guide_id,guide_title,from_snapshot,to_snapshot,from_snapshot_date,to_snapshot_date,from_version,to_version,from_guide_version_date,to_guide_version_date,diff_file,case_key,case_name,application_numbers,citation_change,citation_text,paragraph_rank,paragraph_match_strategies,change_type,section_path,section_title,section_level,para_num_a,para_num_b,similarity,citations_added,citations_removed,text_a,text_b
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20230923175405__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20240405124507__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:7246/20,A.H. and Others v. Germany,7246/20,added,"A.H. and Others v. Germany, no. 7246/20, 4 April 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.B.1.b,Gender recognition (i.e. the change of the sex marker on legal documents),4,132,70,0.8575,"A.H. and Others v. Germany , 2023|In O.H. and G.H. v. Germany , 2023","Court reversed the position it had taken in Fretté v. France , 2002","However, six years later, in E.B. v. France [GC], 2008, the Court reversed the position it had taken in Fretté v. France, 2002. It analysed in detail the reasons given by the French authorities for refusing the applicant (a lesbian), who was living with another woman in a stable same-sex relationship, authorisation to adopt. The Court noted that the domestic authorities had based their decisions on two main grounds, the lack of a ""paternal referent"" in the applicant' s household or immediate circle of family and friends, and the lack of commitment on the part of her partner. It added that the two grounds formed part of an overall assessment of the applicant's situation, with the result that the illegitimacy of one ground contaminated the entire decision. While the second ground was not unreasonable, the first ground was implicitly linked to the applicant's homosexuality and the authorities'reference to it was excessive in the context of a single person's request for authorisation to adopt. In sum, the applicant's sexual orientation had been consistently at the centre of deliberations in her regard and had been decisive for the decision to refuse her authorisation to adopt ( E.B. v. France [GC], 2008, §§ 72-89). Having regard to its analysis of the reasons advanced by the French authorities, the Court concluded that in refusing the applicant authorisation to adopt, they had made a distinction on the basis of her sexual orientation which was not acceptable under the Convention. The Court consequently found a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 (ibid., §§ 94-98).","In O.H. and G.H. v. Germany, 2023, the Court examined the legal impossibility for a transgender parent's current gender, disconnected from biological reality, to be indicated on the birth certificate of his child conceived after gender reclassification (see also A.H. and Others v. Germany, 2023, for a similar factual context and reasoning). The Court considered that the respondent State enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation, given the lack of a European consensus on the matter, as well as the fact that the authorities had been called upon to weigh up a number of private and public interests against several competing rights. Special attention was given to the public interest in the coherence of the legal system and the accuracy and completeness of civil registration records, which records were of a particular evidential value (§§ 114-116). The Court considered that the best interests of the child had to be examined exhaustively in this context, taking into account any conflict of interest between the child and his transgender parents. It was also necessary to take account of the child's possible future interests and the interests of children who are in a comparable situation and to whom the legislative provisions in question also applied. The Court stressed that the child's well-being could not be examined individually because of his young age at the time it was necessary to determine what information to record in the birth certificate. In the view of the Federal Court of Justice, the children's interests coincided to some extent with the general interest in ensuring the reliability and consistency of the civil registration system and in ensuring legal certainty. Furthermore, the Court endorsed the approach of the domestic courts that the right to gender identity of the parents could be limited by the right of the child to know his origins, to be brought up by both parents and to be attached to them in a stable manner. The legal attachment of the child to his parents according to their reproductive functions allowed the child to be attached in a stable and immutable manner to a mother and a father who would not change, even in the not only theoretical case, where the transgender parent applied for the annulment of the decision to change their gender (§§ 123-127). Moreover, there had been a limited number of situations that could lead, when presenting a child's birth certificate, to the disclosure of the transgender identity of the parents. In particular, precautions had been in place to reduce the inconvenience to which transgender parents might be exposed (§§ 130-133). Finally, the Court had regard to the fact that the parent-child relationship between the transgender parents and their children was not affected (§ 134). In light of these factors, the Court did not find a violation of Article 8 of the Convention."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20230923175405__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20240405124507__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:20081/19,Buhuceanu and Others v. Romania,20081/19,added,"Buhuceanu and Others v. Romania, nos. 20081/19 and 20 others, 23 May 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.B.3.4,Civil partnerships/unions,4,80,81,0.9887,"Buhuceanu and Others v. Romania , 2023|Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine , 2023",,"Fedotova and Others v. Russia [GC], 2023 concerned the absence of any form of legal recognition and protection for same-sex couples in Russia. The Court confirmed that, under Article 8, State Parties were required to ensure legal recognition and protection for same-sex couples by putting in place a ""specific legal framework"". It considered that this positive obligation on States Partieswas in line with the tangible and ongoing evolution of the domestic legislation of States Parties and of international law. Indeed, there was a clear ongoing trend within the States Parties towards legal recognition of same-sex couples (through the institution of marriage or other forms of partnership), since a majority of thirty States Parties had legislated to that effect. Accordingly, and given that particularly important facets of the personal and social identity of persons of the same sex were at stake, the Court considered that the States Parties'margin of appreciation was significantly reduced. The Russian legal framework did not provide for the core needs of recognition and protection of same-sex couples, in a stable and committed relationship, and none of the public-interest grounds put forward by the Government (traditional family values, the feelings of the majority of the Russian population and the protection of minors from promotion of homosexuality) prevailed over the applicants'interest. The Court thus concluded that the respondent State had overstepped its margin of appreciation and had failed to comply with its positive obligation to secure the applicants'right to respect for their private and family life. The Court emphasised that a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention rejects any stigmatisation based on sexual orientation and is built on the equal dignity of individuals and is sustained by diversity, which it perceives not as a threat but as a source of enrichment.","Fedotova and Others v. Russia [GC], 2023 concerned the absence of any form of legal recognition and protection for same-sex couples in Russia. The Court confirmed that, under Article 8, State Parties were required to ensure legal recognition and protection for same-sex couples by putting in place a ""specific legal framework"". It considered that this positive obligation on States Parties was in line with the tangible and ongoing evolution of the domestic legislation of States Parties and of international law. Indeed, there was a clear ongoing trend within the States Parties towards legal recognition of same-sex couples (through the institution of marriage or other forms of partnership), since a majority of thirty States Parties had legislated to that effect. Accordingly, and given that particularly important facets of the personal and social identity of persons of the same sex were at stake, the Court considered that the States Parties'margin of appreciation was significantly reduced. The Russian legal framework did not provide for the core needs of recognition and protection of same-sex couples, in a stable and committed relationship, and none of the public-interest grounds put forward by the Government (traditional family values, the feelings of the majority of the Russian population and the protection of minors from promotion of homosexuality) prevailed over the applicants'interest. The Court thus concluded that the respondent State had overstepped its margin of appreciation and had failed to comply with its positive obligation to secure the applicants'right to respect for their private and family life. The Court emphasised that a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention rejects any stigmatisation based on sexual orientation and is built on the equal dignity of individuals and is sustained by diversity, which it perceives not as a threat but as a source of enrichment (see also, Buhuceanu and Others v. Romania, 2023, §§ 75-84, for the first application of the principles established in Fedotova and Others under Article 8; and Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine, 2023, §§ 72-79, for the application of those principles under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20230923175405__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20240405124507__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:47833/20,Lenis v. Greece (dec.),47833/20,added,"Lenis v. Greece (dec.), no. 47833/20, 27 June 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A.2,Hate speech,3,,97,,,,,"' Hate speech'is addressed by the Court in two ways. The first is to find that the'hate speech'in question falls within the scope of Article 17 and is thus excluded entirely from the protection of Article 10 of the Convention . The first application of this approach in the context of homophobic speech was in Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, concerning the conviction of a senior Greek Orthodox Church official for an article published on his personal blog. The Court considered that on account of their content, tone and context, the expressions used in the disputed article constituted hate speech and incitement to violence against a group of people on the basis of their sexual orientation. Three additional factors reinforced that conclusion: in the first place, the applicant in his position as a senior Church official had the power to influence many people; secondly, the views expressed in the article were disseminated to a wide audience through the Internet; and thirdly, the protection of the dignity and human value of persons, irrespective of their sexual orientation, was of high importance in modern European society. Consequently, the Court applied Article 17 to find that the applicant could not claim the benefit of the protection afforded by Article 10 of the Convention (§§ 46-57)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20230923175405__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20240405124507__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:75135/14,Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine,75135/14,added,"Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine, no. 75135/14, 1 June 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.B.3.4,Civil partnerships/unions,4,80,81,0.9887,"Buhuceanu and Others v. Romania , 2023|Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine , 2023",,"Fedotova and Others v. Russia [GC], 2023 concerned the absence of any form of legal recognition and protection for same-sex couples in Russia. The Court confirmed that, under Article 8, State Parties were required to ensure legal recognition and protection for same-sex couples by putting in place a ""specific legal framework"". It considered that this positive obligation on States Partieswas in line with the tangible and ongoing evolution of the domestic legislation of States Parties and of international law. Indeed, there was a clear ongoing trend within the States Parties towards legal recognition of same-sex couples (through the institution of marriage or other forms of partnership), since a majority of thirty States Parties had legislated to that effect. Accordingly, and given that particularly important facets of the personal and social identity of persons of the same sex were at stake, the Court considered that the States Parties'margin of appreciation was significantly reduced. The Russian legal framework did not provide for the core needs of recognition and protection of same-sex couples, in a stable and committed relationship, and none of the public-interest grounds put forward by the Government (traditional family values, the feelings of the majority of the Russian population and the protection of minors from promotion of homosexuality) prevailed over the applicants'interest. The Court thus concluded that the respondent State had overstepped its margin of appreciation and had failed to comply with its positive obligation to secure the applicants'right to respect for their private and family life. The Court emphasised that a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention rejects any stigmatisation based on sexual orientation and is built on the equal dignity of individuals and is sustained by diversity, which it perceives not as a threat but as a source of enrichment.","Fedotova and Others v. Russia [GC], 2023 concerned the absence of any form of legal recognition and protection for same-sex couples in Russia. The Court confirmed that, under Article 8, State Parties were required to ensure legal recognition and protection for same-sex couples by putting in place a ""specific legal framework"". It considered that this positive obligation on States Parties was in line with the tangible and ongoing evolution of the domestic legislation of States Parties and of international law. Indeed, there was a clear ongoing trend within the States Parties towards legal recognition of same-sex couples (through the institution of marriage or other forms of partnership), since a majority of thirty States Parties had legislated to that effect. Accordingly, and given that particularly important facets of the personal and social identity of persons of the same sex were at stake, the Court considered that the States Parties'margin of appreciation was significantly reduced. The Russian legal framework did not provide for the core needs of recognition and protection of same-sex couples, in a stable and committed relationship, and none of the public-interest grounds put forward by the Government (traditional family values, the feelings of the majority of the Russian population and the protection of minors from promotion of homosexuality) prevailed over the applicants'interest. The Court thus concluded that the respondent State had overstepped its margin of appreciation and had failed to comply with its positive obligation to secure the applicants'right to respect for their private and family life. The Court emphasised that a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention rejects any stigmatisation based on sexual orientation and is built on the equal dignity of individuals and is sustained by diversity, which it perceives not as a threat but as a source of enrichment (see also, Buhuceanu and Others v. Romania, 2023, §§ 75-84, for the first application of the principles established in Fedotova and Others under Article 8; and Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine, 2023, §§ 72-79, for the application of those principles under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20230923175405__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20240405124507__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:53568/18|54741/18,O.H. and G.H. v. Germany,53568/18|54741/18,added,"O.H. and G.H. v. Germany, nos. 53568/18 and 54741/18, 4 April 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.2,Negative and positive obligations,3,46,46,0.9732,"O.H. and G.H. v. Germany , 2023",,"While the boundaries between the State's positive and negative obligations under Article 8 do not lend themselves to precise definition, the applicable principles are nonetheless similar. In determining whether or not such an obligation exists, regard must be had to the fair balance which has to be struck between the general interest and the interests of the individual: in both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation ( B. v. France, 1992, § 44; Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], 2014, § 67).","While the boundaries between the State's positive and negative obligations under Article 8 do not lend themselves to precise definition, the applicable principles are nonetheless similar. In determining whether or not such an obligation exists, regard must be had to the fair balance which has to be struck between the general interest and the interests of the individual: in both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation ( B. v. France, 1992, § 44; Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], 2014, § 67; O.H. and G.H. v. Germany, 2023, §§ 109-111)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20230923175405__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20240405124507__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:53568/18|54741/18,O.H. and G.H. v. Germany,53568/18|54741/18,added,"O.H. and G.H. v. Germany, nos. 53568/18 and 54741/18, 4 April 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.3,Margin of appreciation and consensus,3,50,50,0.9903,"O.H. and G.H. v. Germany , 2023",,"Where, however, there is no consensus within the member States of the Council of Europe, either as to the relative importance of the interest at stake or as to the best means of protecting it, particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues, the margin will be wider ( X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 44; Fretté v. France, 2002, § 41; Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2002, § 85). There will also usually be a wide margin if the State is required to strike a balance between competing private and public interests or Convention rights ( Fretté v. France, 2002, § 42. See also, albeit in the context of Article 9, but of interest to the subject matter of this Guide, Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2013, § 102-110). In Eweida and Others, the disciplinary measures against the applicants (employees) for their refusal to perform functions which they held were contrary to their religious beliefs (such as counselling same-sex couples or carrying out civil partnership ceremonies as regards same-sex couples) were found not to violate their right to manifest their religion under Article 9 alone or in conjunction with Article 14, given the authorities'wide margin of appreciation when balancing between two Convention rights.","Where, however, there is no consensus within the member States of the Council of Europe, either as to the relative importance of the interest at stake or as to the best means of protecting it, particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues, the margin will be wider ( X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 44; Fretté v. France, 2002, § 41; Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2002, § 85). There will also usually be a wide margin if the State is required to strike a balance between competing private and public interests or Convention rights ( Fretté v. France, 2002, § 42; O.H. and G.H. v. Germany, 2023, § 112 and the references cited therein). See also, albeit in the context of Article 9, but of interest to the subject matter of this Guide, Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2013, § 102-110). In Eweida and Others, the disciplinary measures against the applicants (employees) for their refusal to perform functions which they held were contrary to their religious beliefs (such as counselling same-sex couples or carrying out civil partnership ceremonies as regards same-sex couples) were found not to violate their right to manifest their religion under Article 9 alone or in conjunction with Article 14, given the authorities'wide margin of appreciation when balancing between two Convention rights."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20230923175405__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20240405124507__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:53568/18|54741/18,O.H. and G.H. v. Germany,53568/18|54741/18,added,"O.H. and G.H. v. Germany, nos. 53568/18 and 54741/18, 4 April 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.3,Margin of appreciation and consensus,3,53,53,0.9094,"O.H. and G.H. v. Germany , 2023",,"At the same time, there remain issues where there is, for the moment, no European consensus such as: ▪ the right of same-sex couples to marry, or how to deal with gender recognition in the case of a pre-existing marriage ( Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], 2014, §§ 74-75); and ▪ registration of same-sex marriages contracted abroad ( Orlandi and Others v. Italy, 2017, § 205).","At the same time, there remain issues where there is, for the moment, no European consensus such as: ▪ the right of same-sex couples to marry, or how to deal with gender recognition in the case of a pre-existing marriage ( Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], 2014, §§ 74-75); and ▪ registration of same-sex marriages contracted abroad ( Orlandi and Others v. Italy, 2017, § 205); ▪ the indication, in civil registration records concerning a child, of the fact that one of the persons having parental status is transgender ( O.H. and G.H. v. Germany, 2023, § 114)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20230923175405__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20240405124507__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:53568/18|54741/18,O.H. and G.H. v. Germany,53568/18|54741/18,added,"O.H. and G.H. v. Germany, nos. 53568/18 and 54741/18, 4 April 2023",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.B.1.b,Gender recognition (i.e. the change of the sex marker on legal documents),4,132,70,0.8575,"A.H. and Others v. Germany , 2023|In O.H. and G.H. v. Germany , 2023","Court reversed the position it had taken in Fretté v. France , 2002","However, six years later, in E.B. v. France [GC], 2008, the Court reversed the position it had taken in Fretté v. France, 2002. It analysed in detail the reasons given by the French authorities for refusing the applicant (a lesbian), who was living with another woman in a stable same-sex relationship, authorisation to adopt. The Court noted that the domestic authorities had based their decisions on two main grounds, the lack of a ""paternal referent"" in the applicant' s household or immediate circle of family and friends, and the lack of commitment on the part of her partner. It added that the two grounds formed part of an overall assessment of the applicant's situation, with the result that the illegitimacy of one ground contaminated the entire decision. While the second ground was not unreasonable, the first ground was implicitly linked to the applicant's homosexuality and the authorities'reference to it was excessive in the context of a single person's request for authorisation to adopt. In sum, the applicant's sexual orientation had been consistently at the centre of deliberations in her regard and had been decisive for the decision to refuse her authorisation to adopt ( E.B. v. France [GC], 2008, §§ 72-89). Having regard to its analysis of the reasons advanced by the French authorities, the Court concluded that in refusing the applicant authorisation to adopt, they had made a distinction on the basis of her sexual orientation which was not acceptable under the Convention. The Court consequently found a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 (ibid., §§ 94-98).","In O.H. and G.H. v. Germany, 2023, the Court examined the legal impossibility for a transgender parent's current gender, disconnected from biological reality, to be indicated on the birth certificate of his child conceived after gender reclassification (see also A.H. and Others v. Germany, 2023, for a similar factual context and reasoning). The Court considered that the respondent State enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation, given the lack of a European consensus on the matter, as well as the fact that the authorities had been called upon to weigh up a number of private and public interests against several competing rights. Special attention was given to the public interest in the coherence of the legal system and the accuracy and completeness of civil registration records, which records were of a particular evidential value (§§ 114-116). The Court considered that the best interests of the child had to be examined exhaustively in this context, taking into account any conflict of interest between the child and his transgender parents. It was also necessary to take account of the child's possible future interests and the interests of children who are in a comparable situation and to whom the legislative provisions in question also applied. The Court stressed that the child's well-being could not be examined individually because of his young age at the time it was necessary to determine what information to record in the birth certificate. In the view of the Federal Court of Justice, the children's interests coincided to some extent with the general interest in ensuring the reliability and consistency of the civil registration system and in ensuring legal certainty. Furthermore, the Court endorsed the approach of the domestic courts that the right to gender identity of the parents could be limited by the right of the child to know his origins, to be brought up by both parents and to be attached to them in a stable manner. The legal attachment of the child to his parents according to their reproductive functions allowed the child to be attached in a stable and immutable manner to a mother and a father who would not change, even in the not only theoretical case, where the transgender parent applied for the annulment of the decision to change their gender (§§ 123-127). Moreover, there had been a limited number of situations that could lead, when presenting a child's birth certificate, to the disclosure of the transgender identity of the parents. In particular, precautions had been in place to reduce the inconvenience to which transgender parents might be exposed (§§ 130-133). Finally, the Court had regard to the fact that the parent-child relationship between the transgender parents and their children was not affected (§ 134). In light of these factors, the Court did not find a violation of Article 8 of the Convention."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20230923175405__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20240405124507__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:54006/20,R.K. v. Hungary,54006/20,added,"R.K. v. Hungary, no. 54006/20, 22 June 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.1.b,Gender recognition (i.e. the change of the sex marker on legal documents),4,68,68,0.9876,"R.K. v. Hungary , 2023",,"In Rana v. Hungary, (Committee judgment), 2020, there existed a legislative gap which excluded all lawfully settled non-Hungarian citizens from accessing the procedures for changing gender and name regardless of their circumstances. As a result, the authorities had rejected the applicant's application on purely formal grounds, without examining his situation. The Court thus found that, by not giving the applicant (an Iranian transgender refugee, who did not have a Hungarian birth certificate) access to the legal gender recognition procedure, a fair balance had not been struck between the public interest and the applicant's right to respect for his private life. There was therefore a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.","In Rana v. Hungary, (Committee judgment), 2020, there existed a legislative gap which excluded all lawfully settled non-Hungarian citizens from accessing the procedures for changing gender and name regardless of their circumstances. As a result, the authorities had rejected the applicant's application on purely formal grounds, without examining his situation. The Court thus found that, by not giving the applicant (an Iranian transgender refugee, who did not have a Hungarian birth certificate) access to the legal gender recognition procedure, a fair balance had not been struck between the public interest and the applicant's right to respect for his private life. There was therefore a violation of Article 8 of the Convention (see also R.K. v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 57-77)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240405124507__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-04-05__2024-06-13.json,apps:28834/19,Lapunov v. Russia,28834/19,added,"Lapunov v. Russia, no.28834/19; 12 September 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I.A,The relevant threshold,2,4,4,0.9957,"Aghdgomelas hvili and Japaridze v. Georgia Lapunov v. Russia , 2020","Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia , 2020","According to the Court's case-law ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 and trigger the related obligations. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, its duration, its physical and mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim ( Stasi v. France, 2011, § 75), it being noted, however, that any physical force by a State agent not made strictly necessary by the person's conduct would equally fall within the scope of (and violate) Article 3 of the Convention ( Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], 2015, § 101). Furthermore, Article 3 cannot be limited to acts of physical ill-treatment; it also covers the infliction of psychological suffering. Hence, the treatment can be categorised as degrading when it arouses in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them ( Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020, § 42).","According to the Court's case-law ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 and trigger the related obligations. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, its duration, its physical and mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim ( Stasi v. France, 2011, § 75), it being noted, however, that any physical force by a State agent not made strictly necessary by the person's conduct would equally fall within the scope of (and violate) Article 3 of the Convention ( Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], 2015, § 101). Furthermore, Article 3 cannot be limited to acts of physical ill-treatment; it also covers the infliction of psychological suffering. Hence, the treatment can be categorised as degrading when it arouses in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them ( Aghdgomelas hvili and Japaridze v. Georgia Lapunov v. Russia, 2020, § 42;, 2023, § 108)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240405124507__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-04-05__2024-06-13.json,apps:28834/19,Lapunov v. Russia,28834/19,added,"Lapunov v. Russia, no.28834/19; 12 September 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.C,The specific duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence and investigate discriminatory motives,2,,24,,"In Lapunov v. Russia , 2023",,,"In Lapunov v. Russia, 2023, the applicant's detailed and consistent statements that he had been abducted and ill-treated by the Chechen authorities on account of his sexual orientation were corroborated by information collected by the press and public bodies about the so-called ""anti-gay purge"" of 2017, and the general context of human rights and those of LGBTIpersons in Chechnya. The Government had failed to provide convincing explanations capable of refuting those allegations and had thus failed to discharge their burden of proof to prove the contrary. The ill-treatment to which the applicant was subjected by State agents amounted to torture and resulted in a violation of the substantive limb of Article 3 of the Convention (§ 110). Moreover, there had been a systemic failure to investigate unacknowledged detentions and disappearances in Chechnya in respect of complaints under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, which led to a violation of the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention (§ 118). Besides, the applicant had been subjected to targeted violence solely on account of his sexual orientation, which was an aggravating factor, and characterised as a hate crime in the relevant international material. Thus, the violation under Article 3 was motivated by homophobic attitudes, in light of the level of intolerance towards LGBTIpersons in Chechnya, which led to a finding of a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention (§§ 119-121). In addition, the applicant's arbitrary detention had no legal grounds and was not officially acknowledged, which was in beach of Article 5 of the Convention (§§ 127-129)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240405124507__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-04-05__2024-06-13.json,apps:11454/17,Przybyszewska and others v. Poland,11454/17,added,"Przybyszewska and others v. Poland, no. 11454/17, 12 December 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.B.4,Civil partnerships/unions,3,81,83,0.9963,,,"Fedotova and Others v. Russia [GC], 2023 concerned the absence of any form of legal recognition and protection for same-sex couples in Russia. The Court confirmed that, under Article 8, State Parties were required to ensure legal recognition and protection for same-sex couples by putting in place a ""specific legal framework"". It considered that this positive obligation on States Parties was in line with the tangible and ongoing evolution of the domestic legislation of States Parties and of international law. Indeed, there was a clear ongoing trend within the States Parties towards legal recognition of same-sex couples (through the institution of marriage or other forms of partnership), since a majority of thirty States Parties had legislated to that effect. Accordingly, and given that particularly important facets of the personal and social identity of persons of the same sex were at stake, the Court considered that the States Parties'margin of appreciation was significantly reduced. The Russian legal framework did not provide for the core needs of recognition and protection of same-sex couples, in a stable and committed relationship, and none of the public-interest grounds put forward by the Government (traditional family values, the feelings of the majority of the Russian population and the protection of minors from promotion of homosexuality) prevailed over the applicants'interest. The Court thus concluded that the respondent State had overstepped its margin of appreciation and had failed to comply with its positive obligation to secure the applicants'right to respect for their private and family life. The Court emphasised that a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention rejects any stigmatisation based on sexual orientation and is built on the equal dignity of individuals and is sustained by diversity, which it perceives not as a threat but as a source of enrichment (see also, Buhuceanu and Others v. Romania, 2023, §§ 75-84, for the first application of the principles established in Fedotova and Others under Article 8; and Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine, 2023, §§ 72-79, for the application of those principles under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention).","Fedotova and Others v. Russia [GC], 2023 concerned the absence of any form of legal recognition and protection for same-sex couples in Russia. The Court confirmed that, under Article 8, State Parties were required to ensure legal recognition and protection for same-sex couples by putting in place a ""specific legal framework"". It considered that this positive obligation on States Parties was in line with the tangible and ongoing evolution of the domestic legislation of States Parties and of international law. Indeed, there was a clear ongoing trend within the States Parties towards legal recognition of same-sex couples (through the institution of marriage or other forms of partnership), since a majority of thirty States Parties had legislated to that effect. Accordingly, and given that particularly important facets of the personal and social identity of persons of the same sex were at stake, the Court considered that the States Parties' margin of appreciation was significantly reduced. The Russian legal framework did not provide for the core needs of recognition and protection of same-sex couples, in a stable and committed relationship, and none of the public-interest grounds put forward by the Government (traditional family values, the feelings of the majority of the Russian population and the protection of minors from promotion of homosexuality) prevailed over the applicants' interest. The Court thus concluded that the respondent State had overstepped its margin of appreciation and had failed to comply with its positive obligation to secure the applicants' right to respect for their private and family life. The Court emphasised that a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention rejects any stigmatisation based on sexual orientation and is built on the equal dignity of individuals and is sustained by diversity, which it perceives not as a threat but as a source of enrichment (see also, Buhuceanu and Others v. Romania, 2023, §§ 75-84, for the first application of the principles Fedotova and Others Przybyszewska and others v. Poland established in under Article 8;, 2023, §§ 120-122, in respect of Poland, and Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine, 2023, §§ 72-79, for the application of those principles under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240405124507__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-04-05__2024-06-13.json,apps:58358/14,Romanov and others v. Russia,58358/14,added,"Romanov and others v. Russia, no. 58358/14 and 5 others, 12 September 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,I.A,The relevant threshold,2,6,6,0.9952,,"Identoba and Others v. Georgia , 2015|Oganezova v. Armenia , 2022","Conversely, in Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015, §§ 70-71, the Court noted that the applicants had been the target of hate speech and aggressive behaviour when they were attacked during a march to mark the International Day Against Homophobia in Tbilsi. The applicants had been surrounded by an angry mob that outnumbered them and was uttering death threats and randomly resorting to physical assaults, demonstrating the reality of the threats, and that a clearly distinguishable homophobic bias played the role of an aggravating factor in a situation which was already one of intense fear and anxiety. The Court considered that the aim of that verbal - and sporadically physical - abuse was evidently to frighten the applicants so that they would desist from their public expression of support for the LGBTcommunity. The Court thus found that the treatment of the applicants aroused in them feelings of fear, anguish and insecurity incompatible with respect for their human dignity and which reached the threshold of severity within the meaning of Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, which were ultimately considered to have been violated (See other examples, Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020, § 49; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016, § 119, Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021, §§ 60-61, Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, § 97, referred to below) .","Conversely, in, 2015, §§ 70-71, the Court noted that the applicants had been the target of hate speech and aggressive behaviour when they were attacked during a march to mark the International Day Against Homophobia in Tbilisi. The applicants had been surrounded by an angry mob that outnumbered them and was uttering death threats and randomly resorting to physical assaults, demonstrating the reality of the threats, and that a clearly distinguishable homophobic bias played the role of an aggravating factor in a situation which was already one of intense fear and anxiety. The Court considered that the aim of that verbal - and sporadically physical - abuse was evidently to frighten the applicants so that they would desist from their public expression of support for the LGBTcommunity. The Court thus found that the treatment of the applicants aroused in them feelings of fear, anguish and insecurity incompatible with respect for their human dignity and which reached the threshold of severity within the meaning of Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, which were ultimately considered to have been violated (see other examples, Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020, § 49; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016, § 119, Women' s Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021, §§ 60-61, Oganezova v. Armenia Romanov and others v. Russia ., 2022, § 97, referred to below;, 2023, § 68)"
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240405124507__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-04-05__2024-06-13.json,apps:58358/14,Romanov and others v. Russia,58358/14,added,"Romanov and others v. Russia, no. 58358/14 and 5 others, 12 September 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.C,The specific duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence and investigate discriminatory motives,2,,25,,"Romanov and others v. Russia, 2023",,,"Likewise, in Romanov and others v. Russia, 2023, the applicants were subjected to homophobic acts of violence by private individuals and were apprehended and detained unlawfully during peaceful demonstrations in support of LGBTIrights. The authorities should have foreseen the risks associated with mass events related to the socially sensitive topic of supporting the LGBTIcommunity, given the hostile attitudes of parts of Russian society towards this issue. Besides, serious threats had circulated prior to the demonstration. Thus, there has been a violation of Article 3 (substantive and procedural) in the light of Article 14 of the Convention, since the authorities had failed to protect the applicant from violence (§ 72) and failed to conduct an effective investigation (§ 79)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240405124507__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-04-05__2024-06-13.json,apps:58358/14,Romanov and others v. Russia,58358/14,added,"Romanov and others v. Russia, no. 58358/14 and 5 others, 12 September 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,III.B.§4,ii. Positive obligations,4,114,116,0.9965,"Ba czkowski and Others v. Poland , 2007|Romanov and others v. Russia , 2023","Baczkowski and Others v. Poland , 2007","The Court has repeatedly held that the State must act as the ultimate guarantor of the principles of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. Genuine, effective freedom of peaceful assembly cannot, therefore, be reduced to a mere duty on the part of the State not to interfere: a purely negative conception would not be compatible with the object and purpose of Article 11 of the Convention. This provision sometimes requires positive measures to be taken, even in the sphere of relations between individuals. That positive obligation is of particular importance for persons holding unpopular views or belonging to minorities, because they are more vulnerable to victimisation ( Berkman v. Russia, 2020, § 46; Baczkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007, § 64; Zhdanov and Others v. Russia, 2019, §§ 162-163). According to the Court's case-law, freedom of assembly, as enshrined in Article 11, protects a demonstration that may annoy or cause offence to persons opposed to the ideas or claims that the demonstration is seeking to promote. The participants must nevertheless be able to hold the demonstration without having to fear that they will be subjected to physical violence by their opponents ( Berkman v. Russia, 2020, § 54; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021, § 140). It is thus the duty of Contracting States to take reasonable and appropriate measures to enable lawful demonstrations to proceed peacefully. Indeed, failure to protect demonstrators from homophobic violence also amounts to a violation of the State's positive obligations under Article 14 of the Convention .","The Court has repeatedly held that the State must act as the ultimate guarantor of the principles of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. Genuine, effective freedom of peaceful assembly cannot, therefore, be reduced to a mere duty on the part of the State not to interfere: a purely negative conception would not be compatible with the object and purpose of Article 11 of the Convention. This provision sometimes requires positive measures to be taken, even in the sphere of relations between individuals. That positive obligation is of particular importance for persons holding unpopular views or belonging to minorities, because they are more vulnerable to victimisation ( Berkman v. Russia, 2020, § 46; Ba czkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007, § 64; Zhdanov and Others v. Russia, 2019, §§ 162-163; Romanov and others v. Russia, 2023, §71). According to the Court's case- law, freedom of assembly, as enshrined in Article 11, protects a demonstration that may annoy or cause offence to persons opposed to the ideas or claims that the demonstration is seeking to promote. The participants must nevertheless be able to hold the demonstration without having to fear that they will be subjected to physical violence by their opponents ( Berkman v. Russia, 2020, § 54; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021, § 140). It is thus the duty of Contracting States to take reasonable and appropriate measures to enable lawful demonstrations to proceed peacefully. Indeed, failure to protect demonstrators from homophobic violence also amounts to a violation of the State's positive obligations under Article 14 of the Convention 20 ."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:49014/16,A.K. v. Russia,49014/16,added,"A.K. v. Russia, no. 49014/16, 7 May 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.A.1,The notions of private life and family life,3,42,44,0.9842,"A.K. v. Russia , 2024|Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania , 2020|W.W. v. Poland , 2024","Beizaras and L evickas v. Lithuania , 2020","The Court has held that the concept of ""private life"" is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person, including his or her sexual life X and Y v. the Netherlands (, 1985, § 22). It can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's physical and social identity ( Y.Y v. Turkey, 2015, § 56). Elements such as, for example, gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life fall within the personal sphere protected by Article 8 ( Sousa Goucha v. Portugal, 2016, § 27 ; B. v. France, 1992, § 63 ; Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 41 ; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, § 109; Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, 1999, § 71). Article 8 also protects the right to personal development and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world ( Schlumpf v. Switzerland, 2009, § 77).","The Court has held that the concept of ""private life"" is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person, including his or her sexual life ( X and Y v. the Netherlands, 1985, § 22). It can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's physical and social identity ( Y.Y v. Turkey, 2015, § 56). Elements such as, for example, gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life fall within the personal sphere protected by Article 8 ( Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 41; B. v. France, 1992, § 63; Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, 1999, § 71; Sousa Goucha v. Portugal, 2016, § 27 ; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, § 109; A.K. v. Russia, 2024, § 30; W.W. v. Poland, 2024, § 82). Article 8 also protects the right to personal development and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world ( Schlumpf v. Switzerland, 2009, § 77)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:49014/16,A.K. v. Russia,49014/16,added,"A.K. v. Russia, no. 49014/16, 7 May 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,IV.A.2,Legitimate aims and justifications,3,123,130,0.9719,"A.K. v. Russia , 2024|L. and v. v. Austria , 2003",Vallianatos and Others v. Greece 2003,"Just like differences based on gender, differences based on sexual orientation require particularly serious reasons by way of justification ( Karner v. Austria, 2003, § 37; L. and v. v. Austria, Vallianatos and Others v. Greece 2003, § 45; [GC], 2013, § 77).","Just like differences based on gender, differences based on sexual orientation require particularly serious reasons by way of justification ( Karner v. Austria, 2003, § 37; L. and v. v. Austria, 2003, § 45; Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], 2013, § 77, A.K. v. Russia, 2024, § 34)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:49014/16,A.K. v. Russia,49014/16,added,"A.K. v. Russia, no. 49014/16, 7 May 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.A.3,Margin of appreciation,3,127,134,0.9901,"A.K. v. Russia , 2024",,"Where a difference in treatment is based on sex or sexual orientation the State's margin of appreciation is narrow ( Karner v. Austria, 2003, § 41; Kozak v. Poland, 2010, § 92). Differences based solely on considerations of sexual orientation are unacceptable under the Convention ( Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999, § 36; E.B. v. France [GC], 2008, §§ 93 and 96; X and Others v. Austria, [GC], 2013, § 99; Pajić v. Croatia, 2016, § 84; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, § 114; Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine, 2023, § 62).","Where a difference in treatment is based on sex or sexual orientation the State's margin of appreciation is narrow ( Karner v. Austria, 2003, § 41; Kozak v. Poland, 2010, § 92). Differences based solely on considerations of sexual orientation are unacceptable under the Convention ( Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999, § 36; E.B. v. France [GC], 2008, §§ 93 and 96; X and Others v. Austria, [GC], 2013, § 99; Pajić v. Croatia, 2016, § 84; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, § 114; Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine, 2023, § 62; A.K. v. Russia, 2024, § 34)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:49014/16,A.K. v. Russia,49014/16,added,"A.K. v. Russia, no. 49014/16, 7 May 2024",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,IV.B.6,Employment,3,150,156,0.6528,"In A.K. v. Russia , 2024",,"The Court has held that a restrictive interpretation of the concept of ""family member"" (which excludes homosexual partners who cannot get married or enter into a civil partnership under the law of the receiving State) results in homosexual couples facing an insurmountable obstacle to obtaining Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy a residence permit for family reasons (, 2016, § 83). In particular, according to the Court, a homosexual couple who cannot obtain legal recognition of their union (because it is not provided for in the law of the receiving State) is not in an analogous situation to that of an unmarried heterosexual couple who chose not to regularise their union. Thus, a failure to apply different treatment to such homosexual couples may be in breach of Article 14 of the Convention (ibid., § 98).","In A.K. v. Russia, 2024, the dismissal of a teacher for posting photos on social media showing affection to intimate partners was considered by the Court to be a disproportionate interference with her rights under Article 8 of the Convention. First, the Court held that the dismissal of a teacher with appropriate qualifications, of good repute with students and parents and without a prior history of complaints could not have been the necessary, sole, and immediate sanction for the images whether they had stayed private or became public (§ 40). Moreover, the dismissal amounted to a difference in treatment based solely on considerations of sexual orientation without particularly convincing and weighty reasons (§ 45). The school administration's position and the judicial decisions referred explicitly to ""lesbian scenes"" and ""lesbian content"", ""unethically close same - sex relations"" and ""non - traditional sexual orientation"" ( § 43). The Court reiterated that an individual's sexual orientation may not be isolated from the private and public expressions of it, which are evidently protected elements of an individual's private life. The posting of travel and partying photos showing affection towards intimate partners is a commonplace practice on social media. Consequently, the authorities'hostile reaction was unmistakably driven by the lack of acceptance of the applicant's sexuality, and was, therefore, patently discriminatory (§ 44). The Court found accordingly a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:8825/22|19130/22,Bazhenov and Semkin v. Russia*,8825/22|19130/22,added,"Bazhenov and Semkin v. Russia*, nos. 8825/22 and 19130/22, 4 February 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.8,Positive obligations under Article 14,3,,166,,,,,"In Bazhenov and Semkin v. Russia *, 2025, the domestic authorities were found to have failed to discharge their positive obligation to adequately respond to the non-consensual dissemination of the applicants' private data, including information on their sexual orientation, by private individuals on social networks. They did not investigate in an effective manner whether the data dissemination had been motivated by homophobic attitudes (§§ 72-75 and 78) and they disregarded the vulnerability of the LGBTIcommunity in Russia and their need for special protection (§§ 77-78). The applicants had suffered discrimination on the grounds of their sexual orientation and there was therefore a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention (§§ 78-79)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:40861/22,Hanovs v. Latvia,40861/22,added,"Hanovs v. Latvia, no. 40861/22, 18 July 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.C,The specific duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence and investigate discriminatory motives,2,,26,,"In Hanovs v. Latvia , 2024",,,"In Hanovs v. Latvia, 2024, the applicant and his partner were verbally and physically assaulted by private individuals in a public space, with the intent of intimidating them from publicly expressing their affection. The Court considered that such an attack, triggered by expressions of affection, constituted an affront to human dignity by targeting universal expressions of love and companionship (§ 42). Such attacks, motivated by displays of affection, profoundly affected the private lives of individuals by compromising their ability to live authentically and compelling them to conceal essential aspects of their private lives to avoid harm (§ 43). Even if the discriminatory motive for the attack was not in doubt, domestic authorities only resorted to administrative-offence proceedings and the perpetrator was neither charged nor prosecuted (§ 51). Consequently, there was a failure by the domestic authorities to provide a robust response to an attack motivated by the applicant's sexual orientation, fostering a sense of impunity for hate-motivated offences rather than affirming a clear and uncompromising stance against such acts (§ 52). This kind of failure to address can normalise hostility towards LGBTIindividuals, perpetuate a culture of intolerance and discrimination and encourage further acts of a similar nature (§ 53). Thus, the Court concluded that the State had failed to provide adequate protection for the applicant's dignity and private life by ensuring the effective prosecution of the attack against him, in breach of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 14."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:40861/22,Hanovs v. Latvia,40861/22,added,"Hanovs v. Latvia, no. 40861/22, 18 July 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C,The specific duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence and investigate discriminatory motives,2,12,12,0.9763,"Hanovs v. Latvia , 2024",,"The authorities' have a specific duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence. In particular, when the prima facie domestic authorities are confronted with indications of violence motivated or at least influenced by the victim's sexual orientation, this requires the effective application of domestic criminal-law mechanisms capable of elucidating the possible hate motive with homophobic overtones behind the violent incident and of identifying and, if appropriate, adequately punishing those responsible ( Sabalić v. Croatia, 2021, § 105).","The authorities'have a specific duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence. In particular, when the domestic authorities are confronted with prima facie indications of violence motivated or at least influenced by the victim's sexual orientation, this requires the effective application of domestic criminal-law mechanisms capable of elucidating the possible hate motive with homophobic overtones behind the violent incident and of identifying and, if appropriate, adequately punishing those responsible ( Sabalić v. Croatia, 2021, § 105, Hanovs v. Latvia, 2024, § 48)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:40861/22,Hanovs v. Latvia,40861/22,added,"Hanovs v. Latvia, no. 40861/22, 18 July 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C,The specific duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence and investigate discriminatory motives,2,13,13,0.9693,"Hanovs v. Latvia , 2024|Karter v. Ukraine , 2024",,"The authorities' duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence, as well as to investigate the existence of a possible link between a discriminatory motive and the act of violence, can fall under the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention, but may also be seen to form part of the authorities' positive responsibilities under Article 14 of the Convention to secure the fundamental value enshrined in Article 3 without discrimination (ibid., § 91; Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015, §§ 63-64; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania 2016, § 106; Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020, § 36, Genderdoc- M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021, § 34, and Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021, § 57, discussed below, where the Court proceeded to a simultaneous examination under Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention 1 ).","The authorities'duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence, as well as to investigate the existence of a possible link between a discriminatory motive and the act of violence, can fall under the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention, but may also be seen to form part of the authorities'positive responsibilities under Article 14 of the Convention to secure the fundamental value enshrined in Article 3 without discrimination (ibid., § 91; Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015, §§ 63-64; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania 2016, § 106; Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020, § 36, Genderdoc- M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021, § 34; see also Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021, § 57, and Karter v. Ukraine, 2024, § 77, where the Court proceeded to a simultaneous examination under Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention 1 ). Furthermore, the Court recently reiterated that this duty may also manifest as a positive obligation to ensure the enjoyment of rights enshrined in Article 8 ( Hanovs v. Latvia, 2024, § 38, discussed below, where the Court proceeded to a simultaneous examination under Articles 3 and 8 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:40861/22,Hanovs v. Latvia,40861/22,added,"Hanovs v. Latvia, no. 40861/22, 18 July 2024",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C,The specific duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence and investigate discriminatory motives,2,14,14,0.9813,"Hanovs v. Latvia , 2024|Karter v. Ukraine , 2024",,"The Court has held that, without a strict approach from the law-enforcement authorities, prejudice-motivated crimes would unavoidably be treated on an equal footing with ordinary cases without such overtones, and the resultant indifference would be tantamount to official acquiescence to, or even connivance with, hate crimes ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015, § 77, with further references, and Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, § 106). Thus, according to the Court, treating violence and brutality arising from discriminatory attitudes on an equal footing with violence occurring in cases that have no such overtones would be turning a blind eye to the specific nature of acts that are particularly destructive of fundamental rights. Moreover, a failure to make a distinction in the way situations that are essentially different are handled may constitute unjustified treatment irreconcilable with Article 14 of the Convention ( Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020, § 44).","The Court has held that, without a strict approach from the law-enforcement authorities, prejudice-motivated crimes would unavoidably be treated on an equal footing with ordinary cases without such overtones, and the resultant indifference would be tantamount to official acquiescence to, or even connivance with, hate crimes ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015, § 77, with further references, as well as Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, § 106 and Hanovs v. Latvia, 2024, § 46). Thus, according to the Court, treating violence and brutality arising from discriminatory attitudes on an equal footing with violence occurring in cases that have no such overtones would be turning a blind eye to the specific nature of acts that are particularly destructive of fundamental rights. Moreover, a failure to make a distinction in the way situations that are essentially different are handled may constitute unjustified treatment irreconcilable with Article 14 of the Convention ( Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020, § 44, Karter v. Ukraine, 2024, § 76)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:18179/17,Karter v. Ukraine,18179/17,added,"Karter v. Ukraine, no. 18179/17, 11 April 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C,The specific duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence and investigate discriminatory motives,2,13,13,0.9693,"Hanovs v. Latvia , 2024|Karter v. Ukraine , 2024",,"The authorities' duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence, as well as to investigate the existence of a possible link between a discriminatory motive and the act of violence, can fall under the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention, but may also be seen to form part of the authorities' positive responsibilities under Article 14 of the Convention to secure the fundamental value enshrined in Article 3 without discrimination (ibid., § 91; Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015, §§ 63-64; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania 2016, § 106; Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020, § 36, Genderdoc- M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021, § 34, and Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021, § 57, discussed below, where the Court proceeded to a simultaneous examination under Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention 1 ).","The authorities'duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence, as well as to investigate the existence of a possible link between a discriminatory motive and the act of violence, can fall under the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention, but may also be seen to form part of the authorities'positive responsibilities under Article 14 of the Convention to secure the fundamental value enshrined in Article 3 without discrimination (ibid., § 91; Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015, §§ 63-64; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania 2016, § 106; Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020, § 36, Genderdoc- M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021, § 34; see also Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021, § 57, and Karter v. Ukraine, 2024, § 77, where the Court proceeded to a simultaneous examination under Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention 1 ). Furthermore, the Court recently reiterated that this duty may also manifest as a positive obligation to ensure the enjoyment of rights enshrined in Article 8 ( Hanovs v. Latvia, 2024, § 38, discussed below, where the Court proceeded to a simultaneous examination under Articles 3 and 8 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:18179/17,Karter v. Ukraine,18179/17,added,"Karter v. Ukraine, no. 18179/17, 11 April 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C,The specific duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence and investigate discriminatory motives,2,14,14,0.9813,"Hanovs v. Latvia , 2024|Karter v. Ukraine , 2024",,"The Court has held that, without a strict approach from the law-enforcement authorities, prejudice-motivated crimes would unavoidably be treated on an equal footing with ordinary cases without such overtones, and the resultant indifference would be tantamount to official acquiescence to, or even connivance with, hate crimes ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015, § 77, with further references, and Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, § 106). Thus, according to the Court, treating violence and brutality arising from discriminatory attitudes on an equal footing with violence occurring in cases that have no such overtones would be turning a blind eye to the specific nature of acts that are particularly destructive of fundamental rights. Moreover, a failure to make a distinction in the way situations that are essentially different are handled may constitute unjustified treatment irreconcilable with Article 14 of the Convention ( Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020, § 44).","The Court has held that, without a strict approach from the law-enforcement authorities, prejudice-motivated crimes would unavoidably be treated on an equal footing with ordinary cases without such overtones, and the resultant indifference would be tantamount to official acquiescence to, or even connivance with, hate crimes ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015, § 77, with further references, as well as Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, § 106 and Hanovs v. Latvia, 2024, § 46). Thus, according to the Court, treating violence and brutality arising from discriminatory attitudes on an equal footing with violence occurring in cases that have no such overtones would be turning a blind eye to the specific nature of acts that are particularly destructive of fundamental rights. Moreover, a failure to make a distinction in the way situations that are essentially different are handled may constitute unjustified treatment irreconcilable with Article 14 of the Convention ( Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020, § 44, Karter v. Ukraine, 2024, § 76)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:18179/17,Karter v. Ukraine,18179/17,added,"Karter v. Ukraine, no. 18179/17, 11 April 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C,The specific duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence and investigate discriminatory motives,2,15,15,0.9905,"Karter v. Ukraine , 2024",,"The respondent State's obligation to investigate possible discriminatory motives for a violent act is an obligation to use its best endeavours to do so and is not absolute. The authorities must do whatever is reasonable in the circumstances to collect and secure the evidence, to explore all practical means of discovering the truth, and to deliver fully reasoned, impartial and objective decisions, without omitting suspicious facts that may be indicative of violence induced by, for instance, sexual orientation based discrimination ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015, § 67; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania 2016, § 113; Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020, § 38, Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021, § 37, Women' s Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021, § 63).","The respondent State's obligation to investigate possible discriminatory motives for a violent act is an obligation to use its best endeavours to do so and is not absolute. The authorities must do whatever is reasonable in the circumstances to collect and secure the evidence, to explore all practical means of discovering the truth, and to deliver fully reasoned, impartial and objective decisions, without omitting suspicious facts that may be indicative of violence induced by, for instance, sexual orientation based discrimination ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015, § 67; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania 2016, § 113; Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020, § 38, Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021, § 37, Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021, § 63, Karter v. Ukraine, 2024, § 76)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:33421/16,Klimova and Others v. Russia*,33421/16,added,"Klimova and Others v. Russia*, no. 33421/16 and 6 others, 4 February 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A.3,Imposed silence and legal bans concerning homosexuality,3,,112,,,,,"The above principles were also applied in Klimova and Others v. Russia *, 2025, a case which concerned the applicants' convictions for an administrative offence of ""promoting homosexua lity among minors"" in connection with content they published in social networking groups or communities they administered. The impugned measures had been incompatible with Article 10 of the Convention in so far as they had sought to limit children's access to information which depicted same-sex relationships as essentially the same as different-sex relationships (§§ 149-153)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:59180/15,Minasyan and Others v. Armenia*,59180/15,added,"Minasyan and Others v. Armenia*, no. 59180/15, 7 January 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,IV.B.8,Positive obligations under Article 14,3,164,167,0.724,,"ączkowski and Others v. Poland , 2007","In Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007, the decisions refusing the applicants' request for permission to hold the demonstrations against homophobia had been given by the municipal authorities on the Mayor's behalf after he had already made public his opinion on the matter. The Court found that his opinions may have affected the decision-making process and consequently infringed in a discriminatory manner the applicants' right to freedom of assembly (ibid., § 100).","The case of Minasyan and Others v. Armenia *, 2025, concerned an online newspaper article targeting LGBTIrights activists following their public comments challenging a statement of the Armenian Eurovision jury member criticising the victory of a gay cross-dressing man in 2014. The impugned article had been motivated by hostility against LGBTIpersons and had attacked applicants because of their activism (§ 54). The author of the article had expressly incited the public to commit harmful discriminatory acts against them (§ 66). The Court found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14, because the domestic courts had failed to recognise the article's hostile tone, intentions and impact on the applicants' Convention rights, as well as the discriminatory nature of the impugned statements. The domestic courts also failed to carry out the requisite balancing of the competing rights in line with the Court's case -law (§§ 69-71). Furthermore, the manner in which the only civil remedy available to the applicants had been interpreted and applied in practice had failed to provide them with protection against hate speech and discrimination (§ 71)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:46808/16,R.F. and Others v. Germany,46808/16,added,"R.F. and Others v. Germany, no. 46808/16, 12 November 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.2.5,Parental issues,4,,91,,"In R.F. and Others v. Germany , 2024",,,"In R.F. and Others v. Germany, 2024, the domestic authorities refused to register the first applicant as the second biological (as opposed to adoptive) mother of a child conceived through IVFwith her egg but carried to term by her registered partner. Nevertheless, the Court found that the applicants' family life had been ensured in that they did not experience any difficulties in living as a family on a daily basis (§§ 69-73). The first applicant's private life had been ensured even though she had to follow the adoption procedure (§§ 75-78). The private life of the child had also been ensured since the adoption had been carried out without particular difficulties and since the first applicant had previously held certain parental prerogatives, albeit derived from her legal union with the second applicant (§§ 91-94). There was therefore no violation of Article 8 of the Convention."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:16206/19,Savinovskikh and Others v. Russia,16206/19,added,"Savinovskikh and Others v. Russia, no. 16206/19, 9 July 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1,The notions of private life and family life,3,43,45,0.9912,"Savinovskikh and Others v. Russia , 2024|Valdís Fjölnisdóttir and Others v. Iceland , 2021",,"The notion of family life is an autonomous concept. Consequently, whether or not ""family life"" exists is essentially a question of fact depending upon the real existence in practice of close personal ties. The Court will therefore look at de facto family ties. For example, the Court found that there was family life in the context of a female to male transsexual who had undergone gender reassignment surgery and who had lived with a female, who had given birth to a child by Artificial Insemination by Donor (AID), a procedure the couple had jointly applied for. In those circumstances, the Court de facto X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, considered that family ties linked the three applicants ( 1997, § 37). The relationship between two women who were living together and had entered into a civil partnership, with a child conceived by one of them by means of assisted reproduction but who was being brought up by both of them, also constituted ""family life"" within the meaning of Article 8 of the Gas and Dubois v. France Convention ( (dec.), 2010). The same applied to the relationship with the child of one of them, which they were raising together ( X and Others v. Austria [GC], 2013, § 96; Boeckel and Gessner-Boeckel v. Germany (dec.), 2013, § 27; S.W. and Others v. Austria (dec.), 2022, § 43). The Court has also considered in this context that the relationship between the non-biological ""parent"" (or ""sibling"") and the child persists even after the break down of the relationship between the couple and continues to constitute family life ( Honner v. France, 2020, § 51; C.E. and Others v. France, 2022, §§ 49-52). More recently, the Court has also found that two applicants, a same-sex couple living in Iceland, who were the intended parents of the third applicant, a child born by way of gestational surrogacy in the United States and having no biological link with either of them constituted family life since they had bonded for over four years (all of the third applicant's life), also via a foster Valdís Fjölnisdóttir and Others care arrangement, and they regarded each other as parents and child ( v. Iceland, 2021, §§ 58-62, see also D.B. and Others v. Switzerland, 2022).","The notion of family life is an autonomous concept. Consequently, whether or not ""family life"" exists is essentially a question of fact depending upon the real existence in practice of close personal ties. The Court will therefore look at de facto family ties. For example, the Court found that there was family life in the context of a female to male transsexual who had undergone gender reassignment surgery and who had lived with a female, who had given birth to a child by Artificial Insemination by Donor (AID), a procedure the couple had jointly applied for. In those circumstances, the Court considered that de facto family ties linked the three applicants ( X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 37). The relationship between two women who were living together and had entered into a civil partnership, with a child conceived by one of them by means of assisted reproduction but who was being brought up by both of them, also constituted ""family life"" within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention ( Gas and Dubois v. France (dec.), 2010). The same applied to the relationship with the child of one of them, which they were raising together ( X and Others v. Austria [GC], 2013, § 96; Boeckel and Gessner-Boeckel v. Germany (dec.), 2013, § 27; S.W. and Others v. Austria (dec.), 2022, § 43). The Court has also considered in this context that the relationship between the non-biological ""parent"" (or ""sibling"") and the child persists even after the break down of the relationship between the couple and continues to constitute family life ( Honner v. France, 2020, § 51; C.E. and Others v. France, 2022, §§ 49-52). More recently, the Court has also found that two applicants, a same-sex couple living in Iceland, who were the intended parents of the third applicant, a child born by way of gestational surrogacy in the United States and having no biological link with either of them constituted family life since they had bonded for over four years (all of the third applicant's life), also via a foster care arrangement, and they regarded each other as parents and child ( Valdís Fjölnisdóttir and Others v. Iceland, 2021, §§ 58-62, see also D.B. and Others v. Switzerland, 2022). Lastly, the Court held that a relationship between the applicant, a transgender man, and two fostered children placed in his care during many months, had amounted to family life, despite the lack of a biological relationship between them, given the close emotional bond that had developed ( Savinovskikh and Others v. Russia, 2024, § 68)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:16206/19,Savinovskikh and Others v. Russia,16206/19,added,"Savinovskikh and Others v. Russia, no. 16206/19, 9 July 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.2,Negative and positive obligations,3,45,47,0.9238,"Norris v. Ireland , 1998|Savinovskikh and Others v. Russia , 2024|W.W. v. Poland , 2024",,"The Court has examined various cases of interference (negative obligations) with the private and/or family life of LGBTIapplicants under Article 8. It held, for example, that the legislation prohibiting homosexual acts committed in private between consenting males constituted a continuing interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life (which included his sexual life - a Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, ; Norris v. Ireland most intimate aspect of private life) ( 1981, § 41, 1998, § 38; Modinos v. Cyprus, 1993, § 24). Similarly, the existence of legislation prohibiting consensual sexual acts between more than two men in private and a consequent conviction for gross indecency also constituted an interference with the right to respect for private life ( A.D.T. v. the United Kingdom, 2000, § 26).","The Court has examined various cases of interference (negative obligations) with the private and/or family life of LGBTIapplicants under Article 8. It held, for example, that the legislation prohibiting homosexual acts committed in private between consenting males constituted a continuing interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life (which included his sexual life - a most intimate aspect of private life) ( Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 41 ; Norris v. Ireland, 1998, § 38; Modinos v. Cyprus, 1993, § 24). Similarly, the existence of legislation prohibiting consensual sexual acts between more than two men in private and a consequent conviction for gross indecency also constituted an interference with the right to respect for private life ( A.D.T. v. the United Kingdom, 2000, § 26). More recently, the Court has held that refusing to allow a transgender person to continue prescribed hormone therapy after her transfer in a new prison constituted an interference with the applicant's rights to respect for her private life ( W.W. v. Poland, 2024, § 87). Adecision to terminate custody and foster care agreement of a transgender person on the basis of his change of gender identity was also found to amount to an interference with the right to respect for family life ( Savinovskikh and Others v. Russia, 2024, § 69)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:16206/19,Savinovskikh and Others v. Russia,16206/19,added,"Savinovskikh and Others v. Russia, no. 16206/19, 9 July 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.2.5,Parental issues,4,,93,,"In Savinovskikh and Others v. Russia , 2024",,,"In Savinovskikh and Others v. Russia, 2024, the domestic authorities decided to terminate the custody and foster care agreement of a transgender person in respect of two minors on the basis of his ""transsexualism"" and change of gender identity. The Court observed that the decision in question was not supported by any individualised expert examination of the applicant and the children or any scientific study regarding the impact of a change of gender identity on the children's psychological health and development (§ 73). As the reasoning of the domestic courts relied primarily on the legal impossibility of same-sex couples'being accepted as foster parents and on the traditions and mentality of Russian society, the Court found that the domestic authorities failed in their duty to conduct an in-depth examination of the entire family situation and to make a balanced and reasonable assessment of the respective interests of each person with a constant concern for determining what the best solution would be for the children and concluded that there had been a violation of Article 8 (§§ 76 and 78)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:32678/18,Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia,32678/18,added,"Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia, no. 32678/18 and 2 others, 17 December 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A.4,Positive obligations under Article 10,3,,114,,"Convention were set out in the case of Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia , 2024",,,"Principles governing the Contracting States' positive obligations under Article 10 of the Convention were set out in the case of Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia, 2024, §§ 14-15. That case concerned repeated disruptions - telephone bomb threats and other false alarms - of film screenings at an annual international LGBTIfilm festival. The failure by the authorities for years to secure the safe and uninterrupted conduct of this festival amounted to a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The authorities had been unwilling to assess the disruptions as a whole rather than as a number of isolated incidents, and to take adequate steps to curtail or to put an end to the harassment, thereby inspiring the perpetrators to commit further similar acts and convincing them of their impunity (§§ 18-21)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:31842/20,W.W. v. Poland,31842/20,added,"W.W. v. Poland, no. 31842/20, 11 July 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.A.1,The notions of private life and family life,3,42,44,0.9842,"A.K. v. Russia , 2024|Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania , 2020|W.W. v. Poland , 2024","Beizaras and L evickas v. Lithuania , 2020","The Court has held that the concept of ""private life"" is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person, including his or her sexual life X and Y v. the Netherlands (, 1985, § 22). It can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's physical and social identity ( Y.Y v. Turkey, 2015, § 56). Elements such as, for example, gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life fall within the personal sphere protected by Article 8 ( Sousa Goucha v. Portugal, 2016, § 27 ; B. v. France, 1992, § 63 ; Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 41 ; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, § 109; Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, 1999, § 71). Article 8 also protects the right to personal development and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world ( Schlumpf v. Switzerland, 2009, § 77).","The Court has held that the concept of ""private life"" is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person, including his or her sexual life ( X and Y v. the Netherlands, 1985, § 22). It can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's physical and social identity ( Y.Y v. Turkey, 2015, § 56). Elements such as, for example, gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life fall within the personal sphere protected by Article 8 ( Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 41; B. v. France, 1992, § 63; Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, 1999, § 71; Sousa Goucha v. Portugal, 2016, § 27 ; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, § 109; A.K. v. Russia, 2024, § 30; W.W. v. Poland, 2024, § 82). Article 8 also protects the right to personal development and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world ( Schlumpf v. Switzerland, 2009, § 77)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:31842/20,W.W. v. Poland,31842/20,added,"W.W. v. Poland, no. 31842/20, 11 July 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.2,Negative and positive obligations,3,45,47,0.9238,"Norris v. Ireland , 1998|Savinovskikh and Others v. Russia , 2024|W.W. v. Poland , 2024",,"The Court has examined various cases of interference (negative obligations) with the private and/or family life of LGBTIapplicants under Article 8. It held, for example, that the legislation prohibiting homosexual acts committed in private between consenting males constituted a continuing interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life (which included his sexual life - a Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, ; Norris v. Ireland most intimate aspect of private life) ( 1981, § 41, 1998, § 38; Modinos v. Cyprus, 1993, § 24). Similarly, the existence of legislation prohibiting consensual sexual acts between more than two men in private and a consequent conviction for gross indecency also constituted an interference with the right to respect for private life ( A.D.T. v. the United Kingdom, 2000, § 26).","The Court has examined various cases of interference (negative obligations) with the private and/or family life of LGBTIapplicants under Article 8. It held, for example, that the legislation prohibiting homosexual acts committed in private between consenting males constituted a continuing interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life (which included his sexual life - a most intimate aspect of private life) ( Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 41 ; Norris v. Ireland, 1998, § 38; Modinos v. Cyprus, 1993, § 24). Similarly, the existence of legislation prohibiting consensual sexual acts between more than two men in private and a consequent conviction for gross indecency also constituted an interference with the right to respect for private life ( A.D.T. v. the United Kingdom, 2000, § 26). More recently, the Court has held that refusing to allow a transgender person to continue prescribed hormone therapy after her transfer in a new prison constituted an interference with the applicant's rights to respect for her private life ( W.W. v. Poland, 2024, § 87). Adecision to terminate custody and foster care agreement of a transgender person on the basis of his change of gender identity was also found to amount to an interference with the right to respect for family life ( Savinovskikh and Others v. Russia, 2024, § 69)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:31842/20,W.W. v. Poland,31842/20,added,"W.W. v. Poland, no. 31842/20, 11 July 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.B.1,Issues related to transgender persons,3,57,59,0.9795,"Schlumpf v. Switzerland , 2009|W.W. v. Poland , 2024","Kück v. Germany , 2003|Schlumpf v. Switzerlan d , 2009|Y.Y v. Turke y , 2015","The notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of the guarantees of Article 8 of the Convention. This has led the Court to recognise, in the context of the Van application of that provision to transgender persons, that it includes a right to self-determination ( Kück v. Germany, 2003, § 69; Schlumpf v. Switzerlan d, 2009, § 100), of which the freedom to define one's gender identity is one of the most basic essentials ( Van Kück v. Germany, 2003, § 73; Y.Y v. Turkey, 2015, § 102). The right of transgender persons to personal development and to physical and Van Kück v. Germany Schlumpf moral security is thus guaranteed by Article 8 (, 2003, § 69; v. Switzerland, 2009, § 100; Y.Y v. Turke y, 2015, § 58). The right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the Convention applies fully to gender identity, as a component of personal identity. This holds true for all individuals, irrespective of whether an individual has undergone gender reassignment surgery ( A.P., Garçon and Nicot v. France, 2017, §§ 94-95, S.V. v. Italy, 2018, §§ 56-58).","The notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of the guarantees of Article 8 of the Convention. This has led the Court to recognise, in the context of the application of that provision to transgender persons, that it includes a right to self-determination ( Van Kück v. Germany, 2003, § 69; Schlumpf v. Switzerland, 2009, § 100), of which the freedom to define one's gender identity is one of the most basic essentials ( Van Kück v. Germany, 2003, § 73; Y.Y v. Turkey, 2015, § 102, W.W. v. Poland, 2024, § 83). The right of transgender persons to personal development and to physical and moral security is thus guaranteed by Article 8 ( Van Kück v. Germany, 2003, § 69; Schlumpf v. Switzerland, 2009, § 100; Y.Y v. Turkey, 2015, § 58). The right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the Convention applies fully to gender identity, as a component of personal identity ( W.W. v. Poland, 2024, § 82). This holds true for all individuals, irrespective of whether an individual has undergone gender reassignment surgery ( A.P., Garçon and Nicot v. France, 2017, §§ 94-95, S.V. v. Italy, 2018, §§ 56-58)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:31842/20,W.W. v. Poland,31842/20,added,"W.W. v. Poland, no. 31842/20, 11 July 2024",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.1.c,Medical expenses,4,,77,,"In W.W. v. Poland , 2024",,,"In W.W. v. Poland, 2024, the Court considered that a decision, taken by prison authorities, to prevent the applicant from continuing the hormone replacement therapy associated with her gender reassignment, which she had initially been allowed to undergo in facilities where she was previously detained, involved an interference with her right to respect for private life (§ 87). This decision touched upon the applicant's freedom to define her gender identity, one of the most basic essentials of self-determination. Given the numerous and painful interventions involved in gender reassignment and the level of commitment and conviction required to achieve a change in social gender role, it could not be suggested that there was anything arbitrary or capricious in the decision taken by a person to undergo such a procedure (§ 91). The Court observed that the prescribed hormone treatment had beneficial effects on the applicant's physical and mental health and that it had been an appropriate medical treatment in her case (§ 93). Furthermore, the Court noted that allowing the applicant to continue the therapy would not have caused any technical or financial difficulties for the prison authorities, as the applicant bore the cost of the medications (§ 94). Bearing in mind the applicant's particular vulnerability as an imprisoned transgender person undergoing a gender reassignment procedure requiring enhanced protection, the Court concluded that the authorities had failed to strike a fair balance between competing interests at stake (§ 96)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:226/18,Yevstifeyev and Others v. Russia,226/18,added,"Yevstifeyev and Others v. Russia, no. 226/18 and 3 others, 3 December 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.C,The specific duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence and investigate discriminatory motives,2,,27,,"In Y evstifeyev and Others v. Russia , 2024",,,"In Yevstifeyev and Others v. Russia, 2024, the domestic authorities had failed to comply with their positive obligation to adequately respond to homophobic physical threats and verbal assault, by a politician against the first three applicants at a rally, in violation of Article 14 combined with Article 8 of the Convention (§§ 69-77)."
0a61f8f7ceb0,Rights of LGBTI persons,20240613074526__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_lgbti_rights_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0a61f8f7ceb0/diff_2024-06-13__2025-06-12.json,apps:226/18,Yevstifeyev and Others v. Russia,226/18,added,"Yevstifeyev and Others v. Russia, no. 226/18 and 3 others, 3 December 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.8,Positive obligations under Article 14,3,,171,,,,,"In Yevstifeyev and Others v. Russia *, 2024, a video, created and published on social networks by a well-known comic actor and television presenter, had been put online shortly before a national vote on Constitutional amendments and had clearly been a parody of another video calling on the public to vote for them. It was found to be a provocative political satire on a matter of public interest contributing to a political debate which, taken as a whole and in context, could not reasonably have appeared to have had as its purpose the propagation of homophobic views and ideas. It had not therefore reached the ""threshold of severity"" required to affect the ""private life"" of individual members of the LGBTIcommunity. The applicant could not therefore be considered a victim of the alleged violations of Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention (§§ 49-60)."
0bd62693ae9f,Article 3 Protocol 1,20230923144330__guide_art_3_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20240807014915__guide_art_3_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-08-07,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/0bd62693ae9f/diff_2023-09-23__2024-08-07.json,apps:58811/18,Güngen v. Türkiye (dec.),58811/18,added,"Güngen v. Türkiye (dec.), no. 58811/18, 10 October 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.D,Other legitimate aims,2,,91,,"Güngen v. Türkiye (dec.), no. 58811/18, 10 October 2023",,,"In Güngen v. Türkiye (dec.), 2023, the refusal to register the applicant as a candidate on the list of a pro-Kurdish political party, on the ground that he had not submitted a judgment confirming the restoration of his civic rights following his criminal conviction was found not to be arbitrary, taking into consideration the well-established and foreseeable practice of the relevant authorities. The application was declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded."
0bd62693ae9f,Article 3 Protocol 1,20230923144330__guide_art_3_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20240807014915__guide_art_3_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-08-07,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/0bd62693ae9f/diff_2023-09-23__2024-08-07.json,apps:68958/17,Myslihaka and Others v. Albania,68958/17,added,"Myslihaka and Others v. Albania, nos. 68958/17 and 5 others, 24 October 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B,Specific case of prisoners,2,,29,,"Myslihaka and Others v. Albania, nos. 68958/17 and 5 others, 24 October 2023",,,"In Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3) [GC], 2012, however, the Court examined a voting ban which applied only to persons convicted of certain well-determined offences or to a custodial sentence exceeding a statutory threshold. The legislature had been careful to adjust the duration of this measure according to the specific features of each case. It had also adjusted the duration of the ban depending on the sentence imposed and therefore, indirectly, on the gravity of the sentence. Many of the convicted prisoners had retained the possibility of voting in legislative elections. In addition, this system had been complemented by the possibility for convicts affected by a permanent ban to recover their voting rights. The Italian system was not therefore marked by excessive rigidity. The Court thus held that there had been no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. Asimilar situation arose in Myslihaka and Others v. Albania, 2023, where serving prisoners convicted of serious criminal offences were banned from voting in the 2017 parliamentary elections. The restriction of the prisoners' right to vote was found to be proportionate because it had been conditional on the nature and the gravity of the offences."
0bd62693ae9f,Article 3 Protocol 1,20240807014915__guide_art_3_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20241030214015__guide_art_3_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-07,2024-10-30,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0bd62693ae9f/diff_2024-08-07__2024-10-30.json,apps:24159/22|25751/22,Guðmundur Gunnarsson and Magnús Davíð Norðdahl v. Iceland,24159/22|25751/22,added,"Guðmundur Gunnarsson and Magnús Davíð Norðdahl v. Iceland, nos. 24159/22 and 25751/22, 16 April 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV,Electoral disputes,2,,121,,"The above-mentioned principles on adequate and sufficient procedural safeguards to prevent arbitrariness were again applied by the Court in Guðmundur Gunnarsson and Magnús Davíð Norðdahl v. Iceland , 2024",,,"The above-mentioned principles on adequate and sufficient procedural safeguards to prevent arbitrariness were again applied by the Court in Guðmundur Gunnarsson and Magnús Davíð Norðdahl v. Iceland, 2024, which concerned the examination of complaints by two unsuccessful candidates who alleged that there had been irregularities in the counting and recounting of votes cast in their constituency, affecting the election results and the ultimate composition of the Icelandic parliament ( Althingi ). The existing regulatory framework created a decision-making mechanism by which the preparatory credentials committee (appointed by the acting speaker of the Althingi ) conducted a full inquiry into the complaints and prepared a report, the credentials committee (elected by the new Althingi ) formulated proposals on the basis of that report, and the full chamber of the Althingi debated and voted on the relevant proposals. At the time of examination of the complaints, all of those bodies were composed of newly elected MPs whose credentials had not yet been approved and a fully functioning parliament had yet to be constituted. No rules existed addressing potential conflicts of interest and, in fact, certain MPs voting on the matter had been directly affected by the outcome of the vote and had therefore been ""deciding their own fate"". While there were no grounds to doubt the credibility of the inquiry and objectivity of the proposals, the absence of specific rules ensuring political and partisan neutrality created genuine impartiality concerns from the standpoint of appearances. Moreover, the discretion of the full chamber of the Althingi, regarding the practical consequences of any identified electoral defects, was not circumscribed with sufficient precision by domestic law. At the same time, the Court found that the procedure for the examination of the applicants'complaints had been fair, objective and had guaranteed a sufficiently reasoned decision: the applicants'effective participation had been ensured, the proposals and recommendations had been detailed and reasoned, and the debate in the full chamber had allowed the rationale of the final decision to be understood. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned findings as to the impartiality and the unrestrained discretion of the Althingi led the Court to a conclusion that there had been a breach of the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention."
0bd62693ae9f,Article 3 Protocol 1,20240807014915__guide_art_3_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20241030214015__guide_art_3_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-07,2024-10-30,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0bd62693ae9f/diff_2024-08-07__2024-10-30.json,apps:24159/22|25751/22,Guðmundur Gunnarsson and Magnús Davíð Norðdahl v. Iceland,24159/22|25751/22,added,"Guðmundur Gunnarsson and Magnús Davíð Norðdahl v. Iceland, nos. 24159/22 and 25751/22, 16 April 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V,Effective remedies,2,122,125,0.9503,"Guðmundur Gunnarsson and Magnús Davíð Norðdahl v. Iceland , 2024",,"On the other hand, where the post-election dispute had not been examined by a judicial body at domestic level, the Court has conducted a separate assessment of the complaint under Article 13 ( Grosaru v. Romania, 2010; Paunović and Milivojević v. Serbia, 2016; Mugemangango v. Belgium [GC], 2020).","On the other hand, where the post-election dispute had not been examined by a judicial body at domestic level, the Court has conducted a separate assessment of the complaint under Article 13 ( Grosaru v. Romania, 2010; Paunović and Milivojević v. Serbia, 2016; Mugemangango v. Belgium [GC], 2020; Guðmundur Gunnarsson and Magnús Davíð Norðdahl v. Iceland, 2024)."
0bd62693ae9f,Article 3 Protocol 1,20240807014915__guide_art_3_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20241030214015__guide_art_3_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-07,2024-10-30,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0bd62693ae9f/diff_2024-08-07__2024-10-30.json,apps:55159/16,Kokëdhima v. Albania,55159/16,added,"Kokëdhima v. Albania, no. 55159/16, 11 June 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.F,...to the exercise of office,3,,113,,"Kokëdhima v. Albania , 2024",,,"Kokëdhima v. Albania, 2024, concerned the lawfulness of the termination by the Constitutional Court of the mandate of an MP on the ground that, according to the Constitution, it was incompatible with his involvement in business activities through a company of which he was the sole shareholder and that drew income from contracts with State bodies for the provision of services. Even though the contracts had been concluded before the elections and the applicant sold the company several months after he had been elected, the company continued to generate income under those contracts and the applicant, who had failed to take all measures necessary to terminate the ongoing conflict of interest at the time of assuming his mandate, thus continued to derive benefit from the company as its sole shareholder for several months while serving as an MP at the same time. The Court found that the manner in which the relevant domestic legislation was interpreted and applied in the applicant's case was sufficiently foreseeable and not arbitrary."
0bd62693ae9f,Article 3 Protocol 1,20240807014915__guide_art_3_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20241030214015__guide_art_3_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-07,2024-10-30,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0bd62693ae9f/diff_2024-08-07__2024-10-30.json,apps:42221/18,Ždanoka v. Latvia (no. 2),42221/18,added,"Ždanoka v. Latvia (no. 2),* no. 42221/18, 25 July 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.B,Importance of context,3,,66,,,,,"Ždanoka v. Latvia (no. 2), 2024* follows-up on the Grand Chamber judgment of Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], 2006, (referenced in paragraph 64 above). In 2018, following a request by the applicant for a review of the constitutionality of the provision restricting the right to stand for election of persons who had actively participated in the CPLafter 13 January 1991, the Constitutional Court confirmed its constitutionality but narrowed the restriction to those active participants who ""[had] endangered and still continued to endanger the independence of the Latvian State and the principles of a democratic State governed by the rule of law"". In that year' s parliamentary elections, the applicant's name was removed from the list of candidates after the Central Electoral Commission had found that the restriction, as interpreted by the Constitutional Court, applied in her situation. At the outset, the Court emphasised the context: Latvia was a neighbour of Russia, a State that had recently invaded and controlled parts of Georgia and Ukraine in ""a clearly discernible trend of events"" subsequent to the 2006 Grand Chamber judgment. While the Latvian parliament had rejected proposals to lift the restriction on three occasions and while in other circumstances the Court might consider this limited action as unjustified and capable of tipping the balance in favour of finding a violation, it could not reach such a conclusion in the specific and sensitive context of the case, given that the "" greater stability"" enjoyed by Latvia (and Europe in general), and referred to by the Grand Chamber in the 2006 judgment, no longer existed. Since that judgment Latvia increasingly had legitimate reasons to fear for its security, territorial integrity and democratic order, and the restriction therefore had to be assessed in the light of the wider margin of appreciation to be afforded to it in this matter. The Constitutional Court's interpretation of the impugned restriction was, in view of the developments, within its interpretative authority and not arbitrary or unreasonable, while the subsequent proceedings before the electoral commission and the appellate court on the application of the impugned restriction and the applicant's disqualification afforded her sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness."
0bd62693ae9f,Article 3 Protocol 1,20241030214015__guide_art_3_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20251220163343__guide_art_3_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-10-30,2025-12-20,31 August 2024,31 August 2025,2024-08-31,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0bd62693ae9f/diff_2024-10-30__2025-12-20.json,apps:29780/20|33702/20|48537/20,Costa i Rosselló and Others v. Spain (dec.),29780/20|33702/20|48537/20,added,"Costa i Rosselló and Others v. Spain (dec.), nos. 29780/20, 33702/20 and 48537/20, 11 February 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.F,...to the exercise of office,3,,115,,,,,"In Costa i Rosselló and Others v. Spain (dec.), 2025, the Court considered the compatibility with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, along with Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, of (i) the measures taken by the authorities, in particular by the Spanish Constitutional Court, in reaction to the repeated tabling for discussion and adoption by the Catalan Parliament of draft resolutions similar to those that that court had previously declared unconstitutional, and (ii) the criminal proceedings instituted against the first applicant for disobeying the relevant Constitutional Court rulings. The applicants (who were all members of the Catalan Parliament) claimed that, in the context of enforcement proceedings in respect of its previous judgments and decisions, the Constitutional Court had prevented the holding of certain debates on questions of general interest, thereby infringing their rights. The Court held that, the applicants' complaints under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention were ancillary to and were to be examined together with their main complaint under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, which essentially concerned the violation of their right to exercise political participation. In undertaking that examination, the Court made use of the classic and more stringent test of "" necessity "", not ordinarily applied in the context of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraph 13 above). It found on that basis that the interference occasioned had been lawful and foreseeable, had pursued a legitimate aim (protection of the constitutional order and the procedures for revising the Constitution, and the protection of the rights of others), had been necessary and proportionate, and had not otherwise interfered with the free expression of the opinion of the people. In particular, the Court was satisfied that the Constitutional Court had exercised its power, in extreme circumstances, to implement its own previous decisions protecting the Constitution as the guarantor of the territorial integrity of the State and rejected the applicants'complaints as manifestly ill-founded."
0bd62693ae9f,Article 3 Protocol 1,20241030214015__guide_art_3_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20251220163343__guide_art_3_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-10-30,2025-12-20,31 August 2024,31 August 2025,2024-08-31,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0bd62693ae9f/diff_2024-10-30__2025-12-20.json,apps:32648/22,Shlosberg v. Russia,32648/22,added,"Shlosberg v. Russia, no. 32648/22, 3 September 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.A,Inability to stand for election and the democratic order,3,61,61,0.8884,"In Shlosberg v. Russia , 2024",,"The Court has also stressed the need to afford sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness in the framework of the procedures of the domestic authorities, including the need to provide sufficient reasons. In Political Party ""Patria"" and Others v. the Republic of Moldova, 2020, the disqualification of a party three days before parliamentary elections on account of the alleged use of undeclared foreign funds was found to be arbitrary on account of the lack of sufficient procedural safeguards.","The Court has also stressed the need to afford sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness in the framework of the procedures of the domestic authorities, including the need to provide sufficient reasons. In Political Party ""Patria"" and Others v. the Republic of Moldova, 2020, the disqualification of a party three days before parliamentary elections on account of the alleged use of undeclared foreign funds was found to be arbitrary on account of the lack of sufficient procedural safeguards. In Shlosberg v. Russia, 2024, the Court further underlined that disqualification from elections should not be based on arbitrary grounds. The case concerned the applic ant's disqualification from standing for Parliament on account of his involvement in an organisation classified as extremist by the Russian authorities. According to the domestic courts, this ""involvement"" had consisted in taking part in an unauthorised rally, for which the applicant had been sanctioned, and in encouraging others to do the same. The Court found that the applicant's disqualification, while formally complying with the law, had been based on arbitrary grounds, as the exercise of the Convention right to peaceful assembly could not constitute a ground for any form of sanction, including disqualification from standing for Parliament."
