at the core of the failure on the part of the relevant public authorities to discharge their positive obligation to investigate in an effective manner whether those comments constituted incitement to hatred and violence. The Court concluded that the applicants had suffered discrimination on the ground of their sexual orientation (§§ 106-116, § 129). In Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021, the Court reiterated the obligation on the authorities' part to offer adequate protection in respect of the Oganezova v. Armenia applicants' dignity (§ 127). As a matter of principle, in, 2022, the Court recalled the authorities' duty to prevent hate-motivated violence on the part of private individuals as well as to investigate the existence of a possible link between a discriminatory motive and the act of violence (whether physical or verbal) could constitute positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 and could also be seen to as part of the authorities' positive responsibilities under Article 14 of the Convention to secure the fundamental values protected by Articles 3 and 8 without discrimination. In Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023, the applicants, members of the LGBTI community, complained about negative public statements made by public officials about the LGBTI community. The Court found that the applicants may claim to be victims despite the fact that they had not been directly targeted by the contested statements (§ 57). Bearing in mind the history of public hostility towards the LGBTI community in Russia and the increase in homophobic hate crimes, including violent crimes, at the material time, the openly homophobic content and particularly aggressive and hostile tone of the statements, as well as the fact that they were made by influential public figures holding official posts and were published in popular newspapers with a large readership, the Court considered that the contested statements reached the \"threshold of severity\" required to be considered to affect the \"private life\" of members of the group (§§ 59-62).", - "post_text": "In Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, the applicants, two young men, posted a photograph of themselves kissing on a public Facebook page. This online post received hundreds of virulently homophobic comments. Although the applicants requested it, the prosecutors and domestic courts refused to prosecute, finding that the applicants'behaviour had been \"eccentric\" and did not correspond to \"traditional family values\" in the country. The Court stated that the hateful comments against the applicants and the homosexual community in general were instigated by a bigoted attitude towards that community and that the very same discriminatory state of mind was at the core of the failure on the part of the relevant public authorities to discharge their positive obligation to investigate in an effective manner whether those comments constituted incitement to hatred and violence. The Court concluded that the applicants had suffered discrimination on the ground of their sexual orientation (§§ 106-116, § 129). In Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021, the Court reiterated the obligation on the authorities'part to offer adequate protection in respect of the applicants'dignity (§ 127). As a matter of principle, in Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, the Court recalled the authorities'duty to prevent hate-motivated violence on the part of private individuals as well as to investigate the existence of a possible link between a discriminatory motive and the act of violence (whether physical or verbal) could constitute positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 and could also be seen to as part of the authorities'positive responsibilities under Article 14 of the Convention to secure the fundamental values protected by Articles 3 and 8 without discrimination. In Allouche v. France, 2024 the Court found that the domestic authorities, in prosecuting an aggressor for death threats without taking into account the antisemitic dimension to the case, had failed to comply with their positive obligations under Articles 8 and 14. In Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023, the applicants, members of the LGBTI community, complained about negative public statements made by public officials about the LGBTI community. The Court found that the applicants could claim to be victims despite the fact that they had not been directly targeted by the contested statements. Bearing in mind the history of public hostility towards the LGBTI community in Russia and the increase in homophobic hate crimes, including violent crimes, at the material time, the openly homophobic content and particularly aggressive and hostile tone of the statements, as well as the fact that they were made by influential public figures holding official posts and were published in popular newspapers with a large readership, the Court considered that the contested statements reached the \"threshold of severity\" required to be considered to affect the \"private life\" of members of the group (§§ 57 and 59-62).", + "pre_text": "In Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, the applicants, two young men, posted a photograph of themselves kissing on a public Facebook page. This online post received hundreds of virulently homophobic comments. Although the applicants requested it, the prosecutors and domestic courts refused to prosecute, finding that the applicants' behaviour had been \"eccentric\" and did not correspond to \"traditional family values\" in the country. The Court stated that the hateful comments against the applicants and the homosexual community in general were instigated by a bigoted attitude towards that community and that the very same discriminatory state of mind was at the core of the failure on the part of the relevant public authorities to discharge their positive obligation to investigate in an effective manner whether those comments constituted incitement to hatred and violence. The Court concluded that the applicants had suffered discrimination on the ground of their sexual orientation (§§ 106-116, § 129). In Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021, the Court reiterated the obligation on the authorities' part to offer adequate protection in respect of the Oganezova v. Armenia applicants' dignity (§ 127). As a matter of principle, in, 2022, the Court recalled the authorities' duty to prevent hate-motivated violence on the part of private individuals as well as to investigate the existence of a possible link between a discriminatory motive and the act of violence (whether physical or verbal) could constitute positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 and could also be seen to as part of the authorities' positive responsibilities under Article 14 of the Convention to secure the fundamental values protected by Articles 3 and 8 without discrimination. In Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023, the applicants, members of the LGBTIcommunity, complained about negative public statements made by public officials about the LGBTIcommunity. The Court found that the applicants may claim to be victims despite the fact that they had not been directly targeted by the contested statements (§ 57). Bearing in mind the history of public hostility towards the LGBTIcommunity in Russia and the increase in homophobic hate crimes, including violent crimes, at the material time, the openly homophobic content and particularly aggressive and hostile tone of the statements, as well as the fact that they were made by influential public figures holding official posts and were published in popular newspapers with a large readership, the Court considered that the contested statements reached the \"threshold of severity\" required to be considered to affect the \"private life\" of members of the group (§§ 59-62).", + "post_text": "In Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, the applicants, two young men, posted a photograph of themselves kissing on a public Facebook page. This online post received hundreds of virulently homophobic comments. Although the applicants requested it, the prosecutors and domestic courts refused to prosecute, finding that the applicants'behaviour had been \"eccentric\" and did not correspond to \"traditional family values\" in the country. The Court stated that the hateful comments against the applicants and the homosexual community in general were instigated by a bigoted attitude towards that community and that the very same discriminatory state of mind was at the core of the failure on the part of the relevant public authorities to discharge their positive obligation to investigate in an effective manner whether those comments constituted incitement to hatred and violence. The Court concluded that the applicants had suffered discrimination on the ground of their sexual orientation (§§ 106-116, § 129). In Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021, the Court reiterated the obligation on the authorities'part to offer adequate protection in respect of the applicants'dignity (§ 127). As a matter of principle, in Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, the Court recalled the authorities'duty to prevent hate-motivated violence on the part of private individuals as well as to investigate the existence of a possible link between a discriminatory motive and the act of violence (whether physical or verbal) could constitute positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 and could also be seen to as part of the authorities'positive responsibilities under Article 14 of the Convention to secure the fundamental values protected by Articles 3 and 8 without discrimination. In Allouche v. France, 2024 the Court found that the domestic authorities, in prosecuting an aggressor for death threats without taking into account the antisemitic dimension to the case, had failed to comply with their positive obligations under Articles 8 and 14. In Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023, the applicants, members of the LGBTIcommunity, complained about negative public statements made by public officials about the LGBTIcommunity. The Court found that the applicants could claim to be victims despite the fact that they had not been directly targeted by the contested statements. Bearing in mind the history of public hostility towards the LGBTIcommunity in Russia and the increase in homophobic hate crimes, including violent crimes, at the material time, the openly homophobic content and particularly aggressive and hostile tone of the statements, as well as the fact that they were made by influential public figures holding official posts and were published in popular newspapers with a large readership, the Court considered that the contested statements reached the \"threshold of severity\" required to be considered to affect the \"private life\" of members of the group (§§ 57 and 59-62).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240618070506/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250523211813/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -21821,6 +23073,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:59/17", "case_name": "Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye", @@ -21854,6 +23108,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:24228/18", "case_name": "Biba v. Albania", @@ -21887,6 +23143,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:9602/18", "case_name": "Bild GmbH & Co. KG v. Germany", @@ -21920,6 +23178,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:11575/24", "case_name": "Borzykh v. Ukraine (dec.)", @@ -21953,6 +23213,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:2507/19", "case_name": "Contrada v. Italy (no. 4)", @@ -21986,6 +23248,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:32312/23", "case_name": "Dániel Karsai v. Hungary", @@ -22004,7 +23268,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.B.6|a:None|b:173|II.D.1|a:277|b:284", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "Article 8 protects a right to personal development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world ( Niemietz v. Germany, 1992, § 29; Pretty v. the United Kingdom, 2002, §§ 61 and 67; Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, 2013, §§ 165-167; El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], 2012, §§ 248-250, concerning the applicant's secret and extrajudicial abduction and arbitrary detention). The right to personal autonomy was relied upon, for instance, in a case of death by euthanasia where the Court had to weigh up the various competing interests at stake namely, the applicant's wish to accompany his mother in the last moments of her life and his mother's right to respect for her wishes and her personal autonomy ( Mortier v. Belgium, 2022, § 124 and § 204).", - "post_text": "In Dániel Karsai v. Hungary, 2024, concerning the impossibility for the terminally ill applicant suffering from an uncurable progressive neurodegenerative disease, to avail himself of physician- assisted dying (\"PAD\"), the Court examined his complaint under Article 8 in the light of both the negative and positive obligations of the respondent State, considering them to be intertwined, without clearly separating them in the specific circumstances of the case: more emphasis was placed on the positive obligation with respect to the provision of PAD at home and on the negative obligation when considering the prohibition which applied to access to PAD abroad, even if the Court noted that the latter could not be entirely separated from the positive aspect. It focused, in particular, on the deep ethical and societal implications of PAD, agreeing that the impugned criminal ban pursued the legitimate aims of, in particular, protecting the lives of vulnerable individuals at risk of abuse, maintaining the medical profession's ethical integrity and protecting the morals of society as a whole with regard to the meaning and value of human life (§§ 137-52). The Court further refused the argument that the existential suffering of a terminally ill patient could, as such, create an obligation for the State under Article 8 to legalise PAD. It emphasised palliative care as ensuring a dignified end of life and that the heightened state of vulnerability of a terminally ill patient warranted a fundamentally humane approach, necessarily including palliative care which is guided by compassion and high medical standards (§§ 154-58). The applicant's refusal to receive sedation constituted a legitimate personal choice which could not, in itself, require authorities to provide alternative solutions or legalise PAD (§ 155). It did not consider that criminal liability for an act of assisted suicide committed abroad, a practice that is not unusual among the Contracting States, would make the alleged interference disproportionate, but noted that the need for appropriate legal measures in the area of PAD is to be kept under review, having regard to developments in European societies and relevant international standards on medical ethics (§ 167). It concluded that, given the very complex and sensitive ethical nature of the issue at stake and the lack of a European consensus in this area (while there is a growing trend towards the legalisation of PAD, the majority of member States continue to prohibit and prosecute any assistance for suicide, including PAD), the Hungarian authorities did not overstep their wide margin of appreciation in balancing, on the one hand, the applicant's right to personal autonomy guaranteed by Article 8 and, on the other, the interest in, in particular, protecting the lives of vulnerable individuals at risk of abuse and the morals of society with regard to the value of human life. The Court found no violation of Article 8 of the Convention.\n\nArticle 8 protects a right to personal development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world ( Niemietz v. Germany, 1992, § 29; Pretty v. the United Kingdom, 2002, §§ 61 and 67; Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, 2013, §§ 165-167; El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], 2012, §§ 248-250, concerning the applicant's secret and extrajudicial abduction and arbitrary detention). The right to personal autonomy was relied upon, for instance, in a case of death by euthanasia where the Court had to weigh up the various competing interests at stake namely, the applicant's wish to accompany his mother in the last moments of her life and his mother's right to respect for her wishes and her personal autonomy ( Mortier v. Belgium, 2022, § 124 and § 204; for personal autonomy in the context of physician-assisted suicide, see also Dániel Karsai v. Hungary, § 85; for personal autonomy in the context of vaccination, see Pasquinelli and Others v. San Marino, 2024, § 77).", + "post_text": "In Dániel Karsai v. Hungary, 2024, concerning the impossibility for the terminally ill applicant suffering from an uncurable progressive neurodegenerative disease, to avail himself of physician- assisted dying (\"PAD\"), the Court examined his complaint under Article 8 in the light of both the negative and positive obligations of the respondent State, considering them to be intertwined, without clearly separating them in the specific circumstances of the case: more emphasis was placed on the positive obligation with respect to the provision of PAD at home and on the negative obligation when considering the prohibition which applied to access to PADabroad, even if the Court noted that the latter could not be entirely separated from the positive aspect. It focused, in particular, on the deep ethical and societal implications of PAD, agreeing that the impugned criminal ban pursued the legitimate aims of, in particular, protecting the lives of vulnerable individuals at risk of abuse, maintaining the medical profession's ethical integrity and protecting the morals of society as a whole with regard to the meaning and value of human life (§§ 137-52). The Court further refused the argument that the existential suffering of a terminally ill patient could, as such, create an obligation for the State under Article 8 to legalise PAD. It emphasised palliative care as ensuring a dignified end of life and that the heightened state of vulnerability of a terminally ill patient warranted a fundamentally humane approach, necessarily including palliative care which is guided by compassion and high medical standards (§§ 154-58). The applicant's refusal to receive sedation constituted a legitimate personal choice which could not, in itself, require authorities to provide alternative solutions or legalise PAD (§ 155). It did not consider that criminal liability for an act of assisted suicide committed abroad, a practice that is not unusual among the Contracting States, would make the alleged interference disproportionate, but noted that the need for appropriate legal measures in the area of PAD is to be kept under review, having regard to developments in European societies and relevant international standards on medical ethics (§ 167). It concluded that, given the very complex and sensitive ethical nature of the issue at stake and the lack of a European consensus in this area (while there is a growing trend towards the legalisation of PAD, the majority of member States continue to prohibit and prosecute any assistance for suicide, including PAD), the Hungarian authorities did not overstep their wide margin of appreciation in balancing, on the one hand, the applicant's right to personal autonomy guaranteed by Article 8 and, on the other, the interest in, in particular, protecting the lives of vulnerable individuals at risk of abuse and the morals of society with regard to the value of human life. The Court found no violation of Article 8 of the Convention.\n\nArticle 8 protects a right to personal development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world ( Niemietz v. Germany, 1992, § 29; Pretty v. the United Kingdom, 2002, §§ 61 and 67; Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, 2013, §§ 165-167; El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], 2012, §§ 248-250, concerning the applicant's secret and extrajudicial abduction and arbitrary detention). The right to personal autonomy was relied upon, for instance, in a case of death by euthanasia where the Court had to weigh up the various competing interests at stake namely, the applicant's wish to accompany his mother in the last moments of her life and his mother's right to respect for her wishes and her personal autonomy ( Mortier v. Belgium, 2022, § 124 and § 204; for personal autonomy in the context of physician-assisted suicide, see also Dániel Karsai v. Hungary, § 85; for personal autonomy in the context of vaccination, see Pasquinelli and Others v. San Marino, 2024, § 77).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240618070506/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250523211813/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -22019,6 +23283,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:44002/22", "case_name": "Dian v. Denmark (dec.)", @@ -22052,6 +23318,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:29550/17", "case_name": "Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*", @@ -22069,8 +23337,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "minor_edit|paragraph_added|section_moved_modified", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.C|a:21|b:21|I.C|a:24|b:24|IV.C.4|a:None|b:519|IV.C.4|a:None|b:522|IV.D|a:None|b:534|V.A.1|a:543|b:553|V.A.§4|a:547|b:557|V.D|a:223|b:652", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "\"Lawfulness\" also requires that there be adequate safeguards to ensure that an individual's Article 8 rights are respected. Domestic law must provide adequate safeguards to offer the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference ( Bykov v. Russia [GC], 2009, § 81; Vig v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 51-62).\n\nA finding that the measure in question was not \"in accordance with the law\" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a \"legitimate aim\" or was \"necessary in a democratic society\" ( M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be \"in accordance with the law\", as a result of an unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 ( Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been \"neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society\" (§§ 62-63). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be \"in accordance with the law\" was so closely linked to the \"necessary in a democratic society\" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 66).\n\nTechnologies also come within the scope of Article 8, in particular data from a smart phone/lap Saber v. Norway Särgava v. Estonia top and/or the mirror image copy of it (, 2020, § 48;, 2021), electronic messages (emails) ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 41; Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 72; Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 31; for emails exchanged with correspondents on a casual dating site, see M.P. v. Portugal, 2021, § 34), Internet use ( Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 81 and Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, §§ 41-42), and data stored on computer servers ( Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria, 2007, § 45), including hard drives ( Petri Sallinen and Others v. Finland, 2005, § 71) and floppy disks ( Iliya Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2008, § 42). Christie v. the\n\nOther forms of interference with the right to respect for \"correspondence\" may include the following acts attributable to the public authorities:  screening of correspondence ( Campbell v. the United Kingdom, 1992, § 33), the making of copies ( Foxley v. the United Kingdom, 2000, § 30) or the deletion of certain passages ( Pfeifer and Plankl v. Austria, 1992, § 43);  interception by various means and recording of personal or business related conversations Amann v. Switzerland ( [GC], 2000, § 45), for example by means of telephone tapping ( Malone v. the United Kingdom, 1984, § 64, and, as regards metering, §§ 83-84, Azer Ahmadov v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 62; see also P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 42), even when carried out on the line of a third party ( Lambert v. France, 1998, § 21; Potoczka and Adamco v. Slovakia, 2023, and also for the individual not concerned by the criminal proceedings, §§ 1, 46-51);  copying the full content of the hard drive of the applicant's laptop on to an external hard drive, the mirror-image copy ( Särgava v. Estonia, 2021), or the seizure of a smart phone and the search of its mirror image copy ( Saber v. Norway, 2020, § 48);  storage of intercepted data concerning telephone, email and Internet use ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 44). The mere fact that such data may be obtained legitimately, for example from telephone bills, is no bar to finding an \"interference\"; the fact that the information has not been disclosed to third parties or used in disciplinary or other proceedings against the person concerned is likewise immaterial ( ibid ., § 43); This may also concern:  the forwarding of mail to a third party ( Luordo v. Italy, 2003, §§ 72 and 75, with regard to a trustee in bankruptcy; Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 1992, §§ 87-88, with regard to the guardian of a psychiatric detainee);  the copying of electronic files, including those belonging to companies ( Bernh Larsen Holding AS and Others v. Norway, 2013, § 106);  the copying of documents containing banking data and their subsequent storage by the M.N. and Others v. San Marino authorities (, 2015, § 52); and  secret surveillance measures ( Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden Roman Zakharov v. Russia 2021; [GC], 2022; [GC], 2015, and the references cited therein). A situation where an individual under secret surveillance happens to be a member of a company's management board does not automatically lead to Liblik and others v. Estonia an interference with that company's Article 8 rights (, 2019, § 112, in which, however, the Court saw no reason to distinguish between the correspondence of a member of the management board of the applicant companies and that of the applicant companies themselves even if no secret surveillance authorisations had been formally issued in respect of the companies).\n\nAlthough the press must not overstep certain bounds, regarding in particular protection of the reputation and rights of others ( Kaboğlu and Oran v. Turkey, 2018, § 74), its duty is nevertheless to impart - in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities - information and ideas on all matters of public interest, which the public has a right to receive, including reporting and commenting on court proceedings ( Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 2012, § 79). The Court has also stressed the importance of the proactive role of the press, namely to reveal and bring to the public's attention information capable of eliciting such interest and of giving rise to such a debate within society ( Couderc and Hachette Filipac chi Associés v. France [GC], 2015, § 114). When covering certain events, journalists have the duty to show prudence and caution (§ 140). In particular, the Court has held that that there is a distinction to be drawn between reporting facts - even if controversial - capable of contributing to a debate of general public interest in a democratic society and making tawdry allegations about an individual's private life. In respect of the former, the pre-eminent role of the press in a democracy and its duty to act as a \"public watchdog\" are important considerations in favour of a narrow construction of any limitations on freedom of expression. However, different considerations apply to press reports concentrating on sensational and, at times, lurid news, intended to titillate and entertain, which are aimed at satisfying the curiosity of a particular readership regarding aspects of a person's strictly private life. Thus, in M.L. v. Slovakia, 2021, which concerned publication in the media of information regarding the conviction of the applicant's deceased son - a parish priest - of sexual offences, the Court observed that the revealed information had been particularly intrusive as it had concerned the intimate sphere of the private life of the applicant's late son life and that his picture had also been published. It found a violation of Article 8 on the basis that such publication was not justified by considerations of the general interest (§ 53).", - "post_text": "\" Lawfulness \" also requires that there be adequate safeguards to ensure that an individual's Article 8 rights are respected. Domestic law must provide adequate safeguards to offer the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference ( Bykov v. Russia [GC], 2009, § 81; Vig v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 51-62; as regards legal persons, see Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, 2024, §§ 97, 99 and 107).\n\nA finding that the measure in question was not \"in accordance with the law\" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a \"legitimate aim\" or was \"necessary in a democratic society\" ( M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be \"in accordance with the law\", as a result of a n unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 ( Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been \" neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society \" (§§ 62-63). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be \"in accordance with the law\" was so closely linked to the \"necessary in a democratic society\" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 66; Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, 2024, § 103).\n\nIn Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, §§ 98-102, where the applicant association complained about a search at its premises and seizure of a large amount of paper and digital documents performed in the context of a parliamentary commission's inquiry concerning organised crime syndicates, the Court found that the lawfulness requirement had been met and, in particular, the guarantees provided by the domestic legal system had been sufficient to prevent abuse and arbitrariness, since the Constitution vested in such parliamentary commissions the same powers of investigation, and subjected them to the same limitations as a judicial authority, adapted where appropriate to the context of a parliamentary inquiry.\n\nThe following are examples of measures which pursue legitimate aims: action by the Competition Authority to protect economic competition ( DELTA PEKÁRNY a.s. v. the Czech Republic, 2014, § 81); suppression of tax evasion ( Keslassy v. France (dec.), 2002, and K.S. and M.S. v. Germany, 2016, § 48); seeking circumstantial and material evidence in criminal cases, for example involving forgery, breach of trust and the issuing of uncovered cheques ( Van Rossem v. Belgium, 2004, § 40), murder ( Dragan Petrović v. Serbia, 2020, § 74), drug trafficking ( Işıldak v. Turkey, 2008, § 50) and illegal trade in medicines ( Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria, 2007, § 55); environmental protection and prevention of nuisance ( Halabi v. France, 2019, §§ 60-61); protecting health and the \"rights and freedoms of others\" in the context of combating doping in sport ( National Federation of Sportspersons'Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 165-166); search at an association's premises and seizure of paper and digital documents in the context of a parliamentary inquiry concerning the Mafia ( Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, § 105).\n\nThe margin of appreciation afforded to the State in assessing the necessity of an interference is wider where the search measure concerns legal entities rather than individuals ( DELTA PEKÁRNY a.s. v. the Czech Republic, 2014, § 82; Bernh Larsen Holding AS and Others v. Norway, 2013, § 159; Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, 2024, § 93) .\n\nTechnologies also come within the scope of Article 8, in particular data from a smart phone/lap top and/or the mirror image copy of it ( Saber v. Norway, 2020, § 48; Särgava v. Estonia, 2021), electronic messages (emails) ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 41; Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 72; Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 31; for emails exchanged with correspondents on a casual dating site, see M.P. v. Portugal, 2021, § 34), Internet use ( Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 81 and Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, §§ 41-42), and data stored on computer servers ( Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria, 2007, § 45; Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, 2024, § 89), including hard drives ( Petri Sallinen and Others v. Finland, 2005, § 71) and floppy disks ( Iliya Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2008, § 42).\n\nOther forms of interference with the right t o respect for \"correspondence\" may include the following acts attributable to the public authorities: ▪ screening of correspondence ( Campbell v. the United Kingdom, 1992, § 33), the making of copies ( Foxley v. the United Kingdom, 2000, § 30) or the deletion of certain passages ( Pfeifer and Plankl v. Austria, 1992, § 43); ▪ interception by various means and recording of personal or business related conversations ( Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, § 45), for example by means of telephone tapping ( Malone v. the United Kingdom, 1984, § 64, and, as regards metering, §§ 83-84, Azer Ahmadov v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 62; see also P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 42), even when carried out on the line of a third party ( Lambert v. France, 1998, § 21; Potoczka and Adamco v. Slovakia, 2023, and also for the individual not concerned by the criminal proceedings, §§ 1, 46-51); ▪ copying the full content of the hard drive of the applicant's laptop on to an external hard drive, the mirror-image copy ( Särgava v. Estonia, 2021), or the seizure of a smart phone and the search of its mirror image copy ( Saber v. Norway, 2020, § 48); ▪ storage of intercepted data concerning telephone, email and Internet use ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 44). The mere fact that such data may be obtained legitimately, for example from telephone bills, is no bar to finding an \"interference\"; the fact that the information has not been disclosed to third parties or used in disciplinary or other proceedings against the person concerned is likewise immaterial ( ibid ., § 43); This may also concern: ▪ the forwarding of mail to a third party ( Luordo v. Italy, 2003, §§ 72 and 75, with regard to a trustee in bankruptcy; Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 1992, §§ 87-88, with regard to the guardian of a psychiatric detainee); ▪ the copying of electronic files, including those belonging to companies ( Bernh Larsen Holding AS and Others v. Norway, 2013, § 106; ); ▪ the copying of documents containing banking data and their subsequent storage by the authorities ( M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, § 52); and seizure of paper and digital documents of an association, including a list of its members ( Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, § 91); ▪ secret surveillance measures ( Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2021; Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden [GC], 2022; Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, and the references cited therein). A situation where an individual under secret surveillance happens to be a member of a company's management board does not automatically lead to an interference with that company's Article 8 rights ( Liblik and others v. Estonia, 2019, § 112, in which, however, the Court saw no reason to distinguish between the correspondence of a member of the management board of the applicant companies and that of the applicant companies themselves even if no secret surveillance authorisations had been formally issued in respect of the companies).\n\nThe question of companies'correspondence is closely linked to that of searches of their premises (reference is accordingly made to the chapter on Commercial premises). For example, in Bernh Larsen Holding AS and Others v. Norway, 2013, the Court found no violation on account of a decision ordering a company to hand over a copy of all data on the computer server it used jointly with other companies. Although the applicable law did not require prior judicial authorisation, the Court took into account the existence of effective and adequate safeguards against abuse, the interests of the companies and their employees and the public interest in effective tax inspections (§§ 172-175). However, the Court found a violation in the case of DELTA PEKÁRNY a.s. v. the Czech Republic, 2014, concerning an inspection of business premises with a view to finding circumstantial and material evidence of an unlawful pricing agreement in breach of competition rules. The Court referred to the lack of prior judicial authorisation, the lack of ex post facto review of the necessity of the measure, and the lack of rules governing the possibility of destroying the data obtained (§§ 92-93). The Court also found a violation in Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, 2024, a case concerning a search at the applicant association's premises and seizure of a large amount of materials, performed in the context of a parliamentary commission's inquiry concerning organised crime syndicates . In particular, the Court underlined that the applicant association's rights under Article 8 had been significantly affected during the search since the domestic authorities had examined and retained a large number of paper and digital documents, which included confidential information (§ 131). It also pointed to the lack of evidence or a reasonable suspicion of involvement in the matter being investigated, capable of justifying the measure (§ 124), its wide and indeterminate content (§§ 126-131), as well as the absence of sufficient counterbalancing guarantees, in particular of an independent and impartial review of the contested measure (§§ 134-145).", + "pre_text": "\"Lawfulness\" also requires that there be adequate safeguards to ensure that an individual's Article 8 rights are respected. Domestic law must provide adequate safeguards to offer the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference ( Bykov v. Russia [GC], 2009, § 81; Vig v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 51-62).\n\nAfinding that the measure in question was not \"in accordance with the law\" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a \"legitimate aim\" or was \"necessary in a democratic society\" ( M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be \"in accordance with the law\", as a result of an unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 ( Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been \"neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society\" (§§ 62-63). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be \"in accordance with the law\" was so closely linked to the \"necessary in a democratic society\" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 66).\n\nTechnologies also come within the scope of Article 8, in particular data from a smart phone/lap Saber v. Norway Särgava v. Estonia top and/or the mirror image copy of it (, 2020, § 48;, 2021), electronic messages (emails) ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 41; Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 72; Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 31; for emails exchanged with correspondents on a casual dating site, see M.P. v. Portugal, 2021, § 34), Internet use ( Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 81 and Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, §§ 41-42), and data stored on computer servers ( Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria, 2007, § 45), including hard drives ( Petri Sallinen and Others v. Finland, 2005, § 71) and floppy disks ( Iliya Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2008, § 42). Christie v. the\n\nOther forms of interference with the right to respect for \"correspondence\" may include the following acts attributable to the public authorities:  screening of correspondence ( Campbell v. the United Kingdom, 1992, § 33), the making of copies ( Foxley v. the United Kingdom, 2000, § 30) or the deletion of certain passages ( Pfeifer and Plankl v. Austria, 1992, § 43);  interception by various means and recording of personal or business related conversations Amann v. Switzerland ( [GC], 2000, § 45), for example by means of telephone tapping ( Malone v. the United Kingdom, 1984, § 64, and, as regards metering, §§ 83-84, Azer Ahmadov v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 62; see also P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 42), even when carried out on the line of a third party ( Lambert v. France, 1998, § 21; Potoczka and Adamco v. Slovakia, 2023, and also for the individual not concerned by the criminal proceedings, §§ 1, 46-51);  copying the full content of the hard drive of the applicant's laptop on to an external hard drive, the mirror-image copy ( Särgava v. Estonia, 2021), or the seizure of a smart phone and the search of its mirror image copy ( Saber v. Norway, 2020, § 48);  storage of intercepted data concerning telephone, email and Internet use ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 44). The mere fact that such data may be obtained legitimately, for example from telephone bills, is no bar to finding an \"interference\"; the fact that the information has not been disclosed to third parties or used in disciplinary or other proceedings against the person concerned is likewise immaterial ( ibid ., § 43); This may also concern:  the forwarding of mail to a third party ( Luordo v. Italy, 2003, §§ 72 and 75, with regard to a trustee in bankruptcy; Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 1992, §§ 87-88, with regard to the guardian of a psychiatric detainee);  the copying of electronic files, including those belonging to companies ( Bernh Larsen Holding AS and Others v. Norway, 2013, § 106);  the copying of documents containing banking data and their subsequent storage by the M.N. and Others v. San Marino authorities (, 2015, § 52); and  secret surveillance measures ( Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden Roman Zakharov v. Russia 2021; [GC], 2022; [GC], 2015, and the references cited therein). Asituation where an individual under secret surveillance happens to be a member of a company's management board does not automatically lead to Liblik and others v. Estonia an interference with that company's Article 8 rights (, 2019, § 112, in which, however, the Court saw no reason to distinguish between the correspondence of a member of the management board of the applicant companies and that of the applicant companies themselves even if no secret surveillance authorisations had been formally issued in respect of the companies).\n\nAlthough the press must not overstep certain bounds, regarding in particular protection of the reputation and rights of others ( Kaboğlu and Oran v. Turkey, 2018, § 74), its duty is nevertheless to impart - in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities - information and ideas on all matters of public interest, which the public has a right to receive, including reporting and commenting on court proceedings ( Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 2012, § 79). The Court has also stressed the importance of the proactive role of the press, namely to reveal and bring to the public's attention information capable of eliciting such interest and of giving rise to such a debate within society ( Couderc and Hachette Filipac chi Associés v. France [GC], 2015, § 114). When covering certain events, journalists have the duty to show prudence and caution (§ 140). In particular, the Court has held that that there is a distinction to be drawn between reporting facts - even if controversial - capable of contributing to a debate of general public interest in a democratic society and making tawdry allegations about an individual's private life. In respect of the former, the pre-eminent role of the press in a democracy and its duty to act as a \"public watchdog\" are important considerations in favour of a narrow construction of any limitations on freedom of expression. However, different considerations apply to press reports concentrating on sensational and, at times, lurid news, intended to titillate and entertain, which are aimed at satisfying the curiosity of a particular readership regarding aspects of a person's strictly private life. Thus, in M.L. v. Slovakia, 2021, which concerned publication in the media of information regarding the conviction of the applicant's deceased son - a parish priest - of sexual offences, the Court observed that the revealed information had been particularly intrusive as it had concerned the intimate sphere of the private life of the applicant's late son life and that his picture had also been published. It found a violation of Article 8 on the basis that such publication was not justified by considerations of the general interest (§ 53).", + "post_text": "\" Lawfulness \" also requires that there be adequate safeguards to ensure that an individual's Article 8 rights are respected. Domestic law must provide adequate safeguards to offer the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference ( Bykov v. Russia [GC], 2009, § 81; Vig v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 51-62; as regards legal persons, see Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, 2024, §§ 97, 99 and 107).\n\nAfinding that the measure in question was not \"in accordance with the law\" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a \"legitimate aim\" or was \"necessary in a democratic society\" ( M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be \"in accordance with the law\", as a result of a n unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 ( Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been \" neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society \" (§§ 62-63). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be \"in accordance with the law\" was so closely linked to the \"necessary in a democratic society\" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 66; Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, 2024, § 103).\n\nIn Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, §§ 98-102, where the applicant association complained about a search at its premises and seizure of a large amount of paper and digital documents performed in the context of a parliamentary commission's inquiry concerning organised crime syndicates, the Court found that the lawfulness requirement had been met and, in particular, the guarantees provided by the domestic legal system had been sufficient to prevent abuse and arbitrariness, since the Constitution vested in such parliamentary commissions the same powers of investigation, and subjected them to the same limitations as a judicial authority, adapted where appropriate to the context of a parliamentary inquiry.\n\nThe following are examples of measures which pursue legitimate aims: action by the Competition Authority to protect economic competition ( DELTA PEKÁRNY a.s. v. the Czech Republic, 2014, § 81); suppression of tax evasion ( Keslassy v. France (dec.), 2002, and K.S. and M.S. v. Germany, 2016, § 48); seeking circumstantial and material evidence in criminal cases, for example involving forgery, breach of trust and the issuing of uncovered cheques ( Van Rossem v. Belgium, 2004, § 40), murder ( Dragan Petrović v. Serbia, 2020, § 74), drug trafficking ( Işıldak v. Turkey, 2008, § 50) and illegal trade in medicines ( Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria, 2007, § 55); environmental protection and prevention of nuisance ( Halabi v. France, 2019, §§ 60-61); protecting health and the \"rights and freedoms of others\" in the context of combating doping in sport ( National Federation of Sportspersons'Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 165-166); search at an association's premises and seizure of paper and digital documents in the context of a parliamentary inquiry concerning the Mafia ( Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, § 105).\n\nThe margin of appreciation afforded to the State in assessing the necessity of an interference is wider where the search measure concerns legal entities rather than individuals ( DELTA PEKÁRNY a.s. v. the Czech Republic, 2014, § 82; Bernh Larsen Holding AS and Others v. Norway, 2013, § 159; Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, 2024, § 93) .\n\nTechnologies also come within the scope of Article 8, in particular data from a smart phone/lap top and/or the mirror image copy of it ( Saber v. Norway, 2020, § 48; Särgava v. Estonia, 2021), electronic messages (emails) ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 41; Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 72; Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 31; for emails exchanged with correspondents on a casual dating site, see M.P. v. Portugal, 2021, § 34), Internet use ( Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 81 and Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, §§ 41-42), and data stored on computer servers ( Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria, 2007, § 45; Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, 2024, § 89), including hard drives ( Petri Sallinen and Others v. Finland, 2005, § 71) and floppy disks ( Iliya Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2008, § 42).\n\nOther forms of interference with the right t o respect for \"correspondence\" may include the following acts attributable to the public authorities: ▪ screening of correspondence ( Campbell v. the United Kingdom, 1992, § 33), the making of copies ( Foxley v. the United Kingdom, 2000, § 30) or the deletion of certain passages ( Pfeifer and Plankl v. Austria, 1992, § 43); ▪ interception by various means and recording of personal or business related conversations ( Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, § 45), for example by means of telephone tapping ( Malone v. the United Kingdom, 1984, § 64, and, as regards metering, §§ 83-84, Azer Ahmadov v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 62; see also P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 42), even when carried out on the line of a third party ( Lambert v. France, 1998, § 21; Potoczka and Adamco v. Slovakia, 2023, and also for the individual not concerned by the criminal proceedings, §§ 1, 46-51); ▪ copying the full content of the hard drive of the applicant's laptop on to an external hard drive, the mirror-image copy ( Särgava v. Estonia, 2021), or the seizure of a smart phone and the search of its mirror image copy ( Saber v. Norway, 2020, § 48); ▪ storage of intercepted data concerning telephone, email and Internet use ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 44). The mere fact that such data may be obtained legitimately, for example from telephone bills, is no bar to finding an \"interference\"; the fact that the information has not been disclosed to third parties or used in disciplinary or other proceedings against the person concerned is likewise immaterial ( ibid ., § 43); This may also concern: ▪ the forwarding of mail to a third party ( Luordo v. Italy, 2003, §§ 72 and 75, with regard to a trustee in bankruptcy; Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 1992, §§ 87-88, with regard to the guardian of a psychiatric detainee); ▪ the copying of electronic files, including those belonging to companies ( Bernh Larsen Holding AS and Others v. Norway, 2013, § 106; ); ▪ the copying of documents containing banking data and their subsequent storage by the authorities ( M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, § 52); and seizure of paper and digital documents of an association, including a list of its members ( Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, § 91); ▪ secret surveillance measures ( Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2021; Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden [GC], 2022; Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, and the references cited therein). Asituation where an individual under secret surveillance happens to be a member of a company's management board does not automatically lead to an interference with that company's Article 8 rights ( Liblik and others v. Estonia, 2019, § 112, in which, however, the Court saw no reason to distinguish between the correspondence of a member of the management board of the applicant companies and that of the applicant companies themselves even if no secret surveillance authorisations had been formally issued in respect of the companies).\n\nThe question of companies'correspondence is closely linked to that of searches of their premises (reference is accordingly made to the chapter on Commercial premises). For example, in Bernh Larsen Holding AS and Others v. Norway, 2013, the Court found no violation on account of a decision ordering a company to hand over a copy of all data on the computer server it used jointly with other companies. Although the applicable law did not require prior judicial authorisation, the Court took into account the existence of effective and adequate safeguards against abuse, the interests of the companies and their employees and the public interest in effective tax inspections (§§ 172-175). However, the Court found a violation in the case of DELTA PEKÁRNY a.s. v. the Czech Republic, 2014, concerning an inspection of business premises with a view to finding circumstantial and material evidence of an unlawful pricing agreement in breach of competition rules. The Court referred to the lack of prior judicial authorisation, the lack of ex post facto review of the necessity of the measure, and the lack of rules governing the possibility of destroying the data obtained (§§ 92-93). The Court also found a violation in Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, 2024, a case concerning a search at the applicant association's premises and seizure of a large amount of materials, performed in the context of a parliamentary commission's inquiry concerning organised crime syndicates . In particular, the Court underlined that the applicant association's rights under Article 8 had been significantly affected during the search since the domestic authorities had examined and retained a large number of paper and digital documents, which included confidential information (§ 131). It also pointed to the lack of evidence or a reasonable suspicion of involvement in the matter being investigated, capable of justifying the measure (§ 124), its wide and indeterminate content (§§ 126-131), as well as the absence of sufficient counterbalancing guarantees, in particular of an independent and impartial review of the contested measure (§§ 134-145).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240618070506/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250523211813/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -22085,6 +23353,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:13805/21", "case_name": "H.W. v. France", @@ -22118,6 +23388,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:52319/22", "case_name": "Le Marrec v. France (dec.)", @@ -22135,8 +23407,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added|minor_edit|section_moved_modified", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.C|a:18|b:18|I.D|a:30|b:30|II.B.C|a:196|b:202", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "The national law must be clear, foreseeable, and adequately accessible ( Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1983, § 87; for an instruction issued by the Chief Prosecutor, see Vasil Vasilev v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 92-94; for instructions issued by the Ministry of Justice, see Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 83-99). It must be sufficiently foreseeable to enable individuals to act in accordance with the law ( Lebois v. Bulgaria, 2017, §§ 66-67 with further references therein, as regards internal orders in prison), and it must demarcate clearly the scope of discretion for public authorities. For example, as the Court articulated in the surveillance context (see the outline of the requirements in Falzarano v. Italy (dec.), 2021, §§ 27-29), the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication of the conditions and circumstances in which the authorities are empowered to resort to any measures of secret surveillance and collection of data ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, § 68). In Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, the Court found a violation of Article 8 due to the lack of clarity and precision in the domestic legal provisions that had served as the legal basis of the Glukhin v. Russia applicant's surveillance by her insurance company after an accident. In, 2023 (§§ 82-83), the Court expressed strong doubts that the domestic legal provisions which authorised the processing of biometric personal data, including with the aid of facial recognition technology, \"in connection with the administration of justice\" met the \"quality of law\" requirement since they were widely formulated and would appear to allow the processing of such data in connection with any type of judicial proceedings. For the \"quality of law\" requirement to be met in the context of implementing facial recognition technology, it was essential to have detailed rules governing the scope and application of measures as well as strong safeguards against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness. The need for safeguards will be all the greater where the use of live facial recognition technology is concerned.\n\nThe publication of the applicant'sidentifying data, including his full name and home address, on a tax authority website for failing to fulfil his tax obligations was found to be in pursuit of the \"interests of ... the economic well-being of the country\" as well as \"the protection of the rights and freedoms of L.B. v. Hungary others\" ( [GC], 2023, §§ 111-13).\n\nUsers of telecommunications and Internet services must have a guarantee that their own privacy will be respected, although such a guarantee cannot be absolute and must yield on occasion to other legitimate imperatives, such as the prevention of disorder and crime or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others ( Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 65). In particular, as regards online activities, information associated with specific dynamic IP addresses facilitating the identification of the author of such activities, constitutes, in principle, personal data which are not accessible to the public. The use of such data may therefore fall within the scope of Article 8 ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 107-108). In that regard, the fact that the applicant had not concealed his dynamic IP address had not been a decisive factor for assessing whether his expectation of privacy had been reasonable (§ 116). Conversely, the anonymity linked to online activities is an important factor which must be taken into account (§ 117).", - "post_text": "The national law must be clear, foreseeable, and adequately accessible ( Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1983, § 87; for an instruction issued by the Chief Prosecutor, see Vasil Vasilev v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 92-94; for instructions issued by the Ministry of Justice, see Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 83-99; for a regulation published on the website of a social welfare authority, see Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 72-75). It must be sufficiently foreseeable to enable individuals to act in accordance with the law ( Lebois v. Bulgaria, 2017, §§ 66-67 with further references therein, as regards internal orders in prison), and it must demarcate clearly the scope of discretion for public authorities. For example, as the Court articulated in the surveillance context (see the outline of the requirements in Falzarano v. Italy (dec.), 2021, §§ 27-29), the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication of the conditions and circumstances in which the authorities are empowered to resort to any measures of secret surveillance and collection of data ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, § 68). In Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, the Court found a violation of Article 8 due to the lack of clarity and precision in the domestic legal provisions that had served as the legal basis of the applicant's surveillance by her insurance company after an accident. In Glukhin v. Russia, 2023 (§§ 82-83), the Court expressed strong doubts that the domestic legal provisions which authorised the processing of biometric personal data, including with the aid of facial recognition technology, \"in connection with the administration of justice\" met the \"quality of law\" requirement since they were widely formulated and would appear to allow the processing of such data in connection with any type of judicial proceedings. F or the \"quality of law\" requirement to be met in the context of implementing facial recognition technology, it was essential to have detailed rules governing the scope and application of measures as well as strong safeguards against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness. The need for safeguards will be all the greater where the use of live facial recognition technology is concerned.\n\nThe publication of the applicant's identifying data, including his full name and home address, on a tax authority website for failing to fulfil his tax obligations was found to be in pursuit of the \"interests of ... the economic well- being of the country\" as well as \"the protection of the rights and freedoms of others\" ( L.B. v. Hungary [GC], 2023, §§ 111-13). In the same vein, the processing of the applicant's IP address and other \"connection data\" to enable the relevant social welfare authority to locate him to prevent welfare fraud, was in the interests of the economic well-being of the country and the prevention of crime ( Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, § 76).\n\nUsers of telecommunications and Internet services must have a guarantee that their own privacy will be respected, although such a guarantee cannot be absolute and must yield on occasion to other legitimate imperatives, such as the prevention of disorder and crime or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others ( Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 65). In particular, as regards online activities, information associated with specific dynamic IP addresses facilitating the identification of the author of such activities, constitutes, in principle, personal data which are not accessible to the public. The use of such data may therefore fall within the scope of Article 8 ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 107-108; Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 51 and 54, as regards an IP address masked by a VPN). In that regard, the fact that the applicant had not concealed his dynamic IP address had not been a decisive factor for assessing whether his expectation of privacy had been reasonable ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, § 116). Conversely, the anonymity linked to online activities is an important factor which must be taken into account (§ 117).", + "pre_text": "The national law must be clear, foreseeable, and adequately accessible ( Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1983, § 87; for an instruction issued by the Chief Prosecutor, see Vasil Vasilev v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 92-94; for instructions issued by the Ministry of Justice, see Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 83-99). It must be sufficiently foreseeable to enable individuals to act in accordance with the law ( Lebois v. Bulgaria, 2017, §§ 66-67 with further references therein, as regards internal orders in prison), and it must demarcate clearly the scope of discretion for public authorities. For example, as the Court articulated in the surveillance context (see the outline of the requirements in Falzarano v. Italy (dec.), 2021, §§ 27-29), the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication of the conditions and circumstances in which the authorities are empowered to resort to any measures of secret surveillance and collection of data ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, § 68). In Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, the Court found a violation of Article 8 due to the lack of clarity and precision in the domestic legal provisions that had served as the legal basis of the Glukhin v. Russia applicant's surveillance by her insurance company after an accident. In, 2023 (§§ 82-83), the Court expressed strong doubts that the domestic legal provisions which authorised the processing of biometric personal data, including with the aid of facial recognition technology, \"in connection with the administration of justice\" met the \"quality of law\" requirement since they were widely formulated and would appear to allow the processing of such data in connection with any type of judicial proceedings. For the \"quality of law\" requirement to be met in the context of implementing facial recognition technology, it was essential to have detailed rules governing the scope and application of measures as well as strong safeguards against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness. The need for safeguards will be all the greater where the use of live facial recognition technology is concerned.\n\nThe publication of the applicant'sidentifying data, including his full name and home address, on a tax authority website for failing to fulfil his tax obligations was found to be in pursuit of the \"interests of ... the economic well-being of the country\" as well as \"the protection of the rights and freedoms of L.B. v. Hungary others\" ( [GC], 2023, §§ 111-13).\n\nUsers of telecommunications and Internet services must have a guarantee that their own privacy will be respected, although such a guarantee cannot be absolute and must yield on occasion to other legitimate imperatives, such as the prevention of disorder and crime or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others ( Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 65). In particular, as regards online activities, information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses facilitating the identification of the author of such activities, constitutes, in principle, personal data which are not accessible to the public. The use of such data may therefore fall within the scope of Article 8 ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 107-108). In that regard, the fact that the applicant had not concealed his dynamic IPaddress had not been a decisive factor for assessing whether his expectation of privacy had been reasonable (§ 116). Conversely, the anonymity linked to online activities is an important factor which must be taken into account (§ 117).", + "post_text": "The national law must be clear, foreseeable, and adequately accessible ( Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1983, § 87; for an instruction issued by the Chief Prosecutor, see Vasil Vasilev v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 92-94; for instructions issued by the Ministry of Justice, see Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 83-99; for a regulation published on the website of a social welfare authority, see Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 72-75). It must be sufficiently foreseeable to enable individuals to act in accordance with the law ( Lebois v. Bulgaria, 2017, §§ 66-67 with further references therein, as regards internal orders in prison), and it must demarcate clearly the scope of discretion for public authorities. For example, as the Court articulated in the surveillance context (see the outline of the requirements in Falzarano v. Italy (dec.), 2021, §§ 27-29), the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication of the conditions and circumstances in which the authorities are empowered to resort to any measures of secret surveillance and collection of data ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, § 68). In Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, the Court found a violation of Article 8 due to the lack of clarity and precision in the domestic legal provisions that had served as the legal basis of the applicant's surveillance by her insurance company after an accident. In Glukhin v. Russia, 2023 (§§ 82-83), the Court expressed strong doubts that the domestic legal provisions which authorised the processing of biometric personal data, including with the aid of facial recognition technology, \"in connection with the administration of justice\" met the \"quality of law\" requirement since they were widely formulated and would appear to allow the processing of such data in connection with any type of judicial proceedings. F or the \"quality of law\" requirement to be met in the context of implementing facial recognition technology, it was essential to have detailed rules governing the scope and application of measures as well as strong safeguards against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness. The need for safeguards will be all the greater where the use of live facial recognition technology is concerned.\n\nThe publication of the applicant's identifying data, including his full name and home address, on a tax authority website for failing to fulfil his tax obligations was found to be in pursuit of the \"interests of ... the economic well- being of the country\" as well as \"the protection of the rights and freedoms of others\" ( L.B. v. Hungary [GC], 2023, §§ 111-13). In the same vein, the processing of the applicant's IPaddress and other \"connection data\" to enable the relevant social welfare authority to locate him to prevent welfare fraud, was in the interests of the economic well-being of the country and the prevention of crime ( Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, § 76).\n\nUsers of telecommunications and Internet services must have a guarantee that their own privacy will be respected, although such a guarantee cannot be absolute and must yield on occasion to other legitimate imperatives, such as the prevention of disorder and crime or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others ( Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 65). In particular, as regards online activities, information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses facilitating the identification of the author of such activities, constitutes, in principle, personal data which are not accessible to the public. The use of such data may therefore fall within the scope of Article 8 ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 107-108; Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 51 and 54, as regards an IPaddress masked by a VPN). In that regard, the fact that the applicant had not concealed his dynamic IPaddress had not been a decisive factor for assessing whether his expectation of privacy had been reasonable ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, § 116). Conversely, the anonymity linked to online activities is an important factor which must be taken into account (§ 117).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240618070506/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250523211813/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -22151,6 +23423,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:25636/22", "case_name": "Lindholm and the Estate after Leif Lindholm v. Denmark", @@ -22184,6 +23458,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:63664/19", "case_name": "M.A. and Others v. France", @@ -22217,6 +23493,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:28935/21", "case_name": "M.Ș.D. v. Romania", @@ -22250,6 +23528,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:20949/21", "case_name": "Mitrevska v. North Macedonia", @@ -22283,6 +23563,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:25259/20", "case_name": "Oleg Balan v. the Republic of Moldova", @@ -22316,6 +23598,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:24622/22", "case_name": "Pasquinelli and Others v. San Marino", @@ -22349,6 +23633,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:23570/22", "case_name": "Paterson v. the United Kingdom (dec.)", @@ -22382,6 +23668,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:32514/22", "case_name": "Petrović v. Croatia*", @@ -22399,8 +23687,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added|citation_updated|minor_edit|paragraph_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.1|a:92|b:92|II.B|a:121|b:122|II.B.8|a:179|b:184|II.D.11|a:None|b:332|III.D.a|a:357|b:366|IV.C|a:None|b:488|IV.C.1|a:None|b:496|IV.C.2|a:None|b:500|IV.C.2|a:None|b:501|IV.C.2|a:None|b:502|IV.C.4|a:None|b:529|V.E|a:None|b:653|V.E|a:None|b:655|V.E|a:None|b:656", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "in addition, the right of a child born out of wedlock to determine the legal relationship between him or her and his or her natural parent, even if the latter has died, falls within the scope of concept Mikulić v. Croatia Moldovan v. Ukraine* of \"private life\" (, 2002, § 53;, 2024, §§ 32 and 35).\n\nThe Court indicated for the first time that the concept of private life covered the physical and X and Y v. the Netherlands moral integrity of the person in, 1985, § 22. That case concerned the sexual assault of a mentally disabled sixteen-year old girl and the absence of criminal law provisions to provide her with effective and practical protection (see, more recently, Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2021, § 261). A person's body concerns the most intimate aspect of private life ( Y.F. v. Turkey, 2003, § 33). Regarding the protection of the physical and psychological integrity of an individual from other persons, the Court has held that the authorities' positive obligations - in some cases under Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention and in other instances under Article 8 taken alone or in ibid. combination with Article 3 ( ) - may include a duty to maintain and apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection against acts of violence by private individuals ( Osman v. the United Kingdom, 1998, §§ 128-130; Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, 2008, § 65; Sandra Janković v. Croatia A v. Croatia Đorđević v. Croatia Söderman, 2009, § 45;, 2010, § 60;, 2012, §§ 141-143; v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 80). Furthermore, that legal framework must be implemented effectively in practice in order for the State to comply with its positive obligations under Article 8 ( Špadijer v. Montenegro, 2021, § 101). For a recapitulation of the case-law and the limits of the applicability of Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania Article 8 in this context, see [GC], 2019, §§ 125-132. In this case, the Court found Article 8 not applicable to a road-traffic accident which did not occur as the result of an act of violence intended to cause harm to the applicant's physical and psychological integrity Špadijer (§§ 129-132). See also the summary of the case-law principles and references in v. Montenegro, 2021, §§ 85-90.\n\nIn Hadri-Vionnet v. Switzerland, 2008, the Court found that the municipality's failure to inform the mother about the location and time of the burial of her stillborn son was not authorised by law and violated her right to private and family life under Article 8 ( Pannullo and Forte v. France, 2001). Similarly, in Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia, 2013, the Court held that the hospital's failure to give information to the applicant regarding the death of her infant son and the subsequent disappearance of his body violated Article 8, even though the child had died in 1983, because of the State's ongoing failure to provide information about what had happened. The Court also held that Russia's refusal to allow a stillborn baby to take the name of its biological father, because of the legal presumption that the mother's husband was the father, violated the mother's Article 8 rights to bury her child with the name of his true father ( Znamenskaya v. Russia, 2005).\n\nThe Court has also found that a State's continuing failure to provide an applicant with credible information as to the fate of her newborn son - who had gone missing from a State-run maternity ward shortly after birth - constituted a continuing violation of the right to mutual enjoyment and respect for her family life ( Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia, 2013, §§ 74-75; and for the measures taken by Mik and Jovanović v. Serbia the State in implementation of the said judgment, see (dec.), 2021).", - "post_text": "in addition, the right of a child born out of wedlock to determine the legal relationship between him or her and his or her natural parent, even if the latter has died, falls within the scope of concept of \"private life\" ( Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, § 53; Moldovan v. Ukraine, 2024, §§ 32 and 35).\n\nThe Court indicated for the first time that the concept of private life covered the physical and moral integrity of the person in X and Y v. the Netherlands, 1985, § 22. That case concerned the sexual assault of a mentally disabled sixteen-year old girl and the absence of criminal law provisions to provide her with effective and practical protection (see, more recently, Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2021, § 261). A person's body concerns the most intimate aspect of private life ( Y.F. v. Turkey, 2003, § 33). Regarding the protection of the physical and psychological integrity of an individual from other persons, the Court has held that the authorities'positive obligations - in some cases under Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention and in other instances under Article 8 taken alone or in combination with Article 3 ( X and Y v. the Netherlands, 1985) - may include a duty to maintain and apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection against acts of violence by private individuals ( Osman v. the United Kingdom, 1998, §§ 128-130; Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, 2008, § 65; Sandra Janković v. Croatia, 2009, § 45; A v. Croatia, 2010, § 60; Đorđević v. Croatia, 2012, §§ 141-143; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 80). Furthermore, that legal framework must be implemented effectively in practice in order for the State to comply with its positive obligations under Article 8 ( Špadijer v. Montenegro, 2021, § 101). For a recapitulation of the case-law and the limits of the applicability of Article 8 in this context, see Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], 2019, §§ 125-132. In this case, the Court found Article 8 not applicable to a road-traffic accident which did not occur as the result of an act of violence intended to cause harm to the applicant's physical and psychological integrity (§§ 129-132). See also the summary of the case-law principles and references in Špadijer v. Montenegro, 2021, §§ 85-90.\n\nIn Hadri-Vionnet v. Switzerland, 2008, the Court found that the municipality's failure to inform the mother about the location and time of the burial of her stillborn son was not authorised by law and violated her right to private and family life under Article 8 ( Pannullo and Forte v. France, 2001). Similarly, in Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia, 2013, the Court held that the hospital's failure to give information to the applicant regarding the death of her infant son and the subsequent disappearance of his body violated Article 8, even though the child had died in 1983, because of the State's ongoing failure to provide information about what had happened (see also Petrović v. Croatia *, 2025). The Court also held that Russia's refusal to allow a stillborn baby to take the name of its biological father, because of the legal presumption that the mother's husband was the father, violated the mother's Article 8 rights to bury her child with the name of his true father ( Znamenskaya v. Russia, 2005).\n\nSimilarly, proceedings relating to one's identity as a parent fall under private and family life. The Court has found cases involving the determination of the legal provisions governing a father's relations with his putative child to come within the scope of private life ( Rasmussen v. Denmark, 1984, § 33; Yildirim v. Austria (dec.), 1999; Krušković v. Croatia, 2011, § 20; Ahrens v. Germany, 2012, § 60; Tsvetelin Petkov v. Bulgaria, 2014, §§ 49-59; Marinis v. Greece, 2014, § 58; I.V. v. Estonia, 2023, § 75), as does a putative father's attempt to disavow paternity ( R.L. and Others v. Denmark, 2017, § 38; Shofman v. Russia, 2005, §§ 30-32; C.P. and M.N. v. France, 2023, § 33). In addition, the right to apply for adoption with a view to becoming parents falls within the scope of private life ( A.H. and Others v. Russia, 2017, § 383). For a detailed analysis of the Court's case-law on this topic, see the Case-law Guide on Article 12 .\n\nThe Court has also found that a State's continuing failure to provide an applicant with credible information as to the fate of her newborn son - who had gone missing from a State-run maternity ward shortly after birth - constituted a continuing violation of the right to mutual enjoyment and respect for her family life ( Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia, 2013, §§ 74-75; and for the measures taken by the State in implementation of the said judgment, see Mik and Jovanović v. Serbia (dec.), 2021). In the same vein, in the case of newborn babies having been transferred from a hospital in Croatia to a hospital Serbia, the Court considered that each State could be held accountable for its share of the responsibility for the breach in question, and asserted its jurisdiction to examine, under Article 8, the Croatian State's continued failure to provide the applicants with in formation as to the fate of their babies who were transferred from Croatia to Serbia ( Petrović v. Croatia *, 2025, §§ 107-13).\n\nThe right to respect for one's home means not just the right to the actual physical area, but also to the quiet enjoyment of that area. This may involve measures that are required to be taken by the authorities, particularly regarding the enforcement of court decisions ( Cvijetić v. Croatia, 2004, §§ 51-53). An interference may be either physical, such as unauthorised entry into a person's home ( Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 2001, § 294; National Federation of Sportspersons'Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, § 154), or not physical, such as noise, smells, etc. ( Moreno Gómez v. Spain, 2004, § 53). Where noise disturbances or other nuisances go beyond the ordinary difficulties of living with neighbours, they may affect the peaceful enjoyment of one's home, whether they be caused by private individuals, business activities or public agencies ( Kapa and Others v. Poland, 2021, § 151 with further references therein).\n\nIt will sometimes be necessary for a member State to attach and sell an individual's home in order to secure the payment of taxes due to the State. However, these measures must be enforced in a manner which ensures that the individual's right to his or her home is respected. In a case concerning the conditions of an enforced sale at auction of a house, to repay a tax debt, the Court found a violation because the owner's interests had not been adequately protected ( Rousk v. Sweden, 2013, §§ 137-142). With regard, more generally, to reconciliation of the right to respect for one's home with the enforced sale of a house for the purposes of paying debts, see Vrzić v. Croatia, 2016, § 13.\n\nThe Court has ruled on a number of disputes relating to the eviction of tenants (see the references cited in Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria, 2016, § 52). A notice to quit issued by the authorities must be necessary and comply with procedural guarantees as part of a fair decision-making process before an independent tribunal complying with the requirements of Article 8 ( Connors v. the United Kingdom, 2004, §§ 81-84; Bjedov v. Croatia, 2012, §§ 70-71). It is insufficient merely to indicate that the measure is prescribed by domestic law, without taking into account the individual circumstances in question ( Ćosić v. Croatia, 2009, § 21). The measure must also pursue a legitimate objective and loss of the home must be shown to be proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued, in accordance with Article 8 § 2. Regard must therefore be had to the factual circumstances of the occupant whose legitimate interests are to be protected ( Orlić v. Croatia, 2011, § 64; Gladysheva v. Russia, 2011, §§ 94-95; Kryvitska and Kryvitskyy v. Ukraine, 2010, § 50; Andrey Medvedev v. Russia, 2016, § 55).\n\nThe Court has thus decided that a summary procedure for eviction of a tenant that does not offer adequate procedural guarantees would entail a violation of the Convention, even if the measure was legitimately seeking to ensure due application of the statutory housing regulations ( McCann v. the United Kingdom, 2008, § 55). Termination of a lease without any possibility of having the proportionality of the measure determined by an independent tribunal was held to infringe Article 8 in cases where the landlord was a public body ( Kay and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 74; see also Nafornita v. The Republic of Moldova, 2024, in which the Supreme Court of Justice did not weigh up the competing interests at stake, despite the fact that the evicted applicants had been lawfully resident in State-owned apartments for over eleven years). In cases where the landlord was a private individual or body, this principle did not apply automatically ( Vrzić v. Croatia, 2016, § 67; F.J.M. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2018, § 41). Furthermore, continuing occupation of a person's property in breach of an enforceable eviction order issued by a court after finding that the occupation in question was illegal infringes Article 8 ( Khamidov v. Russia, 2007, § 145).\n\nIn its judgment Larkos v. Cyprus [GC], 1999, the Court held that offering differential protection to tenants against eviction - according to whether they are renting State-owned property or renting from private landlords - entailed a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 (§§ 31-32). However, it is not discriminatory to make provisions only for tenants of publicly owned property to purchase their flat, with tenants of privately owned flats which they occupy being unable to do so ( Strunjak and Others v. Croatia (dec.), 2000). Moreover, it is legitimate to put in place criteria according to which social housing can be allocated, when there is insufficient supply available to satisfy demand, so long as such criteria are not arbitrary or discriminatory ( Bah v. the United Kingdom, 2011, § 49; see, more generally, on tenants of social housing Pau lić v. Croatia, 2009; Kay and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2010).\n\nConversely, the safeguards established by domestic law and the practicalities of the search may lead to a finding of no violation of Article 8 ( Camenzind v. Switzerland, 1997, § 46, and Paulić v. Croatia, 2009, regarding a search of limited scope geared to seizing an unauthorised telephone; Cronin v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004, and Ratushna v. Ukraine, 2010, § 82, regarding the existence of appropriate safeguards).\n\nThe abovementioned requirements of Article 8 § 2 must of course be satisfied in this context ( Kruslin v. France, 1990, § 26; Huvig v. France, 1990, § 25). In particular, such surveillance must serve to uncover the truth. Since it represents a serious interference with the right to respect for correspondence, it must be based on a \"law\" that is particularly pr ecise ( Huvig v. France, 1990, § 32) and must form part of a legislative framework affording sufficient legal certainty ( ibid. ). The rules must be clear and detailed (the technology available for use is continually becoming more sophisticated), as well as being both accessible and foreseeable, so that anyone can foresee the consequences for themselves ( Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, 1998, §§ 59 and 61). This requirement of sufficiently clear rules concerns both the circumstances in which and the conditions on which the surveillance is authorised and carried out. Since the implementation of measures of secret surveillance of communications is not open to scrutiny by the individuals concerned or the public at large, the \"law\" would run counter to the rule of law if there were no limits to the legal discretion granted to the executive, or to a judge ( Karabeyoğlu v. Turkey, 2016, §§ 67-69 and §§ 86-88, with further references therein; Potoczka and Adamco v. Slovakia, 2023, §§ 71-73). Consequently, the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference ( Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, §§ 229-230). If there is any risk of arbitrariness in its implementation, the law will not be compatible with the lawfulness requirement ( Bykov v. Russia [GC], 2009, §§ 78-79). In such a sensitive area as recourse to secret surveillance, the competent authority must state the compelling reasons justifying such an intrusive measure, while complying with the applicable legal instruments ( Dragojević v. Croatia, 2015, §§ 94-98; see also Liblik and others v. Estonia, 2019, §§ 132-143, as to the duly reasoning of authorisations of secret surveillance). In addition, the interception of telephone conversations is not to be based on an overly broad and imprecise decision, for instance, merely authorising secret surveillance of a stabbing victim and his \"contacts\" ( Azer Ahmadov v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 66, §§ 71-72; see also Potoczka and Adamco v. Slovakia, 2023, § 76).\n\nThe phone-tapping operations can only be ordered on the basis of suspicions that can be regarded as objectively reasonable ( Karabeyoğlu v. Turkey, 2016, § 103). The Court has also underlined the importance of an authority empowered to authorise the use of secret surveillance being capable of verifying \"the existence of a reasonable suspicion against the person concerned, in particular, whether there are factual indications for suspecting that person of planning, committing or having committed criminal acts or other acts that may give rise to secret surveillance measures\" and \"whether the requested interception meets the requ irement of'necessity in a democratic society ' ... for example, whether it is possible to achieve the aims by less restrictive means\" ( Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 260; Dragojević v. Croatia, 2015, § 94). Such verification, together with the requirement to set out the relevant reasons in the decisions by which secret surveillance is authorised, constitute an important guarantee, ensuring that the measures are not ordered haphazardly, irregularly or without due and proper consideration. Hence, the authorisation and extension of a measure of telephone tapping must not be without grounds or \"general\" or \"exploratory\" ( Adomaitis v. Lithuania, 2022, § 85; Drakšas v. Lithuania, 2012, § 56).\n\nThe Court has found a violation of the right to respect for correspondence, for example, in the following cases: Kruslin v. France, 1990, § 36; Huvig v. France, 1990, § 35; Malone v. the United Kingdom, 1984, § 79; Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, 1998, §§ 60-61; Prado Bugallo v. Spain, 2003, § 30; Matheron v. France, 2005, § 43; Dragojević v. Croatia, 2015, § 101; Šantare and Labazņikovs v. Latvia, 2016, § 62; Liblik and others v. Estonia, 2019, §§ 140-142 concerning the retrospective justification of orders authorising secret surveillance during criminal proceedings. As for a non-violation, see, for instance, Adomaitis v. Lithuania, 2022, §§ 81-86 and Karabeyoğlu v. Turkey, 2016, §§ 104-110 and below.", + "pre_text": "in addition, the right of a child born out of wedlock to determine the legal relationship between him or her and his or her natural parent, even if the latter has died, falls within the scope of concept Mikulić v. Croatia Moldovan v. Ukraine* of \"private life\" (, 2002, § 53;, 2024, §§ 32 and 35).\n\nThe Court indicated for the first time that the concept of private life covered the physical and X and Y v. the Netherlands moral integrity of the person in, 1985, § 22. That case concerned the sexual assault of a mentally disabled sixteen-year old girl and the absence of criminal law provisions to provide her with effective and practical protection (see, more recently, Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2021, § 261). Aperson's body concerns the most intimate aspect of private life ( Y.F. v. Turkey, 2003, § 33). Regarding the protection of the physical and psychological integrity of an individual from other persons, the Court has held that the authorities' positive obligations - in some cases under Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention and in other instances under Article 8 taken alone or in ibid. combination with Article 3 ( ) - may include a duty to maintain and apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection against acts of violence by private individuals ( Osman v. the United Kingdom, 1998, §§ 128-130; Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, 2008, § 65; Sandra Janković v. Croatia A v. Croatia Đorđević v. Croatia Söderman, 2009, § 45;, 2010, § 60;, 2012, §§ 141-143; v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 80). Furthermore, that legal framework must be implemented effectively in practice in order for the State to comply with its positive obligations under Article 8 ( Špadijer v. Montenegro, 2021, § 101). For a recapitulation of the case-law and the limits of the applicability of Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania Article 8 in this context, see [GC], 2019, §§ 125-132. In this case, the Court found Article 8 not applicable to a road-traffic accident which did not occur as the result of an act of violence intended to cause harm to the applicant's physical and psychological integrity Špadijer (§§ 129-132). See also the summary of the case-law principles and references in v. Montenegro, 2021, §§ 85-90.\n\nIn Hadri-Vionnet v. Switzerland, 2008, the Court found that the municipality's failure to inform the mother about the location and time of the burial of her stillborn son was not authorised by law and violated her right to private and family life under Article 8 ( Pannullo and Forte v. France, 2001). Similarly, in Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia, 2013, the Court held that the hospital's failure to give information to the applicant regarding the death of her infant son and the subsequent disappearance of his body violated Article 8, even though the child had died in 1983, because of the State's ongoing failure to provide information about what had happened. The Court also held that Russia's refusal to allow a stillborn baby to take the name of its biological father, because of the legal presumption that the mother's husband was the father, violated the mother's Article 8 rights to bury her child with the name of his true father ( Znamenskaya v. Russia, 2005).\n\nThe Court has also found that a State's continuing failure to provide an applicant with credible information as to the fate of her newborn son - who had gone missing from a State-run maternity ward shortly after birth - constituted a continuing violation of the right to mutual enjoyment and respect for her family life ( Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia, 2013, §§ 74-75; and for the measures taken by Mik and Jovanović v. Serbia the State in implementation of the said judgment, see (dec.), 2021).", + "post_text": "in addition, the right of a child born out of wedlock to determine the legal relationship between him or her and his or her natural parent, even if the latter has died, falls within the scope of concept of \"private life\" ( Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, § 53; Moldovan v. Ukraine, 2024, §§ 32 and 35).\n\nThe Court indicated for the first time that the concept of private life covered the physical and moral integrity of the person in X and Y v. the Netherlands, 1985, § 22. That case concerned the sexual assault of a mentally disabled sixteen-year old girl and the absence of criminal law provisions to provide her with effective and practical protection (see, more recently, Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2021, § 261). Aperson's body concerns the most intimate aspect of private life ( Y.F. v. Turkey, 2003, § 33). Regarding the protection of the physical and psychological integrity of an individual from other persons, the Court has held that the authorities'positive obligations - in some cases under Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention and in other instances under Article 8 taken alone or in combination with Article 3 ( X and Y v. the Netherlands, 1985) - may include a duty to maintain and apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection against acts of violence by private individuals ( Osman v. the United Kingdom, 1998, §§ 128-130; Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, 2008, § 65; Sandra Janković v. Croatia, 2009, § 45; A v. Croatia, 2010, § 60; Đorđević v. Croatia, 2012, §§ 141-143; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 80). Furthermore, that legal framework must be implemented effectively in practice in order for the State to comply with its positive obligations under Article 8 ( Špadijer v. Montenegro, 2021, § 101). For a recapitulation of the case-law and the limits of the applicability of Article 8 in this context, see Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], 2019, §§ 125-132. In this case, the Court found Article 8 not applicable to a road-traffic accident which did not occur as the result of an act of violence intended to cause harm to the applicant's physical and psychological integrity (§§ 129-132). See also the summary of the case-law principles and references in Špadijer v. Montenegro, 2021, §§ 85-90.\n\nIn Hadri-Vionnet v. Switzerland, 2008, the Court found that the municipality's failure to inform the mother about the location and time of the burial of her stillborn son was not authorised by law and violated her right to private and family life under Article 8 ( Pannullo and Forte v. France, 2001). Similarly, in Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia, 2013, the Court held that the hospital's failure to give information to the applicant regarding the death of her infant son and the subsequent disappearance of his body violated Article 8, even though the child had died in 1983, because of the State's ongoing failure to provide information about what had happened (see also Petrović v. Croatia *, 2025). The Court also held that Russia's refusal to allow a stillborn baby to take the name of its biological father, because of the legal presumption that the mother's husband was the father, violated the mother's Article 8 rights to bury her child with the name of his true father ( Znamenskaya v. Russia, 2005).\n\nSimilarly, proceedings relating to one's identity as a parent fall under private and family life. The Court has found cases involving the determination of the legal provisions governing a father's relations with his putative child to come within the scope of private life ( Rasmussen v. Denmark, 1984, § 33; Yildirim v. Austria (dec.), 1999; Krušković v. Croatia, 2011, § 20; Ahrens v. Germany, 2012, § 60; Tsvetelin Petkov v. Bulgaria, 2014, §§ 49-59; Marinis v. Greece, 2014, § 58; I.V. v. Estonia, 2023, § 75), as does a putative father's attempt to disavow paternity ( R.L. and Others v. Denmark, 2017, § 38; Shofman v. Russia, 2005, §§ 30-32; C.P. and M.N. v. France, 2023, § 33). In addition, the right to apply for adoption with a view to becoming parents falls within the scope of private life ( A.H. and Others v. Russia, 2017, § 383). For a detailed analysis of the Court's case-law on this topic, see the Case-law Guide on Article 12 .\n\nThe Court has also found that a State's continuing failure to provide an applicant with credible information as to the fate of her newborn son - who had gone missing from a State-run maternity ward shortly after birth - constituted a continuing violation of the right to mutual enjoyment and respect for her family life ( Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia, 2013, §§ 74-75; and for the measures taken by the State in implementation of the said judgment, see Mik and Jovanović v. Serbia (dec.), 2021). In the same vein, in the case of newborn babies having been transferred from a hospital in Croatia to a hospital Serbia, the Court considered that each State could be held accountable for its share of the responsibility for the breach in question, and asserted its jurisdiction to examine, under Article 8, the Croatian State's continued failure to provide the applicants with in formation as to the fate of their babies who were transferred from Croatia to Serbia ( Petrović v. Croatia *, 2025, §§ 107-13).\n\nThe right to respect for one's home means not just the right to the actual physical area, but also to the quiet enjoyment of that area. This may involve measures that are required to be taken by the authorities, particularly regarding the enforcement of court decisions ( Cvijetić v. Croatia, 2004, §§ 51-53). An interference may be either physical, such as unauthorised entry into a person's home ( Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 2001, § 294; National Federation of Sportspersons'Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, § 154), or not physical, such as noise, smells, etc. ( Moreno Gómez v. Spain, 2004, § 53). Where noise disturbances or other nuisances go beyond the ordinary difficulties of living with neighbours, they may affect the peaceful enjoyment of one's home, whether they be caused by private individuals, business activities or public agencies ( Kapa and Others v. Poland, 2021, § 151 with further references therein).\n\nIt will sometimes be necessary for a member State to attach and sell an individual's home in order to secure the payment of taxes due to the State. However, these measures must be enforced in a manner which ensures that the individual's right to his or her home is respected. In a case concerning the conditions of an enforced sale at auction of a house, to repay a tax debt, the Court found a violation because the owner's interests had not been adequately protected ( Rousk v. Sweden, 2013, §§ 137-142). With regard, more generally, to reconciliation of the right to respect for one's home with the enforced sale of a house for the purposes of paying debts, see Vrzić v. Croatia, 2016, § 13.\n\nThe Court has ruled on a number of disputes relating to the eviction of tenants (see the references cited in Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria, 2016, § 52). Anotice to quit issued by the authorities must be necessary and comply with procedural guarantees as part of a fair decision-making process before an independent tribunal complying with the requirements of Article 8 ( Connors v. the United Kingdom, 2004, §§ 81-84; Bjedov v. Croatia, 2012, §§ 70-71). It is insufficient merely to indicate that the measure is prescribed by domestic law, without taking into account the individual circumstances in question ( Ćosić v. Croatia, 2009, § 21). The measure must also pursue a legitimate objective and loss of the home must be shown to be proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued, in accordance with Article 8 § 2. Regard must therefore be had to the factual circumstances of the occupant whose legitimate interests are to be protected ( Orlić v. Croatia, 2011, § 64; Gladysheva v. Russia, 2011, §§ 94-95; Kryvitska and Kryvitskyy v. Ukraine, 2010, § 50; Andrey Medvedev v. Russia, 2016, § 55).\n\nThe Court has thus decided that a summary procedure for eviction of a tenant that does not offer adequate procedural guarantees would entail a violation of the Convention, even if the measure was legitimately seeking to ensure due application of the statutory housing regulations ( McCann v. the United Kingdom, 2008, § 55). Termination of a lease without any possibility of having the proportionality of the measure determined by an independent tribunal was held to infringe Article 8 in cases where the landlord was a public body ( Kay and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 74; see also Nafornita v. The Republic of Moldova, 2024, in which the Supreme Court of Justice did not weigh up the competing interests at stake, despite the fact that the evicted applicants had been lawfully resident in State-owned apartments for over eleven years). In cases where the landlord was a private individual or body, this principle did not apply automatically ( Vrzić v. Croatia, 2016, § 67; F.J.M. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2018, § 41). Furthermore, continuing occupation of a person's property in breach of an enforceable eviction order issued by a court after finding that the occupation in question was illegal infringes Article 8 ( Khamidov v. Russia, 2007, § 145).\n\nIn its judgment Larkos v. Cyprus [GC], 1999, the Court held that offering differential protection to tenants against eviction - according to whether they are renting State-owned property or renting from private landlords - entailed a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 (§§ 31-32). However, it is not discriminatory to make provisions only for tenants of publicly owned property to purchase their flat, with tenants of privately owned flats which they occupy being unable to do so ( Strunjak and Others v. Croatia (dec.), 2000). Moreover, it is legitimate to put in place criteria according to which social housing can be allocated, when there is insufficient supply available to satisfy demand, so long as such criteria are not arbitrary or discriminatory ( Bah v. the United Kingdom, 2011, § 49; see, more generally, on tenants of social housing Pau lić v. Croatia, 2009; Kay and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2010).\n\nConversely, the safeguards established by domestic law and the practicalities of the search may lead to a finding of no violation of Article 8 ( Camenzind v. Switzerland, 1997, § 46, and Paulić v. Croatia, 2009, regarding a search of limited scope geared to seizing an unauthorised telephone; Cronin v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004, and Ratushna v. Ukraine, 2010, § 82, regarding the existence of appropriate safeguards).\n\nThe abovementioned requirements of Article 8 § 2 must of course be satisfied in this context ( Kruslin v. France, 1990, § 26; Huvig v. France, 1990, § 25). In particular, such surveillance must serve to uncover the truth. Since it represents a serious interference with the right to respect for correspondence, it must be based on a \"law\" that is particularly pr ecise ( Huvig v. France, 1990, § 32) and must form part of a legislative framework affording sufficient legal certainty ( ibid. ). The rules must be clear and detailed (the technology available for use is continually becoming more sophisticated), as well as being both accessible and foreseeable, so that anyone can foresee the consequences for themselves ( Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, 1998, §§ 59 and 61). This requirement of sufficiently clear rules concerns both the circumstances in which and the conditions on which the surveillance is authorised and carried out. Since the implementation of measures of secret surveillance of communications is not open to scrutiny by the individuals concerned or the public at large, the \"law\" would run counter to the rule of law if there were no limits to the legal discretion granted to the executive, or to a judge ( Karabeyoğlu v. Turkey, 2016, §§ 67-69 and §§ 86-88, with further references therein; Potoczka and Adamco v. Slovakia, 2023, §§ 71-73). Consequently, the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference ( Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, §§ 229-230). If there is any risk of arbitrariness in its implementation, the law will not be compatible with the lawfulness requirement ( Bykov v. Russia [GC], 2009, §§ 78-79). In such a sensitive area as recourse to secret surveillance, the competent authority must state the compelling reasons justifying such an intrusive measure, while complying with the applicable legal instruments ( Dragojević v. Croatia, 2015, §§ 94-98; see also Liblik and others v. Estonia, 2019, §§ 132-143, as to the duly reasoning of authorisations of secret surveillance). In addition, the interception of telephone conversations is not to be based on an overly broad and imprecise decision, for instance, merely authorising secret surveillance of a stabbing victim and his \"contacts\" ( Azer Ahmadov v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 66, §§ 71-72; see also Potoczka and Adamco v. Slovakia, 2023, § 76).\n\nThe phone-tapping operations can only be ordered on the basis of suspicions that can be regarded as objectively reasonable ( Karabeyoğlu v. Turkey, 2016, § 103). The Court has also underlined the importance of an authority empowered to authorise the use of secret surveillance being capable of verifying \"the existence of a reasonable suspicion against the person concerned, in particular, whether there are factual indications for suspecting that person of planning, committing or having committed criminal acts or other acts that may give rise to secret surveillance measures\" and \"whether the requested interception meets the requ irement of'necessity in a democratic society ' ... for example, whether it is possible to achieve the aims by less restrictive means\" ( Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 260; Dragojević v. Croatia, 2015, § 94). Such verification, together with the requirement to set out the relevant reasons in the decisions by which secret surveillance is authorised, constitute an important guarantee, ensuring that the measures are not ordered haphazardly, irregularly or without due and proper consideration. Hence, the authorisation and extension of a measure of telephone tapping must not be without grounds or \"general\" or \"exploratory\" ( Adomaitis v. Lithuania, 2022, § 85; Drakšas v. Lithuania, 2012, § 56).\n\nThe Court has found a violation of the right to respect for correspondence, for example, in the following cases: Kruslin v. France, 1990, § 36; Huvig v. France, 1990, § 35; Malone v. the United Kingdom, 1984, § 79; Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, 1998, §§ 60-61; Prado Bugallo v. Spain, 2003, § 30; Matheron v. France, 2005, § 43; Dragojević v. Croatia, 2015, § 101; Šantare and Labazņikovs v. Latvia, 2016, § 62; Liblik and others v. Estonia, 2019, §§ 140-142 concerning the retrospective justification of orders authorising secret surveillance during criminal proceedings. As for a non-violation, see, for instance, Adomaitis v. Lithuania, 2022, §§ 81-86 and Karabeyoğlu v. Turkey, 2016, §§ 104-110 and below.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240618070506/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250523211813/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -22415,6 +23703,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:15541/20", "case_name": "Pindo Mulla v. Spain [GC]", @@ -22448,6 +23738,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:46808/16", "case_name": "R.F. and Others v. Germany", @@ -22465,8 +23757,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "section_moved_modified", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.D.3|a:291|b:299|II.D.3|a:292|b:300", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Respect for private life requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as individual human beings, which includes the legal parent-child relationship ( Mennesson v. France, 2014, § 96). Therefore, Article 8 protects children born to a surrogate mother outside the member State in question, whose legal parents according to the foreign State could not register as such under domestic law (see, for a summary of the principle, for instance, D v. France, 2020, §§ 45-54). The Court does not require that States legalise surrogacy and, furthermore, States may demand proof of parentage for children born to surrogates before issuing the child's identity papers. However, the child's right to respect for his or her private life requires that domestic law provide a possibility of recognition of the legal relationship between a child born through a surrogacy arrangement abroad and the intended father, where he is the biological father ( Mennesson v. France, 2014; Labassee v. France, 2014; Foulon and Bouvet v. France, 2016; C v. Italy, 2023).\n\nIn its first Advisory Opinion, the Court clarified that where a child is born through a gestational surrogacy arrangement abroad, in a situation where he or she was conceived using the eggs of a third- party donor, and the intended mother is designated in a birth certificate legally established abroad as the \"legal mother\", the child's right to respect for his or her private life also requires that domestic law provide a possibility of recognition of a legal parent-child relationship with the intended mother. The choice of means by which to achieve recognition of the legal relationship between the child and the intended mother falls within the State's margin of appreciation. However, once the relationship between the child and the intended mother has become a \"practical reality\" the procedure laid down to establish recognition of the relationship in domestic law must be capable of being \"implemented promptly and efficiently\" ( Advisory opinion concerning the recognition in domestic law of a legal parent-child relationship between a child born through a gestational surrogacy arrangement abroad and the intended mother [GC]). Applying the principles of Mennesson v. France, 2014, and the before- mentioned Advisory opinion, the Court found that the obligation for children born under a surrogacy arrangement to be adopted in order to ensure the legal recognition between the genetic mother and her child did not violate the mother's right to private life ( D v. France, 2020). However, in K.K. and Others v. Denmark, 2022, it found that the refusal of the intended mother's application to adopt, where domestic law did not provide for other possibilities of recognition of a legal parent-child relationship with the intended mother, violated the children's right to respect for their private lives A.M. v. Norway (§§ 56-77). In, 2022, the applicant was the intended mother of a child born in the US via a surrogacy arrangement. After returning to Norway, the biological father (her former partner) cut off her contact with the child and the domestic courts rejected her claims to have her parental status under US law recognised in Norway, and to be allowed to adopt the child. Although the Court accepted that the applicant's situation was \"particularly harsh\" it found it difficult to attribute this consequence to the authorities. Moreover, while the applicant had been put in a difficult situation, the domestic courts had examined the interests of all the parties involved and, in its view, the outcome had to be considered to fall within the margin of appreciation afforded to domestic authorities (see the States' margin of appreciation on the issue of surrogacy, § 131).", - "post_text": "Respect for private life requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as individual human beings, which includes the legal parent-child relationship ( Mennesson v. France, 2014, § 96). Therefore, Article 8 protects children born to a surrogate mother outside the member State in question, whose legal parents according to the foreign State could not register as such under domestic law (see, for a summary of the principle, for instance, D v. France, 2020, §§ 45-54). The Court does not require that States legalise surrogacy and, furthermore, States may demand proof of parentage for children born to surrogates before issuing the child's identity papers. However, the child's right to respect for his or her private life requires that domestic law provide a possibility of recognition of the legal relationship between a child born through a surrogacy arrangement abroad and the intended father, where he is the biological father ( Mennesson v. France, 2014; Labassee v. France, 2014; Foulon and Bouvet v. France, 2016; C v. Italy, 2023; R.F. and Others v. Germany, 2024).\n\nIn its first Advisory Opinion, the Court clarified that where a child is born through a gestational surrogacy arrangement abroad, in a situation where he or she was conceived using the eggs of a third- party donor, and the intended mother is designated in a birth certificate legally established abroad as the \"legal mother\", the child' s right to respect for his or her private life also requires that domestic law provide a possibility of recognition of a legal parent-child relationship with the intended mother. The choice of means by which to achieve recognition of the legal relationship between the child and the intended mother falls within the State's margin of appreciation. However, once the relationship between the child and the intended mother has become a \"practical reality\" the procedure laid d own to establish recognition of the relationship in domestic law must be capable of being \"implemented promptly and efficiently\" ( Advisory opinion concerning the recognition in domestic law of a legal parent-child relationship between a child born through a gestational surrogacy arrangement abroad and the intended mother [GC]). Applying the principles of Mennesson v. France, 2014, and the before- mentioned Advisory opinion, the Court found that the obligation for children born under a surrogacy arrangement to be adopted in order to ensure the legal recognition between the genetic mother and her child did not violate the mother's right to private life ( D v. France, 2020; R.F. and Others v. Germany, 2024). However, in K.K. and Others v. Denmark, 2022, it found that the refusal of the intended mother's application to adopt, where domestic law did not provide for other possibilities of recognition of a legal parent-child relationship with the intended mother, violated the children's right to respect for their private lives (§§ 56-77). In A.M. v. Norway, 2022, the applicant was the intended mother of a child born in the US via a surrogacy arrangement. After returning to Norway, the biological father (her former partner) cut off her contact with the child and the domestic courts rejected her claims to have her parental status under US law recognised in Norway, and to be allowed to adopt the child. Although the Court accepted that the applicant 's situation was \"particularly harsh\" it f ound it difficult to attribute this consequence to the authorities. Moreover, while the applicant had been put in a difficult situation, the domestic courts had examined the interests of all the parties involved and, in its view, the outcome had to be considered to fall within the margin of appreciation afforded to domestic authorities (see the States'margin of appreciation on the issue of surrogacy, § 131).", + "pre_text": "Respect for private life requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as individual human beings, which includes the legal parent-child relationship ( Mennesson v. France, 2014, § 96). Therefore, Article 8 protects children born to a surrogate mother outside the member State in question, whose legal parents according to the foreign State could not register as such under domestic law (see, for a summary of the principle, for instance, D v. France, 2020, §§ 45-54). The Court does not require that States legalise surrogacy and, furthermore, States may demand proof of parentage for children born to surrogates before issuing the child's identity papers. However, the child's right to respect for his or her private life requires that domestic law provide a possibility of recognition of the legal relationship between a child born through a surrogacy arrangement abroad and the intended father, where he is the biological father ( Mennesson v. France, 2014; Labassee v. France, 2014; Foulon and Bouvet v. France, 2016; C v. Italy, 2023).\n\nIn its first Advisory Opinion, the Court clarified that where a child is born through a gestational surrogacy arrangement abroad, in a situation where he or she was conceived using the eggs of a third- party donor, and the intended mother is designated in a birth certificate legally established abroad as the \"legal mother\", the child's right to respect for his or her private life also requires that domestic law provide a possibility of recognition of a legal parent-child relationship with the intended mother. The choice of means by which to achieve recognition of the legal relationship between the child and the intended mother falls within the State's margin of appreciation. However, once the relationship between the child and the intended mother has become a \"practical reality\" the procedure laid down to establish recognition of the relationship in domestic law must be capable of being \"implemented promptly and efficiently\" ( Advisory opinion concerning the recognition in domestic law of a legal parent-child relationship between a child born through a gestational surrogacy arrangement abroad and the intended mother [GC]). Applying the principles of Mennesson v. France, 2014, and the before- mentioned Advisory opinion, the Court found that the obligation for children born under a surrogacy arrangement to be adopted in order to ensure the legal recognition between the genetic mother and her child did not violate the mother's right to private life ( D v. France, 2020). However, in K.K. and Others v. Denmark, 2022, it found that the refusal of the intended mother's application to adopt, where domestic law did not provide for other possibilities of recognition of a legal parent-child relationship with the intended mother, violated the children's right to respect for their private lives A.M. v. Norway (§§ 56-77). In, 2022, the applicant was the intended mother of a child born in the USvia a surrogacy arrangement. After returning to Norway, the biological father (her former partner) cut off her contact with the child and the domestic courts rejected her claims to have her parental status under USlaw recognised in Norway, and to be allowed to adopt the child. Although the Court accepted that the applicant's situation was \"particularly harsh\" it found it difficult to attribute this consequence to the authorities. Moreover, while the applicant had been put in a difficult situation, the domestic courts had examined the interests of all the parties involved and, in its view, the outcome had to be considered to fall within the margin of appreciation afforded to domestic authorities (see the States' margin of appreciation on the issue of surrogacy, § 131).", + "post_text": "Respect for private life requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as individual human beings, which includes the legal parent-child relationship ( Mennesson v. France, 2014, § 96). Therefore, Article 8 protects children born to a surrogate mother outside the member State in question, whose legal parents according to the foreign State could not register as such under domestic law (see, for a summary of the principle, for instance, D v. France, 2020, §§ 45-54). The Court does not require that States legalise surrogacy and, furthermore, States may demand proof of parentage for children born to surrogates before issuing the child's identity papers. However, the child's right to respect for his or her private life requires that domestic law provide a possibility of recognition of the legal relationship between a child born through a surrogacy arrangement abroad and the intended father, where he is the biological father ( Mennesson v. France, 2014; Labassee v. France, 2014; Foulon and Bouvet v. France, 2016; C v. Italy, 2023; R.F. and Others v. Germany, 2024).\n\nIn its first Advisory Opinion, the Court clarified that where a child is born through a gestational surrogacy arrangement abroad, in a situation where he or she was conceived using the eggs of a third- party donor, and the intended mother is designated in a birth certificate legally established abroad as the \"legal mother\", the child' s right to respect for his or her private life also requires that domestic law provide a possibility of recognition of a legal parent-child relationship with the intended mother. The choice of means by which to achieve recognition of the legal relationship between the child and the intended mother falls within the State's margin of appreciation. However, once the relationship between the child and the intended mother has become a \"practical reality\" the procedure laid d own to establish recognition of the relationship in domestic law must be capable of being \"implemented promptly and efficiently\" ( Advisory opinion concerning the recognition in domestic law of a legal parent-child relationship between a child born through a gestational surrogacy arrangement abroad and the intended mother [GC]). Applying the principles of Mennesson v. France, 2014, and the before- mentioned Advisory opinion, the Court found that the obligation for children born under a surrogacy arrangement to be adopted in order to ensure the legal recognition between the genetic mother and her child did not violate the mother's right to private life ( D v. France, 2020; R.F. and Others v. Germany, 2024). However, in K.K. and Others v. Denmark, 2022, it found that the refusal of the intended mother's application to adopt, where domestic law did not provide for other possibilities of recognition of a legal parent-child relationship with the intended mother, violated the children's right to respect for their private lives (§§ 56-77). In A.M. v. Norway, 2022, the applicant was the intended mother of a child born in the USvia a surrogacy arrangement. After returning to Norway, the biological father (her former partner) cut off her contact with the child and the domestic courts rejected her claims to have her parental status under USlaw recognised in Norway, and to be allowed to adopt the child. Although the Court accepted that the applicant 's situation was \"particularly harsh\" it f ound it difficult to attribute this consequence to the authorities. Moreover, while the applicant had been put in a difficult situation, the domestic courts had examined the interests of all the parties involved and, in its view, the outcome had to be considered to fall within the margin of appreciation afforded to domestic authorities (see the States'margin of appreciation on the issue of surrogacy, § 131).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240618070506/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250523211813/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -22481,6 +23773,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:45430/19", "case_name": "Toth and Crișan v. Romania*", @@ -22498,7 +23792,7 @@ "linked_change_types": "section_moved_modified|minor_edit", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.F.c|a:222|b:56|II.A.1|a:87|b:87", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "When balancing freedom of expression protected by Article 10 and the right to respect for private life enshrined in Article 8, the Court has applied several criteria. They include the contribution to a debate of general interest; how well known is the person concerned and what is the subject of the report; his or her prior conduct; the method of obtaining the information and its veracity; the A xel content, form and consequences of the publication; and the severity of the sanction imposed ( Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 2012, § 89-95). These criteria are not exhaustive and should be transposed and adapted in the light of the particular circumstances of the case ( Axel Springer SE an d RTL Television GmbH v. Germany, 2017, § 42; Jishkariani v. Georgia, 2018, § 46; see also McCann and Healy v. Portugal, 2022, §§ 80-81 and 98-101). For instance, in Mesić v. Croatia, 2022, the Court took into account certain additional criteria: on the one hand, the applicant's status as a politician and a high-ranking State official, and on the other, the complainant's status as an advocate (§ 86).\n\nPrivate life is a broad concept incapable of exhaustive definition ( Niemietz v. Germany, 1992, § 29; Pretty v. the United Kingdom, 2002, § 61; Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 57). It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person and may \"embrace multiple aspects of the person's Denisov v. Ukraine S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom physical and social identity\" ( [GC], 2018, § 95; [GC], 2008, § 66). However, through its case-law, the Court has provided guidance as to the meaning and scope of private life for the purposes of Article 8 ( Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 159). Moreover, the generous approach to the definition of personal interests has allowed the case- law to develop in line with social and technological developments.", + "pre_text": "When balancing freedom of expression protected by Article 10 and the right to respect for private life enshrined in Article 8, the Court has applied several criteria. They include the contribution to a debate of general interest; how well known is the person concerned and what is the subject of the report; his or her prior conduct; the method of obtaining the information and its veracity; the Axel content, form and consequences of the publication; and the severity of the sanction imposed ( Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 2012, § 89-95). These criteria are not exhaustive and should be transposed and adapted in the light of the particular circumstances of the case ( Axel Springer SE an d RTL Television GmbH v. Germany, 2017, § 42; Jishkariani v. Georgia, 2018, § 46; see also McCann and Healy v. Portugal, 2022, §§ 80-81 and 98-101). For instance, in Mesić v. Croatia, 2022, the Court took into account certain additional criteria: on the one hand, the applicant's status as a politician and a high-ranking State official, and on the other, the complainant's status as an advocate (§ 86).\n\nPrivate life is a broad concept incapable of exhaustive definition ( Niemietz v. Germany, 1992, § 29; Pretty v. the United Kingdom, 2002, § 61; Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 57). It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person and may \"embrace multiple aspects of the person's Denisov v. Ukraine S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom physical and social identity\" ( [GC], 2018, § 95; [GC], 2008, § 66). However, through its case-law, the Court has provided guidance as to the meaning and scope of private life for the purposes of Article 8 ( Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 159). Moreover, the generous approach to the definition of personal interests has allowed the case- law to develop in line with social and technological developments.", "post_text": "In cases which require the right to respect for private life to be balanced against the right to freedom of expression, the Court considers that the outcome of the application should not, in theory, vary according to whether it has been lodged with the Court under Article 8 of the Convention by the person who was the subject of the news report, or under Article 10 by the publisher. Indeed, as a matter of principle these rights deserve equal respect ( Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France [GC], 2015, § 91; Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 123; Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], 2017, § 77; McCann and Healy v. Portugal, 2022, § 80; Toth and Crișan v. Romania *, 2025, § 50). Accordingly, the margin of appreciation should in theory be the same in both cases. The non-exhaustive criteria defined by the case-law include the following ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, §§ 165-166): the contribution to a debate of public interest, the degree of notoriety of the person affected, the subject of the news report, the prior conduct of the person concerned, the content, form and consequences of the publication, and, where appropriate, the circumstances in which the photographs were taken ( Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France [GC], 2015, §§ 90-93; Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], 2012, §§ 108-113; Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 2012, §§ 89-95), the order of which may be examined differently ( M.L. v. Slovakia, 2021, §§ 35 and 36). Furthermore, in the context of an application lodged under Article 10, the Court examines the way in which the information was obtained and its veracity, and the gravity of the penalty imposed on the journalists or publishers ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 165). Some of these criteria may have more or less relevance given the particular circumstances of the case (see, for a case concerning the mass collection, processing and publication of tax data, ibid., § 166), and according to the context, other criteria may also apply ( Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], 2017, § 88). With regard to the way in which the information was obtained, the Court has held that the press should normally be entitled to rely on the content of official reports without further verification of the facts presented in the document ( Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], 1999, § 68; Mityanin and Leonov v. Russia, 2019, § 109).\n\nPrivate life is a broad concept incapable of exhaustive definition ( Niemietz v. Germany, 1992, § 29; Pretty v. the United Kingdom, 2002, § 61; Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 57). It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person and may \"embrace multiple aspects of the person' s physical and social identity\" ( Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, § 95; S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 66; Toth and Crișan v. Romania *, 2025, § 30). However, through its case-law, the Court has provided guidance as to the meaning and scope of private life for the purposes of Article 8 ( Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 159). Moreover, the generous approach to the definition of personal interests has allowed the case-law to develop in line with social and technological developments.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240618070506/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250523211813/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", @@ -22514,6 +23808,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "9 April 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-04-09", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:42917/16", "case_name": "Zăicescu and Fălticineanu v. Romania", @@ -22547,6 +23843,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-19", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:6033/19", "case_name": "A.R. v. the United Kingdom", @@ -22564,8 +23862,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added|paragraph_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.C|a:24|b:24|I.F.1.b|a:47|b:47|II.A.2|a:None|b:117", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "A finding that the measure in question was not \"in accordance with the law\" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a \"legitimate aim\" or was \"necessary in a democratic society\" (M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be \"in accordance with the law\", as a result of an unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 (Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been \"neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society\" (§§ 62-63). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be \"in accordance with the law\" was so closely linked to the \"necessary in a democratic society\" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together (S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 66; Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*, 2024, § 103).