0bd62693ae9f,Article 3 Protocol 1,20241030214015__guide_art_3_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20251220163343__guide_art_3_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-10-30,2025-12-20,31 August 2024,31 August 2025,2024-08-31,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0bd62693ae9f/diff_2024-10-30__2025-12-20.json,apps:79340/16,Tomenko v. Ukraine,79340/16,added,"Tomenko v. Ukraine, no. 79340/16, 10 July 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.F,...to the exercise of office,3,,110,,,,,"Tomenko v. Ukraine *, 2025, concerned the te rmination of an MP's mandate by the political party through which he had been elected, after he withdrew from its parliamentary faction. The party relied on a constitutional provision allowing early termination of the mandate in such cases. That provision required the existence of a special law setting out the relevant conditions and procedures. No such law had been adopted at the time. Domestic courts nonetheless upheld the termination, finding the constitutional provision directly applicable and sufficient on its own. The Court held that, in the absence of a legal framework establishing the procedures to be followed and effective safeguards against abuse, political parties enjoyed unfettered discretion in this regard, making the interference with the appli cant's passive electoral rights unlawful and disproportionate. While acknowledging that strengthening party discipline and preventing the fragmentation of parliamentary blocs were legitimate aims with a view to ensuring the effective functioning of Parliament, and that some countermeasures preventing the ""sale"" of mandates or votes might be justified, the Court considered it unacceptable allowing parties, under the pretext of such countermeasures, to override the will of the electorate by annulling electoral results."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20230923100034__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20240217124840__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:6180/15,Ayyubzade v. Azerbaijan,6180/15,added,"Ayyubzade v. Azerbaijan, no. 6180/15, 2 March 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.D,Allegations of ulterior purposes examined under other provisions of the Convention,3,25,26,0.9925,"Ayyubzade v. Azerbaijan , 2023",,"Allegations of improper motives or ulterior purposes underlying restrictions of Convention rights are sometimes raised and examined under substantive provisions of the Convention. ▪ Article 5 § 1: If there is some manifest irregularity which, seen in context, shows that a deprivation of liberty was chiefly meant for an ulterior purpose, the Court finds an absence of a legitimate ground for the deprivation of liberty and accordingly a breach of Article 5 § 1. Such was the case where:  the applicants were detained on vague or fabricated charges or their detention was extended in order to prevent or punish their participation in rallies ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, §§ 52-57; Hakobyan and Others v. Armenia, 2012, § 123; Nemtsov v. Russia, 2014, § 103; Gafgaz Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2015, §§ 107-108; Kasparov v. Russia, 2016, §§ 50-56; Huseynli and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2016, §§ 146-147; Ibrahimov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2016, §§ 126-127; Navalnyy and Yashin v. Russia, 2014, §§ 92-95);  the authorities manipulated procedures to delay having to obtain judicial authorisation for the detention, as required under domestic law ( Oleksiy Mykhaylovych Zakharkin v. Ukraine, 2010, §§ 86-88), or in order to proceed with a disguised extradition ( Bozano v. France, 1986, §§ 59-60; Nowak v. Ukraine, 2011, § 58; Azimov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 163 and 165; Eshonkulov v. Russia, 2015, § 65);  the applicant was illegally abducted and surrendered to another State ( Iskandarov v. Russia, 2010, §§ 109-115 and 148-151);  the authorities summoned asylum-seekers to complete their asylum request, thereby seeking to gain their trust with a view to arresting and subsequently deporting them ( Čonka v. Belgium, 2002, § 41);  citizens of another State were indiscriminately arrested with a view to being deported en masse as a measure of reprisal ( Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], 2014, §§ 185-186);  the applicant was arrested and detained with a view to acquiring leverage over the criminal proceedings against his brother ( Giorgi Nikolaishvili v. Georgia, 2009, § 57);  the applicant was apprehended as a witness - although the investigator's real intent was to charge him as a defendant - in order to change the venue of the detention proceedings to a more convenient one ( Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 142). ▪ Article 6: In Jordan v. the United Kingdom, 2004, criminal proceedings against the applicant were stayed on health grounds, providing, inter alia, that he did not engage in any activities either political, social or personal, which would demonstrate that he was in fact able to stand trial irrespective of his medical condition. The Court examined whether this condition was an instance of a prohibition on political activity ""in return"" f or the dropping of criminal charges. In Nikëhasani v. Albania, 2022, the Court examined various complaints of a prosecutor who had been dismissed due to serious doubts as to her financial propriety based on findings of a vetting process. The Court, in particular, rejected her allegation that the manner in which the vetting proceedings had been conducted pursued an ulterior purpose of persecuting her for, essentially, her husband's political views or activities (§ 77). ▪ Article 10: In NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], 2022, the Court examined, inter alia, whether the revocation of the broadcasting licence of a TVchannel after a breach of the statutory requirement of political pluralism had sought to hinder it from expressing critical views of the government, or had pursued any other ulterior purpose (§ 222). ▪ Article 11: In The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden - PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 2), 2011, the Court examined whether a refusal to register the applicant party sought to penalise it on account of the views or policies it promoted (§§ 85-89). ▪ Article 14 in conjunction with Article 11: In Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007, the Court examined whether the refusal to allow a protest march against homophobia was influenced by the mayor's publicly expressed homophobic opinions (§§ 97 and 100).","Allegations of improper motives or ulterior purposes underlying restrictions of Convention rights are sometimes raised and examined under substantive provisions of the Convention. ▪ Article 5 § 1: If there is some manifest irregularity which, seen in context, shows that a deprivation of liberty was chiefly meant for an ulterior purpose, the Court finds an absence of a legitimate ground for the deprivation of liberty and accordingly a breach of Article 5 § 1. Such was the case where:  the applicants were detained on vague or fabricated charges or their detention was extended in order to prevent or punish their participation in rallies ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, §§ 52-57; Hakobyan and Others v. Armenia, 2012, § 123; Nemtsov v. Russia, 2014, § 103; Gafgaz Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2015, §§ 107-108; Kasparov v. Russia, 2016, §§ 50-56; Huseynli and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2016, §§ 146-147; Ibrahimov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2016, §§ 126-127; Navalnyy and Yashin v. Russia, 2014, §§ 92-95);  the authorities manipulated procedures to delay having to obtain judicial authorisation for the detention, as required under domestic law ( Oleksiy Mykhaylovych Zakharkin v. Ukraine, 2010, §§ 86-88), or in order to proceed with a disguised extradition ( Bozano v. France, 1986, §§ 59-60; Nowak v. Ukraine, 2011, § 58; Azimov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 163 and 165; Eshonkulov v. Russia, 2015, § 65);  the applicant was illegally abducted and surrendered to another State ( Iskandarov v. Russia, 2010, §§ 109-115 and 148-151);  the authorities summoned asylum-seekers to complete their asylum request, thereby seeking to gain their trust with a view to arresting and subsequently deporting them ( Čonka v. Belgium, 2002, § 41);  citizens of another State were indiscriminately arrested with a view to being deported en masse as a measure of reprisal ( Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], 2014, §§ 185-186);  the applicant was arrested and detained with a view to acquiring leverage over the criminal proceedings against his brother ( Giorgi Nikolaishvili v. Georgia, 2009, § 57);  the applicant was apprehended as a witness - although the investigator's real intent was to charge him as a defendant - in order to change the venue of the detention proceedings to a more convenient one ( Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 142);  the criminal proceedings against the applicant followed the same pattern of misuse of power as the proceedings against other government critics and civil society activists, which the Court had previously found to be in breach of Article 18; the Court relied on this consideration to conclude that the applicant had not been deprived of his liberty on a ""reasonable suspicion"" of having committed a crimin al offence, within the meaning of Article 5 § 1(c) ( Ayyubzade v. Azerbaijan, 2023, §§ 48-54). ▪ Article 6: In Jordan v. the United Kingdom, 2004, criminal proceedings against the applicant were stayed on health grounds, providing, inter alia, that he did not engage in any activities either political, social or personal, which would demonstrate that he was in fact able to stand trial irrespective of his medical condition. The Court examined whether this condition was an instance of a prohibition on political activity ""in return"" for the dropping of criminal charges. In Nikëhasani v. Albania, 2022, the Court examined various complaints of a prosecutor who had been dismissed due to serious doubts as to her financial propriety based on findings of a vetting process. The Court, in particular, rejected her allegation that the manner in which the vetting proceedings had been conducted pursued an ulterior purpose of persecuting her for, essentially, her husband's political views or activities (§ 77). ▪ Article 10: In NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], 2022, the Court examined, inter alia, whether the revocation of the broadcasting licence of a TVchannel after a breach of the statutory requirement of political pluralism had sought to hinder it from expressing critical views of the government, or had pursued any other ulterior purpose (§ 222). ▪ Article 11: In The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden - PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 2), 2011, the Court examined whether a refusal to register the applicant party sought to penalise it on account of the views or policies it promoted (§§ 85-89). ▪ Article 14 in conjunction with Article 11: In Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007, the Court examined whether the refusal to allow a protest march against homophobia was influenced by the mayor's publicly expressed homophobic opinions (§§ 97 and 100)."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20230923100034__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20240217124840__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:6180/15,Ayyubzade v. Azerbaijan,6180/15,added,"Ayyubzade v. Azerbaijan, no. 6180/15, 2 March 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.E,When to apply Article 18,3,27,28,0.9856,"Ayyubzade v. Azerbaijan , 2023",,"Where the parties'submissions under Article 18 are essentially the same as their arguments regarding the alleged interference with the applicant's rights under the relevant substantive provisions of the Convention, the Court has no grounds to conclude that the complaint under Article 18 represents a fundamental aspect of the case ( Razvozzhayev v. Russia and Ukraine and Udaltsov v. Russia, 2019, § 305). Thus, before embarking on the analysis of a complaint under Article 18, the Court will first ascertain whether the crux of it has been already examined under the relevant substantive provision ( Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 204; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), 2020, § 622; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 401; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 103; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 317). Where this has been the case, the Court will generally consider that the complaint under Article 18 does not raise any separate issue ( Navalnyy and Gunko v. Russia, 2020, §§ 96-98; Staykov v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 120-121). The Court may also prefer such a course of action even after having established, in another case brought by the same applicant, a pattern of misuse of power indicative of personal targeting of the applicant concerned ( Navalnyy and Others v. Russia, 2022, § 18). Alternatively, the Court may find no violation of this provision ( Udaltsov v. Russia, 2020, §§ 195-196).","Where the parties'submissions under Article 18 are essentially the same as their arguments regarding the alleged interference with the applicant's rights under the relevant substantive provisions of the Convention, the Court has no grounds to conclude that the complaint under Article 18 represents a fundamental aspect of the case ( Razvozzhayev v. Russia and Ukraine and Udaltsov v. Russia, 2019, § 305). Thus, before embarking on the analysis of a complaint under Article 18, the Court will first ascertain whether the crux of it has been already examined under the relevant substantive provision ( Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 204; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), 2020, § 622; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 401; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 103; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 317). Where this has been the case, the Court will generally consider that the complaint under Article 18 does not raise any separate issue ( Navalnyy and Gunko v. Russia, 2020, §§ 96-98; Staykov v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 120-121). The Court may also prefer such a course of action even after having established, in another case brought by the same applicant, a pattern of misuse of power indicative of personal targeting of the applicant concerned ( Navalnyy and Others v. Russia, 2022, § 18). The Court may also find no separate issue under Article 18 after having established, in its finding under the relevant substantive provision, that the applicant's case followed the same pattern of misuse of power as identified in the Court's previous judgments against the State concerned ( Ayyubzade v. Azerbaijan, 2023, § 60). Alternatively, the Court may find no violation of Article 18 ( Udaltsov v. Russia, 2020, §§ 195-196)."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20230923100034__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20240217124840__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:54003/20,Kogan and Others v. Russia,54003/20,added,"Kogan and Others v. Russia, no. 54003/20, 7 March 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A,The accessory nature of Article 18,3,12,13,0.9968,"Kogan and Others v. Russia , 2023",,"In a similar way to Article 14, Article 18 of the Convention has no independent existence; it can only be applied in conjunction with an Article of the Convention or the Protocols thereto which sets out or qualifies the rights and freedoms that the High Contracting Parties have undertaken to secure to those under their jurisdiction ( Kamma v. the Netherlands, Commission's report, 1974, p. 9; Gusinskiy v. Russia, § 73; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 49; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, § 663; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 105; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 294; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 137; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 153; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 113; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 93; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 116; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 198; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 164; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 84; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 421; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 191; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 306).","In a similar way to Article 14, Article 18 of the Convention has no independent existence; it can only be applied in conjunction with an Article of the Convention or the Protocols thereto which sets out or qualifies the rights and freedoms that the High Contracting Parties have undertaken to secure to those under their jurisdiction ( Kamma v. the Netherlands, Commission's report, 1974, p. 9; Gusinskiy v. Russia, § 73; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 49; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, § 663; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 105; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 294; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 137; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 153; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 113; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 93; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 116; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 198; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 164; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 84; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 421; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 191; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 306; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 67)."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20230923100034__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20240217124840__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:54003/20,Kogan and Others v. Russia,54003/20,added,"Kogan and Others v. Russia, no. 54003/20, 7 March 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B,Applicability of Article 18,3,16,17,0.9955,"Kogan and Others v. Russia , 2023",,"Aviolation of Article 18 can only arise where the right or freedom which has been interfered with is subject to restrictions permitted under the Convention ( Kamma v. the Netherlands, Commission's report, 1974, p. 9; Oates v. Poland (dec.), 2000; Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 73); in other words when it is a qualified right ( Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 265, 271 and 290; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 93; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 116; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 164; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 84; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), 2020, § 620; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 421; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 98; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 193; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 308).","Aviolation of Article 18 can only arise where the right or freedom which has been interfered with is subject to restrictions permitted under the Convention ( Kamma v. the Netherlands, Commission's report, 1974, p. 9; Oates v. Poland (dec.), 2000; Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 73); in other words when it is a qualified right ( Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 265, 271 and 290; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 93; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 116; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 164; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 84; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), 2020, § 620; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 421; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 98; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 193; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 308; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 67)."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20230923100034__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20240217124840__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:54003/20,Kogan and Others v. Russia,54003/20,added,"Kogan and Others v. Russia, no. 54003/20, 7 March 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C,Examples of application of Article 18 in conjunction with other substantive provisions,3,20,21,0.9997,"Kogan and Others v. Russia , 2023",,"The Convention organs have examined complaints under Article 18 in conjunction with the provisions listed below: ▪ Article 5 of the Convention: Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 78; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 53; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 110; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 114; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 301; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 144; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 163; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 110; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 318-354; Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), 2007; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 105; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 127; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 86; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 225; Batiashvili v. Georgia, 2019, § 103; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 71; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 158; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 119; and Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 195; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 402; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 235; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 194 ; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 228; Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 135; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 640; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 142; Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 131); ▪ Article 5 § 3 in fine ( Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 80); ▪ Article 6 of the Convention: Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, §§ 105-109; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011, § 16; and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010, §§ 310-314; ▪ Article 8 of the Convention: Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011, § 16; Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010, §§ 310-314; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), 2020, §§ 624-626); Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 136; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 338; ▪ Article 9 of the Convention: C.R. v. Switzerland (dec.), 1999; ▪ Article 10 of the Convention: Şener v. Turkey, 2000, §§ 59-62; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 235; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 194 ; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 214; ▪ Article 11 of the Convention: Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; ▪ Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: Isik v. Turkey, decision Commission, 1995; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, §§ 663-666; Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Rustavi 2 Broadcasting Company Ltd and Others v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 316-317; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 97-98; ▪ Article 2 of Protocol no. 4: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 97-98.","The Convention organs have examined complaints under Article 18 in conjunction with the provisions listed below: ▪ Article 5 of the Convention: Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 78; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 53; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 110; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 114; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 301; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 144; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 163; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 110; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 318-354; Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), 2007; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 105; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 127; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 86; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 225; Batiashvili v. Georgia, 2019, § 103; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 71; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 158; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 119; and Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 195; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 402; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 235; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 194 ; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 228; Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 135; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 640; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 142; Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 131); ▪ Article 5 § 3 in fine ( Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 80); ▪ Article 6 of the Convention: Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, §§ 105-109; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011, § 16; and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010, §§ 310-314; ▪ Article 8 of the Convention: Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011, § 16; Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010, §§ 310-314; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), 2020, §§ 624-626); Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 136; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 338; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 77; ▪ Article 9 of the Convention: C.R. v. Switzerland (dec.), 1999; ▪ Article 10 of the Convention: Şener v. Turkey, 2000, §§ 59-62; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 235; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 194 ; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 214; ▪ Article 11 of the Convention: Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; ▪ Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: Isik v. Turkey, decision Commission, 1995; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, §§ 663-666; Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Rustavi 2 Broadcasting Company Ltd and Others v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 316-317; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 97-98; ▪ Article 2 of Protocol no. 4: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 97-98."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20230923100034__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20240217124840__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:54003/20,Kogan and Others v. Russia,54003/20,added,"Kogan and Others v. Russia, no. 54003/20, 7 March 2023",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C,Examples of application of Article 18 in conjunction with other substantive provisions,3,24,25,0.9987,"Kogan and Others v. Russia , 2023",,"The Court has thus far found a breach of Article 18 in conjunction with: ▪ Article 5 ( Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], § 176; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 99; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 71; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 158; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 120; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 195; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 438; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 640; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 142); ▪ Article 5 § 3 in fine : Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 80; ▪ Article 8 ( Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 338); ▪ Article 10 ( Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 214); ▪ Article 11 ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176) ; ▪ Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 111; ▪ Article 2 of Protocol no. 4: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 111.","The Court has thus far found a breach of Article 18 in conjunction with: ▪ Article 5 ( Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], § 176; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 99; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 71; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 158; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 120; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 195; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 438; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 640; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 142); ▪ Article 5 § 3 in fine : Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 80; ▪ Article 8 ( Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 338; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 78); ▪ Article 10 ( Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 214); ▪ Article 11 ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176) ; ▪ Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 111; ▪ Article 2 of Protocol no. 4: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 111."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20230923100034__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20240217124840__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:54003/20,Kogan and Others v. Russia,54003/20,added,"Kogan and Others v. Russia, no. 54003/20, 7 March 2023",5,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.E,When to apply Article 18,3,26,27,0.9973,"Kogan and Others v. Russia , 2023",,"The mere fact that a restriction of a Convention right or freedom does not meet all the requirements of the clause that permits it does not necessarily raise an issue under Article 18. Separate examination of a complaint under that Article is only warranted if the claim that a restriction has been applied for a purpose not prescribed by the Convention appears to be a fundamental aspect of the case ( Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 291; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 421; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 97; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 120; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 199; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 164; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 92; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 198 ; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 63; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 150; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 112; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 186; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 252; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 211; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 234; Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 68; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 194, 203; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 309).","The mere fact that a restriction of a Convention right or freedom does not meet all the requirements of the clause that permits it does not necessarily raise an issue under Article 18. Separate examination of a complaint under that Article is only warranted if the claim that a restriction has been applied for a purpose not prescribed by the Convention appears to be a fundamental aspect of the case ( Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 291; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 421; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 97; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 120; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 199; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 164; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 92; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 198 ; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 63; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 150; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 112; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 186; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 252; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 211; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 234; Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 68; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 194, 203; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 309, Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 69)."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20230923100034__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20240217124840__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:54003/20,Kogan and Others v. Russia,54003/20,added,"Kogan and Others v. Russia, no. 54003/20, 7 March 2023",6,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.A,The n otion of “ulterior purpose”,3,35,36,0.9994,"Kogan and Others v. Russia , 2023",,"The Court has examined allegations of the following ulterior purposes: ▪ intimidation and putting pressure on the applicant with a view to obtaining information or other advantages ( Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 76; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 53; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 353; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 116 ); ▪ punishing and silencing the applicant and/or impeding his/her activities ( Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), 2007; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 109; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 299; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 143; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 162; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 104; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 125; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 215; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 70; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 157; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 119; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 194; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 249; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 207; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 238; Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 133; Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 79; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 110; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 213; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 141; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 337); ▪ political and/or economic motivation behind criminal prosecution and other relevant proceedings ( Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, § 665; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, § 889; Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, § 109; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 114; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 332; Batiashvili v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 101-103; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 203; Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 130; Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 123); ▪ suppression of political pluralism and limiting freedom of political debate ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC],2018, § 175; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 98; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 437; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, § 639).","The Court has examined allegations of the following ulterior purposes: ▪ intimidation and putting pressure on the applicant with a view to obtaining information or other advantages ( Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 76; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 53; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 353; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 116 ); ▪ punishing and silencing the applicant and/or impeding his/her activities ( Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), 2007; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 109; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 299; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 143; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 162; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 104; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 125; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 215; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 70; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 157; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 119; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 194; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 249; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 207; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 238; Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 133; Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 79; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 110; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 213; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 141; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 337; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 77); ▪ political and/or economic motivation behind criminal prosecution and other relevant proceedings ( Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, § 665; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, § 889; Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, § 109; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 114; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 332; Batiashvili v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 101-103; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 203; Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 130; Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 123); ▪ suppression of political pluralism and limiting freedom of political debate ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC],2018, § 175; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 98; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 437; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, § 639)."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20230923100034__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20240217124840__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:54003/20,Kogan and Others v. Russia,54003/20,added,"Kogan and Others v. Russia, no. 54003/20, 7 March 2023",7,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.B.§4,Single purpose and plurality of purposes,4,40,41,0.9867,"Kogan and Others v. Russia , 2023",,"Similarly, in Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, in view of its finding as to the unlawfulness of the impugned interference, the Court did not consider it necessary to examine the question of whether it had pursued a legitimate aim under Article 8 taken alone. However, for the purposes of its examination of the applicant's complaint under Article 18 in conjunction with Article 8, the Court was prepared to assume that the measures against the applicant had pursued the legitimate aim relied upon by the Government. The Court therefore proceeded on the basis of the plurality of purposes ( Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, §§ 318-321).","Similarly, in Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, in view of its finding as to the unlawfulness of the impugned interference, the Court did not consider it necessary to examine the question of whether it had pursued a legitimate aim under Article 8 taken alone. However, for the purposes of its examination of the applicant's complaint under Article 18 in conjunction with Article 8, the Court was prepared to assume that the measures against the applicant had pursued the legitimate aim relied upon by the Government. The Court therefore proceeded on the basis of the plurality of purposes ( Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, §§ 318-321; see also Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 59 and 77)."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20230923100034__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20240217124840__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:54003/20,Kogan and Others v. Russia,54003/20,added,"Kogan and Others v. Russia, no. 54003/20, 7 March 2023",8,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.D.§4,Cases not concerning an established pattern of misuse of power,4,,89,,"In Kogan and Others v. Russia , 2023|Kogan and Others v. Russia , 2023",,,"In Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, the Court found a violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 8 on account of the unjustified revocation, on undisclosed national security grounds, of a residence permit of a prominent human rights defender. In view of several indications of the pressure on the applicant lawyers in connection with their work, the Court concluded that the predominant purpose of that measure was to punish them for, and prevent them from continuing, their human rights activities in Russia ( Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 77)."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20230923100034__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20240217124840__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:54003/20,Kogan and Others v. Russia,54003/20,added,"Kogan and Others v. Russia, no. 54003/20, 7 March 2023",9,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.A,General evidentiary standards,3,98,100,0.9973,"Kogan and Others v. Russia , 2023",,"The Court will not restrict itself to direct proof in relation to complaints under Article 18 or apply a special standard of proof to such allegations ( Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 282 and 310; contrast Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 260; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 116; Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, § 109; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, § 603; Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, § 899; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 98; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 120; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 204; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 165; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 215; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 422; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 237). Indeed, depending on the circumstances of the case, an ulterior purpose cannot always be proved by pointing to a particularly inculpatory piece of evidence, which clearly reveals an actual reason behind the authorities'action (for example, a written document as in Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004), or a specific isolated incident ( Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 132), or the fact that the applicant was interviewed in connection with events not related to the ongoing criminal case ( Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 125; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 222).","The Court will not restrict itself to direct proof in relation to complaints under Article 18 or apply a special standard of proof to such allegations ( Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 282 and 310; contrast Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 260; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 116; Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, § 109; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, § 603; Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, § 899; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 98; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 120; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 204; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 165; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 215; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 422; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 237; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 68). Indeed, depending on the circumstances of the case, an ulterior purpose cannot always be proved by pointing to a particularly inculpatory piece of evidence, which clearly reveals an actual reason behind the authorities'action (for example, a written document as in Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004), or a specific isolated incident ( Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 132), or the fact that the applicant was interviewed in connection with events not related to the ongoing criminal case ( Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 125; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 222)."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20230923100034__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20240217124840__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:54003/20,Kogan and Others v. Russia,54003/20,added,"Kogan and Others v. Russia, no. 54003/20, 7 March 2023",10,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.A,General evidentiary standards,3,99,101,0.9836,"Kogan and Others v. Russia , 2023",,"Finally, circumstantial evidence in this context means information about the primary facts, or contextual facts or sequences of events which can form the basis for inferences about the primary facts ( Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 142; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 158; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 317; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 215; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 422; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 202; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 316).","Finally, circumstantial evidence in this context means information about the primary facts, or contextual facts or sequences of events which can form the basis for inferences about the primary facts ( Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 142; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 158; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 317; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 215; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 422; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 202; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 316; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 68)."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20230923100034__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20240217124840__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:54003/20,Kogan and Others v. Russia,54003/20,added,"Kogan and Others v. Russia, no. 54003/20, 7 March 2023",11,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.A,General evidentiary standards,3,103,105,0.9932,"Kogan and Others v. Russia , 2023",,"Reports or statements by international observers, non-governmental organisations or the media, or the decisions of other national or international courts are often taken into account, in particular, to shed light on the facts, or to corroborate findings made by the Court ( Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 148; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 317; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 95; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 118; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 205; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 165; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 215; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, §§ 422, 424 and 434; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 202; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 139; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 316).","Reports or statements by international observers, non-governmental organisations or the media, or the decisions of other national or international courts are often taken into account, in particular, to shed light on the facts, or to corroborate findings made by the Court ( Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 148; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 317; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 95; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 118; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 205; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 165; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 215; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, §§ 422, 424 and 434; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 202; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 139; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 316; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 68)."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20230923100034__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20240217124840__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:54003/20,Kogan and Others v. Russia,54003/20,added,"Kogan and Others v. Russia, no. 54003/20, 7 March 2023",12,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.C,Allegations of political purposes,3,,121,,"Kogan and Others v. Russia , 2023",,,"In this context, the Court takes into account indications of pressure on the part of the authorities and/or State-supported media in connection with the applicant's status and activities. The Court further examines the relevant proceedings in order to establish whether procedural defects taken together are indicative of an ulterior purpose behind the contested measure. The Court also relies on the overall context and the political and social climate concerning the relevant group or category of actors ( Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 71-76)."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20230923100034__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20240217124840__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:54003/20,Kogan and Others v. Russia,54003/20,added,"Kogan and Others v. Russia, no. 54003/20, 7 March 2023",13,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.C,Allegations of political purposes,3,118,120,0.9966,"Kogan and Others v. Russia , 2023",,"The Court has regard to the applicant's specific status and activities ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 174; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, §§ 208; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 231; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 66; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 153; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 115; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 189; and Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 257; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 424; Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 73; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 138). At the same time, the absence of a particular political status, such as that of an opposition leader or a public official, does not rule out political motivation behind the contested measures. The Court has established political purposes in cases concerning detention of well-known civil society activists and NGOleaders, critical of elections or involved in protests against the government ( Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 103, and Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 124).","The Court has regard to the applicant's specific status and activities ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 174; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, §§ 208; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 231; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 66; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 153; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 115; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 189; and Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 257; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 424; Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 73; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 138; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 70). At the same time, the absence of a particular political status, such as that of an opposition leader or a public official, does not rule out political motivation behind the contested measures. The Court has established political purposes in cases concerning detention of well-known civil society activists and NGOleaders, critical of elections or involved in protests against the government ( Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 103, and Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 124)."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20230923100034__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20240217124840__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:54003/20,Kogan and Others v. Russia,54003/20,added,"Kogan and Others v. Russia, no. 54003/20, 7 March 2023",14,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.D.a,Cases not concerning an established pattern of misuse of power,4,,144,,"In Kogan and Others v. Russia , 2023",,,"In Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, the Court concluded that when revoking a residence permit, the authorities had predominantly pursued the purpose of punishing the applicant lawyers for, and preventing them from, continuing their human rights activities in Russia. The Court particularly focussed on the indications of pressure and hostility in connection with the applicants'work: strong negative bias on the part of State-supported media outlets; the authorities'lack of action in response to threats received by the applicants; as well as contacts with a representative of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and law-enforcement activities directed at the NGOheaded by one of the applicants and its partner organisations. Further, the identified procedural defects taken together indicated that the applicant concerned by the revocation decision had faced an insurmountable obstacle to challenge it, which revealed the authorities'intent to deprive her of the legal grounds to remain in Russia. Seen against the background of the overall hostile context in which civil society actors had been operating in the past years in Russia, the established ulterior purpose went clearly against the values of the Convention and was of particular gravity, given the prominent role of human rights defenders in a democratic society. The Court therefore found a violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 8 (§§ 70-78)."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20240217124840__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20240409183922__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-04-09,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2024-02-17__2024-04-09.json,apps:13668/21,Melia v. Georgia,13668/21,added,"Melia v. Georgia, no. 13668/21, 7 September 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C,Examples of application of Article 18 in conjunction with other substantive provisions,3,21,21,0.9998,"Melia v. Georgia , 2023",,"The Convention organs have examined complaints under Article 18 in conjunction with the provisions listed below: ▪ Article 5 of the Convention: Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 78; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 53; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 110; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 114; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 301; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 144; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 163; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 110; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 318-354; Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), 2007; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 105; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 127; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 86; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 225; Batiashvili v. Georgia, 2019, § 103; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 71; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 158; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 119; and Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 195; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 402; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 235; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 194 ; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 228; Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 135; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 640; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 142; Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 131); ▪ Article 5 § 3 in fine ( Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 80); ▪ Article 6 of the Convention: Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, §§ 105-109; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011, § 16; and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010, §§ 310-314; ▪ Article 8 of the Convention: Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011, § 16; Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010, §§ 310-314; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), 2020, §§ 624-626); Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 136; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 338; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 77; ▪ Article 9 of the Convention: C.R. v. Switzerland (dec.), 1999; ▪ Article 10 of the Convention: Şener v. Turkey, 2000, §§ 59-62; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 235; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 194 ; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 214; ▪ Article 11 of the Convention: Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; ▪ Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: Isik v. Turkey, decision Commission, 1995; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, §§ 663-666; Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Rustavi 2 Broadcasting Company Ltd and Others v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 316-317; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 97-98; ▪ Article 2 of Protocol no. 4: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 97-98.","The Convention organs have examined complaints under Article 18 in conjunction with the provisions listed below: ▪ Article 5 of the Convention: Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 78; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 53; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 110; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 114; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 301; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 144; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 163; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 110; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 318-354; Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), 2007; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 105; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 127; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 86; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 225; Batiashvili v. Georgia, 2019, § 103; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 71; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 158; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 119; and Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 195; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 402; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 235; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 194 ; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 228; Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 135; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 640; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 142; Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 131; Melia v. Georgia, 2023, § 144); ▪ Article 5 § 3 in fine ( Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 80); ▪ Article 6 of the Convention: Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, §§ 105-109; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011, § 16; and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010, §§ 310-314; ▪ Article 8 of the Convention: Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011, § 16; Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010, §§ 310-314; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), 2020, §§ 624-626); Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 136; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 338; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 77; ▪ Article 9 of the Convention: C.R. v. Switzerland (dec.), 1999; ▪ Article 10 of the Convention: Şener v. Turkey, 2000, §§ 59-62; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 235; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 194 ; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 214; ▪ Article 11 of the Convention: Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; ▪ Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: Isik v. Turkey, decision Commission, 1995; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, §§ 663-666; Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Rustavi 2 Broadcasting Company Ltd and Others v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 316-317; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 97-98; ▪ Article 2 of Protocol no. 4: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 97-98."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20240217124840__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20240409183922__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-04-09,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2024-02-17__2024-04-09.json,apps:13668/21,Melia v. Georgia,13668/21,added,"Melia v. Georgia, no. 13668/21, 7 September 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.A,The notion of “ulterior purpose”,3,36,36,0.9996,"Melia v. Georgia , 2023",,"The Court has examined allegations of the following ulterior purposes: ▪ intimidation and putting pressure on the applicant with a view to obtaining information or other advantages ( Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 76; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 53; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 353; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 116 ); ▪ punishing and silencing the applicant and/or impeding his/her activities ( Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), 2007; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 109; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 299; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 143; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 162; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 104; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 125; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 215; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 70; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 157; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 119; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 194; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 249; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 207; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 238; Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 133; Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 79; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 110; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 213; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 141; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 337; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 77); ▪ political and/or economic motivation behind criminal prosecution and other relevant proceedings ( Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, § 665; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, § 889; Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, § 109; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 114; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 332; Batiashvili v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 101-103; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 203; Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 130; Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 123); ▪ suppression of political pluralism and limiting freedom of political debate ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC],2018, § 175; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 98; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 437; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, § 639).","The Court has examined allegations of the following ulterior purposes: ▪ intimidation and putting pressure on the applicant with a view to obtaining information or other advantages ( Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 76; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 53; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 353; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 116 ); ▪ punishing and silencing the applicant and/or impeding his/her activities ( Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), 2007; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 109; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 299; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 143; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 162; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 104; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 125; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 215; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 70; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 157; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 119; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 194; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 249; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 207; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 238; Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 133; Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 79; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 110; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 213; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 141; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 337; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 77); ▪ political and/or economic motivation behind criminal prosecution and other relevant proceedings ( Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, § 665; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, § 889; Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, § 109; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 114; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 332; Batiashvili v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 101-103; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 203; Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 130; Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 123; Melia v. Georgia, 2023, § 137); ▪ suppression of political pluralism and limiting freedom of political debate ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC],2018, § 175; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 98; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 437; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, § 639)."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20240217124840__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20240409183922__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-04-09,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2024-02-17__2024-04-09.json,apps:13668/21,Melia v. Georgia,13668/21,added,"Melia v. Georgia, no. 13668/21, 7 September 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.A,General evidentiary standards,3,108,108,0.997,"Melia v. Georgia , 2023",,"The political process and adjudicative process being fundamentally different, the Court will base its decision on ""evidence in the legal sense"", in accordance with the above criteria ( Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 310-317) and its own assessment of the specific relevant facts (see Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 217; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 259; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 140; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 155; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 250; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 209; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 238; Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 123). In this connection, it will consider whether the elements relied upon by the applicant, taken separately or in combination with each other, form a sufficiently homogeneous whole ( Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 256; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 218; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 246).","The political process and adjudicative process being fundamentally different, the Court will base its decision on ""evidence in the legal sense"", in accordance with the above criteria ( Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 310-317) and its own assessment of the specific relevant facts (see Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 217; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 259; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 140; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 155; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 250; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 209; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 238; Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 123; Melia v. Georgia, 2023, § 140). In this connection, it will consider whether the elements relied upon by the applicant, taken separately or in combination with each other, form a sufficiently homogeneous whole ( Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 256; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 218; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 246)."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20240217124840__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20240409183922__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-04-09,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2024-02-17__2024-04-09.json,apps:13668/21,Melia v. Georgia,13668/21,added,"Melia v. Georgia, no. 13668/21, 7 September 2023",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.C,Allegations of political purposes,3,118,118,0.989,"Melia v. Georgia , 2023",,"The mere fact that a politician is criminally prosecuted, even during an electoral campaign or a referendum, is not automatically in breach of his/her right to run for office; nor does it automatically indicate that the aim pursued is to restrict political debate (and Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 424; Uspaskich v. Lithuania, 2016, §§ 90-100). There is no right as such under the Convention not to be criminally prosecuted ( Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 320).","The mere fact that a politician is criminally prosecuted, even during an electoral campaign or a referendum, is not automatically in breach of his/her right to run for office; nor does it automatically indicate that the aim pursued is to restrict political debate (and Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 424; Uspaskich v. Lithuania, 2016, §§ 90-100). There is no right as such under the Convention not to be criminally prosecuted ( Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 320; Melia v. Georgia, 2023, § 135)."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20240217124840__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20240409183922__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-04-09,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2024-02-17__2024-04-09.json,apps:13668/21,Melia v. Georgia,13668/21,added,"Melia v. Georgia, no. 13668/21, 7 September 2023",5,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,IV.C,Allegations of political purposes,3,119,119,0.7804,"Melia v. Georgia , 2023",,"The fact that the applicant does not stand as a candidate for election may render less convincing his argument concerning a possible link between the restrictions imposed on him and the upcoming elections ( Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 126).","The fact that the applicant does not stand as a candidate for election may render less convincing his argument concerning a possible link between the restrictions imposed on him and the upcoming elections ( Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 126). The domestic authorities' decis ions, to suspend the criminal proceedings against the applicant in order to allow him to participate properly in the parliamentary elections and to return his identity documents for that purpose, were also taken into account in the examination of the appli cant's allegation that the authorities had wished to remove him from the political scene ( Melia v. Georgia, 2023, § 137)."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20240217124840__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20240409183922__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-04-09,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2024-02-17__2024-04-09.json,apps:13668/21,Melia v. Georgia,13668/21,added,"Melia v. Georgia, no. 13668/21, 7 September 2023",6,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.E,Unsubstantiated complaints,3,,173,,"In Melia v. Georgia , 2023",,,"In Melia v. Georgia, 2023, the applicant, an opposition politician and member of Parliament, was prosecuted for his involvement in the escalation of demonstrations in front of the Parliament building and was subsequently remanded in custody following his refusal to pay the amount of bail. Referring to the conditions in which criminal proceedings had been instituted against him and his pre-trial detention had been ordered, he claimed that the ulterior purpose behind his detention had been to remove him from the political scene. However, despite the political tensions and the particular context of the applicant's pre -trial detention, having regard to all the arguments submitted by the applicant, the Court did not find that the applicant's detention pursued a purpose not prescribed by the Convention. The Court therefore found no violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5 § 1 (§§ 135-144)."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20240409183922__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20250403142625__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-04-03,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2024-04-09__2025-04-03.json,apps:11027/22,Kezerashvili v. Georgia,11027/22,added,"Kezerashvili v. Georgia, no. 11027/22, 5 December 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C,Examples of application of Article 18 in conjunction with other substantive provisions,3,21,21,0.9896,"Kezerashvili v. Georgia , 2024",,"The Convention organs have examined complaints under Article 18 in conjunction with the provisions listed below: ▪ Article 5 of the Convention: Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 78; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 53; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 110; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 114; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 301; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 144; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 163; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 110; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 318-354; Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), 2007; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 105; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 127; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 86; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 225; Batiashvili v. Georgia, 2019, § 103; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 71; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 158; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 119; and Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 195; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 402; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 235; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 194 ; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 228; Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 135; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 640; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 142; Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 131; Melia v. Georgia, 2023, § 144); ▪ Article 5 § 3 in fine ( Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 80); ▪ Article 6 of the Convention: Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, §§ 105-109; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011, § 16; and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010, §§ 310-314; ▪ Article 8 of the Convention: Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011, § 16; Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010, §§ 310-314; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), 2020, §§ 624-626); Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 136; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 338; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 77; ▪ Article 9 of the Convention: C.R. v. Switzerland (dec.), 1999; ▪ Article 10 of the Convention: Şener v. Turkey, 2000, §§ 59-62; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 235; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 194 ; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 214; ▪ Article 11 of the Convention: Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; ▪ Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: Isik v. Turkey, decision Commission, 1995; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, §§ 663-666; Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Rustavi 2 Broadcasting Company Ltd and Others v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 316-317; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 97-98; ▪ Article 2 of Protocol no. 4: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 97-98.","The Convention organs have examined complaints under Article 18 in conjunction with the provisions listed below: ▪ Article 5 of the Convention: Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 78; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 53; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 110; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 114; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 301; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 144; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 163; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 110; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 318-354; Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), 2007; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 105; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 127; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 86; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 225; Batiashvili v. Georgia, 2019, § 103; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 71; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 158; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 119; and Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 195; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 402; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 235; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 194 ; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 228; Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 135; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 640; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 142; Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 131; Melia v. Georgia, 2023, § 144; Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], 2024, § 1341; ▪ Article 5 § 3 of the Convention: Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 80; ▪ Article 6 of the Convention: Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, §§ 105-109; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011, § 16; and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010, §§ 310-314; Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], 2024, § 1341; Kezerashvili v. Georgia, 2024, § 128; ▪ Article 8 of the Convention: Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011, § 16; Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010, §§ 310-314; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), 2020, §§ 624-626; Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 136; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 338; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 77; Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], 2024, § 1341; ▪ Article 9 of the Convention: C.R. v. Switzerland (dec.), 1999; ▪ Article 10 of the Convention: Şener v. Turkey, 2000, §§ 59-62; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 235; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 194 ; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 214; Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], 2024 § 1341; ▪ Article 11 of the Convention: Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], 2024, § 1341; ▪ Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: Isik v. Turkey, decision Commission, 1995; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, §§ 663-666; Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Rustavi 2 Broadcasting Company Ltd and Others v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 316-317; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 97-98; ▪ Article 2 of Protocol no. 4: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 97-98."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20240409183922__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20250403142625__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-04-03,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2024-04-09__2025-04-03.json,apps:11027/22,Kezerashvili v. Georgia,11027/22,added,"Kezerashvili v. Georgia, no. 11027/22, 5 December 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,IV.C,Allegations of political purposes,3,117,119,0.6893,"Kezerashvili v. Georgia , 2024",,"Although criminal prosecutions initiated against politicians and high-ranking officials after a change of power could suggest a wish to eliminate or harm them or their political parties, they could equally reflect a desire to deal with alleged wrongdoings under a previous government whose members could not be held to account while in power ( Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 323; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, § 903).","Although criminal prosecutions initiated against politicians and high-ranking officials after a change of power could suggest a wish to eliminate or harm them or their political parties, they could equally reflect a desire to deal with alleged wrongdoings under a previous government whose members could not be held to account while in power ( Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 323; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, § 903). Moreover, the fact that Interpol deleted all data relating to the applicant and that the competent courts of other States dismissed extradition requests in respect of the applicant on the basis, inter alia, that the criminal prosecutions against him were politically motivated, does not necessarily determine the Court's assessment since the extradition courts were essentially assessing a future risk, whereas the Court is concerned with past facts ( Kezerashvili v. Georgia, 2024, § 129)."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20240409183922__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20250403142625__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-04-03,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2024-04-09__2025-04-03.json,apps:11027/22,Kezerashvili v. Georgia,11027/22,added,"Kezerashvili v. Georgia, no. 11027/22, 5 December 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.E,Unsubstantiated complaints,3,,176,,"In Kezerashvili v. Georgia , 2024",,,"In Kezerashvili v. Georgia, 2024, the applicant, a founding member of an opposition party and former Minister of Defence, was convicted in absentia of embezzlement by a final judgment of the Supreme Court which partially overturned his acquittal by the lower courts . Referring to the nature of the statements of the Prime Minister in Parliament and the close timing between those statements and the consideration of his case by the Supreme Court, along with links with the ruling party of one of the Supreme Court's judges sitting in the examination of his case, the applicant claimed that his criminal conviction had been the result of political considerations. However, the Court held that in the absence of evidence, in the legal sense, that the judicial authority had not been sufficiently independent from the executive authorities, the Prime Minister's political statements in the context of heated parliamentary debates could not, as such, lead to the conclusion that the courts had been driven by the ulterior purpose of removing the applicant from the political scene. The Court also found that the relative closeness in time between the impugned statements and the Supreme Court's judgment was an insufficient basis for finding that there had been an ulterior purpose behind the applicant's conviction. Accordingly, the Court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to substantiate the applicant's allegation of an ulterior motive behind his prosecution and conviction (§§ 132-133)."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20240409183922__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20250403142625__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-04-03,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2024-04-09__2025-04-03.json,apps:20958/14|38334/18,Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC],20958/14|38334/18,added,"Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, 25 June 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,II.B,Applicability of Article 18,3,20,20,0.7677,,"Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan , 2014|Kavala v. Turkey , 2019|Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia , 2013|Navalnyy and Ofitserov v. Russia , 2016|Navalnyye v. Russia , 2017|Nevzlin v. Russia , 2022","The question whether Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention contain any express or implied restrictions which may form the subject of the Court's examination under Article 18 of the Convention remains open ( Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2017, § 261). Compare, for example, ▪ Navalnyy and Ofitserov v. Russia, 2016 (§ 129), and Navalnyye v. Russia, 2017 (§ 88), where, in the circumstances relevant to those cases, the Court rejected as incompatible ratione materiae complaints under Article 18 read in conjunction with Articles 6 and 7 as these provisions did not contain any express or implied restrictions in so far as relevant to those cases; ▪ Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014 (§§ 105-109), where the Court rejected as manifestly ill- founded a complaint under Article 18 read in conjunction with Article 6; ▪ Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011 (§ 16) and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010 (§§ 310-314), where the Court declared admissible the applicants'complaints under Article 18 read in conjunction with Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 and subsequently, having examined the merits of those complaints in the judgment of Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 897-909, found no violation of Article 18. By reference to the latter judgment, the Court dismissed as manifestly ill-founded the complaint under Article 18 taken in conjunction with Article 6 brought by another Yukos shareholder ( Nevzlin v. Russia, 2022, §§ 124-125); ▪ Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (infringement proceedings) [GC], 2019 (§§ 189 and 208) and Kavala v. Türkiye (infringement proceedings) [GC], 2022 (§§ 145-146 and 151), where the Court considered that its findings of a violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5 in the respective initial judgments ( Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014 and Kavala v. Turkey, 2019) vitiated any later actions resulting from the pursuit of the abusive criminal charges, including the applicants'conviction and prison sentence; ▪ In Saakashvili v. Georgia (dec.), 2022, the Court joined to the merits the question of the applicability of Article 18 in conjunction with Articles 6 and 7 (§§ 60-61).","Following a period of uncertainty as to whether Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention contain express or implied restrictions which may form the subject of the Court's examination under Article 18 of the Conventionthe Court clarified the question in Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC]It held that the object and purpose of Article 18, as described by the travaux préparatoires, do not support a narrow application of Article 18, for example only in relation to Articles which expressly provide for restrictions. It can therefore be applied in conjunction with other Articles of the Convention which contain inherent restrictions. By contrast, it will not be applicable in conjunction with absolute rights which do not allow such limitations ( Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], 2024, § 1335). In that connection, the Court considered that Article 6 of the Convention allows for both explicit and implicit restrictions and that the rights protected under Article 6 are guarantees through which fundamental abuses by a State may be likely to manifest themselves. Therefore, Article 18 is capable of applying in conjunction with Article 6 of the Convention (Ibid. §§ 1337-1338). However, given the non-derogable nature of the rights guaranteed under Article 7, the Court considered that Article 18 of the Convention cannot apply in conjunction with it (Ibdid. §§ 1339-1340)."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20240409183922__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20250403142625__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-04-03,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2024-04-09__2025-04-03.json,apps:20958/14|38334/18,Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC],20958/14|38334/18,added,"Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, 25 June 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C,Examples of application of Article 18 in conjunction with other substantive provisions,3,21,21,0.9896,"Kezerashvili v. Georgia , 2024",,"The Convention organs have examined complaints under Article 18 in conjunction with the provisions listed below: ▪ Article 5 of the Convention: Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 78; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 53; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 110; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 114; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 301; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 144; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 163; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 110; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 318-354; Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), 2007; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 105; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 127; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 86; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 225; Batiashvili v. Georgia, 2019, § 103; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 71; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 158; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 119; and Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 195; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 402; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 235; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 194 ; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 228; Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 135; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 640; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 142; Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 131; Melia v. Georgia, 2023, § 144); ▪ Article 5 § 3 in fine ( Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 80); ▪ Article 6 of the Convention: Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, §§ 105-109; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011, § 16; and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010, §§ 310-314; ▪ Article 8 of the Convention: Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011, § 16; Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010, §§ 310-314; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), 2020, §§ 624-626); Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 136; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 338; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 77; ▪ Article 9 of the Convention: C.R. v. Switzerland (dec.), 1999; ▪ Article 10 of the Convention: Şener v. Turkey, 2000, §§ 59-62; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 235; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 194 ; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 214; ▪ Article 11 of the Convention: Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; ▪ Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: Isik v. Turkey, decision Commission, 1995; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, §§ 663-666; Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Rustavi 2 Broadcasting Company Ltd and Others v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 316-317; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 97-98; ▪ Article 2 of Protocol no. 4: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 97-98.","The Convention organs have examined complaints under Article 18 in conjunction with the provisions listed below: ▪ Article 5 of the Convention: Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 78; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 53; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 110; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 114; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 301; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 144; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 163; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 110; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, §§ 318-354; Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), 2007; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 105; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 127; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 86; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 225; Batiashvili v. Georgia, 2019, § 103; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 71; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 158; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 119; and Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 195; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 402; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 235; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 194 ; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 228; Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 135; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 640; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 142; Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 131; Melia v. Georgia, 2023, § 144; Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], 2024, § 1341; ▪ Article 5 § 3 of the Convention: Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 80; ▪ Article 6 of the Convention: Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, §§ 105-109; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011, § 16; and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010, §§ 310-314; Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], 2024, § 1341; Kezerashvili v. Georgia, 2024, § 128; ▪ Article 8 of the Convention: Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2011, § 16; Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), 2010, §§ 310-314; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), 2020, §§ 624-626; Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 136; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 338; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 77; Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], 2024, § 1341; ▪ Article 9 of the Convention: C.R. v. Switzerland (dec.), 1999; ▪ Article 10 of the Convention: Şener v. Turkey, 2000, §§ 59-62; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 235; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 194 ; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 214; Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], 2024 § 1341; ▪ Article 11 of the Convention: Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], 2024, § 1341; ▪ Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: Isik v. Turkey, decision Commission, 1995; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, §§ 663-666; Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 73; Rustavi 2 Broadcasting Company Ltd and Others v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 316-317; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 97-98; ▪ Article 2 of Protocol no. 4: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 97-98."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20240409183922__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20250403142625__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-04-03,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2024-04-09__2025-04-03.json,apps:20958/14|38334/18,Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC],20958/14|38334/18,added,"Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, 25 June 2024",3,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.C,Examples of application of Article 18 in conjunction with other substantive provisions,3,25,25,0.9443,,,"The Court has thus far found a breach of Article 18 in conjunction with: ▪ Article 5 ( Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], § 176; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 99; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 71; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 158; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 120; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 195; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 438; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 640; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 142); ▪ Article 5 § 3 in fine : Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 80; ▪ Article 8 ( Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 338; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 78); ▪ Article 10 ( Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 214); ▪ Article 11 ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176) ; ▪ Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 111; ▪ Article 2 of Protocol no. 4: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 111.","The Court has thus far found a breach of Article 18 in conjunction with: ▪ Article 5 of the Convention: Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 78; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 53; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 110; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 301; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 144; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 163; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 354; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 105; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 127; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], § 176; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 99; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 71; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 158; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 120; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 195; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 438; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 640; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 142; Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], 2024, § 1382; ▪ Article 5 § 3 of the Convention: Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 80; ▪ Article 6 of the Convention: Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], 2024, § 1382; ▪ Article 8 of the Convention: Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 216; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 338; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 78; Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], 2024, § 1382; ▪ Article 10 of the Convention: Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 214; Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], 2024, § 1382; ▪ Article 11 of the Convention: Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 176; Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], 2024, § 1382; ▪ Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 111; ▪ Article 2 of Protocol no. 4: Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 111."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20240409183922__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20250403142625__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-04-03,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2024-04-09__2025-04-03.json,apps:20958/14|38334/18,Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC],20958/14|38334/18,added,"Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, 25 June 2024",4,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.A,The notion of “ulterior purpose”,3,36,36,0.9991,,,"The Court has examined allegations of the following ulterior purposes: ▪ intimidation and putting pressure on the applicant with a view to obtaining information or other advantages ( Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 76; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 53; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 353; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 116 ); ▪ punishing and silencing the applicant and/or impeding his/her activities ( Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), 2007; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 109; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 299; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 143; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 162; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 104; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 125; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 215; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 70; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 157; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 119; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 194; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 249; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 207; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 238; Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 133; Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 79; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 110; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 213; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 141; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 337; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 77); ▪ political and/or economic motivation behind criminal prosecution and other relevant proceedings ( Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, § 665; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, § 889; Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, § 109; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 114; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 332; Batiashvili v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 101-103; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 203; Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 130; Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 123; Melia v. Georgia, 2023, § 137); ▪ suppression of political pluralism and limiting freedom of political debate ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC],2018, § 175; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 98; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 437; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, § 639).","The Court has examined allegations of the following ulterior purposes: ▪ intimidation and putting pressure on the applicant with a view to obtaining information or other advantages ( Gusinskiy v. Russia, 2004, § 76; Cebotari v. Moldova, 2007, § 53; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 353; Dochnal v. Poland, 2012, § 116 ); ▪ punishing and silencing the applicant and/or impeding his/her activities ( Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), 2007; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, 2012, § 109; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 299; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 143; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 162; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 104; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 125; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 215; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 70; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 232; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 157; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 119; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, § 194; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 249; Şık v. Turkey (no. 2), 2020, § 207; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, § 238; Mirgadirov v. Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2020, § 133; Azizov and Novruzlu v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 79; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 110; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 213; Kutayev v. Russia, 2023, § 141; Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 337; Kogan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 77); ▪ political and/or economic motivation behind criminal prosecution and other relevant proceedings ( Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 2011, § 254; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 2011, § 665; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, § 889; Nastase v. Romania (dec.), 2014, § 109; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, 2016, § 114; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 332; Batiashvili v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 101-103; Korban v. Ukraine, 2019, § 203; Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 130; Ugulava v. Georgia, 2023, § 123; Melia v. Georgia, 2023, § 137); ▪ suppression of political pluralism and limiting freedom of political debate ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC],2018, § 175; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 2), 2019, § 98; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 437; Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, § 639; Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], 2024, § 1375)."
0faa41c7c031,Article 18,20240409183922__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,20250403142625__guide_art_18_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-04-03,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/0faa41c7c031/diff_2024-04-09__2025-04-03.json,apps:20958/14|38334/18,Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC],20958/14|38334/18,added,"Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, 25 June 2024",5,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.B.§4,Single purpose and plurality of purposes,4,,42,,,,,"In Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], 2024, the Court followed the same approach. Despite its findings that the extension of the application of Russian law in Crimea was unlawful and led to a violation of Articles 5, 6, 8, 10 and 11 of the Convention, the Court proceeded from the standpoint of a potential plurality of purposes ( Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], 2024, §§ 1354-1356)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20230627221844__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-06-27,2023-10-27,31 August 2022,28 February 2023,2022-08-31,2023-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json,apps:35511/20,Gherardi Martiri v. San Marino,35511/20,added,"Gherardi Martiri v. San Marino, no. 35511/20, §§ 83-84, 15 December 2022",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.E.3,Offensive language,3,,251,,"Gherardi Martiri v. San Marino , 2022",,,"The Court has held that the mere fact of accusing the Agent of the respondent Government of ""abuse of process"" was not in itself abusive, provided that it is not founded on untrue factual allegations. It would be inconsistent with the spirit of equality of the parties to consider an allegation that the State Agent is acting in abuse of process as gratuitous, given that States have the possibility, without restriction, to argue that an application is inadmissible because an applicant has abused the right of individual petition ( Gherardi Martiri v. San Marino, 2022, § 84)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20230627221844__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-06-27,2023-10-27,31 August 2022,28 February 2023,2022-08-31,2023-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json,apps:35511/20,Gherardi Martiri v. San Marino,35511/20,added,"Gherardi Martiri v. San Marino, no. 35511/20, §§ 83-84, 15 December 2022",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.E.3,Offensive language,3,204,250,0.9873,"Aleksanyan v. Russia , 2008|Chernitsyn v. Russia , 2006|Gherardi Martiri v. San Marino , 2022",,"It is not sufficient for the applicant's language to be merely cutting, polemical or sarcastic; it must exceed ""the bounds of normal, civil and legitimate criticism"" in order to be regarded as abusive ( Di Salvo v. Italy (dec.), Apinis v. Latvia (dec.); for a contrary example, see Aleksanyan v. Russia, §§ 116-118; X and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], § 146). If, during the proceedings, the applicant ceases using offensive remarks after a formal warning from the Court, expressly withdraws them or, better still, offers an apology, the application will no longer be rejected as an abuse of application ( Chernitsyn v. Russia, §§ 25-28).","It is not sufficient for the applicant's language to be merely cutting, polemical or sarcastic; it must exceed ""the bounds of normal, civil and legitimate criticism"" in order to be regarded as abusive ( Di Salvo v. Italy (dec.), 2007, Apinis v. Latvia (dec.), 2011; for a contrary example, see Aleksanyan v. Russia, 2008, §§ 116-118; X and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], § 146; Gherardi Martiri v. San Marino, 2022, §§ 83-84). If, during the proceedings, the applicant ceases using offensive remarks after a formal warning from the Court, expressly withdraws them or, better still, offers an apology, the application will no longer be rejected as an abuse of application ( Chernitsyn v. Russia, 2006, §§ 25-28)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20230627221844__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-06-27,2023-10-27,31 August 2022,28 February 2023,2022-08-31,2023-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json,apps:24384/19|44234/20,H.F. and Others v. France [GC],24384/19|44234/20,added,"H.F. and Others v. France [GC], nos. 24384/19 and 44234/20, 14 September 2022",1,citation_field_name_match,citation_added,§1.A.3.d,Potential victims and actio popularis,4,37,46,1.0,"Others v. France , 2018",,"In order to be able to claim to be a victim in such a situation, an applicant must produce reasonable and convincing evidence of the likelihood that a violation affecting him or her personally will occur; mere suspicion or conjecture is insufficient ( Senator Lines GmbH v. fifteen member States of the European Union (dec.) [GC]; Shortall and Others v. Ireland (dec.)). For the absence of a formal expulsion order, see Vijayanathan and Pusparajah v. France, § 46; for alleged consequences of a parliamentary report, see Fédération chrétienne des témoins de Jéhovah de France v. France (dec.); for alleged consequences of a judicial ruling concerning a third party in a coma, see Rossi and Others v. Italy (dec.); for alleged consequences of anti-doping measures for sports associations and individual sports professionals, see National federation of Sportspersons'Associations and unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, §§ 91-103.","In order to be able to claim to be a victim in such a situation, an applicant must produce reasonable and convincing evidence of the likelihood that a violation affecting him or her personally will occur; mere suspicion or conjecture is insufficient ( Senator Lines GmbH v. fifteen member States of the European Union (dec.) [GC], 2004; Shortall and Others v. Ireland (dec.), 2021). For the absence of a formal expulsion order, see Vijayanathan and Pusparajah v. France, § 46; for alleged consequences of a parliamentary report, see Fédération chrétienne des témoins de Jéhovah de France v. France (dec.), 2001; for alleged consequences of a judicial ruling concerning a third party in a coma, see Rossi and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2008; for alleged consequences of anti-doping measures for sports associations and individual sports professionals, see National federation of Sportspersons'Associations and unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 91-103."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20230627221844__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-06-27,2023-10-27,31 August 2022,28 February 2023,2022-08-31,2023-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json,apps:24384/19|44234/20,H.F. and Others v. France [GC],24384/19|44234/20,added,"H.F. and Others v. France [GC], nos. 24384/19 and 44234/20, 14 September 2022",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,§1.A.3.f,Death of the applicant,4,,76,,,,,"In H.F. and Others v. France [GC], 2022, §§ 148-152, the applicants complained about the refusal by the respondent State to repatriate their daughters and grandchildren, who were being held in camps in north-eastern Syria: they invoked Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention and Article 3 § 2 of Protocol No. 4. The Court found that the applicants'daughters and grandchildren were in a situation which prevented them from lodging applications directly with the Court and exposed them to the risk of being deprived of the effective protection of their rights under the Convention and its Protocols. Moreover, there was no conflict of interest between the applicants and the direct victims: in addition to having close family ties, they all shared the same objective namely, repatriation to France. Consequently, there were exceptional circumstances enabling the Court to conclude that the applicants had locus standi to raise the complaints as representatives of their daughters and grandchildren."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20230627221844__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-06-27,2023-10-27,31 August 2022,28 February 2023,2022-08-31,2023-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json,apps:976/20,Hoppen and trade union of AB Amber Grid employees v. Lithuania,976/20,added,"Hoppen and trade union of AB Amber Grid employees v. Lithuania, no. 976/20, § 153, 17 January 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,§1.A.3.c,Indirect victim,4,35,43,0.947,"Hoppen and trade union of AB Amber Grid employees v. Lithuania, 2023|Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria , 2013",,"As regards non-governmental organisations, the Court does not grant ""victim"" status to associations whose interests are not at stake, even if the interests of their members - or some of them - could be at stake. In addition, "" victim "" status is not granted to NGOs even if the associations have been founded for the sole purpose of defending the rights of the alleged9 victims ( Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, § 90 and § 93 and the references cited therein; see also Kalfagiannis and Pospert v. Greece (dec.), §§ 49-51, concerning a federation of trade unions representing media employees; Yusufeli İlçesini Güzelleştirme Yaşatma Kültür Varlıklarını Koruma Derneği v. Turkey (dec.), §§ 42-44, concerning a non-governmental organisation created with a view to defending the residents of an area where a dam was being built, and Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 25-26, concerning a non-governmental organisation representing the interests of LGBTpersons. See, by contrast, AsDAC c. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 21-37, concerning a non- governmental organisation set up for the collective management of intellectual property rights of its members and its victim status in relation to an Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 complaint, and Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland, §§ 36-42, concerning a non- governmental organization set up to defend the interests of workers, especially in the sphere of trade union freedoms, in relation to an Article 11 complaint). However, it should be noted that under certain circumstances NGOs (instead of the applicants) can take part in domestic proceedings, defending the applicants'interests. This does not deprive the applicants, who have not participated in the domestic proceedings, of their victim status ( Gorraiz Lizarraga and Others v. Spain, §§ 37-39; Centre of Societies for Krishna Consciousness in Russia and Frolov v. Russia, § 30; for the interplay between victim status under Article 34 and exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 see Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, §§ 78-81; Thibaut v. France (dec.), §§ 26-31).","As regards non-governmental organisations, the Court does not grant ""victim"" status to associations whose interests are not at stake, even if the interests of their members - or some of them - could be at stake. In addition, "" victim "" status is not granted to NGOs even if the associations have been founded for the sole purpose of defending the rights of the allegedvictims ( Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, 2013, § 90 and § 93 and the references cited therein; see also Kalfagiannis and Pospert v. Greece (dec.), 2020, §§ 49-51, concerning a federation of trade unions representing media employees; Yusufeli İlçesini Güzelleştirme Yaşatma Kültür Varlıklarını Koruma Derneği v. Turkey (dec.), §§ 42-44, concerning a non-governmental organisation created with a view to defending the residents of an area where a dam was being built, and Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021, §§ 25-26, concerning a non-governmental organisation representing the interests of LGBTpersons. See, by contrast, AsDAC c. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 21-37, concerning a non-governmental organisation set up for the collective management of intellectual property rights of its members and its victim status in relation to an Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 complaint; Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland, 2022, §§ 36-42, concerning a non-governmental organization set up to defend the interests of workers, especially in the sphere of trade union freedoms, in relation to an Article 11 complaint), and Hoppen and trade union of AB Amber Grid employees v. Lithuania, 2023, § 153, concerning a trade union that complained that the dismissal of one of its members had negatively affected its own freedom of association)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20230627221844__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-06-27,2023-10-27,31 August 2022,28 February 2023,2022-08-31,2023-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json,apps:2809/18,Kaganovskyy v. Ukraine,2809/18,added,"Kaganovskyy v. Ukraine, no. 2809/18, 15 September 2022",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,§1.A.3.f,Death of the applicant,4,,80,,"In the case of Kaganovskyy v. Ukraine , 2022",,,"In the case of Kaganovskyy v. Ukraine, 2022, §§ 67-72, the applicant complained, under Articles 3 et 5, about his confinement in the ""enhanced (intensive) supervision unit"" of a psychoneurological institution for a period of ten days in 2017. The applicant having died, the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union pursued the application on his behalf (even though he had a brother who had been his guardian and who had not expressed his wish to pursue the application). Referring to Article 37 § 1 in fine of the Convention, the Court decided that the case raised a question of a serious nature involving a question of general interest and presenting an opportunity to clarify the conventional standards of protection of vulnerable persons: respect for human rights therefore required the Court to continue the examination of the application."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20230627221844__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-06-27,2023-10-27,31 August 2022,28 February 2023,2022-08-31,2023-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json,apps:2809/18,Kaganovskyy v. Ukraine,2809/18,added,"Kaganovskyy v. Ukraine, no. 2809/18, 15 September 2022",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,§1.A.3.f,Death of the applicant,4,59,71,0.9325,"Delecolle v. France , 2018|Ivko v. Russia , 2015|Kaganovskyy v. Ukraine , 2022|Raimondo v. Italy , 1994|Savenko and Others v. Russia , 2021",,"See, for example, Raimondo v. Italy, § 2, and Stojkovic v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, § 25 (widow and children); X v. France, § 26 (parents); Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC] (nephew and potential heir); Velikova v. Bulgaria (dec.), Ivko v. Russia, §§ 64-70 and Delecolle v. France, §§ 39-44 (unmarried or de facto partner); contrast with Thévenon v. France (dec.) (universal legatee not related to the deceased); Léger v. France (striking out) [GC], §§ 50-51 (niece); Savenko and Others v. Russia, § 53 (former wife who divorced the applicant twelve years before his death and did not have any close contact with him afterwards).","See, for example, Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 2, and Stojkovic v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2007, § 25 (widow and children); X v. France, § 26 (parents); Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], 2000, (nephew and potential heir); Velikova v. Bulgaria (dec.), Ivko v. Russia, 2015, §§ 64-70 and Delecolle v. France, 2018, §§ 39-44 (unmarried or de facto partner), Kaganovskyy v. Ukraine, 2022, §§ 67-72 (the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union in the case of a vulnerable person who had been confined in a psychiatric institution and in respect of whom no relative had wished to pursue his application); contrast with Thévenon v. France (dec.), 2006 (universal legatee not related to the deceased); Léger v. France (striking out) [GC], 2009, §§ 50-51 (niece); Savenko and Others v. Russia, 2021, § 53 (former wife who divorced the applicant twelve years before his death and did not have any close contact with him afterwards)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20230627221844__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-06-27,2023-10-27,31 August 2022,28 February 2023,2022-08-31,2023-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json,apps:383/12,Khural and Zeynalov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2),383/12,added,"Khural and Zeynalov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), no. 383/12, 19 January 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,§1.A.3.b,Direct victim,4,21,27,0.9959,"Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania , 2020|Hristozov and Others v. Bulgaria , 2012|In Mukhin v. Russia , 2021|Karner v. Austria , 2003|Margulev v. Russia , 2019",,"In order to be able to lodge an application in accordance with Article 34, an applicant must be able to show that he or she was ""directly affected"" by the measure complained of ( Tănase v. Moldova [GC], § 104; Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], § 33; Lambert and Others v. France [GC], § 89). This is indispensable for putting the protection mechanism of the Convention into motion ( Hristozov and Others v. Bulgaria, § 73), although this criterion is not to be applied in a rigid, mechanical and inflexible way throughout the proceedings ( Micallef v. Malta [GC], § 45; Karner v. Austria, § 25; Aksu v. Turkey [GC], § 51). For instance, a person cannot complain of a violation of his or her rights in proceedings to which he or she was not a party ( Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], § 92). However, in Margulev v. Russia, the Court considered the applicant to be a direct victim of defamation proceedings although he was only admitted as a third party to the proceedings. Since domestic law granted the status of third party to proceedings where ""the judgment may affect the third party's rights and obligations vis-à- vis the claimant or defendant"", the Court considered that the domestic courts had tacitly accepted that the applicant's rights might have been affected by the outcome of the defamation proceedings (§ 36). In Mukhin v. Russia, the Court recognised that the editor-in-chief of a newspaper could claim to be a victim of the domestic courts'decisions divesting that newspaper of its media-outlet status and annulling the document certifying its registration (§§ 158-160). Further, in some specific circumstances, direct victims who had not participated in the domestic proceedings were accepted as applicants before the Court ( Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, §§ 78-81). Standing in domestic proceedings is therefore not decisive, as the notion of ""victim"" is interpreted autonomously in the Convent ion system (see, for instance, Kalfagiannis and Pospert v. Greece (dec.), §§ 44-48, concerning the financial administrator of a public service broadcaster whose victim status was accepted by the domestic courts but not by the Court).","In order to be able to lodge an application in accordance with Article 34, an applicant must be able to show that he or she was ""directly affected"" by the measure complained of ( Tănase v. Moldova [GC], 2010, § 104; Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 33; Lambert and Others v. France [GC], 2015, § 89). This is indispensable for putting the protection mechanism of the Convention into motion ( Hristozov and Others v. Bulgaria, 2012, § 73), although this criterion is not to be applied in a rigid, mechanical and inflexible way throughout the proceedings ( Micallef v. Malta [GC], 2009, § 45; Karner v. Austria, 2003, § 25; Aksu v. Turkey [GC], 2012, § 51). For instance, a person cannot complain of a violation of his or her rights in proceedings to which he or she was not a party ( Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 92). However, in Margulev v. Russia, 2019, the Court considered the applicant to be a direct victim of defamation proceedings although he was only admitted as a third party to the proceedings. Since domestic law granted the status of third party to proceedings where ""the judgment may affect the third party' s rights and obligations vis-à- vis the claimant or defendant"", the Court considered that the domestic courts had tacitly accepted that the applicant's rights might have been affected by the outcome of the defamation proceedings (§ 36; see also Khural and Zeynalov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2023, §§ 31-32) . In Mukhin v. Russia, 2021, the Court recognised that the editor- in-chief of a newspaper could claim to be a victim of the domestic courts'decisions divesting that newspaper of its media-outlet status and annulling the document certifying its registration (§§ 158-160). Further, in some specific circumstances, direct victims who had not participated in the domestic proceedings were accepted as applicants before the Court ( Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 78-81). Standing in domestic proceedings is therefo re not decisive, as the notion of ""victim"" is interpreted autonomously in the Convention system (see, for instance, Kalfagiannis and Pospert v. Greece (dec.), 2020, §§ 44-48, concerning the financial administrator of a public service broadcaster whose victim status was accepted by the domestic courts but not by the Court)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20230627221844__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-06-27,2023-10-27,31 August 2022,28 February 2023,2022-08-31,2023-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json,apps:23158/20,Makarashvili and Others v. Georgia,23158/20,added,"Makarashvili and Others v. Georgia, nos. 23158/20 and 2 others, 1 September 2022",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.3,Expiry of the four-month period,3,151,192,0.999,"Makarashvili and Others v. Georgia , 2022",,"Moreover, in very exceptional circumstances, the Court may rely on its interpretive jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Convention to adjust the method of calculation of the four-month rule in order to preserve the substance of the right of individual petition. Thus, during the global outbreak of COVID-19 and the public health emergency of international concern declared by the World Health Organisation, on 16 March and 9 April 2020 the President of the Court announced a number of exceptional measures to allow applicants, High Contracting Parties and the Court to deal with the difficulties arising . One effect of those measures (decided by the President in the exercise of his competence to direct the work and the administration of the Court under Rule 9 of the Rules of Court) was that the Registry of the Court, when registering newly received applications and without prejudice to any subsequent judicial decision on the matter, was to add three months in total to the calculation of the then six-month period whenever a calendar six-month period either started to run or, on the contrary, was due to expire at any time between 16 March and 15 June 2020. The Court held that the running of the then six-month period could legitimately be considered to have been suspended during the most critical phase of the global pandemic: this was, moreover, consistent with the general principle in public international law of force majeure as well as that of contra non valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio, a legal maxim according to which prescriptions cannot run against those who are incapable of acting. It follows that if the aforementioned time-limit either started to run or was due to expire during the aforementioned specified time-frame, the then six- month rule had to be exceptionally considered to have been suspended for three calendar months ( Saakashvili v. Georgia (dec.), §§ 49-59).","Moreover, in very exceptional circumstances, the Court may rely on its interpretive jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Convention to adjust the method of calculation of the four-month rule in order to preserve the substance of the right of individual petition. Thus, during the global outbreak of COVID- 19 and the public health emergency of international concern declared by the World Health Organisation, on 16 March and 9 April 2020 the President of the Court announced a number of exceptional measures to allow applicants, High Contracting Parties and the Court to deal with the difficulties arising . One effect of those measures (decided by the President in the exercise of his competence to direct the work and the administration of the Court under Rule 9 of the Rules of Court) was that the Registry of the Court, when registering newly received applications and without prejudice to any subsequent judicial decision on the matter, was to add three months in total to the calculation of the then six-month period whenever a calendar six-month period either started to run or, on the contrary, was due to expire at any time between 16 March and 15 June 2020. The Court held that the running of the then six-month period could legitimately be considered to have been suspended during the most critical phase of the global pandemic: this was, moreover, consistent with the general principle in public international law of force majeure as well as that of contra non valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio, a legal maxim according to which prescriptions cannot run against those who are incapable of acting. It follows that if the aforementioned time-limit either started to run or was due to expire during the aforementioned specified time-frame, the then six-month rule had to be exceptionally considered to have been suspended for three calendar months ( Saakashvili v. Georgia (dec.), 2022, §§ 49-59); Makarashvili and Others v. Georgia, 2022, § 47)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20230627221844__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-06-27,2023-10-27,31 August 2022,28 February 2023,2022-08-31,2023-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json,apps:38358/22,Orhan v. Türkiye (dec.),38358/22,added,"Orhan v. Türkiye (dec.), no. 38358/22, 6 December 2022",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.B.1,Purpose of the rule,3,129,167,0.9428,,,"Before the entry into force of Protocol No. 15 to the Convention (1 August 2021), Article 35 § 1 of the Convention referred to a period of six months. Article 4 of Protocol No. 15 has amended Article 35 § 1 to reduce the period from six to four 5 months. According to the transitional provisions of the Protocol (Article 8 § 3), this amendment applies only after a period of six months following the entry into force of the Protocol (as from 1 February 2022), in order to allow potential applicants to become fully aware of the new deadline. Furthermore, the new time limit does not have a retroactive effect, since it does not apply to applications in respect of which the final decision within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention was taken prior to the date of entry into force of the new rule (see the Explanatory Report to Protocol No.15, § 22). Although the judgments and decisions pre-dating Protocol No. 15 mentioned in this section referred to the ""six - month period"" or ""six - month rule"", those terms have been replaced in this guide by the terms ""four -month period"" and ""four - month rule"", in order to reflect the new time-limit established in the Convention. The general principles in the Court's case-law on how the former rule operated remain valid for the operation of the new time limit ( Saakashvili v. Georgia (dec.), § 46).","Before the entry into force of Protocol No. 15 to the Convention (1 August 2021), Article 35 § 1 of the Convention referred to a period of six months. Article 4 of Protocol No. 15 has amended Article 35 § 1 to reduce the period from six to four 5 months. According to the transitional provisions of the Protocol (Article 8 § 3), this amendment applies only after a period of six months following the entry into force of the Protocol (as from 1 February 2022), in order to allow potential applicants to become fully aware of the new deadline. Furthermore, the new time limit does not have a retroactive effect, since it does not apply to applications in respect of which the final decision within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention was taken prior to the date of entry into force of the new rule (see the Explanatory Report to Protocol No.15, § 22). If the final decision within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 was taken before the entry into force of Protocol no. 15 but notified to the applicant after 1 August 2021, the applicable time-limit is still that of six months; however, it starts to run from the day following the notification of the final decision ( Orhan v. Türkiye (dec.), 2022, §§ 23-47)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20230627221844__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-06-27,2023-10-27,31 August 2022,28 February 2023,2022-08-31,2023-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json,apps:26922/19,P.C. v. Ireland,26922/19,added,"P.C. v. Ireland, no. 26922/19, 1 September 2022",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.2.d,Complaint raised in substance,4,,116,,"P.C. v. Ireland , 2022",,,"On the other hand, domestic law must enable the courts to properly engage with the substance of Convention complaints, failing which the remedy cannot be considered to be effective ( P.C. v. Ireland, 2022, § 107)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20230627221844__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-06-27,2023-10-27,31 August 2022,28 February 2023,2022-08-31,2023-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json,apps:26922/19,P.C. v. Ireland,26922/19,added,"P.C. v. Ireland, no. 26922/19, 1 September 2022",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.2.f,Availability and effectiveness,4,,122,,"P.C. v. Ireland , 2022",,,"In order for a judicial remedy to be effective, the domestic courts must be able to properly engage with the substance of the Convention complaint raised by the applicant ( P.C. v. Ireland, 2022, § 107)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20230627221844__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-06-27,2023-10-27,31 August 2022,28 February 2023,2022-08-31,2023-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json,apps:67259/14,Selami and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,67259/14,removed,"Selami and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 67259/14, 9 February 2017",1,paragraph_text_name_match|paragraph_text_app_match,reformulation,III.B.4,The safeguard clause: whether respect for human rights requires an examination of the case on the merits.,3,356,414,0.5262,"Fedotova v. Russia , 2006",,"The Court has already held that respect for human rights does not require it to continue the examination of an application when, for example, the relevant law has changed and similar issues have been resolved in other cases before it ( Léger v. France (striking out) [GC], § 51; Rinck v. France (dec.); Fedotova v. Russia ). Nor where the relevant law has been repealed and the complaint before the Court is of historical interest only ( Ionescu v. Romania (dec.)). Similarly, respect for human rights does not require the Court to examine an application where the Court and the Committee of Ministers have addressed the issue as a systemic problem, for example non-enforcement of domestic judgments in the Russian Federation ( Vasilchenko v. Russia ) or Romania ( Gaftoniuc v. Romania (dec.); Savu v. Romania (dec.)) or indeed the Republic of Moldova ( Burov v. Moldova (dec.)) or Armenia ( Guruyan v. Armenia (dec.)). Moreover, where the issue involves length of proceedings cases in Greece ( Kiousi v. Greece (dec.)) or the Czech Republic ( Havelka v. the Czech Republic (dec.)), the Court has had numerous opportunities to address the issue in previous judgments. This applies equally with respect to the public pronouncement of judgments ( Jančev v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.)) or the opportunity to have knowledge of and to comment on observations filed or evidence adduced by the other party ( Bazelyuk v. Ukraine (dec.)). Aizpurua Ortiz and Others v. Spain, no. 42430/05, 2 February 2010 Akarsubaşı and Alçiçek v. Turkey, no. 19620/12, 23 January 2018 Akbay and Others v. Germany, nos. 40495/15 and 2 others, 15 October 2020 Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV Akif Hasanov v. Azerbaijan, no. 7268/10, 19 September 2019 Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, Reports 1996-VI Aksu v. Turkey [GC], nos. 4149/04 and 41029/04, ECHR 2012 Al Husin v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (no. 2), no. 10112/16, 25 June 2019 Al Nashiri v. Poland, no. 28761/11, 24 July 2014 Al Nashiri v. Romania, no. 33234/12, 31 May 2018 Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland [GC], no. 5809/08, 21 June 2016 Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27021/08, ECHR 2011 Al-Moayad v. Germany (dec.), no. 35865/03, 20 February 2007 Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, no. 50963/99, 20 June 2002 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, no. 61498/08, ECHR 2010 Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, ECHR 2011 Albayrak v. Turkey, no. 38406/97, 31 January 2008 Albert and Others v. Hungary [GC], no. 5294/14, 7 July 2020 Aleksanyan v. Russia, no. 46468/06, 22 December 2008 Alekseyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 14988/09 and 50 others, 27 November 2018 Aliev v. Georgia, no. 522/04, 13 January 2009 Aliyeva and Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 35587/08, 31 July 2014 Allan v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 48539/99, 28 August 2001 Almeida Garrett, Mascarenhas Falcão and Others v. Portugal, nos. 29813/96 and 30229/96, ECHR 2000-I Amarandei and Others v. Romania, no. 1443/10, 26 April 2016 An and Others v. Cyprus, no. 18270/91, Commission decision of 8 October 1991 Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia, nos. 11157/04 and 15162/05, 4 July 2013 Andrášik and Others v. Slovakia (dec.), nos. 57984/00 and 6 others, ECHR 2002-IX Andreasen v. the United Kingdom and 26 other member States of the European Union (dec.), no. 28827/11, 31 March 2015 Andronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus, 9 October 1997, Reports 1997-VI Ankarcrona v. Sweden (dec.), no. 35178/97, ECHR 2000-VI Apinis v. Latvia (dec.), no. 46549/06, 20 September 2011 Aquilina v. Malta [GC], no. 25642/94, ECHR 1999-III Arat v. Turkey, no. 10309/03, 10 November 2009 Agrotexim and Others v. Greece, 24 October 1995, Series A no. 330-A Arlewin v. Sweden, no. 22302/10, 1 March 2016 Armonienė v. Lithuania, no. 36919/02, 25 November 2008 Aspiotis v. Greece (dec.), no. 4561/17, 1 March 2022 Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503/01, ECHR 2004-II Association for the Defence of Human Rights in Romania - Helsinki Committee on behalf of Ionel Garcea v. Romania, no. 2959/11, 24 March 2015 Association Innocence en Danger and Association Enfance et Partage v. France, nos. 15343/15 and 16806/15, 4 June 2020 Association Les témoins de Jéhovah v. France (dec.), no. 8916/05, 21 September 2010 Ataykaya v. Turkey, no. 50275/08, 22 July 2014 Aydarov and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), nos. 33586/15, 2 October 2018 Ayuntamiento de Mula v. Spain (dec.), no. 55346/00, ECHR 2001-I Azemi v. Serbia (dec.), no. 11209/09, 5 November 2013 Azinas v. Cyprus [GC], no. 56679/00, ECHR 2004-III Malysh and Ivanin v. Ukraine (dec.), nos. 40139/14 and 41418/14, 9 September 2014 Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, ECHR 2005-I Mann v. the United Kingdom and Portugal (dec.), no. 360/10, 1 February 2011 Mannai v. Italy, no. 9961/10, 27 March 2012 Manoilescu and Dobrescu v. Romania and Russia (dec.), no. 60861/00, ECHR 2005-VI Manuel v. Portugal (dec.), no. 62341/00, 31 January 2002 Maravić Markeš v. Croatia, no. 70923/11, 9 January 2014 Margaretić v. Croatia, no. 16115/13, 5 June 2014 Margulev v. Russia, no. 15449/09, 8 October 2019 Marguš v. Croatia [GC], no. 4455/10, ECHR 2014 Marić v. Croatia, no. 50132/12, 12 June 2014 Marion v. France, no. 30408/02, 20 December 2005 Markovic and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 1398/03, ECHR 2006-XIV Marshall and Others v. Malta, no. 79177/16, 11 February 2020 Martins Alves v. Portugal (dec.), no. 56297/11, 21 January 2014 Maslova and Nalbandov v. Russia, no. 839/02, 24 January 2008 Mastilović and Others v. Montenegro, no. 28754/10, 24 February 2022 Mătăsaru v. the Republic of Moldova (dec.), no. 44743/08, 21 January 2020 Mateuț v. Romania (dec.), no. 35959/15, 1 March 2022 Matoušek v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 9965/08, 29 March 2011 Matthews v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, ECHR 1999-I Matveyev v. Russia, no. 26601/02, 3 July 2008 McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27 September 1995, Series A no. 324 McElhinney v. Ireland and the United Kingdom (dec.) [GC], no. 31253/96, 9 February 2000 McFarlane v. Ireland [GC], no. 31333/06, 10 September 2010 McFeeley and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 8317/78, Commission decision of 15 May 1980, DR 20 McKerr v. the United Kingdom, no. 28883/95, ECHR 2001-III McShane v. the United Kingdom, no. 43290/98, 28 May 2002 Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], no. 3394/03, ECHR 2010 Mehmet Ali Ayhan and Others v. Turkey, nos. 4536/06 and 53282/07, 4 June 2019 Mehmet Ali Eser v. Turkey, no. 1399/07, 15 October 2019 Melnichuk and Others v. Romania, nos. 35279/10 and 34782/10, 5 May 2015 Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286/01, 28 March 2006 Meltex Ltd v. Armenia (dec.), no. 37780/02, 27 May 2008 Mentzen v. Latvia (dec.), no. 71074/01, ECHR 2004-XII Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], no. 72508/13, 28 November 2017 Merger and Cros v. France (dec.), no. 68864/01, 11 March 2004 Merit v. Ukraine, no. 66561/01, 30 March 2004 Micallef v. Malta [GC], no. 17056/06, ECHR 2009 Michalak v. Poland (dec.), no. 24549/03, 1 March 2005 Michaud v. France, no. 12323/11, ECHR 2012 Migliore and Others v. Italy (dec.), nos. 58511/13 and 2 others, 12 November 2013 Mikolajová v. Slovakia, no. 4479/03, 18 January 2011 Mile Novaković v. Croatia, no. 73544/14, 17 December 2020 Milošević v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 77631/01, 19 March 2002 Milovanović v. Serbia, no. 56065/10, §..., 8 October 2019 Miroļubovs and Others v. Latvia, no. 798/05, 15 September 2009 Miszczyński v. Poland (dec.), no. 23672/07, 8 February 2011 Mitrović v. Serbia, no. 52142/12, 21 March 2017 Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865/09 and 2 others, ECHR 2014 Schmidt v. Latvia, no. 22493/05, 27 April 2017 Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft and publisuisse SA v. Switzerland, no. 41723/14, 22 December 2020 Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], no. 10249/03, 17 September 2009 Scordino v. Italy (dec.), no. 36813/97, ECHR 2003-IV Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, ECHR 2006-V Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, ECHR 2000-VIII Sebeleva and Others v. Russia, no. 42416/18, 1 March 2022 Segame SA v. France, no. 4837/06, ECHR 2012 Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06, ECHR 2009 Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581/00, ECHR 2006-II Şeker v. Turkey (dec.), no. 30330/19, 7 September 2021 Šeks v. Croatia, no. 39325/20, 3 February 2022 Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], no. 14305/17, 22 December 2020 Selami and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 78241/13, 1 March 2018 Selami and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 67259/14, 9 February 2017 Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, ECHR 1999-V Senator Lines GmbH v. fifteen member States of the European Union (dec.) [GC], no. 56672/00, ECHR 2004-IV Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia [GC], no. 14939/03, ECHR 2009 Shalyavski and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 67608/11, 15 June 2017 no. 52142/12, 21 March 2017 Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia (dec.), no. 36378/02, 16 September 2003 Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, no. 36378/02, ECHR 2005-III Shchukin and Others v. Ukraine [Committee], nos. 59834/09 and 249 others, 13 February 2014 Shefer v. Russia (dec.), no. 45175/04, 13 March 2012 Shevanova v. Latvia (striking out) [GC], no. 58822/00, 7 December 2007 Shibendra Dev v. Sweden (dec.), no. 7362/10, 21 October 2014 Shioshvili and Others v. Russia, no. 19356/07, 20 December 2016 Shishanov v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 11353/06, 15 September 2015 Shmelev and Others v. Russia (dec.), no. 41743/17 and 16 others, 17 March 2020 Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 15367/14 and 13 others, 21 January 2021 Shortall and Others v. Ireland (dec.), no 50272/18, 19 October 2021 Shtefan and Others v. Ukraine [Committee], nos. 36762/06 and 249 others, 31 July 2014 Shtukaturov v. Russia, no. 44009/05, ECHR 2008 Siemaszko and Olszyński v. Poland, nos. 60975/08 and 35410/09, 13 September 2016 Siliadin v. France, no. 73316/01, ECHR 2005-VII Šilih v. Slovenia [GC], no. 71463/01, 9 April 2009 Simitzi-Papachristou and Others v. Greece (dec.), nos. 50634/11 and 18 others, 5 November 2013 Şimşek, Andiç and Boğatekin v. Turkey (dec.), no. 75845/12 and 2 others, 17 March 2020 Sindicatul Păstorul cel Bun v. Romania [GC], no. 2330/09, ECHR 2013 Sine Tsaggarakis A.E.E. v. Greece, no. 17257/13, 23 May 2019 Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia (striking out) [GC], no. 60654/00, ECHR 2007-I Škorjanec v. Croatia, no. 25536/14, 28 March 2017 Škrlj v. Croatia, no. 32953/13, 11 July 2019 Slavgorodski v. Estonia (dec.), no. 37043/97, ECHR 1999-II Slaviček v. Croatia (dec.), no. 20862/02, ECHR 2002-VII Slivenko and Others v. Latvia (dec.) [GC], no. 48321/99, ECHR 2002-II Slovenia v. Croatia [GC] (dec.), no. 54155/16, 18 novembre 2020 Smirnov v. Russia (dec.), no. 14085/04, 6 July 2006 Sociedad Anónima del Ucieza v. Spain, no. 38963/08, 4 November 2014 Söderman v. Sweden [GC], no. 5786/08, ECHR 2013","The Court has already held that respect for human rights does not require it to continue the examination of an application when, for example, the relevant law has changed and similar issues have been resolved in other cases before it ( Léger v. France (striking out) [GC], 2009, § 51; Rinck v. France (dec.), 2010; Fedotova v. Russia, 2006). Nor where the relevant law has been repealed and the complaint before the Court is of historical interest only ( Ionescu v. Romania (dec.), 2010). Similarly, respect for human rights does not require the Court to examine an application where the Court and the Committee of Ministers have addressed the issue as a systemic problem, for example non- enforcement of domestic judgments in the Russian Federation ( Vasilchenko v. Russia ) or Romania ( Gaftoniuc v. Romania (dec.), 2011; Savu v. Romania (dec.), 2011) or indeed the Republic of Moldova ( Burov v. Moldova (dec.), 2011) or Armenia ( Guruyan v. Armenia (dec.), 2012). Moreover, where the issue involves length of proceedings cases in Greece ( Kiousi v. Greece (dec.), 2011, or the Czech Republic ( Havelka v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2011), the Court has had numerous opportunities to address the issue in previous judgments. This applies equally with respect to the public pronouncement of judgments ( Jančev v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), 2011) or the opportunity to have knowledge of and to comment on observations filed or evidence adduced by the other party ( Bazelyuk v. Ukraine (dec.), 2012)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20230627221844__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-06-27,2023-10-27,31 August 2022,28 February 2023,2022-08-31,2023-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json,apps:67259/14,Selami and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,67259/14,removed,"Selami and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 67259/14, 9 February 2017",2,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,§1.A.3.c,Indirect victim,4,28,34,1.0,"Dzidzava v. Russia , 2016|Karpylenko v. Ukraine , 2016|Stepanian v. Romania , 2016|ă and Others v. Romania , 2016",,"As regards complaints of ill-treatment of deceased relatives under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court has accepted the locus standi of applicants in cases where the ill-treatment was closely linked to the death or the disappearance of their relatives ( Karpylenko v. Ukraine, § 105; Dzidzava v. Russia, § 46). The Court has also affirmed that it may recognise the standing of applicants who complain about ill-treatment of their late relative if the applicants show either a strong moral interest, besides the mere pecuniary interest in the outcome of the domestic proceedings, or other compelling reasons, such as an important general interest which requires their case to be examined ( Boacă and Others v. Romania, § 46; Karpylenko v. Ukraine, § 106; see also Stepanian v. Romania, §§ 40-41; Selami and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, §§ 58-65).","As regards complaints of ill-treatment of deceased relatives under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court has accepted the locus standi of applicants in cases where the ill-treatment was closely linked to the death or the disappearance of their relatives ( Karpylenko v. Ukraine, 2016, § 105; Dzidzava v. Russia, 2016, § 46). The Court has also affirmed that it may recognise the standing of applicants who complain about ill-treatment of their late relative if the applicants show either a strong moral interest, besides the mere pecuniary interest in the outcome of the domestic proceedings, or other compelling reasons, such as an important general interest which requires their case to be examined ( Boacă and Others v. Romania, 2016, § 46; Karpylenko v. Ukraine, 2016, § 106; see also Stepanian v. Romania, 2016, §§ 40-41; Selami and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2018, §§ 58-65)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20230627221844__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-06-27,2023-10-27,31 August 2022,28 February 2023,2022-08-31,2023-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json,apps:67259/14,Selami and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,67259/14,removed,"Selami and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 67259/14, 9 February 2017",3,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,§1.A.3.c,Indirect victim,4,32,38,0.9572,,,"In addition to their status as ""indirect victims"", f amily members can also be ""direct victims"" of a treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention on account of the suffering stemming from serious human rights violations affecting their relatives (see the relevant criteria in Janowiec and Others v. Russia [GC], §§ 177-181, and Selami and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, §§ 54-56).","In addition to their status as ""indirect victims"", f amily members can also be ""direct victims"" of a treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention on account of the suffering stemming from serious human rights violations affecting their relatives (see the relevant criteria in Janowiec and Others v. Russia [GC], 2013, §§ 177-181, and 2018,, §§ 54-56)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20230627221844__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-06-27,2023-10-27,31 August 2022,28 February 2023,2022-08-31,2023-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json,apps:1210/10,Sorbalo v. Moldova (dec.),1210/10,added,"Sorbalo v. Moldova (dec.), no. 1210/10, 31 January 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,§1.A.3.e,Loss of victim status,4,53,65,0.9982,"Arat v. Turkey , 2009|Chevrol v. France , 2003|Constantinescu v. Romania , 2000|Guisset v. France , 2000|Kemal Çetin v. Turkey , 2020|Kerman v. Turkey , 2016|Marshall and Others v. Malta , 2020|Moon v. France , 2009|Moskovets v. Russia , 2009|Çölgeçen and Others v. Turkey , 2017",,"For other specific situations, see Marshall and Others v. Malta, §§ 33-34, 46-47 (Article 6); Arat v. Turkey, § 47 (Article 6); Constantinescu v. Romania, §§ 40-44 (Articles 6 and 10); Guisset v. France, §§ 66-70 (Article 6); Chevrol v. France, §§ 30 et seq. (Article 6); Kerman v. Turkey, § 106 (Article 6); Moskovets v. Russia, § 50 (Article 5); Bivolaru v. Romania (no. 2), §§ 168-175; Y.Y. and Y.Y. v. Russia, § 51, (Article 8); X. and Y. v. Romania, §§ 109-114 (Article 8); Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. v. Turkey (dec.), §§ 47-51, (Article 10); Kemal Çetin v. Turkey, § 33 (Article 11); Moon v. France, §§ 29 et seq. (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1); D.J. and A.-K.R. v. Romania (dec.), §§ 77 et seq. (Article 2 of Protocol No. 4); and Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia [GC], § 115 (Article 4 of Protocol No. 7); Dalban v. Romania [GC], § 44 (Article 10); Güneş v. Turkey (dec.) (Article 10); Çölgeçen and Others v. Turkey, §§ 39-40, (Article 2 of Protocol No. 1).","For other specific situations, see Marshall and Others v. Malta, 2020, §§ 33-34, 46-47 (Article 6); Arat v. Turkey, 2009, § 47 (Article 6); Constantinescu v. Romania, 2000, §§ 40-44 (Articles 6 and 10); Guisset v. France, 2000, §§ 66-70 (Article 6); Chevrol v. France, 2003, §§ 30 et seq. (Article 6); Kerman v. Turkey, 2016, § 106 (Article 6); Sorbalo v. Moldova (dec.), 2023, §§ 39-62 (Article 6); Moskovets v. Russia, 2009, § 50 (Article 5); Bivolaru v. Romania (no. 2), 2018, §§ 168-175; Y.Y. and Y.Y. v. Russia, § 51, (Article 8); X. and Y. v. Romania, §§ 109-114 (Article 8); Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. v. Turkey (dec.), §§ 47-51, (Article 10); Kemal Çetin v. Turkey, 2020, § 33 (Article 11); Moon v. France, 2009, §§ 29 et seq. (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1); D.J. and A.-K.R. v. Romania (dec.), 2009, §§ 77 et seq. (Article 2 of Protocol No. 4); and Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia [GC], 2009, § 115 (Article 4 of Protocol No. 7); Dalban v. Romania [GC], 1999, § 44 (Article 10); Güneş v. Turkey (dec.) (Article 10), 2004; Çölgeçen and Others v. Turkey, 2017, §§ 39-40, (Article 2 of Protocol No. 1)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20230627221844__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-06-27,2023-10-27,31 August 2022,28 February 2023,2022-08-31,2023-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-06-27__2023-10-27.json,apps:8019/16|43800/14|28525/20,Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.),8019/16|43800/14|28525/20,added,"Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), nos. 8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20, 30 November 2022",1,paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.B.1,Principles,3,244,294,0.9938,"Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia , 2010",,"Where complaints concern actions that have taken place outside the territory of a Contracting State, the Government may raise a preliminary objection that the application is incompatible ratione loci with the provisions of the Convention ( Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), § 55; Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, § 203; Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], §§ 79 and 111; Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey, §§ 170-174; Hanan v. Germany [GC], §§ 104-113). Such an objection will be examined under Article 1 of the Convention (for the scope of the concept of ""jurisdiction"" under this Article, see for instance, N.D. and N.T. Spain [GC], §§ 102-103; Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], § 75; Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey, §§ 178-197; Hanan v. Germany [GC], §§ 132-142; see also point II.A.2 above). Even if the Government do not raise an objection, the Court can of its own motion examine the matter ( Vasiliciuc v. the Republic of Moldova, § 22; Stephens v. Malta (no. 1), § 45).","Where complaints concern actions that have taken place outside the territory of a Contracting State, the Government may raise a preliminary objection that the application is incompatible ratione loci with the provisions of the Convention ( Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 1995, § 55; Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, 2010, § 203; Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, §§ 79 and 111; Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey, §§ 170-174; Hanan v. Germany [GC], 2021, §§ 104-113). Such an objection will be examined under Article 1 of the Convention 10 (for the scope of the concept of ""jurisdiction"" under this Article, see for instance, N.D. and N.T. Spain [GC], §§ 102-103; Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], 2001, § 75; Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey, §§ 178-197; Hanan v. Germany [GC], 2021, §§ 132-142; Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, §§ 547-564; see also point II.A.2 above). Even if the Government do not raise an objection, the Court can of its own motion examine the matter ( Vasiliciuc v. the Republic of Moldova, § 22; Stephens v. Malta (no. 1), § 45)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-10-27,2023-12-12,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json,apps:4188/21,A.M. and Others v. Poland (dec.),4188/21,added,"A.M. and Others v. Poland (dec.), nos. 4188/21, 16 May 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,§1.A.3.d,Potential victims and actio popularis,4,46,47,0.9471,"Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye , 2023|Vijayanathan and Pusparajah v. France , 1992",,"In order to be able to claim to be a victim in such a situation, an applicant must produce reasonable and convincing evidence of the likelihood that a violation affecting him or her personally will occur; mere suspicion or conjecture is insufficient ( Senator Lines GmbH v. fifteen member States of the European Union (dec.) [GC], 2004; Shortall and Others v. Ireland (dec.), 2021). For the absence of a formal expulsion order, see Vijayanathan and Pusparajah v. France, § 46; for alleged consequences of a parliamentary report, see Fédération chrétienne des témoins de Jéhovah de France v. France (dec.), 2001; for alleged consequences of a judicial ruling concerning a third party in a coma, see Rossi and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2008; for alleged consequences of anti-doping measures for sports associations and individual sports professionals, see National federation of Sportspersons'Associations and unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 91-103.","In order to be able to claim to be a victim in such a situation, an applicant must produce reasonable and convincing evidence of the likelihood that a violation affecting him or her personally will occur; mere suspicion or conjecture is insufficient ( Senator Lines GmbH v. fifteen member States of the European Union (dec.) [GC], 2004; Shortall and Others v. Ireland (dec.), 2021). For the absence of a formal expulsion order, see Vijayanathan and Pusparajah v. France, 1992, § 46; for alleged consequences of a parliamentary report, see Fédération chrétienne des témoins de Jéhovah de France v. France (dec.), 2001; for alleged consequences of a judicial ruling concerning a third party in a coma, see Rossi and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2008; for alleged consequences of anti-doping measures for sports associations and individual sports professionals, see National federation of Sportspersons'Associations and unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 91-103; for alleged consequences of amendments banning access to legal abortion on foetal malformation grounds, see A.M. and Others v. Poland (dec.), 2023, §§ 75-87; for the refusal to exempt an applicant, without her undergoing a medical examination to prove that she was not pregnant, from the 300-day waiting period imposed on divorced women wishing to remarry, in the absence of any actual intention to do so, see Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye, 2023, §§ 27-29."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-10-27,2023-12-12,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json,apps:22515/14,Bryan and Others v. Russia,22515/14,added,"Bryan and Others v. Russia, no. 22515/14, 27 June 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.D.2.a,The assessment of similarity of cases,4,237,241,0.9886,"Bryan and Others v. Russia , 2023",,"For example, if the complainants before the two institutions are not identical the ""application"" to the Court cannot be considered as being ""substantially the same as a matter that has ... been submitted to another procedure of international investigati on or settlement"" ( Folgerø and Others v. Norway (dec.), 2006). Thus, the Court found that it was not precluded from examining the application before it when the other international procedure was initiated by a non-governmental organisation ( Celniku v. Greece, 2007, §§ 39-41; Illiu and Others v. Belgium (dec.), 2009) or by a Confederation of Unions which it was affiliated to ( Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası v. Turkey, 2012, § 38) and not by the applicants themselves. In Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, UN Special Rapporteurs and the Vice-Chair of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) had sent a letter to Turkey containing an ""urgent appeal"", in the context of special proceedings introduced by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, which could give rise to the opening of a procedure. However, since the WGADhad not opened such a procedure and since neither the applicant nor his close relatives had lodged any appeal before the UNbodies, the ""application"" was not ""substantially the same"" (§§ 92-94; see also Taner Kılıç v. Turkey (no. 2), 2022, § 62-63).","For example, if the complainants before the two institutions are not identical the ""application"" to the Court can not be considered as being ""substantially the same as a matter that has ... been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement"" ( Folgerø and Others v. Norway (dec.), 2006). Thus, the Court found that it was not precluded from examining the application before it when the other international procedure was initiated by a non-governmental organisation ( Celniku v. Greece, 2007, §§ 39-41; Illiu and Others v. Belgium (dec.), 2009), or by a Confederation of Unions which it was affiliated to ( Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası v. Turkey, 2012, § 38), or by a Government acting on their own behalf in an inter-governmental procedure ( Bryan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 40), and not by the applicants themselves. In Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, UN Special Rapporteurs and the Vice-Chair of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) had sent a letter to Turkey containing an ""urgent appeal"", in the context of special proceedings introduced by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, which could give rise to the opening of a procedure. However, since the WGADhad not opened such a procedure and since neither the applicant nor his close relatives had lodged any appeal before the UNbodies, the ""application"" was not ""substantially the same"" ( §§ 92-94; see also Taner Kılıç v. Turkey (no. 2), 2022, § 62-63)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-10-27,2023-12-12,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json,apps:22515/14,Bryan and Others v. Russia,22515/14,added,"Bryan and Others v. Russia, no. 22515/14, 27 June 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,§1.A.3.e,Loss of victim status,4,53,54,0.9724,"Bryan and Others v. Russia , 2023",,"The applicant would remain a victim if the authorities have failed to acknowledge either expressly or in substance that there has been a violation of the applicant's rights ( Albayrak v. Turkey, 2008, § 33; Jensen v. Denmark (dec.), 2001) even if the latter received some compensation ( Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 88).","The applicant would remain a victim if the authorities have failed to acknowledge either expressly or in substance that there has been a violation of the applicant's rights ( Albayrak v. Turkey, 2008, § 33; Jensen v. Denmark (dec.), 2001) even if the latter received some compensation ( Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 88; Bryan and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 45)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-10-27,2023-12-12,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json,apps:46412/21,Calvi and C.G. v. Italy,46412/21,added,"Calvi and C.G. v. Italy, no. 46412/21, 6 July 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,§1.A.3.f,Death of the applicant,4,75,76,0.9721,"Court. In Calvi and C.G. v. Italy , 2023",,"In Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, §§ 41-44, relating to the lawfulness of a placement in a closed educational institution for minors, the Court stated that the applicant was entitled to apply to the Court to protect the interest of the minor under Article 5 and 8 as regards her placement in the institution: the daughter was a minor at the time of the events in issue, as well as at the time when the application was lodged. Once she had reached the age of majotity, the applicant's daughter has confirmed her interest in the application and issued a power of attorney to the lawyer already representing the applicant in the case before the Court.","In Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, §§ 41-44, relating to the lawfulness of a placement in a closed educational institution for minors, the Court stated that the applicant was entitled to apply to the Court to protect the interest of the minor under Article 5 and 8 as regards her placement in the institution: the daughter was a minor at the time of the events in issue, as well as at the time when the application was lodged. Once she had reached the age of majority, the applicant's daughter has confirmed her interest in the application and issued a power of attorney to the lawyer already representing the applicant in the case before the Court. In Calvi and C.G. v. Italy, 2023, §§ 68-70, the Court recognised that the applicant could lodge an application on behalf of his elderly cousin, subject to a legal protection measure, placed in social isolation in a nursing home for three years and unable to apply to the Court himself."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-10-27,2023-12-12,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json,apps:4704/19,Chennouf and Others v. France (dec.),4704/19,added,"Chennouf and Others v. France (dec.), no. 4704/19, 20 June 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,§1.A.3.e,Loss of victim status,4,54,55,0.8602,,,"Moreover, the redress afforded must be appropriate and sufficient. This will depend on all the circumstances of the case, with particular regard to the nature of the Convention violation in issue ( Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], 2010, § 116; Bivolaru v. Romania (no. 2), 2018, § 170).","Moreover, the redress afforded must be appropriate and sufficient. This will depend on all the circumstances of the case, with particular regard to the nature of the Convention violation in issue ( Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], 2010, § 116; Bivolaru v. Romania (no. 2), 2018, § 170). However, if the applicant has agreed to the terms of a friendly settlement at domestic level, he or she cannot complain that the monetary compensation received under that settlement was not sufficient ( Chennouf and Others v. France (dec.), 2023, § 39)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-10-27,2023-12-12,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json,apps:1574/12,Chief Rabbinate of the Jewish Community of Izmir v. Türkiye,1574/12,added,"Chief Rabbinate of the Jewish Community of Izmir v. Türkiye, no. 1574/12, 21 March 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,§1.A.2.b,Legal persons,4,,22,,"Chief Rabbinate of the Jewish Community of Izmir v. Türkiye , 2023",,,"Areligious organisation without aformally recognised legal personality in domestic law, whose capacity to take legal action and acquire real estate had never been questioned internally by administrative authorities or courts, may lodge an application under Article 34 ( Chief Rabbinate of the Jewish Community of Izmir v. Türkiye, 2023, §§ 43-46)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-10-27,2023-12-12,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json,apps:52132/19,Croatian Radio-Television v. Croatia,52132/19,added,"Croatian Radio-Television v. Croatia, nos. 52132/19 and 19 others, 2 March 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,§1.A.2.b,Legal persons,4,,20,,"Croatian Radio-Television v. Croatia , 2023|Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft and publisuisse SA v. Switzerland , 2020|The Holy Monasteries v. Greece , 1994|Österreichischer Rundfunk v. Austria , 2004",,,"In order to determine whether any given legal person other than a territorial authority falls within that category, account must be taken of its legal status and, where appropriate, the rights that status gives it, the nature of the activity it carries out and the context in which it is carried out, and the degree of its independence from the political authorities ( Radio France and Others v. France (dec.), 2003, § 26; Kotov v. Russia [GC], 2012, § 93; Slovenia v. Croatia [GC] (dec.), 2020, § 61). For public-law entities which do not exercise any governmental powers or public-service broadcasters, see The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 1994, § 49; Radio France and Others v. France (dec.), 2003, §§ 24-26; Österreichischer Rundfunk v. Austria, 2004, §§ 46-53; Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft and publisuisse SA v. Switzerland, 2020, §§ 46-48; Croatian Radio-Television v. Croatia, 2023, §§ 98"
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-10-27,2023-12-12,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json,apps:2394/22,Ferrara and Others v. Italy (dec.),2394/22,added,"Ferrara and Others v. Italy (dec.), nos. 2394/22 and 18 others, 16 May 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.E.1,General definition,3,,247,,,,,"Having due regard to the functions of the Court as defined by Article 19 of the Convention, lawyers must show a high level of professional prudence and meaningful cooperation with the Court by refraining from bringing unmeritorious complaints and, once proceedings before the Court have been instituted, by abiding by all the relevant rules of procedure and professional ethics. Otherwise, an abusive or negligent application undermines the credibility of lawyers'work in the eyes of the Court and, if done systematically, may even result in their being excluded from the proceedings under Rule 36 § 4 (c), as amended by the Court on 7 February 2022, and Rule 44D of the Rules of Court ( Ferrara and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2023, § 66)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-10-27,2023-12-12,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json,apps:2394/22,Ferrara and Others v. Italy (dec.),2394/22,added,"Ferrara and Others v. Italy (dec.), nos. 2394/22 and 18 others, 16 May 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,I.E.1,General definition,3,246,246,0.9444,,,"Furthermore, the applicant is entirely responsible for the conduct of his or her lawyer or any other person representing him or her before the Court. Any omissions on the representative's part are in principle attributable to the applicant himself or herself and may lead to the application being rejected as an abuse of the right of application ( Bekauri v. Georgia (preliminary objections), 2012, §§ 22-25; Migliore and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2013; Martins Alves v. Portugal (dec.), 2014, §§ 11-13 and 16-17; Gross v. Switzerland [GC], 2014, § 33).","In assessing whether an application should be considered an abuse of the right of application, the Court may take into account the applicant's behaviour not only before itself but also at the domestic level ( Ferrara and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2023, § 43). Furthermore, the applicant is entirely responsible for the conduct of his or her lawyer or any other person representing him or her before the Court. Any actions or omissions on the representative's part are in principle attributable to the applicant himself or herself and may lead to the application being rejected as an abuse of the right of application ( Bekauri v. Georgia (preliminary objections), 2012, §§ 22-25; Migliore and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2013; Martins Alves v. Portugal (dec.), 2014, §§ 11-13 and 16-17; Gross v. Switzerland [GC], 2014, § 33)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-10-27,2023-12-12,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json,apps:2394/22,Ferrara and Others v. Italy (dec.),2394/22,added,"Ferrara and Others v. Italy (dec.), nos. 2394/22 and 18 others, 16 May 2023",3,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.E.6,Misuse of domestic remedies or other blameworthy acts at the domestic level,3,,265,,,,,"The applicant's conduct at the domestic level is a relevant factor in assessing whether an application should be considered an abuse of the right of application. As domestic remedies are the primary means to protect human rights guaranteed by the Convention, the Court would often decide on the basis of a cumulative analysis of the applicant's behaviour both at the domestic level and before the Court. In particular, a blatant misuse of domestic remedies may lead to the application being declared inadmissible as abusive ( Ferrara and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2023, § 43). For example, unjustified fragmentation of domestic enforcement proceedings with no other purpose than to take the advantage of domestic law to multiply awards of legal fees to lawyers, coupled with the same technique before the Court (lodging many separate identical applications based on the same or similar facts, without joining them or even informing the Court of the existence of a link between them), was considered to be manifestly abusive, negatively affecting the organisation and the workload of both the domestic courts and the Court itself ( ibid., §§ 63-68)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-10-27,2023-12-12,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json,apps:24827/14,"Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC]",24827/14,added,"Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 24827/14, 1 June 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A.2.d,Complaint raised in substance,4,114,115,0.9173,"Farzaliyev v. Azerbaijan , 2020|Kandarakis v. Greece , 2020",,"In sum, the mere fact that an applicant has submitted his or her case to the relevant court does not of itself constitute compliance with the requirements of Article 35 § 1, as even in those jurisdictions where the domestic courts are able, or even obliged, to examine the case of their own motion, applicants are not dispensed from the obligation to raise before them the complaint subsequently made to the Court. Thus, in order properly to exhaust domestic remedies it is not sufficient for a violation of the Convention to be ""evident"" from the facts of the case or the applicant' s submissions. Rather, the applicant must actually have complained (expressly or in substance) about it in a manner which leaves no doubt that the same complaint that is subsequently submitted to the Court was indeed raised at the domestic level ( Farzaliyev v. Azerbaijan, § 55; Peacock v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2016, § 38).","In sum, the mere fact that an applicant has submitted his or her case to the relevant court does not of itself constitute compliance with the requirements of Article 35 § 1. Even in those jurisdictions where the domestic courts are able, or even obliged, to examine the case of their own motion (that is, to apply the principle of jura novit curia ), applicants are not dispensed from raising before them a complaint which they may intend to subsequently make to the Court (see, among other authorities, Kandarakis v. Greece, 2020, § 77), it being understood that for the purposes of exhaustion of domestic remedies the Court must take into account not only the facts but also the legal arguments presented domestically (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 117; Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 171). it must be borne in mind that the Court has no power to substitute itself for the applicant and formulate new complaints simply on the basis of the arguments and facts advanced ( Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 91). Thus, in order properly to exhaust domestic remedies it is not sufficient for a violation of the Convention to be ""evident"" from the facts of the case or the applicant's submissions. Rather, the applicant must actually have complained (expressly or in substance) about it in a manner which leaves no doubt that the same complaint that was subsequently submitted to the Court had indeed been raised at the domestic level ( Peacock v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2016, § 38; Farzaliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 55; Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 90; Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 145 and 172)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-10-27,2023-12-12,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json,apps:24827/14,"Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC]",24827/14,added,"Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 24827/14, 1 June 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.B.1,Purpose of the rule,3,165,166,0.8929,,,"The four-month rule is a public policy rule and the Court has jurisdiction to apply it of its own motion, even if the Government has not raised that objection ( Sabri Güneş c. Turquie [GC], § 29 ; § 29; Svinarenko and Slydanev v. Russia [GC], 2014, § 85; Blokhin v. Russia [GC], 2016, § 102; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 247; Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 138).","The four-month rule is a public policy rule and the Court has jurisdiction to apply it of its own motion, even if the Government has not raised that objection ( Sabri Güneş c. Turquie [GC], § 29 ; § 29; Svinarenko and Slydanev v. Russia [GC], 2014, § 85; Blokhin v. Russia [GC], 2016, § 102; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 2017, § 247; Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 138). Therefore, it is not necessary for the Court to assess whether the respondent Government have properly raised an objection on this point or whether they are estopped from doing so ( Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 163)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-10-27,2023-12-12,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json,apps:24827/14,"Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC]",24827/14,added,"Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 24827/14, 1 June 2023",3,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B.4.d,Characterisation of a complaint,4,,202,,,,,"However, it must be borne in mind that the Court has no power to substitute itself for the applicant and formulate new complaints simply on the basis of the arguments and facts advanced ( Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 91). Since the Court can base its decision only on the facts complained of, it is not sufficient that a violation of the Convention is ""evident"" from the facts of the case or the applicant's submissions. Rather, the applicant must complain that a certain act or omission entailed a violation of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto, in a manner which should not leave the Court to second-guess whether a certain complaint was raised or not ( Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 90; Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 145). Therefore, ambiguous phrases or isolated words do not suffice to accept that a particular complaint has been raised ( Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, §§ 82-85; Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 146)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-10-27,2023-12-12,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json,apps:2758/05,Gaziyev v. Azerbaijan (dec),2758/05,removed,"Gaziyev v. Azerbaijan (dec), no. 2758/05, 7 July 2007",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.A.2.d,Complaint raised in substance,4,113,114,0.9896,,,"It is not necessary for the Convention right to be explicitly raised in domestic proceedings provided that the complaint is raised ""at least in substance"" ( Castells v. Spain, 1992, § 32; Ahmet Sadik v. Greece, 1996, § 33; Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], 1999, § 38; Azinas v. Cyprus [GC], 2004, §§ 40-41; Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], §§ 72, 79 and 81-82; Platini v. Switzerland (dec.), 2020, § 51; Kemal Çetin v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 28-30). This means that if the applicant has not relied on the provisions of the Convention, he or she must have raised arguments to the same or like effect on the basis of domestic law, in order to have given the national courts the opportunity to redress the alleged breach in the first place ( Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], 2010, §§ 142, 144 and 146; Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 117; Karapanagiotou and Others v. Greece, 2010, § 29; Marić v. Croatia, 2014, § 53; Portu Juanenea and Sarasola Yarzabal v. Spain, 2018, §§ 62-63; Rodina v. Latvia, 2020, §§ 81-83; and, in relation to a complaint that was not raised, even implicitly, at the final level of jurisdiction, Association Les témoins de Jéhovah v. France (dec.), 2010; Nicklinson and Lamb v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2015, §§ 89-94; Peacock v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2016, §§ 32-41). It is not sufficient that the applicant may have exercised a remedy which could have overturned the impugned measure on other grounds not connected with the complaint of a violation of a Convention right. It is the Convention complaint which must have been aired at national level for there to have been exhaustion of ""effective remedies"" ( Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], § 75; Nicklinson and Lamb v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2015, § 90). The applicant is not dispensed from this requirement even if the national courts might have been able, or even obliged, to examine the case of their own motion under the Convention"" ( Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, § 39; Gaziyev v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2007).","It is not necessary for the Convention right to be explicitly raised in domestic proceedings provided that the complaint is raised ""at least in substance"" ( Castells v. Spain, 1992, § 32; Ahmet Sadik v. Greece, 1996, § 33; Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], 1999, § 38; Azinas v. Cyprus [GC], 2004, §§ 40-41; Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], 2014, §§ 72, 79 and 81-82; Platini v. Switzerland (dec.), 2020, § 51; Kemal Çetin v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 28-30). This means that if the applicant has not relied on the provisions of the Convention, he or she must have raised arguments to the same or like effect on the basis of domestic law, in order to have given the national courts the opportunity to redress the alleged breach in the first place ( Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], 2010, §§ 142, 144 and 146; Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 117; Karapanagiotou and Others v. Greece, 2010, § 29; Marić v. Croatia, 2014, § 53; Portu Juanenea and Sarasola Yarzabal v. Spain, 2018, §§ 62-63; Rodina v. Latvia, 2020, §§ 81-83; and, in relation to a complaint that was not raised, even implicitly, at the final level of jurisdiction, Association Les témoins de Jéhovah v. France (dec.), 2010; Nicklinson and Lamb v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2015, §§ 89-94; Peacock v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2016, §§ 32-41). It is not sufficient that the applicant may have exercised a remedy which could have overturned the impugned measure on other grounds not connected with the complaint of a violation of a Convention right. It is the Convention complaint which must have been aired at national level for there to have been exhaustion of ""effective remedies"" ( Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], 2014, § 75; Nicklinson and Lamb v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2015, § 90)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-10-27,2023-12-12,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json,apps:19750/13,Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC],19750/13,added,"Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 19750/13, 1 June 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A.2.d,Complaint raised in substance,4,114,115,0.9173,"Farzaliyev v. Azerbaijan , 2020|Kandarakis v. Greece , 2020",,"In sum, the mere fact that an applicant has submitted his or her case to the relevant court does not of itself constitute compliance with the requirements of Article 35 § 1, as even in those jurisdictions where the domestic courts are able, or even obliged, to examine the case of their own motion, applicants are not dispensed from the obligation to raise before them the complaint subsequently made to the Court. Thus, in order properly to exhaust domestic remedies it is not sufficient for a violation of the Convention to be ""evident"" from the facts of the case or the applicant' s submissions. Rather, the applicant must actually have complained (expressly or in substance) about it in a manner which leaves no doubt that the same complaint that is subsequently submitted to the Court was indeed raised at the domestic level ( Farzaliyev v. Azerbaijan, § 55; Peacock v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2016, § 38).","In sum, the mere fact that an applicant has submitted his or her case to the relevant court does not of itself constitute compliance with the requirements of Article 35 § 1. Even in those jurisdictions where the domestic courts are able, or even obliged, to examine the case of their own motion (that is, to apply the principle of jura novit curia ), applicants are not dispensed from raising before them a complaint which they may intend to subsequently make to the Court (see, among other authorities, Kandarakis v. Greece, 2020, § 77), it being understood that for the purposes of exhaustion of domestic remedies the Court must take into account not only the facts but also the legal arguments presented domestically (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 117; Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 171). it must be borne in mind that the Court has no power to substitute itself for the applicant and formulate new complaints simply on the basis of the arguments and facts advanced ( Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 91). Thus, in order properly to exhaust domestic remedies it is not sufficient for a violation of the Convention to be ""evident"" from the facts of the case or the applicant's submissions. Rather, the applicant must actually have complained (expressly or in substance) about it in a manner which leaves no doubt that the same complaint that was subsequently submitted to the Court had indeed been raised at the domestic level ( Peacock v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2016, § 38; Farzaliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 55; Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 90; Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 145 and 172)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-10-27,2023-12-12,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json,apps:19750/13,Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC],19750/13,added,"Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 19750/13, 1 June 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B.4.d,Characterisation of a complaint,4,,202,,,,,"However, it must be borne in mind that the Court has no power to substitute itself for the applicant and formulate new complaints simply on the basis of the arguments and facts advanced ( Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 91). Since the Court can base its decision only on the facts complained of, it is not sufficient that a violation of the Convention is ""evident"" from the facts of the case or the applicant's submissions. Rather, the applicant must complain that a certain act or omission entailed a violation of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto, in a manner which should not leave the Court to second-guess whether a certain complaint was raised or not ( Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 90; Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 145). Therefore, ambiguous phrases or isolated words do not suffice to accept that a particular complaint has been raised ( Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, §§ 82-85; Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 146)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-10-27,2023-12-12,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json,apps:19750/13,Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC],19750/13,added,"Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 19750/13, 1 June 2023",3,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B.4.d,Characterisation of a complaint,4,,204,,,,,"Adifference must be made between complaints (that is, the arguments pointing to the cause or the fact constitutive of the alleged violations of the Convention) clearly formulated as such, and a mere secondary argument in support of a complaint ( Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, §§ 94-95)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-10-27,2023-12-12,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json,apps:48345/12,Kandarakis v. Greece,48345/12,added,"Kandarakis v. Greece, nos. 48345/12 and 2 others, 11 June 2020",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A.2.d,Complaint raised in substance,4,114,115,0.9173,"Farzaliyev v. Azerbaijan , 2020|Kandarakis v. Greece , 2020",,"In sum, the mere fact that an applicant has submitted his or her case to the relevant court does not of itself constitute compliance with the requirements of Article 35 § 1, as even in those jurisdictions where the domestic courts are able, or even obliged, to examine the case of their own motion, applicants are not dispensed from the obligation to raise before them the complaint subsequently made to the Court. Thus, in order properly to exhaust domestic remedies it is not sufficient for a violation of the Convention to be ""evident"" from the facts of the case or the applicant' s submissions. Rather, the applicant must actually have complained (expressly or in substance) about it in a manner which leaves no doubt that the same complaint that is subsequently submitted to the Court was indeed raised at the domestic level ( Farzaliyev v. Azerbaijan, § 55; Peacock v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2016, § 38).","In sum, the mere fact that an applicant has submitted his or her case to the relevant court does not of itself constitute compliance with the requirements of Article 35 § 1. Even in those jurisdictions where the domestic courts are able, or even obliged, to examine the case of their own motion (that is, to apply the principle of jura novit curia ), applicants are not dispensed from raising before them a complaint which they may intend to subsequently make to the Court (see, among other authorities, Kandarakis v. Greece, 2020, § 77), it being understood that for the purposes of exhaustion of domestic remedies the Court must take into account not only the facts but also the legal arguments presented domestically (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 117; Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 171). it must be borne in mind that the Court has no power to substitute itself for the applicant and formulate new complaints simply on the basis of the arguments and facts advanced ( Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 91). Thus, in order properly to exhaust domestic remedies it is not sufficient for a violation of the Convention to be ""evident"" from the facts of the case or the applicant's submissions. Rather, the applicant must actually have complained (expressly or in substance) about it in a manner which leaves no doubt that the same complaint that was subsequently submitted to the Court had indeed been raised at the domestic level ( Peacock v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2016, § 38; Farzaliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 55; Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 90; Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 145 and 172)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-10-27,2023-12-12,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json,apps:53030/19,Kitanovska and Barbulovski v. North Macedonia,53030/19,added,"Kitanovska and Barbulovski v. North Macedonia, no. 53030/19, 9 May 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.3,Expiry of the four-month period,3,192,193,0.9958,"Kitanovska and Barbulovski v. North Macedonia , 2023",,"Moreover, in very exceptional circumstances, the Court may rely on its interpretive jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Convention to adjust the method of calculation of the four-month rule in order to preserve the substance of the right of individual petition. Thus, during the global outbreak of COVID- 19 and the public health emergency of international concern declared by the World Health Organisation, on 16 March and 9 April 2020 the President of the Court announced a number of exceptional measures to allow applicants, High Contracting Parties and the Court to deal with the difficulties arising . One effect of those measures (decided by the President in the exercise of his competence to direct the work and the administration of the Court under Rule 9 of the Rules of Court) was that the Registry of the Court, when registering newly received applications and without prejudice to any subsequent judicial decision on the matter, was to add three months in total to the calculation of the then six-month period whenever a calendar six-month period either started to run or, on the contrary, was due to expire at any time between 16 March and 15 June 2020. The Court held that the running of the then six-month period could legitimately be considered to have been suspended during the most critical phase of the global pandemic: this was, moreover, consistent with the general principle in public international law of force majeure as well as that of contra non valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio, a legal maxim according to which prescriptions cannot run against those who are incapable of acting. It follows that if the aforementioned time-limit either started to run or was due to expire during the aforementioned specified time-frame, the then six-month rule had to be exceptionally considered to have been suspended for three calendar months ( Saakashvili v. Georgia (dec.), 2022, §§ 49-59); Makarashvili and Others v. Georgia, 2022, § 47).","Moreover, in very exceptional circumstances, the Court may rely on its interpretive jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Convention to adjust the method of calculation of the four-month rule in order to preserve the substance of the right of individual petition. Thus, during the global outbreak of COVID- 19 and the public health emergency of international concern declared by the World Health Organisation, on 16 March and 9 April 2020 the President of the Court announced a number of exceptional measures to allow applicants, High Contracting Parties and the Court to deal with the difficulties arising . One effect of those measures (decided by the President in the exercise of his competence to direct the work and the administration of the Court under Rule 9 of the Rules of Court) was that the Registry of the Court, when registering newly received applications and without prejudice to any subsequent judicial decision on the matter, was to add three months in total to the calculation of the then six-month period whenever a calendar six-month period either started to run or, on the contrary, was due to expire at any time between 16 March and 15 June 2020. The Court held that the running of the then six-month period could legitimately be considered to have been suspended during the most critical phase of the global pandemic: this was, moreover, consistent with the general principle in public international law of force majeure as well as that of contra non valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio, a legal maxim according to which prescriptions cannot run against those who are incapable of acting. It follows that if the aforementioned time-limit either started to run or was due to expire during the aforementioned specified time-frame, the then six-month rule had to be exceptionally considered to have been suspended for three calendar months ( Saakashvili v. Georgia (dec.), 2022, §§ 49-59); Makarashvili and Others v. Georgia, 2022, § 47). For a negative example when the time-limit expired after the end of the exceptional time-frame, see Kitanovska and Barbulovski v. North Macedonia, 2023, § 40."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-10-27,2023-12-12,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json,apps:29999/04|41424/04,Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia,29999/04|41424/04,added,"Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, nos. 29999/04 and 41424/04, 7 March 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B.5.c,Application of the four-month rule as regards the conditions of detention,4,,219,,"In Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia , 2023",,,"In Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, concerning unlawful arrests, ill- treatment and detention of two vulnerable men by de facto Abkhaz authorities in Georgia, the Court emphasised that the psychological effects of torture and other ill-treatment might render people incapable of instigating proceedings without delay. Because of the exceptional circumstances of the case, the Court accepted that, after their arrests in a generally politically unclear and unstable context, the applicants might well feel helpless and unable to influence what was happening to them. In addition, they might have been waiting for developments that could resolve crucial factual or legal issues. With that in mind and the absence of effective domestic remedies, the Court accepted that the application was not belated (§§ 271-277)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-10-27,2023-12-12,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json,apps:27094/20,Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye,27094/20,added,"Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye, no. 27094/20, 27 June 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,§1.A.3.d,Potential victims and actio popularis,4,46,47,0.9471,"Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye , 2023|Vijayanathan and Pusparajah v. France , 1992",,"In order to be able to claim to be a victim in such a situation, an applicant must produce reasonable and convincing evidence of the likelihood that a violation affecting him or her personally will occur; mere suspicion or conjecture is insufficient ( Senator Lines GmbH v. fifteen member States of the European Union (dec.) [GC], 2004; Shortall and Others v. Ireland (dec.), 2021). For the absence of a formal expulsion order, see Vijayanathan and Pusparajah v. France, § 46; for alleged consequences of a parliamentary report, see Fédération chrétienne des témoins de Jéhovah de France v. France (dec.), 2001; for alleged consequences of a judicial ruling concerning a third party in a coma, see Rossi and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2008; for alleged consequences of anti-doping measures for sports associations and individual sports professionals, see National federation of Sportspersons'Associations and unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 91-103.","In order to be able to claim to be a victim in such a situation, an applicant must produce reasonable and convincing evidence of the likelihood that a violation affecting him or her personally will occur; mere suspicion or conjecture is insufficient ( Senator Lines GmbH v. fifteen member States of the European Union (dec.) [GC], 2004; Shortall and Others v. Ireland (dec.), 2021). For the absence of a formal expulsion order, see Vijayanathan and Pusparajah v. France, 1992, § 46; for alleged consequences of a parliamentary report, see Fédération chrétienne des témoins de Jéhovah de France v. France (dec.), 2001; for alleged consequences of a judicial ruling concerning a third party in a coma, see Rossi and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2008; for alleged consequences of anti-doping measures for sports associations and individual sports professionals, see National federation of Sportspersons'Associations and unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 91-103; for alleged consequences of amendments banning access to legal abortion on foetal malformation grounds, see A.M. and Others v. Poland (dec.), 2023, §§ 75-87; for the refusal to exempt an applicant, without her undergoing a medical examination to prove that she was not pregnant, from the 300-day waiting period imposed on divorced women wishing to remarry, in the absence of any actual intention to do so, see Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye, 2023, §§ 27-29."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-10-27,2023-12-12,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json,apps:22060/20,Sperisen v. Switzerland,22060/20,added,"Sperisen v. Switzerland, no. 22060/20, 13 June 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.2.b,Starting point,4,176,177,0.9193,"Sperisen v. Switzerland , 2023",,"The four-month rule is autonomous and must be construed and applied to the facts of each individual case, so as to ensure the effective exercise of the right to individual petition. While taking account of domestic law and practice is an important aspect, it is not decisive in determining the starting point of the four-month period ( Sabri Güneş v. Turkey [GC], 2012, §§ 52 and 55). As an example, the Court has considered that it would be an overly formalistic interpretation of the four- month time-limit to require an applicant with two related complaints to bring two applications before it on different dates in order to take account of certain procedural rules of domestic law ( Sociedad Anónima del Ucieza v. Spain, 2014, §§ 43-45).","The four-month rule is autonomous and must be construed and applied to the facts of each individual case, so as to ensure the effective exercise of the right to individual petition. While taking account of domestic law and practice is an important aspect, it is not decisive in determining the starting point of the four-month period ( Sabri Güneş v. Turkey [GC], 2012, §§ 52 and 55). As an example, the Court has considered that it would be an overly formalistic interpretation of the four- month time-limit to require an applicant with two related complaints to bring two applications before it on different dates in order to take account of certain procedural rules of domestic law ( Sociedad Anónima del Ucieza v. Spain, 2014, §§ 43-45). Applying the same principle, the Court has held that, when a recusal request against a judge had been rejected by a final decision in the course of the domestic proceedings and the applicant later alleged a violation of the right to an impartial tribunal, the four-month time limit regarding that complaint had to be counted as running from the date of the final domestic judgment on the merits of the case ( Sperisen v. Switzerland, 2023, §§ 47-49)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-10-27,2023-12-12,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json,apps:54421/21,Szaxon v. Hungary (dec.),54421/21,added,"Szaxon v. Hungary (dec.), no. 54421/21, 21 March 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.A.6,Creation of new remedies,3,152,153,0.9988,,,"The assessment of whether domestic remedies have been exhausted is normally carried out with reference to the state of the proceedings on the date on which the application was lodged with the Court. This rule is, however, subject to exceptions following the creation of new remedies ( İçyer v. Turkey (dec.), 2006, §§ 72 et seq.). The Court has departed from this rule in particular in cases concerning the length of proceedings ( Predil Anstalt v. Italy (dec.), 2002; Bottaro v. Italy (dec.), 2002; Andrášik and Others v. Slovakia (dec.), 2002; Nogolica v. Croatia (dec.), 2002; Brusco v. Italy (dec.), 2001; Korenjak v. Slovenia (dec.), 2007, §§ 66-71; Techniki Olympiaki A.E. v. Greece (dec.), 2013) or concerning a new compensatory remedy in respect of interferences with property rights ( Charzyński v. Poland (dec.), 2005; Michalak v. Poland (dec.), 2005; Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (dec.) [GC], 2010; Beshiri and Others v. Albania (dec.), § 177 and §§ 216-218; Olkhovik and Others v. Russia (dec.), 2022, §§ 34-41); or failure to execute domestic judgments ( Nagovitsyn and Nalgiyev v. Russia (dec.), 2010, §§ 36-40; Balan v. Moldova (dec.), 2012); or prison overcrowding ( Łatak v. Poland (dec.), 2010; Stella and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2014, §§ 42-45); or improper conditions of detention ( Shmelev and Others v. Russia (dec.), 2020, §§ 123-131).","The assessment of whether domestic remedies have been exhausted is normally carried out with reference to the state of the proceedings on the date on which the application was lodged with the Court. This rule is, however, subject to exceptions following the creation of new remedies ( İçyer v. Turkey (dec.), 2006, §§ 72 et seq.). The Court has departed from this rule in particular in cases concerning the length of proceedings ( Predil Anstalt v. Italy (dec.), 2002; Bottaro v. Italy (dec.), 2002; Andrášik and Others v. Slovakia (dec.), 2002; Nogolica v. Croatia (dec.), 2002; Brusco v. Italy (dec.), 2001; Korenjak v. Slovenia (dec.), 2007, §§ 66-71; Techniki Olympiaki A.E. v. Greece (dec.), 2013; Szaxon v. Hungary (dec.), 2023, §§ 42-48) or concerning a new compensatory remedy in respect of interferences with property rights ( Charzyński v. Poland (dec.), 2005; Michalak v. Poland (dec.), 2005; Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (dec.) [GC], 2010; Beshiri and Others v. Albania (dec.), § 177 and §§ 216-218; Olkhovik and Others v. Russia (dec.), 2022, §§ 34-41); or failure to execute domestic judgments ( Nagovitsyn and Nalgiyev v. Russia (dec.), 2010, §§ 36-40; Balan v. Moldova (dec.), 2012); or prison overcrowding ( Łatak v. Poland (dec.), 2010; Stella and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2014, §§ 42-45); or improper conditions of detention ( Shmelev and Others v. Russia (dec.), 2020, §§ 123-131)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231027002911__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-10-27,2023-12-12,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-10-27__2023-12-12.json,name:van oosterwijck v belgium::1980,Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium,,removed,"Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, 6 November 1980, Series A no. 40",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.A.2.d,Complaint raised in substance,4,113,114,0.9896,,,"It is not necessary for the Convention right to be explicitly raised in domestic proceedings provided that the complaint is raised ""at least in substance"" ( Castells v. Spain, 1992, § 32; Ahmet Sadik v. Greece, 1996, § 33; Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], 1999, § 38; Azinas v. Cyprus [GC], 2004, §§ 40-41; Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], §§ 72, 79 and 81-82; Platini v. Switzerland (dec.), 2020, § 51; Kemal Çetin v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 28-30). This means that if the applicant has not relied on the provisions of the Convention, he or she must have raised arguments to the same or like effect on the basis of domestic law, in order to have given the national courts the opportunity to redress the alleged breach in the first place ( Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], 2010, §§ 142, 144 and 146; Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 117; Karapanagiotou and Others v. Greece, 2010, § 29; Marić v. Croatia, 2014, § 53; Portu Juanenea and Sarasola Yarzabal v. Spain, 2018, §§ 62-63; Rodina v. Latvia, 2020, §§ 81-83; and, in relation to a complaint that was not raised, even implicitly, at the final level of jurisdiction, Association Les témoins de Jéhovah v. France (dec.), 2010; Nicklinson and Lamb v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2015, §§ 89-94; Peacock v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2016, §§ 32-41). It is not sufficient that the applicant may have exercised a remedy which could have overturned the impugned measure on other grounds not connected with the complaint of a violation of a Convention right. It is the Convention complaint which must have been aired at national level for there to have been exhaustion of ""effective remedies"" ( Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], § 75; Nicklinson and Lamb v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2015, § 90). The applicant is not dispensed from this requirement even if the national courts might have been able, or even obliged, to examine the case of their own motion under the Convention"" ( Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, § 39; Gaziyev v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2007).","It is not necessary for the Convention right to be explicitly raised in domestic proceedings provided that the complaint is raised ""at least in substance"" ( Castells v. Spain, 1992, § 32; Ahmet Sadik v. Greece, 1996, § 33; Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], 1999, § 38; Azinas v. Cyprus [GC], 2004, §§ 40-41; Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], 2014, §§ 72, 79 and 81-82; Platini v. Switzerland (dec.), 2020, § 51; Kemal Çetin v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 28-30). This means that if the applicant has not relied on the provisions of the Convention, he or she must have raised arguments to the same or like effect on the basis of domestic law, in order to have given the national courts the opportunity to redress the alleged breach in the first place ( Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], 2010, §§ 142, 144 and 146; Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 117; Karapanagiotou and Others v. Greece, 2010, § 29; Marić v. Croatia, 2014, § 53; Portu Juanenea and Sarasola Yarzabal v. Spain, 2018, §§ 62-63; Rodina v. Latvia, 2020, §§ 81-83; and, in relation to a complaint that was not raised, even implicitly, at the final level of jurisdiction, Association Les témoins de Jéhovah v. France (dec.), 2010; Nicklinson and Lamb v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2015, §§ 89-94; Peacock v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2016, §§ 32-41). It is not sufficient that the applicant may have exercised a remedy which could have overturned the impugned measure on other grounds not connected with the complaint of a violation of a Convention right. It is the Convention complaint which must have been aired at national level for there to have been exhaustion of ""effective remedies"" ( Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], 2014, § 75; Nicklinson and Lamb v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2015, § 90)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:24382/15,Asgarova and Veselova v. Armenia (dec.),24382/15,added,"Asgarova and Veselova v. Armenia (dec.), no. 24382/15, 12 September 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,§2.A.4,Representation,3,,79,,"Asgarova and Veselova v. Armenia (dec.), no. 24382/15, 12 September 2023|Ghazaryan and Bayramyan v. Azerbaijan, 2023, no. 33050/18, 5 October 2023",,,"In Ghazaryan and Bayramyan v. Azerbaijan, 2023, the Court allowed the applicants to lodge the application, without written authority, in the name and on behalf of their son, an Armenian national with prior mental health issues, who had been apprehended in Azerbaijan, sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment and continuously kept in solitary confinement. In these circumstances, the cumulative effect of the serious mental health issues of the direct victim and his situation during his detention and confinement, had entailed a vulnerability that had rendered him unable to lodge a complaint with the Court (§§ 73-82). Conversely, in Asgarova and Veselova v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, the Court did not recognise the locus standi of two women complaining on behalf of their partners convicted and held in detention in the unrecognised ""Nagorno-Karabakh Republic"" under the effective control of Armenia. The applicants' partners having repeatedly had the opportunity to communicate with their families with the help of the International Committee of the Red Cross and having been visited by representatives of the International Working Group on Search for Missing Persons and Hostages, there was no proof of their inability to appoint a representative and/or to sign an authority form. Consequently, there were no exceptional circumstances allowing those applicants to act in the name and on behalf of their partners without a duly signed written authority (§§ 47-55)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:38692/16,Blazheski v. North Macedonia (dec.),38692/16,added,"Blazheski v. North Macedonia (dec.), no. 38692/16, 4 July 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.D,Incompatibility ratione materiae,2,,354,,"Blazheski v. North Macedonia (dec.), no. 38692/16, 4 July 2023",,,"It is to be noted that the vast majority of decisions declaring applications inadmissible on the ground of incompatibility ratione materiae pertain to the limits of the scope of the Articles of the Convention or its Protocols, in particular Article 2 of the Convention (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition of torture), Article 4 of the Convention (prohibition of slavery and forced labour), Article 5 of the Convention (right to liberty and security), Article 6 of the Convention (right to a fair hearing), Article 7 (no punishment without law), Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life; see for instance, Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, § 134), Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion), Article 10 (freedom of expression), Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association) and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) and other Articles. ). As concerns the applicability of Article 5 of Protocol No. 7, see Blazheski v. North Macedonia (dec.), 2023."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:9987/14,Boronenkov v. Ukraine (dec.),9987/14,added,"Boronenkov v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 9987/14, 2 April 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.B.2,Scope,3,,395,,"Boronenkov v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 9987/14, 2 April 2024",,,"The application of the no significant disadvantage criterion is not limited to any particular right protected under the Convention. However, the Court has found it difficult to envisage a situation in which a complaint under Article 3, which would not be inadmissible on any other grounds and which would fall within the scope of Article 3 (which means that the minimum level of severity test would be fulfilled), might be declared inadmissible because the applicant has not suffered significant disadvantage (Y v. Latvia, 2014, § 44). Similarly, the Court has rejected the application of the the new criterion in relation to an Article 2 complaint, stressing that the right to life is one of the most fundamental provisions of the Convention (Makuchyan and Minasyan v. Azerbaijan and Hungary, 2020, §§ 72-73). In relation to complaints under Article 5, the Court has so far rejected the application of the ""no significant disadvantage"" admissibility criterion in the light of the prominent place that the right to liberty has in a democratic society (Zelčs v. Latvia, 2020, § 44 and the references cited therein). The Court has also stated that in cases concerning freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9) or freedom of expression (Article 10), the application of the no significant disadvantage criterion should take due account of the importance of these freedoms and be subject to careful scrutiny by the Court (for Article 9, see Stavropoulos and Others v. Greece, 2020, §§ 29-30). In the context of Article 10, such scrutiny should encompass elements such as the contribution made to a debate of general interest and whether the case involves the press or other news media (Margulev v. Russia, 2019, §§ 41-42; Sylka v. Poland (dec.), 2014, § 28; Panioglu v. Romania, 2020, §§ 72-76; Šeks v. Croatia, 2022, § 48). As regards cases concerning freedom of assembly and freedom of association (Article 11), the Court should take due account of the importance of these freedoms for a democratic society and carry out a careful scrutiny (Obote v. Russia, 2019, § 31; Yordanovi v. Bulgaria, 2020, §§ 49-52). Unlike previous cases, in Boronenkov v. Ukraine (dec.), 2024, §§ 17-23, the Court found that the applicant had not suffered a significant disadvantage within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (b) in respect of his complaint under Article 11 (freedom of assembly). In addition, having regard to the link between the Article 11 complaint and the complaint under Article 6, the Court arrived at the same conclusion in respect of the latter complaint (ibid., § 23)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:9987/14,Boronenkov v. Ukraine (dec.),9987/14,added,"Boronenkov v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 9987/14, 2 April 2024",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.B.3,Whether the applicant has suffered a significant disadvantage,3,,398,,"Boronenkov v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 9987/14, 2 April 2024",,,"Moreover, in evaluating the subjective significance of the issue for the applicant, the Court can take into account the applicant's conduct, for example in being inactive in court proceedings during a certain period which demonstrated that in this case the proceedings could not have been significant to her (Shefer v. Russia (dec.), 2012). In Giusti v. Italy, 2011, §§ 22-36, the Court introduced certain new elements to take into account when determining the minimum threshold of seriousness to justify examination by an international court, namely the nature of the right allegedly violated, the seriousness of the claimed violation and/or the potential consequences of the violation on the personal situation of the applicant. In evaluating these consequences, the Court will examine, in particular, what is at stake or the outcome of the national proceedings. For instance, in Boronenkov v. Ukraine (dec.), 2024, §§ 17-21, the Court took into account several factors diminishing the significance of any ""disadvantage"" suffered by the applicant and found a lack of a ""chilling effect"" on the exercise of his right to freedom of assembly."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:9987/14,Boronenkov v. Ukraine (dec.),9987/14,added,"Boronenkov v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 9987/14, 2 April 2024",3,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.B.3.d,Significant non-financial disadvantage,4,,419,,"Boronenkov v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 9987/14, 2 April 2024",,,"In interesting cases involving complaints under Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11, the Government's objections on the basis of no significant disadvantage were also rejected. In Biržietis v. Lithuania, 2016, §§ 34-37, internal regulations of the prison prohibited the applicant from growing a beard and he contended that the prohibition had caused him mental suffering. The Court considered that the case raised issues concerning restrictions on prisoners' personal choices as to their desired appearance, which was arguably an important matter of principle. In Brazzi v. Italy, 2018, §§ 24-29, a case concerning a house search devoid of any financial implications, the Court took into account the subjective importance of the matter for the applicant (his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions and his home) as well as what was objectively at stake, namely the existence under domestic law of effective judicial supervision in respect of a search. In Cordella and Others v. Italy, 2019, §§ 135-139, a case concerning the alleged lack of reaction by the State to air pollution by a steelworks, to the detriment of the surrounding population's health, the Court took into account the nature of the complaints brought by the applicants (under Article 8) and the existence of scientific studies showing the polluting effects of the emissions from the steelworks on the environment and on the health of the persons living in the affected areas. In Vartic v. Romania (no. 2), 2013, §§ 37-41, the applicant complained that by refusing to provide him with the vegetarian diet required by his Buddhist convictions, the prison authorities had infringed his right to manifest his religion under Article 9. The Court concluded that the subject matter of the complaint gave rise to an important matter of principle (see also Stavropoulos and Others v. Greece, 2020, §§ 29-30, concerning a birth certificate revealing the parents' choice not to christen their child in relation to the right not to manifest their beliefs). In Eon v. France, 2013, § 34, the complaint under Article 10, turned on whether insulting the head of State should remain a criminal offence. Rejecting the Government's objection, the Court concluded that the issue was subjectively important to the applicant and objectively a matter of public interest. Another Article 10 case, Jankovskis v. Lithuania, 2017, §§ 59-63, concerned a prisoner's right to receive information. The applicant was denied access to a website containing information about learning and study programmes. Such information was directly relevant to the applicant's interest in obtaining education, which was in turn of relevance for his rehabilitation and subsequent reintegration into society. Having regard to the consequences of that interference for the applicant, the Court dismissed the Government's objection that the applicant had not suffered significant disadvantage. In Šeks v. Croatia, 2022, § 49, where the applicant complained about the refusal of the national authorities to declassify some documents that he considered essential for his scientific monograph, the Court dismissed the Government's objection based on the fact that the book in question had eventually been published, even without the respective references. In Panioglu v. Romania, 2020, §§ 75-76, the Court also dismissed the Government's objection and considered that the alleged violation of Article 10 (code-of-conduct proceedings against a judge for publishing allegations calling into question the moral and professional integrity of the President of the Court of Cassation) concerned ""important questions of principle"", having regard to the applicant's subjective perception that it had affected her prospects of career advancement and had penalised her for participating in a debate of general interest on the reform and the functioning of the justice system. In Berladir and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 34, the Court did not find it appropriate to dismiss the complaints under Articles 10 and 11 with reference to Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention, given that they arguably concerned a matter of principle. In Akarsubaşı and Alçiçek v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 16-20, the applicants, who were members of a trade union, had been fined for attaching a banner stating ""Workplace on Strike"" to a fence in front of a secondary school on a day of national mobilisation. They complained under Article 11 of the Convention. The Court rejected the Government's objection that the applicants had not suffered a significant disadvantage. It emphasized the crucial importance of the right to peaceful assembly and noted that the alleged violation was likely to have a considerable impact on the applicants' exercise of this right, since the fines could discourage them from participating in other assemblies as part of their trade union activities. The Court also relied on the crucial importance of the freedom of peaceful assembly in rejecting the Government's objection under Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention in Öğrü and Others v. Turkey, 2017, §§ 53-54 (concerning human rights activists). Both these cases differ from the case of Boronenkov v. Ukraine (dec.), 2024, §§ 22-23, where the penalty imposed on the applicant and the alleged disadvantage he suffered were not significant enough to warrant examination of his case on the merits. On another hand, see, as regards freedom of association, Yordanovi v. Bulgaria, 2020, §§ 49-52 (concerning criminal proceedings for attempting to set up a political party)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:37364/10,Boškoćević v. Serbia,37364/10,added,"Boškoćević v. Serbia, no. 37364/10, 5 March 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,§2.B.1,Principles and examples,3,,88,,"Boškoćević v. Serbia, no. 37364/10, 5 March 2024",,,"The domestic authorities must refrain from putting any form of pressure on applicants to withdraw or modify their complaints. According to the Court, pressure may take the form of direct coercion and flagrant acts of intimidation in respect of applicants or potential applicants, their families or their legal representatives, but also improper indirect acts or contacts designed to dissuade or discourage applicants from pursuing a Convention remedy (Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], 2005, § 102). The Court examines the dissuasive effect on the exercise of the right of individual application (Colibaba v. Moldova, 2007, § 68). Whether or not contacts between the authorities and an applicant are tantamount to unacceptable practices from the standpoint of Article 34 must be determined in the light of the particular circumstances of the case (Boškoćević v. Serbia, 2024, § 65). Afailure by the respondent Government to comply with their procedural obligation under Article 34 does not necessarily require that the alleged interference should have actually restricted, or had any appreciable impact on, the exercise of the right of individual petition. The procedural obligations under Articles 34 and 38 of the Convention must be enforced irrespective of the eventual outcome of the proceedings, and in such a manner as to avoid any actual or potential chilling effect on applicants or their representatives (Mehmet Ali Ayhan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 41)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:37364/10,Boškoćević v. Serbia,37364/10,added,"Boškoćević v. Serbia, no. 37364/10, 5 March 2024",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,§2.B.1,Principles and examples,3,,91,,"Boškoćević v. Serbia, no. 37364/10, 5 March 2024",,,"Some noteworthy examples: ▪ as regards interrogation by the authorities concerning the application: Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 1996, § 105; Tanrıkulu v. Turkey [GC], 1999, § 131; ▪ threats of criminal proceedings against the applicant's lawyer: Kurt v. Turkey, 1998, §§ 159-65; complaint by the authorities against the lawyer in the domestic proceedings: McShane v. the United Kingdom, 2002, § 151; disciplinary and other measures against the applicant's lawyers: Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 929-33; ▪ police questioning of the applicants' lawyer concerning the signature of a power of attorney (M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 62, 64, and §§ 325-336); police questioning of the applicant's lawyer and translator concerning the claim for just satisfaction: Fedotova v. Russia, 2006, §§ 49-51; regarding an inquiry ordered by the Government's representative: Ryabov v. Russia, 2008, §§ 53-65; ▪ inability of the applicant's lawyer and doctor to meet: Boicenco v. Moldova, 2006, §§ 158-59; ▪ measures limiting an applicant's contacts with her/his representative: Shtukaturov v. Russia, 2008, § 140, where a ban on a lawyer's visits, coupled with a ban on telephone calls and correspondence, was held to be incompatible with the respondent State's obligations under Article 34, and Zakharkin v. Russia, 2010, §§ 157-60, where the applicant's contacts with his representative before the Court had been restricted on the grounds that the representative in question was not a professional advocate and did not belong to any Bar association; ▪ interception of letters sent to the detained applicants by their legal representatives enclosing forms of authority to be completed for the purpose of lodging and then subsequently finalising their application with the Court: Mehmet Ali Ayhan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 39-45 and the references cited therein; ▪ failure to respect the confidentiality of lawyer-applicant discussions in a meeting room: Oferta Plus SRL v. Moldova, 2006, § 156; ▪ threats by the prison authorities: Petra v. Romania, 1998, § 44; ▪ refusal by the prison authorities to forward an application to the Court on the ground of non- exhaustion of domestic remedies: Nurmagomedov v. Russia, 2007, § 61; ▪ pressure put on a witness in a case before the Court concerning conditions of detention: Novinskiy v. Russia, 2009, §§ 119 et seq.; ▪ dissuasive remarks by the prison authorities combined with unjustified omissions and delays in providing the prisoner with writing materials for his correspondence and with the documents necessary for his application to the Court: Gagiu v. Romania, 2009, §§ 94 et seq.; ▪ the authorities' refusal to provide an imprisoned applicant with copies of documents required for his application to the Court: Naydyon v. Ukraine, 2010, § 68; Vasiliy Ivashchenko v. Ukraine, 2012, §§ 107-10; ▪ loss by prison authorities of irreplaceable papers relating to prisoner's application to the Court: Buldakov v. Russia, 2011, §§ 48-50; ▪ intimidation and pressuring of an applicant by the authorities in connection with the case before the Court: Lopata v. Russia, 2010, §§ 154-60; ▪ threats of dismissal from a job at a statutory corporation which cannot be regarded as ""non- governmental"" for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention, for having applied to the Court, and pressuring the applicant into submitting to his employer copies of all relevant correspondence with the Court (Boškoćević v. Serbia, 2024, §§ 58-62, 65-67)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:7189/21,Carême v. France [GC] (dec.),7189/21,added,"Carême v. France [GC] (dec.), no. 7189/21, 9 April 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,§2.A.3.b,Direct victim,4,,29,,"Carême v. France [GC] (dec.), no. 7189/21, 9 April 2024|Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, 9 April 2024",,,"In the specific context of complaints concerning harm or risk of harm resulting from alleged failures by the State to combat climate change, having regard to the special features of climate change and to the principle of exclusion of actio popularis under the Convention, the Court ruled that applicants needed to show that they were personally and directly affected by the impugned failures. That depends on two key criteria for which the threshold is especially high. Firstly, the applicant must be subject to a high intensity of exposure to the adverse effects of climate change, that is, the level and severity of (the risk of) adverse consequences of governmental action or inaction affecting the applicant must be significant. Secondly, there must be a pressing need to ensure the applicant's individual protection, owing to the absence or inadequacy of any reasonable measures to reduce harm (Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], 2024, §§ 487-488). In that case, having carefully considered, inter alia, the nature and scope of the individual applicants' complaints and the material submitted by them, the degree of likelihood and/or probability of the adverse effects of climate change in time, the specific impact on each individual applicant's life, health or well-being, the magnitude and duration of the harmful effects, the scope of the risk (localised or general), and the nature of the applicants' vulnerability, the Court found that the four individual applicants did not fulfil the relevant criteria so as to constitute victims within the meaning of Article 34 (§§ 527-536). Applying the same criteria, the Court refused to recognise the victim status of the former mayor of a French municipality who alleged that the relevant territory ran the risk of climate-change induced flooding in the future but who had left that municipality and did not have any property or other relevant link to it (Carême v. France [GC] (dec.), 2024, § 83)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:21881/20,Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland,21881/20,removed,"Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland,* no. 21881/20, 15 March 2022",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_deleted,I.A.2.f,Availability and effectiveness,4,134,,,,,"The Court must take realistic account not only of formal remedies available in the domestic legal system, but also of the general legal and political context in which they operate as well as the personal circumstances of the applicant (Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 1996, §§ 68-69; Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia, 2005, §§ 116-117; Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], 2015, § 119; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, §§ 117-119; Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland,* 2022, §§ 55-59). It must examine whether, in all the circumstances of the case, the applicant did everything that could reasonably be expected of him or her to exhaust domestic remedies (D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, §§ 116-122). For instance, an applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies when he failed to use the remedy - which could not be regarded as obviously futile -suggested by the domestic court, which guided him as to the further concrete steps to be taken (P. v. Ukraine (dec.), 2019, §§ 52-55). In a case where the enforcement of a judgment ordering urgent rehousing was delayed and achieved after the requisite deadline, an action for damages against the State in order to challenge the lengthy non- enforcement of the judgment can be considered an effective remedy even if it was enforced after the application had been lodged with the Court (Bouhamla v. France (dec.), 2019, §§ 35-44).",
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:21881/20,Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland,21881/20,removed,"Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland,* no. 21881/20, 15 March 2022",2,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,§2.A.3.c,Indirect victim,4,44,45,0.921,,,"As regards non-governmental organisations, the Court does not grant ""victim"" status to associations whose interests are not at stake, even if the interests of their members - or some of them - could be at stake. In addition, ""victim"" status is not granted to NGOs even if the associations have been founded for the sole purpose of defending the rights of the allegedvictims (Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, 2013, § 90 and § 93 and the references cited therein; see also Kalfagiannis and Pospert v. Greece (dec.), 2020, §§ 49-51, concerning a federation of trade unions representing media employees; Yusufeli İlçesini Güzelleştirme Yaşatma Kültür Varlıklarını Koruma Derneği v. Turkey (dec.), 2021, §§ 42-44, concerning a non-governmental organisation created with a view to defending the residents of an area where a dam was being built, and Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021, §§ 25-26, concerning a non-governmental organisation representing the interests of LGBTpersons. See, by contrast, AsDAC c. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 21-37, concerning a non- governmental organisation set up for the collective management of intellectual property rights of its members and its victim status in relation to an Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 complaint; Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland,* 2022, §§ 36-42, concerning a non- governmental organization set up to defend the interests of workers, especially in the sphere of trade union freedoms, in relation to an Article 11 complaint), and Hoppen and trade union of AB Amber Grid employees v. Lithuania, 2023, § 153, concerning a trade union that complained that the dismissal of one of its members had negatively affected its own freedom of association).","As regards non-governmental organisations, the Court does not grant ""victim"" status to associations whose interests are not at stake, even if the interests of their members - or some of them - could be at stake. In addition, ""victim"" status is not granted to NGOs even if the associations have been founded for the sole purpose of defending the rights of the alleged victims (Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, 2013, § 90 and § 93 and the references cited therein; see also Kalfagiannis and Pospert v. Greece (dec.), 2020, §§ 49-51, concerning a federation of trade unions representing media employees; Yusufeli İlçesini Güzelleştirme Yaşatma Kültür Varlıklarını Koruma Derneği v. Turkey (dec.), 2021, §§ 42-44, concerning a non-governmental organisation created with a view to defending the residents of an area where a dam was being built, and Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021, §§ 25-26, concerning a non-governmental organisation representing the interests of LGBTpersons. See, by contrast, AsDAC c. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 21-37, concerning a non- governmental organisation set up for the collective management of intellectual property rights of its members and its victim status in relation to an Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 complaint; and Hoppen and trade union of AB Amber Grid employees v. Lithuania, 2023, § 153, concerning a trade union that complained that the dismissal of one of its members had negatively affected its own freedom of association)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:18536/18,Gernelle and S.A. Société d'Exploitation de l'Hebdomadaire Le Point v. France (dec.),18536/18,added,"Gernelle and S.A. Société d'Exploitation de l'Hebdomadaire Le Point v. France (dec.), no. 18536/18, §§ 50-54, 9 April 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.2.f,Availability and effectiveness,4,,136,,"Gernelle and S.A. Société d'Exploitation de l'Hebdomadaire Le Point v. France (dec.), no. 18536/18, §§ 50-54, 9 April 2024",,,"Whether raising an issue of covert surveillance in criminal proceedings can be regarded as an effective remedy in respect of a complaint under Article 8 will depend on the circumstances of the case. Although criminal courts could consider questions of the fairness of admitting evidence in the criminal proceedings, the Court has found that they were not capable of providing an effective remedy where it was not open to them to deal with the substance of the Article 8 complaint that the interference was not ""in accordance with the law"" or not ""necessary in a democratic society"", or to grant appropriate relief in connection with that complaint (Hambardzumyan v. Armenia, 2019, §§ 40-44 and and the references cited therein; Zubkov and Others v. Russia, 2017, § 88). Regarding the Article 8 complaints raised by the publishers of a magazine whose journalists had been subject to secret interception of telephone communications within the framework of a criminal investigation against a third person, the Court found that a compensatory claim against the State for ""defective functioning of the judiciary"" would constitute an accessible and effective remedy to be exhausted (Gernelle and S.A. Société d'Exploitation de l'Hebdomadaire Le Point v. France (dec.), §§ 50-54, 2024)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:33050/18,"Ghazaryan and Bayramyan v. Azerbaijan, 2023",33050/18,added,"Ghazaryan and Bayramyan v. Azerbaijan, 2023, no. 33050/18, 5 October 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,§2.A.4,Representation,3,,79,,"Asgarova and Veselova v. Armenia (dec.), no. 24382/15, 12 September 2023|Ghazaryan and Bayramyan v. Azerbaijan, 2023, no. 33050/18, 5 October 2023",,,"In Ghazaryan and Bayramyan v. Azerbaijan, 2023, the Court allowed the applicants to lodge the application, without written authority, in the name and on behalf of their son, an Armenian national with prior mental health issues, who had been apprehended in Azerbaijan, sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment and continuously kept in solitary confinement. In these circumstances, the cumulative effect of the serious mental health issues of the direct victim and his situation during his detention and confinement, had entailed a vulnerability that had rendered him unable to lodge a complaint with the Court (§§ 73-82). Conversely, in Asgarova and Veselova v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, the Court did not recognise the locus standi of two women complaining on behalf of their partners convicted and held in detention in the unrecognised ""Nagorno-Karabakh Republic"" under the effective control of Armenia. The applicants' partners having repeatedly had the opportunity to communicate with their families with the help of the International Committee of the Red Cross and having been visited by representatives of the International Working Group on Search for Missing Persons and Hostages, there was no proof of their inability to appoint a representative and/or to sign an authority form. Consequently, there were no exceptional circumstances allowing those applicants to act in the name and on behalf of their partners without a duly signed written authority (§§ 47-55)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:24159/22|25751/22,Guðmundur Gunnarsson and Magnús Davíð Norðdahl v. Iceland,24159/22|25751/22,added,"Guðmundur Gunnarsson and Magnús Davíð Norðdahl v. Iceland, nos. 24159/22 and 25751/22, 16 April 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.4,Distribution of the burden of proof,3,,147,,"Guðmundur Gunnarsson and Magnús Davíð Norðdahl v. Iceland, nos. 24159/22 and 25751/22, 16 April 2024",,,"The Government's arguments will clearly carry more weight if examples from national case-law are supplied (Andrášik and Others v. Slovakia (dec.), 2002; Di Sante v. Italy (dec.), 2004; Giummarra and Others v. France (dec.), 2001; Paulino Tomás v. Portugal (dec.), 2003; Johtti Sapmelaccat Ry and Others v. Finland (dec.), 2005; Parrillo v. Italy [GC], 2015, §§ 87-105; P. v. Ukraine (dec.), 2019, § 53). Even though the Government normally should be able to illustrate the practical effectiveness of a remedy with examples of domestic case-law, the Court accepts that this may be more difficult in smaller jurisdictions, where the number of cases of a specific kind may be fewer than in larger jurisdictions (Aden Ahmed v. Malta, 2013, § 63; M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, § 81): in such cases, the Government should be able to provide a reasonable explanation for the absence of relevant case-law (Guðmundur Gunnarsson and Magnús Davíð Norðdahl v. Iceland, 2024, § 48)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:2059/16,Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan (dec.),2059/16,added,"Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan (dec.), no. 2059/16 and 3 others, 12 September 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.B.4,The safeguard clause: whether respect for human rights requires an examination of the case on the merits.,3,,428,,"Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan (dec.), no. 2059/16 and 3 others, 12 September 2023",,,"The Court has already held that respect for human rights does not require it to continue the examination of an application when, for example, the relevant law has changed and similar issues have been resolved in other cases before it (Léger v. France (striking out) [GC], 2009, § 51; Rinck v. France (dec.), 2010; Fedotova v. Russia, 2006). Nor where the relevant law has been repealed and the complaint before the Court is of historical interest only (Ionescu v. Romania (dec.), 2010). Similarly, respect for human rights does not require the Court to examine an application where the Court and the Committee of Ministers have addressed the issue as a systemic problem, for example non- enforcement of domestic judgments in the Russian Federation (Vasilchenko v. Russia, 2010) or Romania (Gaftoniuc v. Romania (dec.), 2011; Savu v. Romania (dec.), 2011) or indeed the Republic of Moldova (Burov v. Moldova (dec.), 2011) or Armenia (Guruyan v. Armenia (dec.), 2012), or where the Court has already dealt with almost identical issues in a number of cases in respect of the State concerned (Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan (dec.), § 45). Where the issue involves length of proceedings cases in Greece (Kiousi v. Greece (dec.), 2011, or the Czech Republic (Havelka v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2011), the Court has had numerous opportunities to address the issue in previous judgments. This applies equally with respect to the public pronouncement of judgments (Jančev v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), 2011) or the opportunity to have knowledge of and to comment on observations filed or evidence adduced by the other party (Bazelyuk v. Ukraine (dec.), 2012)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:2059/16,Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan (dec.),2059/16,added,"Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan (dec.), no. 2059/16 and 3 others, 12 September 2023",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,§2.A.3.e,Loss of victim status,4,69,70,0.97,"Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan (dec.), no. 2059/16 and 3 others, 12 September 2023",,"The Court also examines whether the case should be struck out of its list on one or more of the grounds set forth in Article 37 of the Convention, in the light of events occurring subsequent to the lodging of the application, notwithstanding the fact that the applicant can still claim to be a ""victim"" (Pisano v. Italy (striking out) [GC], 2022, § 39), or even irrespective of whether or not he or she can continue to claim victim status. For developments occurring after a decision to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, see El Majjaoui and Stichting Touba Moskee v. the Netherlands (striking out) [GC], 2007, §§ 28-35; after the application had been declared admissible, see Shevanova v. Latvia (striking out) [GC], 2007, §§ 44 et seq.; and after the Chamber judgment, see Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia (striking out) [GC], 2007, § 96.","The Court also examines whether the case should be struck out of its list on one or more of the grounds set forth in Article 37 of the Convention, in the light of events occurring subsequent to the lodging of the application, notwithstanding the fact that the applicant can still claim to be a ""victim"" (Pisano v. Italy (striking out) [GC], 2022, § 39, compare, Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan (dec.), §§ 38-44), or even irrespective of whether or not he or she can continue to claim victim status. For developments occurring after a decision to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, see El Majjaoui and Stichting Touba Moskee v. the Netherlands (striking out) [GC], 2007, §§ 28-35; after the application had been declared admissible, see Shevanova v. Latvia (striking out) [GC], 2007, §§ 44 et seq.; and after the Chamber judgment, see Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia (striking out) [GC], 2007, § 96."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:32439/19,Leroy and Others v. France,32439/19,added,"Leroy and Others v. France, nos. 32439/19 and 2 others, 18 April 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.2.f,Availability and effectiveness,4,,128,,"Leroy and Others v. France, nos. 32439/19 and 2 others, 18 April 2024",,,"For example, the Court has held that where an applicant complains about conditions of detention after the detention has already ended, a compensatory remedy that is available and sufficient - that is to say, one which offers reasonable prospects of success - is a remedy that has to be used for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (Lienhardt v. France (dec.), 2011; Rhazali and Others v. France (dec.), 2012; Ignats v. Latvia (dec.), 2013; J.M.B. and Others v. France, 2020, § 163; Leroy and Others v. France, 2024, § 59). However, if the applicant was still detained at the time of the lodging of the application, the remedy must be capable of preventing the alleged continuous situation in order for it to be effective (Torreggiani and Others v. Italy, 2013, § 50; Neshkov and Others v. Bulgaria, 2015, §§ 181 and 192-93; Vasilescu v. Belgium, 2014, §§ 70 and 128). Normally, before bringing their complaints to the Court concerning their conditions of detention, applicants are first required to use properly the available and effective preventive remedy and then, if appropriate, the relevant compensatory remedy. However, the Court accepted that there may be instances in which the use of an otherwise effective preventive remedy would be futile in view of the brevity of an applicant's stay in inadequate conditions of detention and thus the only viable option would be a compensatory remedy allowing for a possibility to obtain redress for the past placement in such conditions. This period may depend on many factors related to the manner of operation of the domestic system of remedies (Ulemek v. Croatia, 2019, §§ 84-88). The Court has examined different remedies in this context: see, for instance, Petrescu v. Portugal, 2019, §§ 81-84, Shmelev and Others v. Russia (dec.), 2020, §§ 123-131; J.M.B. and Others v. France, 2020, §§ 212-221; compare and contrast with Leroy and Others v. France, 2024 §§ 60-67).4"
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:31592/18,M.C. v. Türkiye,31592/18,added,"M.C. v. Türkiye, no. 31592/18, 4 June 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.5,Procedural aspects,3,,155,,"M.C. v. Türkiye, no. 31592/18, 4 June 2024|Varyan v. Armenia, no. 48998/14, 4 June 2024",,,"Where the Government intends to lodge a non-exhaustion plea, it must do so, in so far as the character of the plea and the circumstances permit, in its written or oral observations on the admissibility of the application, though there may be exceptional circumstances dispensing it from that obligation (López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], § 83; Mooren v. Germany [GC], 2009, § 57-59 and the references cited therein; Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], 2014, §§ 79-83; Blokhin v. Russia [GC], 2016, §§ 96-98; see also Rule 55 of the Rules of Court). At this stage, when notice of the application has been given to the respondent Government and the Government has not raised the question of non-exhaustion, the Court cannot examine it of its own motion (M.C. v. Türkiye, 2024, § 44 and the references cited therein). In Strezovski and Others v. North Macedonia, 2020, the Court found that the Government was not estopped from raising the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies although they had raised their objection for the first time in their additional observations, having regard to the special circumstances of the case (the adoption of a Supreme Court's legal opinion subsequent to the Government's initial observations on the admissibility and merits, §§ 33, 35; see, conversely, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 52-53; Varyan v. Armenia, §§ 73-75)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:21714/22,Mamić v. Croatia (dec.),21714/22,added,"Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), no. 21714/22 and 2 others, 9 July 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.E.1,General definition,3,,251,,"Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), no. 21714/22 and 2 others, 9 July 2024|Petrović v. Serbia (dec.), nos. 56551/11 and 10 others, 18 October 2011",,,"The concept of ""abuse"" within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) must be understood in its ordinary sense according to general legal theory - namely, the harmful exercise of a right for purposes other than those for which it is designed (Petrović v. Serbia (dec.), 2011). Accordingly, any conduct of an applicant that is manifestly contrary to the purpose of the right of individual application as provided for in the Convention and impedes the proper functioning of the Court or the proper conduct of the proceedings before it constitutes an abuse of the right of application (Zhdanov and Others v. Russia, 2019, §§ 79-81 and the references cited therein; Miroļubovs and Others v. Latvia, 2009, §§ 62 and 65; S.A.S. v. France [GC], 2014, § 66; Bivolaru v. Romania, 2017, §§ 78-82). Dealing with manifestly abusive conduct by applicants or their authorised representatives is incompatible with the Court's proper functions under the Convention (Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), 2024, § 140, and the references cited therein)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:21714/22,Mamić v. Croatia (dec.),21714/22,added,"Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), no. 21714/22 and 2 others, 9 July 2024",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.E.1,General definition,3,,252,,"Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), no. 21714/22 and 2 others, 9 July 2024",,,"In assessing whether an application should be considered an abuse of the right of application, the Court may take into account the applicant's behaviour not only before itself but also at the domestic level (Ferrara and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2023, § 43; Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), 2024, § 139). Furthermore, the applicant is entirely responsible for the conduct of his or her lawyer or any other person representing him or her before the Court. Any actions or omissions on the representative's part are in principle attributable to the applicant himself or herself and may lead to the application being rejected as an abuse of the right of application (Bekauri v. Georgia (preliminary objections), 2012, §§ 22-25; Migliore and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2013; Martins Alves v. Portugal (dec.), 2014, §§ 11-13 and 16-17; Gross v. Switzerland [GC], 2014, § 33)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:21714/22,Mamić v. Croatia (dec.),21714/22,added,"Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), no. 21714/22 and 2 others, 9 July 2024",3,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.E.1,General definition,3,,254,,"Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), no. 21714/22 and 2 others, 9 July 2024",,,"The Court has stressed that rejection of an application on grounds of abuse of the right of application is an exceptional measure (Miroļubovs and Others v. Latvia, 2009, § 62). The cases in which the Court has found an abuse of the right of application can be grouped into five typical categories: misleading information; use of offensive language; violation of the obligation to keep friendly- settlement proceedings confidential; application manifestly vexatious or devoid of any real purpose; and misuse of domestic remedies or other blameworthy acts at the domestic level insofar as they are directly connected with the proceedings before the Court (Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), 2024, §§ 116-119)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:21714/22,Mamić v. Croatia (dec.),21714/22,added,"Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), no. 21714/22 and 2 others, 9 July 2024",4,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.E.2,Misleading the Court,3,,255,,"Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), no. 21714/22 and 2 others, 9 July 2024",,,"An application is an abuse of the right of application if it is knowingly based on untrue facts with a view to deceiving the Court (Varbanov v. Bulgaria, 2000, § 36; Gogitidze and Others v. Georgia, 2015, § 76). The most serious and blatant examples of such abuses are, firstly, the submission of an application under a false identity (Drijfhout v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2011, §§ 27-29), and, secondly, the falsification of documents sent to the Court (Jian v. Romania (dec.), 2004; Bagheri and Maliki v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2007; Poznanski and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2007; Gogitidze and Others v. Georgia, 2015, §§ 77-78; Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), 2024, §§ 123-124). In a case concerning detention pending expulsion, the Court has found that there was an abuse of the right of application when an applicant had misled both the domestic authorities and the Court about his nationality (see Bencheref v. Sweden (dec.), 2017, § 39). The Court has also deemed an application abusive when the applicant had made, before the Court, a factual allegation contrary to his own testimony in domestic proceedings on a point relevant for the outcome of the case (Povilonis v. Lithuania (dec.), 2022, §§ 92-101), or when the applicants had used vague and undefined terms in order to make the circumstances of the case appear similar to another case where the Court had found a violation (Kongresna Narodna Stranka and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), 2016, §§ 13 and 15-19)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:21714/22,Mamić v. Croatia (dec.),21714/22,added,"Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), no. 21714/22 and 2 others, 9 July 2024",5,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.E.6,Misuse of domestic remedies or other blameworthy acts at the domestic level,3,,272,,"Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), no. 21714/22 and 2 others, 9 July 2024",,,"In Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), 2024, the applicants were found to have manipulated the domestic proceedings in their favour, seriously obstructing the justice system, and thereafter to have aimed at taking advantage of the system of protection of human rights under the Convention and benefit from their own abusive conduct at domestic level (§§ 139-143). Although the conduct which constituted abuse had directly concerned only one of several complaints under Article 6 of the Convention communicated to the respondent Government, the Court considered that such behaviour should have implications for the admissibility of the entire applications which, as a whole, had to be rejected as an abuse of the right of individual application (§§ 144-145)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:21714/22,Mamić v. Croatia (dec.),21714/22,added,"Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), no. 21714/22 and 2 others, 9 July 2024",6,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.E.7,Approach to be adopted by the respondent Government,3,,275,,"Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), no. 21714/22 and 2 others, 9 July 2024",,,"If the respondent Government considers that the applicant has abused the right of application, it must inform the Court accordingly and bring to its attention the relevant information in its possession so that the Court can draw the appropriate conclusions (Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), 2024, §§ 120-122). It is for the Court itself and not the respondent Government to monitor compliance with the procedural obligations imposed by the Convention and by its Rules on the applicant party. However, threats on the part of the Government and its bodies to bring criminal or disciplinary proceedings against an applicant for an alleged breach of its procedural obligations before the Court could raise a problem under Article 34 in fine of the Convention, which prohibits any interference with the effective exercise of the right of individual application (Miroļubovs and Others v. Latvia, 2009, § 70)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:3324/19,Mehmet Zeki Doğan v. Türkiye (no. 2),3324/19,added,"Mehmet Zeki Doğan v. Türkiye (no. 2), no. 3324/19, 13 February 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B.2.a,Final decision,4,,182,,"Mehmet Zeki Doğan v. Türkiye (no. 2), no. 3324/19, 13 February 2024",,,"In cases where proceedings are reopened or a final decision is reviewed, the running of the four- month period in respect of the initial set of proceedings or the final decision will be interrupted only in relation to those Convention issues which served as a ground for such a review or reopening and were the subject of examination before the extraordinary appeal body (ibid., § 24). If proceedings are reopened and the court examines an issue that had not been addressed in the initial proceedings, the four-month time-limit restarts in respect of the complaint concerning this issue (Mehmet Zeki Doğan v. Türkiye (no. 2), 2024, § 66). Even when an application for extraordinary review could not lead to the reopening of the initial proceedings, but the domestic courts were provided with the opportunity of addressing the core of the human rights issues that the applicant subsequently brought before the Court and did address them, the running of the four-month time-limit has been considered to have restarted (Schmidt v. Latvia, 2017, §§ 70-71)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:14139/21,Narbutas v. Lithuania,14139/21,added,"Narbutas v. Lithuania, no. 14139/21, 19 December 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.2.f,Availability and effectiveness,4,,133,,"Narbutas v. Lithuania, no. 14139/21, 19 December 2023",,,"As concerns the presumption of innocence (Article 6 § 2), a remedy under civil law can, in principle, be considered effective against alleged violations. In several cases the Court found remedies under civil law, offering the possibility of obtaining monetary compensation, together with various other procedures for acknowledgment of or putting an end to the infringement of the presumption of innocence, to be effective within the meaning of the Convention (see Januškevičienė v. Lithuania, 2019, §§ 58-62 and the references cited therein, as well as Narbutas v. Lithuania, 2023, §§ 214-217, where the applicants could have lodged a civil claim to obtain monetary compensation for the breach of their honour and dignity)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:42126/15|42127/15,O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia,42126/15|42127/15,added,"O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, nos. 42126/15 and 42127/15, 19 December 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B.5.c,Application of the four-month rule as regards the conditions of detention,4,,225,,"O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, nos. 42126/15 and 42127/15, 19 December 2023",,,"In Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, concerning unlawful arrests, ill- treatment and detention of two vulnerable men by de facto Abkhaz authorities in Georgia, the Court emphasised that the psychological effects of torture and other ill-treatment might render people incapable of instigating proceedings without delay. Because of the exceptional circumstances of the case, the Court accepted that, after their arrests in a generally politically unclear and unstable context, the applicants might well feel helpless and unable to influence what was happening to them. In addition, they might have been waiting for developments that could resolve crucial factual or legal issues. With that in mind and the absence of effective domestic remedies, the Court accepted that the application was not belated (§§ 271-277). In similar circumstances regarding complaints under Articles 3, 5, and 6 of the Convention, the Court accepted that being detained in the Abkhaz territory by the de facto Abkhaz authorities represented, of itself, a serious obstacle to an applicant's applying to the Court within the required time-limit (O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 51)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:56551/11,Petrović v. Serbia (dec.),56551/11,added,"Petrović v. Serbia (dec.), nos. 56551/11 and 10 others, 18 October 2011",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.E.1,General definition,3,,251,,"Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), no. 21714/22 and 2 others, 9 July 2024|Petrović v. Serbia (dec.), nos. 56551/11 and 10 others, 18 October 2011",,,"The concept of ""abuse"" within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) must be understood in its ordinary sense according to general legal theory - namely, the harmful exercise of a right for purposes other than those for which it is designed (Petrović v. Serbia (dec.), 2011). Accordingly, any conduct of an applicant that is manifestly contrary to the purpose of the right of individual application as provided for in the Convention and impedes the proper functioning of the Court or the proper conduct of the proceedings before it constitutes an abuse of the right of application (Zhdanov and Others v. Russia, 2019, §§ 79-81 and the references cited therein; Miroļubovs and Others v. Latvia, 2009, §§ 62 and 65; S.A.S. v. France [GC], 2014, § 66; Bivolaru v. Romania, 2017, §§ 78-82). Dealing with manifestly abusive conduct by applicants or their authorised representatives is incompatible with the Court's proper functions under the Convention (Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), 2024, § 140, and the references cited therein)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:56551/11,Petrović v. Serbia (dec.),56551/11,added,"Petrović v. Serbia (dec.), nos. 56551/11 and 10 others, 18 October 2011",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.E.5,Application manifestly vexatious or devoid of any real purpose,3,,268,,"Petrović v. Serbia (dec.), nos. 56551/11 and 10 others, 18 October 2011",,,"An applicant abuses the right of application where he or she repeatedly lodges vexatious and manifestly ill-founded applications with the Court that are similar to an application that he or she has lodged in the past that has already been declared inadmissible (M. v. the United Kingdom and Philis v. Greece, both Commission decisions, 1987, 1996; Petrović v. Serbia (dec.), 2011). It cannot be the task of the Court to deal with a succession of ill-founded and querulous complaints or with otherwise manifestly abusive conduct of applicants or their authorised representatives (ibid.), which creates gratuitous work for the Court, incompatible with its real functions under the Convention (Bekauri v. Georgia (preliminary objections), 2012, § 21; see also Migliore and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2013, and Simitzi-Papachristou and Others v. Greece (dec.), 2013)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:17131/19,Tamazount and Others v. France,17131/19,added,"Tamazount and Others v. France, nos. 17131/19 and 4 others, 4 April 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.1,General principles,3,,317,,"Tamazount and Others v. France, nos. 17131/19 and 4 others, 4 April 2024",,,"Jurisdiction ratione temporis covers only the period after the ratification of the Convention or the Protocols thereto by the respondent State. However, the Convention imposes no specific obligation on Contracting States to provide redress for wrongs or damage caused prior to that date (Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], 2004, § 38; Tamazount and Others v. France, 2024, §§ 134-135 and the references cited therein)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:17131/19,Tamazount and Others v. France,17131/19,added,"Tamazount and Others v. France, nos. 17131/19 and 4 others, 4 April 2024",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.3.d,Consideration of prior facts,4,,341,,"Tamazount and Others v. France, nos. 17131/19 and 4 others, 4 April 2024",,,"The Court takes the view that it may ""have regard to the facts prior to ratification inasmuch as they could be considered to have created a situation extending beyond that date or may be relevant for the understanding of facts occurring after that date"" (Broniowski v. Poland (dec.) [GC], 2002, § 74; Hoti v. Croatia, 2018, § 85). For instance, the Court could take into account relevant facts prior to that date in order to assess the context and the impugned situation as a whole (Tamazount and Others v. France, §§ 136 et 138)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:17131/19,Tamazount and Others v. France,17131/19,added,"Tamazount and Others v. France, nos. 17131/19 and 4 others, 4 April 2024",3,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,§2.A.3.e,Loss of victim status,4,55,56,0.926,"Tamazount and Others v. France, nos. 17131/19 and 4 others, 4 April 2024",,"Moreover, the redress afforded must be appropriate and sufficient. This will depend on all the circumstances of the case, with particular regard to the nature of the Convention violation in issue (Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], 2010, § 116; Bivolaru v. Romania (no. 2), 2018, § 170). However, if the applicant has agreed to the terms of a friendly settlement at domestic level, he or she cannot complain that the monetary compensation received under that settlement was not sufficient (Chennouf and Others v. France (dec.), 2023, § 39).","Moreover, the redress afforded must be appropriate and sufficient. This will depend on all the circumstances of the case, with particular regard to the nature of the Convention violation in issue (Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], 2010, § 116; Bivolaru v. Romania (no. 2), 2018, § 170; Romanov and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 86; Tamazount and Others v. France, 2024, §§ 155-162). However, if the applicant has agreed to the terms of a friendly settlement at domestic level, he or she cannot complain that the monetary compensation received under that settlement was not sufficient (Chennouf and Others v. France (dec.), 2023, § 39)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:17131/19,Tamazount and Others v. France,17131/19,added,"Tamazount and Others v. France, nos. 17131/19 and 4 others, 4 April 2024",4,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,§2.A.3.e,Loss of victim status,4,66,67,0.949,"Tamazount and Others v. France, nos. 17131/19 and 4 others, 4 April 2024",,"For other specific situations, see Marshall and Others v. Malta, 2020, §§ 33-34, 46-47 (Article 6); Arat v. Turkey, 2009, § 47 (Article 6); Constantinescu v. Romania, 2000, §§ 40-44 (Articles 6 and 10); Guisset v. France, 2000, §§ 66-70 (Article 6); Chevrol v. France, 2003, §§ 30 et seq. (Article 6); Kerman v. Turkey, 2016, § 106 (Article 6); Sorbalo v. Moldova (dec.), 2023, §§ 39-62 (Article 6); Moskovets v. Russia, 2009, § 50 (Article 5); Bivolaru v. Romania (no. 2), 2018, §§ 168-175; Y.Y. and Y.Y. v. Russia, 2022, § 51, (Article 8); X and Y v. Romania, §§ 109-114 (Article 8); Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. v. Turkey (dec.), 2022, §§ 47-51, (Article 10); Kemal Çetin v. Turkey, 2020, § 33 (Article 11); Moon v. France, 2009, §§ 29 et seq. (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1); D.J. and A.-K.R. v. Romania (dec.), 2009, §§ 77 et seq. (Article 2 of Protocol No. 4); and Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia [GC], 2009, § 115 (Article 4 of Protocol No. 7); Dalban v. Romania [GC], 1999, § 44 (Article 10); Güneş v. Turkey (dec.) (Article 10), 2004; Çölgeçen and Others v. Turkey, 2017, §§ 39-40, (Article 2 of Protocol No. 1).","For other specific situations, see, for instance, Tamazount and Others v. France, 2024, §§ 155-162 (Articles 3, 8 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1); Marshall and Others v. Malta, 2020, §§ 33-34, 46-47 (Article 6); Arat v. Turkey, 2009, § 47 (Article 6); Constantinescu v. Romania, 2000, §§ 40-44 (Articles 6 and 10); Guisset v. France, 2000, §§ 66-70 (Article 6); Chevrol v. France, 2003, §§ 30 et seq. (Article 6); Kerman v. Turkey, 2016, § 106 (Article 6); Sorbalo v. Moldova (dec.), 2023, §§ 39-62 (Article 6); Moskovets v. Russia, 2009, § 50 (Article 5); Bivolaru v. Romania (no. 2), 2018, §§ 168-175; Y.Y. and Y.Y. v. Russia, 2022, § 51, (Article 8); X and Y v. Romania, §§ 109-114 (Article 8); Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. v. Turkey (dec.), 2022, §§ 47-51, (Article 10); Kemal Çetin v. Turkey, 2020, § 33 (Article 11); Moon v. France, 2009, §§ 29 et seq. (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1); D.J. and A.