\n\nMoreover, in several cases where a close link was found between the complaints raised under Article 6 and Article 8, the Court has considered the complaint under Article 6 as being part of the complaint under Article 8 (Anghel v. Italy, 2013, § 69; Diamante and Pelliccioni v. San Marino, 2011, § 151; Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, § 57; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, § 187). In G.B. v. Lithuania, 2016, the Court did not consider it necessary to examine separately whether there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 given that the Court had found that the applicant's procedural rights had been respected when examining her complaints under Article 8 (§ 113). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 1987, 2021, the Court found no need to give a separate ruling on the admissibility and merits of the complaint under Article 6 § 1 since it had already examined, from the standpoint of Article 8, the applicant's complaint about a violation of her procedural rights affecting her right to respect for her private life (§ 78).", - "post_text": "A finding that the measure in question was not \"in accordance with the law\" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a \"legitimate aim\" or was \"necessary in a democratic society\" (M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129; A.R. v. the United Kingdom, 2025, § 70). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be \"in accordance with the law\", as a result of an unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 (Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been \"neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society\" (§§ 62-63). In Selishcheva and Others v. Russia, 2025 the Court found that the interference was neither \"prescribed by law\" nor \"necessary in a democratic society\" (§ 37). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be \"in accordance with the law\" was so closely linked to the \"necessary in a democratic society\" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together (S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 66; Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*, 2024, § 103).\n\nMoreover, in several cases where a close link was found between the complaints raised under Article 6 and Article 8, the Court has considered the complaint under Article 6 as being part of the complaint under Article 8 (Anghel v. Italy, 2013, § 69; Diamante and Pelliccioni v. San Marino, 2011, § 151; Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, § 57; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, § 187; A.R. v. the United Kingdom, 2025, § 71). In G.B. v. Lithuania, 2016, the Court did not consider it necessary to examine separately whether there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 given that the Court had found that the applicant's procedural rights had been respected when examining her complaints under Article 8 (§ 113). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 1987, 2021, the Court found no need to give a separate ruling on the admissibility and merits of the complaint under Article 6 § 1 since it had already examined, from the standpoint of Article 8, the applicant's complaint about a violation of her procedural rights affecting her right to respect for her private life (§ 78).\n\nIn S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court considered that the decision of a judge of the Family Court to, in the first place, criticise the applicant in strong terms without giving her an adequate opportunity to respond and, then, to direct that those criticisms be shared with the local authorities where she had worked and with the relevant professional bodies, had significantly affected her ability to pursue her chosen professional activity, which in turn would have had consequential effects on the enjoyment of her right to respect for her \"private life\" within the meaning of Article 8 (§ 47). In A.R. v. the United Kingdom, 2005, the Court considered the disclosure, to a prospective employer, of a criminal charge of which the applicant had been acquitted. The Court found that the statutory regime was not in accordance with the law, and therefore in breach of Article 8, because at the relevant time the legal provisions in force, taken together with applicable guidance, left an excessively broad discretion for the competent authorities in the application of the disclosure provisions, and there was no guidance to assist employers when faced with the task of deciding how to approach information concerning criminal allegations of which an individual had been acquitted (§§ 60-70; see also M.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2012).", + "pre_text": "Afinding that the measure in question was not \"in accordance with the law\" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a \"legitimate aim\" or was \"necessary in a democratic society\" (M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be \"in accordance with the law\", as a result of an unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 (Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been \"neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society\" (§§ 62-63). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be \"in accordance with the law\" was so closely linked to the \"necessary in a democratic society\" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together (S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 66; Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*, 2024, § 103).\n\nMoreover, in several cases where a close link was found between the complaints raised under Article 6 and Article 8, the Court has considered the complaint under Article 6 as being part of the complaint under Article 8 (Anghel v. Italy, 2013, § 69; Diamante and Pelliccioni v. San Marino, 2011, § 151; Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, § 57; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, § 187). In G.B. v. Lithuania, 2016, the Court did not consider it necessary to examine separately whether there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 given that the Court had found that the applicant's procedural rights had been respected when examining her complaints under Article 8 (§ 113). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 1987, 2021, the Court found no need to give a separate ruling on the admissibility and merits of the complaint under Article 6 § 1 since it had already examined, from the standpoint of Article 8, the applicant's complaint about a violation of her procedural rights affecting her right to respect for her private life (§ 78).", + "post_text": "Afinding that the measure in question was not \"in accordance with the law\" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a \"legitimate aim\" or was \"necessary in a democratic society\" (M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129; A.R. v. the United Kingdom, 2025, § 70). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be \"in accordance with the law\", as a result of an unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 (Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been \"neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society\" (§§ 62-63). In Selishcheva and Others v. Russia, 2025 the Court found that the interference was neither \"prescribed by law\" nor \"necessary in a democratic society\" (§ 37). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be \"in accordance with the law\" was so closely linked to the \"necessary in a democratic society\" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together (S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 66; Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*, 2024, § 103).\n\nMoreover, in several cases where a close link was found between the complaints raised under Article 6 and Article 8, the Court has considered the complaint under Article 6 as being part of the complaint under Article 8 (Anghel v. Italy, 2013, § 69; Diamante and Pelliccioni v. San Marino, 2011, § 151; Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, § 57; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, § 187; A.R. v. the United Kingdom, 2025, § 71). In G.B. v. Lithuania, 2016, the Court did not consider it necessary to examine separately whether there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 given that the Court had found that the applicant's procedural rights had been respected when examining her complaints under Article 8 (§ 113). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 1987, 2021, the Court found no need to give a separate ruling on the admissibility and merits of the complaint under Article 6 § 1 since it had already examined, from the standpoint of Article 8, the applicant's complaint about a violation of her procedural rights affecting her right to respect for her private life (§ 78).\n\nIn S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court considered that the decision of a judge of the Family Court to, in the first place, criticise the applicant in strong terms without giving her an adequate opportunity to respond and, then, to direct that those criticisms be shared with the local authorities where she had worked and with the relevant professional bodies, had significantly affected her ability to pursue her chosen professional activity, which in turn would have had consequential effects on the enjoyment of her right to respect for her \"private life\" within the meaning of Article 8 (§ 47). In A.R. v. the United Kingdom, 2005, the Court considered the disclosure, to a prospective employer, of a criminal charge of which the applicant had been acquitted. The Court found that the statutory regime was not in accordance with the law, and therefore in breach of Article 8, because at the relevant time the legal provisions in force, taken together with applicable guidance, left an excessively broad discretion for the competent authorities in the application of the disclosure provisions, and there was no guidance to assist employers when faced with the task of deciding how to approach information concerning criminal allegations of which an individual had been acquitted (§§ 60-70; see also M.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2012).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250523211813/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20251219191704/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -22580,6 +23878,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-19", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:3485/21", "case_name": "Andronache v. Romania (dec.)", @@ -22598,7 +23898,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "III|a:None|b:338|III.D.3.h|a:None|b:428", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "The notion of family life is an autonomous concept (Marckx v. Belgium, 1979, § 31). Consequently, whether or not \"family life\" exists is essentially a question of fact depending upon the real existence in practice of close personal ties (Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 140). The Court will therefore look at de facto family ties, such as applicants living together, in the absence of any legal recognition of family life (Johnston and Others v. Ireland, 1986, § 56). Other factors will include the length of the relationship and, in the case of couples, whether they have demonstrated their commitment to each other by having children together (X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 36; Andronache v. Romania (dec.), 2025, § 54). Therefore, the notion of \"family\" in Article 8 concerns marriage-based relationships, and also other de facto \"family ties\", including between same- sex couples, where the parties are living together outside marriage or where other factors 63 See also other chapters of the Guide for further references. demonstrated that the relationship had sufficient constancy (Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 140 and Oliari and Others v. Italy, 2016, § 130)64. \"Family life\" can extend after the age of majority on account of \"additional elements of dependence\" allowing for the existence of \"family life\" between parents and adult children (see, for instance, Belli and Arquier-Martinez v. Switzerland, 2018, § 65; Emonet and Others v. Switzerland, 2007, § 80; Bierski v. Poland, 2022, § 47; Advisory opinion on the procedural status and rights of a biological parent in proceedings for the adoption of an adult [GC], 2023, § 50, and, in the immigration context, Savran v. Denmark [GC], 2021, § 174 and the references therein).\n\nThe judgment in Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway [GC], 2019, summarised the case-law principles (§§ 202-213) applicable to cases where the authorities have decided to replace the foster home arrangement with a more far-reaching type of measure, namely deprivation of parental responsibilities and authorisation of adoption. The Court has had regard to the principle that \"such measures should only be applied in exceptional circumstances and could only be justified if they were motivated by an overriding requirement pertaining to the child's best interests\" (S.S. v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 85-87, 96 and 103; Aune v. Norway, 2010, § 66). A mother's financial situation cannot, without regard for changed circumstances, justify the removal of a child from her mother's care (R.M.S. v. Spain, 2013, § 92). Likewise, a breach was found where domestic authorities had merely based their decision on the applicant's financial and social difficulties, without providing him with appropriate social assistance (Akinnibosun v. Italy, 2015, §§ 83-84). In Soares De Melo v. Portugal, 2016, the Court found a violation of Article 8 where the children of a woman living in precarious conditions were placed in care with a view to adoption, resulting in the severance of the family ties (§§ 118-123). Further, the absence of skills and experience in rearing children could hardly in itself be regarded as a legitimate ground for restricting parental authority or keeping a child in public care (Kocherov and Sergeyeva v. Russia, 2016, § 106, concerning a father with a mild intellectual disability). In Van Slooten v. the Netherlands, 2025, § 73, the domestic authorities having put considerable weight on the child's vulnerability without any in-depth analysis thereof when terminating the mother's parental authority, contributed to the finding of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. In Andronache v. Romania (dec.), 2025, the nature of the crimes committed by the father, who was the only surviving parent and serving a prison term at that time, was taken into account, among other things, in the domestic courts' assessment (§§ 54-67).", + "post_text": "The notion of family life is an autonomous concept (Marckx v. Belgium, 1979, § 31). Consequently, whether or not \"family life\" exists is essentially a question of fact depending upon the real existence in practice of close personal ties (Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 140). The Court will therefore look at de facto family ties, such as applicants living together, in the absence of any legal recognition of family life (Johnston and Others v. Ireland, 1986, § 56). Other factors will include the length of the relationship and, in the case of couples, whether they have demonstrated their commitment to each other by having children together (X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 36; Andronache v. Romania (dec.), 2025, § 54). Therefore, the notion of \"family\" in Article 8 concerns marriage-based relationships, and also other de facto \"family ties\", including between same- sex couples, where the parties are living together outside marriage or where other factors 63 See also other chapters of the Guide for further references. demonstrated that the relationship had sufficient constancy (Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 140 and Oliari and Others v. Italy, 2016, § 130)64. \"Family life\" can extend after the age of majority on account of \"additional elements of dependence\" allowing for the existence of \"family life\" between parents and adult children (see, for instance, Belli and Arquier-Martinez v. Switzerland, 2018, § 65; Emonet and Others v. Switzerland, 2007, § 80; Bierski v. Poland, 2022, § 47; Advisory opinion on the procedural status and rights of a biological parent in proceedings for the adoption of an adult [GC], 2023, § 50, and, in the immigration context, Savran v. Denmark [GC], 2021, § 174 and the references therein).\n\nThe judgment in Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway [GC], 2019, summarised the case-law principles (§§ 202-213) applicable to cases where the authorities have decided to replace the foster home arrangement with a more far-reaching type of measure, namely deprivation of parental responsibilities and authorisation of adoption. The Court has had regard to the principle that \"such measures should only be applied in exceptional circumstances and could only be justified if they were motivated by an overriding requirement pertaining to the child's best interests\" (S.S. v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 85-87, 96 and 103; Aune v. Norway, 2010, § 66). Amother's financial situation cannot, without regard for changed circumstances, justify the removal of a child from her mother's care (R.M.S. v. Spain, 2013, § 92). Likewise, a breach was found where domestic authorities had merely based their decision on the applicant's financial and social difficulties, without providing him with appropriate social assistance (Akinnibosun v. Italy, 2015, §§ 83-84). In Soares De Melo v. Portugal, 2016, the Court found a violation of Article 8 where the children of a woman living in precarious conditions were placed in care with a view to adoption, resulting in the severance of the family ties (§§ 118-123). Further, the absence of skills and experience in rearing children could hardly in itself be regarded as a legitimate ground for restricting parental authority or keeping a child in public care (Kocherov and Sergeyeva v. Russia, 2016, § 106, concerning a father with a mild intellectual disability). In Van Slooten v. the Netherlands, 2025, § 73, the domestic authorities having put considerable weight on the child's vulnerability without any in-depth analysis thereof when terminating the mother's parental authority, contributed to the finding of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. In Andronache v. Romania (dec.), 2025, the nature of the crimes committed by the father, who was the only surviving parent and serving a prison term at that time, was taken into account, among other things, in the domestic courts' assessment (§§ 54-67).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250523211813/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20251219191704/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -22613,6 +23913,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-19", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:43316/98", "case_name": "B.R. v. Poland", @@ -22646,6 +23948,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-19", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:4581/16", "case_name": "B.T. and B.K.Cs. v. Hungary", @@ -22679,6 +23983,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-19", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:48302/21", "case_name": "Demirci v. Hungary", @@ -22712,6 +24018,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-19", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:22077/19", "case_name": "Green v. the United Kingdom", @@ -22745,6 +24053,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-19", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:46949/21|24989/22|39759/22", "case_name": "L and Others v. France", @@ -22778,6 +24088,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-19", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:24029/07", "case_name": "M.M. v. the United Kingdom", @@ -22811,6 +24123,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-19", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:12908/23|24544/23", "case_name": "Paic and Wernersson v. Sweden (dec.)", @@ -22844,6 +24158,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-19", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:5742/22", "case_name": "S.O. v. Spain*", @@ -22877,6 +24193,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-19", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:21669/21", "case_name": "Sahiner v. Austria", @@ -22910,6 +24228,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-19", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:39056/22", "case_name": "Selishcheva and Others v. Russia", @@ -22927,8 +24247,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.C|a:24|b:24", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "A finding that the measure in question was not \"in accordance with the law\" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a \"legitimate aim\" or was \"necessary in a democratic society\" (M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be \"in accordance with the law\", as a result of an unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 (Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been \"neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society\" (§§ 62-63). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be \"in accordance with the law\" was so closely linked to the \"necessary in a democratic society\" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together (S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 66; Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*, 2024, § 103).", - "post_text": "A finding that the measure in question was not \"in accordance with the law\" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a \"legitimate aim\" or was \"necessary in a democratic society\" (M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129; A.R. v. the United Kingdom, 2025, § 70). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be \"in accordance with the law\", as a result of an unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 (Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been \"neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society\" (§§ 62-63). In Selishcheva and Others v. Russia, 2025 the Court found that the interference was neither \"prescribed by law\" nor \"necessary in a democratic society\" (§ 37). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be \"in accordance with the law\" was so closely linked to the \"necessary in a democratic society\" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together (S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 66; Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*, 2024, § 103).", + "pre_text": "Afinding that the measure in question was not \"in accordance with the law\" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a \"legitimate aim\" or was \"necessary in a democratic society\" (M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be \"in accordance with the law\", as a result of an unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 (Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been \"neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society\" (§§ 62-63). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be \"in accordance with the law\" was so closely linked to the \"necessary in a democratic society\" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together (S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 66; Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*, 2024, § 103).", + "post_text": "Afinding that the measure in question was not \"in accordance with the law\" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a \"legitimate aim\" or was \"necessary in a democratic society\" (M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129; A.R. v. the United Kingdom, 2025, § 70). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be \"in accordance with the law\", as a result of an unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 (Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been \"neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society\" (§§ 62-63). In Selishcheva and Others v. Russia, 2025 the Court found that the interference was neither \"prescribed by law\" nor \"necessary in a democratic society\" (§ 37). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be \"in accordance with the law\" was so closely linked to the \"necessary in a democratic society\" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together (S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 66; Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*, 2024, § 103).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250523211813/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20251219191704/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -22943,6 +24263,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-19", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:2799/16", "case_name": "Ships Waste Oil Collector B.V. and Others v. the Netherlands", @@ -22976,6 +24298,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-19", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:16497/20", "case_name": "Sytnyk v. Ukraine", @@ -23009,6 +24333,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-19", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:8019/16", "case_name": "Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC]", @@ -23027,7 +24353,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.C.6|a:None|b:253|III.D.3.e|a:None|b:408|IV.A.2|a:None|b:487", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "In Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025, the Court found that systematic and extensive data gathering from civilians in the context of filtration measures was not \"in accordance with the law\" within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. Such measures entailed downloading phone contact lists, registering identification numbers of the telephones, including IMEI numbers, collecting passport numbers, scanning for biometric indicators and questioning people on their background and political beliefs, and allowed for a creation of extensive database of the persons subjected to such measures.\n\nThe case of Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025 addressed a particular form of abduction of children: the administrative practice of transferring Ukrainian children to Russia (which did not qualify as lawful evacuation under the international humanitarian law) without parental or legal consent, coupled with the absence of any steps by the Russian authorities to secure the children's reunification with their parents or caregivers. This was followed by the facilitation of the children's adoption in Russia by way of the automatic imposition of Russian nationality on them. The Court found that this practice amounted to an interference with the children's right to respect for their private and family lives and was not \"in accordance with the law\" within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention (§§ 1567-1594).\n\nThe following can be cited as examples of possible \"interference\" with the right to respect for one's home: ▪ deliberate destruction of the home by the authorities (Selçuk and Asker v. Turkey, 1998, § 86; Akdivar and Others v. Turkey [GC], 1996, § 88; Menteş and Others v. Turkey, 1997, § 73) or confiscation (Aboufadda v. France (dec.), 2014); demolition of home unlawfully built (Ghailan and Others v. Spain, 2012, § 55); ▪ refusal to allow displaced persons to return to their homes (Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 2001, § 174) which may amount to a \"continuing violation\" of Article 8; ▪ the transfer of the inhabitants of a village by decision of the authorities (Noack and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2000); ▪ civilians being \"evacuated\" by being gathered, directed and at times escorted from their homes by armed men in circumstances where the alleged \"evacuation\" was not lawful under international humanitarian law (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025, § 1165-1167); ▪ civilians being forced to leave their homes due to fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression and abuse of power: the absence of direct physical force did not render the displacement voluntary given that, in the circumstances, the civilians were deprived of a genuine choice between remaining in their homes and fleeing for safety (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025, § 1166 and 1168-1171); ▪ police entry into a person's home (Gutsanovi v. Bulgaria, 2013, § 217; Sabani v. Belgium, 2022, § 41) and a search (Murray v. the United Kingdom, 1994, § 86), even where the applicant has cooperated to the extent of opening the door for the unannounced police, because a waiver of the fundamental right to protection of one's home can only be made free of coercion and on the basis of unequivocal and informed consent (Sabani v. Belgium, 2022, § 46); and a police operation to return an elderly, dependent and highly vulnerable woman to her care home (Jarrand v. France, 2021, § 75); ▪ searches and seizures (Chappell v. the United Kingdom, 1989, §§ 50-51; Funke v. France, 1993, § 48), even where the applicant has co-operated with the police (Saint-Paul Luxembourg S.A. v. Luxembourg, 2013, § 38) and where the offence giving rise to the search had been committed by a third party (Buck v. Germany, 2005), and, more generally, any measure, if it is no different in its manner of execution and its practical effects from a search, regardless of its characterisation under domestic law (Kruglov and Others v. Russia, 2020, § 123); ▪ home visits of public officials without permission, even when no search is carried out and the visit does not lead to a seizure of documents or other objects (Halabi v. France, 2019, §§ 54-56); ▪ occupation or damaging of property (Khamidov v. Russia, 2007, § 138) or expulsion from home (Orlić v. Croatia, 2011, § 56 with further references therein), including an eviction order which has not yet been enforced (Gladysheva v. Russia, 2011, § 91; Ćosić v. Croatia, 2009, § 22); ▪ the dissemination of photographic images of the interior of a country house (Samoylova v. Russia, 2021, § 66).", + "post_text": "In Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025, the Court found that systematic and extensive data gathering from civilians in the context of filtration measures was not \"in accordance with the law\" within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. Such measures entailed downloading phone contact lists, registering identification numbers of the telephones, including IMEInumbers, collecting passport numbers, scanning for biometric indicators and questioning people on their background and political beliefs, and allowed for a creation of extensive database of the persons subjected to such measures.\n\nThe case of Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025 addressed a particular form of abduction of children: the administrative practice of transferring Ukrainian children to Russia (which did not qualify as lawful evacuation under the international humanitarian law) without parental or legal consent, coupled with the absence of any steps by the Russian authorities to secure the children's reunification with their parents or caregivers. This was followed by the facilitation of the children's adoption in Russia by way of the automatic imposition of Russian nationality on them. The Court found that this practice amounted to an interference with the children's right to respect for their private and family lives and was not \"in accordance with the law\" within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention (§§ 1567-1594).\n\nThe following can be cited as examples of possible \"interference\" with the right to respect for one's home: ▪ deliberate destruction of the home by the authorities (Selçuk and Asker v. Turkey, 1998, § 86; Akdivar and Others v. Turkey [GC], 1996, § 88; Menteş and Others v. Turkey, 1997, § 73) or confiscation (Aboufadda v. France (dec.), 2014); demolition of home unlawfully built (Ghailan and Others v. Spain, 2012, § 55); ▪ refusal to allow displaced persons to return to their homes (Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 2001, § 174) which may amount to a \"continuing violation\" of Article 8; ▪ the transfer of the inhabitants of a village by decision of the authorities (Noack and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2000); ▪ civilians being \"evacuated\" by being gathered, directed and at times escorted from their homes by armed men in circumstances where the alleged \"evacuation\" was not lawful under international humanitarian law (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025, § 1165-1167); ▪ civilians being forced to leave their homes due to fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression and abuse of power: the absence of direct physical force did not render the displacement voluntary given that, in the circumstances, the civilians were deprived of a genuine choice between remaining in their homes and fleeing for safety (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025, § 1166 and 1168-1171); ▪ police entry into a person's home (Gutsanovi v. Bulgaria, 2013, § 217; Sabani v. Belgium, 2022, § 41) and a search (Murray v. the United Kingdom, 1994, § 86), even where the applicant has cooperated to the extent of opening the door for the unannounced police, because a waiver of the fundamental right to protection of one's home can only be made free of coercion and on the basis of unequivocal and informed consent (Sabani v. Belgium, 2022, § 46); and a police operation to return an elderly, dependent and highly vulnerable woman to her care home (Jarrand v. France, 2021, § 75); ▪ searches and seizures (Chappell v. the United Kingdom, 1989, §§ 50-51; Funke v. France, 1993, § 48), even where the applicant has co-operated with the police (Saint-Paul Luxembourg S.A. v. Luxembourg, 2013, § 38) and where the offence giving rise to the search had been committed by a third party (Buck v. Germany, 2005), and, more generally, any measure, if it is no different in its manner of execution and its practical effects from a search, regardless of its characterisation under domestic law (Kruglov and Others v. Russia, 2020, § 123); ▪ home visits of public officials without permission, even when no search is carried out and the visit does not lead to a seizure of documents or other objects (Halabi v. France, 2019, §§ 54-56); ▪ occupation or damaging of property (Khamidov v. Russia, 2007, § 138) or expulsion from home (Orlić v. Croatia, 2011, § 56 with further references therein), including an eviction order which has not yet been enforced (Gladysheva v. Russia, 2011, § 91; Ćosić v. Croatia, 2009, § 22); ▪ the dissemination of photographic images of the interior of a country house (Samoylova v. Russia, 2021, § 66).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250523211813/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20251219191704/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -23042,6 +24368,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-19", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:45644/18", "case_name": "Van Slooten v. the Netherlands", @@ -23060,7 +24388,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.D.3.h|a:None|b:428|III.D.3.h|a:None|b:430", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "The judgment in Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway [GC], 2019, summarised the case-law principles (§§ 202-213) applicable to cases where the authorities have decided to replace the foster home arrangement with a more far-reaching type of measure, namely deprivation of parental responsibilities and authorisation of adoption. The Court has had regard to the principle that \"such measures should only be applied in exceptional circumstances and could only be justified if they were motivated by an overriding requirement pertaining to the child's best interests\" (S.S. v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 85-87, 96 and 103; Aune v. Norway, 2010, § 66). A mother's financial situation cannot, without regard for changed circumstances, justify the removal of a child from her mother's care (R.M.S. v. Spain, 2013, § 92). Likewise, a breach was found where domestic authorities had merely based their decision on the applicant's financial and social difficulties, without providing him with appropriate social assistance (Akinnibosun v. Italy, 2015, §§ 83-84). In Soares De Melo v. Portugal, 2016, the Court found a violation of Article 8 where the children of a woman living in precarious conditions were placed in care with a view to adoption, resulting in the severance of the family ties (§§ 118-123). Further, the absence of skills and experience in rearing children could hardly in itself be regarded as a legitimate ground for restricting parental authority or keeping a child in public care (Kocherov and Sergeyeva v. Russia, 2016, § 106, concerning a father with a mild intellectual disability). In Van Slooten v. the Netherlands, 2025, § 73, the domestic authorities having put considerable weight on the child's vulnerability without any in-depth analysis thereof when terminating the mother's parental authority, contributed to the finding of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. In Andronache v. Romania (dec.), 2025, the nature of the crimes committed by the father, who was the only surviving parent and serving a prison term at that time, was taken into account, among other things, in the domestic courts' assessment (§§ 54-67).\n\nA care order should be regarded as a temporary measure, to be discontinued as soon as circumstances permit, and any measures implementing temporary care should be consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the natural parents and the child (Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway [GC], 2019, § 208; Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1), 1988, § 81). The positive duty to take measures to facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible will begin to weigh on the competent authorities with increasing force as from the commencement of the period of care, subject always to its being balanced against the duty to consider the best interests of the child (K. and T. v. Finland [GC], 2001, § 178 and Haddad v. Spain, 2019, § 54). The Court found a violation of Article 8 where the domestic authorities, by declaring the children of the applicant adoptable, did not make all the necessary efforts to preserve the parent-child relationship (S.H. v. Italy, 2015, § 58). A violation was found where a mother was denied contact rights in respect of her child in foster care because of abduction risk by the father. As the Court pointed out, the risk of abduction of the applicant's child by her father (and hence the issue of his protection) should not prevail over sufficiently addressing the mother's contact rights with her child (Jansen v. Norway, 2018, §§ 103-104). The Court also found a violation of Article 8 where the authorities did not re-establish contact between a child and her father following his acquittal of charges of domestic violence and the return of two older children to his care. The Court did not find convincing the reasons relied on by the authorities and domestic courts to justify the child's placement in pre-adoption care (Haddad v. Spain, 2019, §§ 57-74). In comparison, in A and Others v. Iceland, 2022, the Supreme Court had not based its decision to deprive the first and second applicants of custody on a finding that the allegations against the first applicant were true. On the contrary, the Supreme Court recognised the final binding force of the first applicant's acquittal, but noted that that acquittal alone could not be determinative of the childcare proceedings. It proceeded to carry out an assessment of the facts of the case and the available expert evidence, without any further reference to the criminal proceedings against the first applicant or any allegedly criminal behaviour on his part. The Court therefore concluded that the domestic authorities had acted within their margin of appreciation (§§ 84-97). In Van Slooten v. the Netherlands, 2025, §§ 74-77, proceedings for terminating a mother's parental authority were at stake. In giving up on family reunification as the ultimate goal at a very early stage, without a proper assessment of the applicant's parenting capacity or adequately demonstrating why reunification would no longer be compatible with the child's best interests, the domestic authorities contributed to finding a violation of Article 8 (see also paragraph 428 above).", + "post_text": "The judgment in Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway [GC], 2019, summarised the case-law principles (§§ 202-213) applicable to cases where the authorities have decided to replace the foster home arrangement with a more far-reaching type of measure, namely deprivation of parental responsibilities and authorisation of adoption. The Court has had regard to the principle that \"such measures should only be applied in exceptional circumstances and could only be justified if they were motivated by an overriding requirement pertaining to the child's best interests\" (S.S. v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 85-87, 96 and 103; Aune v. Norway, 2010, § 66). Amother's financial situation cannot, without regard for changed circumstances, justify the removal of a child from her mother's care (R.M.S. v. Spain, 2013, § 92). Likewise, a breach was found where domestic authorities had merely based their decision on the applicant's financial and social difficulties, without providing him with appropriate social assistance (Akinnibosun v. Italy, 2015, §§ 83-84). In Soares De Melo v. Portugal, 2016, the Court found a violation of Article 8 where the children of a woman living in precarious conditions were placed in care with a view to adoption, resulting in the severance of the family ties (§§ 118-123). Further, the absence of skills and experience in rearing children could hardly in itself be regarded as a legitimate ground for restricting parental authority or keeping a child in public care (Kocherov and Sergeyeva v. Russia, 2016, § 106, concerning a father with a mild intellectual disability). In Van Slooten v. the Netherlands, 2025, § 73, the domestic authorities having put considerable weight on the child's vulnerability without any in-depth analysis thereof when terminating the mother's parental authority, contributed to the finding of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. In Andronache v. Romania (dec.), 2025, the nature of the crimes committed by the father, who was the only surviving parent and serving a prison term at that time, was taken into account, among other things, in the domestic courts' assessment (§§ 54-67).\n\nAcare order should be regarded as a temporary measure, to be discontinued as soon as circumstances permit, and any measures implementing temporary care should be consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the natural parents and the child (Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway [GC], 2019, § 208; Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1), 1988, § 81). The positive duty to take measures to facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible will begin to weigh on the competent authorities with increasing force as from the commencement of the period of care, subject always to its being balanced against the duty to consider the best interests of the child (K. and T. v. Finland [GC], 2001, § 178 and Haddad v. Spain, 2019, § 54). The Court found a violation of Article 8 where the domestic authorities, by declaring the children of the applicant adoptable, did not make all the necessary efforts to preserve the parent-child relationship (S.H. v. Italy, 2015, § 58). Aviolation was found where a mother was denied contact rights in respect of her child in foster care because of abduction risk by the father. As the Court pointed out, the risk of abduction of the applicant's child by her father (and hence the issue of his protection) should not prevail over sufficiently addressing the mother's contact rights with her child (Jansen v. Norway, 2018, §§ 103-104). The Court also found a violation of Article 8 where the authorities did not re-establish contact between a child and her father following his acquittal of charges of domestic violence and the return of two older children to his care. The Court did not find convincing the reasons relied on by the authorities and domestic courts to justify the child's placement in pre-adoption care (Haddad v. Spain, 2019, §§ 57-74). In comparison, in A and Others v. Iceland, 2022, the Supreme Court had not based its decision to deprive the first and second applicants of custody on a finding that the allegations against the first applicant were true. On the contrary, the Supreme Court recognised the final binding force of the first applicant's acquittal, but noted that that acquittal alone could not be determinative of the childcare proceedings. It proceeded to carry out an assessment of the facts of the case and the available expert evidence, without any further reference to the criminal proceedings against the first applicant or any allegedly criminal behaviour on his part. The Court therefore concluded that the domestic authorities had acted within their margin of appreciation (§§ 84-97). In Van Slooten v. the Netherlands, 2025, §§ 74-77, proceedings for terminating a mother's parental authority were at stake. In giving up on family reunification as the ultimate goal at a very early stage, without a proper assessment of the applicant's parenting capacity or adequately demonstrating why reunification would no longer be compatible with the child's best interests, the domestic authorities contributed to finding a violation of Article 8 (see also paragraph 428 above).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250523211813/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20251219191704/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/99cd2ce32cf8/20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf", @@ -23075,6 +24403,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-19", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:3795/22", "case_name": "Versaci v. Italy", @@ -23108,6 +24438,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-19", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json", "case_key": "apps:10934/21", "case_name": "Semenya v. Switzerland*", @@ -23141,6 +24473,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/a94e3bc7e2bf/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:49072/21", "case_name": "Panju v. Belgium (no. 2)", @@ -23174,6 +24508,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/a94e3bc7e2bf/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:37241/21", "case_name": "S.H. v. Malta", @@ -23207,6 +24543,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/a94e3bc7e2bf/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:10934/21", "case_name": "Semenya v. Switzerland", @@ -23240,6 +24578,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/a94e3bc7e2bf/diff_2024-02-17__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:36318/21", "case_name": "Rizzo and Others v. Malta", @@ -23258,7 +24598,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.M.§4|a:None|b:272", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "In the case of Rizzo and Others v. Malta, 2024 (§§ 31-46), the appeal to the Constitutional Court as of 2021 had been a remedy, available in theory as well as in practice, which was accessible, capable of providing redress and offering reasonable prospects of success in relation to claims under the old rent laws. The Constitutional Court had consistently applied the specific guidelines for the award of adequate compensation indicated in Cauchi v. Malta . Moreover, domestic law had been Cauchi amended subsequent to . A new potentially effective procedure, capable of evicting the tenant or putting in place a higher future rent, had been open to the applicants. The Court thus found no violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.", + "post_text": "In the case of Rizzo and Others v. Malta, 2024 (§§ 31-46), the appeal to the Constitutional Court as of 2021 had been a remedy, available in theory as well as in practice, which was accessible, capable of providing redress and offering reasonable prospects of success in relation to claims under the old rent laws. The Constitutional Court had consistently applied the specific guidelines for the award of adequate compensation indicated in Cauchi v. Malta . Moreover, domestic law had been Cauchi amended subsequent to . Anew potentially effective procedure, capable of evicting the tenant or putting in place a higher future rent, had been open to the applicants. The Court thus found no violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217120356/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_13_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240409181346/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_13_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/a94e3bc7e2bf/20240217120356__guide_art_13_eng.pdf", @@ -23273,6 +24613,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-19", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/a94e3bc7e2bf/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-19.json", "case_key": "apps:59476/21", "case_name": "Haugen v. Norway", @@ -23306,6 +24648,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:39326/02", "case_name": "Çevik v. Turkey (no. 2)", @@ -23339,6 +24683,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:44394/15", "case_name": "G.M. and Others v. the Republic of Moldova", @@ -23346,10 +24692,10 @@ "judgment_year": "2023", "citation_change": "added", "citation_text": "G.M. and Others v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 44394/15, 22 February 2023", - "hudoc_itemid": "", - "hudoc_importance_level": "", - "hudoc_doctype": "", - "hudoc_docname": "", + "hudoc_itemid": "001-220954", + "hudoc_importance_level": "3", + "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", + "hudoc_docname": "G.M. AND OTHERS v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA", "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", "linked_paragraph_count": 1, "linked_sections": "II.K.d: Involuntary sterilization and forced abortion", @@ -23372,6 +24718,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:43572/18", "case_name": "Grzęda v. Poland [GC]", @@ -23405,6 +24753,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:37928/20", "case_name": "Horion v. Belgium", @@ -23438,6 +24788,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:30078/06", "case_name": "Konstantin Markin v. Russia", @@ -23471,6 +24823,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:40020/03", "case_name": "M. and Other v.Italiy and Bulgaria", @@ -23504,6 +24858,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:33394/96", "case_name": "Price v. United Kingdom", @@ -23515,14 +24871,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "1", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF PRICE v. THE UNITED KINGDOM", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", - "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "I.D.3: Degrading treatment or punishment", + "linked_change_types": "citation_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.D.3|a:22|b:22", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "For instance, treatment or punishment was held to be \"degrading\" when: ▪ a severely disabled person was detained in inappropriate conditions where she was dangerously cold, risked developing sores because her bed was too hard or unreachable, and was unable to go to the toilet or keep clean without the greatest of difficulty (Price v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 30; see also Vincent v. France, 2006, §§ 101-103 where the applicant, paraplegic, could not leave his cell nor move about the prison independently); ▪ the applicants hair was forcefully shaved by the prison administration, without any justification or legal basis (Yankov v. Bulgaria, 2003, §§ 120-121; see also Slyusarev v. Russia, 2010, § 44 where the applicant's glasses were confiscated after his arrest for five months, without justification and legal basis); ▪ an unaccompanied foreign minor had to live in precarious conditions in a shantytown due to the authorities' failure to execute a judicial placement order (Khan v. France, 2019, §§ 94-95); ▪ use of force on the applicants when searching their home was not strictly necessary (Ilievi and Ganchevi v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 56-57); ▪ judicial corporal punishment was inflicted on the applicant (Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 1978, § 35). ▪ the authorities failed to ensure that a twelve-year old child, who witnessed the arrest of his parents, was looked after by an adult, and was informed about the situation while his parents were held in police custody (Ioan Pop and Others v. Romania, 2016, § 65). ▪ the applicant was detained for a lengthy time in a severely overcrowded and unsanitary environment in prison (Kalashnikov v. Russia, 2002, § 102); ▪ the applicant was subjected to a strip search in an inappropriate manner, such as the making of humiliating remarks (Iwańczuk v. Poland, 2001, § 59; see also Valašinas v. Lithuania, 2001, § 117 where the applicant was stripped naked in front of a female prison officer and prison guards examined his sexual organs as well as the food he had received without gloves); ▪ the detention of an asylum-seeker for three months on police premises pending the application of an administrative measure, with no access to any recreational activities and without proper meals (Tabesh v. Greece, 2009, §§ 38-44, see also Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019, § 195 where, pending their request for asylum, the applicants were confined in inadequate conditions not fit for a lengthy stay in an airport transit zone as well as N.H. and Others v. France, 2020, § 184 where asylum seekers were destitute and lived rough for several months due to administrative delays preventing them from receiving the support for which the law provided); ▪ twenty-seven LGBTIactivists were subject to vicious verbal abuse and random physical attacks by a mob of counter demonstrators and the promised police protection was not provided in due time or adequately (Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021 § 60; see also Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, § 97 where, following a televised interview, the applicant - a well-known member of the LGBTIcommunity - was the target of a sustained and aggressive homophobic campaign, including an arson attack on her club, as well as receiving death threats and subjected to physical mobbing and hate speech); ▪ as a result of the procrastination of the health professionals in providing access to genetic tests, the applicant, who was pregnant, had had to endure six weeks of painful uncertainty concerning the health of her foetus and, when she eventually obtained the results of the tests, it was already too late for her to make an informed decision on whether to continue the pregnancy or to have recourse to a legal abortion (R.R. v. Poland, 2011, § 159). ▪ the applicant was handcuffed during a bus journey lasting around 20 hours in the context of forced deportation (Akkad v. Türkiye, 2022, § 115).", + "post_text": "For instance, treatment or punishment was held to be \"degrading\" when: ▪ a severely disabled person was detained in inappropriate conditions where she was dangerously cold, risked developing sores because her bed was too hard or unreachable, and was unable to go to the toilet or keep clean without the greatest of difficulty (Price v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 30; see also Vincent v. France, 2006, §§ 101-103 where the applicant, paraplegic, could not leave his cell nor move about the prison independently); ▪ the applicants hair was forcefully shaved by the prison administration, without any justification or legal basis (Yankov v. Bulgaria, 2003, §§ 120-121; see also Slyusarev v. Russia, 2010, § 44 where the applicant's glasses were confiscated after his arrest for five months, without justification and legal basis); ▪ an unaccompanied foreign minor had to live in precarious conditions in a shantytown due to the authorities' failure to execute a judicial placement order (Khan v. France, 2019, §§ 94-95); ▪ use of force on the applicants when searching their home was not strictly necessary (Ilievi and Ganchevi v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 56-57); ▪ judicial corporal punishment was inflicted on the applicant (Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 1978, § 35). ▪ the authorities failed to ensure that a twelve-year old child, who witnessed the arrest of his parents, was looked after by an adult, and was informed about the situation while his parents were held in police custody (Ioan Pop and Others v. Romania, 2016, § 65). ▪ the applicant was detained for a lengthy time in a severely overcrowded and unsanitary environment in prison (Kalashnikov v. Russia, 2002, § 102); ▪ the applicant was subjected to a strip search in an inappropriate manner, such as the making of humiliating remarks (Iwańczuk v. Poland, 2001, § 59; see also Valašinas v. Lithuania, 2001, § 117 where the applicant was stripped naked in front of a female prison officer and prison guards examined his sexual organs as well as the food he had received without gloves); ▪ the detention of an asylum-seeker for three months on police premises pending the application of an administrative measure, with no access to any recreational activities and without proper meals (Tabesh v. Greece, 2009, §§ 38-44, see also Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019, § 195 where, pending their request for asylum, the applicants were confined in inadequate conditions not fit for a lengthy stay in an airport transit zone as well as N.H. and Others v. France, 2020, § 184 where asylum seekers were destitute and lived rough for several months due to administrative delays preventing them from receiving the support for which the law provided); ▪ twenty-seven LGBTIactivists were subject to vicious verbal abuse and random physical attacks by a mob of counter demonstrators and the promised police protection was not provided in due time or adequately (Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021 § 60; see also Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, § 97 where, following a televised interview, the applicant - a well-known member of the LGBTIcommunity - was the target of a sustained and aggressive homophobic campaign, including an arson attack on her club, as well as receiving death threats and subjected to physical mobbing and hate speech); ▪ as a result of the procrastination of the health professionals in providing access to genetic tests, the applicant, who was pregnant, had had to endure six weeks of painful uncertainty concerning the health of her foetus and, when she eventually obtained the results of the tests, it was already too late for her to make an informed decision on whether to continue the pregnancy or to have recourse to a legal abortion (R.R. v. Poland, 2011, § 159). ▪ the applicant was handcuffed during a bus journey lasting around 20 hours in the context of forced deportation (Akkad v. Türkiye, 2022, § 115). ▪ prisoners were segregated, humiliated, and abused by fellow inmates on account of their inferior status (\"outcasts\") in an informal prisoner hierarchy. The stigmatisation, assignment to menial labour and denial of basic needs, enforced by threats of violence, had lasted for years (S.P. and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 92-96).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230911235803/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_3_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240223121333/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_3_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/acdaf72cea98/20230911235803__guide_art_3_eng.pdf", @@ -23537,6 +24893,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:36463/11", "case_name": "S.P. and Others v. Russia", @@ -23554,8 +24912,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.D.3|a:22|b:22", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "For instance, treatment or punishment was held to be \"degrading\" when: ▪ a severely disabled person was detained in inappropriate conditions where she was dangerously cold, risked developing sores because her bed was too hard or unreachable, and was unable to go to the toilet or keep clean without the greatest of difficulty (Price v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 30; see also Vincent v. France, 2006, §§ 101-103 where the applicant, paraplegic, could not leave his cell nor move about the prison independently); ▪ the applicants hair was forcefully shaved by the prison administration, without any justification or legal basis (Yankov v. Bulgaria, 2003, §§ 120-121; see also Slyusarev v. Russia, 2010, § 44 where the applicant's glasses were confiscated after his arrest for five months, without justification and legal basis); ▪ an unaccompanied foreign minor had to live in precarious conditions in a shantytown due to the authorities' failure to execute a judicial placement order (Khan v. France, 2019, §§ 94-95); ▪ use of force on the applicants when searching their home was not strictly necessary (Ilievi and Ganchevi v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 56-57); ▪ judicial corporal punishment was inflicted on the applicant (Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 1978, § 35). ▪ the authorities failed to ensure that a twelve-year old child, who witnessed the arrest of his parents, was looked after by an adult, and was informed about the situation while his parents were held in police custody (Ioan Pop and Others v. Romania, 2016, § 65). ▪ the applicant was detained for a lengthy time in a severely overcrowded and unsanitary environment in prison (Kalashnikov v. Russia, 2002, § 102); ▪ the applicant was subjected to a strip search in an inappropriate manner, such as the making of humiliating remarks (Iwańczuk v. Poland, 2001, § 59; see also Valašinas v. Lithuania, 2001, § 117 where the applicant was stripped naked in front of a female prison officer and prison guards examined his sexual organs as well as the food he had received without gloves); ▪ the detention of an asylum-seeker for three months on police premises pending the application of an administrative measure, with no access to any recreational activities and without proper meals (Tabesh v. Greece, 2009, §§ 38-44, see also Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019, § 195 where, pending their request for asylum, the applicants were confined in inadequate conditions not fit for a lengthy stay in an airport transit zone as well as N.H. and Others v. France, 2020, § 184 where asylum seekers were destitute and lived rough for several months due to administrative delays preventing them from receiving the support for which the law provided); ▪ twenty-seven LGBTI activists were subject to vicious verbal abuse and random physical attacks by a mob of counter demonstrators and the promised police protection was not provided in due time or adequately (Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021 § 60; see also Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, § 97 where, following a televised interview, the applicant - a well-known member of the LGBTI community - was the target of a sustained and aggressive homophobic campaign, including an arson attack on her club, as well as receiving death threats and subjected to physical mobbing and hate speech); ▪ as a result of the procrastination of the health professionals in providing access to genetic tests, the applicant, who was pregnant, had had to endure six weeks of painful uncertainty concerning the health of her foetus and, when she eventually obtained the results of the tests, it was already too late for her to make an informed decision on whether to continue the pregnancy or to have recourse to a legal abortion (R.R. v. Poland, 2011, § 159). ▪ the applicant was handcuffed during a bus journey lasting around 20 hours in the context of forced deportation (Akkad v. Türkiye, 2022, § 115).", - "post_text": "For instance, treatment or punishment was held to be \"degrading\" when: ▪ a severely disabled person was detained in inappropriate conditions where she was dangerously cold, risked developing sores because her bed was too hard or unreachable, and was unable to go to the toilet or keep clean without the greatest of difficulty (Price v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 30; see also Vincent v. France, 2006, §§ 101-103 where the applicant, paraplegic, could not leave his cell nor move about the prison independently); ▪ the applicants hair was forcefully shaved by the prison administration, without any justification or legal basis (Yankov v. Bulgaria, 2003, §§ 120-121; see also Slyusarev v. Russia, 2010, § 44 where the applicant's glasses were confiscated after his arrest for five months, without justification and legal basis); ▪ an unaccompanied foreign minor had to live in precarious conditions in a shantytown due to the authorities' failure to execute a judicial placement order (Khan v. France, 2019, §§ 94-95); ▪ use of force on the applicants when searching their home was not strictly necessary (Ilievi and Ganchevi v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 56-57); ▪ judicial corporal punishment was inflicted on the applicant (Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 1978, § 35). ▪ the authorities failed to ensure that a twelve-year old child, who witnessed the arrest of his parents, was looked after by an adult, and was informed about the situation while his parents were held in police custody (Ioan Pop and Others v. Romania, 2016, § 65). ▪ the applicant was detained for a lengthy time in a severely overcrowded and unsanitary environment in prison (Kalashnikov v. Russia, 2002, § 102); ▪ the applicant was subjected to a strip search in an inappropriate manner, such as the making of humiliating remarks (Iwańczuk v. Poland, 2001, § 59; see also Valašinas v. Lithuania, 2001, § 117 where the applicant was stripped naked in front of a female prison officer and prison guards examined his sexual organs as well as the food he had received without gloves); ▪ the detention of an asylum-seeker for three months on police premises pending the application of an administrative measure, with no access to any recreational activities and without proper meals (Tabesh v. Greece, 2009, §§ 38-44, see also Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019, § 195 where, pending their request for asylum, the applicants were confined in inadequate conditions not fit for a lengthy stay in an airport transit zone as well as N.H. and Others v. France, 2020, § 184 where asylum seekers were destitute and lived rough for several months due to administrative delays preventing them from receiving the support for which the law provided); ▪ twenty-seven LGBTI activists were subject to vicious verbal abuse and random physical attacks by a mob of counter demonstrators and the promised police protection was not provided in due time or adequately (Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021 § 60; see also Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, § 97 where, following a televised interview, the applicant - a well-known member of the LGBTI community - was the target of a sustained and aggressive homophobic campaign, including an arson attack on her club, as well as receiving death threats and subjected to physical mobbing and hate speech); ▪ as a result of the procrastination of the health professionals in providing access to genetic tests, the applicant, who was pregnant, had had to endure six weeks of painful uncertainty concerning the health of her foetus and, when she eventually obtained the results of the tests, it was already too late for her to make an informed decision on whether to continue the pregnancy or to have recourse to a legal abortion (R.R. v. Poland, 2011, § 159). ▪ the applicant was handcuffed during a bus journey lasting around 20 hours in the context of forced deportation (Akkad v. Türkiye, 2022, § 115). ▪ prisoners were segregated, humiliated, and abused by fellow inmates on account of their inferior status (\"outcasts\") in an informal prisoner hierarchy. The stigmatisation, assignment to menial labour and denial of basic needs, enforced by threats of violence, had lasted for years (S.P. and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 92-96).", + "pre_text": "For instance, treatment or punishment was held to be \"degrading\" when: ▪ a severely disabled person was detained in inappropriate conditions where she was dangerously cold, risked developing sores because her bed was too hard or unreachable, and was unable to go to the toilet or keep clean without the greatest of difficulty (Price v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 30; see also Vincent v. France, 2006, §§ 101-103 where the applicant, paraplegic, could not leave his cell nor move about the prison independently); ▪ the applicants hair was forcefully shaved by the prison administration, without any justification or legal basis (Yankov v. Bulgaria, 2003, §§ 120-121; see also Slyusarev v. Russia, 2010, § 44 where the applicant's glasses were confiscated after his arrest for five months, without justification and legal basis); ▪ an unaccompanied foreign minor had to live in precarious conditions in a shantytown due to the authorities' failure to execute a judicial placement order (Khan v. France, 2019, §§ 94-95); ▪ use of force on the applicants when searching their home was not strictly necessary (Ilievi and Ganchevi v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 56-57); ▪ judicial corporal punishment was inflicted on the applicant (Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 1978, § 35). ▪ the authorities failed to ensure that a twelve-year old child, who witnessed the arrest of his parents, was looked after by an adult, and was informed about the situation while his parents were held in police custody (Ioan Pop and Others v. Romania, 2016, § 65). ▪ the applicant was detained for a lengthy time in a severely overcrowded and unsanitary environment in prison (Kalashnikov v. Russia, 2002, § 102); ▪ the applicant was subjected to a strip search in an inappropriate manner, such as the making of humiliating remarks (Iwańczuk v. Poland, 2001, § 59; see also Valašinas v. Lithuania, 2001, § 117 where the applicant was stripped naked in front of a female prison officer and prison guards examined his sexual organs as well as the food he had received without gloves); ▪ the detention of an asylum-seeker for three months on police premises pending the application of an administrative measure, with no access to any recreational activities and without proper meals (Tabesh v. Greece, 2009, §§ 38-44, see also Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019, § 195 where, pending their request for asylum, the applicants were confined in inadequate conditions not fit for a lengthy stay in an airport transit zone as well as N.H. and Others v. France, 2020, § 184 where asylum seekers were destitute and lived rough for several months due to administrative delays preventing them from receiving the support for which the law provided); ▪ twenty-seven LGBTIactivists were subject to vicious verbal abuse and random physical attacks by a mob of counter demonstrators and the promised police protection was not provided in due time or adequately (Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021 § 60; see also Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, § 97 where, following a televised interview, the applicant - a well-known member of the LGBTIcommunity - was the target of a sustained and aggressive homophobic campaign, including an arson attack on her club, as well as receiving death threats and subjected to physical mobbing and hate speech); ▪ as a result of the procrastination of the health professionals in providing access to genetic tests, the applicant, who was pregnant, had had to endure six weeks of painful uncertainty concerning the health of her foetus and, when she eventually obtained the results of the tests, it was already too late for her to make an informed decision on whether to continue the pregnancy or to have recourse to a legal abortion (R.R. v. Poland, 2011, § 159). ▪ the applicant was handcuffed during a bus journey lasting around 20 hours in the context of forced deportation (Akkad v. Türkiye, 2022, § 115).", + "post_text": "For instance, treatment or punishment was held to be \"degrading\" when: ▪ a severely disabled person was detained in inappropriate conditions where she was dangerously cold, risked developing sores because her bed was too hard or unreachable, and was unable to go to the toilet or keep clean without the greatest of difficulty (Price v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 30; see also Vincent v. France, 2006, §§ 101-103 where the applicant, paraplegic, could not leave his cell nor move about the prison independently); ▪ the applicants hair was forcefully shaved by the prison administration, without any justification or legal basis (Yankov v. Bulgaria, 2003, §§ 120-121; see also Slyusarev v. Russia, 2010, § 44 where the applicant's glasses were confiscated after his arrest for five months, without justification and legal basis); ▪ an unaccompanied foreign minor had to live in precarious conditions in a shantytown due to the authorities' failure to execute a judicial placement order (Khan v. France, 2019, §§ 94-95); ▪ use of force on the applicants when searching their home was not strictly necessary (Ilievi and Ganchevi v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 56-57); ▪ judicial corporal punishment was inflicted on the applicant (Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 1978, § 35). ▪ the authorities failed to ensure that a twelve-year old child, who witnessed the arrest of his parents, was looked after by an adult, and was informed about the situation while his parents were held in police custody (Ioan Pop and Others v. Romania, 2016, § 65). ▪ the applicant was detained for a lengthy time in a severely overcrowded and unsanitary environment in prison (Kalashnikov v. Russia, 2002, § 102); ▪ the applicant was subjected to a strip search in an inappropriate manner, such as the making of humiliating remarks (Iwańczuk v. Poland, 2001, § 59; see also Valašinas v. Lithuania, 2001, § 117 where the applicant was stripped naked in front of a female prison officer and prison guards examined his sexual organs as well as the food he had received without gloves); ▪ the detention of an asylum-seeker for three months on police premises pending the application of an administrative measure, with no access to any recreational activities and without proper meals (Tabesh v. Greece, 2009, §§ 38-44, see also Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019, § 195 where, pending their request for asylum, the applicants were confined in inadequate conditions not fit for a lengthy stay in an airport transit zone as well as N.H. and Others v. France, 2020, § 184 where asylum seekers were destitute and lived rough for several months due to administrative delays preventing them from receiving the support for which the law provided); ▪ twenty-seven LGBTIactivists were subject to vicious verbal abuse and random physical attacks by a mob of counter demonstrators and the promised police protection was not provided in due time or adequately (Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021 § 60; see also Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, § 97 where, following a televised interview, the applicant - a well-known member of the LGBTIcommunity - was the target of a sustained and aggressive homophobic campaign, including an arson attack on her club, as well as receiving death threats and subjected to physical mobbing and hate speech); ▪ as a result of the procrastination of the health professionals in providing access to genetic tests, the applicant, who was pregnant, had had to endure six weeks of painful uncertainty concerning the health of her foetus and, when she eventually obtained the results of the tests, it was already too late for her to make an informed decision on whether to continue the pregnancy or to have recourse to a legal abortion (R.R. v. Poland, 2011, § 159). ▪ the applicant was handcuffed during a bus journey lasting around 20 hours in the context of forced deportation (Akkad v. Türkiye, 2022, § 115). ▪ prisoners were segregated, humiliated, and abused by fellow inmates on account of their inferior status (\"outcasts\") in an informal prisoner hierarchy. The stigmatisation, assignment to menial labour and denial of basic needs, enforced by threats of violence, had lasted for years (S.P. and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 92-96).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230911235803/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_3_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240223121333/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_3_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/acdaf72cea98/20230911235803__guide_art_3_eng.pdf", @@ -23570,6 +24928,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:25276/15", "case_name": "Verzilov and Others v. Russia", @@ -23603,6 +24963,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:7144/15", "case_name": "A and B v. Croatia", @@ -23636,6 +24998,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:7224/11", "case_name": "Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia", @@ -23669,6 +25033,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:25338/16", "case_name": "Barbotin v. France", @@ -23702,6 +25068,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:30059/15", "case_name": "Boukrourou and Others v. France", @@ -23735,6 +25103,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:43207/16", "case_name": "Castellani v. France", @@ -23768,6 +25138,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:30050/12", "case_name": "Cazan v. Romania", @@ -23801,6 +25173,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:16270/12", "case_name": "Comoraşu v. Romania", @@ -23834,6 +25208,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:25781/94", "case_name": "Cyprus v. Turkey [GC]", @@ -23867,6 +25243,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:38305/07", "case_name": "Daşlık v. Turkey", @@ -23900,6 +25278,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:74912/01", "case_name": "Enea v. Italy [GC]", @@ -23933,6 +25313,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:25060/02|1705/03", "case_name": "Erdal Aslan v. Turkey", @@ -23966,6 +25348,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:13255/07", "case_name": "Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC]", @@ -23999,6 +25383,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:38263/08", "case_name": "Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC] (merits)", @@ -24032,6 +25418,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:24816/14|25140/14", "case_name": "Hudorovič and Others v. Slovenia", @@ -24065,6 +25453,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:38949/09", "case_name": "İltümür Ozan and Others v. Turkey,", @@ -24098,6 +25488,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:71670/14", "case_name": "J.M. v. France", @@ -24131,6 +25523,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:37023/13", "case_name": "Kanciał v. Poland", @@ -24164,6 +25558,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:56660/12", "case_name": "Korneykova and Korneykov v. Ukraine", @@ -24197,6 +25593,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:19796/14", "case_name": "Krsmanović v. Serbia", @@ -24230,6 +25628,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:10161/13", "case_name": "M. and M. v. Croatia", @@ -24263,6 +25663,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:40503/17", "case_name": "M.K. and Others v. Poland", @@ -24296,6 +25698,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:4455/10", "case_name": "Marguš v. Croatia [GC]", @@ -24329,6 +25733,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:40591/11", "case_name": "N.Ç. v. Turkey", @@ -24362,6 +25768,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:72226/11", "case_name": "N.P. and N.I. v. Bulgaria (dec.)", @@ -24395,6 +25803,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:52067/99", "case_name": "Okkalı v. Turkey", @@ -24428,6 +25838,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:33401/02", "case_name": "Opuz v. Turkey", @@ -24461,6 +25873,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:74552/01", "case_name": "Oya Ataman v. Turkey", @@ -24494,6 +25908,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:1653/13", "case_name": "Portu Juanenea and Sarasola Yarzabal v. Spain", @@ -24527,6 +25943,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:47709/99", "case_name": "Rachwalski and Ferenc v. Poland", @@ -24560,6 +25978,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "name:raninen v finland::1997", "case_name": "Raninen v. Finland", @@ -24593,6 +26013,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:48475/09", "case_name": "Sakir v. Greece", @@ -24626,6 +26048,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:36083/16", "case_name": "Semache v. France", @@ -24659,6 +26083,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:71463/01", "case_name": "Šilih v. Slovenia [GC]", @@ -24692,6 +26118,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:26088/06", "case_name": "Stanimirović v. Serbia", @@ -24725,6 +26153,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:2954/07", "case_name": "Stefanou v. Greece", @@ -24758,6 +26188,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:34602/16", "case_name": "Strazimiri v. Albania", @@ -24791,6 +26223,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:41461/02", "case_name": "Vladimir Romanov v. Russia", @@ -24824,6 +26258,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:41990/18", "case_name": "Y v. Bulgaria", @@ -24857,6 +26293,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:75345/01", "case_name": "Yatsenko v. Ukraine", @@ -24890,6 +26328,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:35880/14|75926/17", "case_name": "Zakharov and Varzhabetyan v. Russia", @@ -24923,6 +26363,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-23", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json", "case_key": "apps:34015/07", "case_name": "Zherdev v. Ukraine", @@ -24956,6 +26398,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2024-02-23__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:58737/14", "case_name": "A.P. v. Armenia", @@ -24989,6 +26433,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2024-02-23__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:6383/17", "case_name": "Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania", @@ -25022,6 +26468,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2024-02-23__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:76680/17", "case_name": "D v. Latvia", @@ -25055,6 +26503,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2024-02-23__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:27753/19", "case_name": "El-Asmar v. Denmark", @@ -25088,6 +26538,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2024-02-23__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:21882/09|6189/10", "case_name": "Israilov v. Russia", @@ -25121,6 +26573,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2024-02-23__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:28834/19", "case_name": "Lapunov v. Russia", @@ -25154,6 +26608,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2024-02-23__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:55351/17", "case_name": "Luca v. the Republic of Moldova", @@ -25187,6 +26643,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2024-02-23__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:6406/21", "case_name": "M.G. v. Lithuania", @@ -25220,6 +26678,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2024-02-23__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:58358/14", "case_name": "Romanov and Others v. Russia", @@ -25253,6 +26713,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2024-02-23__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:38963/18", "case_name": "V.I. v the Republic of Moldova", @@ -25286,6 +26748,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2024-02-23__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:15798/20", "case_name": "Vučković v. Croatia", @@ -25319,6 +26783,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2024-02-23__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:37782/21", "case_name": "Z v the Czech Republic", @@ -25352,9 +26818,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-22", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-22.json", "case_key": "apps:36436/22", - "case_name": "I.C. v the Republic of Moldova, no 36436/22", + "case_name": "I.C. v the Republic of Moldova", "application_numbers": "36436/22", "judgment_year": "2025", "citation_change": "added", @@ -25385,6 +26853,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-22", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-22.json", "case_key": "apps:18980/20", "case_name": "Kasım Özdemir and Mehmet Özdemir v. Türkiye", @@ -25418,6 +26888,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-24", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2025-06-22__2025-12-24.json", "case_key": "apps:231/16", "case_name": "Gevorgyan v. Armenia", @@ -25451,6 +26923,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-24", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2025-06-22__2025-12-24.json", "case_key": "apps:41412/21", "case_name": "Gözütok v. Türkiye", @@ -25484,6 +26958,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-24", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2025-06-22__2025-12-24.json", "case_key": "apps:46949/21", "case_name": "L and Others v. France", @@ -25517,6 +26993,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-24", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2025-06-22__2025-12-24.json", "case_key": "apps:21180/15", "case_name": "Spivak v. Ukraine", @@ -25550,6 +27028,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-24", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2025-06-22__2025-12-24.json", "case_key": "apps:8019/16", "case_name": "Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, [GC]", @@ -25583,6 +27063,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-06", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json", "case_key": "apps:31349/20", "case_name": "Chkhartishvili v. Georgia", @@ -25616,6 +27098,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-06", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json", "case_key": "apps:15158/19", "case_name": "Drozd v. Poland", @@ -25649,9 +27133,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-06", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json", "case_key": "apps:58262/10", - "case_name": "Kazan v. Türkiye,* no. 58262/10", + "case_name": "Kazan v. Türkiye", "application_numbers": "58262/10", "judgment_year": "2023", "citation_change": "added", @@ -25660,14 +27146,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF KAZAN v. TÜRKİYE", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", - "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "I.B.4: Post demonstration sanctions", + "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.B.4|a:45|b:46", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "By contrast, in Zülküf Murat Kahraman v. Turkey, 2019, § 45, where in the domestic proceedings the applicant denied participating in a demonstration, the Court found that a criminal conviction for participation in a demonstration constituted an interference with the exercise of his right to freedom of assembly. In particular, the Court considered that the applicant's criminal conviction had been indisputably directed at activities falling within the scope of freedom of assembly. The Court explained that to hold otherwise would be tantamount to requiring him to acknowledge the acts of which he had stood accused. In this connection, the Court also had regard to the right not to incriminate oneself and stressed that not accepting that a criminal conviction constituted an interference would lock the applicant, who denied any involvement in the acts at issue, in a vicious circle that would deprive him of the protection of the Convention.", + "post_text": "By contrast, in Zülküf Murat Kahraman v. Turkey, 2019, § 45, where in the domestic proceedings the applicant denied participating in a demonstration, the Court found that a criminal conviction for participation in a demonstration constituted an interference with the exercise of his right to freedom of assembly. In particular, the Court considered that the applicant's criminal conviction had been indisputably directed at activities falling within the scope of freedom of assembly. The Court explained that to hold otherwise would be tantamount to requiring him to acknowledge the acts of which he had stood accused. In this connection, the Court also had regard to the right not to incriminate oneself and stressed that not accepting that a criminal conviction constituted an interference would lock the applicant, who denied any involvement in the acts at issue, in a vicious circle that would deprive him of the protection of the Convention (see also Kazan v. Türkiye,* 2023, § 56, concerning an unintended gathering outside a courthouse).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923172116/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_mass_protests_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231206111146/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_mass_protests_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/b8a991ab1181/20230923172116__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf", @@ -25682,6 +27168,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-08-13", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-12-06__2025-08-13.json", "case_key": "apps:1162/22", "case_name": "Auray and Others v. France", @@ -25715,6 +27203,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-08-13", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-12-06__2025-08-13.json", "case_key": "apps:35834/22", "case_name": "Bodson and Others v. Belgium", @@ -25748,6 +27238,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-08-13", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-12-06__2025-08-13.json", "case_key": "apps:49363/20", "case_name": "Central Unitaria de Traballadores/as v. Spain", @@ -25781,6 +27273,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-08-13", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-12-06__2025-08-13.json", "case_key": "apps:56270/21", "case_name": "Eckert v. France", @@ -25799,7 +27293,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.C|a:None|b:55|I.E.1.a|a:None|b:76|I.E.2|a:84|b:92", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "Similarly, in Razvozzhayev v. Russia and Ukraine and Udaltsov v. Russia, 2019, the Court found the conviction of the applicants for organising \"mass disorder\" following clashes during demonstration, without sufficient scrutiny of the event organiser's own acts and intentions, to be in breach of Article", - "post_text": "In contrast, in Eckert v. France, 2024, the legal basis of the interference, an arrêté préfectoral (which clearly delimited the scope of the impugned demonstration ban to time and place) together with the relevant provision of the criminal code, was found to be sufficiently clear, accessible, and offering sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness (§§ 53-54 and 57-59).\n\nIn Eckert v. France, 2024, the Court held that an order banning demonstrations in a defined area on a specific day, which had followed calls on social media for protests by the \" gilet jaunes\" movement, was justified. The Court took into account factors such as the prior violence and clashes with the police during previous rallies, that there had been no dialogue with authorities because of the lack of prior notice by demonstrators as required by law, and that the ban had been strictly limited to a place and time (§§ 67-72).\n\nIn Eckert v. France, 2024, after refusing to leave the premises at a banned demonstration, the applicant was subjected to an identity check and a 150 EUR fine was imposed. Noting the pecuniary nature and moderate severity of the penalty, and the significant risk of disturbances of public disorder, the measures were found to not be disproportionate (§§ 73-75).", + "post_text": "In contrast, in Eckert v. France, 2024, the legal basis of the interference, an arrêté préfectoral (which clearly delimited the scope of the impugned demonstration ban to time and place) together with the relevant provision of the criminal code, was found to be sufficiently clear, accessible, and offering sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness (§§ 53-54 and 57-59).\n\nIn Eckert v. France, 2024, the Court held that an order banning demonstrations in a defined area on a specific day, which had followed calls on social media for protests by the \" gilet jaunes\" movement, was justified. The Court took into account factors such as the prior violence and clashes with the police during previous rallies, that there had been no dialogue with authorities because of the lack of prior notice by demonstrators as required by law, and that the ban had been strictly limited to a place and time (§§ 67-72).\n\nIn Eckert v. France, 2024, after refusing to leave the premises at a banned demonstration, the applicant was subjected to an identity check and a 150 EURfine was imposed. Noting the pecuniary nature and moderate severity of the penalty, and the significant risk of disturbances of public disorder, the measures were found to not be disproportionate (§§ 73-75).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231206111146/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_mass_protests_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250813215218/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_mass_protests_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/b8a991ab1181/20231206111146__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf", @@ -25814,6 +27308,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-08-13", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-12-06__2025-08-13.json", "case_key": "apps:47626/21|22525/21", "case_name": "Fraisse and Others v. France", @@ -25847,6 +27343,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-08-13", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-12-06__2025-08-13.json", "case_key": "apps:10443/12", "case_name": "Geylani and Others v. Türkiye", @@ -25880,6 +27378,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-08-13", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-12-06__2025-08-13.json", "case_key": "apps:5297/16", "case_name": "Ishkhanyan v. Armenia", @@ -25913,6 +27413,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-08-13", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-12-06__2025-08-13.json", "case_key": "apps:56896/17", "case_name": "Laurijsen and Others v. the Netherlands", @@ -25946,6 +27448,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-04", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2025-08-13__2025-11-04.json", "case_key": "apps:38283/18", "case_name": "Bogay and Others v. Ukraine", @@ -25979,6 +27483,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-04", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2025-08-13__2025-11-04.json", "case_key": "apps:17710/15", "case_name": "Cioffi v. Italy", @@ -26012,6 +27518,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-04", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2025-08-13__2025-11-04.json", "case_key": "apps:45401/15", "case_name": "Harutyunyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.)", @@ -26045,6 +27553,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-04", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2025-08-13__2025-11-04.json", "case_key": "apps:29760/21|33931/21", "case_name": "Mzhavanadze and Rukhadze v. Georgia", @@ -26078,6 +27588,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-04", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2025-08-13__2025-11-04.json", "case_key": "apps:44241/20", "case_name": "Russ v. Germany", @@ -26111,9 +27623,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-11-27", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-27.json", "case_key": "apps:62239/12", - "case_name": "Kaymak and Others v. Türkiye,* no. 62239/12", + "case_name": "Kaymak and Others v. Türkiye", "application_numbers": "62239/12", "judgment_year": "2023", "citation_change": "added", @@ -26122,14 +27636,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF KAYMAK AND OTHERS v. TÜRKİYE", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "III.F: Trade unions ’ rights in the public sector", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.F|a:None|b:137", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "In Kaymak and Others v. Türkiye,* 2023, the Court examined complaints concerning disciplinary sanctions, in the form of non-punitive warnings, imposed on civil servants for having set up a stand at a university to promote a trade union and distribute leaflets. In finding a violation of Article 11, the Court noted the lack of judicial review of the measure by the domestic courts, in particular the impact it had on the applicants'careers with regard to future promotions, appointments and advancement, as well as the possibility of heavier sanctions in the event of further disciplinary proceedings against them which was such as to cause hesitation and deter them from participating in future union activities (§§ 58-59).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923175935/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_social_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231127144526/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_social_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/cfca8cb0bbc6/20230923175935__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -26144,9 +27658,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-11-27", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-27.json", "case_key": "apps:61721/19", - "case_name": "Kubát and Others v. the Czech Republic,* nos. 61721/19 and 5 others", + "case_name": "Kubát and Others v. the Czech Republic", "application_numbers": "61721/19", "judgment_year": "2023", "citation_change": "added", @@ -26155,14 +27671,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "CLIN", "hudoc_docname": "Kubát and Others v. the Czech Republic", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "II.E.§4: austerity measures", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.E.§4|a:None|b:96", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "The case of Kubát and Others v. the Czech Republic,* 2023, concerned the denial of retroactive payment of the difference in judges'salaries, found to have been unconstitutionally reduced during the 2011-2014 financial crisis. The Court acknowledged the tense social and political climate in the country at the relevant time, as well as the budgetary burden that the retroactive payment would have created on the State in a period of economic crisis (§§ 89-91). In addition, it noted that the impugned measure had not risked the ability of judges to exercise their judicial functions independently and impartially, nor constituted a threat to their livelihood. Accordingly, the Court did not find a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (§§ 93-97).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923175935/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_social_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231127144526/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_social_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/cfca8cb0bbc6/20230923175935__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -26177,9 +27693,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-11-27", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-27.json", "case_key": "apps:70583/17", - "case_name": "M.A. v. Italy,* no. 70583/17", + "case_name": "M.A. v. Italy", "application_numbers": "70583/17", "judgment_year": "2023", "citation_change": "added", @@ -26188,14 +27706,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF M.A. v. ITALY", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", - "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "VI.A: Migrants/Asylum-seekers", + "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "VI.A|a:202|b:205", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "The Court has come to similar conclusions in other cases involving children: ▪ Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, 2006, concerning the detention of an unaccompanied five-year-old in a centre designed for adults and incapable of meeting a child's needs, followed by her deportation without the requisite measures and precautions for her situation (§§ 50-59 and 66-71); ▪ Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, 2010, concerning the detention of four minor asylum-seekers, respectively aged seven months, three and a half years, five and seven years at the material time, accompanied by their parents, in a facility ill-equipped to receive children which had resulted in deterioration of their psychological health in particular (§§ 59-63); ▪ Popov v. France, 2012, concerning the detention of minor children, pending expulsion, accompanied by their parents, for fifteen days, in an adult environment with a strong police presence, with no activities to keep them occupied, combined with their parents'distress, which was clearly ill-suited to their age (§§ 91-103); ▪ A.B. and Others v. France, 2016, concerning the detention of a four-year-old, albeit accompanied with his parents, for eighteen days in a detention facility in which, inter alia, he was exposed to particularly high levels of noise and mixed with armed police officers in uniform during transfers to various judicial and administrative hearings which he was obliged to attend as he could not be left alone (§§ 112-115); ▪ Khan v. France, 2019, concerning the precarious living conditions of an unaccompanied foreign minor in a shantytown, an environment manifestly unsuitable for children, for several months and the failure by the authorities to execute a judicial placement order for the applicant, who was in a vulnerable position, to be provided with care and protection (§§ 81-95); ▪ Moustahi v. France, 2020, concerning the interception at sea and subsequent detention of unaccompanied minors though they being arbitrarily associated with an unrelated adult and deportation without precautions to a third State (§§ 58-70).", + "post_text": "The Court has come to similar conclusions in other cases involving children: ▪ Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, 2006, concerning the detention of an unaccompanied five-year-old in a centre designed for adults and incapable of meeting a child's needs, followed by her deportation without the requisite measures and precautions for her situation (§§ 50-59 and 66-71); ▪ Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, 2010, concerning the detention of four minor asylum-seekers, respectively aged seven months, three and a half years, five and seven years at the material time, accompanied by their parents, in a facility ill-equipped to receive children which had resulted in deterioration of their psychological health in particular (§§ 59-63); ▪ Popov v. France, 2012, concerning the detention of minor children, pending expulsion, accompanied by their parents, for fifteen days, in an adult environment with a strong police presence, with no activities to keep them occupied, combined with their parents'distress, which was clearly ill-suited to their age (§§ 91-103); ▪ A.B. and Others v. France, 2016, concerning the detention of a four-year-old, albeit accompanied with his parents, for eighteen days in a detention facility in which, inter alia, he was exposed to particularly high levels of noise and mixed with armed police officers in uniform during transfers to various judicial and administrative hearings which he was obliged to attend as he could not be left alone (§§ 112-115); ▪ Khan v. France, 2019, concerning the precarious living conditions of an unaccompanied foreign minor in a shantytown, an environment manifestly unsuitable for children, for several months and the failure by the authorities to execute a judicial placement order for the applicant, who was in a vulnerable position, to be provided with care and protection (§§ 81-95); ▪ Moustahi v. France, 2020, concerning the interception at sea and subsequent detention of unaccompanied minors though they being arbitrarily associated with an unrelated adult and deportation without precautions to a third State (§§ 58-70); ▪ M.A. v. Italy,* 2023, concerning the placement of an unaccompanied minor asylum-seeker, allegedly a victim of sexual abuse, for almost eight months in an adult reception centre which was not equipped to provide the appropriate psychological assistance that her vulnerable situation required (§§ 41-48).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923175935/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_social_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231127144526/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_social_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/cfca8cb0bbc6/20230923175935__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -26210,6 +27728,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-11-27", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-27.json", "case_key": "apps:35289/11", "case_name": "Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC]", @@ -26227,8 +27747,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "unchanged", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.B.3|a:58|b:58|II.B.3|a:59|b:59", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "A similar conclusion was reached in Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2017, concerning the lack of access in judicial review proceedings to classified information on the basis of which the applicant's security clearance enabling him to hold a post as deputy to the first Vice-Minister of Defence had been revoked. With regard to the existence of a right, and hence the applicability of Article 6 § 1, the Court noted that the applicant's ability to carry out his duties and obtain a new post in the civil service was conditional on his being authorised to access classified information. The link between the decision to revoke the applicant's security clearance and the loss of his duties and his employment was therefore more than tenuous or remote, granting him a right to challenge the lawfulness of that revocation before the courts (§§ 118-119).\n\nAs to the applicant's rights in accordance with the principles of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms under Article 6 § 1, the Court observed that the domestic courts had duly exercised the powers of scrutiny available to them in such proceedings, both regarding the need to preserve the confidentiality of the classified documents and regarding the justification for the decision revoking the applicant's security clearance ( Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2017, § 154). They had considered that the disclosure of the classified information could have had the effect of disclosing the intelligence service's working methods, revealing its sources of information or leading to attempts to influence possible witnesses. In addition, the information contained specific, comprehensive and detailed information on the basis of which the domestic courts were satisfied as to its relevance for determining whether the applicant posed a national security risk ( ibid ., §§ 155-156). Therefore, having regard to the proceedings as a whole, the nature of the dispute and the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national authorities, the Court considered that the restrictions placed on the applicant's rights were offset in such a manner that the fair balance between the parties was not affected to such an extent as to impair the very essence of the applicant's right to a fair trial (§ 161).", - "post_text": "A similar conclusion was reached in Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2017, concerning the lack of access in judicial review proceedings to classified information on the basis of which the applicant's security clearance enabling him to hold a post as deputy to the first Vice-Minister of Defence had been revoked. With regard to the existence of a right, and hence the applicability of Article 6 § 1, the Court noted that the applicant's ability to carry out his duties and obtain a new post in the civil service was conditional on his being authorised to access classified information. The link between the decision to revoke the applicant's security clearance and the loss of his duties and his employment was therefore more than tenuous or remote, granting him a right to challenge the lawfulness of that revocation before the courts (§§ 118-119).\n\nAs to the applicant's rights in accordance with the principles of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms under Article 6 § 1, the Court observed that the domestic courts had duly exercised the powers of scrutiny available to them in such proceedings, both regarding the need to preserve the confidentiality of the classified documents and regarding the justification for the decision revoking the applicant's security clearance ( Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2017, § 154). They had considered that the disclosure of the classified information could have had the effect of disclosing the intelligence service's working methods, revealing its sources of information or leading to attempts to influence possible witnesses. In addition, the information contained specific, comprehensive and detailed information on the basis of which the domestic courts were satisfied as to its relevance for determining whether the applicant posed a national security risk ( ibid ., §§ 155-156). Therefore, having regard to the proceedings as a whole, the nature of the dispute and the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national authorities, the Court considered that the restrictions placed on the applicant's rights were offset in such a manner that the fair balance between the parties was not affected to such an extent as to impair the very essence of the applicant's right to a fair trial (§ 161).", + "pre_text": "Asimilar conclusion was reached in Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2017, concerning the lack of access in judicial review proceedings to classified information on the basis of which the applicant's security clearance enabling him to hold a post as deputy to the first Vice-Minister of Defence had been revoked. With regard to the existence of a right, and hence the applicability of Article 6 § 1, the Court noted that the applicant's ability to carry out his duties and obtain a new post in the civil service was conditional on his being authorised to access classified information. The link between the decision to revoke the applicant's security clearance and the loss of his duties and his employment was therefore more than tenuous or remote, granting him a right to challenge the lawfulness of that revocation before the courts (§§ 118-119).\n\nAs to the applicant's rights in accordance with the principles of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms under Article 6 § 1, the Court observed that the domestic courts had duly exercised the powers of scrutiny available to them in such proceedings, both regarding the need to preserve the confidentiality of the classified documents and regarding the justification for the decision revoking the applicant's security clearance ( Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2017, § 154). They had considered that the disclosure of the classified information could have had the effect of disclosing the intelligence service's working methods, revealing its sources of information or leading to attempts to influence possible witnesses. In addition, the information contained specific, comprehensive and detailed information on the basis of which the domestic courts were satisfied as to its relevance for determining whether the applicant posed a national security risk ( ibid ., §§ 155-156). Therefore, having regard to the proceedings as a whole, the nature of the dispute and the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national authorities, the Court considered that the restrictions placed on the applicant's rights were offset in such a manner that the fair balance between the parties was not affected to such an extent as to impair the very essence of the applicant's right to a fair trial (§ 161).", + "post_text": "Asimilar conclusion was reached in Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2017, concerning the lack of access in judicial review proceedings to classified information on the basis of which the applicant's security clearance enabling him to hold a post as deputy to the first Vice-Minister of Defence had been revoked. With regard to the existence of a right, and hence the applicability of Article 6 § 1, the Court noted that the applicant's ability to carry out his duties and obtain a new post in the civil service was conditional on his being authorised to access classified information. The link between the decision to revoke the applicant's security clearance and the loss of his duties and his employment was therefore more than tenuous or remote, granting him a right to challenge the lawfulness of that revocation before the courts (§§ 118-119).\n\nAs to the applicant's rights in accordance with the principles of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms under Article 6 § 1, the Court observed that the domestic courts had duly exercised the powers of scrutiny available to them in such proceedings, both regarding the need to preserve the confidentiality of the classified documents and regarding the justification for the decision revoking the applicant's security clearance ( Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2017, § 154). They had considered that the disclosure of the classified information could have had the effect of disclosing the intelligence service's working methods, revealing its sources of information or leading to attempts to influence possible witnesses. In addition, the information contained specific, comprehensive and detailed information on the basis of which the domestic courts were satisfied as to its relevance for determining whether the applicant posed a national security risk ( ibid ., §§ 155-156). Therefore, having regard to the proceedings as a whole, the nature of the dispute and the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national authorities, the Court considered that the restrictions placed on the applicant's rights were offset in such a manner that the fair balance between the parties was not affected to such an extent as to impair the very essence of the applicant's right to a fair trial (§ 161).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923175935/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_social_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231127144526/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_social_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/cfca8cb0bbc6/20230923175935__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -26243,6 +27763,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-11-27", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-27.json", "case_key": "apps:30782/16", "case_name": "Simonova v. Bulgaria", @@ -26276,9 +27798,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-11-27", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-27.json", "case_key": "apps:23851/20|24360/20", - "case_name": "X and others v. Ireland,* nos. 23851/20 and 24360/20", + "case_name": "X and others v. Ireland", "application_numbers": "23851/20|24360/20", "judgment_year": "2023", "citation_change": "added", @@ -26287,14 +27811,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF X AND OTHERS v. IRELAND", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", - "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 3, + "linked_sections": "IV.A.1: Scope|IV.A.2: Margin of Appreciation", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added|minor_edit", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.A.1|a:None|b:143|IV.A.1|a:139|b:141|IV.A.2|a:144|b:147", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "Moreover, the Court has stressed that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 places no restriction on the Contracting State's freedom to decide whether or not to have in place any form of social security scheme, or to choose the type or amount of benefits to provide under any such scheme. If, however, a Contracting State has in force legislation providing for the payment as of right of a welfare benefit - whether conditional or not on the prior payment of contributions - that legislation must be regarded as generating a proprietary interest falling within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 for persons satisfying its requirements. In cases where the applicant has been denied all or part of a particular benefit, the Court has applied the relevant test as to whether, but for the condition of entitlement about which the applicant complains, he or she would have had a right, enforceable under domestic law, to receive the benefit in question. In addition, while under no obligation to do so, if a State decides to create a benefits scheme, it must do so in a manner which is compatible with Article 14 ( Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.) [GC], 2005, §§ 54-55; Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], 2009, § 77; Stummer v. Austria [GC], 2011, §§ 82-83; Efe v. Austria, 2013, §§ 45-46).\n\nThe Court will generally allow a wide margin when it comes to general measures of economic or social strategy ( Luczak v. Poland, 2007, § 48; Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], 2009, § 83). Because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities are, in principle, better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is in the public interest on social or economic grounds, and the Court will generally respect the legislature 's policy choice unless it is \"manifestly wi thout reasonable foundation\" ( Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2006, § 52; Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 61). The Court has considered that for any welfare system to be workable, the State may have to use broad categorisations to distinguish between different groups in need ( Runkee and White v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 39).", + "post_text": "Moreover, in X and Others v. Ireland,* 2023, the Court examined complaints concerning the denial of a universal statutory child benefit to two mothers, lawfully present in the country, for non- fulfilment of a domestic law habitual residence criterion. Applying the criteria set down in Beeler, the Court concluded that the payment of the benefit did not fall within the ambit of Article 8, noting that beyond having an effect on family life, it could not be said that the intended purpose of the benefit was to promote family life and necessarily affect the way in which it is organised. The Court compared the facts of the case to those of Beeler, considering that the benefit would or could not have been of such significance that the applicants would - as in Beeler - have organised key aspects of their daily life, at least partially, on the strength of it. In addition, the Court noted that the period complained of had been a relatively short one (just over a year and eight months respectively) and that, although not eligible to claim the child benefit during this time, both mothers had been accommodated with their children and had received material support until their immigration status was positively determined, at which point they became eligible for, and began to receive, the benefit in question (§ 74).\n\nMoreover, the Court has stressed that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 places no restriction on the Contracting State's freedom to decide whether or not to have in place any form of social security scheme, or to choose the type or amount of benefits to provide under any such scheme. If, however, a Contracting State has in force legislation providing for the payment as of right of a welfare benefit - whether conditional or not on the prior payment of contributions - that legislation must be regarded as generating a proprietary interest falling within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 for persons satisfying its requirements. In cases where the applicant has been denied all or part of a particular benefit, the Court has applied the relevant test as to whether, but for the condition of entitlement about which the applicant complains, he or she would have had a right, enforceable under domestic law, to receive the benefit in question. In addition, while under no obligation to do so, if a State decides to create a benefits scheme, it must do so in a manner which is compatible with Article 14 ( Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.) [GC], 2005, §§ 54-55; Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], 2009, § 77; Stummer v. Austria [GC], 2011, §§ 82-83; Efe v. Austria, 2013, §§ 45-46; X and Others v. Ireland,* 2023, §§ 67-69).\n\nThe Court will generally allow a wide margin when it comes to general measures of economic or social strategy ( Luczak v. Poland, 2007, § 48; Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], 2009, § 83). Because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities are, in principle, better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is in the public interest on social or economic grounds, and the Court will generally respect the legislature 's policy choice unless it is \"manifestly without reasonable foundation\" ( Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2006, § 52; Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom, [GC], 2010, § 61). Indeed, the Court has emphasised the essentially national character of social security systems ( Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom, [GC], 2010, § 85; X and Others v. Ireland,* 2023, §§ 97 and 98 26 ).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923175935/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_social_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231127144526/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_social_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/cfca8cb0bbc6/20230923175935__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -26309,6 +27833,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json", "case_key": "apps:59065/21", "case_name": "Bernotas v. Lithuania", @@ -26342,6 +27868,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json", "case_key": "apps:20007/22", "case_name": "Bielau v. Austria", @@ -26375,6 +27903,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json", "case_key": "apps:7120/17", "case_name": "Brazauskienė v. Lithuania (dec.)", @@ -26408,6 +27938,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json", "case_key": "apps:44002/22", "case_name": "Dian v. Denmark (dec.)", @@ -26441,6 +27973,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json", "case_key": "apps:59433/18", "case_name": "Humpert and Others v. Germany [GC]", @@ -26474,6 +28008,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json", "case_key": "apps:52319/22", "case_name": "Le Marrec v. France (dec.)", @@ -26507,6 +28043,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json", "case_key": "apps:63664/19", "case_name": "M.A. and Others v. France", @@ -26540,6 +28078,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json", "case_key": "apps:49066/12", "case_name": "Nafornița v. the Republic of Moldova", @@ -26573,6 +28113,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json", "case_key": "apps:25226/18", "case_name": "Pająk and Others v. Poland", @@ -26591,7 +28133,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A|a:None|b:47|II.C.9|a:None|b:86|II.D|a:None|b:96", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "The Court adopted the consequence-based approach in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, a case concerning the dismissal of a judge from his position of president of a court, to find that the measure complained of did not have serious negative consequences for the aspects constituting the applicant's \"private life\", namely: (i) his \"inner circle\"; (ii) his opportunities to establish and develop relationships with others; or (iii) his reputation. It therefore found that Article 8 was not applicable (§§ 120-134). A different conclusion was reached by the Court in Polyakh and Others v. Ukraine, 2019, concerning dismissals of public officials from their posts altogether, by adopting the same approach (§§ 207-211). In Budimir v. Croatia, 2021, the Court applied the consequence-based approach to the revocation of the applicant's licence to work as a motor vehicle inspector pending criminal proceedings against him, which had resulted in his dismissal from private employment and which later ended with his acquittal on all charges (§§ 46-47). In Pająk and Others v. Poland, 2023, the Court applied the consequence- based approach to complaints in relation to legislation differentiating between men and women with regard to the retirement age of judges and the refusal to allow the applicants to exercise their functions beyond the age limit (§§ 210-220).\n\nIn Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, the Court found that the applicant's inability to have the premature termination of his mandate as president of the Supreme Court reviewed by an ordinary tribunal or other body exercising judicial powers was in breach of his right of access to a court, as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (§§ 121-122). The applicant's dismissal had been the result of legislation at constitutional level that deprived him of any possibility of seeking judicial review, which the Court considered to be doubtful as to its compatibility with the rule of law (§§ 117 and 121; see also, Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, §§ 345-346, for the application of similar procedural safeguards in the context of the removal of a judge from a judicial council while he still remained a serving judge; and Pająk and Others v. Poland, 2023, §§ 196-198, for the early termination of a female judge's term by a unilateral decision of the National Council of the Judiciary). The Court also found a violation of Article 10 of the Convention in this case on account of, inter alia, the absence of effective and adequate safeguards against abuse as regards the measures that interfered with the applicant's right to freedom of expression (§§ 174-176). Indeed, the Court has found, in other similar cases, that the procedural guarantees in disciplinary sanctions (such as dismissals) constitute an important part of the protection of freedom of expression under Article 10 (Kudeshkina v. Russia, 2009, §§ 96-97, concerning the removal from office of a judge following critical statements about the judiciary).\n\nIn the case of Moraru and Marin v. Romania, 2022, the Court examined complaints in relation to the inability of two female civil servants who had attained the retirement age set for women to continue to work until reaching the higher retirement age set for men. It found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.12 on the ground of discrimination based on sex, noting in particular that the blanket rule on mandatory termination of women's employment at a lower age than that set for men perpetuated a stereotypical view of gender roles and treated women as a homogenous group deprived of agency, one whose personal situations or desires in terms of professional life and career 9 The Court made reference to Articles 8 (the right of employed women to protection of maternity), 20 (the right to equal opportunities and equal treatment in matters of employment and occupation without discrimination on the grounds of sex) and 27 (the right of workers with family responsibilities to equal opportunities and equal treatment) of the European Social Charter (revised) under Council of Europe material (§ 39). 10 International Labour Organisation's (ILO) Maternity Protection Convention 2000 (No. 183). development, as well as their alignment with those of men, had been completely disregarded (§ 118). Moreover, in Pająk and Others v. Poland, 2023, the Court examined the complaints of four female judges concerning a law lowering the retirement age to sixty for female judges and to sixty-five for male judges. In finding a difference in treatment based on sex regarding the mandatory retirement age of persons from the same profession, the Court was particularly concerned with the requirement for female judges to justify their intellectual aptitude to sit as a judge by means of a medical certificate (§ 259). In addition, the Court considered that the early retirement had obvious negative repercussions on their careers as well as their prospects in terms of professional and personal development (§ 263). Accordingly, there had been a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention.", + "post_text": "The Court adopted the consequence-based approach in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, a case concerning the dismissal of a judge from his position of president of a court, to find that the measure complained of did not have serious negative consequences for the aspects constituting the applicant's \"private life\", namely: (i) his \"inner circle\"; (ii) his opportunities to establish and develop relationships with others; or (iii) his reputation. It therefore found that Article 8 was not applicable (§§ 120-134). Adifferent conclusion was reached by the Court in Polyakh and Others v. Ukraine, 2019, concerning dismissals of public officials from their posts altogether, by adopting the same approach (§§ 207-211). In Budimir v. Croatia, 2021, the Court applied the consequence-based approach to the revocation of the applicant's licence to work as a motor vehicle inspector pending criminal proceedings against him, which had resulted in his dismissal from private employment and which later ended with his acquittal on all charges (§§ 46-47). In Pająk and Others v. Poland, 2023, the Court applied the consequence- based approach to complaints in relation to legislation differentiating between men and women with regard to the retirement age of judges and the refusal to allow the applicants to exercise their functions beyond the age limit (§§ 210-220).\n\nIn Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, the Court found that the applicant's inability to have the premature termination of his mandate as president of the Supreme Court reviewed by an ordinary tribunal or other body exercising judicial powers was in breach of his right of access to a court, as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (§§ 121-122). The applicant's dismissal had been the result of legislation at constitutional level that deprived him of any possibility of seeking judicial review, which the Court considered to be doubtful as to its compatibility with the rule of law (§§ 117 and 121; see also, Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, §§ 345-346, for the application of similar procedural safeguards in the context of the removal of a judge from a judicial council while he still remained a serving judge; and Pająk and Others v. Poland, 2023, §§ 196-198, for the early termination of a female judge's term by a unilateral decision of the National Council of the Judiciary). The Court also found a violation of Article 10 of the Convention in this case on account of, inter alia, the absence of effective and adequate safeguards against abuse as regards the measures that interfered with the applicant's right to freedom of expression (§§ 174-176). Indeed, the Court has found, in other similar cases, that the procedural guarantees in disciplinary sanctions (such as dismissals) constitute an important part of the protection of freedom of expression under Article 10 (Kudeshkina v. Russia, 2009, §§ 96-97, concerning the removal from office of a judge following critical statements about the judiciary).\n\nIn the case of Moraru and Marin v. Romania, 2022, the Court examined complaints in relation to the inability of two female civil servants who had attained the retirement age set for women to continue to work until reaching the higher retirement age set for men. It found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.12 on the ground of discrimination based on sex, noting in particular that the blanket rule on mandatory termination of women's employment at a lower age than that set for men perpetuated a stereotypical view of gender roles and treated women as a homogenous group deprived of agency, one whose personal situations or desires in terms of professional life and career 9 The Court made reference to Articles 8 (the right of employed women to protection of maternity), 20 (the right to equal opportunities and equal treatment in matters of employment and occupation without discrimination on the grounds of sex) and 27 (the right of workers with family responsibilities to equal opportunities and equal treatment) of the European Social Charter (revised) under Council of Europe material (§ 39). 10 International Labour Organisation's (ILO) Maternity Protection Convention 2000 (No. 183). development, as well as their alignment with those of men, had been completely disregarded (§ 118). Moreover, in Pająk and Others v. Poland, 2023, the Court examined the complaints of four female judges concerning a law lowering the retirement age to sixty for female judges and to sixty-five for male judges. In finding a difference in treatment based on sex regarding the mandatory retirement age of persons from the same profession, the Court was particularly concerned with the requirement for female judges to justify their intellectual aptitude to sit as a judge by means of a medical certificate (§ 259). In addition, the Court considered that the early retirement had obvious negative repercussions on their careers as well as their prospects in terms of professional and personal development (§ 263). Accordingly, there had been a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231127144526/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_social_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20251104040747/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_social_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/cfca8cb0bbc6/20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -26606,6 +28148,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json", "case_key": "apps:24622/22", "case_name": "Pasquinelli and Others v. San Marino", @@ -26639,6 +28183,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json", "case_key": "apps:66292/14", "case_name": "Pengezov v. Bulgaria", @@ -26657,7 +28203,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.C.9|a:None|b:87|II.C.9|a:None|b:89", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "A failure by a domestic court to conduct an in-depth, thorough examination of an applicant's arguments following dismissal and to give reasons for dismissing the latter's challenges has been found by the Court to violate the right to a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the 6 In § 215 the Court noted that no such requirement was stipulated by the relevant ILO Conventions either, and that ILO Recommendation no. 143 on Protection and Facilities to be Afforded to Workers' Representatives in the Undertaking 1971 refers instead to \"a requirement of consultation with, an advisory opinion from, or agreement of an independent body, public or private, or a joint body, before the dismissal of a workers' representative becomes final\". Convention (Pişkin v. Turkey, 2020, § 151). The Pişkin case concerned the dismissal of an employee of a public institute under an emergency legislative decree on account of his alleged links with a terrorist organisation. While the domestic courts theoretically had jurisdiction to assess the dispute between the applicant and the authorities, they did not examine the questions of law and fact presented before them. Such shortcomings in the judicial review of the applicant's complaints and in the reasoning of the judicial decisions amounted to a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (§§ 141-1507; see also Pengezov v. Bulgaria, 2023, §§ 49-53).