-K.R. v. Romania (dec.), 2009, §§ 77 et seq. (Article 2 of Protocol No. 4); and Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia [GC], 2009, § 115 (Article 4 of Protocol No. 7); Dalban v. Romania [GC], 1999, § 44 (Article 10); Güneş v. Turkey (dec.) (Article 10), 2004; Çölgeçen and Others v. Turkey, 2017, §§ 39-40, (Article 2 of Protocol No. 1)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:48998/14,Varyan v. Armenia,48998/14,added,"Varyan v. Armenia, no. 48998/14, 4 June 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.5,Procedural aspects,3,,155,,"M.C. v. Türkiye, no. 31592/18, 4 June 2024|Varyan v. Armenia, no. 48998/14, 4 June 2024",,,"Where the Government intends to lodge a non-exhaustion plea, it must do so, in so far as the character of the plea and the circumstances permit, in its written or oral observations on the admissibility of the application, though there may be exceptional circumstances dispensing it from that obligation (López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], § 83; Mooren v. Germany [GC], 2009, § 57-59 and the references cited therein; Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], 2014, §§ 79-83; Blokhin v. Russia [GC], 2016, §§ 96-98; see also Rule 55 of the Rules of Court). At this stage, when notice of the application has been given to the respondent Government and the Government has not raised the question of non-exhaustion, the Court cannot examine it of its own motion (M.C. v. Türkiye, 2024, § 44 and the references cited therein). In Strezovski and Others v. North Macedonia, 2020, the Court found that the Government was not estopped from raising the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies although they had raised their objection for the first time in their additional observations, having regard to the special circumstances of the case (the adoption of a Supreme Court's legal opinion subsequent to the Government's initial observations on the admissibility and merits, §§ 33, 35; see, conversely, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 52-53; Varyan v. Armenia, §§ 73-75)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:49812/09,Vegotex International S.A. v. Belgium [GC],49812/09,added,"Vegotex International S.A. v. Belgium [GC], no. 49812/09, 3 November 2022",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.D,Incompatibility ratione materiae,2,,351,,"Vegotex International S.A. v. Belgium [GC], no. 49812/09, 3 November 2022",,,"According to Blečić v. Croatia [GC], 2006, § 67, any question affecting the Court's jurisdiction is determined by the Convention itself, in particular by Article 32 (Slivenko and Others v. Latvia (dec.) [GC], 2002, §§ 56 et seq.), and not by the parties' submissions in a particular case and the mere absence of a plea of incompatibility cannot extend that jurisdiction. As a result, the Court is obliged to examine whether it has jurisdiction ratione materiae at every stage of the proceedings (Vegotex International S.A. v. Belgium [GC], 2022, § 59), irrespective of whether or not the Government is estopped from raising such an objection (Tănase v. Moldova [GC], 2010, § 131). The Court can therefore address this issue of its own motion (Studio Monitori and Others v. Georgia, 2020, § 32;)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:53600/20,Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC],53600/20,added,"Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, 9 April 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,§2.A.3.b,Direct victim,4,,29,,"Carême v. France [GC] (dec.), no. 7189/21, 9 April 2024|Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, 9 April 2024",,,"In the specific context of complaints concerning harm or risk of harm resulting from alleged failures by the State to combat climate change, having regard to the special features of climate change and to the principle of exclusion of actio popularis under the Convention, the Court ruled that applicants needed to show that they were personally and directly affected by the impugned failures. That depends on two key criteria for which the threshold is especially high. Firstly, the applicant must be subject to a high intensity of exposure to the adverse effects of climate change, that is, the level and severity of (the risk of) adverse consequences of governmental action or inaction affecting the applicant must be significant. Secondly, there must be a pressing need to ensure the applicant's individual protection, owing to the absence or inadequacy of any reasonable measures to reduce harm (Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], 2024, §§ 487-488). In that case, having carefully considered, inter alia, the nature and scope of the individual applicants' complaints and the material submitted by them, the degree of likelihood and/or probability of the adverse effects of climate change in time, the specific impact on each individual applicant's life, health or well-being, the magnitude and duration of the harmful effects, the scope of the risk (localised or general), and the nature of the applicants' vulnerability, the Court found that the four individual applicants did not fulfil the relevant criteria so as to constitute victims within the meaning of Article 34 (§§ 527-536). Applying the same criteria, the Court refused to recognise the victim status of the former mayor of a French municipality who alleged that the relevant territory ran the risk of climate-change induced flooding in the future but who had left that municipality and did not have any property or other relevant link to it (Carême v. France [GC] (dec.), 2024, § 83)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:53600/20,Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC],53600/20,added,"Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, 9 April 2024",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,§2.A.4,Representation,3,,85,,"Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, 9 April 2024",,,"Regarding the specific context of climate change, the Court held that it was important to make allowance for recourse to legal action by associations for the purpose of seeking the protection of the human rights of those affected, as well as those at risk of being affected, by the adverse effects of that phenomenon, instead of exclusively relying on proceedings brought by each individual on his or her own behalf. For an association to have the right to act on behalf of individuals and to lodge an application on account of the alleged failure of a Contracting State to take adequate measures to protect them against the adverse effects of climate change, the Court held that three criteria have to be fulfilled: (a) it has to be lawfully established in the jurisdiction concerned or have standing to act there; (b) it has to demonstrate that it pursues a dedicated purpose in accordance with its statutory objectives in the defence of the human rights of its members or other affected individuals within the jurisdiction concerned, whether limited to or including collective action for the protection of those rights against the threats arising from climate change; (c) it has to demonstrate that it can be regarded as genuinely qualified and representative to act on behalf of members or other affected individuals within the jurisdiction who were subject to specific threats or adverse effects of climate change on their lives, health or well-being as protected under the Convention. In that connection, the Court will have regard to factors such as the purpose for which the association had been established, its non- profit character, the nature and extent of its activities within the relevant jurisdiction, its membership and representativeness, its principles and transparency of governance and whether on the whole, in the particular circumstances of a case, the grant of such standing is in the interests of the proper administration of justice. The standing of an association to act on behalf of the members or other affected individuals within the jurisdiction concerned is not subject to a separate requirement that those on whose behalf the case had been brought themselves meet the victim-status requirements for individuals in the climate-change context (Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], 2024, § 502)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:14179/21,Victoria Cassar (dec.),14179/21,added,"Victoria Cassar (dec.), no. 14179/21, 18 June 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B.4.b,Date of dispatch,4,,205,,"Victoria Cassar (dec.), no. 14179/21, 18 June 2024",,,"Applicants cannot be held responsible for any delays that may affect their correspondence with the Court in transit (Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia, 2013, § 70). In the case of Victoria Cassar (dec.) 2024, the application was originally dispatched within the time-limit, but, due to a postal error, it was returned to Malta nearly six months later. The relevant period coincided with the COVID-19 lockdown and disturbances of postal services. However, no explanation had been submitted justifying the delay of more than two weeks to dispatch the application afresh. Hence, while the postal delays were certainly regrettable and cannot be attributed to the applicant, the applicant did not pursue her interests diligently (ibid., §§ 35-40)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:41701/16,Y.T. v. Bulgaria (revision),41701/16,added,"Y.T. v. Bulgaria (revision), no. 41701/16, 4 July 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.E.2,Misleading the Court,3,,257,,"Y.T. v. Bulgaria (revision), no. 41701/16, 4 July 2024",,,"Likewise, if new, important developments occur during the proceedings before the Court and if - despite the express obligation on him or her under the Rules of Court - the applicant fails to disclose that information to the Court, thereby preventing it from ruling on the case in full knowledge of the facts, his or her application may be rejected as being an abuse of application (Hadrabová and Others v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2007; Predescu v. Romania, 2008, §§ 25-27; Gross v. Switzerland [GC], 2014, §§ 28-37; Dimo Dimov and Others v. Bulgaria, 2020, §§ 42-47; Y.T. v. Bulgaria (revision), 2024, §§ 39-40)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20231212091045__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2023-12-12,2025-01-26,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2023-12-12__2025-01-26.json,apps:41701/16,Y.T. v. Bulgaria (revision),41701/16,added,"Y.T. v. Bulgaria (revision), no. 41701/16, 4 July 2024",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.E.2,Misleading the Court,3,,259,,"Y.T. v. Bulgaria (revision), no. 41701/16, 4 July 2024",,,"Even where the Court's judgment on the merits has already become final and it subsequently transpires that the applicant had concealed a fact that would have been relevant to the examination of the application, the Court is able to reconsider its judgment by means of the revision procedure (laid down in Rule 80 of the Rules of Court) and to reject the application as an abuse of the right of application (Gardean and S.C. Grup 95 SA v. Romania (revision), 2013, §§ 12-22; Vidu and Others v. Romania (revision), 2017, §§ 17-30; Petroiu v. Romania (revision), 2017, §§ 16-30; Y.T. v. Bulgaria (revision), 2024, where the revision of the judgment was followed by an assessment as to whether there had been an abuse of the right of individual petition, §§ 32-40; and as regards the effect of the resulting inadmissibility of the application on the State's obligation under the Convention, see §§ 41-43). Revision of a judgment is possible only if the respondent Government could not reasonably have known of the fact in question at the time of the Court's examination of the case, and if it submits the request for revision within a period of six months after acquiring knowledge of the fact, in accordance with Rule 80 § 1 (Grossi and Others v. Italy (revision), 2012, §§ 17-24; Vidu and Others v. Romania (revision), 2017, §§ 20-23; Petroiu v. Romania (revision), 2017, §§ 19 and 27-28; Y.T. v. Bulgaria (revision), 2024, §§ 19-21)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-01-26,2025-04-13,31 August 2024,31 August 2024,2024-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-01-26__2025-04-13.json,apps:21881/20,Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland [GC],21881/20,added,"Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland [GC], no. 21881/20, 27 November 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.A.2.f,Availability and effectiveness,4,138,138,0.9953,,,"The Court must take realistic account not only of formal remedies available in the domestic legal system, but also of the general legal and political context in which they operate as well as the personal circumstances of the applicant ( Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 1996, §§ 68-69; Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia, 2005, §§ 116-117; Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], 2015, § 119; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, §§ 117-119). It must examine whether, in all the circumstances of the case, the applicant did everything that could reasonably be expected of him or her to exhaust domestic remedies ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, §§ 116-122). For instance, an applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies when he failed to use the remedy - which could not be regarded as obviously futile - suggested by the domestic court, which guided him as to the further concrete steps to be taken ( P. v. Ukraine (dec.), 2019, §§ 52-55). In a case where the enforcement of a judgment ordering urgent rehousing was delayed and achieved after the requisite deadline, an action for damages against the State in order to challenge the lengthy non-enforcement of the judgment can be considered an effective remedy even if it was enforced after the application had been lodged with the Court ( Bouhamla v. France (dec.), 2019, §§ 35-44).","The Court must take realistic account not only of formal remedies available in the domestic legal system, but also of the general legal and political context in which they operate as well as the personal circumstances of the applicant ( Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 1996, §§ 68-69; Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia, 2005, §§ 116-117; Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], 2015, § 119; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, §§ 117-119 ; Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland [GC], 2023, §§ 162-163). It must examine whether, in all the circumstances of the case, the applicant did everything that could reasonably be expected of him or her to exhaust domestic remedies ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, §§ 116-122). For instance, an applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies when he failed to use the remedy - which could not be regarded as obviously futile - suggested by the domestic court, which guided him as to the further concrete steps to be taken ( P. v. Ukraine (dec.), 2019, §§ 52-55). In a case where the enforcement of a judgment ordering urgent rehousing was delayed and achieved after the requisite deadline, an action for damages against the State in order to challenge the lengthy non-enforcement of the judgment can be considered an effective remedy even if it was enforced after the application had been lodged with the Court ( Bouhamla v. France (dec.), 2019, §§ 35-44)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-01-26,2025-04-13,31 August 2024,31 August 2024,2024-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-01-26__2025-04-13.json,apps:21881/20,Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland [GC],21881/20,added,"Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland [GC], no. 21881/20, 27 November 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,§1.A.3.b,Direct victim,4,28,28,0.9974,,,"In order to be able to lodge an application in accordance with Article 34, an applicant must be able to show that he or she was ""directly affected"" by the measure complained of ( Tănase v. Moldova [GC], 2010, § 104; Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 33; Lambert and Others v. France [GC], 2015, § 89). This is indispensable for putting the protection mechanism of the Convention into motion ( Hristozov and Others v. Bulgaria, 2012, § 73), although this criterion is not to be applied in a rigid, mechanical and inflexible way throughout the proceedings ( Micallef v. Malta [GC], 2009, § 45; Karner v. Austria, 2003, § 25; Aksu v. Turkey [GC], 2012, § 51). For instance, a person cannot complain of a violation of his or her rights in proceedings to which he or she was not a party ( Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 92). However, in Margulev v. Russia, 2019, the Court considered the applicant to be a direct victim of defamation proceedings although he was only admitted as a third party to the proceedings. Since domestic law granted the status of third party to proceedings where ""the judgment may affect the third party' s rights and obligations vis-à- vis the claimant or defendant"", the Court considered that the domestic courts had tacitly accepted that the applicant's rights might have been affected by the outcome of the defamation proceedings (§ 36; see also Khural and Zeynalov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2023, §§ 31-32) . In Mukhin v. Russia, 2021, the Court recognised that the editor- in-chief of a newspaper could claim to be a victim of the domestic courts'decisions divesting that newspaper of its media-outlet status and annulling the document certifying its registration (§§ 158-160). Further, in some specific circumstances, direct victims who had not participated in the domestic proceedings were accepted as applicants before the Court ( Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 78-81). Standing in domestic proceedings is therefo re not decisive, as the notion of ""victim"" is interpreted autonomously in the Convention system (see, for instance, Kalfagiannis and Pospert v. Greece (dec.), 2020, §§ 44-48, concerning the financial administrator of a public service broadcaster whose victim status was accepted by the domestic courts but not by the Court).","In order to be able to lodge an application in accordance with Article 34, an applicant must be able to show that he or she was ""directly affected"" by the measure complained of ( Tănase v. Moldova [GC], 2010, § 104; Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 33; Lambert and Others v. France [GC], 2015, § 89; Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland [GC], 2023, §§ 115, 125). This is indispensable for putting the protection mechanism of the Convention into motion ( Hristozov and Others v. Bulgaria, 2012, § 73), although this criterion is not to be applied in a rigid, mechanical and inflexible way throughout the proceedings ( Micallef v. Malta [GC], 2009, § 45; Karner v. Austria, 2003, § 25; Aksu v. Turkey [GC], 2012, § 51). For instance, a person cannot complain of a violation of his or her rights in proceedings to which he or she was not a party ( Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 92). However, in Margulev v. Russia, 2019, the Court considered the applicant to be a direct victim of defamation proceedings although he was only admitted as a third party to the proceedings. Since domestic law granted the status of third party to proceedings where ""the judgment may affect the third party's rights and obligations vis-à- vis the claimant or defendant"", the Court considered that the domestic courts had tacitly accepted that the applicant's rights might have been affected by the outcome of the defamation proceedings (§ 36; see also Khural and Zeynalov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2023, §§ 31-32) . In Mukhin v. Russia, 2021, the Court recognised that the editor- in-chief of a newspaper could claim to be a victim of the domestic courts'decisions divesting that newspaper of its media-outlet status and annulling the document certifying its registration (§§ 158-160). Further, in some specific circumstances, direct victims who had not participated in the domestic proceedings were accepted as applicants before the Court ( Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 78-81). Standing in domestic proceedings is therefo re not decisive, as the notion of ""victim"" is interpreted autonomously in the Convention system (see, for instance, Kalfagiannis and Pospert v. Greece (dec.), 2020, §§ 44-48, concerning the financial administrator of a public service broadcaster whose victim status was accepted by the domestic courts but not by the Court)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250126230921__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-01-26,2025-04-13,31 August 2024,31 August 2024,2024-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-01-26__2025-04-13.json,apps:58358/14,Romanov and Others v. Russia,58358/14,added,"Romanov and Others v. Russia, nos. 58358/14 and 5 others, 12 September 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,unchanged,§1.A.3.e,Loss of victim status,4,56,56,,,,"Moreover, the redress afforded must be appropriate and sufficient. This will depend on all the circumstances of the case, with particular regard to the nature of the Convention violation in issue ( Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], 2010, § 116; Bivolaru v. Romania (no. 2), 2018, § 170; Romanov and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 86; Tamazount and Others v. France, 2024, §§ 155-162). However, if the applicant has agreed to the terms of a friendly settlement at domestic level, he or she cannot complain that the monetary compensation received under that settlement was not sufficient ( Chennouf and Others v. France (dec.), 2023, § 39).","Moreover, the redress afforded must be appropriate and sufficient. This will depend on all the circumstances of the case, with particular regard to the nature of the Convention violation in issue ( Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], 2010, § 116; Bivolaru v. Romania (no. 2), 2018, § 170; Romanov and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 86; Tamazount and Others v. France, 2024, §§ 155-162). However, if the applicant has agreed to the terms of a friendly settlement at domestic level, he or she cannot complain that the monetary compensation received under that settlement was not sufficient ( Chennouf and Others v. France (dec.), 2023, § 39)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-04-13,2025-06-04,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json,apps:40519/15,Borislav Tonchev v. Bulgaria,40519/15,added,"Borislav Tonchev v. Bulgaria, no. 40519/15, 16 April 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.B.3.c,Lack of significant non-financial disadvantage,4,405,407,0.9985,"Borislav Tonchev v. Bulgaria , 2024",,"However, the Court is not exclusively concerned with cases of insignificant financial sums, when applying the no significant disadvantage criterion. The actual outcome of a case at national level might have repercussions other than financial ones. In Holub v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2010; Bratři Zátkové, A.S., v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2001; Matoušek v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2011; Čavajda v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2011, and Hanzl and Špadrna v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2013, the Court based its decisions on the fact that the non-communicated observations of the other parties had not contained anything new or relevant to the case and the decision of the Constitutional Court in each case had not been based on them. In Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional v. Portugal (dec.), 2012, the Court followed the same reasoning as that set out in Holub v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2010. The prejudice in question was the fact that the applicant had not been sent the prosecutor's opinion, and not the sum of 19 million euros which the company could have been forced to pay. The Court found that the applicant company had not been prejudiced by the non-communication of the opinion in question.","However, the Court is not exclusively concerned with cases of insignificant financial sums, when applying the no significant disadvantage criterion ( Borislav Tonchev v. Bulgaria, 2024, § 110). The actual outcome of a case at national level might have repercussions other than financial ones. In Holub v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2010; Bratři Zátkové, A.S., v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2001; Matoušek v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2011; Čavajda v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2011, and Hanzl and Špadrna v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2013, the Court based its decisions on the fact that the non- communicated observations of the other parties had not contained anything new or relevant to the case and the decision of the Constitutional Court in each case had not been based on them. In Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional v. Portugal (dec.), 2012, the Court followed the same reasoning as that set out in Holub v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2010. The prejudice in question was the fact that the applicant had not been sent the prosecutor's opinion, and not the sum of 19 million euros which the company could have been forced to pay. The Court found that the applicant company had not been prejudiced by the non-communication of the opinion in question."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-04-13,2025-06-04,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json,apps:25373/16,E.T. v. the Republic of Moldova,25373/16,added,"E.T. v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 25373/16, 12 November 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,§1.A.3.f,Death of the applicant,4,74,74,0.9932,,,"Where applicants choose to be represented under Rule 36 § 1 of the Rules of Court, rather than lodging the application themselves, Rule 45 § 3 requires them to produce a written authority to act, duly signed. It is essential for representatives to demonstrate that they have received specific and explicit instructions from the alleged victim within the meaning of Article 34 on whose behalf they purport to act before the Court ( Post v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2009; Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], 2014, § 102 - see also Oliyevskyy v. Ukraine (dec.), 2020, §§ 16-22 and V.M. and Others v. Belgium (striking out) [GC], §§ 32-41, where the applicants did not maintain contact with their representative and contrast with N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, §§ 69-79, and the references therein, where the representative remained in contact with both applicants via telephone and WhatsApp, and the existence of special circumstances regarding respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requiring the Court to continue the examination of the application (Article 37 § 1 in fine )). On the validity of an authority to act, see Aliev v. Georgia, 2009, §§ 44-49; on the authenticity of an application, see Velikova v. Bulgaria, 2000, §§ 48-52.","Where applicants choose to be represented under Rule 36 § 1 of the Rules of Court, rather than lodging the application themselves, Rule 45 § 3 requires them to produce a written authority to act, duly signed. It is essential for representatives to demonstrate that they have received specific and explicit instructions from the alleged victim within the meaning of Article 34 on whose behalf they purport to act before the Court ( Post v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2009; Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], 2014, § 102 - see also Oliyevskyy v. Ukraine (dec.), 2020, §§ 16-22 and V.M. and Others v. Belgium (striking out) [GC], §§ 32-41, where the applicants did not maintain contact with their representative and contrast with N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, §§ 69-79, and the references therein, where the representative remained in contact with both applicants via telephone and WhatsApp, and the existence of special circumstances regarding respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requiring the Court to continue the examination of the application (Article 37 § 1 in fine )). On the validity of an authority to act, see Aliev v. Georgia, 2009, §§ 44-49; on the authenticity of an application, see Velikova v. Bulgaria, 2000, §§ 48-52 and, as concerns a particular vulnerable applicant, see E.T. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2024, §§ 31-33)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-04-13,2025-06-04,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json,apps:32806/09,Egić v. Croatia,32806/09,added,"Egić v. Croatia, no. 32806/09, 5 June 2014",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.E.1,General definition,3,254,256,0.9953,"ć v. Croatia , 2014",,"The Court has stressed that rejection of an application on grounds of abuse of the right of application is an exceptional measure ( Miroļubovs and Others v. Latvia, 2009, § 62). The cases in which the Court has found an abuse of the right of application can be grouped into five typical categories: misleading information; use of offensive language; violation of the obligation to keep friendly- settlement proceedings confidential; application manifestly vexatious or devoid of any real purpose; and misuse of domestic remedies or other blameworthy acts at the domestic level insofar as they are directly connected with the proceedings before the Court ( Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), 2024, §§ 116-119).","The Court has stressed that rejection of an application on grounds of abuse of the right of application is an exceptional measure ( Miroļubovs and Others v. Latvia, 2009, § 62; Egić v. Croatia, 2014, § 40). The cases in which the Court has found an abuse of the right of application can be grouped into five typical categories: misleading information; use of offensive language; violation of the obligation to keep friendly-settlement proceedings confidential; application manifestly vexatious or devoid of any real purpose; and misuse of domestic remedies or other blameworthy acts at the domestic level insofar as they are directly connected with the proceedings before the Court ( Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), 2024, §§ 116-119)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-04-13,2025-06-04,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json,apps:12058/21,Eldar Hasanov v. Azerbaijan,12058/21,added,"Eldar Hasanov v. Azerbaijan, no. 12058/21, 10 October 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,§1.B.2.a,Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,4,,96,,"Eldar Hasanov v. Azerbaijan , 2024",,,"Asignificant delay on the part of the authorities in complying with an interim measure, which results in the applicant being put at risk of the kind of treatment that the measure was aimed at protecting him against, constitutes a failure by the State to comply with its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention ( Eldar Hasanov v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 171 and the references cited therein, and §§ 179-183)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-04-13,2025-06-04,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json,apps:12058/21,Eldar Hasanov v. Azerbaijan,12058/21,added,"Eldar Hasanov v. Azerbaijan, no. 12058/21, 10 October 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,§1.B.2.a,Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,4,94,94,0.8992,"Eldar Hasanov v. Azerbaijan , 2024",,"The Government must demonstrate to the Court that the interim measure was complied with or, in an exceptional case, that there was an objective impediment which prevented compliance and that the Government took all reasonable steps to remove the impediment and to keep the Court informed about the situation (see, for example, A.N.H. v. Finland (dec.), 2013, § 27).","It is not open to a Contracting State to substitute its own judgment for that of the Court in verifying whether there were grounds for indicating the interim measure ( Paladi v. Moldova [GC], 2009, § 90). Rather, the Government must demonstrate to the Court that the interim measure was complied with or, in an exceptional case, that there was an objective impediment which prevented compliance and that the Government took all reasonable steps to remove the impediment and to keep the Court informed about the situation (see, for example, A.N.H. v. Finland (dec.), 2013, § 27). In particular, they must demonstrate their assertion that the applicant's own conduct has created a serious and objective impediment to compliance with the interim measures and inform the Court of any possible impediments in a timely manner ( Eldar Hasanov v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 177)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-04-13,2025-06-04,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json,apps:12058/21,Eldar Hasanov v. Azerbaijan,12058/21,added,"Eldar Hasanov v. Azerbaijan, no. 12058/21, 10 October 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,§1.B.2.a,Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,4,95,95,0.9851,"Eldar Hasanov v. Azerbaijan , 2024",,"Some examples: ▪ failure to secure a timely meeting between an asylum-seeker in detention and a lawyer despite the interim measure indicated under Rule 39 in this respect: D.B. v. Turkey, 2010, § 67; ▪ transfer of detainees to Iraqi authorities in contravention of interim measure: Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, 2010, §§ 162-65; ▪ expulsion of the first applicant in contravention of interim measure: Kamaliyevy v. Russia, 2010, §§ 75-79; ▪ inadvertent but not irremediable failure to comply with interim measure indicated in respect of Article 8: Hamidovic v. Italy (dec.), 2011; ▪ failure to comply with interim measure requiring a prisoner's placement in specialised medical institution: Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia, 2011, §§ 100-05, or an unjustified delay in complying with such measure: Sy v. Italy, 2022, §§ 167-174; ▪ failure to comply with interim measure indicated by the Court on account of a real risk of torture if extradited: Mannai v. Italy, 2012, §§ 54-57; Labsi v. Slovakia, 2012, §§ 149-51; ▪ secret transfer of a person at risk of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan and in respect of whom an interim measure was in force: Abdulkhakov v. Russia, 2012, §§ 226-31; ▪ forcible transfer of person to Tajikistan with a real risk of ill-treatment and circumvention of interim measures: Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 218-19; see also failure by Russian authorities to protect a Tajik national in their custody from forcible repatriation to Tajikistan in breach of interim measure: Nizomkhon Dzhurayev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 157-59. ▪ preparation of an expulsion in a way that deliberately created a situation whereby the applicant would have great difficulty in submitting a request for an interim measure to the Court: M.A. v. France, 2018, § 70.","Some examples: ▪ failure to secure a timely meeting between an asylum-seeker in detention and a lawyer despite the interim measure indicated under Rule 39 in this respect: D.B. v. Turkey, 2010, § 67; ▪ transfer of detainees to Iraqi authorities in contravention of interim measure: Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, 2010, §§ 162-65; ▪ expulsion of the first applicant in contravention of interim measure: Kamaliyevy v. Russia, 2010, §§ 75-79; ▪ inadvertent but not irremediable failure to comply with interim measure indicated in respect of Article 8: Hamidovic v. Italy (dec.), 2011; ▪ failure to comply with interim measure requiring a prisoner's placement in specialised medical institution: Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia, 2011, §§ 100-05, or an unjustified delay in complying with such measure: Sy v. Italy, 2022, §§ 167-174; ▪ failure to comply with initial interim measures indicated by the Court to ensure the applicant's transfer to a prison medical facility for a comprehensive medical examination and, if necessary, carrying out urgent interventions, and excessively long delays in complying with subsequent such measures ( Eldar Hasanov v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 183). ▪ failure to comply with interim measure indicated by the Court on account of a real risk of torture if extradited: Mannai v. Italy, 2012, §§ 54-57; Labsi v. Slovakia, 2012, §§ 149-51; ▪ secret transfer of a person at risk of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan and in respect of whom an interim measure was in force: Abdulkhakov v. Russia, 2012, §§ 226-31; ▪ forcible transfer of person to Tajikistan with a real risk of ill-treatment and circumvention of interim measures: Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 218-19; see also failure by Russian authorities to protect a Tajik national in their custody from forcible repatriation to Tajikistan in breach of interim measure: Nizomkhon Dzhurayev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 157-59. ▪ preparation of an expulsion in a way that deliberately created a situation whereby the applicant would have great difficulty in submitting a request for an interim measure to the Court: M.A. v. France, 2018, § 70."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-04-13,2025-06-04,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json,apps:25344/20,Friedrich and Others v. Poland,25344/20,added,"Friedrich and Others v. Poland, nos. 25344/20 and 17 others, 20 June 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.E.1,General definition,3,251,253,0.9932,"Friedrich and Others v. Poland, 2024",,"The concept of ""abuse"" within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) must be understood in its ordinary sense according to general legal theory - namely, the harmful exercise of a right for purposes other than those for which it is designed ( Petrović v. Serbia (dec.), 2011). Accordingly, any conduct of an applicant that is manifestly contrary to the purpose of the right of individual application as provided for in the Convention and impedes the proper functioning of the Court or the proper conduct of the proceedings before it constitutes an abuse of the right of application ( Zhdanov and Others v. Russia, 2019, §§ 79-81 and the references cited therein; Miroļubovs and Others v. Latvia, 2009, §§ 62 and 65; S.A.S. v. France [GC], 2014, § 66; Bivolaru v. Romania, 2017, §§ 78-82). Dealing with manifestly abusive conduct by applicants or their authorised representatives is incompatible with the Court's proper functions under the Convention ( Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), 2024, § 140, and the references cited therein).","The concept of ""abuse"" within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) must be understood in its ordinary sense according to general legal theory - namely, the harmful exercise of a right for purposes other than those for which it is designed ( Petrović v. Serbia (dec.), 2011; Friedrich and Others v. Poland, 2024, §§ 121-123 and the references cited therein). Accordingly, any conduct of an applicant that is manifestly contrary to the purpose of the right of individual application as provided for in the Convention and impedes the proper functioning of the Court or the proper conduct of the proceedings before it constitutes an abuse of the right of application ( Zhdanov and Others v. Russia, 2019, §§ 79-81 and the references cited therein; Miroļubovs and Others v. Latvia, 2009, §§ 62 and 65; S.A.S. v. France [GC], 2014, § 66; Bivolaru v. Romania, 2017, §§ 78-82). Dealing with manifestly abusive conduct by applicants or their authorised representatives is incompatible with the Court's proper functions under the Convention ( Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), 2024, § 140, and the references cited therein)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-04-13,2025-06-04,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json,apps:25344/20,Friedrich and Others v. Poland,25344/20,added,"Friedrich and Others v. Poland, nos. 25344/20 and 17 others, 20 June 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.E.6,Misuse of domestic remedies or other blameworthy acts at the domestic level,3,273,275,0.996,"Friedrich and Others v. Poland, 2024",,"Sometimes judgments and decisions of the Court, and cases still pending before it, are used for the purposes of a political speech at national level in the Contracting States. An application inspired by a desire for publicity or propaganda is not for this reason alone an abuse of the right of application ( McFeeley and Others v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision, 1980, and also Khadzhialiyev and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 66-67). However, there may be an abuse if the applicant, motivated by political interests, gives interviews to the press or television in which he or she expresses an irresponsible and frivolous attitude towards proceedings pending before the Court ( Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, 2008). Dissemination of false information to the press in a way that could have been a result of an error in good faith has not been found to be an abuse of the right of application ( Podeschi v. San Marino, 2017, § 88, where the applicant or his representatives had erroneously publicly alleged that the application had already been declared admissible by the Court).","Sometimes judgments and decisions of the Court, and cases still pending before it, are used for the purposes of a political speech at national level in the Contracting States. An application inspired by a desire for publicity or propaganda is not for this reason alone an abuse of the right of application ( McFeeley and Others v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision, 1980, and also Khadzhialiyev and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 66-67; Friedrich and Others v. Poland, 2024, § 123). However, there may be an abuse if the applicant, motivated by political interests, gives interviews to the press or television in which he or she expresses an irresponsible and frivolous attitude towards proceedings pending before the Court ( Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, 2008). Dissemination of false information to the press in a way that could have been a result of an error in good faith has not been found to be an abuse of the right of application ( Podeschi v. San Marino, 2017, § 88, where the applicant or his representatives had erroneously publicly alleged that the application had already been declared admissible by the Court)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-04-13,2025-06-04,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json,apps:25344/20,Friedrich and Others v. Poland,25344/20,added,"Friedrich and Others v. Poland, nos. 25344/20 and 17 others, 20 June 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.B.3,Whether the applicant has suffered a significant disadvantage,3,396,398,0.9933,"Friedrich and Others v. Poland , 2024",,"The main element contained in the criterion is the question of whether the applicant has suffered a ""significant disadvantage"". ""Significant disadvantage"" hinges on the idea that a violation of a right, however real from a purely legal point of view, should attain a minimum level of severity to warrant consideration by an international court. Violations which are purely technical and insignificant outside a formalistic framework do not merit European supervision ( Shefer v. Russia (dec.), 2012). The assessment of this minimum level is relative and depends on all the circumstances of the case. The severity of a violation should be assessed by taking into account both the applicant's subjective perception and what is objectively at stake in a particular case ( Korolev v. Russia (dec . ), 2010).","The main element contained in the criterion is the question of whether the applicant has suffered a ""significant disadvantage"". ""Significant disadvantage"" hinges on the idea that a violation of a right, however real from a purely legal point of view, should attain a minimum level of severity to warrant consideration by an international court. Violations which are purely technical and insignificant outside a formalistic framework do not merit European supervision ( Shefer v. Russia (dec.), 2012). The assessment of this minimum level is relative and depends on all the circumstances of the case. The severity of a violation should be assessed by taking into account both the applicant's subjective perception and what is objectively at stake in a particular case ( Korolev v. Russia (dec.), 2010; Friedrich and Others v. Poland, 2024, § 125)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-04-13,2025-06-04,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json,apps:13337/19,H.T. v. Germany and Greece,13337/19,added,"H.T. v. Germany and Greece, no. 13337/19, 15 October 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.E.2,Misleading the Court,3,256,258,0.9974,"H.T. v. Germany and Greece , 2024",,"This type of abuse may also be committed by omission, where the applicant fails to inform the Court at the outset of a factor essential for the examination of the case ( Kerechashvili v. Georgia (dec.), 2006; Martins Alves v. Portugal (dec.), 2014, §§ 12-15; Gross v. Switzerland [GC], 2014, §§ 35-36; Gevorgyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), 2020, §§ 31-37; Safaryan v. Armenia (dec.), 2020, §§ 24-30; contrast with Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, 2002, § 89; G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy [GC], § 174; S.L. and J.L. v. Croatia, 2015, § 49; Zličić v. Serbia, §§ 55-56). The misleading information should however concern the very core of the case in order for the Court to find the omission to amount to an abuse of the right of individual application ( J.B. v. Poland, 2015, § 44; Mitrović v. Serbia, 2017, §§ 33-34; Shalyavski and Others v. Bulgaria, 2017, § 45; Saakashvili v. Georgia (dec.), 2022, §§ 64-65). Whenever an applicant omits, contrary to Rule 44C § 1 of the Rules of Court, to divulge relevant information, depending on the particular circumstances of the case, the Court may draw such inferences as it deems appropriate, including striking the application out under either of the three sub-paragraphs of Article 37 § 1 of the Convention ( Belošević v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, §§ 48-49 and §§ 51-54, and Şeker v. Turkey (dec.), 2021, §§ 19-23).","This type of abuse may also be committed by omission, where the applicant fails to inform the Court at the outset of a factor essential for the examination of the case ( Kerechashvili v. Georgia (dec.), 2006; Martins Alves v. Portugal (dec.), 2014, §§ 12-15; Gross v. Switzerland [GC], 2014, §§ 35-36; Gevorgyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), 2020, §§ 31-37; Safaryan v. Armenia (dec.), 2020, §§ 24-30; contrast with Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, 2002, § 89; G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy [GC], § 174; S.L. and J.L. v. Croatia, 2015, § 49; Zličić v. Serbia, §§ 55-56). The misleading information should however concern the very core of the case in order for the Court to find the omission to amount to an abuse of the right of individual application ( J.B. v. Poland, 2015, § 44; Mitrović v. Serbia, 2017, §§ 33-34; Shalyavski and Others v. Bulgaria, 2017, § 45; Saakashvili v. Georgia (dec.), 2022, §§ 64-65; H.T. v. Germany and Greece, 2024 §§ 127-128). Whenever an applicant omits, contrary to Rule 44C § 1 of the Rules of Court, to divulge relevant information, depending on the particular circumstances of the case, the Court may draw such inferences as it deems appropriate, including striking the application out under either of the three sub-paragraphs of Article 37 § 1 of the Convention ( Belošević v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, §§ 48-49 and §§ 51-54, and Şeker v. Turkey (dec.), 2021, §§ 19-23)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-04-13,2025-06-04,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json,apps:16974/14,Kaczmarek v. Poland,16974/14,added,"Kaczmarek v. Poland, no. 16974/14, 22 February 2024,",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.B.3,Whether the applicant has suffered a significant disadvantage,3,397,399,0.9954,"Kaczmarek v. Poland , 2024",,"However, the applicant's subjective perception cannot alone suffice to conclude that he or she suffered a significant disadvantage. The subjective perception must be justified on objective grounds ( Ladygin v. Russia (dec.), 2011). Aviolation of the Convention may concern important questions of principle and thus cause a significant disadvantage regardless of pecuniary interest ( Korolev v. Russia (dec.), 2010; Biržietis v. Lithuania, 2016; Karelin v. Russia, 2016). In Giuran v. Romania, 2011, §§ 17-25, the Court found that the applicant had suffered a significant disadvantage because the proceedings concerned a question of principle for him, namely his right to respect for his possessions and for his home. This was despite the fact that the domestic proceedings which were the subject of the complaint were aimed at the recovery of stolen goods worth 350 euros (EUR) from the applicant's own apartment. Similarly, in Konstantin Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2015, §§ 46-47, the Court took into account the fact that the fine concerned a question of principle for the applicant, namely the respect for his position as a lawyer in the exercise of his professional activities.","However, the applicant's subjective perception cannot alone suffice to conclude that he or she suffered a significant disadvantage. The subjective perception must be justified on objective grounds ( Ladygin v. Russia (dec.), 2011). Aviolation of the Convention may concern important questions of principle and thus cause a significant disadvantage regardless of pecuniary interest ( Korolev v. Russia (dec.), 2010; Biržietis v. Lithuania, 2016; Karelin v. Russia, 2016). In Giuran v. Romania, 2011, §§ 17-25, the Court found that the applicant had suffered a significant disadvantage because the proceedings concerned a question of principle for him, namely his right to respect for his possessions and for his home (see also, for instance, Kaczmarek v. Poland, 2024, § 56). This was despite the fact that the domestic proceedings which were the subject of the complaint were aimed at the recovery of stolen goods worth 350 euros (EUR) from the applicant's own apartment. Similarly, in Konstantin Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2015, §§ 46-47, the Court took into account the fact that the fine concerned a question of principle for the applicant, namely the respect for his position as a lawyer in the exercise of his professional activities."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-04-13,2025-06-04,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json,apps:56658/22,Secară v. Romania (dec.),56658/22,added,"Secară v. Romania (dec.), no. 56658/22, 28 January 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.A.1,Purpose of the rule,3,111,112,0.9934,,,"Determining whether a domestic procedure constitutes an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 35 § 1, which an applicant must exhaust and which should therefore be taken into account for the purposes of the four-month time-limit, depends on a number of factors, notably the applicant's complaint, the scope of the obligations of the State under that particular Convention provision, the available remedies in the respondent State and the specific circumstances of the case ( Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], 2017, § 134; see, also, Kozacıoğlu v. Turkey [GC], 2009, § 40 and D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 116).","Determining whether a domestic procedure constitutes an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 35 § 1, which an applicant must exhaust and which should therefore be taken into account for the purposes of the four-month time-limit, depends on a number of factors, notably the applicant's complaint, the scope of the obligations of the State under that particular Convention provision, the available remedies in the respondent State and the specific circumstances of the case ( Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], 2017, § 134; see, also, Kozacıoğlu v. Turkey [GC], 2009, § 40 and D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 116; Secară v. Romania (dec.), 2025, §§ 30-38)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-04-13,2025-06-04,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json,apps:56658/22,Secară v. Romania (dec.),56658/22,added,"Secară v. Romania (dec.), no. 56658/22, 28 January 2025",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.A.2.e,Existence and appropriateness,4,122,123,0.9644,,,"Applicants are only obliged to exhaust domestic remedies which are available in theory and in practice at the relevant time and which they can directly institute themselves - that is to say, remedies that are accessible, capable of providing redress in respect of their complaints and offering reasonable prospects of success ( Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], 2006, § 46; Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, § 75; see also the Court's subsidiary consideration in S.A.S. v. France [GC], 2014, § 61, regarding reasonable prospects of success of an appeal on points of law on the basis of Article 9 of the Convention).","Applicants are only obliged to exhaust domestic remedies which are available in theory and in practice at the relevant time and which they can directly institute themselves - that is to say, remedies that are accessible, capable of providing redress in respect of their complaints and offering reasonable prospects of success ( Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], 2006, § 46; Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, § 75; see also the Court's subsidiary consideration in S.A.S. v. France [GC], 2014, § 61, regarding reasonable prospects of success of an appeal on points of law on the basis of Article 9 of the Convention; and, as concerns the relevance of an appeal on points of law on the basis of Article 6 of the Convention, Secară v. Romania (dec.), 2025, § 35)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-04-13,2025-06-04,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json,apps:56658/22,Secară v. Romania (dec.),56658/22,added,"Secară v. Romania (dec.), no. 56658/22, 28 January 2025",3,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.A.2.e,Existence and appropriateness,4,123,124,0.9809,,,"Discretionary or extraordinary remedies need not be used, for example requesting a court to review its decision ( Çınar v. Turkey (dec.), 2003; Prystavska v. Ukraine (dec.), 2002), or requesting the reopening of proceedings, except in special circumstances where, for example, it is established under domestic law that such a request does in fact constitute an effective remedy ( K.S. and K.S. AG v. Switzerland, Commission decision, 1994; Shibendra Dev v. Sweden (dec.), 2014, §§ 41-43, 45 and 48), or where the quashing of a judgment that has acquired legal force is the only means by which the respondent State can put matters right through its own legal system ( Kiiskinen and Kovalainen v. Finland (dec.), 1999; Nikula v. Finland (dec.), 2000; Dinchev v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2017, §§ 27-29). Similarly, an appeal to a higher authority does not constitute an effective remedy ( Horvat v. Croatia, 2001, § 47; Hartman v. the Czech Republic, 2003, § 66); nor does a remedy that is not directly accessible to the applicant but is dependent on the exercise of discretion by an intermediary ( Tănase v. Moldova [GC], 2010, § 122). In particular, in criminal matters, an appeal to a higher prosecutor is an effective remedy only if it is not merely a hierarchical appeal and if the person making it has a personal right to have it examined ( Aspiotis v. Greece (dec.), 2022, § 52, and, a contrario, Belevitskiy c. Russia, 2007, §§ 59-60). Acomplaint to the Ministry amounts to a hierarchical complaint and is not considered an effective remedy ( Polyakh and Others v. Ukraine, 2019, § 135; Milovanović v. Serbia, 2019, § 104). Regarding the effectiveness in the case in question of an appeal that does not in principle have to be used (Ombudsman), see the reasoning in Egmez v. Cyprus, 2000, §§ 66-73. Lastly, a domestic remedy which is not subject to any precise time-limit and thus creates uncertainty cannot be regarded as effective ( Williams v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2009, and the references cited therein; Nicholas v. Cyprus, 2018, §§ 38-39).","Discretionary or extraordinary remedies need not be used, for example requesting a court to review its decision ( Çınar v. Turkey (dec.), 2003; Prystavska v. Ukraine (dec.), 2002), or requesting the reopening of proceedings, except in special circumstances where, for example, it is established under domestic law that such a request does in fact constitute an effective remedy ( K.S. and K.S. AG v. Switzerland, Commission decision, 1994; Shibendra Dev v. Sweden (dec.), 2014, §§ 41-43, 45 and 48), or where the quashing of a judgment that has acquired legal force is the only means by which the respondent State can put matters right through its own legal system ( Kiiskinen and Kovalainen v. Finland (dec.), 1999; Nikula v. Finland (dec.), 2000; Dinchev v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2017, §§ 27-29). On the other hand, the characterisation of the remedy in the domestic legal system as an extraordinary remedy does not necessarily render it ineffective, its relevance for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 depending on the specific circumstances of the case ( Secară v. Romania (dec.), 2025, §§ 31-36). Similarly, an appeal to a higher authority does not constitute an effective remedy ( Horvat v. Croatia, 2001, § 47; Hartman v. the Czech Republic, 2003, § 66); nor does a remedy that is not directly accessible to the applicant but is dependent on the exercise of discretion by an intermediary ( Tănas e v. Moldova [GC], 2010, § 122). In particular, in criminal matters, an appeal to a higher prosecutor is an effective remedy only if it is not merely a hierarchical appeal and if the person making it has a personal right to have it examined ( Aspiotis v. Greece (dec.), 2022, § 52, and, a contrario, Belevitskiy c. Russia, 2007, §§ 59-60). Acomplaint to the Ministry amounts to a hierarchical complaint and is not considered an effective remedy ( Polyakh and Others v. Ukraine, 2019, § 135; Milovanović v. Serbia, 2019, § 104). Regarding the effectiveness in the case in question of an appeal that does not in principle have to be used (Ombudsman), see the reasoning in Egmez v. Cyprus, 2000, §§ 66-73. Lastly, a domestic remedy which is not subject to any precise time-limit and thus creates uncertainty cannot be regarded as effective ( Williams v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2009, and the references cited therein; Nicholas v. Cyprus, 2018, §§ 38-39)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-04-13,2025-06-04,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json,apps:56658/22,Secară v. Romania (dec.),56658/22,added,"Secară v. Romania (dec.), no. 56658/22, 28 January 2025",4,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.B.2.a,Final decision,4,178,180,0.9927,,,"Determining whether a domestic procedure constitutes an effective remedy, which an applicant must exhaust and which should therefore be taken into account for the purposes of the four-month time-limit, depends on a number of factors, notably the applicant's complaint, the scope of the obligations of the State under that particular Convention provision, the available remedies in the respondent State and the specific circumstances of the case. For example, it will differ in cases concerning unlawful use of force by State agents compared to cases concerning medical negligence ( Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], 2017, §§ 134-137). For a case concerning covert surveillance measures, see Hambardzumyan v. Armenia, 2019, §§ 52-53.","Determining whether a domestic procedure constitutes an effective remedy, which an applicant must exhaust and which should therefore be taken into account for the purposes of the four-month time-limit, depends on a number of factors, notably the applicant's complaint, the scope of the obligations of the State under that particular Convention provision, the available remedies in the respondent State and the specific circumstances of the case ( Secară v. Romania (dec.), 2025, §§ 35-36). For example, it will differ in cases concerning unlawful use of force by State agents compared to cases concerning medical negligence ( Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], 2017, §§ 134-137). For a case concerning covert surveillance measures, see Hambardzumyan v. Armenia, 2019, §§ 52-53."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-04-13,2025-06-04,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json,apps:56658/22,Secară v. Romania (dec.),56658/22,added,"Secară v. Romania (dec.), no. 56658/22, 28 January 2025",5,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.B.2.a,Final decision,4,180,182,0.9601,,,"As a rule Article 35 § 1 does not require applicants to have applied for the reopening of proceedings or to have used similar extraordinary remedies and does not allow the four-month time- limit to be extended on the grounds that such remedies have been used ( Berdzenishvili v. Russia (dec.), 2004; Tucka v. the United Kingdom (no. 1) (dec.), 2011; Haász and Szabó v. Hungary, 2015, §§ 36-37). However, if an extraordinary remedy is the only judicial remedy available to the applicant, the four- month time-limit may be calculated from the date of the decision given regarding that remedy ( Ahtinen v. Finland (dec.), 2005; Tomaszewscy v. Poland, 2014, §§ 117-119).","As a rule Article 35 § 1 does not require applicants to have applied for the reopening of proceedings or to have used similar extraordinary remedies and does not allow the four-month time- limit to be extended on the grounds that such remedies have been used ( Berdzenishvili v. Russia (dec.), 2004; Tucka v. the United Kingdom (no. 1) (dec.), 2011; Haász and Szabó v. Hungary, 2015, §§ 36-37; see also for an extraordinary remedy intended solely to rectify situations of manifest unlawfulness and strictly limited to five grounds of appeal, Secară v. Romania (dec.), 2025, §§ 32-38). However, if an extraordinary remedy is the only judicial remedy available to the applicant, the four-month time- limit may be calculated from the date of the decision given regarding that remedy ( Ahtinen v. Finland (dec.), 2005; Tomaszewscy v. Poland, 2014, §§ 117-119)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-04-13,2025-06-04,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json,apps:10103/20,Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland,10103/20,added,"Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, no. 10103/20, 21 March 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.B.2,Scope,3,395,397,0.9974,"ć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland , 2024",,"The application of the no significant disadvantage criterion is not limited to any particular right protected under the Convention. However, the Court has found it difficult to envisage a situation in which a complaint under Article 3, which would not be inadmissible on any other grounds and which would fall within the scope of Article 3 (which means that the minimum level of severity test would be fulfilled), might be declared inadmissible because the applicant has not suffered significant disadvantage ( Y v. Latvia, 2014, § 44). Similarly, the Court has rejected the application of the the new criterion in relation to an Article 2 complaint, stressing that the right to life is one of the most fundamental provisions of the Convention ( Makuchyan and Minasyan v. Azerbaijan and Hungary, 2020, §§ 72-73). In relation to complaints under Article 5, the Court has so far rejected the application of th e ""no significant disadvantage"" admissibility criterion in the light of the prominent place that the right to liberty has in a democratic society ( Zelčs v. Latvia, 2020, § 44 and the references cited therein). The Court has also stated that in cases concerning freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9) or freedom of expression (Article 10), the application of the no significant disadvantage criterion should take due account of the importance of these freedoms and be subject to careful scrutiny by the Court (for Article 9, see Stavropoulos and Others v. Greece, 2020, §§ 29-30). In the context of Article 10, such scrutiny should encompass elements such as the contribution made to a debate of general interest and whether the case involves the press or other news media ( Margulev v. Russia, 2019, §§ 41-42; Sylka v. Poland (dec.), 2014, § 28; Panioglu v. Romania, 2020, §§ 72-76; Šeks v. Croatia, 2022, § 48). As regards cases concerning freedom of assembly and freedom of association (Article 11), the Court should take due account of the importance of these freedoms for a democratic society and carry out a careful scrutiny ( Obote v. Russia, 2019, § 31; Yordanovi v. Bulgaria, 2020, §§ 49-52). Unlike previous cases, in Boronenkov v. Ukraine (dec.), 2024, §§ 17-23, the Court found that the applicant had not suffered a significant disadvantage within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (b) in respect of his complaint under Article 11 (freedom of assembly). In addition, having regard to the link between the Article 11 complaint and the complaint under Article 6, the Court arrived at the same conclusion in respect of the latter complaint ( ibid., § 23).","The application of the no significant disadvantage criterion is not limited to any particular right protected under the Convention. However, the Court has found it difficult to envisage a situation in which a complaint under Article 3, which would not be inadmissible on any other grounds and which would fall within the scope of Article 3 (which means that the minimum level of severity test would be fulfilled), might be declared inadmissible because the applicant has not suffered significant disadvantage ( Y v. Latvia, 2014, § 44). Similarly, the Court has rejected the application of the the new criterion in relation to an Article 2 complaint, stressing that the right to life is one of the most fundamental provisions of the Convention ( Makuchyan and Minasyan v. Azerbaijan and Hungary, 2020, §§ 72-73). In relation to complaints under Article 5, the Court has so far rejected the application of the ""no significant disadvantage"" admissibility crit erion in the light of the prominent place that the right to liberty has in a democratic society ( Zelčs v. Latvia, 2020, § 44 and the references cited therein). The Court has also stated that in cases concerning freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9) or freedom of expression (Article 10), the application of the no significant disadvantage criterion should take due account of the importance of these freedoms and be subject to careful scrutiny by the Court (for Article 9, see Stavropoulos and Others v. Greece, 2020, §§ 29-30 and for Article 10, see for instance, Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, 2024, § 25). In the context of Article 10, such scrutiny should encompass elements such as the contribution made to a debate of general interest and whether the case involves the press or other news media ( Margulev v. Russia, 2019, §§ 41-42; Sylka v. Poland (dec.), 2014, § 28; Panioglu v. Romania, 2020, §§ 72-76; Šeks v. Croatia, 2022, § 48). As regards cases concerning freedom of assembly and freedom of association (Article 11), the Court should take due account of the importance of these freedoms for a democratic society and carry out a careful scrutiny ( Obote v. Russia, 2019, § 31; Yordanovi v. Bulgaria, 2020, §§ 49-52). Unlike previous cases, in Boronenkov v. Ukraine (dec.), 2024, §§ 17-23, the Court found that the applicant had not suffered a significant disadvantage within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (b) in respect of his complaint under Article 11 (freedom of assembly). In addition, having regard to the link between the Article 11 complaint and the complaint under Article 6, the Court arrived at the same conclusion in respect of the latter complaint ( ibid., § 23)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-04-13,2025-06-04,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json,apps:64387/14,Stoyanov and Tabakov v. Bulgaria (no. 2),64387/14,added,"Stoyanov and Tabakov v. Bulgaria (no. 2), no. 64387/14, 7 December 2021,",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.D.1,Substantially the same as a matter that has been examined by the Court,3,239,241,0.9893,,,"The Court examines whether the two applications brought before it by the applicants relate essentially to the same persons, the same facts and the same complaints ( Vojnović v. Croatia (dec.), 2012, § 28; Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2) [GC], 2009, § 63; Amarandei and Others v. Romania, 2016, §§ 106-111; Leon Madrid v. Spain, 2021, § 44). In order to determine whether an application or a complaint is substantially the same in terms of Article 35 § 2 (b) of the Convention, the complaint is always characterised by the facts alleged in it ( Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 120).","The Court examines whether the two applications brought before it by the applicants relate essentially to the same persons, the same facts and the same complaints ( Vojnović v. Croatia (dec.), 2012, § 28; Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2) [GC], 2009, § 63; Amarandei and Others v. Romania, 2016, §§ 106-111; Leon Madrid v. Spain, 2021, § 44; Stoyanov and Tabakov v. Bulgaria (no. 2), 2021, § 30). In order to determine whether an application or a complaint is substantially the same in terms of Article 35 § 2 (b) of the Convention, the complaint is always characterised by the facts alleged in it ( Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 120)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-04-13,2025-06-04,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json,apps:15830/16,Tverdokhlebova v. Ukraine,15830/16,added,"Tverdokhlebova v. Ukraine, no. 15830/16, 16 January 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.E.2,Misleading the Court,3,258,260,0.9847,,,"An intention to mislead the Court must always be established with sufficient certainty ( Melnik v. Ukraine, 2006, §§ 58-60; Nold v. Germany, 2006, § 87; Miszczyński v. Poland (dec.), 2011; Gross v. Switzerland [GC], 2014, § 28; S.L. and J.L. v. Croatia, 2015, §§ 48-49; Bagdonavicius and Others v. Russia, 2016, §§ 64-65; Yusufeli İlçesini Güzelleştirme Yaşatma Kültür Varlıklarını Koruma Derneği v. Turkey (dec.), 2021, §§ 29-30). Parties can submit arguments which are rejected by the Court without such contentious submissions being regarded as an abuse of the right of individual application ( Hoti v. Croatia ), 2018, § 92.","An intention to mislead the Court must always be established with sufficient certainty ( Melnik v. Ukraine, 2006, §§ 58-60; Nold v. Germany, 2006, § 87; Miszczyński v. Poland (dec.), 2011; Gross v. Switzerland [GC], 2014, § 28; S.L. and J.L. v. Croatia, 2015, §§ 48-49; Bagdonavicius and Others v. Russia, 2016, §§ 64-65; Yusufeli İlçesini Güzelleştirme Yaşatma Kültür Varlıklarını Koruma Derneği v. Turkey (dec.), 2021, §§ 29-30; Tverdokhlebova v. Ukraine,* 2025, § 33). Parties can submit arguments which are rejected by the Court without such contentious submissions being regarded as an abuse of the right of individual application ( Hoti v. Croatia ), 2018, § 92."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-04-13,2025-06-04,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json,apps:29582/09,Yakut Republican Trade-Union Federation v. Russia,29582/09,added,"Yakut Republican Trade-Union Federation v. Russia, no. 29582/09, 7 December 2021",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C.2,Non-anonymous application,3,233,235,0.9484,"Yakut Republican Trade-Union Federation v. Russia , 2021",,"Article 35 § 2 (a) of the Convention is not applicable where applicants have submitted factual and legal information enabling the Court to identify them and establish their links with the facts in issue and the complaint raised ( Sindicatul Păstorul cel Bun v. Romania [GC], 2013, § 71).","Article 35 § 2 (a) of the Convention is not applicable where applicants have submitted factual and legal information enabling the Court to identify them and establish their links with the facts in issue and the complaint raised ( Sindicatul Păstorul cel Bun v. Romania [GC], 2013, § 71; Yakut Republican Trade-Union Federation v. Russia, 2021, §§ 25 and 31)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250413114857__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-04-13,2025-06-04,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-04-13__2025-06-04.json,apps:29582/09,Yakut Republican Trade-Union Federation v. Russia,29582/09,added,"Yakut Republican Trade-Union Federation v. Russia, no. 29582/09, 7 December 2021",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C.2,Non-anonymous application,3,235,237,0.8774,"Yakut Republican Trade-Union Federation v. Russia , 2021",,"Applications lodged by a church body or an association with religious and philosophical objects the identity of whose members is not disclosed have not been rejected as being anonymous (Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention): see Omkarananda and Divine Light Zentrum v. Switzerland, Commission decision, 1981.","Applications lodged by a church body or an association with religious and philosophical objects the identity of whose members is not disclosed have not been rejected as being anonymous (Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention): see Omkarananda and Divine Light Zentrum v. Switzerland, Commission decision, 1981. For an application lodged by a trade-union federation, see Yakut Republican Trade-Union Federation v. Russia, 2021, §§ 25 and 31 ."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:55737/16,Bogdan Shevchuk v. Ukraine,55737/16,added,"Bogdan Shevchuk v. Ukraine, no. 55737/16, 24 April 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,§1.B.1,Principles and examples,3,91,92,0.9956,"Bogdan Shevchuk v. Ukraine , 2025",,"Some noteworthy examples: ▪ as regards interrogation by the authorities concerning the application: Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 1996, § 105; Tanrıkulu v. Turkey [GC], 1999, § 131; ▪ threats of criminal proceedings against the applicant's lawyer: Kurt v. Turkey, 1998, §§ 159-65; complaint by the authorities against the lawyer in the domestic proceedings: McShane v. the United Kingdom, 2002, § 151; disciplinary and other measures against the applicant's lawyers: Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 929-33; ▪ police questioning of the applicants'lawyer concerning the signature of a power of attorney ( M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 62, 64, and §§ 325-336); police questioning of the applicant's lawyer and translator concerning the claim for just satisfaction: Fedotova v. Russia, 2006, §§ 49-51; regarding an inquiry ordered by the Government's representative: Ryabov v. Russia, 2008, §§ 53-65; ▪ inability of the applicant's lawyer and doctor to meet: Boicenco v. Moldova, 2006, §§ 158-59; ▪ measures limiting an applicant's contacts with her/his representative: Shtukaturov v. Russia, 2008, § 140, where a ban on a lawyer's visits, coupled with a ban on telephone calls and correspondence, was held to be incompatible with the respondent State's obligations under Article 34, and Zakharkin v. Russia, 2010, §§ 157-60, where the applicant's contacts with his representative before the Court had been restricted on the grounds that the representative in question was not a professional advocate and did not belong to any Bar association; ▪ interception of letters sent to the detained applicants by their legal representatives enclosing forms of authority to be completed for the purpose of lodging and then subsequently finalising their application with the Court: Mehmet Ali Ayhan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 39-45 and the references cited therein; ▪ failure to respect the confidentiality of lawyer-applicant discussions in a meeting room: Oferta Plus SRL v. Moldova, 2006, § 156; ▪ threats by the prison authorities: Petra v. Romania, 1998, § 44; ▪ refusal by the prison authorities to forward an application to the Court on the ground of non- exhaustion of domestic remedies: Nurmagomedov v. Russia, 2007, § 61; ▪ pressure put on a witness in a case before the Court concerning conditions of detention: Novinskiy v. Russia, 2009, §§ 119 et seq.; ▪ dissuasive remarks by the prison authorities combined with unjustified omissions and delays in providing the prisoner with writing materials for his correspondence and with the documents necessary for his application to the Court: Gagiu v. Romania, 2009, §§ 94 et seq.; ▪ the authorities'refusal to provide an imprisoned applicant with copies of documents required for his application to the Court: Naydyon v. Ukraine, 2010, § 68; Vasiliy Ivashchenko v. Ukraine, 2012, §§ 107-10; ▪ loss by prison authorities of irreplaceable papers relating to prisoner's application to the Court: Buldakov v. Russia, 2011, §§ 48-50; ▪ intimidation and pressuring of an applicant by the authorities in connection with the case before the Court: Lopata v. Russia, 2010, §§ 154-60; ▪ threats of dismissal from a job at a statutory corporation which cannot be regarded as ""non - governmental"" for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention, for having applied to the Court, and pressuring the applicant into submitting to his employer copies of all relevant correspondence with the Court ( Boškoćević v. Serbia, 2024, §§ 58-62, 65-67).","Some noteworthy examples: ▪ as regards interrogation by the authorities concerning the application: Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 1996, § 105; Tanrıkulu v. Turkey [GC], 1999, § 131; ▪ threats of criminal proceedings against the applicant's lawyer: Kurt v. Turkey, 1998, §§ 159-65; complaint by the authorities against the lawyer in the domestic proceedings: McShane v. the United Kingdom, 2002, § 151; disciplinary and other measures against the applicant's lawyers: Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 929-33; ▪ police questioning of the applicants'lawyer concerning the signature of a power of attorney ( M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 62, 64, and §§ 325-336); police questioning of the applicant's lawyer and translator concerning the claim for just satisfaction: Fedotova v. Russia, 2006, §§ 49-51; regarding an inquiry ordered by the Government's representative: Ryabov v. Russia, 2008, §§ 53-65; ▪ inability of the applicant's lawyer and doctor to meet: Boicenco v. Moldova, 2006, §§ 158-59; ▪ measures limiting an applicant's contacts with her/his representative: Shtukaturov v. Russia, 2008, § 140, where a ban on a lawyer's visits, coupled with a ban on telephone calls and correspondence, was held to be incompatible with the respondent State's obligations under Article 34, and Zakharkin v. Russia, 2010, §§ 157-60, where the applicant's contacts with his representative before the Court had been restricted on the grounds that the representative in question was not a professional advocate and did not belong to any Bar association; ▪ interception of letters sent to the detained applicants by their legal representatives enclosing forms of authority to be completed for the purpose of lodging and then subsequently finalising their application with the Court: Mehmet Ali Ayhan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 39-45 and the references cited therein; ▪ failure to respect the confidentiality of lawyer-applicant discussions in a meeting room: Oferta Plus SRL v. Moldova, 2006, § 156; ▪ threats by the prison authorities: Petra v. Romania, 1998, § 44; ▪ refusal by the prison authorities to forward an application to the Court on the ground of non- exhaustion of domestic remedies: Nurmagomedov v. Russia, 2007, § 61; ▪ pressure put on a witness in a case before the Court concerning conditions of detention: Novinskiy v. Russia, 2009, §§ 119 et seq.; ▪ dissuasive remarks by the prison authorities combined with unjustified omissions and delays in providing the prisoner with writing materials for his correspondence and with the documents necessary for his application to the Court: Gagiu v. Romania, 2009, §§ 94 et seq.; ▪ the authorities'refusal to provide an imprisoned applicant with copies of documents required for his application to the Court: Naydyon v. Ukraine, 2010, § 68; Vasiliy Ivashchenko v. Ukraine, 2012, §§ 107-10; ▪ loss by prison authorities of irreplaceable papers relating to prisoner's application to the Court: Buldakov v. Russia, 2011, §§ 48-50; ▪ intimidation and pressuring of an applicant by the authorities in connection with the case before the Court: Lopata v. Russia, 2010, §§ 154-60; ▪ threats of dismissal from a job at a statutory corporation which cannot be regarded as ""non - governmental"" for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention, for having applied to the Court, and pressuring the applicant into submitting to his employer copies of all relevant correspondence with the Court ( Boškoćević v. Serbia, 2024, §§ 58-62, 65-67); ▪ pressure exerted on the applicant by a judge involved in the initial criminal proceedings against him, who continued to sit in the case and decided, in a single judge formation, on questions significantly affecting the applicant's rights, including his liberty ( Bogdan Shevchuk v. Ukraine, 2025, §§ 49-54)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:65087/19,Cangı and Others v. Türkiye (no. 2),65087/19,added,"Cangı and Others v. Türkiye (no. 2), no. 65087/19, 8 July 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,§1.A.3.b,Direct victim,4,29,29,0.9941,,,"In the specific context of complaints concerning harm or risk of harm resulting from alleged failures by the State to combat climate change, having regard to the special features of climate change and to the principle of exclusion of actio popularis under the Convention, the Court ruled that applicants needed to show that they were personally and directly affected by the impugned failures. That depends on two key criteria for which the threshold is especially high. Firstly, the applicant must be subject to a high intensity of exposure to the adverse effects of climate change, that is, the level and severity of (the risk of) adverse consequences of governmental action or inaction affecting the applicant must be significant. Secondly, there must be a pressing need to ensure the applicant's individual protection, owing to the absence or inadequacy of any reasonable measures to reduce harm ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], 2024, §§ 487-488). In that case, having carefully considered, inter alia, the nature and scope of the individual applicants'complaints and the material submitted by them, the degree of likelihood and/or probability of the adverse effects of climate change in time, the specific impact on each individual applicant's life, health or well-being, the magnitude and duration of the harmful effects, the scope of the risk (localised or general), and the nature of the applicants'vulnerability, the Court found that the four individual applicants did not fulfil the relevant criteria so as to constitute victims within the meaning of Article 34 (§§ 527-536). Applying the same criteria, the Court refused to recognise the victim status of the former mayor of a French municipality who alleged that the relevant territory ran the risk of climate-change induced flooding in the future but who had left that municipality and did not have any property or other relevant link to it ( Carême v. France (dec.) [GC], 2024, § 83).","In the specific context of complaints concerning harm or risk of harm resulting from alleged failures by the State to combat climate change, having regard to the special features of climate change and to the principle of exclusion of actio popularis under the Convention, the Court ruled that applicants needed to show that they were personally and directly affected by the impugned failures. That depends on two key criteria for which the threshold is especially high. Firstly, the applicant must be subject to a high intensity of exposure to the adverse effects of climate change, that is, the level and severity of (the risk of) adverse consequences of governmental action or inaction affecting the applicant must be significant. Secondly, there must be a pressing need to ensure the applicant's individual protection, owing to the absence or inadequacy of any reasonable measures to reduce harm ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], 2024, §§ 487-488). In that case, having carefully considered, inter alia, the nature and scope of the individual applicants'complaints and the material submitted by them, the degree of likelihood and/or probability of the adverse effects of climate change in time, the specific impact on each individual applicant's life, health or well-being, the magnitude and duration of the harmful effects, the scope of the risk (localised or general), and the nature of the applicants'vulnerability, the Court found that the four individual applicants did not fulfil the relevant criteria so as to constitute victims within the meaning of Article 34 (§§ 527-536). Applying the same criteria, the Court refused to recognise the victim status of the former mayor of a French municipality who alleged that the relevant territory ran the risk of climate-change induced flooding in the future but who had left that municipality and did not have any property or other relevant link to it ( Carême v. France (dec.) [GC], 2024, § 83). In Cangı and Others v. Türkiye (no. 2), 2025, § 31, the Court clarified that the high threshold set out in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland (GC], 2024, § 613, with regard to the victim status of natural persons under Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention, is confined to cases concerning the issue of climate change."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:17710/15,Cioffi v. Italy,17710/15,added,"Cioffi v. Italy, no. 17710/15, 5 June 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,I.B.5.d,Characterisation of a complaint,4,210,215,0.9862,"Cioffi v. Italy , 2025",,"However, it must be borne in mind that the Court has no power to substitute itself for the applicant and formulate new complaints simply on the basis of the arguments and facts advanced ( Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 91). Since the Court can base its decision only on the facts complained of, it is not sufficient that a violation of the Convention is ""evident"" from the facts of the case or the applicant's submissions. Rather, the applicant must complain that a certain act or omission entailed a violation of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto, in a manner which should not leave the Court to second-guess whether a certain complaint was raised or not ( Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 90; Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 145). Therefore, ambiguous phrases or isolated words do not suffice to accept that a particular complaint has been raised ( Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, §§ 82-85; Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 146).","However, it must be borne in mind that the Court has no power to substitute itself for the applicant and formulate new complaints simply on the basis of the arguments and facts advanced ( Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 91). Since the Court can base its decision only on the facts complained of, it is not sufficient that a violation of the Convention is ""evident"" from the facts of the case or the applicant's submissions. Rather, the applicant must complain that a certain act or omission entailed a violation of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto, in a manner which should not leave the Court to second-guess whether a certain complaint was raised or not ( Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 90; Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 145). Therefore, aambiguous phrases or isolated words do not suffice to accept that a particular complaint has been raised ( Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, §§ 82-85; Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 146; contrast with Cioffi v. Italy, 2025, §§ 54-56 where the Court found that the applicant had raised his complaint of ill-treatment with sufficient clarity and precision)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:7535/21|58894/21,Darko Špehar v. Croatia and Danijel Gojković v. Croatia (dec.),7535/21|58894/21,added,"Darko Špehar v. Croatia and Danijel Gojković v. Croatia (dec.), nos. 7535/21 and 58894/21, 8 July 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,§1.A.3.f,Death of the applicant,4,74,75,0.9878,,,"Where applicants choose to be represented under Rule 36 § 1 of the Rules of Court, rather than lodging the application themselves, Rule 45 § 3 requires them to produce a written authority to act, duly signed. It is essential for representatives to demonstrate that they have received specific and explicit instructions from the alleged victim within the meaning of Article 34 on whose behalf they purport to act before the Court ( Post v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2009; Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], 2014, § 102 - see also Oliyevskyy v. Ukraine (dec.), 2020, §§ 16-22 and V.M. and Others v. Belgium (striking out) [GC], §§ 32-41, where the applicants did not maintain contact with their representative and contrast with N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, §§ 69-79, and the references therein, where the representative remained in contact with both applicants via telephone and WhatsApp, and the existence of special circumstances regarding respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requiring the Court to continue the examination of the application (Article 37 § 1 in fine )). On the validity of an authority to act, see Aliev v. Georgia, 2009, §§ 44-49; on the authenticity of an application, see Velikova v. Bulgaria, 2000, §§ 48-52 and, as concerns a particular vulnerable applicant, see E.T. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2024, §§ 31-33).","Where applicants choose to be represented under Rule 36 § 1 of the Rules of Court, rather than lodging the application themselves, Rule 45 § 3 requires them to produce a written authority to act, duly signed. It is essential for representatives to demonstrate that they have received specific and explicit instructions from the alleged victim within the meaning of Article 34 on whose behalf they purport to act before the Court ( Post v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2009; Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], 2014, § 102 - see also Oliyevskyy v. Ukraine (dec.), 2020, §§ 16-22 and V.M. and Others v. Belgium (striking out) [GC], §§ 32-41, where the applicants did not maintain contact with their representative and contrast with N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, §§ 69-79, and the references therein, where the representative remained in contact with both applicants via telephone and WhatsApp, and the existence of special circumstances regarding respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requiring the Court to continue the examination of the application (Article 37 § 1 in fine )). On the validity of an authority to act, see Aliev v. Georgia, 2009, §§ 44-49; on the authenticity of an application, see Velikova v. Bulgaria, 2000, §§ 48-52, as concerns a particular vulnerable applicant, see E.T. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2024, §§ 31-33, and, as concerns the applicants'lawyer's failure to maintain contact with his clients and to inform the Court of their respective deaths in a timely manner, see Darko Špehar v. Croatia and Danijel Gojković v. Croatia (dec.), 2025, §§ 21-27."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:2474/21,Garand and Others v. France,2474/21,added,"Garand and Others v. France, no. 2474/21, 6 March 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,§1.A.3.c,Indirect victim,4,32,32,0.908,"Garand and Others v. France , 2025",,"In such cases, the Court has accepted that close family members, such as parents, of a person whose death or disappearance is alleged to engage the responsibility of the State can themselves claim to be indirect victims of the alleged violation of Article 2, the question of whether they were legal heirs of the deceased not being relevant ( Van Colle v. the United Kingdom, 2012, § 86; Tsalikidis and Others v. Greece, 2017, § 64; Kotilainen and Others v. Finland, 2020, §§ 51-52).","In such cases, the Court has accepted that close family members, such as parents, of a person whose death or disappearance is alleged to engage the responsibility of the State can themselves claim to be indirect victims of the alleged violation of Article 2, the question of whether they were legal heirs of the deceased not being relevant ( Van Colle v. the United Kingdom, 2012, § 86; Tsalikidis and Others v. Greece, 2017, § 64; Kotilainen and Others v. Finland, 2020, §§ 51-52). For example, in the case of Garand and Others v. France, 2025, concerning the use of firearms by members of a special force of the gendarmerie resulting in the death of a prisoner on the run whom they were trying to arrest, the Court granted victim status to the deceased person's stepmother who had raised him since his childhood after his mother had died, but not to his stepmother's brother and his half-brother's partner (§§ 73-74)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:3473/19,Gündüz v. Türkiye (dec.),3473/19,added,"Gündüz v. Türkiye (dec.), no. 3473/19, 29 April 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,§1.A.3.e,Loss of victim status,4,65,66,0.9829,,,"In some other cases whether an individual remains a victim may also depend on the amount of compensation awarded by the domestic courts or at least on the possibility of seeking and obtaining compensation for the damage sustained, having regard to the facts about which he or she complains before the Court and the effectiveness (including the promptness) of the remedy affording the award ( Normann v. Denmark (dec.), 2001; Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], 2006, § 202; see also Jensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark (dec.), 2003; Kurić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], 2012, § 262; J.B. and Others v. Hungary (dec.), 2018, § 59). With regard to the sufficiency of compensation awarded to an association representing several individuals, see Društvo za varstvo upnikov v. Slovenia (dec.), 2017, §§ 48-64. The express acknowledgment at the domestic level of a violation of an applicant's right to a fair trial within a reasonable time in criminal proceedings may not be sufficient to remove that applicant's victims status, in the absence of any award of compensation or reduction of the sentence ( Tempel v. the Czech Republic, 2021, §§ 77-83). Conversely, in the case of a lawyer whose lawyer-client privilege had been breached by intercepting his telephone conversation and by forcing him to appear as a witness at his client's trial, an implicit acknowledgment of the violation by excluding the respective evidence from the file together with the possibility, for that lawyer, to seek compensation by filing a civil claim, were deemed to be sufficient to deprive him of his victim status in relation to Article 8 of the Convention ( Mateuț v. Romania (dec.), 2022, §§ 33-39).","In some other cases whether an individual remains a victim may also depend on the amount of compensation awarded by the domestic courts or at least on the possibility of seeking and obtaining compensation for the damage sustained, having regard to the facts about which he or she complains before the Court and the effectiveness (including the promptness) of the remedy affording the award ( Normann v. Denmark (dec.), 2001; Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], 2006, § 202; see also Jensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark (dec.), 2003; Kurić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], 2012, § 262; J.B. and Others v. Hungary (dec.), 2018, § 59). With regard to the sufficiency of compensation awarded to an association representing several individuals, see Društvo za varstvo upnikov v. Slovenia (dec.), 2017, §§ 48-64. The express acknowledgment at the domestic level of a violation of an applicant's right to a fair trial within a reasonable time in criminal proceedings may not be sufficient to remove that applicant's victims status, in the absence of any award of compensation or reduction of the sentence ( Tempel v. the Czech Republic, 2021, §§ 77-83). Conversely, in the case of a lawyer whose lawyer-client privilege had been breached by intercepting his telephone conversation and by forcing him to appear as a witness at his client's trial, an implicit acknowledgment of the violation by excluding the respective evidence from the file together with the possibility, for that lawyer, to seek compensation by filing a civil claim, were deemed to be sufficient to deprive him of his victim status in relation to Article 8 of the Convention ( Mateuț v. Romania (dec.), 2022, §§ 33-39). In respect of a complaint under the criminal limb of Article 6 § 1 regarding the right to a reasoned judgment, an express acknowledgment by the Constitutional Court of a breach of the applicant's right, together with the reopening of the criminal proceedings ending in the applicant's release and final acquittal and the possibility to lodge a claim for compensation for wrongful conviction, were deemed to be sufficient to deprive him of his victim status in relation to Article 6 of the Convention even in the absence of actual compensation ( Gündüz v. Türkiye (dec.), 2025, §§ 50-57)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:13959/20,Jewish Community of Thessaloniki v. Greece,13959/20,added,"Jewish Community of Thessaloniki v. Greece, no. 13959/20, 6 May 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C.2.b,Instantaneous facts prior or subsequent to entry into force or declaration,4,326,332,0.9875,"Jewish Community of Thessaloniki v. Greece , 2025",,"The Court's temporal jurisdiction must be determined in relation to the facts constituting the alleged interference. To that end it is essential to identify, in each specific case, the exact time of the alleged interference. In doing so the Court must take into account both the facts of which the applicant complains and the scope of the Convention right alleged to have been violated ( Blečić v. Croatia [GC], 2006, § 82; Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2009, § 131; Nešić v. Montenegro, 2020, §§ 36-38).","The Court's temporal jurisdiction must be determined in relation to the facts constituting the alleged interference. To that end it is essential to identify, in each specific case, the exact time of the alleged interference. In doing so the Court must take into account both the facts of which the applicant complains and the scope of the Convention right alleged to have been violated ( Blečić v. Croatia [GC], 2006, § 82; Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2009, § 131; Nešić v. Montenegro, 2020, §§ 36-38; Jewish Community of Thessaloniki v. Greece, 2025, § 44)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:13959/20,Jewish Community of Thessaloniki v. Greece,13959/20,added,"Jewish Community of Thessaloniki v. Greece, no. 13959/20, 6 May 2025",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C.2.b,Instantaneous facts prior or subsequent to entry into force or declaration,4,329,335,0.9874,"Jewish Community of Thessaloniki v. Greece , 2025",,"Examples of cases include: ▪ interferences occurring prior to the critical date and final court decisions delivered after that date ( Meltex Ltd v. Armenia (dec.), 2008); ▪ interferences occurring after the critical date ( Lep ojić v. Serbia, 2007, § 45; Filipović v. Serbia, 2007, § 33); ▪ use of evidence obtained as a result of ill-treatment occurring prior to the critical date in judicial decisions delivered after that date ( Harutyunyan v. Armenia, 2007, § 50); ▪ action for the annulment of title to property instituted prior to the critical date but concluded afterwards ( Turgut and Others v. Turkey, 2008, § 73); ▪ date of final annulment of title to property ( Fener Rum Patrikliği (Ecumenical Patriarchy) v. Turkey (dec.), 2007). 330. See also: ▪ conviction of the applicant in absentia by the Greek courts prior to Greece's declaration under Article 25, despite the ultimately unsuccessful appeals lodged against the conviction after that date ( Stamoulakatos v. Greece (no. 1), 1993, § 33); ▪ implicit decision of the Central Electoral Commission, prior to ratification, refusing the applicant's request to sign a petition without having a stamp affixed to his passport, whereas the proceedings instituted on that account were conducted after that date ( Kadiķis v. Latvia (dec.), 2000); ▪ dismissal of the applicant from his job and civil action brought by him prior to ratification, followed by the Constitutional Court's decision after that date ( Jovanović v. Croatia (dec.), 2002); ▪ ministerial order transferring the management of the applicants'company to a board appointed by the Minister for the Economy, thus depriving them of their right of access to a court, whereas the Supreme Court's judgment dismissing the applicants'appeal was given after the critical date ( Kefalas and Others v. Greece, 1995, § 45); ▪ conviction of the applicant after the relevant declaration under Article 46 on account of statements made to journalists before that date ( Zana v. Turkey, 1997, § 42); ▪ search of the applicant's company's premises and seizure of documents, although the subsequent proceedings took place after ratification ( Veeber v. Estonia (no. 1), 2002, § 55; see also Kikots and Kikota v. Latvia (dec.), 2002).","Examples of cases include: ▪ interferences occurring prior to the critical date and final court decisions delivered after that date ( Meltex Ltd v. Armenia (dec.), 2008); ▪ interferences occurring after the critical date ( Lepojić v. Serbia, 2007, § 45; Filipović v. Serbia, 2007, § 33); ▪ use of evidence obtained as a result of ill-treatment occurring prior to the critical date in judicial decisions delivered after that date ( Harutyunyan v. Armenia, 2007, § 50); ▪ action for the annulment of title to property instituted prior to the critical date but concluded afterwards ( Turgut and Others v. Turkey, 2008, § 73); ▪ date of final annulment of title to property ( Fener Rum Patrikliği (Ecumenical Patriarchy) v. Turkey (dec.), 2007). 336. See also: ▪ conviction of the applicant in absentia by the Greek courts prior to Greece's declaration under Article 25, despite the ultimately unsuccessful appeals lodged against the conviction after that date ( Stamoulakatos v. Greece (no. 1), 1993, § 33); ▪ implicit decision of the Central Electoral Commission, prior to ratification, refusing the applicant's request to sign a petition without having a stamp affixed to his passport, whereas the proceedings instituted on that account were conducted after that date ( Kadiķis v. Latvia (dec.), 2000); ▪ dismissal of the applicant from his job and civil action brought by him prior to ratification, followed by the Constitutional Court's decision after that date ( Jovanović v. Croatia (dec.), 2002); ▪ ministerial order transferring the management of the applicants'company to a board appointed by the Minister for the Economy, thus depriving them of their right of access to a court, whereas the Supreme Court's judgment dismissing the applicants'appeal was given after the critical date ( Kefalas and Others v. Greece, 1995, § 45); ▪ conviction of the applicant after the relevant declaration under Article 46 on account of statements made to journalists before that date ( Zana v. Turkey, 1997, § 42); ▪ search of the applicant's company's premises and seizure of documents, although the subsequent proceedings took place after ratification ( Veeber v. Estonia (no. 1), 2002, § 55; see also Kikots and Kikota v. Latvia (dec.), 2002); ▪ the alleged interference in the applicant's property right, resulting from a final judgment delivered after Greece's recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, and by virtue of which the applicant had irrevocably lost the ownership of the contested plot of land ( Jewish Community of Thessaloniki v. Greece, 2025, § 48-53)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:59144/16,K.M. v. North Macedonia,59144/16,added,"K.M. v. North Macedonia, no. 59144/16, 4 March 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.2.f,Availability and effectiveness,4,,140,,"K.M. v. North Macedonia , 2025",,,"In the context of Article 8, in a case concerning the alleged failure to protect the applicant, a girl (fourteen years of age at the material time) from sexual abuse, the Court found that, even if effective protection against sexual abuse requires measures of a criminal-law nature, in the specific circumstances of the case the applicant was not to be blamed for having pursued civil proceedings as it was the only possible fact-finding judicial forum for the establishment of any liability on the part of the alleged offender ( K.M. v. North Macedonia, 2025, §§ 52-55). In a case concerning the unauthorised use of the applicants'sperm samples (given at a public hospital in the context of fertility evaluations) to inseminate two women, and resulting in the conception and birth of two children, the Court found that, in the light of the relevant case-law of the Supreme Court and the flexible approach followed by the Swedish courts, a civil action for compensation for damage before the domestic courts was an effective remedy despite the fact that the relevant acts had occurred before the Convention was incorporated into domestic law ( Paic v. Sweden and Wernersson v. Sweden (dec.), 2025, §§ 61-73)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:29791/21,Kári Orrason and Others v. Iceland,29791/21,added,"Kári Orrason and Others v. Iceland, nos. 29791/21 and 2 others, 27 May 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A.2.b,Compliance with domestic rules and limits,4,116,117,0.9104,"Kári Orrason and Others v. Iceland , 2025",,"Applicants must comply with the applicable rules and procedures of domestic law, failing which their application is likely to fall foul of the condition laid down in Article 35 ( Ben Salah Adraqui and Dhaime v. Spain (dec.), 2000; Merger and Cros v. France (dec.), 2004; MPP Golub v. Ukraine (dec.), 2005; Agbovi v. Germany (dec.), 2006; Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], 2014, §§ 72 and 80). Article 35 § 1 has not been complied with when an appeal is not accepted for examination because of a procedural mistake by the applicant ( Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], 2010, § 143). Where the Government claims that an applicant has failed to comply with domestic rules (e.g. rules on the exhaustion of ordinary remedies before constitutional redress), the Court must verify whether those rules were pre-existing mandatory legal requirements deriving from law or well-established case-law ( Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 69; Pop- Ilić and Others v. Serbia, 2014, § 42).","Applicants must comply with the applicable rules and procedures of domestic law, failing which their application is likely to fall foul of the condition laid down in Article 35 ( Ben Salah Adraqui and Dhaime v. Spain (dec.), 2000; Merger and Cros v. France (dec.), 2004; MPP Golub v. Ukraine (dec.), 2005; Agbovi v. Germany (dec.), 2006; Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], 2014, §§ 72 and 80). Article 35 § 1 has not been complied with when an appeal is not accepted for examination because of a procedural mistake by the applicant ( Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], 2010, § 143). Where the Government claims that an applicant has failed to comply with domestic rules (e.g. rules on the exhaustion of ordinary remedies before constitutional redress), the Court must verify whether those rules were pre-existing mandatory legal requirements deriving from law or well-established case-law ( Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 69; Pop- Ilić and Others v. Serbia, 2014, § 42; see Kári Orrason and Others v. Iceland, 2025, §§ 36-40, where the Court found that the first and second applicants had exhausted domestic remedies even though they had not raised the Convention argument in the first instance but had done so for the first time on appeal, as the failure to raise it earlier had no influence on the refusal of the leave to appeal)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:56605/19|25424/23,Kotnik and Jukič v. Slovenia (dec.),56605/19|25424/23,added,"Kotnik and Jukič v. Slovenia (dec.), nos. 56605/19 and 25424/23, 11 February 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.A.6,Creation of new remedies,3,161,165,0.994,,,"The assessment of whether domestic remedies have been exhausted is normally carried out with reference to the state of the proceedings on the date on which the application was lodged with the Court. This rule is, however, subject to exceptions following the creation of new remedies ( İçyer v. Turkey (dec.), 2006, §§ 72 et seq.). The Court has departed from this rule in particular in cases concerning the length of proceedings ( Predil Anstalt v. Italy (dec.), 2002; Bottaro v. Italy (dec.), 2002; Andrášik and Others v. Slovakia (dec.), 2002; Nogolica v. Croatia (dec.), 2002; Brusco v. Italy (dec.), 2001; Korenjak v. Slovenia (dec.), 2007, §§ 66-71; Techniki Olympiaki A.E. v. Greece (dec.), 2013; Szaxon v. Hungary (dec.), 2023, §§ 42-48) or concerning a new compensatory remedy in respect of interferences with property rights ( Charzyński v. Poland (dec.), 2005; Michalak v. Poland (dec.), 2005; Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (dec.) [GC], 2010; Beshiri and Others v. Albania (dec.), § 177 and §§ 216-218; Olkhovik and Others v. Russia (dec.), 2022, §§ 34-41); or failure to execute domestic judgments ( Nagovitsyn and Nalgiyev v. Russia (dec.), 2010, §§ 36-40; Balan v. Moldova (dec.), 2012); or prison overcrowding ( Łatak v. Poland (dec.), 2010; Stella and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2014, §§ 42-45); or improper conditions of detention ( Shmelev and Others v. Russia (dec.), 2020, §§ 123-131).","The assessment of whether domestic remedies have been exhausted is normally carried out with reference to the state of the proceedings on the date on which the application was lodged with the Court. This rule is, however, subject to exceptions following the creation of new remedies ( İçyer v. Turkey (dec.), 2006, §§ 72 et seq.). The Court has departed from this rule in particular in cases concerning the length of proceedings ( Predil Anstalt v. Italy (dec.), 2002; Bottaro v. Italy (dec.), 2002; Andrášik and Others v. Slovakia (dec.), 2002; Nogolica v. Croatia (dec.), 2002; Brusco v. Italy (dec.), 2001; Korenjak v. Slovenia (dec.), 2007, §§ 66-71; Techniki Olympiaki A.E. v. Greece (dec.), 2013; Szaxon v. Hungary (dec.), 2023, §§ 42-48) or concerning a new compensatory remedy in respect of interferences with property rights ( Charzyński v. Poland (dec.), 2005; Michalak v. Poland (dec.), 2005; Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (dec.) [GC], 2010; Beshiri and Others v. Albania (dec.), § 177 and §§ 216-218; Olkhovik and Others v. Russia (dec.), 2022, §§ 34-41); or failure to execute domestic judgments ( Nagovitsyn and Nalgiyev v. Russia (dec.), 2010, §§ 36-40; Balan v. Moldova (dec.), 2012); or prison overcrowding ( Łatak v. Poland (dec.), 2010; Stella and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2014, §§ 42-45); or improper conditions of detention ( Shmelev and Others v. Russia (dec.), 2020, §§ 123-131) or in respect of the national bank's extraordinary measures cancelling shares and bonds ( Kotnik and Jukič v. Slovenia (dec.), 2025, §§ 59-67)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:3613/19,Lembergs v. Latvia (dec.),3613/19,added,"Lembergs v. Latvia (dec.), no. 3613/19, 6 May 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.A.2.f,Availability and effectiveness,4,135,137,0.9198,,,"As concerns the presumption of innocence (Article 6 § 2), a remedy under civil law can, in principle, be considered effective against alleged violations. In several cases the Court found remedies under civil law, offering the possibility of obtaining monetary compensation, together with various other procedures for acknowledgment of or putting an end to the infringement of the presumption of innocence, to be effective within the meaning of the Convention (see Januškevičienė v. Lithuania, 2019, §§ 58-62 and the references cited therein, as well as Narbutas v. Lithuania, 2023, §§ 214-217, where the applicants could have lodged a civil claim to obtain monetary compensation for the breach of their honour and dignity).","As concerns the presumption of innocence (Article 6 § 2), a remedy under civil law can, in principle, be considered effective against alleged violations. In several cases the Court found remedies under civil law, offering the possibility of obtaining monetary compensation, together with various other procedures for acknowledgment of or putting an end to the infringement of the presumption of innocence, to be effective within the meaning of the Convention (see Januškevičienė v. Lithuania, 2019, §§ 58-62 and the references cited therein, as well as Narbutas v. Lithuania, 2023, §§ 214-217, where the applicants could have lodged a civil claim to obtain monetary compensation for the breach of their honour and dignity). However, the question of which remedies need to be exhausted in respect of allegations of a violation of presumption of innocence depends inevitably on the particular facts and the domestic law applicable to the case ( Lembergs v. Latvia (dec.), 2025, § 35). In that case, the Court considered that an ordinary civil action for defamation was not an effective remedy in respect of a claim of an alleged breach of presumption of innocence by persons not involved in the criminal proceedings and that the applicant should have used a special remedy provided for such cases by the Criminal Procedure Act, allowing the plaintiff to obtain an official acknowledgment of a breach of presumption of innocence and then to seek compensatory redress before civil courts ( ibid., §§ 41-44)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:5855/23,Mamaladze v. Georgia (dec.),5855/23,added,"Mamaladze v. Georgia (dec.), 5855/23, 17 June 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,§1.B.1,Principles and examples,3,92,93,0.9745,,,"The circumstances of the case may make the alleged interference with the right of individual application less serious ( Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia (striking out) [GC], 2007, §§ 118 et seq.). See also Holland v. Sweden (dec.), 2010, where the Court found that the destruction of tape recordings from a court hearing in accordance with Swedish law before the expiry of the six-month time-limit for lodging an application with the Court did not hinder the applicant from effectively exercising his right of petition; Farcaş v. Romania (dec.), 2010, where the Court considered that the alleged inability of the physically disabled applicant to exhaust domestic remedies, owing to lack of special facilities providing access to public services, did not hinder him from effectively exercising his right of petition; Yepishin v. Russia, 2013, §§ 73-77, where the Court considered that the prison administration's refusal to pay postage for dispatch of prisoner's letters to the Court did not hinder the applicant from effectively exercising his right of petition; Yam v. the United Kingdom, 2020, §§ 79-83, where the Court considered that the domestic authorities'decision not to disclose in camera material in the absence of a request from the Court did not hinder the applicant from effectively exercising his right of petition because there had been a meaningful independent scrutiny of the asserted basis for the continuing need for confidentiality.","The circumstances of the case may make the alleged interference with the right of individual application less serious ( Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia (striking out) [GC], 2007, §§ 118 et seq.). See also Holland v. Sweden (dec.), 2010, where the Court found that the destruction of tape recordings from a court hearing in accordance with Swedish law before the expiry of the six-month time-limit for lodging an application with the Court did not hinder the applicant from effectively exercising his right of petition; Farcaş v. Romania (dec.), 2010, where the Court considered that the alleged inability of the physically disabled applicant to exhaust domestic remedies, owing to lack of special facilities providing access to public services, did not hinder him from effectively exercising his right of petition; Yepishin v. Russia, 2013, §§ 73-77, where the Court considered that the prison administration's refusal to pay postage for dispatch of prisoner's letters to the Court did not hinder the applicant from effectively exercising his right of petition; Yam v. the United Kingdom, 2020, §§ 79-83, where the Court considered that the domestic authorities'decision not to disclose in camera material in the absence of a request from the Court did not hinder the applicant from effectively exercising his right of petition because there had been a meaningful independent scrutiny of the asserted basis for the continuing need for confidentiality; Mamaladze v. Georgia (dec.), 2025, §§ 42-49, where the Court considered that the dissemination, by an anonymous source, of a massive amount of material - containing transcripts of hundreds of individuals'private exchanges including those involving the applicant and his lawyer but not the interactions between them, pre- and post-dating the submission of his initial application to the Court -, could not be regarded as sufficient, in and of itself, for the applicant to form a genuine belief held on reasonable grounds that his discussions with his lawyer were being listened to, all the more so given his ability to successfully pursue his initial application before the Court."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:63386/16,Mansouri v. Italy (dec.) [GC],63386/16,added,"Mansouri v. Italy (dec.) [GC], no. 63386/16, 29 April 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.2.f,Availability and effectiveness,4,,134,,,,,"In the case of Mansouri v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2025, §§ 84-117, the applicant complained about the lawfulness of his alleged deprivation of liberty on board of an Italian cruise ship and about the conditions of his confinement on the basis of an order refusing him entry to Italy. After an assessment of the domestic case-law that the Government had submitted to the Committee of Ministers as part of the execution procedure pertaining to the Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, the Court concluded that, even though these decisions had been delivered after the events in the present case, they demonstrated with a sufficient degree of certainty that the compensatory remedy was capable of holding the State authorities to account for unlawful deprivation of liberty in various regards and, where appropriate, could award compensation. Moreover, the applicant could have pursued a compensatory remedy against the shipowner or the captain. Given that the deprivation of liberty alleged by the applicant had already come to an end when he lodged his application, the compensatory remedy was effective ( Mansouri v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2025, §§ 95-101). The Court also examined the possibility for the applicant to apply to the ordinary courts for interim relief and noted that this remedy empowered the courts to order urgent provisional measures for the preservation of a right that was likely to be breached, or to prevent imminent and irreparable damage. If the applicant had had any doubts as to the possibility of obtaining interim relief entailing his release, it had been for him to dispel those doubts by applying to the domestic courts ( ibid. §§ 103-10). In sum, the applicant had failed to exhaust available and effective remedies. Lastly, the Court noted that the present case was closely connected to issues that fell within the ambit of EUlaw and that the circumstances alleged by the applicant had formed part of the process of refusing admission to national territory, which was governed by the provisions of the Schengen Borders Code and Annex Vthereto. In light of the functioning of the system for policing the external borders of the Schengen Area, the return by the carrier of a third-country national who did not fulfil all the entry conditions formed an integral part of the process of refusing admission to national territory and originated in the refusal-of-entry order. In the absence of proceedings before them, the Italian courts had not had the opportunity to examine, whether on the basis of arguments put forward by the parties or of the courts'own motion, any issue as to the interpretation of the provisions of the Schengen Borders Code and Annex Vthereto or its compatibility with fundamental rights, while seeking, if appropriate, a preliminary ruling from the CJEU."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:75000/17,Milashina and Others v. Russia,75000/17,added,"Milashina and Others v. Russia, no. 75000/17, 4 March 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,§1.A.3.b,Direct victim,4,28,28,0.9916,"In Milashina and Others v. Russia , 2025",,"In order to be able to lodge an application in accordance with Article 34, an applicant must be able to show that he or she was ""directly affected"" by the measure complained of ( Tănase v. Moldova [GC], 2010, § 104; Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 33; Lambert and Others v. France [GC], 2015, § 89; Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland [GC], 2023, §§ 115, 125). This is indispensable for putting the protection mechanism of the Convention into motion ( Hristozov and Others v. Bulgaria, 2012, § 73), although this criterion is not to be applied in a rigid, mechanical and inflexible way throughout the proceedings ( Micallef v. Malta [GC], 2009, § 45; Karner v. Austria, 2003, § 25; Aksu v. Turkey [GC], 2012, § 51). For instance, a person cannot complain of a violation of his or her rights in proceedings to which he or she was not a party ( Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 92). However, in Margulev v. Russia, 2019, the Court considered the applicant to be a direct victim of defamation proceedings although he was only admitted as a third party to the proceedings. Since domestic law granted the status of third party to proceedings where ""the judgment may affect the third party' s rights and obligations vis-à-vis the claimant or defendant"", the Court considered that the domestic courts had tacitly accepted that the applicant's rights might have been affected by the outcome of the defamation proceedings (§ 36; see also Khural and Zeynalov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2023, §§ 31-32) . In Mukhin v. Russia, 2021, the Court recognised that the editor-in-chief of a newspaper could claim to be a victim of the domestic courts'decisions divesting that newspaper of its media-outlet status and annulling the document certifying its registration (§§ 158-160). Further, in some specific circumstances, direct victims who had not participated in the domestic proceedings were accepted as applicants before the Court ( Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 78-81). Standing in domestic proceedings is therefore not decisive, as the notion of ""victim"" is interpreted autonomously in the Convent ion system (see, for instance, Kalfagiannis and Pospert v. Greece (dec.), 2020, §§ 44-48, concerning the financial administrator of a public service broadcaster whose victim status was accepted by the domestic courts but not by the Court).","In order to be able to lodge an application in accordance with Article 34, an applicant must be able to show that he or she was ""directly affected"" by the measure complained of ( Tănase v. Moldova [GC], 2010, § 104; Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 33; Lambert and Others v. France [GC], 2015, § 89; Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale (CGAS) v. Switzerland [GC], 2023, §§ 115, 125). This is indispensable for putting the protection mechanism of the Convention into motion ( Hristozov and Others v. Bulgaria, 2012, § 73), although this criterion is not to be applied in a rigid, mechanical and inflexible way throughout the proceedings ( Micallef v. Malta [GC], 2009, § 45; Karner v. Austria, 2003, § 25; Aksu v. Turkey [GC], 2012, § 51). For instance, a person cannot complain of a violation of his or her rights in proceedings to which he or she was not a party ( Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 92). However, in Margulev v. Russia, 2019, the Court considered the applicant to be a direct victim of defamation proceedings although he was only admitted as a third party to the proceedings. Since domestic law granted the status of third party to proceedings where ""the judgment may affect the third party' s rights and obligations vis-à-vis the claimant or defendant"", the Court considered that the domestic courts had tacitly accepted that the applicant's rights might have been affected by the outcome of the defamation proceedings (§ 36; see also Khural and Zeynalov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2023, §§ 31-32). In Mukhin v. Russia, 2021, the Court recognised that the editor-in-chief of a newspaper could claim to be a victim of the domestic courts'decisions divesting that newspaper of its media-outlet status and annulling the document certifying its registration (§§ 158-160). In Milashina and Others v. Russia, 2025, the Court found that the applicant company, an editorial and publishing house, could claim to be a victim of an alleged violation of Article 10 since it had taken part in the domestic proceedings and the threats against it and the journalists had affected its work (§ 44). Further, in some specific circumstances, direct victims who had not participated in the domestic proceedings were accepted as applicants before the Court ( Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 78-81). Standing in domestic proceedings is therefore not decisive, as the notion of ""victim"" is interpreted autonomously in the Convent ion system (see, for instance, Kalfagiannis and Pospert v. Greece (dec.), 2020, §§ 44-48, concerning the financial administrator of a public service broadcaster whose victim status was accepted by the domestic courts but not by the Court)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:12908/23|24544/23,Paic v. Sweden and Wernersson v. Sweden (dec.),12908/23|24544/23,added,"Paic v. Sweden and Wernersson v. Sweden (dec.), nos. 12908/23 and 24544/23, 20 May 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.2.f,Availability and effectiveness,4,,140,,"K.M. v. North Macedonia , 2025",,,"In the context of Article 8, in a case concerning the alleged failure to protect the applicant, a girl (fourteen years of age at the material time) from sexual abuse, the Court found that, even if effective protection against sexual abuse requires measures of a criminal-law nature, in the specific circumstances of the case the applicant was not to be blamed for having pursued civil proceedings as it was the only possible fact-finding judicial forum for the establishment of any liability on the part of the alleged offender ( K.M. v. North Macedonia, 2025, §§ 52-55). In a case concerning the unauthorised use of the applicants'sperm samples (given at a public hospital in the context of fertility evaluations) to inseminate two women, and resulting in the conception and birth of two children, the Court found that, in the light of the relevant case-law of the Supreme Court and the flexible approach followed by the Swedish courts, a civil action for compensation for damage before the domestic courts was an effective remedy despite the fact that the relevant acts had occurred before the Convention was incorporated into domestic law ( Paic v. Sweden and Wernersson v. Sweden (dec.), 2025, §§ 61-73)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:30085/13,Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova,30085/13,added,"Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 30085/13, 15 May 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A.5,Procedural aspects,3,157,161,0.9801,"Wulffaert and Wulffaert Beheer NV v. Belgium , 2025",,"Where the Government intends to lodge a non-exhaustion plea, it must do so, in so far as the character of the plea and the circumstances permit, in its written or oral observations on the admissibility of the application, though there may be exceptional circumstances dispensing it from that obligation ( López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], § 83; Mooren v. Germany [GC], 2009, § 57-59 and the references cited therein; Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], 2014, §§ 79-83; Blokhin v. Russia [GC], 2016, §§ 96-98; see also Rule 55 of the Rules of Court). At this stage, when notice of the application has been given to the respondent Government and the Government has not raised the question of non-exhaustion, the Court cannot examine it of its own motion ( M.C. v. Türkiye, 2024, § 44 and the references cited therein). In Strezovski and Others v. North Macedonia, 2020, the Court found that the Government was not estopped from raising the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies although they had raised their objection for the first time in their additional observations, having regard to the special circumstances of the case (the adoption of a Supreme Court's legal opinion subsequent to the Government's initial observations on the admissibility and merits, §§ 33, 35; see, conversely, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 52-53; Varyan v. Armenia, §§ 73-75).","Where the Government intends to lodge a non-exhaustion plea, it must do so, in so far as the character of the plea and the circumstances permit, in its written or oral observations on the admissibility of the application, though there may be exceptional circumstances dispensing it from that obligation ( López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], § 83; Mooren v. Germany [GC], 2009, § 57-59 and the references cited therein; Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], 2014, §§ 79-83; Blokhin v. Russia [GC], 2016, §§ 96-98; see also Rule 55 of the Rules of Court). At this stage, when notice of the application has been given to the respondent Government and the Government has not raised the question of non-exhaustion, the Court cannot examine it of its own motion ( M.C. v. Türkiye, 2024, § 44 and the references cited therein). In Strezovski and Others v. North Macedonia, 2020, the Court found that the Government was not estopped from raising the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies although they had raised their objection for the first time in their additional observations, having regard to the special circumstances of the case (the adoption of a Supreme Court's legal opinion subsequent to the Government's initial observations on the admissibility and merits, §§ 33, 35; see, conversely, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 52-53; Varyan v. Armenia, §§ 73-75; and Wulffaert and Wulffaert Beheer NV v. Belgium, 2025, §§ 23). Conversely, in Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, 2025, § 28, the Court found that the Government was estopped from raising the issue of the reopened and still pending domestic proceedings given that the relevant new facts preceded the date of the Government's first observations and that the proceedings in question were initiated by the Government Agent after the communication of the case."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:30085/13,Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova,30085/13,added,"Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 30085/13, 15 May 2025",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,§1.A.3.e,Loss of victim status,4,,55,,,,,"When the national authorities have neither acknowledged a breach of the applicant's rights, nor have afforded any redress, the mere reopening of domestic proceedings after the communication of the case by the Court does not suffice to deprive an applicant of its ""victim"" status ( Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, 2025, § 29)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:13609/20,Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (no. 4),13609/20,added,"Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (no. 4), no. 13609/20, 8 July 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,I.B.5.a,Completed application form,4,218,207,0.6564,,,"Similarly, where alleged continuing violations of the right to property or home in the context of a long-standing conflict are at stake, the time may come when an applicant should introduce his or her case, as remaining passive in the face of an unchanging situation would no longer be justified. Once an applicant has become aware or should have been aware that there is no realistic hope of regaining access to his or her property and home in the foreseeable future, unexplained or excessive delay in lodging the application may lead to the application being rejected as out of time. In a complex post-conflict situation the time-frames must be generous in order to allow for the situation to settle and to permit applicants to collect comprehensive information of obtaining a solution at the domestic level ( Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.) [GC], 2011, §§ 140-141, for a period of about three years after ratification of the Convention; Chiragov and Others v. Armenia (dec.) [GC], 2011, §§ 141-142, for a period of four years and almost four months after ratification; compare and contrast Samadov v. Armenia (dec.), §§ 9-18, for a period of more than six years after ratification).","In the case of Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (no. 4), 2025, § 134, the Government argued that the applicant had raised his complaints before the Court not in the application form but on attached sheets. The Court observed that the applicant had described all the facts relating to his complaints in his application form and had indicated the alleged violations of the Convention clearly and in substance. In accordance with Rule 47 § 2 (b) of the Rules of Court, he had also supplemented that information by appending to the application form a 15-page document containing further details of the alleged violations of the Convention and relevant arguments. Nevertheless, as regards objections of inadmissibility based on a breach of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the Court reiterated that it alone had the power to apply that provision in the administration of the proceedings before it: the Contracting States could not rely on it as a ground of inadmissibility in raising an objection under Article 35 of the Convention."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:13609/20,Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (no. 4),13609/20,added,"Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (no. 4), no. 13609/20, 8 July 2025",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.D.1,Substantially the same as a matter that has been examined by the Court,3,244,249,0.9954,,,"The Convention organs have found that the application or a complaint was not essentially the same as a previous application in Nobili Massuero v. Italy (dec.), 2004; Riener v. Bulgaria, 2006, § 103; Chappex v. Switzerland, Commission decision, 1994; Yurttas v. Turkey, 2004, §§ 36-37; Sadak v. Turkey, 2004, §§ 32-33; Amarandei and Others v. Romania, 2016, §§ 106-112; Tsalikidis and Others v. Greece, 2017, §§ 56-58; Volodina v. Russia (no. 2), 2021, §§ 37-40; Ekimdzhiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2022, §§ 253-255). On the contrary, they have found that the application or a complaint was essentially the same in Moldovan and Others v. Romania (dec.), 2011; Hokkanen v. Finland, Commission decision, 1996; Adesina v. France, Commission decision, 1996; Bernardet v. France, Commission decision, 1996; Gennari v. Italy (dec.)2000; Manuel v. Portugal (dec.), 2002.","The Convention organs have found that the application or a complaint was not essentially the same as a previous application in Nobili Massuero v. Italy (dec.), 2004; Riener v. Bulgaria, 2006, § 103; Chappex v. Switzerland, Commission decision, 1994; Yurttas v. Turkey, 2004, §§ 36-37; Sadak v. Turkey, 2004, §§ 32-33; Amarandei and Others v. Romania, 2016, §§ 106-112; Tsalikidis and Others v. Greece, 2017, §§ 56-58; Volodina v. Russia (no. 2), 2021, §§ 37-40; Ekimdzhiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2022, §§ 253-255), Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (no. 4), 2025, §§ 120-24. On the contrary, they have found that the application or a complaint was essentially the same in Moldovan and Others v. Romania (dec.), 2011; Hokkanen v. Finland, Commission decision, 1996; Adesina v. France, Commission decision, 1996; Bernardet v. France, Commission decision, 1996; Gennari v. Italy (dec.)2000; Manuel v. Portugal (dec.), 2002."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:13609/20,Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (no. 4),13609/20,added,"Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (no. 4), no. 13609/20, 8 July 2025",3,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.D,Incompatibility ratione materiae,2,355,361,0.996,,,"In addition, the Court has no jurisdiction ratione materiae to examine whether a Contracting Party has complied with the obligations imposed on it by one of the Court's judgments. Complaints of a failure either to execute the Court's judgment or to redress a violation already found by the Court fall outside its competence ratione materiae ( Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], 2015, § 34 (citing Egmez v. Cyprus (dec.), 2012, and § 35). The Court cannot entertain complaints of this nature without encroaching on the powers of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which supervises the execution of judgments by virtue of Article 46 § 2 of the Convention. However, the Committee of Ministers'role in this sphere does not mean that measures taken by a respondent State to remedy a violation found by the Court cannot raise a new issue undecided by the judgment and, as such, form the subject of a new application that may be dealt with by the Court ( Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2) [GC], 2009, § 62). In other words, the Court may entertain a complaint that the reopening of proceedings at domestic level by way of implementation of one of its judgments gave rise to a new breach of the Convention ( ibid .; Lyons and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2003). The Court may be competent to examine a complaint about the refusal by a domestic court to reopen civil or criminal proceedings following an earlier finding of a violation of Article 6 by the Court, as long as the complaint relates to a ""new issue"" undecided by the first judgment, for instance the alleged unfairness of the subsequent proceedings before the domestic court at issue ( Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], 2015, §§ 35-39, in a civil context, Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [GC], 2017, §§ 52-58, in a criminal context). Similarly, the Court may have jurisdiction to examine the alleged lack of effectiveness of a fresh investigation following a previous judgment finding a violation of the procedural limb of Article 3 ( V.D. v. Croatia (no. 2), 2018, §§ 46-54.","In addition, the Court has no jurisdiction ratione materiae to examine whether a Contracting Party has complied with the obligations imposed on it by one of the Court's judgments. Complaints of a failure either to execute the Court's judgment or to redress a violation already found by the Court fall outside its competence ratione materiae ( Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], 2015, § 34 (citing Egmez v. Cyprus (dec.), 2012, and § 35). The Court cannot entertain complaints of this nature without encroaching on the powers of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which supervises the execution of judgments by virtue of Article 46 § 2 of the Convention. However, the Committee of Ministers'role in this sphere does not mean that measures taken by a respondent State to remedy a violation found by the Court cannot raise a new issue undecided by the judgment and, as such, form the subject of a new application that may be dealt with by the Court ( Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2) [GC], 2009, § 62). In other words, the Court may entertain a complaint that the reopening of proceedings at domestic level by way of implementation of one of its judgments gave rise to a new breach of the Convention ( ibid .; Lyons and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2003). The Court may be competent to examine a complaint about the refusal by a domestic court to reopen civil or criminal proceedings following an earlier finding of a violation of Article 6 by the Court, as long as the complaint relates to a ""new issue"" undecided by the first judgment, for instance the alleged unfairness of the subsequent proceedings before the domestic court at issue ( Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], 2015, §§ 35-39, in a civil context, Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [GC], 2017, §§ 52-58, in a criminal context) . Similarly, the Court may have jurisdiction to examine the alleged lack of effectiveness of a fresh investigation following a previous judgment finding a violation of the procedural limb of Article 3 ( V.D. v. Croatia (no. 2), 2018, §§ 46-54) or grievances that concerned the applicant continued detention and the alleged continuation of the violation found in the Court's initial judgment ( Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (no. 4), 2025, §§ 120-24."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:10934/21,Semenya v. Switzerland [GC],10934/21,added,"Semenya v. Switzerland [GC], no. 10934/21, 10 July 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.A.2,Jurisdiction,3,209,297,0.8619,,,"T he scope of a case ""referred to"" the Court in the exercise of the right of individual application is determined by the applicant 's complaint or ""claim"" - which is the term used in Article 34 ( Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 109). Acomplaint is characterised by the facts alleged in it and not merely by the legal grounds or arguments relied on ( Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], 2009, § 54); Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 110-126). By virtue of the jura novit curia principle the Court is not bound by the legal grounds adduced by the applicant under the Convention and the Protocols thereto and has the power to decide on the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of a complaint by examining it under Articles or provisions of the Convention that are different from those relied upon by the applicant ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, §§ 62-66, where the Court observed that the factual elements of the complaints under Article 18 were present in all the initial applications although the applicant had only relied on this provision in two of them, and therefore dismissed the Government's objection that parts of these complaints had been introduced out of time, that is to say, during the Grand Chamber proceedings).","In the case Semenya v. Switzerland [GC], 2025, §§ 128-35, the applicant, a professional athlete, complained about the dismissal, by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, of a civil-law appeal she had made against the award of the Court of Arbitration for Sport rejecting her complaint concerning non- State regulations requiring her to lower her natural testosterone level in order to compete in the woman's category in international competitions. The Court confirmed the principle, established in Markovic and Others v. Italy [GC], 2006, §§ 53-54, according to which, even if the facts giving rise to a case took place outside the territory of the respondent State, the latter's jurisdiction is established from the moment an individual brings a civil action before the courts of that State when domestic law recognises the possibility of bringing such an action and, a priori, the right claimed has the characteristics required by that provision. In the context of this civil action, the person concerned therefore falls within the jurisdiction of that State with regard to respect of the rights guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. However, the reasoning set out above applies only to procedural obligations that are autonomous and separable from the substantive aspect of the case (another example being the procedural aspect of Article 2 relating to the right to life; see Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey [GC], 2019, §§ 188-89). The Court emphasised that it is only in very exceptional circumstances that it may conclude that a State has extraterritorial jurisdiction over the substantive aspect of such a case. With regard, in particular, to the criterion of ""control over the person of the applicant"" as the basis for establishing the extraterritorial jurisdiction of a State within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, the Court specified that this requires control over the person of the applicant himself and not simply ""control over his interests protected by the Convention"". It considered that the absence of any other remedies at the applicant's disposal was not a sufficient argument to create a jurisdictional link ( Semenya v. Switzerland [GC], 2025, § 150)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:79549/16,Taşdemir v. Türkiye (dec.),79549/16,added,"Taşdemir v. Türkiye (dec.), no. 79549/16, 25 March 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.E.2,Misleading the Court,3,257,262,0.9896,,,"An application is an abuse of the right of application if it is knowingly based on untrue facts with a view to deceiving the Court ( X and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2021, § 145; Varbanov v. Bulgaria, 2000, § 36; Gogitidze and Others v. Georgia, 2015, § 76). The most serious and blatant examples of such abuses are, firstly, the submission of an application under a false identity ( Drijfhout v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2011, §§ 27-29), and, secondly, the falsification of documents sent to the Court ( Jian v. Romania (dec.), 2004; Bagheri and Maliki v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2007; Poznanski and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2007; Gogitidze and Others v. Georgia, 2015, §§ 77-78; Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), 2024, §§ 123-124). In a case concerning detention pending expulsion, the Court has found that there was an abuse of the right of application when an applicant had misled both the domestic authorities and the Court about his nationality (see Bencheref v. Sweden (dec.), 2017, § 39). The Court has also deemed an application abusive when the applicant had made, before the Court, a factual allegation contrary to his own testimony in domestic proceedings on a point relevant for the outcome of the case ( Povilonis v. Lithuania (dec.), 2022, §§ 92-101), or when the applicants had used vague and undefined terms in order to make the circumstances of the case appear similar to another case where the Court had found a violation ( Kongresna Narodna Stranka and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), 2016, §§ 13 and 15-19).","An application is an abuse of the right of application if it is knowingly based on untrue facts with a view to deceiving the Court ( X and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2021, § 145; Varbanov v. Bulgaria, 2000, § 36; Gogitidze and Others v. Georgia, 2015, § 76). The most serious and blatant examples of such abuses are, firstly, the submission of an application under a false identity ( Drijfhout v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2011, §§ 27-29), and, secondly, the falsification of documents sent to the Court ( Jian v. Romania (dec.), 2004; Bagheri and Maliki v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2007; Poznanski and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2007; Gogitidze and Others v. Georgia, 2015, §§ 77-78; Mamić v. Croatia (dec.), 2024, §§ 123-124). The Court has found that there was an abuse of the right of application when an applicant had misled both the domestic authorities and the Court (see Bencheref v. Sweden (dec.), 2017, § 39, concerning a detention pending expulsion where the applicant had given misleading information about his nationality, and Taşdemir v. Türkiye (dec.), 2025, §§ 42-43, concerning the right to education, where the applicant had withheld significant information). The Court has also deemed an application abusive when the applicant had made, before the Court, a factual allegation contrary to his own testimony in domestic proceedings on a point relevant for the outcome of the case ( Povilonis v. Lithuania (dec.), 2022, §§ 92-101), or when the applicants had used vague and undefined terms in order to make the circumstances of the case appear similar to another case where the Court had found a violation ( Kongresna Narodna Stranka and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), 2016, §§ 13 and 15-19)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:76634/16,Wulffaert and Wulffaert Beheer NV v. Belgium,76634/16,added,"Wulffaert and Wulffaert Beheer NV v. Belgium, no. 76634/16, 10 July 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I,Procedural grounds for inadmissibility,1,107,108,0.9812,"Wulffaert and Wulffaert Beheer NV v. Belgium , 2025",,"Under Rule 55 of the Rules of Court, any plea of inadmissibility must be raised by the respondent Contracting Party, in so far as the nature of the objection and the circumstances so allow, in its written or oral observations on the admissibility of the application. Any omission by the Government to raise such objections in their initial observations on the admissibility of the case may lead the Court to conclude that they are estopped from raising those objections at a later stage in the proceedings ( Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 51-54 and below).","Under Rule 55 of the Rules of Court, any plea of inadmissibility must be raised by the respondent Contracting Party, in so far as the nature of the objection and the circumstances so allow, in its written or oral observations on the admissibility of the application. Any omission by the Government to raise such objections in their initial observations on the admissibility of the case may lead the Court to conclude that they are estopped from raising those objections at a later stage in the proceedings ( Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 51-54 and below, and Wulffaert and Wulffaert Beheer NV v. Belgium, 2025, § 23)."
154b01c3289a,Article 34/35,20250604184157__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,20251202174715__Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-02,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/154b01c3289a/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-02.json,apps:76634/16,Wulffaert and Wulffaert Beheer NV v. Belgium,76634/16,added,"Wulffaert and Wulffaert Beheer NV v. Belgium, no. 76634/16, 10 July 2025",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A.5,Procedural aspects,3,157,161,0.9801,"Wulffaert and Wulffaert Beheer NV v. Belgium , 2025",,"Where the Government intends to lodge a non-exhaustion plea, it must do so, in so far as the character of the plea and the circumstances permit, in its written or oral observations on the admissibility of the application, though there may be exceptional circumstances dispensing it from that obligation ( López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], § 83; Mooren v. Germany [GC], 2009, § 57-59 and the references cited therein; Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], 2014, §§ 79-83; Blokhin v. Russia [GC], 2016, §§ 96-98; see also Rule 55 of the Rules of Court). At this stage, when notice of the application has been given to the respondent Government and the Government has not raised the question of non-exhaustion, the Court cannot examine it of its own motion ( M.C. v. Türkiye, 2024, § 44 and the references cited therein). In Strezovski and Others v. North Macedonia, 2020, the Court found that the Government was not estopped from raising the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies although they had raised their objection for the first time in their additional observations, having regard to the special circumstances of the case (the adoption of a Supreme Court's legal opinion subsequent to the Government's initial observations on the admissibility and merits, §§ 33, 35; see, conversely, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 52-53; Varyan v. Armenia, §§ 73-75).","Where the Government intends to lodge a non-exhaustion plea, it must do so, in so far as the character of the plea and the circumstances permit, in its written or oral observations on the admissibility of the application, though there may be exceptional circumstances dispensing it from that obligation ( López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], § 83; Mooren v. Germany [GC], 2009, § 57-59 and the references cited therein; Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], 2014, §§ 79-83; Blokhin v. Russia [GC], 2016, §§ 96-98; see also Rule 55 of the Rules of Court). At this stage, when notice of the application has been given to the respondent Government and the Government has not raised the question of non-exhaustion, the Court cannot examine it of its own motion ( M.C. v. Türkiye, 2024, § 44 and the references cited therein). In Strezovski and Others v. North Macedonia, 2020, the Court found that the Government was not estopped from raising the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies although they had raised their objection for the first time in their additional observations, having regard to the special circumstances of the case (the adoption of a Supreme Court's legal opinion subsequent to the Government's initial observations on the admissibility and merits, §§ 33, 35; see, conversely, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 52-53; Varyan v. Armenia, §§ 73-75; and Wulffaert and Wulffaert Beheer NV v. Belgium, 2025, §§ 23). Conversely, in Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, 2025, § 28, the Court found that the Government was estopped from raising the issue of the reopened and still pending domestic proceedings given that the relevant new facts preceded the date of the Government's first observations and that the proceedings in question were initiated by the Government Agent after the communication of the case."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:20725/20,Allée v. France,20725/20,added,"Allée v. France, no. 20725/20, 18 January 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.1.a.v,"Content, form and consequences of the impugned article",5,,187,,"Allée v. France, no. 20725/20, 18 January 2024|Dede c. Türkiye, no. 48340/20, 20 February 2024",,,"Lastly, the Court considers that the extent to which the report and photo have been disseminated may also be an important factor, depending on whether the newspaper is a national or local one, and has a large or a limited circulation (Karhuvaara and Iltalehti v. Finland, 2004, § 47; Gurgenidze v. Georgia, 2006, § 55; Klein v. Slovakia, 2006, § 48). This factor was, in particular, relevant in the case of Allée v. France, 2024, § 48, which concerned an email sent to six people, of whom only one was not involved in the case of harassment alleged therein; or in Dede c. Türkiye, 2024, § 50, concerning an internal e-mail sent by an employee to human resources staff criticising the management methods of a top-level manager."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:20725/20,Allée v. France,20725/20,added,"Allée v. France, no. 20725/20, 18 January 2024",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.2.b.i.§45,"c Procedural issues: standard and burden of proof, equality of arms",6,,238,,"Allée v. France, no. 20725/20, 18 January 2024",,,"In Allée v. France, 2024, the Court underlined a need to provide appropriate protections for self- reporting victims of psychological or sexual harassment. In that case, the Court found that the national courts had placed an excessive burden on the applicant by requiring her to provide proof of the alleged workplace sexual harassment, which had no outside witnesses, rather than adapting the criteria of ""good faith"" and ""sufficient factual basis"" to the specific circumstances (§ 52)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:39822/98,Altın v. Turkey (dec.),39822/98,added,"Altın v. Turkey (dec.), no. 39822/98, 6 April 2000",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,"Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and the forms of interference",2,,65,,"Altın v. Turkey (dec.), no. 39822/98, 6 April 2000|Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, no. 30655/09, 21 March 2017|Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), no. 28369/07, 30 September 2010;|Bathellier v. France (dec.), no. 49001/07, 12 October 2010|Catalan v. Romania, no. 13003/04, 9 January 2018|Gollnisch v. France (dec.), no. 48135/08, 7 June 2011|Guz v. Poland, no. 965/12, 15 October 2020|Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), no. 8696/09, 5 February 2013|Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023|Marunić v. Croatia, no. 51706/11, 28 March 2017|Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, no. 40072/13, 19 October 2021|Otto v. Germany (dec.), no. 27574/02, 24 November 2005|Peev v. Bulgaria, no. 64209/01, 26 July 2007|Petersen v. Germany (dec.), no. 39793/98, 22 November 2001|Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), no. 11002/07, 4 November 2014",,,"When it comes to professional posts - such as court presidents, judges, public prosecutors, judicial employees, civil servants, university professors, journalists at public broadcasters, employees in State or municipally owned companies, lawyers, notaries, medical doctors, nurses, servicemen- removals or suspensions from those posts (and even refusals to appoint) relating, overtly or covertly, to statements by the post-holders, or candidates, have consistently been seen as interferences with their right to freedom of expression, as in the following examples: ▪ an announcement by a Head of State of his intention not to reappoint the applicant, a Supreme Court president, to any other public office on the grounds that the latter had expressed an opinion on a constitutional issue, which opinion had allegedly contradicted that of the Head of State (Wille v. Liechtenstein [GC], §§ 44 and 49-51); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Supreme Court president (Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, §§ 145-52); ▪ dismissals of judges (Pitkevich v. Russia (dec.); Kudeshkina v. Russia, §§ 79-80; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 53-55), or demotions of judges (Albayrak v. Turkey, 2008, § 38; Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, § 127; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, §§ 157-64); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Chief Public Prosecutor (Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 183-90); removal of a Deputy General Prosecutor (Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), 2013, § 36), or of the head of a local public prosecutor's office (Brisc v. Romania, 2018, § 89); ▪ dismissals of public prosecutors (Altın v. Turkey (dec.), 2000; Goryaynova v. Ukraine, 2020, § 54); of an expert in a prosecutor's office (Peev v. Bulgaria, § 60); or of a press officer in a prosecutor's office (Guja v. Moldova [GC], 2008, §§ 53 and 55); ▪ dismissals of civil servants (Vogt v. Germany, § 44; Petersen v. Germany (dec.); Volkmer v. Germany (dec.); De Diego Nafría v. Spain, 2002, § 30; Kern v. Germany (dec.), 2007; Langner v. Germany, § 39; Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, § 36; Catalan v. Romania, 2018, § 44), or refusal to promote them (Otto v. Germany (dec.)); ▪ dismissal of a university professor (Rubins v. Latvia, §§ 68-70) or suspension of a university professor (Gollnisch v. France (dec.), 2011); ▪ dismissals of journalists at public broadcasters (Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Nenkova- Lalova v. Bulgaria, §§ 52-53; Matúz v. Hungary, §§ 25-27); ▪ dismissals of employees of State and municipal companies (Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), 2010; Bathellier v. France (dec.), 2010; Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), §§ 39-40; Marunić v. Croatia, § 45); ▪ disbarment of a lawyer (Bagirov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 70), or suspension of a notary (Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, 2017, § 41); ▪ dismissal of a doctor at a public hospital (Gawlik v. Liechtenstein, 2021, § 48); or of a nurse in a partly State-owned hospital (Heinisch v. Germany, 2011, §§ 43-45); and a disciplinary penalty imposed on a doctor for breach of professional ethics, for criticising the medical treatment provided to a patient (Frankowicz v. Poland), 2008; ▪ reprimands or warnings given to judges (Kayasu v. Turkey, 2008, §§ 78-81; Di Giovanni v. Italy, 2013, § 74; Guz v. Poland, 2020, § 73; Kozan v. Turkey, § 52), a lawyer (Veraart v. the Netherlands, § 49), a journalist (Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland, § 44), and an academic (Kula v. Turkey, §§ 36-40); and ▪ even a decision no more than hypothetically capable of affecting the career prospects of a judge (Panioglu v. Romania, § 98)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:30655/09,Ana Ioniţă v. Romania,30655/09,added,"Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, no. 30655/09, 21 March 2017",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,"Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and the forms of interference",2,,65,,"Altın v. Turkey (dec.), no. 39822/98, 6 April 2000|Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, no. 30655/09, 21 March 2017|Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), no. 28369/07, 30 September 2010;|Bathellier v. France (dec.), no. 49001/07, 12 October 2010|Catalan v. Romania, no. 13003/04, 9 January 2018|Gollnisch v. France (dec.), no. 48135/08, 7 June 2011|Guz v. Poland, no. 965/12, 15 October 2020|Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), no. 8696/09, 5 February 2013|Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023|Marunić v. Croatia, no. 51706/11, 28 March 2017|Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, no. 40072/13, 19 October 2021|Otto v. Germany (dec.), no. 27574/02, 24 November 2005|Peev v. Bulgaria, no. 64209/01, 26 July 2007|Petersen v. Germany (dec.), no. 39793/98, 22 November 2001|Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), no. 11002/07, 4 November 2014",,,"When it comes to professional posts - such as court presidents, judges, public prosecutors, judicial employees, civil servants, university professors, journalists at public broadcasters, employees in State or municipally owned companies, lawyers, notaries, medical doctors, nurses, servicemen- removals or suspensions from those posts (and even refusals to appoint) relating, overtly or covertly, to statements by the post-holders, or candidates, have consistently been seen as interferences with their right to freedom of expression, as in the following examples: ▪ an announcement by a Head of State of his intention not to reappoint the applicant, a Supreme Court president, to any other public office on the grounds that the latter had expressed an opinion on a constitutional issue, which opinion had allegedly contradicted that of the Head of State (Wille v. Liechtenstein [GC], §§ 44 and 49-51); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Supreme Court president (Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, §§ 145-52); ▪ dismissals of judges (Pitkevich v. Russia (dec.); Kudeshkina v. Russia, §§ 79-80; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 53-55), or demotions of judges (Albayrak v. Turkey, 2008, § 38; Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, § 127; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, §§ 157-64); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Chief Public Prosecutor (Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 183-90); removal of a Deputy General Prosecutor (Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), 2013, § 36), or of the head of a local public prosecutor's office (Brisc v. Romania, 2018, § 89); ▪ dismissals of public prosecutors (Altın v. Turkey (dec.), 2000; Goryaynova v. Ukraine, 2020, § 54); of an expert in a prosecutor's office (Peev v. Bulgaria, § 60); or of a press officer in a prosecutor's office (Guja v. Moldova [GC], 2008, §§ 53 and 55); ▪ dismissals of civil servants (Vogt v. Germany, § 44; Petersen v. Germany (dec.); Volkmer v. Germany (dec.); De Diego Nafría v. Spain, 2002, § 30; Kern v. Germany (dec.), 2007; Langner v. Germany, § 39; Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, § 36; Catalan v. Romania, 2018, § 44), or refusal to promote them (Otto v. Germany (dec.)); ▪ dismissal of a university professor (Rubins v. Latvia, §§ 68-70) or suspension of a university professor (Gollnisch v. France (dec.), 2011); ▪ dismissals of journalists at public broadcasters (Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Nenkova- Lalova v. Bulgaria, §§ 52-53; Matúz v. Hungary, §§ 25-27); ▪ dismissals of employees of State and municipal companies (Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), 2010; Bathellier v. France (dec.), 2010; Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), §§ 39-40; Marunić v. Croatia, § 45); ▪ disbarment of a lawyer (Bagirov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 70), or suspension of a notary (Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, 2017, § 41); ▪ dismissal of a doctor at a public hospital (Gawlik v. Liechtenstein, 2021, § 48); or of a nurse in a partly State-owned hospital (Heinisch v. Germany, 2011, §§ 43-45); and a disciplinary penalty imposed on a doctor for breach of professional ethics, for criticising the medical treatment provided to a patient (Frankowicz v. Poland), 2008; ▪ reprimands or warnings given to judges (Kayasu v. Turkey, 2008, §§ 78-81; Di Giovanni v. Italy, 2013, § 74; Guz v. Poland, 2020, § 73; Kozan v. Turkey, § 52), a lawyer (Veraart v. the Netherlands, § 49), a journalist (Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland, § 44), and an academic (Kula v. Turkey, §§ 36-40); and ▪ even a decision no more than hypothetically capable of affecting the career prospects of a judge (Panioglu v. Romania, § 98)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:20755/08,Azadliq and Zayidov v. Azerbaijan,20755/08,added,"Azadliq and Zayidov v. Azerbaijan, no. 20755/08, 30 June 2022",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.2.b.i.§44,b Distinction between statements of fact and value judgments,6,,211,,"Azadliq and Zayidov v. Azerbaijan, no. 20755/08, 30 June 2022|Makraduli v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, nos. 64659/11 and 24133/13, 19 July 2018|Staniszewski v. Poland, no. 20422/15, 14 October 2021|Udovychenko v. Ukraine, no. 46396/14, 23 March 2023",,,"With respect to statements of facts, the Court has held, in particular, that the ""presumption of falsity"" of such statements - that is an obligation on the author to demonstrate their truth - does not necessarily contravene the Convention provided that the defendant is allowed a realistic opportunity to prove that the statement was true (Kasabova v. Bulgaria, 2011, §§ 58-62; Staniszewski v. Poland, § 45; Azadliq and Zayidov v. Azerbaijan, 2022, § 35; Udovychenko v. Ukraine, § 44). At the same time, the Court has also indicated in such cases that an applicant who was clearly involved in a public debate on an important issue should not be required to fulfil a more demanding standard than that of due diligence, as in such circumstances an obligation to prove factual statements may deprive the applicant of the protection afforded by Article 10 (Makraduli v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, § 75; Staniszewski v. Poland, § 45; Wojczuk v. Poland, § 74; Azadliq and Zayidov v. Azerbaijan, 2022, § 35; Udovychenko v. Ukraine, § 44)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:28369/07,Balenović v. Croatia (dec.),28369/07,added,"Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), no. 28369/07, 30 September 2010;",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,"Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and the forms of interference",2,,65,,"Altın v. Turkey (dec.), no. 39822/98, 6 April 2000|Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, no. 30655/09, 21 March 2017|Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), no. 28369/07, 30 September 2010;|Bathellier v. France (dec.), no. 49001/07, 12 October 2010|Catalan v. Romania, no. 13003/04, 9 January 2018|Gollnisch v. France (dec.), no. 48135/08, 7 June 2011|Guz v. Poland, no. 965/12, 15 October 2020|Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), no. 8696/09, 5 February 2013|Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023|Marunić v. Croatia, no. 51706/11, 28 March 2017|Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, no. 40072/13, 19 October 2021|Otto v. Germany (dec.), no. 27574/02, 24 November 2005|Peev v. Bulgaria, no. 64209/01, 26 July 2007|Petersen v. Germany (dec.), no. 39793/98, 22 November 2001|Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), no. 11002/07, 4 November 2014",,,"When it comes to professional posts - such as court presidents, judges, public prosecutors, judicial employees, civil servants, university professors, journalists at public broadcasters, employees in State or municipally owned companies, lawyers, notaries, medical doctors, nurses, servicemen- removals or suspensions from those posts (and even refusals to appoint) relating, overtly or covertly, to statements by the post-holders, or candidates, have consistently been seen as interferences with their right to freedom of expression, as in the following examples: ▪ an announcement by a Head of State of his intention not to reappoint the applicant, a Supreme Court president, to any other public office on the grounds that the latter had expressed an opinion on a constitutional issue, which opinion had allegedly contradicted that of the Head of State (Wille v. Liechtenstein [GC], §§ 44 and 49-51); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Supreme Court president (Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, §§ 145-52); ▪ dismissals of judges (Pitkevich v. Russia (dec.); Kudeshkina v. Russia, §§ 79-80; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 53-55), or demotions of judges (Albayrak v. Turkey, 2008, § 38; Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, § 127; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, §§ 157-64); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Chief Public Prosecutor (Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 183-90); removal of a Deputy General Prosecutor (Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), 2013, § 36), or of the head of a local public prosecutor's office (Brisc v. Romania, 2018, § 89); ▪ dismissals of public prosecutors (Altın v. Turkey (dec.), 2000; Goryaynova v. Ukraine, 2020, § 54); of an expert in a prosecutor's office (Peev v. Bulgaria, § 60); or of a press officer in a prosecutor's office (Guja v. Moldova [GC], 2008, §§ 53 and 55); ▪ dismissals of civil servants (Vogt v. Germany, § 44; Petersen v. Germany (dec.); Volkmer v. Germany (dec.); De Diego Nafría v. Spain, 2002, § 30; Kern v. Germany (dec.), 2007; Langner v. Germany, § 39; Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, § 36; Catalan v. Romania, 2018, § 44), or refusal to promote them (Otto v. Germany (dec.)); ▪ dismissal of a university professor (Rubins v. Latvia, §§ 68-70) or suspension of a university professor (Gollnisch v. France (dec.), 2011); ▪ dismissals of journalists at public broadcasters (Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Nenkova- Lalova v. Bulgaria, §§ 52-53; Matúz v. Hungary, §§ 25-27); ▪ dismissals of employees of State and municipal companies (Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), 2010; Bathellier v. France (dec.), 2010; Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), §§ 39-40; Marunić v. Croatia, § 45); ▪ disbarment of a lawyer (Bagirov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 70), or suspension of a notary (Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, 2017, § 41); ▪ dismissal of a doctor at a public hospital (Gawlik v. Liechtenstein, 2021, § 48); or of a nurse in a partly State-owned hospital (Heinisch v. Germany, 2011, §§ 43-45); and a disciplinary penalty imposed on a doctor for breach of professional ethics, for criticising the medical treatment provided to a patient (Frankowicz v. Poland), 2008; ▪ reprimands or warnings given to judges (Kayasu v. Turkey, 2008, §§ 78-81; Di Giovanni v. Italy, 2013, § 74; Guz v. Poland, 2020, § 73; Kozan v. Turkey, § 52), a lawyer (Veraart v. the Netherlands, § 49), a journalist (Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland, § 44), and an academic (Kula v. Turkey, §§ 36-40); and ▪ even a decision no more than hypothetically capable of affecting the career prospects of a judge (Panioglu v. Romania, § 98)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:49001/07,Bathellier v. France (dec.),49001/07,added,"Bathellier v. France (dec.), no. 49001/07, 12 October 2010",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,"Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and the forms of interference",2,,65,,"Altın v. Turkey (dec.), no. 39822/98, 6 April 2000|Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, no. 30655/09, 21 March 2017|Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), no. 28369/07, 30 September 2010;|Bathellier v. France (dec.), no. 49001/07, 12 October 2010|Catalan v. Romania, no. 13003/04, 9 January 2018|Gollnisch v. France (dec.), no. 48135/08, 7 June 2011|Guz v. Poland, no. 965/12, 15 October 2020|Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), no. 8696/09, 5 February 2013|Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023|Marunić v. Croatia, no. 51706/11, 28 March 2017|Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, no. 40072/13, 19 October 2021|Otto v. Germany (dec.), no. 27574/02, 24 November 2005|Peev v. Bulgaria, no. 64209/01, 26 July 2007|Petersen v. Germany (dec.), no. 39793/98, 22 November 2001|Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), no. 11002/07, 4 November 2014",,,"When it comes to professional posts - such as court presidents, judges, public prosecutors, judicial employees, civil servants, university professors, journalists at public broadcasters, employees in State or municipally owned companies, lawyers, notaries, medical doctors, nurses, servicemen- removals or suspensions from those posts (and even refusals to appoint) relating, overtly or covertly, to statements by the post-holders, or candidates, have consistently been seen as interferences with their right to freedom of expression, as in the following examples: ▪ an announcement by a Head of State of his intention not to reappoint the applicant, a Supreme Court president, to any other public office on the grounds that the latter had expressed an opinion on a constitutional issue, which opinion had allegedly contradicted that of the Head of State (Wille v. Liechtenstein [GC], §§ 44 and 49-51); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Supreme Court president (Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, §§ 145-52); ▪ dismissals of judges (Pitkevich v. Russia (dec.); Kudeshkina v. Russia, §§ 79-80; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 53-55), or demotions of judges (Albayrak v. Turkey, 2008, § 38; Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, § 127; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, §§ 157-64); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Chief Public Prosecutor (Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 183-90); removal of a Deputy General Prosecutor (Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), 2013, § 36), or of the head of a local public prosecutor's office (Brisc v. Romania, 2018, § 89); ▪ dismissals of public prosecutors (Altın v. Turkey (dec.), 2000; Goryaynova v. Ukraine, 2020, § 54); of an expert in a prosecutor's office (Peev v. Bulgaria, § 60); or of a press officer in a prosecutor's office (Guja v. Moldova [GC], 2008, §§ 53 and 55); ▪ dismissals of civil servants (Vogt v. Germany, § 44; Petersen v. Germany (dec.); Volkmer v. Germany (dec.); De Diego Nafría v. Spain, 2002, § 30; Kern v. Germany (dec.), 2007; Langner v. Germany, § 39; Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, § 36; Catalan v. Romania, 2018, § 44), or refusal to promote them (Otto v. Germany (dec.)); ▪ dismissal of a university professor (Rubins v. Latvia, §§ 68-70) or suspension of a university professor (Gollnisch v. France (dec.), 2011); ▪ dismissals of journalists at public broadcasters (Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Nenkova- Lalova v. Bulgaria, §§ 52-53; Matúz v. Hungary, §§ 25-27); ▪ dismissals of employees of State and municipal companies (Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), 2010; Bathellier v. France (dec.), 2010; Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), §§ 39-40; Marunić v. Croatia, § 45); ▪ disbarment of a lawyer (Bagirov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 70), or suspension of a notary (Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, 2017, § 41); ▪ dismissal of a doctor at a public hospital (Gawlik v. Liechtenstein, 2021, § 48); or of a nurse in a partly State-owned hospital (Heinisch v. Germany, 2011, §§ 43-45); and a disciplinary penalty imposed on a doctor for breach of professional ethics, for criticising the medical treatment provided to a patient (Frankowicz v. Poland), 2008; ▪ reprimands or warnings given to judges (Kayasu v. Turkey, 2008, §§ 78-81; Di Giovanni v. Italy, 2013, § 74; Guz v. Poland, 2020, § 73; Kozan v. Turkey, § 52), a lawyer (Veraart v. the Netherlands, § 49), a journalist (Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland, § 44), and an academic (Kula v. Turkey, §§ 36-40); and ▪ even a decision no more than hypothetically capable of affecting the career prospects of a judge (Panioglu v. Romania, § 98)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:77419/16,Biancardi v. Italy,77419/16,added,"Biancardi v. Italy, no. 77419/16, 25 November 2021",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XIII.B.6,"""Right to be forgotten""",3,,706,,"Biancardi v. Italy, no. 77419/16, 25 November 2021|Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], no. 57292/16, 4 July 2023",,,"In its practice, the Court has dealt with several cases concerning requests for removal, alteration, anonymisation or de-indexing of news articles. These cases were examined either under Article 8, if brought by individuals who had invoked their right to respect for their private life (Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Poland; M.L. and W.W. v. Germany), or under Article 10, if brought by journalists, editors or media owners, who had referred to their right of freedom of expression (Biancardi v. Italy, 2021; Mediengruppe Österreich GmbH v. Austria; Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:77419/16,Biancardi v. Italy,77419/16,added,"Biancardi v. Italy, no. 77419/16, 25 November 2021",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XIII.B.6,"""Right to be forgotten""",3,,707,,"Biancardi v. Italy, no. 77419/16, 25 November 2021",,,"More specifically, the case of Biancardi v. Italy, 2021, afforded the Court its first opportunity to rule on the compatibility with Article 10 of a civil judgment against a journalist for not de-indexing sensitive information published on the Internet concerning criminal proceedings against private individuals and the journalist's decision to keep the information easily accessible in spite of opposition from those concerned. The question of anonymising identities in the on-line article did not arise in this case. The Court noted that the article had remained easily accessible online for eight months after a formal request to remove it by the persons concerned. The severity of the sanction - liability under civil and not criminal law - and the amount of the compensation awarded did not appear excessive."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:9602/18,Bild GmbH & Co. KG v. Germany,9602/18,added,"Bild GmbH & Co. KG v. Germany, no. 9602/18, 31 October 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.2.b.§49.§51.§54, Civil servants,7,,263,,"Bild GmbH & Co. KG v. Germany, no. 9602/18, 31 October 2023",,,"In the case of Bild GmbH & Co. KG v. Germany, 2023, a news outlet shared unblurred CCTVfootage of a police officer using force during an arrest but did not allege any misconduct on the part of the officer. Tthe Court observed that, in the absence of such misconduct allegations, civil servants retain a legitimate interest in protecting their private life against false portrayals of abuse of office. Therefore, courts should balance the relevant public interest against the specific adverse consequences that publication of an officer's image may have on his or her private or family life (§ 35). Such balancing must take place regardless of whether the coverage is positive or negative, since in any case the public has an interest in news coverage of police use of force (§ 42)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:13003/04,Catalan v. Romania,13003/04,added,"Catalan v. Romania, no. 13003/04, 9 January 2018",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,"Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and the forms of interference",2,,65,,"Altın v. Turkey (dec.), no. 39822/98, 6 April 2000|Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, no. 30655/09, 21 March 2017|Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), no. 28369/07, 30 September 2010;|Bathellier v. France (dec.), no. 49001/07, 12 October 2010|Catalan v. Romania, no. 13003/04, 9 January 2018|Gollnisch v. France (dec.), no. 48135/08, 7 June 2011|Guz v. Poland, no. 965/12, 15 October 2020|Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), no. 8696/09, 5 February 2013|Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023|Marunić v. Croatia, no. 51706/11, 28 March 2017|Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, no. 40072/13, 19 October 2021|Otto v. Germany (dec.), no. 27574/02, 24 November 2005|Peev v. Bulgaria, no. 64209/01, 26 July 2007|Petersen v. Germany (dec.), no. 39793/98, 22 November 2001|Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), no. 11002/07, 4 November 2014",,,"When it comes to professional posts - such as court presidents, judges, public prosecutors, judicial employees, civil servants, university professors, journalists at public broadcasters, employees in State or municipally owned companies, lawyers, notaries, medical doctors, nurses, servicemen- removals or suspensions from those posts (and even refusals to appoint) relating, overtly or covertly, to statements by the post-holders, or candidates, have consistently been seen as interferences with their right to freedom of expression, as in the following examples: ▪ an announcement by a Head of State of his intention not to reappoint the applicant, a Supreme Court president, to any other public office on the grounds that the latter had expressed an opinion on a constitutional issue, which opinion had allegedly contradicted that of the Head of State (Wille v. Liechtenstein [GC], §§ 44 and 49-51); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Supreme Court president (Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, §§ 145-52); ▪ dismissals of judges (Pitkevich v. Russia (dec.); Kudeshkina v. Russia, §§ 79-80; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 53-55), or demotions of judges (Albayrak v. Turkey, 2008, § 38; Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, § 127; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, §§ 157-64); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Chief Public Prosecutor (Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 183-90); removal of a Deputy General Prosecutor (Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), 2013, § 36), or of the head of a local public prosecutor's office (Brisc v. Romania, 2018, § 89); ▪ dismissals of public prosecutors (Altın v. Turkey (dec.), 2000; Goryaynova v. Ukraine, 2020, § 54); of an expert in a prosecutor's office (Peev v. Bulgaria, § 60); or of a press officer in a prosecutor's office (Guja v. Moldova [GC], 2008, §§ 53 and 55); ▪ dismissals of civil servants (Vogt v. Germany, § 44; Petersen v. Germany (dec.); Volkmer v. Germany (dec.); De Diego Nafría v. Spain, 2002, § 30; Kern v. Germany (dec.), 2007; Langner v. Germany, § 39; Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, § 36; Catalan v. Romania, 2018, § 44), or refusal to promote them (Otto v. Germany (dec.)); ▪ dismissal of a university professor (Rubins v. Latvia, §§ 68-70) or suspension of a university professor (Gollnisch v. France (dec.), 2011); ▪ dismissals of journalists at public broadcasters (Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Nenkova- Lalova v. Bulgaria, §§ 52-53; Matúz v. Hungary, §§ 25-27); ▪ dismissals of employees of State and municipal companies (Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), 2010; Bathellier v. France (dec.), 2010; Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), §§ 39-40; Marunić v. Croatia, § 45); ▪ disbarment of a lawyer (Bagirov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 70), or suspension of a notary (Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, 2017, § 41); ▪ dismissal of a doctor at a public hospital (Gawlik v. Liechtenstein, 2021, § 48); or of a nurse in a partly State-owned hospital (Heinisch v. Germany, 2011, §§ 43-45); and a disciplinary penalty imposed on a doctor for breach of professional ethics, for criticising the medical treatment provided to a patient (Frankowicz v. Poland), 2008; ▪ reprimands or warnings given to judges (Kayasu v. Turkey, 2008, §§ 78-81; Di Giovanni v. Italy, 2013, § 74; Guz v. Poland, 2020, § 73; Kozan v. Turkey, § 52), a lawyer (Veraart v. the Netherlands, § 49), a journalist (Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland, § 44), and an academic (Kula v. Turkey, §§ 36-40); and ▪ even a decision no more than hypothetically capable of affecting the career prospects of a judge (Panioglu v. Romania, § 98)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:48340/20,Dede c. Türkiye,48340/20,added,"Dede c. Türkiye, no. 48340/20, 20 February 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A,Applicability of Article 10 of the Convention,2,26,25,0.929,"Dede c. Türkiye, no. 48340/20, 20 February 2024",,"Furthermore, the Court has found that Article 10 of the Convention applies in the context of labour relations, including where these are governed by the rules of private law (Herbai v. Hungary, § 37; Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, § 38).","Furthermore, the Court has found that Article 10 of the Convention applies in the context of labour relations, including where these are governed by the rules of private law (Herbai v. Hungary, 2019, § 37; Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Dede c. Türkiye, 2024, § 38)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:48340/20,Dede c. Türkiye,48340/20,added,"Dede c. Türkiye, no. 48340/20, 20 February 2024",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.1.a.v,"Content, form and consequences of the impugned article",5,,187,,"Allée v. France, no. 20725/20, 18 January 2024|Dede c. Türkiye, no. 48340/20, 20 February 2024",,,"Lastly, the Court considers that the extent to which the report and photo have been disseminated may also be an important factor, depending on whether the newspaper is a national or local one, and has a large or a limited circulation (Karhuvaara and Iltalehti v. Finland, 2004, § 47; Gurgenidze v. Georgia, 2006, § 55; Klein v. Slovakia, 2006, § 48). This factor was, in particular, relevant in the case of Allée v. France, 2024, § 48, which concerned an email sent to six people, of whom only one was not involved in the case of harassment alleged therein; or in Dede c. Türkiye, 2024, § 50, concerning an internal e-mail sent by an employee to human resources staff criticising the management methods of a top-level manager."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:15158/19,Drozd v. Poland,15158/19,added,"Drozd v. Poland, no. 15158/19, 6 April 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.B.1.b,"Access to localities in order to gather information, and presence therein",4,,327,,"Drozd v. Poland, no. 15158/19, 6 April 2023",,,"In the Mándli and Others v. Hungary judgment, concerning a decision to suspend journalists' accreditation to enter Parliament on account of interviews and video recordings they had made with MPs outside the designated areas, the Court considered that parliaments were entitled to some degree of deference in regulating conduct in parliament buildings by designating areas for recording, so as to avoid disruption to parliamentary work (§§ 68-70). However, the absence of adequate procedural safeguards, namely the fact that it had been impossible to take part in the decision-making process, the lack of clarity regarding the length of the restriction period and of any effective means of challenging the contested decision, led the Court to find that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention (§§ 72-78; for similar findings in a case involving members of informal civic movement, see Drozd v. Poland, 2023, §§ 67-75)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:84048/17|84051/17,"Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania",84048/17|84051/17,added,"Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania, nos. 84048/17 and 84051/17, 12 September 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.1.a.i,Contribution to a debate of public interest,5,,154,,"Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania, nos. 84048/17 and 84051/17, 12 September 2023",,,"In the Court's view, public interest ordinarily relates to matters which affect the public to such an extent that it may legitimately take an interest in them, which attract its attention or which concern it to a significant degree, especially in that they affect the well-being of citizens or the life of the community. This is also the case with regard to matters which are capable of giving rise to considerable controversy, which concern an important social issue, or which involve a problem that the public would have an interest in being informed about (Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], § 171). The weight of the public interest in the relevant information will vary depending on the situations encountered. Information concerning unlawful acts or practices is undeniably of particularly strong public interest. Information concerning acts, practices or conduct which, while not unlawful in themselves, are nonetheless reprehensible or controversial may also be particularly important. That being so, although information capable of being considered of public interest concerns, in principle, public authorities or public bodies, it cannot be ruled out that it may also, in certain cases, concern the conduct of private parties, such as companies, which also inevitably and knowingly lay themselves open to close scrutiny of their acts (Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania, 2023, § 88)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:84048/17|84051/17,"Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania",84048/17|84051/17,added,"Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania, nos. 84048/17 and 84051/17, 12 September 2023",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.2.b.i.§44,b Distinction between statements of fact and value judgments,6,,215,,"Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania, nos. 84048/17 and 84051/17, 12 September 2023",,,"The classification of a statement as a fact or as a value judgment is a matter which in the first place falls within the margin of appreciation of the national authorities, in particular the domestic courts (Peruzzi v. Italy, § 48). In the context of its review, the Court occasionally calls into question the classification made by the national authorities in this connection, considering that the impugned statements amounted to a value judgment whose truth could not be demonstrated (see, for example, Feldek v. Slovakia, 2001, §§ 35 and 86; Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania, 2023, §§ 98-99) or, alternately, that they were to be considered as factual (Egill Einarsson v. Iceland, 2017, § 52)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:84048/17|84051/17,"Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania",84048/17|84051/17,added,"Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania, nos. 84048/17 and 84051/17, 12 September 2023",3,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.2.b.i.§44,b Distinction between statements of fact and value judgments,6,,216,,"Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania, nos. 84048/17 and 84051/17, 12 September 2023|Radio Broadcasting Company B92 AD v. Serbia, no. 67369/16, 5 September 2023",,,"In order to distinguish between a factual allegation and a value judgment it is necessary to take account of the circumstances of the case and the general tone of the remarks (Brasilier v. France, 2006, § 37; Balaskas v. Greece, 2020, § 58), bearing in mind that assertions about matters of public interest may, on that basis, constitute value judgments rather than statements of fact (Paturel v. France, § 37; see also Lopes Gomes da Silva v. Portugal, concerning comments made by a journalist on the political thought and ideology of a candidate in municipal elections; Hrico v. Slovakia, 2004, criticism of a Supreme Court judge; Radio Broadcasting Company B92 AD v. Serbia, concerning allegations of corruption in vaccine procurement; and Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania, 2023, § 100, concerning involvement of a well-known businessman and politician in hidden political advertising during elections)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:84048/17|84051/17,"Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania",84048/17|84051/17,added,"Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania, nos. 84048/17 and 84051/17, 12 September 2023",4,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.2.b.§49.§51.§56," Legal entities (companies, associations)",7,,275,,"Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania, nos. 84048/17 and 84051/17, 12 September 2023",,,"In the case of Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania, 2023, the Court also recognised a legitimate aim in protecting the reputation of a magazine, without referring to the individual reputations of its members (§ 108)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:84048/17|84051/17,"Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania",84048/17|84051/17,added,"Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania, nos. 84048/17 and 84051/17, 12 September 2023",5,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.2.b.§57.§59.§61," Right of reply, retraction or rectification, court order to issue and publish an apology",7,,295,,"Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania, nos. 84048/17 and 84051/17, 12 September 2023",,,"The Court has held that the legal obligation to publish a rectification may be considered a normal element of the legal framework governing the exercise of freedom of expression by the media. The aim of the right to reply is to afford everyone the possibility of protecting him or herself against certain statements or opinions disseminated by the mass media that are likely to be injurious to his or her private life, honour or dignity: in other words, the primary objective of the right of reply is to allow individuals to challenge false information published about them in the press (Axel Springer SE v. Germany, 2023, §§ 33-34; Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania, 2023, § 116). At the same time, given the high level of protection enjoyed by the press there would need to be exceptional circumstances in which a newspaper may legitimately be required to publish, for example, a retraction, an apology or a judgment in a defamation case. In this respect, the potential chilling effect of the penalties imposed on the press in the performance of its task as a purveyor of information and public watchdog in the future must also be taken into consideration (Axel Springer SE v. Germany, 2023, § 33)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:84048/17|84051/17,"Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania",84048/17|84051/17,added,"Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania, nos. 84048/17 and 84051/17, 12 September 2023",6,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.2.b.§57.§59.§61," Right of reply, retraction or rectification, court order to issue and publish an apology",7,,296,,"Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania, nos. 84048/17 and 84051/17, 12 September 2023",,,"In the case of Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania, 2023, the Court considered the implications of a pre-notification requirement which established a right to reply even before the publication of certain information, thereby obliging journalists to solicit the response of the person(s) criticised in an article prior to that article's publication (§ 119). The Court found that such pre-notification requirements were not required by Article 8 given doubts as to their effectiveness, a wide margin of appreciation, and concerns over the potential chilling effects on journalism (§ 120). It therefore held that there had been a violation of Article 10 when domestic courts disciplined a media outlet for publishing demeaning comments about another media outlet's coverage of public figures without first asking the second media outlet if they would like to exercise their right of reply (§ 124)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:27926/21,Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain,27926/21,added,"Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, no. 27926/21, 8 June 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A,Applicability of Article 10 of the Convention,2,,30,,"Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, no. 27926/21, 8 June 2023|Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), no. 67783/13, 11 July 2023|Rujak v. Croatia (dec.), no. 57942/10, 2 October 2012",,,"The Court would not exclude the possibility that certain categories of expression may not be covered by the protection of Article 10 of the Convention. In particular, an offensive statement may fall outside the protection of freedom of expression where its sole intent is to insult. (Rujak v. Croatia (dec.), §§ 27-32). However, it is only by a careful examination of the context in which the offending, insulting or aggressive words appear that one can draw a meaningful distinction between shocking and offensive language which is protected by Article 10 of the Convention and language which amounts to wanton denigration - for example, where the sole intent of the offensive statement is to insult - thereby falling outside the protection of Article 10 (Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023, § 27). In particular, the Court found that the expressions, which the domestic authorities had considered to have been gratuitously offensive and insulting towards the national flag, fell within the scope of Article 10 (Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, 2023, § 20)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:27926/21,Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain,27926/21,added,"Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, no. 27926/21, 8 June 2023",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.1.a.i,Contribution to a debate of public interest,5,,157,,"Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, no. 27926/21, 8 June 2023|Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], nos. 28955/06, 28957/06, 28959/06 and 28964/06, 12 September 2011",,,"In a case where the Court examined the dismissal of trade-union members for publishing articles which offended their colleagues, it did not share the Government's view that the content of the articles in question did not concern any matter of general interest. In the Court's view, they had been published in the context of a labour dispute inside the company, to which the applicants had presented certain demands. The debate had therefore not been a purely private one; it had at least been a matter of general interest for the workers of the company (Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], § 72; see also Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, 2023, § 32)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:27926/21,Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain,27926/21,added,"Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, no. 27926/21, 8 June 2023",3,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XI.B.2,The nature and content of the speech and its potential impact: analysis of the text in its context,3,,591,,"Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, no. 27926/21, 8 June 2023",,,"In a case, where the applicant, a representative of a trade union, had been convicted in criminal proceedings for having uttered expletives directed at the national flag at a peaceful protest against unpaid wages, the Court observed that the national authorities had not examined whether there had been sufficient grounds to find that his statements had amounted to hate speech, such as the existence of a tense political or social background or the capacity of the statements to lead to harmful consequences. It also took into account the fact that the impugned remarks had been made orally during a protest, so that the applicant had had no possibility of reformulating, refining or retracting them. It furthermore emphasised the fact that the applicant's statements had not been directed at any person or group of persons. While the Court was prepared to accept that provocative statements directed against a national symbol might hurt people's feelings, the damage thus caused, if any, was of a different nature compared with that caused by attacking the reputation of a named individual. (Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, 2023, §§ 29-30)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:27926/21,Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain,27926/21,added,"Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, no. 27926/21, 8 June 2023",4,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XI.B.3,The severity of the sanction,3,,625,,"Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, no. 27926/21, 8 June 2023",,,"The Court found that the imposition of a fine in criminal proceedings, which could have been replaced by deprivation of liberty in the event of non-payment, on a representative of a trade union for having uttered expletives directed at the national flag at a peaceful protest against unpaid wages, had been disproportionate. It observed in that respect that the statements in issue had been made orally on only one occasion, before a limited audience, in the context of a protest that had lasted several months relating to unpaid wages and that those statements had not resulted in any disturbances or disorder (Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, 2023, § 33)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:30237/18,Gapoņenko v. Latvia (dec.),30237/18,added,"Gapoņenko v. Latvia (dec.), no. 30237/18, 23 May 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XI.B.2,The nature and content of the speech and its potential impact: analysis of the text in its context,3,,582,,"Gapoņenko v. Latvia (dec.), no. 30237/18, 23 May 2023",,,"One of the key factors in the Court's assessment is the political or social background against which the statements in question are made (Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], § 205); for example: a tense political or social background (Mariya Alekhina and Others v. Russia, § 218; Zana v. Turkey, §§ 57-60; 16 See the Guide on Article 17 of the Convention (prohibition of abuse of rights). Sürek v. Turkey (no. 3) [GC], § 40; Erkizia Almandoz v. Spain, 2021, § 45; Gapoņenko v. Latvia (dec.), 2023, § 43), the atmosphere during deadly prison riots (Saygılı and Falakaoğlu (no. 2) v. Turkey, § 28), problems relating to the integration of non-European and especially Muslim immigrants in France (Soulas and Others v. France, §§ 38-39; Le Pen v. France (dec.)), or the relations with national minorities in Lithuania shortly after the re-establishment of its independence in 1990 (Balsytė- Lideikienė v. Lithuania, 2008, § 78)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:67783/13,Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2),67783/13,added,"Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), no. 67783/13, 11 July 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A,Applicability of Article 10 of the Convention,2,,30,,"Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, no. 27926/21, 8 June 2023|Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), no. 67783/13, 11 July 2023|Rujak v. Croatia (dec.), no. 57942/10, 2 October 2012",,,"The Court would not exclude the possibility that certain categories of expression may not be covered by the protection of Article 10 of the Convention. In particular, an offensive statement may fall outside the protection of freedom of expression where its sole intent is to insult. (Rujak v. Croatia (dec.), §§ 27-32). However, it is only by a careful examination of the context in which the offending, insulting or aggressive words appear that one can draw a meaningful distinction between shocking and offensive language which is protected by Article 10 of the Convention and language which amounts to wanton denigration - for example, where the sole intent of the offensive statement is to insult - thereby falling outside the protection of Article 10 (Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023, § 27). In particular, the Court found that the expressions, which the domestic authorities had considered to have been gratuitously offensive and insulting towards the national flag, fell within the scope of Article 10 (Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, 2023, § 20)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:67783/13,Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2),67783/13,added,"Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), no. 67783/13, 11 July 2023",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,"Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and the forms of interference",2,,64,,"Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), no. 67783/13, 11 July 2023|Sàrl Gator v. Monaco, no. 18287/18, 11 May 2023",,,"For example, the following situations may be considered under the Court's case-law as forms of interference with the right to freedom of expression: ▪ a criminal conviction (Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], § 59), combined with a fine (Kasabova v. Bulgaria, 2011; Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023) or imprisonment (Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania [GC], 2004); ▪ an order to pay damages (Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, § 51), even where these are symbolic (Paturel v. France, § 49); ▪ a conviction, even where execution is suspended (Otegi Mondragon v. Spain, § 60); ▪ the mere fact of having been investigated in criminal proceedings, or the real risk of being investigated on the basis of legislation that had been unclearly drafted and was also interpreted unclearly by the national courts (Altuğ Taner Akçam v. Turkey, 2011); ▪ a prohibition on publication (Cumhuriyet Vakfı and Others v. Turkey, 2013); ▪ the confiscation of a publication (Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976); ▪ seizure by the prison administration of newspapers and magazines sent to an imprisoned applicant by his relatives, and of a radio in his possession (Rodionov v. Russia); ▪ a refusal to grant a broadcasting frequency (Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy); ▪ a judicial decision preventing a person from receiving transmissions from telecommunications satellites (Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden, 2008, § 32); ▪ a ban on an advertisement (Barthold v. Germany, 1985); ▪ an order to disclose journalistic sources (Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, 1996), even where the order has not been enforced (Financial Times Ltd and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2009, § 56) or where the source has already come forward and the journalist was compelled to give evidence against him (Becker v. Norway, 2017); ▪ the refusal to grant authorisation to film inside a prison when preparing a television programme and to interview one of the detainees (Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft SRG v. Switzerland); the refusal to grant access to a reception centre for asylum seekers to obtain statements about the living conditions therein (Szurovecz v. Hungary); ▪ the arrest and detention of protestors (Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom, § 92; Açık and Others v. Turkey, 2009, § 40); ▪ written warnings sent by the prosecutor's office to the officials of an NGOwhich had organised public demonstrations against a law (Karastelev and Others v. Russia, 2020, §§ 70-76); ▪ withdrawal of accreditation to study archives, used by a journalist in preparing press articles (Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020, § 55); ▪ withdrawal of the applicant's parliamentary immunity through the constitutional amendment (Kerestecioğlu Demir v. Turkey, 2021, § 67); ▪ a caution issued by a mass-media regulator in respect of a publisher, a non-governmental organisation, and the founder, a joint-stock company, for dissemination of ""extremist material"" in relation to an article with quotations from a manifesto of a controversial nationalist group and with symbols resembling Nazi symbols (RID Novaya Gazeta and ZAO Novaya Gazeta v. Russia, §§ 60-66); ▪ revocation of broadcasting licence of a TVchannel (NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], § 150); ▪ deletion by an appellate court of certain statements made by the applicant's lawyer in written submissions before that court (Sàrl Gator v. Monaco, § 38)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:67783/13,Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2),67783/13,added,"Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), no. 67783/13, 11 July 2023",3,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XI.A,General principles,2,,567,,"Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), no. 67783/13, 11 July 2023",,,"As a matter of general principle, the ""necessity"" of any restriction on the exercise of freedom of expression must be convincingly established (Sürek and Özdemir v. Turkey [GC], § 57; Dilipak v. Turkey, 2015, § 63; Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023, § 25). The Court must determine whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify the restriction are ""relevant and sufficient"" (Barthold v. Germany, 1985, § 55; Lingens v. Austria, § 40; Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023, § 26)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:67783/13,Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2),67783/13,added,"Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), no. 67783/13, 11 July 2023",4,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XI.A,General principles,2,,568,,"Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), no. 67783/13, 11 July 2023|Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 45581/15, 15 May 2023",,,"With particular regard to the disclosure of information received in confidence, the Court has emphasised that the concepts of ""national security"" and ""public safety"" need to be applied with restraint and to be interpreted restrictively and should be brought into play only where it has been 15 See also the Case-law Guide on Terrorism. shown to be necessary to suppress release of the information for the purposes of protecting national security and public safety (Stoll v. Switzerland [GC], § 54; Görmüş and Others v. Turkey, 2016, § 37). Likewise, in the context of cases concerning expression alleged to stir up, promote or justify violence, hatred or intolerance, the Court has considered that the legitimate aim of ""prevention of disorder"" may not be invoked unless it has been demonstrated that the impugned statements statements were capable of leading or actually led to disorder - for instance in the form of public disturbances - and that in acting to suppress them, the relevant authorities had that in mind (Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], §§ 152-153; compare also Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023, § 30; and contrast Sanchez v. France [GC], § 144)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:67783/13,Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2),67783/13,added,"Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), no. 67783/13, 11 July 2023",5,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XI.B.2,The nature and content of the speech and its potential impact: analysis of the text in its context,3,,590,,"Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), no. 67783/13, 11 July 2023",,,"In the case of Savva Terentyev v. Russia, concerning the imposition of a prison sentence on a blogger convicted of offensive comments on the Internet against police officers, the Court noted the offensive, insulting and virulent wording of the applicant's comments. However, it considered that these statements could not be regarded as an attempt to incite hatred or provoke violence against the police officers and thus as posing a clear and imminent danger which would have required the applicant's conviction. The Court stressed, in particular, that the applicant was neither a well-known blogger or a popular user of social media and that, accordingly, he did not have the status of an influential figure (§ 81). In a similar context where the use of derogatory language was at stake, the Court stressed that, although certain remarks may be perceived as offensive or insulting by particular individuals or groups, such sentiments, albeit understandable, could not alone set the limits of freedom of expression. It is only by a careful examination of the context in which the offending, insulting or aggressive words appear that one can draw a meaningful distinction between shocking and offensive language which is protected by Article 10 of the Convention and language which amounts to wanton denigration - for example, where the sole intent of the offensive statement is to insult - thereby falling outside the protection of freedom of expression. (Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023, §§ 27-29)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:1519/20,Glukhin v. Russia,1519/20,added,"Glukhin v. Russia, no. 1519/20, 4 July 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A,Applicability of Article 10 of the Convention,2,,15,,"Glukhin v. Russia, no. 1519/20, 4 July 2023",,,"Equally, the Court has considered that Article 10 is also applicable to forms of conduct (Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, §§ 166-167; Semir Güzel v. Turkey; Murat Vural v. Turkey; Gough v. the United Kingdom, 2014, § 150; Mătăsaru v. the Republic of Moldova, § 29; Shvydika v. Ukraine, §§ 37-38; Karuyev v. Russia, 2022, §§ 18-20; Bumbeș v. Romania, 2022, § 46; Genov and Sarbinska v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 58-60; Ete v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 15-16; Bouton v. France, 2022, §§ 30-31; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 51), to rules governing clothing (Stevens v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision) or to the display of vestimentary symbols (Vajnai v. Hungary, § 47), including in prison (Donaldson v. the United Kingdom, 2011). The Court also considered that using the ""Like"" button on social networks to express interest towards or approve the contents published by third persons constituted, as such, a current and popular form of the exercise of freedom of expression online (Melike v. Turkey, § 44)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:1519/20,Glukhin v. Russia,1519/20,added,"Glukhin v. Russia, no. 1519/20, 4 July 2023",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.B.1,"The criterion of the ""lawfulness of the interference""",3,,81,,"Glukhin v. Russia, no. 1519/20, 4 July 2023",,,"In another case, the Court reiterated that criminal-law provisions (in the case in question, related to hate speech) must clearly and precisely define the scope of relevant offences, in order to avoid a situation where the State's discretion to prosecute for such offences becomes too broad and potentially subject to abuse through selective enforcement (Savva Terentyev v. Russia, § 85; see also Altuğ Taner Akçam v. Turkey, 2011, §§ 93-94). Likewise, the Court expressed doubt that the provision, which had served as a basis for the applicant's conviction in administrative proceedings for solo demonstration without a prior notification where he had used ""quickly (de)assembled objects"", had been sufficiently foreseeable to meet the ""quality of law"" requirements since it contained no criteria allowing a person to foresee what kind of objects it covered (Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 54)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:1519/20,Glukhin v. Russia,1519/20,added,"Glukhin v. Russia, no. 1519/20, 4 July 2023",3,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.B.3.c,Requirement of relevant and sufficient reasons,4,,113,,"Glukhin v. Russia, no. 1519/20, 4 July 2023",,,"The Court has held in numerous cases that a lack of relevant and sufficient reasoning on the part of the national courts or a failure to consider the applicable standards in assessing the interference in question will entail a violation of Article 10 (see, among many other authorities, Uj v. Hungary, §§ 25-26; Sapan v. Turkey, §§ 35-41; Gözel and Özer v. Turkey, 2010, § 58; Scharsach and News Verlagsgesellschaft v. Austria, § 46; Cheltsova v. Russia, 2017, § 100; Mariya Alekhina and Others v. Russia, § 264; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 56)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:1519/20,Glukhin v. Russia,1519/20,added,"Glukhin v. Russia, no. 1519/20, 4 July 2023",4,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.1,"Publications (photographs, images and articles) relating to the intimate aspects of an individual's life or that of his or her family",3,,147,,"Glukhin v. Russia, no. 1519/20, 4 July 2023|Margari v. Greece, no. 36705/16, 20 June 2023",,,"The Court recognises every person's right to protection of his or her own image, emphasising that a person's image constitutes one of the chief attributes of his or her personality, as it reveals the person's unique characteristics and distinguishes the person from his or her peers. The right to the protection of one's image is thus one of the essential components of personal development and mainly presupposes the individual's right to control the use of that image, including the right to refuse publication thereof (Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], § 96; see also, in different contexts, Margari v. Greece, § 28; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:1519/20,Glukhin v. Russia,1519/20,added,"Glukhin v. Russia, no. 1519/20, 4 July 2023",5,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XI.B.2,The nature and content of the speech and its potential impact: analysis of the text in its context,3,,586,,"Glukhin v. Russia, no. 1519/20, 4 July 2023",,,"Likewise, in the case of Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, the Court observed that the applicant's solo demonstration had been carried out in an indisputably peaceful and non-disruptive manner. The offence of which he had been convicted consisted merely of a failure to notify the authorities of his solo demonstration and included no further incriminating element concerning any reprehensible act, such as the obstruction of traffic, damage to property or acts of violence. Nor did the applicant's actions cause any major disruption to ordinary life and other activities to a degree exceeding that which was normal or inevitable in the circumstances or present any danger to public order or transport safety. However, the authorities did not take the above relevant elements into account and did not assess whether the applicant's acts had constituted an expression of his views. The only relevant consideration was the need to punish unlawful conduct, which in the Court's view was not a sufficient consideration in this context, in terms of Article 10 of the Convention. It thus considered that the domestic courts had failed to adduce ""relevant or sufficient reasons"" to justify the interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression (§ 56)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:1519/20,Glukhin v. Russia,1519/20,added,"Glukhin v. Russia, no. 1519/20, 4 July 2023",6,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XV.4,Article 11 of the Convention,2,,776,,"Glukhin v. Russia, no. 1519/20, 4 July 2023",,,"In the case of Women On Waves and Others v. Portugal, the Court noted at the outset that the question of freedom of expression was difficult to separate from that of freedom of assembly and reiterated that the protection of personal opinions, secured by Article 10, is one of the objectives of freedom of peaceful assembly as enshrined in Article 11 of the Convention (§ 28). The Court found that it was easier to examine the situation in question under Article 10 alone. However, this approach does not prevent the Court from taking into account, where appropriate, Article 11 of the Convention when examining and interpreting Article 10 (Schwabe and M.G. v. Germany, § 101; Ezelin v. France, 1991, § 37; Karademirci and Others v. Turkey, 2005, § 26; Novikova and Others v. Russia, § 91; Bumbeș 18 See also Guide on Article 11, Chapter I B. v. Romania, 2022, §§ 69-70; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 47; see also, on the relationship between these two Convention provisions, Öllinger v. Austria, § 38; Djavit An v. Turkey, 2003, § 39; for the opposite approach, where Article 10 was regarded as a lex generalis in relation to Article 11, see Hakim Aydın v. Turkey, 2020, § 41)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:48135/08,Gollnisch v. France (dec.),48135/08,added,"Gollnisch v. France (dec.), no. 48135/08, 7 June 2011",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,"Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and the forms of interference",2,,65,,"Altın v. Turkey (dec.), no. 39822/98, 6 April 2000|Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, no. 30655/09, 21 March 2017|Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), no. 28369/07, 30 September 2010;|Bathellier v. France (dec.), no. 49001/07, 12 October 2010|Catalan v. Romania, no. 13003/04, 9 January 2018|Gollnisch v. France (dec.), no. 48135/08, 7 June 2011|Guz v. Poland, no. 965/12, 15 October 2020|Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), no. 8696/09, 5 February 2013|Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023|Marunić v. Croatia, no. 51706/11, 28 March 2017|Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, no. 40072/13, 19 October 2021|Otto v. Germany (dec.), no. 27574/02, 24 November 2005|Peev v. Bulgaria, no. 64209/01, 26 July 2007|Petersen v. Germany (dec.), no. 39793/98, 22 November 2001|Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), no. 11002/07, 4 November 2014",,,"When it comes to professional posts - such as court presidents, judges, public prosecutors, judicial employees, civil servants, university professors, journalists at public broadcasters, employees in State or municipally owned companies, lawyers, notaries, medical doctors, nurses, servicemen- removals or suspensions from those posts (and even refusals to appoint) relating, overtly or covertly, to statements by the post-holders, or candidates, have consistently been seen as interferences with their right to freedom of expression, as in the following examples: ▪ an announcement by a Head of State of his intention not to reappoint the applicant, a Supreme Court president, to any other public office on the grounds that the latter had expressed an opinion on a constitutional issue, which opinion had allegedly contradicted that of the Head of State (Wille v. Liechtenstein [GC], §§ 44 and 49-51); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Supreme Court president (Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, §§ 145-52); ▪ dismissals of judges (Pitkevich v. Russia (dec.); Kudeshkina v. Russia, §§ 79-80; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 53-55), or demotions of judges (Albayrak v. Turkey, 2008, § 38; Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, § 127; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, §§ 157-64); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Chief Public Prosecutor (Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 183-90); removal of a Deputy General Prosecutor (Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), 2013, § 36), or of the head of a local public prosecutor's office (Brisc v. Romania, 2018, § 89); ▪ dismissals of public prosecutors (Altın v. Turkey (dec.), 2000; Goryaynova v. Ukraine, 2020, § 54); of an expert in a prosecutor's office (Peev v. Bulgaria, § 60); or of a press officer in a prosecutor's office (Guja v. Moldova [GC], 2008, §§ 53 and 55); ▪ dismissals of civil servants (Vogt v. Germany, § 44; Petersen v. Germany (dec.); Volkmer v. Germany (dec.); De Diego Nafría v. Spain, 2002, § 30; Kern v. Germany (dec.), 2007; Langner v. Germany, § 39; Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, § 36; Catalan v. Romania, 2018, § 44), or refusal to promote them (Otto v. Germany (dec.)); ▪ dismissal of a university professor (Rubins v. Latvia, §§ 68-70) or suspension of a university professor (Gollnisch v. France (dec.), 2011); ▪ dismissals of journalists at public broadcasters (Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Nenkova- Lalova v. Bulgaria, §§ 52-53; Matúz v. Hungary, §§ 25-27); ▪ dismissals of employees of State and municipal companies (Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), 2010; Bathellier v. France (dec.), 2010; Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), §§ 39-40; Marunić v. Croatia, § 45); ▪ disbarment of a lawyer (Bagirov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 70), or suspension of a notary (Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, 2017, § 41); ▪ dismissal of a doctor at a public hospital (Gawlik v. Liechtenstein, 2021, § 48); or of a nurse in a partly State-owned hospital (Heinisch v. Germany, 2011, §§ 43-45); and a disciplinary penalty imposed on a doctor for breach of professional ethics, for criticising the medical treatment provided to a patient (Frankowicz v. Poland), 2008; ▪ reprimands or warnings given to judges (Kayasu v. Turkey, 2008, §§ 78-81; Di Giovanni v. Italy, 2013, § 74; Guz v. Poland, 2020, § 73; Kozan v. Turkey, § 52), a lawyer (Veraart v. the Netherlands, § 49), a journalist (Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland, § 44), and an academic (Kula v. Turkey, §§ 36-40); and ▪ even a decision no more than hypothetically capable of affecting the career prospects of a judge (Panioglu v. Romania, § 98)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:965/12,Guz v. Poland,965/12,added,"Guz v. Poland, no. 965/12, 15 October 2020",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,"Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and the forms of interference",2,,65,,"Altın v. Turkey (dec.), no. 39822/98, 6 April 2000|Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, no. 30655/09, 21 March 2017|Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), no. 28369/07, 30 September 2010;|Bathellier v. France (dec.), no. 49001/07, 12 October 2010|Catalan v. Romania, no. 13003/04, 9 January 2018|Gollnisch v. France (dec.), no. 48135/08, 7 June 2011|Guz v. Poland, no. 965/12, 15 October 2020|Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), no. 8696/09, 5 February 2013|Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023|Marunić v. Croatia, no. 51706/11, 28 March 2017|Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, no. 40072/13, 19 October 2021|Otto v. Germany (dec.), no. 27574/02, 24 November 2005|Peev v. Bulgaria, no. 64209/01, 26 July 2007|Petersen v. Germany (dec.), no. 39793/98, 22 November 2001|Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), no. 11002/07, 4 November 2014",,,"When it comes to professional posts - such as court presidents, judges, public prosecutors, judicial employees, civil servants, university professors, journalists at public broadcasters, employees in State or municipally owned companies, lawyers, notaries, medical doctors, nurses, servicemen- removals or suspensions from those posts (and even refusals to appoint) relating, overtly or covertly, to statements by the post-holders, or candidates, have consistently been seen as interferences with their right to freedom of expression, as in the following examples: ▪ an announcement by a Head of State of his intention not to reappoint the applicant, a Supreme Court president, to any other public office on the grounds that the latter had expressed an opinion on a constitutional issue, which opinion had allegedly contradicted that of the Head of State (Wille v. Liechtenstein [GC], §§ 44 and 49-51); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Supreme Court president (Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, §§ 145-52); ▪ dismissals of judges (Pitkevich v. Russia (dec.); Kudeshkina v. Russia, §§ 79-80; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 53-55), or demotions of judges (Albayrak v. Turkey, 2008, § 38; Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, § 127; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, §§ 157-64); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Chief Public Prosecutor (Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 183-90); removal of a Deputy General Prosecutor (Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), 2013, § 36), or of the head of a local public prosecutor's office (Brisc v. Romania, 2018, § 89); ▪ dismissals of public prosecutors (Altın v. Turkey (dec.), 2000; Goryaynova v. Ukraine, 2020, § 54); of an expert in a prosecutor's office (Peev v. Bulgaria, § 60); or of a press officer in a prosecutor's office (Guja v. Moldova [GC], 2008, §§ 53 and 55); ▪ dismissals of civil servants (Vogt v. Germany, § 44; Petersen v. Germany (dec.); Volkmer v. Germany (dec.); De Diego Nafría v. Spain, 2002, § 30; Kern v. Germany (dec.), 2007; Langner v. Germany, § 39; Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, § 36; Catalan v. Romania, 2018, § 44), or refusal to promote them (Otto v. Germany (dec.)); ▪ dismissal of a university professor (Rubins v. Latvia, §§ 68-70) or suspension of a university professor (Gollnisch v. France (dec.), 2011); ▪ dismissals of journalists at public broadcasters (Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Nenkova- Lalova v. Bulgaria, §§ 52-53; Matúz v. Hungary, §§ 25-27); ▪ dismissals of employees of State and municipal companies (Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), 2010; Bathellier v. France (dec.), 2010; Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), §§ 39-40; Marunić v. Croatia, § 45); ▪ disbarment of a lawyer (Bagirov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 70), or suspension of a notary (Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, 2017, § 41); ▪ dismissal of a doctor at a public hospital (Gawlik v. Liechtenstein, 2021, § 48); or of a nurse in a partly State-owned hospital (Heinisch v. Germany, 2011, §§ 43-45); and a disciplinary penalty imposed on a doctor for breach of professional ethics, for criticising the medical treatment provided to a patient (Frankowicz v. Poland), 2008; ▪ reprimands or warnings given to judges (Kayasu v. Turkey, 2008, §§ 78-81; Di Giovanni v. Italy, 2013, § 74; Guz v. Poland, 2020, § 73; Kozan v. Turkey, § 52), a lawyer (Veraart v. the Netherlands, § 49), a journalist (Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland, § 44), and an academic (Kula v. Turkey, §§ 36-40); and ▪ even a decision no more than hypothetically capable of affecting the career prospects of a judge (Panioglu v. Romania, § 98)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:57292/16,Hurbain v. Belgium [GC],57292/16,added,"Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], no. 57292/16, 4 July 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.1.a.v,"Content, form and consequences of the impugned article",5,,190,,"Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], no. 57292/16, 4 July 2023",,,"The Court has also noted that Internet sites are an information and communication tool particularly distinct from the printed media, especially as regards the capacity to store and transmit information, and that the risk of harm posed by content and communications on the Internet to the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and freedoms, particularly the right to respect for private life, is certainly higher than that posed by the press, particularly on account of the important role of search engines (Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, § 236; M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, § 91, with further references)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:57292/16,Hurbain v. Belgium [GC],57292/16,added,"Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], no. 57292/16, 4 July 2023",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XIII.A.1,The innovative character of the Internet,3,,672,,"Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], no. 57292/16, 4 July 2023",,,"In particular, it considers that the following spheres are covered by the exercise of the right to freedom of expression: ▪ the maintenance of Internet archives in so far as they represent a critical aspect of the role played by Internet sites (Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (no. 1 and no. 2), § 27; M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, § 90; Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Poland, § 59; Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, § 180); ▪ the publication of photographs on an Internet site specialising in fashion and offering photos and videos of fashion shows on a free or pay-to-view basis (Ashby Donald and Others v. France, 2013, § 34); ▪ the fact of a political party making available a mobile application allowing voters to share anonymous photographs of their invalid ballot papers and comments on their reasons for voting in this way (Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt v. Hungary [GC], § 91); ▪ the use of certain sites allowing information to be shared, in particular YouTube, a video- hosting website on which users can upload, view and share videos (Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, 2015, § 52), and Google Sites, a Google service designed to facilitate the creation and sharing of websites within a group (Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey, 2012, § 49); ▪ the use of the ""Like"" button on social networks (Melike v. Turkey, § 44)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:57292/16,Hurbain v. Belgium [GC],57292/16,added,"Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], no. 57292/16, 4 July 2023",3,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XIII.B.6,"""Right to be forgotten""",3,,706,,"Biancardi v. Italy, no. 77419/16, 25 November 2021|Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], no. 57292/16, 4 July 2023",,,"In its practice, the Court has dealt with several cases concerning requests for removal, alteration, anonymisation or de-indexing of news articles. These cases were examined either under Article 8, if brought by individuals who had invoked their right to respect for their private life (Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Poland; M.L. and W.W. v. Germany), or under Article 10, if brought by journalists, editors or media owners, who had referred to their right of freedom of expression (Biancardi v. Italy, 2021; Mediengruppe Österreich GmbH v. Austria; Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:57292/16,Hurbain v. Belgium [GC],57292/16,added,"Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], no. 57292/16, 4 July 2023",4,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XIII.B.6,"""Right to be forgotten""",3,,709,,"Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], no. 57292/16, 4 July 2023",,,"As regards media web archives comprising the personal data of an individual who had been the subject of a publication in the past, the Court pointed out that this context differed from situations concerning an initial publication (Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, § 205), and defined the main issue to be addressed as the continued availability of such information online rather than its original publication (ibid., § 174)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:57292/16,Hurbain v. Belgium [GC],57292/16,added,"Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], no. 57292/16, 4 July 2023",5,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XIII.B.6,"""Right to be forgotten""",3,,712,,"Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], no. 57292/16, 4 July 2023",,,"In the case of Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, the Court revisited its existing case-law and adjusted the criteria to be applied for balancing of the respective rights under Article 8 and Article 10 concerning the continued availability of an electronic archived version of an article disclosing an individual's personal data. The case was brought by a newspaper publisher who had been ordered by the domestic courts to anonymise an online archived version of an article which had been published some twenty years earlier and had provided an accurate account of a fatal accident, on the ground of the ""right to be forgotten"" of a driver who had caused that accident. In its judgment, the Court acknowledged the adverse effects of the continued availability of certain information on the Internet, and in particular the considerable impact on the way in which the person concerned was perceived by public opinion, as well as the risks linked to the creation of a profile of the person concerned and to a fragmented and distorted presentation of the reality. Nevertheless, it explained that a claim of entitlement to be forgotten did not amount to a self-standing right protected by the Convention and, to the extent that it is covered by Article 8, could concern only certain situations and items of information (ibid., § 199)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:8696/09,Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.),8696/09,added,"Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), no. 8696/09, 5 February 2013",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,"Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and the forms of interference",2,,65,,"Altın v. Turkey (dec.), no. 39822/98, 6 April 2000|Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, no. 30655/09, 21 March 2017|Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), no. 28369/07, 30 September 2010;|Bathellier v. France (dec.), no. 49001/07, 12 October 2010|Catalan v. Romania, no. 13003/04, 9 January 2018|Gollnisch v. France (dec.), no. 48135/08, 7 June 2011|Guz v. Poland, no. 965/12, 15 October 2020|Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), no. 8696/09, 5 February 2013|Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023|Marunić v. Croatia, no. 51706/11, 28 March 2017|Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, no. 40072/13, 19 October 2021|Otto v. Germany (dec.), no. 27574/02, 24 November 2005|Peev v. Bulgaria, no. 64209/01, 26 July 2007|Petersen v. Germany (dec.), no. 39793/98, 22 November 2001|Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), no. 11002/07, 4 November 2014",,,"When it comes to professional posts - such as court presidents, judges, public prosecutors, judicial employees, civil servants, university professors, journalists at public broadcasters, employees in State or municipally owned companies, lawyers, notaries, medical doctors, nurses, servicemen- removals or suspensions from those posts (and even refusals to appoint) relating, overtly or covertly, to statements by the post-holders, or candidates, have consistently been seen as interferences with their right to freedom of expression, as in the following examples: ▪ an announcement by a Head of State of his intention not to reappoint the applicant, a Supreme Court president, to any other public office on the grounds that the latter had expressed an opinion on a constitutional issue, which opinion had allegedly contradicted that of the Head of State (Wille v. Liechtenstein [GC], §§ 44 and 49-51); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Supreme Court president (Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, §§ 145-52); ▪ dismissals of judges (Pitkevich v. Russia (dec.); Kudeshkina v. Russia, §§ 79-80; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 53-55), or demotions of judges (Albayrak v. Turkey, 2008, § 38; Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, § 127; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, §§ 157-64); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Chief Public Prosecutor (Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 183-90); removal of a Deputy General Prosecutor (Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), 2013, § 36), or of the head of a local public prosecutor's office (Brisc v. Romania, 2018, § 89); ▪ dismissals of public prosecutors (Altın v. Turkey (dec.), 2000; Goryaynova v. Ukraine, 2020, § 54); of an expert in a prosecutor's office (Peev v. Bulgaria, § 60); or of a press officer in a prosecutor's office (Guja v. Moldova [GC], 2008, §§ 53 and 55); ▪ dismissals of civil servants (Vogt v. Germany, § 44; Petersen v. Germany (dec.); Volkmer v. Germany (dec.); De Diego Nafría v. Spain, 2002, § 30; Kern v. Germany (dec.), 2007; Langner v. Germany, § 39; Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, § 36; Catalan v. Romania, 2018, § 44), or refusal to promote them (Otto v. Germany (dec.)); ▪ dismissal of a university professor (Rubins v. Latvia, §§ 68-70) or suspension of a university professor (Gollnisch v. France (dec.), 2011); ▪ dismissals of journalists at public broadcasters (Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Nenkova- Lalova v. Bulgaria, §§ 52-53; Matúz v. Hungary, §§ 25-27); ▪ dismissals of employees of State and municipal companies (Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), 2010; Bathellier v. France (dec.), 2010; Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), §§ 39-40; Marunić v. Croatia, § 45); ▪ disbarment of a lawyer (Bagirov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 70), or suspension of a notary (Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, 2017, § 41); ▪ dismissal of a doctor at a public hospital (Gawlik v. Liechtenstein, 2021, § 48); or of a nurse in a partly State-owned hospital (Heinisch v. Germany, 2011, §§ 43-45); and a disciplinary penalty imposed on a doctor for breach of professional ethics, for criticising the medical treatment provided to a patient (Frankowicz v. Poland), 2008; ▪ reprimands or warnings given to judges (Kayasu v. Turkey, 2008, §§ 78-81; Di Giovanni v. Italy, 2013, § 74; Guz v. Poland, 2020, § 73; Kozan v. Turkey, § 52), a lawyer (Veraart v. the Netherlands, § 49), a journalist (Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland, § 44), and an academic (Kula v. Turkey, §§ 36-40); and ▪ even a decision no more than hypothetically capable of affecting the career prospects of a judge (Panioglu v. Romania, § 98)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:25285/15,Karaca v. Türkiye,25285/15,added,"Karaca v. Türkiye, no. 25285/15, 20 June 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.B.1,"The criterion of the ""lawfulness of the interference""",3,,82,,"Karaca v. Türkiye, no. 25285/15, 20 June 2023",,,"In several cases, the Court held that placement in pre-trial detention which was not based on a reasonable suspicion that an offence had been committed within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention entailed a violation of that provision, and referred to that finding in concluding that the applicant's pre-trial detention amounted to an interference that had no basis in law, a requirement under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention (Ragıp Zarakolu v. Turkey, § 79; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, § 230). Conversely, pre-trial detention may be justified where there is reasonable suspicion that a journalist's activities are part of a broader organised effort to target and detain members of a particular religious group. Special safeguards against such detention apply only to journalistic discussions based on accurate factual information, and did not apply where a journalist broadcasts accusations of terrorism without evidentiary basis (Karaca v. Türkiye, 2023, §§ 101-02 and 157-58)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:25285/15,Karaca v. Türkiye,25285/15,added,"Karaca v. Türkiye, no. 25285/15, 20 June 2023",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.B.2,Duties and responsibilities which relate to editorial decision-making,3,,342,,"Karaca v. Türkiye, no. 25285/15, 20 June 2023",,,"The Court considers that the safeguard afforded by Article 10 to journalists in relation to reporting on issues of general interest is subject to the proviso that they are acting in good faith and on an accurate factual basis and provide ""reliable and precise"" information in accordance with the ethics of journalism (Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 2012, § 93; Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], 1999, § 65; Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark [GC], § 78; Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], 1999, § 54; Stoll v. Switzerland [GC], § 103; Kasabova v. Bulgaria, 2011, §§ 61 and 63-68; Sellami v. France, §§ 52-54; Karaca v. Türkiye, 2023, § 157; for an indication by the Court that the same principle must apply to others who engage in public debate, see Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, § 90)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:25285/15,Karaca v. Türkiye,25285/15,added,"Karaca v. Türkiye, no. 25285/15, 20 June 2023",3,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.B.2.a,Reliable and precise information: responsibilities with regard to verification and transmission,4,,354,,"Karaca v. Türkiye, no. 25285/15, 20 June 2023",,,"Likewise, where a television program had not been based on precise facts, had not contained any accurate and reliable information and had apparently aimed solely at gratuitously attacking an opposing religious group, the Court considered that such a program could not be regarded as dissemination of information made in good faith with a view to contributing to a debate of general interest (Karaca v. Türkiye, 2023, § 158)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:25285/15,Karaca v. Türkiye,25285/15,added,"Karaca v. Türkiye, no. 25285/15, 20 June 2023",4,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XI.B.1,Contribution to a debate of general interest,3,,579,,"Karaca v. Türkiye, no. 25285/15, 20 June 2023",,,"On the other hand, in a case concerning a television program where a certain religious group had been accused of terrorism with the result that a number of its members had spent significant periods in detention before being ultimately acquitted, the Court observed, with reference to the domestic courts' findings, that the program in question had not been based on precise facts, had not contained any accurate and reliable information and had apparently aimed solely at gratuitously attacking an opposing religious group. The Court considered that such a program could not be regarded as a contribution to a debate of general interest (Karaca v. Türkiye, 2023, § 158)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:9406/05,Kunitsyna v. Russia,9406/05,added,"Kunitsyna v. Russia, no. 9406/05, 13 December 2016",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.2.a.i,The existence of an objective link between the impugned statement and the person claiming protection under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention,5,,194,,"Kunitsyna v. Russia, no. 9406/05, 13 December 2016|Udovychenko v. Ukraine, no. 46396/14, 23 March 2023",,,"In establishing the constituent elements of defamation, the Court requires that there be an objective link between the impugned statement and the person suing in defamation. Mere personal conjecture or subjective perception of a publication as defamatory does not suffice to establish that the person was directly affected by the publication. There must be something in the circumstances of a particular case to make the ordinary reader feel that the statement reflected directly on the individual claimant or that he or she was targeted by the criticism (Reznik v. Russia § 45; Kunitsyna v. Russia, §§ 42-43; Margulev v. Russia, § 53; Udovychenko v. Ukraine, §§ 41 and 43)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:64659/11|24133/13,Makraduli v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,64659/11|24133/13,added,"Makraduli v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, nos. 64659/11 and 24133/13, 19 July 2018",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.2.b.i.§44,b Distinction between statements of fact and value judgments,6,,211,,"Azadliq and Zayidov v. Azerbaijan, no. 20755/08, 30 June 2022|Makraduli v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, nos. 64659/11 and 24133/13, 19 July 2018|Staniszewski v. Poland, no. 20422/15, 14 October 2021|Udovychenko v. Ukraine, no. 46396/14, 23 March 2023",,,"With respect to statements of facts, the Court has held, in particular, that the ""presumption of falsity"" of such statements - that is an obligation on the author to demonstrate their truth - does not necessarily contravene the Convention provided that the defendant is allowed a realistic opportunity to prove that the statement was true (Kasabova v. Bulgaria, 2011, §§ 58-62; Staniszewski v. Poland, § 45; Azadliq and Zayidov v. Azerbaijan, 2022, § 35; Udovychenko v. Ukraine, § 44). At the same time, the Court has also indicated in such cases that an applicant who was clearly involved in a public debate on an important issue should not be required to fulfil a more demanding standard than that of due diligence, as in such circumstances an obligation to prove factual statements may deprive the applicant of the protection afforded by Article 10 (Makraduli v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, § 75; Staniszewski v. Poland, § 45; Wojczuk v. Poland, § 74; Azadliq and Zayidov v. Azerbaijan, 2022, § 35; Udovychenko v. Ukraine, § 44)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:26360/19,Manole v. the Republic of Moldova,26360/19,added,"Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,"Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and the forms of interference",2,,65,,"Altın v. Turkey (dec.), no. 39822/98, 6 April 2000|Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, no. 30655/09, 21 March 2017|Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), no. 28369/07, 30 September 2010;|Bathellier v. France (dec.), no. 49001/07, 12 October 2010|Catalan v. Romania, no. 13003/04, 9 January 2018|Gollnisch v. France (dec.), no. 48135/08, 7 June 2011|Guz v. Poland, no. 965/12, 15 October 2020|Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), no. 8696/09, 5 February 2013|Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023|Marunić v. Croatia, no. 51706/11, 28 March 2017|Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, no. 40072/13, 19 October 2021|Otto v. Germany (dec.), no. 27574/02, 24 November 2005|Peev v. Bulgaria, no. 64209/01, 26 July 2007|Petersen v. Germany (dec.), no. 39793/98, 22 November 2001|Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), no. 11002/07, 4 November 2014",,,"When it comes to professional posts - such as court presidents, judges, public prosecutors, judicial employees, civil servants, university professors, journalists at public broadcasters, employees in State or municipally owned companies, lawyers, notaries, medical doctors, nurses, servicemen- removals or suspensions from those posts (and even refusals to appoint) relating, overtly or covertly, to statements by the post-holders, or candidates, have consistently been seen as interferences with their right to freedom of expression, as in the following examples: ▪ an announcement by a Head of State of his intention not to reappoint the applicant, a Supreme Court president, to any other public office on the grounds that the latter had expressed an opinion on a constitutional issue, which opinion had allegedly contradicted that of the Head of State (Wille v. Liechtenstein [GC], §§ 44 and 49-51); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Supreme Court president (Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, §§ 145-52); ▪ dismissals of judges (Pitkevich v. Russia (dec.); Kudeshkina v. Russia, §§ 79-80; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 53-55), or demotions of judges (Albayrak v. Turkey, 2008, § 38; Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, § 127; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, §§ 157-64); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Chief Public Prosecutor (Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 183-90); removal of a Deputy General Prosecutor (Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), 2013, § 36), or of the head of a local public prosecutor's office (Brisc v. Romania, 2018, § 89); ▪ dismissals of public prosecutors (Altın v. Turkey (dec.), 2000; Goryaynova v. Ukraine, 2020, § 54); of an expert in a prosecutor's office (Peev v. Bulgaria, § 60); or of a press officer in a prosecutor's office (Guja v. Moldova [GC], 2008, §§ 53 and 55); ▪ dismissals of civil servants (Vogt v. Germany, § 44; Petersen v. Germany (dec.); Volkmer v. Germany (dec.); De Diego Nafría v. Spain, 2002, § 30; Kern v. Germany (dec.), 2007; Langner v. Germany, § 39; Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, § 36; Catalan v. Romania, 2018, § 44), or refusal to promote them (Otto v. Germany (dec.)); ▪ dismissal of a university professor (Rubins v. Latvia, §§ 68-70) or suspension of a university professor (Gollnisch v. France (dec.), 2011); ▪ dismissals of journalists at public broadcasters (Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Nenkova- Lalova v. Bulgaria, §§ 52-53; Matúz v. Hungary, §§ 25-27); ▪ dismissals of employees of State and municipal companies (Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), 2010; Bathellier v. France (dec.), 2010; Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), §§ 39-40; Marunić v. Croatia, § 45); ▪ disbarment of a lawyer (Bagirov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 70), or suspension of a notary (Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, 2017, § 41); ▪ dismissal of a doctor at a public hospital (Gawlik v. Liechtenstein, 2021, § 48); or of a nurse in a partly State-owned hospital (Heinisch v. Germany, 2011, §§ 43-45); and a disciplinary penalty imposed on a doctor for breach of professional ethics, for criticising the medical treatment provided to a patient (Frankowicz v. Poland), 2008; ▪ reprimands or warnings given to judges (Kayasu v. Turkey, 2008, §§ 78-81; Di Giovanni v. Italy, 2013, § 74; Guz v. Poland, 2020, § 73; Kozan v. Turkey, § 52), a lawyer (Veraart v. the Netherlands, § 49), a journalist (Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland, § 44), and an academic (Kula v. Turkey, §§ 36-40); and ▪ even a decision no more than hypothetically capable of affecting the career prospects of a judge (Panioglu v. Romania, § 98)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:26360/19,Manole v. the Republic of Moldova,26360/19,added,"Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.A,"Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and the forms of interference",2,64,66,0.945,"Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023",,"In cases concerning disciplinary proceedings or the removal or appointment of judges, when ascertaining whether the measure complained of amounted to an interference with the exercise of the applicant's freedom of expression, the Court has first determined the scope of the measure by putting it in the context of the facts of the case and of the relevant legislation (Baka v. Hungary [GC], § 140; see also Wille v. Liechtenstein [GC], §§ 42-43; Kayasu v. Turkey, §§ 77-79; Kudeshkina v. Russia, § 79; Poyraz v. Turkey, §§ 55-57; Harabin v. Slovakia, § 149; Kövesi v. Romania, § 190; Żurek v. Poland, §§ 210-213; see also, with regard to the refusal to award the title of court expert to a candidate on account of his blog and criticisms of State authorities, although he had been successful in the relevant examination, Cimperšek v. Slovenia, § 57).","As regards, more specifically, cases concerning disciplinary proceedings or the removal or appointment of judges, when ascertaining whether the measure complained of amounted to an interference with the exercise of the applicant's freedom of expression, the Court has first determined the scope of the measure by putting it in the context of the facts of the case and of the relevant legislation (Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 140; see also Wille v. Liechtenstein [GC], §§ 42-43; Kayasu v. Turkey, 2008, §§ 77-79; Kudeshkina v. Russia, § 79; Poyraz v. Turkey, §§ 55-57; Harabin v. Slovakia, 2012, § 149; Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, § 190; Żurek v. Poland, §§ 210-213; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, § 54; see also, with regard to the refusal to award the title of court expert to a candidate on account of his blog and criticisms of State authorities, although he had been successful in the relevant examination, Cimperšek v. Slovenia, 2020, § 57)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:26360/19,Manole v. the Republic of Moldova,26360/19,added,"Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023",3,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.B.1,"The criterion of the ""lawfulness of the interference""",3,,71,,"Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023|Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 45581/15, 15 May 2023",,,"The Court has also considered that an individual cannot claim that a legal provision lacks foreseeability simply because it is applied for the first time in his or her case (Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], § 150; Tête v. France, § 52; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, § 58). Thus, the Court found that the application of legal provisions, on the basis of which the applicant, a politician, had been convicted in criminal proceedings as a ""producer"" for third-party comments posted on the ""wall"" of his personal Facebook account, had met the ""quality of law"" requirements (Sanchez v. France [GC], §§ 132-142)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:26360/19,Manole v. the Republic of Moldova,26360/19,added,"Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023",4,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VIII.A,Protection of whistle-blowers,2,,428,,"Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023",,,"Equally, in several cases concerning the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, disclosure serves the public interest. In the Court's view, these questions concern the separation of powers: ""Issues relating to the separation of powers can involve very important matters in a democratic society which the public has a legitimate interest in being informed about and which fall within the scope of political debate"" (Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 165; Guja v. Moldova [GC], 2008, § 88; see also Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, § 51). By way of example, in the case of Kudeshkina v. Russia, noting that the applicant had publicly criticised the conduct of various officials and alleged that instances of pressure on judges were commonplace in the courts, the Court held that she had raised a very important matter of public interest, which should be open to free debate in a democratic society (§ 94)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:26360/19,Manole v. the Republic of Moldova,26360/19,added,"Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023",5,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,X.A.1,Members of the judiciary,3,,482,,"Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023",,,"Given the prominent place among State organs that the judiciary occupies in a democratic society, this approach also applies in the event of restrictions on the freedom of expression of a judge in connection with the performance of his or her functions, albeit the judiciary is not part of the ordinary civil service (Albayrak v. Turkey, 2008, § 42; Pitkevich v. Russia (dec.); Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, § 49). 14 As used here, the term ""member of the judiciary"" includes both judges and prosecutors."