\n\nIn addition, in Pişkin v. Turkey, 2020, the lack of effective judicial review of the applicant's dismissal also led the Court to finding a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in that the applicant had not benefitted from the minimum degree of protection against arbitrary interference required by this provision. The Court stressed once again that, even when national security is at stake, measures affecting fundamental human rights must be subject to some form of adversarial proceedings before an independent body competent to review the reasons for the decision and relevant evidence (§§ 223-229). Indeed, a thorough and in-depth analysis of the interests at stake by domestic courts has been an important aspect in the Court's evaluation of the 'necessary in a democratic society' component under Article 8 of the Convention (Fernández Martínez v. Spain [GC], 2014, §§ 147-151; Travaš v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 108-113; Pengezov v. Bulgaria, 2023, §§ 85-87).", + "post_text": "Afailure by a domestic court to conduct an in-depth, thorough examination of an applicant's arguments following dismissal and to give reasons for dismissing the latter's challenges has been found by the Court to violate the right to a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the 6 In § 215 the Court noted that no such requirement was stipulated by the relevant ILO Conventions either, and that ILO Recommendation no. 143 on Protection and Facilities to be Afforded to Workers' Representatives in the Undertaking 1971 refers instead to \"a requirement of consultation with, an advisory opinion from, or agreement of an independent body, public or private, or a joint body, before the dismissal of a workers' representative becomes final\". Convention (Pişkin v. Turkey, 2020, § 151). The Pişkin case concerned the dismissal of an employee of a public institute under an emergency legislative decree on account of his alleged links with a terrorist organisation. While the domestic courts theoretically had jurisdiction to assess the dispute between the applicant and the authorities, they did not examine the questions of law and fact presented before them. Such shortcomings in the judicial review of the applicant's complaints and in the reasoning of the judicial decisions amounted to a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (§§ 141-1507; see also Pengezov v. Bulgaria, 2023, §§ 49-53).\n\nIn addition, in Pişkin v. Turkey, 2020, the lack of effective judicial review of the applicant's dismissal also led the Court to finding a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in that the applicant had not benefitted from the minimum degree of protection against arbitrary interference required by this provision. The Court stressed once again that, even when national security is at stake, measures affecting fundamental human rights must be subject to some form of adversarial proceedings before an independent body competent to review the reasons for the decision and relevant evidence (§§ 223-229). Indeed, a thorough and in-depth analysis of the interests at stake by domestic courts has been an important aspect in the Court's evaluation of the 'necessary in a democratic society' component under Article 8 of the Convention (Fernández Martínez v. Spain [GC], 2014, §§ 147-151; Travaš v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 108-113; Pengezov v. Bulgaria, 2023, §§ 85-87).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231127144526/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_social_rights_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20251104040747/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_social_rights_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/cfca8cb0bbc6/20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf", @@ -26672,6 +28218,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json", "case_key": "apps:29359/22", "case_name": "Salay v. Slovakia", @@ -26705,6 +28253,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json", "case_key": "apps:2412/19", "case_name": "Shylina v. Ukraine", @@ -26738,6 +28288,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json", "case_key": "apps:59963/21", "case_name": "Zanola v. Italy (dec.)", @@ -26771,6 +28323,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-11-11", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d24a9ac722de/diff_2024-06-18__2024-11-11.json", "case_key": "apps:27547/18", "case_name": "Büttner and Krebs v. Germany (dec.)", @@ -26788,8 +28342,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_removed", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.E|a:36|b:36", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "The Court is not competent to review the compatibility of a national measure or decision with European Union law ( K.I. v. France, 2021, § 123; see also, to similar effect, Occhetto v. Italy (dec.), 2013, § 54; Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], 2014, § 110); see also, to similar effect, Parti nationaliste basque - Organisation régionale d'Iparralde v. France, 2007, § 48; Avotiņš v. Latvia [GC], Lechouritou and Others v. Germany 2016, § 100) or to rule on the CJEU's interpretation of EU law ( and 26 other member States of the European Union (dec.) [committee], 2012). It is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law, if necessary in conformity with EU law, the Court's role being confined to ascertaining whether the effects of such adjudication are compatible with the Convention ( Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], 2014, § 110; K.I. v. France, 2021, § 123).", - "post_text": "The Court is not competent to review the compatibility of a national measure or decision with European Union law ( K.I. v. France, 2021, § 123; see also, to similar effect, Occhetto v. Italy (dec.), 2013, § 54; Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], 2014, § 110); see also, to similar effect, Parti nationaliste basque - Organisation régionale d'Iparralde v. France, 2007, § 48; Avotiņš v. Latvia [GC], 2016, § 100) or to rule on the CJEU's interpretation of EU law ( Lechouritou and Others v. Germany and 26 other member States of the European Union (dec.) [committee], 2012). It is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law, if necessary in conformity with EU law, the Court's role being confined to ascertaining whether the effects of such adjudication are compatible with the Convention ( Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], 2014, § 110; K.I. v. France, 2021, § 123; Büttner and Krebs v. Germany (dec.), 2024, § 59).", + "pre_text": "The Court is not competent to review the compatibility of a national measure or decision with European Union law ( K.I. v. France, 2021, § 123; see also, to similar effect, Occhetto v. Italy (dec.), 2013, § 54; Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], 2014, § 110); see also, to similar effect, Parti nationaliste basque - Organisation régionale d'Iparralde v. France, 2007, § 48; Avotiņš v. Latvia [GC], Lechouritou and Others v. Germany 2016, § 100) or to rule on the CJEU's interpretation of EUlaw ( and 26 other member States of the European Union (dec.) [committee], 2012). It is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law, if necessary in conformity with EUlaw, the Court's role being confined to ascertaining whether the effects of such adjudication are compatible with the Convention ( Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], 2014, § 110; K.I. v. France, 2021, § 123).", + "post_text": "The Court is not competent to review the compatibility of a national measure or decision with European Union law ( K.I. v. France, 2021, § 123; see also, to similar effect, Occhetto v. Italy (dec.), 2013, § 54; Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], 2014, § 110); see also, to similar effect, Parti nationaliste basque - Organisation régionale d'Iparralde v. France, 2007, § 48; Avotiņš v. Latvia [GC], 2016, § 100) or to rule on the CJEU's interpretation of EUlaw ( Lechouritou and Others v. Germany and 26 other member States of the European Union (dec.) [committee], 2012). It is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law, if necessary in conformity with EUlaw, the Court's role being confined to ascertaining whether the effects of such adjudication are compatible with the Convention ( Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], 2014, § 110; K.I. v. France, 2021, § 123; Büttner and Krebs v. Germany (dec.), 2024, § 59).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240618210119/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_eu_law_in_echr_case-law_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20241111181638/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_eu_law_in_echr_case-law_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/d24a9ac722de/20240618210119__guide_eu_law_in_echr_case-law_eng.pdf", @@ -26804,6 +28358,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-11-11", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d24a9ac722de/diff_2024-06-18__2024-11-11.json", "case_key": "apps:35271/19", "case_name": "The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy", @@ -26837,6 +28393,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:44033/17", "case_name": "D.H. and Others v. North Macedonia", @@ -26854,8 +28412,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.3.a|a:243|b:247", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "As regards persons under arrest or prosecution, the Court found violations of Article 8 where police services had handed over photographs of the applicants to the press without their consent ( Sciacca v. Italy, 2005, §§ 29-31; Khuzhin and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 115-118), where they had invited TV crews to film an applicant at a police station without his consent with a view to broadcasting the images on television ( Toma v. Romania, 2009, §§ 90-93; Khmel v. Russia, 2013, § 41), or in a case 55/99 where posting up a photograph of the applicant on the \"wanted\" noticeboard had not been prescribed by law ( Guiorgui Nikolaïchvili v. Georgia, 2009, §§ 129-131).", - "post_text": "As regards persons under arrest or prosecution, the Court found violations of Article 8 where police services had handed over photographs of the applicants to the press without their consent ( Sciacca v. Italy, 2005, §§ 29-31; Khuzhin and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 115-118; Margari v. Greece, 2023, §§ 54-60), where they had invited TV crews to film an applicant at a police station without his consent with a view to broadcasting the images on television ( Toma v. Romania, 2009, §§ 90-93; Khmel v. Russia, 2013, § 41), where the Ministry of the Interior published on its website the applicants' photographs, taken while they were in police custody, in which their identity was not concealed ( D.H. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2023, §§ 63-65), where posting up a photograph of the applicant on the \"wanted\" noticeboard had not been prescribed by law ( Guiorgui Nikolaïchvili v. Georgia, 2009, §§ 129-131) or where the existing rules and procedures did not meet \"the quality of law\" requirement ( Negru v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 29-35).", + "pre_text": "As regards persons under arrest or prosecution, the Court found violations of Article 8 where police services had handed over photographs of the applicants to the press without their consent ( Sciacca v. Italy, 2005, §§ 29-31; Khuzhin and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 115-118), where they had invited TVcrews to film an applicant at a police station without his consent with a view to broadcasting the images on television ( Toma v. Romania, 2009, §§ 90-93; Khmel v. Russia, 2013, § 41), or in a case 55/99 where posting up a photograph of the applicant on the \"wanted\" noticeboard had not been prescribed by law ( Guiorgui Nikolaïchvili v. Georgia, 2009, §§ 129-131).", + "post_text": "As regards persons under arrest or prosecution, the Court found violations of Article 8 where police services had handed over photographs of the applicants to the press without their consent ( Sciacca v. Italy, 2005, §§ 29-31; Khuzhin and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 115-118; Margari v. Greece, 2023, §§ 54-60), where they had invited TVcrews to film an applicant at a police station without his consent with a view to broadcasting the images on television ( Toma v. Romania, 2009, §§ 90-93; Khmel v. Russia, 2013, § 41), where the Ministry of the Interior published on its website the applicants' photographs, taken while they were in police custody, in which their identity was not concealed ( D.H. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2023, §§ 63-65), where posting up a photograph of the applicant on the \"wanted\" noticeboard had not been prescribed by law ( Guiorgui Nikolaïchvili v. Georgia, 2009, §§ 129-131) or where the existing rules and procedures did not meet \"the quality of law\" requirement ( Negru v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 29-35).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923165006/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331212544/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/d5256ad78e38/20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", @@ -26870,6 +28428,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:11519/20", "case_name": "Glukhin v. Russia", @@ -26887,8 +28447,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_updated|citation_added|paragraph_added|minor_edit", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A.1|a:9|b:9|I.A.1|a:13|b:13|I.A.2.§4|a:21|b:21|I.C.1|a:None|b:97|I.C.1|a:92|b:92|I.C.3.d|a:121|b:123|II.A.2.a|a:199|b:202|IV.A|a:None|b:402", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Under Article 2 of Convention 108, \"data processing\" includes : \"any operation or set of operations performed on personal data, such as the collection, storage, preservation, alteration, retrieval, disclosure, making available, erasure, or destruction of, or the carrying out of logical and/or arithmetical operations on such data\" . The development of technologies has led to an increase in the types of operations involving personal data that can constitute processing; the Court has identified the following typical examples: 8/99 ▪ The collection by the police from an Internet provider of subscriber information associated with an individual's specific dynamic IP address ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109). ▪ The fact of gathering and storing public information on an individual, for example about his/her political activity ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44; Association \"21 December 1989\" and Others v. Romania, 2011, §§ 167-168; Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, §§ 65-67; Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 93). ▪ The listing of an individual in a national judicial database of sex offenders ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 58), and the collection and storage of a suspect's fingerprints ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 29). ▪ The covert recording in a police station, for permanent storage, of voice samples to be used in identifying the individuals concerned, by a process of analysis in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, §§ 59-60). ▪ The filming of an individual in a police interview room by cameras installed for security reasons and totally visible, with the permanent recording of the footage and its inclusion in a montage for further use ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 41). ▪ The systematic collection and retention of GPS monitoring data indicating the whereabouts and public movements of the subject ( Uzun v. Germany, 2010, §§ 49-53). ▪ The publication in a magazine of an article illustrated by photos of celebrities taken without their knowledge ( Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], 2012, §§ 95-99). ▪ The recording and disclosure to media of CCTV footage showing an individual trying to commit suicide in a public place ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 59-63). ▪ The recording and storage by police of data on an individual's supposed occupation ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ The disclosure by a psychiatric hospital to journalists of highly sensitive confidential information about the private life of a patient ( Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, § 99). ▪ The collection by the State, as part of anti-doping measures in sport, of information on the whereabouts and daily pursuits, even at weekends, of high-level athletes ( National Federation of Sportspersons'Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 155-159). ▪ The systematic scanning and uploading of prisoners'private correspondence, both incoming and outgoing, onto the National Judicial Network Server ( Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-82).\n\nA significant element, although not necessarily decisive, is whether an individual is reasonably entitled to expect protection of his/her private life ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 37; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 80). As to on-line activities, the anonymity of personal information will be a key factor in that assessment and the fact that a subscriber to an Internet service provider had not hidden his/her dynamic IP address was not decisive in the assessment of whether his expectation of privacy was reasonable from an objective standpoint ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, § 116). In the workplace, an employer's instructions cannot reduce private social life in the workplace to zero. Respect for private life and for the privacy of correspondence continues to exist, even if these may be restricted in so far as necessary ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 80-81). Video recordings made in a public place using surveillance mechanisms may fall within Article 8 where their disclosure, by its manner or extent, goes beyond what the individuals could reasonably have expected ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 62; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 41-43). As regards press articles about the arrest of a television actor, illustrated by photos, the Court found that the actor 's \"legitimate expectation\" of having his private life effectively protected was reduced by the fact that he had \"actively sought the limelight\" by revealing details of his private life in a number of interviews ( Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 2012, § 101).\n\nData revealing political opinions are regarded as a \"sensitive\" category of personal data and, in the Court's view, it is unacceptable for the national authorities to disregard this aspect by processing such data in accordance with ordinary domestic rules, without taking account of the need for eightened protection ( Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 112). In the 2019 case of Catt v. the United Kingdom, concerning the storage in a police database of data relating to a peaceful demonstrator, the national courts had merely made reference to the general data protection law in examining the lawfulness of the interference. The Court found a violation of Article 8, pointing out that the sensitive nature of the data in question should have constituted a key element of the case before the domestic 11/99 courts, as it was before the Court (ibid., § 112). The Court likewise found a violation of Article 8 in M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022, (§§ 63-64) concerning a report drawn up by the police in respect of judges and magistrates, who exercised their functions in Catalonia and who had signed a manifesto in which they had set out their legal opinion in favour of the possibility of the Catalan people's exercising the so- called \"right to decide\", the report revealing, in particular, the political views of some of the applicants.\n\nLastly, in other cases the Court has found that the requirement for interference to be \" in accordance with the law \" was so closely linked to the \"necessary in a democratic society\" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155).\n\nIn order to establish the boundary of the intimacy of private life secured by Article 8, the Court has made a distinction between surveillance of an individual's acts in a public place for security purposes, and recordings of such acts used for other purposes, going beyond what the individual concerned could have expected ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 59-62, on the filming of an applicant in a public place on security grounds where the footage was disclosed to the media; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 41-42, on a subterfuge used by the police for the purposes of identifying the applicant by video recording, going beyond the limits of the normal or foreseeable use of surveillance cameras in police stations).\n\nThe interests of data subjects and the community as a whole in protecting personal data, including fingerprint and DNA information, may be outweighed by the legitimate interest in the prevention of crime ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 104). In order to protect their population as required, the national authorities can legitimately set up databases as an effective means of helping to punish and prevent certain offences, including the most serious types of crime, such as sex offences ( B.B. v. France, 2009, § 62; Gardel v. France, 2009, § 63; M.B. v. France, 2009, § 54). While the original taking of this information pursues the aim of linking a particular person to the particular crime of which he or she is suspected, its retention pursues the broader purpose of assisting 46/99 in the identification of future offenders ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 100). The Court cannot call into question the preventive purpose of such registers ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 63; B.B. v. France, 2009, § 62; M.B. v. France, 2009, § 54). The fight against crime, and in particular against organised crime and terrorism, which is one of the challenges faced by today's European societies, depends to a great extent on the use of modern scientific techniques of investigation and identification ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 105). At the same time, since the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, domestic law must afford appropriate safeguards to prevent any such use of personal data as may be inconsistent with the guarantees of this Article (ibid., § 103).", - "post_text": "Under Article 2 of Convention 108, \"data processing\" includes: \"any operation or set of operations performed on personal data, such as the collection, storage, preservation, alteration, retrieval, disclosure, making available, erasure, or destruction of, or the carrying out of logical and/or arithmetical operations on such data\". The development of technologies has led to an increase in the types of operations involving personal data that can constitute processing; the Court has identified the following typical examples:  The collection by the police from an Internet provider of subscriber information associated Benedik v. Slovenia with an individual's specific dynamic IP address (, 2018, §§ 108-109).  The fact of gathering and storing public information on an individual, for example about his/her political activity ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44; Association \"21 December 1989\" and Others v. Romania, 2011, §§ 167-168; Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, §§ 65-67; Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 93).  The listing of an individual in a national judicial database of sex offenders ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 58), and the collection and storage of a suspect's fingerprints ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 29).  The covert recording in a police station, for permanent storage, of voice samples to be used in identifying the individuals concerned, by a process of analysis in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, §§ 59-60).  The filming of an individual in a police interview room by cameras installed for security reasons and totally visible, with the permanent recording of the footage and its inclusion in a montage for further use ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 41).  The systematic collection and retention of GPS monitoring data indicating the whereabouts and public movements of the subject ( Uzun v. Germany, 2010, §§ 49-53).  The publication in a magazine of an article illustrated by photos of celebrities taken without Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) their knowledge ( [GC], 2012, §§ 95-99).  The recording and disclosure to media of CCTV footage showing an individual trying to Peck v. the United Kingdom commit suicide in a public place (, 2003, §§ 59-63).  The recording and storage by police of data on an individual's supposed occupation ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56).  The disclosure by a psychiatric hospital to journalists of highly sensitive confidential information about the private life of a patient ( Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, § 99).  The collection by the State, as part of anti-doping measures in sport, of information on the whereabouts and daily pursuits, even at weekends, of high-level athletes ( National Federation of Sportspersons' Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 155-159).  The systematic scanning and uploading of prisoners' private correspondence, both incoming and outgoing, onto the National Judicial Network Server ( Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-82).  The use of facial recognition technology to, in the first place, identify the applicant, who had held a solo demonstration without a prior notification, from the photographs and the video published on the Telegram channel and, secondly, locate and arrest him while he was travelling on the underground ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 73).\n\nA significant element, although not necessarily decisive, is whether an individual is reasonably entitled to expect protection of his/her private life ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 37; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 80; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66). As to on-line activities, the anonymity of personal information will be a key factor in that assessment and the fact that a subscriber to an Internet service provider had not hidden his/her dynamic IP address was not decisive in the assessment of whether his expectation of privacy was reasonable from an objective standpoint Benedik v. Slovenia (, 2018, § 116). In the workplace, an employer's instructions cannot reduce private social life in the workplace to zero. Respect for private life and for the privacy of correspondence continues to exist, even if these may be restricted in so far as necessary ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 80-81; see also, for the professional context, Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 37-38). The monitoring of the actions or movements of an individual in a public place using surveillance mechanisms may fall within Article 8 once any systemic or permanent record of such personal data comes into existence ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66), or where their disclosure, by its manner or extent, Peck v. the United Kingdom goes beyond what the individuals could reasonably have expected (, 2003, § 62; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 41-43). As regards press articles about the arrest of a television actor, illustrated by photos, the Court found that the actor's \"legitimate expectation\" of having his private life effectively protected was reduced by the fact that he had \"actively sought the Axel Springer AG v. Germany limelight\" by revealing details of his private life in a number of interviews ( [GC], 2012, § 101).\n\nData revealing political opinions are regarded as a \"sensitive\" category of personal data and, in the Court's view, it is unacceptable for the national authorities to disregard this aspect by processing such data in accordance with ordinary domestic rules, without taking account of the need for heightened protection ( Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 112). In the case of Catt v. the United Kingdom, concerning the storage in a police database of data relating to a peaceful demonstrator, the national courts had merely made reference to the general data protection law in examining the lawfulness of the interference. The Court found a violation of Article 8, pointing out that the sensitive nature of the data in question should have constituted a key element of the case before the domestic courts, as it was before the Court (ibid., § 112). The Court likewise found a violation of Article 8 in M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022, (§§ 63-64) concerning a report drawn up by the police in respect of judges and magistrates, who exercised their functions in Catalonia and who had signed a manifesto in which they had set out their legal opinion in favour of the possibility of the Catalan people's exercising the so-called \"right to decide\", the report revealing, in particular, the political views of some of the applicants. The Court has also underlined that personal data revealing political opinions should attract a heightened level of protection ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, §§ 76 and 86, where the personal data of the applicant which had been processed contained information about his participation in a peaceful protest).\n\nIn the context of implementing facial recognition technology, the Court emphasised that, for the \"quality of law\" requirement to be met, it was essential to have detailed rules governing the scope and application of measures as well as strong safeguards against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness. The need for safeguards will be all the greater where the use of live facial recognition technology is concerned ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 82). In this case, where the Court for the first time addressed the issue of the use of such technology, it expressed strong doubts that the domestic legal provisions which authorised the processing of biometric personal data, including with the aid of facial recognition technology, \"in connection with the administration of justice\" met the \"quality of law\" requirement, since they were widely formulated and would appear to allow processing of such data in connection with any type of judicial proceedings. Domestic law did not contain any limitations on the nature of situations which might give rise to the use of facial recognition technology, the intended purposes, the categories of person who might be targeted, or on the processing of sensitive personal data. Moreover, there would appear to be no procedural safeguards accompanying the use of facial recognition technology, such as authorisation procedures, procedures to be followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained, supervisory control mechanisms or available remedies ( ibid ., § 83).\n\nLastly, in other cases the Court has found that the requirement for interference to be \"in accordance with the law\" was so closely linked to the \"necessary in a democratic society\" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78).\n\nIn order to establish the boundary of the intimacy of private life secured by Article 8, the Court has made a distinction between surveillance of an individual's acts in a public place for security purposes, and recordings of such acts used for other purposes, going beyond what the individual concerned could have expected ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 59-62, on the filming of an Perry applicant in a public place on security grounds where the footage was disclosed to the media; v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 41-42, on a subterfuge used by the police for the purposes of identifying the applicant by video recording, going beyond the limits of the normal or foreseeable use Glukhin v. Russia of surveillance cameras in police stations;, 2023, §§ 65-73, on the use of facial recognition technology in the context of public surveillance by CCTV cameras).\n\nThe interests of data subjects and the community as a whole in protecting personal data, including fingerprint and DNA information, may be outweighed by the legitimate interest in the prevention of crime ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 104). In order to protect their population as required, the national authorities can legitimately set up databases as an effective means of helping to punish and prevent certain offences, including the most serious types of crime, B.B. v. France Gardel v. France M.B. v. France, such as sex offences (, 2009, § 62;, 2009, § 63; 2009, § 54). While the original taking of this information pursues the aim of linking a particular person to the particular crime of which he or she is suspected, its retention pursues the broader purpose of assisting in the identification of future offenders ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 100). The Court cannot call into question the preventive purpose of such registers ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 63; B.B. v. France, 2009, § 62; M.B. v. France, 2009, § 54). The fight against crime, and in particular against organised crime and terrorism, which is one of the challenges faced by today's European societies, depends to a great extent on the use of modern scientific techniques of investigation and identification ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 105). At the same time, since the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, domestic law must afford appropriate safeguards to prevent any such use of personal data as may be inconsistent with the guarantees of this Article ( ibid., § 103; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 75).\n\nIn the case of Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, the Court examined, for the first time, the question of the use by the police of facial recognition technology. That technology had been used, in the first place, to identify the applicant from the photographs and the video published on a public Telegram channel, and, secondly, to locate and arrest him while he had been travelling on the city underground. The Court noted the very intrusive nature of those measures, emphasising that a high level of justification was therefore required in order for them to be considered \"necessary in a democratic society\", with ibid the highest level of justification required for the use of live facial recognition technology ( ., § 86). In that connection, it observed that the applicant had been prosecuted for a minor offence consisting of holding a solo demonstration without a prior notification. He had never been accused of committing any reprehensible acts during his demonstration (such as the obstruction of traffic, damage to property or acts of violence). It had never been claimed that his actions presented any danger to public order or transport safety. In such circumstances, the Court considered that the use of facial recognition technology to identify the applicant, and a fortiori the use of live facial recognition technology to locate and arrest him, had not corresponded to a \"pressing social need\" and thus could not be regarded as \"necessary in a democratic society ( ibid ., §§ 88-90).", + "pre_text": "Under Article 2 of Convention 108, \"data processing\" includes : \"any operation or set of operations performed on personal data, such as the collection, storage, preservation, alteration, retrieval, disclosure, making available, erasure, or destruction of, or the carrying out of logical and/or arithmetical operations on such data\" . The development of technologies has led to an increase in the types of operations involving personal data that can constitute processing; the Court has identified the following typical examples: 8/99 ▪ The collection by the police from an Internet provider of subscriber information associated with an individual's specific dynamic IPaddress ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109). ▪ The fact of gathering and storing public information on an individual, for example about his/her political activity ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44; Association \"21 December 1989\" and Others v. Romania, 2011, §§ 167-168; Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, §§ 65-67; Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 93). ▪ The listing of an individual in a national judicial database of sex offenders ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 58), and the collection and storage of a suspect's fingerprints ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 29). ▪ The covert recording in a police station, for permanent storage, of voice samples to be used in identifying the individuals concerned, by a process of analysis in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, §§ 59-60). ▪ The filming of an individual in a police interview room by cameras installed for security reasons and totally visible, with the permanent recording of the footage and its inclusion in a montage for further use ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 41). ▪ The systematic collection and retention of GPSmonitoring data indicating the whereabouts and public movements of the subject ( Uzun v. Germany, 2010, §§ 49-53). ▪ The publication in a magazine of an article illustrated by photos of celebrities taken without their knowledge ( Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], 2012, §§ 95-99). ▪ The recording and disclosure to media of CCTVfootage showing an individual trying to commit suicide in a public place ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 59-63). ▪ The recording and storage by police of data on an individual's supposed occupation ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ The disclosure by a psychiatric hospital to journalists of highly sensitive confidential information about the private life of a patient ( Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, § 99). ▪ The collection by the State, as part of anti-doping measures in sport, of information on the whereabouts and daily pursuits, even at weekends, of high-level athletes ( National Federation of Sportspersons'Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 155-159). ▪ The systematic scanning and uploading of prisoners'private correspondence, both incoming and outgoing, onto the National Judicial Network Server ( Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-82).\n\nAsignificant element, although not necessarily decisive, is whether an individual is reasonably entitled to expect protection of his/her private life ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 37; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 80). As to on-line activities, the anonymity of personal information will be a key factor in that assessment and the fact that a subscriber to an Internet service provider had not hidden his/her dynamic IPaddress was not decisive in the assessment of whether his expectation of privacy was reasonable from an objective standpoint ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, § 116). In the workplace, an employer's instructions cannot reduce private social life in the workplace to zero. Respect for private life and for the privacy of correspondence continues to exist, even if these may be restricted in so far as necessary ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 80-81). Video recordings made in a public place using surveillance mechanisms may fall within Article 8 where their disclosure, by its manner or extent, goes beyond what the individuals could reasonably have expected ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 62; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 41-43). As regards press articles about the arrest of a television actor, illustrated by photos, the Court found that the actor 's \"legitimate expectation\" of having his private life effectively protected was reduced by the fact that he had \"actively sought the limelight\" by revealing details of his private life in a number of interviews ( Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 2012, § 101).\n\nData revealing political opinions are regarded as a \"sensitive\" category of personal data and, in the Court's view, it is unacceptable for the national authorities to disregard this aspect by processing such data in accordance with ordinary domestic rules, without taking account of the need for eightened protection ( Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 112). In the 2019 case of Catt v. the United Kingdom, concerning the storage in a police database of data relating to a peaceful demonstrator, the national courts had merely made reference to the general data protection law in examining the lawfulness of the interference. The Court found a violation of Article 8, pointing out that the sensitive nature of the data in question should have constituted a key element of the case before the domestic 11/99 courts, as it was before the Court (ibid., § 112). The Court likewise found a violation of Article 8 in M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022, (§§ 63-64) concerning a report drawn up by the police in respect of judges and magistrates, who exercised their functions in Catalonia and who had signed a manifesto in which they had set out their legal opinion in favour of the possibility of the Catalan people's exercising the so- called \"right to decide\", the report revealing, in particular, the political views of some of the applicants.\n\nLastly, in other cases the Court has found that the requirement for interference to be \" in accordance with the law \" was so closely linked to the \"necessary in a democratic society\" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155).\n\nIn order to establish the boundary of the intimacy of private life secured by Article 8, the Court has made a distinction between surveillance of an individual's acts in a public place for security purposes, and recordings of such acts used for other purposes, going beyond what the individual concerned could have expected ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 59-62, on the filming of an applicant in a public place on security grounds where the footage was disclosed to the media; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 41-42, on a subterfuge used by the police for the purposes of identifying the applicant by video recording, going beyond the limits of the normal or foreseeable use of surveillance cameras in police stations).\n\nThe interests of data subjects and the community as a whole in protecting personal data, including fingerprint and DNAinformation, may be outweighed by the legitimate interest in the prevention of crime ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 104). In order to protect their population as required, the national authorities can legitimately set up databases as an effective means of helping to punish and prevent certain offences, including the most serious types of crime, such as sex offences ( B.B. v. France, 2009, § 62; Gardel v. France, 2009, § 63; M.B. v. France, 2009, § 54). While the original taking of this information pursues the aim of linking a particular person to the particular crime of which he or she is suspected, its retention pursues the broader purpose of assisting 46/99 in the identification of future offenders ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 100). The Court cannot call into question the preventive purpose of such registers ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 63; B.B. v. France, 2009, § 62; M.B. v. France, 2009, § 54). The fight against crime, and in particular against organised crime and terrorism, which is one of the challenges faced by today's European societies, depends to a great extent on the use of modern scientific techniques of investigation and identification ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 105). At the same time, since the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, domestic law must afford appropriate safeguards to prevent any such use of personal data as may be inconsistent with the guarantees of this Article (ibid., § 103).", + "post_text": "Under Article 2 of Convention 108, \"data processing\" includes: \"any operation or set of operations performed on personal data, such as the collection, storage, preservation, alteration, retrieval, disclosure, making available, erasure, or destruction of, or the carrying out of logical and/or arithmetical operations on such data\". The development of technologies has led to an increase in the types of operations involving personal data that can constitute processing; the Court has identified the following typical examples:  The collection by the police from an Internet provider of subscriber information associated Benedik v. Slovenia with an individual's specific dynamic IPaddress (, 2018, §§ 108-109).  The fact of gathering and storing public information on an individual, for example about his/her political activity ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44; Association \"21 December 1989\" and Others v. Romania, 2011, §§ 167-168; Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, §§ 65-67; Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 93).  The listing of an individual in a national judicial database of sex offenders ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 58), and the collection and storage of a suspect's fingerprints ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 29).  The covert recording in a police station, for permanent storage, of voice samples to be used in identifying the individuals concerned, by a process of analysis in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, §§ 59-60).  The filming of an individual in a police interview room by cameras installed for security reasons and totally visible, with the permanent recording of the footage and its inclusion in a montage for further use ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 41).  The systematic collection and retention of GPSmonitoring data indicating the whereabouts and public movements of the subject ( Uzun v. Germany, 2010, §§ 49-53).  The publication in a magazine of an article illustrated by photos of celebrities taken without Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) their knowledge ( [GC], 2012, §§ 95-99).  The recording and disclosure to media of CCTVfootage showing an individual trying to Peck v. the United Kingdom commit suicide in a public place (, 2003, §§ 59-63).  The recording and storage by police of data on an individual's supposed occupation ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56).  The disclosure by a psychiatric hospital to journalists of highly sensitive confidential information about the private life of a patient ( Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, § 99).  The collection by the State, as part of anti-doping measures in sport, of information on the whereabouts and daily pursuits, even at weekends, of high-level athletes ( National Federation of Sportspersons' Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 155-159).  The systematic scanning and uploading of prisoners' private correspondence, both incoming and outgoing, onto the National Judicial Network Server ( Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-82).  The use of facial recognition technology to, in the first place, identify the applicant, who had held a solo demonstration without a prior notification, from the photographs and the video published on the Telegram channel and, secondly, locate and arrest him while he was travelling on the underground ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 73).\n\nAsignificant element, although not necessarily decisive, is whether an individual is reasonably entitled to expect protection of his/her private life ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 37; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 80; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66). As to on-line activities, the anonymity of personal information will be a key factor in that assessment and the fact that a subscriber to an Internet service provider had not hidden his/her dynamic IPaddress was not decisive in the assessment of whether his expectation of privacy was reasonable from an objective standpoint Benedik v. Slovenia (, 2018, § 116). In the workplace, an employer's instructions cannot reduce private social life in the workplace to zero. Respect for private life and for the privacy of correspondence continues to exist, even if these may be restricted in so far as necessary ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 80-81; see also, for the professional context, Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 37-38). The monitoring of the actions or movements of an individual in a public place using surveillance mechanisms may fall within Article 8 once any systemic or permanent record of such personal data comes into existence ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66), or where their disclosure, by its manner or extent, Peck v. the United Kingdom goes beyond what the individuals could reasonably have expected (, 2003, § 62; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 41-43). As regards press articles about the arrest of a television actor, illustrated by photos, the Court found that the actor's \"legitimate expectation\" of having his private life effectively protected was reduced by the fact that he had \"actively sought the Axel Springer AG v. Germany limelight\" by revealing details of his private life in a number of interviews ( [GC], 2012, § 101).\n\nData revealing political opinions are regarded as a \"sensitive\" category of personal data and, in the Court's view, it is unacceptable for the national authorities to disregard this aspect by processing such data in accordance with ordinary domestic rules, without taking account of the need for heightened protection ( Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 112). In the case of Catt v. the United Kingdom, concerning the storage in a police database of data relating to a peaceful demonstrator, the national courts had merely made reference to the general data protection law in examining the lawfulness of the interference. The Court found a violation of Article 8, pointing out that the sensitive nature of the data in question should have constituted a key element of the case before the domestic courts, as it was before the Court (ibid., § 112). The Court likewise found a violation of Article 8 in M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022, (§§ 63-64) concerning a report drawn up by the police in respect of judges and magistrates, who exercised their functions in Catalonia and who had signed a manifesto in which they had set out their legal opinion in favour of the possibility of the Catalan people's exercising the so-called \"right to decide\", the report revealing, in particular, the political views of some of the applicants. The Court has also underlined that personal data revealing political opinions should attract a heightened level of protection ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, §§ 76 and 86, where the personal data of the applicant which had been processed contained information about his participation in a peaceful protest).\n\nIn the context of implementing facial recognition technology, the Court emphasised that, for the \"quality of law\" requirement to be met, it was essential to have detailed rules governing the scope and application of measures as well as strong safeguards against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness. The need for safeguards will be all the greater where the use of live facial recognition technology is concerned ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 82). In this case, where the Court for the first time addressed the issue of the use of such technology, it expressed strong doubts that the domestic legal provisions which authorised the processing of biometric personal data, including with the aid of facial recognition technology, \"in connection with the administration of justice\" met the \"quality of law\" requirement, since they were widely formulated and would appear to allow processing of such data in connection with any type of judicial proceedings. Domestic law did not contain any limitations on the nature of situations which might give rise to the use of facial recognition technology, the intended purposes, the categories of person who might be targeted, or on the processing of sensitive personal data. Moreover, there would appear to be no procedural safeguards accompanying the use of facial recognition technology, such as authorisation procedures, procedures to be followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained, supervisory control mechanisms or available remedies ( ibid ., § 83).\n\nLastly, in other cases the Court has found that the requirement for interference to be \"in accordance with the law\" was so closely linked to the \"necessary in a democratic society\" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78).\n\nIn order to establish the boundary of the intimacy of private life secured by Article 8, the Court has made a distinction between surveillance of an individual's acts in a public place for security purposes, and recordings of such acts used for other purposes, going beyond what the individual concerned could have expected ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 59-62, on the filming of an Perry applicant in a public place on security grounds where the footage was disclosed to the media; v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 41-42, on a subterfuge used by the police for the purposes of identifying the applicant by video recording, going beyond the limits of the normal or foreseeable use Glukhin v. Russia of surveillance cameras in police stations;, 2023, §§ 65-73, on the use of facial recognition technology in the context of public surveillance by CCTVcameras).\n\nThe interests of data subjects and the community as a whole in protecting personal data, including fingerprint and DNAinformation, may be outweighed by the legitimate interest in the prevention of crime ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 104). In order to protect their population as required, the national authorities can legitimately set up databases as an effective means of helping to punish and prevent certain offences, including the most serious types of crime, B.B. v. France Gardel v. France M.B. v. France, such as sex offences (, 2009, § 62;, 2009, § 63; 2009, § 54). While the original taking of this information pursues the aim of linking a particular person to the particular crime of which he or she is suspected, its retention pursues the broader purpose of assisting in the identification of future offenders ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 100). The Court cannot call into question the preventive purpose of such registers ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 63; B.B. v. France, 2009, § 62; M.B. v. France, 2009, § 54). The fight against crime, and in particular against organised crime and terrorism, which is one of the challenges faced by today's European societies, depends to a great extent on the use of modern scientific techniques of investigation and identification ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 105). At the same time, since the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, domestic law must afford appropriate safeguards to prevent any such use of personal data as may be inconsistent with the guarantees of this Article ( ibid., § 103; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 75).\n\nIn the case of Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, the Court examined, for the first time, the question of the use by the police of facial recognition technology. That technology had been used, in the first place, to identify the applicant from the photographs and the video published on a public Telegram channel, and, secondly, to locate and arrest him while he had been travelling on the city underground. The Court noted the very intrusive nature of those measures, emphasising that a high level of justification was therefore required in order for them to be considered \"necessary in a democratic society\", with ibid the highest level of justification required for the use of live facial recognition technology ( ., § 86). In that connection, it observed that the applicant had been prosecuted for a minor offence consisting of holding a solo demonstration without a prior notification. He had never been accused of committing any reprehensible acts during his demonstration (such as the obstruction of traffic, damage to property or acts of violence). It had never been claimed that his actions presented any danger to public order or transport safety. In such circumstances, the Court considered that the use of facial recognition technology to identify the applicant, and a fortiori the use of live facial recognition technology to locate and arrest him, had not corresponded to a \"pressing social need\" and thus could not be regarded as \"necessary in a democratic society ( ibid ., §§ 88-90).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923165006/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331212544/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/d5256ad78e38/20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", @@ -26903,6 +28463,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:57292/16", "case_name": "Hurbain v. Belgium [GC]", @@ -26921,7 +28483,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.2.c|a:233|b:237|II.B.3.a|a:None|b:294|II.B.3.a|a:None|b:295|II.B.3.a|a:None|b:298|II.B.3.a|a:None|b:301|III.A.2|a:322|b:337|IV.B|a:387|b:403|IV.B|a:388|b:404|IV.B|a:389|b:405|IV.B|a:391|b:406|IV.B|a:392|b:407", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "In M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2018 (§ 90), the Court stated that the press had a secondary but nonetheless valuable role in maintaining archives containing news which had previously been reported and making them available to the public. In that regard, Internet archives make a substantial contribution to preserving and making available news and information, since they constitute an important source for education and historical research, particularly as they are readily accessible to the public and are generally free ( Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), 2009, §§ 27, 45; Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Poland, 2013, § 59).\n\nConversely, the Court has found no violation of Article 10 in several cases including: ▪ Biancardi v. Italy, 2021 (§§ 67-71) on the compatibility with Article 10 of a civil judgment against a journalist for not de-indexing sensitive information published on the Internet concerning criminal proceedings against a private individual and the journalist's decision to keep the information easily accessible in spite of the individual's opposition; ▪ Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017 (§§ 139-199), concerning a judicial decision banning the mass publication of personal taxation data; ▪ Bédat v. Switzerland [GC], 2016 (§§ 44-82), on the conviction of a journalist for publishing information covered by the secrecy of criminal investigations; ▪ Mediengruppe Österreich GmbH v. Austria, 2022 (§§ 44-73), concerning a court order for a daily newspaper not to publish a photograph with a \"convicted neo-Nazi \" caption as regards an individual indirectly connected to the campaign of a political candidate in the run-up to a presidential election, the relevant publication having taken place more than twenty years after the conviction; ▪ Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020 (§§ 85-90), concerning the withdrawal of a journalist's accreditation to search the Securitate archives, following the disclosure in several articles written by him of personal data in \"raw\" form concerning various well -known sports figures, without the relevance of the data having been assessed in the light of the declared subject of his research, namely sport in Romania under the communist regime; ▪ Giesbert and Others v. France, 2017 (§§ 77-103), concerning the courts'findings against a newspaper for publishing documents from a set of criminal proceedings before they were to be read out at a public hearing; ▪ Verlagsgruppe Droemer Knaur GmbH & Co. KG v. Germany, 2017 (§§ 36-62), concerning an order for a publishing company to pay damages for failing to carry out thorough research and for serious interference with an individual's personality rights; ▪ Kurier Zeitungsverlag und Druckerei GmbH v. Austria, 2012 (§§ 47-56), concerning the requirement to pay compensation to a child who had been the victim of sexual abuse and whose identity was disclosed in a press article. In view of the vulnerability of crime victims, their identity deserved particular protection; ▪ MGN Limited v. the United Kingdom, 2011 (§ 152), in which the Court was persuaded, among other considerations, by the fact that the disclosure in the press of details of a celebrity's therapy for drug addiction was harmful and risked causing a significant setback to her recovery; ▪ Editions Plon v. France, 2004 (§§ 22-55), on the definitive suspension of distribution of a book containing information relating to a deceased Head of State and covered by medical confidentiality.\n\nInternet sites are an information and communication tool particularly distinct from the printed media, especially as regards the capacity to store and transmit information ( M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2018, § 91). In the light of its accessibility and its capacity to store and communicate vast amounts of information, the Internet plays an important role in enhancing the public's access to news 88/99 and facilitating the dissemination of information generally ( Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), 2009, § 27).\n\nThe risk of harm posed by content and communications on the Internet to the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and freedoms, particularly the right to respect for private life, is certainly higher than that posed by the press, particularly on account of the important role of search engines ( M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2018, § 91 and the references cited therein).\n\nInformation containing personal data held by media outlets can easily be found by Internet users via search engines (ibid., § 97). Because of this amplifying effect on the dissemination of information and the nature of the activity underlying the publication of information, the obligations of search engines towards the individual who is the subject of the information may differ from those of the entity which originally published the information (ibid ., § 97). Hence, in a case in which two individuals had requested that the full details of their identity and their photographs be removed from the online archives of certain newspapers and radio stations after they had finished serving long prison sentences for murder (ibid ., §§ 7, 12, 33), the Court found that the balancing of the interests at stake could result in different outcomes depending on whether a request for the deletion of personal data concerned the original publisher of the information, whose activity was generally at the heart of what freedom of expression was intended to protect, or a search engine whose main interest was not in publishing the initial information about the person concerned, but in particular in facilitating identification of any available information on that person and establishing a profile of him or her (ibid ., § 97). See also paragraphs 281 and 282 above of the present Guide for more information on the \"right to be forgotten\" in the context of the online archives of media outlets containing individuals'personal data, in the case of M.L. and W.W. v. Germany .\n\nThe discretion afforded to States in striking a balance between the competing rights is greater where news archives of past events, rather than news reporting of current affairs, are concerned (ibid., § 45). The duty of the press to act in accordance with the principles of responsible journalism by ensuring the accuracy of historical, rather than perishable, information published is more stringent in the absence of any urgency in publishing the material (ibid., § 45).\n\nThe refusal of the courts to order the withdrawal of an article damaging the reputation of a lawyer and available in a newspaper's Internet archives was found not to be in breach of Article 8 in the case of Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Polan d, 2013 (§§ 60-70). The Court accepted that it was not the role of the judicial authorities to engage in rewriting history by ordering the removal from the public domain of all traces of publications which had in the past been found, by final judicial decisions, to amount to unjustified attacks on individual reputations (ibid., § 65). Furthermore, the legitimate interest of the public in access to the public Internet archives of the press was protected under Article 10 (ibid., § 65). It was noteworthy that the Polish courts had observed that it would be desirable to add a comment to the article on the newspaper's website informing the public of the outcome of the first set of proceedings. In the Court's view, this showed that the domestic courts had been aware of the significance which publications available to the general public on the Internet could have for the effective protection of individual rights and that they appreciated the value of the availability on the newspaper's website of full information about the judicial decisions concerning the article. The lawyer had not requested that a reference to the earlier judgments in his favour be added to the article (ibid., §§ 66-67).", - "post_text": "The Court has underlined that the press had a secondary but nonetheless valuable role in maintaining archives containing news which had previously been reported and making them available to the public. In that regard, Internet archives make a substantial contribution to preserving and making available news and information, since they constitute an important source for education and historical research, particularly as they are readily accessible to the public and are generally free ( Times New spapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), 2009, §§ 27 and 45; Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Poland M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2013, § 59;, 2018, § 90; see also, a case examined under Article 10, Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, § 180).\n\nAlthough the concept of a \"right to be forgotten\" has only emerged recently and is still under construction, its application in practice has already acquired a number of distinctive features ( Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, §§ 191 and 194). This concept first emerged in national judicial practice in the context of the republication by the press of previously disclosed information of a judicial nature, with the person claiming a \"right to be forgotten\" effectively seeking to obtain a judgment against the person who republished the information ( ibid ., § 194). Subsequently, a new aspect of this \"right to be forgotten\" emerged in national judicial practice in the context of the digitisation of news articles, resulting in their widespread dissemination on the websites of the newspapers concerned. The effect of this dissemination was simultaneously magnified by the listing of websites by search engines. This aspect, known as the \"right to be forgotten online\", has concerned requests for the removal or alteration of data available on the Internet or for limitations on access to those data, directed against news publishers or search engine operators. In such cases, the issue is not the resurfacing of the information but rather its continued availability online ( ibid ., § 195). Generally speaking, the \"right to be forgotten\" may give rise, in practice, to various measures that can be taken by search engine operators or by news publishers. These relate either to the content of an archived article (for instance, the removal, alteration or anonymisation of the article) or to limitations on the accessibility of the information. In the latter case, limitations on access may be put in place by both search engines and news publishers ( ibid ., § 175).\n\nIn its practice, the Court has dealt with several cases concerning requests for removal, alteration, anonymisation or de-indexing of news articles disclosing personal data of individuals. These cases were examined either under Article 8, if brought by individuals who had invoked their right to respect for their private life ( Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Polan d, 2013; M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2018), or under Article 10, if brought by journalists, editors or media owners, who had referred to Biancardi v. Italy Mediengruppe Österreich GmbH their right of freedom of expression (, 2021; v. Austria, 2022; Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023).\n\nAs regards media web archives comprising the personal data of an individual who had been the subject of a publication in the past, the Court pointed out that this context differed from situations concerning initial publication ( Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, § 205), and defined the main issue to be addressed as the continued availability of such information online rather than its original publication ibid ( ., § 174).\n\nIn the case of Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, the Court revisited its existing case-law and adjusted the criteria to be applied for balancing of the respective rights under Article 8 and Article 10 concerning the continued availability of an electronic archived version of an article disclosing an individual's personal data. The case was brought by a newspaper publisher who had been ordered by the domestic courts to anonymise an online archived version of an article which had been published some twenty years earlier and had provided an accurate account of a fatal accident, on the ground of the \"right to be forgotten\" of a driver who had caused that accident.\n\nConversely, the Court has found no violation of Article 10 in, or declared inadmissible, several cases including:  Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023 (§§ 167-257), concerning a civil judgment ordering a newspaper publisher to anonymise the electronic online version of an article which had mentioned the full name of a driver responsible for a fatal accident that had taken place many years earlier;  Biancardi v. Italy, 2021 (§§ 67-71) concerning a civil judgment against a newspaper editor for not de-indexing sensitive information published on the Internet concerning criminal proceedings against a private individual and the journalist's decision to keep the information easily accessible in spite of the individual's opposition;  Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017 (§§ 139-199), concerning a judicial decision banning the mass publication of personal taxation data;  Bédat v. Switzerland [GC], 2016 (§§ 44-82), on the conviction of a journalist for publishing information covered by the secrecy of criminal investigations;  Mediengruppe Österreich GmbH v. Austria, 2022 (§§ 44-73), concerning a court order for a daily newspaper not to publish a photograph with a \"convicted neo-Nazi\" caption as regards an individual indirectly connected to the campaign of a political candidate in the run-up to a presidential election, the relevant publication having taken place more than twenty years after the conviction;  Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020 (§§ 85-90), concerning the withdrawal of a journalist's accreditation to search the Securitate archives, following the disclosure in several articles written by him of personal data in \"raw\" form concerning various well-known sports figures, without the relevance of the data having been assessed in the light of the declared subject of his research, namely sport in Romania under the communist regime;  Giesbert and Others v. France, 2017 (§§ 77-103), concerning the courts' findings against a newspaper for publishing documents from a set of criminal proceedings before they were to be read out at a public hearing;  Verlagsgruppe Droemer Knaur GmbH & Co. KG v. Germany, 2017 (§§ 36-62), concerning an order for a publishing company to pay damages for failing to carry out thorough research and for serious interference with an individual's personality rights;  Kurier Zeitungsverlag und Druckerei GmbH v. Austria, 2012 (§§ 47-56), concerning the requirement to pay compensation to a child who had been the victim of sexual abuse and whose identity was disclosed in a press article. In view of the vulnerability of crime victims, their identity deserved particular protection;  MGN Limited v. the United Kingdom, 2011 (§ 152), in which the Court was persuaded, among other considerations, by the fact that the disclosure in the press of details of a celebrity's therapy for drug addiction was harmful and risked causing a significant setback to her recovery;  Editions Plon v. France, 2004 (§§ 22-55), on the definitive suspension of distribution of a book containing information relating to a deceased Head of State and covered by medical confidentiality;  Mitov and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2023 (§§ 30-41), concerning anonymisation rules laid down by the President of the Supreme Administrative Court and legislation introducing a deferred-publication rule for certain criminal judgments, following which the applicants, investigative journalists, had been unable to access freely on the Internet all scanned case materials available in the database of that court.\n\nInternet sites are an information and communication tool particularly distinct from the printed Węgrzynowski and media, especially as regards the capacity to store and transmit information ( Smolczewski v. Polan d, 2013, § 58; M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2018, § 91; Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, § 236). In the light of its accessibility and its capacity to store and communicate vast amounts of information, the Internet plays an important role in enhancing the public's access to news and facilitating the dissemination of information generally ( Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), 2009, § 27).\n\nThe risk of harm posed by content and communications on the Internet to the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and freedoms, particularly the right to respect for private life, is certainly higher than that posed by the press, particularly on account of the important role of search engines ( Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, § 236; M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2018, § 91 and the references cited therein).\n\nInformation containing personal data held by media outlets can easily be found by Internet users via search engines. Because of this amplifying effect on the dissemination of information and the nature of the activity underlying the publication of information, the obligations of search engines towards the individual who is the subject of the information may differ from those of the entity which originally published the information ( Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, § 207; M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2018, § 97). In view of the distinction between the activities and obligations of search engine operators and those of news publishers, data subjects, who seek protection of their personal data in this context, are not obliged to contact the original website, either beforehand or simultaneously, in order to exercise their rights vis-à-vis search engines, as these are two different forms of processing, each with its own grounds of legitimacy and with different impacts on the individual's rights and interests. Likewise, the examination of an action against the publisher of a news website cannot be made contingent on a prior request for delisting ( Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, § 208). See also paragraphs 294-305 above of the present Guide for more information on the \"right to be forgotten\".\n\nIn the Court's view, Internet archives contribute to preserving and making available news and information ( Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos . 1 and 2), 2009, § 45). Such archives constitute an important source for education and historical research, particularly as they are readily accessible to the public and are generally free ( Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], § 180). The discretion afforded to States in striking a balance between the competing rights is greater where news archives of past events, rather than news reporting of current affairs, are concerned ( Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), § 45). The duty of the press to act in accordance with the principles of responsible journalism by ensuring the accuracy of historical, rather than perishable, information published is more stringent in the absence of any urgency in publishing the material ( ibid., § 45).\n\nIn the case of Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023 (§§ 180-185) the Court noted the emergence of a consensus within Europe regarding the importance of archives, which should, as a general rule, remain authentic, reliable and complete so that the press could carry out its mission. Accordingly, the integrity of press archives should be the guiding principle in examining any request for the removal or alteration of all or part of an archived article, especially where its lawfulness had never been called into question. Such requests called for particular vigilance and thorough examination by the national authorities.", + "post_text": "The Court has underlined that the press had a secondary but nonetheless valuable role in maintaining archives containing news which had previously been reported and making them available to the public. In that regard, Internet archives make a substantial contribution to preserving and making available news and information, since they constitute an important source for education and historical research, particularly as they are readily accessible to the public and are generally free ( Times New spapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), 2009, §§ 27 and 45; Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Poland M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2013, § 59;, 2018, § 90; see also, a case examined under Article 10, Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, § 180).\n\nAlthough the concept of a \"right to be forgotten\" has only emerged recently and is still under construction, its application in practice has already acquired a number of distinctive features ( Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, §§ 191 and 194). This concept first emerged in national judicial practice in the context of the republication by the press of previously disclosed information of a judicial nature, with the person claiming a \"right to be forgotten\" effectively seeking to obtain a judgment against the person who republished the information ( ibid ., § 194). Subsequently, a new aspect of this \"right to be forgotten\" emerged in national judicial practice in the context of the digitisation of news articles, resulting in their widespread dissemination on the websites of the newspapers concerned. The effect of this dissemination was simultaneously magnified by the listing of websites by search engines. This aspect, known as the \"right to be forgotten online\", has concerned requests for the removal or alteration of data available on the Internet or for limitations on access to those data, directed against news publishers or search engine operators. In such cases, the issue is not the resurfacing of the information but rather its continued availability online ( ibid ., § 195). Generally speaking, the \"right to be forgotten\" may give rise, in practice, to various measures that can be taken by search engine operators or by news publishers. These relate either to the content of an archived article (for instance, the removal, alteration or anonymisation of the article) or to limitations on the accessibility of the information. In the latter case, limitations on access may be put in place by both search engines and news publishers ( ibid ., § 175).\n\nIn its practice, the Court has dealt with several cases concerning requests for removal, alteration, anonymisation or de-indexing of news articles disclosing personal data of individuals. These cases were examined either under Article 8, if brought by individuals who had invoked their right to respect for their private life ( Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Polan d, 2013; M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2018), or under Article 10, if brought by journalists, editors or media owners, who had referred to Biancardi v. Italy Mediengruppe Österreich GmbHtheir right of freedom of expression (, 2021; v. Austria, 2022; Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023).\n\nAs regards media web archives comprising the personal data of an individual who had been the subject of a publication in the past, the Court pointed out that this context differed from situations concerning initial publication ( Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, § 205), and defined the main issue to be addressed as the continued availability of such information online rather than its original publication ibid ( ., § 174).\n\nIn the case of Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, the Court revisited its existing case-law and adjusted the criteria to be applied for balancing of the respective rights under Article 8 and Article 10 concerning the continued availability of an electronic archived version of an article disclosing an individual's personal data. The case was brought by a newspaper publisher who had been ordered by the domestic courts to anonymise an online archived version of an article which had been published some twenty years earlier and had provided an accurate account of a fatal accident, on the ground of the \"right to be forgotten\" of a driver who had caused that accident.\n\nConversely, the Court has found no violation of Article 10 in, or declared inadmissible, several cases including:  Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023 (§§ 167-257), concerning a civil judgment ordering a newspaper publisher to anonymise the electronic online version of an article which had mentioned the full name of a driver responsible for a fatal accident that had taken place many years earlier;  Biancardi v. Italy, 2021 (§§ 67-71) concerning a civil judgment against a newspaper editor for not de-indexing sensitive information published on the Internet concerning criminal proceedings against a private individual and the journalist's decision to keep the information easily accessible in spite of the individual's opposition;  Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017 (§§ 139-199), concerning a judicial decision banning the mass publication of personal taxation data;  Bédat v. Switzerland [GC], 2016 (§§ 44-82), on the conviction of a journalist for publishing information covered by the secrecy of criminal investigations;  Mediengruppe Österreich GmbH v. Austria, 2022 (§§ 44-73), concerning a court order for a daily newspaper not to publish a photograph with a \"convicted neo-Nazi\" caption as regards an individual indirectly connected to the campaign of a political candidate in the run-up to a presidential election, the relevant publication having taken place more than twenty years after the conviction;  Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020 (§§ 85-90), concerning the withdrawal of a journalist's accreditation to search the Securitate archives, following the disclosure in several articles written by him of personal data in \"raw\" form concerning various well-known sports figures, without the relevance of the data having been assessed in the light of the declared subject of his research, namely sport in Romania under the communist regime;  Giesbert and Others v. France, 2017 (§§ 77-103), concerning the courts' findings against a newspaper for publishing documents from a set of criminal proceedings before they were to be read out at a public hearing;  Verlagsgruppe Droemer Knaur GmbH & Co. KG v. Germany, 2017 (§§ 36-62), concerning an order for a publishing company to pay damages for failing to carry out thorough research and for serious interference with an individual's personality rights;  Kurier Zeitungsverlag und Druckerei GmbH v. Austria, 2012 (§§ 47-56), concerning the requirement to pay compensation to a child who had been the victim of sexual abuse and whose identity was disclosed in a press article. In view of the vulnerability of crime victims, their identity deserved particular protection;  MGN Limited v. the United Kingdom, 2011 (§ 152), in which the Court was persuaded, among other considerations, by the fact that the disclosure in the press of details of a celebrity's therapy for drug addiction was harmful and risked causing a significant setback to her recovery;  Editions Plon v. France, 2004 (§§ 22-55), on the definitive suspension of distribution of a book containing information relating to a deceased Head of State and covered by medical confidentiality;  Mitov and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2023 (§§ 30-41), concerning anonymisation rules laid down by the President of the Supreme Administrative Court and legislation introducing a deferred-publication rule for certain criminal judgments, following which the applicants, investigative journalists, had been unable to access freely on the Internet all scanned case materials available in the database of that court.\n\nInternet sites are an information and communication tool particularly distinct from the printed Węgrzynowski and media, especially as regards the capacity to store and transmit information ( Smolczewski v. Polan d, 2013, § 58; M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2018, § 91; Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, § 236). In the light of its accessibility and its capacity to store and communicate vast amounts of information, the Internet plays an important role in enhancing the public's access to news and facilitating the dissemination of information generally ( Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), 2009, § 27).\n\nThe risk of harm posed by content and communications on the Internet to the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and freedoms, particularly the right to respect for private life, is certainly higher than that posed by the press, particularly on account of the important role of search engines ( Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, § 236; M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2018, § 91 and the references cited therein).\n\nInformation containing personal data held by media outlets can easily be found by Internet users via search engines. Because of this amplifying effect on the dissemination of information and the nature of the activity underlying the publication of information, the obligations of search engines towards the individual who is the subject of the information may differ from those of the entity which originally published the information ( Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, § 207; M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2018, § 97). In view of the distinction between the activities and obligations of search engine operators and those of news publishers, data subjects, who seek protection of their personal data in this context, are not obliged to contact the original website, either beforehand or simultaneously, in order to exercise their rights vis-à-vis search engines, as these are two different forms of processing, each with its own grounds of legitimacy and with different impacts on the individual's rights and interests. Likewise, the examination of an action against the publisher of a news website cannot be made contingent on a prior request for delisting ( Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, § 208). See also paragraphs 294-305 above of the present Guide for more information on the \"right to be forgotten\".\n\nIn the Court's view, Internet archives contribute to preserving and making available news and information ( Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos . 1 and 2), 2009, § 45). Such archives constitute an important source for education and historical research, particularly as they are readily accessible to the public and are generally free ( Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], § 180). The discretion afforded to States in striking a balance between the competing rights is greater where news archives of past events, rather than news reporting of current affairs, are concerned ( Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), § 45). The duty of the press to act in accordance with the principles of responsible journalism by ensuring the accuracy of historical, rather than perishable, information published is more stringent in the absence of any urgency in publishing the material ( ibid., § 45).\n\nIn the case of Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023 (§§ 180-185) the Court noted the emergence of a consensus within Europe regarding the importance of archives, which should, as a general rule, remain authentic, reliable and complete so that the press could carry out its mission. Accordingly, the integrity of press archives should be the guiding principle in examining any request for the removal or alteration of all or part of an archived article, especially where its lawfulness had never been called into question. Such requests called for particular vigilance and thorough examination by the national authorities.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923165006/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331212544/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/d5256ad78e38/20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", @@ -26936,6 +28498,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:31172/19", "case_name": "Jehovah's Witnesses v. Finland", @@ -26954,7 +28518,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.A.1|a:None|b:333", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "In Jehovah's Witnesses v. Finland, 2023 (§§ 80-99), the Court was called upon to decide whether a fair balance had been struck between the applicant community's right to freedom of religion and the right to privacy of persons (data subjects) whom the applicant community's members visited in the context of their door-to-door preaching. At the domestic level, the competent authorities had found that the unambiguous or express consent of data subjects had been required during that activity, when personal and sensitive data (their names and addresses) had been being collected and processed. The Court accepted that the application of the consent requirement in the context of the applicant community's door-to-door preaching - a religious activity intended to manifest or spread their faith - had constituted an interference with that community's rights under Article 9 (§ 81). At the same time, it considered that the impugned interference had been \"prescribed by law\" given, in particular, that the Supreme Administrative Court had interpreted the relevant domestic legal act, which had served as a basis for the contested measures and had itself been based on the relevant EU directive, in line with the interpretation given by the EU Court of Justice (§§ 84-88). The measure complained of had also pursued the legitimate aim of protecting \"the rights and freedoms of others\" (§ 89) and was \"necessary in a democratic society\". In the latter respect, the Court observed that, whilst the requirement of consent was an appropriate and necessary safeguard for preventing any communication or disclosure of personal and sensitive data in the context of door-to-door preaching of the applicant community, the latter had failed to demonstrate how that requirement would hinder the essence of its right to freedom of religion (§ 95). Moreover, the relevant requirement was applicable to all religious communities and religious activities (§ 96) and no penalty, although requested, had been imposed on the applicant community (§ 97).", + "post_text": "In Jehovah's Witnesses v. Finland, 2023 (§§ 80-99), the Court was called upon to decide whether a fair balance had been struck between the applicant community's right to freedom of religion and the right to privacy of persons (data subjects) whom the applicant community's members visited in the context of their door-to-door preaching. At the domestic level, the competent authorities had found that the unambiguous or express consent of data subjects had been required during that activity, when personal and sensitive data (their names and addresses) had been being collected and processed. The Court accepted that the application of the consent requirement in the context of the applicant community's door-to-door preaching - a religious activity intended to manifest or spread their faith - had constituted an interference with that community's rights under Article 9 (§ 81). At the same time, it considered that the impugned interference had been \"prescribed by law\" given, in particular, that the Supreme Administrative Court had interpreted the relevant domestic legal act, which had served as a basis for the contested measures and had itself been based on the relevant EUdirective, in line with the interpretation given by the EU Court of Justice (§§ 84-88). The measure complained of had also pursued the legitimate aim of protecting \"the rights and freedoms of others\" (§ 89) and was \"necessary in a democratic society\". In the latter respect, the Court observed that, whilst the requirement of consent was an appropriate and necessary safeguard for preventing any communication or disclosure of personal and sensitive data in the context of door-to-door preaching of the applicant community, the latter had failed to demonstrate how that requirement would hinder the essence of its right to freedom of religion (§ 95). Moreover, the relevant requirement was applicable to all religious communities and religious activities (§ 96) and no penalty, although requested, had been imposed on the applicant community (§ 97).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923165006/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331212544/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/d5256ad78e38/20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", @@ -26969,6 +28533,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:36345/16", "case_name": "L.B. v. Hungary [GC]", @@ -26986,8 +28552,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "minor_edit|citation_added|citation_removed", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I|a:3|b:3|I.A.1|a:15|b:15|II.A.3|a:234|b:238", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "The right to the protection of personal data is not an autonomous right among the various Convention rights and freedoms. The Court has nevertheless acknowledged that the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 137; Z v. Finland, 1997, § 95). This Article is the main vector through which personal data is protected in the Convention system, even though considerations related to this protection may also come into play under other provisions of the Convention and its Protocols.\n\nThe fact that personal data are already in the public domain or can be accessed by the public does not necessarily remove such data from the protection of Article 8 ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 134). Data of a public nature may fall within the \"private life\" of an individual when they are collected and stored in a systematic manner ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 57; Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 58-59; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 38), even without using secret surveillance methods ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44; Antovi ć and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). Article 8 of the Convention provides for the right to a form of informational self-determination, allowing individuals to rely on their right to privacy as regards data which, albeit neutral, are collected, processed and disseminated collectively and in such a form or manner that Article 8 rights may be engaged ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 137).\n\nIn several cases the Court has assessed measures entailing the disclosure of an individual's personal data by the data processor, to: ▪ another individual or a legal person ( Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 99-100, concerning the transmission by a hospital of information on a patient's state of health to a member of her family and to journalists; Y. v. Turkey (dec.), 2015, §§ 70-72, concerning the disclosure by an ambulance crew to hospital staff of information on a patient's HIV-positive status; Radu v. Republic of Moldova, 2014, § 27, concerning the disclosure by a hospital of medical information on a patient to her employer; M.C. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, § 46 concerning the disclosure by the authorities of information concerning the applicant's criminal record to her prospective employer); ▪ a public authority ( M.S. v. Sweden, 1997, § 35, concerning the disclosure by a gynaecological department of medical information on a patient to a social security fund; P.T. v. Republic of Moldova, 2020, §§ 5-6, 29-31, concerning the unnecessary inclusion of sensitive medical data on a certificate to be produced in various contexts); 53/99 ▪ the public ( Hájovský v. Slovakia, 2021 §§ 46-49, on the publication in a television news broadcast of information identifying an individual and containing a non-blurred photo of him taken covertly and under false pretence; Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 63, on the transmission to the media of a closed-circuit TV video showing a person attempting to commit suicide in a public place; Bremner v. Turkey, 2015, §§ 71-85, concerning the TV broadcast of an unblurred, unpixellated image of an individual filmed by a hidden camera; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, 2019, §§ 108-132, concerning a covert video recording of a journalist in her private home and the public broadcasting of the videos; Z v. Finland, 1997, §§ 70-71, concerning the disclosure in a judicial decision transmitted to the press of an individual's identity and state of health; Apostu v. Romania, 2015, §§ 121-132, on the disclosure to the press of pieces of evidence from an investigation file; Montera v. Italy (dec.), 2002, concerning the public disclosure of a report by a parliamentary commission on a magistrate's private life and professional ethics; Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004, §§ 61-81, on the publication in the tabloid press of photographs relating to a princess's private life; Polanco Torres and Movilla Polanco v. Spain, 2010, §§ 44-54, concerning a press article based on statements by a former accountant accusing a senior judge's wife of involvement in unlawful transactions with a specified company; Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, §§ 30-31, concerning the disclosure by a mass-circulation daily newspaper of a famous actress's full postal address; Mityanin and Leonov v. Russia, 2018, §§ 111-121, on the dissemination in the press of a photograph of a suspect, accompanied by statements accusing him of various minor and serious criminal offences; and Bogomolova v. Russia, 2017, §§ 54-58, concerning the publication of a photograph of a child on the cover page of a booklet entitled \"Children need a family\", published by a Centre for Psychological, Medical and Social Suppor t).", - "post_text": "The right to the protection of personal data is not an autonomous right among the various Convention rights and freedoms. The Court has nevertheless acknowledged that the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 137; Z v. Finland, 1997, § 95; L.B. v. Hungary [GC], 2023, § 103). This Article is the main vector through which personal data is protected in the Convention system, even though considerations related to this protection may also come into play under other provisions of the Convention and its Protocols.\n\nThe fact that personal data are already in the public domain or can be accessed by the public does Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and not necessarily remove such data from the protection of Article 8 ( Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 134; L.B. v. Hungary [GC], 2023, § 104). Data of a public nature may fall within the \"private life\" of an individual when they are collected and stored in a systematic P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom Peck v. the United Kingdom, manner (, 2001, § 57; 2003, §§ 58-59; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 38), even without using secret surveillance methods ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44; Antović and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). Article 8 of the Convention provides for the right to a form of informational self-determination, allowing individuals to rely on their right to privacy as regards data which, albeit neutral, are collected, processed and disseminated collectively and in such a form or manner that Article 8 rights may be engaged ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 137; L.B. v. Hungary [GC], 2023, § 103).\n\nIn several cases the Court has assessed measures entailing the disclosure of an individual's personal data by the data processor, to:  another individual or a legal person ( Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 99-100, concerning the transmission by a hospital of information on a patient's state of health to a member of her family and to journalists; Y. v. Turkey (dec.), 2015, §§ 70-72, concerning the disclosure by an ambulance crew to hospital staff of information on a patient's HIV-positive status; Radu v. Republic of Moldova, 2014, § 27, concerning the disclosure by a hospital of medical M.C. v. the United Kingdom information on a patient to her employer;, 2021, § 46 concerning the disclosure by the authorities of information concerning the applicant's criminal record to her prospective employer);  a public authority ( M.S. v. Sweden, 1997, § 35, concerning the disclosure by a gynaecological department of medical information on a patient to a social security fund; P.T. v. Republic of Moldova, 2020, §§ 5-6, 29-31, concerning the unnecessary inclusion of sensitive medical data on a certificate to be produced in various contexts);  the public ( Hájovský v. Slovakia, 2021 §§ 46-49, on the publication in a television news broadcast of information identifying an individual and containing a non-blurred photo of him taken covertly and under false pretence; Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 63, on the transmission to the media of a closed-circuit TV video showing a person attempting to commit suicide in a public place; Bremner v. Turkey, 2015, §§ 71-85, concerning the TV broadcast of an unblurred, unpixellated image of an individual filmed by a hidden camera; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, 2019, §§ 108-132, concerning a covert video recording of Z v. Finland a journalist in her private home and the public broadcasting of the videos;, 1997, §§ 70-71, concerning the disclosure in a judicial decision transmitted to the press of an individual's identity and state of health; Apostu v. Romania, 2015, §§ 121-132, on the Montera v. Italy disclosure to the press of pieces of evidence from an investigation file; (dec.), 2002, concerning the public disclosure of a report by a parliamentary commission on a magistrate's private life and professional ethics; Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004, §§ 61-81, on the publication in the tabloid press of photographs relating to a princess's private life; Polanco Torres and Movilla Polanco v. Spain, 2010, §§ 44-54, concerning a press article based on statements by a former accountant accusing a senior judge's wife of involvement in unlawful transactions with a specified company; Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, §§ 30-31, concerning the disclosure by a mass-circulation daily newspaper of a famous actress's full postal address; Mityanin and Leonov v. Russia, 2018, §§ 111-121, on the dissemination in the press of a photograph of a suspect, accompanied by statements accusing him of various minor and serious criminal offences; Bogomolova v. Russia, 2017, §§ 54-58, concerning the publication of a photograph of a child on the cover page of a booklet entitled \"Children need a family\", published by a Centre for Psychological, Medical and Social Support; L.B. v. Hungary [GC], 2023, concerning mandatory publication by a tax authority of the applicant's personal data, including his name and home address, on its website on the list of major tax debtors).", + "pre_text": "The right to the protection of personal data is not an autonomous right among the various Convention rights and freedoms. The Court has nevertheless acknowledged that the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 137; Z v. Finland, 1997, § 95). This Article is the main vector through which personal data is protected in the Convention system, even though considerations related to this protection may also come into play under other provisions of the Convention and its Protocols.\n\nThe fact that personal data are already in the public domain or can be accessed by the public does not necessarily remove such data from the protection of Article 8 ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 134). Data of a public nature may fall within the \"private life\" of an individual when they are collected and stored in a systematic manner ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 57; Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 58-59; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 38), even without using secret surveillance methods ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44; Antovi ć and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). Article 8 of the Convention provides for the right to a form of informational self-determination, allowing individuals to rely on their right to privacy as regards data which, albeit neutral, are collected, processed and disseminated collectively and in such a form or manner that Article 8 rights may be engaged ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 137).\n\nIn several cases the Court has assessed measures entailing the disclosure of an individual's personal data by the data processor, to: ▪ another individual or a legal person ( Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 99-100, concerning the transmission by a hospital of information on a patient's state of health to a member of her family and to journalists; Y. v. Turkey (dec.), 2015, §§ 70-72, concerning the disclosure by an ambulance crew to hospital staff of information on a patient's HIV-positive status; Radu v. Republic of Moldova, 2014, § 27, concerning the disclosure by a hospital of medical information on a patient to her employer; M.C. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, § 46 concerning the disclosure by the authorities of information concerning the applicant's criminal record to her prospective employer); ▪ a public authority ( M.S. v. Sweden, 1997, § 35, concerning the disclosure by a gynaecological department of medical information on a patient to a social security fund; P.T. v. Republic of Moldova, 2020, §§ 5-6, 29-31, concerning the unnecessary inclusion of sensitive medical data on a certificate to be produced in various contexts); 53/99 ▪ the public ( Hájovský v. Slovakia, 2021 §§ 46-49, on the publication in a television news broadcast of information identifying an individual and containing a non-blurred photo of him taken covertly and under false pretence; Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 63, on the transmission to the media of a closed-circuit TVvideo showing a person attempting to commit suicide in a public place; Bremner v. Turkey, 2015, §§ 71-85, concerning the TVbroadcast of an unblurred, unpixellated image of an individual filmed by a hidden camera; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, 2019, §§ 108-132, concerning a covert video recording of a journalist in her private home and the public broadcasting of the videos; Z v. Finland, 1997, §§ 70-71, concerning the disclosure in a judicial decision transmitted to the press of an individual's identity and state of health; Apostu v. Romania, 2015, §§ 121-132, on the disclosure to the press of pieces of evidence from an investigation file; Montera v. Italy (dec.), 2002, concerning the public disclosure of a report by a parliamentary commission on a magistrate's private life and professional ethics; Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004, §§ 61-81, on the publication in the tabloid press of photographs relating to a princess's private life; Polanco Torres and Movilla Polanco v. Spain, 2010, §§ 44-54, concerning a press article based on statements by a former accountant accusing a senior judge's wife of involvement in unlawful transactions with a specified company; Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, §§ 30-31, concerning the disclosure by a mass-circulation daily newspaper of a famous actress's full postal address; Mityanin and Leonov v. Russia, 2018, §§ 111-121, on the dissemination in the press of a photograph of a suspect, accompanied by statements accusing him of various minor and serious criminal offences; and Bogomolova v. Russia, 2017, §§ 54-58, concerning the publication of a photograph of a child on the cover page of a booklet entitled \"Children need a family\", published by a Centre for Psychological, Medical and Social Suppor t).", + "post_text": "The right to the protection of personal data is not an autonomous right among the various Convention rights and freedoms. The Court has nevertheless acknowledged that the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 137; Z v. Finland, 1997, § 95; L.B. v. Hungary [GC], 2023, § 103). This Article is the main vector through which personal data is protected in the Convention system, even though considerations related to this protection may also come into play under other provisions of the Convention and its Protocols.\n\nThe fact that personal data are already in the public domain or can be accessed by the public does Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and not necessarily remove such data from the protection of Article 8 ( Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 134; L.B. v. Hungary [GC], 2023, § 104). Data of a public nature may fall within the \"private life\" of an individual when they are collected and stored in a systematic P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom Peck v. the United Kingdom, manner (, 2001, § 57; 2003, §§ 58-59; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 38), even without using secret surveillance methods ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44; Antović and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). Article 8 of the Convention provides for the right to a form of informational self-determination, allowing individuals to rely on their right to privacy as regards data which, albeit neutral, are collected, processed and disseminated collectively and in such a form or manner that Article 8 rights may be engaged ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 137; L.B. v. Hungary [GC], 2023, § 103).\n\nIn several cases the Court has assessed measures entailing the disclosure of an individual's personal data by the data processor, to:  another individual or a legal person ( Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 99-100, concerning the transmission by a hospital of information on a patient's state of health to a member of her family and to journalists; Y. v. Turkey (dec.), 2015, §§ 70-72, concerning the disclosure by an ambulance crew to hospital staff of information on a patient's HIV-positive status; Radu v. Republic of Moldova, 2014, § 27, concerning the disclosure by a hospital of medical M.C. v. the United Kingdom information on a patient to her employer;, 2021, § 46 concerning the disclosure by the authorities of information concerning the applicant's criminal record to her prospective employer);  a public authority ( M.S. v. Sweden, 1997, § 35, concerning the disclosure by a gynaecological department of medical information on a patient to a social security fund; P.T. v. Republic of Moldova, 2020, §§ 5-6, 29-31, concerning the unnecessary inclusion of sensitive medical data on a certificate to be produced in various contexts);  the public ( Hájovský v. Slovakia, 2021 §§ 46-49, on the publication in a television news broadcast of information identifying an individual and containing a non-blurred photo of him taken covertly and under false pretence; Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 63, on the transmission to the media of a closed-circuit TVvideo showing a person attempting to commit suicide in a public place; Bremner v. Turkey, 2015, §§ 71-85, concerning the TVbroadcast of an unblurred, unpixellated image of an individual filmed by a hidden camera; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, 2019, §§ 108-132, concerning a covert video recording of Z v. Finland a journalist in her private home and the public broadcasting of the videos;, 1997, §§ 70-71, concerning the disclosure in a judicial decision transmitted to the press of an individual's identity and state of health; Apostu v. Romania, 2015, §§ 121-132, on the Montera v. Italy disclosure to the press of pieces of evidence from an investigation file; (dec.), 2002, concerning the public disclosure of a report by a parliamentary commission on a magistrate's private life and professional ethics; Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004, §§ 61-81, on the publication in the tabloid press of photographs relating to a princess's private life; Polanco Torres and Movilla Polanco v. Spain, 2010, §§ 44-54, concerning a press article based on statements by a former accountant accusing a senior judge's wife of involvement in unlawful transactions with a specified company; Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, §§ 30-31, concerning the disclosure by a mass-circulation daily newspaper of a famous actress's full postal address; Mityanin and Leonov v. Russia, 2018, §§ 111-121, on the dissemination in the press of a photograph of a suspect, accompanied by statements accusing him of various minor and serious criminal offences; Bogomolova v. Russia, 2017, §§ 54-58, concerning the publication of a photograph of a child on the cover page of a booklet entitled \"Children need a family\", published by a Centre for Psychological, Medical and Social Support; L.B. v. Hungary [GC], 2023, concerning mandatory publication by a tax authority of the applicant's personal data, including his name and home address, on its website on the list of major tax debtors).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923165006/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331212544/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/d5256ad78e38/20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", @@ -27002,6 +28568,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:36705/16", "case_name": "Margari v. Greece", @@ -27019,8 +28587,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added|citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.C.3.b|a:None|b:116|II.A.3.a|a:243|b:247|II.A.3.b|a:245|b:249|II.A.3.b|a:246|b:250", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "As regards persons under arrest or prosecution, the Court found violations of Article 8 where police services had handed over photographs of the applicants to the press without their consent ( Sciacca v. Italy, 2005, §§ 29-31; Khuzhin and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 115-118), where they had invited TV crews to film an applicant at a police station without his consent with a view to broadcasting the images on television ( Toma v. Romania, 2009, §§ 90-93; Khmel v. Russia, 2013, § 41), or in a case 55/99 where posting up a photograph of the applicant on the \"wanted\" noticeboard had not been prescribed by law ( Guiorgui Nikolaïchvili v. Georgia, 2009, §§ 129-131).\n\nIn several cases the Court has examined measures adopted by the authorities in the context of judicial proceedings having led to the disclosure of the parties'or third parties'personal data, such as: ▪ the reproduction by a court in a divorce judgment of an extract from personal medical records ( L.L. v. France, 2006, § 46), and an order restricting to ten years the period of confidentiality of evidence produced containing medical data ( Z v. Finland, 1997, §§ 112-113); ▪ the disclosure of confidential psychiatric data on an applicant during a public hearing ( Panteleyenko v. Ukraine, 2006, § 57), and verification of a medical certificate produced in support of a request for adjournment ( Stokłosa v. Poland (dec.) 2021, §§ 43-44; ▪ the disclosure of an individual's identity and HIV-positive status in a judgment communicated to the press ( Z v. Finland, 1997, § 113); ▪ the disclosure of the full identity of a third party in a judgment without prior notification of the latter ( Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, §§ 47-51); ▪ the use of language and arguments disclosing, in a judgment, personal data of the victim, conveying stereotypes about the role of women and capable of hindering the effective protection of the victims of sexual violence in spite of a satisfactory legislative framework ( J.L. v. Italy, 2021, §§ 136-142).\n\nIn the Court's opinion, the necessity of protecting the confidentiality of certain types of personal data may sometimes be outweighed by the interest in the investigation and prosecution of crime and in the publicity of court proceedings ( Avilkina and Others v. Russia, 2013, § 45; Z v. Finland, 1997, § 97). The competent national authorities should be afforded some leeway in striking a fair balance between, on the hand, the protection of the publicity of judicial proceedings, which is necessary to uphold trust in the courts, and on the other hand, the interests of a part or of a third person in maintaining the confidentiality of his data ( C.C. v. Spain, 2009, § 35). Any measure liable to make public an individual's personal data, whether he is a party or a third party to judicial proceedings, should meet an overriding social need ( Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, § 46) and should be limited as far as possible to that which is rendered strictly necessary by the specific features of the proceedings ( L.L. v. France, 2006, § 45).", - "post_text": "In Margari v. Greece, 2023, § 59, where the information published in the press on the applicant's criminal offences had inaccurately reflected the charges brought against her, the Court underlined that it was of the utmost importance that the data published, in the context of pending criminal proceedings or in the context of the investigation of criminal offences, accurately reflect the situation and the charges pending against an accused person, regard also being had to the observance of the presumption of innocence.\n\nAs regards persons under arrest or prosecution, the Court found violations of Article 8 where police services had handed over photographs of the applicants to the press without their consent ( Sciacca v. Italy, 2005, §§ 29-31; Khuzhin and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 115-118; Margari v. Greece, 2023, §§ 54-60), where they had invited TV crews to film an applicant at a police station without his consent with a view to broadcasting the images on television ( Toma v. Romania, 2009, §§ 90-93; Khmel v. Russia, 2013, § 41), where the Ministry of the Interior published on its website the applicants' photographs, taken while they were in police custody, in which their identity was not concealed ( D.H. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2023, §§ 63-65), where posting up a photograph of the applicant on the \"wanted\" noticeboard had not been prescribed by law ( Guiorgui Nikolaïchvili v. Georgia, 2009, §§ 129-131) or where the existing rules and procedures did not meet \"the quality of law\" requirement ( Negru v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 29-35).\n\nIn several cases the Court has examined measures adopted by the authorities in the context of judicial proceedings having led to the disclosure of the parties' or third parties' personal data, such as:  the reproduction by a court in a divorce judgment of an extract from personal medical records ( L.L. v. France, 2006, § 46), and an order restricting to ten years the period of Z v. Finland confidentiality of evidence produced containing medical data (, 1997, §§ 112-113);  the disclosure of confidential psychiatric data on an applicant during a public hearing ( Panteleyenko v. Ukraine, 2006, § 57), and verification of a medical certificate produced in support of a request for adjournment ( Stokłosa v. Poland (dec.) 2021, §§ 43-44;  the disclosure of an individual's identity and HIV-positive status in a judgment communicated to the press ( Z v. Finland, 1997, § 113);  the disclosure of the full identity of a third party in a judgment without prior notification of the latter ( Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, §§ 47-51);  the use of language and arguments disclosing, in a judgment, personal data of the victim, conveying stereotypes about the role of women and capable of hindering the effective protection of the victims of sexual violence in spite of a satisfactory legislative framework ( J.L. v. Italy, 2021, §§ 136-142);  the publication of photographs and personal data of defendants in criminal proceedings in the press ( Margari v. Greece, 2023, § 54) or on the public list of wanted persons in the public part of a police station ( Negru v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 24).\n\nIn the Court's opinion, the necessity of protecting the confidentiality of certain types of personal data may sometimes be outweighed by the interest in the investigation and prosecution of crime and in the publicity of court proceedings ( Avilkina and Others v. Russia, 2013, § 45; Z v. Finland, 1997, § 97). The competent national authorities should be afforded some leeway in striking a fair balance between, on the hand, the protection of the publicity of judicial proceedings, which is necessary to uphold trust in the courts, and on the other hand, the interests of a part or of a third person in maintaining the confidentiality of his data ( C.C. v. Spain, 2009, § 35). Any measure liable to make public an individual's personal data, whether he is a party or a third party to judicial proceedings, should meet an overriding social need ( Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, § 46) and should be limited as far as possible to that which is rendered strictly necessary by the specific features of the proceedings ( L.L. v. France, 2006, § 45; Margari v. Greece, 2023, § 47).", + "pre_text": "As regards persons under arrest or prosecution, the Court found violations of Article 8 where police services had handed over photographs of the applicants to the press without their consent ( Sciacca v. Italy, 2005, §§ 29-31; Khuzhin and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 115-118), where they had invited TVcrews to film an applicant at a police station without his consent with a view to broadcasting the images on television ( Toma v. Romania, 2009, §§ 90-93; Khmel v. Russia, 2013, § 41), or in a case 55/99 where posting up a photograph of the applicant on the \"wanted\" noticeboard had not been prescribed by law ( Guiorgui Nikolaïchvili v. Georgia, 2009, §§ 129-131).\n\nIn several cases the Court has examined measures adopted by the authorities in the context of judicial proceedings having led to the disclosure of the parties'or third parties'personal data, such as: ▪ the reproduction by a court in a divorce judgment of an extract from personal medical records ( L.L. v. France, 2006, § 46), and an order restricting to ten years the period of confidentiality of evidence produced containing medical data ( Z v. Finland, 1997, §§ 112-113); ▪ the disclosure of confidential psychiatric data on an applicant during a public hearing ( Panteleyenko v. Ukraine, 2006, § 57), and verification of a medical certificate produced in support of a request for adjournment ( Stokłosa v. Poland (dec.) 2021, §§ 43-44; ▪ the disclosure of an individual's identity and HIV-positive status in a judgment communicated to the press ( Z v. Finland, 1997, § 113); ▪ the disclosure of the full identity of a third party in a judgment without prior notification of the latter ( Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, §§ 47-51); ▪ the use of language and arguments disclosing, in a judgment, personal data of the victim, conveying stereotypes about the role of women and capable of hindering the effective protection of the victims of sexual violence in spite of a satisfactory legislative framework ( J.L. v. Italy, 2021, §§ 136-142).\n\nIn the Court's opinion, the necessity of protecting the confidentiality of certain types of personal data may sometimes be outweighed by the interest in the investigation and prosecution of crime and in the publicity of court proceedings ( Avilkina and Others v. Russia, 2013, § 45; Z v. Finland, 1997, § 97). The competent national authorities should be afforded some leeway in striking a fair balance between, on the hand, the protection of the publicity of judicial proceedings, which is necessary to uphold trust in the courts, and on the other hand, the interests of a part or of a third person in maintaining the confidentiality of his data ( C.C. v. Spain, 2009, § 35). Any measure liable to make public an individual's personal data, whether he is a party or a third party to judicial proceedings, should meet an overriding social need ( Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, § 46) and should be limited as far as possible to that which is rendered strictly necessary by the specific features of the proceedings ( L.L. v. France, 2006, § 45).", + "post_text": "In Margari v. Greece, 2023, § 59, where the information published in the press on the applicant's criminal offences had inaccurately reflected the charges brought against her, the Court underlined that it was of the utmost importance that the data published, in the context of pending criminal proceedings or in the context of the investigation of criminal offences, accurately reflect the situation and the charges pending against an accused person, regard also being had to the observance of the presumption of innocence.\n\nAs regards persons under arrest or prosecution, the Court found violations of Article 8 where police services had handed over photographs of the applicants to the press without their consent ( Sciacca v. Italy, 2005, §§ 29-31; Khuzhin and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 115-118; Margari v. Greece, 2023, §§ 54-60), where they had invited TVcrews to film an applicant at a police station without his consent with a view to broadcasting the images on television ( Toma v. Romania, 2009, §§ 90-93; Khmel v. Russia, 2013, § 41), where the Ministry of the Interior published on its website the applicants' photographs, taken while they were in police custody, in which their identity was not concealed ( D.H. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2023, §§ 63-65), where posting up a photograph of the applicant on the \"wanted\" noticeboard had not been prescribed by law ( Guiorgui Nikolaïchvili v. Georgia, 2009, §§ 129-131) or where the existing rules and procedures did not meet \"the quality of law\" requirement ( Negru v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 29-35).\n\nIn several cases the Court has examined measures adopted by the authorities in the context of judicial proceedings having led to the disclosure of the parties' or third parties' personal data, such as:  the reproduction by a court in a divorce judgment of an extract from personal medical records ( L.L. v. France, 2006, § 46), and an order restricting to ten years the period of Z v. Finland confidentiality of evidence produced containing medical data (, 1997, §§ 112-113);  the disclosure of confidential psychiatric data on an applicant during a public hearing ( Panteleyenko v. Ukraine, 2006, § 57), and verification of a medical certificate produced in support of a request for adjournment ( Stokłosa v. Poland (dec.) 2021, §§ 43-44;  the disclosure of an individual's identity and HIV-positive status in a judgment communicated to the press ( Z v. Finland, 1997, § 113);  the disclosure of the full identity of a third party in a judgment without prior notification of the latter ( Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, §§ 47-51);  the use of language and arguments disclosing, in a judgment, personal data of the victim, conveying stereotypes about the role of women and capable of hindering the effective protection of the victims of sexual violence in spite of a satisfactory legislative framework ( J.L. v. Italy, 2021, §§ 136-142);  the publication of photographs and personal data of defendants in criminal proceedings in the press ( Margari v. Greece, 2023, § 54) or on the public list of wanted persons in the public part of a police station ( Negru v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 24).\n\nIn the Court's opinion, the necessity of protecting the confidentiality of certain types of personal data may sometimes be outweighed by the interest in the investigation and prosecution of crime and in the publicity of court proceedings ( Avilkina and Others v. Russia, 2013, § 45; Z v. Finland, 1997, § 97). The competent national authorities should be afforded some leeway in striking a fair balance between, on the hand, the protection of the publicity of judicial proceedings, which is necessary to uphold trust in the courts, and on the other hand, the interests of a part or of a third person in maintaining the confidentiality of his data ( C.C. v. Spain, 2009, § 35). Any measure liable to make public an individual's personal data, whether he is a party or a third party to judicial proceedings, should meet an overriding social need ( Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, § 46) and should be limited as far as possible to that which is rendered strictly necessary by the specific features of the proceedings ( L.L. v. France, 2006, § 45; Margari v. Greece, 2023, § 47).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923165006/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331212544/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/d5256ad78e38/20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", @@ -27035,6 +28603,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:80857/17", "case_name": "Mitov and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.)", @@ -27068,6 +28638,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:7336/11", "case_name": "Negru v. the Republic of Moldova", @@ -27085,8 +28657,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_removed|citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.C.1|a:95|b:95|II.A.3.a|a:243|b:247|II.A.3.b|a:245|b:249", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "In the context of personal data collected by the authorities and stored in databases for purposes related to the prevention or punishment of crime, the Court has indicated that it is essential to have clear, detailed rules governing the scope and application of such measures, together with minimum safeguards concerning, inter alia, duration, storage, usage, access of third parties, procedures for preserving the integrity and confidentiality of data and procedures for their destruction, thus providing sufficient guarantees against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 99, 103; Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 86). The Court has found a violation of Article 8 in cases where the domestic law did not indicate with sufficient clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the discretion conferred on the domestic authorities ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, § 70 ; Dimitrov-Kazakov v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 33). In the case of Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011 (§ 69), the creation and maintenance of a surveillance database storing personal data, including on the movements of a human rights activist, and the procedure for its operation, were governed by a ministerial order which had never been published or otherwise made accessible to the public. In the case of Dimitrov-Kazakov v. Bulgaria, 2011 (§ 33), the registration of an individual as an \"offender\" in the police registers was based on a non-public instruction at the material time which was confidential in character and was reserved, until its subsequent declassification, for the internal use of the Interior Ministry.\n\nAs regards persons under arrest or prosecution, the Court found violations of Article 8 where police services had handed over photographs of the applicants to the press without their consent ( Sciacca v. Italy, 2005, §§ 29-31; Khuzhin and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 115-118), where they had invited TV crews to film an applicant at a police station without his consent with a view to broadcasting the images on television ( Toma v. Romania, 2009, §§ 90-93; Khmel v. Russia, 2013, § 41), or in a case 55/99 where posting up a photograph of the applicant on the \"wanted\" noticeboard had not been prescribed by law ( Guiorgui Nikolaïchvili v. Georgia, 2009, §§ 129-131).\n\nIn several cases the Court has examined measures adopted by the authorities in the context of judicial proceedings having led to the disclosure of the parties'or third parties'personal data, such as: ▪ the reproduction by a court in a divorce judgment of an extract from personal medical records ( L.L. v. France, 2006, �� 46), and an order restricting to ten years the period of confidentiality of evidence produced containing medical data ( Z v. Finland, 1997, §§ 112-113); ▪ the disclosure of confidential psychiatric data on an applicant during a public hearing ( Panteleyenko v. Ukraine, 2006, § 57), and verification of a medical certificate produced in support of a request for adjournment ( Stokłosa v. Poland (dec.) 2021, §§ 43-44; ▪ the disclosure of an individual's identity and HIV-positive status in a judgment communicated to the press ( Z v. Finland, 1997, § 113); ▪ the disclosure of the full identity of a third party in a judgment without prior notification of the latter ( Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, §§ 47-51); ▪ the use of language and arguments disclosing, in a judgment, personal data of the victim, conveying stereotypes about the role of women and capable of hindering the effective protection of the victims of sexual violence in spite of a satisfactory legislative framework ( J.L. v. Italy, 2021, §§ 136-142).", - "post_text": "In the context of personal data collected by the authorities and stored in databases for purposes related to the prevention or punishment of crime, the Court has indicated that it is essential to have clear, detailed rules governing the scope and application of such measures, together with minimum safeguards concerning, inter alia, duration, storage, usage, access of third parties, procedures for preserving the integrity and confidentiality of data and procedures for their destruction, thus providing sufficient guarantees against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2008, §§ 99, 103;, 2022, § 86). The Court has found a violation of Article 8 in cases where the domestic law did not indicate with sufficient clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the discretion conferred on the domestic authorities ( Shimovolos v. Russia, Dimitrov- Kazakov v. Bulgaria Negru v. the Republic of Moldova 2011, § 70 ;, 2011, § 33;, 2023, § 34). In the case of Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011 (§ 69), the creation and maintenance of a surveillance database storing personal data, including on the movements of a human rights activist, and the procedure for its operation, were governed by a ministerial order which had never been published or Dimitrov- Kazakov v. Bulgaria otherwise made accessible to the public. In the case of, 2011 (§ 33), the registration of an individual as an \"offender\" in the police registers was based on a non-public instruction at the material time which was confidential in character and was reserved, until its Negru v. the subsequent declassification, for the internal use of the Interior Ministry. In the case of Republic of Moldova, 2023 (§ 24), the applicant was included on the list of wanted persons, which had involved the processing of her personal data in the national integrated automated information system for recording offences, criminal cases and offenders, and her photograph was posted on the public premises of a police station on the basis of a prosecutor's decision which was taken in procedures lacking clarity whereby the prosecutor's discretion was considered to amount to a practically unfettered power.\n\nAs regards persons under arrest or prosecution, the Court found violations of Article 8 where police services had handed over photographs of the applicants to the press without their consent ( Sciacca v. Italy, 2005, §§ 29-31; Khuzhin and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 115-118; Margari v. Greece, 2023, §§ 54-60), where they had invited TV crews to film an applicant at a police station without his consent with a view to broadcasting the images on television ( Toma v. Romania, 2009, §§ 90-93; Khmel v. Russia, 2013, § 41), where the Ministry of the Interior published on its website the applicants' photographs, taken while they were in police custody, in which their identity was not concealed ( D.H. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2023, §§ 63-65), where posting up a photograph of the applicant on the \"wanted\" noticeboard had not been prescribed by law ( Guiorgui Nikolaïchvili v. Georgia, 2009, §§ 129-131) or where the existing rules and procedures did not meet \"the quality of law\" requirement ( Negru v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 29-35).\n\nIn several cases the Court has examined measures adopted by the authorities in the context of judicial proceedings having led to the disclosure of the parties' or third parties' personal data, such as:  the reproduction by a court in a divorce judgment of an extract from personal medical records ( L.L. v. France, 2006, § 46), and an order restricting to ten years the period of Z v. Finland confidentiality of evidence produced containing medical data (, 1997, §§ 112-113);  the disclosure of confidential psychiatric data on an applicant during a public hearing ( Panteleyenko v. Ukraine, 2006, § 57), and verification of a medical certificate produced in support of a request for adjournment ( Stokłosa v. Poland (dec.) 2021, §§ 43-44;  the disclosure of an individual's identity and HIV-positive status in a judgment communicated to the press ( Z v. Finland, 1997, § 113);  the disclosure of the full identity of a third party in a judgment without prior notification of the latter ( Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, §§ 47-51);  the use of language and arguments disclosing, in a judgment, personal data of the victim, conveying stereotypes about the role of women and capable of hindering the effective protection of the victims of sexual violence in spite of a satisfactory legislative framework ( J.L. v. Italy, 2021, §§ 136-142);  the publication of photographs and personal data of defendants in criminal proceedings in the press ( Margari v. Greece, 2023, § 54) or on the public list of wanted persons in the public part of a police station ( Negru v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 24).", + "pre_text": "In the context of personal data collected by the authorities and stored in databases for purposes related to the prevention or punishment of crime, the Court has indicated that it is essential to have clear, detailed rules governing the scope and application of such measures, together with minimum safeguards concerning, inter alia, duration, storage, usage, access of third parties, procedures for preserving the integrity and confidentiality of data and procedures for their destruction, thus providing sufficient guarantees against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 99, 103; Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 86). The Court has found a violation of Article 8 in cases where the domestic law did not indicate with sufficient clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the discretion conferred on the domestic authorities ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, § 70 ; Dimitrov-Kazakov v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 33). In the case of Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011 (§ 69), the creation and maintenance of a surveillance database storing personal data, including on the movements of a human rights activist, and the procedure for its operation, were governed by a ministerial order which had never been published or otherwise made accessible to the public. In the case of Dimitrov-Kazakov v. Bulgaria, 2011 (§ 33), the registration of an individual as an \"offender\" in the police registers was based on a non-public instruction at the material time which was confidential in character and was reserved, until its subsequent declassification, for the internal use of the Interior Ministry.\n\nAs regards persons under arrest or prosecution, the Court found violations of Article 8 where police services had handed over photographs of the applicants to the press without their consent ( Sciacca v. Italy, 2005, §§ 29-31; Khuzhin and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 115-118), where they had invited TVcrews to film an applicant at a police station without his consent with a view to broadcasting the images on television ( Toma v. Romania, 2009, §§ 90-93; Khmel v. Russia, 2013, § 41), or in a case 55/99 where posting up a photograph of the applicant on the \"wanted\" noticeboard had not been prescribed by law ( Guiorgui Nikolaïchvili v. Georgia, 2009, §§ 129-131).\n\nIn several cases the Court has examined measures adopted by the authorities in the context of judicial proceedings having led to the disclosure of the parties'or third parties'personal data, such as: ▪ the reproduction by a court in a divorce judgment of an extract from personal medical records ( L.L. v. France, 2006, § 46), and an order restricting to ten years the period of confidentiality of evidence produced containing medical data ( Z v. Finland, 1997, §§ 112-113); ▪ the disclosure of confidential psychiatric data on an applicant during a public hearing ( Panteleyenko v. Ukraine, 2006, § 57), and verification of a medical certificate produced in support of a request for adjournment ( Stokłosa v. Poland (dec.) 2021, §§ 43-44; ▪ the disclosure of an individual's identity and HIV-positive status in a judgment communicated to the press ( Z v. Finland, 1997, § 113); ▪ the disclosure of the full identity of a third party in a judgment without prior notification of the latter ( Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, §§ 47-51); ▪ the use of language and arguments disclosing, in a judgment, personal data of the victim, conveying stereotypes about the role of women and capable of hindering the effective protection of the victims of sexual violence in spite of a satisfactory legislative framework ( J.L. v. Italy, 2021, §§ 136-142).", + "post_text": "In the context of personal data collected by the authorities and stored in databases for purposes related to the prevention or punishment of crime, the Court has indicated that it is essential to have clear, detailed rules governing the scope and application of such measures, together with minimum safeguards concerning, inter alia, duration, storage, usage, access of third parties, procedures for preserving the integrity and confidentiality of data and procedures for their destruction, thus providing sufficient guarantees against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2008, §§ 99, 103;, 2022, § 86). The Court has found a violation of Article 8 in cases where the domestic law did not indicate with sufficient clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the discretion conferred on the domestic authorities ( Shimovolos v. Russia, Dimitrov- Kazakov v. Bulgaria Negru v. the Republic of Moldova 2011, § 70 ;, 2011, § 33;, 2023, § 34). In the case of Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011 (§ 69), the creation and maintenance of a surveillance database storing personal data, including on the movements of a human rights activist, and the procedure for its operation, were governed by a ministerial order which had never been published or Dimitrov- Kazakov v. Bulgaria otherwise made accessible to the public. In the case of, 2011 (§ 33), the registration of an individual as an \"offender\" in the police registers was based on a non-public instruction at the material time which was confidential in character and was reserved, until its Negru v. the subsequent declassification, for the internal use of the Interior Ministry. In the case of Republic of Moldova, 2023 (§ 24), the applicant was included on the list of wanted persons, which had involved the processing of her personal data in the national integrated automated information system for recording offences, criminal cases and offenders, and her photograph was posted on the public premises of a police station on the basis of a prosecutor's decision which was taken in procedures lacking clarity whereby the prosecutor's discretion was considered to amount to a practically unfettered power.\n\nAs regards persons under arrest or prosecution, the Court found violations of Article 8 where police services had handed over photographs of the applicants to the press without their consent ( Sciacca v. Italy, 2005, §§ 29-31; Khuzhin and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 115-118; Margari v. Greece, 2023, §§ 54-60), where they had invited TVcrews to film an applicant at a police station without his consent with a view to broadcasting the images on television ( Toma v. Romania, 2009, §§ 90-93; Khmel v. Russia, 2013, § 41), where the Ministry of the Interior published on its website the applicants' photographs, taken while they were in police custody, in which their identity was not concealed ( D.H. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2023, §§ 63-65), where posting up a photograph of the applicant on the \"wanted\" noticeboard had not been prescribed by law ( Guiorgui Nikolaïchvili v. Georgia, 2009, §§ 129-131) or where the existing rules and procedures did not meet \"the quality of law\" requirement ( Negru v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 29-35).\n\nIn several cases the Court has examined measures adopted by the authorities in the context of judicial proceedings having led to the disclosure of the parties' or third parties' personal data, such as:  the reproduction by a court in a divorce judgment of an extract from personal medical records ( L.L. v. France, 2006, § 46), and an order restricting to ten years the period of Z v. Finland confidentiality of evidence produced containing medical data (, 1997, §§ 112-113);  the disclosure of confidential psychiatric data on an applicant during a public hearing ( Panteleyenko v. Ukraine, 2006, § 57), and verification of a medical certificate produced in support of a request for adjournment ( Stokłosa v. Poland (dec.) 2021, §§ 43-44;  the disclosure of an individual's identity and HIV-positive status in a judgment communicated to the press ( Z v. Finland, 1997, § 113);  the disclosure of the full identity of a third party in a judgment without prior notification of the latter ( Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, §§ 47-51);  the use of language and arguments disclosing, in a judgment, personal data of the victim, conveying stereotypes about the role of women and capable of hindering the effective protection of the victims of sexual violence in spite of a satisfactory legislative framework ( J.L. v. Italy, 2021, §§ 136-142);  the publication of photographs and personal data of defendants in criminal proceedings in the press ( Margari v. Greece, 2023, § 54) or on the public list of wanted persons in the public part of a police station ( Negru v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 24).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923165006/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331212544/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/d5256ad78e38/20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", @@ -27101,6 +28673,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:34467/15", "case_name": "Sârbu v. Romania", @@ -27118,8 +28692,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_updated|minor_edit", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A.1|a:8|b:8|I.A.1|a:13|b:13|I.A.1|a:16|b:16|I.C.1|a:93|b:93|I.C.2|a:102|b:103", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match|citation_field_name_match", - "pre_text": "Personal data can take very different forms. For example: ▪ Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IP addresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109). ▪ Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59). ▪ Cellular samples and DNA profiles ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints (ibid., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances (ibid., § 85). ▪ Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving sensitive details or professional activity ( M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.). ▪ Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the police ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 18, 74-81). ▪ A copy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdök and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36). ▪ Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Antovi ć and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). ▪ Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138). ▪ Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 54-64; Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29). ▪ Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68).\n\nA significant element, although not necessarily decisive, is whether an individual is reasonably entitled to expect protection of his/her private life ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 37; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 80). As to on-line activities, the anonymity of personal information will be a key factor in that assessment and the fact that a subscriber to an Internet service provider had not hidden his/her dynamic IP address was not decisive in the assessment of whether his expectation of privacy was reasonable from an objective standpoint ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, § 116). In the workplace, an employer's instructions cannot reduce private social life in the workplace to zero. Respect for private life and for the privacy of correspondence continues to exist, even if these may be restricted in so far as necessary ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 80-81). Video recordings made in a public place using surveillance mechanisms may fall within Article 8 where their disclosure, by its manner or extent, goes beyond what the individuals could reasonably have expected ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 62; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 41-43). As regards press articles about the arrest of a television actor, illustrated by photos, the Court found that the actor 's \"legitimate expectation\" of having his private life effectively protected was reduced by the fact that he had \"actively sought the limelight\" by revealing details of his private life in a number of interviews ( Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 2012, § 101).\n\nIn most cases where the processing of personal data was intended to allow the authorities to conduct an investigation into the data subject or to collect evidence in judicial proceedings before the domestic courts, the Court has found that such processing fell within the scope of Article 8 and had entailed interference with the respect for the private life of the person concerned ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 39-43; Uzun v. Germany, 2010, §§ 51-52; Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, §§ 57-10/99 59 ; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 94 ; contrast Lupker and Others v. the Netherlands, 1992, on the use by the police, for the purpose of identifying the applicants, of photographs which had been voluntarily handed to the authorities or which had been taken by the police in connection with previous arrests; Friedl v. Austria, 1994, §§ 50-51, on the taking of photographs by the authorities during a demonstration with a view to opening an investigation against the applicants for traffic offences).\n\nIn the specific context of covert surveillance measures, such as the interception of communications, the Court has found that \"foreseeability\" cannot be understood in the same way as in many other fields. In its view, it cannot mean that an individual should be able to foresee when the authorities are likely to have recourse to such measures so that he or she can adapt his or her conduct accordingly ( Adomaitis v.Lithuania, 2022, § 83). However, especially where a power vested in the executive is exercised in secret, the risks of arbitrariness are evident. It is therefore essential to have clear, detailed rules on covert surveillance measures, especially as the technology available for use is continually becoming more sophisticated. The domestic law must be sufficiently clear to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which, and the conditions upon which, public authorities are empowered to resort to any such measures ( Malone v. the United Kingdom, 1984, § 67; Leander v. Sweden, 1987, § 51; Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, 1998, § 46; Weber and Saravia v. Germany (dec.), 2006, § 93; Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdjiev v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 75; Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 229). In addition, the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference ( Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 230).\n\nThe interception of telephone conversations of the applicant - a prison director, who had been suspected of corruption - the storage of that information and its disclosure in the disciplinary proceedings, which ultimately had led to his dismissal, were found to aim at preventing acts of a corrupt nature and guaranteeing the transparency and openness of public service, and thus had pursued the legitimate aims of the prevention of disorder or crime, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others in Adomaitis v. Lithuania, 2022 (§ 84).", - "post_text": "Personal data can take very different forms. For example:  Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IP addresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109).  Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59).  S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom Cellular samples and DNA profiles ( [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints (ibid., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances (ibid., § 85).  Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving M.N. and Others v. San Marino sensitive details or professional activity (, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.).  Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the Khelili v. Switzerland police (, 2011, § 56).  Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 18, 74-81).  A copy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdök and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36).  Antović and Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45).  Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138).  Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom Mikulić v. Croatia Odièvre v. France, 1989, § 39;, 2002, §§ 54-64; [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29).  Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68).  Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings Sârbu v. Romania against the applicant (, 2023, §§ 39-41).\n\nA significant element, although not necessarily decisive, is whether an individual is reasonably entitled to expect protection of his/her private life ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 37; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 80; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66). As to on-line activities, the anonymity of personal information will be a key factor in that assessment and the fact that a subscriber to an Internet service provider had not hidden his/her dynamic IP address was not decisive in the assessment of whether his expectation of privacy was reasonable from an objective standpoint Benedik v. Slovenia (, 2018, § 116). In the workplace, an employer's instructions cannot reduce private social life in the workplace to zero. Respect for private life and for the privacy of correspondence continues to exist, even if these may be restricted in so far as necessary ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 80-81; see also, for the professional context, Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 37-38). The monitoring of the actions or movements of an individual in a public place using surveillance mechanisms may fall within Article 8 once any systemic or permanent record of such personal data comes into existence ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66), or where their disclosure, by its manner or extent, Peck v. the United Kingdom goes beyond what the individuals could reasonably have expected (, 2003, § 62; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 41-43). As regards press articles about the arrest of a television actor, illustrated by photos, the Court found that the actor's \"legitimate expectation\" of having his private life effectively protected was reduced by the fact that he had \"actively sought the Axel Springer AG v. Germany limelight\" by revealing details of his private life in a number of interviews ( [GC], 2012, § 101).\n\nIn most cases where the processing of personal data was intended to allow the authorities to conduct an investigation into the data subject or to collect evidence in judicial proceedings before the domestic courts, the Court has found that such processing fell within the scope of Article 8 and had entailed interference with the respect for the private life of the person concerned ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, Uzun v. Germany, Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland 2003, §§ 39-43; 2010, §§ 51-52;, 2016, §§ 57-59 ; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 94 ; Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 38 and 41; contrast Lupker and Others v. the Netherlands, 1992, on the use by the police, for the purpose of identifying the applicants, of photographs which had been voluntarily handed to the authorities or which had been taken by the police in connection with previous arrests; Friedl v. Austria, 1994, §§ 50-51, on the taking of photographs by the authorities during a demonstration with a view to opening an investigation against the applicants for traffic offences).\n\nIn the specific context of covert surveillance measures, such as the interception of communications, the Court has found that \"foreseeability\" cannot be understood in the same way as in many other fields. In its view, it cannot mean that an individual should be able to foresee when the authorities are likely to have recourse to such measures so that he or she can adapt his or her conduct accordingly ( Adomaitis v.Lithuania, 2022, § 83; see also Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, § 51, where the same principles were applied in the context of covert video recording made by a private individual). However, especially where a power vested in the executive is exercised in secret, the risks of arbitrariness are evident. It is therefore essential to have clear, detailed rules on covert surveillance measures, especially as the technology available for use is continually becoming more sophisticated. The domestic law must be sufficiently clear to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which, and the conditions upon which, public authorities are empowered to resort to any such measures ( Malone v. the United Kingdom, 1984, § 67; Leander v. Sweden, 1987, § 51; Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, 1998, § 46; Weber and Saravia v. Germany (dec.), 2006, § 93; Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdjiev v. Bulgaria Roman, 2007, § 75; Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 229). In addition, the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference ( Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 230).\n\nThe interception of telephone conversations of the applicant - a prison director, who had been suspected of corruption - the storage of that information and its disclosure in the disciplinary proceedings, which ultimately had led to his dismissal, were found to aim at preventing acts of a corrupt nature and guaranteeing the transparency and openness of public service, and thus had pursued the legitimate aims of the prevention of disorder or crime, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others in Adomaitis v. Lithuania, 2022 (§ 84). Similar findings were made by the Court in respect of the covert filming of conversations made by a private individual in the professional context and subsequently used by the authorities as evidence to find the applicant guilty of corruption Sârbu v. Romania (, 2023, § 54).", + "pre_text": "Personal data can take very different forms. For example: ▪ Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109). ▪ Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59). ▪ Cellular samples and DNAprofiles ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints (ibid., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances (ibid., § 85). ▪ Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving sensitive details or professional activity ( M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.). ▪ Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the police ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 18, 74-81). ▪ Acopy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdök and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36). ▪ Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Antovi ć and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). ▪ Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138). ▪ Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 54-64; Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29). ▪ Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68).\n\nAsignificant element, although not necessarily decisive, is whether an individual is reasonably entitled to expect protection of his/her private life ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 37; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 80). As to on-line activities, the anonymity of personal information will be a key factor in that assessment and the fact that a subscriber to an Internet service provider had not hidden his/her dynamic IPaddress was not decisive in the assessment of whether his expectation of privacy was reasonable from an objective standpoint ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, § 116). In the workplace, an employer's instructions cannot reduce private social life in the workplace to zero. Respect for private life and for the privacy of correspondence continues to exist, even if these may be restricted in so far as necessary ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 80-81). Video recordings made in a public place using surveillance mechanisms may fall within Article 8 where their disclosure, by its manner or extent, goes beyond what the individuals could reasonably have expected ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 62; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 41-43). As regards press articles about the arrest of a television actor, illustrated by photos, the Court found that the actor 's \"legitimate expectation\" of having his private life effectively protected was reduced by the fact that he had \"actively sought the limelight\" by revealing details of his private life in a number of interviews ( Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 2012, § 101).\n\nIn most cases where the processing of personal data was intended to allow the authorities to conduct an investigation into the data subject or to collect evidence in judicial proceedings before the domestic courts, the Court has found that such processing fell within the scope of Article 8 and had entailed interference with the respect for the private life of the person concerned ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 39-43; Uzun v. Germany, 2010, §§ 51-52; Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, §§ 57-10/99 59 ; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 94 ; contrast Lupker and Others v. the Netherlands, 1992, on the use by the police, for the purpose of identifying the applicants, of photographs which had been voluntarily handed to the authorities or which had been taken by the police in connection with previous arrests; Friedl v. Austria, 1994, §§ 50-51, on the taking of photographs by the authorities during a demonstration with a view to opening an investigation against the applicants for traffic offences).\n\nIn the specific context of covert surveillance measures, such as the interception of communications, the Court has found that \"foreseeability\" cannot be understood in the same way as in many other fields. In its view, it cannot mean that an individual should be able to foresee when the authorities are likely to have recourse to such measures so that he or she can adapt his or her conduct accordingly ( Adomaitis v.Lithuania, 2022, § 83). However, especially where a power vested in the executive is exercised in secret, the risks of arbitrariness are evident. It is therefore essential to have clear, detailed rules on covert surveillance measures, especially as the technology available for use is continually becoming more sophisticated. The domestic law must be sufficiently clear to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which, and the conditions upon which, public authorities are empowered to resort to any such measures ( Malone v. the United Kingdom, 1984, § 67; Leander v. Sweden, 1987, § 51; Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, 1998, § 46; Weber and Saravia v. Germany (dec.), 2006, § 93; Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdjiev v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 75; Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 229). In addition, the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference ( Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 230).\n\nThe interception of telephone conversations of the applicant - a prison director, who had been suspected of corruption - the storage of that information and its disclosure in the disciplinary proceedings, which ultimately had led to his dismissal, were found to aim at preventing acts of a corrupt nature and guaranteeing the transparency and openness of public service, and thus had pursued the legitimate aims of the prevention of disorder or crime, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others in Adomaitis v. Lithuania, 2022 (§ 84).", + "post_text": "Personal data can take very different forms. For example:  Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109).  Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59).  S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom Cellular samples and DNAprofiles ( [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints (ibid., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances (ibid., § 85).  Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving M.N. and Others v. San Marino sensitive details or professional activity (, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.).  Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the Khelili v. Switzerland police (, 2011, § 56).  Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 18, 74-81).  Acopy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdök and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36).  Antović and Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45).  Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138).  Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom Mikulić v. Croatia Odièvre v. France, 1989, § 39;, 2002, §§ 54-64; [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29).  Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68).  Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings Sârbu v. Romania against the applicant (, 2023, §§ 39-41).\n\nAsignificant element, although not necessarily decisive, is whether an individual is reasonably entitled to expect protection of his/her private life ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 37; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 80; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66). As to on-line activities, the anonymity of personal information will be a key factor in that assessment and the fact that a subscriber to an Internet service provider had not hidden his/her dynamic IPaddress was not decisive in the assessment of whether his expectation of privacy was reasonable from an objective standpoint Benedik v. Slovenia (, 2018, § 116). In the workplace, an employer's instructions cannot reduce private social life in the workplace to zero. Respect for private life and for the privacy of correspondence continues to exist, even if these may be restricted in so far as necessary ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 80-81; see also, for the professional context, Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 37-38). The monitoring of the actions or movements of an individual in a public place using surveillance mechanisms may fall within Article 8 once any systemic or permanent record of such personal data comes into existence ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66), or where their disclosure, by its manner or extent, Peck v. the United Kingdom goes beyond what the individuals could reasonably have expected (, 2003, § 62; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 41-43). As regards press articles about the arrest of a television actor, illustrated by photos, the Court found that the actor's \"legitimate expectation\" of having his private life effectively protected was reduced by the fact that he had \"actively sought the Axel Springer AG v. Germany limelight\" by revealing details of his private life in a number of interviews ( [GC], 2012, § 101).\n\nIn most cases where the processing of personal data was intended to allow the authorities to conduct an investigation into the data subject or to collect evidence in judicial proceedings before the domestic courts, the Court has found that such processing fell within the scope of Article 8 and had entailed interference with the respect for the private life of the person concerned ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, Uzun v. Germany, Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland 2003, §§ 39-43; 2010, §§ 51-52;, 2016, §§ 57-59 ; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 94 ; Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 38 and 41; contrast Lupker and Others v. the Netherlands, 1992, on the use by the police, for the purpose of identifying the applicants, of photographs which had been voluntarily handed to the authorities or which had been taken by the police in connection with previous arrests; Friedl v. Austria, 1994, §§ 50-51, on the taking of photographs by the authorities during a demonstration with a view to opening an investigation against the applicants for traffic offences).\n\nIn the specific context of covert surveillance measures, such as the interception of communications, the Court has found that \"foreseeability\" cannot be understood in the same way as in many other fields. In its view, it cannot mean that an individual should be able to foresee when the authorities are likely to have recourse to such measures so that he or she can adapt his or her conduct accordingly ( Adomaitis v.Lithuania, 2022, § 83; see also Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, § 51, where the same principles were applied in the context of covert video recording made by a private individual). However, especially where a power vested in the executive is exercised in secret, the risks of arbitrariness are evident. It is therefore essential to have clear, detailed rules on covert surveillance measures, especially as the technology available for use is continually becoming more sophisticated. The domestic law must be sufficiently clear to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which, and the conditions upon which, public authorities are empowered to resort to any such measures ( Malone v. the United Kingdom, 1984, § 67; Leander v. Sweden, 1987, § 51; Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, 1998, § 46; Weber and Saravia v. Germany (dec.), 2006, § 93; Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdjiev v. Bulgaria Roman, 2007, § 75; Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 229). In addition, the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference ( Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 230).\n\nThe interception of telephone conversations of the applicant - a prison director, who had been suspected of corruption - the storage of that information and its disclosure in the disciplinary proceedings, which ultimately had led to his dismissal, were found to aim at preventing acts of a corrupt nature and guaranteeing the transparency and openness of public service, and thus had pursued the legitimate aims of the prevention of disorder or crime, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others in Adomaitis v. Lithuania, 2022 (§ 84). Similar findings were made by the Court in respect of the covert filming of conversations made by a private individual in the professional context and subsequently used by the authorities as evidence to find the applicant guilty of corruption Sârbu v. Romania (, 2023, § 54).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923165006/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331212544/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/d5256ad78e38/20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", @@ -27134,6 +28708,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-13", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json", "case_key": "apps:18843/20", "case_name": "Cherrier v. France", @@ -27151,8 +28727,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_updated", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A.1|a:8|b:8|I.B|a:71|b:71", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Personal data can take very different forms. For example:  Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IP addresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109).  Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59).  S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom Cellular samples and DNA profiles ( [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints (ibid., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances (ibid., § 85).  Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving M.N. and Others v. San Marino sensitive details or professional activity (, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.).  Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the Khelili v. Switzerland police (, 2011, § 56).  Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 18, 74-81).  A copy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdök and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36).  Antović and Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45).  Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138).  Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom Mikulić v. Croatia Odièvre v. France, 1989, § 39;, 2002, §§ 54-64; [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29).  Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68).  Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings Sârbu v. Romania against the applicant (, 2023, §§ 39-41).\n\nWhere a measure interfering with the protection of personal data is taken by an individual or entity purely in the private sector, the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's positive obligations ( Craxi v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, §§ 68-76; Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010; Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, § 32; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 89; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 111; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain Buturugă v. Romania Volodina [GC], 2019, § 111;, 2020, §§ 60-63; v. Russia (no. 2 ), 2021, §§ 58-68; Florindo de Almeida Vasconcelos Gramaxo v. Portugal, 2022, § 111). However, where a measure has been taken by a public entity ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 39; Libert v. France, 2018, § 41; Drelon v. France, 2022, § 85) or a private body to which the State has delegated its obligations ( Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, § 47), the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's negative obligation. The Court will have to verify that the interference met the requirements of Article 8 § 2, namely that it was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. This question will be examined in more detail in the part of this guide below on the Three data protection \"tests\".", - "post_text": "Personal data can take very different forms. For example: ▪ Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IP addresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109). ▪ Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59). ▪ Cellular samples and DNA profiles ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints ( ibid ., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances ( ibid ., § 85). ▪ Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving sensitive details or professional activity ( M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.). ▪ Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the police ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 18, 74-81). ▪ A copy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdö k and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36). ▪ Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Antovi ć and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). ▪ Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138). ▪ Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 54-64; Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, §§ 106 and 112; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 50). ▪ Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68). ▪ Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings against the applicant ( Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 39-41). 8/107\n\nWhere a measure interfering with the protection of personal data is taken by an individual or entity purely in the private sector, the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's positive obligations ( Craxi v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, §§ 68-76; Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010; Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, § 32; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 89; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 111; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 111; Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, §§ 60-63; Volodina v. Russia (no. 2 ), 2021, §§ 58-68; Florindo de Almeida Vasconcelos Gramaxo v. Portugal, 2022, § 111; Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 35). However, where a measure has been taken by a public entity ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 39; Libert v. France, 2018, § 41; Drelon v. France, 2022, § 85; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 57), a private body to which the State has delegated its obligations ( Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, § 47), or a private body pursuant to statutory requirements ( Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 52), the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's negative obligation. The Court will have to verify that the interference met the requirements of Article 8 § 2, namely that it was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. This question will be examined in more detail in the part of this guide below on the Three data protection \"tests\".", + "pre_text": "Personal data can take very different forms. For example:  Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109).  Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59).  S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom Cellular samples and DNAprofiles ( [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints (ibid., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances (ibid., § 85).  Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving M.N. and Others v. San Marino sensitive details or professional activity (, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.).  Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the Khelili v. Switzerland police (, 2011, § 56).  Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 18, 74-81).  Acopy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdök and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36).  Antović and Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45).  Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138).  Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom Mikulić v. Croatia Odièvre v. France, 1989, § 39;, 2002, §§ 54-64; [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29).  Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68).  Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings Sârbu v. Romania against the applicant (, 2023, §§ 39-41).\n\nWhere a measure interfering with the protection of personal data is taken by an individual or entity purely in the private sector, the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's positive obligations ( Craxi v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, §§ 68-76; Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010; Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, § 32; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 89; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 111; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain Buturugă v. Romania Volodina [GC], 2019, § 111;, 2020, §§ 60-63; v. Russia (no. 2 ), 2021, §§ 58-68; Florindo de Almeida Vasconcelos Gramaxo v. Portugal, 2022, § 111). However, where a measure has been taken by a public entity ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 39; Libert v. France, 2018, § 41; Drelon v. France, 2022, § 85) or a private body to which the State has delegated its obligations ( Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, § 47), the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's negative obligation. The Court will have to verify that the interference met the requirements of Article 8 § 2, namely that it was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. This question will be examined in more detail in the part of this guide below on the Three data protection \"tests\".", + "post_text": "Personal data can take very different forms. For example: ▪ Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109). ▪ Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59). ▪ Cellular samples and DNAprofiles ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints ( ibid ., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances ( ibid ., § 85). ▪ Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving sensitive details or professional activity ( M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.). ▪ Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the police ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 18, 74-81). ▪ Acopy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdö k and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36). ▪ Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Antovi ć and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). ▪ Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138). ▪ Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 54-64; Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, §§ 106 and 112; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 50). ▪ Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68). ▪ Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings against the applicant ( Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 39-41). 8/107\n\nWhere a measure interfering with the protection of personal data is taken by an individual or entity purely in the private sector, the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's positive obligations ( Craxi v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, §§ 68-76; Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010; Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, § 32; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 89; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 111; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 111; Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, §§ 60-63; Volodina v. Russia (no. 2 ), 2021, §§ 58-68; Florindo de Almeida Vasconcelos Gramaxo v. Portugal, 2022, § 111; Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 35). However, where a measure has been taken by a public entity ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 39; Libert v. France, 2018, § 41; Drelon v. France, 2022, § 85; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 57), a private body to which the State has delegated its obligations ( Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, § 47), or a private body pursuant to statutory requirements ( Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 52), the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's negative obligation. The Court will have to verify that the interference met the requirements of Article 8 § 2, namely that it was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. This question will be examined in more detail in the part of this guide below on the Three data protection \"tests\".", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331212544/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240613075829/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/d5256ad78e38/20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", @@ -27167,6 +28743,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-13", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json", "case_key": "apps:21424/16|45728/17", "case_name": "Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France", @@ -27184,8 +28762,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_updated|citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A.1|a:8|b:8|I.B|a:77|b:77|I.B|a:78|b:78|II.B.1|a:285|b:288", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Personal data can take very different forms. For example:  Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IP addresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109).  Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59).  S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom Cellular samples and DNA profiles ( [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints (ibid., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances (ibid., § 85).  Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving M.N. and Others v. San Marino sensitive details or professional activity (, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.).  Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the Khelili v. Switzerland police (, 2011, § 56).  Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 18, 74-81).  A copy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdök and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36).  Antović and Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45).  Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138).  Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom Mikulić v. Croatia Odièvre v. France, 1989, § 39;, 2002, §§ 54-64; [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29).  Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68).  Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings Sârbu v. Romania against the applicant (, 2023, §§ 39-41).\n\nIn cases which raise the issue of the protection of personal data, the Court has found that the State's margin of appreciation is broader: where there is no consensus in the member States of the Council of Europe as to the importance of the interest at stake, or the best means of protecting it ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 47; Breyer v. Germany, 2020, § 108); where the purely financial data at stake were not closely related to the applicant's identity ( G.S.B. v. Switzerland, 2015, § 93); and, Leander v. Sweden lastly, in matters of national security (, 1987, § 59). By contrast, the margin of appreciation afforded to national authorities was found to be narrower where, for example, personal data subject to automatic processing which considerably facilitated their access and dissemination Khelili v. Switzerland could harm a person's reputation and render his daily life more difficult (, 2011, §§ 64, 70). The same consideration is especially valid for the protection of categories of sensitive data, in particular DNA information, which contains the person's genetic make-up and is of great importance to both the person concerned and his or her family ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 102-103).\n\nInherent positive obligations to ensure the effective protection of the Convention rights and freedoms may involve, for example, an obligation to secure to an individual: access within a reasonable time to information stored systematically about the individual by former State secret services concerning his or her distant past ( Haralambie v. Romania, 2009, § 79; Jarnea v. Romania, 2011, § 50; Joanna Szulc v. Poland, 2012, § 87); an \"effective and accessible procedure\" enabling an interested party to have access to \"all relevant and appropriate information\" collected and stored by public authorities in order to receive the information necessary to know and to understand the individual's childhood and early development ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 49), to discover his or her personal identity ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 42), or to identify any health risks to which Guerra and Others v. Italy, McGinley and Egan v. the United he or she has been exposed ( 1998, § 60; Kingdom, 1998, § 101; Roche v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2005, § 162).\n\nIn the case of children born anonymously, the issue of access to one's origins and to information on the identity of one's biological parents is different from that of access to a case record concerning a child in care or to evidence of alleged paternity ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 43; Godelli v. Italy, 2012, § 62). Depending on the wide range of different legal systems and traditions, States had to benefit from a degree of discretion in preserving the confidentiality of the identities of biological parents ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 46; Godelli v. Italy, 2012, § 65). A national system which provided an applicant with access to non-identifying information on his mother and his biological family, enabling her to establish some her past history, without prejudice to third-party interests, accompanied by the possibility under recently enacted legislation to call on the services of an independent body mandated to help individuals to find their biological origins in order to secure the disclosure of her mother's identity, subject to the latter's consent, was deemed compatible with Article 8 ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 49). Conversely, a system which gave blind preference to a mother's wish to remain anonymous and provided no means for an adopted child who had not been recognised at birth of applying for either access to non-identifying information on her origins or disclosure of her mother's identity, was found to be incompatible with the requirements of Article 8 Godelli v. Italy (, 2012, §§ 70-72).", - "post_text": "Personal data can take very different forms. For example: ▪ Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IP addresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109). ▪ Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59). ▪ Cellular samples and DNA profiles ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints ( ibid ., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances ( ibid ., § 85). ▪ Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving sensitive details or professional activity ( M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.). ▪ Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the police ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 18, 74-81). ▪ A copy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdö k and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36). ▪ Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Antovi ć and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). ▪ Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138). ▪ Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 54-64; Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, §§ 106 and 112; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 50). ▪ Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68). ▪ Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings against the applicant ( Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 39-41). 8/107\n\nIn cases which raise the issue of the protection of personal data, the Court has found that the State's margin of appreciation is broader: where there is no consensus in the member States of the Council of Europe as to the importance of the interest at stake, or the best means of protecting it ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 47; Breyer v. Germany, 2020, § 108; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, § 111); where the purely financial data at stake were not closely related to the applicant's identity ( G.S.B. v. Switzerland, 2015, § 93); and, lastly, in matters of national security ( Leander v. Sweden, 1987, § 59). By contrast, the margin of appreciation afforded to national authorities was found to be narrower where, for example, personal data subject to automatic processing which considerably facilitated their access and dissemination could harm a person's reputation and render his daily life more difficult ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, §§ 64, 70). The same consideration is especially valid for the protection of categories of sensitive data, in particular DNA information, which contains the person's genetic make-up and is of great importance to both the person concerned and his or her family ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 102-103).\n\nInherent positive obligations to ensure the effective protection of the Convention rights and freedoms may involve, for example, an obligation to secure to an individual: access within a reasonable time to information stored systematically about the individual by former State secret services concerning his or her distant past ( Haralambie v. Romania, 2009, § 79; Jarnea v. Romania, 2011, § 50; Joanna Szulc v. Poland, 2012, § 87); an \"effective and accessible procedure\" enabling an interested party to have access to \"all relevant and appropriate information\" collected and stored by public authorities in order to receive the information necessary to know and to understand the individual's childhood and early development ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 49), to discover his or her personal identity ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 42; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, § 110), or to identify any health risks to which he or she has been exposed ( Guerra and Others v. Italy, 1998, § 60; McGinley and Egan v. the United Kingdom, 1998, § 101; Roche v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2005, § 162). 23/107\n\nIn the case of children born anonymously, the issue of access to one's origins and to information on the identity of one's biological parents is different from that of access to a case record concerning a child in care or to evidence of alleged paternity ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 43; Godelli v. Italy, 2012, § 62). Depending on the wide range of different legal systems and traditions, States had to benefit from a degree of discretion in preserving the confidentiality of the identities of biological parents ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 46; Godelli v. Italy, 2012, § 65). A national system which provided an applicant with access to non-identifying information on his mother and his biological family, enabling her to establish some her past history, without prejudice to third-party interests, accompanied by the possibility under recently enacted legislation to call on the services of an independent body mandated to help individuals to find their biological origins in order to secure the disclosure of her mother's identity, subject to the latter's consent, was deemed compatible with Article 8 ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 49; see also, as regards access of persons born through medically assisted reproduction involving a third-party donor, to information concerning that donor, Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, §§ 113-33). Conversely, a system which gave blind preference to a mother's wish to remain anonymous and provided no means for an adopted child who had not been recognised at birth of applying for either access to non-identifying information on her origins or disclosure of her mother's identity, was found to be incompatible with the requirements of Article 8 ( Godelli v. Italy, 2012, §§ 70-72).", + "pre_text": "Personal data can take very different forms. For example:  Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109).  Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59).  S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom Cellular samples and DNAprofiles ( [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints (ibid., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances (ibid., § 85).  Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving M.N. and Others v. San Marino sensitive details or professional activity (, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.).  Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the Khelili v. Switzerland police (, 2011, § 56).  Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 18, 74-81).  Acopy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdök and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36).  Antović and Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45).  Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138).  Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom Mikulić v. Croatia Odièvre v. France, 1989, § 39;, 2002, §§ 54-64; [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29).  Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68).  Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings Sârbu v. Romania against the applicant (, 2023, §§ 39-41).\n\nIn cases which raise the issue of the protection of personal data, the Court has found that the State's margin of appreciation is broader: where there is no consensus in the member States of the Council of Europe as to the importance of the interest at stake, or the best means of protecting it ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 47; Breyer v. Germany, 2020, § 108); where the purely financial data at stake were not closely related to the applicant's identity ( G.S.B. v. Switzerland, 2015, § 93); and, Leander v. Sweden lastly, in matters of national security (, 1987, § 59). By contrast, the margin of appreciation afforded to national authorities was found to be narrower where, for example, personal data subject to automatic processing which considerably facilitated their access and dissemination Khelili v. Switzerland could harm a person's reputation and render his daily life more difficult (, 2011, §§ 64, 70). The same consideration is especially valid for the protection of categories of sensitive data, in particular DNAinformation, which contains the person's genetic make-up and is of great importance to both the person concerned and his or her family ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 102-103).\n\nInherent positive obligations to ensure the effective protection of the Convention rights and freedoms may involve, for example, an obligation to secure to an individual: access within a reasonable time to information stored systematically about the individual by former State secret services concerning his or her distant past ( Haralambie v. Romania, 2009, § 79; Jarnea v. Romania, 2011, § 50; Joanna Szulc v. Poland, 2012, § 87); an \"effective and accessible procedure\" enabling an interested party to have access to \"all relevant and appropriate information\" collected and stored by public authorities in order to receive the information necessary to know and to understand the individual's childhood and early development ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 49), to discover his or her personal identity ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 42), or to identify any health risks to which Guerra and Others v. Italy, McGinley and Egan v. the United he or she has been exposed ( 1998, § 60; Kingdom, 1998, § 101; Roche v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2005, § 162).\n\nIn the case of children born anonymously, the issue of access to one's origins and to information on the identity of one's biological parents is different from that of access to a case record concerning a child in care or to evidence of alleged paternity ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 43; Godelli v. Italy, 2012, § 62). Depending on the wide range of different legal systems and traditions, States had to benefit from a degree of discretion in preserving the confidentiality of the identities of biological parents ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 46; Godelli v. Italy, 2012, § 65). Anational system which provided an applicant with access to non-identifying information on his mother and his biological family, enabling her to establish some her past history, without prejudice to third-party interests, accompanied by the possibility under recently enacted legislation to call on the services of an independent body mandated to help individuals to find their biological origins in order to secure the disclosure of her mother's identity, subject to the latter's consent, was deemed compatible with Article 8 ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 49). Conversely, a system which gave blind preference to a mother's wish to remain anonymous and provided no means for an adopted child who had not been recognised at birth of applying for either access to non-identifying information on her origins or disclosure of her mother's identity, was found to be incompatible with the requirements of Article 8 Godelli v. Italy (, 2012, §§ 70-72).", + "post_text": "Personal data can take very different forms. For example: ▪ Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109). ▪ Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59). ▪ Cellular samples and DNAprofiles ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints ( ibid ., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances ( ibid ., § 85). ▪ Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving sensitive details or professional activity ( M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.). ▪ Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the police ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 18, 74-81). ▪ Acopy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdö k and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36). ▪ Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Antovi ć and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). ▪ Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138). ▪ Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 54-64; Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, §§ 106 and 112; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 50). ▪ Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68). ▪ Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings against the applicant ( Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 39-41). 8/107\n\nIn cases which raise the issue of the protection of personal data, the Court has found that the State's margin of appreciation is broader: where there is no consensus in the member States of the Council of Europe as to the importance of the interest at stake, or the best means of protecting it ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 47; Breyer v. Germany, 2020, § 108; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, § 111); where the purely financial data at stake were not closely related to the applicant's identity ( G.S.B. v. Switzerland, 2015, § 93); and, lastly, in matters of national security ( Leander v. Sweden, 1987, § 59). By contrast, the margin of appreciation afforded to national authorities was found to be narrower where, for example, personal data subject to automatic processing which considerably facilitated their access and dissemination could harm a person's reputation and render his daily life more difficult ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, §§ 64, 70). The same consideration is especially valid for the protection of categories of sensitive data, in particular DNAinformation, which contains the person's genetic make-up and is of great importance to both the person concerned and his or her family ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 102-103).\n\nInherent positive obligations to ensure the effective protection of the Convention rights and freedoms may involve, for example, an obligation to secure to an individual: access within a reasonable time to information stored systematically about the individual by former State secret services concerning his or her distant past ( Haralambie v. Romania, 2009, § 79; Jarnea v. Romania, 2011, § 50; Joanna Szulc v. Poland, 2012, § 87); an \"effective and accessible procedure\" enabling an interested party to have access to \"all relevant and appropriate information\" collected and stored by public authorities in order to receive the information necessary to know and to understand the individual's childhood and early development ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 49), to discover his or her personal identity ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 42; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, § 110), or to identify any health risks to which he or she has been exposed ( Guerra and Others v. Italy, 1998, § 60; McGinley and Egan v. the United Kingdom, 1998, § 101; Roche v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2005, § 162). 23/107\n\nIn the case of children born anonymously, the issue of access to one's origins and to information on the identity of one's biological parents is different from that of access to a case record concerning a child in care or to evidence of alleged paternity ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 43; Godelli v. Italy, 2012, § 62). Depending on the wide range of different legal systems and traditions, States had to benefit from a degree of discretion in preserving the confidentiality of the identities of biological parents ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 46; Godelli v. Italy, 2012, § 65). Anational system which provided an applicant with access to non-identifying information on his mother and his biological family, enabling her to establish some her past history, without prejudice to third-party interests, accompanied by the possibility under recently enacted legislation to call on the services of an independent body mandated to help individuals to find their biological origins in order to secure the disclosure of her mother's identity, subject to the latter's consent, was deemed compatible with Article 8 ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 49; see also, as regards access of persons born through medically assisted reproduction involving a third-party donor, to information concerning that donor, Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, §§ 113-33). Conversely, a system which gave blind preference to a mother's wish to remain anonymous and provided no means for an adopted child who had not been recognised at birth of applying for either access to non-identifying information on her origins or disclosure of her mother's identity, was found to be incompatible with the requirements of Article 8 ( Godelli v. Italy, 2012, §§ 70-72).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331212544/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240613075829/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/d5256ad78e38/20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", @@ -27200,6 +28778,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-13", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json", "case_key": "apps:16974/14", "case_name": "Kaczmarek v. Poland", @@ -27217,8 +28797,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added|citation_updated", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.C.1|a:87|b:87|I.C.1|a:88|b:88|I.C.1|a:89|b:89", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "The Court has examined in a number of cases the question whether the requirement, as stated in Article 5 of Convention 108, that personal data undergoing automatic processing must have been obtained and processed fairly and lawfully, has or has not been met. In a number of cases the Court has found a violation of Article 8 solely on the grounds of a lack of legal basis at national level to authorise measures capable of interfering with the relevant rights ( Taylor -Sabori v. the United Kingdom, 2002, §§ 17-19; Radu v. Moldova, 2014, § 31; Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 103-104; M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022, §§ 61-64).\n\nIn particular, in Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018 (§§ 103-104), the Court noted that neither the Government nor the national courts had indicated any provision that could have formed the legal basis for the communication, by the psychiatric hospital, of information on the health of the applicant, Taylor -Sabori v. the United Kingdom who was an adult, to his mother and to journalists. In, 2002 (§§ 17-19), where the applicant had been subjected to police surveillance by the \"cloning\" of his pager, there existed no statutory system to regulate the interception of pager messages transmitted via a private telecommunications system. In Radu v. Republic of Moldova, 2014 (§ 31), the dissemination by a public hospital of medical information on the applicant's pregnancy, state of health and treatment by her employer had not been \"in accordance with the law\". In M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022 (§§ 61-64), the police drew up a report in respect of judges and magistrates, who exercised their functions in Catalonia and who had signed a manifesto in which they had set out their legal opinion in favour of the possibility of the Catalan people exercising a so-called \"right to decide\", the report revealing the personal data, photographs, professional information and political views of some of them. The Court observed that the drawing up of the report by the police had not been provided for by law, and since the public authorities had used the personal data for a purpose other than that which justified collection, the mere existence of the police report, which had been drafted in respect of individuals whose behaviour had not implied any criminal activity, amounted to a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.\n\nIn other cases the Court found a violation of Article 8 on the ground that domestic law, which was supposed to protect personal data, was inaccessible or confidential ( Vasil Vasilev v. Bulgaria, 2021, Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey §§ 169-170;, 2022, §§ 80-99) or was not sufficiently clear and foreseeable ( Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016; Ben Faiza v. France, 2018, §§ 58-61; Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018 ; Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000; Zoltán Varga v. Slovakia, 2021, § 162; Haščák v. Slovakia, 2022, §§ 94-95). Thus in Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-99, prisoners' correspondence was scanned and uploaded onto the National Judicial Network Server on the basis of instructions issued by the Ministry of Justice, directly and specifically addressed to the public prosecutors and prison authorities, which had not been made accessible to the public in general or to the applicants in particular. In the case of Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, §§ 71-77, the provisions forming the basis of the covert surveillance to which the applicant had been subjected by her insurance company after a road accident had not indicated with sufficient clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the discretion conferred on insurance companies acting as public authorities in insurance disputes to conduct secret surveillance of insured persons. In the case of Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000 (§§ 57-62), concerning personal information held by the Romanian intelligence service, national law did not define the type of information which could be processed, the categories of individuals in respect of whom surveillance measures could be taken and in what circumstances, or the procedure to be followed. In Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018 (§ 132), certain legal provisions used by the police to obtain data on a subscriber associated with a dynamic IP address lacked clarity and provided no protection against arbitrary interference, as there were no safeguards against abuse or any independent monitoring of the police powers in question.", - "post_text": "The Court has examined in a number of cases the question whether the requirement, as stated in Article 5 of Convention 108, that personal data undergoing automatic processing must have been obtained and processed fairly and lawfully, has or has not been met. In a number of cases the Court has found a violation of Article 8 solely on the grounds of a lack of legal basis at national level to authorise measures capable of interfering with the relevant rights ( Taylor-Sabori v. the United Kingdom, 2002, §§ 17-19; Radu v. Moldova, 2014, § 31; Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 103-104; M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022, §§ 61-64; Kaczmarek v. Poland, 2024, §§ 74-80).\n\nIn particular, in Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018 (§§ 103-104), the Court noted that neither the Government nor the national courts had indicated any provision that could have formed the legal basis for the communication, by the psychiatric hospital, of information on the health of the applicant, who was an adult, to his mother and to journalists. In Taylor-Sabori v. the United Kingdom, 2002 (§§ 17-19), where the applicant had been subjected to police surveillance by the \"cloning\" of his pager, there existed no statutory system to regulate the interception of pager messages 25/107 transmitted via a private telecommunications system. In Radu v. Republic of Moldova, 2014 (§ 31), the dissemination by a public hospital of medical information on the applicant's pregnancy, state of health and treatment by her employer had not been \"in accordance with the law\" . In M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022 (§§ 61-64), the police drew up a report in respect of judges and magistrates, who exercised their functions in Catalonia and who had signed a manifesto in which they had set out their legal opinion in favour of the possibility of the Catalan people exercising a so- called \"right to dec ide\", the report revealing the personal data, photographs, professional information and political views of some of them. The Court observed that the drawing up of the report by the police had not been provided for by law, and since the public authorities had used the personal data for a purpose other than that which justified collection, the mere existence of the police report, which had been drafted in respect of individuals whose behaviour had not implied any criminal activity, amounted to a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. In Kaczmarek v. Poland, 2024 (§§ 74-80), where the recording of the applicant's telephone conversation was disclosed at a press conference, the Court found that the relevant provision of the law on criminal procedure, which mainly concerned the inspection of file and making copies in the course of an investigation, could not be regarded as a legal basis for that disclosure.\n\nIn other cases the Court found a violation of Article 8 on the ground that domestic law, which was supposed to protect personal data, was inaccessible or confidential ( Vasil Vasilev v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 169-170; Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-99) or was not sufficiently clear and foreseeable ( Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016; Ben Faiza v. France, 2018, §§ 58-61; Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018 ; Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000; Zoltán Varga v. Slovakia, 2021, § 162; Haščák v. Slovakia, 2022, §§ 94-95; Kaczmarek v. Poland, 2024, §§ 93-96). Thus in Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-99, prisoners'correspondence was scanned and uploaded onto the National Judicial Network Server on the basis of instructions issued by the Ministry of Justice, directly and specifically addressed to the public prosecutors and prison authorities, which had not been made accessible to the public in general or to the applicants in particular. In the case of Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, §§ 71-77, the provisions forming the basis of the covert surveillance to which the applicant had been subjected by her insurance company after a road accident had not indicated with sufficient clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the discretion conferred on insurance companies acting as public authorities in insurance disputes to conduct secret surveillance of insured persons. In the case of Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000 (��§ 57-62), concerning personal information held by the Romanian intelligence service, national law did not define the type of information which could be processed, the categories of individuals in respect of whom surveillance measures could be taken and in what circumstances, or the procedure to be followed. In Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018 (§ 132), certain legal provisions used by the police to obtain data on a subscriber associated with a dynamic IP address lacked clarity and provided no protection against arbitrary interference, as there were no safeguards against abuse or any independent monitoring of the police powers in question. Likewise, in Kaczmarek v. Poland, 2024 (§§ 93-96) the continued storage by the authorities of surveillance material regarding the applicant collected in the course of a security operation of which she, herself, had not been a subject, was based on legal provisions that lacked sufficient clarity and did not provide for any procedural guarantees with the result that the applicant had been unable to have that material destroyed.", + "pre_text": "The Court has examined in a number of cases the question whether the requirement, as stated in Article 5 of Convention 108, that personal data undergoing automatic processing must have been obtained and processed fairly and lawfully, has or has not been met. In a number of cases the Court has found a violation of Article 8 solely on the grounds of a lack of legal basis at national level to authorise measures capable of interfering with the relevant rights ( Taylor -Sabori v. the United Kingdom, 2002, §§ 17-19; Radu v. Moldova, 2014, § 31; Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 103-104; M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022, §§ 61-64).\n\nIn particular, in Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018 (§§ 103-104), the Court noted that neither the Government nor the national courts had indicated any provision that could have formed the legal basis for the communication, by the psychiatric hospital, of information on the health of the applicant, Taylor -Sabori v. the United Kingdom who was an adult, to his mother and to journalists. In, 2002 (§§ 17-19), where the applicant had been subjected to police surveillance by the \"cloning\" of his pager, there existed no statutory system to regulate the interception of pager messages transmitted via a private telecommunications system. In Radu v. Republic of Moldova, 2014 (§ 31), the dissemination by a public hospital of medical information on the applicant's pregnancy, state of health and treatment by her employer had not been \"in accordance with the law\". In M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022 (§§ 61-64), the police drew up a report in respect of judges and magistrates, who exercised their functions in Catalonia and who had signed a manifesto in which they had set out their legal opinion in favour of the possibility of the Catalan people exercising a so-called \"right to decide\", the report revealing the personal data, photographs, professional information and political views of some of them. The Court observed that the drawing up of the report by the police had not been provided for by law, and since the public authorities had used the personal data for a purpose other than that which justified collection, the mere existence of the police report, which had been drafted in respect of individuals whose behaviour had not implied any criminal activity, amounted to a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.\n\nIn other cases the Court found a violation of Article 8 on the ground that domestic law, which was supposed to protect personal data, was inaccessible or confidential ( Vasil Vasilev v. Bulgaria, 2021, Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey §§ 169-170;, 2022, §§ 80-99) or was not sufficiently clear and foreseeable ( Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016; Ben Faiza v. France, 2018, §§ 58-61; Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018 ; Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000; Zoltán Varga v. Slovakia, 2021, § 162; Haščák v. Slovakia, 2022, §§ 94-95). Thus in Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-99, prisoners' correspondence was scanned and uploaded onto the National Judicial Network Server on the basis of instructions issued by the Ministry of Justice, directly and specifically addressed to the public prosecutors and prison authorities, which had not been made accessible to the public in general or to the applicants in particular. In the case of Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, §§ 71-77, the provisions forming the basis of the covert surveillance to which the applicant had been subjected by her insurance company after a road accident had not indicated with sufficient clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the discretion conferred on insurance companies acting as public authorities in insurance disputes to conduct secret surveillance of insured persons. In the case of Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000 (§§ 57-62), concerning personal information held by the Romanian intelligence service, national law did not define the type of information which could be processed, the categories of individuals in respect of whom surveillance measures could be taken and in what circumstances, or the procedure to be followed. In Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018 (§ 132), certain legal provisions used by the police to obtain data on a subscriber associated with a dynamic IPaddress lacked clarity and provided no protection against arbitrary interference, as there were no safeguards against abuse or any independent monitoring of the police powers in question.", + "post_text": "The Court has examined in a number of cases the question whether the requirement, as stated in Article 5 of Convention 108, that personal data undergoing automatic processing must have been obtained and processed fairly and lawfully, has or has not been met. In a number of cases the Court has found a violation of Article 8 solely on the grounds of a lack of legal basis at national level to authorise measures capable of interfering with the relevant rights ( Taylor-Sabori v. the United Kingdom, 2002, §§ 17-19; Radu v. Moldova, 2014, § 31; Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 103-104; M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022, §§ 61-64; Kaczmarek v. Poland, 2024, §§ 74-80).\n\nIn particular, in Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018 (§§ 103-104), the Court noted that neither the Government nor the national courts had indicated any provision that could have formed the legal basis for the communication, by the psychiatric hospital, of information on the health of the applicant, who was an adult, to his mother and to journalists. In Taylor-Sabori v. the United Kingdom, 2002 (§§ 17-19), where the applicant had been subjected to police surveillance by the \"cloning\" of his pager, there existed no statutory system to regulate the interception of pager messages 25/107 transmitted via a private telecommunications system. In Radu v. Republic of Moldova, 2014 (§ 31), the dissemination by a public hospital of medical information on the applicant's pregnancy, state of health and treatment by her employer had not been \"in accordance with the law\" . In M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022 (§§ 61-64), the police drew up a report in respect of judges and magistrates, who exercised their functions in Catalonia and who had signed a manifesto in which they had set out their legal opinion in favour of the possibility of the Catalan people exercising a so- called \"right to dec ide\", the report revealing the personal data, photographs, professional information and political views of some of them. The Court observed that the drawing up of the report by the police had not been provided for by law, and since the public authorities had used the personal data for a purpose other than that which justified collection, the mere existence of the police report, which had been drafted in respect of individuals whose behaviour had not implied any criminal activity, amounted to a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. In Kaczmarek v. Poland, 2024 (§§ 74-80), where the recording of the applicant's telephone conversation was disclosed at a press conference, the Court found that the relevant provision of the law on criminal procedure, which mainly concerned the inspection of file and making copies in the course of an investigation, could not be regarded as a legal basis for that disclosure.\n\nIn other cases the Court found a violation of Article 8 on the ground that domestic law, which was supposed to protect personal data, was inaccessible or confidential ( Vasil Vasilev v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 169-170; Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-99) or was not sufficiently clear and foreseeable ( Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016; Ben Faiza v. France, 2018, §§ 58-61; Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018 ; Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000; Zoltán Varga v. Slovakia, 2021, § 162; Haščák v. Slovakia, 2022, §§ 94-95; Kaczmarek v. Poland, 2024, §§ 93-96). Thus in Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-99, prisoners'correspondence was scanned and uploaded onto the National Judicial Network Server on the basis of instructions issued by the Ministry of Justice, directly and specifically addressed to the public prosecutors and prison authorities, which had not been made accessible to the public in general or to the applicants in particular. In the case of Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, §§ 71-77, the provisions forming the basis of the covert surveillance to which the applicant had been subjected by her insurance company after a road accident had not indicated with sufficient clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the discretion conferred on insurance companies acting as public authorities in insurance disputes to conduct secret surveillance of insured persons. In the case of Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000 (§§ 57-62), concerning personal information held by the Romanian intelligence service, national law did not define the type of information which could be processed, the categories of individuals in respect of whom surveillance measures could be taken and in what circumstances, or the procedure to be followed. In Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018 (§ 132), certain legal provisions used by the police to obtain data on a subscriber associated with a dynamic IPaddress lacked clarity and provided no protection against arbitrary interference, as there were no safeguards against abuse or any independent monitoring of the police powers in question. Likewise, in Kaczmarek v. Poland, 2024 (§§ 93-96) the continued storage by the authorities of surveillance material regarding the applicant collected in the course of a security operation of which she, herself, had not been a subject, was based on legal provisions that lacked sufficient clarity and did not provide for any procedural guarantees with the result that the applicant had been unable to have that material destroyed.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331212544/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240613075829/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/d5256ad78e38/20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", @@ -27233,6 +28813,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-13", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json", "case_key": "apps:3866/20|9292/20", "case_name": "L.F. v. France (dec.)", @@ -27250,8 +28832,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added|paragraph_added|minor_edit|reformulation", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A.1|a:9|b:9|I.C.3.a|a:None|b:112|I.C.3.a|a:108|b:108|II.B.3.b|a:309|b:312", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Under Article 2 of Convention 108, \"data processing\" includes: \"any operation or set of operations performed on personal data, such as the collection, storage, preservation, alteration, retrieval, disclosure, making available, erasure, or destruction of, or the carrying out of logical and/or arithmetical operations on such data\". The development of technologies has led to an increase in the types of operations involving personal data that can constitute processing; the Court has identified the following typical examples:  The collection by the police from an Internet provider of subscriber information associated Benedik v. Slovenia with an individual's specific dynamic IP address (, 2018, §§ 108-109).  The fact of gathering and storing public information on an individual, for example about his/her political activity ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44; Association \"21 December 1989\" and Others v. Romania, 2011, §§ 167-168; Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, §§ 65-67; Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 93).  The listing of an individual in a national judicial database of sex offenders ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 58), and the collection and storage of a suspect's fingerprints ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 29).  The covert recording in a police station, for permanent storage, of voice samples to be used in identifying the individuals concerned, by a process of analysis in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, §§ 59-60).  The filming of an individual in a police interview room by cameras installed for security reasons and totally visible, with the permanent recording of the footage and its inclusion in a montage for further use ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 41).  The systematic collection and retention of GPS monitoring data indicating the whereabouts and public movements of the subject ( Uzun v. Germany, 2010, §§ 49-53).  The publication in a magazine of an article illustrated by photos of celebrities taken without Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) their knowledge ( [GC], 2012, §§ 95-99).  The recording and disclosure to media of CCTV footage showing an individual trying to Peck v. the United Kingdom commit suicide in a public place (, 2003, §§ 59-63).  The recording and storage by police of data on an individual's supposed occupation ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56).  The disclosure by a psychiatric hospital to journalists of highly sensitive confidential information about the private life of a patient ( Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, § 99).  The collection by the State, as part of anti-doping measures in sport, of information on the whereabouts and daily pursuits, even at weekends, of high-level athletes ( National Federation of Sportspersons' Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 155-159).  The systematic scanning and uploading of prisoners' private correspondence, both incoming and outgoing, onto the National Judicial Network Server ( Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-82).  The use of facial recognition technology to, in the first place, identify the applicant, who had held a solo demonstration without a prior notification, from the photographs and the video published on the Telegram channel and, secondly, locate and arrest him while he was travelling on the underground ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 73).\n\nIn a number of cases the Court has examined the question whether the personal data undergoing automatic processing had been adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they had been recorded ( L.L. v. France, 2006, §§ 45-46; Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, § 51; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 147; Kruglov and Others v. Russia, 2020, § 132 in fine ).\n\nIn several cases relating to the retention of the personal data of individuals convicted of sexual assault, the Court found no violation of Article 8 after noting that the data subjects had been able to submit a request for deletion if the retention of their data no longer seemed relevant in view, inter alia B.B. v. France Gardel v. France, of the lapse of time since their conviction (, 2009, §§ 66-68;, 2009, §§ 67-69; M.B. v. France, 2009, §§ 58-60).", - "post_text": "Under Article 2 of Convention 108, \"data processing\" includes : \"any operation or set of operations performed on personal data, such as the collection, storage, preservation, alteration, retrieval, disclosure, making available, erasure, or destruction of, or the carrying out of logical and/or arithmetical operations on such data\" . The development of technologies has led to an increase in the types of operations involving personal data that can constitute processing; the Court has identified the following typical examples: ▪ The collection by the police from an Internet provider of subscriber information associated with an individual's specific dynamic IP address ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109). ▪ The fact of gathering and storing public information on an individual, for example about his/her political activity ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44; Association \"21 December 1989\" and Others v. Romania, 2011, §§ 167-168; Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, §§ 65-67; Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 93). ▪ The listing of an individual in an internal judicial database of a relevant ministry ( L.F. v. France (dec.), 2024, § 30); in a national judicial database of sex offenders ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 58); or in a national database concerning any criminal proceedings instituted against an individual ( N.F. and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 34 and 49), and the collection and storage of a suspect's fingerprints ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 29). ▪ The covert recording in a police station, for permanent storage, of voice samples to be used in identifying the individuals concerned, by a process of analysis in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, §§ 59-60). ▪ The filming of an individual in a police interview room by cameras installed for security reasons and totally visible, with the permanent recording of the footage and its inclusion in a montage for further use ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 41). ▪ The systematic collection and retention of GPS monitoring data indicating the whereabouts and public movements of the subject ( Uzun v. Germany, 2010, §§ 49-53). ▪ The publication in a magazine of an article illustrated by photos of celebrities taken without their knowledge ( Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], 2012, §§ 95-99). ▪ The recording and disclosure to media of CCTV footage showing an individual trying to commit suicide in a public place ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 59-63). ▪ The recording and storage by police of data on an individual's supposed occupation ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ The disclosure by a psychiatric hospital to journalists of highly sensitive confidential information about the private life of a patient ( M ockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, § 99). ▪ The collection by the State, as part of anti-doping measures in sport, of information on the whereabouts and daily pursuits, even at weekends, of high-level athletes ( National Federation of Sportspersons'Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 155-159). ▪ The systematic scanning and uploading of prisoners'private correspondence, both incoming and outgoing, onto the National Judicial Network Server ( Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-82). ▪ The use of facial recognition technology to, in the first place, identify the applicant, who had held a solo demonstration without a prior notification, from the photographs and the video published on the Telegram channel and, secondly, locate and arrest him while he was travelling on the underground ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 73).\n\nOn the other hand, the processing of personal data, which was not \"sensitive\" within the meaning of Article 6 of Convention 108 and which was limited to factual and objective information related to legal proceedings to which an individual was a party, in an internal database of the Ministry of Justice did not fall foul of the requirements of Article 8 ( L.F. v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 34 and 40).\n\nIn a number of cases the Court has examined the question whether the personal data undergoing automatic processing had been adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they had been recorded ( L.L. v. France, 2006, §§ 45-46; Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, § 51; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 147; Kruglov and Others v. Russia, 2020, § 132 in fine ; L.F. v. France (dec.), 2024, § 34).\n\nIn several cases relating to the retention of the personal data of individuals convicted of sexual assault, the Court found no violation of Article 8 after noting that the data subjects had been able to submit a request for deletion if the retention of their data no longer seemed relevant in view, inter alia, of the lapse of time since their conviction ( B.B. v. France, 2009, §§ 66-68; Gardel v. France, 2009, §§ 67-69; M.B. v. France, 2009, §§ 58-60). At the same time, the absence of any possibility to request deletion of data will not necessarily amount to a breach of Article 8 and must be assessed in the light of the purpose pursued by the storage of such data, the nature of the date as well as the guarantees afforded to those concerned against the risk of arbitrariness and abuse. In particular, where the relevant data retained in an internal database of the Ministry of Justice was not \"sensitive\" within the meaning of Art icle 6 of Convention 108 and was limited to factual and objective information related to legal proceedings to which an individual was a party, and where their processing aimed at ensuring the proper administration of justice and the proper functioning of the relevant public services and was attended by appropriate guarantees (the possibility to ensure the accuracy of data and a limited period of their storage), the absence of a procedure for anticipated deletion of such data was not disproportionate ( L.F. v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 44-47).", + "pre_text": "Under Article 2 of Convention 108, \"data processing\" includes: \"any operation or set of operations performed on personal data, such as the collection, storage, preservation, alteration, retrieval, disclosure, making available, erasure, or destruction of, or the carrying out of logical and/or arithmetical operations on such data\". The development of technologies has led to an increase in the types of operations involving personal data that can constitute processing; the Court has identified the following typical examples:  The collection by the police from an Internet provider of subscriber information associated Benedik v. Slovenia with an individual's specific dynamic IPaddress (, 2018, §§ 108-109).  The fact of gathering and storing public information on an individual, for example about his/her political activity ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44; Association \"21 December 1989\" and Others v. Romania, 2011, §§ 167-168; Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, §§ 65-67; Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 93).  The listing of an individual in a national judicial database of sex offenders ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 58), and the collection and storage of a suspect's fingerprints ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 29).  The covert recording in a police station, for permanent storage, of voice samples to be used in identifying the individuals concerned, by a process of analysis in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, §§ 59-60).  The filming of an individual in a police interview room by cameras installed for security reasons and totally visible, with the permanent recording of the footage and its inclusion in a montage for further use ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 41).  The systematic collection and retention of GPSmonitoring data indicating the whereabouts and public movements of the subject ( Uzun v. Germany, 2010, §§ 49-53).  The publication in a magazine of an article illustrated by photos of celebrities taken without Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) their knowledge ( [GC], 2012, §§ 95-99).  The recording and disclosure to media of CCTVfootage showing an individual trying to Peck v. the United Kingdom commit suicide in a public place (, 2003, §§ 59-63).  The recording and storage by police of data on an individual's supposed occupation ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56).  The disclosure by a psychiatric hospital to journalists of highly sensitive confidential information about the private life of a patient ( Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, § 99).  The collection by the State, as part of anti-doping measures in sport, of information on the whereabouts and daily pursuits, even at weekends, of high-level athletes ( National Federation of Sportspersons' Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 155-159).  The systematic scanning and uploading of prisoners' private correspondence, both incoming and outgoing, onto the National Judicial Network Server ( Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-82).  The use of facial recognition technology to, in the first place, identify the applicant, who had held a solo demonstration without a prior notification, from the photographs and the video published on the Telegram channel and, secondly, locate and arrest him while he was travelling on the underground ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 73).\n\nIn a number of cases the Court has examined the question whether the personal data undergoing automatic processing had been adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they had been recorded ( L.L. v. France, 2006, §§ 45-46; Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, § 51; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 147; Kruglov and Others v. Russia, 2020, § 132 in fine ).\n\nIn several cases relating to the retention of the personal data of individuals convicted of sexual assault, the Court found no violation of Article 8 after noting that the data subjects had been able to submit a request for deletion if the retention of their data no longer seemed relevant in view, inter alia B.B. v. France Gardel v. France, of the lapse of time since their conviction (, 2009, §§ 66-68;, 2009, §§ 67-69; M.B. v. France, 2009, §§ 58-60).", + "post_text": "Under Article 2 of Convention 108, \"data processing\" includes : \"any operation or set of operations performed on personal data, such as the collection, storage, preservation, alteration, retrieval, disclosure, making available, erasure, or destruction of, or the carrying out of logical and/or arithmetical operations on such data\" . The development of technologies has led to an increase in the types of operations involving personal data that can constitute processing; the Court has identified the following typical examples: ▪ The collection by the police from an Internet provider of subscriber information associated with an individual's specific dynamic IPaddress ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109). ▪ The fact of gathering and storing public information on an individual, for example about his/her political activity ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44; Association \"21 December 1989\" and Others v. Romania, 2011, §§ 167-168; Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, §§ 65-67; Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 93). ▪ The listing of an individual in an internal judicial database of a relevant ministry ( L.F. v. France (dec.), 2024, § 30); in a national judicial database of sex offenders ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 58); or in a national database concerning any criminal proceedings instituted against an individual ( N.F. and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 34 and 49), and the collection and storage of a suspect's fingerprints ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 29). ▪ The covert recording in a police station, for permanent storage, of voice samples to be used in identifying the individuals concerned, by a process of analysis in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, §§ 59-60). ▪ The filming of an individual in a police interview room by cameras installed for security reasons and totally visible, with the permanent recording of the footage and its inclusion in a montage for further use ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 41). ▪ The systematic collection and retention of GPSmonitoring data indicating the whereabouts and public movements of the subject ( Uzun v. Germany, 2010, §§ 49-53). ▪ The publication in a magazine of an article illustrated by photos of celebrities taken without their knowledge ( Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], 2012, §§ 95-99). ▪ The recording and disclosure to media of CCTVfootage showing an individual trying to commit suicide in a public place ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 59-63). ▪ The recording and storage by police of data on an individual's supposed occupation ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ The disclosure by a psychiatric hospital to journalists of highly sensitive confidential information about the private life of a patient ( Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, § 99). ▪ The collection by the State, as part of anti-doping measures in sport, of information on the whereabouts and daily pursuits, even at weekends, of high-level athletes ( National Federation of Sportspersons'Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 155-159). ▪ The systematic scanning and uploading of prisoners'private correspondence, both incoming and outgoing, onto the National Judicial Network Server ( Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-82). ▪ The use of facial recognition technology to, in the first place, identify the applicant, who had held a solo demonstration without a prior notification, from the photographs and the video published on the Telegram channel and, secondly, locate and arrest him while he was travelling on the underground ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 73).\n\nOn the other hand, the processing of personal data, which was not \"sensitive\" within the meaning of Article 6 of Convention 108 and which was limited to factual and objective information related to legal proceedings to which an individual was a party, in an internal database of the Ministry of Justice did not fall foul of the requirements of Article 8 ( L.F. v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 34 and 40).\n\nIn a number of cases the Court has examined the question whether the personal data undergoing automatic processing had been adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they had been recorded ( L.L. v. France, 2006, §§ 45-46; Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, § 51; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 147; Kruglov and Others v. Russia, 2020, § 132 in fine ; L.F. v. France (dec.), 2024, § 34).\n\nIn several cases relating to the retention of the personal data of individuals convicted of sexual assault, the Court found no violation of Article 8 after noting that the data subjects had been able to submit a request for deletion if the retention of their data no longer seemed relevant in view, inter alia, of the lapse of time since their conviction ( B.B. v. France, 2009, §§ 66-68; Gardel v. France, 2009, §§ 67-69; M.B. v. France, 2009, §§ 58-60). At the same time, the absence of any possibility to request deletion of data will not necessarily amount to a breach of Article 8 and must be assessed in the light of the purpose pursued by the storage of such data, the nature of the date as well as the guarantees afforded to those concerned against the risk of arbitrariness and abuse. In particular, where the relevant data retained in an internal database of the Ministry of Justice was not \"sensitive\" within the meaning of Art icle 6 of Convention 108 and was limited to factual and objective information related to legal proceedings to which an individual was a party, and where their processing aimed at ensuring the proper administration of justice and the proper functioning of the relevant public services and was attended by appropriate guarantees (the possibility to ensure the accuracy of data and a limited period of their storage), the absence of a procedure for anticipated deletion of such data was not disproportionate ( L.F. v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 44-47).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331212544/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240613075829/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/d5256ad78e38/20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", @@ -27266,6 +28848,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-13", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json", "case_key": "apps:3537/15", "case_name": "N.F. and Others v. Russia", @@ -27283,41 +28867,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added|citation_updated|paragraph_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A.1|a:9|b:9|II.A.2.a|a:202|b:204|II.A.2.a|a:203|b:205|II.A.2.i|a:None|b:211|II.A.2.i|a:205|b:207", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Under Article 2 of Convention 108, \"data processing\" includes: \"any operation or set of operations performed on personal data, such as the collection, storage, preservation, alteration, retrieval, disclosure, making available, erasure, or destruction of, or the carrying out of logical and/or arithmetical operations on such data\". The development of technologies has led to an increase in the types of operations involving personal data that can constitute processing; the Court has identified the following typical examples:  The collection by the police from an Internet provider of subscriber information associated Benedik v. Slovenia with an individual's specific dynamic IP address (, 2018, §§ 108-109).  The fact of gathering and storing public information on an individual, for example about his/her political activity ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44; Association \"21 December 1989\" and Others v. Romania, 2011, §§ 167-168; Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, §§ 65-67; Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 93).  The listing of an individual in a national judicial database of sex offenders ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 58), and the collection and storage of a suspect's fingerprints ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 29).  The covert recording in a police station, for permanent storage, of voice samples to be used in identifying the individuals concerned, by a process of analysis in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, §§ 59-60).  The filming of an individual in a police interview room by cameras installed for security reasons and totally visible, with the permanent recording of the footage and its inclusion in a montage for further use ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 41).  The systematic collection and retention of GPS monitoring data indicating the whereabouts and public movements of the subject ( Uzun v. Germany, 2010, §§ 49-53).  The publication in a magazine of an article illustrated by photos of celebrities taken without Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) their knowledge ( [GC], 2012, §§ 95-99).  The recording and disclosure to media of CCTV footage showing an individual trying to Peck v. the United Kingdom commit suicide in a public place (, 2003, §§ 59-63).  The recording and storage by police of data on an individual's supposed occupation ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56).  The disclosure by a psychiatric hospital to journalists of highly sensitive confidential information about the private life of a patient ( Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, § 99).  The collection by the State, as part of anti-doping measures in sport, of information on the whereabouts and daily pursuits, even at weekends, of high-level athletes ( National Federation of Sportspersons' Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 155-159).  The systematic scanning and uploading of prisoners' private correspondence, both incoming and outgoing, onto the National Judicial Network Server ( Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-82).  The use of facial recognition technology to, in the first place, identify the applicant, who had held a solo demonstration without a prior notification, from the photographs and the video published on the Telegram channel and, secondly, locate and arrest him while he was travelling on the underground ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 73).\n\nThe interests of data subjects and the community as a whole in protecting personal data, including fingerprint and DNA information, may be outweighed by the legitimate interest in the prevention of crime ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 104). In order to protect their population as required, the national authorities can legitimately set up databases as an effective means of helping to punish and prevent certain offences, including the most serious types of crime, B.B. v. France Gardel v. France M.B. v. France, such as sex offences (, 2009, § 62;, 2009, § 63; 2009, § 54). While the original taking of this information pursues the aim of linking a particular person to the particular crime of which he or she is suspected, its retention pursues the broader purpose of assisting in the identification of future offenders ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 100). The Court cannot call into question the preventive purpose of such registers ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 63; B.B. v. France, 2009, § 62; M.B. v. France, 2009, § 54). The fight against crime, and in particular against organised crime and terrorism, which is one of the challenges faced by today's European societies, depends to a great extent on the use of modern scientific techniques of investigation and identification ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 105). At the same time, since the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, domestic law must afford appropriate safeguards to prevent any such use of personal data as may be inconsistent with the guarantees of this Article ( ibid., § 103; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 75).\n\nThe Court has considered a series of cases relating to the recording in databases designed for the punishment and prevention of crime the personal data of individuals convicted of minor offences ( M.K. v. France, 2013, §§ 6, 8, 41; Aycaguer v. France, 2017, §§ 8, 43), serious offences ( B.B. v. France, 2009, §§ 6, 62; Gardel v. France, 2009, §§ 8, 9, 63; M.B. v. France, 2009, §§ 6, 54; Peruzzo and Martens v. Germany (dec.), 2013, §§ 6, 12, 37-38; Trajkovski and Chipovski v. North Macedonia, 2020, §§ 6, 12), or for a series of offences that were neither minor nor particularly serious ( P.N. v. Germany, 2020, §§ 6, 81). Other cases concerned the storage, in databases designed for the punishment and prevention of crime, of the personal data of individuals who had been suspected of committing S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom offences but who had ultimately been discharged ( [GC], 2007, §§ 10, 11, 113; M.K. v. France, 2013, §§ 7, 9, 42; Brunet v. France, 2014, §§ 6, 7, 40), acquitted ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 10, 113), or simply cautioned after the proceedings, without conviction ( M.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2012, §§ 7-9). Lastly, other cases have concerned preventive measures involving storing personal data in police files, on the basis of mere suspicions ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, § 16; Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, §§ 8, 9, 59; Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, §§ 6, 14, 119).\n\nIn several cases the Court has called into question the broad scope of the data storage system installed by the authorities, which failed to draw a distinction according to the nature or degree of seriousness of the offence leading to conviction ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 41; Aycaguer v. France, 2017, § 43; Gaughran v. the United Kingdom, 2020, § 94), or depending on whether the data subject had been convicted, acquitted, discharged or merely cautioned, having been suspected of committing an offence ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 119; M.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2012, § 198; M.K. v. France, 2013, § 42 ; Brunet v. France, 2014, § 41). The Court considers that the facilities put in place by the authorities to assist in punishing and preventing certain offences cannot be implemented as part of an abusive drive to maximise the information stored in them. Indeed, without respect for the requisite proportionality vis-à-vis the legitimate aims assigned to such mechanisms, their advantages would be outweighed by the serious breaches which they would cause to the rights and freedoms which States must guarantee under the Convention to persons under their jurisdiction ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 35 ; Aycaguer v. France, 2017, § 34).", - "post_text": "Under Article 2 of Convention 108, \"data processing\" includes : \"any operation or set of operations performed on personal data, such as the collection, storage, preservation, alteration, retrieval, disclosure, making available, erasure, or destruction of, or the carrying out of logical and/or arithmetical operations on such data\" . The development of technologies has led to an increase in the types of operations involving personal data that can constitute processing; the Court has identified the following typical examples: ▪ The collection by the police from an Internet provider of subscriber information associated with an individual's specific dynamic IP address ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109). ▪ The fact of gathering and storing public information on an individual, for example about his/her political activity ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44; Association \"21 December 1989\" and Others v. Romania, 2011, §§ 167-168; Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, §§ 65-67; Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 93). ▪ The listing of an individual in an internal judicial database of a relevant ministry ( L.F. v. France (dec.), 2024, § 30); in a national judicial database of sex offenders ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 58); or in a national database concerning any criminal proceedings instituted against an individual ( N.F. and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 34 and 49), and the collection and storage of a suspect's fingerprints ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 29). ▪ The covert recording in a police station, for permanent storage, of voice samples to be used in identifying the individuals concerned, by a process of analysis in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, §§ 59-60). ▪ The filming of an individual in a police interview room by cameras installed for security reasons and totally visible, with the permanent recording of the footage and its inclusion in a montage for further use ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 41). ▪ The systematic collection and retention of GPS monitoring data indicating the whereabouts and public movements of the subject ( Uzun v. Germany, 2010, §§ 49-53). ▪ The publication in a magazine of an article illustrated by photos of celebrities taken without their knowledge ( Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], 2012, §§ 95-99). ▪ The recording and disclosure to media of CCTV footage showing an individual trying to commit suicide in a public place ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 59-63). ▪ The recording and storage by police of data on an individual's supposed occupation ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ The disclosure by a psychiatric hospital to journalists of highly sensitive confidential information about the private life of a patient ( M ockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, § 99). ▪ The collection by the State, as part of anti-doping measures in sport, of information on the whereabouts and daily pursuits, even at weekends, of high-level athletes ( National Federation of Sportspersons'Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 155-159). ▪ The systematic scanning and uploading of prisoners'private correspondence, both incoming and outgoing, onto the National Judicial Network Server ( Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-82). ▪ The use of facial recognition technology to, in the first place, identify the applicant, who had held a solo demonstration without a prior notification, from the photographs and the video published on the Telegram channel and, secondly, locate and arrest him while he was travelling on the underground ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 73).\n\nThe interests of data subjects and the community as a whole in protecting personal data, including fingerprint and DNA information, may be outweighed by the legitimate interest in the prevention of crime ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 104). In order to protect their population as required, the national authorities can legitimately set up databases as an effective means of helping to punish and prevent certain offences, including the most serious types of crime, such as sex offences ( B.B. v. France, 2009, § 62; Gardel v. France, 2009, § 63; M.B. v. France, 2009, § 54; N.F. and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 44). While the original taking of this information pursues the aim of linking a particular person to the particular crime of which he or she is suspected, its retention pursues the broader purpose of assisting in the identification of future offenders ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 100). The Court cannot call into question the preventive purpose of such registers ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 63; B.B. v. France, 2009, § 62; M.B. v. France, 2009, § 54). The fight against crime, and in particular against organised crime and terrorism, which is one of the challenges faced by today's European societies, depends to a great extent on the use of modern scientific techniques of investigation and identification ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 105). At the same time, since the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, domestic law must afford appropriate safeguards to prevent any such use of personal data as may be inconsistent with the guarantees of this Article ( ibid., § 103; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 75).\n\nThe Court has considered a series of cases relating to the recording in databases designed for the punishment and prevention of crime the personal data of individuals convicted of minor offences ( M.K. v. France, 2013, §§ 6, 8, 41; Aycaguer v. France, 2017, §§ 8, 43), serious offences ( B.B. 49/107 v. France, 2009, §§ 6, 62; Gardel v. France, 2009, §§ 8, 9, 63; M.B. v. France, 2009, §§ 6, 54; Peruzzo and Martens v. Germany (dec.), 2013, §§ 6, 12, 37-38; Trajkovski and Chipovski v. North Macedonia, 2020, §§ 6, 12), or for a series of offences that were neither minor nor particularly serious ( P.N. v. Germany, 2020, §§ 6, 81). Other cases concerned the storage, in databases designed for the punishment and prevention of crime, of the personal data of individuals who had been suspected of committing offences but who had ultimately been discharged ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2007, §§ 10, 11, 113; M.K. v. France, 2013, §§ 7, 9, 42; Brunet v. France, 2014, §§ 6, 7, 40), acquitted ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 10, 113), or simply cautioned after the proceedings, without conviction ( M.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2012, §§ 7-9). In one case, the applicants'personal data were collected and stored in a database of the Ministry of the Interior on the sole ground that at various times they had been subjected to criminal prosecution. The recording system in place covered not only criminal convictions - and that is irrespective of the nature and gravity of the relevant offences, and even where those convictions had been lifted or had become spent - but also situations where an individual had been subjected to criminal prosecution and the criminal proceedings were subsequently discontinued on \"non -rehabilitative ground s\" ( N.F. and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 49). Lastly, other cases have concerned preventive measures involving storing personal data in police files, on the basis of mere suspicions ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, § 16; Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, §§ 8, 9, 59; Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, §§ 6, 14, 119).\n\nThe case of N.F. and Others v. Russia, 2023 (§§ 49-55), concerned a data storage system where information concerning criminal proceedings was automatically collected and stored once an individual was subjected to criminal prosecution. That system covered information on all criminal convictions, irrespective of the nature and gravity of the offence committed and irrespective of the fact whether those convictions had already been spent, as well as information on criminal proceedings that had been discontinued on \"non - rehabilitative grounds\". The Court found the scope and application of that system to be excessive. Moreover, it emphasised that the continued processing of data had been particularly intrusive for those individuals who had not been convicted of any criminal offences. As regards convicted individuals, the level of interference with their private life would also be intrusive after their convictions had become spent or were lifted by a court. In the absence of sufficient guarantees against abuse and the possibility of a review, such processing was found to be disproportionate.\n\nIn several cases the Court has called into question the broad scope of the data storage system installed by the authorities, which failed to draw a distinction according to the nature or degree of seriousness of the offence leading to conviction ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 41; Aycaguer v. France, 2017, § 43; Gaughran v. the United Kingdom, 2020, § 94; N.F. and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 49), or depending on whether the data subject had been convicted, acquitted, discharged or merely cautioned, having been suspected of committing an offence ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 119; M.