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:26360/19,Manole v. the Republic of Moldova,26360/19,added,"Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023",6,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,X.A.1,Members of the judiciary,3,,483,,"Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023",,,"With regard to public officials serving in the judiciary, the Court has reiterated that it can be expected of them that they should show restraint in exercising their freedom of expression in all cases where the authority and impartiality of the judiciary are likely to be called in question (Wille v. Liechtenstein [GC], § 64; Kayasu v. Turkey, 2008, § 92; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, § 49)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:26360/19,Manole v. the Republic of Moldova,26360/19,added,"Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023",7,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,X.A.1,Members of the judiciary,3,,485,,"Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023",,,"Judicial authorities, in the exercise of their adjudicatory function, are required to exercise maximum discretion with regard to the cases with which they deal in order to preserve their image as impartial judges (Olujić v. Croatia, § 59; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, § 50), but also in expressing criticism towards fellow public officers and, in particular, other judges (Di Giovanni v. Italy, 2013)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:26360/19,Manole v. the Republic of Moldova,26360/19,added,"Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023",8,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,X.A.1,Members of the judiciary,3,,487,,"Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023",,,"The Court has likewise emphasised that, in principle, the judicial authorities were required to exercise maximum discretion with regard to the cases with which they dealt in order to preserve their image as impartial judges. That discretion should dissuade them from making use of the press, even when provoked. It is the higher demands of justice and the elevated nature of judicial office which impose that duty (Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, § 136; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, § 65). That duty of reserve is even stronger as regards information on pending cases which have not yet been rendered public particularly where those cases have been adjudicated by the person making statements, whose duty of reserve has thus been supplemented by the obligation of confidentiality (ibid., § 66)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:36705/16,Margari v. Greece,36705/16,added,"Margari v. Greece, no. 36705/16, 20 June 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.1,"Publications (photographs, images and articles) relating to the intimate aspects of an individual's life or that of his or her family",3,,147,,"Glukhin v. Russia, no. 1519/20, 4 July 2023|Margari v. Greece, no. 36705/16, 20 June 2023",,,"The Court recognises every person's right to protection of his or her own image, emphasising that a person's image constitutes one of the chief attributes of his or her personality, as it reveals the person's unique characteristics and distinguishes the person from his or her peers. The right to the protection of one's image is thus one of the essential components of personal development and mainly presupposes the individual's right to control the use of that image, including the right to refuse publication thereof (Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], § 96; see also, in different contexts, Margari v. Greece, § 28; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:51706/11,Marunić v. Croatia,51706/11,added,"Marunić v. Croatia, no. 51706/11, 28 March 2017",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,"Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and the forms of interference",2,,65,,"Altın v. Turkey (dec.), no. 39822/98, 6 April 2000|Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, no. 30655/09, 21 March 2017|Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), no. 28369/07, 30 September 2010;|Bathellier v. France (dec.), no. 49001/07, 12 October 2010|Catalan v. Romania, no. 13003/04, 9 January 2018|Gollnisch v. France (dec.), no. 48135/08, 7 June 2011|Guz v. Poland, no. 965/12, 15 October 2020|Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), no. 8696/09, 5 February 2013|Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023|Marunić v. Croatia, no. 51706/11, 28 March 2017|Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, no. 40072/13, 19 October 2021|Otto v. Germany (dec.), no. 27574/02, 24 November 2005|Peev v. Bulgaria, no. 64209/01, 26 July 2007|Petersen v. Germany (dec.), no. 39793/98, 22 November 2001|Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), no. 11002/07, 4 November 2014",,,"When it comes to professional posts - such as court presidents, judges, public prosecutors, judicial employees, civil servants, university professors, journalists at public broadcasters, employees in State or municipally owned companies, lawyers, notaries, medical doctors, nurses, servicemen- removals or suspensions from those posts (and even refusals to appoint) relating, overtly or covertly, to statements by the post-holders, or candidates, have consistently been seen as interferences with their right to freedom of expression, as in the following examples: ▪ an announcement by a Head of State of his intention not to reappoint the applicant, a Supreme Court president, to any other public office on the grounds that the latter had expressed an opinion on a constitutional issue, which opinion had allegedly contradicted that of the Head of State (Wille v. Liechtenstein [GC], §§ 44 and 49-51); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Supreme Court president (Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, §§ 145-52); ▪ dismissals of judges (Pitkevich v. Russia (dec.); Kudeshkina v. Russia, §§ 79-80; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 53-55), or demotions of judges (Albayrak v. Turkey, 2008, § 38; Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, § 127; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, §§ 157-64); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Chief Public Prosecutor (Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 183-90); removal of a Deputy General Prosecutor (Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), 2013, § 36), or of the head of a local public prosecutor's office (Brisc v. Romania, 2018, § 89); ▪ dismissals of public prosecutors (Altın v. Turkey (dec.), 2000; Goryaynova v. Ukraine, 2020, § 54); of an expert in a prosecutor's office (Peev v. Bulgaria, § 60); or of a press officer in a prosecutor's office (Guja v. Moldova [GC], 2008, §§ 53 and 55); ▪ dismissals of civil servants (Vogt v. Germany, § 44; Petersen v. Germany (dec.); Volkmer v. Germany (dec.); De Diego Nafría v. Spain, 2002, § 30; Kern v. Germany (dec.), 2007; Langner v. Germany, § 39; Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, § 36; Catalan v. Romania, 2018, § 44), or refusal to promote them (Otto v. Germany (dec.)); ▪ dismissal of a university professor (Rubins v. Latvia, §§ 68-70) or suspension of a university professor (Gollnisch v. France (dec.), 2011); ▪ dismissals of journalists at public broadcasters (Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Nenkova- Lalova v. Bulgaria, §§ 52-53; Matúz v. Hungary, §§ 25-27); ▪ dismissals of employees of State and municipal companies (Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), 2010; Bathellier v. France (dec.), 2010; Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), §§ 39-40; Marunić v. Croatia, § 45); ▪ disbarment of a lawyer (Bagirov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 70), or suspension of a notary (Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, 2017, § 41); ▪ dismissal of a doctor at a public hospital (Gawlik v. Liechtenstein, 2021, § 48); or of a nurse in a partly State-owned hospital (Heinisch v. Germany, 2011, §§ 43-45); and a disciplinary penalty imposed on a doctor for breach of professional ethics, for criticising the medical treatment provided to a patient (Frankowicz v. Poland), 2008; ▪ reprimands or warnings given to judges (Kayasu v. Turkey, 2008, §§ 78-81; Di Giovanni v. Italy, 2013, § 74; Guz v. Poland, 2020, § 73; Kozan v. Turkey, § 52), a lawyer (Veraart v. the Netherlands, § 49), a journalist (Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland, § 44), and an academic (Kula v. Turkey, §§ 36-40); and ▪ even a decision no more than hypothetically capable of affecting the career prospects of a judge (Panioglu v. Romania, § 98)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:45066/17,Mesić v. Croatia (no. 2),45066/17,added,"Mesić v. Croatia (no. 2), no. 45066/17, 30 May 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.B.2.a,Reliable and precise information: responsibilities with regard to verification and transmission,4,,345,,"Mesić v. Croatia (no. 2), no. 45066/17, 30 May 2023",,,"Generally speaking, the Court considers that reporters must be free to report on events based on information gathered from official sources without having to verify them (Selistö v. Finland, § 60; Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 2012, § 105; Yordanova and Toshev v. Bulgaria, § 51; Mesić v. Croatia (no. 2), § 66)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:45066/17,Mesić v. Croatia (no. 2),45066/17,added,"Mesić v. Croatia (no. 2), no. 45066/17, 30 May 2023",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,X.B.2,General principles,3,,506,,"Mesić v. Croatia (no. 2), no. 45066/17, 30 May 2023|SIC - Sociedade Independente de Comunicação v. Portugal, no. 29856/13, 27 July 2021",,,"Indeed, the Court considers it inconceivable that there should be no prior or contemporaneous discussion of the subject matter of trials, be it in specialised journals, in the general press or amongst the public at large. Not only do the media have the task of imparting such information and ideas; the public also has a right to receive them (Bédat v. Switzerland [GC], 2016, § 51; SIC - Sociedade Independente de Comunicação v. Portugal, § 58; Mesić v. Croatia (no. 2), § 64)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:24108/15,Mestan v. Bulgaria,24108/15,added,"Mestan v. Bulgaria, no. 24108/15, 2 May 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.1,Exhaustion of domestic remedies (Article 35 § 1),3,,39,,"Mestan v. Bulgaria, no. 24108/15, 2 May 2023",,,"In the case of Karácsony and Others v. Hungary [GC], 2016, the respondent State argued that the applicants, members of parliament who had been subjected to disciplinary proceedings and ordered to pay fines on account of their conduct during a parliamentary hearing, had not exhausted the domestic remedies, namely a constitutional complaint. The Court dismissed this objection, noting that the complaint in question did not offer the applicants the possibility to request any form of rectification of the disciplinary decisions, since there were no regulations in Hungarian law to that effect (§§ 81-82); see also the case of Szanyi v. Hungary (§ 18). In Mestan v. Bulgaria, the Court dismissed the Government's argument that the applicant should have instituted a procedure under the Constitution to have certain provisions of the relevant electoral legislation, insofar as they required that all electoral campaigns should be led in the Bulgarian language, declared unconstitutional. Even if such recourse had been successful, it would not have enabled the applicant 3 See the Practical Guide on Admissibility to have the decisions, by which he had been fined for using a non-official language during his electoral campaign, reviewed (§§ 38-40)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:24108/15,Mestan v. Bulgaria,24108/15,added,"Mestan v. Bulgaria, no. 24108/15, 2 May 2023",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XV.6,Article 3 of Protocol No. 1,2,,783,,"Mestan v. Bulgaria, no. 24108/15, 2 May 2023",,,"In Mestan v. Bulgaria, the applicant, a leader of a political party and a candidate at a legislative election, was fined for using Turkish, his mother tongue, at one of his election campaign meetings. In their relevant decision, the authorities referred to a provision of the national legislation on elections which prohibited the use of any language other than the official language (Bulgarian) in the context of electoral campaigns. The Court pointed out that, in principle, the Contracting States had the right to regulate the use of languages - in certain forms or considering the circumstances surrounding the public communication - by candidates or other persons during electoral campaigns and, where appropriate, to impose certain restrictions or conditions corresponding to a ""pressing social need"". However, a regulatory framework imposing an absolute ban on the use of a non-official language under the threat of administrative sanctions could not be considered as being compatible with the essential values of a democratic society, the freedom of expression secured by Article 10 being amongst their number (§§ 58-60). In that context, the Court also emphasised the importance of pluralism, tolerance and the protection of minorities in a democratic society (§ 62)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:40072/13,Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria,40072/13,added,"Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, no. 40072/13, 19 October 2021",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,"Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and the forms of interference",2,,65,,"Altın v. Turkey (dec.), no. 39822/98, 6 April 2000|Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, no. 30655/09, 21 March 2017|Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), no. 28369/07, 30 September 2010;|Bathellier v. France (dec.), no. 49001/07, 12 October 2010|Catalan v. Romania, no. 13003/04, 9 January 2018|Gollnisch v. France (dec.), no. 48135/08, 7 June 2011|Guz v. Poland, no. 965/12, 15 October 2020|Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), no. 8696/09, 5 February 2013|Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023|Marunić v. Croatia, no. 51706/11, 28 March 2017|Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, no. 40072/13, 19 October 2021|Otto v. Germany (dec.), no. 27574/02, 24 November 2005|Peev v. Bulgaria, no. 64209/01, 26 July 2007|Petersen v. Germany (dec.), no. 39793/98, 22 November 2001|Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), no. 11002/07, 4 November 2014",,,"When it comes to professional posts - such as court presidents, judges, public prosecutors, judicial employees, civil servants, university professors, journalists at public broadcasters, employees in State or municipally owned companies, lawyers, notaries, medical doctors, nurses, servicemen- removals or suspensions from those posts (and even refusals to appoint) relating, overtly or covertly, to statements by the post-holders, or candidates, have consistently been seen as interferences with their right to freedom of expression, as in the following examples: ▪ an announcement by a Head of State of his intention not to reappoint the applicant, a Supreme Court president, to any other public office on the grounds that the latter had expressed an opinion on a constitutional issue, which opinion had allegedly contradicted that of the Head of State (Wille v. Liechtenstein [GC], §§ 44 and 49-51); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Supreme Court president (Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, §§ 145-52); ▪ dismissals of judges (Pitkevich v. Russia (dec.); Kudeshkina v. Russia, §§ 79-80; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 53-55), or demotions of judges (Albayrak v. Turkey, 2008, § 38; Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, § 127; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, §§ 157-64); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Chief Public Prosecutor (Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 183-90); removal of a Deputy General Prosecutor (Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), 2013, § 36), or of the head of a local public prosecutor's office (Brisc v. Romania, 2018, § 89); ▪ dismissals of public prosecutors (Altın v. Turkey (dec.), 2000; Goryaynova v. Ukraine, 2020, § 54); of an expert in a prosecutor's office (Peev v. Bulgaria, § 60); or of a press officer in a prosecutor's office (Guja v. Moldova [GC], 2008, §§ 53 and 55); ▪ dismissals of civil servants (Vogt v. Germany, § 44; Petersen v. Germany (dec.); Volkmer v. Germany (dec.); De Diego Nafría v. Spain, 2002, § 30; Kern v. Germany (dec.), 2007; Langner v. Germany, § 39; Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, § 36; Catalan v. Romania, 2018, § 44), or refusal to promote them (Otto v. Germany (dec.)); ▪ dismissal of a university professor (Rubins v. Latvia, §§ 68-70) or suspension of a university professor (Gollnisch v. France (dec.), 2011); ▪ dismissals of journalists at public broadcasters (Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Nenkova- Lalova v. Bulgaria, §§ 52-53; Matúz v. Hungary, §§ 25-27); ▪ dismissals of employees of State and municipal companies (Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), 2010; Bathellier v. France (dec.), 2010; Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), §§ 39-40; Marunić v. Croatia, § 45); ▪ disbarment of a lawyer (Bagirov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 70), or suspension of a notary (Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, 2017, § 41); ▪ dismissal of a doctor at a public hospital (Gawlik v. Liechtenstein, 2021, § 48); or of a nurse in a partly State-owned hospital (Heinisch v. Germany, 2011, §§ 43-45); and a disciplinary penalty imposed on a doctor for breach of professional ethics, for criticising the medical treatment provided to a patient (Frankowicz v. Poland), 2008; ▪ reprimands or warnings given to judges (Kayasu v. Turkey, 2008, §§ 78-81; Di Giovanni v. Italy, 2013, § 74; Guz v. Poland, 2020, § 73; Kozan v. Turkey, § 52), a lawyer (Veraart v. the Netherlands, § 49), a journalist (Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland, § 44), and an academic (Kula v. Turkey, §§ 36-40); and ▪ even a decision no more than hypothetically capable of affecting the career prospects of a judge (Panioglu v. Romania, § 98)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:80857/17,Mitov and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.),80857/17,added,"Mitov and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 80857/17, 28 February 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IX.B,Assessment criteria concerning the applicability of Article 10 and the existence of an interference,2,,446,,"Mitov and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 80857/17, 28 February 2023",,,"Whilst in two cases, it was expressly stated that those criteria were cumulative (Saure v. Germany (dec.), § 34), or were ""in principle"" cumulative (Mitov and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), § 30), the majority of cases do not expressly indicate whether they are cumulative or not (Rovshan Hajiyev v. Azerbaijan, §§ 44-45; Šeks v. Croatia, § 37; Namazli v. Azerbaijan (dec.), § 31). The methodology applied in Namazli v. Azerbaijan (dec.), §§ 33-38, may be considered to provide some basis for treating them as not cumulative."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:80857/17,Mitov and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.),80857/17,added,"Mitov and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 80857/17, 28 February 2023",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IX.B.1,The purpose of the information request,3,,450,,"Mitov and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 80857/17, 28 February 2023",,,"Likewise, in Mitov and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), § 32, the applicants - investigative journalists - complained that, following the entry into force of anonymisation rules laid down by the President of the Supreme Administrative Court, they were unable to access freely on the Internet all scanned case material available in the database of that court. The Court reiterated that general statement on why certain types of information held by the authorities ought to be made available were insufficient to engage Article 10, and that the applicants could not complain of a restriction on access to information in the abstract."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:80857/17,Mitov and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.),80857/17,added,"Mitov and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 80857/17, 28 February 2023",3,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IX.B.2,The nature of the information sought,3,,459,,"Mitov and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 80857/17, 28 February 2023",,,"Similarly, in Mitov and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), § 32, where the applicants - investigative journalists - claimed unrestricted access to all case material available in the Supreme Administrative Court's data base, the Court was not convinced that all judicial review and other cases heard by that court concerned matters of public interest and that all information concerning those cases related, without distinction, to such matters."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:27574/02,Otto v. Germany (dec.),27574/02,added,"Otto v. Germany (dec.), no. 27574/02, 24 November 2005",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,"Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and the forms of interference",2,,65,,"Altın v. Turkey (dec.), no. 39822/98, 6 April 2000|Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, no. 30655/09, 21 March 2017|Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), no. 28369/07, 30 September 2010;|Bathellier v. France (dec.), no. 49001/07, 12 October 2010|Catalan v. Romania, no. 13003/04, 9 January 2018|Gollnisch v. France (dec.), no. 48135/08, 7 June 2011|Guz v. Poland, no. 965/12, 15 October 2020|Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), no. 8696/09, 5 February 2013|Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023|Marunić v. Croatia, no. 51706/11, 28 March 2017|Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, no. 40072/13, 19 October 2021|Otto v. Germany (dec.), no. 27574/02, 24 November 2005|Peev v. Bulgaria, no. 64209/01, 26 July 2007|Petersen v. Germany (dec.), no. 39793/98, 22 November 2001|Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), no. 11002/07, 4 November 2014",,,"When it comes to professional posts - such as court presidents, judges, public prosecutors, judicial employees, civil servants, university professors, journalists at public broadcasters, employees in State or municipally owned companies, lawyers, notaries, medical doctors, nurses, servicemen- removals or suspensions from those posts (and even refusals to appoint) relating, overtly or covertly, to statements by the post-holders, or candidates, have consistently been seen as interferences with their right to freedom of expression, as in the following examples: ▪ an announcement by a Head of State of his intention not to reappoint the applicant, a Supreme Court president, to any other public office on the grounds that the latter had expressed an opinion on a constitutional issue, which opinion had allegedly contradicted that of the Head of State (Wille v. Liechtenstein [GC], §§ 44 and 49-51); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Supreme Court president (Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, §§ 145-52); ▪ dismissals of judges (Pitkevich v. Russia (dec.); Kudeshkina v. Russia, §§ 79-80; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 53-55), or demotions of judges (Albayrak v. Turkey, 2008, § 38; Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, § 127; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, §§ 157-64); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Chief Public Prosecutor (Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 183-90); removal of a Deputy General Prosecutor (Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), 2013, § 36), or of the head of a local public prosecutor's office (Brisc v. Romania, 2018, § 89); ▪ dismissals of public prosecutors (Altın v. Turkey (dec.), 2000; Goryaynova v. Ukraine, 2020, § 54); of an expert in a prosecutor's office (Peev v. Bulgaria, § 60); or of a press officer in a prosecutor's office (Guja v. Moldova [GC], 2008, §§ 53 and 55); ▪ dismissals of civil servants (Vogt v. Germany, § 44; Petersen v. Germany (dec.); Volkmer v. Germany (dec.); De Diego Nafría v. Spain, 2002, § 30; Kern v. Germany (dec.), 2007; Langner v. Germany, § 39; Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, § 36; Catalan v. Romania, 2018, § 44), or refusal to promote them (Otto v. Germany (dec.)); ▪ dismissal of a university professor (Rubins v. Latvia, §§ 68-70) or suspension of a university professor (Gollnisch v. France (dec.), 2011); ▪ dismissals of journalists at public broadcasters (Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Nenkova- Lalova v. Bulgaria, §§ 52-53; Matúz v. Hungary, §§ 25-27); ▪ dismissals of employees of State and municipal companies (Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), 2010; Bathellier v. France (dec.), 2010; Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), §§ 39-40; Marunić v. Croatia, § 45); ▪ disbarment of a lawyer (Bagirov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 70), or suspension of a notary (Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, 2017, § 41); ▪ dismissal of a doctor at a public hospital (Gawlik v. Liechtenstein, 2021, § 48); or of a nurse in a partly State-owned hospital (Heinisch v. Germany, 2011, §§ 43-45); and a disciplinary penalty imposed on a doctor for breach of professional ethics, for criticising the medical treatment provided to a patient (Frankowicz v. Poland), 2008; ▪ reprimands or warnings given to judges (Kayasu v. Turkey, 2008, §§ 78-81; Di Giovanni v. Italy, 2013, § 74; Guz v. Poland, 2020, § 73; Kozan v. Turkey, § 52), a lawyer (Veraart v. the Netherlands, § 49), a journalist (Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland, § 44), and an academic (Kula v. Turkey, §§ 36-40); and ▪ even a decision no more than hypothetically capable of affecting the career prospects of a judge (Panioglu v. Romania, § 98)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:28955/06|28957/06|28959/06|28964/06,Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC],28955/06|28957/06|28959/06|28964/06,added,"Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], nos. 28955/06, 28957/06, 28959/06 and 28964/06, 12 September 2011",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.1.a.i,Contribution to a debate of public interest,5,,157,,"Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, no. 27926/21, 8 June 2023|Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], nos. 28955/06, 28957/06, 28959/06 and 28964/06, 12 September 2011",,,"In a case where the Court examined the dismissal of trade-union members for publishing articles which offended their colleagues, it did not share the Government's view that the content of the articles in question did not concern any matter of general interest. In the Court's view, they had been published in the context of a labour dispute inside the company, to which the applicants had presented certain demands. The debate had therefore not been a purely private one; it had at least been a matter of general interest for the workers of the company (Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], § 72; see also Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, 2023, § 32)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:28955/06|28957/06|28959/06|28964/06,Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC],28955/06|28957/06|28959/06|28964/06,added,"Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], nos. 28955/06, 28957/06, 28959/06 and 28964/06, 12 September 2011",2,paragraph_text_name_match,unchanged,IV.B.2.b.§49.§51,b Target of the impugned statement,6,245,250,,,,"The status of the individual targeted by defamatory statements is one of the parameters taken into account by the Court in examining defamation cases. The Court considers that the ""limits of acceptable criticism"" are much wider as regards individuals with a public status than as regards private individuals (Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], § 71).","The status of the individual targeted by defamatory statements is one of the parameters taken into account by the Court in examining defamation cases. The Court considers that the ""limits of acceptable criticism"" are much wider as regards individuals with a public status than as regards private individuals (Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], § 71)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:28955/06|28957/06|28959/06|28964/06,Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC],28955/06|28957/06|28959/06|28964/06,added,"Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], nos. 28955/06, 28957/06, 28959/06 and 28964/06, 12 September 2011",3,paragraph_text_name_match,unchanged,XV.4,Article 11 of the Convention,2,746,775,,,,"In a case (Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC]) concerning the dismissal of trade-union members of having published articles which offended their colleagues, the Courted noted firstly that the question of freedom of expression was closely related to that of freedom of association in a trade- union context. However, although the applicants' complaint mainly concerned their dismissal for having, as members of the executive committee of a trade union, published and displayed the articles and cartoons in question, the Court considered it more appropriate to examine the facts under Article 10, which was nevertheless interpreted in the light of Article 11, given that it had not been found to be established that the applicants were dismissed as a result of their membership of that trade union (§ 52). Conversely, in another case (Straume v. Latvia, §§ 89-90) concerning sanctions suffered by an employee in response to a complaint she made while acting as a trade union representative, the Court considered that the question of freedom of expression was closely related to that of freedom of association within a trade union context and examined the complaint under Article 11, in the light of Article 10 of the Convention.","In a case (Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC]) concerning the dismissal of trade-union members of having published articles which offended their colleagues, the Courted noted firstly that the question of freedom of expression was closely related to that of freedom of association in a trade- union context. However, although the applicants' complaint mainly concerned their dismissal for having, as members of the executive committee of a trade union, published and displayed the articles and cartoons in question, the Court considered it more appropriate to examine the facts under Article 10, which was nevertheless interpreted in the light of Article 11, given that it had not been found to be established that the applicants were dismissed as a result of their membership of that trade union (§ 52). Conversely, in another case (Straume v. Latvia, §§ 89-90) concerning sanctions suffered by an employee in response to a complaint she made while acting as a trade union representative, the Court considered that the question of freedom of expression was closely related to that of freedom of association within a trade union context and examined the complaint under Article 11, in the light of Article 10 of the Convention."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:64209/01,Peev v. Bulgaria,64209/01,added,"Peev v. Bulgaria, no. 64209/01, 26 July 2007",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,"Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and the forms of interference",2,,65,,"Altın v. Turkey (dec.), no. 39822/98, 6 April 2000|Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, no. 30655/09, 21 March 2017|Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), no. 28369/07, 30 September 2010;|Bathellier v. France (dec.), no. 49001/07, 12 October 2010|Catalan v. Romania, no. 13003/04, 9 January 2018|Gollnisch v. France (dec.), no. 48135/08, 7 June 2011|Guz v. Poland, no. 965/12, 15 October 2020|Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), no. 8696/09, 5 February 2013|Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023|Marunić v. Croatia, no. 51706/11, 28 March 2017|Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, no. 40072/13, 19 October 2021|Otto v. Germany (dec.), no. 27574/02, 24 November 2005|Peev v. Bulgaria, no. 64209/01, 26 July 2007|Petersen v. Germany (dec.), no. 39793/98, 22 November 2001|Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), no. 11002/07, 4 November 2014",,,"When it comes to professional posts - such as court presidents, judges, public prosecutors, judicial employees, civil servants, university professors, journalists at public broadcasters, employees in State or municipally owned companies, lawyers, notaries, medical doctors, nurses, servicemen- removals or suspensions from those posts (and even refusals to appoint) relating, overtly or covertly, to statements by the post-holders, or candidates, have consistently been seen as interferences with their right to freedom of expression, as in the following examples: ▪ an announcement by a Head of State of his intention not to reappoint the applicant, a Supreme Court president, to any other public office on the grounds that the latter had expressed an opinion on a constitutional issue, which opinion had allegedly contradicted that of the Head of State (Wille v. Liechtenstein [GC], §§ 44 and 49-51); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Supreme Court president (Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, §§ 145-52); ▪ dismissals of judges (Pitkevich v. Russia (dec.); Kudeshkina v. Russia, §§ 79-80; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 53-55), or demotions of judges (Albayrak v. Turkey, 2008, § 38; Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, § 127; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, §§ 157-64); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Chief Public Prosecutor (Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 183-90); removal of a Deputy General Prosecutor (Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), 2013, § 36), or of the head of a local public prosecutor's office (Brisc v. Romania, 2018, § 89); ▪ dismissals of public prosecutors (Altın v. Turkey (dec.), 2000; Goryaynova v. Ukraine, 2020, § 54); of an expert in a prosecutor's office (Peev v. Bulgaria, § 60); or of a press officer in a prosecutor's office (Guja v. Moldova [GC], 2008, §§ 53 and 55); ▪ dismissals of civil servants (Vogt v. Germany, § 44; Petersen v. Germany (dec.); Volkmer v. Germany (dec.); De Diego Nafría v. Spain, 2002, § 30; Kern v. Germany (dec.), 2007; Langner v. Germany, § 39; Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, § 36; Catalan v. Romania, 2018, § 44), or refusal to promote them (Otto v. Germany (dec.)); ▪ dismissal of a university professor (Rubins v. Latvia, §§ 68-70) or suspension of a university professor (Gollnisch v. France (dec.), 2011); ▪ dismissals of journalists at public broadcasters (Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Nenkova- Lalova v. Bulgaria, §§ 52-53; Matúz v. Hungary, §§ 25-27); ▪ dismissals of employees of State and municipal companies (Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), 2010; Bathellier v. France (dec.), 2010; Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), §§ 39-40; Marunić v. Croatia, § 45); ▪ disbarment of a lawyer (Bagirov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 70), or suspension of a notary (Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, 2017, § 41); ▪ dismissal of a doctor at a public hospital (Gawlik v. Liechtenstein, 2021, § 48); or of a nurse in a partly State-owned hospital (Heinisch v. Germany, 2011, §§ 43-45); and a disciplinary penalty imposed on a doctor for breach of professional ethics, for criticising the medical treatment provided to a patient (Frankowicz v. Poland), 2008; ▪ reprimands or warnings given to judges (Kayasu v. Turkey, 2008, §§ 78-81; Di Giovanni v. Italy, 2013, § 74; Guz v. Poland, 2020, § 73; Kozan v. Turkey, § 52), a lawyer (Veraart v. the Netherlands, § 49), a journalist (Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland, § 44), and an academic (Kula v. Turkey, §§ 36-40); and ▪ even a decision no more than hypothetically capable of affecting the career prospects of a judge (Panioglu v. Romania, § 98)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:39793/98,Petersen v. Germany (dec.),39793/98,added,"Petersen v. Germany (dec.), no. 39793/98, 22 November 2001",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,"Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and the forms of interference",2,,65,,"Altın v. Turkey (dec.), no. 39822/98, 6 April 2000|Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, no. 30655/09, 21 March 2017|Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), no. 28369/07, 30 September 2010;|Bathellier v. France (dec.), no. 49001/07, 12 October 2010|Catalan v. Romania, no. 13003/04, 9 January 2018|Gollnisch v. France (dec.), no. 48135/08, 7 June 2011|Guz v. Poland, no. 965/12, 15 October 2020|Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), no. 8696/09, 5 February 2013|Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023|Marunić v. Croatia, no. 51706/11, 28 March 2017|Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, no. 40072/13, 19 October 2021|Otto v. Germany (dec.), no. 27574/02, 24 November 2005|Peev v. Bulgaria, no. 64209/01, 26 July 2007|Petersen v. Germany (dec.), no. 39793/98, 22 November 2001|Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), no. 11002/07, 4 November 2014",,,"When it comes to professional posts - such as court presidents, judges, public prosecutors, judicial employees, civil servants, university professors, journalists at public broadcasters, employees in State or municipally owned companies, lawyers, notaries, medical doctors, nurses, servicemen- removals or suspensions from those posts (and even refusals to appoint) relating, overtly or covertly, to statements by the post-holders, or candidates, have consistently been seen as interferences with their right to freedom of expression, as in the following examples: ▪ an announcement by a Head of State of his intention not to reappoint the applicant, a Supreme Court president, to any other public office on the grounds that the latter had expressed an opinion on a constitutional issue, which opinion had allegedly contradicted that of the Head of State (Wille v. Liechtenstein [GC], §§ 44 and 49-51); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Supreme Court president (Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, §§ 145-52); ▪ dismissals of judges (Pitkevich v. Russia (dec.); Kudeshkina v. Russia, §§ 79-80; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 53-55), or demotions of judges (Albayrak v. Turkey, 2008, § 38; Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, § 127; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, §§ 157-64); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Chief Public Prosecutor (Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 183-90); removal of a Deputy General Prosecutor (Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), 2013, § 36), or of the head of a local public prosecutor's office (Brisc v. Romania, 2018, § 89); ▪ dismissals of public prosecutors (Altın v. Turkey (dec.), 2000; Goryaynova v. Ukraine, 2020, § 54); of an expert in a prosecutor's office (Peev v. Bulgaria, § 60); or of a press officer in a prosecutor's office (Guja v. Moldova [GC], 2008, §§ 53 and 55); ▪ dismissals of civil servants (Vogt v. Germany, § 44; Petersen v. Germany (dec.); Volkmer v. Germany (dec.); De Diego Nafría v. Spain, 2002, § 30; Kern v. Germany (dec.), 2007; Langner v. Germany, § 39; Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, § 36; Catalan v. Romania, 2018, § 44), or refusal to promote them (Otto v. Germany (dec.)); ▪ dismissal of a university professor (Rubins v. Latvia, §§ 68-70) or suspension of a university professor (Gollnisch v. France (dec.), 2011); ▪ dismissals of journalists at public broadcasters (Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Nenkova- Lalova v. Bulgaria, §§ 52-53; Matúz v. Hungary, §§ 25-27); ▪ dismissals of employees of State and municipal companies (Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), 2010; Bathellier v. France (dec.), 2010; Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), §§ 39-40; Marunić v. Croatia, § 45); ▪ disbarment of a lawyer (Bagirov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 70), or suspension of a notary (Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, 2017, § 41); ▪ dismissal of a doctor at a public hospital (Gawlik v. Liechtenstein, 2021, § 48); or of a nurse in a partly State-owned hospital (Heinisch v. Germany, 2011, §§ 43-45); and a disciplinary penalty imposed on a doctor for breach of professional ethics, for criticising the medical treatment provided to a patient (Frankowicz v. Poland), 2008; ▪ reprimands or warnings given to judges (Kayasu v. Turkey, 2008, §§ 78-81; Di Giovanni v. Italy, 2013, § 74; Guz v. Poland, 2020, § 73; Kozan v. Turkey, § 52), a lawyer (Veraart v. the Netherlands, § 49), a journalist (Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland, § 44), and an academic (Kula v. Turkey, §§ 36-40); and ▪ even a decision no more than hypothetically capable of affecting the career prospects of a judge (Panioglu v. Romania, § 98)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:67369/16,Radio Broadcasting Company B92 AD v. Serbia,67369/16,added,"Radio Broadcasting Company B92 AD v. Serbia, no. 67369/16, 5 September 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.2.b.i.§44,b Distinction between statements of fact and value judgments,6,,216,,"Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania, nos. 84048/17 and 84051/17, 12 September 2023|Radio Broadcasting Company B92 AD v. Serbia, no. 67369/16, 5 September 2023",,,"In order to distinguish between a factual allegation and a value judgment it is necessary to take account of the circumstances of the case and the general tone of the remarks (Brasilier v. France, 2006, § 37; Balaskas v. Greece, 2020, § 58), bearing in mind that assertions about matters of public interest may, on that basis, constitute value judgments rather than statements of fact (Paturel v. France, § 37; see also Lopes Gomes da Silva v. Portugal, concerning comments made by a journalist on the political thought and ideology of a candidate in municipal elections; Hrico v. Slovakia, 2004, criticism of a Supreme Court judge; Radio Broadcasting Company B92 AD v. Serbia, concerning allegations of corruption in vaccine procurement; and Eigirdas and VĮ ""Demokratijos plėtros fondas"" v. Lithuania, 2023, § 100, concerning involvement of a well-known businessman and politician in hidden political advertising during elections)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:23443/23,Ramadan v. France (dec.),23443/23,added,"Ramadan v. France (dec.), no. 23443/23, 9 January 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A,Applicability of Article 10 of the Convention,2,13,13,0.977,"Ramadan v. France (dec.), no. 23443/23, 9 January 2024",,"Even if the publication of news pursues the purpose of entertainment, it nonetheless contributes to the variety of information available to the public and undoubtedly benefits from the protection of Article 10 of the Convention (Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France [GC], § 89; Dupate v. Latvia, § 51). Article 10 is thus applicable even in such situations where the relevant actors do not seek to impart any message, opinion, or idea, or to take part in a debate on the matter of public interest (C8 (Canal 8) v. France, §§ 45-47; see also Sigma Radio Television Ltd v. Cyprus, §§ 203-210, where Article 10 was applied in a situation involving remarks made by actors playing fictional characters in an enterntainment television series which had been broadcast by the applicant company). Such reporting, however, does not attract the robust protection of Article 10 afforded to the press so that, in such cases, freedom of expression requires a narrower interpretation (Mosley v. the United Kingdom, § 114) and States enjoy a wider margin of appreciation (C8 (Canal 8) v. France, §§ 47, 79 and 84; see also MGN Limited v. the United Kingdom (dec.), §§ 58-60).","Even if the publication of news pursues the purpose of entertainment, it nonetheless contributes to the variety of information available to the public and undoubtedly benefits from the protection of Article 10 of the Convention (Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France [GC], 2015, § 89; Dupate v. Latvia, 2020, § 51). Article 10 is thus applicable even in such situations where the relevant actors do not seek to impart any message, opinion, or idea, or to take part in a debate on the matter of public interest (C8 (Canal 8) v. France, 2023, §§ 45-47; see also Sigma Radio Television Ltd v. Cyprus, §§ 203-210, where Article 10 was applied in a situation involving remarks made by actors playing fictional characters in an entertainment television series which had been broadcast by the applicant company). Such reporting, however, does not attract the robust protection of Article 10 afforded to the press so that, in such cases, freedom of expression requires a narrower interpretation (Mosley v. the United Kingdom, § 114) and States enjoy a wider margin of appreciation (C8 (Canal 8) v. France, 2023, §§ 47, 79 and 84; Ramadan v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 36-37; see also MGN Limited v. the United Kingdom (dec.), §§ 58-60)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:23443/23,Ramadan v. France (dec.),23443/23,added,"Ramadan v. France (dec.), no. 23443/23, 9 January 2024",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.1.a.i,Contribution to a debate of public interest,5,,161,,"Ramadan v. France (dec.), no. 23443/23, 9 January 2024",,,"In Ramadan v. France (dec.), 2024, the applicant, accused of sexual assault in ongoing criminal proceedings, disseminated in his book and two other media information concerning the identity of the alleged victim of that assault without the latter's consent. The Court accepted the domestic courts' finding that by his relevant actions the applicant had not intended to take part in the debate of general interest but rather sought to defend himself in public against the relevant accusations which however had not been required to ensure the fairness of the proceedings against him (§§ 37-38 and 41)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:23443/23,Ramadan v. France (dec.),23443/23,added,"Ramadan v. France (dec.), no. 23443/23, 9 January 2024",3,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.1.a.§34,iii. Prior conduct of the person concerned,5,,172,,"Ramadan v. France (dec.), no. 23443/23, 9 January 2024",,,"In contrast, the Court has specified that the mere fact of having cooperated with the press on previous occasions cannot serve as an argument for depriving the party concerned of all protection against publication. An individual's alleged or real previous tolerance or accommodation with regard to publications touching on his or her private life does not necessarily deprive the person concerned of the right to privacy (Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France [GC], 2015, § 130). Likewise, disclosure by the alleged victim of sexual assault of her identity on her social media accounts would not justify further public dissemination of this information without her consent by the alleged perpetrator (Ramadan v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 38-43)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:23443/23,Ramadan v. France (dec.),23443/23,added,"Ramadan v. France (dec.), no. 23443/23, 9 January 2024",4,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XIII.B.2,Protection of vulnerable persons,3,,688,,"Ramadan v. France (dec.), no. 23443/23, 9 January 2024",,,"In Ramadan v. France (dec.), 2024, the applicant, accused of sexual assault in ongoing criminal proceedings, disseminated in his book and two other media information concerning the identity of the alleged victim of that assault without the latter's consent. The Court observed that the applicant was known in certain circles and that, despite the fact that the victim's identity had already been in the public domain, not least because she herself had revealed it on her social media accounts, her subsequent identification by the applicant had significantly amplified public awareness and coverage, which fact had been attested by numerous reactions to the applicant's revelations on social media (§§ 37-38). Given the State's obligation to ensure protection of the victim of the alleged sexual assault, it did not overstep its margin of appreciation in sanctioning the applicant for his publication (§§ 39-40 and 45)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:5420/16,Rogalski v. Poland,5420/16,added,"Rogalski v. Poland, no. 5420/16, 23 March 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A,Applicability of Article 10 of the Convention,2,,26,,"Rogalski v. Poland, no. 5420/16, 23 March 2023",,,"Statements made in private correspondence (Zakharov v. Russia, § 23; Sofranschi v. Moldova, § 29; Marin Kostov v. Bulgaria, § 42; Matalas v. Greece, § 46), in a complaint to a competent authority (Rogalski v. Poland, § 47), or during a meeting held behind closed doors (Raichinov v. Bulgaria, § 45) may also fall within the scope of Article 10, in spite of the fact that the public nature of such statements is limited."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:5420/16,Rogalski v. Poland,5420/16,added,"Rogalski v. Poland, no. 5420/16, 23 March 2023",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VIII.B,Protection in the context of reporting on irregularities in the conduct of State officials,2,,435,,"Rogalski v. Poland, no. 5420/16, 23 March 2023",,,"The Court has held that it is ""one of the precepts of the rule of law"" that citizens should be able to notify competent State officials about the conduct of civil servants which to them appears irregular or unlawful (Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], § 82; Zakharov v. Russia, § 26; Kazakov v. Russia, 2008, § 28; Siryk v. Ukraine, § 42; Rogalski v. Poland, § 48) and maintains confidence in the public administration (Shahanov and Palfreeman v. Bulgaria, § 63). This right to report irregularities takes on an added importance in the case of persons under the control of the authorities, such as prisoners, even if the allegations in question are likely to alter the prison wardens' authority in their respect (ibid., § 64)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:5420/16,Rogalski v. Poland,5420/16,added,"Rogalski v. Poland, no. 5420/16, 23 March 2023",3,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VIII.B,Protection in the context of reporting on irregularities in the conduct of State officials,2,,436,,"Rogalski v. Poland, no. 5420/16, 23 March 2023",,,"The Court considers that civil servants acting in an official capacity are subject to wider limits of acceptable criticism than ordinary individuals (Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], § 98; Morice v. France [GC], § 131; Rogalski v. Poland, § 46). Nonetheless, civil servants must enjoy public confidence in conditions free of undue perturbation if they are to be successful in performing their tasks and it may therefore prove necessary to protect them from offensive and abusive verbal attacks when on duty (Janowski v. Poland [GC], 1999, § 33). As to the specific case of prosecutors, the Court considers that it is in the general interest that they, like judicial officers, should enjoy public confidence. It may therefore be necessary for the State to protect them from accusations that are unfounded (Lešník v. Slovakia, § 54; Chernysheva v. Russia (dec.), 2004)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:5420/16,Rogalski v. Poland,5420/16,added,"Rogalski v. Poland, no. 5420/16, 23 March 2023",4,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VIII.B,Protection in the context of reporting on irregularities in the conduct of State officials,2,,437,,"Rogalski v. Poland, no. 5420/16, 23 March 2023",,,"The Court attributes ""crucial importance"" to the fact that applicants addressed their complaints by way of private correspondence (Zakharov v. Russia, § 26; Sofranschi v. Moldova, § 33; Kazakov v. Russia, 2008, § 29; Raichinov v. Bulgaria, § 48), and accepts a relatively lenient burden on the applicants to ascertain the veracity of the allegations in question (see, for example, Bezymyannyy v. Russia, 2010, §§ 40-41, where the applicant had reported the alleged unlawful conduct of a judge who had adjudicated his case; Lešník v. Slovakia, § 60, where the applicant had complained of abuse of office and corruption regarding a public prosecutor who had rejected his criminal complaint against a third person; Boykanov v. Bulgaria, 2016, § 42, where the applicant had reported maladministration in a letter which was read by two people, and Rogalski v. Poland, §§ 47, 49 and 50, where the applicant, a lawyer, acting in his client's interests, lodged with a competent authority a formal notification of a crime alleging that a public prosecutor had committed an offence of bribe taking)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:57942/10,Rujak v. Croatia (dec.),57942/10,added,"Rujak v. Croatia (dec.), no. 57942/10, 2 October 2012",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A,Applicability of Article 10 of the Convention,2,,30,,"Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, no. 27926/21, 8 June 2023|Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), no. 67783/13, 11 July 2023|Rujak v. Croatia (dec.), no. 57942/10, 2 October 2012",,,"The Court would not exclude the possibility that certain categories of expression may not be covered by the protection of Article 10 of the Convention. In particular, an offensive statement may fall outside the protection of freedom of expression where its sole intent is to insult. (Rujak v. Croatia (dec.), §§ 27-32). However, it is only by a careful examination of the context in which the offending, insulting or aggressive words appear that one can draw a meaningful distinction between shocking and offensive language which is protected by Article 10 of the Convention and language which amounts to wanton denigration - for example, where the sole intent of the offensive statement is to insult - thereby falling outside the protection of Article 10 (Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023, § 27). In particular, the Court found that the expressions, which the domestic authorities had considered to have been gratuitously offensive and insulting towards the national flag, fell within the scope of Article 10 (Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, 2023, § 20)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:45581/15,Sanchez v. France [GC],45581/15,added,"Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 45581/15, 15 May 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B,General considerations on Article 10 in the Court's case-law,2,8,8,0.974,"Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 45581/15, 15 May 2023",,"Indissociable from democracy, freedom of expression is enshrined in a number of national, European1, international and regional2 instruments which promote this political system, recognised as the only one capable of guaranteeing the protection of human rights. In its interpretation of Article 10 of the Convention, the Court has held that ""freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of [democratic] society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man"" (Handyside v. the United Kingdom, § 49).","Indissociable from democracy, freedom of expression is enshrined in a number of national, European1, international and regional2 instruments which promote this political system, recognised as the only one capable of guaranteeing the protection of human rights. In its interpretation of Article 10 of the Convention, the Court has held that ""freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of [democratic] society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man"" (Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, § 49; Sanchez v. France [GC], § 145)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:45581/15,Sanchez v. France [GC],45581/15,added,"Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 45581/15, 15 May 2023",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.B.1,"The criterion of the ""lawfulness of the interference""",3,,70,,"Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 45581/15, 15 May 2023",,,"The Court has held that a norm cannot be regarded as a ""law"" unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his or her conduct and that he or she must be able - if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. However, it went on to state that these consequences do not need to be foreseeable with absolute certainty, as experience showed that to be unattainable (Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], § 131; Sanchez v. France [GC], § 125). Whilst certainty is desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity, and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice (Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], § 41; Bouton v. France, 2022, § 33; Sanchez v. France [GC], § 125). Amargin of doubt in relation to borderline facts does not therefore,,,of itself, make a legal provision unforeseeable in its application. Nor does the mere fact that a provision is capable of more than one construction mean that it fails to meet the requirement of ""foreseeability"" for the purposes of the Convention. The role of adjudication, vested in the courts, serves precisely to dissipate such interpretational doubts as remain, taking into account the changes in everyday practice (ibid., § 126)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:45581/15,Sanchez v. France [GC],45581/15,added,"Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 45581/15, 15 May 2023",3,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.B.1,"The criterion of the ""lawfulness of the interference""",3,,71,,"Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023|Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 45581/15, 15 May 2023",,,"The Court has also considered that an individual cannot claim that a legal provision lacks foreseeability simply because it is applied for the first time in his or her case (Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], § 150; Tête v. France, § 52; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, § 58). Thus, the Court found that the application of legal provisions, on the basis of which the applicant, a politician, had been convicted in criminal proceedings as a ""producer"" for third-party comments posted on the ""wall"" of his personal Facebook account, had met the ""quality of law"" requirements (Sanchez v. France [GC], §§ 132-142)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:45581/15,Sanchez v. France [GC],45581/15,added,"Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 45581/15, 15 May 2023",4,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XI.A,General principles,2,,568,,"Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), no. 67783/13, 11 July 2023|Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 45581/15, 15 May 2023",,,"With particular regard to the disclosure of information received in confidence, the Court has emphasised that the concepts of ""national security"" and ""public safety"" need to be applied with restraint and to be interpreted restrictively and should be brought into play only where it has been 15 See also the Case-law Guide on Terrorism. shown to be necessary to suppress release of the information for the purposes of protecting national security and public safety (Stoll v. Switzerland [GC], § 54; Görmüş and Others v. Turkey, 2016, § 37). Likewise, in the context of cases concerning expression alleged to stir up, promote or justify violence, hatred or intolerance, the Court has considered that the legitimate aim of ""prevention of disorder"" may not be invoked unless it has been demonstrated that the impugned statements statements were capable of leading or actually led to disorder - for instance in the form of public disturbances - and that in acting to suppress them, the relevant authorities had that in mind (Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], §§ 152-153; compare also Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023, § 30; and contrast Sanchez v. France [GC], § 144)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:45581/15,Sanchez v. France [GC],45581/15,added,"Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 45581/15, 15 May 2023",5,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XI.A,General principles,2,,569,,"Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 45581/15, 15 May 2023",,,"On the one hand, the Court has consistently held that there is little scope under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention for restrictions on political speech or debate (Brasilier v. France, 2006, § 41; Sanchez v. France [GC], § 146) or on debate on matters of public interest (Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC], § 61; Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], § 46; Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, § 58)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:45581/15,Sanchez v. France [GC],45581/15,added,"Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 45581/15, 15 May 2023",6,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XIII.A.1,The innovative character of the Internet,3,,668,,"Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 45581/15, 15 May 2023",,,"The Court has noted on several occasions that user-generated expressive activity on the Internet provides an unprecedented platform for the exercise of freedom of expression (Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], 2015, § 110; Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, 2015, § 52; Sanchez v. France [GC], § 159), holding that, in view of its accessibility and its capacity to store and communicate vast amounts of information, the Internet plays an important role in enhancing the public's access to news and facilitating the dissemination of information generally (Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], 2015, § 133; Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (no. 1 and no. 2), § 27)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:45581/15,Sanchez v. France [GC],45581/15,added,"Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 45581/15, 15 May 2023",7,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XIII.B.1,General comments,3,,682,,"Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 45581/15, 15 May 2023",,,"The general principles applicable to offline publications also apply online. For example: - the Court considers that where private or personal information is published on the Internet, such as a person's name or a description of them, the need to preserve confidentiality in this regard can no longer constitute an overriding requirement, in that this information has ceased to be confidential and is in the public domain. In such cases, it is the protection of family life and reputation which comes to the fore and must be ensured (Aleksey Ovchinnikov v. Russia, 2010, §§ 49-50); - the Court found that a webmaster's criminal conviction for public insult against a mayor in respect of comments published on the Internet site of an association chaired by him had been excessive, noting in particular that the comments in question related to expression by the representative body of an association, which was conveying the claims made by its members on a subject of general interest in the context of challenging a municipal policy (Renaud v. France, § 40); - equally, the Court found a breach of the Convention where an NGOwas held liable for having described a politician's speech as ""verbal racism"" (GRA Stiftung gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus v. Switzerland, 2018); - in contrast, although animal and environmental protection is undeniably in the public interest, the Court held that it had been proportionate to issue an injunction which prevented an animal rights organisation from publishing on the Internet a poster campaign featuring photos of concentration camp inmates alongside pictures of animals reared in intensive farming conditions (PETA Deutschland v. Germany); - in addition, whatever the medium used, statements which incite to racial discrimination and hatred do not enjoy the protection offered by Article 10 § 2; the Court has held that the conviction of a website's owner - who was also a politician - for disseminating xenophobic comments corresponded to the pressing social need to protect the rights of the immigrant community (Féret v. Belgium, 2009, § 78; see also Willem v. France, concerning the conviction of an elected representative for comments inciting to discrimination, which were repeated on the municipality's website; and Sanchez v. France [GC], concerning a criminal conviction of a politician for xenophobic remarks posted by third persons on the ""wall"" of his persona Facebook account during an election campaign); - equally, the online publication of personal attacks which go beyond a legitimate battle of ideas are not protected by Article 10 § 2 (Tierbefreier e.V. v. Germany, § 56)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:45581/15,Sanchez v. France [GC],45581/15,added,"Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 45581/15, 15 May 2023",8,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XIII.B.7,Social media,3,,715,,"Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 45581/15, 15 May 2023",,,"In the case of Sanchez v. France [GC] the Court addressed, for the first time, the question of the liability of users of social networks on account of comments by third parties. In this case, the applicant a politician, was held criminal liable for xenophobic remarks posted by other users on the ""wall"" of his personal Facebook account during an election campaign. The Court underlined, in particular, that the applicant's Facebook ""wall"" was not comparable to a ""large professionally managed Internet news portal run on a commercial basis"", and rather approached the case in the light of ""duties and responsibilities"" attributable to politicians when they decided use social networks for political purposes, in particular for an election campaign, by opening fora that were accessible to the public on the Internet in order to receive their reactions and comments (§ 180). In this context, the Court emphasised the fact that an account holder could not claim any right to impunity in his or her use of electronic resources made available on the Internet and that such a person had a duty to act within the confines of conduct that could reasonably be expected of him or her (§ 190). In the latter connection, a degree of notoriety was a relevant factor: a private individual of limited notoriety and representativeness would have fewer duties than a local politician and a candidate standing for election to local office, who in turn would have a lesser burden than a national figure for whom the requirements would necessarily be even heavier, on account of the weight and scope accorded to his or her words and the resources to which he or she would enjoy greater access in order to intervene efficiently on social media platforms (§ 201)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:18287/18,Sàrl Gator v. Monaco,18287/18,added,"Sàrl Gator v. Monaco, no. 18287/18, 11 May 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,"Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and the forms of interference",2,,64,,"Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), no. 67783/13, 11 July 2023|Sàrl Gator v. Monaco, no. 18287/18, 11 May 2023",,,"For example, the following situations may be considered under the Court's case-law as forms of interference with the right to freedom of expression: ▪ a criminal conviction (Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], § 59), combined with a fine (Kasabova v. Bulgaria, 2011; Gaspari v. Armenia (no. 2), 2023) or imprisonment (Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania [GC], 2004); ▪ an order to pay damages (Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, § 51), even where these are symbolic (Paturel v. France, § 49); ▪ a conviction, even where execution is suspended (Otegi Mondragon v. Spain, § 60); ▪ the mere fact of having been investigated in criminal proceedings, or the real risk of being investigated on the basis of legislation that had been unclearly drafted and was also interpreted unclearly by the national courts (Altuğ Taner Akçam v. Turkey, 2011); ▪ a prohibition on publication (Cumhuriyet Vakfı and Others v. Turkey, 2013); ▪ the confiscation of a publication (Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976); ▪ seizure by the prison administration of newspapers and magazines sent to an imprisoned applicant by his relatives, and of a radio in his possession (Rodionov v. Russia); ▪ a refusal to grant a broadcasting frequency (Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy); ▪ a judicial decision preventing a person from receiving transmissions from telecommunications satellites (Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden, 2008, § 32); ▪ a ban on an advertisement (Barthold v. Germany, 1985); ▪ an order to disclose journalistic sources (Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, 1996), even where the order has not been enforced (Financial Times Ltd and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2009, § 56) or where the source has already come forward and the journalist was compelled to give evidence against him (Becker v. Norway, 2017); ▪ the refusal to grant authorisation to film inside a prison when preparing a television programme and to interview one of the detainees (Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft SRG v. Switzerland); the refusal to grant access to a reception centre for asylum seekers to obtain statements about the living conditions therein (Szurovecz v. Hungary); ▪ the arrest and detention of protestors (Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom, § 92; Açık and Others v. Turkey, 2009, § 40); ▪ written warnings sent by the prosecutor's office to the officials of an NGOwhich had organised public demonstrations against a law (Karastelev and Others v. Russia, 2020, §§ 70-76); ▪ withdrawal of accreditation to study archives, used by a journalist in preparing press articles (Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020, § 55); ▪ withdrawal of the applicant's parliamentary immunity through the constitutional amendment (Kerestecioğlu Demir v. Turkey, 2021, § 67); ▪ a caution issued by a mass-media regulator in respect of a publisher, a non-governmental organisation, and the founder, a joint-stock company, for dissemination of ""extremist material"" in relation to an article with quotations from a manifesto of a controversial nationalist group and with symbols resembling Nazi symbols (RID Novaya Gazeta and ZAO Novaya Gazeta v. Russia, §§ 60-66); ▪ revocation of broadcasting licence of a TVchannel (NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], § 150); ▪ deletion by an appellate court of certain statements made by the applicant's lawyer in written submissions before that court (Sàrl Gator v. Monaco, § 38)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:29856/13,SIC - Sociedade Independente de Comunicação v. Portugal,29856/13,added,"SIC - Sociedade Independente de Comunicação v. Portugal, no. 29856/13, 27 July 2021",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,X.B.2,General principles,3,,506,,"Mesić v. Croatia (no. 2), no. 45066/17, 30 May 2023|SIC - Sociedade Independente de Comunicação v. Portugal, no. 29856/13, 27 July 2021",,,"Indeed, the Court considers it inconceivable that there should be no prior or contemporaneous discussion of the subject matter of trials, be it in specialised journals, in the general press or amongst the public at large. Not only do the media have the task of imparting such information and ideas; the public also has a right to receive them (Bédat v. Switzerland [GC], 2016, § 51; SIC - Sociedade Independente de Comunicação v. Portugal, § 58; Mesić v. Croatia (no. 2), § 64)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:11002/07,Skwirut v. Poland (dec.),11002/07,added,"Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), no. 11002/07, 4 November 2014",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,"Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and the forms of interference",2,,65,,"Altın v. Turkey (dec.), no. 39822/98, 6 April 2000|Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, no. 30655/09, 21 March 2017|Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), no. 28369/07, 30 September 2010;|Bathellier v. France (dec.), no. 49001/07, 12 October 2010|Catalan v. Romania, no. 13003/04, 9 January 2018|Gollnisch v. France (dec.), no. 48135/08, 7 June 2011|Guz v. Poland, no. 965/12, 15 October 2020|Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), no. 8696/09, 5 February 2013|Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26360/19, 18 July 2023|Marunić v. Croatia, no. 51706/11, 28 March 2017|Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, no. 40072/13, 19 October 2021|Otto v. Germany (dec.), no. 27574/02, 24 November 2005|Peev v. Bulgaria, no. 64209/01, 26 July 2007|Petersen v. Germany (dec.), no. 39793/98, 22 November 2001|Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), no. 11002/07, 4 November 2014",,,"When it comes to professional posts - such as court presidents, judges, public prosecutors, judicial employees, civil servants, university professors, journalists at public broadcasters, employees in State or municipally owned companies, lawyers, notaries, medical doctors, nurses, servicemen- removals or suspensions from those posts (and even refusals to appoint) relating, overtly or covertly, to statements by the post-holders, or candidates, have consistently been seen as interferences with their right to freedom of expression, as in the following examples: ▪ an announcement by a Head of State of his intention not to reappoint the applicant, a Supreme Court president, to any other public office on the grounds that the latter had expressed an opinion on a constitutional issue, which opinion had allegedly contradicted that of the Head of State (Wille v. Liechtenstein [GC], §§ 44 and 49-51); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Supreme Court president (Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, §§ 145-52); ▪ dismissals of judges (Pitkevich v. Russia (dec.); Kudeshkina v. Russia, §§ 79-80; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 53-55), or demotions of judges (Albayrak v. Turkey, 2008, § 38; Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, § 127; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, §§ 157-64); ▪ termination of the mandate of a Chief Public Prosecutor (Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 183-90); removal of a Deputy General Prosecutor (Jhangiryan v. Armenia (dec.), 2013, § 36), or of the head of a local public prosecutor's office (Brisc v. Romania, 2018, § 89); ▪ dismissals of public prosecutors (Altın v. Turkey (dec.), 2000; Goryaynova v. Ukraine, 2020, § 54); of an expert in a prosecutor's office (Peev v. Bulgaria, § 60); or of a press officer in a prosecutor's office (Guja v. Moldova [GC], 2008, §§ 53 and 55); ▪ dismissals of civil servants (Vogt v. Germany, § 44; Petersen v. Germany (dec.); Volkmer v. Germany (dec.); De Diego Nafría v. Spain, 2002, § 30; Kern v. Germany (dec.), 2007; Langner v. Germany, § 39; Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, § 36; Catalan v. Romania, 2018, § 44), or refusal to promote them (Otto v. Germany (dec.)); ▪ dismissal of a university professor (Rubins v. Latvia, §§ 68-70) or suspension of a university professor (Gollnisch v. France (dec.), 2011); ▪ dismissals of journalists at public broadcasters (Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Nenkova- Lalova v. Bulgaria, §§ 52-53; Matúz v. Hungary, §§ 25-27); ▪ dismissals of employees of State and municipal companies (Balenović v. Croatia (dec.), 2010; Bathellier v. France (dec.), 2010; Skwirut v. Poland (dec.), §§ 39-40; Marunić v. Croatia, § 45); ▪ disbarment of a lawyer (Bagirov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 70), or suspension of a notary (Ana Ioniţă v. Romania, 2017, § 41); ▪ dismissal of a doctor at a public hospital (Gawlik v. Liechtenstein, 2021, § 48); or of a nurse in a partly State-owned hospital (Heinisch v. Germany, 2011, §§ 43-45); and a disciplinary penalty imposed on a doctor for breach of professional ethics, for criticising the medical treatment provided to a patient (Frankowicz v. Poland), 2008; ▪ reprimands or warnings given to judges (Kayasu v. Turkey, 2008, §§ 78-81; Di Giovanni v. Italy, 2013, § 74; Guz v. Poland, 2020, § 73; Kozan v. Turkey, § 52), a lawyer (Veraart v. the Netherlands, § 49), a journalist (Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland, § 44), and an academic (Kula v. Turkey, §§ 36-40); and ▪ even a decision no more than hypothetically capable of affecting the career prospects of a judge (Panioglu v. Romania, § 98)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:20422/15,Staniszewski v. Poland,20422/15,added,"Staniszewski v. Poland, no. 20422/15, 14 October 2021",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.2.b.i.§44,b Distinction between statements of fact and value judgments,6,,211,,"Azadliq and Zayidov v. Azerbaijan, no. 20755/08, 30 June 2022|Makraduli v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, nos. 64659/11 and 24133/13, 19 July 2018|Staniszewski v. Poland, no. 20422/15, 14 October 2021|Udovychenko v. Ukraine, no. 46396/14, 23 March 2023",,,"With respect to statements of facts, the Court has held, in particular, that the ""presumption of falsity"" of such statements - that is an obligation on the author to demonstrate their truth - does not necessarily contravene the Convention provided that the defendant is allowed a realistic opportunity to prove that the statement was true (Kasabova v. Bulgaria, 2011, §§ 58-62; Staniszewski v. Poland, § 45; Azadliq and Zayidov v. Azerbaijan, 2022, § 35; Udovychenko v. Ukraine, § 44). At the same time, the Court has also indicated in such cases that an applicant who was clearly involved in a public debate on an important issue should not be required to fulfil a more demanding standard than that of due diligence, as in such circumstances an obligation to prove factual statements may deprive the applicant of the protection afforded by Article 10 (Makraduli v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, § 75; Staniszewski v. Poland, § 45; Wojczuk v. Poland, § 74; Azadliq and Zayidov v. Azerbaijan, 2022, § 35; Udovychenko v. Ukraine, § 44)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:46396/14,Udovychenko v. Ukraine,46396/14,added,"Udovychenko v. Ukraine, no. 46396/14, 23 March 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A,Applicability of Article 10 of the Convention,2,,27,,"Udovychenko v. Ukraine, no. 46396/14, 23 March 2023",,,"Witness statements also fall within the protective scope of Article 10 (Udovychenko v. Ukraine, §§ 5-7 and 28)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:46396/14,Udovychenko v. Ukraine,46396/14,added,"Udovychenko v. Ukraine, no. 46396/14, 23 March 2023",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.2.a.i,The existence of an objective link between the impugned statement and the person claiming protection under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention,5,,194,,"Kunitsyna v. Russia, no. 9406/05, 13 December 2016|Udovychenko v. Ukraine, no. 46396/14, 23 March 2023",,,"In establishing the constituent elements of defamation, the Court requires that there be an objective link between the impugned statement and the person suing in defamation. Mere personal conjecture or subjective perception of a publication as defamatory does not suffice to establish that the person was directly affected by the publication. There must be something in the circumstances of a particular case to make the ordinary reader feel that the statement reflected directly on the individual claimant or that he or she was targeted by the criticism (Reznik v. Russia § 45; Kunitsyna v. Russia, §§ 42-43; Margulev v. Russia, § 53; Udovychenko v. Ukraine, §§ 41 and 43)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:46396/14,Udovychenko v. Ukraine,46396/14,added,"Udovychenko v. Ukraine, no. 46396/14, 23 March 2023",3,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.2.b.i.§44,b Distinction between statements of fact and value judgments,6,,211,,"Azadliq and Zayidov v. Azerbaijan, no. 20755/08, 30 June 2022|Makraduli v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, nos. 64659/11 and 24133/13, 19 July 2018|Staniszewski v. Poland, no. 20422/15, 14 October 2021|Udovychenko v. Ukraine, no. 46396/14, 23 March 2023",,,"With respect to statements of facts, the Court has held, in particular, that the ""presumption of falsity"" of such statements - that is an obligation on the author to demonstrate their truth - does not necessarily contravene the Convention provided that the defendant is allowed a realistic opportunity to prove that the statement was true (Kasabova v. Bulgaria, 2011, §§ 58-62; Staniszewski v. Poland, § 45; Azadliq and Zayidov v. Azerbaijan, 2022, § 35; Udovychenko v. Ukraine, § 44). At the same time, the Court has also indicated in such cases that an applicant who was clearly involved in a public debate on an important issue should not be required to fulfil a more demanding standard than that of due diligence, as in such circumstances an obligation to prove factual statements may deprive the applicant of the protection afforded by Article 10 (Makraduli v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, § 75; Staniszewski v. Poland, § 45; Wojczuk v. Poland, § 74; Azadliq and Zayidov v. Azerbaijan, 2022, § 35; Udovychenko v. Ukraine, § 44)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:46396/14,Udovychenko v. Ukraine,46396/14,added,"Udovychenko v. Ukraine, no. 46396/14, 23 March 2023",4,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B.2.b.i.§45,"c Procedural issues: standard and burden of proof, equality of arms",6,,237,,"Udovychenko v. Ukraine, no. 46396/14, 23 March 2023",,,"As regards other contexts, in Udovychenko v. Ukraine, where the applicant, a private individual, had been found liable in defamation proceedings as regards her statement she had made, in reply to a question from a journalist, concerning the circumstances of a mediatised traffic accident she had eye-witnessed, the Court found that in the absence of any allegation of bad faith on the applicant's part, to require her to prove the truthfulness of her impugned statement - a requirement that would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to fulfil - had not been consistent with the principles laid down in the Court's case-law (§ 51). The Court took the view that allowing witnesses of events that may have involved criminal offences to convey publicly, in good faith, what they had directly observed and duly reported to the authorities, unless they were bound by the secrecy of investigations, was an aspect of the protection of freedom of expression (§ 50)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20230912000014__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2023-09-12,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2023-09-12__2024-09-30.json,apps:36658/18,Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria,36658/18,added,"Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria, no. 36658/18, 27 June 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,"Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and the forms of interference",2,,67,,"Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria, no. 36658/18, 27 June 2023",,,"At the same time, the Court drew a distinction between professional posts and political ones. The former enjoy some sort of stability or tenure, and holding them is chiefly premised on having certain professional qualifications. The latter are as a rule inherently unstable, and holding them is often premised not only on possessing certain qualifications but also on having and expressing views which match those of the political party vested with the right to fill such a post. Therefore, the reasoning underlying the existence of an interference regarding professional posts cannot be automatically transposed to political ones (Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria, §§ 89-90). Thus, the Court expressed doubts as regards the existence of an interference with the right to freedom of expression in a situation concerning a removal from a position as deputy speaker of a parliament (Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria, § 94)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:20007/22,Bielau v. Austria,20007/22,added,"Bielau v. Austria, no. 20007/22, 27 August 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.B.2,The criterion of the “ le gitimacy of the aim pursued by the interference”,3,92,93,0.9901,"Bielau v. Austria , 2024|Mária Somogyi v. Hungary , 2024|OOO Memo v. Russia , 2022|Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland , 1992",,"The legitimate aims of interference with the right to freedom of expression are set out in the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Convention. This list is exhaustive ( OOO Memo v. Russia, § 37). At this stage of its examination, the Court may find that an interference does not serve to advance the legitimate aim relied on ( Bayev and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 64 and 83, where the Court's assessment focused on the necessity of the impugned laws as general measures; Macatė v. Lithuania [GC], §§ 216-217), or choose to retain only one of the legitimate aims relied on by the State, while dismissing others ( Morice v. France [GC], § 170; Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], §§ 146-154; Stoll v. Switzerland [GC], § 54; Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, § 63; Kilin v. Russia, 2021, §§ 63-66).","The legitimate aims of interference with the right to freedom of expression are set out in the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Convention. This list is exhaustive ( OOO Memo v. Russia, 2022, § 37; Mária Somogyi v. Hungary, 2024, § 29; Bielau v. Austria, 2024, § 30). At this stage of its examination, the Court may find that an interference does not serve to advance the legitimate aim relied on ( Bayev and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 64 and 83, where the Court's assessment focused on the necessity of the impugned laws as general measures; Macatė v. Lithuania [GC], 2023, §§ 216-217), or choose to retain only one of the legitimate aims relied on by the State, while dismissing others ( Morice v. France [GC], 2015, § 170; Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, §§ 146-154; Stoll v. Switzerland [GC], 2007, § 54; Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 1992, § 63; Kilin v. Russia, 2021, §§ 63-66)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:20007/22,Bielau v. Austria,20007/22,added,"Bielau v. Austria, no. 20007/22, 27 August 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XII.A.1,The protection of health,3,,638,,"Bielau v. Austria , 2024",,,"Furthermore, a nuanced approach is required where statements concerning public health issues are made by health professionals. In particular, practicing doctors enjoy freedom of expression under Article 10 and have the right to participate in debates on public health issues, including expressing critical and minority opinions. The exercise of that right is, however, not without limits, particularly when connected to the exercise of their profession. Because of their expert knowledge in the medical field and the professional services they offer in the interest of public health, they have a key role to play in the context of public health debates. They can be submitted to professional obligations in line with their duties and responsibilities under Article 10 § 2. Restricting the freedom of expression of doctors may be called for in cases of categorical and untrue public information on medical questions, in particular if that information is published on a website, to protect the health and well-being of others ( Bielau v. Austria, 2024, §§ 41,42 and 44). Thus, the Court found no violation of Article 10 in a case where the applicant, a practicing doctor, had been sanctioned in disciplinary proceedings for publishing on his website one-sided, negative and scientifically untenable statements about the ineffectiveness of vaccination ( Bielau v. Austria, 2024, §§ 37-47)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:20007/22,Bielau v. Austria,20007/22,added,"Bielau v. Austria, no. 20007/22, 27 August 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,XII.A.1,The protection of health,3,632,634,0.9805,"Bielau v. Austria , 2024|édition and Ponson v. France , 2009",,"The legitimate aim of the protection of health has been relied on in several types of case, concerning, among other issues, public health (in particular, in Société de conception de presse et d'édition and Ponson v. France, § 53, concerning a restriction on tobacco advertisements), bioethics ( Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland [GC], § 54, concerning discourse in favour of human cloning and the transfer of conscience), and patients'rights not to be exposed to unverified medical information ( Vérités Santé Pratique SARL v. France (dec.); and discourse encouraging the use of drugs ( Palusinski v. Poland (dec.)).","The legitimate aim of the protection of health has been relied on in several types of case, concerning, among other issues, public health (in particular, in Société de conception de presse et d'édition and Ponson v. France, 2009, § 53, concerning a restriction on tobacco advertisements; Bielau v. Austria, 2024, § 39, concerning statements on general ineffectiveness of vaccines), bioethics ( Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland [GC], 2012, § 54, concerning discourse in favour of human cloning and the transfer of conscience), and patients'rights not to be exposed to unverified medical information ( Vérités Santé Pratique SARL v. France (dec.), 2005; and discourse encouraging the use of drugs ( Palusinski v. Poland (dec.), 2006)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:20007/22,Bielau v. Austria,20007/22,added,"Bielau v. Austria, no. 20007/22, 27 August 2024",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,XII.A.1,The protection of health,3,636,639,0.97,"Bielau v. Austria , 2024|édition and Ponson v. France , 2009",,"In assessing whether an interference with regard to the protection of public health was proportionate, the Court attaches considerable significance to the existence of a European consensus. Indeed, after recognising the existence of a European consensus as to the need for strict regulation of tobacco advertising, the Court held that fundamental considerations of public health, on which legislation had been enacted in France and the European Union, could prevail over economic imperatives and even over certain fundamental rights such as freedom of expression ( Société de conception de presse et d'édition and Ponson v. France, § 56).","In assessing whether an interference with regard to the protection of public health was proportionate, the Court attaches considerable significance to the existence of a European consensus. Indeed, after recognising the existence of a European consensus as to the need for strict regulation of tobacco advertising, the Court held that fundamental considerations of public health, on which legislation had been enacted in France and the European Union, could prevail over economic imperatives and even over certain fundamental rights such as freedom of expression ( Société de conception de presse et d'édition and Ponson v. France, 2009, § 56; see also, in the same vein, Bielau v. Austria, 2024, § 44, regarding the Contracting Parties'consensus on effectiveness of vaccination)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:20007/22,Bielau v. Austria,20007/22,added,"Bielau v. Austria, no. 20007/22, 27 August 2024",5,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,XII.B.1.b,The impact of the speech: means of dissemination and the target audience,4,656,659,0.9298,"Bielau v. Austria , 2024|édition and Ponson v. France , 2009",,"This reasoning is also applicable with regard to the protection of health. The Court considered that, given that the readership of a magazine was essentially made up of young people, who were more vulnerable, the impact of messages on that group had to be taken into consideration. In consequence, the Court held in one case that the fact that the offending publications were regarded as capable of inciting people, particularly young people, to consume tobacco products was a relevant and sufficient reason to justify the interference ( Société de conception de presse et d'édition and Ponson v. France, §§ 58-60).","This reasoning is also applicable with regard to the protection of health. The Court considered that, given that the readership of a magazine was essentially made up of young people, who were more vulnerable, the impact of messages on that group had to be taken into consideration. In consequence, the Court held in one case that the fact that the offending publications were regarded as capable of inciting people, particularly young people, to consume tobacco products was a relevant and sufficient reason to justify the interference ( Société de conception de presse et d'édition and Ponson v. France, 2009, §§ 58-60). Likewise, where one-sided and scientifically untenable statements regarding the general ineffectiveness of vaccination were made by a doctor on his website in connection with his medical practice, the Court underlined the potentially very wide impact of those statements which could be easily accessible to everyone including, in particular, medical laypersons ( Bielau v. Austria, 2024, § 43)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:2933/03,Cox v. Turkey,2933/03,added,"Cox v. Turkey, no. 2933/03, 20 May 2010",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,"Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and the forms of interference",2,,63,,"Cox v. Turkey , 2010",,,"It is worth noting that Article 10 rights are secured ""regardless of frontiers"", that is no distinction shall be drawn between its exercise by nationals and foreigners. This principle implies that States may only restrict information received from abroad within the confines of the justifications set out in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention ( Cox v. Turkey, 2010, § 31; Kirkorov v. Lithuania (dec.), 2024, § 53)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:15028/16,Hrachya Harutyunyan v. Armenia,15028/16,added,"Hrachya Harutyunyan v. Armenia, no. 15028/16, 27 August 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,VIII.A,Protection of whistle-blowers,2,433,434,0.8119,"Hrachya Harutyunyan v. Armenia , 2024",,"The Court considers that the above-mentioned principles and criteria, set out in the Guja v. Moldova [GC], 2008, judgment, which concerned a public-sector employee, are transposable to employment relationships under private law and that they apply to the weighing of employees'right to signal illegal conduct or wrongdoing on the part of their employer against the latter's right to protection of its reputation and commercial interests ( Heinisch v. Germany, 2011, § 64; Halet v. Luxembourg [GC], 2023, § 155).","The Court considers that the above-mentioned principles and criteria, set out in the Guja v. Moldova [GC], 2008, judgment, which concerned a public-sector employee, are transposable to employment relationships under private law and that they apply to the weighing of employees'right to signal illegal conduct or wrongdoing on the part of their employer against the latter's right to protection of its reputation and commercial interests ( Heinisch v. Germany, 2011, § 64; Halet v. Luxembourg [GC], 2023, § 155). Furthermore, where the reporting of alleged professional misconduct takes place after the end of employment, the protection regime for the freedom of expression of whistle-blowers should not automatically cease to apply simply because the work-based relationship ended. Rather, such protection can, in principle, apply provided that the public-interest information was obtained while the ""whistle - blower"" had privileged access to it by virtue of his or her work-based relationship. In cases where work-based relationship ended, there could be no question of repercussions at work, but retaliation measures against the former employee could take other forms. What is important is whether the detriment suffered by the former employee was the direct consequence of the protected disclosure ( Hrachya Harutyunyan v. Armenia, 2024, § 46)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:12174/22,Kirkorov v. Lithuania (dec.),12174/22,added,"Kirkorov v. Lithuania (dec.), no. 12174/22, 19 March 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,"Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and the forms of interference",2,,63,,"Cox v. Turkey , 2010",,,"It is worth noting that Article 10 rights are secured ""regardless of frontiers"", that is no distinction shall be drawn between its exercise by nationals and foreigners. This principle implies that States may only restrict information received from abroad within the confines of the justifications set out in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention ( Cox v. Turkey, 2010, § 31; Kirkorov v. Lithuania (dec.), 2024, § 53)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:12174/22,Kirkorov v. Lithuania (dec.),12174/22,added,"Kirkorov v. Lithuania (dec.), no. 12174/22, 19 March 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XI.A,General principles,2,,577,,,,,"The ""national security"" and ""public order"" aims have also been used to justify entry bans on foreigners. Apopular Russian performer and producer was prohibited from entering Lithuania not because of isolated statements or speeches but because of the local authorities assessment that he was the Russian Federation 's ""tool of soft power"" ( Kirkorov v. Lithuania (dec.), 2024, § 59)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:36681/23,Lutgen v. Luxembourg,36681/23,added,"Lutgen v. Luxembourg, no. 36681/23, 16 May 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,X.B.4.d,Contempt of court,4,552,553,0.9014,"Lutgen v. Luxembourg , 2024",,"Lawyers cannot, moreover, make remarks that are so serious that they overstep the permissible expression of comments without a sound factual basis, nor can they proffer insults. The Court assesses remarks in their general context, in particular to ascertain whether they can be regarded as misleading or as a gratuitous personal attack and to ensure that the expressions used had a sufficiently close connection with the facts of the case ( Morice v. France [GC], § 139, with further references).","Lawyers cannot, moreover, make remarks that are so serious that they overstep the permissible expression of comments without a sound factual basis, nor can they proffer insults. The Court assesses remarks in their general context, in particular to ascertain whether they can be regarded as misleading or as a gratuitous personal attack and to ensure that the expressions used had a sufficiently close connection with the facts of the case ( Morice v. France [GC], 2015, § 139, with further references). Where the applicant lawyer, acting in his client's interests in a situation of emergency, had made critical comments concerning a judge, the Court found that those remarks had not amounted to insults or gratuitous personal attacks given, in particular, that that reporting had been found legitimate at the domestic level ( Lutgen v. Luxembourg, 2024, §§ 58, 69-71)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:15076/17,Mária Somogyi v. Hungary,15076/17,added,"Mária Somogyi v. Hungary, no. 15076/17, 16 May 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.B.2,The criterion of the “ le gitimacy of the aim pursued by the interference”,3,92,93,0.9901,"Bielau v. Austria , 2024|Mária Somogyi v. Hungary , 2024|OOO Memo v. Russia , 2022|Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland , 1992",,"The legitimate aims of interference with the right to freedom of expression are set out in the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Convention. This list is exhaustive ( OOO Memo v. Russia, § 37). At this stage of its examination, the Court may find that an interference does not serve to advance the legitimate aim relied on ( Bayev and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 64 and 83, where the Court's assessment focused on the necessity of the impugned laws as general measures; Macatė v. Lithuania [GC], §§ 216-217), or choose to retain only one of the legitimate aims relied on by the State, while dismissing others ( Morice v. France [GC], § 170; Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], §§ 146-154; Stoll v. Switzerland [GC], § 54; Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, § 63; Kilin v. Russia, 2021, §§ 63-66).","The legitimate aims of interference with the right to freedom of expression are set out in the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Convention. This list is exhaustive ( OOO Memo v. Russia, 2022, § 37; Mária Somogyi v. Hungary, 2024, § 29; Bielau v. Austria, 2024, § 30). At this stage of its examination, the Court may find that an interference does not serve to advance the legitimate aim relied on ( Bayev and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 64 and 83, where the Court's assessment focused on the necessity of the impugned laws as general measures; Macatė v. Lithuania [GC], 2023, §§ 216-217), or choose to retain only one of the legitimate aims relied on by the State, while dismissing others ( Morice v. France [GC], 2015, § 170; Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, §§ 146-154; Stoll v. Switzerland [GC], 2007, § 54; Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 1992, § 63; Kilin v. Russia, 2021, §§ 63-66)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:13801/07,Marin Kostov v. Bulgaria,13801/07,added,"Marin Kostov v. Bulgaria, no. 13801/07, 24 July 2012",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A,Applicability of Article 10 of the Convention,2,26,26,1.0,"Marin Kostov v. Bulgaria, 2012|Matalas v. Greece , 2021|Raichinov v. Bulgaria , 2006|Rogalski v. Poland , 2023|Sofranschi v. Moldova, 2010|Zakharov v. Russia, 2006",,"Statements made in private correspondence ( Zakharov v. Russia, § 23; Sofranschi v. Moldova, § 29; Marin Kostov v. Bulgaria, § 42; Matalas v. Greece, § 46), in a complaint to a competent authority ( Rogalski v. Poland, § 47), or during a meeting held behind closed doors ( Raichinov v. Bulgaria, § 45) may also fall within the scope of Article 10, in spite of the fact that the public nature of such statements is limited.","Statements made in private correspondence ( Zakharov v. Russia, 2006, § 23; Sofranschi v. Moldova, 2010, § 29; Marin Kostov v. Bulgaria, 2012, § 42; Matalas v. Greece, 2021, § 46), in a complaint to a competent authority ( Rogalski v. Poland, 2023, § 47), or during a meeting held behind closed doors ( Raichinov v. Bulgaria, 2006, § 45) may also fall within the scope of Article 10, in spite of the fact that the public nature of such statements is limited."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:15450/03,Müdür Duman v. Turkey,15450/03,added,"Müdür Duman v. Turkey, no. 15450/03, 6 octobre 2015",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.A,"Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, and the forms of interference",2,61,61,1.0,"Müdür Duman v. Turkey , 2015",,"In a case where the applicant had denied, before the domestic criminal courts, his responsibility for the materials that had led to his conviction, the Court held that this conviction amounted to an interference in the exercise of his right to freedom of expression. In the Court's view, to hold otherwise would be tantamount to requiring him to acknowledge the acts of which he stood accused, contrary to his right not to incriminate himself, which lies at the heart of the notion of a fair trial protected by Article 6 of the Convention. In addition, not accepting that a criminal conviction constituted an interference, on the ground that the person concerned denied any involvement in the acts at issue, would lock that person in a vicious circle that would deprive him or her of the protection of the Convention ( Müdür Duman v. Turkey, § 30; see also for similar findings, Kilin v. Russia, 2021, §§ 55-58).","In a case where the applicant had denied, before the domestic criminal courts, his responsibility for the materials that had led to his conviction, the Court held that this conviction amounted to an interference in the exercise of his right to freedom of expression. In the Court's view, to hold otherwise would be tantamount to requiring him to acknowledge the acts of which he stood accused, contrary to his right not to incriminate himself, which lies at the heart of the notion of a fair trial protected by Article 6 of the Convention. In addition, not accepting that a criminal conviction constituted an interference, on the ground that the person concerned denied any involvement in the acts at issue, would lock that person in a vicious circle that would deprive him or her of the protection of the Convention ( Müdür Duman v. Turkey, 2015, § 30; see also for similar findings, Kilin v. Russia, 2021, §§ 55-58)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:42442/08,Mura v. Poland (dec.),42442/08,added,"Mura v. Poland (dec.), no. 42442/08, 9 May 2016",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.B.3,Absence of significant disadvantage (Article 35 § 3 (b)).,3,58,58,1.0,,,"In contrast, in some other cases, the Court accepted this objection, still emphasising the importance of freedom of expression and the need for careful scrutiny by the Court in the application of this criterion. Such scrutiny should focus on elements such as the contribution made to a debate of general interest and whether the case involves the press or other news media ( Sylka v. Poland (dec.), §§ 25-39; Mura v. Poland (dec.), §§ 20-32; Savelyev v. Russia (dec.), §§ 24-35, see also the Committee decision in Anthony France and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.) [committee], 2017).","In contrast, in some other cases, the Court accepted this objection, still emphasising the importance of freedom of expression and the need for careful scrutiny by the Court in the application of this criterion. Such scrutiny should focus on elements such as the contribution made to a debate of general interest and whether the case involves the press or other news media ( Sylka v. Poland (dec.), 2014, §§ 25-39; Mura v. Poland (dec.), 2016, §§ 20-32; Savelyev v. Russia (dec.), 2019, §§ 24-35, see also the Committee decision in Anthony France and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.) [committee], 2017)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:15379/13,National Youth Council of Moldova v. the Republic of Moldova,15379/13,added,"National Youth Council of Moldova v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 15379/13, 25 June 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,V.A,The role of watchdog,2,314,315,0.9923,,,"Although the press is at the origin of the concept of ""public watchdog"", the Court also recognises that NGOs play the same role ( Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 103; Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], § 86; Cangi v. Turkey, 2019, § 35). In particular, the Court considers that the public watchdog role played by NGOs is ""of similar importance to that of the press"" ( Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 103; Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, § 89; Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary [GC], § 166). In the Court's view, in a comparable way to the press, an NGOperforming a public watchdog role is likely to have greater impact when reporting on irregularities of public officials, and will often dispose of greater means of verifying and corroborating the veracity of criticism than would be the case of an individual reporting on what he or she has observed personally ( Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], § 87).","Although the press is at the origin of the concept of ""public watchdog"", the Court also recognises that NGOs play the same role ( Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 103; Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], 2017, § 86; Cangi v. Turkey, 2019, § 35; National Youth Council of Moldova v. the Republic of Moldova, 2024, § 73). In particular, the Court considers that the public watchdog role played by NGOs is ""of similar importance to that of the press"" ( Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 103; Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, 2005, § 89; Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 166). In the Court's view, in a comparable way to the press, an NGOperforming a public watchdog role is likely to have greater impact when reporting on irregularities of public officials, and will often dispose of greater means of verifying and corroborating the veracity of criticism than would be the case of an individual reporting on what he or she has observed personally ( Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], 2017, § 87)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:15379/13,National Youth Council of Moldova v. the Republic of Moldova,15379/13,added,"National Youth Council of Moldova v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 15379/13, 25 June 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,XI.B.2,The nature and content of the speech and its potential impact: analysis of the text in its context,3,583,585,0.8584,"Soulas and Others v. France , 2008|Vona v. Hungary , 2013|Özgür Gündem v. Turkey , 2000",,"Another factor has been whether the statements, fairly construed and seen in their immediate or wider context, could be seen as a direct or indirect call for violence or as a justification of violence, hatred or intolerance ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], § 206; see, inter alia, Incal v. Turkey, 1998, § 50; Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC], § 62; Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, § 64; Gündüz v. Turkey, 2003, §§ 48 and 51; Soulas and Others v. France, §§ 39-41 and 43; Balsytė - Lideikienė v. Lithuania, 2008, §§ 79-80; Féret v. Belgium, 2009, §§ 69-73 and 78; Hizb ut-Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012, § 73; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 107-112; Fáber v. Hungary, 2012, §§ 52 and 56-58; Vona v. Hungary, §§ 64-67; Lilliendal v. Iceland (dec.), §§ 36-39).","Another factor has been whether the statements, fairly construed and seen in their immediate or wider context, could be seen as a direct or indirect call for violence or as a justification of violence, hatred or intolerance ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, § 206; see, inter alia, Incal v. Turkey, 1998, § 50; Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC], 1999, § 62; Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, 2000, § 64; Gündüz v. Turkey, 2003, §§ 48 and 51; Soulas and Others v. France, 2008, §§ 39-41 and 43; Balsytė - Lideikienė v. Lithuania, 2008, §§ 79-80; Féret v. Belgium, 2009, §§ 69-73 and 78; Hizb ut-Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012, § 73; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 107-112; Fáber v. Hungary, 2012, §§ 52 and 56-58; Vona v. Hungary, 2013, §§ 64-67; Lilliendal v. Iceland (dec.), 2020, §§ 36-39). In particular, in the case of a purportedly offensive billboard advertisement published by an NGO, the Court has stated that it is important to look at the broader social context in which the advertisement was published. In this case, the Court found that there was no incitement to hatred or intolerance conveyed by the advertisement, and that it contained an intelligible albeit exaggerated anti-discrimination message ( National Youth Council of Moldova v. the Republic of Moldova, 2024, §§ 78-79)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:44230/06,Petropavlovskis v. Latvia,44230/06,added,"Petropavlovskis v. Latvia, no. 44230/06, ECHR 2015",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A,Applicability of Article 10 of the Convention,2,32,32,1.0,"Petropavlovskis v. Latvia , 2015",,"In cases concerning a refusal to grant citizenship to a foreign national following discretionary assessment of his loyalty to the State, the Court has found Article 10 to be inapplicable ( Boudelal v. France (dec.), 2017, § 30). In particular, it has emphasised that the assessment of loyalty for the purposes of a naturalisation decision does not refer to loyalty to the government in power, but rather to the State and its Constitution. The Court considers that a democratic State is entitled to require persons who wish to acquire its citizenship to be loyal to the State and, in particular, to the constitutional principles on which it is founded ( Petropavlovskis v. Latvia, § 85).","In cases concerning a refusal to grant citizenship to a foreign national following discretionary assessment of his loyalty to the State, the Court has found Article 10 to be inapplicable ( Boudelal v. France (dec.), 2017, § 30). In particular, it has emphasised that the assessment of loyalty for the purposes of a naturalisation decision does not refer to loyalty to the government in power, but rather to the State and its Constitution. The Court considers that a democratic State is entitled to require persons who wish to acquire its citizenship to be loyal to the State and, in particular, to the constitutional principles on which it is founded ( Petropavlovskis v. Latvia, 2015, § 85)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:56138/18,RFE/RL Inc. and Others v. Azerbaijan,56138/18,added,"RFE/RL Inc. and Others v. Azerbaijan, nos. 56138/18 and 3 others, 13 June 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,XIII.C,Blocking of access to the Internet,2,721,724,0.903,"RL Inc. and Others v. Azerbaijan , 2024",,"The Court has emphasised, in particular, the need to weigh up the various interests at stake, in particular by assessing the need to block all access to particular sites ( Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey, 2012, § 66) and noted that the authorities should have taken into consideration, among other aspects, the fact that such a measure, by rendering large quantities of information inaccessible, was bound to substantially restrict the rights of Internet users and to have a significant collateral effect ( ibid. ; Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, 2015, § 64).","The Court has emphasised, in particular, the need to weigh up the various interests at stake, in particular by assessing the need to block all access to particular sites ( Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey, 2012, § 66) and noted that the authorities should have taken into consideration, among other aspects, the fact that such a measure, by rendering large quantities of information inaccessible, was bound to substantially restrict the rights of Internet users and to have a significant collateral effect ( ibid. ; Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, 2015, § 64). The fact that the organisations continued to have social media presence or were pu blishing on other platforms is not ""an equivalent substitute for their main and fully fledged news websites"" that have been blocked by local authorities. Even the fact that the website block could be bypassed through VPNs and other third-party services can not ""alleviate"" the impact of such orders ( RFE/RL Inc. and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 72-73)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:26826/16,"Ringier Axel Springer Slovakia, a.s. v. Slovakia (no. 4)",26826/16,added,"Ringier Axel Springer Slovakia, a.s. v. Slovakia (no. 4), no. 26826/16, 23 September 2021",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.3,Absence of significant disadvantage (Article 35 § 3 (b)).,3,57,57,0.9902,"Margulev v. Russia , 2019|Panioglu v. Romania , 2020|ć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland , 2024|őkés v. Romania , 2021|Šeks v. Croatia , 2022",,"In particular, it has dismissed the preliminary objection under the significant disadvantage criterion in a number of cases, including: ▪ Eon v. France, 2013, where the Court had regard to the national debate in France on whether insulting the head of State should remain a criminal offence and the wider issue of whether that offence was compatible with the Convention (§§ 34-36). ▪ Margulev v. Russia, where the Court had regard to the fact that the applicant had experienced a chilling effect as a result of the defamation proceedings against the editorial board of a newspaper in which he had expressed his personal opinions and also to the essential role of a free press in ensuring the proper functioning of a democratic society (§ 42; see also Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020, § 39; Panioglu v. Romania, § 75; Ringier Axel Springer Slovakia, a.s. v. Slovakia (no. 4), §§ 26-30). ▪ Tőkés v. Romania, where the Court had regard to the fact that the applicant wished to show his belonging to a minority and given the political sensitivity of minority rights in a democratic sociey (§§ 54-55). ▪ Handzhiyski v. Bulgaria, 2021, where the Court noted that, although the fine imposed on the applicant in that case had not been criminal in nature and had been modest in its amount, the practical and in particular the pecuniary effects on the applicant could not be the sole criterion for assessing whether he had suffered a ""significant disadvantage"". It pointed out that his complaint under Article 10 had concerned a proper exercise of his right to freedom of expression on a matter of public interest, being thus a point of principle for him, and had raised issues of general importance: whether a political protest carried out in the manner chosen by the applicant - by profaning a public monument without damaging it - could amount to a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of expression (§ 36). ▪ Gachechiladze v. Georgia, 2021, § 40; and Šeks v. Croatia, § 50, where the Court considered that the applicants'complaints had concerned important questions of principle and had gone beyond the scope of their relevant cases.","In particular, it has dismissed the preliminary objection under the significant disadvantage criterion in a number of cases, including: ▪ Eon v. France, 2013, where the Court had regard to the national debate in France on whether insulting the head of State should remain a criminal offence and the wider issue of whether that offence was compatible with the Convention (§§ 34-36). ▪ Margulev v. Russia, 2019, where the Court had regard to the fact that the applicant had experienced a chilling effect as a result of the defamation proceedings against the editorial board of a newspaper in which he had expressed his personal opinions and also to the essential role of a free press in ensuring the proper functioning of a democratic society (§ 42; see also Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020, § 39; Panioglu v. Romania, 2020, § 75; Ringier Axel Springer Slovakia, a.s. v. Slovakia (no. 4), 2021, §§ 26-30). ▪ Tőkés v. Romania, 2021, where the Court had regard to the fact that the applicant wished to show his belonging to a minority and given the political sensitivity of minority rights in a democratic sociey (§§ 54-55). ▪ Handzhiyski v. Bulgaria, 2021, where the Court noted that, although the fine imposed on the applicant in that case had not been criminal in nature and had been modest in its amount, the practical and in particular the pecuniary effects on the applicant could not be the sole criterion for assessing whether he had suffered a ""significant disadvantage"". It pointed out that his complaint under Article 10 had concerned a proper exercise of his right to freedom of expression on a matter of public interest, being thus a point of principle for him, and had raised issues of general importance: whether a political protest carried out in the manner chosen by the applicant - by profaning a public monument without damaging it - could amount to a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of expression (§ 36). ▪ Gachechiladze v. Georgia, 2021, § 40; and Šeks v. Croatia, 2022, § 50, where the Court considered that the applicants'complaints had concerned important questions of principle and had gone beyond the scope of their relevant cases. ▪ Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, 2024, § 26, where the Court considered that the decision to deny access to certain information requested by the applicant NGOhad undermined the very core of its activity given the fact that the main area of that activity was gathering information, sharing it with the public and contributing to public debate."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:42982/08,Savelyev v. Russia (dec.),42982/08,added,"Savelyev v. Russia (dec.), no. 42982/08, 21 May 2019",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.B.3,Absence of significant disadvantage (Article 35 § 3 (b)).,3,58,58,1.0,,,"In contrast, in some other cases, the Court accepted this objection, still emphasising the importance of freedom of expression and the need for careful scrutiny by the Court in the application of this criterion. Such scrutiny should focus on elements such as the contribution made to a debate of general interest and whether the case involves the press or other news media ( Sylka v. Poland (dec.), §§ 25-39; Mura v. Poland (dec.), §§ 20-32; Savelyev v. Russia (dec.), §§ 24-35, see also the Committee decision in Anthony France and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.) [committee], 2017).","In contrast, in some other cases, the Court accepted this objection, still emphasising the importance of freedom of expression and the need for careful scrutiny by the Court in the application of this criterion. Such scrutiny should focus on elements such as the contribution made to a debate of general interest and whether the case involves the press or other news media ( Sylka v. Poland (dec.), 2014, §§ 25-39; Mura v. Poland (dec.), 2016, §§ 20-32; Savelyev v. Russia (dec.), 2019, §§ 24-35, see also the Committee decision in Anthony France and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.) [committee], 2017)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:10103/20,Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland,10103/20,added,"Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, no. 10103/20, 21 March 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.3,Absence of significant disadvantage (Article 35 § 3 (b)).,3,57,57,0.9902,"Margulev v. Russia , 2019|Panioglu v. Romania , 2020|ć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland , 2024|őkés v. Romania , 2021|Šeks v. Croatia , 2022",,"In particular, it has dismissed the preliminary objection under the significant disadvantage criterion in a number of cases, including: ▪ Eon v. France, 2013, where the Court had regard to the national debate in France on whether insulting the head of State should remain a criminal offence and the wider issue of whether that offence was compatible with the Convention (§§ 34-36). ▪ Margulev v. Russia, where the Court had regard to the fact that the applicant had experienced a chilling effect as a result of the defamation proceedings against the editorial board of a newspaper in which he had expressed his personal opinions and also to the essential role of a free press in ensuring the proper functioning of a democratic society (§ 42; see also Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020, § 39; Panioglu v. Romania, § 75; Ringier Axel Springer Slovakia, a.s. v. Slovakia (no. 4), §§ 26-30). ▪ Tőkés v. Romania, where the Court had regard to the fact that the applicant wished to show his belonging to a minority and given the political sensitivity of minority rights in a democratic sociey (§§ 54-55). ▪ Handzhiyski v. Bulgaria, 2021, where the Court noted that, although the fine imposed on the applicant in that case had not been criminal in nature and had been modest in its amount, the practical and in particular the pecuniary effects on the applicant could not be the sole criterion for assessing whether he had suffered a ""significant disadvantage"". It pointed out that his complaint under Article 10 had concerned a proper exercise of his right to freedom of expression on a matter of public interest, being thus a point of principle for him, and had raised issues of general importance: whether a political protest carried out in the manner chosen by the applicant - by profaning a public monument without damaging it - could amount to a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of expression (§ 36). ▪ Gachechiladze v. Georgia, 2021, § 40; and Šeks v. Croatia, § 50, where the Court considered that the applicants'complaints had concerned important questions of principle and had gone beyond the scope of their relevant cases.","In particular, it has dismissed the preliminary objection under the significant disadvantage criterion in a number of cases, including: ▪ Eon v. France, 2013, where the Court had regard to the national debate in France on whether insulting the head of State should remain a criminal offence and the wider issue of whether that offence was compatible with the Convention (§§ 34-36). ▪ Margulev v. Russia, 2019, where the Court had regard to the fact that the applicant had experienced a chilling effect as a result of the defamation proceedings against the editorial board of a newspaper in which he had expressed his personal opinions and also to the essential role of a free press in ensuring the proper functioning of a democratic society (§ 42; see also Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020, § 39; Panioglu v. Romania, 2020, § 75; Ringier Axel Springer Slovakia, a.s. v. Slovakia (no. 4), 2021, §§ 26-30). ▪ Tőkés v. Romania, 2021, where the Court had regard to the fact that the applicant wished to show his belonging to a minority and given the political sensitivity of minority rights in a democratic sociey (§§ 54-55). ▪ Handzhiyski v. Bulgaria, 2021, where the Court noted that, although the fine imposed on the applicant in that case had not been criminal in nature and had been modest in its amount, the practical and in particular the pecuniary effects on the applicant could not be the sole criterion for assessing whether he had suffered a ""significant disadvantage"". It pointed out that his complaint under Article 10 had concerned a proper exercise of his right to freedom of expression on a matter of public interest, being thus a point of principle for him, and had raised issues of general importance: whether a political protest carried out in the manner chosen by the applicant - by profaning a public monument without damaging it - could amount to a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of expression (§ 36). ▪ Gachechiladze v. Georgia, 2021, § 40; and Šeks v. Croatia, 2022, § 50, where the Court considered that the applicants'complaints had concerned important questions of principle and had gone beyond the scope of their relevant cases. ▪ Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, 2024, § 26, where the Court considered that the decision to deny access to certain information requested by the applicant NGOhad undermined the very core of its activity given the fact that the main area of that activity was gathering information, sharing it with the public and contributing to public debate."