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2012, § 198; M.K. v. France, 2013, § 42 ; Brunet v. France, 2014, § 41; N.F. and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 49). The Court considers that the facilities put in place by the authorities to assist in punishing and preventing certain offences cannot be implemented as part of an abusive drive to maximise the information stored in them. Indeed, without respect for the requisite proportionality vis-à-vis the legitimate aims assigned to such mechanisms, their advantages would be outweighed by the serious breaches which they would cause to the rights and freedoms which States must guarantee under the Convention to persons under their jurisdiction ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 35 ; Aycaguer v. France, 2017, § 34).", - "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331212544/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", - "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240613075829/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", - "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/d5256ad78e38/20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", - "to_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/d5256ad78e38/20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf" - }, - { - "guide_id": "d5256ad78e38", - "guide_title": "Data protection", - "from_snapshot": "20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", - "to_snapshot": "20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", - "from_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", - "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-13", - "from_version": "31 August 2023", - "to_version": "29 February 2024", - "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json", - "case_key": "apps:36908/13", - "case_name": "N. Š. v. Croatia", - "application_numbers": "36908/13", - "judgment_year": "2020", - "citation_change": "added", - "citation_text": "N. Š. v. Croatia, no. 36908/13, 10 September 2020", - "hudoc_itemid": "001-204320", - "hudoc_importance_level": "4", - "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", - "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF N.Š. v. CROATIA", - "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", - "linked_paragraph_count": 1, - "linked_sections": "III.A.2: Data protection and freedom of expression (Article 10 of the Convention)", - "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.A.2|a:336|b:339", - "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "With regard to the disclosure of personal data in the printed or audiovisual media, the Court has found a violation of Article 10 in a number of cases including:  N. Š. v. Croatia, 2020 (§§ 92-117), where the applicant was convicted for disclosing on television supposedly confidential information she had obtained during administrative proceedings concerning custody of a child. The Court held that, owing to children's vulnerability, the protection of their personal data was essential (ibid., § 99). However, the unduly formalistic approach taken by the national courts, which did not take account of the background to the disclosure and in particular the fact that the information was already in the public domain, was incompatible with Article 10 (ibid., §§ 115-116);  Gîrleanu v. Romania, 2018 (§§ 68-100), concerning an order for the applicant to pay an administrative fine for disclosing confidential military information as part of a journalistic investigation;  Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associé s v. France [GC], 2015 (§§ 94-153), on the subject of a court ruling against the publication director and the publisher of a weekly magazine for publishing an article and photographs revealing the existence of a monarch's secret child;  Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 2012 (§§ 75-111), concerning a ban on reporting on the arrest and conviction of a well-known actor;  Dupuis and Others v. France, 2007 (§§ 30-32, 39-49), concerning the conviction of journalists for using and reproducing in their book information from the case file of an ongoing judicial investigation, including personal data of the accused.", - "post_text": "With regard to the disclosure of personal data in the printed or audiovisual media, the Court has found a violation of Article 10 in a number of cases including: ▪ N. Š. v. Croatia, 2020 (§§ 92-117), where the applicant was convicted for disclosing on television supposedly confidential information she had obtained during administrative proceedings concerning custody of a child. The Court held that, owing to children's vulnerability, the protection of their personal data was essential ( ibid ., § 99). However, the unduly formalistic approach taken by the national courts, which did not take account of the background to the disclosure and in particular the fact that the information was already in the public domain, was incompatible with Article 10 ( ibid ., §§ 115-116); ▪ Gîrleanu v. Romania, 2018 (§§ 68-100), concerning an order for the applicant to pay an administrative fine for disclosing confidential military information as part of a journalistic investigation; ▪ Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France [GC], 2015 (§§ 94-153), on the subject of a court ruling against the publication director and the publisher of a weekly magazine for publishing an article and photographs revealing the existence of a monarch's secret child; ▪ Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 2012 (§§ 75-111), concerning a ban on reporting on the arrest and conviction of a well-known actor; ▪ Dupuis and Others v. France, 2007 (§§ 30-32, 39-49), concerning the conviction of journalists for using and reproducing in their book information from the case file of an ongoing judicial investigation, including personal data of the accused.", + "pre_text": "Under Article 2 of Convention 108, \"data processing\" includes: \"any operation or set of operations performed on personal data, such as the collection, storage, preservation, alteration, retrieval, disclosure, making available, erasure, or destruction of, or the carrying out of logical and/or arithmetical operations on such data\". The development of technologies has led to an increase in the types of operations involving personal data that can constitute processing; the Court has identified the following typical examples:  The collection by the police from an Internet provider of subscriber information associated Benedik v. Slovenia with an individual's specific dynamic IPaddress (, 2018, §§ 108-109).  The fact of gathering and storing public information on an individual, for example about his/her political activity ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44; Association \"21 December 1989\" and Others v. Romania, 2011, §§ 167-168; Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, §§ 65-67; Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 93).  The listing of an individual in a national judicial database of sex offenders ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 58), and the collection and storage of a suspect's fingerprints ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 29).  The covert recording in a police station, for permanent storage, of voice samples to be used in identifying the individuals concerned, by a process of analysis in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, §§ 59-60).  The filming of an individual in a police interview room by cameras installed for security reasons and totally visible, with the permanent recording of the footage and its inclusion in a montage for further use ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 41).  The systematic collection and retention of GPSmonitoring data indicating the whereabouts and public movements of the subject ( Uzun v. Germany, 2010, §§ 49-53).  The publication in a magazine of an article illustrated by photos of celebrities taken without Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) their knowledge ( [GC], 2012, §§ 95-99).  The recording and disclosure to media of CCTVfootage showing an individual trying to Peck v. the United Kingdom commit suicide in a public place (, 2003, §§ 59-63).  The recording and storage by police of data on an individual's supposed occupation ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56).  The disclosure by a psychiatric hospital to journalists of highly sensitive confidential information about the private life of a patient ( Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, § 99).  The collection by the State, as part of anti-doping measures in sport, of information on the whereabouts and daily pursuits, even at weekends, of high-level athletes ( National Federation of Sportspersons' Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 155-159).  The systematic scanning and uploading of prisoners' private correspondence, both incoming and outgoing, onto the National Judicial Network Server ( Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-82).  The use of facial recognition technology to, in the first place, identify the applicant, who had held a solo demonstration without a prior notification, from the photographs and the video published on the Telegram channel and, secondly, locate and arrest him while he was travelling on the underground ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 73).\n\nThe interests of data subjects and the community as a whole in protecting personal data, including fingerprint and DNAinformation, may be outweighed by the legitimate interest in the prevention of crime ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 104). In order to protect their population as required, the national authorities can legitimately set up databases as an effective means of helping to punish and prevent certain offences, including the most serious types of crime, B.B. v. France Gardel v. France M.B. v. France, such as sex offences (, 2009, § 62;, 2009, § 63; 2009, § 54). While the original taking of this information pursues the aim of linking a particular person to the particular crime of which he or she is suspected, its retention pursues the broader purpose of assisting in the identification of future offenders ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 100). The Court cannot call into question the preventive purpose of such registers ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 63; B.B. v. France, 2009, § 62; M.B. v. France, 2009, § 54). The fight against crime, and in particular against organised crime and terrorism, which is one of the challenges faced by today's European societies, depends to a great extent on the use of modern scientific techniques of investigation and identification ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 105). At the same time, since the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, domestic law must afford appropriate safeguards to prevent any such use of personal data as may be inconsistent with the guarantees of this Article ( ibid., § 103; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 75).\n\nThe Court has considered a series of cases relating to the recording in databases designed for the punishment and prevention of crime the personal data of individuals convicted of minor offences ( M.K. v. France, 2013, §§ 6, 8, 41; Aycaguer v. France, 2017, §§ 8, 43), serious offences ( B.B. v. France, 2009, §§ 6, 62; Gardel v. France, 2009, §§ 8, 9, 63; M.B. v. France, 2009, §§ 6, 54; Peruzzo and Martens v. Germany (dec.), 2013, §§ 6, 12, 37-38; Trajkovski and Chipovski v. North Macedonia, 2020, §§ 6, 12), or for a series of offences that were neither minor nor particularly serious ( P.N. v. Germany, 2020, §§ 6, 81). Other cases concerned the storage, in databases designed for the punishment and prevention of crime, of the personal data of individuals who had been suspected of committing S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom offences but who had ultimately been discharged ( [GC], 2007, §§ 10, 11, 113; M.K. v. France, 2013, §§ 7, 9, 42; Brunet v. France, 2014, §§ 6, 7, 40), acquitted ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 10, 113), or simply cautioned after the proceedings, without conviction ( M.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2012, §§ 7-9). Lastly, other cases have concerned preventive measures involving storing personal data in police files, on the basis of mere suspicions ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, § 16; Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, §§ 8, 9, 59; Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, §§ 6, 14, 119).\n\nIn several cases the Court has called into question the broad scope of the data storage system installed by the authorities, which failed to draw a distinction according to the nature or degree of seriousness of the offence leading to conviction ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 41; Aycaguer v. France, 2017, § 43; Gaughran v. the United Kingdom, 2020, § 94), or depending on whether the data subject had been convicted, acquitted, discharged or merely cautioned, having been suspected of committing an offence ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 119; M.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2012, § 198; M.K. v. France, 2013, § 42 ; Brunet v. France, 2014, § 41). The Court considers that the facilities put in place by the authorities to assist in punishing and preventing certain offences cannot be implemented as part of an abusive drive to maximise the information stored in them. Indeed, without respect for the requisite proportionality vis-à-vis the legitimate aims assigned to such mechanisms, their advantages would be outweighed by the serious breaches which they would cause to the rights and freedoms which States must guarantee under the Convention to persons under their jurisdiction ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 35 ; Aycaguer v. France, 2017, § 34).", + "post_text": "Under Article 2 of Convention 108, \"data processing\" includes : \"any operation or set of operations performed on personal data, such as the collection, storage, preservation, alteration, retrieval, disclosure, making available, erasure, or destruction of, or the carrying out of logical and/or arithmetical operations on such data\" . The development of technologies has led to an increase in the types of operations involving personal data that can constitute processing; the Court has identified the following typical examples: ▪ The collection by the police from an Internet provider of subscriber information associated with an individual's specific dynamic IPaddress ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109). ▪ The fact of gathering and storing public information on an individual, for example about his/her political activity ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44; Association \"21 December 1989\" and Others v. Romania, 2011, §§ 167-168; Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, §§ 65-67; Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 93). ▪ The listing of an individual in an internal judicial database of a relevant ministry ( L.F. v. France (dec.), 2024, § 30); in a national judicial database of sex offenders ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 58); or in a national database concerning any criminal proceedings instituted against an individual ( N.F. and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 34 and 49), and the collection and storage of a suspect's fingerprints ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 29). ▪ The covert recording in a police station, for permanent storage, of voice samples to be used in identifying the individuals concerned, by a process of analysis in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, §§ 59-60). ▪ The filming of an individual in a police interview room by cameras installed for security reasons and totally visible, with the permanent recording of the footage and its inclusion in a montage for further use ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 41). ▪ The systematic collection and retention of GPSmonitoring data indicating the whereabouts and public movements of the subject ( Uzun v. Germany, 2010, §§ 49-53). ▪ The publication in a magazine of an article illustrated by photos of celebrities taken without their knowledge ( Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], 2012, §§ 95-99). ▪ The recording and disclosure to media of CCTVfootage showing an individual trying to commit suicide in a public place ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 59-63). ▪ The recording and storage by police of data on an individual's supposed occupation ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ The disclosure by a psychiatric hospital to journalists of highly sensitive confidential information about the private life of a patient ( Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, § 99). ▪ The collection by the State, as part of anti-doping measures in sport, of information on the whereabouts and daily pursuits, even at weekends, of high-level athletes ( National Federation of Sportspersons'Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 155-159). ▪ The systematic scanning and uploading of prisoners'private correspondence, both incoming and outgoing, onto the National Judicial Network Server ( Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-82). ▪ The use of facial recognition technology to, in the first place, identify the applicant, who had held a solo demonstration without a prior notification, from the photographs and the video published on the Telegram channel and, secondly, locate and arrest him while he was travelling on the underground ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 73).\n\nThe interests of data subjects and the community as a whole in protecting personal data, including fingerprint and DNAinformation, may be outweighed by the legitimate interest in the prevention of crime ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 104). In order to protect their population as required, the national authorities can legitimately set up databases as an effective means of helping to punish and prevent certain offences, including the most serious types of crime, such as sex offences ( B.B. v. France, 2009, § 62; Gardel v. France, 2009, § 63; M.B. v. France, 2009, § 54; N.F. and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 44). While the original taking of this information pursues the aim of linking a particular person to the particular crime of which he or she is suspected, its retention pursues the broader purpose of assisting in the identification of future offenders ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 100). The Court cannot call into question the preventive purpose of such registers ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 63; B.B. v. France, 2009, § 62; M.B. v. France, 2009, § 54). The fight against crime, and in particular against organised crime and terrorism, which is one of the challenges faced by today's European societies, depends to a great extent on the use of modern scientific techniques of investigation and identification ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 105). At the same time, since the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, domestic law must afford appropriate safeguards to prevent any such use of personal data as may be inconsistent with the guarantees of this Article ( ibid., § 103; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 75).\n\nThe Court has considered a series of cases relating to the recording in databases designed for the punishment and prevention of crime the personal data of individuals convicted of minor offences ( M.K. v. France, 2013, §§ 6, 8, 41; Aycaguer v. France, 2017, §§ 8, 43), serious offences ( B.B. 49/107 v. France, 2009, §§ 6, 62; Gardel v. France, 2009, §§ 8, 9, 63; M.B. v. France, 2009, §§ 6, 54; Peruzzo and Martens v. Germany (dec.), 2013, §§ 6, 12, 37-38; Trajkovski and Chipovski v. North Macedonia, 2020, §§ 6, 12), or for a series of offences that were neither minor nor particularly serious ( P.N. v. Germany, 2020, §§ 6, 81). Other cases concerned the storage, in databases designed for the punishment and prevention of crime, of the personal data of individuals who had been suspected of committing offences but who had ultimately been discharged ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2007, §§ 10, 11, 113; M.K. v. France, 2013, §§ 7, 9, 42; Brunet v. France, 2014, §§ 6, 7, 40), acquitted ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 10, 113), or simply cautioned after the proceedings, without conviction ( M.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2012, §§ 7-9). In one case, the applicants'personal data were collected and stored in a database of the Ministry of the Interior on the sole ground that at various times they had been subjected to criminal prosecution. The recording system in place covered not only criminal convictions - and that is irrespective of the nature and gravity of the relevant offences, and even where those convictions had been lifted or had become spent - but also situations where an individual had been subjected to criminal prosecution and the criminal proceedings were subsequently discontinued on \"non -rehabilitative ground s\" ( N.F. and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 49). Lastly, other cases have concerned preventive measures involving storing personal data in police files, on the basis of mere suspicions ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, § 16; Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, §§ 8, 9, 59; Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, §§ 6, 14, 119).\n\nThe case of N.F. and Others v. Russia, 2023 (§§ 49-55), concerned a data storage system where information concerning criminal proceedings was automatically collected and stored once an individual was subjected to criminal prosecution. That system covered information on all criminal convictions, irrespective of the nature and gravity of the offence committed and irrespective of the fact whether those convictions had already been spent, as well as information on criminal proceedings that had been discontinued on \"non - rehabilitative grounds\". The Court found the scope and application of that system to be excessive. Moreover, it emphasised that the continued processing of data had been particularly intrusive for those individuals who had not been convicted of any criminal offences. As regards convicted individuals, the level of interference with their private life would also be intrusive after their convictions had become spent or were lifted by a court. In the absence of sufficient guarantees against abuse and the possibility of a review, such processing was found to be disproportionate.\n\nIn several cases the Court has called into question the broad scope of the data storage system installed by the authorities, which failed to draw a distinction according to the nature or degree of seriousness of the offence leading to conviction ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 41; Aycaguer v. France, 2017, § 43; Gaughran v. the United Kingdom, 2020, § 94; N.F. and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 49), or depending on whether the data subject had been convicted, acquitted, discharged or merely cautioned, having been suspected of committing an offence ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 119; M.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2012, § 198; M.K. v. France, 2013, § 42 ; Brunet v. France, 2014, § 41; N.F. and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 49). The Court considers that the facilities put in place by the authorities to assist in punishing and preventing certain offences cannot be implemented as part of an abusive drive to maximise the information stored in them. Indeed, without respect for the requisite proportionality vis-à-vis the legitimate aims assigned to such mechanisms, their advantages would be outweighed by the serious breaches which they would cause to the rights and freedoms which States must guarantee under the Convention to persons under their jurisdiction ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 35 ; Aycaguer v. France, 2017, § 34).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331212544/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240613075829/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/d5256ad78e38/20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", @@ -27332,6 +28883,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-13", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json", "case_key": "apps:33696/19", "case_name": "Podchasov v. Russia", @@ -27349,8 +28902,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_updated|citation_added|reformulation", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.B|a:71|b:71|IV.A|a:395|b:398|IV.A|a:397|b:400", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Where a measure interfering with the protection of personal data is taken by an individual or entity purely in the private sector, the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's positive obligations ( Craxi v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, §§ 68-76; Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010; Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, § 32; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 89; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 111; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain Buturugă v. Romania Volodina [GC], 2019, § 111;, 2020, §§ 60-63; v. Russia (no. 2 ), 2021, §§ 58-68; Florindo de Almeida Vasconcelos Gramaxo v. Portugal, 2022, § 111). However, where a measure has been taken by a public entity ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 39; Libert v. France, 2018, § 41; Drelon v. France, 2022, § 85) or a private body to which the State has delegated its obligations ( Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, § 47), the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's negative obligation. The Court will have to verify that the interference met the requirements of Article 8 § 2, namely that it was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. This question will be examined in more detail in the part of this guide below on the Three data protection \"tests\".\n\nIn cases concerning the taking and storage by the authorities, for crime-prevention purposes, of fingerprints, biological samples and DNA profiles of persons suspected or convicted of offences, the Court has stated clearly that the use of modern scientific techniques cannot be authorised at any cost and without carefully balancing the potential benefits of the extensive use of such techniques against important private-life interests ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 112). Any State claiming a pioneer role in the development of new technologies bears special responsibility for striking the right balance in this regard (ibid., § 112). Bearing in mind the rapid pace of developments in the field of genetics and information technology, the possibility that in the future the private-life interests bound up with genetic information may be adversely affected in novel ways or in a manner which cannot be anticipated with precision today cannot be discounted (ibid., § 71).\n\nIn Breyer v. Germany, 2020 (§ 88), the Court recognised, in the context of the fight against organised crime and terrorism, that modern means of telecommunications and changes in communication behaviour required that investigative tools be adapted. In the Court's view, the obligation for mobile-telephone operators to store subscriber information and make it available to the authorities on request is, in general, a suitable response to changes in communication behaviour and in the means of telecommunications. Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary", - "post_text": "Where a measure interfering with the protection of personal data is taken by an individual or entity purely in the private sector, the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's positive obligations ( Craxi v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, §§ 68-76; Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010; Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, § 32; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 89; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 111; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 111; Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, §§ 60-63; Volodina v. Russia (no. 2 ), 2021, §§ 58-68; Florindo de Almeida Vasconcelos Gramaxo v. Portugal, 2022, § 111; Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 35). However, where a measure has been taken by a public entity ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 39; Libert v. France, 2018, § 41; Drelon v. France, 2022, § 85; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 57), a private body to which the State has delegated its obligations ( Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, § 47), or a private body pursuant to statutory requirements ( Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 52), the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's negative obligation. The Court will have to verify that the interference met the requirements of Article 8 § 2, namely that it was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. This question will be examined in more detail in the part of this guide below on the Three data protection \"tests\".\n\nIn cases concerning the taking and storage by the authorities, for crime-prevention purposes, of fingerprints, biological samples and DNA profiles of persons suspected or convicted of offences, the Court has stated clearly that the use of modern scientific techniques cannot be authorised at any cost and without carefully balancing the potential benefits of the extensive use of such techniques against important private-life interests ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 112; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 62). Any State claiming a pioneer role in the development of new technologies bears special responsibility for striking the right balance in this regard ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 112). Bearing in mind the rapid pace of developments in the field of genetics and information technology, the possibility that in the future the private-life interests bound up with genetic information may be adversely affected in novel ways or in a manner which cannot be anticipated with precision today cannot be discounted ( ibid ., § 71).\n\nIn Breyer v. Germany, 2020 (§ 88), the Court recognised, in the context of the fight against organised crime and terrorism, that modern means of telecommunications and changes in communication behaviour required that investigative tools be adapted. In the Court's view, the obligation for mobile-telephone operators to store subscriber information and make it available to the authorities on request is, in general, a suitable response to changes in communication behaviour and in the means of telecommunications. By contrast, in Podchasov v. Russia, 2024 (§§ 70-79), domestic law required Internet communications service providers to retain and store the contents of all Internet communications for six months and the related communications data for one year as well as to give law-enforcement authorities or security services access to the stored data at their request, together with information necessary to decrypt electronic messages if they were encrypted: the Court was struck by the extremely broad duty of retention and considered such an interference to have been exceptionally wide-ranging and serious. It further observed that, under domestic law, the law-enforcement or security services were not required to show the judicial authorisation to the relevant communications service provider before obtaining access to a particular person's communications. In fact, communications service providers were under an obligation to install equipment giving the said authorities direct access to the data stored. Although in such a system the need for safeguards against arbitrariness and abuse was particularly great, domestic law did not provide for such safeguards. As regards a statutory requirement to decrypt communications, it would appear that any such measures would not be limited to specific individuals and would weaken encryption for all users thus affecting everyone indiscriminately, including 94/107 individuals who posed no threat to legitimate interests; such measures therefore could not be regarded as proportionate (§§ 77-79).", + "pre_text": "Where a measure interfering with the protection of personal data is taken by an individual or entity purely in the private sector, the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's positive obligations ( Craxi v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, §§ 68-76; Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010; Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, § 32; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 89; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 111; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain Buturugă v. Romania Volodina [GC], 2019, § 111;, 2020, §§ 60-63; v. Russia (no. 2 ), 2021, §§ 58-68; Florindo de Almeida Vasconcelos Gramaxo v. Portugal, 2022, § 111). However, where a measure has been taken by a public entity ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 39; Libert v. France, 2018, § 41; Drelon v. France, 2022, § 85) or a private body to which the State has delegated its obligations ( Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, § 47), the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's negative obligation. The Court will have to verify that the interference met the requirements of Article 8 § 2, namely that it was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. This question will be examined in more detail in the part of this guide below on the Three data protection \"tests\".\n\nIn cases concerning the taking and storage by the authorities, for crime-prevention purposes, of fingerprints, biological samples and DNAprofiles of persons suspected or convicted of offences, the Court has stated clearly that the use of modern scientific techniques cannot be authorised at any cost and without carefully balancing the potential benefits of the extensive use of such techniques against important private-life interests ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 112). Any State claiming a pioneer role in the development of new technologies bears special responsibility for striking the right balance in this regard (ibid., § 112). Bearing in mind the rapid pace of developments in the field of genetics and information technology, the possibility that in the future the private-life interests bound up with genetic information may be adversely affected in novel ways or in a manner which cannot be anticipated with precision today cannot be discounted (ibid., § 71).\n\nIn Breyer v. Germany, 2020 (§ 88), the Court recognised, in the context of the fight against organised crime and terrorism, that modern means of telecommunications and changes in communication behaviour required that investigative tools be adapted. In the Court's view, the obligation for mobile-telephone operators to store subscriber information and make it available to the authorities on request is, in general, a suitable response to changes in communication behaviour and in the means of telecommunications. Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary", + "post_text": "Where a measure interfering with the protection of personal data is taken by an individual or entity purely in the private sector, the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's positive obligations ( Craxi v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, §§ 68-76; Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010; Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, § 32; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 89; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 111; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 111; Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, §§ 60-63; Volodina v. Russia (no. 2 ), 2021, §§ 58-68; Florindo de Almeida Vasconcelos Gramaxo v. Portugal, 2022, § 111; Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 35). However, where a measure has been taken by a public entity ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 39; Libert v. France, 2018, § 41; Drelon v. France, 2022, § 85; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 57), a private body to which the State has delegated its obligations ( Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, § 47), or a private body pursuant to statutory requirements ( Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 52), the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's negative obligation. The Court will have to verify that the interference met the requirements of Article 8 § 2, namely that it was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. This question will be examined in more detail in the part of this guide below on the Three data protection \"tests\".\n\nIn cases concerning the taking and storage by the authorities, for crime-prevention purposes, of fingerprints, biological samples and DNAprofiles of persons suspected or convicted of offences, the Court has stated clearly that the use of modern scientific techniques cannot be authorised at any cost and without carefully balancing the potential benefits of the extensive use of such techniques against important private-life interests ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 112; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 62). Any State claiming a pioneer role in the development of new technologies bears special responsibility for striking the right balance in this regard ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 112). Bearing in mind the rapid pace of developments in the field of genetics and information technology, the possibility that in the future the private-life interests bound up with genetic information may be adversely affected in novel ways or in a manner which cannot be anticipated with precision today cannot be discounted ( ibid ., § 71).\n\nIn Breyer v. Germany, 2020 (§ 88), the Court recognised, in the context of the fight against organised crime and terrorism, that modern means of telecommunications and changes in communication behaviour required that investigative tools be adapted. In the Court's view, the obligation for mobile-telephone operators to store subscriber information and make it available to the authorities on request is, in general, a suitable response to changes in communication behaviour and in the means of telecommunications. By contrast, in Podchasov v. Russia, 2024 (§§ 70-79), domestic law required Internet communications service providers to retain and store the contents of all Internet communications for six months and the related communications data for one year as well as to give law-enforcement authorities or security services access to the stored data at their request, together with information necessary to decrypt electronic messages if they were encrypted: the Court was struck by the extremely broad duty of retention and considered such an interference to have been exceptionally wide-ranging and serious. It further observed that, under domestic law, the law-enforcement or security services were not required to show the judicial authorisation to the relevant communications service provider before obtaining access to a particular person's communications. In fact, communications service providers were under an obligation to install equipment giving the said authorities direct access to the data stored. Although in such a system the need for safeguards against arbitrariness and abuse was particularly great, domestic law did not provide for such safeguards. As regards a statutory requirement to decrypt communications, it would appear that any such measures would not be limited to specific individuals and would weaken encryption for all users thus affecting everyone indiscriminately, including 94/107 individuals who posed no threat to legitimate interests; such measures therefore could not be regarded as proportionate (§§ 77-79).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331212544/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240613075829/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/d5256ad78e38/20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", @@ -27365,6 +28918,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-13", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json", "case_key": "apps:23443/23", "case_name": "Ramadan v. France (dec.)", @@ -27398,6 +28953,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-13", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json", "case_key": "apps:42541/18", "case_name": "Tena Arregui v. Spain", @@ -27415,41 +28972,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added|citation_updated|paragraph_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A.1|a:13|b:13|I.B|a:71|b:71|I.B|a:76|b:76|I.B|a:82|b:82|II.A.1.b|a:None|b:167", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "A significant element, although not necessarily decisive, is whether an individual is reasonably entitled to expect protection of his/her private life ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 37; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 80; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66). As to on-line activities, the anonymity of personal information will be a key factor in that assessment and the fact that a subscriber to an Internet service provider had not hidden his/her dynamic IP address was not decisive in the assessment of whether his expectation of privacy was reasonable from an objective standpoint Benedik v. Slovenia (, 2018, § 116). In the workplace, an employer's instructions cannot reduce private social life in the workplace to zero. Respect for private life and for the privacy of correspondence continues to exist, even if these may be restricted in so far as necessary ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 80-81; see also, for the professional context, Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 37-38). The monitoring of the actions or movements of an individual in a public place using surveillance mechanisms may fall within Article 8 once any systemic or permanent record of such personal data comes into existence ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66), or where their disclosure, by its manner or extent, Peck v. the United Kingdom goes beyond what the individuals could reasonably have expected (, 2003, § 62; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 41-43). As regards press articles about the arrest of a television actor, illustrated by photos, the Court found that the actor's \"legitimate expectation\" of having his private life effectively protected was reduced by the fact that he had \"actively sought the Axel Springer AG v. Germany limelight\" by revealing details of his private life in a number of interviews ( [GC], 2012, § 101).\n\nWhere a measure interfering with the protection of personal data is taken by an individual or entity purely in the private sector, the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's positive obligations ( Craxi v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, §§ 68-76; Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010; Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, § 32; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 89; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 111; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain Buturugă v. Romania Volodina [GC], 2019, § 111;, 2020, §§ 60-63; v. Russia (no. 2 ), 2021, §§ 58-68; Florindo de Almeida Vasconcelos Gramaxo v. Portugal, 2022, § 111). However, where a measure has been taken by a public entity ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 39; Libert v. France, 2018, § 41; Drelon v. France, 2022, § 85) or a private body to which the State has delegated its obligations ( Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, § 47), the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's negative obligation. The Court will have to verify that the interference met the requirements of Article 8 § 2, namely that it was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. This question will be examined in more detail in the part of this guide below on the Three data protection \"tests\".\n\nWhile the boundaries between the State's positive and negative obligations under the Convention do not lend themselves to precise definition, the applicable principles are nonetheless similar. In both contexts regard must be had in particular to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole, subject in any event to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 112).\n\nAs regards less serious acts between individuals, such as monitoring of employees in the workplace, States may choose whether or not to enact specific legislation concerning video- surveillance ( López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 113; Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010) or the monitoring of employees' non-professional correspondence and communications ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 119). It is nevertheless for the domestic courts to ensure that any implementation by an employer of surveillance measures interfering with the right of employees to respect for their private life or correspondence is proportionate and accompanied by appropriate and Köpke v. Germany B ă rbulescu v. Romania adequate safeguards against abuse ( (dec.), 2010; [GC], 2017, § 120; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 116).", - "post_text": "A significant element, although not necessarily decisive, is whether an individual is reasonably entitled to expect protection of his/her private life ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 37; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 80; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66). As to on-line activities, the anonymity of personal information will be a key factor in that assessment and the fact that a subscriber to an Internet service provider had not hidden his/her dynamic IP address was not decisive in the assessment of whether his expectation of privacy was reasonable from an objective standpoint ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, § 116). In the workplace, an employer's instructions cannot reduce private social life in the workplace to zero. Respect for private life and for the privacy of correspondence continues to exist, even if these may be restricted in so far as necessary ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 80-81; see also, for the professional context, Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 37-38; see also in the context of monitoring by a political party of the electronic correspondence of its members, Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 38). The monitoring of the actions or movements of an individual in a public place using surveillance mechanisms may fall within Article 8 once any systemic or permanent record of such personal data comes into existence ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66), or where their disclosure, by its manner or extent, goes beyond what the individuals could reasonably have expected ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 62; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 41-43). As regards press articles about the arrest of a television actor, illustrated by photos, the Court found that the actor 's \"legitimate expectation\" of having his private life effect ively protected was reduced by the fact that he had \"actively sought the limelight\" by revealing details of his private life in a number of interviews ( Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 2012, § 101).\n\nWhere a measure interfering with the protection of personal data is taken by an individual or entity purely in the private sector, the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's positive obligations ( Craxi v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, §§ 68-76; Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010; Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, § 32; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 89; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 111; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 111; Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, §§ 60-63; Volodina v. Russia (no. 2 ), 2021, §§ 58-68; Florindo de Almeida Vasconcelos Gramaxo v. Portugal, 2022, § 111; Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 35). However, where a measure has been taken by a public entity ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 39; Libert v. France, 2018, § 41; Drelon v. France, 2022, § 85; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 57), a private body to which the State has delegated its obligations ( Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, § 47), or a private body pursuant to statutory requirements ( Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 52), the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's negative obligation. The Court will have to verify that the interference met the requirements of Article 8 § 2, namely that it was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. This question will be examined in more detail in the part of this guide below on the Three data protection \"tests\".\n\nWhile the boundaries between the State's positive and negative obligations under the Convention do not lend themselves to precise definition, the applicable principles are nonetheless similar. In both contexts regard must be had in particular to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole, subject in any event to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 112; Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 32).\n\nAs regards less serious acts between individuals, such as monitoring of employees in the workplace, States may choose whether or not to enact specific legislation concerning video- surveillance ( López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 113; Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010) or the monitoring of employees'non-professional correspondence and communications ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 119). It is nevertheless for the domestic courts to ensure that any implementation by an employer of surveillance measures interfering with the right of employees to respect for their private life or correspondence is proportionate and accompanied by appropriate and adequate safeguards against abuse ( Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 120; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 116; see also in the context of monitoring by a political party of the electronic correspondence of its members, Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 38).\n\nSimilar principles are also applicable in other contexts, in particular, as regards monitoring by a political party of the electronic communications of its members, even though internal organisational structures of political parties are distinguishable from those or private companies and that the legal links existing between an employer and employee and between a political party and its members are fundamentally different ( Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, §§ 38 and 41).", - "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331212544/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", - "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240613075829/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", - "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/d5256ad78e38/20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", - "to_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/d5256ad78e38/20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf" - }, - { - "guide_id": "d5256ad78e38", - "guide_title": "Data protection", - "from_snapshot": "20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", - "to_snapshot": "20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", - "from_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", - "to_snapshot_date": "2024-06-13", - "from_version": "31 August 2023", - "to_version": "29 February 2024", - "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json", - "case_key": "name:n s v croatia::2020", - "case_name": "N. Š. v. Croatia", - "application_numbers": "", - "judgment_year": "2020", - "citation_change": "removed", - "citation_text": "N. Š. v. Croatia, 10 September 2020", - "hudoc_itemid": "001-204320", - "hudoc_importance_level": "4", - "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", - "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF N.Š. v. CROATIA", - "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", - "linked_paragraph_count": 1, - "linked_sections": "III.A.2: Data protection and freedom of expression (Article 10 of the Convention)", - "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.A.2|a:336|b:339", - "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "With regard to the disclosure of personal data in the printed or audiovisual media, the Court has found a violation of Article 10 in a number of cases including:  N. Š. v. Croatia, 2020 (§§ 92-117), where the applicant was convicted for disclosing on television supposedly confidential information she had obtained during administrative proceedings concerning custody of a child. The Court held that, owing to children's vulnerability, the protection of their personal data was essential (ibid., § 99). However, the unduly formalistic approach taken by the national courts, which did not take account of the background to the disclosure and in particular the fact that the information was already in the public domain, was incompatible with Article 10 (ibid., §§ 115-116);  Gîrleanu v. Romania, 2018 (§§ 68-100), concerning an order for the applicant to pay an administrative fine for disclosing confidential military information as part of a journalistic investigation;  Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associé s v. France [GC], 2015 (§§ 94-153), on the subject of a court ruling against the publication director and the publisher of a weekly magazine for publishing an article and photographs revealing the existence of a monarch's secret child;  Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 2012 (§§ 75-111), concerning a ban on reporting on the arrest and conviction of a well-known actor;  Dupuis and Others v. France, 2007 (§§ 30-32, 39-49), concerning the conviction of journalists for using and reproducing in their book information from the case file of an ongoing judicial investigation, including personal data of the accused.", - "post_text": "With regard to the disclosure of personal data in the printed or audiovisual media, the Court has found a violation of Article 10 in a number of cases including: ▪ N. Š. v. Croatia, 2020 (§§ 92-117), where the applicant was convicted for disclosing on television supposedly confidential information she had obtained during administrative proceedings concerning custody of a child. The Court held that, owing to children's vulnerability, the protection of their personal data was essential ( ibid ., § 99). However, the unduly formalistic approach taken by the national courts, which did not take account of the background to the disclosure and in particular the fact that the information was already in the public domain, was incompatible with Article 10 ( ibid ., §§ 115-116); ▪ Gîrleanu v. Romania, 2018 (§§ 68-100), concerning an order for the applicant to pay an administrative fine for disclosing confidential military information as part of a journalistic investigation; ▪ Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France [GC], 2015 (§§ 94-153), on the subject of a court ruling against the publication director and the publisher of a weekly magazine for publishing an article and photographs revealing the existence of a monarch's secret child; ▪ Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 2012 (§§ 75-111), concerning a ban on reporting on the arrest and conviction of a well-known actor; ▪ Dupuis and Others v. France, 2007 (§§ 30-32, 39-49), concerning the conviction of journalists for using and reproducing in their book information from the case file of an ongoing judicial investigation, including personal data of the accused.", + "pre_text": "Asignificant element, although not necessarily decisive, is whether an individual is reasonably entitled to expect protection of his/her private life ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 37; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 80; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66). As to on-line activities, the anonymity of personal information will be a key factor in that assessment and the fact that a subscriber to an Internet service provider had not hidden his/her dynamic IPaddress was not decisive in the assessment of whether his expectation of privacy was reasonable from an objective standpoint Benedik v. Slovenia (, 2018, § 116). In the workplace, an employer's instructions cannot reduce private social life in the workplace to zero. Respect for private life and for the privacy of correspondence continues to exist, even if these may be restricted in so far as necessary ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 80-81; see also, for the professional context, Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 37-38). The monitoring of the actions or movements of an individual in a public place using surveillance mechanisms may fall within Article 8 once any systemic or permanent record of such personal data comes into existence ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66), or where their disclosure, by its manner or extent, Peck v. the United Kingdom goes beyond what the individuals could reasonably have expected (, 2003, § 62; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 41-43). As regards press articles about the arrest of a television actor, illustrated by photos, the Court found that the actor's \"legitimate expectation\" of having his private life effectively protected was reduced by the fact that he had \"actively sought the Axel Springer AG v. Germany limelight\" by revealing details of his private life in a number of interviews ( [GC], 2012, § 101).\n\nWhere a measure interfering with the protection of personal data is taken by an individual or entity purely in the private sector, the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's positive obligations ( Craxi v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, §§ 68-76; Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010; Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, § 32; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 89; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 111; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain Buturugă v. Romania Volodina [GC], 2019, § 111;, 2020, §§ 60-63; v. Russia (no. 2 ), 2021, §§ 58-68; Florindo de Almeida Vasconcelos Gramaxo v. Portugal, 2022, § 111). However, where a measure has been taken by a public entity ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 39; Libert v. France, 2018, § 41; Drelon v. France, 2022, § 85) or a private body to which the State has delegated its obligations ( Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, § 47), the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's negative obligation. The Court will have to verify that the interference met the requirements of Article 8 § 2, namely that it was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. This question will be examined in more detail in the part of this guide below on the Three data protection \"tests\".\n\nWhile the boundaries between the State's positive and negative obligations under the Convention do not lend themselves to precise definition, the applicable principles are nonetheless similar. In both contexts regard must be had in particular to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole, subject in any event to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 112).\n\nAs regards less serious acts between individuals, such as monitoring of employees in the workplace, States may choose whether or not to enact specific legislation concerning video- surveillance ( López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 113; Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010) or the monitoring of employees' non-professional correspondence and communications ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 119). It is nevertheless for the domestic courts to ensure that any implementation by an employer of surveillance measures interfering with the right of employees to respect for their private life or correspondence is proportionate and accompanied by appropriate and Köpke v. Germany B ă rbulescu v. Romania adequate safeguards against abuse ( (dec.), 2010; [GC], 2017, § 120; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 116).", + "post_text": "Asignificant element, although not necessarily decisive, is whether an individual is reasonably entitled to expect protection of his/her private life ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 37; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 80; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66). As to on-line activities, the anonymity of personal information will be a key factor in that assessment and the fact that a subscriber to an Internet service provider had not hidden his/her dynamic IPaddress was not decisive in the assessment of whether his expectation of privacy was reasonable from an objective standpoint ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, § 116). In the workplace, an employer's instructions cannot reduce private social life in the workplace to zero. Respect for private life and for the privacy of correspondence continues to exist, even if these may be restricted in so far as necessary ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 80-81; see also, for the professional context, Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 37-38; see also in the context of monitoring by a political party of the electronic correspondence of its members, Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 38). The monitoring of the actions or movements of an individual in a public place using surveillance mechanisms may fall within Article 8 once any systemic or permanent record of such personal data comes into existence ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66), or where their disclosure, by its manner or extent, goes beyond what the individuals could reasonably have expected ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 62; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 41-43). As regards press articles about the arrest of a television actor, illustrated by photos, the Court found that the actor 's \"legitimate expectation\" of having his private life effect ively protected was reduced by the fact that he had \"actively sought the limelight\" by revealing details of his private life in a number of interviews ( Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 2012, § 101).\n\nWhere a measure interfering with the protection of personal data is taken by an individual or entity purely in the private sector, the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's positive obligations ( Craxi v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, §§ 68-76; Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010; Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, § 32; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 89; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 111; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 111; Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, §§ 60-63; Volodina v. Russia (no. 2 ), 2021, §§ 58-68; Florindo de Almeida Vasconcelos Gramaxo v. Portugal, 2022, § 111; Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 35). However, where a measure has been taken by a public entity ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 39; Libert v. France, 2018, § 41; Drelon v. France, 2022, § 85; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 57), a private body to which the State has delegated its obligations ( Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, § 47), or a private body pursuant to statutory requirements ( Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 52), the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's negative obligation. The Court will have to verify that the interference met the requirements of Article 8 § 2, namely that it was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. This question will be examined in more detail in the part of this guide below on the Three data protection \"tests\".\n\nWhile the boundaries between the State's positive and negative obligations under the Convention do not lend themselves to precise definition, the applicable principles are nonetheless similar. In both contexts regard must be had in particular to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole, subject in any event to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 112; Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 32).\n\nAs regards less serious acts between individuals, such as monitoring of employees in the workplace, States may choose whether or not to enact specific legislation concerning video- surveillance ( López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 113; Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010) or the monitoring of employees'non-professional correspondence and communications ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 119). It is nevertheless for the domestic courts to ensure that any implementation by an employer of surveillance measures interfering with the right of employees to respect for their private life or correspondence is proportionate and accompanied by appropriate and adequate safeguards against abuse ( Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 120; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 116; see also in the context of monitoring by a political party of the electronic correspondence of its members, Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 38).\n\nSimilar principles are also applicable in other contexts, in particular, as regards monitoring by a political party of the electronic communications of its members, even though internal organisational structures of political parties are distinguishable from those or private companies and that the legal links existing between an employer and employee and between a political party and its members are fundamentally different ( Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, §§ 38 and 41).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331212544/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240613075829/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/d5256ad78e38/20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", @@ -27464,6 +28988,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-07-05", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json", "case_key": "apps:58737/14", "case_name": "A.P. v. Armenia", @@ -27497,6 +29023,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-07-05", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json", "case_key": "apps:25578/11", "case_name": "Casarini v. Italy (dec.)", @@ -27514,8 +29042,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_updated|paragraph_added|minor_edit", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A.1|a:8|b:8|II.B.4|a:None|b:330|II.B.4|a:318|b:325", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Personal data can take very different forms. For example: ▪ Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IP addresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109). ▪ Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59). ▪ Cellular samples and DNA profiles ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints ( ibid ., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances ( ibid ., § 85). ▪ Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving sensitive details or professional activity ( M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.). ▪ Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the police ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 18, 74-81). ▪ A copy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdö k and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36). ▪ Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Antovi ć and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). ▪ Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138). ▪ Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 54-64; Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, §§ 106 and 112; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 50). ▪ Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68). ▪ Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings against the applicant ( Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 39-41). 8/107\n\nRestrictions imposed by law on the domestic courts'powers to compensate for damage caused by the press disclosure of confidential information on the health of identified persons and to deter the recurrence of such abuses were liable to hamper the effectiveness of any appeal, thus failing to provide the applicants with such protection of their private life as they might legitimately have expected. Thus, in Armonienė v. Lithuania, 2008 (§§ 47-48) and Biriuk v. Lithuania, 2008 (§§ 46-47), the Court found a violation of Article 8 because the Law on Provision of Information to the Public in force at the material time had set an upper limit on damages awarded to the applicants by the domestic courts following the disclosure of their HIV-positive status in the leading national daily newspaper, without their consent and revealing their identities.", - "post_text": "Personal data can take very different forms. For example: ▪ Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IP addresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109), including an IP address masked by a VPN if the applicant can be identified and located ( Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, § 54). ▪ Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59). ▪ Cellular samples and DNA profiles ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints ( ibid ., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances ( ibid ., § 85). ▪ Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving sensitive details or professional activity ( M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.), or from the Taxpayer Information Service database, including, in particular, details on income and net assets and any pending cases with the tax authorities ( Casarini v. Italy (dec.), 2024, §§ 56-57). ▪ Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the police ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 18, §§ 74-81). ▪ A copy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdök and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36). ▪ Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Antovi ć and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). ▪ Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138). ▪ Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 54-64; Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, §§ 106 and 112; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 50). ▪ Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68). 8/110 ▪ Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings against the applicant ( Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 39-41).\n\nIn Casarini v. Italy (dec.), 2024, §§ 92-105, where the applicant's personal data stored in the Taxpayer Information Service database had been, on multiple occasions, unlawfully accessed by an officer of the Revenue Police who had passed it to a journalist for publication, the Court found that a complaint to the Data Protection Authority would have been an effective remedy and thus needed to have been exhausted. Whilst not a judicial body, the Data Protection Authority was an independent 76/110 and fully autonomous administrative body, free from external pressure: proceedings before it were adversarial in nature and led to the adoption of binding decisions. Moreover, those decisions could be appealed against before the competent judicial authorities and the latter's decisions could be the subject of an appeal on points of law before the Court of Cassation.\n\nRestrictions imposed by law on the domestic courts'powers to compensate for damage caused by the press disclosure of confidential information on the health of identified persons and to deter the recurrence of such abuses were liable to hamper the effectiveness of any appeal, thus failing to provide the applicants with such protection of their private life as they might legitimately have expected. Thus, in Armonienė v. Lithuania, 2008 (§§ 47-48) and Biriuk v. Lithuania, 2008 (§§ 46-47), the Court found a violation of Article 8 because the Law on Provision of Information to the Public in force at the material time had set an upper limit on damages awarded to the applicants by the domestic courts following the disclosure of their HIV-positive status in the leading national daily newspaper, without their consent and revealing their identities. Moreover, a purely compensatory remedy was found to be ineffective where the applicant complained about a continuing situation of inadequate protection of his personal data stored in a State's database (the Taxpayer Information Service) and the authorities'long-standing failure to prevent abuse in the context of access to that database ( Casarini v. Italy (dec.), 2024, § 89).", + "pre_text": "Personal data can take very different forms. For example: ▪ Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109). ▪ Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59). ▪ Cellular samples and DNAprofiles ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints ( ibid ., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances ( ibid ., § 85). ▪ Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving sensitive details or professional activity ( M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.). ▪ Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the police ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 18, 74-81). ▪ Acopy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdö k and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36). ▪ Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Antovi ć and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). ▪ Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138). ▪ Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 54-64; Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, §§ 106 and 112; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 50). ▪ Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68). ▪ Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings against the applicant ( Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 39-41). 8/107\n\nRestrictions imposed by law on the domestic courts'powers to compensate for damage caused by the press disclosure of confidential information on the health of identified persons and to deter the recurrence of such abuses were liable to hamper the effectiveness of any appeal, thus failing to provide the applicants with such protection of their private life as they might legitimately have expected. Thus, in Armonienė v. Lithuania, 2008 (§§ 47-48) and Biriuk v. Lithuania, 2008 (§§ 46-47), the Court found a violation of Article 8 because the Law on Provision of Information to the Public in force at the material time had set an upper limit on damages awarded to the applicants by the domestic courts following the disclosure of their HIV-positive status in the leading national daily newspaper, without their consent and revealing their identities.", + "post_text": "Personal data can take very different forms. For example: ▪ Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109), including an IPaddress masked by a VPN if the applicant can be identified and located ( Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, § 54). ▪ Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59). ▪ Cellular samples and DNAprofiles ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints ( ibid ., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances ( ibid ., § 85). ▪ Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving sensitive details or professional activity ( M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.), or from the Taxpayer Information Service database, including, in particular, details on income and net assets and any pending cases with the tax authorities ( Casarini v. Italy (dec.), 2024, §§ 56-57). ▪ Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the police ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 18, §§ 74-81). ▪ Acopy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdök and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36). ▪ Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Antovi ć and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). ▪ Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138). ▪ Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 54-64; Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, §§ 106 and 112; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 50). ▪ Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68). 8/110 ▪ Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings against the applicant ( Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 39-41).\n\nIn Casarini v. Italy (dec.), 2024, §§ 92-105, where the applicant's personal data stored in the Taxpayer Information Service database had been, on multiple occasions, unlawfully accessed by an officer of the Revenue Police who had passed it to a journalist for publication, the Court found that a complaint to the Data Protection Authority would have been an effective remedy and thus needed to have been exhausted. Whilst not a judicial body, the Data Protection Authority was an independent 76/110 and fully autonomous administrative body, free from external pressure: proceedings before it were adversarial in nature and led to the adoption of binding decisions. Moreover, those decisions could be appealed against before the competent judicial authorities and the latter's decisions could be the subject of an appeal on points of law before the Court of Cassation.\n\nRestrictions imposed by law on the domestic courts'powers to compensate for damage caused by the press disclosure of confidential information on the health of identified persons and to deter the recurrence of such abuses were liable to hamper the effectiveness of any appeal, thus failing to provide the applicants with such protection of their private life as they might legitimately have expected. Thus, in Armonienė v. Lithuania, 2008 (§§ 47-48) and Biriuk v. Lithuania, 2008 (§§ 46-47), the Court found a violation of Article 8 because the Law on Provision of Information to the Public in force at the material time had set an upper limit on damages awarded to the applicants by the domestic courts following the disclosure of their HIV-positive status in the leading national daily newspaper, without their consent and revealing their identities. Moreover, a purely compensatory remedy was found to be ineffective where the applicant complained about a continuing situation of inadequate protection of his personal data stored in a State's database (the Taxpayer Information Service) and the authorities'long-standing failure to prevent abuse in the context of access to that database ( Casarini v. Italy (dec.), 2024, § 89).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240613075829/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250705120234/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/d5256ad78e38/20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", @@ -27530,6 +29058,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-07-05", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json", "case_key": "apps:22790/12", "case_name": "Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine", @@ -27563,6 +29093,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-07-05", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json", "case_key": "apps:29550/17", "case_name": "Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy", @@ -27596,6 +29128,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-07-05", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json", "case_key": "apps:52319/22", "case_name": "Le Marrec v. France (dec.)", @@ -27613,8 +29147,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_updated|paragraph_added|minor_edit", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I.A.1|a:6|b:6|I.A.1|a:8|b:8|I.C.1|a:None|b:93|I.C.2|a:None|b:107|I.C.3.a|a:112|b:115", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Such data cover not only information directly identifying an ind ividual (the \"data subject\" ), such as surname and forename ( Guillot v. France, 1996, §§ 21-22; Mentzen v. Latvia (dec.), 2004; Güzel Erdagöz v. Turkey, 2008, § 43; Garnaga v. Ukraine, 2013, § 36; Henry Kismoun v. France, 2013, § 25; Hájovský v. Slovakia, 2021, §§ 11-12 and 41), but also any element indirectly identifying a person such as a dynamic IP (Internet Protocol) address ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 107-108). 7/107\n\nPersonal data can take very different forms. For example: ▪ Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IP addresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109). ▪ Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59). ▪ Cellular samples and DNA profiles ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints ( ibid ., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances ( ibid ., § 85). ▪ Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving sensitive details or professional activity ( M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.). ▪ Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the police ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 18, 74-81). ▪ A copy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdö k and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36). ▪ Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Antovi ć and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). ▪ Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138). ▪ Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 54-64; Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, §§ 106 and 112; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 50). ▪ Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68). ▪ Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings against the applicant ( Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 39-41). 8/107\n\nOn the other hand, the processing of personal data, which was not \"sensitive\" within the meaning of Article 6 of Convention 108 and which was limited to factual and objective information related to legal proceedings to which an individual was a party, in an internal database of the Ministry of Justice did not fall foul of the requirements of Article 8 ( L.F. v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 34 and 40).", - "post_text": "Such data cover not only information directly identifying an individual (the \"data subject\" ), such as surname and forename ( Guillot v. France, 1996, §§ 21-22; Mentzen v. Latvia (dec.), 2004; Güzel Erdagöz v. Turkey, 2008, �� 43; Garnaga v. Ukraine, 2013, § 36; Henry Kismoun v. France, 2013, § 25; Hájovský v. Slovakia, 2021, §§ 11-12 and 41), but also any element indirectly identifying a person such 7/110 as a dynamic IP (Internet Protocol) address ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 107-108; see also, as regards an IP address masked by a VPN, Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 51 and 54).\n\nPersonal data can take very different forms. For example: ▪ Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IP addresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109), including an IP address masked by a VPN if the applicant can be identified and located ( Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, § 54). ▪ Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59). ▪ Cellular samples and DNA profiles ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints ( ibid ., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances ( ibid ., § 85). ▪ Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving sensitive details or professional activity ( M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.), or from the Taxpayer Information Service database, including, in particular, details on income and net assets and any pending cases with the tax authorities ( Casarini v. Italy (dec.), 2024, §§ 56-57). ▪ Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the police ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 18, §§ 74-81). ▪ A copy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdök and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36). ▪ Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Antovi ć and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). ▪ Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138). ▪ Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 54-64; Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, §§ 106 and 112; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 50). ▪ Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68). 8/110 ▪ Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings against the applicant ( Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 39-41).\n\nIn Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 72-75, the Court found that a regulation containing specific provisions concerning, in particular, the processing of IP addresses, which regulation had been published on the website of the relevant social welfare authority, was sufficiently accessible to the public, and thus met the \"lawfulness\" requirements of Article 8 of the Convention.\n\nThe publication of the applicant's identifying data, including his full name and home address, on a tax authority website for failing to fulfil his tax obligations was found to be in pursuit of the \"interests of ... the economic well- being of the country\" as well as \"the protection of the rights and freedoms of others\" ( L.B. v. Hungary [GC], 2023, §§ 111-13). In the same vein, the processing of the applicant's IP address and other \"connection data\", which had enabled the relevant social welfare authority to locate him with a view to preventing welfare fraud, was in the interests of the economic well-being of the country and the prevention of crime ( Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, § 76).\n\nOn the other hand, the processing of personal data, which was not \"sensitive\" within the meaning of Article 6 of Convention 108 and which was limited to factual and objective information related to legal proceedings to which an individual was a party, in an internal database of the Ministry of Justice did not fall foul of the requirements of Article 8 ( L.F. v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 34 and 40). Likewise, in Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 78-79, the Court pointed out that the applicant's IP address and other \"connection data\" processed by the relevant social welfare authority, resulting in him being located as living in \"another country\", was not \"sensitive\" data within the above -mentioned meaning nor did it concern the most intimate aspects or a particularly important facet of his existence or identity:the said data contained very approximate information on the applicant and the margin of appreciation left to the domestic authorities was therefore wide.", + "pre_text": "Such data cover not only information directly identifying an ind ividual (the \"data subject\" ), such as surname and forename ( Guillot v. France, 1996, §§ 21-22; Mentzen v. Latvia (dec.), 2004; Güzel Erdagöz v. Turkey, 2008, § 43; Garnaga v. Ukraine, 2013, § 36; Henry Kismoun v. France, 2013, § 25; Hájovský v. Slovakia, 2021, §§ 11-12 and 41), but also any element indirectly identifying a person such as a dynamic IP (Internet Protocol) address ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 107-108). 7/107\n\nPersonal data can take very different forms. For example: ▪ Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109). ▪ Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59). ▪ Cellular samples and DNAprofiles ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints ( ibid ., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances ( ibid ., § 85). ▪ Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving sensitive details or professional activity ( M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.). ▪ Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the police ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 18, 74-81). ▪ Acopy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdö k and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36). ▪ Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Antovi ć and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). ▪ Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138). ▪ Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 54-64; Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, §§ 106 and 112; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 50). ▪ Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68). ▪ Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings against the applicant ( Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 39-41). 8/107\n\nOn the other hand, the processing of personal data, which was not \"sensitive\" within the meaning of Article 6 of Convention 108 and which was limited to factual and objective information related to legal proceedings to which an individual was a party, in an internal database of the Ministry of Justice did not fall foul of the requirements of Article 8 ( L.F. v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 34 and 40).", + "post_text": "Such data cover not only information directly identifying an individual (the \"data subject\" ), such as surname and forename ( Guillot v. France, 1996, §§ 21-22; Mentzen v. Latvia (dec.), 2004; Güzel Erdagöz v. Turkey, 2008, § 43; Garnaga v. Ukraine, 2013, § 36; Henry Kismoun v. France, 2013, § 25; Hájovský v. Slovakia, 2021, §§ 11-12 and 41), but also any element indirectly identifying a person such 7/110 as a dynamic IP (Internet Protocol) address ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 107-108; see also, as regards an IPaddress masked by a VPN, Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 51 and 54).\n\nPersonal data can take very different forms. For example: ▪ Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109), including an IPaddress masked by a VPN if the applicant can be identified and located ( Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, § 54). ▪ Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59). ▪ Cellular samples and DNAprofiles ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints ( ibid ., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances ( ibid ., § 85). ▪ Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving sensitive details or professional activity ( M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.), or from the Taxpayer Information Service database, including, in particular, details on income and net assets and any pending cases with the tax authorities ( Casarini v. Italy (dec.), 2024, §§ 56-57). ▪ Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the police ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 18, §§ 74-81). ▪ Acopy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdök and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36). ▪ Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Antovi ć and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). ▪ Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138). ▪ Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 54-64; Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, §§ 106 and 112; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 50). ▪ Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68). 8/110 ▪ Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings against the applicant ( Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 39-41).\n\nIn Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 72-75, the Court found that a regulation containing specific provisions concerning, in particular, the processing of IPaddresses, which regulation had been published on the website of the relevant social welfare authority, was sufficiently accessible to the public, and thus met the \"lawfulness\" requirements of Article 8 of the Convention.\n\nThe publication of the applicant's identifying data, including his full name and home address, on a tax authority website for failing to fulfil his tax obligations was found to be in pursuit of the \"interests of ... the economic well- being of the country\" as well as \"the protection of the rights and freedoms of others\" ( L.B. v. Hungary [GC], 2023, §§ 111-13). In the same vein, the processing of the applicant's IPaddress and other \"connection data\", which had enabled the relevant social welfare authority to locate him with a view to preventing welfare fraud, was in the interests of the economic well-being of the country and the prevention of crime ( Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, § 76).\n\nOn the other hand, the processing of personal data, which was not \"sensitive\" within the meaning of Article 6 of Convention 108 and which was limited to factual and objective information related to legal proceedings to which an individual was a party, in an internal database of the Ministry of Justice did not fall foul of the requirements of Article 8 ( L.F. v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 34 and 40). Likewise, in Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 78-79, the Court pointed out that the applicant's IPaddress and other \"connection data\" processed by the relevant social welfare authority, resulting in him being located as living in \"another country\", was not \"sensitive\" data within the above -mentioned meaning nor did it concern the most intimate aspects or a particularly important facet of his existence or identity:the said data contained very approximate information on the applicant and the margin of appreciation left to the domestic authorities was therefore wide.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240613075829/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250705120234/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/d5256ad78e38/20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", @@ -27629,6 +29163,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-07-05", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json", "case_key": "apps:62020/14", "case_name": "Moldovan v. Ukraine", @@ -27647,7 +29183,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.B.4|a:None|b:332", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "Strict time-limits or procedural limitations also require scrutiny. In the case of Moldovan v. Ukraine, 2024, (§§ 52-53), the applicant had complained that the domestic courts dealing with his claim seeking recognition of his biological father had applied old legal provisions making proof of cohabitation indispensable for the recognition of paternity despite available DNA testing. In the Court's view, the effects of such an approach by the domestic courts were comparable to those of inflexible time-limits or other procedural limitations. The Court concluded that this approach, combined with the domestic court's failure to deal with the DNA evidence submitted to them with sufficient thoroughness, amounted to a breach of their positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention.", + "post_text": "Strict time-limits or procedural limitations also require scrutiny. In the case of Moldovan v. Ukraine, 2024, (§§ 52-53), the applicant had complained that the domestic courts dealing with his claim seeking recognition of his biological father had applied old legal provisions making proof of cohabitation indispensable for the recognition of paternity despite available DNAtesting. In the Court's view, the effects of such an approach by the domestic courts were comparable to those of inflexible time-limits or other procedural limitations. The Court concluded that this approach, combined with the domestic court's failure to deal with the DNAevidence submitted to them with sufficient thoroughness, amounted to a breach of their positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240613075829/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250705120234/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/d5256ad78e38/20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", @@ -27662,6 +29198,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-07-05", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json", "case_key": "apps:72038/17|25237/18", "case_name": "Pietrzak and Bychawska-Siniarska and Others v. Poland", @@ -27695,6 +29233,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-07-05", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json", "case_key": "apps:31175/14", "case_name": "Reznik v. Ukraine", @@ -27728,6 +29268,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-07-05", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json", "case_key": "apps:40519/15", "case_name": "Tonchev v. Bulgaria", @@ -27745,8 +29287,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.2.§4|a:213|b:218", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "The length of the period for which the authorities decide to store an individual's personal data is an important, albeit not a decisive, aspect to be taken into account in assessing whether or not the 51/107 storage of personal data in a file or a database for police purposes is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The Court found violations of Article 8 in cases concerning: ▪ indefinite storage of fingerprints of and DNA data on persons who were suspected of an offence but whose proceedings had ended with a discontinuance decision or an acquittal ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008); ▪ indefinite storage of the DNA profiles, fingerprints and photographs of an individual found guilty of an offence, even after his conviction had been deleted from his police record on expiry of the legal time-limit ( Gaughran v. the United Kingdom, 2020); ▪ lifelong retention on a police record of all the convictions, acquittals, cautions, warnings and reprimands pertaining to one individual ( M.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ indefinite storage of the DNA profiles of persons convicted of aggravated theft ( Trajkovski and Chipovski v. Macédoine du Nord, 2020); ▪ retention for a maximum forty years of the personal data of an individual convicted of a fairly minor offence ( Ayçaguer v. France, 2017); ▪ retention for a maximum twenty years of the fingerprints of an individual suspected, but not convicted, of stealing books ( M. K. v. France, 2013); ▪ retention for a maximum twenty years of the personal data of an individual following a complaint of violence against his partner, which case was discontinued following mediation ( Brunet v. France, 2014);", - "post_text": "The length of the period for which the authorities decide to store an individual's personal data is an important, albeit not a decisive, aspect to be taken into account in assessing whether or not the storage of personal data in a file or a database for police purposes is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The Court found violations of Article 8 in cases concerning: ▪ indefinite storage of fingerprints of and DNA data on persons who were suspected of an offence but whose proceedings had ended with a discontinuance decision or an acquittal ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008); ▪ indefinite storage of the DNA profiles, fingerprints and photographs of an individual found guilty of an offence, even after his conviction had been deleted from his police record on expiry of the legal time-limit ( Gaughran v. the United Kingdom, 2020); ▪ lifelong retention on a police record of all the convictions, acquittals, cautions, warnings and reprimands pertaining to one individual ( M.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ indefinite storage of the DNA profiles of persons convicted of aggravated theft ( Trajkovski and Chipovski v. Macédoine du Nord, 2020); ▪ retention for a maximum forty years of the personal data of an individual convicted of a fairly minor offence ( Ayçaguer v. France, 2017); ▪ retention for a maximum twenty years of the fingerprints of an individual suspected, but not convicted, of stealing books ( M. K. v. France, 2013); ▪ retention for a maximum twenty years of the personal data of an individual following a complaint of violence against his partner, which case was discontinued following mediation ( Brunet v. France, 2014); ▪ the indefinite retention of data about the applicant's substitute administrative penalty ( Tonchev v. Bulgaria, 2024);", + "pre_text": "The length of the period for which the authorities decide to store an individual's personal data is an important, albeit not a decisive, aspect to be taken into account in assessing whether or not the 51/107 storage of personal data in a file or a database for police purposes is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The Court found violations of Article 8 in cases concerning: ▪ indefinite storage of fingerprints of and DNAdata on persons who were suspected of an offence but whose proceedings had ended with a discontinuance decision or an acquittal ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008); ▪ indefinite storage of the DNAprofiles, fingerprints and photographs of an individual found guilty of an offence, even after his conviction had been deleted from his police record on expiry of the legal time-limit ( Gaughran v. the United Kingdom, 2020); ▪ lifelong retention on a police record of all the convictions, acquittals, cautions, warnings and reprimands pertaining to one individual ( M.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ indefinite storage of the DNAprofiles of persons convicted of aggravated theft ( Trajkovski and Chipovski v. Macédoine du Nord, 2020); ▪ retention for a maximum forty years of the personal data of an individual convicted of a fairly minor offence ( Ayçaguer v. France, 2017); ▪ retention for a maximum twenty years of the fingerprints of an individual suspected, but not convicted, of stealing books ( M. K. v. France, 2013); ▪ retention for a maximum twenty years of the personal data of an individual following a complaint of violence against his partner, which case was discontinued following mediation ( Brunet v. France, 2014);", + "post_text": "The length of the period for which the authorities decide to store an individual's personal data is an important, albeit not a decisive, aspect to be taken into account in assessing whether or not the storage of personal data in a file or a database for police purposes is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The Court found violations of Article 8 in cases concerning: ▪ indefinite storage of fingerprints of and DNAdata on persons who were suspected of an offence but whose proceedings had ended with a discontinuance decision or an acquittal ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008); ▪ indefinite storage of the DNAprofiles, fingerprints and photographs of an individual found guilty of an offence, even after his conviction had been deleted from his police record on expiry of the legal time-limit ( Gaughran v. the United Kingdom, 2020); ▪ lifelong retention on a police record of all the convictions, acquittals, cautions, warnings and reprimands pertaining to one individual ( M.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ indefinite storage of the DNAprofiles of persons convicted of aggravated theft ( Trajkovski and Chipovski v. Macédoine du Nord, 2020); ▪ retention for a maximum forty years of the personal data of an individual convicted of a fairly minor offence ( Ayçaguer v. France, 2017); ▪ retention for a maximum twenty years of the fingerprints of an individual suspected, but not convicted, of stealing books ( M. K. v. France, 2013); ▪ retention for a maximum twenty years of the personal data of an individual following a complaint of violence against his partner, which case was discontinued following mediation ( Brunet v. France, 2014); ▪ the indefinite retention of data about the applicant's substitute administrative penalty ( Tonchev v. Bulgaria, 2024);", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240613075829/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250705120234/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_data_protection_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/d5256ad78e38/20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf", @@ -27761,6 +29303,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-01-01", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2025-07-05__2026-01-01.json", "case_key": "apps:6033/19", "case_name": "A.R. v. the United Kingdom", @@ -27794,6 +29338,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-01-01", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2025-07-05__2026-01-01.json", "case_key": "apps:39056/22", "case_name": "Selishcheva and Others v. Russia", @@ -27827,6 +29373,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2026-01-01", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2025-07-05__2026-01-01.json", "case_key": "apps:16497/20", "case_name": "Sytnyk v. Ukraine", @@ -27858,8 +29406,10 @@ "to_snapshot": "20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf", "from_snapshot_date": "2023-09-23", "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", - "from_version": "unknown (20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf)", + "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:31185/18", "case_name": "Fanouni v. France", @@ -27877,8 +29427,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_updated|citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "I|a:14|b:14|III.A.1|a:105|b:105|V.B.1|a:181|b:186|V.B.1|a:182|b:187|V.B.1.c|a:193|b:198|V.B.1.c|a:194|b:199|V.B.1.c|a:195|b:200|V.B.2.a|a:219|b:224|V.B.2.c|a:239|b:244", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "The Court will opt for the \"necessity in a democratic society\" te st under paragraph 3 of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 in two types of situations: ▪ any measure restricting the right to leave any country ( Gochev v. Bulgaria, 2009, § 44; Shioshvili and Others v. Russia, 2016, § 58), be it a measure depriving the applicant entirely of that right or limiting his or her choice of destination countries to a certain geographic area ( L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, § 81; Soltysyak v. Russia, 2011, § 37; Peltonen v. Finland, Commission decision, 1995; K.S. v. Finland, Commission decision, 1995); ▪ a restriction on the exercise of the rights to freedom of movement or freedom to choose residence, which is not limited in geographical scope and applies to the entire territory of a given State ( Garib v. the Netherlands [GC], 2017, § 110; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 171).\n\nThe following situations have been considered to amount to a form of interference with the right to freedom of movement: ▪ a requirement not to leave one's place of residence or another specified area/municipality without permission. This requirement can be imposed:  as part of the bail conditions or as a separate measure in the context of criminal proceedings ( Fedorov and Fedorova v. Russia, 2005, § 35; Antonenkov and Others v. Ukraine, 2005, § 52; Nagy v. Hungary (dec.), 2004; Ivanov v. Ukraine, 2006, § 85; Komarova v. Russia, 2006, § 55; Hajibeyli v. Azerbaijan, 2008, § 58; Rosengren v. Romania, 2008, § 32; Nikiforenko v. Ukraine, 2010, § 55; Pokhalchuk v. Ukraine, 2010, § 94; Doroshenko v. Ukraine, 2011, § 52; Manannikov v. Russia, 2018, § 60);  during bankruptcy proceedings ( Luordo v. Italy, 2003, § 92; Goffi v. Italy, 2005, § 20; Bassani v. Italy, 2003, § 24; Gasser v. Italy, 2006, §§ 30-31; Di Carlo et Bonaffini v. Italy (dec.), 2006; Bova v. Italy (dec.), 2004; Shaw v. Italy, 2009, § 16; Bottaro v. Italy, 2003, § 54; Campagnano v. Italy, 2006, § 38);  in the context of a compulsory military service ( Golub v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [Committee], 2021, §§ 54 and 58);  as a compulsory residence order in the context of: ▪ criminal prevention measures ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 154; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Marturana v. Italy, 2008, § 190; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991; Guzzardi v. Italy, Commission decision, 1977); ▪ extradition ( Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010); ▪ expulsion ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; M v. France, Commission decision, 1984; Kenane v. France, Commission decision, 1992; Kalibi v. France, Commission decision, 1984); ▪ a prohibition on leaving home at night except in case of necessity ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 86-88; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 154; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, §§ 13 and 39; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991); ▪ a prohibition on migrants leaving a \"hotspot\" facility at night ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, § 86); ▪ an obligation to report regularly to the court ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) or the police ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 17, 84 and 89; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 154; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, §§ 13 and 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Poninski v. Poland (dec.), 2000; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991); ▪ special police supervision, including the above measures and other associated restrictions (not leaving home without informing a supervising authority, not going to bars, nightclubs, amusement arcades or brothels or attending public meetings, not associating with individuals who have a criminal record and who are subject to preventive measures) ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991); ▪ a prohibition on leaving home from 7 p.m. until 7 a.m. during week-days and the whole day during week-ends, coupled with permission to attend one's work place during week-days ( Trijonis v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005); ▪ a general lockdown in order to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, including a prohibition on leaving home on pain of a fine, except in an exhaustive number of circumstances and on production of a document attesting to valid reasons for doing so ( Terheş v. Romania (dec.), 2021, § 45); ▪ a requirement to report any change of place of residence ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) or to have it registered by the police within a specific time-limit, on pain of a fine ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66; Corley and Others v. Russia, 2021, § 72; Ananiyevy v. Russia [Committee], 2021; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125); ▪ a fine imposed on a foreigner for having stayed overnight outside his registered place of residence ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66); ▪ a prohibition on approaching a specified place (for example, a centre for asylum seekers ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193); a building site ( Cokarić and Others v. Croatia (dec.), 2006); or an abortion clinic ( Van den Dungen v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1995); ▪ a barring and protection order issued in the context of domestic violence, prohibiting a perpetrator from returning to the family home and the surrounding areas for a specified period ( Kurt v. Austria [GC], 2021, §§ 14, 25 and 183); ▪ an inability to enter a specified area of a city, or a prohibition thereof ( Bigliazzi and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2008; Olivieira v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 39; Landvreugd v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 46); ▪ \"kettling\" or containment of a crowd by a police cordon on public-order grounds ( Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012, § 67); ▪ The applicant's retention, upon release, in the courtroom on safety grounds, due to the aggressive behaviour of the public ( Vadym Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2022, § 87); ▪ extensive police monitoring of movements between a territorial entity not recognised by the international community and a government-controlled area and within the latter, coupled with the requirement to report to the police before each intended border crossing ( Denizci and Others v. Cyprus, 2001, §§ 403-406); ▪ the inability of internally displaced persons to return to their homes situated on the territory of an entity not recognised by the international community ( Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, §§ 292-301); ▪ restrictions on freedom of movement resulting from the purported \"annexation\" of territory from one State to another and the ensuing de facto transformation (by the respondent State) of the administrative border line into a State border (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], 2020, §§ 500-503); ▪ Alleged abduction and forcible transfer from a territorial entity not recognised by the international community to the State which exercises effective control over that entity (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.) [GC], 2022, §§ 895-898); ▪ police refusal to let the applicant cross the administrative border between two regions ( Timishev v. Russia, 2005, § 44; Gartukayev v. Russia, 2005, § 21); ▪ a transit ban, under legislation implementing UN Security Council Resolutions, imposed on a resident of an enclaved area by the State surrounding it; and the resulting inability to travel within the country of which the applicant was a national ( Nada v. Switzerland [GC], 2012, §§ 198 and 226-228); ▪ an obligation to provide fingerprints when applying for a passport and the subsequent storage of the fingerprints on a microchip in the passport ( Willems v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2021, §§ 23 and 38).\n\nThe effects and specific conditions of a given measure should be suited to its purpose ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 199).\n\nThe effectiveness of a preventive measure frequently depends on the speed of its implementation ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 199; Gochev v. Bulgaria, 2009, § 53).\n\nIn order to assess whether a given restriction is sufficiently connected to the aim of crime prevention, the Court has regard to the following elements: ▪ the applicant's conduct and, in particular, the risk of offending or re-engaging in criminal conduct ( Villa v. Italy, 2010, § 46; Vlasov and Benyash v. Russia, 2016, § 35); ▪ the nature and severity of the assessed risk  to the life and health of a specific victim, for example, in the context of protective and preventive measures taken against a perpetrator of domestic violence ( Kurt v. Austria [GC], 2021, § 183);  of the applicant's engagement in terrorism ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 201); ▪ medical data ( Villa v. Italy, 2010, § 46); ▪ the nature and gravity of the offences committed by the applicant ( Villa v. Italy, 2010, § 46; Sarkizov and Others v. Bulgaria, 2012, § 66), as well as recidivism ( Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 134).\n\nWhere restrictions are imposed in the context of a terrorist threat, the following factors are of relevance: ▪ the seriousness and duration of such threat ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 200); ▪ the timing of restrictions, for example shortly after terrorist attacks ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 199); ▪ the existence of a set of factors and a body of evidence probative of a course of \"conduct\" amounting to a threat, for example :  such factors may include religious radicalisation, violent tendencies, criminal record;  the relevant evidence may include public statements, association with jihadists, jihadist propaganda videos found on the applicant's devices ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, §§ 198-201); ▪ general threat to the society stemming from unauthorized entry and stay in a zone of armed conflict involving a terrorist organization ( Mørck Jensen v. Denmark, 2022, § 67).\n\nA restriction on freedom of movement cannot be based solely on an individual's beliefs or religious practice ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 199).\n\nSuch assessment must include all the relevant aspects of the particular situation ( A.-M.V. v. Finland, 2017, § 89) and factors specific to the applicant ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 195), for example, his or her family, professional, financial and personal situation, his or her conduct (including, where applicable, the gravity of a breach committed and the risk of its repetition), as well as the existence of a criminal record ( Stamose v. Bulgaria, 2012, § 35).\n\nThe judicial review proceedings should provide the appropriate procedural safeguards ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 196). The Court may examine in particular: ▪ whether the rights of the defence were fully respected ( Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991), notably, whether the applicant had access to a lawyer and a real opportunity to obtain information on the accusations against him, which prompted the imposition of the impugned restriction on his or her freedom of movement ( Marturana v. Italy, 2008, §§ 188-189; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 207); ▪ whether the applicant was effectively able to put forward his or her arguments and whether his or her submissions were thoroughly analysed ( Popoviciu v. Romania, 2016, §§ 92-93; Bulea v. Romania, 2013, § 63; A.-M.V. v. Finland, 2017, § 90; L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, §§ 93-96; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 204); ▪ whether the domestic courts provided adequate and sufficient reasons, devoid of formalism or arbitrariness ( Ioviţă v. Romania (dec.), 2017, § 76; Căşuneanu v. Romania (dec.), 2011, §§ 53-54; Moldovan Duda v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 38; L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, §§ 95-96); ▪ whether the proceedings were adversarial ( Marturana v. Italy, 2008, § 189; Moldovan Duda v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 37); ▪ whether the applicant was involved at all stages of the proceedings and heard in person ( A.- M.V. v. Finland, 2017, § 90); ▪ whether sufficient procedural safeguards attached to the presentation in evidence of confidential documents (for example, intelligence reports) ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 207).", - "post_text": "The Court will opt for the \"necessity in a democratic society\" test under paragraph 3 of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 in two types of situations:  any Gochev v. Bulgaria, measure restricting the right to leave any country ( 2009, § 44; Shioshvili and Others v. Russia, 2016, § 58), be it a measure depriving the applicant entirely of that right or limiting his or her choice of destination countries to a certain geographic area ( L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, § 81; Soltysyak v. Russia, 2011, § 37; Peltonen v. Finland, Commission decision, 1995; K.S. v. Finland, Commission decision, 1995);  a restriction on the exercise of the rights to freedom of movement or freedom to choose residence, which is not limited in geographical scope and applies to the entire territory of a given State ( Garib v. the Netherlands [GC], 2017, § 110; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 171; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 44).\n\nThe following situations have been considered to amount to a form of interference with the right to freedom of movement:  a requirement not to leave one's place of residence or another specified area/municipality without permission. This requirement can be imposed:  as part of the bail conditions or as a separate measure in the context of criminal proceedings ( Fedorov and Fedorova v. Russia, 2005, § 35; Antonenkov and Others v. Ukraine, 2005, § 52; Nagy v. Hungary (dec.), 2004; Ivanov v. Ukraine, 2006, § 85; Komarova v. Russia, 2006, § 55; Hajibeyli v. Azerbaijan, 2008, § 58; Rosengren v. Romania, 2008, § 32; Nikiforenko v. Ukraine, 2010, § 55; Pokhalchuk v. Ukraine, 2010, Doroshenko v. Ukraine Manannikov v. Russia § 94;, 2011, § 52;, 2018, § 60);  during bankruptcy proceedings ( Luordo v. Italy, 2003, § 92; Goffi v. Italy, 2005, § 20; Bassani v. Italy Gasser v. Italy Di Carlo et Bonaffini v. Italy, 2003, § 24;, 2006, §§ 30-31; (dec.), 2006; Bova v. Italy (dec.), 2004; Shaw v. Italy, 2009, § 16; Bottaro v. Italy, 2003, § 54; Campagnano v. Italy, 2006, § 38);  in the context of a compulsory military service ( Golub v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [Committee], 2021, §§ 54 and 58);  as a compulsory residence order in the context of:  criminal prevention measures ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 154; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 54 ; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Marturana v. Italy, 2008, § 190; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991; Guzzardi v. Italy, Commission decision, 1977);  extradition ( Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010);  expulsion ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; M v. France, Commission decision, 1984; Kenane v. France, Commission decision, 1992; Kalibi v. France, Commission decision, 1984);  a prohibition on leaving home at night except in case of necessity ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], Pagerie v. France Fanouni v. France Timofeyev and 2017, §§ 86-88;, 2023, § 154;, 2023, § 54; Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, §§ 13 and 39; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  a prohibition on migrants leaving a \"hotspot\" facility at night ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, § 86);  an obligation to report regularly to the court ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) De Tommaso v. Italy Pagerie v. France or the police ( [GC], 2017, §§ 17, 84 and 89;, 2023, § 154; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 54; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Raimondo v. Italy, Labita v. Italy Poninski v. Poland 1994, §§ 13 and 39; [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; (dec.), 2000; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  special police supervision, including the above measures and other associated restrictions (not leaving home without informing a supervising authority, not going to bars, nightclubs, amusement arcades or brothels or attending public meetings, not associating with De individuals who have a criminal record and who are subject to preventive measures) ( Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  a prohibition on leaving home from 7 p.m. until 7 a.m. during week-days and the whole day during week-ends, coupled with permission to attend one's work place during week-days ( Trijonis v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005);  a general lockdown in order to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, including a prohibition on leaving home on pain of a fine, except in an exhaustive number of circumstances and on production of a document attesting to valid reasons for doing so ( Terheş v. Romania (dec.), 2021, § 45);  a requirement to report any change of place of residence ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) or to have it registered by the police within a specific time-limit, on pain of a fine ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66; Corley and Others v. Russia, 2021, § 72; Ananiyevy v. Russia [Committee], 2021; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125);  a fine imposed on a foreigner for having stayed overnight outside his registered place of residence ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66);  a prohibition on approaching a specified place (for example, a centre for asylum seekers ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193); a building site ( Cokarić and Others v. Croatia (dec.), 2006); or an abortion clinic ( Van den Dungen v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1995);  a barring and protection order issued in the context of domestic violence, prohibiting a perpetrator from returning to the family home and the surrounding areas for a specified period ( Kurt v. Austria [GC], 2021, §§ 14, 25 and 183);  an inability to enter a specified area of a city, or a prohibition thereof ( Bigliazzi and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2008; Olivieira v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 39; Landvreugd v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 46);  \"kettling\" or containment of a crowd by a police cordon on public-order grounds ( Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012, § 67);  The applicant's retention, upon release, in the courtroom on safety grounds, due to the Vadym Melnyk v. Ukraine aggressive behaviour of the public (, 2022, § 87);  extensive police monitoring of movements between a territorial entity not recognised by the international community and a government-controlled area and within the latter, coupled with the requirement to report to the police before each intended border crossing ( Denizci and Others v. Cyprus, 2001, §§ 403-406);  the inability of internally displaced persons to return to their homes situated on the territory of an entity not recognised by the international community ( Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, §§ 292-301);  restrictions on freedom of movement resulting from the purported \"annexation\" of territory de facto from one State to another and the ensuing transformation (by the respondent State) of the administrative border line into a State border (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], 2020, §§ 500-503);  restrictions on freedom of movement between a territorial entity not recognised by the international community and a government-controlled area stemming from \"borderisation\" process (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Georgia v. Russia (IV) (dec.), 2023);  Alleged abduction and forcible transfer from a territorial entity not recognised by the international community to the State which exercises effective control over that entity (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.) [GC], 2022, §§ 895-898);  police refusal to let the applicant cross the administrative border between two regions ( Timishev v. Russia, 2005, § 44; Gartukayev v. Russia, 2005, § 21);  a transit ban, under legislation implementing UN Security Council Resolutions, imposed on a resident of an enclaved area by the State surrounding it; and the resulting inability to travel Nada v. Switzerland within the country of which the applicant was a national ( [GC], 2012, §§ 198 and 226-228);  an obligation to provide fingerprints when applying for a passport and the subsequent storage of the fingerprints on a microchip in the passport ( Willems v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2021, §§ 23 and 38).\n\nThe effects and specific conditions of a given measure should be suited to its purpose ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 199; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 62).\n\nThe effectiveness of a preventive measure frequently depends on the speed of its implementation ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 199; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 62; Gochev v. Bulgaria, 2009, § 53).\n\nIn order to assess whether a given restriction is sufficiently connected to the aim of crime prevention, the Court has regard to the following elements:  the applicant's conduct and, in particular, the risk of offending or re-engaging in criminal Villa v. Italy Vlasov and Benyash v. Russia conduct (, 2010, § 46;, 2016, § 35);  the nature and severity of the assessed risk  to the life and health of a specific victim, for example, in the context of protective and preventive measures taken against a perpetrator of domestic violence ( Kurt v. Austria [GC], 2021, § 183);  of the applicant's engagement in terrorism ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 201; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 55);  medical data ( Villa v. Italy, 2010, § 46);  the nature and gravity of the offences committed by the applicant ( Villa v. Italy, 2010, § 46; Sarkizov and Others v. Bulgaria, 2012, § 66), as well as recidivism ( Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 134).\n\nWhere restrictions are imposed in the context of a terrorist threat, the following factors are of relevance:  the seriousness and duration of such threat ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 200);  the timing of restrictions, for example shortly after terrorist attacks ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 199; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 62);  the existence of a set of factors and a body of evidence probative of a course of \"conduct\" amounting to a threat, for example:  such factors may include religious radicalisation, violent tendencies, criminal record;  the relevant evidence may include public statements, association with jihadists, jihadist propaganda videos found on the applicant's devices ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, §§ 198- Fanouni 201); discovery of prohibited weapons and ammunition at the applicant's home ( v. France, 2023, §§ 55 and 62);  general threat to the society stemming from unauthorized entry and stay in a zone of armed conflict involving a terrorist organization ( Mørck Jensen v. Denmark, 2022, § 67).\n\nA restriction on freedom of movement cannot be based solely on an individual's beliefs or religious practice ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 199; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 62).\n\nSuch assessment must include all the relevant aspects of the particular situation ( A. -M.V. v. Finland, 2017, § 89) and factors specific to the applicant ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 195; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 57), for example, his or her family, professional, financial and personal situation, his or her conduct (including, where applicable, the gravity of a breach committed and the risk of its repetition), as well as the existence of a criminal record ( Stamose v. Bulgaria, 2012, § 35).\n\nThe judicial review proceedings should provide the appropriate procedural safeguards ( Pagerie v. France Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 196;, 2023, § 56). The Court may examine in particular:  whether the rights of the defence were fully respected ( Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991), notably, whether the applicant had access to a lawyer and a real opportunity to obtain information on the accusations against him, which prompted the imposition of the impugned restriction on his or her freedom of movement ( Marturana v. Italy, 2008, §§ 188-189; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 207);  whether the applicant was effectively able to put forward his or her arguments and whether his or her submissions were thoroughly analysed ( Popoviciu v. Romania, 2016, §§ 92-93; Bulea v. Romania, 2013, § 63; A. -M.V. v. Finland, 2017, § 90; L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, §§ 93-96; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 204; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 58);  whether the domestic courts provided adequate and sufficient reasons, devoid of formalism or arbitrariness ( Ioviţă v. Romania (dec.), 2017, § 76; Căşuneanu v. Romania (dec.), 2011, §§ 53-54; Moldovan Duda v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 38; L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, §§ 95-96);  whether the proceedings were adversarial ( Marturana v. Italy, 2008, § 189; Moldovan Duda v. Romania Fanouni v. France (dec.), 2016, § 37;, 2023, § 58);  whether the applicant was involved at all stages of the proceedings and heard in person ( A. - M.V. v. Finland, 2017, § 90);  whether sufficient procedural safeguards attached to the presentation in evidence of Pagerie v. France confidential documents (for example, intelligence reports) (, 2023, § 207; Fanouni v. France, 2023, §§ 60-61).", + "pre_text": "The Court will opt for the \"necessity in a democratic society\" te st under paragraph 3 of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 in two types of situations: ▪ any measure restricting the right to leave any country ( Gochev v. Bulgaria, 2009, § 44; Shioshvili and Others v. Russia, 2016, § 58), be it a measure depriving the applicant entirely of that right or limiting his or her choice of destination countries to a certain geographic area ( L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, § 81; Soltysyak v. Russia, 2011, § 37; Peltonen v. Finland, Commission decision, 1995; K.S. v. Finland, Commission decision, 1995); ▪ a restriction on the exercise of the rights to freedom of movement or freedom to choose residence, which is not limited in geographical scope and applies to the entire territory of a given State ( Garib v. the Netherlands [GC], 2017, § 110; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 171).\n\nThe following situations have been considered to amount to a form of interference with the right to freedom of movement: ▪ a requirement not to leave one's place of residence or another specified area/municipality without permission. This requirement can be imposed:  as part of the bail conditions or as a separate measure in the context of criminal proceedings ( Fedorov and Fedorova v. Russia, 2005, § 35; Antonenkov and Others v. Ukraine, 2005, § 52; Nagy v. Hungary (dec.), 2004; Ivanov v. Ukraine, 2006, § 85; Komarova v. Russia, 2006, § 55; Hajibeyli v. Azerbaijan, 2008, § 58; Rosengren v. Romania, 2008, § 32; Nikiforenko v. Ukraine, 2010, § 55; Pokhalchuk v. Ukraine, 2010, § 94; Doroshenko v. Ukraine, 2011, § 52; Manannikov v. Russia, 2018, § 60);  during bankruptcy proceedings ( Luordo v. Italy, 2003, § 92; Goffi v. Italy, 2005, § 20; Bassani v. Italy, 2003, § 24; Gasser v. Italy, 2006, §§ 30-31; Di Carlo et Bonaffini v. Italy (dec.), 2006; Bova v. Italy (dec.), 2004; Shaw v. Italy, 2009, § 16; Bottaro v. Italy, 2003, § 54; Campagnano v. Italy, 2006, § 38);  in the context of a compulsory military service ( Golub v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [Committee], 2021, §§ 54 and 58);  as a compulsory residence order in the context of: ▪ criminal prevention measures ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 154; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Marturana v. Italy, 2008, § 190; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991; Guzzardi v. Italy, Commission decision, 1977); ▪ extradition ( Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010); ▪ expulsion ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; M v. France, Commission decision, 1984; Kenane v. France, Commission decision, 1992; Kalibi v. France, Commission decision, 1984); ▪ a prohibition on leaving home at night except in case of necessity ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 86-88; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 154; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, §§ 13 and 39; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991); ▪ a prohibition on migrants leaving a \"hotspot\" facility at night ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, § 86); ▪ an obligation to report regularly to the court ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) or the police ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 17, 84 and 89; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 154; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, §§ 13 and 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Poninski v. Poland (dec.), 2000; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991); ▪ special police supervision, including the above measures and other associated restrictions (not leaving home without informing a supervising authority, not going to bars, nightclubs, amusement arcades or brothels or attending public meetings, not associating with individuals who have a criminal record and who are subject to preventive measures) ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991); ▪ a prohibition on leaving home from 7 p.m. until 7 a.m. during week-days and the whole day during week-ends, coupled with permission to attend one's work place during week-days ( Trijonis v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005); ▪ a general lockdown in order to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, including a prohibition on leaving home on pain of a fine, except in an exhaustive number of circumstances and on production of a document attesting to valid reasons for doing so ( Terheş v. Romania (dec.), 2021, § 45); ▪ a requirement to report any change of place of residence ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) or to have it registered by the police within a specific time-limit, on pain of a fine ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66; Corley and Others v. Russia, 2021, § 72; Ananiyevy v. Russia [Committee], 2021; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125); ▪ a fine imposed on a foreigner for having stayed overnight outside his registered place of residence ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66); ▪ a prohibition on approaching a specified place (for example, a centre for asylum seekers ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193); a building site ( Cokarić and Others v. Croatia (dec.), 2006); or an abortion clinic ( Van den Dungen v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1995); ▪ a barring and protection order issued in the context of domestic violence, prohibiting a perpetrator from returning to the family home and the surrounding areas for a specified period ( Kurt v. Austria [GC], 2021, §§ 14, 25 and 183); ▪ an inability to enter a specified area of a city, or a prohibition thereof ( Bigliazzi and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2008; Olivieira v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 39; Landvreugd v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 46); ▪ \"kettling\" or containment of a crowd by a police cordon on public-order grounds ( Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012, § 67); ▪ The applicant's retention, upon release, in the courtroom on safety grounds, due to the aggressive behaviour of the public ( Vadym Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2022, § 87); ▪ extensive police monitoring of movements between a territorial entity not recognised by the international community and a government-controlled area and within the latter, coupled with the requirement to report to the police before each intended border crossing ( Denizci and Others v. Cyprus, 2001, §§ 403-406); ▪ the inability of internally displaced persons to return to their homes situated on the territory of an entity not recognised by the international community ( Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, §§ 292-301); ▪ restrictions on freedom of movement resulting from the purported \"annexation\" of territory from one State to another and the ensuing de facto transformation (by the respondent State) of the administrative border line into a State border (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], 2020, §§ 500-503); ▪ Alleged abduction and forcible transfer from a territorial entity not recognised by the international community to the State which exercises effective control over that entity (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.) [GC], 2022, §§ 895-898); ▪ police refusal to let the applicant cross the administrative border between two regions ( Timishev v. Russia, 2005, § 44; Gartukayev v. Russia, 2005, § 21); ▪ a transit ban, under legislation implementing UN Security Council Resolutions, imposed on a resident of an enclaved area by the State surrounding it; and the resulting inability to travel within the country of which the applicant was a national ( Nada v. Switzerland [GC], 2012, §§ 198 and 226-228); ▪ an obligation to provide fingerprints when applying for a passport and the subsequent storage of the fingerprints on a microchip in the passport ( Willems v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2021, §§ 23 and 38).\n\nThe effects and specific conditions of a given measure should be suited to its purpose ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 199).\n\nThe effectiveness of a preventive measure frequently depends on the speed of its implementation ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 199; Gochev v. Bulgaria, 2009, § 53).\n\nIn order to assess whether a given restriction is sufficiently connected to the aim of crime prevention, the Court has regard to the following elements: ▪ the applicant's conduct and, in particular, the risk of offending or re-engaging in criminal conduct ( Villa v. Italy, 2010, § 46; Vlasov and Benyash v. Russia, 2016, § 35); ▪ the nature and severity of the assessed risk  to the life and health of a specific victim, for example, in the context of protective and preventive measures taken against a perpetrator of domestic violence ( Kurt v. Austria [GC], 2021, § 183);  of the applicant's engagement in terrorism ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 201); ▪ medical data ( Villa v. Italy, 2010, § 46); ▪ the nature and gravity of the offences committed by the applicant ( Villa v. Italy, 2010, § 46; Sarkizov and Others v. Bulgaria, 2012, § 66), as well as recidivism ( Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 134).\n\nWhere restrictions are imposed in the context of a terrorist threat, the following factors are of relevance: ▪ the seriousness and duration of such threat ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 200); ▪ the timing of restrictions, for example shortly after terrorist attacks ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 199); ▪ the existence of a set of factors and a body of evidence probative of a course of \"conduct\" amounting to a threat, for example :  such factors may include religious radicalisation, violent tendencies, criminal record;  the relevant evidence may include public statements, association with jihadists, jihadist propaganda videos found on the applicant's devices ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, §§ 198-201); ▪ general threat to the society stemming from unauthorized entry and stay in a zone of armed conflict involving a terrorist organization ( Mørck Jensen v. Denmark, 2022, § 67).\n\nArestriction on freedom of movement cannot be based solely on an individual's beliefs or religious practice ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 199).\n\nSuch assessment must include all the relevant aspects of the particular situation ( A.-M.V. v. Finland, 2017, § 89) and factors specific to the applicant ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 195), for example, his or her family, professional, financial and personal situation, his or her conduct (including, where applicable, the gravity of a breach committed and the risk of its repetition), as well as the existence of a criminal record ( Stamose v. Bulgaria, 2012, § 35).\n\nThe judicial review proceedings should provide the appropriate procedural safeguards ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 196). The Court may examine in particular: ▪ whether the rights of the defence were fully respected ( Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991), notably, whether the applicant had access to a lawyer and a real opportunity to obtain information on the accusations against him, which prompted the imposition of the impugned restriction on his or her freedom of movement ( Marturana v. Italy, 2008, §§ 188-189; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 207); ▪ whether the applicant was effectively able to put forward his or her arguments and whether his or her submissions were thoroughly analysed ( Popoviciu v. Romania, 2016, §§ 92-93; Bulea v. Romania, 2013, § 63; A.-M.V. v. Finland, 2017, § 90; L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, §§ 93-96; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 204); ▪ whether the domestic courts provided adequate and sufficient reasons, devoid of formalism or arbitrariness ( Ioviţă v. Romania (dec.), 2017, § 76; Căşuneanu v. Romania (dec.), 2011, §§ 53-54; Moldovan Duda v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 38; L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, §§ 95-96); ▪ whether the proceedings were adversarial ( Marturana v. Italy, 2008, § 189; Moldovan Duda v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 37); ▪ whether the applicant was involved at all stages of the proceedings and heard in person ( A.- M.V. v. Finland, 2017, § 90); ▪ whether sufficient procedural safeguards attached to the presentation in evidence of confidential documents (for example, intelligence reports) ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 207).", + "post_text": "The Court will opt for the \"necessity in a democratic society\" test under paragraph 3 of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 in two types of situations:  any Gochev v. Bulgaria, measure restricting the right to leave any country ( 2009, § 44; Shioshvili and Others v. Russia, 2016, § 58), be it a measure depriving the applicant entirely of that right or limiting his or her choice of destination countries to a certain geographic area ( L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, § 81; Soltysyak v. Russia, 2011, § 37; Peltonen v. Finland, Commission decision, 1995; K.S. v. Finland, Commission decision, 1995);  a restriction on the exercise of the rights to freedom of movement or freedom to choose residence, which is not limited in geographical scope and applies to the entire territory of a given State ( Garib v. the Netherlands [GC], 2017, § 110; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 171; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 44).\n\nThe following situations have been considered to amount to a form of interference with the right to freedom of movement:  a requirement not to leave one's place of residence or another specified area/municipality without permission. This requirement can be imposed:  as part of the bail conditions or as a separate measure in the context of criminal proceedings ( Fedorov and Fedorova v. Russia, 2005, § 35; Antonenkov and Others v. Ukraine, 2005, § 52; Nagy v. Hungary (dec.), 2004; Ivanov v. Ukraine, 2006, § 85; Komarova v. Russia, 2006, § 55; Hajibeyli v. Azerbaijan, 2008, § 58; Rosengren v. Romania, 2008, § 32; Nikiforenko v. Ukraine, 2010, § 55; Pokhalchuk v. Ukraine, 2010, Doroshenko v. Ukraine Manannikov v. Russia § 94;, 2011, § 52;, 2018, § 60);  during bankruptcy proceedings ( Luordo v. Italy, 2003, § 92; Goffi v. Italy, 2005, § 20; Bassani v. Italy Gasser v. Italy Di Carlo et Bonaffini v. Italy, 2003, § 24;, 2006, §§ 30-31; (dec.), 2006; Bova v. Italy (dec.), 2004; Shaw v. Italy, 2009, § 16; Bottaro v. Italy, 2003, § 54; Campagnano v. Italy, 2006, § 38);  in the context of a compulsory military service ( Golub v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [Committee], 2021, §§ 54 and 58);  as a compulsory residence order in the context of:  criminal prevention measures ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 154; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 54 ; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Marturana v. Italy, 2008, § 190; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991; Guzzardi v. Italy, Commission decision, 1977);  extradition ( Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010);  expulsion ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; M v. France, Commission decision, 1984; Kenane v. France, Commission decision, 1992; Kalibi v. France, Commission decision, 1984);  a prohibition on leaving home at night except in case of necessity ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], Pagerie v. France Fanouni v. France Timofeyev and 2017, §§ 86-88;, 2023, § 154;, 2023, § 54; Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, §§ 13 and 39; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  a prohibition on migrants leaving a \"hotspot\" facility at night ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, § 86);  an obligation to report regularly to the court ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) De Tommaso v. Italy Pagerie v. France or the police ( [GC], 2017, §§ 17, 84 and 89;, 2023, § 154; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 54; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Raimondo v. Italy, Labita v. Italy Poninski v. Poland 1994, §§ 13 and 39; [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; (dec.), 2000; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  special police supervision, including the above measures and other associated restrictions (not leaving home without informing a supervising authority, not going to bars, nightclubs, amusement arcades or brothels or attending public meetings, not associating with De individuals who have a criminal record and who are subject to preventive measures) ( Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  a prohibition on leaving home from 7 p.m. until 7 a.m. during week-days and the whole day during week-ends, coupled with permission to attend one's work place during week-days ( Trijonis v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005);  a general lockdown in order to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, including a prohibition on leaving home on pain of a fine, except in an exhaustive number of circumstances and on production of a document attesting to valid reasons for doing so ( Terheş v. Romania (dec.), 2021, § 45);  a requirement to report any change of place of residence ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) or to have it registered by the police within a specific time-limit, on pain of a fine ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66; Corley and Others v. Russia, 2021, § 72; Ananiyevy v. Russia [Committee], 2021; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125);  a fine imposed on a foreigner for having stayed overnight outside his registered place of residence ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66);  a prohibition on approaching a specified place (for example, a centre for asylum seekers ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193); a building site ( Cokarić and Others v. Croatia (dec.), 2006); or an abortion clinic ( Van den Dungen v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1995);  a barring and protection order issued in the context of domestic violence, prohibiting a perpetrator from returning to the family home and the surrounding areas for a specified period ( Kurt v. Austria [GC], 2021, §§ 14, 25 and 183);  an inability to enter a specified area of a city, or a prohibition thereof ( Bigliazzi and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2008; Olivieira v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 39; Landvreugd v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 46);  \"kettling\" or containment of a crowd by a police cordon on public-order grounds ( Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012, § 67);  The applicant's retention, upon release, in the courtroom on safety grounds, due to the Vadym Melnyk v. Ukraine aggressive behaviour of the public (, 2022, § 87);  extensive police monitoring of movements between a territorial entity not recognised by the international community and a government-controlled area and within the latter, coupled with the requirement to report to the police before each intended border crossing ( Denizci and Others v. Cyprus, 2001, §§ 403-406);  the inability of internally displaced persons to return to their homes situated on the territory of an entity not recognised by the international community ( Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, §§ 292-301);  restrictions on freedom of movement resulting from the purported \"annexation\" of territory de facto from one State to another and the ensuing transformation (by the respondent State) of the administrative border line into a State border (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], 2020, §§ 500-503);  restrictions on freedom of movement between a territorial entity not recognised by the international community and a government-controlled area stemming from \"borderisation\" process (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Georgia v. Russia (IV) (dec.), 2023);  Alleged abduction and forcible transfer from a territorial entity not recognised by the international community to the State which exercises effective control over that entity (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.) [GC], 2022, §§ 895-898);  police refusal to let the applicant cross the administrative border between two regions ( Timishev v. Russia, 2005, § 44; Gartukayev v. Russia, 2005, § 21);  a transit ban, under legislation implementing UN Security Council Resolutions, imposed on a resident of an enclaved area by the State surrounding it; and the resulting inability to travel Nada v. Switzerland within the country of which the applicant was a national ( [GC], 2012, §§ 198 and 226-228);  an obligation to provide fingerprints when applying for a passport and the subsequent storage of the fingerprints on a microchip in the passport ( Willems v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2021, §§ 23 and 38).\n\nThe effects and specific conditions of a given measure should be suited to its purpose ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 199; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 62).\n\nThe effectiveness of a preventive measure frequently depends on the speed of its implementation ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 199; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 62; Gochev v. Bulgaria, 2009, § 53).\n\nIn order to assess whether a given restriction is sufficiently connected to the aim of crime prevention, the Court has regard to the following elements:  the applicant's conduct and, in particular, the risk of offending or re-engaging in criminal Villa v. Italy Vlasov and Benyash v. Russia conduct (, 2010, § 46;, 2016, § 35);  the nature and severity of the assessed risk  to the life and health of a specific victim, for example, in the context of protective and preventive measures taken against a perpetrator of domestic violence ( Kurt v. Austria [GC], 2021, § 183);  of the applicant's engagement in terrorism ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 201; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 55);  medical data ( Villa v. Italy, 2010, § 46);  the nature and gravity of the offences committed by the applicant ( Villa v. Italy, 2010, § 46; Sarkizov and Others v. Bulgaria, 2012, § 66), as well as recidivism ( Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 134).\n\nWhere restrictions are imposed in the context of a terrorist threat, the following factors are of relevance:  the seriousness and duration of such threat ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 200);  the timing of restrictions, for example shortly after terrorist attacks ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 199; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 62);  the existence of a set of factors and a body of evidence probative of a course of \"conduct\" amounting to a threat, for example:  such factors may include religious radicalisation, violent tendencies, criminal record;  the relevant evidence may include public statements, association with jihadists, jihadist propaganda videos found on the applicant's devices ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, §§ 198- Fanouni 201); discovery of prohibited weapons and ammunition at the applicant's home ( v. France, 2023, §§ 55 and 62);  general threat to the society stemming from unauthorized entry and stay in a zone of armed conflict involving a terrorist organization ( Mørck Jensen v. Denmark, 2022, § 67).\n\nArestriction on freedom of movement cannot be based solely on an individual's beliefs or religious practice ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 199; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 62).\n\nSuch assessment must include all the relevant aspects of the particular situation ( A. -M.V. v. Finland, 2017, § 89) and factors specific to the applicant ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 195; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 57), for example, his or her family, professional, financial and personal situation, his or her conduct (including, where applicable, the gravity of a breach committed and the risk of its repetition), as well as the existence of a criminal record ( Stamose v. Bulgaria, 2012, § 35).\n\nThe judicial review proceedings should provide the appropriate procedural safeguards ( Pagerie v. France Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 196;, 2023, § 56). The Court may examine in particular:  whether the rights of the defence were fully respected ( Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991), notably, whether the applicant had access to a lawyer and a real opportunity to obtain information on the accusations against him, which prompted the imposition of the impugned restriction on his or her freedom of movement ( Marturana v. Italy, 2008, §§ 188-189; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 207);  whether the applicant was effectively able to put forward his or her arguments and whether his or her submissions were thoroughly analysed ( Popoviciu v. Romania, 2016, §§ 92-93; Bulea v. Romania, 2013, § 63; A. -M.V. v. Finland, 2017, § 90; L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, §§ 93-96; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 204; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 58);  whether the domestic courts provided adequate and sufficient reasons, devoid of formalism or arbitrariness ( Ioviţă v. Romania (dec.), 2017, § 76; Căşuneanu v. Romania (dec.), 2011, §§ 53-54; Moldovan Duda v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 38; L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, §§ 95-96);  whether the proceedings were adversarial ( Marturana v. Italy, 2008, § 189; Moldovan Duda v. Romania Fanouni v. France (dec.), 2016, § 37;, 2023, § 58);  whether the applicant was involved at all stages of the proceedings and heard in person ( A. - M.V. v. Finland, 2017, § 90);  whether sufficient procedural safeguards attached to the presentation in evidence of Pagerie v. France confidential documents (for example, intelligence reports) (, 2023, § 207; Fanouni v. France, 2023, §§ 60-61).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923150809/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217131620/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/dbfbd08a4477/20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf", @@ -27891,8 +29441,10 @@ "to_snapshot": "20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf", "from_snapshot_date": "2023-09-23", "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", - "from_version": "unknown (20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf)", + "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:39611/18", "case_name": "Georgia v. Russia (IV) (dec.)", @@ -27924,8 +29476,10 @@ "to_snapshot": "20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf", "from_snapshot_date": "2023-09-23", "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-17", - "from_version": "unknown (20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf)", + "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json", "case_key": "apps:61365/16", "case_name": "S.E. v. Serbia", @@ -27959,6 +29513,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2024-02-17__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:1162/22", "case_name": "Auray and Others v. France*", @@ -27976,8 +29532,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_updated|minor_edit|paragraph_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.C.1.b|a:66|b:66|III.A.1|a:105|b:105|IV|a:None|b:163", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "The following examples provide an illustration of the manner in which the Court can distinguish between deprivation of liberty under Article 5 § 1 and restrictions on liberty of movement within the scope of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4:  While house arrest amounts to deprivation of liberty (see Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2016, § 104; [GC], 2017, § 87), a milder version of this measure can be considered as a restriction of freedom of movement. This was the case in Trijonis v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005, where the applicant's initial house arrest was replaced by a more lenient regime, allowing him to be at his work place during week-days and obliging him to stay at home from 7 p.m. until 7 a.m. during week-days and the whole day during week- ends.  The prohibition on leaving home at night except in the case of necessity (between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.) cannot be equated to house arrest and amounts to an interference with liberty of movement ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 86-88; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125).  In J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, the Court considered that the applicants, asylum seekers, had been deprived of their liberty during the first month of their stay in a \"hotspot\" facility (a migrant reception, identification and registration centre), but that they had been subjected only to a restriction of movement once the facility had become semi-open and they had been allowed out during the day (§ 86).  Special police supervision, together with a compulsory residence order and other associated restrictions, are examined under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, particularly where an applicant is not forced to live within a restricted area, is able to leave home during the day and have a social life, and has never sought permission to travel away from his place of residence ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Pagerie v. France, 2023, §§ 154-158; Raimondo v. Italy Labita v. Italy Guzzardi v. Italy, 1994, § 39; [GC], 2000, § 193). As an exception, in, 1980, the Court held that measures of this nature amounted to a deprivation of liberty. It attached particular significance to the combination of the following factors: the duration of the special supervision (sixteen months), the extremely small size of the area where the applicant had been confined (an unfenced area of 2.5 sq. km on an island, nine-tenths of which was occupied by a prison), the almost permanent supervision to which he had been subjected and the fact that it had been almost completely impossible for him to make social contacts (other than with his near family, fellow \"residents\" subjected to the same measure and supervisory staff) (§ 95).  Nada v. Switzerland In [GC], 2012, the Court examined the prohibition on travel through Switzerland, imposed on the applicant residing in an Italian enclave in the country, on the basis of legislation implementing UN Security Council Resolutions. As a result, the applicant was unable to leave the enclave and travel to any other part of Italy, the country of which he was a national. For the Court, the restrictions on the applicant's freedom of movement did not amount to a \"deprivation of liberty\", even though they had been maintained for a considerable length of time (six years) and the territory of the enclave was small (about 1.6 sq. km). In contrast to the case of Guzzard i v. Italy, 1980, the applicant had not been prevented from freely living and moving within the enclave and receiving visitors. Nor had he been subjected to any surveillance or obliged to report regularly to the police. Furthermore, he had been allowed to seek exemptions from the entry or transit ban and, in any event, Switzerland had the right, under international law, to prevent the entry of an alien (§§ 228-233). While Article 5 § 1 was inapplicable, the restrictions on the applicant's freedom of movement were found to be in breach of Article 8. No complaint was submitted under Article 2 of Protocol no. 4 (a Protocol not ratified by Switzerland).  A general nation-wide lockdown imposed by the authorities to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, including a prohibition on leaving home on pain of a fine, was not deemed to constitute a \"deprivation of liberty\" in view of the level of intensity of the restrictions on the applicant's freedom of movement ( Terheş v. Romania (dec.), 2021, §§ 41-45). In particular, the applicant had been free to leave home for various reasons exhaustively set out in the legislation and could go to different places, at whatever time of day the situation required. He did not claim that his circumstances were not covered by any of those reasons and that he had thus been confined indoors for the entire duration of the lockdown (52 days). Moreover, unlike in the case of Guzzardi v. Italy, 1980, he had not been subject to individual surveillance and did not claim to have been forced to live in a cramped space, nor had he been deprived of all social contact. Hence the conditions of the lockdown could not be equated with house arrest. Article 5 § 1 was inapplicable. As the applicant had focused specifically on Article 5 and had not asserted his rights under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, the Court did not examine the case under the latter provision.  In Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012, the Court examined the \"kettling\" or containment of a crowd by a police cordon on public-order grounds. The coercive nature of the containment, its duration (seven hours), and its effect on the applicants, in terms of physical discomfort (no shelter, food, water or toilet facilities) and inability to leave the area, pointed towards a deprivation of liberty. However, in the particular circumstances, the containment had been the least intrusive and most effective means of preventing injury to people and property from violent demonstrators in dangerous and volatile conditions, which had persisted throughout its duration. The police had kept the situation constantly under close review and made frequent attempts at controlled release. Accordingly, on the specific and exceptional facts, the Court was unable to identify a moment when the containment could be considered to have changed from what had been, at most, a restriction on freedom of movement, to a deprivation of liberty. Had it not remained necessary to maintain the cordon in order to prevent serious injury or damage, the \"type\" of the measure would have been different, and its coercive and restrictive nature might have been sufficient to bring it within Article 5. Article 5 § 1 was inapplicable, and no complaint was submitted under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (a Protocol not ratified by the United Kingdom) (§§ 64-68).  In Vadym Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2022, the Court examined a situation where an applicant had been blocked in the courtroom for about two hours due to aggressive behaviour by the public which was dissatisfied with the court's decision to release him. In the Court's view, given the relatively short duration of the applicant's retention and to the extent that the police officers present in the courtroom had prevented the applicant from leaving immediately, the particular situation must be seen as a restriction on the applicant's freedom of movement rather than a deprivation of liberty. Article 5 did not apply, and the applicant did not raise a complaint under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (§§ 86-89).\n\nThe following situations have been considered to amount to a form of interference with the right to freedom of movement:  a requirement not to leave one's place of residence or another specified area/municipality without permission. This requirement can be imposed:  as part of the bail conditions or as a separate measure in the context of criminal proceedings ( Fedorov and Fedorova v. Russia, 2005, § 35; Antonenkov and Others v. Ukraine, 2005, § 52; Nagy v. Hungary (dec.), 2004; Ivanov v. Ukraine, 2006, § 85; Komarova v. Russia, 2006, § 55; Hajibeyli v. Azerbaijan, 2008, § 58; Rosengren v. Romania, 2008, § 32; Nikiforenko v. Ukraine, 2010, § 55; Pokhalchuk v. Ukraine, 2010, Doroshenko v. Ukraine Manannikov v. Russia § 94;, 2011, § 52;, 2018, § 60);  during bankruptcy proceedings ( Luordo v. Italy, 2003, § 92; Goffi v. Italy, 2005, § 20; Bassani v. Italy Gasser v. Italy Di Carlo et Bonaffini v. Italy, 2003, § 24;, 2006, §§ 30-31; (dec.), 2006; Bova v. Italy (dec.), 2004; Shaw v. Italy, 2009, § 16; Bottaro v. Italy, 2003, § 54; Campagnano v. Italy, 2006, § 38);  in the context of a compulsory military service ( Golub v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [Committee], 2021, §§ 54 and 58);  as a compulsory residence order in the context of:  criminal prevention measures ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 154; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 54 ; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Marturana v. Italy, 2008, § 190; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991; Guzzardi v. Italy, Commission decision, 1977);  extradition ( Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010);  expulsion ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; M v. France, Commission decision, 1984; Kenane v. France, Commission decision, 1992; Kalibi v. France, Commission decision, 1984);  a prohibition on leaving home at night except in case of necessity ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], Pagerie v. France Fanouni v. France Timofeyev and 2017, §§ 86-88;, 2023, § 154;, 2023, § 54; Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, §§ 13 and 39; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  a prohibition on migrants leaving a \"hotspot\" facility at night ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, § 86);  an obligation to report regularly to the court ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) De Tommaso v. Italy Pagerie v. France or the police ( [GC], 2017, §§ 17, 84 and 89;, 2023, § 154; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 54; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Raimondo v. Italy, Labita v. Italy Poninski v. Poland 1994, §§ 13 and 39; [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; (dec.), 2000; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  special police supervision, including the above measures and other associated restrictions (not leaving home without informing a supervising authority, not going to bars, nightclubs, amusement arcades or brothels or attending public meetings, not associating with De individuals who have a criminal record and who are subject to preventive measures) ( Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  a prohibition on leaving home from 7 p.m. until 7 a.m. during week-days and the whole day during week-ends, coupled with permission to attend one's work place during week-days ( Trijonis v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005);  a general lockdown in order to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, including a prohibition on leaving home on pain of a fine, except in an exhaustive number of circumstances and on production of a document attesting to valid reasons for doing so ( Terheş v. Romania (dec.), 2021, § 45);  a requirement to report any change of place of residence ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) or to have it registered by the police within a specific time-limit, on pain of a fine ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66; Corley and Others v. Russia, 2021, § 72; Ananiyevy v. Russia [Committee], 2021; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125);  a fine imposed on a foreigner for having stayed overnight outside his registered place of residence ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66);  a prohibition on approaching a specified place (for example, a centre for asylum seekers ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193); a building site ( Cokarić and Others v. Croatia (dec.), 2006); or an abortion clinic ( Van den Dungen v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1995);  a barring and protection order issued in the context of domestic violence, prohibiting a perpetrator from returning to the family home and the surrounding areas for a specified period ( Kurt v. Austria [GC], 2021, §§ 14, 25 and 183);  an inability to enter a specified area of a city, or a prohibition thereof ( Bigliazzi and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2008; Olivieira v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 39; Landvreugd v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 46);  \"kettling\" or containment of a crowd by a police cordon on public-order grounds ( Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012, § 67);  The applicant's retention, upon release, in the courtroom on safety grounds, due to the Vadym Melnyk v. Ukraine aggressive behaviour of the public (, 2022, § 87);  extensive police monitoring of movements between a territorial entity not recognised by the international community and a government-controlled area and within the latter, coupled with the requirement to report to the police before each intended border crossing ( Denizci and Others v. Cyprus, 2001, §§ 403-406);  the inability of internally displaced persons to return to their homes situated on the territory of an entity not recognised by the international community ( Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, §§ 292-301);  restrictions on freedom of movement resulting from the purported \"annexation\" of territory de facto from one State to another and the ensuing transformation (by the respondent State) of the administrative border line into a State border (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], 2020, §§ 500-503);  restrictions on freedom of movement between a territorial entity not recognised by the international community and a government-controlled area stemming from \"borderisation\" process (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Georgia v. Russia (IV) (dec.), 2023);  Alleged abduction and forcible transfer from a territorial entity not recognised by the international community to the State which exercises effective control over that entity (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.) [GC], 2022, §§ 895-898);  police refusal to let the applicant cross the administrative border between two regions ( Timishev v. Russia, 2005, § 44; Gartukayev v. Russia, 2005, § 21);  a transit ban, under legislation implementing UN Security Council Resolutions, imposed on a resident of an enclaved area by the State surrounding it; and the resulting inability to travel Nada v. Switzerland within the country of which the applicant was a national ( [GC], 2012, §§ 198 and 226-228);  an obligation to provide fingerprints when applying for a passport and the subsequent storage of the fingerprints on a microchip in the passport ( Willems v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2021, §§ 23 and 38).", - "post_text": "The following examples provide an illustration of the manner in which the Court can distinguish between deprivation of liberty under Article 5 § 1 and restrictions on liberty of movement within the scope of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4:  While house arrest amounts to deprivation of liberty (see Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2016, § 104; [GC], 2017, § 87), a milder version of this measure can be considered as a restriction of freedom of movement. This was the case in Trijonis v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005, where the applicant's initial house arrest was replaced by a more lenient regime, allowing him to be at his work place during week-days and obliging him to stay at home from 7 p.m. until 7 a.m. during week-days and the whole day during week- ends.  The prohibition on leaving home at night except in the case of necessity (between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.) cannot be equated to house arrest and amounts to an interference with liberty of movement ( De T ommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 86-88; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125).  In J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, the Court considered that the applicants, asylum seekers, had been deprived of their liberty during the first month of their stay in a \"hotspot\" facility (a migrant reception, identification and registration centre), but that they had been subjected only to a restriction of movement once the facility had become semi-open and they had been allowed out during the day (§ 86).  Special police supervision, together with a compulsory residence order and other associated restrictions, are examined under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, particularly where an applicant is not forced to live within a restricted area, is able to leave home during the day and have a social life, and has never sought permission to travel away from his place of residence ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Pagerie v. France, 2023, §§ 154-158; Raimondo v. Italy Labita v. Italy Guzzardi v. Italy, 1994, § 39; [GC], 2000, § 193). As an exception, in, 1980, the Court held that measures of this nature amounted to a deprivation of liberty. It attached particular significance to the combination of the following factors: the duration of the special supervision (sixteen months), the extremely small size of the area where the applicant had been confined (an unfenced area of 2.5 sq. km on an island, nine-tenths of which was occupied by a prison), the almost permanent supervision to which he had been subjected and the fact that it had been almost completely impossible for him to make social contacts (other than with his near family, fellow \"residents\" subjected to the same measure and supervisory staff) (§ 95).  Nada v. Switzerland In [GC], 2012, the Court examined the prohibition on travel through Switzerland, imposed on the applicant residing in an Italian enclave in the country, on the basis of legislation implementing UN Security Council Resolutions. As a result, the applicant was unable to leave the enclave and travel to any other part of Italy, the country of which he was a national. For the Court, the restrictions on the applicant's freedom of movement did not amount to a \"deprivation of liberty\", even though they had been maintained for a considerable length of time (six years) and the territory of the enclave was small (about 1.6 sq. km). In contrast to the case of Guzzardi v. Italy, 1980, the applicant had not been prevented from freely living and moving within the enclave and receiving visitors. Nor had he been subjected to any surveillance or obliged to report regularly to the police. Furthermore, he had been allowed to seek exemptions from the entry or transit ban and, in any event, Switzerland had the right, under international law, to prevent the entry of an alien (§§ 228-233). While Article 5 § 1 was inapplicable, the restrictions on the applicant's freedom of movement were found to be in breach of Article 8. No complaint was submitted under Article 2 of Protocol no. 4 (a Protocol not ratified by Switzerland).  A general nation-wide lockdown imposed by the authorities to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, including a prohibition on leaving home on pain of a fine, was not deemed to constitute a \"deprivation of liberty\" in view of the level of intensity of the restrictions on the applicant's freedom of movement ( Terheş v. Romania (dec.), 2021, §§ 41-45). In particular, the applicant had been free to leave home for various reasons exhaustively set out in the legislation and could go to different places, at whatever time of day the situation required. He did not claim that his circumstances were not covered by any of those reasons and that he had thus been confined indoors for the entire duration of the lockdown (52 days). Moreover, unlike in the case of Guzzardi v. Italy, 1980, he had not been subject to individual surveillance and did not claim to have been forced to live in a cramped space, nor had he been deprived of all social contact. Hence the conditions of the lockdown could not be equated with house arrest. Article 5 § 1 was inapplicable. As the applicant had focused specifically on Article 5 and had not asserted his rights under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, the Court did not examine the case under the latter provision.  In Austin and Othe rs v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012, the Court examined the \"kettling\" or containment of a crowd by a police cordon on public-order grounds. The coercive nature of the containment, its duration (seven hours), and its effect on the applicants, in terms of physical discomfort (no shelter, food, water or toilet facilities) and inability to leave the area, pointed towards a deprivation of liberty. However, in the particular circumstances, the containment had been the least intrusive and most effective means of preventing injury to people and property from violent demonstrators in dangerous and volatile conditions, which had persisted throughout its duration. The police had kept the situation constantly under close review and made frequent attempts at controlled release. Accordingly, on the specific and exceptional facts, the Court was unable to identify a moment when the containment could be considered to have changed from what had been, at most, a restriction on freedom of movement, to a deprivation of liberty. Had it not remained necessary to maintain the cordon in order to prevent serious injury or damage, the \"type\" of the measure would have been different, and its coercive and restrictive nature might have been sufficient to bring it within Article 5. Article 5 § 1 was inapplicable, and no complaint was submitted under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (a Protocol not ratified by the United Kingdom) (§§ 64-68). The Court reached a similar finding in respect of Article 5 § 1 in Auray and Others v. France*, 2024, §§ 65-74, where it found Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to be applicable (§ 84).  In Vadym Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2022, the Court examined a situation where an applicant had been blocked in the courtroom for about two hours due to aggressive behaviour by the public which was dissatisfied with the court's decision to release him. In the Court's view, given the relatively short duration of the applicant's retention and to the extent that the police officers present in the courtroom had prevented the applicant from leaving immediately, the particular situation must be seen as a restriction on the applicant's freedom of movement rather than a deprivation of liberty. Article 5 did not apply, and the applicant did not raise a complaint under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (§§ 86-89).\n\nThe following situations have been considered to amount to a form of interference with the right to freedom of movement:  a requirement not to leave one's place of residence or another specified area/municipality without permission. This requirement can be imposed:  as part of the bail conditions or as a separate measure in the context of criminal proceedings ( Fedorov and Fedorova v. Russia, 2005, § 35; Antonenkov and Others v. Ukraine, 2005, § 52; Nagy v. Hungary (dec.), 2004; Ivanov v. Ukraine, 2006, § 85; Komarova v. Russia, 2006, § 55; Hajibeyli v. Azerbaijan, 2008, § 58; Rosengren v. Romania, 2008, § 32; Nikiforenko v. Ukraine, 2010, § 55; Pokhalchuk v. Ukraine, 2010, Doroshenko v. Ukraine Manannikov v. Russia § 94;, 2011, § 52;, 2018, § 60);  during bankruptcy proceedings ( Luordo v. Italy, 2003, § 92; Goffi v. Italy, 2005, § 20; Bassani v. Italy Gasser v. Italy Di Carlo et Bonaffini v. Italy, 2003, § 24;, 2006, §§ 30-31; (dec.), 2006; Bova v. Italy (dec.), 2004; Shaw v. Italy, 2009, § 16; Bottaro v. Italy, 2003, § 54; Campagnano v. Italy, 2006, § 38);  in the context of a compulsory military service ( Golub v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [Committee], 2021, §§ 54 and 58);  as a compulsory residence order in the context of:  criminal prevention measures ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 154; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 54 ; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Marturana v. Italy, 2008, § 190; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991; Guzzardi v. Italy, Commission decision, 1977);  extradition ( Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010);  expulsion ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; M v. France, Commission decision, 1984; Kenane v. France, Commission decision, 1992; Kalibi v. France, Commission decision, 1984);  a prohibition on leaving home at night except in case of necessity ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], Pagerie v. France Fanouni v. France Timofeyev and 2017, §§ 86-88;, 2023, § 154;, 2023, § 54; Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, §§ 13 and 39; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  a prohibition on migrants leaving a \"hotspot\" facility at night ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, § 86);  an obligation to report regularly to the court ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) De Tommaso v. Italy Pagerie v. France or the police ( [GC], 2017, §§ 17, 84 and 89;, 2023, § 154; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 54; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Raimondo v. Italy, Labita v. Italy Poninski v. Poland 1994, §§ 13 and 39; [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; (dec.), 2000; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  special police supervision, including the above measures and other associated restrictions (not leaving home without informing a supervising authority, not going to bars, nightclubs, amusement arcades or brothels or attending public meetings, not associating with De individuals who have a criminal record and who are subject to preventive measures) ( Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  a prohibition on leaving home from 7 p.m. until 7 a.m. during week-days and the whole day during week-ends, coupled with permission to attend one's work place during week-days ( Trijonis v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005);  a general lockdown in order to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, including a prohibition on leaving home on pain of a fine, except in an exhaustive number of circumstances and on production of a document attesting to valid reasons for doing so ( Terheş v. Romania (dec.), 2021, § 45);  a requirement to report any change of place of residence ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) or to have it registered by the police within a specific time-limit, on pain of a fine ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66; Corley and Others v. Russia, 2021, § 72; Ananiyevy v. Russia [Committee], 2021; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125);  a fine imposed on a foreigner for having stayed overnight outside his registered place of residence ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66);  a prohibition on approaching a specified place (for example, a centre for asylum seekers ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193); a building site ( Cokarić and Others v. Croatia (dec.), 2006); or an abortion clinic ( Van den Dungen v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1995);  a barring and protection order issued in the context of domestic violence, prohibiting a perpetrator from returning to the family home and the surrounding areas for a specified period ( Kurt v. Austria [GC], 2021, §§ 14, 25 and 183);  an inability to enter a specified area of a city, or a prohibition thereof ( Bigliazzi and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2008; Olivieira v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 39; Landvreugd v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 46);  \"kettling\" or containment of a crowd by a police cordon on public-order grounds ( Auray and Others v. France*, 2024, § 84);  The applicant's retention, upon release, in the courtroom on safety grounds, due to the Vadym Melnyk v. Ukraine aggressive behaviour of the public (, 2022, § 87);  extensive police monitoring of movements between a territorial entity not recognised by the international community and a government-controlled area and within the latter, coupled with the requirement to report to the police before each intended border crossing ( Denizci and Others v. Cyprus, 2001, §§ 403-406);  the inability of internally displaced persons to return to their homes situated on the territory of an entity not recognised by the international community ( Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, §§ 292-301);  restrictions on freedom of movement resulting from the purported \"annexation\" of territory de facto from one State to another and the ensuing transformation (by the respondent State) of the administrative border line into a State border (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], 2020, §§ 500-503);  restrictions on freedom of movement between a territorial entity not recognised by the international community and a government-controlled area stemming from \"borderisation\" process (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Georgia v. Russia (IV) (dec.), 2023);  Alleged abduction and forcible transfer from a territorial entity not recognised by the international community to the State which exercises effective control over that entity (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.) [GC], 2022, §§ 895-898);  police refusal to let the applicant cross the administrative border between two regions ( Timishev v. Russia, 2005, § 44; Gartukayev v. Russia, 2005, § 21);  a transit ban, under legislation implementing UN Security Council Resolutions, imposed on a resident of an enclaved area by the State surrounding it; and the resulting inability to travel Nada v. Switzerland within the country of which the applicant was a national ( [GC], 2012, §§ 198 and 226-228);  an obligation to provide fingerprints when applying for a passport and the subsequent storage of the fingerprints on a microchip in the passport ( Willems v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2021, §§ 23 and 38).\n\nAs a preventive measure likely to affect the fundamental rights and freedoms of peaceful demonstrators, the legal framework regulating the use of the \"kettling\" technique by the police needs to define the rules on its use with sufficient precision, setting out precisely under what circumstances and conditions it could be implemented, how it should be carried out and time-limits for its use ( Auray and Others v. France*, 2024, §§ 91-94).", + "pre_text": "The following examples provide an illustration of the manner in which the Court can distinguish between deprivation of liberty under Article 5 § 1 and restrictions on liberty of movement within the scope of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4:  While house arrest amounts to deprivation of liberty (see Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2016, § 104; [GC], 2017, § 87), a milder version of this measure can be considered as a restriction of freedom of movement. This was the case in Trijonis v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005, where the applicant's initial house arrest was replaced by a more lenient regime, allowing him to be at his work place during week-days and obliging him to stay at home from 7 p.m. until 7 a.m. during week-days and the whole day during week- ends.  The prohibition on leaving home at night except in the case of necessity (between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.) cannot be equated to house arrest and amounts to an interference with liberty of movement ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 86-88; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125).  In J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, the Court considered that the applicants, asylum seekers, had been deprived of their liberty during the first month of their stay in a \"hotspot\" facility (a migrant reception, identification and registration centre), but that they had been subjected only to a restriction of movement once the facility had become semi-open and they had been allowed out during the day (§ 86).  Special police supervision, together with a compulsory residence order and other associated restrictions, are examined under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, particularly where an applicant is not forced to live within a restricted area, is able to leave home during the day and have a social life, and has never sought permission to travel away from his place of residence ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Pagerie v. France, 2023, §§ 154-158; Raimondo v. Italy Labita v. Italy Guzzardi v. Italy, 1994, § 39; [GC], 2000, § 193). As an exception, in, 1980, the Court held that measures of this nature amounted to a deprivation of liberty. It attached particular significance to the combination of the following factors: the duration of the special supervision (sixteen months), the extremely small size of the area where the applicant had been confined (an unfenced area of 2.5 sq. km on an island, nine-tenths of which was occupied by a prison), the almost permanent supervision to which he had been subjected and the fact that it had been almost completely impossible for him to make social contacts (other than with his near family, fellow \"residents\" subjected to the same measure and supervisory staff) (§ 95).  Nada v. Switzerland In [GC], 2012, the Court examined the prohibition on travel through Switzerland, imposed on the applicant residing in an Italian enclave in the country, on the basis of legislation implementing UN Security Council Resolutions. As a result, the applicant was unable to leave the enclave and travel to any other part of Italy, the country of which he was a national. For the Court, the restrictions on the applicant's freedom of movement did not amount to a \"deprivation of liberty\", even though they had been maintained for a considerable length of time (six years) and the territory of the enclave was small (about 1.6 sq. km). In contrast to the case of Guzzard i v. Italy, 1980, the applicant had not been prevented from freely living and moving within the enclave and receiving visitors. Nor had he been subjected to any surveillance or obliged to report regularly to the police. Furthermore, he had been allowed to seek exemptions from the entry or transit ban and, in any event, Switzerland had the right, under international law, to prevent the entry of an alien (§§ 228-233). While Article 5 § 1 was inapplicable, the restrictions on the applicant's freedom of movement were found to be in breach of Article 8. No complaint was submitted under Article 2 of Protocol no. 4 (a Protocol not ratified by Switzerland).  Ageneral nation-wide lockdown imposed by the authorities to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, including a prohibition on leaving home on pain of a fine, was not deemed to constitute a \"deprivation of liberty\" in view of the level of intensity of the restrictions on the applicant's freedom of movement ( Terheş v. Romania (dec.), 2021, §§ 41-45). In particular, the applicant had been free to leave home for various reasons exhaustively set out in the legislation and could go to different places, at whatever time of day the situation required. He did not claim that his circumstances were not covered by any of those reasons and that he had thus been confined indoors for the entire duration of the lockdown (52 days). Moreover, unlike in the case of Guzzardi v. Italy, 1980, he had not been subject to individual surveillance and did not claim to have been forced to live in a cramped space, nor had he been deprived of all social contact. Hence the conditions of the lockdown could not be equated with house arrest. Article 5 § 1 was inapplicable. As the applicant had focused specifically on Article 5 and had not asserted his rights under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, the Court did not examine the case under the latter provision.  In Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012, the Court examined the \"kettling\" or containment of a crowd by a police cordon on public-order grounds. The coercive nature of the containment, its duration (seven hours), and its effect on the applicants, in terms of physical discomfort (no shelter, food, water or toilet facilities) and inability to leave the area, pointed towards a deprivation of liberty. However, in the particular circumstances, the containment had been the least intrusive and most effective means of preventing injury to people and property from violent demonstrators in dangerous and volatile conditions, which had persisted throughout its duration. The police had kept the situation constantly under close review and made frequent attempts at controlled release. Accordingly, on the specific and exceptional facts, the Court was unable to identify a moment when the containment could be considered to have changed from what had been, at most, a restriction on freedom of movement, to a deprivation of liberty. Had it not remained necessary to maintain the cordon in order to prevent serious injury or damage, the \"type\" of the measure would have been different, and its coercive and restrictive nature might have been sufficient to bring it within Article 5. Article 5 § 1 was inapplicable, and no complaint was submitted under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (a Protocol not ratified by the United Kingdom) (§§ 64-68).  In Vadym Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2022, the Court examined a situation where an applicant had been blocked in the courtroom for about two hours due to aggressive behaviour by the public which was dissatisfied with the court's decision to release him. In the Court's view, given the relatively short duration of the applicant's retention and to the extent that the police officers present in the courtroom had prevented the applicant from leaving immediately, the particular situation must be seen as a restriction on the applicant's freedom of movement rather than a deprivation of liberty. Article 5 did not apply, and the applicant did not raise a complaint under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (§§ 86-89).\n\nThe following situations have been considered to amount to a form of interference with the right to freedom of movement:  a requirement not to leave one's place of residence or another specified area/municipality without permission. This requirement can be imposed:  as part of the bail conditions or as a separate measure in the context of criminal proceedings ( Fedorov and Fedorova v. Russia, 2005, § 35; Antonenkov and Others v. Ukraine, 2005, § 52; Nagy v. Hungary (dec.), 2004; Ivanov v. Ukraine, 2006, § 85; Komarova v. Russia, 2006, § 55; Hajibeyli v. Azerbaijan, 2008, § 58; Rosengren v. Romania, 2008, § 32; Nikiforenko v. Ukraine, 2010, § 55; Pokhalchuk v. Ukraine, 2010, Doroshenko v. Ukraine Manannikov v. Russia § 94;, 2011, § 52;, 2018, § 60);  during bankruptcy proceedings ( Luordo v. Italy, 2003, § 92; Goffi v. Italy, 2005, § 20; Bassani v. Italy Gasser v. Italy Di Carlo et Bonaffini v. Italy, 2003, § 24;, 2006, §§ 30-31; (dec.), 2006; Bova v. Italy (dec.), 2004; Shaw v. Italy, 2009, § 16; Bottaro v. Italy, 2003, § 54; Campagnano v. Italy, 2006, § 38);  in the context of a compulsory military service ( Golub v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [Committee], 2021, §§ 54 and 58);  as a compulsory residence order in the context of:  criminal prevention measures ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 154; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 54 ; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Marturana v. Italy, 2008, § 190; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991; Guzzardi v. Italy, Commission decision, 1977);  extradition ( Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010);  expulsion ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; M v. France, Commission decision, 1984; Kenane v. France, Commission decision, 1992; Kalibi v. France, Commission decision, 1984);  a prohibition on leaving home at night except in case of necessity ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], Pagerie v. France Fanouni v. France Timofeyev and 2017, §§ 86-88;, 2023, § 154;, 2023, § 54; Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, §§ 13 and 39; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  a prohibition on migrants leaving a \"hotspot\" facility at night ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, § 86);  an obligation to report regularly to the court ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) De Tommaso v. Italy Pagerie v. France or the police ( [GC], 2017, §§ 17, 84 and 89;, 2023, § 154; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 54; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Raimondo v. Italy, Labita v. Italy Poninski v. Poland 1994, §§ 13 and 39; [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; (dec.), 2000; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  special police supervision, including the above measures and other associated restrictions (not leaving home without informing a supervising authority, not going to bars, nightclubs, amusement arcades or brothels or attending public meetings, not associating with De individuals who have a criminal record and who are subject to preventive measures) ( Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  a prohibition on leaving home from 7 p.m. until 7 a.m. during week-days and the whole day during week-ends, coupled with permission to attend one's work place during week-days ( Trijonis v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005);  a general lockdown in order to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, including a prohibition on leaving home on pain of a fine, except in an exhaustive number of circumstances and on production of a document attesting to valid reasons for doing so ( Terheş v. Romania (dec.), 2021, § 45);  a requirement to report any change of place of residence ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) or to have it registered by the police within a specific time-limit, on pain of a fine ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66; Corley and Others v. Russia, 2021, § 72; Ananiyevy v. Russia [Committee], 2021; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125);  a fine imposed on a foreigner for having stayed overnight outside his registered place of residence ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66);  a prohibition on approaching a specified place (for example, a centre for asylum seekers ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193); a building site ( Cokarić and Others v. Croatia (dec.), 2006); or an abortion clinic ( Van den Dungen v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1995);  a barring and protection order issued in the context of domestic violence, prohibiting a perpetrator from returning to the family home and the surrounding areas for a specified period ( Kurt v. Austria [GC], 2021, §§ 14, 25 and 183);  an inability to enter a specified area of a city, or a prohibition thereof ( Bigliazzi and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2008; Olivieira v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 39; Landvreugd v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 46);  \"kettling\" or containment of a crowd by a police cordon on public-order grounds ( Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012, § 67);  The applicant's retention, upon release, in the courtroom on safety grounds, due to the Vadym Melnyk v. Ukraine aggressive behaviour of the public (, 2022, § 87);  extensive police monitoring of movements between a territorial entity not recognised by the international community and a government-controlled area and within the latter, coupled with the requirement to report to the police before each intended border crossing ( Denizci and Others v. Cyprus, 2001, §§ 403-406);  the inability of internally displaced persons to return to their homes situated on the territory of an entity not recognised by the international community ( Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, §§ 292-301);  restrictions on freedom of movement resulting from the purported \"annexation\" of territory de facto from one State to another and the ensuing transformation (by the respondent State) of the administrative border line into a State border (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], 2020, §§ 500-503);  restrictions on freedom of movement between a territorial entity not recognised by the international community and a government-controlled area stemming from \"borderisation\" process (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Georgia v. Russia (IV) (dec.), 2023);  Alleged abduction and forcible transfer from a territorial entity not recognised by the international community to the State which exercises effective control over that entity (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.) [GC], 2022, §§ 895-898);  police refusal to let the applicant cross the administrative border between two regions ( Timishev v. Russia, 2005, § 44; Gartukayev v. Russia, 2005, § 21);  a transit ban, under legislation implementing UN Security Council Resolutions, imposed on a resident of an enclaved area by the State surrounding it; and the resulting inability to travel Nada v. Switzerland within the country of which the applicant was a national ( [GC], 2012, §§ 198 and 226-228);  an obligation to provide fingerprints when applying for a passport and the subsequent storage of the fingerprints on a microchip in the passport ( Willems v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2021, §§ 23 and 38).", + "post_text": "The following examples provide an illustration of the manner in which the Court can distinguish between deprivation of liberty under Article 5 § 1 and restrictions on liberty of movement within the scope of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4:  While house arrest amounts to deprivation of liberty (see Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2016, § 104; [GC], 2017, § 87), a milder version of this measure can be considered as a restriction of freedom of movement. This was the case in Trijonis v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005, where the applicant's initial house arrest was replaced by a more lenient regime, allowing him to be at his work place during week-days and obliging him to stay at home from 7 p.m. until 7 a.m. during week-days and the whole day during week- ends.  The prohibition on leaving home at night except in the case of necessity (between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.) cannot be equated to house arrest and amounts to an interference with liberty of movement ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 86-88; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125).  In J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, the Court considered that the applicants, asylum seekers, had been deprived of their liberty during the first month of their stay in a \"hotspot\" facility (a migrant reception, identification and registration centre), but that they had been subjected only to a restriction of movement once the facility had become semi-open and they had been allowed out during the day (§ 86).  Special police supervision, together with a compulsory residence order and other associated restrictions, are examined under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, particularly where an applicant is not forced to live within a restricted area, is able to leave home during the day and have a social life, and has never sought permission to travel away from his place of residence ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Pagerie v. France, 2023, §§ 154-158; Raimondo v. Italy Labita v. Italy Guzzardi v. Italy, 1994, § 39; [GC], 2000, § 193). As an exception, in, 1980, the Court held that measures of this nature amounted to a deprivation of liberty. It attached particular significance to the combination of the following factors: the duration of the special supervision (sixteen months), the extremely small size of the area where the applicant had been confined (an unfenced area of 2.5 sq. km on an island, nine-tenths of which was occupied by a prison), the almost permanent supervision to which he had been subjected and the fact that it had been almost completely impossible for him to make social contacts (other than with his near family, fellow \"residents\" subjected to the same measure and supervisory staff) (§ 95).  Nada v. Switzerland In [GC], 2012, the Court examined the prohibition on travel through Switzerland, imposed on the applicant residing in an Italian enclave in the country, on the basis of legislation implementing UN Security Council Resolutions. As a result, the applicant was unable to leave the enclave and travel to any other part of Italy, the country of which he was a national. For the Court, the restrictions on the applicant's freedom of movement did not amount to a \"deprivation of liberty\", even though they had been maintained for a considerable length of time (six years) and the territory of the enclave was small (about 1.6 sq. km). In contrast to the case of Guzzardi v. Italy, 1980, the applicant had not been prevented from freely living and moving within the enclave and receiving visitors. Nor had he been subjected to any surveillance or obliged to report regularly to the police. Furthermore, he had been allowed to seek exemptions from the entry or transit ban and, in any event, Switzerland had the right, under international law, to prevent the entry of an alien (§§ 228-233). While Article 5 § 1 was inapplicable, the restrictions on the applicant's freedom of movement were found to be in breach of Article 8. No complaint was submitted under Article 2 of Protocol no. 4 (a Protocol not ratified by Switzerland).  Ageneral nation-wide lockdown imposed by the authorities to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, including a prohibition on leaving home on pain of a fine, was not deemed to constitute a \"deprivation of liberty\" in view of the level of intensity of the restrictions on the applicant's freedom of movement ( Terheş v. Romania (dec.), 2021, §§ 41-45). In particular, the applicant had been free to leave home for various reasons exhaustively set out in the legislation and could go to different places, at whatever time of day the situation required. He did not claim that his circumstances were not covered by any of those reasons and that he had thus been confined indoors for the entire duration of the lockdown (52 days). Moreover, unlike in the case of Guzzardi v. Italy, 1980, he had not been subject to individual surveillance and did not claim to have been forced to live in a cramped space, nor had he been deprived of all social contact. Hence the conditions of the lockdown could not be equated with house arrest. Article 5 § 1 was inapplicable. As the applicant had focused specifically on Article 5 and had not asserted his rights under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, the Court did not examine the case under the latter provision.  In Austin and Othe rs v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012, the Court examined the \"kettling\" or containment of a crowd by a police cordon on public-order grounds. The coercive nature of the containment, its duration (seven hours), and its effect on the applicants, in terms of physical discomfort (no shelter, food, water or toilet facilities) and inability to leave the area, pointed towards a deprivation of liberty. However, in the particular circumstances, the containment had been the least intrusive and most effective means of preventing injury to people and property from violent demonstrators in dangerous and volatile conditions, which had persisted throughout its duration. The police had kept the situation constantly under close review and made frequent attempts at controlled release. Accordingly, on the specific and exceptional facts, the Court was unable to identify a moment when the containment could be considered to have changed from what had been, at most, a restriction on freedom of movement, to a deprivation of liberty. Had it not remained necessary to maintain the cordon in order to prevent serious injury or damage, the \"type\" of the measure would have been different, and its coercive and restrictive nature might have been sufficient to bring it within Article 5. Article 5 § 1 was inapplicable, and no complaint was submitted under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (a Protocol not ratified by the United Kingdom) (§§ 64-68). The Court reached a similar finding in respect of Article 5 § 1 in Auray and Others v. France*, 2024, §§ 65-74, where it found Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to be applicable (§ 84).  In Vadym Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2022, the Court examined a situation where an applicant had been blocked in the courtroom for about two hours due to aggressive behaviour by the public which was dissatisfied with the court's decision to release him. In the Court's view, given the relatively short duration of the applicant's retention and to the extent that the police officers present in the courtroom had prevented the applicant from leaving immediately, the particular situation must be seen as a restriction on the applicant's freedom of movement rather than a deprivation of liberty. Article 5 did not apply, and the applicant did not raise a complaint under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (§§ 86-89).\n\nThe following situations have been considered to amount to a form of interference with the right to freedom of movement:  a requirement not to leave one's place of residence or another specified area/municipality without permission. This requirement can be imposed:  as part of the bail conditions or as a separate measure in the context of criminal proceedings ( Fedorov and Fedorova v. Russia, 2005, § 35; Antonenkov and Others v. Ukraine, 2005, § 52; Nagy v. Hungary (dec.), 2004; Ivanov v. Ukraine, 2006, § 85; Komarova v. Russia, 2006, § 55; Hajibeyli v. Azerbaijan, 2008, § 58; Rosengren v. Romania, 2008, § 32; Nikiforenko v. Ukraine, 2010, § 55; Pokhalchuk v. Ukraine, 2010, Doroshenko v. Ukraine Manannikov v. Russia § 94;, 2011, § 52;, 2018, § 60);  during bankruptcy proceedings ( Luordo v. Italy, 2003, § 92; Goffi v. Italy, 2005, § 20; Bassani v. Italy Gasser v. Italy Di Carlo et Bonaffini v. Italy, 2003, § 24;, 2006, §§ 30-31; (dec.), 2006; Bova v. Italy (dec.), 2004; Shaw v. Italy, 2009, § 16; Bottaro v. Italy, 2003, § 54; Campagnano v. Italy, 2006, § 38);  in the context of a compulsory military service ( Golub v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [Committee], 2021, §§ 54 and 58);  as a compulsory residence order in the context of:  criminal prevention measures ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 154; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 54 ; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Marturana v. Italy, 2008, § 190; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991; Guzzardi v. Italy, Commission decision, 1977);  extradition ( Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010);  expulsion ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; M v. France, Commission decision, 1984; Kenane v. France, Commission decision, 1992; Kalibi v. France, Commission decision, 1984);  a prohibition on leaving home at night except in case of necessity ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], Pagerie v. France Fanouni v. France Timofeyev and 2017, §§ 86-88;, 2023, § 154;, 2023, § 54; Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, §§ 13 and 39; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  a prohibition on migrants leaving a \"hotspot\" facility at night ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, § 86);  an obligation to report regularly to the court ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) De Tommaso v. Italy Pagerie v. France or the police ( [GC], 2017, §§ 17, 84 and 89;, 2023, § 154; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 54; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Raimondo v. Italy, Labita v. Italy Poninski v. Poland 1994, §§ 13 and 39; [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; (dec.), 2000; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  special police supervision, including the above measures and other associated restrictions (not leaving home without informing a supervising authority, not going to bars, nightclubs, amusement arcades or brothels or attending public meetings, not associating with De individuals who have a criminal record and who are subject to preventive measures) ( Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  a prohibition on leaving home from 7 p.m. until 7 a.m. during week-days and the whole day during week-ends, coupled with permission to attend one's work place during week-days ( Trijonis v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005);  a general lockdown in order to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, including a prohibition on leaving home on pain of a fine, except in an exhaustive number of circumstances and on production of a document attesting to valid reasons for doing so ( Terheş v. Romania (dec.), 2021, § 45);  a requirement to report any change of place of residence ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) or to have it registered by the police within a specific time-limit, on pain of a fine ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66; Corley and Others v. Russia, 2021, § 72; Ananiyevy v. Russia [Committee], 2021; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125);  a fine imposed on a foreigner for having stayed overnight outside his registered place of residence ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66);  a prohibition on approaching a specified place (for example, a centre for asylum seekers ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193); a building site ( Cokarić and Others v. Croatia (dec.), 2006); or an abortion clinic ( Van den Dungen v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1995);  a barring and protection order issued in the context of domestic violence, prohibiting a perpetrator from returning to the family home and the surrounding areas for a specified period ( Kurt v. Austria [GC], 2021, §§ 14, 25 and 183);  an inability to enter a specified area of a city, or a prohibition thereof ( Bigliazzi and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2008; Olivieira v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 39; Landvreugd v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 46);  \"kettling\" or containment of a crowd by a police cordon on public-order grounds ( Auray and Others v. France*, 2024, § 84);  The applicant's retention, upon release, in the courtroom on safety grounds, due to the Vadym Melnyk v. Ukraine aggressive behaviour of the public (, 2022, § 87);  extensive police monitoring of movements between a territorial entity not recognised by the international community and a government-controlled area and within the latter, coupled with the requirement to report to the police before each intended border crossing ( Denizci and Others v. Cyprus, 2001, §§ 403-406);  the inability of internally displaced persons to return to their homes situated on the territory of an entity not recognised by the international community ( Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, §§ 292-301);  restrictions on freedom of movement resulting from the purported \"annexation\" of territory de facto from one State to another and the ensuing transformation (by the respondent State) of the administrative border line into a State border (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], 2020, §§ 500-503);  restrictions on freedom of movement between a territorial entity not recognised by the international community and a government-controlled area stemming from \"borderisation\" process (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Georgia v. Russia (IV) (dec.), 2023);  Alleged abduction and forcible transfer from a territorial entity not recognised by the international community to the State which exercises effective control over that entity (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.) [GC], 2022, §§ 895-898);  police refusal to let the applicant cross the administrative border between two regions ( Timishev v. Russia, 2005, § 44; Gartukayev v. Russia, 2005, § 21);  a transit ban, under legislation implementing UN Security Council Resolutions, imposed on a resident of an enclaved area by the State surrounding it; and the resulting inability to travel Nada v. Switzerland within the country of which the applicant was a national ( [GC], 2012, §§ 198 and 226-228);  an obligation to provide fingerprints when applying for a passport and the subsequent storage of the fingerprints on a microchip in the passport ( Willems v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2021, §§ 23 and 38).\n\nAs a preventive measure likely to affect the fundamental rights and freedoms of peaceful demonstrators, the legal framework regulating the use of the \"kettling\" technique by the police needs to define the rules on its use with sufficient precision, setting out precisely under what circumstances and conditions it could be implemented, how it should be carried out and time-limits for its use ( Auray and Others v. France*, 2024, §§ 91-94).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240217131620/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930065636/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/dbfbd08a4477/20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf", @@ -27992,6 +29548,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2024-02-17__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:40926/16|73942/17", "case_name": "Lypovchenko and Halabudenco v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia*", @@ -28025,6 +29583,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2024-02-17__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:42429/16", "case_name": "Memedova and Others v. North Macedonia", @@ -28058,6 +29618,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-30.json", "case_key": "apps:53891/20", "case_name": "A.E. v. Bulgaria", @@ -28075,8 +29637,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added|paragraph_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.B|a:89|b:89|V.A|a:None|b:113|V.A|a:100|b:100|VI.G|a:256|b:260", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "A specific set of circumstances needs to be proven in domestic violence cases, where the applicant has to show that such violence affects mainly women and that the authorities'actions were not a simple failure or delay in dealing with domestic violence, but amounted to repeatedly condoning such violence and reflected a discriminatory attitude towards the applicant as a woman ( Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013, § 89). For example, in Talpis v. Italy, 2017, the Court considered that the applicant had demonstrated the existence of prima facie discrimination through the conclusions of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences and of the National Statistics Institute. In Opuz v. Turkey, 2009, there were no statistics presented to the Court showing that victims of domestic violence were predominantly women, and indeed it was noted that Amnesty International stated that there were no reliable data to this effect. Rather, the Court was prepared to accept the assessment of Amnesty International, a reputable international NGO and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women that violence against women was a significant problem in Turkey. On the other hand, in Y and Others v. Bulgaria, 2022, the Court held that no concrete evidence had been presented to suggest that the domestic authorities had remained generally complacent in domestic violence cases. It was established that the Bulgarian authorities did not collect or keep comprehensive statistics about the manner in which the law-enforcement authorities handled domestic-violence cases, which was a serious omission already criticized by a number of international actors in the field. In the absence of comprehensive statistics, it was however open to the applicants to attempt to substantiate their assertion with other kinds of prima facie evidence, such as for instance specialised reports. However, the three international reports they submitted urged the Bulgarian authorities to combat any discrimination against women, but they did not in terms state that the police or other authorities were consistently downplaying or unwilling to deal with domestic violence cases, or cite concrete field data on the point. Not having, in addition, established any proof of anti-female bias by the State officials dealing specifically with the victim's case, or problems with the existing legal framework for the protection of women from domestic violence in Bulgaria, the Court found no violation of Article 14 in the case.\n\nThe Court has found that differential treatment on the grounds of sex violated Article 14 in different areas, such as ▪ equality in marriage ( Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, 2004; Burghartz v. Switzerland, 1994); ▪ access to employment ( Emel Boyraz v. Turkey, 2014); ▪ retirement age ( Moraru and Marin v. Romania, 2022); ▪ parental leave and allowances ( Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], 2012; Gruba and Others v. Russia, 2021); ▪ survivor's pensions ( Willis v. the United Kingdom, 2002; Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022); ▪ civic obligations ( Zarb Adami v. Malta, 2006; Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany, 1994); ▪ family reunification ( Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 1985); ▪ children's surnames ( Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy, 2014; León Madrid v. Spain, 2021); or ▪ domestic violence ( Opuz v. Turkey, 2009; Volodina v. Russia, 2019; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021).\n\nThe Court has examined cases of violence based on the victim's ▪ gender ( Opuz v. Turkey, 2009; Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013; Halime Kılıç v. Turkey, 2016; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021); ▪ race and ethnic origin ( Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005; Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2), 2005; Škorjanec v. Croatia, 2017; Makuchyan and Minasyan v. Azerbaijan and Hungary, 2020; Adzhigitova and Others v. Russia, 2021); ▪ religion ( Milanović v. Serbia, 2010; Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, 2007); ▪ political opinion ( Virabyan v. Armenia, 2012); and ▪ sexual orientation ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016).", - "post_text": "A specific set of circumstances needs to be proven in domestic violence cases, where the applicant has to show that such violence affects mainly women and that the authorities'actions were not a simple failure or delay in dealing with domestic violence, but amounted to repeatedly condoning such violence and reflected a discriminatory attitude towards the applicant as a woman ( Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013, § 89). For example, in Talpis v. Italy, 2017, the Court considered that the applicant had demonstrated the existence of prima facie discrimination through the conclusions of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences and of the National Statistics Institute. In Opuz v. Turkey, 2009, there were no statistics presented to the Court showing that victims of domestic violence were predominantly women, and indeed it was noted that Amnesty International stated that there were no reliable data to this effect. Rather, the Court was prepared to accept the assessment of Amnesty International, a reputable international NGO and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women that violence against women was a significant problem in Turkey. On the other hand, in Y and Others v. Bulgaria, 2022, the Court held that no concrete evidence had been presented to suggest that the domestic authorities had remained generally complacent in domestic violence cases. It was established that the Bulgarian authorities did not collect or keep comprehensive statistics about the manner in which the law-enforcement authorities handled domestic-violence cases, which was a serious omission already criticized by a number of international actors in the field. In the absence of comprehensive statistics, it was however open to the applicants to attempt to substantiate their assertion with other kinds of prima facie evidence, such as for instance specialised reports. However, the three international reports they submitted urged the Bulgarian authorities to combat any discrimination against women, but they did not in terms state that the police or other authorities were consistently downplaying or unwilling to deal with domestic violence cases, or cite concrete field data on the point. Not having, in addition, established any proof of anti-female bias by the State officials dealing specifically with the victim's case, or problems with the existing legal framework for the protection of women from domestic violence in Bulgaria, the Court found no violation of Article 14 in the case. In contrast, in A.E. v. Bulgaria, 2023, the Court was satisfied that the evidence brought by the applicant, notably statistics as regards violence against women in Bulgaria, reported by domestic non-governmental organisations and contained in the 2017 EU tool for measuring gender equality and figures provided by the Ministry of Interior in respect of 2019 and 2020 concerning the numbers of women who reported domestic violence, was sufficient to make a prima facie case of discrimination against women, bearing also in mind that that was the third case against Bulgaria in which it found a violation of the Convention stemming from the authorities'response to acts of domestic violence against women (§§ 118-19). The Court considered that the absence of official comprehensive statistics kept by the authorities can no longer be explained as a mere omission on their part, given the level of the problem in Bulgaria and the authorities'related obligation to pay particular attention to the effects of domestic violence on women and to act accordingly (§ 120). The Court found a violation of Article 14 taken together with Article 3, observing that the way in which the legal provisions providing protection against domestic violence were worded and interpreted by the relevant authorities was bound to deprive a number of women victims of domestic violence from official prosecution and thus effective protection (§ 120).\n\nIn A.E. v. Bulgaria, 2023 the applicant, a minor at that time, was victim of domestic violence at the hands of her partner. Based on the statistical evidence submitted by her, which together with the previous cases of domestic violence brought against Bulgaria demonstrated that domestic violence in Bulgaria affected predominantly women (§§ 118-19), the Court considered that the authorities had not shown what specific policies geared towards protecting victims of domestic violence and punishing the offenders they have pursued and to what effect (§ 120) and had not disproved the applicant's prima facie case of a general institutional passivity in matters related to domestic violence in Bulgaria (§ 122).\n\nThe Court has found that differential treatment on the grounds of sex violated Article 14 in different areas, such as: ▪ equality in marriage ( Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, 2004; Burghartz v. Switzerland, 1994; Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye , 2023); ▪ access to employment ( Emel Boyraz v. Turkey, 2014); ▪ retirement age ( Moraru and Marin v. Romania, 2022); ▪ parental leave and allowances ( Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], 2012; Gruba and Others v. Russia, 2021); ▪ survivor's pensions ( Willis v. the United Kingdom, 2002; Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022); ▪ civic obligations ( Zarb Adami v. Malta, 2006; Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany, 1994); ▪ family reunification ( Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 1985); ▪ children's surnames ( Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy, 2014; León Madrid v. Spain, 2021); or ▪ domestic violence ( Opuz v. Turkey, 2009; Volodina v. Russia, 2019; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021; A.E. v. Bulgaria, 2023).\n\nThe Court has examined cases of violence based on the victim's ▪ gender ( Opuz v. Turkey, 2009; Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013; Halime Kılıç v. Turkey, 2016; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021; A.E. v. Bulgaria, 2023); ▪ race and ethnic origin ( Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005; Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2), 2005; Škorjanec v. Croatia, 2017; Makuchyan and Minasyan v. Azerbaijan and Hungary, 2020; Adzhigitova and Others v. Russia, 2021); ▪ religion ( Milanović v. Serbia, 2010; Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, 2007); ▪ political opinion ( Virabyan v. Armenia, 2012); and ▪ sexual orientation ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016).", + "pre_text": "Aspecific set of circumstances needs to be proven in domestic violence cases, where the applicant has to show that such violence affects mainly women and that the authorities'actions were not a simple failure or delay in dealing with domestic violence, but amounted to repeatedly condoning such violence and reflected a discriminatory attitude towards the applicant as a woman ( Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013, § 89). For example, in Talpis v. Italy, 2017, the Court considered that the applicant had demonstrated the existence of prima facie discrimination through the conclusions of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences and of the National Statistics Institute. In Opuz v. Turkey, 2009, there were no statistics presented to the Court showing that victims of domestic violence were predominantly women, and indeed it was noted that Amnesty International stated that there were no reliable data to this effect. Rather, the Court was prepared to accept the assessment of Amnesty International, a reputable international NGO and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women that violence against women was a significant problem in Turkey. On the other hand, in Y and Others v. Bulgaria, 2022, the Court held that no concrete evidence had been presented to suggest that the domestic authorities had remained generally complacent in domestic violence cases. It was established that the Bulgarian authorities did not collect or keep comprehensive statistics about the manner in which the law-enforcement authorities handled domestic-violence cases, which was a serious omission already criticized by a number of international actors in the field. In the absence of comprehensive statistics, it was however open to the applicants to attempt to substantiate their assertion with other kinds of prima facie evidence, such as for instance specialised reports. However, the three international reports they submitted urged the Bulgarian authorities to combat any discrimination against women, but they did not in terms state that the police or other authorities were consistently downplaying or unwilling to deal with domestic violence cases, or cite concrete field data on the point. Not having, in addition, established any proof of anti-female bias by the State officials dealing specifically with the victim's case, or problems with the existing legal framework for the protection of women from domestic violence in Bulgaria, the Court found no violation of Article 14 in the case.\n\nThe Court has found that differential treatment on the grounds of sex violated Article 14 in different areas, such as ▪ equality in marriage ( Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, 2004; Burghartz v. Switzerland, 1994); ▪ access to employment ( Emel Boyraz v. Turkey, 2014); ▪ retirement age ( Moraru and Marin v. Romania, 2022); ▪ parental leave and allowances ( Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], 2012; Gruba and Others v. Russia, 2021); ▪ survivor's pensions ( Willis v. the United Kingdom, 2002; Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022); ▪ civic obligations ( Zarb Adami v. Malta, 2006; Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany, 1994); ▪ family reunification ( Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 1985); ▪ children's surnames ( Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy, 2014; León Madrid v. Spain, 2021); or ▪ domestic violence ( Opuz v. Turkey, 2009; Volodina v. Russia, 2019; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021).\n\nThe Court has examined cases of violence based on the victim's ▪ gender ( Opuz v. Turkey, 2009; Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013; Halime Kılıç v. Turkey, 2016; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021); ▪ race and ethnic origin ( Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005; Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2), 2005; Škorjanec v. Croatia, 2017; Makuchyan and Minasyan v. Azerbaijan and Hungary, 2020; Adzhigitova and Others v. Russia, 2021); ▪ religion ( Milanović v. Serbia, 2010; Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, 2007); ▪ political opinion ( Virabyan v. Armenia, 2012); and ▪ sexual orientation ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016).", + "post_text": "Aspecific set of circumstances needs to be proven in domestic violence cases, where the applicant has to show that such violence affects mainly women and that the authorities'actions were not a simple failure or delay in dealing with domestic violence, but amounted to repeatedly condoning such violence and reflected a discriminatory attitude towards the applicant as a woman ( Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013, § 89). For example, in Talpis v. Italy, 2017, the Court considered that the applicant had demonstrated the existence of prima facie discrimination through the conclusions of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences and of the National Statistics Institute. In Opuz v. Turkey, 2009, there were no statistics presented to the Court showing that victims of domestic violence were predominantly women, and indeed it was noted that Amnesty International stated that there were no reliable data to this effect. Rather, the Court was prepared to accept the assessment of Amnesty International, a reputable international NGO and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women that violence against women was a significant problem in Turkey. On the other hand, in Y and Others v. Bulgaria, 2022, the Court held that no concrete evidence had been presented to suggest that the domestic authorities had remained generally complacent in domestic violence cases. It was established that the Bulgarian authorities did not collect or keep comprehensive statistics about the manner in which the law-enforcement authorities handled domestic-violence cases, which was a serious omission already criticized by a number of international actors in the field. In the absence of comprehensive statistics, it was however open to the applicants to attempt to substantiate their assertion with other kinds of prima facie evidence, such as for instance specialised reports. However, the three international reports they submitted urged the Bulgarian authorities to combat any discrimination against women, but they did not in terms state that the police or other authorities were consistently downplaying or unwilling to deal with domestic violence cases, or cite concrete field data on the point. Not having, in addition, established any proof of anti-female bias by the State officials dealing specifically with the victim's case, or problems with the existing legal framework for the protection of women from domestic violence in Bulgaria, the Court found no violation of Article 14 in the case. In contrast, in A.E. v. Bulgaria, 2023, the Court was satisfied that the evidence brought by the applicant, notably statistics as regards violence against women in Bulgaria, reported by domestic non-governmental organisations and contained in the 2017 EUtool for measuring gender equality and figures provided by the Ministry of Interior in respect of 2019 and 2020 concerning the numbers of women who reported domestic violence, was sufficient to make a prima facie case of discrimination against women, bearing also in mind that that was the third case against Bulgaria in which it found a violation of the Convention stemming from the authorities'response to acts of domestic violence against women (§§ 118-19). The Court considered that the absence of official comprehensive statistics kept by the authorities can no longer be explained as a mere omission on their part, given the level of the problem in Bulgaria and the authorities'related obligation to pay particular attention to the effects of domestic violence on women and to act accordingly (§ 120). The Court found a violation of Article 14 taken together with Article 3, observing that the way in which the legal provisions providing protection against domestic violence were worded and interpreted by the relevant authorities was bound to deprive a number of women victims of domestic violence from official prosecution and thus effective protection (§ 120).\n\nIn A.E. v. Bulgaria, 2023 the applicant, a minor at that time, was victim of domestic violence at the hands of her partner. Based on the statistical evidence submitted by her, which together with the previous cases of domestic violence brought against Bulgaria demonstrated that domestic violence in Bulgaria affected predominantly women (§§ 118-19), the Court considered that the authorities had not shown what specific policies geared towards protecting victims of domestic violence and punishing the offenders they have pursued and to what effect (§ 120) and had not disproved the applicant's prima facie case of a general institutional passivity in matters related to domestic violence in Bulgaria (§ 122).\n\nThe Court has found that differential treatment on the grounds of sex violated Article 14 in different areas, such as: ▪ equality in marriage ( Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, 2004; Burghartz v. Switzerland, 1994; Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye , 2023); ▪ access to employment ( Emel Boyraz v. Turkey, 2014); ▪ retirement age ( Moraru and Marin v. Romania, 2022); ▪ parental leave and allowances ( Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], 2012; Gruba and Others v. Russia, 2021); ▪ survivor's pensions ( Willis v. the United Kingdom, 2002; Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022); ▪ civic obligations ( Zarb Adami v. Malta, 2006; Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany, 1994); ▪ family reunification ( Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 1985); ▪ children's surnames ( Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy, 2014; León Madrid v. Spain, 2021); or ▪ domestic violence ( Opuz v. Turkey, 2009; Volodina v. Russia, 2019; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021; A.E. v. Bulgaria, 2023).\n\nThe Court has examined cases of violence based on the victim's ▪ gender ( Opuz v. Turkey, 2009; Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013; Halime Kılıç v. Turkey, 2016; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021; A.E. v. Bulgaria, 2023); ▪ race and ethnic origin ( Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005; Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2), 2005; Škorjanec v. Croatia, 2017; Makuchyan and Minasyan v. Azerbaijan and Hungary, 2020; Adzhigitova and Others v. Russia, 2021); ▪ religion ( Milanović v. Serbia, 2010; Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, 2007); ▪ political opinion ( Virabyan v. Armenia, 2012); and ▪ sexual orientation ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923093716/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240330045513/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/e12c697e461c/20230923093716__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf", @@ -28091,6 +29653,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-30.json", "case_key": "apps:43651/22", "case_name": "Kovačević v. Bosnia and Herzegovina*", @@ -28124,6 +29688,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-30.json", "case_key": "apps:75135/14", "case_name": "Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine", @@ -28157,6 +29723,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-30.json", "case_key": "apps:39954/09|3465/17", "case_name": "Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia", @@ -28175,7 +29743,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "V.J.3|a:None|b:183|V.J.3|a:173|b:176", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "In 1999 the Court found for the first time a violation of Article 14 on grounds of sexual orientation in a case concerning parental rights ( Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999; see also X v. Poland, 2021). Ever since, it has examined the issue of sexual orientation in a number of other contexts involving ▪ different age of consent under criminal law for homosexual relations ( L. and v. v. Austria, 2003; S.L. v. Austria, 2003; B.B. v. the United Kingdom, 2004; Santos Couto v. Portugal, 2010); ▪ permission to adopt a child ( X and Others v. Austria [GC], 2013; E.B. v. France [GC], 2008; Gas and Dubois v. France, 2012); ▪ the right to succeed to the deceased partner's tenancy ( Karner v. Austria, 2003; Kozak v. Poland, 2010); ▪ social protection ( P.B. and J.S. v. Austria, 2010; Mata Estevez v. Spain (dec.), 2001); ▪ conditions of detention ( X v. Turkey, 2012); ▪ regulations on child maintenance ( J.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2010); ▪ civil unions ( Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], 2013); ▪ marriage ( Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010; Chapin and Charpentier v. France, 2016); ▪ family reunification ( Pajić v. Croatia, 2016; Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy, 2016); ▪ freedom of thought, conscience and religion ( Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2013); ▪ freedom of assembly and association ( Bączkowski a nd Others v. Poland, 2007; Alekseyev and Others v. Russia, 2018; Genderdoc-M v. Moldova, 2012; Zhdanov and Others v. Russia, 2019; Berkman v. Russia, 2020; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021); ▪ protection from homophobic speech or acts of violence and effectiveness of investigation ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020; Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020; Sabalić v. Croatia, 2021 ; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021; Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021; Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022).", - "post_text": "In Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023, the applicants, members of the LGBTI community, complained about negative public statements made by public officials about the LGBTI community. The Court found that the applicants may claim to be victims of a violation the Convention despite the fact that they had not been directly targeted by the contested statements (§ 57). Bearing in mind the history of public hostility towards the LGBTI community in Russia and the increase in homophobic hate crimes, including violent crimes, at the material time, the openly homophobic content and particularly aggressive and hostile tone of the statements, as well as the fact that they were made by influential public figures holding official posts and were published in popular newspapers with a large readership, the Court considered that the contested statements reached the \"threshold of severity\" required to affect the \"private life\" of members of the group (§ § 59-62). On the merits, the Court found that the domestic law contained both civil-law mechanisms and criminal-law provisions for the protection of an individual's private life against stigmatising statements, including homophobic statements (§ 79), but owing to the authorities'approach, those domestic provisions were not applied in the applicants'case, and the requisite protection was not granted to them (§ 85).\n\nIn 1999 the Court found for the first time a violation of Article 14 on grounds of sexual orientation in a case concerning parental rights ( Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999; see also X v. Poland, 2021). Ever since, it has examined the issue of sexual orientation in a number of other contexts involving ▪ different age of consent under criminal law for homosexual relations ( L. and v. v. Austria, 2003; S.L. v. Austria, 2003; B.B. v. the United Kingdom, 2004; Santos Couto v. Portugal, 2010); ▪ permission to adopt a child ( X and Others v. Austria [GC], 2013; E.B. v. France [GC], 2008; Gas and Dubois v. France, 2012); ▪ the right to succeed to the deceased partner's tenancy ( Karner v. Austria, 2003; Kozak v. Poland, 2010); ▪ social protection ( P.B. and J.S. v. Austria, 2010; Mata Estevez v. Spain (dec.), 2001); ▪ conditions of detention ( X v. Turkey, 2012); ▪ regulations on child maintenance ( J.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2010); ▪ civil unions ( Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], 2013; Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine, 2023); ▪ marriage ( Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010; Chapin and Charpentier v. France, 2016); ▪ family reunification ( Pajić v. Croatia, 2016; Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy, 2016); ▪ freedom of thought, conscience and religion ( Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2013); ▪ freedom of assembly and association ( Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007; Alekseyev and Others v. Russia, 2018; Genderdoc-M v. Moldova, 2012; Zhdanov and Others v. Russia, 2019; Berkman v. Russia, 2020; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021); ▪ protection from homophobic speech or acts of violence and effectiveness of investigation ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020; Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020; Sabalić v. Croatia, 2021 ; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021; Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021; Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022; Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023).", + "post_text": "In Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023, the applicants, members of the LGBTIcommunity, complained about negative public statements made by public officials about the LGBTIcommunity. The Court found that the applicants may claim to be victims of a violation the Convention despite the fact that they had not been directly targeted by the contested statements (§ 57). Bearing in mind the history of public hostility towards the LGBTIcommunity in Russia and the increase in homophobic hate crimes, including violent crimes, at the material time, the openly homophobic content and particularly aggressive and hostile tone of the statements, as well as the fact that they were made by influential public figures holding official posts and were published in popular newspapers with a large readership, the Court considered that the contested statements reached the \"threshold of severity\" required to affect the \"private life\" of members of the group (§ § 59-62). On the merits, the Court found that the domestic law contained both civil-law mechanisms and criminal-law provisions for the protection of an individual's private life against stigmatising statements, including homophobic statements (§ 79), but owing to the authorities'approach, those domestic provisions were not applied in the applicants'case, and the requisite protection was not granted to them (§ 85).\n\nIn 1999 the Court found for the first time a violation of Article 14 on grounds of sexual orientation in a case concerning parental rights ( Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999; see also X v. Poland, 2021). Ever since, it has examined the issue of sexual orientation in a number of other contexts involving ▪ different age of consent under criminal law for homosexual relations ( L. and v. v. Austria, 2003; S.L. v. Austria, 2003; B.B. v. the United Kingdom, 2004; Santos Couto v. Portugal, 2010); ▪ permission to adopt a child ( X and Others v. Austria [GC], 2013; E.B. v. France [GC], 2008; Gas and Dubois v. France, 2012); ▪ the right to succeed to the deceased partner's tenancy ( Karner v. Austria, 2003; Kozak v. Poland, 2010); ▪ social protection ( P.B. and J.S. v. Austria, 2010; Mata Estevez v. Spain (dec.), 2001); ▪ conditions of detention ( X v. Turkey, 2012); ▪ regulations on child maintenance ( J.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2010); ▪ civil unions ( Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], 2013; Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine, 2023); ▪ marriage ( Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010; Chapin and Charpentier v. France, 2016); ▪ family reunification ( Pajić v. Croatia, 2016; Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy, 2016); ▪ freedom of thought, conscience and religion ( Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2013); ▪ freedom of assembly and association ( Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007; Alekseyev and Others v. Russia, 2018; Genderdoc-M v. Moldova, 2012; Zhdanov and Others v. Russia, 2019; Berkman v. Russia, 2020; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021); ▪ protection from homophobic speech or acts of violence and effectiveness of investigation ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020; Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020; Sabalić v. Croatia, 2021 ; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021; Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021; Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022; Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923093716/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240330045513/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/e12c697e461c/20230923093716__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf", @@ -28190,6 +29758,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-30.json", "case_key": "apps:27094/20", "case_name": "Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye", @@ -28223,6 +29793,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-30.json", "case_key": "apps:10934/21", "case_name": "Semenya v. Switzerland*", @@ -28256,6 +29828,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-30.json", "case_key": "apps:24408/16", "case_name": "Szolcsán v. Hungary", @@ -28289,6 +29863,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-30", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-30.json", "case_key": "apps:23851/20|24360/20", "case_name": "X and others v. Ireland*", @@ -28322,6 +29898,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:225/20", "case_name": "Džibuti and Others v. Latvia", @@ -28355,6 +29933,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:16760/22", "case_name": "Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*", @@ -28388,6 +29968,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:24225/19", "case_name": "Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia", @@ -28421,6 +30003,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:42429/16", "case_name": "Memedova and Others v. North Macedonia", @@ -28454,6 +30038,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:25226/18", "case_name": "Pająk and Others v. Poland", @@ -28487,6 +30073,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:2412/19", "case_name": "Shylina v. Ukraine*", @@ -28520,6 +30108,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:26104/19", "case_name": "Stott v. the United Kingdom", @@ -28553,6 +30143,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:56928/19", "case_name": "Valiullina and Others v. Latvia", @@ -28560,10 +30152,10 @@ "judgment_year": "2023", "citation_change": "added", "citation_text": "Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, nos. 56928/19 and 2 others, 14 September 2023", - "hudoc_itemid": "", - "hudoc_importance_level": "", - "hudoc_doctype": "", - "hudoc_docname": "", + "hudoc_itemid": "001-226485", + "hudoc_importance_level": "3", + "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", + "hudoc_docname": "VALIULLINA AND OTHERS v. LATVIA", "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", "linked_paragraph_count": 1, "linked_sections": "V.C: Language", @@ -28586,6 +30178,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:43868/18|25883/21", "case_name": "Wa Baile v. Switzerland*", @@ -28619,6 +30213,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:29295/22", "case_name": "Abo v. Estonia (dec.)", @@ -28652,6 +30248,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:81249/17", "case_name": "Allouche v. France", @@ -28685,6 +30283,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:20592/21", "case_name": "Bakradze v. Georgia", @@ -28718,6 +30318,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:71671/16|40190/18", "case_name": "F.M. and Others v. Russia", @@ -28751,6 +30353,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:2669/19", "case_name": "Ferrero Quintana v. Spain", @@ -28784,6 +30388,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:36436/22", "case_name": "I.C. v. the Republic of Moldova*", @@ -28817,6 +30423,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:59180/15", "case_name": "Minasyan and Others v. Armenia", @@ -28834,8 +30442,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added|citation_updated", "linked_paragraph_refs": "V.J.3|a:None|b:190|V.J.3|a:178|b:182", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "In 1999 the Court found for the first time a violation of Article 14 on grounds of sexual orientation in a case concerning parental rights ( Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999; see also X v. Poland, 2021). Ever since, it has examined the issue of sexual orientation in a number of other contexts involving  different age of consent under criminal law for homosexual relations ( L. and v. v. Austria, 2003; S.L. v. Austria, 2003; B.B. v. the United Kingdom, 2004; Santos Couto v. Portugal, 2010);  permission to adopt a child ( X and Others v. Austria [GC], 2013; E.B. v. France [GC], 2008; Gas and Dubois v. France, 2012);  the right to succeed to the deceased partner's tenancy ( Karner v. Austria, 2003; Kozak v. Poland, 2010);  social protection ( P.B. and J.S. v. Austria, 2010; Mata Estevez v. Spain (dec.), 2001);  conditions of detention ( X v. Turkey, 2012);  regulations on child maintenance ( J.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2010);  Vallianatos and Others v. Greece Maymulakhin and Markiv civil unions ( [GC], 2013; v. Ukraine, 2023);  Schalk and Kopf v. A ustria Chapin and Charpentier v. France marriage (, 2010;, 2016);  family reunification ( Pajić v. Croatia, 2016; Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy, 2016);  freedom of thought, conscience and religion ( Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2013);  freedom of assembly and association ( Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007; Alekseyev and Others v. Russia Genderdoc-M v. Moldova Zhdanov and Others v. Russia, 2018;, 2012;, 2019; Berkman v. Russia, 2020; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021);  protection from homophobic speech or acts of violence and effectiveness of investigation ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020; Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020; Sabalić v. Croatia, 2021 ; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021; Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021; Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022; Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023).", - "post_text": "The case of Minasyan and Others v. Armenia, 2025, concerned an online newspaper Article targeting LGBTI rights activists following their public comments challenging a statement of the Armenian Eurovision jury member criticising the victory of a gay cross-dressing man in 2014. The impugned Article had been motivated by hostility against LGBTI persons and the author of the Article had expressly incited the public to commit harmful discriminatory acts against the applicants (§ 66). The Court found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14, because the domestic courts had failed to recognise the article's hostile tone, intentions and impact on the applicants'Convention rights, as well as the discriminatory nature of the impugned statements. They also failed to carry out the requisite balancing of the competing rights in line with the Court's case-law (§§ 69-71). Furthermore, the manner in which the only (civil) remedy available to the applicants had been interpreted and applied in practice had failed to provide them with protection against hate speech and discrimination (§ 71).\n\nIn 1999 the Court found for the first time a violation of Article 14 on grounds of sexual orientation in a case concerning parental rights ( Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999; see also X v. Poland, 2021). Ever since, it has examined the issue of sexual orientation in a number of other contexts involving ▪ different age of consent under criminal law for homosexual relations ( L. and v. v. Austria, 2003; S.L. v. Austria, 2003; B.B. v. the United Kingdom, 2004; Santos Couto v. Portugal, 2010); ▪ permission to adopt a child ( X and Others v. Austria [GC], 2013; E.B. v. France [GC], 2008; Gas and Dubois v. France, 2012); ▪ the right to succeed to the deceased partner's tenancy ( Karner v. Austria, 2003; Kozak v. Poland, 2010); ▪ social protection ( P.B. and J.S. v. Austria, 2010; Mata Estevez v. Spain (dec.), 2001); ▪ conditions of detention ( X v. Turkey, 2012); ▪ regulations on child maintenance ( J.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2010); ▪ civil unions ( Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], 2013; Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine, 2023); ▪ marriage ( Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010; Chapin and Charpentier v. France, 2016); ▪ family reunification ( Pajić v. Croatia, 2016; Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy, 2016); ▪ freedom of thought, conscience and religion ( Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2013); ▪ freedom of assembly and association ( Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007; Alekseyev and Others v. Russia, 2018; Genderdoc-M v. Moldova, 2012; Zhdanov and Others v. Russia, 2019; Berkman v. Russia, 2020; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021); ▪ protection from homophobic speech or acts of violence and effectiveness of investigation ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020; Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020; Sabalić v. Croatia, 2021 ; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021; Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021; Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022; Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023; Minasyan and Others v. Armenia, 2025).", + "pre_text": "In 1999 the Court found for the first time a violation of Article 14 on grounds of sexual orientation in a case concerning parental rights ( Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999; see also X v. Poland, 2021). Ever since, it has examined the issue of sexual orientation in a number of other contexts involving  different age of consent under criminal law for homosexual relations ( L. and v. v. Austria, 2003; S.L. v. Austria, 2003; B.B. v. the United Kingdom, 2004; Santos Couto v. Portugal, 2010);  permission to adopt a child ( X and Others v. Austria [GC], 2013; E.B. v. France [GC], 2008; Gas and Dubois v. France, 2012);  the right to succeed to the deceased partner's tenancy ( Karner v. Austria, 2003; Kozak v. Poland, 2010);  social protection ( P.B. and J.S. v. Austria, 2010; Mata Estevez v. Spain (dec.), 2001);  conditions of detention ( X v. Turkey, 2012);  regulations on child maintenance ( J.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2010);  Vallianatos and Others v. Greece Maymulakhin and Markiv civil unions ( [GC], 2013; v. Ukraine, 2023);  Schalk and Kopf v. Austria Chapin and Charpentier v. France marriage (, 2010;, 2016);  family reunification ( Pajić v. Croatia, 2016; Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy, 2016);  freedom of thought, conscience and religion ( Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2013);  freedom of assembly and association ( Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007; Alekseyev and Others v. Russia Genderdoc-M v. Moldova Zhdanov and Others v. Russia, 2018;, 2012;, 2019; Berkman v. Russia, 2020; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021);  protection from homophobic speech or acts of violence and effectiveness of investigation ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020; Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020; Sabalić v. Croatia, 2021 ; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021; Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021; Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022; Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023).", + "post_text": "The case of Minasyan and Others v. Armenia, 2025, concerned an online newspaper Article targeting LGBTIrights activists following their public comments challenging a statement of the Armenian Eurovision jury member criticising the victory of a gay cross-dressing man in 2014. The impugned Article had been motivated by hostility against LGBTIpersons and the author of the Article had expressly incited the public to commit harmful discriminatory acts against the applicants (§ 66). The Court found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14, because the domestic courts had failed to recognise the article's hostile tone, intentions and impact on the applicants'Convention rights, as well as the discriminatory nature of the impugned statements. They also failed to carry out the requisite balancing of the competing rights in line with the Court's case-law (§§ 69-71). Furthermore, the manner in which the only (civil) remedy available to the applicants had been interpreted and applied in practice had failed to provide them with protection against hate speech and discrimination (§ 71).\n\nIn 1999 the Court found for the first time a violation of Article 14 on grounds of sexual orientation in a case concerning parental rights ( Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999; see also X v. Poland, 2021). Ever since, it has examined the issue of sexual orientation in a number of other contexts involving ▪ different age of consent under criminal law for homosexual relations ( L. and v. v. Austria, 2003; S.L. v. Austria, 2003; B.B. v. the United Kingdom, 2004; Santos Couto v. Portugal, 2010); ▪ permission to adopt a child ( X and Others v. Austria [GC], 2013; E.B. v. France [GC], 2008; Gas and Dubois v. France, 2012); ▪ the right to succeed to the deceased partner's tenancy ( Karner v. Austria, 2003; Kozak v. Poland, 2010); ▪ social protection ( P.B. and J.S. v. Austria, 2010; Mata Estevez v. Spain (dec.), 2001); ▪ conditions of detention ( X v. Turkey, 2012); ▪ regulations on child maintenance ( J.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2010); ▪ civil unions ( Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], 2013; Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine, 2023); ▪ marriage ( Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010; Chapin and Charpentier v. France, 2016); ▪ family reunification ( Pajić v. Croatia, 2016; Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy, 2016); ▪ freedom of thought, conscience and religion ( Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2013); ▪ freedom of assembly and association ( Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007; Alekseyev and Others v. Russia, 2018; Genderdoc-M v. Moldova, 2012; Zhdanov and Others v. Russia, 2019; Berkman v. Russia, 2020; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021); ▪ protection from homophobic speech or acts of violence and effectiveness of investigation ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020; Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020; Sabalić v. Croatia, 2021 ; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021; Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021; Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022; Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023; Minasyan and Others v. Armenia, 2025).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930063628/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250523211809/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/e12c697e461c/20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf", @@ -28850,6 +30458,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:37614/22", "case_name": "S. v. the Czech Republic", @@ -28883,6 +30493,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:29359/22", "case_name": "Salay v. Slovakia*", @@ -28916,6 +30528,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:13968/22", "case_name": "Spišák v. the Czech Republic", @@ -28949,6 +30563,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:38963/18", "case_name": "V.I. v. the Republic of Moldova", @@ -28982,6 +30598,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:17106/18", "case_name": "Vieru v. the Republic of Moldova", @@ -29015,6 +30633,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-05-23", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json", "case_key": "apps:42917/16", "case_name": "Zăicescu and Fălticineanu v. Romania", @@ -29048,6 +30668,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:4677/20", "case_name": "A.A. v. Sweden", @@ -29081,6 +30703,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:4262/17", "case_name": "Ansari v. Portugal (dec.)", @@ -29099,7 +30723,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.A.5|a:None|b:80", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "In Ansari v. Portugal (dec.), 2023, the Court dealt with the scenario where the applicant had been extradited following diplomatic assurances, which were later allegedly not complied with and the domestic courts of the respondent State later revoked the extradition decision because the authorities of the State to which the applicant had been extradited had prosecuted him on charges other than those in respect of which the extradition had been authorised. The applicant was detained in the State to which he had been extradited when he lodged his application to the Court, by which he complained that the authorities of the respondent State had not taken the necessary measures to help him return to the respondent State or to ensure that the diplomatic assurances were complied with. The Court found that the domestic authorities had taken the measures at their disposal to follow up on the applicant's allegations (see also Boumediiene and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), 2008, where the applicants, who had been handed over by the authorities of the respondent State to US forces and were later detained in Guantanamo Bay, alleged that the authorities of the respondent State had failed to enforce judicial decisions ordering the authorities to protect the rights, and obtain the return, of the applicants).", + "post_text": "In Ansari v. Portugal (dec.), 2023, the Court dealt with the scenario where the applicant had been extradited following diplomatic assurances, which were later allegedly not complied with and the domestic courts of the respondent State later revoked the extradition decision because the authorities of the State to which the applicant had been extradited had prosecuted him on charges other than those in respect of which the extradition had been authorised. The applicant was detained in the State to which he had been extradited when he lodged his application to the Court, by which he complained that the authorities of the respondent State had not taken the necessary measures to help him return to the respondent State or to ensure that the diplomatic assurances were complied with. The Court found that the domestic authorities had taken the measures at their disposal to follow up on the applicant's allegations (see also Boumediiene and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), 2008, where the applicants, who had been handed over by the authorities of the respondent State to USforces and were later detained in Guantanamo Bay, alleged that the authorities of the respondent State had failed to enforce judicial decisions ordering the authorities to protect the rights, and obtain the return, of the applicants).