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:10103/20,Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland,10103/20,added,"Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, no. 10103/20, 21 March 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IX.B.1,The purpose of the information request,3,448,449,0.9596,"Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria , 2013|Suprun and Others v. Russia , 2024|Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary , 2009|ć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland , 2024|şiianu v. Romania , 2014",,"It must be ascertained whether access to the information sought was an essential element of the exercise of freedom of expression. Thus, the Court has placed emphasis on whether the gathering of the information was a relevant preparatory step in journalistic activities or in other activities creating a forum for, or constituting an essential element of, public debate (for an NGO, see Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, §§ 27-28; for journalists, Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria, § 36; Roşiianu v. Romania, § 63).","It must be ascertained whether access to the information sought was an essential element of the exercise of freedom of expression. Thus, the Court has placed emphasis on whether the gathering of the information was a relevant preparatory step in journalistic activities or in other activities creating a forum for, or constituting an essential element of, public debate (for an NGO, see Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, 2009, §§ 27-28; Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, 2024, § 60; for journalists, Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria, 2013, § 36; Roşiianu v. Romania, 2014, § 63; for academic researchers, Suprun and Others v. Russia, 2024, § 73)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:10103/20,Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland,10103/20,added,"Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, no. 10103/20, 21 March 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IX.B.2,The nature of the information sought,3,455,456,0.9805,"Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria , 2013|Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary , 2009|Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia , 2013|Yuriy Chumak v. Ukraine , 2021|ć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland , 2024|Šeks v. Croatia , 2022",,"By way of illustration, the following may come within the categories of information considered to be in the public interest: ▪ ""Factual information concerning the use of electronic surveillance measures"" ( Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, § 24); ▪ ""Information about a constitutional complaint"" and ""on a matter of public importance"" ( Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, §§ 37-38). ▪ ""Original documentary sources for legitimate historical research"" ( Kenedi v. Hungary, 2009, § 43). ▪ Decisions concerning real property transaction commissions ( Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria, § 42); ▪ ""Titles of legal acts issued by the head of State, which, apparently, were part of the law in Ukraine"" ( Yuriy Chumak v. Ukraine, § 30); ▪ Information regarding the number of formal emplyees and informal collaborators of the German Foreign Intelligence Service, and how many of those were formerly members of Nazi organisations ( Saure v. Germany (dec.), §§ 4 and 36); ▪ Classified documents from the archives of the Office of the President of the Republic of Croatia which the applicant needed for writing a book about the creation of the Croatian State ( Šeks v. Croatia, §§ 5 and 38).","By way of illustration, the following may come within the categories of information considered to be in the public interest: ▪ ""Factual information concerning the use of electronic surveillance measures"" ( Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, 2013, § 24); ▪ ""Information about a constitutional complaint"" and ""on a matter of public importance"" ( Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, 2009, §§ 37-38). ▪ ""Original documentary sources for legitimate historical research"" ( Kenedi v. Hungary, 2009, § 43). ▪ Decisions concerning real property transaction commissions ( Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria, 2013, § 42); ▪ ""Titles of legal acts issued by the head of State, which, apparently, were part of the law in Ukraine"" ( Yuriy Chumak v. Ukraine, 2021, § 30); ▪ Information regarding the number of formal employees and informal collaborators of the German Foreign Intelligence Service, and how many of those were formerly members of Nazi organisations ( Saure v. Germany (dec.), 2021, §§ 4 and 36); ▪ Classified documents from the archives of the Office of the President of the Republic of Croatia which the applicant needed for writing a book about the creation of the Croatian State ( Šeks v. Croatia, 2022, §§ 5 and 38); ▪ Information from the meeting diaries of the president and vice-president of the Constitutional Court of Poland, concerning their meetings held during a specified period of time, particularly given the political context at that time ( Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, 2024, §§ 61-64)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:10103/20,Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland,10103/20,added,"Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, no. 10103/20, 21 March 2024",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IX.B.3,The role of the person requesting the information,3,461,462,0.9735,"Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria , 2013|Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary , 2009|Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia , 2013|ć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland , 2024|şiianu v. Romania , 2014",,"The Court has recognised that this role is played by journalists ( Roşiianu v. Romania, § 61; Saure v. Germany (dec.), § 35) and NGOs whose activities are related to matters of public interest ( Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary ; Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria ; Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia ; Association BURESTOP 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 88).","The Court has recognised that this role is played by journalists ( Roşiianu v. Romania, 2014, § 61; Saure v. Germany (dec.), 2021, § 35) and NGOs whose activities are related to matters of public interest ( Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, 2009; Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria, 2013; Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, 2013; Association BURESTOP 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 88; Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, 2024, § 65)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:10103/20,Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland,10103/20,added,"Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, no. 10103/20, 21 March 2024",5,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IX.C,Criteria for assessing the necessity of the interference (whether the interference was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued or a fair balance was struck between different rights and interests),2,474,475,0.959,"ć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland , 2024|Šeks v. Croatia , 2022",,"The procedural safeguards provided in a decision-making procedure are also a factor to be taken into account when assessing the proportionality of an interference. At the same time, the extent of those safeguards may differ depending on the context of a particular case. In particular, the Court held that in the context of national security - a sphere which traditionally forms part of the inner core of State sovereignty - the competent authorities may not be expected to give the same amount of details in their reasoning as, for instance, in ordinary civil or administrative cases. Providing detailed reasons for refusing declassification of top-secret documents may easily run counter to the very purpose for which that information had been classified in the first place ( Šeks v. Croatia, § 71). On the other hand, since access to accurate and reliable information concerning the management of radioactive waste - a project representing a major environmental risk - was of particular importance, it was important that the decisions delivered by the authorities in an adversarial procedure were detailed and well- reasoned ( Association BURESTOP 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 115).","The procedural safeguards provided in a decision-making procedure are also a factor to be taken into account when assessing the proportionality of an interference. At the same time, the extent of those safeguards may differ depending on the context of a particular case. In particular, the Court held that in the context of national security - a sphere which traditionally forms part of the inner core of State sovereignty - the competent authorities may not be expected to give the same amount of details in their reasoning as, for instance, in ordinary civil or administrative cases. Providing detailed reasons for refusing declassification of top-secret documents may easily run counter to the very purpose for which that information had been classified in the first place ( Šeks v. Croatia, 2022, § 71). On the other hand, since access to accurate and reliable information concerning the management of radioactive waste - a project representing a major environmental risk - was of particular importance, it was important that the decisions delivered by the authorities in an adversarial procedure were detailed and well-reasoned ( Association BURESTOP 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 115). Where the Government failed to present to present any argument, either in the domestic proceedings or in their observations, to show that the denial of information sought by the applicant NGOhad pursued any legitimate aim or had been ""necessary in a democratic society"", the Court noted that it was precluded from further assessing the legitimate aim of the refusal and from analysing whether the interference with the applicant NGO's right was proportionate in the circumstances of the case, and it found a violation of Article 10 in that respect ( Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, 2024, §§ 76-78)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:10103/20,Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland,10103/20,added,"Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, no. 10103/20, 21 March 2024",6,citation_field_name_match,citation_added,X.B.4.d,Contempt of court,4,553,554,1.0,"łka v. Poland , 2003",,"In a case concerning a letter sent by a detained applicant to a regional court, the Court drew a clear distinction between criticism and insult. In the Court's view, where an individual's sole intent is to insult a court or the judges on its bench, it would not in principle constitute a violation of Article 10 were an appropriate punishment to be imposed. However, the heavy prison sentence imposed was found to exceed the seriousness of the offence, particularly given that the applicant had not previously been convicted of a similar offence and the letter had not been brought to the attention of the public ( Skałka v. Poland, §§ 39-42).","In a case concerning a letter sent by a detained applicant to a regional court, the Court drew a clear distinction between criticism and insult. In the Court's view, where an individual's sole intent is to insult a court or the judges on its bench, it would not in principle constitute a violation of Article 10 were an appropriate punishment to be imposed. However, the heavy prison sentence imposed was found to exceed the seriousness of the offence, particularly given that the applicant had not previously been convicted of a similar offence and the letter had not been brought to the attention of the public ( Skałka v. Poland, 2003, §§ 39-42)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:58029/12,Suprun and Others v. Russia,58029/12,added,"Suprun and Others v. Russia, nos. 58029/12 and 4 others, 18 June 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IX.B.1,The purpose of the information request,3,448,449,0.9596,"Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria , 2013|Suprun and Others v. Russia , 2024|Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary , 2009|ć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland , 2024|şiianu v. Romania , 2014",,"It must be ascertained whether access to the information sought was an essential element of the exercise of freedom of expression. Thus, the Court has placed emphasis on whether the gathering of the information was a relevant preparatory step in journalistic activities or in other activities creating a forum for, or constituting an essential element of, public debate (for an NGO, see Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, §§ 27-28; for journalists, Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria, § 36; Roşiianu v. Romania, § 63).","It must be ascertained whether access to the information sought was an essential element of the exercise of freedom of expression. Thus, the Court has placed emphasis on whether the gathering of the information was a relevant preparatory step in journalistic activities or in other activities creating a forum for, or constituting an essential element of, public debate (for an NGO, see Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, 2009, §§ 27-28; Sieć Obywatelska Watchdog Polska v. Poland, 2024, § 60; for journalists, Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria, 2013, § 36; Roşiianu v. Romania, 2014, § 63; for academic researchers, Suprun and Others v. Russia, 2024, § 73)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20240930062921__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-01-15,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2024-09-30__2025-01-15.json,apps:58029/12,Suprun and Others v. Russia,58029/12,added,"Suprun and Others v. Russia, nos. 58029/12 and 4 others, 18 June 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IX.B.3,The role of the person requesting the information,3,462,463,0.9805,"Suprun and Others v. Russia , 2024|Šeks v. Croatia , 2022",,"Furthermore, the Court has clearly stated that a right of access to information ought not to apply exclusively to NGOs and the press. It has reiterated that a high level of protection also extends to academic researchers ( Başkaya and Okçuoğlu v. Turkey [GC], 1999, §§ 61-67; Kenedi v. Hungary, 2009, § 42; Gillberg v. Sweden [GC], 2012, § 93; Šeks v. Croatia, § 41) and authors of literature on matters of public concern ( Chauvy and Others v. France, 2004, § 68; Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July","Furthermore, the Court has clearly stated that a right of access to information ought not to apply exclusively to NGOs and the press. It has reiterated that a high level of protection also extends to academic researchers ( Başkaya and Okçuoğlu v. Turkey [GC], 1999, §§ 61-67; Kenedi v. Hungary, 2009, § 42; Gillberg v. Sweden [GC], 2012, § 93; Šeks v. Croatia, 2022, § 41; Suprun and Others v. Russia, 2024, § 75) and authors of literature on matters of public concern ( Chauvy and Others v. France, 2004, § 68; Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], 2007, § 48)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:41675/12,Aghajanyan v. Armenia,41675/12,added,"Aghajanyan v. Armenia, no. 41675/12, 8 October 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VIII.A,Protection of whistle-blowers,2,,438,,"Aghajanyan v. Armenia , 2024|Boronyák v. Hungary , 2024|Herbai v. Hungary , 2019",,,"On the other hand, the Court has approached some cases concerning disclosure by employees of work-related information on the basis of the general principles under Article 10 ( Herbai v. Hungary, 2019, § 40; Norman v. the United Kingdom, 2021, § 89; Boronyák v. Hungary, 2024, § 35; Aghajanyan v. Armenia, 2024, §§ 37-45) rather than from specifically the perspective of the whistle-blower case- law and criteria."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:1847/21,Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania,1847/21,added,"Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania, no. 1847/21, 7 January 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.B.1,The criterion of the “ l awfulness of the interference”,3,71,74,0.9911,"şcu v. Romania , 2025",,"The Court has held that a norm cannot be regarded as a ""law"" unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his or her conduct and that he or she must be able - if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. However, it went on to state that these consequences do not need to be foreseeable with absolute certainty, as experience showed that to be unattainable ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, § 131; Sanchez v. France [GC], 2023, § 125). Whilst certainty is desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity, and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice ( Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], 2007, § 41; Bouton v. France, 2022, § 33; Sanchez v. France [GC], 2023, § 125). Amargin of doubt in relation to borderline facts does not therefore,,,of itself, make a legal provision unforeseeable in its application. Nor does the mere fact that a provision is capable of more than one construction mean that it fails to meet the requirement of ""foreseeability"" for the purposes of the Convention. The role of adjudication, vested in the courts, serves precisely to dissipate such interpretational doubts as remain, taking into account the changes in everyday practice ( ibid ., § 126).","The Court has held that a norm cannot be regarded as a ""law"" unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his or her conduct and that he or she must be able - if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. However, it went on to state that these consequences do not need to be foreseeable with absolute certainty, as experience showed that to be unattainable ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, § 131; Sanchez v. France [GC], 2023, § 125). Whilst certainty is desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity, and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice ( Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], 2007, § 41; Bouton v. France, 2022, § 33; Sanchez v. France [GC], 2023, § 125; Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania, 2025, § 90). Amargin of doubt in relation to borderline facts does not therefore, of itself, make a legal provision unforeseeable in its application. Nor does the mere fact that a provision is capable of more than one construction mean that it fails to meet the requirement of ""foreseeability"" for the purposes of the Convention. Th e role of adjudication, vested in the courts, serves precisely to dissipate such interpretational doubts as remain, taking into account the changes in everyday practice ( Sanchez v. France [GC], 2023, § 126)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:1847/21,Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania,1847/21,added,"Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania, no. 1847/21, 7 January 2025",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.B.1,The criterion of the “ l awfulness of the interference”,3,72,75,0.9311,"şcu v. Romania , 2025",,"The Court has also considered that an individual cannot claim that a legal provision lacks foreseeability simply because it is applied for the first time in his or her case ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 150; Tête v. France, 2020, § 52; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 58). Thus, the Court found that the application of legal provisions, on the basis of which the applicant, a politician, had been convicted in criminal proceedings as a ""producer"" for third - party comments posted on the ""wall"" of his personal Facebook account, had met the ""quality of law"" requirements ( Sanchez v. France [GC], 2023, §§ 132-142).","The Court has also considered that an individual cannot claim that a legal provision lacks foreseeability simply because it is applied for the first time in his or her case ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 150; Tête v. France, 2020, § 52; Manole v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 58), or because it is open to more than one interpretation ( Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania, 2025, § 129). Thus, the Court found that the application of legal provisions, on the basis of which the applicant, a politician, had been convicted in criminal proceedings as a ""producer"" for third -party comments posted on the ""wall"" of his personal Facebook account, had met the ""quality of law"" requirements ( Sanchez v. France [GC], 2023, §§ 132-142). At the same time, the Court emphasised that legal provisions imposing liability for third parties'comments made on a private individual 's Internet account should be ""particularly precise"" ( Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania, 2025, § 127)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:1847/21,Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania,1847/21,added,"Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania, no. 1847/21, 7 January 2025",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XIII.B.7,Social media,3,,724,,"şcu v. Romania , 2025",,,"The Court took a strict stance regarding liability for third parties'comments of social networks users who are private individuals. It emphasised, in particular, that legal provisions imposing such liability should be ""particularly precise"" ( Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania, 2025, § 127). In this case, where the applicant - a well-known opera fan and blogger - had been held liable in civil proceedings, in particular, for third parties'comments on his Facebook page concerning his post about a conflict in the Bucharest National Opera, the Court observed that the relevant legal provisions were of a very general nature, contained no indication of any obligation on the applicant, as the owner of a Facebook page, to monitor messages posted by third parties; nor did they provide any further details regarding the circumstances in which the owner of such a page could be required to carry out such monitoring or regarding measures to be taken following such monitoring, or regarding the conditions that would define fault in that context ( Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania, 2025, § 128). Noting also the divergent interpretation of those provisions by the national courts at three levels of jurisdiction, the Court concluded that national law could not be considered to have been sufficiently clear and precise to enable the applicant to enjoy his freedom of expression as required by the rule of law in a democratic society, and thus the interference in question could not be said to have been ""prescribed by law"" ( Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania, 2025, §§ 130-34)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:44306/98,Appleby and Others v. the United Kingdom,44306/98,added,"Appleby and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 44306/98, 6 May 2003",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B,General considerations on Article 10 in the Court ’ s case-law,2,,11,,"Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia , 2024|ši and Others v. Serbia , 2022",,,"In addition to those general considerations, the Court has explored in its case-law the States'positive obligations in protecting the exercise of this right. It has held that genuine, effective exercise of this freedom does not depend merely on the State's duty not to interfere, but may require positive measures of protection ( Appleby and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 39; Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia, 2024, § 13). In determining whether or not a positive obligation exists, to the Court will have regard to the fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest of the community and the interests of the individual. The scope of this obligation will inevitably vary, having regard to the diversity of situations obtaining in Contracting States and the choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources. However, this obligation must not be interpreted in such a way as to impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities ( Appleby and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 40; Gaši and Others v. Serbia, 2022, § 77; Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia, 2024, § 14)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:44306/98,Appleby and Others v. the United Kingdom,44306/98,added,"Appleby and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 44306/98, 6 May 2003",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B,General considerations on Article 10 in the Court ’ s case-law,2,,13,,"Court examined a situation where the applicants protested against certain urban development plans and displayed their relevant posters on the premises of a private shopping mall. Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia , 2024",,,"As regards other contexts involving positive obligations, in Appleby and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2003, the Court examined a situation where the applicants protested against certain urban development plans and displayed their relevant posters on the premises of a private shopping mall. Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia, 2024, concerned the authorities'years-long failure to secure safe and uninterrupted film screening held at an international LGBTQ+ film festival, which was repeatedly disrupted by bomb threats and other false alarms."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:4110/20,Boronyák v. Hungary,4110/20,added,"Boronyák v. Hungary, no. 4110/20; 20 June 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VIII.A,Protection of whistle-blowers,2,,438,,"Aghajanyan v. Armenia , 2024|Boronyák v. Hungary , 2024|Herbai v. Hungary , 2019",,,"On the other hand, the Court has approached some cases concerning disclosure by employees of work-related information on the basis of the general principles under Article 10 ( Herbai v. Hungary, 2019, § 40; Norman v. the United Kingdom, 2021, § 89; Boronyák v. Hungary, 2024, § 35; Aghajanyan v. Armenia, 2024, §§ 37-45) rather than from specifically the perspective of the whistle-blower case- law and criteria."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:11575/24,Borzykh v. Ukraine (dec.),11575/24,added,"Borzykh v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 11575/24, 19 November 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.A,Applicability of Article 10 of the Convention,2,15,18,0.997,,,"Equally, the Court has considered that Article 10 is also applicable to forms of conduct ( Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, §§ 166-167; Semir Güzel v. Turkey, 2016; Murat Vural v. Turkey, 2014; Gough v. the United Kingdom, 2014, § 150; Mătăsaru v. the Republic of Moldova, 2019, § 29; Shvydika v. Ukraine, 2014, §§ 37-38; Karuyev v. Russia, 2022, §§ 18-20; Bumbeș v. Romania, 2022, § 46; Genov and Sarbinska v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 58-60; Ete v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 15-16; Bouton v. France, 2022, §§ 30-31; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 51), to rules governing clothing ( Stevens v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision, 1986) or to the display of vestimentary symbols ( Vajnai v. Hungary, 2008, § 47), including in prison ( Donaldson v. the United Kingdom, 2011). The Court also considered that using the ""Like"" button on social networks to express interest towards or approve the contents published by third persons constituted, as such, a current and popular form of the exercise of freedom of expression online ( Melike v. Turkey, 2021, § 44).","Equally, the Court has considered that Article 10 is also applicable to forms of conduct ( Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, §§ 166-167; Semir Güzel v. Turkey, 2016; Murat Vural v. Turkey, 2014; Gough v. the United Kingdom, 2014, § 150; Mătăsaru v. the Republic of Moldova, 2019, § 29; Shvydika v. Ukraine, 2014, §§ 37-38; Karuyev v. Russia, 2022, §§ 18-20; Bumbeș v. Romania, 2022, § 46; Genov and Sarbinska v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 58-60; Ete v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 15-16; Bouton v. France, 2022, §§ 30-31; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 51), to rules governing clothing ( Stevens v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision, 1986) or to the display of vestimentary symbols ( Vajnai v. Hungary, 2008, § 47; Borzykh v. Ukraine (dec.), 2024, § 36), including in prison ( Donaldson v. the United Kingdom, 2011). The Court also considered that using the ""Like"" button on social networks to express interest towards or approve the contents published by third persons constituted, as such, a current and popular form of the exercise of freedom of expression online ( Melike v. Turkey, 2021, § 44)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:11575/24,Borzykh v. Ukraine (dec.),11575/24,added,"Borzykh v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 11575/24, 19 November 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.A.2,Victim status 4 (Article 35 § 3 (a)),3,43,46,0.98,,,"The existence of legislation very broadly suppressing the expression of specific types of opinion, leading the potential authors to adopt a kind of self-censorship, can amount to interference with freedom of expression and the authors in question may thus assert their victim status ( Vajnai v. Hungary, 2008, § 54; Altuğ Taner Akçam v. Turkey, 2011, §§ 68-83).","The existence of legislation very broadly suppressing the expression of specific types of opinion, leading the potential authors to adopt a kind of self-censorship, can amount to interference with freedom of expression and the authors in question may thus assert their victim status ( Vajnai v. Hungary, 2008, § 54; Altuğ Taner Akçam v. Turkey, 2011, §§ 68-83; Borzykh v. Ukraine (dec.), 2024, §§ 43-44)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:29780/20,Costa i Rosselló and Others v. Spain (dec.),29780/20,added,"Costa i Rosselló and Others v. Spain (dec.), nos. 29780/20 and 3 other applications, 11 February 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,XI.A,General principles,2,572,576,0.939,,,"According to the Court, in a democratic society based on the rule of law, political ideas which challenge the existing order and whose realisation is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression ( Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası v. Turkey, 2012, § 70).","According to the Court, in a democratic society based on the rule of law, political ideas which challenge the existing order and whose realisation is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression ( Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası v. Turkey, 2012, § 70; Costa i Rosselló and Others v. Spain (dec.), 2025, § 134)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:29780/20,Costa i Rosselló and Others v. Spain (dec.),29780/20,added,"Costa i Rosselló and Others v. Spain (dec.), nos. 29780/20 and 3 other applications, 11 February 2025",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,XI.B.2.a,Separatist discourse and publications from illegal organisations,4,598,602,0.9548,,,"Generally speaking, the Court considers that it is of the essence of democracy to allow diverse political programmes to be proposed and debated, even those that call into question the way a State is currently organised, provided that they do not harm democracy itself ( Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, 1998, § 47).","Generally speaking, the Court considers that it is of the essence of democracy to allow diverse political programmes to be proposed and debated, even those that call into question the way a State is currently organised, provided that they do not harm democracy itself ( Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, 1998, § 47; Costa i Rosselló and Others v. Spain (dec.), 2025, § 135)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:29780/20,Costa i Rosselló and Others v. Spain (dec.),29780/20,added,"Costa i Rosselló and Others v. Spain (dec.), nos. 29780/20 and 3 other applications, 11 February 2025",3,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,§1.6,Article 3 of Protocol No. 1,3,782,788,0.9868,,,"The Court has repeatedly emphasised the interdependence in a democratic society between freedom of expression and the right to free elections. In particular, it held in the case of Orlovskaya Iskra v. Russia, 2017, that it was appropriate to consider the applicant's right to freedom of expression in the light of the right to free elections, protected by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, which are crucial to establishing and maintaining the foundations of an effective and meaningful democracy governed by the rule of law (§ 110; see also Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], 2005, § 58).","The Court has repeatedly emphasised the interdependence in a democratic society between freedom of expression and the right to free elections ( Costa i Rosselló and Others v. Spain (dec.), 2025, § 122). In particular, it held in the case of Orlovskaya Iskra v. Russia, 2017, that it was appropriate to consider the applicant's right to freedom of expression in the light of the right to free elections, protected by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, which are crucial to establishing and maintaining the foundations of an effective and meaningful democracy governed by the rule of law (§ 110; see also Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], 2005, § 58)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:24738/19,Gaši and Others v. Serbia,24738/19,added,"Gaši and Others v. Serbia, no. 24738/19, 6 September 2022",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B,General considerations on Article 10 in the Court ’ s case-law,2,,11,,"Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia , 2024|ši and Others v. Serbia , 2022",,,"In addition to those general considerations, the Court has explored in its case-law the States'positive obligations in protecting the exercise of this right. It has held that genuine, effective exercise of this freedom does not depend merely on the State's duty not to interfere, but may require positive measures of protection ( Appleby and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 39; Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia, 2024, § 13). In determining whether or not a positive obligation exists, to the Court will have regard to the fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest of the community and the interests of the individual. The scope of this obligation will inevitably vary, having regard to the diversity of situations obtaining in Contracting States and the choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources. However, this obligation must not be interpreted in such a way as to impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities ( Appleby and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 40; Gaši and Others v. Serbia, 2022, § 77; Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia, 2024, § 14)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:24738/19,Gaši and Others v. Serbia,24738/19,added,"Gaši and Others v. Serbia, no. 24738/19, 6 September 2022",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,I.B,General considerations on Article 10 in the Court ’ s case-law,2,11,12,0.8132,"Fuentes Bobo v. Spain , 2000|Heinisch v. Germany , 2011|Herbai v. Hungary , 2019|Özgür Gündem v. Turkey , 2000|ši and Others v. Serbia , 2022",,"In addition to those general considerations, the Court has explored in its case-law the States'positive obligations in protecting the exercise of this right. These positive obligations imply, among other things, that the States are required to establish an effective mechanism for the protection of authors and journalists in order to create a favourable environment for participation in public debate of all those concerned, enabling them to express their opinions and ideas without fear, even if they run counter to those defended by the official authorities or by a significant part of public opinion, or even if they are irritating or shocking to the latter ( Dink v. Turkey, 2010, § 137; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 158). In consequence, Article 10 of the Convention enjoys a very wide scope, whether with regard to the substance of the ideas and information expressed, or to the form in which they are conveyed.","The Court has mainly examined cases from the standpoint of positive obligations in two contexts and, notably, in the employment context, when the relations between employer and employee are governed by private law ( Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], 2011, §§ 60 and 62; Heinisch v. Germany, 2011, § 44; Herbai v. Hungary, 2019, §§ 37 and 39), and in the context of journalistic activity ( Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, 2000, § 43; Dink v. Turkey, 2010, § 106; Gaši and Others v. Serbia, 2022, § 77). In the latter respect, these positive obligations imply, among other things, that the States are required to establish an effective mechanism for the protection of authors and journalists in order to create a favourable environment for participation in public debate of all those concerned, enabling them to express their opinions and ideas without fear, even if they run counter to those defended by the official authorities or by a significant part of public opinion, or even if they are irritating or shocking to the latter ( Dink v. Turkey, 2010, § 137; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 158)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:39446/16,Kobaliya and Others v. Russia,39446/16,added,"Kobaliya and Others v. Russia, nos. 39446/16 and 106 others, 22 October 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A,Applicability of Article 10 of the Convention,2,29,32,0.911,"In Kobaliya and Others v. Russia , 2024",,"With regard to the so- called ""negative right"" not to express oneself, the Court does not rule out that such a right is protected under Article 10 of the Convention, but has found that this issue should be addressed on a case-by-case basis ( Gillberg v. Sweden [GC], 2012, § 86). This issue arose in the case of Wanner v. Germany (dec.), 2018, which concerned the conviction for giving false testimony of an individual who had been previously convicted; he refused to name his accomplices and continued to plead his innocence. The Court held that, even assuming that Article 10 was applicable, conviction for breach of the civic duty to give truthful testimony had been necessary in a democratic society (§§ 38 and 44).","With regard to the so- called ""negative right"" not to express oneself, the Court does not rule out that such a right is protected under Article 10 of the Convention, but has found that this issue should be addressed on a case-by-case basis ( Gillberg v. Sweden [GC], 2012, § 86). This issue arose in the case of Wanner v. Germany (dec.), 2018, which concerned the conviction for giving false testimony of an individual who had been previously convicted; he refused to name his accomplices and continued to plead his innocence. The Court held that, even assuming that Article 10 was applicable, conviction for breach of the civic duty to give truthful testimony had been necessary in a democratic society (§§ 38 and 44). In Kobaliya and Others v. Russia, 2024, § 84, the Court noted that a holistic protection of freedom of expression necessarily encompasses both the right to express ideas and the right to remain silent: otherwise, the right cannot be practical or effective. In that case, which concerned the expanded application of ""foreign agent"" legislation to media organisations, journalists, civil activists and other individuals, the Court observed, in particular, that by forcing the applicants to attach the ""foreign agent"" label to all their public communications, the authorities infringed upon this negative right, compelling them to express a message with which they disagreed."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:257/12,Objective Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and Others v. Azerbaijan,257/12,added,"Objective Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and Others v. Azerbaijan, no. 257/12, 18 February 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XIV.D,The distribution of audiovisual sources,2,,767,,"Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Elenkov v. Bulgaria , 2007|Objective Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and Others v. Azerbaijan , 2025",,,"As regards the ""lawfulness"" requirement concerning specifically licen sing procedures, the Court has emphasised, in particular, that the manner in which the licensing criteria are applied in the licensing process must provide sufficient guarantees against arbitrariness, including proper reasoning by the licensing authority of its decision denying a broadcasting licence ( Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Elenkov v. Bulgaria, 2007, §§ 49-51; Objective Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2025, § 75). Thus, in Objective Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2025, concerning the refusal by the relevant national licensing authority to grant the applicants a radio broadcasting licence following a call for tenders, the Court found that the interference had not been ""prescribed by law"" (§ 87). It pointed, in particular, to the licensing authority's failure to provide a duly reasoned decision, which would include reasoning in respect of the selection criteria, as well as to that authority's virtually unlimited discretionary powers to choose decisive factors for awarding the licence (§§ 77-78). Such a licensing procedure did not provide adequate protection against arbitrary interference by a public authority with the right to freedom of expression (§ 82). In this case, the Court also considered it necessary to address the manner of the appointment of members of the national licensing authority noting that one of those had been a relative of the director of the winning bidder. That apparent conflict of interest had never been disclosed, seriously undermining thereby the licensing authority's impartiality and rendering arbitrary the entire licensing procedure (§§ 83-86)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:257/12,Objective Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and Others v. Azerbaijan,257/12,added,"Objective Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and Others v. Azerbaijan, no. 257/12, 18 February 2025",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,XIV.D,The distribution of audiovisual sources,2,758,763,0.9785,"Objective Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and Others v. Azerbaijan , 2025",,"Under the third sentence of Article 10 § 1, States may regulate by means of a licensing system the way in which broadcasting is organised in their territories, particularly in its technical aspects ( Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 139). The granting of a licence may also be made conditional on other considerations, such as the nature and objectives of a proposed channel, its potential audience at national, regional or local level, the rights and needs of a specific audience and the obligations deriving from international legal instruments ( Demuth v. Switzerland, 2002, § 33; Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 139).","Under the third sentence of Article 10 § 1, States may regulate by means of a licensing system the way in which broadcasting is organised in their territories, particularly in its technical aspects ( Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 139). The granting of a licence may also be made conditional on other considerations, such as the nature and objectives of a proposed channel, its potential audience at national, regional or local level, the rights and needs of a specific audience and the obligations deriving from international legal instruments ( Demuth v. Switzerland, 2002, § 33; Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 139; Objective Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2025, § 72)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:257/12,Objective Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and Others v. Azerbaijan,257/12,added,"Objective Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and Others v. Azerbaijan, no. 257/12, 18 February 2025",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,XIV.D,The distribution of audiovisual sources,2,760,765,0.9819,"Objective Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and Others v. Azerbaijan , 2025",,"The Court has held, in numerous cases, that the refusal to grant a broadcasting licence (see, among many other examples, Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria, 1993, § 27; Radio ABC v. Austria, 1997, § 27; United Christian Broadcasters Ltd v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2000; Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Elenkov v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 42), to authorise the broadcasting of a television programme ( Leveque v. France (dec.), 1999; Demuth v. Switzerland, 2002, § 30) or to revoke the broadcasting licence of a TVchannel ( NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], 2022, § 150), constituted interference with the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Article 10 § 1 of the Convention.","The Court has held, in numerous cases, that the refusal to grant a broadcasting licence (see, among many other examples, Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria, 1993, § 27; Radio ABC v. Austria, 1997, § 27; United Christian Broadcasters Ltd v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2000; Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Elenkov v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 42; Objective Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2025, § 70), to authorise the broadcasting of a television programme ( Leveque v. France (dec.), 1999; Demuth v. Switzerland, 2002, § 30) or to revoke the broadcasting licence of a TVchannel ( NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], 2022, § 150), constituted interference with the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Article 10 § 1 of the Convention."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:56310/15,P. v. Poland,56310/15,added,"P. v. Poland, no. 56310/15, 13 February 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,XII.A.2,The protection of morals,3,641,645,0.997,"P. v. Poland , 2025",,"Generally speaking, in cases concerning a restriction on freedom of expression for the sake of morality, the Court considers that the national authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation ( Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland [GC], 2012, § 76). Nonetheless, the breadth of such a margin of appreciation varies depending on a number of factors, among which the type of speech at issue is of particular importance ( ibid., § 61). Although the Court considers that there is little scope under the Convention for restrictions on political speech ( Ceylan v. Turkey [GC], 1999, § 34), the Contracting States have a wide margin of appreciation with regard to speech in commercial matters and advertising ( Sekmadienis Ltd. v. Lithuania, 2018, § 73; markt intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v. Germany, 1989, § 33), in relation to matters liable to offend intimate personal convictions within the sphere of morals or, especially, religion ( Sekmadienis Ltd. v. Lithuania, 2018, § 73; Murphy v. Ireland, 2003, § 67; Rabczewska v. Poland, 2022, § 52). This is also the case with regard to ""sexual morality"", with regard to which the domestic courts have a wide margin of appreciation ( Müller and Others v. Switzerland, 1988, § 36).","Generally speaking, in cases concerning a restriction on freedom of expression for the sake of morality, the Court considers that the national authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation ( Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland [GC], 2012, § 76). Nonetheless, the breadth of such a margin of appreciation varies depending on a number of factors, among which the type of speech at issue is of particular importance ( ibid., § 61). Although the Court considers that there is little scope under the Convention for restrictions on political speech ( Ceylan v. Turkey [GC], 1999, § 34), the Contracting States have a wide margin of appreciation with regard to speech in commercial matters and advertising ( Sekmadienis Ltd. v. Lithuania, 2018, § 73; markt intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v. Germany, 1989, § 33), in relation to matters liable to offend intimate personal convictions within the sphere of morals or, especially, religion ( Sekmadienis Ltd. v. Lithuania, 2018, § 73; Murphy v. Ireland, 2003, § 67; Rabczewska v. Poland, 2022, § 52). This is also the case with regard to ""sexual morality"", with regard to which the domestic courts have a wide margin of appreciation ( Müller and Others v. Switzerland, 1988, § 36; P. v. Poland, 2025, §§ 74-76 and 79)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:56310/15,P. v. Poland,56310/15,added,"P. v. Poland, no. 56310/15, 13 February 2025",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,XII.A.2,The protection of morals,3,642,646,0.9963,"P. v. Poland , 2025",,"The Court has noted that it is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting States a uniform European conception of morals. The view taken by their respective laws of the requirements of morals varies from time to time and from place to place, and often requires that, within a single State, the existence of various cultural, religious, civil or philosophical communities be taken into consideration ( Kaos GL v. Turkey, 2016, § 49). In consequence, the Court considers that, by reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements as well as on the'necessity'of a'restriction'or'penalty'intended to meet them ( Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, § 48, Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 1994, § 56).","The Court has noted that it is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting States a uniform European conception of morals. The view taken by their respective laws of the requirements of morals varies from time to time and from place to place, and often requires that, within a single State, the existence of various cultural, religious, civil or philosophical communities be taken into consideration ( Kaos GL v. Turkey, 2016, § 49). In consequence, the Court considers that, by reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements as well as on the'necessity'of a'restriction'or'penalty'intended to meet them ( Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, § 48, Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 1994, § 56; P. v. Poland, 2025, § 77)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:56310/15,P. v. Poland,56310/15,added,"P. v. Poland, no. 56310/15, 13 February 2025",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,XII.A.2,The protection of morals,3,643,647,0.9968,"P. v. Poland , 2025",,"Nonetheless, the Court has specified that it cannot agree that the State's discretion in the field of the protection of morals is unfettered and unreviewable ( Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 1992, § 68). In other words, with regard to the protection of morals, the Court considers that the Contracting States enjoy a certain but not unlimited margin of appreciation (see, for example, Norris v. Ireland, 1988, § 45). Thus, in assessing the necessity of State interference in a democratic society, the Court uses the traditional principles developed in its case-law, which require it to determine whether there existed a pressing social need for the interference, whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and whether the reasons given by the national authorities to justify it were relevant and sufficient ( Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 1992, § 70).","Nonetheless, the Court has specified that it cannot agree that the State's discretion in the field of the protection of morals is unfettered and unreviewable ( Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 1992, § 68). In other words, with regard to the protection of morals, the Court considers that the Contracting States enjoy a certain but not unlimited margin of appreciation (see, for example, Norris v. Ireland, 1988, § 45). Thus, in assessing the necessity of State interference in a democratic society, the Court uses the traditional principles developed in its case-law, which require it to determine whether there existed a pressing social need for the interference, whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and whether the reasons given by the national authorities to justify it were relevant and sufficient ( Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 1992, § 70; P. v. Poland, 2025, §§ 80-94)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:28955/06,Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC],28955/06,added,"Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], nos. 28955/06 and 3 others, 12 September 2011",1,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,I.B,General considerations on Article 10 in the Court ’ s case-law,2,11,12,0.8132,"Fuentes Bobo v. Spain , 2000|Heinisch v. Germany , 2011|Herbai v. Hungary , 2019|Özgür Gündem v. Turkey , 2000|ši and Others v. Serbia , 2022",,"In addition to those general considerations, the Court has explored in its case-law the States'positive obligations in protecting the exercise of this right. These positive obligations imply, among other things, that the States are required to establish an effective mechanism for the protection of authors and journalists in order to create a favourable environment for participation in public debate of all those concerned, enabling them to express their opinions and ideas without fear, even if they run counter to those defended by the official authorities or by a significant part of public opinion, or even if they are irritating or shocking to the latter ( Dink v. Turkey, 2010, § 137; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 158). In consequence, Article 10 of the Convention enjoys a very wide scope, whether with regard to the substance of the ideas and information expressed, or to the form in which they are conveyed.","The Court has mainly examined cases from the standpoint of positive obligations in two contexts and, notably, in the employment context, when the relations between employer and employee are governed by private law ( Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], 2011, §§ 60 and 62; Heinisch v. Germany, 2011, § 44; Herbai v. Hungary, 2019, §§ 37 and 39), and in the context of journalistic activity ( Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, 2000, § 43; Dink v. Turkey, 2010, § 106; Gaši and Others v. Serbia, 2022, § 77). In the latter respect, these positive obligations imply, among other things, that the States are required to establish an effective mechanism for the protection of authors and journalists in order to create a favourable environment for participation in public debate of all those concerned, enabling them to express their opinions and ideas without fear, even if they run counter to those defended by the official authorities or by a significant part of public opinion, or even if they are irritating or shocking to the latter ( Dink v. Turkey, 2010, § 137; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 158)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:28955/06|28957/06|28959/06|28964/06,Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC],28955/06|28957/06|28959/06|28964/06,removed,"Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], nos. 28955/06, 28957/06, 28959/06 and 28964/06, 12 September 2011",1,paragraph_text_name_match,unchanged,IV.B.1.i,Contribution to a debate of public interest,4,158,161,,,,"In a case where the Court examined the dismissal of trade-union members for publishing articles which offended their colleagues, it did not share the Government's view that the content of the articles in question did not concern any matter of general interest. In the Court's view, they had been published in the context of a labour dispute inside the company, to which the applicants had presented certain demands. The debate had therefore not been a purely private one; it had at least been a matter of general interest for the workers of the company ( Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], 2011, § 72; see also Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, 2023, § 32).","In a case where the Court examined the dismissal of trade-union members for publishing articles which offended their colleagues, it did not share the Government's view that the content of the articles in question did not concern any matter of general interest. In the Court's view, they had been published in the context of a labour dispute inside the company, to which the applicants had presented certain demands. The debate had therefore not been a purely private one; it had at least been a matter of general interest for the workers of the company ( Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], 2011, § 72; see also Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, 2023, § 32)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:28955/06,Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC],28955/06,added,"Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], nos. 28955/06 and 3 others, 12 September 2011",2,paragraph_text_name_match,unchanged,IV.B.1.i,Contribution to a debate of public interest,4,158,161,,,,"In a case where the Court examined the dismissal of trade-union members for publishing articles which offended their colleagues, it did not share the Government's view that the content of the articles in question did not concern any matter of general interest. In the Court's view, they had been published in the context of a labour dispute inside the company, to which the applicants had presented certain demands. The debate had therefore not been a purely private one; it had at least been a matter of general interest for the workers of the company ( Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], 2011, § 72; see also Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, 2023, § 32).","In a case where the Court examined the dismissal of trade-union members for publishing articles which offended their colleagues, it did not share the Government's view that the content of the articles in question did not concern any matter of general interest. In the Court's view, they had been published in the context of a labour dispute inside the company, to which the applicants had presented certain demands. The debate had therefore not been a purely private one; it had at least been a matter of general interest for the workers of the company ( Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], 2011, § 72; see also Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, 2023, § 32)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:28955/06|28957/06|28959/06|28964/06,Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC],28955/06|28957/06|28959/06|28964/06,removed,"Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], nos. 28955/06, 28957/06, 28959/06 and 28964/06, 12 September 2011",2,paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved,§1.3.4,Article 11 of the Convention,4,778,784,,,,"In a case ( Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], 2011) concerning the dismissal of trade- union members of having published articles which offended their colleagues, the Courted noted firstly that the question of freedom of expression was closely related to that of freedom of association in a trade-union context. However, although the applicants'complaint mainly concerned their dismissal for having, as members of the executive committee of a trade union, published and displayed the articles and cartoons in question, the Court considered it more appropriate to examine the facts under Article 10, which was nevertheless interpreted in the light of Article 11, given that it had not been found to be established that the applicants were dismissed as a result of their membership of that trade union (§ 52). Conversely, in another case ( Straume v. Latvia, 2022, §§ 89-90) concerning sanctions suffered by an employee in response to a complaint she made while acting as a trade union representative, the Court considered that the question of freedom of expression was closely related to that of freedom of association within a trade union context and examined the complaint under Article 11, in the light of Article 10 of the Convention.","In a case ( Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], 2011) concerning the dismissal of trade- union members of having published articles which offended their colleagues, the Courted noted firstly that the question of freedom of expression was closely related to that of freedom of association in a trade-union context. However, although the applicants'complaint mainly concerned their dismissal for having, as members of the executive committee of a trade union, published and displayed the articles and cartoons in question, the Court considered it more appropriate to examine the facts under Article 10, which was nevertheless interpreted in the light of Article 11, given that it had not been found to be established that the applicants were dismissed as a result of their membership of that trade union (§ 52). Conversely, in another case ( Straume v. Latvia, 2022, §§ 89-90) concerning sanctions suffered by an employee in response to a complaint she made while acting as a trade union representative, the Court considered that the question of freedom of expression was closely related to that of freedom of association within a trade union context and examined the complaint under Article 11, in the light of Article 10 of the Convention."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:28955/06,Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC],28955/06,added,"Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], nos. 28955/06 and 3 others, 12 September 2011",3,paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved,§1.3.4,Article 11 of the Convention,4,778,784,,,,"In a case ( Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], 2011) concerning the dismissal of trade- union members of having published articles which offended their colleagues, the Courted noted firstly that the question of freedom of expression was closely related to that of freedom of association in a trade-union context. However, although the applicants'complaint mainly concerned their dismissal for having, as members of the executive committee of a trade union, published and displayed the articles and cartoons in question, the Court considered it more appropriate to examine the facts under Article 10, which was nevertheless interpreted in the light of Article 11, given that it had not been found to be established that the applicants were dismissed as a result of their membership of that trade union (§ 52). Conversely, in another case ( Straume v. Latvia, 2022, §§ 89-90) concerning sanctions suffered by an employee in response to a complaint she made while acting as a trade union representative, the Court considered that the question of freedom of expression was closely related to that of freedom of association within a trade union context and examined the complaint under Article 11, in the light of Article 10 of the Convention.","In a case ( Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain [GC], 2011) concerning the dismissal of trade- union members of having published articles which offended their colleagues, the Courted noted firstly that the question of freedom of expression was closely related to that of freedom of association in a trade-union context. However, although the applicants'complaint mainly concerned their dismissal for having, as members of the executive committee of a trade union, published and displayed the articles and cartoons in question, the Court considered it more appropriate to examine the facts under Article 10, which was nevertheless interpreted in the light of Article 11, given that it had not been found to be established that the applicants were dismissed as a result of their membership of that trade union (§ 52). Conversely, in another case ( Straume v. Latvia, 2022, §§ 89-90) concerning sanctions suffered by an employee in response to a complaint she made while acting as a trade union representative, the Court considered that the question of freedom of expression was closely related to that of freedom of association within a trade union context and examined the complaint under Article 11, in the light of Article 10 of the Convention."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:32678/18,Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia,32678/18,added,"Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia, nos. 32678/18 and 2 others, 17 December 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B,General considerations on Article 10 in the Court ’ s case-law,2,,11,,"Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia , 2024|ši and Others v. Serbia , 2022",,,"In addition to those general considerations, the Court has explored in its case-law the States'positive obligations in protecting the exercise of this right. It has held that genuine, effective exercise of this freedom does not depend merely on the State's duty not to interfere, but may require positive measures of protection ( Appleby and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 39; Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia, 2024, § 13). In determining whether or not a positive obligation exists, to the Court will have regard to the fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest of the community and the interests of the individual. The scope of this obligation will inevitably vary, having regard to the diversity of situations obtaining in Contracting States and the choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources. However, this obligation must not be interpreted in such a way as to impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities ( Appleby and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 40; Gaši and Others v. Serbia, 2022, § 77; Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia, 2024, § 14)."
1900da194ee4,Article 10,20250115221400__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_10_eng.pdf,2025-01-15,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1900da194ee4/diff_2025-01-15__2025-09-18.json,apps:32678/18,Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia,32678/18,added,"Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia, nos. 32678/18 and 2 others, 17 December 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B,General considerations on Article 10 in the Court ’ s case-law,2,,13,,"Court examined a situation where the applicants protested against certain urban development plans and displayed their relevant posters on the premises of a private shopping mall. Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia , 2024",,,"As regards other contexts involving positive obligations, in Appleby and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2003, the Court examined a situation where the applicants protested against certain urban development plans and displayed their relevant posters on the premises of a private shopping mall. Side by Side International Film Festival and Others v. Russia, 2024, concerned the authorities'years-long failure to secure safe and uninterrupted film screening held at an international LGBTQ+ film festival, which was repeatedly disrupted by bomb threats and other false alarms."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20230923134648__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20240217094618__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:22619/14,Alif Ahmadov and Others v. Azerbaijan,22619/14,added,"Alif Ahmadov and Others v. Azerbaijan, no. 22619/14, 4 May 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,III.E,Tenancies and rent control,2,314,315,0.9156,"Alif Ahmadov and Others v. Azerbaijan , 2023",,"Baykin and Others v. Russia, 2020, concerned a domestic court's order for the demolition of a house (and the eviction of its occupants) located near an underground pipeline, finding it an unlawful building because the safe distance of 100 m between the building and the pipeline had not been observed. The Court found a violation on account of the lack of a clear and foreseeable legal basis for such interference ( ibid., §§ 70-74). Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property","Baykin and Others v. Russia, 2020, concerned a domestic court's order for the demolition of a house (and the eviction of its occupants) located near an underground pipeline, finding it an unlawful building because the safe distance of 100 m between the building and the pipeline had not been observed. The Court found a violation on account of the lack of a clear and foreseeable legal basis for such interference ( ibid., §§ 70-74) On the contrary, in Alif Ahmadov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2023, §§ 36-46, the Court declared the applicants'complaint inadmissible ratione materiae : the domestic courts had established that unauthorised constructions could not be the subject of property rights and the circumstances of the case, considered as a whole, did not confer on the applicants a substantive interest protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20230923134648__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20240217094618__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:37706/17,Bagirova and Others v. Azerbaijan,37706/17,added,"Bagirova and Others v. Azerbaijan, nos. 37706/17 and 5 others, 31 August 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.1.a,Deprivation of property,4,102,103,0.9818,"In Bagirova and Others v. Azerbaijan , 2023",,"In a case where a municipality issued an order, under an expedited procedure for the possession of the applicant company's land, took physical possession of that land and began road-building works, the subsequent judgment retrospectively authorising the unlawful possession by public authorities, deprived the applicant company of the possibility of obtaining restitution of its land. The effect of the judgment amounted to a deprivation of its ""possessions"" ( Belvedere Alberghiera S.r.l. v.Italy, 2000, § 54). The loss of 40 per cent and 100 per cent of the value of the plots of land combined with the partial loss of physical access to them as a result of the construction of a dam was also held to amount to a de facto expropriation ( Aygun v. Turkey, 2011, § 39). Asimilar conclusion was drawn in respect of an unlawful demolition of a building ( Zammit and Vassallo v. Malta, 2019, § 54).","In a case where a municipality issued an order, under an expedited procedure for the possession of the applicant company's land, took physical possession of that land and began road-building works, the subsequent judgment retrospectively authorising the unlawful possession by public authorities, deprived the applicant company of the possibility of obtaining restitution of its land. The effect of the judgment amounted to a deprivation of its ""possessions"" ( Belvedere Alberghiera S.r.l. v.Italy, 2000, § 54). In Bagirova and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2023, §§ 46 and 53, the Court held that the domestic procedure for the expropriation of privately-owned property was not followed. Furthermore, the loss of 40 per cent and 100 per cent of the value of the plots of land combined with the partial loss of physical access to them as a result of the construction of a dam was also held to amount to a de facto expropriation ( Aygun v. Turkey, 2011, § 39). Asimilar conclusion was drawn in respect of an unlawful demolition of a building ( Zammit and Vassallo v. Malta, 2019, § 54). Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property"
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20230923134648__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20240217094618__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:61721/19|5496/20|21318/20|33522/20|43039/20|55448/20,Kubát and Others v. the Czech Republic,61721/19|5496/20|21318/20|33522/20|43039/20|55448/20,added,"Kubát and Others v. the Czech Republic, nos. 61721/19, 5496/20, 21318/20, 33522/20, 43039/20, 55448/20, 22 June 2023.",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.M,Austerity measures,2,,451,,,,,"Furthermore, in Kubát and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2023, §§ 89-92 and 95-96, the salaries of judges were reduced for the period 2011-14, in line with amendments to the Salaries Act. These legislative amendments were later found to be unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court which decided to give pro futuro effect to its decision. Considering that the exceptional circumstances might justify the delivery of a repealing judgment with ex nunc/pro future effect constituted a different matter from that of a reduction of judges'salaries, the Court found no violation as regards the refusal of retroactive payment of the difference in judges'salaries during the financial crisis. However, it observed that the level of judges'remuneration should be fixed so as to shield them from pressures aimed at influencing their decisions and, more generally, their behaviour, and that a failure to ensure that judges are paid the judicial benefits to which they are entitled by law constitutes a circumstance liable to impede the exercise of their judicial functions with the necessary dedication."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20230923134648__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20240217094618__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:15553/15,S.C. Zorina International S.R.L. v. Romania,15553/15,added,"S.C. Zorina International S.R.L. v. Romania, no. 15553/15, 27 June 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,III.H,Taxation,2,441,377,0.7225,"S.C. Zorina International S.R.L. v. Romania , 2023","Khachatryan v. Armenia , 2009","In addition to the factors mentioned above, the Court took the view that even the additional factors developed in the case-law relating to companies other than financial institutions can apply to cases concerning State-owned banks ( Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], 2014, § 115). The cases in question concerned the question whether the State was directly responsible for the company's financial difficulties, siphoned the corporate funds to the detriment of the company and its stakeholders, failed to keep an arm's-length relationship with the company or otherwise acted in abuse of the corporate form ( Anokhin v. Russia (dec.), 2007; Khachatryan v. Armenia, 2009, §§ 51-55).","In addition, the Court ́s power to review compliance with domestic law is limited. It is in the first place for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law, even in those fie lds where the Convention ""incorporates"" the rules of that law, since the national authorities are, in the nature of things, particularly qualified to settle the issues arising in this connection. Unless the interpretation is arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable, the Court's role is confined to ascertaining whether the effects of that interpretation are compatible with the Convention. This principle is particularly relevant in a case which involves a highly specialised and technical area of law ( Iofil AE v. Greece (dec.), 2021, § 42; see also S.C. Zorina International S.R.L. v. Romania, 2023, §§ 52 55, where the domestic courts reviewed sanctions imposed by the tax authority for failure to issue receipts for merchandise sold)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20230923134648__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20240217094618__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:56774/18,UAB AmberCore DC and UAB Arcus Novus v. Lithuania,56774/18,added,"UAB AmberCore DC and UAB Arcus Novus v. Lithuania, no. 56774/18, 13 June 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1.b,Protected “possessions”,4,13,13,0.9094,"UAB AmberCore DC and UAB Arcus Novus v. Lithuania , 2023",,"No legitimate expectation can be said to arise where there is a dispute as to the correct interpretation and application of domestic law and the applicant's submissions are subsequently rejected by the national courts ( Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], 2004, § 50; and Çiftçiler Joint Stock Company and Others v. Turkey (dec.), 2020, § 82, in the context of once lawfully expropriated property that, after a considerable lapse of time, was no longer used in the public interest).","No legitimate expectation can be said to arise where there is a dispute as to the correct interpretation and application of domestic law and the applicant's submissions are subsequently rejected by the national courts ( Kopecký v. Slovakia [GC], 2004, § 50; and Çiftçiler Joint Stock Company and Others v. Turkey (dec.), 2020, § 82, in the context of once lawfully expropriated property that, after a considerable lapse of time, was no longer used in the public interest; UAB AmberCore DC and UAB Arcus Novus v. Lithuania, 2023, §§ 130-131, for a refusal on national security grounds to issue the applicant companies with a permit to build a data centre)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20230923134648__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20240217094618__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:3405/21,Zaghini v. San Marino,3405/21,added,"Zaghini v. San Marino, no. 3405/21, 11 May 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,III.J,Confiscation of the proceeds of crime,2,455,405,0.6551,"Balsamo v. San Marino , 2019|Raimondo v. Italy , 1994|Saccoccia v. Austria , 2008|Zaghini v. San Marino , 2023|ė v. Lithuania , 2012",,"Furthermore, in Heracles S.A. General Cement Company v. Greece (dec.), 2016, §§ 63-70), the Court found that the domestic court's judgment, further to the decision of the European Commission, ordering the repayment of unlawfully acquired State aids, together with accrued interest over 14 years, was not disproportionate and declared the complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 6 inadmissible.","Where confiscation was imposed independently of a criminal charge against third parties, the Court accepted that the authorities may apply confiscation measures not only to persons directly accused of offences but also to their family members and other close relatives who were presumed to possess and manage the ill-gotten property informally on behalf of the suspected offenders, or who otherwise lacked the necessary bona fide status ( Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 30; Arcuri and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2001; Morabito and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2005; Butler v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2002; Webb v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004; Saccoccia v. Austria, 2008, § 88; Silickienė v. Lithuania, 2012, § 65, where a confiscation measure was imposed on the widow of a corrupt public official; Balsamo v. San Marino, 2019, §§ 89 and 93, where a confiscation measure was imposed also Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property on the children on account of their father's previous criminal record; Zaghini v. San Marino, 2023, §§ 17 and 65, where the applicant was a son of a man found guilty of money laundering). Furthermore, in Yusifli and Others v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2022, §§ 88-93, the applicants were acquaintances or relatives of the former Minister of Health. The Court found that their complaints, about the confiscation of proceeds of crime concerning various properties allegedly embezzled from the State by a former Minister of Health and which had been transferred in the applicants'names or the names of companies of which the applicants were nominally sole owners, were manifestly ill-founded."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240217094618__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-08-28,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json,apps:22716/12,Andrzej Ruciński v. Poland,22716/12,added,"Andrzej Ruciński v. Poland, no. 22716/12, 5 October 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.4.e,Compensation for the interference with property as an element of fair balance,4,196,202,0.9953,"ński v. Poland Depalle v. France , 2023",,"Furthermore, where a measure controlling the use of property is in issue, the lack of compensation is a factor to be taken into consideration in determining whether a fair balance has been achieved but is not of itself sufficient to constitute a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( Anonymos Touristiki Etairia Xenodocheia Kritis v. Greece, 2008, §§ 44 and 45). In Depalle v. France [GC], 2010, § 91, where the applicants occupied houses built on land falling within the category of maritime public property, the Court held, having regard to the rules governing public property, and considering that the applicant could not have been unaware of the principle that no compensation was payable, clearly stated in every decision, that the lack of compensation could not be regarded as a measure disproportionate to the control of the use of the applicant's property, carried out in pursuit of the general interest.","Furthermore, where a measure controlling the use of property is in issue, the lack of compensation is a factor to be taken into consideration in determining whether a fair balance has been achieved but is not of itself sufficient to constitute a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( Anonymos Touristiki Etairia Xenodocheia Kritis v. Greece, 2008, §§ 44 and 45; Andrzej Ruciński v. Poland Depalle v. France, 2023 § 84). In [GC], 2010, § 91, where the applicants occupied houses built on land falling within the category of maritime public property, the Court held, having regard to the rules governing public property, and considering that the applicant could not have been unaware of the principle that no compensation was payable, clearly stated in every decision, that the lack of compensation could not be regarded as a measure disproportionate to the control of the use of the applicant's property, carried out in pursuit of the general interest."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240217094618__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-08-28,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json,apps:46201/16|47379/18,Associations of Communally-owned Forestry Proprietors Porceni Pleșa and Piciorul Bătrân Banciu v. Romania,46201/16|47379/18,added,"Associations of Communally-owned Forestry Proprietors Porceni Pleșa and Piciorul Bătrân Banciu v. Romania, nos. 46201/16 and 47379/18, 28 November 2023",1,citation_field_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.2,Principle of lawfulness,3,,137,,"ătrân Banciu v. Romania , 2023",,,"Furthermore, in Associations of Communally - owned Forestry Proprietors Porceni Pleșa and Piciorul Bătrân Banciu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 76-77, the Court dealt with a prolonged failure by the domestic authorities to adopt and publish the methodological standards necessary for granting compensation to which the applicants were entitled. The case concerned two associations of forestry proprietors who complained that, in spite of a legally recognised right, they had not received compensation for the fact that they were unable to make use of their forests, since the forests in question had been designated as protected natural areas for the purposes of the European Natura 2000 network. The Court noted that to date, more than a decade after the European Commission's decision in favour of granting State aid to individuals or legal entities which owned forestry land within the designated Natura 2000 areas, the draft decision defining the methodology for granting State compensatory measures had still not been published and no payment had been made to the applicant associations. Although they were subject to the legal ban on using their forests, as a result of the classification of the relevant forestry land as protected natural areas, the applicant associations had, at their own expense, complied with the obligation to maintain them. The Court found that the impugned interference was not lawful and did not pursue a legitimate aim. Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property"
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240217094618__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-08-28,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json,apps:46201/16|47379/18,Associations of Communally-owned Forestry Proprietors Porceni Pleșa and Piciorul Bătrân Banciu v. Romania,46201/16|47379/18,added,"Associations of Communally-owned Forestry Proprietors Porceni Pleșa and Piciorul Bătrân Banciu v. Romania, nos. 46201/16 and 47379/18, 28 November 2023",2,citation_field_name_match,citation_updated,II.B.3,Public or general interest,3,136,142,0.9706,"Sàrl Couttolenc Frères v. France , 2023|ătrân Banciu v. Romania , 2023","Kyrtatos v. Greece , 2003","The protection of the environment is also considered to be in the public interest ( G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, § 295; Bahia Nova S.A. v. Spain (dec.), 2000; Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 82). In the case of Hamer v. Belgium, 2007, § 79, the Court noted that while none of the Articles of the Convention is specifically designed to provide general protection of the environment as such ( Kyrtatos v. Greece, 2003, § 52), ""in today' s society the protection of the environment is an increasingly important consideration "" and that ""economic considerations and even certain fundamental rights such as the right of property should not take precedence over considerations relating to protection of the environment, in particular where the State has enacted legislation on the subject"". Finally, it was considered that the development of housing, both for private commercial and public interest purposes, did not involve as strong a public interest as the protection of the environment ( Svitlana Ilchenko v. Ukraine, 2019, § 70).","The protection of the environment is also considered to be in the public interest ( G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, § 295; Bahia Nova S.A. v. Spain (dec.), 2000; Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 82; Associations of Communally -owned Forestry Proprietors Porceni Pleșa and Piciorul Bătrân Banciu v. Romania, 2023, § 77; see also Sàrl Couttolenc Frères v. France, 2023, § 62, for equitable and sustainable development of mountain areas). In the case of Hamer v. Belgium, 2007, § 79, the Court noted that while none of the Articles of the Convention is specifically Kyrtatos v. Greece designed to provide general protection of the environment as such (, 2003, § 52), ""in today's society the protection of the environment is an increasingly important consideration"" and that ""economic considerations and even certain fundamental rights such as the right of property should not take precedence over considerations relating to protection of the environment, in particular where the State has enacted legislation on the subject"". Finally, it was considered that the Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property development of housing, both for private commercial and public interest purposes, did not involve as strong a public interest as the protection of the environment ( Svitlana Ilchenko v. Ukraine, 2019, § 70)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240217094618__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-08-28,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json,apps:4558/20,"BCR Banca pentru locuințe S.A. v. Romania, (dec.)",4558/20,added,"BCR Banca pentru locuințe S.A. v. Romania, (dec.), no. 4558/20, 11 January 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.A.1.i,Legitimate expectations,4,22,24,0.9601,,,"No legitimate expectation arises in a situation where the applicant relies on the mere fact that members of the respondent Government made political statements favourable to the applicant's restitution claims ( Bata v. Czech Republic (dec.), 2008, § 77), or on a programmatic statement in a statute, referring to a future statute which ultimately was not adopted ( Zamoyski-Brisson v. Poland (dec.), 2017, § 78) or in relation to the applicants'claim for financial aid, as the relevant national law clearly made the ""right"" to obtain financial aid conditional on the availability of sufficient emergency funds, without providing for any rules on the amounts to be granted and the distribution of the emergency fund's limited financial resources ( Traina Berto and Alfonsetti v. Italy (dec.), 2022, §§ 45-46).","No legitimate expectation arises in a situation where the applicant relies on the mere fact that members of the respondent Government made political statements favourable to the applicant's restitution claims ( Bata v. Czech Republic (dec.), 2008, § 77), or on a programmatic statement in a statute, referring to a future statute which ultimately was not adopted ( Zamoyski-Brisson v. Poland (dec.), 2017, § 78) or in relation to the applicants' claim for financial aid, as the relevant national law clearly made the ""right"" to obtain financial aid conditional on the availability of sufficient emergency funds, without providing for any rules on the amounts to be granted and the distribution of the Traina Berto and Alfonsetti v. Italy emergency fund's limited financial resources ( (dec.), 2022, §§ 45-46). Similarly, no legitimate expectation arises in relation to State aid unlawfully distributed to private individuals via a building society ( BCR Banca pentru locuințe S.A. v. Romania (dec.), 2024, §§ 127-139)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240217094618__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-08-28,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json,apps:59065/21,Bernotas v. Lithuania,59065/21,added,"Bernotas v. Lithuania, no. 59065/21, 30 January 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.F,Social welfare cases,2,,355,,"Bernotas v. Lithuania , 2024",,,"Finally, in Bernotas v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 104-113 the Court found that there was no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 where the applicant had an obligation to reimburse social security authorities for the pension concerning lost working capacity paid to a person whom the applicant had accidentally injured in a hunting accident. The Court was satisfied that the proceedings, viewed as a whole, afforded to the applicant a reasonable opportunity of putting his case to the appropriate authorities with a view to their establishing a fair balance between the conflicting interests at stake. Several elements were considered in the proportionality assessment."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240217094618__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-08-28,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json,apps:14157/18,Jarre v. France,14157/18,added,"Jarre v. France, no. 14157/18, 15 February 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A.1.i,Legitimate expectations,4,,21,,"The case of Jarre v. France , 2024|Uzan and Others v. Turkey , 2019",,,"Similarly, in Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 193, the Court found that the minor applicants had a legitimate expectation falling within the concept of ""possession"", the domestic court having had acknowledged their capacity to acquire certain rights by inheritance and donation. The case of Jarre v. France, 2024, §§ 48-49, also concerned inheritance rights and, in particular, the immediate effects of a Constitutional Council decision repealing a statutory provision whereby individuals entitled to inheritance in France, but denied that right in a succession governed by foreign law, had been permitted to claim a portion of the estate located in France by way of compensation. The Court found that the applicants fulfilled the four statutory conditions when their father died and also when they lodged their claim so that they had a legitimate expectation amounting to ""possessions""."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240217094618__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-08-28,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json,apps:35648/10,Locascia and Others v. Italy,35648/10,added,"Locascia and Others v. Italy, no. 35648/10, 19 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match,citation_updated,II.B.2,Principle of lawfulness,3,130,135,0.9957,"Others v. Italy , 2012","Arras and Others v. Italy , 2012|Maggio and Others v. Italy , 2011|Saliba v. Malta , 2005","In the context of Article 6 of the Convention, the principle of the rule of law and the notion of a fair trial preclude, except for compelling public interest reasons, interference by the legislature with the administration of justice designed to influence the judicial determination of a dispute ( Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, 1994, § 49; National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 112; Zielinski and Pradal and Gonzalez and Others v. France [GC], 1999, § 57; Azienda Agricola Silverfunghi S.a.s. and Others v. Italy, 2014, § 76). Nevertheless, when examined under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, laws with retrospective effect which were found to constitute legislative interference still conformed to the lawfulness requirement of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( Maggio and Others v. Italy, 2011, § 60, Arras and Others v. Italy, 2012, § 81; Azienda Agricola Silverfunghi S.a.s. and Others v. Italy, 2014, § 104; Tokel v. Turkey, 2021, § 76). Measures of control of use effected on the basis of laws enacted posterior Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property to facts giving rise to the interference are not as such unlawful ( Saliba v. Malta, 2005, §§ 39-40), if these laws were not enacted specifically with the purpose of influencing the outcome of an individual case. Neither the Convention nor its protocols preclude the legislature from interfering with existing contracts with retroactive effect ( Mellacher and Others v. Austria, 1989, § 50; Bäck v. Finland, 2004, § 68).","In the context of Article 6 of the Convention, the principle of the rule of law and the notion of a fair trial preclude, except for compelling public interest reasons, interference by the legislature with the administration of justice designed to influence the judicial determination of a dispute ( Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, 1994, § 49; National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 112; Zielinski and Pradal and Gonzalez and Others v. France [GC], 1999, § 57; Azienda Agricola Silverfunghi S.a.s. and Others v. Italy, 2014, § 76). Nevertheless, when examined under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, laws with retrospective effect which were found to constitute legislative interference still conformed to the Maggio and Others v. Italy Arras lawfulness requirement of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (, 2011, § 60, and Others v. Italy, 2012, § 81; Azienda Agricola Silverfunghi S.a.s. and Others v. Italy, 2014, § 104; Tokel v. Turkey, 2021, § 76). Measures of control of use effected on the basis of laws enacted posterior Saliba v. Malta to facts giving rise to the interference are not as such unlawful (, 2005, §§ 39-40), if these laws were not enacted specifically with the purpose of influencing the outcome of an individual case. Neither the Convention nor its protocols preclude the legislature from interfering with existing contracts with retroactive effect ( Mellacher and Others v. Austria, 1989, § 50; Bäck v. Finland, 2004, § 68)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240217094618__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-08-28,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json,apps:35648/10,Locascia and Others v. Italy,35648/10,added,"Locascia and Others v. Italy, no. 35648/10, 19 October 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,III.H,Taxation,2,374,381,0.9884,"Locascia and Others v. Italy , 2023","AD v. Bulgaria , 2009","The State is generally allowed a wide margin of appreciation under the Convention when it comes to general measures of economic or social strategy ( Wallishauser v. Austria (no. 2), 2013, § 65; as well as when framing and implementing policy in the area of taxation ( ""Bulves"" AD v. Bulgaria, 2009, § 63; Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands, 1995, § 60; Stere and Others v. Romania, 2006, § 51). The Court respects the legislature's assessment in such matters unless it is devoid of reasonable foundation ( Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands, 1995, § 60).","The State is generally allowed a wide margin of appreciation under the Convention when it comes to general measures of economic or social strategy ( Wallishauser v. Austria (no. 2), 2013, § 65; ""Bulves"" AD v. Bulgaria as well as when framing and implementing policy in the area of taxation (, 2009, § 63; Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands, 1995, § 60; Stere and Others v. Romania, 2006, § 51; Locascia and Others v. Italy, 2023, § 157). The Court respects the legislature's assessment in such matters unless it is devoid of reasonable foundation ( Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands, 1995, § 60)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240217094618__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-08-28,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json,apps:31620/15,Naskov and Others v. North Macedonia,31620/15,added,"Naskov and Others v. North Macedonia, nos. 31620/15 and 2 others, 12 December 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.2,Principle of lawfulness,3,,131,,"The Court reached a similar conclusion in the context of restitution proceedings in Naskov and Others v. North Macedonia , 2023",,,"The Court reached a similar conclusion in the context of restitution proceedings in Naskov and Others v. North Macedonia, 2023, §§ 77-78, where it held that the quashing of the final 2002 restitution order, as a result of the proceedings that were initiated for administrative enforcement, frustrated the applicants' reliance on a binding decision and deprived them of an opportunity to gain possession of the property that they had legitimately expected to receive. The Court concluded that the interference with the applicants' property interests was in breach of the principle of lawfulness and could not be considered foreseeable in accordance with the Convention principles."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240217094618__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-08-28,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json,apps:31620/15,Naskov and Others v. North Macedonia,31620/15,added,"Naskov and Others v. North Macedonia, nos. 31620/15 and 2 others, 12 December 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.K,Restitution of property,2,,437,,"In Naskov and Others v. North Macedonia , 2023",,,"In Naskov and Others v. North Macedonia, 2023, §§ 72-78, the Court found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on the basis that the interference in the applicants' property interests breached the principle of lawfulness. The domestic authorities quashed motu proprio a final restitution order conferring on the applicants a title to a plot of land, owing to the legal and factual impossibility of enforcing the order on account of private parties having constructed structures on the land in the meantime."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240217094618__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-08-28,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json,apps:20445/15|59246/17,Salento Energy S.r.l. and Nuovo Sole S.r.l. v. Italy (dec.),20445/15|59246/17,added,"Salento Energy S.r.l. and Nuovo Sole S.r.l. v. Italy (dec.), nos. 20445/15 and 59246/17, 1 February 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,II.B.3,Public or general interest,3,135,141,0.9948,,"Katona and Závarský v. Slovakia , 2023|Maria Azzopardi v. Malta , 2022|Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden , 1989|ńscy v. Poland , 2006","The following purposes have been found by the Court to fall within the notion of public interest within the meaning of this provision: elimination of social injustice in the housing sector ( James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 45; Grozdanić and Gršković ‐ Grozdanić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-103; see also Maria Azzopardi v. Malta, 2022, §§ 53 and 60 for the provision of residential homes in the context of the State's economic and planning policies); combating the effects of a foreign-currency loan crisis particularly in the context of preventing mass homelessness ( Béla Németh v. Hungary, 2020, §§ 42-45); nationalisation of specific industries ( Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, §§ 9 and 109); adoption of land and city development plans ( Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 1982, § 69); Cooperativa La Laurentina v. Italy, 2001, § 94; securing land in connection with the implementation of the local land development plan ( Skibińscy v. Poland, 2006, § 86); prevention of tax evasion ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 39); road traffic safety ( Pannon Plakát Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2022, § 48); measures to combat drug trafficking and smuggling ( Butler v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2002; protection of the interests of the victims of the crime ( Šeiko v. Lithuania, 2020, § 31); measures to restrict the consumption of alcohol ( Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden, 1989, § 62); protection of morals ( Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, § 62); control of legitimate origin of cars brought into circulation ( Sildedzis v. Poland, 2005, § 50); confiscation of monies acquired unlawfully ( Honecker and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2001; the prevention of collusive practices and the protection of the public purse and promotion of fair competition ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, § 78); transition from a socialist to a free-market economy ( Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], 2018, §§ 103 and 105); and the smooth operation of the justice system, with further references to the importance of administering justice without delays which might jeopardise its effectiveness and credibility ( Konstantin Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2015, § 64). However, in view of the contractual relationship between the applicants and the debtor which was of Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property a purely business-law nature, the Court did not retain the protection of consumers as a legitimate aim in the circumstances of the case ( Katona and Závarský v. Slovakia, 2023, § 59).","The following purposes have been found by the Court to fall within the notion of public interest within the meaning of this provision: elimination of social injustice in the housing sector ( James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 45; Grozdanić and Gršković Grozdanić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102- Maria Azzopardi v. Malta 103; see also, 2022, §§ 53 and 60 for the provision of residential homes in ‐ the context of the State's economic and planning policies); combating the effects of a foreign-currency loan crisis particularly in the context of preventing mass homelessness ( Béla Németh v. Hungary, 2020, §§ 42-45); nationalisation of specific industries ( Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, §§ 9 and 109); regulation of the energy sector ( Salento Energy S.r.l. and Nuovo Sole S.r.l. v. Italy (dec.), 2024, § 37);adoption of land and city development plans ( Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 1982, § 69); Cooperativa La Laurentina v. Italy, 2001, § 94; securing land in connection with the Skibińscy v. Poland implementation of the local land development plan (, 2006, § 86); prevention of tax evasion ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 39); road traffic safety ( Pannon Plakát Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2022, § 48); measures to combat drug trafficking and smuggling ( Butler v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2002; protection of the interests of the victims of the crime ( Šeiko v. Lithuania, 2020, § 31); measures Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden to restrict the consumption of alcohol (, 1989, § 62); protection of morals ( Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, § 62); control of legitimate origin of cars brought into circulation ( Sildedzis v. Poland, 2005, § 50); confiscation of monies acquired unlawfully ( Honecker and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2001; the prevention of collusive practices and the protection of the public purse and promotion of fair competition ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, § 78); transition from a socialist to a free-market economy ( Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], 2018, §§ 103 and 105); and the smooth operation of the justice system, with further references to the importance of administering justice without delays which might jeopardise its effectiveness and credibility ( Konstantin Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2015, § 64). However, in view of the contractual relationship between the applicants and the debtor which was of a purely business-law nature, the Court did not retain the protection of consumers as a legitimate aim Katona and Závarský v. Slovakia in the circumstances of the case (, 2023, § 59)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240217094618__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-08-28,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json,apps:24300/20,Sàrl Couttolenc Frères v. France,24300/20,added,"Sàrl Couttolenc Frères v. France, no. 24300/20, 5 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.B.3,Public or general interest,3,136,142,0.9706,"Sàrl Couttolenc Frères v. France , 2023|ătrân Banciu v. Romania , 2023","Kyrtatos v. Greece , 2003","The protection of the environment is also considered to be in the public interest ( G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, § 295; Bahia Nova S.A. v. Spain (dec.), 2000; Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 82). In the case of Hamer v. Belgium, 2007, § 79, the Court noted that while none of the Articles of the Convention is specifically designed to provide general protection of the environment as such ( Kyrtatos v. Greece, 2003, § 52), ""in today' s society the protection of the environment is an increasingly important consideration "" and that ""economic considerations and even certain fundamental rights such as the right of property should not take precedence over considerations relating to protection of the environment, in particular where the State has enacted legislation on the subject"". Finally, it was considered that the development of housing, both for private commercial and public interest purposes, did not involve as strong a public interest as the protection of the environment ( Svitlana Ilchenko v. Ukraine, 2019, § 70).","The protection of the environment is also considered to be in the public interest ( G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, § 295; Bahia Nova S.A. v. Spain (dec.), 2000; Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 82; Associations of Communally -owned Forestry Proprietors Porceni Pleșa and Piciorul Bătrân Banciu v. Romania, 2023, § 77; see also Sàrl Couttolenc Frères v. France, 2023, § 62, for equitable and sustainable development of mountain areas). In the case of Hamer v. Belgium, 2007, § 79, the Court noted that while none of the Articles of the Convention is specifically Kyrtatos v. Greece designed to provide general protection of the environment as such (, 2003, § 52), ""in today's society the protection of the environment is an increasingly important consideration"" and that ""economic considerations and even certain fundamental rights such as the right of property should not take precedence over considerations relating to protection of the environment, in particular where the State has enacted legislation on the subject"". Finally, it was considered that the Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property development of housing, both for private commercial and public interest purposes, did not involve as strong a public interest as the protection of the environment ( Svitlana Ilchenko v. Ukraine, 2019, § 70)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240217094618__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-08-28,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json,apps:26604/16,Waldner v. France,26604/16,added,"Waldner v. France, no. 26604/16, 7 December 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.H,Taxation,2,373,380,0.9977,"Waldner v. France, 2023",,"An instance of interference, including one resulting from a measure to secure payment of taxes, must strike a ""fair balance"" between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights. The concern to achieve this balance is reflected in the structure of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 as a whole, including the second paragraph: there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aims pursued ( ""Bulves"" AD v. Bulgaria, 2009, § 62). Consequently, a financial liability arising out of the raising of taxes may adversely affect the guarantee of ownership if it places an excessive burden on the person concerned or fundamentally interferes with his financial position ( Ferretti Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property v. Italy, Commission decision, 1997; Wasa Liv Ömsesidigt, Försäkringsbolaget Valands Pensionsstiftelse and a group of approximately 15,000 individuals v. Sweden, Commission Decision, 1988; Buffalo S.r.l. in liquidation v. Italy, 2003, § 32; Iofil AE v. Greece (dec.), 2021, § 34).","An instance of interference, including one resulting from a measure to secure payment of taxes, must strike a ""fair balance"" between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights. The concern to achieve this balance is reflected in the structure of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 as a whole, including the second paragraph: there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aims pursued ( ""Bulves"" AD v. Bulgaria, 2009, § 62; Waldner v. France, 2023, § 42). Consequently, a financial liability arising out of the raising of taxes may adversely affect the guarantee of ownership if it places an excessive burden on the person concerned or fundamentally interferes Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property with his financial position ( Ferretti v. Italy, Commission decision, 1997; Wasa Liv Ömsesidigt, Försäkringsbolaget Valands Pensionsstiftelse and a group of approximately 15,000 individuals v. Sweden, Commission Decision, 1988; Buffalo S.r.l. in liquidation v. Italy, 2003, § 32; Iofil AE v. Greece (dec.), 2021, § 34)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240217094618__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-08-28,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-02-17__2024-08-28.json,apps:51391/19,Wiegandová v. the Czech Republic,51391/19,added,"Wiegandová v. the Czech Republic, no. 51391/19, 11 January 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.K,Restitution of property,2,,436,,,,,"Conversely, in Wiegandová v. the Czech Republic, 2024, §§ 60-65, the Court held that there was no breach of Article 1 of Protocol No.1 where a flat owned by the applicant had been encumbered by virtue of an ex lege unpaid easement created - free of charge and without any time-limits - by property restitution legislation in favour of a housing cooperative. The applicant, who acquired the flat by way of inheritance from the person to whom the flat had been returned in restitution in 1991, could only sell the flat but not use it or rent it freely. The Court noted that Member States benefitted from a wide margin of appreciation in regulating complex property issues during transition from a communist regime to a democratic public order protecting private property. The Court found it particularly significant, for purposes of its proportionality analysis, that the Constitutional Court had considered the permanent existence of the easement to be instrumental preserving property rights acquired in exchange for pecuniary contributions by bona fide private individuals (the cooperative and its members)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:41028/20,Alperin v. Ukraine,41028/20,added,"Alperin v. Ukraine, no. 41028/20, 10 October 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.2,Principle of lawfulness,3,,132,,"Alperin v. Ukraine , 2024",,,"Further, Alperin v. Ukraine, 2024, § 78, concerned the decision to forfeit the applicant's bail owing to the fact that the applicant had breached his bail conditions. The Court found that the principle of lawfulness was satisfied even if the forfeiture was based on a provision formulated in broad terms and could thus create an impression of a lack of clarity when the domestic court appeared to have eliminated all possible uncertainty by carrying out a thorough analysis of the circumstances and providing substantial reasoning for its decision."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:41028/20,Alperin v. Ukraine,41028/20,added,"Alperin v. Ukraine, no. 41028/20, 10 October 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.4,"Proportionality and related issues (fair balance, compensation, margin of appreciation)",3,,165,,"In Alperin v. Ukraine , 2024",,,"In Alperin v. Ukraine, 2024, §§ 86-87, concerning the partial forfeiture of the applicant's bail owing to the fact that the applicant had breached his bail conditions, the Court observed that the domestic courts made a thorough assessment and provided sufficient reasons for its decision, having weighed the breach found against the relevant background and having limited the forfeiture to half of the amount of the bail."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:50527/20,Amerisoc Center S.R.L. v. Luxembourg,50527/20,added,"Amerisoc Center S.R.L. v. Luxembourg, no. 50527/20, 17 October 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.B.4.a,Procedural factors,4,164,170,0.9759,"Amerisoc Center S.R.L. v. Luxembourg , 2024|Könyv-Tár Kft and Others v. Hungary , 2018|ı v. Serbia , 2024","Könyv - Tár Kft and Others v. Hungary , 2018","In cases where the applicants did not have the possibility of effectively challenging the measure, the Court has found that an excessive burden had been borne by them ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 49; Könyv - Tár Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2018, § 59; and Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 215). The Court checks whether the procedure applied provided the applicant a fair possibility of defending his or her interests ( Bäck v. Finland, 2004, § 63). Aviolation was found on account of a refusal by the receiver of a credit union to grant its directors access to the union's accounting documents to enable Družstevni Záložna Pria and Others v. the Czech Republic them to show that it was financially sound (, 2008, §§ 94-95). The fact of whether major arguments advanced by the applicants were carefully examined by the authorities is also relevant ( Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 2008, § 74; Novoseletskiy v. Ukraine, 2005, § 111; Bistrović v. Croatia, 2007, § 37). The operation of unchallengeable Papachelas v. Greece presumptions of benefit resulting from expropriation ( [GC], 1999, §§ 53-54), and presumptions used in the context of calculating compensation for expropriation ( Katikaridis and Others v. Greece, 1996, § 49; Efstathiou and Michailidis & Co. Motel Amerika v. Greece, 2003, § 33) were held against the Governments.","In cases where the applicants did not have the possibility of effectively challenging the measure, the Court has found that an excessive burden had been borne by them ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 49; Könyv-Tár Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2018, § 59; Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 215; and Amerisoc Center S.R.L. v. Luxembourg, 2024, § 61). The Court checks whether the procedure applied provided the applicant a fair possibility of defending his or her interests ( Bäck v. Finland, 2004, § 63). Aviolation was found on account of a refusal by the receiver of a credit union to grant its directors access to the union's accounting documents to enable them to show that it was financially sound ( Družstevni Záložna Pria and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2008, §§ 94-95). The fact of whether major arguments advanced by the applicants were carefully examined by the authorities is also relevant ( Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 2008, § 74; Novoseletskiy v. Ukraine, 2005, § 111; Bistrović v. Croatia, 2007, § 37). In this respect, the mandatory nature of the confiscation which left no discretion to the domestic authorities to assess the proportionality of the measure, deprived the applicant of any reasonable opportunity to challenge it effectively ( Yaylalı v. Serbia, 2024, §§ 56-58). Furthermore, the operation of unchallengeable presumptions of benefit resulting from expropriation ( Papachelas v. Greece [GC], 1999, §§ 53-54), and presumptions used in the context of calculating compensation for expropriation ( Katikaridis and Others v. Greece, 1996, § 49; Efstathiou and Michailidis & Co. Motel Amerika v. Greece, 2003, § 33) were held against the Governments. )."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:50527/20,Amerisoc Center S.R.L. v. Luxembourg,50527/20,added,"Amerisoc Center S.R.L. v. Luxembourg, no. 50527/20, 17 October 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.J,Confiscation of the proceeds of crime,2,,411,,"Amerisoc Center S.R.L. v. Luxembourg , 2024",,,"In this connection, even where a measure had been ordered in the context of a request for international mutual legal assistance issued by another State, the national authorities have the obligation to apply the principles of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in substance, and to do so with regard to the particular characteristics and mechanisms of international mutual legal assistance ( Amerisoc Center S.R.L. v. Luxembourg, 2024, § 55). In that case, which concerned the seizure of the applicant company's bank assets in Luxembourg, following an international request for assistance issued by Peruvian authorities, the Court found that the national courts had not afforded the applicant company a reasonable opportunity to put its case through adversarial proceedings, considering that this situation had resulted, in first place, from the law on international mutual legal assistance, which did not provide that information about the seizure order had to be communicated to the relevant bank client and, secondly, from the national court's decision not to examine the applicant's arguments . This conclusion was strengthened by the fact that the issue at hand was not examined by the Peruvian authorities either ( ibid ., §§ 58-59). Thus, in the absence of a remedy by which to challenge the seizure of the applicant company's assets in an effective manner, the Court found that the measure was disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued ( ibid ., § 61). Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property"