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923171143/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331051847/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/e19a063de5b3/20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf", @@ -29114,6 +30738,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:24917/15", "case_name": "Asady and Others v. Slovakia", @@ -29147,6 +30773,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:8757/20", "case_name": "Azzaqui v. the Netherlands", @@ -29180,6 +30808,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:13258/18", "case_name": "B.F. and Others v. Switzerland", @@ -29213,6 +30843,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:9839/22", "case_name": "Bijan Balahan v. Sweden", @@ -29230,8 +30862,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.A.5|a:76|b:77", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two- stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez- Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. A distinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving \"whole life prisoners\" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC].", - "post_text": "Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two- stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez- Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. A distinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving \"whole life prisoners\" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2022, Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, 2023, and Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), 2023.", + "pre_text": "Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two- stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez- Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. Adistinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving \"whole life prisoners\" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC].", + "post_text": "Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two- stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez- Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. Adistinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving \"whole life prisoners\" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2022, Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, 2023, and Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), 2023.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923171143/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331051847/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/e19a063de5b3/20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf", @@ -29246,6 +30878,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:38703/06", "case_name": "Boumediiene and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.)", @@ -29253,10 +30887,10 @@ "judgment_year": "2008", "citation_change": "added", "citation_text": "Boumediiene and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), nos. 38703/06 and 5 others, 18 November 2008", - "hudoc_itemid": "", - "hudoc_importance_level": "", - "hudoc_doctype": "", - "hudoc_docname": "", + "hudoc_itemid": "001-89925", + "hudoc_importance_level": "3", + "hudoc_doctype": "HEDEC", + "hudoc_docname": "BOUMEDIIENE AND OTHERS v. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA", "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", "linked_paragraph_count": 1, "linked_sections": "III.A.5: Extradition", @@ -29264,7 +30898,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.A.5|a:None|b:80", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "In Ansari v. Portugal (dec.), 2023, the Court dealt with the scenario where the applicant had been extradited following diplomatic assurances, which were later allegedly not complied with and the domestic courts of the respondent State later revoked the extradition decision because the authorities of the State to which the applicant had been extradited had prosecuted him on charges other than those in respect of which the extradition had been authorised. The applicant was detained in the State to which he had been extradited when he lodged his application to the Court, by which he complained that the authorities of the respondent State had not taken the necessary measures to help him return to the respondent State or to ensure that the diplomatic assurances were complied with. The Court found that the domestic authorities had taken the measures at their disposal to follow up on the applicant's allegations (see also Boumediiene and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), 2008, where the applicants, who had been handed over by the authorities of the respondent State to US forces and were later detained in Guantanamo Bay, alleged that the authorities of the respondent State had failed to enforce judicial decisions ordering the authorities to protect the rights, and obtain the return, of the applicants).", + "post_text": "In Ansari v. Portugal (dec.), 2023, the Court dealt with the scenario where the applicant had been extradited following diplomatic assurances, which were later allegedly not complied with and the domestic courts of the respondent State later revoked the extradition decision because the authorities of the State to which the applicant had been extradited had prosecuted him on charges other than those in respect of which the extradition had been authorised. The applicant was detained in the State to which he had been extradited when he lodged his application to the Court, by which he complained that the authorities of the respondent State had not taken the necessary measures to help him return to the respondent State or to ensure that the diplomatic assurances were complied with. The Court found that the domestic authorities had taken the measures at their disposal to follow up on the applicant's allegations (see also Boumediiene and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), 2008, where the applicants, who had been handed over by the authorities of the respondent State to USforces and were later detained in Guantanamo Bay, alleged that the authorities of the respondent State had failed to enforce judicial decisions ordering the authorities to protect the rights, and obtain the return, of the applicants).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923171143/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331051847/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/e19a063de5b3/20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf", @@ -29279,6 +30913,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:49255/22", "case_name": "Camara v. Belgium", @@ -29312,6 +30948,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:13869/22", "case_name": "Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.)", @@ -29329,8 +30967,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.A.5|a:76|b:77", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two- stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez- Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. A distinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving \"whole life prisoners\" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC].", - "post_text": "Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two- stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez- Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. A distinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving \"whole life prisoners\" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2022, Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, 2023, and Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), 2023.", + "pre_text": "Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two- stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez- Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. Adistinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving \"whole life prisoners\" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC].", + "post_text": "Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two- stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez- Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. Adistinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving \"whole life prisoners\" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2022, Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, 2023, and Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), 2023.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923171143/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331051847/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/e19a063de5b3/20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf", @@ -29345,6 +30983,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:21768/19", "case_name": "Ghadamian v. Switzerland", @@ -29378,6 +31018,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:21329/18", "case_name": "J.A. and Others v. Italy", @@ -29411,6 +31053,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:15297/09", "case_name": "Kanagaratnam and Others v. Belgium", @@ -29444,6 +31088,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:70583/17", "case_name": "M.A. v. Italy", @@ -29477,6 +31123,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:34016/18", "case_name": "O.D. v. Bulgaria", @@ -29510,6 +31158,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:61365/16", "case_name": "S.E. v. Serbia", @@ -29543,6 +31193,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-03-31", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json", "case_key": "apps:74762/01", "case_name": "Mahdid and Haddar v. Austria (dec.)", @@ -29576,6 +31228,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json", "case_key": "apps:12427/22", "case_name": "A.D. v. Malta", @@ -29609,6 +31263,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json", "case_key": "apps:18911/17", "case_name": "A.E. and Others v. Italy", @@ -29642,6 +31298,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json", "case_key": "apps:3566/16", "case_name": "Alkhatib and Others v. Greece", @@ -29675,6 +31333,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json", "case_key": "apps:12510/18", "case_name": "Dabo v. Sweden", @@ -29708,6 +31368,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json", "case_key": "apps:30919/20", "case_name": "H.A. v. the United Kingdom", @@ -29725,8 +31387,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "minor_edit|citation_updated", "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.A.1|a:50|b:52|III.A.1|a:63|b:65", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "The right to political asylum is not contained in either the Convention or its Protocols and the Court does not itself examine the actual asylum application or verify how the States honour their obligations under the 1951 Geneva Convention or European Union law ( F.G. v. Sweden [GC], 2016, § 117; Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, 2011, §§ 212 and 226). However, the expulsion of an alien by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Articles 2 and 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question, if deported, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 in the destination country. In these circumstances, Articles 2 and 3 imply an obligation not to deport the person in question to that country ( F.G. v. Sweden, §§ 110-111). The same level of scrutiny applies to all claims of a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 regardless of the legal basis for the removal (whether extradition or expulsion, Khasanov and Rakhmanov v. Russia [GC], 2022, §94). Removal cases concerning Article 2 - notably in respect of the risk of the applicant being subjected to the death penalty - typically also raise issues under Article 3 (see section \" The death penalty: Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 13 \" below): because the relevant principles are the same for Article 2 and Article 3 assessments in removal cases, the Court either finds the issues under both Articles indissociable and examines them together (see F.G. v. Sweden [GC], 2016, § 110; L.M. and Others v. Russia, 2015, § 108) or deals with the Article 2 complaint in the context of the related main complaint under Article 3 (see J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2011, § 37).\n\nThe Court has developed ample case-law in respect of all of the above-mentioned principles. By way of example, in respect of the weight attributed to country material see Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, 2011, §§ 230-234; in respect of the assessment of an applicant's credibility see N. v. Finland, 2005; A.F. v. France, 2015, and M.O. v. Switzerland, 2017; and in respect of the domestic authorities'obligation to assess the relevance, authenticity and probative value of documents put forward by an applicant - from the outset or later on - which relate to the core of their protection claims see M.D. and M.A. v. Belgium, 2016; Singh and Others v. Belgium, 2012, and M.A. v. Switzerland, 2014; for a combination of elements leading to the conclusion that the assessment of the individual risk of a journalist was insufficient see S.H. v. Malta, 2022. Again by way of example, see Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, 2011, where the Court determined the situation in the country of destination to be such that the removal would breach Article 3, having regard to the situation of general violence in Mogadishu and the lack of safe access to, and the dire conditions in, IDP camps; see Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 2007, as regards a risk assessment in respect of an applicant who belonged to a group which is systematically at risk, and T.K. and Others v. Lithuania, 2022, for a case in which the Court considered that the domestic authorities had not carried out an adequate assessment of the existence of the practice of ill-treatment of persons who were ordinary members of a banned opposition political party (a group of which one applicant (the husband/father of the family) was a member and which the applicants alleged to be systematically at risk of ill-treatment), as well as R v. France, 2022, where the Court rejected the vulnerable group approach as regards the expulsion of a Chechen convicted of terrorist offences in France (§ 122); with regard to various forms and scenarios of gender-related persecution, such as widespread sexual violence ( M.M.R. v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2016), the alleged lack of a male support network ( R.H. v. Sweden, 2015), ill-treatment of a separated woman ( N. v. Sweden ), 2010, ill-treatment inflicted by family members in view of a relationship ( R.D. v. France, 2016, §§ 36-45), honour killings and forced marriage ( A.A. and Others v. Sweden, 2012), and female genital mutilation ( R.B.A.B. v. the Netherlands, 2016; Sow v. Belgium, 2016). As regards forced prostitution and/or return to a human trafficking network see L.O. v. France (dec.), 2015. In V.F. v. France (dec.), 2011, the Court assessed the risk under Article 4, while leaving open the extraterritorial applicability of that Article: in this latter respect, the case of M.O. v. Switzerland, 2017, concerned the risk of forced labour upon removal and the Article 4 complaint was inadmissible due to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.", - "post_text": "The right to political asylum is not contained in either the Convention or its Protocols and the Court does not itself examine the actual asylum application or verify how the States honour their obligations under the 1951 Geneva Convention or European Union law ( F.G. v. Sweden [GC], 2016, § 117; H.A. v. the United Kingdom, 2023, §§ 41-42; Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, 2011, §§ 212 and 226). However, the expulsion of an alien by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Articles 2 and 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question, if deported, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 in the destination country. In these circumstances, Articles 2 and 3 imply an obligation not to deport the person in question to that country ( F.G. v. Sweden, §§ 110-111). The same level of scrutiny applies to all claims of a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 regardless of the legal basis for the removal (whether extradition or Khasanov and Rakhmanov v. Russia expulsion, [GC], 2022, §94). Removal cases concerning Article 2 - notably in respect of the risk of the applicant being subjected to the death penalty - typically also raise issues under Article 3 (see section \"The death penalty: Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 13\" below): because the relevant principles are the same for Article 2 and Article 3 assessments in removal cases, the Court either finds the issues under both Articles indissociable and examines them together (see F.G. v. Sweden [GC], 2016, § 110; L.M. and Others v. Russia, 2015, § 108) or deals with the Article 2 complaint in the context of the related main complaint under Article 3 (see J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2011, § 37).\n\nThe Court has developed ample case-law in respect of all of the above-mentioned principles. By way of example, in respect of the weight attributed to country material see Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, 2011, §§ 230-234; in respect of the assessment of an applicant's credibility see N. v. Finland, A.F. v. France M.O. v. Switzerland 2005;, 2015, and, 2017; and in respect of the domestic authorities' obligation to assess the relevance, authenticity and probative value of documents put forward by an applicant - from the outset or later on - which relate to the core of their protection claims see M.D. and M.A. v. Belgium, 2016; Singh and Others v. Belgium, 2012, and M.A. v. Switzerland, 2014; for a combination of elements leading to the conclusion that the assessment of the individual risk of a journalist was insufficient see S.H. v. Malta, 2022. Again by way of example, see Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, 2011, where the Court determined the situation in the country of destination to be such that the removal would breach Article 3, having regard to the situation of general violence in Mogadishu and the lack of safe access to, and the dire conditions in, IDP camps; see Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 2007, as regards a risk assessment in respect of an applicant who belonged to a group which is systematically at risk, and T.K. and Others v. Lithuania, 2022, for a case in which the Court considered that the domestic authorities had not carried out an adequate assessment of the existence of the practice of ill-treatment of persons who were ordinary members of a banned opposition political party (a group of which one applicant (the husband/father of the family) was a member and which the applicants alleged to be systematically at risk of ill-treatment), as well as R v. France, 2022, where the Court rejected the vulnerable group approach as regards the expulsion of a Chechen convicted of terrorist offences in France (§ 122); for a case concerning an alleged risk on account of attempts to recruit the applicant to extremist armed groups if he were returned to a refugee camp see H.A. v. the United Kingdom, 2023; with regard to various forms and scenarios of gender-related persecution, such as widespread sexual violence ( M.M.R. v. the Netherlands (dec.), R.H. v. Sweden 2016), the alleged lack of a male support network (, 2015), ill-treatment of a separated woman ( N. v. Sweden, 2010), ill-treatment inflicted by family members in view of a relationship ( R.D. v. France, 2016, §§ 36-45), honour killings and forced marriage ( A.A. and Others v. Sweden, 2012), and female genital mutilation ( R.B.A.B. v. the Netherlands, 2016; Sow v. Belgium, 2016). As regards forced prostitution and/or return to a human trafficking network see L.O. v. France (dec.), 2015. In V.F. v. France (dec.), 2011, the Court assessed the risk under Article 4, while leaving open the extraterritorial applicability of that Article: in this latter respect, the case of M.O. v. Switzerland, 2017, concerned the risk of forced labour upon removal and the Article 4 complaint was inadmissible due to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.", + "pre_text": "The right to political asylum is not contained in either the Convention or its Protocols and the Court does not itself examine the actual asylum application or verify how the States honour their obligations under the 1951 Geneva Convention or European Union law ( F.G. v. Sweden [GC], 2016, § 117; Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, 2011, §§ 212 and 226). However, the expulsion of an alien by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Articles 2 and 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question, if deported, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 in the destination country. In these circumstances, Articles 2 and 3 imply an obligation not to deport the person in question to that country ( F.G. v. Sweden, §§ 110-111). The same level of scrutiny applies to all claims of a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 regardless of the legal basis for the removal (whether extradition or expulsion, Khasanov and Rakhmanov v. Russia [GC], 2022, §94). Removal cases concerning Article 2 - notably in respect of the risk of the applicant being subjected to the death penalty - typically also raise issues under Article 3 (see section \" The death penalty: Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 13 \" below): because the relevant principles are the same for Article 2 and Article 3 assessments in removal cases, the Court either finds the issues under both Articles indissociable and examines them together (see F.G. v. Sweden [GC], 2016, § 110; L.M. and Others v. Russia, 2015, § 108) or deals with the Article 2 complaint in the context of the related main complaint under Article 3 (see J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2011, § 37).\n\nThe Court has developed ample case-law in respect of all of the above-mentioned principles. By way of example, in respect of the weight attributed to country material see Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, 2011, §§ 230-234; in respect of the assessment of an applicant's credibility see N. v. Finland, 2005; A.F. v. France, 2015, and M.O. v. Switzerland, 2017; and in respect of the domestic authorities'obligation to assess the relevance, authenticity and probative value of documents put forward by an applicant - from the outset or later on - which relate to the core of their protection claims see M.D. and M.A. v. Belgium, 2016; Singh and Others v. Belgium, 2012, and M.A. v. Switzerland, 2014; for a combination of elements leading to the conclusion that the assessment of the individual risk of a journalist was insufficient see S.H. v. Malta, 2022. Again by way of example, see Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, 2011, where the Court determined the situation in the country of destination to be such that the removal would breach Article 3, having regard to the situation of general violence in Mogadishu and the lack of safe access to, and the dire conditions in, IDPcamps; see Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 2007, as regards a risk assessment in respect of an applicant who belonged to a group which is systematically at risk, and T.K. and Others v. Lithuania, 2022, for a case in which the Court considered that the domestic authorities had not carried out an adequate assessment of the existence of the practice of ill-treatment of persons who were ordinary members of a banned opposition political party (a group of which one applicant (the husband/father of the family) was a member and which the applicants alleged to be systematically at risk of ill-treatment), as well as R v. France, 2022, where the Court rejected the vulnerable group approach as regards the expulsion of a Chechen convicted of terrorist offences in France (§ 122); with regard to various forms and scenarios of gender-related persecution, such as widespread sexual violence ( M.M.R. v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2016), the alleged lack of a male support network ( R.H. v. Sweden, 2015), ill-treatment of a separated woman ( N. v. Sweden ), 2010, ill-treatment inflicted by family members in view of a relationship ( R.D. v. France, 2016, §§ 36-45), honour killings and forced marriage ( A.A. and Others v. Sweden, 2012), and female genital mutilation ( R.B.A.B. v. the Netherlands, 2016; Sow v. Belgium, 2016). As regards forced prostitution and/or return to a human trafficking network see L.O. v. France (dec.), 2015. In V.F. v. France (dec.), 2011, the Court assessed the risk under Article 4, while leaving open the extraterritorial applicability of that Article: in this latter respect, the case of M.O. v. Switzerland, 2017, concerned the risk of forced labour upon removal and the Article 4 complaint was inadmissible due to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.", + "post_text": "The right to political asylum is not contained in either the Convention or its Protocols and the Court does not itself examine the actual asylum application or verify how the States honour their obligations under the 1951 Geneva Convention or European Union law ( F.G. v. Sweden [GC], 2016, § 117; H.A. v. the United Kingdom, 2023, §§ 41-42; Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, 2011, §§ 212 and 226). However, the expulsion of an alien by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Articles 2 and 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question, if deported, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 in the destination country. In these circumstances, Articles 2 and 3 imply an obligation not to deport the person in question to that country ( F.G. v. Sweden, §§ 110-111). The same level of scrutiny applies to all claims of a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 regardless of the legal basis for the removal (whether extradition or Khasanov and Rakhmanov v. Russia expulsion, [GC], 2022, §94). Removal cases concerning Article 2 - notably in respect of the risk of the applicant being subjected to the death penalty - typically also raise issues under Article 3 (see section \"The death penalty: Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 13\" below): because the relevant principles are the same for Article 2 and Article 3 assessments in removal cases, the Court either finds the issues under both Articles indissociable and examines them together (see F.G. v. Sweden [GC], 2016, § 110; L.M. and Others v. Russia, 2015, § 108) or deals with the Article 2 complaint in the context of the related main complaint under Article 3 (see J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2011, § 37).\n\nThe Court has developed ample case-law in respect of all of the above-mentioned principles. By way of example, in respect of the weight attributed to country material see Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, 2011, §§ 230-234; in respect of the assessment of an applicant's credibility see N. v. Finland, A.F. v. France M.O. v. Switzerland 2005;, 2015, and, 2017; and in respect of the domestic authorities' obligation to assess the relevance, authenticity and probative value of documents put forward by an applicant - from the outset or later on - which relate to the core of their protection claims see M.D. and M.A. v. Belgium, 2016; Singh and Others v. Belgium, 2012, and M.A. v. Switzerland, 2014; for a combination of elements leading to the conclusion that the assessment of the individual risk of a journalist was insufficient see S.H. v. Malta, 2022. Again by way of example, see Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, 2011, where the Court determined the situation in the country of destination to be such that the removal would breach Article 3, having regard to the situation of general violence in Mogadishu and the lack of safe access to, and the dire conditions in, IDPcamps; see Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 2007, as regards a risk assessment in respect of an applicant who belonged to a group which is systematically at risk, and T.K. and Others v. Lithuania, 2022, for a case in which the Court considered that the domestic authorities had not carried out an adequate assessment of the existence of the practice of ill-treatment of persons who were ordinary members of a banned opposition political party (a group of which one applicant (the husband/father of the family) was a member and which the applicants alleged to be systematically at risk of ill-treatment), as well as R v. France, 2022, where the Court rejected the vulnerable group approach as regards the expulsion of a Chechen convicted of terrorist offences in France (§ 122); for a case concerning an alleged risk on account of attempts to recruit the applicant to extremist armed groups if he were returned to a refugee camp see H.A. v. the United Kingdom, 2023; with regard to various forms and scenarios of gender-related persecution, such as widespread sexual violence ( M.M.R. v. the Netherlands (dec.), R.H. v. Sweden 2016), the alleged lack of a male support network (, 2015), ill-treatment of a separated woman ( N. v. Sweden, 2010), ill-treatment inflicted by family members in view of a relationship ( R.D. v. France, 2016, §§ 36-45), honour killings and forced marriage ( A.A. and Others v. Sweden, 2012), and female genital mutilation ( R.B.A.B. v. the Netherlands, 2016; Sow v. Belgium, 2016). As regards forced prostitution and/or return to a human trafficking network see L.O. v. France (dec.), 2015. In V.F. v. France (dec.), 2011, the Court assessed the risk under Article 4, while leaving open the extraterritorial applicability of that Article: in this latter respect, the case of M.O. v. Switzerland, 2017, concerned the risk of forced labour upon removal and the Article 4 complaint was inadmissible due to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331051847/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240904075051/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/e19a063de5b3/20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf", @@ -29741,6 +31403,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json", "case_key": "apps:80206/17", "case_name": "J.A. and A.A. v. Türkiye*", @@ -29774,6 +31438,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json", "case_key": "apps:10940/17|15977/17", "case_name": "M.H. and S.B. v. Hungary*", @@ -29791,8 +31457,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_updated|reformulation", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.C.3.a|a:33|b:35|II.C.3.a|a:34|b:36", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "The immigration detention of children and adults with specific vulnerabilities will not be in conformity with Article 5 § 1(f) if the aim pursued by detention can be achieved by other less coercive measures, requiring the domestic authorities to consider alternatives to detention in the light of the specific circumstances of the individual case (as regards children: A.B. and Others v. France, 2016, § 123; Nikoghosyan and Others v. Poland, 2022, § 86; and Rahimi v. Greece, 2011, §§ 108-110; as regards an adult with a medical condition: Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, 2011; see also O.M. v. Hungary, 2016, § 53, with a view to the assessment of the vulnerability of the applicant, an LGBTI asylum-seeker, under Article 5 § 1(b)). The authorities'failure to conduct a proper assessment to determine less coercive alternatives to detention has led the Court to find a violation of Article 5 § 1 in respect of children ( Rahimi v. Greece, 2011, §§ 109-110; Popov v. France, 2012, § 119; A.B. and Others v. France, 2016, § 124; H.A and Others v. Greece, 2019, §§ 206-207; M.D. and A.D. v. France, 2021, § 89; Nikoghosyan and Others v. Poland, 2022, §§ 87-88) In certain cases concerning accompanied children, in which the authorities had dismissed the possibility of resorting to a less coercive measure on account of the accompanying parent's actions, the Court found no violation of Article 5 § 1 on the basis that the authorities had effectively investigated whether the detention was a measure of last resort for which no alternative was available ( A.M. and Others v. France, 2016, §§ 67-69; R.C. and V.C. v. France, 2016, §§ 55-57). Where children are detained with an accompanying parent and the detention decision is only issued against the parent, but not the children, the detention of the children is in breach of Article 5 § 1 ( Minasian and Others v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 40-42). Detaining children in inappropriate conditions within the meaning of Article 3, may of itself lead to a breach of Article 5 § 1, irrespective of whether the children were accompanied by their parents or not ( G.B. and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 151; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, § 239). Depending on the circumstances, the Court has found a violation in respect of the children, but not in respect of the accompanying parents in certain cases ( Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, 2010), whereas it also found a violation of Article 5 § 1 in respect of the accompanying parents in other cases ( Nikoghosyan and Others v. Poland, 2022, M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021).\n\nFor children and adults with specific vulnerabilities to be able to have the benefit of the additional safeguards against arbitrary detention which apply to them, they should have access to an assessment of their vulnerability and be informed about respective procedures (see Thimothawes v. Belgium, 2017, and Abdi Mahamud v. Malta, 2016). Lack of active steps and delays in conducting the vulnerability assessment may be a factor in raising serious doubts as to the authorities'good faith ( Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, 2016; Abdi Mahamud v. Malta, 2016).", - "post_text": "The immigration detention of children and adults with specific vulnerabilities will not be in conformity with Article 5 § 1(f) if the aim pursued by detention can be achieved by other less coercive measures, requiring the domestic authorities to consider alternatives to detention in the light of the specific circumstances of the individual case (as regards children: A.B. and Others v. France, 2016, § 123; Nikoghosyan and Others v. Poland, 2022, § 86; and Rahimi v. Greece, 2011, §§ 108-110; as regards an adult with a medical condition: Yoh- Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, 2011; see also O.M. v. Hungary, 2016, § 53, with a view to the assessment of the vulnerability of the applicant, an LGBTI asylum-seeker, under Article 5 § 1(b)). The authorities' failure to conduct a proper assessment to determine less coercive alternatives to detention has led the Court to find a violation of Article 5 § 1 in respect of children ( Rahimi v. Greece, 2011, §§ 109-110; Popov v. France, 2012, § 119; A.B. and Others v. France, 2016, § 124; H.A and Others v. Greece, 2019, §§ 206-207; M.D. and A.D. v. France, 2021, § 89; Nikoghosyan and Others v. Poland, 2022, §§ 87-88) In certain cases concerning accompanied children, in which the authorities had dismissed the possibility of resorting to a less coercive measure on account of the accompanying parent's actions, the Court found no violation of Article 5 § 1 on the basis that the authorities had effectively investigated whether the detention was A.M. and Others v. France a measure of last resort for which no alternative was available (, 2016, §§ 67-69; R.C. and V.C. v. France, 2016, §§ 55-57). Even where the domestic authorities established that no less coercive measure could be resorted to and the conditions of detention are satisfactory, the detention of migrant children can be justified under Article 5 § 1(f) only for a short period ( M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, § 237; M.H. and S.B. v. Hungary*, 2024, § 76). Where children are detained with an accompanying parent and the detention decision is only issued against the parent, but not the children, the detention of the children is in breach of Article 5 § 1 ( Minasian and Others v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 40-42). Detaining children in inappropriate conditions within the meaning of Article 3, may of itself lead to a breach of Article 5 § 1, irrespective of whether the children were accompanied by their parents or not ( G.B. and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 151; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, § 239). Depending on the circumstances, the Court has found a violation in respect of the children, but not in respect of the accompanying parents in certain cases ( Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, 2010), whereas it also found a violation of Article 5 § 1 in respect of the accompanying parents in other cases ( Nikoghosyan and Others v. Poland, 2022, M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021).\n\nFor children and adults with specific vulnerabilities to be able to have the benefit of the additional safeguards against arbitrary detention which apply to them, they should have access to an assessment of their vulnerability and be informed about respective procedures (see Thimothawes v. Belgium, 2017, and Abdi Mahamud v. Malta, 2016). An individual is presumed to be a minor - which renders these additional safeguards applicable - if he or she claims to be a minor and there are no indications that this claim is unfounded or unreasonable, until a final age-assessment decision is taken ( A.D. v. Malta, 2023, §§ 74 and 190, and see \"Reception conditions, age-assessment procedures and freedom of movement\" below). Where an individual initially claimed to be an adult and subsequently claims to be a minor, the authorities might have legitimate concerns as to the reliability of the individual's statements that he or she is a minor and thus reasonably refrain from placing the individual in a children's facility immediately after those statements have been made ( M.H. and S.B. v. Hungary*, 2024, § 75). However, the mere fact that an individual initially claimed to be an adult cannot justify dismissing his or her later claim to be a minor without taking appropriate measures to verify his or her age, as there might be understandable reasons prompting a migrant child not to reveal his or her real age, such as not being sure of it or a fear of being separated from a group or an adult relative ( M.H. and S.B. v. Hungary*, 2024, § 75). Lack of active steps and delays in conducting the vulnerability assessment may be a factor in raising serious doubts as to the authorities' good faith ( Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, 2016; Abdi Mahamud v. Malta, 2016). The same holds true if the burden of rebutting the presumption that they are adults is placed on the detained asylum- seekers, as obtaining the necessary evidence to prove their age could be challenging and potentially M.H. and S.B. v. Hungary* impossible (, 2024, §§ 77-80).", + "pre_text": "The immigration detention of children and adults with specific vulnerabilities will not be in conformity with Article 5 § 1(f) if the aim pursued by detention can be achieved by other less coercive measures, requiring the domestic authorities to consider alternatives to detention in the light of the specific circumstances of the individual case (as regards children: A.B. and Others v. France, 2016, § 123; Nikoghosyan and Others v. Poland, 2022, § 86; and Rahimi v. Greece, 2011, §§ 108-110; as regards an adult with a medical condition: Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, 2011; see also O.M. v. Hungary, 2016, § 53, with a view to the assessment of the vulnerability of the applicant, an LGBTIasylum-seeker, under Article 5 § 1(b)). The authorities'failure to conduct a proper assessment to determine less coercive alternatives to detention has led the Court to find a violation of Article 5 § 1 in respect of children ( Rahimi v. Greece, 2011, §§ 109-110; Popov v. France, 2012, § 119; A.B. and Others v. France, 2016, § 124; H.A and Others v. Greece, 2019, §§ 206-207; M.D. and A.D. v. France, 2021, § 89; Nikoghosyan and Others v. Poland, 2022, §§ 87-88) In certain cases concerning accompanied children, in which the authorities had dismissed the possibility of resorting to a less coercive measure on account of the accompanying parent's actions, the Court found no violation of Article 5 § 1 on the basis that the authorities had effectively investigated whether the detention was a measure of last resort for which no alternative was available ( A.M. and Others v. France, 2016, §§ 67-69; R.C. and V.C. v. France, 2016, §§ 55-57). Where children are detained with an accompanying parent and the detention decision is only issued against the parent, but not the children, the detention of the children is in breach of Article 5 § 1 ( Minasian and Others v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 40-42). Detaining children in inappropriate conditions within the meaning of Article 3, may of itself lead to a breach of Article 5 § 1, irrespective of whether the children were accompanied by their parents or not ( G.B. and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 151; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, § 239). Depending on the circumstances, the Court has found a violation in respect of the children, but not in respect of the accompanying parents in certain cases ( Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, 2010), whereas it also found a violation of Article 5 § 1 in respect of the accompanying parents in other cases ( Nikoghosyan and Others v. Poland, 2022, M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021).\n\nFor children and adults with specific vulnerabilities to be able to have the benefit of the additional safeguards against arbitrary detention which apply to them, they should have access to an assessment of their vulnerability and be informed about respective procedures (see Thimothawes v. Belgium, 2017, and Abdi Mahamud v. Malta, 2016). Lack of active steps and delays in conducting the vulnerability assessment may be a factor in raising serious doubts as to the authorities'good faith ( Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, 2016; Abdi Mahamud v. Malta, 2016).", + "post_text": "The immigration detention of children and adults with specific vulnerabilities will not be in conformity with Article 5 § 1(f) if the aim pursued by detention can be achieved by other less coercive measures, requiring the domestic authorities to consider alternatives to detention in the light of the specific circumstances of the individual case (as regards children: A.B. and Others v. France, 2016, § 123; Nikoghosyan and Others v. Poland, 2022, § 86; and Rahimi v. Greece, 2011, §§ 108-110; as regards an adult with a medical condition: Yoh- Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, 2011; see also O.M. v. Hungary, 2016, § 53, with a view to the assessment of the vulnerability of the applicant, an LGBTIasylum-seeker, under Article 5 § 1(b)). The authorities' failure to conduct a proper assessment to determine less coercive alternatives to detention has led the Court to find a violation of Article 5 § 1 in respect of children ( Rahimi v. Greece, 2011, §§ 109-110; Popov v. France, 2012, § 119; A.B. and Others v. France, 2016, § 124; H.A and Others v. Greece, 2019, §§ 206-207; M.D. and A.D. v. France, 2021, § 89; Nikoghosyan and Others v. Poland, 2022, §§ 87-88) In certain cases concerning accompanied children, in which the authorities had dismissed the possibility of resorting to a less coercive measure on account of the accompanying parent's actions, the Court found no violation of Article 5 § 1 on the basis that the authorities had effectively investigated whether the detention was A.M. and Others v. France a measure of last resort for which no alternative was available (, 2016, §§ 67-69; R.C. and V.C. v. France, 2016, §§ 55-57). Even where the domestic authorities established that no less coercive measure could be resorted to and the conditions of detention are satisfactory, the detention of migrant children can be justified under Article 5 § 1(f) only for a short period ( M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, § 237; M.H. and S.B. v. Hungary*, 2024, § 76). Where children are detained with an accompanying parent and the detention decision is only issued against the parent, but not the children, the detention of the children is in breach of Article 5 § 1 ( Minasian and Others v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 40-42). Detaining children in inappropriate conditions within the meaning of Article 3, may of itself lead to a breach of Article 5 § 1, irrespective of whether the children were accompanied by their parents or not ( G.B. and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 151; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, § 239). Depending on the circumstances, the Court has found a violation in respect of the children, but not in respect of the accompanying parents in certain cases ( Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, 2010), whereas it also found a violation of Article 5 § 1 in respect of the accompanying parents in other cases ( Nikoghosyan and Others v. Poland, 2022, M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021).\n\nFor children and adults with specific vulnerabilities to be able to have the benefit of the additional safeguards against arbitrary detention which apply to them, they should have access to an assessment of their vulnerability and be informed about respective procedures (see Thimothawes v. Belgium, 2017, and Abdi Mahamud v. Malta, 2016). An individual is presumed to be a minor - which renders these additional safeguards applicable - if he or she claims to be a minor and there are no indications that this claim is unfounded or unreasonable, until a final age-assessment decision is taken ( A.D. v. Malta, 2023, §§ 74 and 190, and see \"Reception conditions, age-assessment procedures and freedom of movement\" below). Where an individual initially claimed to be an adult and subsequently claims to be a minor, the authorities might have legitimate concerns as to the reliability of the individual's statements that he or she is a minor and thus reasonably refrain from placing the individual in a children's facility immediately after those statements have been made ( M.H. and S.B. v. Hungary*, 2024, § 75). However, the mere fact that an individual initially claimed to be an adult cannot justify dismissing his or her later claim to be a minor without taking appropriate measures to verify his or her age, as there might be understandable reasons prompting a migrant child not to reveal his or her real age, such as not being sure of it or a fear of being separated from a group or an adult relative ( M.H. and S.B. v. Hungary*, 2024, § 75). Lack of active steps and delays in conducting the vulnerability assessment may be a factor in raising serious doubts as to the authorities' good faith ( Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, 2016; Abdi Mahamud v. Malta, 2016). The same holds true if the burden of rebutting the presumption that they are adults is placed on the detained asylum- seekers, as obtaining the necessary evidence to prove their age could be challenging and potentially M.H. and S.B. v. Hungary* impossible (, 2024, §§ 77-80).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331051847/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240904075051/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/e19a063de5b3/20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf", @@ -29807,6 +31473,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json", "case_key": "apps:24650/19", "case_name": "O.R. v. Greece", @@ -29840,6 +31508,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json", "case_key": "apps:56417/19|44245/20", "case_name": "S.S. and Others v. Hungary", @@ -29873,6 +31543,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json", "case_key": "apps:37967/18", "case_name": "Shahzad v. Hungary (no. 2)", @@ -29906,6 +31578,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json", "case_key": "apps:18787/17", "case_name": "W.A. and Others v. Italy", @@ -29939,6 +31613,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json", "case_key": "apps:48883/07", "case_name": "Mathloom v. Greece", @@ -29956,8 +31632,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_updated", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.C.1|a:30|b:32", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention allows States to control the liberty of aliens in an immigration context in two different situations: the first limb of that provision permits the detention of an asylum- seeker or other immigrant prior to the State's grant of authorisation to enter (for the second limb, see section \" Restrictions of freedom of movement and detention for purposes of removal \" below). The question as to when the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) ceases to apply, because the individual has been granted formal authorisation to enter or stay, is largely dependent on national law ( Suso Musa v. Malta, 2013, § 97; see also O.M. v. Hungary, 2016, where the detention of the asylum-seeking applicant was consequently examined under Article 5 § 1(b), since domestic law created a more favourable position than required by the Convention, with the result that the Court did not consider it necessary to address the lawfulness of the detention under Article 5 § 1(f); and Muhammad Saqawat v. Belgium, 2020, §§ 47 and 49, as to the impact of EU law on domestic law). Such detention must be compatible with the overall purpose and requirements of Article 5, notably its lawfulness, including the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law. However, compliance with domestic law is not sufficient, since a deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still be arbitrary ( Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 67). In the case of massive arrivals of asylum-seekers at State borders, subject to the prohibition of arbitrariness, the lawfulness requirement of Article 5 may be considered generally satisfied by a domestic legal regime that provides, for example, for no more than the name of the authority competent to order deprivation of liberty in a transit zone, the form of the order, its possible grounds and limits, the maximum duration of the confinement and, as required by Article 5 § 4, the applicable avenue of judicial appeal ( Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019, § 162). The requirement of lawfulness was an issue, for example, where the detention was based on an administrative circular ( Amuur v. France, 1996, where the legal basis was not accessible to the public ( Nolan and K. v. Russia, and Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016: readmission agreement) or where no maximum period of detention was laid down in legislation ( Mathloom v. Greece, 2012). In Nabil and Others v. Hungary, 2015, the domestic courts had not duly assessed whether the conditions set out in domestic law for the prolongation of the detention - falling under the second limb of Article 5 § 1(f) - were met.", - "post_text": "Detention under the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) must be compatible with the overall purpose and requirements of Article 5, notably its lawfulness, including the obligation to conform to the Saadi v. the United Kingdom substantive and procedural rules of national law ( [GC], 2008, § 67; for an example where the lawfulness requirement was not met, see Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 97-108). While a test of the necessity of the detention is not, as such, required under Article 5 § 1(f), such test may be required under domestic legislation when, for example, transposing EU law ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, § 111, and Muhammad Saqawat v. Belgium, 2020, §§ 47-49). In the case of massive arrivals of asylum-seekers at State borders, subject to the prohibition of arbitrariness, the lawfulness requirement of Article 5 may be considered generally satisfied by a domestic legal regime that provides, for example, for no more than the name of the authority competent to order deprivation of liberty in a transit zone, the form of the order, its possible grounds and limits, the maximum duration of the confinement and, as required by Article 5 § 4, the applicable avenue of Z.A. and Others v. Russia judicial appeal ( [GC], 2019, § 162).", + "pre_text": "Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention allows States to control the liberty of aliens in an immigration context in two different situations: the first limb of that provision permits the detention of an asylum- seeker or other immigrant prior to the State's grant of authorisation to enter (for the second limb, see section \" Restrictions of freedom of movement and detention for purposes of removal \" below). The question as to when the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) ceases to apply, because the individual has been granted formal authorisation to enter or stay, is largely dependent on national law ( Suso Musa v. Malta, 2013, § 97; see also O.M. v. Hungary, 2016, where the detention of the asylum-seeking applicant was consequently examined under Article 5 § 1(b), since domestic law created a more favourable position than required by the Convention, with the result that the Court did not consider it necessary to address the lawfulness of the detention under Article 5 § 1(f); and Muhammad Saqawat v. Belgium, 2020, §§ 47 and 49, as to the impact of EUlaw on domestic law). Such detention must be compatible with the overall purpose and requirements of Article 5, notably its lawfulness, including the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law. However, compliance with domestic law is not sufficient, since a deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still be arbitrary ( Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 67). In the case of massive arrivals of asylum-seekers at State borders, subject to the prohibition of arbitrariness, the lawfulness requirement of Article 5 may be considered generally satisfied by a domestic legal regime that provides, for example, for no more than the name of the authority competent to order deprivation of liberty in a transit zone, the form of the order, its possible grounds and limits, the maximum duration of the confinement and, as required by Article 5 § 4, the applicable avenue of judicial appeal ( Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019, § 162). The requirement of lawfulness was an issue, for example, where the detention was based on an administrative circular ( Amuur v. France, 1996, where the legal basis was not accessible to the public ( Nolan and K. v. Russia, and Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016: readmission agreement) or where no maximum period of detention was laid down in legislation ( Mathloom v. Greece, 2012). In Nabil and Others v. Hungary, 2015, the domestic courts had not duly assessed whether the conditions set out in domestic law for the prolongation of the detention - falling under the second limb of Article 5 § 1(f) - were met.", + "post_text": "Detention under the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) must be compatible with the overall purpose and requirements of Article 5, notably its lawfulness, including the obligation to conform to the Saadi v. the United Kingdom substantive and procedural rules of national law ( [GC], 2008, § 67; for an example where the lawfulness requirement was not met, see Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 97-108). While a test of the necessity of the detention is not, as such, required under Article 5 § 1(f), such test may be required under domestic legislation when, for example, transposing EUlaw ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, § 111, and Muhammad Saqawat v. Belgium, 2020, §§ 47-49). In the case of massive arrivals of asylum-seekers at State borders, subject to the prohibition of arbitrariness, the lawfulness requirement of Article 5 may be considered generally satisfied by a domestic legal regime that provides, for example, for no more than the name of the authority competent to order deprivation of liberty in a transit zone, the form of the order, its possible grounds and limits, the maximum duration of the confinement and, as required by Article 5 § 4, the applicable avenue of Z.A. and Others v. Russia judicial appeal ( [GC], 2019, § 162).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331051847/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240904075051/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/e19a063de5b3/20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf", @@ -29972,6 +31648,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json", "case_key": "apps:62116/12", "case_name": "Nabil and Others v. Hungary", @@ -29989,8 +31667,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_updated", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.C.1|a:30|b:32", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention allows States to control the liberty of aliens in an immigration context in two different situations: the first limb of that provision permits the detention of an asylum- seeker or other immigrant prior to the State's grant of authorisation to enter (for the second limb, see section \" Restrictions of freedom of movement and detention for purposes of removal \" below). The question as to when the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) ceases to apply, because the individual has been granted formal authorisation to enter or stay, is largely dependent on national law ( Suso Musa v. Malta, 2013, § 97; see also O.M. v. Hungary, 2016, where the detention of the asylum-seeking applicant was consequently examined under Article 5 § 1(b), since domestic law created a more favourable position than required by the Convention, with the result that the Court did not consider it necessary to address the lawfulness of the detention under Article 5 § 1(f); and Muhammad Saqawat v. Belgium, 2020, §§ 47 and 49, as to the impact of EU law on domestic law). Such detention must be compatible with the overall purpose and requirements of Article 5, notably its lawfulness, including the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law. However, compliance with domestic law is not sufficient, since a deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still be arbitrary ( Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 67). In the case of massive arrivals of asylum-seekers at State borders, subject to the prohibition of arbitrariness, the lawfulness requirement of Article 5 may be considered generally satisfied by a domestic legal regime that provides, for example, for no more than the name of the authority competent to order deprivation of liberty in a transit zone, the form of the order, its possible grounds and limits, the maximum duration of the confinement and, as required by Article 5 § 4, the applicable avenue of judicial appeal ( Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019, § 162). The requirement of lawfulness was an issue, for example, where the detention was based on an administrative circular ( Amuur v. France, 1996, where the legal basis was not accessible to the public ( Nolan and K. v. Russia, and Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016: readmission agreement) or where no maximum period of detention was laid down in legislation ( Mathloom v. Greece, 2012). In Nabil and Others v. Hungary, 2015, the domestic courts had not duly assessed whether the conditions set out in domestic law for the prolongation of the detention - falling under the second limb of Article 5 § 1(f) - were met.", - "post_text": "Detention under the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) must be compatible with the overall purpose and requirements of Article 5, notably its lawfulness, including the obligation to conform to the Saadi v. the United Kingdom substantive and procedural rules of national law ( [GC], 2008, § 67; for an example where the lawfulness requirement was not met, see Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 97-108). While a test of the necessity of the detention is not, as such, required under Article 5 § 1(f), such test may be required under domestic legislation when, for example, transposing EU law ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, § 111, and Muhammad Saqawat v. Belgium, 2020, §§ 47-49). In the case of massive arrivals of asylum-seekers at State borders, subject to the prohibition of arbitrariness, the lawfulness requirement of Article 5 may be considered generally satisfied by a domestic legal regime that provides, for example, for no more than the name of the authority competent to order deprivation of liberty in a transit zone, the form of the order, its possible grounds and limits, the maximum duration of the confinement and, as required by Article 5 § 4, the applicable avenue of Z.A. and Others v. Russia judicial appeal ( [GC], 2019, § 162).", + "pre_text": "Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention allows States to control the liberty of aliens in an immigration context in two different situations: the first limb of that provision permits the detention of an asylum- seeker or other immigrant prior to the State's grant of authorisation to enter (for the second limb, see section \" Restrictions of freedom of movement and detention for purposes of removal \" below). The question as to when the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) ceases to apply, because the individual has been granted formal authorisation to enter or stay, is largely dependent on national law ( Suso Musa v. Malta, 2013, § 97; see also O.M. v. Hungary, 2016, where the detention of the asylum-seeking applicant was consequently examined under Article 5 § 1(b), since domestic law created a more favourable position than required by the Convention, with the result that the Court did not consider it necessary to address the lawfulness of the detention under Article 5 § 1(f); and Muhammad Saqawat v. Belgium, 2020, §§ 47 and 49, as to the impact of EUlaw on domestic law). Such detention must be compatible with the overall purpose and requirements of Article 5, notably its lawfulness, including the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law. However, compliance with domestic law is not sufficient, since a deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still be arbitrary ( Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 67). In the case of massive arrivals of asylum-seekers at State borders, subject to the prohibition of arbitrariness, the lawfulness requirement of Article 5 may be considered generally satisfied by a domestic legal regime that provides, for example, for no more than the name of the authority competent to order deprivation of liberty in a transit zone, the form of the order, its possible grounds and limits, the maximum duration of the confinement and, as required by Article 5 § 4, the applicable avenue of judicial appeal ( Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019, § 162). The requirement of lawfulness was an issue, for example, where the detention was based on an administrative circular ( Amuur v. France, 1996, where the legal basis was not accessible to the public ( Nolan and K. v. Russia, and Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016: readmission agreement) or where no maximum period of detention was laid down in legislation ( Mathloom v. Greece, 2012). In Nabil and Others v. Hungary, 2015, the domestic courts had not duly assessed whether the conditions set out in domestic law for the prolongation of the detention - falling under the second limb of Article 5 § 1(f) - were met.", + "post_text": "Detention under the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) must be compatible with the overall purpose and requirements of Article 5, notably its lawfulness, including the obligation to conform to the Saadi v. the United Kingdom substantive and procedural rules of national law ( [GC], 2008, § 67; for an example where the lawfulness requirement was not met, see Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 97-108). While a test of the necessity of the detention is not, as such, required under Article 5 § 1(f), such test may be required under domestic legislation when, for example, transposing EUlaw ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, § 111, and Muhammad Saqawat v. Belgium, 2020, §§ 47-49). In the case of massive arrivals of asylum-seekers at State borders, subject to the prohibition of arbitrariness, the lawfulness requirement of Article 5 may be considered generally satisfied by a domestic legal regime that provides, for example, for no more than the name of the authority competent to order deprivation of liberty in a transit zone, the form of the order, its possible grounds and limits, the maximum duration of the confinement and, as required by Article 5 § 4, the applicable avenue of Z.A. and Others v. Russia judicial appeal ( [GC], 2019, § 162).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331051847/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240904075051/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/e19a063de5b3/20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf", @@ -30005,6 +31683,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "29 February 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json", "case_key": "apps:2512/04", "case_name": "Nolan and K. v. Russia", @@ -30022,8 +31702,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_updated|section_moved", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.C.1|a:30|b:32|III.E|a:95|b:97", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention allows States to control the liberty of aliens in an immigration context in two different situations: the first limb of that provision permits the detention of an asylum- seeker or other immigrant prior to the State's grant of authorisation to enter (for the second limb, see section \" Restrictions of freedom of movement and detention for purposes of removal \" below). The question as to when the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) ceases to apply, because the individual has been granted formal authorisation to enter or stay, is largely dependent on national law ( Suso Musa v. Malta, 2013, § 97; see also O.M. v. Hungary, 2016, where the detention of the asylum-seeking applicant was consequently examined under Article 5 § 1(b), since domestic law created a more favourable position than required by the Convention, with the result that the Court did not consider it necessary to address the lawfulness of the detention under Article 5 § 1(f); and Muhammad Saqawat v. Belgium, 2020, §§ 47 and 49, as to the impact of EU law on domestic law). Such detention must be compatible with the overall purpose and requirements of Article 5, notably its lawfulness, including the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law. However, compliance with domestic law is not sufficient, since a deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still be arbitrary ( Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 67). In the case of massive arrivals of asylum-seekers at State borders, subject to the prohibition of arbitrariness, the lawfulness requirement of Article 5 may be considered generally satisfied by a domestic legal regime that provides, for example, for no more than the name of the authority competent to order deprivation of liberty in a transit zone, the form of the order, its possible grounds and limits, the maximum duration of the confinement and, as required by Article 5 § 4, the applicable avenue of judicial appeal ( Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019, § 162). The requirement of lawfulness was an issue, for example, where the detention was based on an administrative circular ( Amuur v. France, 1996, where the legal basis was not accessible to the public ( Nolan and K. v. Russia, and Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016: readmission agreement) or where no maximum period of detention was laid down in legislation ( Mathloom v. Greece, 2012). In Nabil and Others v. Hungary, 2015, the domestic courts had not duly assessed whether the conditions set out in domestic law for the prolongation of the detention - falling under the second limb of Article 5 § 1(f) - were met.\n\nIn so far as a measure relating to the continuation of the applicant's residence in a given State is imposed in connection with the exercise of the right to freedom of religion, such measure may disclose an interference with Article 9 of the Convention (see Nolan and K. v. Russia, 2009, § 62). The enforced departure of lawfully resident foreign religious workers for reasons connected to their religious work has been found to breach Article 9 of the Convention ( Corley and Others v. Russia, 2021, §§ 79-89). Where an individual claimed that on return to his own country he would be impeded in his religious worship, the Court did not rule out the possibility that the responsibility of the returning State might in exceptional circumstances be engaged under Article 9 of the Convention where the person concerned ran a real risk of flagrant violation of that Article in the receiving State, but found that it would be difficult to visualise a case in which a sufficiently flagrant violation of Article 9 would not also involve treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention ( Z and T v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2006, and see M.A.M. v. Switzerland, 2022, § 84).", - "post_text": "Detention under the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) must be compatible with the overall purpose and requirements of Article 5, notably its lawfulness, including the obligation to conform to the Saadi v. the United Kingdom substantive and procedural rules of national law ( [GC], 2008, § 67; for an example where the lawfulness requirement was not met, see Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 97-108). While a test of the necessity of the detention is not, as such, required under Article 5 § 1(f), such test may be required under domestic legislation when, for example, transposing EU law ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, § 111, and Muhammad Saqawat v. Belgium, 2020, §§ 47-49). In the case of massive arrivals of asylum-seekers at State borders, subject to the prohibition of arbitrariness, the lawfulness requirement of Article 5 may be considered generally satisfied by a domestic legal regime that provides, for example, for no more than the name of the authority competent to order deprivation of liberty in a transit zone, the form of the order, its possible grounds and limits, the maximum duration of the confinement and, as required by Article 5 § 4, the applicable avenue of Z.A. and Others v. Russia judicial appeal ( [GC], 2019, § 162).\n\nIn so far as a measure relating to the continuation of the applicant's residence in a given State is imposed in connection with the exercise of the right to freedom of religion, such measure may disclose an interference with Article 9 of the Convention (see Nolan and K. v. Russia, 2009, § 62). The enforced departure of lawfully resident foreign religious workers for reasons connected to their religious work has been found to breach Article 9 of the Convention ( Corley and Others v. Russia, 2021, §§ 79-89). Where an individual claimed that on return to his own country he would be impeded in his religious worship, the Court did not rule out the possibility that the responsibility of the returning State might in exceptional circumstances be engaged under Article 9 of the Convention where the person concerned ran a real risk of flagrant violation of that Article in the receiving State, but found that it would be difficult to visualise a case in which a sufficiently flagrant violation of Article 9 would not also involve treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention ( Z and T v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2006, and see M.A.M. v. Switzerland, 2022, § 84).", + "pre_text": "Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention allows States to control the liberty of aliens in an immigration context in two different situations: the first limb of that provision permits the detention of an asylum- seeker or other immigrant prior to the State's grant of authorisation to enter (for the second limb, see section \" Restrictions of freedom of movement and detention for purposes of removal \" below). The question as to when the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) ceases to apply, because the individual has been granted formal authorisation to enter or stay, is largely dependent on national law ( Suso Musa v. Malta, 2013, § 97; see also O.M. v. Hungary, 2016, where the detention of the asylum-seeking applicant was consequently examined under Article 5 § 1(b), since domestic law created a more favourable position than required by the Convention, with the result that the Court did not consider it necessary to address the lawfulness of the detention under Article 5 § 1(f); and Muhammad Saqawat v. Belgium, 2020, §§ 47 and 49, as to the impact of EUlaw on domestic law). Such detention must be compatible with the overall purpose and requirements of Article 5, notably its lawfulness, including the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law. However, compliance with domestic law is not sufficient, since a deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still be arbitrary ( Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 67). In the case of massive arrivals of asylum-seekers at State borders, subject to the prohibition of arbitrariness, the lawfulness requirement of Article 5 may be considered generally satisfied by a domestic legal regime that provides, for example, for no more than the name of the authority competent to order deprivation of liberty in a transit zone, the form of the order, its possible grounds and limits, the maximum duration of the confinement and, as required by Article 5 § 4, the applicable avenue of judicial appeal ( Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019, § 162). The requirement of lawfulness was an issue, for example, where the detention was based on an administrative circular ( Amuur v. France, 1996, where the legal basis was not accessible to the public ( Nolan and K. v. Russia, and Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016: readmission agreement) or where no maximum period of detention was laid down in legislation ( Mathloom v. Greece, 2012). In Nabil and Others v. Hungary, 2015, the domestic courts had not duly assessed whether the conditions set out in domestic law for the prolongation of the detention - falling under the second limb of Article 5 § 1(f) - were met.\n\nIn so far as a measure relating to the continuation of the applicant's residence in a given State is imposed in connection with the exercise of the right to freedom of religion, such measure may disclose an interference with Article 9 of the Convention (see Nolan and K. v. Russia, 2009, § 62). The enforced departure of lawfully resident foreign religious workers for reasons connected to their religious work has been found to breach Article 9 of the Convention ( Corley and Others v. Russia, 2021, §§ 79-89). Where an individual claimed that on return to his own country he would be impeded in his religious worship, the Court did not rule out the possibility that the responsibility of the returning State might in exceptional circumstances be engaged under Article 9 of the Convention where the person concerned ran a real risk of flagrant violation of that Article in the receiving State, but found that it would be difficult to visualise a case in which a sufficiently flagrant violation of Article 9 would not also involve treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention ( Z and T v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2006, and see M.A.M. v. Switzerland, 2022, § 84).", + "post_text": "Detention under the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) must be compatible with the overall purpose and requirements of Article 5, notably its lawfulness, including the obligation to conform to the Saadi v. the United Kingdom substantive and procedural rules of national law ( [GC], 2008, § 67; for an example where the lawfulness requirement was not met, see Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 97-108). While a test of the necessity of the detention is not, as such, required under Article 5 § 1(f), such test may be required under domestic legislation when, for example, transposing EUlaw ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, § 111, and Muhammad Saqawat v. Belgium, 2020, §§ 47-49). In the case of massive arrivals of asylum-seekers at State borders, subject to the prohibition of arbitrariness, the lawfulness requirement of Article 5 may be considered generally satisfied by a domestic legal regime that provides, for example, for no more than the name of the authority competent to order deprivation of liberty in a transit zone, the form of the order, its possible grounds and limits, the maximum duration of the confinement and, as required by Article 5 § 4, the applicable avenue of Z.A. and Others v. Russia judicial appeal ( [GC], 2019, § 162).\n\nIn so far as a measure relating to the continuation of the applicant's residence in a given State is imposed in connection with the exercise of the right to freedom of religion, such measure may disclose an interference with Article 9 of the Convention (see Nolan and K. v. Russia, 2009, § 62). The enforced departure of lawfully resident foreign religious workers for reasons connected to their religious work has been found to breach Article 9 of the Convention ( Corley and Others v. Russia, 2021, §§ 79-89). Where an individual claimed that on return to his own country he would be impeded in his religious worship, the Court did not rule out the possibility that the responsibility of the returning State might in exceptional circumstances be engaged under Article 9 of the Convention where the person concerned ran a real risk of flagrant violation of that Article in the receiving State, but found that it would be difficult to visualise a case in which a sufficiently flagrant violation of Article 9 would not also involve treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention ( Z and T v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2006, and see M.A.M. v. Switzerland, 2022, § 84).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240331051847/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240904075051/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/e19a063de5b3/20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf", @@ -30038,6 +31718,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:2559/23", "case_name": "A.B. and Y.W. v. Malta*", @@ -30071,6 +31753,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:15457/20", "case_name": "A.C. v. France*", @@ -30104,6 +31788,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:22283/21", "case_name": "A.D. and Others v. Sweden", @@ -30137,6 +31823,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:15783/21", "case_name": "A.R.E. v. Greece*", @@ -30170,6 +31858,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:29295/22", "case_name": "Abo v. Estonia (dec.)", @@ -30203,6 +31893,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:14171/23", "case_name": "Al-Habeeb v. Denmark", @@ -30236,6 +31928,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:24607/20", "case_name": "B.A. v. Cyprus", @@ -30269,6 +31963,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:34210/19", "case_name": "D.H. and Others v. Sweden", @@ -30302,6 +31998,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:9568/22", "case_name": "F.O. and G.H. v. Belgium (dec.)", @@ -30335,6 +32033,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:15067/21", "case_name": "G.R.J. v. Greece (dec.)", @@ -30368,6 +32068,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:13337/19", "case_name": "H.T. v. Germany and Greece", @@ -30386,7 +32088,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.1|a:19|b:22|IV.D|a:112|b:115", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "Where the applicants, who had presented themselves at the border seeking to lodge an asylum application and/or communicating fear for their safety, were removed in a summary manner to the third country from which they had sought to enter the respondent State's territory, the Court applied the principles which it had set out in Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, in respect of the obligations under Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the removal of asylum-seekers to third intermediary countries, without an assessment, by the authorities of the removing State, of the merits of their asylum claim (see section \"Removal to a third country\" below). The Court found violations of Article 3 of the Convention (as well as, in certain cases, of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article M.K. and Others v. Poland D.A. and Others v. Poland O.M. and D.S. 3) in these cases (, 2020;, 2021; v. Ukraine, 2022; S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023; for cases concerning similar factual scenarios, but predating Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, see M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018, and Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014), including where domestic law provided that asylum applications could not be lodged at the border crossing point (airport) at which the applicants presented themselves but could only be lodged at a land border transit zone ( S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 62-63). Where applicants can arguably claim that there is no guarantee that their asylum applications would be seriously examined by the authorities in the neighbouring third country and that their return to their country of origin could violate Article 3 of the Convention, the respondent State is obliged to allow the applicants to remain with its jurisdiction until such time that their claims have been properly reviewed by a competent domestic authority and cannot deny access to its territory to persons presenting themselves at a border checkpoint who allege that they may be subjected to ill-treatment if they remain on the territory of the neighbouring state, unless adequate measures are taken to eliminate such a risk ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 178-179). The Court added that the impugned measures did not fall within the respondent State's strict international legal obligations following from its membership in the European Union and that, consequently, the respondent State was fully responsible under the Convention for the impugned acts. More specifically, the Court found the provisions of European Union law embraced the principle of non-refoulement and applied it to persons who were subjected to border checks before being admitted to the territory of a Member States ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 180-182; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 65-67).\n\nIn, 2020, the Court found that the applicant, against whom there was an enforceable removal order and who was held with a view to deportation and accompanied by the police to the airplane, had not waived his Article 3 rights and had not lost his victim status by signing a \"voluntary return\" document at the airport, without the assistance of an interpreter (§§ 60-61).", - "post_text": "Where the applicants, who had presented themselves at the border seeking to lodge an asylum application and/or communicating fear for their safety, were removed in a summary manner to a third country, the Court applied the principles which it had set out in Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, in respect of the obligations under Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the removal of asylum-seekers to third intermediary countries, without an assessment, by the authorities of the removing State, of the merits of their asylum claim (see section \" Removal to a third country \" below) . The Court found violations of Article 3 of the Convention (as well as, in certain cases, of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3) in these cases ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021; O.M. and D.S. v. Ukraine, 2022; S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023; Sherov and Others v. Poland, 2024; H.T. v. Germany and Greece, 2024, in respect of a removal from one EU member State to another on the basis of a bilateral agreement; see also \" Interception, rescue operations and summary returns (\"push - backs\") at sea \" above; for cases concerning similar factual scenarios, but predating Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, see M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018, and Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014), including where domestic law provided that asylum applications could not be lodged at the border crossing point (airport) at which the applicants presented themselves but could only be lodged at a land border transit zone ( S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 62-63). Where applicants can arguably claim that there is no guarantee that their asylum applications would be seriously examined by the authorities in the neighbouring third country and that their return to their country of origin could violate Article 3 of the Convention, the respondent State is obliged to allow the applicants to remain with its jurisdiction until such time that their claims have been properly reviewed by a competent domestic authority and cannot deny access to its territory to persons presenting themselves at a border checkpoint who allege that they may be subjected to ill-treatment if they remain on the territory of the neighbouring state, unless adequate measures are taken to eliminate such a risk ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 178-179). The Court added that the impugned measures did not fall within the respondent State's strict international legal obligations following from its membership in the European Union and that, consequently, the respondent State was fully responsible under the Convention for the impugned acts. More specifically, the Court found the provisions of European Union law embraced the principle of non-refoulement and applied it to persons who were subjected to border checks before being admitted to the territory of a Member States ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 180-182; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 65-67).\n\nWhere an individual alleges to have been expelled in breach of Article 3 and the respondent State submitted that he had signed a \"voluntary return\" document, the Court questioned whether the rights guaranteed by Article 3 could be waived at all and found that the requirements of an effective waiver were, in any event, not met ( M.A. v. Belgium, 2020, §§ 60-61; H.T. v. Germany and Greece, 2024, § 119). It reached a similar conclusion in M.D. and Others v. Hungary, 2024, in a case concerning Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 (§ 44).", + "post_text": "Where the applicants, who had presented themselves at the border seeking to lodge an asylum application and/or communicating fear for their safety, were removed in a summary manner to a third country, the Court applied the principles which it had set out in Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, in respect of the obligations under Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the removal of asylum-seekers to third intermediary countries, without an assessment, by the authorities of the removing State, of the merits of their asylum claim (see section \" Removal to a third country \" below) . The Court found violations of Article 3 of the Convention (as well as, in certain cases, of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3) in these cases ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021; O.M. and D.S. v. Ukraine, 2022; S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023; Sherov and Others v. Poland, 2024; H.T. v. Germany and Greece, 2024, in respect of a removal from one EUmember State to another on the basis of a bilateral agreement; see also \" Interception, rescue operations and summary returns (\"push - backs\") at sea \" above; for cases concerning similar factual scenarios, but predating Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, see M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018, and Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014), including where domestic law provided that asylum applications could not be lodged at the border crossing point (airport) at which the applicants presented themselves but could only be lodged at a land border transit zone ( S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 62-63). Where applicants can arguably claim that there is no guarantee that their asylum applications would be seriously examined by the authorities in the neighbouring third country and that their return to their country of origin could violate Article 3 of the Convention, the respondent State is obliged to allow the applicants to remain with its jurisdiction until such time that their claims have been properly reviewed by a competent domestic authority and cannot deny access to its territory to persons presenting themselves at a border checkpoint who allege that they may be subjected to ill-treatment if they remain on the territory of the neighbouring state, unless adequate measures are taken to eliminate such a risk ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 178-179). The Court added that the impugned measures did not fall within the respondent State's strict international legal obligations following from its membership in the European Union and that, consequently, the respondent State was fully responsible under the Convention for the impugned acts. More specifically, the Court found the provisions of European Union law embraced the principle of non-refoulement and applied it to persons who were subjected to border checks before being admitted to the territory of a Member States ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 180-182; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 65-67).\n\nWhere an individual alleges to have been expelled in breach of Article 3 and the respondent State submitted that he had signed a \"voluntary return\" document, the Court questioned whether the rights guaranteed by Article 3 could be waived at all and found that the requirements of an effective waiver were, in any event, not met ( M.A. v. Belgium, 2020, §§ 60-61; H.T. v. Germany and Greece, 2024, § 119). It reached a similar conclusion in M.D. and Others v. Hungary, 2024, in a case concerning Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 (§ 44).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240904075051/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250602002516/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/e19a063de5b3/20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf", @@ -30401,6 +32103,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:44051/20", "case_name": "Kumari v. the Netherlands (dec.)", @@ -30434,6 +32138,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:20183/21", "case_name": "Lazăr v. Romania", @@ -30451,8 +32157,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.A.5|a:79|b:82|IV.A|a:103|b:106", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two- Sanchez - stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. A distinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving \"whole life prisoners\" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez - Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2022, Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, 2023, and Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), 2023.\n\nThe indication of an interim measure by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see section \"Rule 39/Interim measures\" below) does not in itself have any bearing on whether the deprivation of liberty to which that individual may be subject complies with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, 2007, § 74). Where the respondent States refrained from deporting applicants in compliance with the interim measure indicated by the Court, the Court was, in a number of cases, prepared to accept that deportation or extradition proceedings were temporarily suspended but nevertheless were \"in progress\", and that therefore no violation of Article 5 § 1(f) had occurred (see Azimov v. Russia, 2013, § 170). At the same time, the suspension of the domestic proceedings due to the indication of an interim measure by the Court should not result in a situation where the applicant languishes in prison for an unreasonably long period ( ibid., § 171). Article 5 § 1(f) does not contain maximum time-limits; the question whether the length of deportation proceedings could affect the lawfulness of detention under this provision thus depends solely on the Auad v. Bulgaria J.N. v. the United Kingdom particular circumstances of each case (, 2011, § 128, and, 2016). However, where fixed time-limits exist, a failure to comply with them may be relevant to the question of \"lawfulness\", as detention exceeding the period permitted by domestic law is unlikely to Komissarov v. the Czech Republic be considered to be \"in accordance with the law\" (, 2022, §§ 50-52). The Court has also held that automatic judicial review of immigration detention is not an essential requirement of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( J.N. v. the United Kingdom, 2016, § 96). Where the authorities make efforts to organise removal to a third country in view of an interim measure indicated by the Court, detention may fall within the scope of Article 5 § 1(f) ( M and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 73).", - "post_text": "Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two-stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. A distinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving \"whole life prisoners\" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2022, Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, 2023, Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), 2023, Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, and Lazăr v. Romania, 2024.\n\nThe indication of an interim measure by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see section \" Rule 39/Interim measures \" below) does not in itself have any bearing on whether the deprivation of liberty to which that individual may be subject complies with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, 2007, § 74). Where the respondent States refrained from deporting or extraditing applicants in compliance with the interim measure indicated by the Court, the Court was, in a number of cases, prepared to accept that deportation or extradition proceedings were temporarily suspended but nevertheless were \"in progress\", and that therefore the detention had been justified under Article 5 § 1(f) (see Azimov v. Russia, 2013, § 170, and Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, § 128). At the same time, the suspension of the domestic proceedings due to the indication of an interim measure by the Court should not result in a situation where the applicant languishes in prison for an unreasonably long period ( Azimov v. Russia, 2012, § 171, and Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, § 128). Article 5 § 1(f) does not contain maximum time-limits; the question whether the length of deportation proceedings could affect the lawfulness of detention under this provision thus depends solely on the particular circumstances of each case ( Auad v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 128, and J.N. v. the United Kingdom, 2016). However, where fixed time- limits exist, a failure to comply with them may be relevant to the question of \"lawfulness\", as detention exceeding the period permitted by domestic law is unlikely to be considered to b e \"in accordance with the law\" ( Komissarov v. the Czech Republic, 2022, §§ 50-52). The Court has also held that automatic judicial review of immigration detention is not an essential requirement of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( J.N. v. the United Kingdom, 2016, § 96). Where the authorities make efforts to organise removal to a third country in view of an interim measure indicated by the Court, detention may fall within the scope of Article 5 § 1(f) ( M and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 73). The individual's rearrest and detention, with a view to his extradition after the Court had lifted an interim measure in his case, was found to have been justified under Article 5 § 1(f) in Lazăr v. Romania, 2024, §§ 102-111.", + "pre_text": "Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two- Sanchez - stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. Adistinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving \"whole life prisoners\" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez - Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2022, Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, 2023, and Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), 2023.\n\nThe indication of an interim measure by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see section \"Rule 39/Interim measures\" below) does not in itself have any bearing on whether the deprivation of liberty to which that individual may be subject complies with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, 2007, § 74). Where the respondent States refrained from deporting applicants in compliance with the interim measure indicated by the Court, the Court was, in a number of cases, prepared to accept that deportation or extradition proceedings were temporarily suspended but nevertheless were \"in progress\", and that therefore no violation of Article 5 § 1(f) had occurred (see Azimov v. Russia, 2013, § 170). At the same time, the suspension of the domestic proceedings due to the indication of an interim measure by the Court should not result in a situation where the applicant languishes in prison for an unreasonably long period ( ibid., § 171). Article 5 § 1(f) does not contain maximum time-limits; the question whether the length of deportation proceedings could affect the lawfulness of detention under this provision thus depends solely on the Auad v. Bulgaria J.N. v. the United Kingdom particular circumstances of each case (, 2011, § 128, and, 2016). However, where fixed time-limits exist, a failure to comply with them may be relevant to the question of \"lawfulness\", as detention exceeding the period permitted by domestic law is unlikely to Komissarov v. the Czech Republic be considered to be \"in accordance with the law\" (, 2022, §§ 50-52). The Court has also held that automatic judicial review of immigration detention is not an essential requirement of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( J.N. v. the United Kingdom, 2016, § 96). Where the authorities make efforts to organise removal to a third country in view of an interim measure indicated by the Court, detention may fall within the scope of Article 5 § 1(f) ( M and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 73).", + "post_text": "Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two-stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. Adistinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving \"whole life prisoners\" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2022, Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, 2023, Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), 2023, Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, and Lazăr v. Romania, 2024.\n\nThe indication of an interim measure by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see section \" Rule 39/Interim measures \" below) does not in itself have any bearing on whether the deprivation of liberty to which that individual may be subject complies with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, 2007, § 74). Where the respondent States refrained from deporting or extraditing applicants in compliance with the interim measure indicated by the Court, the Court was, in a number of cases, prepared to accept that deportation or extradition proceedings were temporarily suspended but nevertheless were \"in progress\", and that therefore the detention had been justified under Article 5 § 1(f) (see Azimov v. Russia, 2013, § 170, and Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, § 128). At the same time, the suspension of the domestic proceedings due to the indication of an interim measure by the Court should not result in a situation where the applicant languishes in prison for an unreasonably long period ( Azimov v. Russia, 2012, § 171, and Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, § 128). Article 5 § 1(f) does not contain maximum time-limits; the question whether the length of deportation proceedings could affect the lawfulness of detention under this provision thus depends solely on the particular circumstances of each case ( Auad v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 128, and J.N. v. the United Kingdom, 2016). However, where fixed time- limits exist, a failure to comply with them may be relevant to the question of \"lawfulness\", as detention exceeding the period permitted by domestic law is unlikely to be considered to b e \"in accordance with the law\" ( Komissarov v. the Czech Republic, 2022, §§ 50-52). The Court has also held that automatic judicial review of immigration detention is not an essential requirement of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( J.N. v. the United Kingdom, 2016, § 96). Where the authorities make efforts to organise removal to a third country in view of an interim measure indicated by the Court, detention may fall within the scope of Article 5 § 1(f) ( M and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 73). The individual's rearrest and detention, with a view to his extradition after the Court had lifted an interim measure in his case, was found to have been justified under Article 5 § 1(f) in Lazăr v. Romania, 2024, §§ 102-111.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240904075051/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250602002516/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/e19a063de5b3/20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf", @@ -30467,6 +32173,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:39090/20", "case_name": "M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus", @@ -30500,6 +32208,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:71008/16", "case_name": "M.B. v. the Netherlands", @@ -30518,7 +32228,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.C.1|a:31|b:34|II.C.1|a:33|b:36", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention allows States to control the liberty of aliens in an immigration context in two different situations: the first limb of that provision permits the detention of an asylum- seeker or other immigrant prior to the State's grant of authorisation to enter (for the second limb, see section \"Restrictions of freedom of movement and detention for purposes of removal\" below). The question as to when the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) ceases to apply, because the individual has been granted formal authorisation to enter or stay, is largely dependent on national law ( Suso Musa v. Malta, 2013, § 97). Where domestic law authorises the entry or stay pending an asylum application, the detention of an asylum-seeker may under certain circumstances be authorised under Article 5 § 1 (b) of the Convention ( O.M. v. Hungary, 2016).\n\nHowever, compliance with domestic law is not sufficient, since a deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still be considered arbitrary ( Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 67). In respect of adults with no particular vulnerabilities, detention under Article 5 § 1(f) is not required to be reasonably necessary, for example to prevent the person concerned from committing an offence or fleeing. However, it must not be arbitrary. \"Freedom from arbitrariness\" in the context of the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) means that such detention must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry of the person to the country; the place and conditions of detention should be appropriate, bearing in mind that the measure is applicable not to those who have committed criminal offences but to aliens who, often fearing for their lives, have fled from their own country; and the length of the detention should not Saadi v. the United Kingdom exceed that reasonably required for the purpose pursued ( [GC], 2008, §§ 72-74).", - "post_text": "Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention allows States to control the liberty of aliens in an immigration context in two different situations: the first limb of that provision permits the detention of an asylum-seeker or other immigrant prior to the State's grant of authorisation to enter (for the second limb, see section \" Restrictions of freedom of movement and detention for purposes of removal \" below). The question as to when the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) ceases to apply, because the individual has been granted formal authorisation to enter or stay, is largely dependent on national law ( Suso Musa v. Malta, 2013, § 97; see also M.B. v. the Netherlands, 2024, §§ 63-69, for an example of the transposition of EU law into domestic law). Where domestic law authorises the entry or stay pending an asylum application, the detention of an asylum-seeker may under certain circumstances be authorised under Article 5 § 1 (b) of the Convention ( O.M. v. Hungary, 2016).\n\nHowever, compliance with domestic law is not sufficient, since a deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still be considered arbitrary ( Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 67). In respect of adults with no particular vulnerabilities, detention under Article 5 § 1(f) is not required to be reasonably necessary, for example to prevent the person concerned from committing an offence or fleeing. However, it must not be arbitrary. \"Freedom from arbitrariness\" in the context of the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) means that such detention must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry of the person to the country; the place and conditions of detention should be appropriate, bearing in mind that the measure is applicable not to those who have committed criminal offences but to aliens who, often fearing for their lives, have fled from their own country; and the length of the detention should not exceed that reasonably required for the purpose pursued ( Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 72-74). The detention of an asylum-seeker is not closely connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry if it is based on public order or national security grounds (see M.B. v. the Netherlands, 2024, §§ 70-75, where the applicant's immigration detention followed his earlier (pre-trial) criminal detention on terrorism related charges, and B.A. v. Cyprus, 2024, §§ 62-64. See also §§ 65-66 of the latter judgment as an example of the length of detention in itself rendering the detention under the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) arbitrary).", + "post_text": "Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention allows States to control the liberty of aliens in an immigration context in two different situations: the first limb of that provision permits the detention of an asylum-seeker or other immigrant prior to the State's grant of authorisation to enter (for the second limb, see section \" Restrictions of freedom of movement and detention for purposes of removal \" below). The question as to when the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) ceases to apply, because the individual has been granted formal authorisation to enter or stay, is largely dependent on national law ( Suso Musa v. Malta, 2013, § 97; see also M.B. v. the Netherlands, 2024, §§ 63-69, for an example of the transposition of EUlaw into domestic law). Where domestic law authorises the entry or stay pending an asylum application, the detention of an asylum-seeker may under certain circumstances be authorised under Article 5 § 1 (b) of the Convention ( O.M. v. Hungary, 2016).\n\nHowever, compliance with domestic law is not sufficient, since a deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still be considered arbitrary ( Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 67). In respect of adults with no particular vulnerabilities, detention under Article 5 § 1(f) is not required to be reasonably necessary, for example to prevent the person concerned from committing an offence or fleeing. However, it must not be arbitrary. \"Freedom from arbitrariness\" in the context of the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) means that such detention must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry of the person to the country; the place and conditions of detention should be appropriate, bearing in mind that the measure is applicable not to those who have committed criminal offences but to aliens who, often fearing for their lives, have fled from their own country; and the length of the detention should not exceed that reasonably required for the purpose pursued ( Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 72-74). The detention of an asylum-seeker is not closely connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry if it is based on public order or national security grounds (see M.B. v. the Netherlands, 2024, §§ 70-75, where the applicant's immigration detention followed his earlier (pre-trial) criminal detention on terrorism related charges, and B.A. v. Cyprus, 2024, §§ 62-64. See also §§ 65-66 of the latter judgment as an example of the length of detention in itself rendering the detention under the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) arbitrary).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240904075051/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250602002516/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/e19a063de5b3/20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf", @@ -30533,6 +32243,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:60778/19", "case_name": "M.D. and Others v. Hungary", @@ -30566,6 +32278,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:4470/21", "case_name": "Martinez Alvarado v. the Netherlands", @@ -30599,6 +32313,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:19124/21|20085/21", "case_name": "Matthews and Johnson v. Romania", @@ -30616,8 +32332,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.A.5|a:79|b:82|IV.A|a:103|b:106", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two- Sanchez - stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. A distinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving \"whole life prisoners\" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez - Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2022, Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, 2023, and Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), 2023.\n\nThe indication of an interim measure by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see section \"Rule 39/Interim measures\" below) does not in itself have any bearing on whether the deprivation of liberty to which that individual may be subject complies with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, 2007, § 74). Where the respondent States refrained from deporting applicants in compliance with the interim measure indicated by the Court, the Court was, in a number of cases, prepared to accept that deportation or extradition proceedings were temporarily suspended but nevertheless were \"in progress\", and that therefore no violation of Article 5 § 1(f) had occurred (see Azimov v. Russia, 2013, § 170). At the same time, the suspension of the domestic proceedings due to the indication of an interim measure by the Court should not result in a situation where the applicant languishes in prison for an unreasonably long period ( ibid., § 171). Article 5 § 1(f) does not contain maximum time-limits; the question whether the length of deportation proceedings could affect the lawfulness of detention under this provision thus depends solely on the Auad v. Bulgaria J.N. v. the United Kingdom particular circumstances of each case (, 2011, § 128, and, 2016). However, where fixed time-limits exist, a failure to comply with them may be relevant to the question of \"lawfulness\", as detention exceeding the period permitted by domestic law is unlikely to Komissarov v. the Czech Republic be considered to be \"in accordance with the law\" (, 2022, §§ 50-52). The Court has also held that automatic judicial review of immigration detention is not an essential requirement of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( J.N. v. the United Kingdom, 2016, § 96). Where the authorities make efforts to organise removal to a third country in view of an interim measure indicated by the Court, detention may fall within the scope of Article 5 § 1(f) ( M and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 73).", - "post_text": "Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two-stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. A distinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving \"whole life prisoners\" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2022, Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, 2023, Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), 2023, Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, and Lazăr v. Romania, 2024.\n\nThe indication of an interim measure by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see section \" Rule 39/Interim measures \" below) does not in itself have any bearing on whether the deprivation of liberty to which that individual may be subject complies with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, 2007, § 74). Where the respondent States refrained from deporting or extraditing applicants in compliance with the interim measure indicated by the Court, the Court was, in a number of cases, prepared to accept that deportation or extradition proceedings were temporarily suspended but nevertheless were \"in progress\", and that therefore the detention had been justified under Article 5 § 1(f) (see Azimov v. Russia, 2013, § 170, and Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, § 128). At the same time, the suspension of the domestic proceedings due to the indication of an interim measure by the Court should not result in a situation where the applicant languishes in prison for an unreasonably long period ( Azimov v. Russia, 2012, § 171, and Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, § 128). Article 5 § 1(f) does not contain maximum time-limits; the question whether the length of deportation proceedings could affect the lawfulness of detention under this provision thus depends solely on the particular circumstances of each case ( Auad v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 128, and J.N. v. the United Kingdom, 2016). However, where fixed time- limits exist, a failure to comply with them may be relevant to the question of \"lawfulness\", as detention exceeding the period permitted by domestic law is unlikely to be considered to b e \"in accordance with the law\" ( Komissarov v. the Czech Republic, 2022, §§ 50-52). The Court has also held that automatic judicial review of immigration detention is not an essential requirement of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( J.N. v. the United Kingdom, 2016, § 96). Where the authorities make efforts to organise removal to a third country in view of an interim measure indicated by the Court, detention may fall within the scope of Article 5 § 1(f) ( M and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 73). The individual's rearrest and detention, with a view to his extradition after the Court had lifted an interim measure in his case, was found to have been justified under Article 5 § 1(f) in Lazăr v. Romania, 2024, §§ 102-111.", + "pre_text": "Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two- Sanchez - stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. Adistinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving \"whole life prisoners\" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez - Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2022, Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, 2023, and Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), 2023.\n\nThe indication of an interim measure by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see section \"Rule 39/Interim measures\" below) does not in itself have any bearing on whether the deprivation of liberty to which that individual may be subject complies with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, 2007, § 74). Where the respondent States refrained from deporting applicants in compliance with the interim measure indicated by the Court, the Court was, in a number of cases, prepared to accept that deportation or extradition proceedings were temporarily suspended but nevertheless were \"in progress\", and that therefore no violation of Article 5 § 1(f) had occurred (see Azimov v. Russia, 2013, § 170). At the same time, the suspension of the domestic proceedings due to the indication of an interim measure by the Court should not result in a situation where the applicant languishes in prison for an unreasonably long period ( ibid., § 171). Article 5 § 1(f) does not contain maximum time-limits; the question whether the length of deportation proceedings could affect the lawfulness of detention under this provision thus depends solely on the Auad v. Bulgaria J.N. v. the United Kingdom particular circumstances of each case (, 2011, § 128, and, 2016). However, where fixed time-limits exist, a failure to comply with them may be relevant to the question of \"lawfulness\", as detention exceeding the period permitted by domestic law is unlikely to Komissarov v. the Czech Republic be considered to be \"in accordance with the law\" (, 2022, §§ 50-52). The Court has also held that automatic judicial review of immigration detention is not an essential requirement of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( J.N. v. the United Kingdom, 2016, § 96). Where the authorities make efforts to organise removal to a third country in view of an interim measure indicated by the Court, detention may fall within the scope of Article 5 § 1(f) ( M and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 73).", + "post_text": "Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two-stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. Adistinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving \"whole life prisoners\" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2022, Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, 2023, Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), 2023, Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, and Lazăr v. Romania, 2024.\n\nThe indication of an interim measure by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see section \" Rule 39/Interim measures \" below) does not in itself have any bearing on whether the deprivation of liberty to which that individual may be subject complies with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, 2007, § 74). Where the respondent States refrained from deporting or extraditing applicants in compliance with the interim measure indicated by the Court, the Court was, in a number of cases, prepared to accept that deportation or extradition proceedings were temporarily suspended but nevertheless were \"in progress\", and that therefore the detention had been justified under Article 5 § 1(f) (see Azimov v. Russia, 2013, § 170, and Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, § 128). At the same time, the suspension of the domestic proceedings due to the indication of an interim measure by the Court should not result in a situation where the applicant languishes in prison for an unreasonably long period ( Azimov v. Russia, 2012, § 171, and Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, § 128). Article 5 § 1(f) does not contain maximum time-limits; the question whether the length of deportation proceedings could affect the lawfulness of detention under this provision thus depends solely on the particular circumstances of each case ( Auad v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 128, and J.N. v. the United Kingdom, 2016). However, where fixed time- limits exist, a failure to comply with them may be relevant to the question of \"lawfulness\", as detention exceeding the period permitted by domestic law is unlikely to be considered to b e \"in accordance with the law\" ( Komissarov v. the Czech Republic, 2022, §§ 50-52). The Court has also held that automatic judicial review of immigration detention is not an essential requirement of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( J.N. v. the United Kingdom, 2016, § 96). Where the authorities make efforts to organise removal to a third country in view of an interim measure indicated by the Court, detention may fall within the scope of Article 5 § 1(f) ( M and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 73). The individual's rearrest and detention, with a view to his extradition after the Court had lifted an interim measure in his case, was found to have been justified under Article 5 § 1(f) in Lazăr v. Romania, 2024, §§ 102-111.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240904075051/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250602002516/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/e19a063de5b3/20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf", @@ -30632,6 +32348,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:15117/21|15689/21", "case_name": "Mirzoyan v. the Czech Republic", @@ -30665,6 +32383,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:49755/18", "case_name": "Okubamichael Debru v. Sweden", @@ -30698,6 +32418,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:52232/20", "case_name": "P.J. and R.J. v. Switzerland", @@ -30731,6 +32453,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:35276/20", "case_name": "S.F. v. Finland", @@ -30764,6 +32488,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:5199/23", "case_name": "Sharafane v. Denmark", @@ -30797,6 +32523,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:54029/17", "case_name": "Sherov and Others v. Poland", @@ -30815,7 +32543,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.1|a:19|b:22|II.A.2|a:24|b:27", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "Where the applicants, who had presented themselves at the border seeking to lodge an asylum application and/or communicating fear for their safety, were removed in a summary manner to the third country from which they had sought to enter the respondent State's territory, the Court applied the principles which it had set out in Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, in respect of the obligations under Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the removal of asylum-seekers to third intermediary countries, without an assessment, by the authorities of the removing State, of the merits of their asylum claim (see section \"Removal to a third country\" below). The Court found violations of Article 3 of the Convention (as well as, in certain cases, of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article M.K. and Others v. Poland D.A. and Others v. Poland O.M. and D.S. 3) in these cases (, 2020;, 2021; v. Ukraine, 2022; S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023; for cases concerning similar factual scenarios, but predating Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, see M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018, and Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014), including where domestic law provided that asylum applications could not be lodged at the border crossing point (airport) at which the applicants presented themselves but could only be lodged at a land border transit zone ( S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 62-63). Where applicants can arguably claim that there is no guarantee that their asylum applications would be seriously examined by the authorities in the neighbouring third country and that their return to their country of origin could violate Article 3 of the Convention, the respondent State is obliged to allow the applicants to remain with its jurisdiction until such time that their claims have been properly reviewed by a competent domestic authority and cannot deny access to its territory to persons presenting themselves at a border checkpoint who allege that they may be subjected to ill-treatment if they remain on the territory of the neighbouring state, unless adequate measures are taken to eliminate such a risk ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 178-179). The Court added that the impugned measures did not fall within the respondent State's strict international legal obligations following from its membership in the European Union and that, consequently, the respondent State was fully responsible under the Convention for the impugned acts. More specifically, the Court found the provisions of European Union law embraced the principle of non-refoulement and applied it to persons who were subjected to border checks before being admitted to the territory of a Member States ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 180-182; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 65-67).\n\nWhere migrants entered the respondent State's territory in an unauthorised manner and, following their apprehension near the border, were provided with access to means of legal entry through the appropriate border procedure, the Court did not apply the aforementioned two-tier test, but instead assessed - in order to determine whether the expulsion was \"collective\" in nature - whether the individuals were afforded, prior to the adoption of expulsion orders, an effective possibility of submitting arguments against their removal and whether there were sufficient guarantees demonstrating that their personal circumstances had been genuinely and individually taken into account ( Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, § 62). Such test is, essentially, similar to the one applied to individuals who present themselves at a point of legal entry, such as a border M.K. and Others v. Poland D.A. and Others v. Poland checkpoint (see, 2020, §§ 204-211,, 2021, §§ 81-84, and M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69) or at an airport (see S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 48-51, where the Court considered that it did not absolve the authorities of their obligation under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 that the applicants had initially sought to enter the respondent State by using counterfeit documents). Whether the requirements of this test are satisfied is a question of fact, which is to be determined by having regard to, in so far as pertinent in a given case, supporting evidence provided by the parties, including as to whether an identification process was conducted and under what conditions (whether persons were trained to conduct interviews, whether information was provided, in a language the individuals understood, about the possibility to lodge an asylum application and to request legal aid, whether interpreters were present, and whether the individuals were able, in practice, to consult lawyers and to lodge asylum applications) as well as to independent reports ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 185; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014, §§ 214-225; Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 245-254; Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, §§ 63-71; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 206-210; D.A. and Others v. Poland, M.A. and Others v. Latvia 2021, §§ 81-83; (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69). For an example of a case where individuals, who did not intend to seek asylum in the respondent State, were removed in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 after having been detained for ten days in a \"hotspot\" for the registration J.A. and and identification of migrants from the moment of their arrival in the respondent State, see Others v. Italy, 2023, §§ 47 and 106-116.", - "post_text": "Where the applicants, who had presented themselves at the border seeking to lodge an asylum application and/or communicating fear for their safety, were removed in a summary manner to a third country, the Court applied the principles which it had set out in Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, in respect of the obligations under Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the removal of asylum-seekers to third intermediary countries, without an assessment, by the authorities of the removing State, of the merits of their asylum claim (see section \" Removal to a third country \" below) . The Court found violations of Article 3 of the Convention (as well as, in certain cases, of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3) in these cases ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021; O.M. and D.S. v. Ukraine, 2022; S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023; Sherov and Others v. Poland, 2024; H.T. v. Germany and Greece, 2024, in respect of a removal from one EU member State to another on the basis of a bilateral agreement; see also \" Interception, rescue operations and summary returns (\"push - backs\") at sea \" above; for cases concerning similar factual scenarios, but predating Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, see M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018, and Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014), including where domestic law provided that asylum applications could not be lodged at the border crossing point (airport) at which the applicants presented themselves but could only be lodged at a land border transit zone ( S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 62-63). Where applicants can arguably claim that there is no guarantee that their asylum applications would be seriously examined by the authorities in the neighbouring third country and that their return to their country of origin could violate Article 3 of the Convention, the respondent State is obliged to allow the applicants to remain with its jurisdiction until such time that their claims have been properly reviewed by a competent domestic authority and cannot deny access to its territory to persons presenting themselves at a border checkpoint who allege that they may be subjected to ill-treatment if they remain on the territory of the neighbouring state, unless adequate measures are taken to eliminate such a risk ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 178-179). The Court added that the impugned measures did not fall within the respondent State's strict international legal obligations following from its membership in the European Union and that, consequently, the respondent State was fully responsible under the Convention for the impugned acts. More specifically, the Court found the provisions of European Union law embraced the principle of non-refoulement and applied it to persons who were subjected to border checks before being admitted to the territory of a Member States ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 180-182; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 65-67).\n\nWhere migrants entered the respondent State's territory in an unauthorised manner and, following their apprehension near the border, were provided with access to means of legal entry through the appropriate border procedure, the Court did not apply the aforementioned two-tier test, but instead assessed - in order to determine whether the expulsion was \"collective\" in nature - whether the individuals were afforded, prior to the adoption of expulsion orders, an effective possibility of submitting arguments against their removal and whether there were sufficient guarantees demonstrating that their personal circumstances had been genuinely and individually taken into account ( Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, § 62). Such test is, essentially, similar to the one applied to individuals who present themselves at a point of legal entry, such as a border checkpoint (see M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 204-211, D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-84, M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69, and Sherov and Others v. Poland, 2024, §§ 59-61) or at an airport (see S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 48-51, where the Court considered that it did not absolve the authorities of their obligation under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 that the applicants had initially sought to enter the respondent State by using counterfeit documents). Whether the requirements of this test are satisfied is a question of fact, which is to be determined by having regard to, in so far as pertinent in a given case, supporting evidence provided by the parties, including as to whether an identification process was conducted and under what conditions (whether persons were trained to conduct interviews, whether information was provided, in a language the individuals understood, about the possibility to lodge an asylum application and to request legal aid, whether interpreters were present, and whether the individuals were able, in practice, to consult lawyers and to lodge asylum applications) as well as to independent reports ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 185; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014, §§ 214-225; Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 245-254; Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, §§ 63-71; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 206-210; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-83; M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69). For an example of individuals, who lodged asylum applications, being removed to a third country without a valid decision, in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, see M.D. and Others v. Hungary, 2024. For an example of a case where individuals, who did not intend to seek asylum in the respondent State, were removed in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 after having been detained for ten days in a \"hotspot\" for the registration and identification of migrants from the moment of their arrival in the respondent State, see J.A. and Others v. Italy, 2023, §§ 47 and 106-116.", + "post_text": "Where the applicants, who had presented themselves at the border seeking to lodge an asylum application and/or communicating fear for their safety, were removed in a summary manner to a third country, the Court applied the principles which it had set out in Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, in respect of the obligations under Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the removal of asylum-seekers to third intermediary countries, without an assessment, by the authorities of the removing State, of the merits of their asylum claim (see section \" Removal to a third country \" below) . The Court found violations of Article 3 of the Convention (as well as, in certain cases, of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3) in these cases ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021; O.M. and D.S. v. Ukraine, 2022; S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023; Sherov and Others v. Poland, 2024; H.T. v. Germany and Greece, 2024, in respect of a removal from one EUmember State to another on the basis of a bilateral agreement; see also \" Interception, rescue operations and summary returns (\"push - backs\") at sea \" above; for cases concerning similar factual scenarios, but predating Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, see M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018, and Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014), including where domestic law provided that asylum applications could not be lodged at the border crossing point (airport) at which the applicants presented themselves but could only be lodged at a land border transit zone ( S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 62-63). Where applicants can arguably claim that there is no guarantee that their asylum applications would be seriously examined by the authorities in the neighbouring third country and that their return to their country of origin could violate Article 3 of the Convention, the respondent State is obliged to allow the applicants to remain with its jurisdiction until such time that their claims have been properly reviewed by a competent domestic authority and cannot deny access to its territory to persons presenting themselves at a border checkpoint who allege that they may be subjected to ill-treatment if they remain on the territory of the neighbouring state, unless adequate measures are taken to eliminate such a risk ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 178-179). The Court added that the impugned measures did not fall within the respondent State's strict international legal obligations following from its membership in the European Union and that, consequently, the respondent State was fully responsible under the Convention for the impugned acts. More specifically, the Court found the provisions of European Union law embraced the principle of non-refoulement and applied it to persons who were subjected to border checks before being admitted to the territory of a Member States ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 180-182; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 65-67).\n\nWhere migrants entered the respondent State's territory in an unauthorised manner and, following their apprehension near the border, were provided with access to means of legal entry through the appropriate border procedure, the Court did not apply the aforementioned two-tier test, but instead assessed - in order to determine whether the expulsion was \"collective\" in nature - whether the individuals were afforded, prior to the adoption of expulsion orders, an effective possibility of submitting arguments against their removal and whether there were sufficient guarantees demonstrating that their personal circumstances had been genuinely and individually taken into account ( Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, § 62). Such test is, essentially, similar to the one applied to individuals who present themselves at a point of legal entry, such as a border checkpoint (see M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 204-211, D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-84, M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69, and Sherov and Others v. Poland, 2024, §§ 59-61) or at an airport (see S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 48-51, where the Court considered that it did not absolve the authorities of their obligation under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 that the applicants had initially sought to enter the respondent State by using counterfeit documents). Whether the requirements of this test are satisfied is a question of fact, which is to be determined by having regard to, in so far as pertinent in a given case, supporting evidence provided by the parties, including as to whether an identification process was conducted and under what conditions (whether persons were trained to conduct interviews, whether information was provided, in a language the individuals understood, about the possibility to lodge an asylum application and to request legal aid, whether interpreters were present, and whether the individuals were able, in practice, to consult lawyers and to lodge asylum applications) as well as to independent reports ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 185; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014, §§ 214-225; Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 245-254; Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, §§ 63-71; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 206-210; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-83; M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69). For an example of individuals, who lodged asylum applications, being removed to a third country without a valid decision, in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, see M.D. and Others v. Hungary, 2024. For an example of a case where individuals, who did not intend to seek asylum in the respondent State, were removed in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 after having been detained for ten days in a \"hotspot\" for the registration and identification of migrants from the moment of their arrival in the respondent State, see J.A. and Others v. Italy, 2023, §§ 47 and 106-116.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240904075051/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250602002516/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/e19a063de5b3/20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf", @@ -30830,6 +32558,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:9588/21", "case_name": "Winther v. Denmark", @@ -30863,6 +32593,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:67724/09", "case_name": "C.N. and v. v. France", @@ -30880,7 +32612,7 @@ "linked_change_types": "paragraph_deleted", "linked_paragraph_refs": "V.C|a:118|b:None", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "A number of cases, dealt with by the Court under Article 4 in the context of trafficking in human beings, concerned foreigners, in connection with domestic servitude ( Siliadin v. France, 2005; C.N. and v. v. France C.N. v. the United Kingdom Rantsev v. Cyprus and, 2012;, 2012), sexual exploitation ( Russia, 2021; L.E. v. Greece, 2016; T.I. and Others v. Greece, 2019), and work in agriculture ( Chowdury and Others v. Greece, 2017).", + "pre_text": "Anumber of cases, dealt with by the Court under Article 4 in the context of trafficking in human beings, concerned foreigners, in connection with domestic servitude ( Siliadin v. France, 2005; C.N. and v. v. France C.N. v. the United Kingdom Rantsev v. Cyprus and, 2012;, 2012), sexual exploitation ( Russia, 2021; L.E. v. Greece, 2016; T.I. and Others v. Greece, 2019), and work in agriculture ( Chowdury and Others v. Greece, 2017).", "post_text": "", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240904075051/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250602002516/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", @@ -30896,6 +32628,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:4239/08", "case_name": "C.N. v. the United Kingdom", @@ -30913,7 +32647,7 @@ "linked_change_types": "paragraph_deleted", "linked_paragraph_refs": "V.C|a:118|b:None", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "A number of cases, dealt with by the Court under Article 4 in the context of trafficking in human beings, concerned foreigners, in connection with domestic servitude ( Siliadin v. France, 2005; C.N. and v. v. France C.N. v. the United Kingdom Rantsev v. Cyprus and, 2012;, 2012), sexual exploitation ( Russia, 2021; L.E. v. Greece, 2016; T.I. and Others v. Greece, 2019), and work in agriculture ( Chowdury and Others v. Greece, 2017).", + "pre_text": "Anumber of cases, dealt with by the Court under Article 4 in the context of trafficking in human beings, concerned foreigners, in connection with domestic servitude ( Siliadin v. France, 2005; C.N. and v. v. France C.N. v. the United Kingdom Rantsev v. Cyprus and, 2012;, 2012), sexual exploitation ( Russia, 2021; L.E. v. Greece, 2016; T.I. and Others v. Greece, 2019), and work in agriculture ( Chowdury and Others v. Greece, 2017).", "post_text": "", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240904075051/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250602002516/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", @@ -30929,6 +32663,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:21884/15", "case_name": "Chowdury and Others v. Greece", @@ -30946,7 +32682,7 @@ "linked_change_types": "paragraph_deleted", "linked_paragraph_refs": "V.C|a:118|b:None", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "A number of cases, dealt with by the Court under Article 4 in the context of trafficking in human beings, concerned foreigners, in connection with domestic servitude ( Siliadin v. France, 2005; C.N. and v. v. France C.N. v. the United Kingdom Rantsev v. Cyprus and, 2012;, 2012), sexual exploitation ( Russia, 2021; L.E. v. Greece, 2016; T.I. and Others v. Greece, 2019), and work in agriculture ( Chowdury and Others v. Greece, 2017).", + "pre_text": "Anumber of cases, dealt with by the Court under Article 4 in the context of trafficking in human beings, concerned foreigners, in connection with domestic servitude ( Siliadin v. France, 2005; C.N. and v. v. France C.N. v. the United Kingdom Rantsev v. Cyprus and, 2012;, 2012), sexual exploitation ( Russia, 2021; L.E. v. Greece, 2016; T.I. and Others v. Greece, 2019), and work in agriculture ( Chowdury and Others v. Greece, 2017).", "post_text": "", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240904075051/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250602002516/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", @@ -30962,6 +32698,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:71545/12", "case_name": "L.E. v. Greece", @@ -30979,7 +32717,7 @@ "linked_change_types": "paragraph_deleted", "linked_paragraph_refs": "V.C|a:118|b:None", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "A number of cases, dealt with by the Court under Article 4 in the context of trafficking in human beings, concerned foreigners, in connection with domestic servitude ( Siliadin v. France, 2005; C.N. and v. v. France C.N. v. the United Kingdom Rantsev v. Cyprus and, 2012;, 2012), sexual exploitation ( Russia, 2021; L.E. v. Greece, 2016; T.I. and Others v. Greece, 2019), and work in agriculture ( Chowdury and Others v. Greece, 2017).", + "pre_text": "Anumber of cases, dealt with by the Court under Article 4 in the context of trafficking in human beings, concerned foreigners, in connection with domestic servitude ( Siliadin v. France, 2005; C.N. and v. v. France C.N. v. the United Kingdom Rantsev v. Cyprus and, 2012;, 2012), sexual exploitation ( Russia, 2021; L.E. v. Greece, 2016; T.I. and Others v. Greece, 2019), and work in agriculture ( Chowdury and Others v. Greece, 2017).", "post_text": "", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240904075051/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250602002516/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", @@ -30995,6 +32733,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-02", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json", "case_key": "apps:73316/01", "case_name": "Siliadin v. France", @@ -31012,7 +32752,7 @@ "linked_change_types": "paragraph_deleted", "linked_paragraph_refs": "V.C|a:118|b:None", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "A number of cases, dealt with by the Court under Article 4 in the context of trafficking in human beings, concerned foreigners, in connection with domestic servitude ( Siliadin v. France, 2005; C.N. and v. v. France C.N. v. the United Kingdom Rantsev v. Cyprus and, 2012;, 2012), sexual exploitation ( Russia, 2021; L.E. v. Greece, 2016; T.I. and Others v. Greece, 2019), and work in agriculture ( Chowdury and Others v. Greece, 2017).", + "pre_text": "Anumber of cases, dealt with by the Court under Article 4 in the context of trafficking in human beings, concerned foreigners, in connection with domestic servitude ( Siliadin v. France, 2005; C.N. and v. v. France C.N. v. the United Kingdom Rantsev v. Cyprus and, 2012;, 2012), sexual exploitation ( Russia, 2021; L.E. v. Greece, 2016; T.I. and Others v. Greece, 2019), and work in agriculture ( Chowdury and Others v. Greece, 2017).", "post_text": "", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240904075051/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250602002516/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", @@ -31028,6 +32768,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-22", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2025-06-02__2025-11-22.json", "case_key": "apps:4662/22", "case_name": "Ali v. Serbia", @@ -31061,6 +32803,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-22", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2025-06-02__2025-11-22.json", "case_key": "apps:22776/18", "case_name": "Almukhlas and Al-Maliki v. Greece", @@ -31094,6 +32838,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-22", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2025-06-02__2025-11-22.json", "case_key": "apps:48302/21", "case_name": "Demirci v. Hungary", @@ -31127,6 +32873,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-22", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2025-06-02__2025-11-22.json", "case_key": "apps:47836/21", "case_name": "F.B. v. Belgium", @@ -31160,6 +32908,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-22", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2025-06-02__2025-11-22.json", "case_key": "apps:46084/21", "case_name": "H.Q. and Others v. Hungary", @@ -31178,7 +32928,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A.1.2|a:26|b:27|II.A.3|a:29|b:30|III.G|a:102|b:103", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "In its case-law on Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 on summary returns and related scenarios, the Court has distinguished a number of factual situations and the relevant tests to be applied. In N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, §§ 201 and 209-211, the Court set out a two-tier test to determine compliance with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 in cases where individuals cross a land border in an unauthorised manner and are expelled summarily, a test which has been applied in all later cases presenting precisely the same scenario ( Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 59 et seq .; and M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 294 et seq .; A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 112-123): Firstly, it has to be taken into account whether the State provided genuine and effective access to means of legal entry, in particular border procedures, to allow all persons who face persecution to submit an application for protection, based in particular on Article 3, under conditions which ensure that the application is processed in a manner consistent with international norms including the Convention. Secondly, where the State provided such access but an applicant did not make use of it, it has to be considered whether there were cogent reasons for not doing so which were based on objective facts for which the State was responsible. The absence of such cogent reasons could lead to this being regarded as the consequence of the applicants'own conduct, justifying the lack of individual identification. The burden of proof for showing that the applicants did have genuine and effective access to procedures for legal entry is on the respondent State and all cases decided thus far turned on whether the State had satisfied that burden of proof (location of the border crossing points, modalities for lodging applications there, availability of interpreters/legal assistance enabling asylum-seekers to be informed of their rights and information showing that applications had actually been made at those border points: compare N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, §§ 212-217; A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 116-122, and contrast Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 63-67; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 295-304). An entry visa subject to financial and other requirements does not constitute a genuine and effective means of legal entry for individuals trying to seek asylum ( M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus, 2024, § 118).\n\nWhere the individual has an \"arguable complaint\" that his removal would expose him to treatment contrary to Article 2 or 3 of the Convention, he must have an effective remedy, in practice as well as in law, at the domestic level in accordance with Article 13 of the Convention, which imperatively requires, inter alia, independent and rigorous scrutiny of any claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 and automatic suspensive effect (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011, § 293, M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 142-148 and 212-220, and section \" Procedural aspects \" below) . As regards Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, the Court has made a distinction depending on whether the applicants had, at least, an arguable complaint under Article 2 or 3 of the Convention in respect of risks they faced upon their removal. Where the applicants did have such arguable claim and they had been effectively prevented from applying for asylum and had not had access to a remedy with automatic suspensive effect, the Court found a violation of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol No 4 ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 219-220; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 89-90; Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, §§ 201-207; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014, §§ 240-243). By contrast, the lack of suspensive effect of a removal decision does not in itself constitute a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 4 of Protocol No 4, where an applicant does not allege that there is a real risk of a violation of the rights guaranteed by Articles 2 or 3 in the destination country ( Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, § 281). In such situation the Convention does not impose an absolute obligation on a State to guarantee an automatically suspensive remedy, but requires that the person concerned should have an effective possibility of challenging the expulsion decision by having a sufficiently thorough examination of his or her complaints carried out by an independent and impartial domestic forum ( Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, § 279; Moustahi v. France, 2020, §§ 156-164).\n\nApart from summary returns at sea (see section \" Interception, rescue operations and summary returns (\"push - backs\")\" above) at or near borders described above (see section \" Summary returns at the border and/or shortly after entry into the territory (\"push - backs\")\" above), the Court has dealt with collective expulsions of aliens who had been present in the territory of the respondent State (asylum-seekers in Čonka v. Belgium, 2002, and Sultani v. France, 2007; migrants in Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], 2014, § 170), irrespective of whether they were lawfully resident in the respondent State or not. In Čonka v. Belgium, 2002, and Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], 2014, in which the Court found violations of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, the individuals targeted for expulsion in each case had the same origin (Roma families from Slovakia in the former and Georgian nationals in the latter).", - "post_text": "In its case-law on Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 on summary returns and related scenarios, the Court has distinguished a number of factual situations and the relevant tests to be applied. In N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, §§ 201 and 209-211, the Court set out a two-tier test to determine compliance with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 in cases where individuals cross a land border in an unauthorised manner and are expelled summarily, a test which has been applied in all later cases presenting precisely the same scenario ( Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 59 et seq .; and M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 294 et seq .; A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 112-123): Firstly, it has to be taken into account whether the State provided genuine and effective access to means of legal entry, in particular border procedures, to allow all persons who face persecution to submit an application for protection, based in particular on Article 3, under conditions which ensure that the application is processed in a manner consistent with international norms including the Convention. Secondly, where the State provided such access but an applicant did not make use of it, it has to be considered whether there were cogent reasons for not doing so which were based on objective facts for which the State was responsible. The absence of such cogent reasons could lead to this being regarded as the consequence of the applicants'own conduct, justifying the lack of individual identification. The burden of proof for showing that the applicants did have genuine and effective access to procedures for legal entry is on the respondent State and all cases decided thus far turned on whether the State had satisfied that burden of proof (location of the border crossing points, modalities for lodging applications there, availability of interpreters/legal assistance enabling asylum-seekers to be informed of their rights and information showing that applications had actually been made at those border points: compare N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, §§ 212-217; A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 116-122, and contrast Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 63-67; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 295-304). An entry visa subject to financial and other requirements does not constitute a genuine and effective means of legal entry for individuals trying to seek asylum ( M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus, 2024, § 118). A preliminary procedure was found not to constitute a genuine and effective access to a means of legal entry when it required an individual, who wishes to apply for international protection in the respondent State, to first submit a declaration of intent in person at one of the respondent State's embass ies after which the competent authorities could decide to issue a travel document allowing the individual to enter the respondent State 's territory for the purposes of applying for international protection there ( H.Q. and Others v. Hungary, 2025, §§ 117-124).\n\nWhere the individual has an \"arguable complaint\" that his removal would expose him to treatment contrary to Article 2 or 3 of the Convention, he must have an effective remedy, in practice as well as in law, at the domestic level in accordance with Article 13 of the Convention, which imperatively requires, inter alia, independent and rigorous scrutiny of any claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 and automatic suspensive effect (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011, § 293, M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 142-148 and 212-220, and section \" Procedural aspects \" below) . As regards Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, the Court has made a distinction depending on whether the applicants had, at least, an arguable complaint under Article 2 or 3 of the Convention in respect of risks they faced upon their removal. Where the applicants did have such arguable claim and they had been effectively prevented from applying for asylum and had not had access to a remedy with automatic suspensive effect, the Court found a violation of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol No 4 ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 219-220; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 89-90; H.Q. and Others v. Hungary, 2025, §§ 154-160; Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, §§ 201-207; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014, §§ 240-243). By contrast, the lack of suspensive effect of a removal decision does not in itself constitute a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 4 of Protocol No 4, where an applicant does not allege that there is a real risk of a violation of the rights guaranteed by Articles 2 or 3 in the destination country ( Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, § 281). In such situation the Convention does not impose an absolute obligation on a State to guarantee an automatically suspensive remedy, but requires that the person concerned should have an effective possibility of challenging the expulsion decision by having a sufficiently thorough examination of his or her complaints carried out by an independent and impartial domestic forum ( Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, § 279; Moustahi v. France, 2020, §§ 156-164).\n\nApart from summary returns at sea (see section \" Interception, rescue operations and summary returns (\"push - backs\")\" above) at or near borders described above (see section \" Summary returns at the border and/or shortly after entry into the territory (\"push - backs\")\" above), the Court has dealt with collective expulsions of aliens who had been present in the territory of the respondent State (asylum-seekers in Čonka v. Belgium, 2002, Sultani v. France, 2007, and H.Q. and Others v. Hungary, 2025, §§ 115-116; migrants in Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], 2014, § 170), irrespective of whether they were lawfully resident in the respondent State or not. In Čonka v. Belgium, 2002, and Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], 2014, in which the Court found violations of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, the individuals targeted for expulsion in each case had the same origin (Roma families from Slovakia in the former and Georgian nationals in the latter).", + "post_text": "In its case-law on Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 on summary returns and related scenarios, the Court has distinguished a number of factual situations and the relevant tests to be applied. In N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, §§ 201 and 209-211, the Court set out a two-tier test to determine compliance with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 in cases where individuals cross a land border in an unauthorised manner and are expelled summarily, a test which has been applied in all later cases presenting precisely the same scenario ( Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 59 et seq .; and M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 294 et seq .; A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 112-123): Firstly, it has to be taken into account whether the State provided genuine and effective access to means of legal entry, in particular border procedures, to allow all persons who face persecution to submit an application for protection, based in particular on Article 3, under conditions which ensure that the application is processed in a manner consistent with international norms including the Convention. Secondly, where the State provided such access but an applicant did not make use of it, it has to be considered whether there were cogent reasons for not doing so which were based on objective facts for which the State was responsible. The absence of such cogent reasons could lead to this being regarded as the consequence of the applicants'own conduct, justifying the lack of individual identification. The burden of proof for showing that the applicants did have genuine and effective access to procedures for legal entry is on the respondent State and all cases decided thus far turned on whether the State had satisfied that burden of proof (location of the border crossing points, modalities for lodging applications there, availability of interpreters/legal assistance enabling asylum-seekers to be informed of their rights and information showing that applications had actually been made at those border points: compare N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, §§ 212-217; A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 116-122, and contrast Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 63-67; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 295-304). An entry visa subject to financial and other requirements does not constitute a genuine and effective means of legal entry for individuals trying to seek asylum ( M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus, 2024, § 118). Apreliminary procedure was found not to constitute a genuine and effective access to a means of legal entry when it required an individual, who wishes to apply for international protection in the respondent State, to first submit a declaration of intent in person at one of the respondent State's embass ies after which the competent authorities could decide to issue a travel document allowing the individual to enter the respondent State 's territory for the purposes of applying for international protection there ( H.Q. and Others v. Hungary, 2025, §§ 117-124).\n\nWhere the individual has an \"arguable complaint\" that his removal would expose him to treatment contrary to Article 2 or 3 of the Convention, he must have an effective remedy, in practice as well as in law, at the domestic level in accordance with Article 13 of the Convention, which imperatively requires, inter alia, independent and rigorous scrutiny of any claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 and automatic suspensive effect (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011, § 293, M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 142-148 and 212-220, and section \" Procedural aspects \" below) . As regards Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, the Court has made a distinction depending on whether the applicants had, at least, an arguable complaint under Article 2 or 3 of the Convention in respect of risks they faced upon their removal. Where the applicants did have such arguable claim and they had been effectively prevented from applying for asylum and had not had access to a remedy with automatic suspensive effect, the Court found a violation of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol No 4 ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 219-220; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 89-90; H.Q. and Others v. Hungary, 2025, §§ 154-160; Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, §§ 201-207; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014, §§ 240-243). By contrast, the lack of suspensive effect of a removal decision does not in itself constitute a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 4 of Protocol No 4, where an applicant does not allege that there is a real risk of a violation of the rights guaranteed by Articles 2 or 3 in the destination country ( Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, § 281). In such situation the Convention does not impose an absolute obligation on a State to guarantee an automatically suspensive remedy, but requires that the person concerned should have an effective possibility of challenging the expulsion decision by having a sufficiently thorough examination of his or her complaints carried out by an independent and impartial domestic forum ( Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, § 279; Moustahi v. France, 2020, §§ 156-164).\n\nApart from summary returns at sea (see section \" Interception, rescue operations and summary returns (\"push - backs\")\" above) at or near borders described above (see section \" Summary returns at the border and/or shortly after entry into the territory (\"push - backs\")\" above), the Court has dealt with collective expulsions of aliens who had been present in the territory of the respondent State (asylum-seekers in Čonka v. Belgium, 2002, Sultani v. France, 2007, and H.Q. and Others v. Hungary, 2025, §§ 115-116; migrants in Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], 2014, § 170), irrespective of whether they were lawfully resident in the respondent State or not. In Čonka v. Belgium, 2002, and Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], 2014, in which the Court found violations of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, the individuals targeted for expulsion in each case had the same origin (Roma families from Slovakia in the former and Georgian nationals in the latter).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250602002516/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20251122094224/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/e19a063de5b3/20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf", @@ -31193,6 +32943,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-22", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2025-06-02__2025-11-22.json", "case_key": "apps:35950/20", "case_name": "Hasani v. Sweden", @@ -31226,6 +32978,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-22", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2025-06-02__2025-11-22.json", "case_key": "apps:56532/22", "case_name": "Hayes and Others v. the United Kingdom", @@ -31243,8 +32997,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.A.5|a:82|b:83", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two-stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. A distinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving \"whole life prisoners\" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2022, Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, 2023, Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), 2023, Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, and Lazăr v. Romania, 2024.", - "post_text": "Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two-stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. A distinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving \"whole life prisoners\" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2022, Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, 2023, Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), 2023, Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, and Lazăr v. Romania, 2024. The Court examined the second stage of the aforementioned test for the first time in Hayes and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2025, where it found that compassionate release constituted a review mechanism which satisfied the requirements of that stage of the test.", + "pre_text": "Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two-stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. Adistinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving \"whole life prisoners\" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2022, Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, 2023, Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), 2023, Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, and Lazăr v. Romania, 2024.", + "post_text": "Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two-stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. Adistinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving \"whole life prisoners\" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2022, Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, 2023, Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), 2023, Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, and Lazăr v. Romania, 2024. The Court examined the second stage of the aforementioned test for the first time in Hayes and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2025, where it found that compassionate release constituted a review mechanism which satisfied the requirements of that stage of the test.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250602002516/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20251122094224/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/e19a063de5b3/20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf", @@ -31259,6 +33013,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-22", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2025-06-02__2025-11-22.json", "case_key": "apps:63386/16", "case_name": "Mansouri v. Italy [GC] (dec.)", @@ -31292,6 +33048,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-22", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2025-06-02__2025-11-22.json", "case_key": "apps:21660/18", "case_name": "S.S. and Others v. Italy (dec.)", @@ -31325,6 +33083,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-22", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2025-06-02__2025-11-22.json", "case_key": "apps:5212/23", "case_name": "Siles Cabrera v. Spain", @@ -31358,6 +33118,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-22", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2025-06-02__2025-11-22.json", "case_key": "apps:45240/22", "case_name": "Sumbayev v. Georgia (dec.)", @@ -31375,8 +33137,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.A.5|a:85|b:86", "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "In Ansari v. Portugal (dec.), 2023, the Court dealt with the scenario where the applicant had been extradited following diplomatic assurances, which were later allegedly not complied with and the domestic courts of the respondent State later revoked the extradition decision because the authorities of the State to which the applicant had been extradited had prosecuted him on charges other than those in respect of which the extradition had been authorised. The applicant was detained in the State to which he had been extradited when he lodged his application to the Court, by which he complained that the authorities of the respondent State had not taken the necessary measures to help him return to the respondent State or to ensure that the diplomatic assurances were complied with. The Court found that the domestic authorities had taken the measures at their disposal to follow up on the applicant's allegations (see also Boumediiene and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), 2008, where the applicants, who had been handed over by the authorities of the respondent State to US forces and were later detained in Guantanamo Bay, alleged that the authorities of the respondent State had failed to enforce judicial decisions ordering the authorities to protect the rights, and obtain the return, of the applicants).", - "post_text": "In Ansari v. Portugal (dec.), 2023, the Court dealt with the scenario where the applicant had been extradited following diplomatic assurances, which were later allegedly not complied with and the domestic courts of the respondent State later revoked the extradition decision because the authorities of the State to which the applicant had been extradited had prosecuted him on charges other than those in respect of which the extradition had been authorised. The applicant was detained in the State to which he had been extradited when he lodged his application to the Court, by which he complained that the authorities of the respondent State had not taken the necessary measures to help him return to the respondent State or to ensure that the diplomatic assurances were complied with. The Court found that the domestic authorities had taken the measures at their disposal to follow up on the applicant's allegations (see also Boumediiene and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), 2008, where the applicants, who had been handed over by the authorities of the respondent State to US forces and were later detained in Guantanamo Bay, alleged that the authorities of the respondent State had failed to enforce judicial decisions ordering the authorities to protect the rights, and obtain the return, of the applicants). In Sumbayev v. Georgia (dec.), 2025, the Court dealt with a scenario where the extraditing State received requests to give its consent to the bringing of new criminal charges against the applicant in the State to which he had already been extradited: as the competent authorities of the extraditing State were not intending to examine these post-extradition requests, the Court considered that the applicant could not assert a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.", + "pre_text": "In Ansari v. Portugal (dec.), 2023, the Court dealt with the scenario where the applicant had been extradited following diplomatic assurances, which were later allegedly not complied with and the domestic courts of the respondent State later revoked the extradition decision because the authorities of the State to which the applicant had been extradited had prosecuted him on charges other than those in respect of which the extradition had been authorised. The applicant was detained in the State to which he had been extradited when he lodged his application to the Court, by which he complained that the authorities of the respondent State had not taken the necessary measures to help him return to the respondent State or to ensure that the diplomatic assurances were complied with. The Court found that the domestic authorities had taken the measures at their disposal to follow up on the applicant's allegations (see also Boumediiene and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), 2008, where the applicants, who had been handed over by the authorities of the respondent State to USforces and were later detained in Guantanamo Bay, alleged that the authorities of the respondent State had failed to enforce judicial decisions ordering the authorities to protect the rights, and obtain the return, of the applicants).", + "post_text": "In Ansari v. Portugal (dec.), 2023, the Court dealt with the scenario where the applicant had been extradited following diplomatic assurances, which were later allegedly not complied with and the domestic courts of the respondent State later revoked the extradition decision because the authorities of the State to which the applicant had been extradited had prosecuted him on charges other than those in respect of which the extradition had been authorised. The applicant was detained in the State to which he had been extradited when he lodged his application to the Court, by which he complained that the authorities of the respondent State had not taken the necessary measures to help him return to the respondent State or to ensure that the diplomatic assurances were complied with. The Court found that the domestic authorities had taken the measures at their disposal to follow up on the applicant's allegations (see also Boumediiene and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), 2008, where the applicants, who had been handed over by the authorities of the respondent State to USforces and were later detained in Guantanamo Bay, alleged that the authorities of the respondent State had failed to enforce judicial decisions ordering the authorities to protect the rights, and obtain the return, of the applicants). In Sumbayev v. Georgia (dec.), 2025, the Court dealt with a scenario where the extraditing State received requests to give its consent to the bringing of new criminal charges against the applicant in the State to which he had already been extradited: as the competent authorities of the extraditing State were not intending to examine these post-extradition requests, the Court considered that the applicant could not assert a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250602002516/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20251122094224/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_immigration_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/e19a063de5b3/20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf", @@ -31391,6 +33153,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:16757/21", "case_name": "Aktürk and Others v. Türkiye", @@ -31424,6 +33188,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:22515/14", "case_name": "Bryan and Others v. Russia", @@ -31457,6 +33223,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:9988/13", "case_name": "Ecodefence and Others v. Russia", @@ -31490,6 +33258,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:1269/13", "case_name": "European Air Transport Leipzig GmbH v. Belgium", @@ -31523,6 +33293,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-04-09", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json", "case_key": "apps:38948/10|8954/17", "case_name": "Sakskoburggotski and Chrobok v. Bulgaria", @@ -31556,6 +33328,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:46201/16", "case_name": "Associations of Communally-owned Forestry Proprietors Porceni Plesa and Piciorul Batran Banciu v. Romania", @@ -31589,6 +33363,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:24621/21", "case_name": "Atasagün v. Türkiye (dec.)", @@ -31622,6 +33398,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:22622/22", "case_name": "Besseau v. France (dec.)", @@ -31655,6 +33433,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:27547/18", "case_name": "Büttner and Krebs v. Germany (dec)", @@ -31688,6 +33468,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:48173/18", "case_name": "Cangı and Others v. Türkiye", @@ -31721,9 +33503,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:7189/21", - "case_name": "Carême v. France (dec.) [GC], no 7189/21", + "case_name": "Carême v. France (dec.) [GC]", "application_numbers": "7189/21", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -31754,6 +33538,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:39371/20", "case_name": "Duarte Aghostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Others (dec.) [GC]", @@ -31787,6 +33573,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:63543/09", "case_name": "Durdaj and Others v. Albania", @@ -31820,6 +33608,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:14684/18", "case_name": "Efgan Çetin and Others v. Türkiye", @@ -31853,6 +33643,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:42749/19", "case_name": "Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye", @@ -31886,6 +33678,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:16760/22", "case_name": "Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium", @@ -31919,6 +33713,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:25344/20", "case_name": "Friedrich and Others v. Poland", @@ -31952,6 +33748,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:20793/07|29240/07", "case_name": "Istanbullu and Ayden v. Turkey (dec.)", @@ -31985,6 +33783,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:35648/10", "case_name": "Locascia and Others v. Italy", @@ -32018,6 +33818,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:46514/15", "case_name": "TMMOB and Karakuș Candan v. Türkiye (dec.)", @@ -32051,6 +33853,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-06-04", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json", "case_key": "apps:53600/20", "case_name": "Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC]", @@ -32084,6 +33888,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-12", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "17 September 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-09-17", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-12.json", "case_key": "apps:38283/18", "case_name": "Bogay and Others v. Ukraine", @@ -32117,6 +33923,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-12", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "17 September 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-09-17", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-12.json", "case_key": "apps:65087/19", "case_name": "Cangı and Others v. Türkiye (no. 2)", @@ -32150,6 +33958,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-12", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "17 September 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-09-17", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-12.json", "case_key": "apps:51567/14", "case_name": "Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy", @@ -32183,6 +33993,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-12", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "17 September 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-09-17", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-12.json", "case_key": "apps:52854/18", "case_name": "L.F. and Others v. Italy", @@ -32216,6 +34028,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-12", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "17 September 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-09-17", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-12.json", "case_key": "apps:30336/22", "case_name": "Laterza and D'Errico v. Italy", @@ -32249,6 +34063,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-12-12", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "17 September 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-09-17", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-12.json", "case_key": "apps:40899/22", "case_name": "Ludes and Others v. France", @@ -32282,6 +34098,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-07-08", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e8704f851a2b/diff_2023-09-23__2025-07-08.json", "case_key": "apps:59/17", "case_name": "Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye", @@ -32299,8 +34117,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_updated|paragraph_added|citation_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A|a:13|b:13|II.B|a:None|b:30|II.B|a:21|b:21|II.C|a:None|b:37", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "The Court has held that terrorism in Northern Ireland met the standard of a public emergency, since for a number of years it represented a \"particularly far -reaching and acute danger for the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, the institutions of the six counties [of Northern Ireland] and the lives of the province 's inhabitants\" ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, §§ 205 and 212; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 48; Marshall v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2001). So, too, did PKK terrorist activity in South-East Turkey ( Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, § 70) and the imminent threat of serious terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom after 11 September 2001 ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 181), and the attempted military coup in Turkey in 2016 ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 91-93; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 75-77; this observation was repeated in, for example, Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 88; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 73-74; Pişkin v. Turkey, 2020, § 59 ; Atilla Taş v. Turkey, 2021, § 83). The requirement of imminence is not, however, to be interpreted so narrowly as to require a State to wait for disaster to strike before taking measures to deal with it ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 177).\n\nNevertheless, the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect: the Court is empowered to rule on whether the States have gone beyond the \"extent strictly required by the exigencies\" of the crisis ( ibid. ). T o assess whether the measures taken were \"strictly required by the exigencies of the situation and consistent with the other obligations under international law\", the Court examines the complaints on the merits ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 94; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 78; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 88).", - "post_text": "The Court has held that terrorism in Northern Ireland met the standard of a public emergency, since for a number of years it represented a \"particularly far -reaching and acute danger for the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, the institutions of the six counties [of Northern Ireland] and the lives of the province 's inhabitants\" ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, §§ 205 and 212; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 48; Marshall v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2001). So, too, did PKK terrorist activity in South-East Turkey ( Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, § 70), the imminent threat of serious terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom after 11 September 2001 ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 181), the several terrorist attacks in France between 2015 and 2017 ( Domenjoud v. France, 2024, § 150), and the attempted military coup in Turkey in 2016 ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 91-93; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 75-77; this observation was repeated in, for example, Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 88; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 73-74; Pişkin v. Turkey, 2020, § 59 ; Atilla Taş v. Turkey, 2021, § 83; Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, 2024, § 90). The requirement of imminence is not, however, to be interpreted so narrowly as to require a State to wait for disaster to strike before taking measures to deal with it ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 177).\n\nIn Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, 2024, a judge serving at the United Nations International Residual Mechanisms for Criminal Tribunals had, despite his diplomatic immunity, been arrested and detained pending his trial. The Court found that the measure could not be regarded as strictly required by the exigencies of the attempted coup d'état of 15 July 2016 which gave rise to the state of emergency. In particular, the Court was not convinced that the domestic courts'failure to assess the applicant's diplomatic immunity, up until the trial court pronounced itself on the merits of the case and convicted the applicant, could be regarded as strictly required by the exigencies of the attempted coup d'état of 15 July 2016 which gave rise to the state of emergency (§ 130).\n\nNevertheless, the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect: the Court is empowered to rule on whether the States have gone beyond the \"extent strictly required by the exigencies\" of the crisis ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom ; Domenjoud v. France, 2024, § 144). To assess whether the measures taken were \"strictly required by the exigencies of the situa tion and consistent with the other obligations under international law\", the Court examines the complaints on the merits ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 94; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 78; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 88; Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, 2024, § 90).\n\nIn Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, 2024, the Court extended the caveat of \"other obligations under international law\", within the meaning of Article 15, to obligations arising from diplomatic immunity, in the context of an international judge's pre-trial detention (§ 130) and searches of his residence and person (§ 144), which could not be justified under this provision.", + "pre_text": "The Court has held that terrorism in Northern Ireland met the standard of a public emergency, since for a number of years it represented a \"particularly far -reaching and acute danger for the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, the institutions of the six counties [of Northern Ireland] and the lives of the province 's inhabitants\" ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, §§ 205 and 212; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 48; Marshall v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2001). So, too, did PKKterrorist activity in South-East Turkey ( Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, § 70) and the imminent threat of serious terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom after 11 September 2001 ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 181), and the attempted military coup in Turkey in 2016 ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 91-93; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 75-77; this observation was repeated in, for example, Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 88; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 73-74; Pişkin v. Turkey, 2020, § 59 ; Atilla Taş v. Turkey, 2021, § 83). The requirement of imminence is not, however, to be interpreted so narrowly as to require a State to wait for disaster to strike before taking measures to deal with it ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 177).\n\nNevertheless, the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect: the Court is empowered to rule on whether the States have gone beyond the \"extent strictly required by the exigencies\" of the crisis ( ibid. ). T o assess whether the measures taken were \"strictly required by the exigencies of the situation and consistent with the other obligations under international law\", the Court examines the complaints on the merits ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 94; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 78; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 88).", + "post_text": "The Court has held that terrorism in Northern Ireland met the standard of a public emergency, since for a number of years it represented a \"particularly far -reaching and acute danger for the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, the institutions of the six counties [of Northern Ireland] and the lives of the province 's inhabitants\" ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, §§ 205 and 212; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 48; Marshall v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2001). So, too, did PKKterrorist activity in South-East Turkey ( Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, § 70), the imminent threat of serious terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom after 11 September 2001 ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 181), the several terrorist attacks in France between 2015 and 2017 ( Domenjoud v. France, 2024, § 150), and the attempted military coup in Turkey in 2016 ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 91-93; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 75-77; this observation was repeated in, for example, Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 88; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 73-74; Pişkin v. Turkey, 2020, § 59 ; Atilla Taş v. Turkey, 2021, § 83; Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, 2024, § 90). The requirement of imminence is not, however, to be interpreted so narrowly as to require a State to wait for disaster to strike before taking measures to deal with it ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 177).\n\nIn Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, 2024, a judge serving at the United Nations International Residual Mechanisms for Criminal Tribunals had, despite his diplomatic immunity, been arrested and detained pending his trial. The Court found that the measure could not be regarded as strictly required by the exigencies of the attempted coup d'état of 15 July 2016 which gave rise to the state of emergency. In particular, the Court was not convinced that the domestic courts'failure to assess the applicant's diplomatic immunity, up until the trial court pronounced itself on the merits of the case and convicted the applicant, could be regarded as strictly required by the exigencies of the attempted coup d'état of 15 July 2016 which gave rise to the state of emergency (§ 130).\n\nNevertheless, the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect: the Court is empowered to rule on whether the States have gone beyond the \"extent strictly required by the exigencies\" of the crisis ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom ; Domenjoud v. France, 2024, § 144). To assess whether the measures taken were \"strictly required by the exigencies of the situa tion and consistent with the other obligations under international law\", the Court examines the complaints on the merits ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 94; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 78; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 88; Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, 2024, § 90).\n\nIn Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, 2024, the Court extended the caveat of \"other obligations under international law\", within the meaning of Article 15, to obligations arising from diplomatic immunity, in the context of an international judge's pre-trial detention (§ 130) and searches of his residence and person (§ 144), which could not be justified under this provision.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923094342/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_15_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250708224035/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_15_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/e8704f851a2b/20230923094342__guide_art_15_eng.pdf", @@ -32315,6 +34133,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-07-08", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e8704f851a2b/diff_2023-09-23__2025-07-08.json", "case_key": "apps:34749/16|79607/17", "case_name": "Domenjoud v. France", @@ -32332,8 +34152,8 @@ "linked_change_types": "citation_added|citation_updated|paragraph_added", "linked_paragraph_refs": "II.A|a:12|b:12|II.A|a:13|b:13|II.B|a:None|b:26|II.B|a:21|b:21|II.B|a:24|b:24|IV|a:45|b:48|IV|a:46|b:49", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Generally the Convention organs have deferred to the national authorities'assessment as to whether such an exceptional situation exists. As the Court stated in Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, § 207): \"it falls in the first place to each Contracting State, with its responsibility for'the life of [its] nation ', to determine whether that life is threatened by a'public emergency '\". By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of the derogations necessary to avert it. Accordingly, in this matter a wide margin of appreciation should be left to the national authorities. Nevertheless, the Court had emphasised that States do not enjoy an unlimited discretion in this respect. The domestic margin of appreciation is accompanied by European supervision ( Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 43; Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 91; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 75).\n\nThe Court has held that terrorism in Northern Ireland met the standard of a public emergency, since for a number of years it represented a \"particularly far -reaching and acute danger for the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, the institutions of the six counties [of Northern Ireland] and the lives of the province 's inhabitants\" ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, §§ 205 and 212; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 48; Marshall v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2001). So, too, did PKK terrorist activity in South-East Turkey ( Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, § 70) and the imminent threat of serious terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom after 11 September 2001 ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 181), and the attempted military coup in Turkey in 2016 ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 91-93; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 75-77; this observation was repeated in, for example, Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 88; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 73-74; Pişkin v. Turkey, 2020, § 59 ; Atilla Taş v. Turkey, 2021, § 83). The requirement of imminence is not, however, to be interpreted so narrowly as to require a State to wait for disaster to strike before taking measures to deal with it ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 177).\n\nNevertheless, the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect: the Court is empowered to rule on whether the States have gone beyond the \"extent strictly required by the exigencies\" of the crisis ( ibid. ). T o assess whether the measures taken were \"strictly required by the exigencies of the situation and consistent with the other obligations under international law\", the Court examines the complaints on the merits ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 94; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 78; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 88).\n\nThis involves the Court considering matters such as: ▪ whether ordinary laws would have been sufficient to meet the danger caused by the public emergency ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 36; Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, § 212); ▪ whether the measures are a genuine response to an emergency situation ( Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 51; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, § 118); ▪ whether the measures were used for the purpose for which they were granted ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 38); ▪ whether the Government are able to show that there is a sufficient connection between the individual case and the derogation relied on (see, implicitly, Vedat Şorli v. Turkey, 2021, § 46 - concerning an insult to the head of State); ▪ whether the derogation is limited in scope and the reasons advanced in support of it ( Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 66); ▪ whether the need for the derogation was kept under review ( ibid., § 54); ▪ any attenuation in the measures imposed ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, § 220); ▪ whether the measures were subject to safeguards ( ibid., §§ 216-219; Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 37; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, §§ 61-65; Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, §§ 79-84); ▪ the importance of the right at stake, and the broader purpose of judicial control over interferences with that right ( ibid., § 76); ▪ whether judicial control of the measures was practicable ( ibid., § 78; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 59); ▪ the proportionality of the measures and whether they involved any unjustifiable discrimination ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 190); whether they were \" lawful \" and were effected \" in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law \" ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 140 and 213; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 119 and 183); ▪ whether legal certainty is not compromised by a judicial interpretation running counter to the applicable statutory provisions ( Baş v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 151-153). Thus, for example, the Court has found that an interpretation of the legal concept of \" in flagrante delicto \" - allowing judges to be detained without the prior lifting of their immunity, a guarantee of their independence - that expanded the scope of that concept \"so that judges suspected of belonging to a criminal association are deprived of the judicial protection afforded by Turkish law to members of the judiciary\" was such as to \" [negate] the procedural safeguards which members of the judiciary are afforded in order to protect them from interference by the executive\" ( ibid. ); ▪ whether the minimum requirements of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention regarding the \"reasonableness\" of a suspicion justifying an individual' s detention are satisfied ( Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 147-149; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 176-196; Baş v. Turkey, 2020, § 200); ▪ whether the court decided \"speedily\" on the lawfulness of detention within the meaning of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention ( Baş v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 216 and 230), including the Constitutional Court ( Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 176-196); and ▪ the views of any national courts which have considered the question ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 93 and 140; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 77 and 119; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, § 146). If the highest domestic court in a Contracting State has reached the conclusion that the measures were not strictly required, the Court will be justified in reaching a contrary conclusion only if satisfied that the national court had misinterpreted or misapplied Article 15 or the Court's jurisprudence under that Article, or reached a conclusion which was manifestly unreasonable ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 174).\n\nThe Court has jurisdiction to examine of its own motion whether a notification by a State complies with the formal requirements provided in Article 15 § 3 - namely, keeping the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures taken by way of derogation from the Convention and the reasons for them - even if that issue has not been raised by any of the parties ( Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, §§ 85-86).\n\nThe Court has accepted that this formal condition was observed even where the notice of derogation did not explicitly mention which Articles of the Convention were concerned, in cases where the parties had not raised any objections in that regard ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 89; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 73; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 100-102).", - "post_text": "Generally the Convention organs have deferred to the national authorities'assessment as to whether such an exceptional situation exists. As the Court stated in Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, § 207): \"it falls in the first place to each Contracting State, with its responsibility for'the life of [its] nation ', to determine whether that life is threatened by a'public emergency '\". By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of the derogations necessary to avert it. Accordingly, in this matter a wide margin of appreciation should be left to the national authorities. Nevertheless, the Court had emphasised that States do not enjoy an unlimited discretion in this respect. The domestic margin of appreciation is accompanied by European supervision ( Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 43; Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 91; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 75; Domenjoud v. France, 2024, § 145).\n\nThe Court has held that terrorism in Northern Ireland met the standard of a public emergency, since for a number of years it represented a \"particularly far -reaching and acute danger for the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, the institutions of the six counties [of Northern Ireland] and the lives of the province 's inhabitants\" ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, §§ 205 and 212; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 48; Marshall v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2001). So, too, did PKK terrorist activity in South-East Turkey ( Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, § 70), the imminent threat of serious terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom after 11 September 2001 ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 181), the several terrorist attacks in France between 2015 and 2017 ( Domenjoud v. France, 2024, § 150), and the attempted military coup in Turkey in 2016 ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 91-93; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 75-77; this observation was repeated in, for example, Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 88; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 73-74; Pişkin v. Turkey, 2020, § 59 ; Atilla Taş v. Turkey, 2021, § 83; Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, 2024, § 90). The requirement of imminence is not, however, to be interpreted so narrowly as to require a State to wait for disaster to strike before taking measures to deal with it ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 177).\n\nTo be deemed \"strictly required by the situation\" within the meaning of Article 15 § 1, the measure must be covered by the derogation notified by the State. The case of Domenjoud v. France, 2024 concerned a preventive home-curfew order issued under state-of-emergency legislation in view of a potential participation in violent actions during the COP21 summit. The Court assessed whether the derogating measures had been strictly required in the light of the reasons for the derogation. In the information transmitted to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe pursuant to Article 15 § 3, the Government had indicated that the state of emergency had been dec lared \"to prevent the commission of further terrorist attacks\" ( § 154). The Court found that, in the absence of any individual and detailed assessment of the second applicant's behaviour or actions, the Government had not convincingly shown that his placement under home curfew had been ordered with the aim of combatting terrorism. Therefore, the measure in issue had not been strictly necessary to fulfil the aim pursued by the exercise of the right of derogation (§ 155).\n\nNevertheless, the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect: the Court is empowered to rule on whether the States have gone beyond the \"extent strictly required by the exigencies\" of the crisis ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom ; Domenjoud v. France, 2024, § 144). To assess whether the measures taken were \"strictly required by the exigencies of the situa tion and consistent with the other obligations under international law\", the Court examines the complaints on the merits ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 94; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 78; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 88; Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, 2024, § 90).\n\nThis involves the Court considering matters such as: ▪ whether ordinary laws would have been sufficient to meet the danger caused by the public emergency ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 36; Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, § 212); ▪ whether the measures are a genuine response to an emergency situation ( Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 51; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, § 118); ▪ whether the measures were used for the purpose for which they were granted ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 38 ; Domenjoud v. France, 2024, § 154); ▪ whether the Government are able to show that there is a sufficient connection between the individual case and the derogation relied on ( Domenjoud v. France, 2024, § 154; see also, implicitly, Vedat Şorli v. Turkey, 2021, § 46 - concerning an insult to the head of State); ▪ whether the derogation is limited in scope and the reasons advanced in support of it ( Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 66); ▪ whether the need for the derogation was kept under review ( ibid., § 54); ▪ any attenuation in the measures imposed ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, § 220); ▪ whether the measures were subject to safeguards ( ibid., §§ 216-219; Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 37; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, §§ 61-65; Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, §§ 79-84); ▪ the importance of the right at stake, and the broader purpose of judicial control over interferences with that right ( ibid., § 76); ▪ whether judicial control of the measures was practicable ( ibid., § 78; 3 Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 59); ▪ the proportionality of the measures and whether they involved any unjustifiable discrimination ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 190); whether they were \" lawful \" and were effected \" in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law \" ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 140 and 213; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 119 and 183); ▪ whether legal certainty is not compromised by a judicial interpretation running counter to the applicable statutory provisions ( Baş v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 151-153). Thus, for example, the Court has found that an interpretation of the legal concept of \" in flagrante delicto \" - allowing judges to be detained without the prior lifting of their immunity, a guarantee of their independence - that expanded the scope of that concept \"so that judges suspected of belonging to a criminal association are deprived of the judicial protection afforded by Turkish law to members of the judiciary\" was such as to \" [negate] the procedural safeguards which members of the judiciary are afforded in order to protect them from interference by the executive\" ( ibid. ); ▪ whether the minimum requirements of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention regarding the \"reasonableness\" of a suspicion justifying an individual' s detention are satisfied ( Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 147-149; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 176-196; Baş v. Turkey, 2020, § 200); ▪ whether the court decided \"speedily\" on the lawfulness of detention within the meaning of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention ( Baş v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 216 and 230), including the Constitutional Court ( Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 176-196); and ▪ the views of any national courts which have considered the question ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 93 and 140; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 77 and 119; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, § 146). If the highest domestic court in a Contracting State has reached the conclusion that the measures were not strictly required, the Court will be justified in reaching a contrary conclusion only if satisfied that the national court had misinterpreted or misapplied Article 15 or the Court's jurisprudence under that Article, or reached a conclusion which was manifestly unreasonable ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 174).\n\nThe Court has jurisdiction to examine of its own motion whether a notification by a State complies with the formal requirements provided in Article 15 § 3 - namely, keeping the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures taken by way of derogation from the Convention and the reasons for them - even if that issue has not been raised by any of the parties ( Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, §§ 85-86; Domenjoud v. France, 2024, §§ 147-148).\n\nThe Court has accepted that this formal condition was observed even where the notice of derogation did not explicitly mention which Articles of the Convention were concerned, in cases where the parties had not raised any objections in that regard ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 89; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 73; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 100-102; Domenjoud v. France, 2024, § 151).", + "pre_text": "Generally the Convention organs have deferred to the national authorities'assessment as to whether such an exceptional situation exists. As the Court stated in Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, § 207): \"it falls in the first place to each Contracting State, with its responsibility for'the life of [its] nation ', to determine whether that life is threatened by a'public emergency '\". By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of the derogations necessary to avert it. Accordingly, in this matter a wide margin of appreciation should be left to the national authorities. Nevertheless, the Court had emphasised that States do not enjoy an unlimited discretion in this respect. The domestic margin of appreciation is accompanied by European supervision ( Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 43; Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 91; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 75).\n\nThe Court has held that terrorism in Northern Ireland met the standard of a public emergency, since for a number of years it represented a \"particularly far -reaching and acute danger for the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, the institutions of the six counties [of Northern Ireland] and the lives of the province 's inhabitants\" ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, §§ 205 and 212; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 48; Marshall v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2001). So, too, did PKKterrorist activity in South-East Turkey ( Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, § 70) and the imminent threat of serious terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom after 11 September 2001 ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 181), and the attempted military coup in Turkey in 2016 ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 91-93; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 75-77; this observation was repeated in, for example, Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 88; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 73-74; Pişkin v. Turkey, 2020, § 59 ; Atilla Taş v. Turkey, 2021, § 83). The requirement of imminence is not, however, to be interpreted so narrowly as to require a State to wait for disaster to strike before taking measures to deal with it ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 177).\n\nNevertheless, the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect: the Court is empowered to rule on whether the States have gone beyond the \"extent strictly required by the exigencies\" of the crisis ( ibid. ). T o assess whether the measures taken were \"strictly required by the exigencies of the situation and consistent with the other obligations under international law\", the Court examines the complaints on the merits ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 94; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 78; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 88).\n\nThis involves the Court considering matters such as: ▪ whether ordinary laws would have been sufficient to meet the danger caused by the public emergency ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 36; Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, § 212); ▪ whether the measures are a genuine response to an emergency situation ( Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 51; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, § 118); ▪ whether the measures were used for the purpose for which they were granted ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 38); ▪ whether the Government are able to show that there is a sufficient connection between the individual case and the derogation relied on (see, implicitly, Vedat Şorli v. Turkey, 2021, § 46 - concerning an insult to the head of State); ▪ whether the derogation is limited in scope and the reasons advanced in support of it ( Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 66); ▪ whether the need for the derogation was kept under review ( ibid., § 54); ▪ any attenuation in the measures imposed ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, § 220); ▪ whether the measures were subject to safeguards ( ibid., §§ 216-219; Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 37; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, §§ 61-65; Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, §§ 79-84); ▪ the importance of the right at stake, and the broader purpose of judicial control over interferences with that right ( ibid., § 76); ▪ whether judicial control of the measures was practicable ( ibid., § 78; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 59); ▪ the proportionality of the measures and whether they involved any unjustifiable discrimination ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 190); whether they were \" lawful \" and were effected \" in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law \" ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 140 and 213; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 119 and 183); ▪ whether legal certainty is not compromised by a judicial interpretation running counter to the applicable statutory provisions ( Baş v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 151-153). Thus, for example, the Court has found that an interpretation of the legal concept of \" in flagrante delicto \" - allowing judges to be detained without the prior lifting of their immunity, a guarantee of their independence - that expanded the scope of that concept \"so that judges suspected of belonging to a criminal association are deprived of the judicial protection afforded by Turkish law to members of the judiciary\" was such as to \" [negate] the procedural safeguards which members of the judiciary are afforded in order to protect them from interference by the executive\" ( ibid. ); ▪ whether the minimum requirements of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention regarding the \"reasonableness\" of a suspicion justifying an individual' s detention are satisfied ( Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 147-149; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 176-196; Baş v. Turkey, 2020, § 200); ▪ whether the court decided \"speedily\" on the lawfulness of detention within the meaning of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention ( Baş v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 216 and 230), including the Constitutional Court ( Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 176-196); and ▪ the views of any national courts which have considered the question ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 93 and 140; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 77 and 119; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, § 146). If the highest domestic court in a Contracting State has reached the conclusion that the measures were not strictly required, the Court will be justified in reaching a contrary conclusion only if satisfied that the national court had misinterpreted or misapplied Article 15 or the Court's jurisprudence under that Article, or reached a conclusion which was manifestly unreasonable ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 174).\n\nThe Court has jurisdiction to examine of its own motion whether a notification by a State complies with the formal requirements provided in Article 15 § 3 - namely, keeping the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures taken by way of derogation from the Convention and the reasons for them - even if that issue has not been raised by any of the parties ( Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, §§ 85-86).\n\nThe Court has accepted that this formal condition was observed even where the notice of derogation did not explicitly mention which Articles of the Convention were concerned, in cases where the parties had not raised any objections in that regard ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 89; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 73; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 100-102).", + "post_text": "Generally the Convention organs have deferred to the national authorities'assessment as to whether such an exceptional situation exists. As the Court stated in Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, § 207): \"it falls in the first place to each Contracting State, with its responsibility for'the life of [its] nation ', to determine whether that life is threatened by a'public emergency '\". By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of the derogations necessary to avert it. Accordingly, in this matter a wide margin of appreciation should be left to the national authorities. Nevertheless, the Court had emphasised that States do not enjoy an unlimited discretion in this respect. The domestic margin of appreciation is accompanied by European supervision ( Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 43; Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 91; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 75; Domenjoud v. France, 2024, § 145).\n\nThe Court has held that terrorism in Northern Ireland met the standard of a public emergency, since for a number of years it represented a \"particularly far -reaching and acute danger for the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, the institutions of the six counties [of Northern Ireland] and the lives of the province 's inhabitants\" ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, §§ 205 and 212; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 48; Marshall v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2001). So, too, did PKKterrorist activity in South-East Turkey ( Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, § 70), the imminent threat of serious terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom after 11 September 2001 ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 181), the several terrorist attacks in France between 2015 and 2017 ( Domenjoud v. France, 2024, § 150), and the attempted military coup in Turkey in 2016 ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 91-93; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 75-77; this observation was repeated in, for example, Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 88; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 73-74; Pişkin v. Turkey, 2020, § 59 ; Atilla Taş v. Turkey, 2021, § 83; Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, 2024, § 90). The requirement of imminence is not, however, to be interpreted so narrowly as to require a State to wait for disaster to strike before taking measures to deal with it ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 177).\n\nTo be deemed \"strictly required by the situation\" within the meaning of Article 15 § 1, the measure must be covered by the derogation notified by the State. The case of Domenjoud v. France, 2024 concerned a preventive home-curfew order issued under state-of-emergency legislation in view of a potential participation in violent actions during the COP21 summit. The Court assessed whether the derogating measures had been strictly required in the light of the reasons for the derogation. In the information transmitted to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe pursuant to Article 15 § 3, the Government had indicated that the state of emergency had been dec lared \"to prevent the commission of further terrorist attacks\" ( § 154). The Court found that, in the absence of any individual and detailed assessment of the second applicant's behaviour or actions, the Government had not convincingly shown that his placement under home curfew had been ordered with the aim of combatting terrorism. Therefore, the measure in issue had not been strictly necessary to fulfil the aim pursued by the exercise of the right of derogation (§ 155).\n\nNevertheless, the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect: the Court is empowered to rule on whether the States have gone beyond the \"extent strictly required by the exigencies\" of the crisis ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom ; Domenjoud v. France, 2024, § 144). To assess whether the measures taken were \"strictly required by the exigencies of the situa tion and consistent with the other obligations under international law\", the Court examines the complaints on the merits ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 94; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 78; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 88; Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, 2024, § 90).\n\nThis involves the Court considering matters such as: ▪ whether ordinary laws would have been sufficient to meet the danger caused by the public emergency ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 36; Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, § 212); ▪ whether the measures are a genuine response to an emergency situation ( Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 51; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, § 118); ▪ whether the measures were used for the purpose for which they were granted ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 38 ; Domenjoud v. France, 2024, § 154); ▪ whether the Government are able to show that there is a sufficient connection between the individual case and the derogation relied on ( Domenjoud v. France, 2024, § 154; see also, implicitly, Vedat Şorli v. Turkey, 2021, § 46 - concerning an insult to the head of State); ▪ whether the derogation is limited in scope and the reasons advanced in support of it ( Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 66); ▪ whether the need for the derogation was kept under review ( ibid., § 54); ▪ any attenuation in the measures imposed ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, § 220); ▪ whether the measures were subject to safeguards ( ibid., §§ 216-219; Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 37; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, §§ 61-65; Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, §§ 79-84); ▪ the importance of the right at stake, and the broader purpose of judicial control over interferences with that right ( ibid., § 76); ▪ whether judicial control of the measures was practicable ( ibid., § 78; 3 Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 59); ▪ the proportionality of the measures and whether they involved any unjustifiable discrimination ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 190); whether they were \" lawful \" and were effected \" in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law \" ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 140 and 213; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 119 and 183); ▪ whether legal certainty is not compromised by a judicial interpretation running counter to the applicable statutory provisions ( Baş v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 151-153). Thus, for example, the Court has found that an interpretation of the legal concept of \" in flagrante delicto \" - allowing judges to be detained without the prior lifting of their immunity, a guarantee of their independence - that expanded the scope of that concept \"so that judges suspected of belonging to a criminal association are deprived of the judicial protection afforded by Turkish law to members of the judiciary\" was such as to \" [negate] the procedural safeguards which members of the judiciary are afforded in order to protect them from interference by the executive\" ( ibid. ); ▪ whether the minimum requirements of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention regarding the \"reasonableness\" of a suspicion justifying an individual' s detention are satisfied ( Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 147-149; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 176-196; Baş v. Turkey, 2020, § 200); ▪ whether the court decided \"speedily\" on the lawfulness of detention within the meaning of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention ( Baş v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 216 and 230), including the Constitutional Court ( Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 176-196); and ▪ the views of any national courts which have considered the question ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 93 and 140; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 77 and 119; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, § 146). If the highest domestic court in a Contracting State has reached the conclusion that the measures were not strictly required, the Court will be justified in reaching a contrary conclusion only if satisfied that the national court had misinterpreted or misapplied Article 15 or the Court's jurisprudence under that Article, or reached a conclusion which was manifestly unreasonable ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 174).\n\nThe Court has jurisdiction to examine of its own motion whether a notification by a State complies with the formal requirements provided in Article 15 § 3 - namely, keeping the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures taken by way of derogation from the Convention and the reasons for them - even if that issue has not been raised by any of the parties ( Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, §§ 85-86; Domenjoud v. France, 2024, §§ 147-148).\n\nThe Court has accepted that this formal condition was observed even where the notice of derogation did not explicitly mention which Articles of the Convention were concerned, in cases where the parties had not raised any objections in that regard ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 89; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 73; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 100-102; Domenjoud v. France, 2024, § 151).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923094342/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_15_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250708224035/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_15_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/e8704f851a2b/20230923094342__guide_art_15_eng.pdf", @@ -32348,6 +34168,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-25", "from_version": "28 February 2025", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/e8704f851a2b/diff_2025-07-08__2025-11-25.json", "case_key": "apps:44898/10", "case_name": "Jeronovičs v. Latvia", @@ -32381,6 +34203,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-16", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-16.json", "case_key": "apps:38263/08", "case_name": "Georgia v. Russia (II) (just satisfaction) [GC]", @@ -32414,6 +34238,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-16", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-16.json", "case_key": "apps:36418/20", "case_name": "Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 3)", @@ -32447,6 +34273,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-02-16", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-16.json", "case_key": "apps:61365/16", "case_name": "S.E. v. Serbia", @@ -32480,6 +34308,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-02-16__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:12427/22", "case_name": "A.D. v. Malta", @@ -32513,6 +34343,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-02-16__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:33234/12", "case_name": "Al Nashiri v. Romania", @@ -32546,6 +34378,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-02-16__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:6383/17", "case_name": "Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania", @@ -32564,7 +34398,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.A.1.b|a:None|b:56", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "In the context of an extraordinary rendition case, the Court found that, by enabling the applicant's transfer to another CIA detention site, the respondent State had exposed him to a foreseeable risk of continued secret, incommunicado and otherwise arbitrary detention (in breach of Article 5), as well as to further ill-treatment and conditions of detention, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. While the Court was mindful of the fact that the respondent State had already sought assistance and judicial cooperation from the US authorities, it considered that the respondent State was under an obligation to take the necessary individual measures to redress as far as possible the violations found, which required that the respondent State attempted to make further representations to the US authorities with a view to removing or, at the very least seeking to limit, as far as possible, the effects of these violations ( Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania, 2024, § 277).  Preventing torture, inhuman and degrading treatment", + "post_text": "In the context of an extraordinary rendition case, the Court found that, by enabling the applicant's transfer to another CIAdetention site, the respondent State had exposed him to a foreseeable risk of continued secret, incommunicado and otherwise arbitrary detention (in breach of Article 5), as well as to further ill-treatment and conditions of detention, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. While the Court was mindful of the fact that the respondent State had already sought assistance and judicial cooperation from the USauthorities, it considered that the respondent State was under an obligation to take the necessary individual measures to redress as far as possible the violations found, which required that the respondent State attempted to make further representations to the USauthorities with a view to removing or, at the very least seeking to limit, as far as possible, the effects of these violations ( Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania, 2024, § 277).  Preventing torture, inhuman and degrading treatment", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240216163759/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_46_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930065341/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_46_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/ed0ed05ac958/20240216163759__guide_art_46_eng.pdf", @@ -32579,6 +34413,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-02-16__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:76680/17", "case_name": "D v. Latvia", @@ -32612,6 +34448,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-02-16__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:3324/19", "case_name": "Mehmet Zeki Doğan v. Türkiye (No. 2)", @@ -32645,6 +34483,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-02-16__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:30138/21", "case_name": "Miranda Magro v. Portugal", @@ -32678,6 +34518,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-02-16__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:34323/21", "case_name": "Ştefan-Gabriel Mocanu and Others v. Romania", @@ -32711,6 +34553,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-02-16__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "name:ukraine v russia re crimea gc::2024", "case_name": "Ukraine v. Russia (Re Crimea) [GC]", @@ -32744,6 +34588,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-02-16__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "name:v i v moldova::2024", "case_name": "V.I. v. Moldova", @@ -32777,6 +34623,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-02-16__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "name:verein klimaseniorinnen schweiz and others v switzerland gc::2024", "case_name": "Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC]", @@ -32810,6 +34658,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-02-16__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:50849/21", "case_name": "Wałęsa v. Poland", @@ -32843,6 +34693,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", "from_version": "31 August 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2024", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-02-16__2024-09-30.json", "case_key": "apps:15669/20", "case_name": "Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC]", @@ -32876,6 +34728,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json", "case_key": "apps:2705/20", "case_name": "Beley v. Ukraine", @@ -32909,6 +34763,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json", "case_key": "apps:51567/14", "case_name": "Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy*", @@ -32942,9 +34798,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json", "case_key": "apps:27849/15|33358/15", - "case_name": "Drozdyk and Mikula v. Ukraine, nos.27849/15 and 33358/15", + "case_name": "Drozdyk and Mikula v. Ukraine", "application_numbers": "27849/15|33358/15", "judgment_year": "2024", "citation_change": "added", @@ -32953,14 +34811,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF DROZDYK AND MIKULA v. UKRAINE", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", - "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "IV.A.1.k: Article 1 of Protocol No. 1", + "linked_change_types": "citation_updated", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.A.1.k|a:113|b:114", + "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", + "pre_text": "In a case in which the violation was due to the absence of procedural safeguards, with the result that those affected by an interference with their property rights (cancellation of shares and bonds) could not effectively challenge the measures taken by the national authorities, the Court underlined that it was essential to give the applicants an avenue towards effective legal protection. This should be done as soon as it became possible (after the conclusion of pending constitutional proceedings). Given that a period of several years had passed since the interference occurred, the Court further stressed the importance of avoiding any further unnecessary delays in the determination of the applicants'claims ( Pintar and Others v. Slovenia, 2021, § 114).", + "post_text": "In a case in which the violation was due to the absence of procedural safeguards, with the result that those affected by an interference with their property rights (cancellation of shares and bonds) could not effectively challenge the measures taken by the national authorities, the Court underlined that it was essential to give the applicants an avenue towards effective legal protection. This should be done as soon as it became possible (after the conclusion of pending constitutional proceedings). Given that a period of several years had passed since the interference occurred, the Court further stressed the importance of avoiding any further unnecessary delays in the determination of the applicants'claims ( Pintar and Others v. Slovenia, 2021, § 114). under Article 46 about appropriate forms of redress for a violation of property rights. The case of Drozdyk and Mikula v. Ukraine, 2024, concerned the invalidation of the applicants'title to plots of land adjoining the railway line, the domestic courts accepting the argument of the railway company that it was the owner of the plots in question as they were within the railway protection zone. The Court found that the interference with the applicants'possessions, who had received no compensation, constituted a disproportionate burden on them. In making its award for pecuniary damage, the Court indicated that the respondent State should ensure full restitution of the applicants'titles, through reopening of the domestic proceedings if necessary. Alternatively, it should pay them compensation, or transfer comparable property to them (§ 62 and operative provision 5(a)).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930065341/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_46_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250918162301/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_46_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/ed0ed05ac958/20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf", @@ -32975,6 +34833,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json", "case_key": "apps:1766/23", "case_name": "J.B. and Others v. Malta", @@ -32993,7 +34853,7 @@ "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.A.1.c|a:87|b:88", "linked_match_strategies": "citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "In another case which concerned immigration detention ( A.D. v. Malta, 2023), the Court considered that the problems detected could subsequently give rise to numerous other well-founded applications which were a threat to the future effectiveness of the Convention system. It consequently held that general measures at national level were undoubtedly called for in execution of that judgment. As regards the violation of Article 5 § 1 on account, inter alia, of the lack of legal basis surrounding detention for health considerations, it noted that concerns had already been raised by the CPT and the Commissioner. It thus called on the Government to ensure a legal basis in domestic law for any such detention, in conformity with the general principle of legal certainty (§§ 209-210 - see also above for the general measures indicated under Article 3 in the same case).", - "post_text": "In another case which concerned immigration detention ( A.D. v. Malta, 2023), the Court considered that the problems detected could subsequently give rise to numerous other well-founded applications which were a threat to the future effectiveness of the Convention system. It consequently held that general measures at national level were undoubtedly called for in execution of that judgment. As regards the violation of Article 5 § 1 on account, inter alia, of the lack of legal basis surrounding detention for health considerations, it noted that concerns had already been raised by the CPT and the Commissioner. It thus called on the Government to ensure a legal basis in domestic law for any such detention, in conformity with the general principle of legal certainty (§§ 209-210 - see also above for the general measures indicated under Article 3 in the same case). Later, in J.B. and Others v. Malta, 2024, the Court upheld a complaint that the Immigration Appeals Board (IAB) and its members did not meet the Convention requirements of independence from the executive. The judgment outlines the shortcomings of the IAB including as regards the process for appointment of the members, the professional criteria for appointment, the relatively short term of office and possibility of reappointment, few guarantees against outside pressure and the absence of safeguards against dismissal. Under Article 46, the Court called on the Government to introduce legislation to ensure that the IAB satisfies the Convention requirements of independence and impartiality ( J.B. and Others v. Malta, 2024, §§ 150-155, 167).", + "post_text": "In another case which concerned immigration detention ( A.D. v. Malta, 2023), the Court considered that the problems detected could subsequently give rise to numerous other well-founded applications which were a threat to the future effectiveness of the Convention system. It consequently held that general measures at national level were undoubtedly called for in execution of that judgment. As regards the violation of Article 5 § 1 on account, inter alia, of the lack of legal basis surrounding detention for health considerations, it noted that concerns had already been raised by the CPT and the Commissioner. It thus called on the Government to ensure a legal basis in domestic law for any such detention, in conformity with the general principle of legal certainty (§§ 209-210 - see also above for the general measures indicated under Article 3 in the same case). Later, in J.B. and Others v. Malta, 2024, the Court upheld a complaint that the Immigration Appeals Board (IAB) and its members did not meet the Convention requirements of independence from the executive. The judgment outlines the shortcomings of the IABincluding as regards the process for appointment of the members, the professional criteria for appointment, the relatively short term of office and possibility of reappointment, few guarantees against outside pressure and the absence of safeguards against dismissal. Under Article 46, the Court called on the Government to introduce legislation to ensure that the IABsatisfies the Convention requirements of independence and impartiality ( J.B. and Others v. Malta, 2024, §§ 150-155, 167).", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930065341/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_46_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250918162301/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_46_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/ed0ed05ac958/20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf", @@ -33008,6 +34868,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json", "case_key": "apps:32514/22", "case_name": "Petrović and Others v. Croatia*", @@ -33041,6 +34903,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json", "case_key": "apps:3339/23", "case_name": "Ryaska v. Ukraine", @@ -33074,105 +34938,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", "from_version": "31 August 2024", "to_version": "28 February 2025", - "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json", - "case_key": "apps:20958/14|38334/18", - "case_name": "Ukraine v. Russia (Re Crimea) [GC]", - "application_numbers": "20958/14|38334/18", - "judgment_year": "2024", - "citation_change": "added", - "citation_text": "Ukraine v. Russia (Re Crimea) [GC], nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, 25 June 2024", - "hudoc_itemid": "001-235139", - "hudoc_importance_level": "1", - "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", - "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF UKRAINE v. RUSSIA (RE CRIMEA)", - "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", - "linked_paragraph_count": 1, - "linked_sections": "IV.A.1.i: Article 18 in conjunction with Articles 5 and", - "linked_change_types": "unchanged", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.A.1.i|a:107|b:108", - "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "In other cases relating to Article 18 the Court has indicated that general measures to be taken by the respondent State must focus, as a matter of priority, on the protection of critics of the government, civil society activists and human-rights defenders against arbitrary arrest and detention. The measures to be taken must ensure the eradication of retaliatory prosecutions and misuse of criminal law against this group of individuals and the non-repetition of similar practices in the future ( Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, §§ 223-228). In Ukraine v. Russia (Re Crimea) [GC], 2024, among the multiple findings of violations of the Convention by the respondent State the Court found, as regards the transfer of prisoners from Crimea to penal institutions located within Russia, an administrative practice in violation of the right to respect for family life. Under Article 18, the Court established that in relation to Ukrainian \"political prisoners\", their rights under Article 8 (and other provisions) had been restricted predominantly for the ulterior purpose of punishing and silencing those who opposed to Russia's occupation of Ukraine. This finding led it to indicate that the relevant prisoners must be returned safely as soon as possible from Russia (§§ 1386-7 and operative provision D1).", - "post_text": "In other cases relating to Article 18 the Court has indicated that general measures to be taken by the respondent State must focus, as a matter of priority, on the protection of critics of the government, civil society activists and human-rights defenders against arbitrary arrest and detention. The measures to be taken must ensure the eradication of retaliatory prosecutions and misuse of criminal law against this group of individuals and the non-repetition of similar practices in the future ( Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, §§ 223-228). In Ukraine v. Russia (Re Crimea) [GC], 2024, among the multiple findings of violations of the Convention by the respondent State the Court found, as regards the transfer of prisoners from Crimea to penal institutions located within Russia, an administrative practice in violation of the right to respect for family life. Under Article 18, the Court established that in relation to Ukrainian \"political prisoners\", their rights under Article 8 (and other provisions) had been restricted predominantly for the ulterior purpose of punishing and silencing those who opposed to Russia's occupation of Ukraine. This finding led it to indicate that the relevant prisoners must be returned safely as soon as possible from Russia (§§ 1386-7 and operative provision D1).", - "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930065341/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_46_eng", - "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250918162301/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_46_eng", - "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/ed0ed05ac958/20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf", - "to_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/ed0ed05ac958/20250918162301__guide_art_46_eng.pdf" - }, - { - "guide_id": "ed0ed05ac958", - "guide_title": "Article 46", - "from_snapshot": "20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf", - "to_snapshot": "20250918162301__guide_art_46_eng.pdf", - "from_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", - "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", - "from_version": "31 August 2024", - "to_version": "28 February 2025", - "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json", - "case_key": "apps:38963/18", - "case_name": "V.I. v. Moldova", - "application_numbers": "38963/18", - "judgment_year": "2024", - "citation_change": "added", - "citation_text": "V.I. v. Moldova, no. 38963/18, 26 March 2024", - "hudoc_itemid": "001-231739", - "hudoc_importance_level": "3", - "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", - "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF V.I. v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", - "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", - "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930065341/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_46_eng", - "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250918162301/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_46_eng", - "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/ed0ed05ac958/20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf", - "to_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/ed0ed05ac958/20250918162301__guide_art_46_eng.pdf" - }, - { - "guide_id": "ed0ed05ac958", - "guide_title": "Article 46", - "from_snapshot": "20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf", - "to_snapshot": "20250918162301__guide_art_46_eng.pdf", - "from_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", - "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", - "from_version": "31 August 2024", - "to_version": "28 February 2025", - "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json", - "case_key": "apps:53600/20", - "case_name": "Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC]", - "application_numbers": "53600/20", - "judgment_year": "2024", - "citation_change": "added", - "citation_text": "Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, 9 April 2024", - "hudoc_itemid": "001-233206", - "hudoc_importance_level": "1", - "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", - "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF VEREIN KLIMASENIORINNEN SCHWEIZ AND OTHERS v. SWITZERLAND", - "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", - "linked_paragraph_count": 1, - "linked_sections": "III.A: Supervision of compliance", - "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.A|a:30|b:30", - "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Given the variety of means available to achieve restitutio in integrum and the nature of the issues involved, in the exercise of its competence under Article 46 § 2 of the Convention, the Committee of Ministers is considered to be better placed than the Court to assess the specific measures to be taken. This is well illustrated by the Court's climate change judgment in which it said that, in view of the complexity and the nature of the issues involved, it was unable to be detailed or prescriptive as regards any measures to be implemented in order to effectively comply with the judgment ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], 2024, § 657). It is thus for the Committee of Ministers to supervise, on the basis of the information provided by the respondent State and with due regard to the applicant's evolving situation, the adoption of such measures that are feasible, timely, adequate and sufficient to ensure the maximum possible reparation for the violations found by the Court ( Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2019, § 155).", - "post_text": "Given the variety of means available to achieve restitutio in integrum and the nature of the issues involved, in the exercise of its competence under Article 46 § 2 of the Convention, the Committee of Ministers is considered to be better placed than the Court to assess the specific measures to be taken. This is well illustrated by the Court's climate change judgment in which it said that, in view of the complexity and the nature of the issues involved, it was unable to be detailed or prescriptive as regards any measures to be implemented in order to effectively comply with the judgment ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], 2024, § 657). It is thus for the Committee of Ministers to supervise, on the basis of the information provided by the respondent State and with due regard to the applicant's evolving situation, the adoption of such measures that are feasible, timely, adequate and sufficient to ensure the maximum possible reparation for the violations found by the Court ( Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2019, § 155). 3", - "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930065341/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_46_eng", - "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250918162301/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_46_eng", - "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/ed0ed05ac958/20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf", - "to_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/ed0ed05ac958/20250918162301__guide_art_46_eng.pdf" - }, - { - "guide_id": "ed0ed05ac958", - "guide_title": "Article 46", - "from_snapshot": "20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf", - "to_snapshot": "20250918162301__guide_art_46_eng.pdf", - "from_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", - "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", - "from_version": "31 August 2024", - "to_version": "28 February 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-08-31", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-02-28", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json", "case_key": "apps:21794/08", "case_name": "Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia", @@ -33197,105 +34964,6 @@ "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/ed0ed05ac958/20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf", "to_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/ed0ed05ac958/20250918162301__guide_art_46_eng.pdf" }, - { - "guide_id": "ed0ed05ac958", - "guide_title": "Article 46", - "from_snapshot": "20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf", - "to_snapshot": "20250918162301__guide_art_46_eng.pdf", - "from_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", - "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", - "from_version": "31 August 2024", - "to_version": "28 February 2025", - "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json", - "case_key": "name:ukraine v russia re crimea gc::2024", - "case_name": "Ukraine v. Russia (Re Crimea) [GC]", - "application_numbers": "", - "judgment_year": "2024", - "citation_change": "removed", - "citation_text": "Ukraine v. Russia (Re Crimea) [GC], 25 June 2024", - "hudoc_itemid": "001-235139", - "hudoc_importance_level": "1", - "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", - "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF UKRAINE v. RUSSIA (RE CRIMEA)", - "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", - "linked_paragraph_count": 1, - "linked_sections": "IV.A.1.i: Article 18 in conjunction with Articles 5 and", - "linked_change_types": "unchanged", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "IV.A.1.i|a:107|b:108", - "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "In other cases relating to Article 18 the Court has indicated that general measures to be taken by the respondent State must focus, as a matter of priority, on the protection of critics of the government, civil society activists and human-rights defenders against arbitrary arrest and detention. The measures to be taken must ensure the eradication of retaliatory prosecutions and misuse of criminal law against this group of individuals and the non-repetition of similar practices in the future ( Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, §§ 223-228). In Ukraine v. Russia (Re Crimea) [GC], 2024, among the multiple findings of violations of the Convention by the respondent State the Court found, as regards the transfer of prisoners from Crimea to penal institutions located within Russia, an administrative practice in violation of the right to respect for family life. Under Article 18, the Court established that in relation to Ukrainian \"political prisoners\", their rights under Article 8 (and other provisions) had been restricted predominantly for the ulterior purpose of punishing and silencing those who opposed to Russia's occupation of Ukraine. This finding led it to indicate that the relevant prisoners must be returned safely as soon as possible from Russia (§§ 1386-7 and operative provision D1).", - "post_text": "In other cases relating to Article 18 the Court has indicated that general measures to be taken by the respondent State must focus, as a matter of priority, on the protection of critics of the government, civil society activists and human-rights defenders against arbitrary arrest and detention. The measures to be taken must ensure the eradication of retaliatory prosecutions and misuse of criminal law against this group of individuals and the non-repetition of similar practices in the future ( Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, §§ 223-228). In Ukraine v. Russia (Re Crimea) [GC], 2024, among the multiple findings of violations of the Convention by the respondent State the Court found, as regards the transfer of prisoners from Crimea to penal institutions located within Russia, an administrative practice in violation of the right to respect for family life. Under Article 18, the Court established that in relation to Ukrainian \"political prisoners\", their rights under Article 8 (and other provisions) had been restricted predominantly for the ulterior purpose of punishing and silencing those who opposed to Russia's occupation of Ukraine. This finding led it to indicate that the relevant prisoners must be returned safely as soon as possible from Russia (§§ 1386-7 and operative provision D1).", - "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930065341/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_46_eng", - "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250918162301/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_46_eng", - "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/ed0ed05ac958/20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf", - "to_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/ed0ed05ac958/20250918162301__guide_art_46_eng.pdf" - }, - { - "guide_id": "ed0ed05ac958", - "guide_title": "Article 46", - "from_snapshot": "20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf", - "to_snapshot": "20250918162301__guide_art_46_eng.pdf", - "from_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", - "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", - "from_version": "31 August 2024", - "to_version": "28 February 2025", - "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json", - "case_key": "name:v i v moldova::2024", - "case_name": "V.I. v. Moldova", - "application_numbers": "", - "judgment_year": "2024", - "citation_change": "removed", - "citation_text": "V.I. v. Moldova, 26 March 2024", - "hudoc_itemid": "", - "hudoc_importance_level": "", - "hudoc_doctype": "", - "hudoc_docname": "", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", - "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", - "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930065341/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_46_eng", - "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250918162301/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_46_eng", - "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/ed0ed05ac958/20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf", - "to_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/ed0ed05ac958/20250918162301__guide_art_46_eng.pdf" - }, - { - "guide_id": "ed0ed05ac958", - "guide_title": "Article 46", - "from_snapshot": "20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf", - "to_snapshot": "20250918162301__guide_art_46_eng.pdf", - "from_snapshot_date": "2024-09-30", - "to_snapshot_date": "2025-09-18", - "from_version": "31 August 2024", - "to_version": "28 February 2025", - "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json", - "case_key": "name:verein klimaseniorinnen schweiz and others v switzerland gc::2024", - "case_name": "Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC]", - "application_numbers": "", - "judgment_year": "2024", - "citation_change": "removed", - "citation_text": "Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], 9 April 2024", - "hudoc_itemid": "001-233206", - "hudoc_importance_level": "1", - "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", - "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF VEREIN KLIMASENIORINNEN SCHWEIZ AND OTHERS v. SWITZERLAND", - "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", - "linked_paragraph_count": 1, - "linked_sections": "III.A: Supervision of compliance", - "linked_change_types": "minor_edit", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.A|a:30|b:30", - "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", - "pre_text": "Given the variety of means available to achieve restitutio in integrum and the nature of the issues involved, in the exercise of its competence under Article 46 § 2 of the Convention, the Committee of Ministers is considered to be better placed than the Court to assess the specific measures to be taken. This is well illustrated by the Court's climate change judgment in which it said that, in view of the complexity and the nature of the issues involved, it was unable to be detailed or prescriptive as regards any measures to be implemented in order to effectively comply with the judgment ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], 2024, § 657). It is thus for the Committee of Ministers to supervise, on the basis of the information provided by the respondent State and with due regard to the applicant's evolving situation, the adoption of such measures that are feasible, timely, adequate and sufficient to ensure the maximum possible reparation for the violations found by the Court ( Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2019, § 155).", - "post_text": "Given the variety of means available to achieve restitutio in integrum and the nature of the issues involved, in the exercise of its competence under Article 46 § 2 of the Convention, the Committee of Ministers is considered to be better placed than the Court to assess the specific measures to be taken. This is well illustrated by the Court's climate change judgment in which it said that, in view of the complexity and the nature of the issues involved, it was unable to be detailed or prescriptive as regards any measures to be implemented in order to effectively comply with the judgment ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], 2024, § 657). It is thus for the Committee of Ministers to supervise, on the basis of the information provided by the respondent State and with due regard to the applicant's evolving situation, the adoption of such measures that are feasible, timely, adequate and sufficient to ensure the maximum possible reparation for the violations found by the Court ( Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2019, § 155). 3", - "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20240930065341/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_46_eng", - "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20250918162301/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_46_eng", - "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/ed0ed05ac958/20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf", - "to_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/ed0ed05ac958/20250918162301__guide_art_46_eng.pdf" - }, { "guide_id": "ee9a61e98635", "guide_title": "Article 2 Protocol 7", @@ -33305,6 +34973,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2025-11-26", "from_version": "29 February 2024", "to_version": "31 August 2025", + "from_guide_version_date": "2024-02-29", + "to_guide_version_date": "2025-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/ee9a61e98635/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-26.json", "case_key": "apps:37957/14", "case_name": "Ftiti v. Greece*", @@ -33338,6 +35008,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-06", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/f1175c0d1e5c/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json", "case_key": "apps:14594/07", "case_name": "Berdzenishvili and Others v. Russia", @@ -33371,6 +35043,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-06", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/f1175c0d1e5c/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json", "case_key": "apps:23038/15", "case_name": "Gaspar v. Russia", @@ -33404,9 +35078,11 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-06", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/f1175c0d1e5c/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json", "case_key": "apps:29157/09", - "case_name": "Liu v. Russia (no. 2), no 29157/09", + "case_name": "Liu v. Russia (no. 2)", "application_numbers": "29157/09", "judgment_year": "2011", "citation_change": "added", @@ -33415,14 +35091,14 @@ "hudoc_importance_level": "3", "hudoc_doctype": "HEJUD", "hudoc_docname": "CASE OF LIU v. RUSSIA (No. 2)", - "link_status": "no_paragraph_link", - "linked_paragraph_count": 0, - "linked_sections": "", - "linked_change_types": "", - "linked_paragraph_refs": "", - "linked_match_strategies": "", + "link_status": "linked_paragraphs", + "linked_paragraph_count": 1, + "linked_sections": "III.E.a: Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for one ’ s private and/or family life) taken alone or together with Article 13 of the Convention (right to an effective remedy)", + "linked_change_types": "paragraph_added", + "linked_paragraph_refs": "III.E.a|a:None|b:75", + "linked_match_strategies": "paragraph_text_name_match", "pre_text": "", - "post_text": "", + "post_text": "In certain cases, in complaining about a lack of procedural safeguards in proceedings which led to their removal from their country of residence, applicants have relied on Article 8 of the Convention taken alone ( Baltaji v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 20, and Lupsa v. Romania, 2006, § 19) or together with Article 13 of the Convention ( Kaushal and Others v. Bulgaria, 2010, §§ 18 and 35). In these cases the Court examined the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention by verifying either whether the interference with the right to respect for private and family life was based on a law which satisfied the conditions of quality ( Lupsa v. Romania, 2006, § 42, and Kaushal and Others v. Bulgaria, 2010, §33, Baltaji v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 38) or whether it was necessary in a democratic society ( Gaspar v. Russia, 2018, § 43, and Liu v. Russia (no. 2), 2011, § 85). It also found a violation of Article 13 of the Convention when it noted that the national courts had not carried out an adequate review of the proportionality of the measure in question ( Kaushal and Others v. Bulgaria, 2010, § 41). The Court then examined the applicants'allegations from the angle of Article 1 of Protocol No. 7.", "from_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230923162513/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_protocol_7_eng", "to_wayback_url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20231206112814/https://ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_1_protocol_7_eng", "from_hf_url": "https://huggingface.co/datasets/lexgenie/echr-guide-citation-diffs/resolve/main/pdfs/f1175c0d1e5c/20230923162513__guide_art_1_protocol_7_eng.pdf", @@ -33437,6 +35113,8 @@ "to_snapshot_date": "2023-12-06", "from_version": "28 February 2023", "to_version": "31 August 2023", + "from_guide_version_date": "2023-02-28", + "to_guide_version_date": "2023-08-31", "diff_file": "anas-diff-dataset/f1175c0d1e5c/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json", "case_key": "apps:1103/16", "case_name": "Poklykayew v. Poland*",