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:33189/21,Çatak and Others v. Türkiye,33189/21,added,"Çatak and Others v. Türkiye, no. 33189/21, 3 December 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.B.2,Principle of lawfulness,3,132,136,0.9941,"Capital Bank AD v. Bulgaria , 2005|Jokela v. Finland , 2002|Project-Trade d.o.o. v. Croatia , 2020|Çatak and Others v. Türkiye , 2024","Project - Trade d.o.o. v. Croatia , 2020","The requirement of foreseeability is often intertwined with the requirements of an absence of arbitrariness and procedural safeguards. Thus, a legal norm is ""foreseeable"" when it affords a measure of protection against arbitrary interferences by the public authorities. Any interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions must, therefore, be accompanied by procedural guarantees affording to the individual or entity concerned a reasonable opportunity of presenting their case to the responsible authorities for the purpose of effectively challenging the measures interfering with the rights guaranteed by that provision. In ascertaining whether that condition has been satisfied, a comprehensive view must be taken of the applicable judicial and administrative procedures ( Lekić v. Slovenia Jokela v. Finland Capital Bank AD v. Bulgaria [GC], 2018, § 95;, 2002, § 45;, 2005, § 134; and Stolyarova v. Russia, 2015, § 43; Project - Trade d.o.o. v. Croatia, 2020, § 82; Dănoiu and Others v. Romania, 2022, §§ 69-72).","The requirement of foreseeability is often intertwined with the requirements of an absence of arbitrariness and procedural safeguards. Thus, a legal norm is ""foreseeable"" when it affords a measure of protection against arbitrary interferences by the public authorities. Any interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions must, therefore, be accompanied by procedural guarantees affording to the individual or entity concerned a reasonable opportunity of presenting their case to the responsible authorities for the purpose of effectively challenging the measures interfering with the rights guaranteed by that provision. In ascertaining whether that condition has been satisfied, a comprehensive view must be taken of the applicable judicial and administrative procedures ( Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], 2018, § 95; Jokela v. Finland, 2002, § 45; Capital Bank AD v. Bulgaria, 2005, § 134; and Stolyarova v. Russia, 2015, § 43; Project-Trade d.o.o. v. Croatia, 2020, § 82; Dănoiu and Others v. Romania, 2022, §§ 69-72; Çatak and Others v. Türkiye, 2024, §§ 122-125)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:27849/15|33358/15,Drozdyk and Mikula v. Ukraine,27849/15|33358/15,added,"Drozdyk and Mikula v. Ukraine, nos. 27849/15 and 33358/15, 24 October 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.B.4.a,Procedural factors,4,165,171,0.967,"Alfa Glass Anonymi Emboriki Etairia Yalopinakon v. Greece , 2021|Drozdyk and Mikula v. Ukraine , 2024","Alfa Glass Anonymi Emboriki Etairi a Yalopinakon v. Greece , 2021","When an individual's property is subject to expropriation, there must be a procedure which ensures an overall assessment of the consequences of the expropriation, including the granting of compensation in relation to the value of the expropriated property, the determination of the holders of the right to compensation and any other issue relating to the expropriation, as well as the costs of the proceedings ( Alfa Glass Anonymi Emboriki Etairi a Yalopinakon v. Greece, 2021, § 36; Pálka and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2022, §§ 62-50). In the latter case, the Court found that while it could not be said that a system of compensation using tables and rates issued by the administration was as such problematic, the Czech legislation in force at the relevant time did not provide for ""a procedure ensuring an overall assessment of the consequences of the expropriation"". Furthermore, in Yavuz Özden v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 78-87, where the applicant ́s plot of land had been zoned as a military security zone, the legal framework put in place did not provide for a mechanism adequately respecting the applicant ́s rights and no compensation has been paid.","When an individual's property is subject to expropriation, there must be a procedure which ensures an overall assessment of the consequences of the expropriation, including the granting of compensation in relation to the value of the expropriated property, the determination of the holders of the right to compensation and any other issue relating to the expropriation, as well as the costs of the proceedings ( Alfa Glass Anonymi Emboriki Etairia Yalopinakon v. Greece, 2021, § 36; Pálka and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2022, §§ 62-50). In the latter case, the Court found that while it could not be said that a system of compensation using tables and rates issued by the administration was as such problematic, the Czech legislation in force at the relevant time did not provide for "" a procedure ensuring an overall assessment of the consequences of the expropriation"" . Furthermore, in Yavuz Özden v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 78-87, where the applicant ́s plot of land had been zoned as a military security zone, the legal framework put in place did not provide for a mechanism adequately respecting the applicant ́s rights and no compensation has been paid. Likewise, Drozdyk and Mikula v. Ukraine, 2024, §§ 49-52 concerned the invalidation of the applicants' titles to plots of land which they had used Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property and owned for years on the basis that the lands fell within railway exclusion zones and thus should never have been transferred into private property. The Court found that it had imposed on them a disproportionate burden on the account that the applicants were not offered any compensation for the land reclaimed from them."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:27849/15|33358/15,Drozdyk and Mikula v. Ukraine,27849/15|33358/15,added,"Drozdyk and Mikula v. Ukraine, nos. 27849/15 and 33358/15, 24 October 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.4.e,Compensation for the interference with property as an element of fair balance,4,188,196,0.99,"Drozdyk and Mikula v. Ukraine , 2024",,"The taking of property under the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value, will normally constitute a disproportionate interference and a total lack of compensation can be considered justifiable only in exceptional circumstances ( Former King of Greece and Others v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], 2002, § 89; see also Katona and Závarský v. Slovakia, 2023, § 63). However, in a situation where a measure controlling the use of property is in issue, the lack of compensation is a factor to be taken into consideration in determining whether a fair balance has been achieved ( Depalle v. France [GC], 2010, § 91). Similar considerations apply when the general clause is at stake ( Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 1982, § 69; see at the end of this sub-chapter).","The taking of property under the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value, will normally constitute a disproportionate interference and a total lack of compensation can be considered justifiable only in exceptional circumstances ( Former King of Greece and Others v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], 2002, § 89; see also Katona and Závarský v. Slovakia, 2023, § 63, and Drozdyk and Mikula v. Ukraine, 2024, § 52). However, in a situation where a measure controlling the use of property is in issue, the lack of compensation is a factor to be taken into consideration in determining whether a fair balance has been achieved ( Depalle v. France [GC], 2010, § 91). Similar considerations apply when the general clause is at stake ( Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 1982, § 69; see at the end of this sub-chapter)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:75088/17,Energyworks Cartagena S.L. v. Spain (dec.),75088/17,added,"Energyworks Cartagena S.L. v. Spain (dec.), no. 75088/17, 26 mars 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.B.2,Principle of lawfulness,3,136,140,0.9596,,,"However, in certain circumstances, the retrospective application of legislation whose effect is to deprive someone of a pre-existing ""asset"" that was part of his or her ""possessions"" may constitute interference that is liable to upset the fair balance between the demands of the general interest on the one hand and the protection of the right to peaceful enjoyment of ""possessions"" on the other ( Maurice v. France [GC], 2005, §§ 90 and 93). This also applies to cases in which the dispute is between private individuals and the State is not itself a party to the proceedings ( Kamoy Radyo Televizyon Yayincilik ve Organizasyon A.S. v. Turkey, 2019, § 40).","However, in certain circumstances, the retrospective application of legislation whose effect is to deprive someone of a pre- existing ""asset"" that was part of his or her ""possessions"" may constitute interference that is liable to upset the fair balance between the demands of the general interest on the one hand and the protection of the right to peaceful enjoyment of ""possessions"" on the other ( Maurice v. France [GC], 2005, §§ 90 and 93). This also applies to cases in which the dispute is between private individuals and the State is not itself a party to the proceedings ( Kamoy Radyo Televizyon Yayincilik ve Organizasyon A.S. v. Turkey, 2019, § 40). On the contrary, no retrospective deprivation of possessions was found in a case where the new legal framework on the remuneration system of electric companies included specific safeguards preventing the reimbursement of subsidies received prior to its adoption ( Energyworks Cartagena S.L. v. Spain (dec.), 2024, § 44)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:47284/16|84604/17,Episcopo and Bassani v. Italy,47284/16|84604/17,added,"Episcopo and Bassani v. Italy, nos. 47284/16 and 84604/17, 19 December 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.2,Principle of lawfulness,3,,130,,"The Court further clarified in The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy , 2024|This stance was confirmed in Episcopo and Bassani v. Italy , 2024",,,"The Court further clarified in The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 306, that, in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 cases, the foreseeability of the legal basis allowing for measures of interference must be assessed with reference to the moment when the interference at stake took place, that is the moment of the issuance of the contested measure. This stance was confirmed in Episcopo and Bassani v. Italy, 2024, §§ 154-156, where the Court assessed the degree of foreseeability of a confiscation order of the applicant's assets, considered to be the direct proceeds of crime, which order was made despite the discontinuation of the proceedings due to the expiry of the statute of limitation. The Court found that, at the material time, the established case-law considered that the measure of confiscation could not be applied after an offence had ceased to be punishable and that it was only later that the Court of Cassation started to recognise that the measure of confiscation could, in fact, be applied in such a situation and, even then, the issue was subject to divergent case-law for several years."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:25311/17,Immoreks Makedonija Doo Skopje v. North Macedonia (dec.),25311/17,added,"Immoreks Makedonija Doo Skopje v. North Macedonia (dec.), no. 25311/17, 24 September 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.A.1.i,Legitimate expectations,4,24,25,0.9165,,,"No legitimate expectation arises in a situation where the applicant relies on the mere fact that members of the respondent Government made political statements favourable to the applicant's restitution claims ( Bata v. Czech Republic (dec.), 2008, § 77), or on a programmatic statement in a statute, referring to a future statute which ultimately was not adopted ( Zamoyski-Brisson v. Poland (dec.), 2017, § 78) or in relation to the applicants' claim for financial aid, as the relevant national law clearly made the ""right"" to obtain financial aid conditional on the availability of sufficient emergency funds, without providing for any rules on the amounts to be granted and the distribution of the Traina Berto and Alfonsetti v. Italy emergency fund's limited financial resources ( (dec.), 2022, §§ 45-46). Similarly, no legitimate expectation arises in relation to State aid unlawfully distributed to private individuals via a building society ( BCR Banca pentru locuințe S.A. v. Romania (dec.), 2024, §§ 127-139).","No legitimate expectation arises in a situation where the applicant relies on the mere fact that members of the respondent Government made political statements favourable to the applicant's restitution claims ( Bata v. Czech Republic (dec.), 2008, § 77), or on a programmatic statement in a statute, referring to a future statute which ultimately was not adopted ( Zamoyski-Brisson v. Poland (dec.), 2017, § 78) or in relation to the applicants'claim for financial aid, as the relevant national law clearly made the ""right"" to obtain financial aid conditional on the availability of sufficient emergency funds, without providing for any rules on the amounts to be granted and the distribution Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property of the emergency fund's limited financial resources ( Traina Berto and Alfonsetti v. Italy (dec.), 2022, §§ 45-46). Similarly, no legitimate expectation arises in relation to State aid unlawfully distributed to private individuals via a building society ( BCR Banca pentru locuințe S.A. v. Romania (dec.), 2024, §§ 127-139). Lastly, there is no legitimate expectation of a deduction of VATpreviously paid by an applicant company to its suppliers when the applicant company had knowledge of their failure to comply with their VAT-relate d obligations and had the means to enforce the suppliers' compliance, regardless of whether or not the applicant company fully complied with its own VAT-related obligations ( Immoreks Makedonija Doo Skopje v. North Macedonia (dec.), 2024, §§ 32-35 and 41)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:32879/18,Ioannides v. Cyprus,32879/18,added,"Ioannides v. Cyprus, no. 32879/18, 16 January 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C,Positive obligations on member States,2,,222,,"In Ioannides v. Cyprus , 2025",,,"In Ioannides v. Cyprus, 2025, §§ 78 and 101-104, in an exceptional situation where the respondent State lacked effective control over certain sectors of the buffer zone where the applicant's house was located, the Court held that the State had limited jurisdiction entailing only positive obligations to take diplomatic, economic, judicial or other measures within its power and in accordance with international law."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:61721/19,Kubát and Others v. the Czech Republic,61721/19,added,"Kubát and Others v. the Czech Republic, nos. 61721/19 and 5 others, 22 June 2023.",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.M,Austerity measures,2,459,469,0.9842,,,"Furthermore, in Kubát and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2023, §§ 89-92 and 95-96, the salaries of judges were reduced for the period 2011-14, in line with amendments to the Salaries Act. These legislative amendments were later found to be unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court which pro futuro decided to give effect to its decision. Considering that the exceptional circumstances might justify the delivery of a repealing judgment with ex nunc/pro future effect constituted a different matter from that of a reduction of judges' salaries, the Court found no violation as regards the refusal of retroactive payment of the difference in judges' salaries during the financial crisis. However, it observed that the level of judges' remuneration should be fixed so as to shield them from pressures aimed at influencing their decisions and, more generally, their behaviour, and that a failure to ensure that judges are paid the judicial benefits to which they are entitled by law constitutes a circumstance liable to impede the exercise of their judicial functions with the necessary dedication.","Furthermore, in Kubát and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2023, §§ 89-92 and 95-96, the salaries of judges were reduced for the period 2011-14, in line with amendments to the Salaries Act. These legislative amendments were later found to be unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court which decided to give pro futuro effect to its decision. Considering that the exceptional circumstances might justify the delivery of a repealing judgment with ex nunc/pro future effect constituted a different matter from that of a reduction of judges'salaries, the Court found no violation as regards the refusal of retroactive payment of the difference in judges'salaries during the financial crisis. However, it observed that the level of judges'remuneration should be fixed so as to shield them from pressures aimed at influencing their decisions and, more generally, their behaviour, and that a failure to ensure that judges are paid the judicial benefits to which they are entitled by law constitutes a circumstance liable to impede the exercise of their judicial functions with the necessary dedication."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:61721/19|5496/20|21318/20|33522/20|43039/20|55448/20,Kubát and Others v. the Czech Republic,61721/19|5496/20|21318/20|33522/20|43039/20|55448/20,removed,"Kubát and Others v. the Czech Republic, nos. 61721/19, 5496/20, 21318/20, 33522/20, 43039/20, 55448/20, 22 June 2023.",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.M,Austerity measures,2,459,469,0.9842,,,"Furthermore, in Kubát and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2023, §§ 89-92 and 95-96, the salaries of judges were reduced for the period 2011-14, in line with amendments to the Salaries Act. These legislative amendments were later found to be unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court which pro futuro decided to give effect to its decision. Considering that the exceptional circumstances might justify the delivery of a repealing judgment with ex nunc/pro future effect constituted a different matter from that of a reduction of judges' salaries, the Court found no violation as regards the refusal of retroactive payment of the difference in judges' salaries during the financial crisis. However, it observed that the level of judges' remuneration should be fixed so as to shield them from pressures aimed at influencing their decisions and, more generally, their behaviour, and that a failure to ensure that judges are paid the judicial benefits to which they are entitled by law constitutes a circumstance liable to impede the exercise of their judicial functions with the necessary dedication.","Furthermore, in Kubát and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2023, §§ 89-92 and 95-96, the salaries of judges were reduced for the period 2011-14, in line with amendments to the Salaries Act. These legislative amendments were later found to be unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court which decided to give pro futuro effect to its decision. Considering that the exceptional circumstances might justify the delivery of a repealing judgment with ex nunc/pro future effect constituted a different matter from that of a reduction of judges'salaries, the Court found no violation as regards the refusal of retroactive payment of the difference in judges'salaries during the financial crisis. However, it observed that the level of judges'remuneration should be fixed so as to shield them from pressures aimed at influencing their decisions and, more generally, their behaviour, and that a failure to ensure that judges are paid the judicial benefits to which they are entitled by law constitutes a circumstance liable to impede the exercise of their judicial functions with the necessary dedication."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:57002/11,Mandev and Others v. Bulgaria,57002/11,added,"Mandev and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 57002/11 and 4 others, 21 May 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.J,Confiscation of the proceeds of crime,2,414,424,0.9325,"Mandev and Others v. Bulgaria , 2024|Melandri v. San Marino , 2024|Todorov and Others v. Bulgaria , 2021",,"The Court also found it legitimate for the relevant domestic authorities to issue confiscation orders on the basis of a preponderance of evidence which suggested that the respondents' lawful incomes could not have sufficed for them to acquire the property in question. Whenever a confiscation order was the result of civil proceedings in rem which related to the proceeds of crime derived from serious offences, the Court did not require proof ""beyond reasonable doubt"" of the illicit origins of the property in such proceedings. Instead, proof on a balance of probabilities or a high probability of illicit origins, combined with the inability of the owner to prove the contrary, was found to suffice for the purposes of the proportionality test under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( Balsamo v. San Marino, 2019, § 91).","The Court also found it legitimate for the relevant domestic authorities to issue confiscation orders on the basis of a preponderance of evidence which suggested that the respondents'lawful incomes could not have sufficed for them to acquire the property in question. Whenever a confiscation order was the result of civil proceedings in rem which related to the proceeds of crime derived from serious offences, the Court did not require p roof ""beyond reasonable doubt"" of the illicit Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property origins of the property in such proceedings. Instead, proof on a balance of probabilities or a high probability of illicit origins, combined with the inability of the owner to prove the contrary, was found to suffice for the purposes of the proportionality test under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( Balsamo v. San Marino, 2019, § 91; see also Melandri v. San Marino, 2024, § 72). On the contrary, the Court found that the national courts did not convincingly prove a causal link between, on the one hand, the predicate offences/any other criminal conduct and the assets subject to confiscation, on the other, when they solely relied on the presumption that any asset not shown to have had a lawful origin constituted the proceeds of crime and on the difference they established between the applicants'income from lawful sources and their expenditure ( Mandev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2024, § 100; see also Todorov and Others v. Bulgaria, 2021)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:25189/21,Melandri v. San Marino,25189/21,added,"Melandri v. San Marino, no. 25189/21, 12 September 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.J,Confiscation of the proceeds of crime,2,409,419,0.982,"Melandri v. San Marino , 2024",,"Sometimes, the Court abstained from determining whether the interference at issue was a deprivation of possessions or a control of use because it considered it unnecessary to do so. Instead, it proceeded directly to examining whether there was a violation of the principles of legality, legitimate aim, and proportionality ( Denisova and Moiseyeva v. Russia, 2010, § 55; Aktiva DOO v. Serbia, 2021, §§ 78 and 82).","Sometimes, the Court abstained from determining whether the interference at issue was a deprivation of possessions or a control of use because it considered it unnecessary to do so. Instead, it proceeded directly to examining whether there was a violation of the principles of legality, legitimate aim, and proportionality ( Denisova and Moiseyeva v. Russia, 2010, § 55; Aktiva DOO v. Serbia, 2021, §§ 78 and 82; Melandri v. San Marino, 2024, § 67)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:25189/21,Melandri v. San Marino,25189/21,added,"Melandri v. San Marino, no. 25189/21, 12 September 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.J,Confiscation of the proceeds of crime,2,414,424,0.9325,"Mandev and Others v. Bulgaria , 2024|Melandri v. San Marino , 2024|Todorov and Others v. Bulgaria , 2021",,"The Court also found it legitimate for the relevant domestic authorities to issue confiscation orders on the basis of a preponderance of evidence which suggested that the respondents' lawful incomes could not have sufficed for them to acquire the property in question. Whenever a confiscation order was the result of civil proceedings in rem which related to the proceeds of crime derived from serious offences, the Court did not require proof ""beyond reasonable doubt"" of the illicit origins of the property in such proceedings. Instead, proof on a balance of probabilities or a high probability of illicit origins, combined with the inability of the owner to prove the contrary, was found to suffice for the purposes of the proportionality test under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( Balsamo v. San Marino, 2019, § 91).","The Court also found it legitimate for the relevant domestic authorities to issue confiscation orders on the basis of a preponderance of evidence which suggested that the respondents'lawful incomes could not have sufficed for them to acquire the property in question. Whenever a confiscation order was the result of civil proceedings in rem which related to the proceeds of crime derived from serious offences, the Court did not require p roof ""beyond reasonable doubt"" of the illicit Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property origins of the property in such proceedings. Instead, proof on a balance of probabilities or a high probability of illicit origins, combined with the inability of the owner to prove the contrary, was found to suffice for the purposes of the proportionality test under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( Balsamo v. San Marino, 2019, § 91; see also Melandri v. San Marino, 2024, § 72). On the contrary, the Court found that the national courts did not convincingly prove a causal link between, on the one hand, the predicate offences/any other criminal conduct and the assets subject to confiscation, on the other, when they solely relied on the presumption that any asset not shown to have had a lawful origin constituted the proceeds of crime and on the difference they established between the applicants'income from lawful sources and their expenditure ( Mandev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2024, § 100; see also Todorov and Others v. Bulgaria, 2021)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:25189/21,Melandri v. San Marino,25189/21,added,"Melandri v. San Marino, no. 25189/21, 12 September 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.J,Confiscation of the proceeds of crime,2,415,425,0.9926,"Melandri v. San Marino , 2024",,"The Court attached importance to various procedural guarantees available in confiscation proceedings, such as their adversarial nature ( Yildirim v. Italy (dec.), 2003; Perre v. Italy (dec.), 1999); advance disclosure of the prosecution case ( Grayson and Barnham v. the United Kingdom, 2008, § 45); opportunity for the party to adduce documentary and oral evidence ( Butler v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2002; Perre v. Italy (dec.), 1999), possibility of being legally represented by a privately hired lawyer ( Butler v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2002); assumption of the criminal character of the assets can be rebutted by the party ( Geerings v. Netherlands, 2007, § 44); a judge having the discretion not to apply the assumption if he/she considered that applying it would give rise to a serious risk of injustice ( Phillips v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 43); whether an individual assessment of which pieces of property should be confiscated in the light of the facts of the case has been carried out ( Rummi v. Estonia, 2015, § 108; Silickienė v. Lithuania, 2012, § 68); on the whole, whether the applicant was afforded a reasonable opportunity of putting his arguments before the domestic courts ( Veits v. Estonia, 2015, §§ 72 and 74; Jokela v. Finland, 2002, § 45; Balsamo v. San Marino, 2019, § 93); regard being had to a comprehensive view of the proceedings concerned ( Denisova and Moiseyeva v. Russia, 2010, § 59). Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property","The Court attached importance to various procedural guarantees available in confiscation proceedings, such as their adversarial nature ( Yildirim v. Italy (dec.), 2003; Perre v. Italy (dec.), 1999); advance disclosure of the prosecution case ( Grayson and Barnham v. the United Kingdom, 2008, § 45); opportunity for the party to adduce documentary and oral evidence ( Butler v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2002; Perre v. Italy (dec.), 1999), possibility of being legally represented by a privately hired lawyer ( Butler v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2002); assumption of the criminal character of the assets can be rebutted by the party ( Geerings v. Netherlands, 2007, § 44); a judge having the discretion not to apply the assumption if he/she considered that applying it would give rise to a serious risk of injustice ( Phillips v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 43); whether an individual assessment of which pieces of property should be confiscated in the light of the facts of the case has been carried out ( Rummi v. Estonia, 2015, § 108; Silickienė v. Lithuania, 2012, § 68); on the whole, whether the applicant was afforded a reasonable opportunity of putting his arguments before the domestic courts ( Veits v. Estonia, 2015, §§ 72 and 74; Jokela v. Finland, 2002, § 45; Balsamo v. San Marino, 2019, § 93; Melandri v. San Marino, 2024, § 72), regard being had to a comprehensive view of the proceedings concerned ( Denisova and Moiseyeva v. Russia, 2010, § 59)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:24460/16,Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan,24460/16,added,"Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan, no. 24460/16, 4 July 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.3,Public or general interest,3,141,145,0.9962,"Katona and Závarský v. Slovakia , 2023|Maria Azzopardi v. Malta , 2022|Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan , 2024|The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy , 2024|Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden , 1989|ńscy v. Poland , 2006",,"The following purposes have been found by the Court to fall within the notion of public interest within the meaning of this provision: elimination of social injustice in the housing sector ( James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 45; Grozdanić and Gršković Grozdanić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102- Maria Azzopardi v. Malta 103; see also, 2022, §§ 53 and 60 for the provision of residential homes in ‐ the context of the State's economic and planning policies); combating the effects of a foreign-currency loan crisis particularly in the context of preventing mass homelessness ( Béla Németh v. Hungary, 2020, §§ 42-45); nationalisation of specific industries ( Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, §§ 9 and 109); regulation of the energy sector ( Salento Energy S.r.l. and Nuovo Sole S.r.l. v. Italy (dec.), 2024, § 37);adoption of land and city development plans ( Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 1982, § 69); Cooperativa La Laurentina v. Italy, 2001, § 94; securing land in connection with the Skibińscy v. Poland implementation of the local land development plan (, 2006, § 86); prevention of tax evasion ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 39); road traffic safety ( Pannon Plakát Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2022, § 48); measures to combat drug trafficking and smuggling ( Butler v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2002; protection of the interests of the victims of the crime ( Šeiko v. Lithuania, 2020, § 31); measures Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden to restrict the consumption of alcohol (, 1989, § 62); protection of morals ( Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, § 62); control of legitimate origin of cars brought into circulation ( Sildedzis v. Poland, 2005, § 50); confiscation of monies acquired unlawfully ( Honecker and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2001; the prevention of collusive practices and the protection of the public purse and promotion of fair competition ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, § 78); transition from a socialist to a free-market economy ( Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], 2018, §§ 103 and 105); and the smooth operation of the justice system, with further references to the importance of administering justice without delays which might jeopardise its effectiveness and credibility ( Konstantin Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2015, § 64). However, in view of the contractual relationship between the applicants and the debtor which was of a purely business-law nature, the Court did not retain the protection of consumers as a legitimate aim Katona and Závarský v. Slovakia in the circumstances of the case (, 2023, § 59).","The following purposes have been found by the Court to fall within the notion of public interest within the meaning of this provision: elimination of social injustice in the housing sector ( James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 45; Grozdanić and Gršković ‐ Grozdanić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-103; see also Maria Azzopardi v. Malta, 2022, §§ 53 and 60 for the provision of residential homes in the context of the State's economic and planning policies); combating the effects of a foreign-currency loan crisis particularly in the context of preventing mass homelessness ( Béla Németh v. Hungary, 2020, §§ 42-45); nationalisation of specific industries ( Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, §§ 9 and 109); regulation of the energy sector ( Salento Energy S.r.l. and Nuovo Sole S.r.l. v. Italy (dec.), 2024, § 37); adoption of land and city development plans ( Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 1982, § 69); Cooperativa La Laurentina v. Italy, 2001, § 94; securing land in connection with the implementation of the local land development plan ( Skibińscy v. Poland, 2006, § 86); prevention of tax evasion ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 39); securing payment of a tax debt ( Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 58); road traffic safety ( Pannon Plakát Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2022, § 48); measures to combat drug trafficking and smuggling ( Butler v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2002); protection of cultural heritage against unlawful exportation from the country of origin or ensuring its recovery and return therein ( The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 342); protection of the interests of the victims of the crime ( Šeiko v. Lithuania, 2020, § 31); measures to restrict the consumption of alcohol ( Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden, 1989, § 62); protection of morals ( Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, § 62); control of legitimate origin of cars brought into circulation ( Sildedzis v. Poland, 2005, § 50); confiscation of monies acquired unlawfully ( Honecker and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2001; the prevention of collusive practices and the protection of the public purse and promotion of fair competition ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, § 78); transition from a socialist to a free-market economy ( Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], 2018, §§ 103 and 105); and the smooth operation of the justice system, with further references to the importance of administering justice without delays which might jeopardise its effectiveness and credibility ( Konstantin Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2015, § 64). However, in view of the contractual relationship between the applicants and the debtor which was of a purely business-law nature, the Court did not retain the protection of consumers as a legitimate aim in the circumstances of the case ( Katona and Závarský v. Slovakia, 2023, § 59)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:24460/16,Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan,24460/16,added,"Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan, no. 24460/16, 4 July 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.4.a,Procedural factors,4,166,172,0.9812,"Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan , 2024|Uzan and Others v. Turkey , 2019",,"Afailure on the part of the national authorities to carry out the balancing exercise between the private interests involved in the case and the public interest may also be held against the respondent State ( Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 2008, § 74). Aviolation was found in a case where all life savings generated by employment were confiscated from a person who had obtained that employment using a false passport. The domestic courts failed to examine whether the confiscation order had maintained a fair balance between the property rights and the public interest. Hence, the failure by a domestic court to make the proportionality analysis can result in a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( Paulet v. the United Kingdom, 2014, §§ 68-69). Similarly, an automatic, general and inflexible Uzan and Others v. Turkey protective measure of uncertain duration can result in a violation (, 2019, § 193).","Afailure on the part of the national authorities to carry out the balancing exercise between the private interests involved in the case and the public interest may also be held against the respondent State ( Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 2008, § 74). Aviolation was found in a case where all life savings generated by employment were confiscated from a person who had obtained that employment using a false passport. The domestic courts failed to examine whether the confiscation order had maintained a fair balance between the property rights and the public interest. Hence, the failure by a domestic court to make the proportionality analysis can result in a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( Paulet v. the United Kingdom, 2014, §§ 68-69; see also Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 64, in respect of the freezing of a publishing house 's bank accounts by tax authorities, without a proportionality assessment). Similarly, an automatic, general and inflexible protective measure of uncertain duration can result in a violation ( Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 193)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:24460/16,Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan,24460/16,added,"Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan, no. 24460/16, 4 July 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.H,Taxation,2,393,402,0.9504,"Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan , 2024",,"Also in the context of tax proceedings, the Court attaches importance to the availability of procedural safeguards in the relevant proceedings (compare Agosi v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 55). Fair balance was upset in cases where the national authorities, in the absence of any indication of direct involvement by an individual or entity in fraudulent abuse of a VATchain of supply, or knowledge thereof, nevertheless penalised the fully compliant recipient of a VAT-taxable supply for the actions or inactions of a supplier over which it had no control and in relation to which it had no means of monitoring or securing compliance ( ""Bulves"" AD v. Bulgaria, 2009, §§ 67-71).","Also in the context of tax proceedings, the Court attaches importance to the availability of procedural safeguards in the relevant proceedings (compare Agosi v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 55). In that respect, the Court found the freezing of a company's bank accounts by tax authorities for an indefinite period of time, without any possibility of its review at regular intervals, to be in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 65). Furthermore, the fair balance was upset in cases where the national authorities, in the absence of any indication of direct involvement by an individual or entity in fraudulent abuse of a VATchain of supply, or knowledge thereof, nevertheless penalised the fully compliant recipient of a VAT-taxable supply for the actions or inactions of a supplier over which it had no control and in relation to which it had no means of monitoring or securing compliance ( ""Bulves"" AD v. Bulgaria, 2009, §§ 67-71). Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property"
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:17131/19,Tamazount and others v. France,17131/19,added,"Tamazount and others v. France, nos. 17131/19 and 4 others, 4 April 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.C.2,Remedial measures,3,228,237,0.977,"S tate responsibility was also invoked in Papachela and AMAZON S.A. v. Greece , 2020|Tamazount and others v. France , 2024|ăduraru v. Romania , 2005","State responsibility was also invoked in Papachela and AMAZON S.A. v. Greece , 2020","State responsibility for the failure to provide an adequate remedial action has been found in the Păduraru v. Romania context of enforcement of judgment debts: restitution of property (, 2005, § 112); payment of compensation for expropriation ( Almeida Garrett, Mascarenhas Falcão and Others v. Portugal, 2000, §§ 109-111); enforcement of court orders for the eviction of tenants and the repossession of dwellings ( Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], 1999, §§ 43-59; Matheus v. France, 2005, Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property §§ 69-71; Lo Tufo v. Italy, 2005, § 53; Prodan v. Moldova, 2004, § 61). State responsibility was also invoked in Papachela and AMAZON S.A. v. Greece, 2020, §§ 57-58 and 62-64, in which the Greek Government failed to evict migrants and others who had taken over a hotel belonging to the applicants despite a court order to the contrary.","State responsibility for the failure to provide an adequate remedial action has been found in the context of enforcement of judgment debts: restitution of property ( Păduraru v. Romania, 2005, § 112); payment of compensation for expropriation ( Almeida Garrett, Mascarenhas Falcão and Others v. Portugal, 2000, §§ 109-111); enforcement of court orders for the eviction of tenants and the repossession of dwellings ( Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], 1999, §§ 43-59; Matheus v. France, 2005, §§ 69-71; Lo Tufo v. Italy, 2005, § 53; Prodan v. Moldova, 2004, § 61), and also as regards Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property compensation for the living conditions in a harki reception camp ( Tamazount and others v. France, 2024, § 164). State responsibility was also invoked in Papachela and AMAZON S.A. v. Greece, 2020, §§ 57-58 and 62-64, in which the Greek Government failed to evict migrants and others who had taken over a hotel belonging to the applicants despite a court order to the contrary."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:35271/19,The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy,35271/19,added,"The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, no. 35271/19, 2 May 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1.a,Autonomous meaning,4,6,6,0.9715,"Kutlu and Others v. Turkey , 2016|The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy , 2024",,"The fact that the domestic laws of a State do not recognise a particular interest as a ""right"" or even a ""property right"" does not necessarily prevent the interest in question, in some circumstances, from being regarded as a ""possession"" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( Depalle v. France [GC], 2010, § 68, in respect of a revocable and precarious right to occupancy of a public property on Öneryıldız v. Turkey account of a lapse of time; [GC], 2004, § 129, in respect of the applicant's proprietary interest in his unauthorised dwelling). Along-standing tolerance on the part of the authorities has also conferred property rights on applicants in respect of a disputed plot of land ( Kosmas and Others v. Greece, 2017, §§ 68-71; see also Arnavutkoy Greek Orthodox Taksiarhis Church Foundation v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 45-46, concerning the property of a religious foundation for which the applicant had no proper title but which was mentioned in its founding document). Furthermore, the domestic law ordering the expropriation of a plot of land in certain circumstances, with the right to Kutlu and Others v. Turkey compensation, was considered to have created a proprietary interest (, 2016, § 58).","The fact that the domestic laws of a State do not recognise a particular interest as a ""right"" or even a ""property right"" does not necessarily prevent the interest in question, i n some circumstances, from being regarded as a ""possession"" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( Depalle v. France [GC], 2010, § 68, in respect of a revocable and precarious right to occupancy of a public property on account of a lapse of time; Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 129, in respect of the applicant's proprietary interest in his unauthorised dwelling; The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 264, in respect of inviting the applicant, in its capacity as a current possessor of the cultural item, to participate in domestic proceedings). Along-standing tolerance on the part of the authorities has also conferred property rights on applicants in respect of a disputed plot of land ( Kosmas and Others v. Greece, 2017, §§ 68-71; see also Arnavutkoy Greek Orthodox Taksiarhis Church Foundation v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 45-46, concerning the property of a religious foundation for which the applicant had no proper title but which was mentioned in its founding document; and The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 265, in respect of the length of time that passed conferring on the applicant a proprietary interest that was sufficiently established and weighty to amount to a "" possession "" of the art work). Furthermore, the domestic law ordering the expropriation of a plot of land in certain circumstances, with the right to compensation, was considered to have created a proprietary interest ( Kutlu and Others v. Turkey, 2016, § 58). Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property"
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:35271/19,The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy,35271/19,added,"The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, no. 35271/19, 2 May 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.1,“Three rules” approach,3,95,96,0.9911,"Jokela v. Finland , 2002|The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy , 2024",,"In some cases it is more difficult for the Court to qualify a measure or a series of measures as either deprivation or control of use of property, essentially because it cannot be easily assimilated to measures qualified in the existing case-law or because the series of measures consists of disparate decisions belonging to various branches of domestic law. In such cases it will probably analyse the circumstances of the case under the general principle of the first sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. This will apply in particular to situations where not just one decision, but a combination of various measures/decisions affected the applicant's property ( Ðokić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, §§ 55-56 - a contract of purchase in respect of a flat legally valid, applicant registered as an owner, but unable to have the flat restored to him; and Matos e Silva, Lda., and Others v. Portugal, 1996, § 85 - in the absence of a formal expropriation decision restrictions on the right to property stemmed from Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property the reduced ability to dispose of it and from the damage caused by the fact that expropriation was contemplated; but the applicants continued to work the land). In a case where the applicants complained that their rights had been violated on account of the discrepancy between the assessments of the market value of expropriated property for the purposes of the determination of compensation and for the purposes of inheritance tax in respect of the same property, expropriation and taxation were examined separately and no violation was found. However, the combined effect of Jokela both measures was examined under the first rule and resulted in a finding of a violation ( v. Finland, 2002, §§ 61-65).","In some cases it is more difficult for the Court to qualify a measure or a series of measures as either deprivation or control of use of property, essentially because it cannot be easily assimilated to measures qualified in the existing case-law or because the series of measures consists of disparate decisions belonging to various branches of domestic law. In such cases it will probably analyse the circumstances of the case under the general principle of the first sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. This will apply in particular to situations where not just one decision, but a combination of various measures/decisions affected the applicant's property ( Ðokić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, §§ 55-56 - a contract of purchase in respect of a flat legally valid, applicant registered as an owner, but unable to have the flat restored to him; Matos e Silva, Lda., and Others v. Portugal, 1996, § 85 - in the absence of a formal expropriation decision restrictions on the right to property stemmed from the reduced ability to dispose of it and from the damage caused by the fact that expropriation was contemplated; but the applicants continued to work the land; and The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 278 - the recovery of an unlawfully exported cultural object through a measure that, although adopted within criminal proceedings, had civil effects). In a case where the applicants complained that their rights had been violated on account of the discrepancy between the assessments of the market value of expropriated property for the purposes of the determination of compensation and for the purposes of inheritance tax in respect of the same property, expropriation and taxation were examined separately and no violation was found. However, the combined effect of both measures was examined under the first rule and resulted in a finding of a violation ( Jokela v. Finland, 2002, §§ 61-65)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:35271/19,The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy,35271/19,added,"The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, no. 35271/19, 2 May 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.1.c,General rule,4,,123,,"In The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy , 2024",,,"In The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, §§ 273-277, the Court was satisfied that a confiscation order, adopted in respect of a cultural item located abroad although not enforced yet, limited the applicant Trust's capacity to fully dispose of the item and, accordingly, considered that its mere issuance amounted to an interference with that applicant's proprietary interests protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It found that the general rule was applicable."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:35271/19,The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy,35271/19,added,"The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, no. 35271/19, 2 May 2024",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.2,Principle of lawfulness,3,,130,,"The Court further clarified in The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy , 2024|This stance was confirmed in Episcopo and Bassani v. Italy , 2024",,,"The Court further clarified in The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 306, that, in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 cases, the foreseeability of the legal basis allowing for measures of interference must be assessed with reference to the moment when the interference at stake took place, that is the moment of the issuance of the contested measure. This stance was confirmed in Episcopo and Bassani v. Italy, 2024, §§ 154-156, where the Court assessed the degree of foreseeability of a confiscation order of the applicant's assets, considered to be the direct proceeds of crime, which order was made despite the discontinuation of the proceedings due to the expiry of the statute of limitation. The Court found that, at the material time, the established case-law considered that the measure of confiscation could not be applied after an offence had ceased to be punishable and that it was only later that the Court of Cassation started to recognise that the measure of confiscation could, in fact, be applied in such a situation and, even then, the issue was subject to divergent case-law for several years."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:35271/19,The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy,35271/19,added,"The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, no. 35271/19, 2 May 2024",5,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.3,Public or general interest,3,141,145,0.9962,"Katona and Závarský v. Slovakia , 2023|Maria Azzopardi v. Malta , 2022|Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan , 2024|The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy , 2024|Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden , 1989|ńscy v. Poland , 2006",,"The following purposes have been found by the Court to fall within the notion of public interest within the meaning of this provision: elimination of social injustice in the housing sector ( James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 45; Grozdanić and Gršković Grozdanić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102- Maria Azzopardi v. Malta 103; see also, 2022, §§ 53 and 60 for the provision of residential homes in ‐ the context of the State's economic and planning policies); combating the effects of a foreign-currency loan crisis particularly in the context of preventing mass homelessness ( Béla Németh v. Hungary, 2020, §§ 42-45); nationalisation of specific industries ( Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, §§ 9 and 109); regulation of the energy sector ( Salento Energy S.r.l. and Nuovo Sole S.r.l. v. Italy (dec.), 2024, § 37);adoption of land and city development plans ( Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 1982, § 69); Cooperativa La Laurentina v. Italy, 2001, § 94; securing land in connection with the Skibińscy v. Poland implementation of the local land development plan (, 2006, § 86); prevention of tax evasion ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 39); road traffic safety ( Pannon Plakát Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2022, § 48); measures to combat drug trafficking and smuggling ( Butler v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2002; protection of the interests of the victims of the crime ( Šeiko v. Lithuania, 2020, § 31); measures Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden to restrict the consumption of alcohol (, 1989, § 62); protection of morals ( Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, § 62); control of legitimate origin of cars brought into circulation ( Sildedzis v. Poland, 2005, § 50); confiscation of monies acquired unlawfully ( Honecker and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2001; the prevention of collusive practices and the protection of the public purse and promotion of fair competition ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, § 78); transition from a socialist to a free-market economy ( Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], 2018, §§ 103 and 105); and the smooth operation of the justice system, with further references to the importance of administering justice without delays which might jeopardise its effectiveness and credibility ( Konstantin Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2015, § 64). However, in view of the contractual relationship between the applicants and the debtor which was of a purely business-law nature, the Court did not retain the protection of consumers as a legitimate aim Katona and Závarský v. Slovakia in the circumstances of the case (, 2023, § 59).","The following purposes have been found by the Court to fall within the notion of public interest within the meaning of this provision: elimination of social injustice in the housing sector ( James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 45; Grozdanić and Gršković ‐ Grozdanić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-103; see also Maria Azzopardi v. Malta, 2022, §§ 53 and 60 for the provision of residential homes in the context of the State's economic and planning policies); combating the effects of a foreign-currency loan crisis particularly in the context of preventing mass homelessness ( Béla Németh v. Hungary, 2020, §§ 42-45); nationalisation of specific industries ( Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, §§ 9 and 109); regulation of the energy sector ( Salento Energy S.r.l. and Nuovo Sole S.r.l. v. Italy (dec.), 2024, § 37); adoption of land and city development plans ( Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 1982, § 69); Cooperativa La Laurentina v. Italy, 2001, § 94; securing land in connection with the implementation of the local land development plan ( Skibińscy v. Poland, 2006, § 86); prevention of tax evasion ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 39); securing payment of a tax debt ( Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 58); road traffic safety ( Pannon Plakát Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2022, § 48); measures to combat drug trafficking and smuggling ( Butler v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2002); protection of cultural heritage against unlawful exportation from the country of origin or ensuring its recovery and return therein ( The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 342); protection of the interests of the victims of the crime ( Šeiko v. Lithuania, 2020, § 31); measures to restrict the consumption of alcohol ( Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden, 1989, § 62); protection of morals ( Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, § 62); control of legitimate origin of cars brought into circulation ( Sildedzis v. Poland, 2005, § 50); confiscation of monies acquired unlawfully ( Honecker and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2001; the prevention of collusive practices and the protection of the public purse and promotion of fair competition ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, § 78); transition from a socialist to a free-market economy ( Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], 2018, §§ 103 and 105); and the smooth operation of the justice system, with further references to the importance of administering justice without delays which might jeopardise its effectiveness and credibility ( Konstantin Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2015, § 64). However, in view of the contractual relationship between the applicants and the debtor which was of a purely business-law nature, the Court did not retain the protection of consumers as a legitimate aim in the circumstances of the case ( Katona and Závarský v. Slovakia, 2023, § 59)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:35271/19,The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy,35271/19,added,"The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, no. 35271/19, 2 May 2024",6,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.4,"Proportionality and related issues (fair balance, compensation, margin of appreciation)",3,,164,,"Another example is the case of The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy , 2024",,,"Another example is the case of The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024 §§ 407-408, where the Court noted a wide margin of discretion as to what is ""in accordance with the general interest"", particularly where cultural heritage issues are concerned, the strong consensus in international and European law with regard to the need to protect cultural objects from unlawful exportation and to return them to their country of origin, the applicant's negligent conduct, as well as the very exceptional legal vacuum in which the domestic authorities found themselves to hold there had been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:35271/19,The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy,35271/19,added,"The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, no. 35271/19, 2 May 2024",7,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.B.4.d,Issues concerning the applicant,4,183,190,0.9241,"In UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania , 2025|OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and Others v. France , 2004|The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy , 2024","Casarin v. Italy , 2021|Others v. France , 2004|ć v. Croatia , 2018","One of the significant factors for the balancing test under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is whether the applicant attempted to take advantage of a weakness or a loophole in the system ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom OGIS-Institut Stanislas, OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and, 1997, § 109; Others v. France, 2004, §§ 69 and 71). Similarly, in G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, § 301, the Court noted that the degree of culpability or negligence on the part of the applicants or, at the very least, the relationship between their conduct and the offence in question may be taken into account in order to assess whether a confiscation was proportionate. Aperson's qualification as an accountant was one of the decisive reasons for deciding that reimbursing excess contributions without interest was proportionate ( Taşkaya v. Turkey (dec.), 2018, §§ 49-50). In certain cases the Pyrantienė v. Lithuania applicant's personal vulnerability is also taken into consideration, as in, 2013, § 62, where the applicant was of pensionable age and suffered from long-term disability). An obligation imposed on the applicant to repay benefits already received in reliance on an administrative decision, in her good faith and where the authorities had made a mistake, while not taking into account her health and financial situation, was considered to be disproportionate ( Čakarević v. Croatia, 2018, §§ 82-90; see also Casarin v. Italy, 2021, § 74). Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property","One of the significant factors for the balancing test under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is whether the applicant attempted to take advantage of a weakness or a loophole in the system ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 109; OGIS-Institut Stanislas, OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and Others v. France, 2004, §§ 69 and 71). Similarly, in G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, § 301, the Court noted that the degree of culpability or negligence on the part of the applicants or, at the very least, the relationship between their conduct and the offence in question may be taken into account in order to assess whether a confiscation was proportionate (see also The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 408). Aperson's qualification as an accountant was one of the decisive reasons for deciding that reimbursing excess contributions without interest was proportionate ( Taşkaya v. Turkey (dec.), 2018, §§ 49-50). In UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania, 2025, § 223, the Court observed that the domestic courts had thoroughly assessed the overall conduct of the applicant companies, in the extraordinary situation created by the public health crisis of Covid-19, which companies had acted in bad faith and had sought to take advantage of the public health emergency in order to make an excessive profit."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:46264/22|50184/22,UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania,46264/22|50184/22,added,"UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania, nos. 46264/22 and 50184/22, 7 January 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1.a,Autonomous meaning,4,8,8,0.992,"UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania , 2025",,"The fact that a right to property is revocable in certain circumstances does not prevent it from being considered as a ""possession"" protected by Article 1, at least until its revocation ( Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 75; Krstić v. Serbia, 2013, § 83; Čakarević v. Croatia, 2018, § 52; Moskal v. Poland, 2009, § 40; Grobelny v. Poland, 2020, § 58). For instance, in Beyeler v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 104-105, the Court found the existence of a proprietary interest protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, even though the contract for the purchase of a painting was considered null and void by the national authorities, on the grounds that the applicant had been in possession of the painting for several years, that he had been considered de facto by the authorities as having a proprietary interest in it and that he had received compensation (see also below the chapter on Social welfare cases). Similarly, the Court has also held that a procurement contract may constitute a ""possession"" within the meaning of the Protocol, even if the contract was subsequently annulled ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 64-65).","The fact that a right to property is revocable in certain circumstances does not prevent it from being considered as a ""possession"" protected by Article 1, at least until its revocation ( Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 75; Krstić v. Serbia, 2013, § 83; Čakarević v. Croatia, 2018, § 52; Moskal v. Poland, 2009, § 40; Grobelny v. Poland, 2020, § 58). For instance, in Beyeler v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 104-105, the Court found the existence of a proprietary interest protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, even though the contract for the purchase of a painting was considered null and void by the national authorities, on the grounds that the applicant had been in possession of the painting for several years, that he had been considered de facto by the authorities as having a proprietary interest in it and that he had received compensation (see also below the chapter on Social welfare cases). Similarly, the Court has also held that a procurement contract may constitute a ""possession"" within the meaning of the Protocol, even if the contract was subsequently annulled ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 64-65; UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania, 2025, §§ 173-174)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:46264/22|50184/22,UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania,46264/22|50184/22,added,"UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania, nos. 46264/22 and 50184/22, 7 January 2025",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,II.B.4,"Proportionality and related issues (fair balance, compensation, margin of appreciation)",3,159,163,0.8412,"UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania , 2025",,"For instance, in the case Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 81 and 86, the Court noted that the margin of appreciation enjoyed by Contracting States, when the issue involves an assessment of candidates for public procurement and as regards the policy choices as to the mandatory or discretionary exclusion of candidates, is quite broad, though the fair balance principle must still apply.","For instance, in the context of public procurement, the Court held that the margin of appreciation of Contracting States is substantially broader, when the issues involves an assessment of candidates for public procurement and as regards the policy choices as to the mandatory or discretionary exclusion of candidates ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 81 and 86). The Court further extended this finding to cases concerning the choices facing the Contracting States with regard to the obligations imposed on participants in public procurement procedures and the consequences of failures to fulfil those obligations ( UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania, 2025, § 214)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:46264/22|50184/22,UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania,46264/22|50184/22,added,"UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania, nos. 46264/22 and 50184/22, 7 January 2025",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.4.b,Choice of measures,4,,177,,"UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania , 2025",,,"Furthermore, in UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania, 2025, § 232, the Court held - in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic - that the absence of financial sanctions on the public entity responsible for ensuring compliance with public procurement law was not, in itself, sufficient to render the interference with the applicant' companies' property rights disproportionate. Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property"
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:46264/22|50184/22,UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania,46264/22|50184/22,added,"UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania, nos. 46264/22 and 50184/22, 7 January 2025",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.B.4.d,Issues concerning the applicant,4,183,190,0.9241,"In UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania , 2025|OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and Others v. France , 2004|The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy , 2024","Casarin v. Italy , 2021|Others v. France , 2004|ć v. Croatia , 2018","One of the significant factors for the balancing test under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is whether the applicant attempted to take advantage of a weakness or a loophole in the system ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom OGIS-Institut Stanislas, OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and, 1997, § 109; Others v. France, 2004, §§ 69 and 71). Similarly, in G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, § 301, the Court noted that the degree of culpability or negligence on the part of the applicants or, at the very least, the relationship between their conduct and the offence in question may be taken into account in order to assess whether a confiscation was proportionate. Aperson's qualification as an accountant was one of the decisive reasons for deciding that reimbursing excess contributions without interest was proportionate ( Taşkaya v. Turkey (dec.), 2018, §§ 49-50). In certain cases the Pyrantienė v. Lithuania applicant's personal vulnerability is also taken into consideration, as in, 2013, § 62, where the applicant was of pensionable age and suffered from long-term disability). An obligation imposed on the applicant to repay benefits already received in reliance on an administrative decision, in her good faith and where the authorities had made a mistake, while not taking into account her health and financial situation, was considered to be disproportionate ( Čakarević v. Croatia, 2018, §§ 82-90; see also Casarin v. Italy, 2021, § 74). Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property","One of the significant factors for the balancing test under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is whether the applicant attempted to take advantage of a weakness or a loophole in the system ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 109; OGIS-Institut Stanislas, OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and Others v. France, 2004, §§ 69 and 71). Similarly, in G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, § 301, the Court noted that the degree of culpability or negligence on the part of the applicants or, at the very least, the relationship between their conduct and the offence in question may be taken into account in order to assess whether a confiscation was proportionate (see also The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 408). Aperson's qualification as an accountant was one of the decisive reasons for deciding that reimbursing excess contributions without interest was proportionate ( Taşkaya v. Turkey (dec.), 2018, §§ 49-50). In UAB Profarma and UAB Bona Diagnosis v. Lithuania, 2025, § 223, the Court observed that the domestic courts had thoroughly assessed the overall conduct of the applicant companies, in the extraordinary situation created by the public health crisis of Covid-19, which companies had acted in bad faith and had sought to take advantage of the public health emergency in order to make an excessive profit."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:15887/15,Yaylalı v. Serbia,15887/15,added,"Yaylalı v. Serbia, no. 15887/15, 17 September 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A.1.b,Protected “possessions”,4,,17,,"ı v. Serbia , 2024",,,"Similarly, as to the confiscation of lawfully acquired jewellery belonging to the applicant's wife and the imposition of a fine due to a failure to declare the jewellery to customs authorities while transiting through the country, the Court held that it was not in a position to call into question the Constitutional Court's finding that the bracelets were in the applicant's ""possession"". It thus accepted the applicant's victim status ( Yaylalı v. Serbia, 2024, §§ 31-33)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:15887/15,Yaylalı v. Serbia,15887/15,added,"Yaylalı v. Serbia, no. 15887/15, 17 September 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.B.2,Principle of lawfulness,3,125,127,0.8647,"Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan , 2021|Godlevskaya v. Russia , 2021|Taganrog LRO and Others v. Russia , 2022|ı v. Serbia , 2024","Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan Godlevskaya v. Russia Taganrog LRO , 2021|Others v. Russia , 2022","The principle of lawfulness also presupposes that the applicable provisions of domestic law are sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in their application ( Lekić v. Slovenia, 2018, § 95; Beyeler v. Italy [GC], 2000, § 109; Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 42; Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 110; Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], 2014, § 103; Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. and di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 187; Hutten- Czapska v. Poland [GC], 2005, § 163; Vistiņš and Perepjolkins v. Latvia [GC], 2012, §§ 96-97; Imeri v. Croatia, 2021, § 69; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan Godlevskaya v. Russia Taganrog LRO, 2021, § 67;, 2021, §§ 50 and 61-63; and Others v. Russia, 2022, §§ 281-282).","The principle of lawfulness also presupposes that the applicable provisions of domestic law are sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in their application ( Lekić v. Slovenia, 2018, § 95; Beyeler v. Italy [GC], 2000, § 109; Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 42; Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 110; Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], 2014, § 103; Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. and di Stefano v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 187; Hutten-Czapska v. Poland [GC], 2005, § 163; Vistiņš and Perepjolkins v. Latvia [GC], 2012, §§ 96-97; Imeri v. Croatia, 2021, § 69; Democracy and Human Rights Resource Centre and Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 67; Godlevskaya v. Russia, 2021, §§ 50 and 61-63; Taganrog LRO and Others v. Russia, 2022, §§ 281-282). The Court may also consider it appropriate not to address the issue of the lawfulness of an impugned measure, even when the domestic authorities failed to rule on it, when the applicant, although legally represented, did not raise this issue before Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property those authorities and even when, before the Court, the applicants only made a passing reference without providing any arguments as to the precision of foreseeability of the statutory provisions ( Yaylalı v. Serbia, 2024, §§ 44-45)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:15887/15,Yaylalı v. Serbia,15887/15,added,"Yaylalı v. Serbia, no. 15887/15, 17 September 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.B.4.a,Procedural factors,4,164,170,0.9759,"Amerisoc Center S.R.L. v. Luxembourg , 2024|Könyv-Tár Kft and Others v. Hungary , 2018|ı v. Serbia , 2024","Könyv - Tár Kft and Others v. Hungary , 2018","In cases where the applicants did not have the possibility of effectively challenging the measure, the Court has found that an excessive burden had been borne by them ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 49; Könyv - Tár Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2018, § 59; and Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 215). The Court checks whether the procedure applied provided the applicant a fair possibility of defending his or her interests ( Bäck v. Finland, 2004, § 63). Aviolation was found on account of a refusal by the receiver of a credit union to grant its directors access to the union's accounting documents to enable Družstevni Záložna Pria and Others v. the Czech Republic them to show that it was financially sound (, 2008, §§ 94-95). The fact of whether major arguments advanced by the applicants were carefully examined by the authorities is also relevant ( Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 2008, § 74; Novoseletskiy v. Ukraine, 2005, § 111; Bistrović v. Croatia, 2007, § 37). The operation of unchallengeable Papachelas v. Greece presumptions of benefit resulting from expropriation ( [GC], 1999, §§ 53-54), and presumptions used in the context of calculating compensation for expropriation ( Katikaridis and Others v. Greece, 1996, § 49; Efstathiou and Michailidis & Co. Motel Amerika v. Greece, 2003, § 33) were held against the Governments.","In cases where the applicants did not have the possibility of effectively challenging the measure, the Court has found that an excessive burden had been borne by them ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 49; Könyv-Tár Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2018, § 59; Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 215; and Amerisoc Center S.R.L. v. Luxembourg, 2024, § 61). The Court checks whether the procedure applied provided the applicant a fair possibility of defending his or her interests ( Bäck v. Finland, 2004, § 63). Aviolation was found on account of a refusal by the receiver of a credit union to grant its directors access to the union's accounting documents to enable them to show that it was financially sound ( Družstevni Záložna Pria and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2008, §§ 94-95). The fact of whether major arguments advanced by the applicants were carefully examined by the authorities is also relevant ( Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 2008, § 74; Novoseletskiy v. Ukraine, 2005, § 111; Bistrović v. Croatia, 2007, § 37). In this respect, the mandatory nature of the confiscation which left no discretion to the domestic authorities to assess the proportionality of the measure, deprived the applicant of any reasonable opportunity to challenge it effectively ( Yaylalı v. Serbia, 2024, §§ 56-58). Furthermore, the operation of unchallengeable presumptions of benefit resulting from expropriation ( Papachelas v. Greece [GC], 1999, §§ 53-54), and presumptions used in the context of calculating compensation for expropriation ( Katikaridis and Others v. Greece, 1996, § 49; Efstathiou and Michailidis & Co. Motel Amerika v. Greece, 2003, § 33) were held against the Governments. )."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20240828212851__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-08-28,2025-06-12,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2024-08-28__2025-06-12.json,apps:15887/15,Yaylalı v. Serbia,15887/15,added,"Yaylalı v. Serbia, no. 15887/15, 17 September 2024",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,II.B.4.d,Issues concerning the applicant,4,186,194,0.7099,"Court. In Uzan and Others v. Turkey , 2019|ı v. Serbia , 2024","In Uzan and Others v. Turkey , 2019","In Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 212 the Court took into account the absence of evidence to suggest that the applicants could have been involved in any fraud.","The automatic, general and i nflexible nature of the interferences with an applicant's possessions, without any regular individual scrutiny, may also be taken into account by the Court. In Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 212, concerning the preventive attachment of assets belonging to managers or relatives of executives of an insolvent bank, the Court noted the absence of evidence to suggest that the applicants could have been personally implicated in any fraud. Similarly, in Yaylalı v. Serbia, 2024, § 57, in respect of a mandatory confiscation of the applicant's gold jewellery given his failure to declare it, the automatic nature of the measure deprived the applicant of any reasonable opportunity to put his case to the relevant authorities."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20260104030038__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-01-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json,apps:69080/13,Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia,69080/13,added,"Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia, nos. 69080/13 and 4 others, 24 June 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,III.F,Confiscation of the proceeds of crime,2,341,421,0.5664,"Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia , 2025|Aktiva DOO v. Serbia , 2021|Karapetyan v. Georgia , 2020","ş and Others v. Turkey , 2019","The Commission and the Court have dealt with a number of cases concerning different types of social security/State benefits, including pension rights. For a comprehensive recapitulation of the relevant case-law, see Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC], 2016, §§ 80-89, Yavaş and Others v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 39-43.","The Court treats confiscation mainly as a control of the use of property within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, ( Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, § 63; Agosi v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 51; Karapetyan v. Georgia, 2020, § 32; Aktiva DOO v. Serbia, 2021, § 78; Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia, 2025, § 94), even though confiscation, by its very nature, deprives a person of ownership."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20260104030038__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-01-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json,apps:69080/13,Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia,69080/13,added,"Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia, nos. 69080/13 and 4 others, 24 June 2025",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,III.F,Confiscation of the proceeds of crime,2,344,431,0.725,"Imeri v. Croatia , 2021|In Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia , 2025",,"As to the obligation to adhere to an old-age pension scheme, the Court considered in Ackermann and Fuhrmann v. Germany (dec.), 2013, whether the obligatory contributions imposed an excessive burden on the applicants and declared the case manifestly ill-founded. It had regard to the fact that the contribution amounted to approximately 19 per cent of their gross income and was paid in equal shares by applicants and their employers.","In Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia, 2025, § 103, concerning the confiscation of sums of cash that the applicants had failed to declare when crossing Serbia's borders, the Court left the issue of lawfulness open and proceeded to examine the proportionality of the interference. The Court pointed to the narrow review carried out by the domestic courts and found the legislative framework to be too broad. Moreover, the domestic courts, including the Constitutional Court, failed to dispel interpretational doubt as to the applicable provision of domestic law, to conduct a meaningful analysis as to what sanctions had been necessary in each case and to ensure the requisite fair balance between the competing interests ( Ibid., §§ 107-123; see also Imeri v. Croatia, 2021, in the chapter below on the Law of the European Union)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20260104030038__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-01-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json,apps:69080/13,Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia,69080/13,added,"Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia, nos. 69080/13 and 4 others, 24 June 2025",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,III.F,Confiscation of the proceeds of crime,2,359,423,0.6629,"Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia , 2025|Balsamo v. San Marino , 2019|Gogitidze and Others v. Georgia , 2015|Raimondo v. Italy , 1994|Sun v. Russia , 2009","Giavi v. Greece , 2013|Valkov and Others v. Bulgaria , 2011","The Court accepted the distinction that some Contracting States draw, for pension purposes, between civil servants and private employees ( Matheis v. Germany (dec.), 2005, concerning a survivor's pension); Ackermann and Fuhrmann v. Germany (dec.), 2013; Valkov and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 117; Panfile v. Romania (dec.), 2012, § 28; and more recently, Giavi v. Greece, 2013, § 52; Fábián v. Hungary [GC], 2017, §§ 131-132). The logic behind this approach is to be found in the structural differences between the two systems, which in turn justifies different regulations ( Matheis v. Germany (dec.), 2005, and more generally on the differences between various categories of insured persons, Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2010, § 84) (see the sub-chapter on Article 14 for Fábián v. Hungary [GC], 2017).","The same approach was taken in situations where confiscation measures were implemented independently of a criminal charge because the assets concerned were considered as unlawfully acquired, their lawful origin had not been demonstrated, or they had been the instruments of crime ( Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 27; Riela and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2001; Sun v. Russia, 2009, § 25; Arcuri and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2001; C.M. v. France (dec.), 2001; Air Canada v. the United Kingdom, 1995, § 34; Gogitidze and Others v. Georgia, 2015, §§ 94 and 97, concerning a confiscation applied in civil proceedings; Balsamo v. San Marino, 2019, § 81, concerning money laundering proceedings; Ulemek v. Serbia (dec.), 2021, §§ 62-68, concerning subsequent proceedings instituted under a law on seizure and confiscation of the proceeds from crime which was not considered to be criminal in nature; and, Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia, 2025, § 94, concerning the confiscation of the entire or substantial part of the applicant's cash carried across the border without a customs declaration)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20260104030038__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-01-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json,apps:69080/13,Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia,69080/13,added,"Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia, nos. 69080/13 and 4 others, 24 June 2025",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,III.J,Law of the European Union,2,409,489,0.7154,"In Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia , 2025","The Court observed in Gogitidze and Others v. Georgia , 2015","The Court observed in Gogitidze and Others v. Georgia, 2015, § 105, that common European and even universal legal standards can be said to exist which encourage, in the first place, the confiscation of property linked to serious criminal offences such as corruption, money laundering, drug offences and so on, without the prior existence of a criminal conviction. Secondly, the onus of proving the lawful origin of the property presumed to have been wrongfully acquired may legitimately be shifted onto the respondents in such non-criminal proceedings for confiscation, including civil proceedings in rem . Thirdly, confiscation measures may be applied, not only to the direct proceeds of crime but also to property, including any incomes and other indirect benefits, obtained by converting or transforming the direct proceeds of crime or intermingling them with other, possibly lawful, assets. Finally, confiscation measures may be applied, not only to persons directly suspected of criminal offences, but also to any third parties with ownership rights without the requisite bona fide with a view to disguising their wrongful role in amassing the wealth in question.","In Aksüngür and Others v. Serbia, 2025, § 113, concerning the confiscation of the applicant's cash carried across the border without a customs declaration, the Court noted that the decisions to confiscate the entire amounts of undeclared cash (or a significant portion thereof) also appeared to be at odds with the requirement, existing in many Contracting States and EUlaw, that the severity of a penalty, even in order to be lawful, must not be disproportionate to the offence in question."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20260104030038__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-01-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json,apps:84568/17,Bilyavska v. Ukraine,84568/17,added,"Bilyavska v. Ukraine, no. 84568/17, 27 March 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.1,“Three rules” approach,3,101,101,0.9953,"Bilyavska v. Ukraine , 2025",,"The Court's jurisdiction to verify that domestic law has been correctly interpreted and applied is limited and it is not its function to take the place of the national courts. Rather, its role is to ensure that the decisions of those courts are not arbitrary or otherwise manifestly unreasonable ( Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], 2007, § 83). The State may be held responsible for losses caused by such determinations only if the court decisions are not in accordance with domestic law or if they are flawed by arbitrariness or manifest unreasonableness contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 or a person has been arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of property in favour of another ( Bramelid and Malmström v. Sweden, Commission decision, 1982, pp. 82-83; Dabić v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), 2001; Vulakh and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 44).","The Court's jurisdiction to verify that domestic law has been correctly interpreted and applied is limited and it is not its function to take the place of the national courts. Rather, its role is to ensure that the decisions of those courts are not arbitrary or otherwise manifestly unreasonable ( Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], 2007, § 83). The State may be held responsible for losses caused by such determinations only if the court decisions are not in accordance with domestic law or if they are flawed by arbitrariness or manifest unreasonableness contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ( Bilyavska v. Ukraine, 2025, § 39) or a person has been arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of property in favour of another ( Bramelid and Malmström v. Sweden, Commission decision, 1982, pp. 82-83; Dabić v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), 2001; Vulakh and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 44)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20260104030038__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-01-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json,apps:84568/17,Bilyavska v. Ukraine,84568/17,added,"Bilyavska v. Ukraine, no. 84568/17, 27 March 2025",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C,Positive obligations on member States,2,,223,,,,,"In Bilyavska v. Ukraine, no, 2025, §§ 44-48, the applicant unsuccessfully took an eviction action against her adult children and their families, whose behaviour had made it impossible for her to live in a house she owned. The Court found it difficult to accept that the domestic courts had complied with their positive duty to adjudicate private property disputes in a manner that would not be arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20260104030038__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-01-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json,apps:84568/17,Bilyavska v. Ukraine,84568/17,added,"Bilyavska v. Ukraine, no. 84568/17, 27 March 2025",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C,Positive obligations on member States,2,215,215,0.9901,"Bilyavska v. Ukraine , 2025",,"Genuine, effective exercise of the right protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not depend merely on the State's duty not to interfere, but may require positive measures of protection, particularly where there is a direct link between the measures an applicant may legitimately expect from the authorities and his effective enjoyment of his ""possessions"" ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 134; Dabić v. Croatia, 2021, § 51), even in cases involving litigation between private individuals or companies ( Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, 2002, § 96; Antonopoulou v. Greece (dec.), 2021, § 55).","Genuine, effective exercise of the right protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not depend merely on the State's duty not to interfere, but may require positive measures of protection, particularly where there is a direct link between the measures an applicant may legitimately expect from the authorities and his effective enjoyment of his ""possessions"" ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 134; Dabić v. Croatia, 2021, § 51), even in cases involving litigation between private individuals or companies ( Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, 2002, § 96; Antonopoulou v. Greece (dec.), 2021, § 55; Bilyavska v. Ukraine, 2025, § 39)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20260104030038__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-01-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json,apps:84568/17,Bilyavska v. Ukraine,84568/17,added,"Bilyavska v. Ukraine, no. 84568/17, 27 March 2025",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,Tenancies and rent control,2,,344,,"In Bilyavska v. Ukraine , 2025",,,"In Bilyavska v. Ukraine, 2025, §§ 44-48, the applicant brought an eviction action against her adult children and their families, on account of their behavior which had made it impossible for her to live in the house she owned. The Court found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 based on the domestic courts'failure to adjudicate the dispute in a manner that would not be arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. The domestic courts had essentially validated a very heavy burden on the applicant, despite her undisputed ownership rights and the evidence she submitted regarding her housing needs as well as the behaviour of the defendants. They did so without any attempt to assess the balance between the interests at stake."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20260104030038__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-01-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json,apps:17985/18,Păcurar v. Romania,17985/18,added,"Păcurar v. Romania, no. 17985/18, 24 June 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.2,Principle of lawfulness,3,137,137,0.9776,"ăcurar v. Romania , 2025",,"In Markus v. Latvia, 2020, § 75, the Court held that a confiscation punishment was unlawful because the impugned domestic regulation lacked clarity and foreseeability, did not afford the necessary procedural safeguards, and provided no protection against arbitrariness. The case concerned an ancillary penalty of confiscation of property. However, the domestic court did not specify the property to be confiscated, and instead applied the measure to all properties owned by the applicant. Moreover, there was uncertainty and divergent case-law concerning the trial court's ability to determine the extent of the confiscation. The Court held that, where regulation leaves such uncertainty concerning the trial court's competence, it cannot be regarded as foreseeable and does not provide protection against arbitrariness. It may also seriously impede a person's ability to present his or her case effectively before the court. Moreover, the compulsory nature of the confiscation punishment had deprived the applicants concerned of any possibility to argue their cases and of any Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property prospects of success. Lastly, the exact scope of the punishment being determined at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, by a decision that is designed to serve a different purpose, cannot be regarded as affording the individual a reasonable opportunity of putting his or her case to the competent authorities ( ibid., § 73).","In Markus v. Latvia, 2020, § 75, the Court held that a confiscation punishment was unlawful because the impugned domestic regulation lacked clarity and foreseeability, did not afford the necessary procedural safeguards, and provided no protection against arbitrariness. The case concerned an ancillary penalty of confiscation of property. However, the domestic court did not specify the property to be confiscated, and instead applied the measure to all properties owned by the applicant. Moreover, there was uncertainty and divergent case-law concerning the trial court's ability to determine the extent of the confiscation. The Court held that, where regulation leaves such uncertainty concerning the trial court's competence, it cannot be regarded as foreseeable and does not provide protection against arbitrariness. It may also seriously impede a person's ability to present his or her case effectively before the court. Moreover, the compulsory nature of the confiscation punishment had deprived the applicants concerned of any possibility to argue their cases and of any prospects of success. Lastly, the exact scope of the punishment being determined at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, by a decision that is designed to serve a different purpose, cannot be regarded as affording the individual a reasonable opportunity of putting his or her case to the competent authorities ( ibid., § 73). Conversely, in Păcurar v. Romania, 2025, §§ 173-179 and 199-200, concerning the confiscation of assets belonging to the applicant (a high-ranking police chief), which were deemed by the court in civil proceedings to be unexplained, the Court found that the legal framework on integrity in the exercise of public office provided for sufficient safeguards so as to ensure the proportionality of the measure."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20260104030038__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-01-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json,apps:17985/18,Păcurar v. Romania,17985/18,added,"Păcurar v. Romania, no. 17985/18, 24 June 2025",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,III.F,Confiscation of the proceeds of crime,2,349,416,0.7397,"ăcurar v. Romania , 2025","Moskal v. Poland , 2009","The importance of procedural safeguards in the fair balance assessment in the context of social insurance rights is illustrated by the fact that a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was found in a case where a decision awarding a social insurance benefit to the applicant was subsequently reversed on the basis of a reassessment of the applicant's original file ( Moskal v. Poland, 2009, § 56).","In Păcurar v. Romania, 2025, § 200, concerning a non-conviction based confiscation of assets belonging to the applicant, a high-ranking police chief, on the basis of the legal framework on integrity in the exercise of public office, the Court underlined that that the proceedings, which were based on a procedure which was in line with the relevant international standards, did not upset the requisite fair balance between the protection of the right of property and the requirements of the general interest (for further details see above the chapter on Principle of lawfulness)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20260104030038__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-01-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json,apps:12432/22,Radelić v. Croatia,12432/22,added,"Radelić v. Croatia, no. 12432/22, 13 May 2025",1,citation_field_name_match,paragraph_added,III.B,Social welfare cases,2,,353,,"Casarin v. Italy , 2021|Kjartan Ásmundsson v. Iceland , 2004|Klein v. Austria , 2011|Moskal v. Poland , 2009|Stefanetti and Others v. Italy , 2014|ć v. Croatia , 2018|Šeiko v. Lithuania , 2020",,,"However, the fair balance test in the context of social insurance carried out by the Court is not based solely on the amount or percentage of the loss suffered in the abstract. The Court examines all the relevant elements against the case-specific background ( Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 117 and Stefanetti and Others v. Italy, 2014, § 59). The specific factors relevant for assessing the proportionality of an interference in the area of social insurance include the discriminatory nature of any loss of entitlement ( Kjartan Ásmundsson v. Iceland, 2004, § 43); any arbitrariness of a condition ( Klein v. Austria, 2011, § 55); the applicant's good faith ( Moskal v. Poland, 2009, § 44; Čakarević v. Croatia, 2018, §§ 60-65; Casarin v. Italy, 2021, § 74) the applicant ́s conviction resulting in the recovery of damages by attaching her old-age pension on a monthly basis and the fact that she was not devoid of all means of subsistence ( Šeiko v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 32-35). Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property"
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20260104030038__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-01-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json,apps:12432/22,Radelić v. Croatia,12432/22,added,"Radelić v. Croatia, no. 12432/22, 13 May 2025",2,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,III.F,Confiscation of the proceeds of crime,2,350,430,0.7201,,"Moskal v. Poland , 2009|ć and Others v. Montenegro and Serbia , 2011","In situations of suspension of benefits, the availability of a transitional period when entitled persons could adjust to the new scheme is one of the proportionality factors which operates in favour of the respondent State ( Lakićević and Others v. Montenegro and Serbia, 2011, § 72; Moskal v. Poland, 2009, § 74, where the applicant was faced, practically from one day to the next, with the total loss of her early-retirement pension, which constituted her sole source of income, and with poor prospects of being able to adapt to the change).","Nevertheless, in Radelić v. Croatia, §§ 55-63, where the proceeds of crime acquired by a company which went bankrupt and ceased to exist, were confiscated from its director and sole shareholder who was found guilty of the criminal offence of business fraud with the intent of acquiring illegal gain for the company's benefit, the Court found that the measure was unlawful. The Penal Code did not provide for confiscation of the proceeds of crime from the perpetrator if acquired for the benefit of another person (natural or legal). The imposition of the confiscation measure was therefore not foreseeable under domestic law and inconsistent with the nature of the offence of which he was convicted."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20260104030038__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-01-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json,apps:38785/18,Radobuljac v. Croatia (no. 2),38785/18,added,"Radobuljac v. Croatia (no. 2), no. 38785/18, 17 June 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.B.3,Public or general interest,3,145,145,0.9982,,,"The following purposes have been found by the Court to fall within the notion of public interest within the meaning of this provision: elimination of social injustice in the housing sector ( James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 45; Grozdanić and Gršković ‐ Grozdanić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-103; see also Maria Azzopardi v. Malta, 2022, §§ 53 and 60 for the provision of residential homes in the context of the State's economic and planning policies); combating the effects of a foreign-currency loan crisis particularly in the context of preventing mass homelessness ( Béla Németh v. Hungary, 2020, §§ 42-45); nationalisation of specific industries ( Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, §§ 9 and 109); regulation of the energy sector ( Salento Energy S.r.l. and Nuovo Sole S.r.l. v. Italy (dec.), 2024, § 37); adoption of land and city development plans ( Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 1982, § 69); Cooperativa La Laurentina v. Italy, 2001, § 94; securing land in connection with the implementation of the local land development plan ( Skibińscy v. Poland, 2006, § 86); prevention of tax evasion ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 39); securing payment of a tax debt ( Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 58); road traffic safety ( Pannon Plakát Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2022, § 48); measures to combat drug trafficking and smuggling ( Butler v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2002); protection of cultural heritage against unlawful exportation from the country of origin or ensuring its recovery and return therein ( The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 342); protection of the interests of the victims of the crime ( Šeiko v. Lithuania, 2020, § 31); measures to restrict the consumption of alcohol ( Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden, 1989, § 62); protection of morals ( Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, § 62); control of legitimate origin of cars brought into circulation ( Sildedzis v. Poland, 2005, § 50); confiscation of monies acquired unlawfully ( Honecker and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2001; the prevention of collusive practices and the protection of the public purse and promotion of fair competition ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, § 78); transition from a socialist to a free-market economy ( Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], 2018, §§ 103 and 105); and the smooth operation of the justice system, with further references to the importance of administering justice without delays which might jeopardise its effectiveness and credibility ( Konstantin Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2015, § 64). However, in view of the contractual relationship between the applicants and the debtor which was of a purely business-law nature, the Court did not retain the protection of consumers as a legitimate aim in the circumstances of the case ( Katona and Závarský v. Slovakia, 2023, § 59).","The following purposes have been found by the Court to fall within the notion of public interest within the meaning of this provision: elimination of social injustice in the housing sector ( James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 45; Grozdanić and Gršković ‐ Grozdanić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-103; see also Maria Azzopardi v. Malta, 2022, §§ 53 and 60 for the provision of residential homes in the context of the State's economic and planning policies); combating the effects of a foreign-currency loan crisis particularly in the context of preventing mass homelessness ( Béla Németh v. Hungary, 2020, §§ 42-45); nationalisation of specific industries ( Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, §§ 9 and 109); regulation of the energy sector ( Salento Energy S.r.l. and Nuovo Sole S.r.l. v. Italy (dec.), 2024, § 37); adoption of land and city development plans ( Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 1982, § 69); Cooperativa La Laurentina v. Italy, 2001, § 94; securing land in connection with the implementation of the local land development plan ( Skibińscy v. Poland, 2006, § 86); prevention of tax evasion ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 39); securing payment of a tax debt ( Rustamkhanli v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 58; Radobuljac v. Croatia (no. 2), 2025, § 47); road traffic safety ( Pannon Plakát Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2022, § 48); measures to combat drug trafficking and smuggling ( Butler Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2002); protection of cultural heritage against unlawful exportation from the country of origin or ensuring its recovery and return therein ( The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 342); protection of the interests of the victims of the crime ( Šeiko v. Lithuania, 2020, § 31); measures to restrict the consumption of alcohol ( Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden, 1989, § 62); protection of morals ( Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 1976, § 62); control of legitimate origin of cars brought into circulation ( Sildedzis v. Poland, 2005, § 50); confiscation of monies acquired unlawfully ( Honecker and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2001; the prevention of collusive practices and the protection of the public purse and promotion of fair competition ( Kurban v. Turkey, 2020, § 78); transition from a socialist to a free-market economy ( Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], 2018, §§ 103 and 105); and the smooth operation of the justice system, with further references to the importance of administering justice without delays which might jeopardise its effectiveness and credibility ( Konstantin Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2015, § 64). However, in view of the contractual relationship between the applicants and the debtor which was of a purely business-law nature, the Court did not retain the protection of consumers as a legitimate aim in the circumstances of the case ( Katona and Závarský v. Slovakia, 2023, § 59)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20260104030038__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-01-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json,apps:38785/18,Radobuljac v. Croatia (no. 2),38785/18,added,"Radobuljac v. Croatia (no. 2), no. 38785/18, 17 June 2025",2,citation_field_name_match,paragraph_added,III.B,Social welfare cases,2,,353,,"Casarin v. Italy , 2021|Kjartan Ásmundsson v. Iceland , 2004|Klein v. Austria , 2011|Moskal v. Poland , 2009|Stefanetti and Others v. Italy , 2014|ć v. Croatia , 2018|Šeiko v. Lithuania , 2020",,,"However, the fair balance test in the context of social insurance carried out by the Court is not based solely on the amount or percentage of the loss suffered in the abstract. The Court examines all the relevant elements against the case-specific background ( Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 117 and Stefanetti and Others v. Italy, 2014, § 59). The specific factors relevant for assessing the proportionality of an interference in the area of social insurance include the discriminatory nature of any loss of entitlement ( Kjartan Ásmundsson v. Iceland, 2004, § 43); any arbitrariness of a condition ( Klein v. Austria, 2011, § 55); the applicant's good faith ( Moskal v. Poland, 2009, § 44; Čakarević v. Croatia, 2018, §§ 60-65; Casarin v. Italy, 2021, § 74) the applicant ́s conviction resulting in the recovery of damages by attaching her old-age pension on a monthly basis and the fact that she was not devoid of all means of subsistence ( Šeiko v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 32-35). Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property"
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20260104030038__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-01-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json,apps:38785/18,Radobuljac v. Croatia (no. 2),38785/18,added,"Radobuljac v. Croatia (no. 2), no. 38785/18, 17 June 2025",3,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.D,Taxation,2,,407,,,,,"In Radobuljac v. Croatia (no. 2), 2025, §§ 43-46 and 54-55, having regard to the broad margin of appreciation accorded to the States in the field of taxation, the Court ruled that the refusal to offset the applicant's tax debt against his enforceable claims, arising from a legal relationship unrelated to taxation, was neither arbitrary nor manifestly unreasonable. This measure did not place an excessive individual burden on the applicant, particularly given that the sums imposed did not undermine his financial situation or professional activities."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20260104030038__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-01-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json,apps:30085/13,Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova,30085/13,added,"Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 30085/13, 15 May 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.B.1,“Three rules” approach,3,96,96,0.9919,,,"In some cases it is more difficult for the Court to qualify a measure or a series of measures as either deprivation or control of use of property, essentially because it cannot be easily assimilated to measures qualified in the existing case-law or because the series of measures consists of disparate decisions belonging to various branches of domestic law. In such cases it will probably analyse the circumstances of the case under the general principle of the first sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. This will apply in particular to situations where not just one decision, but a combination of various measures/decisions affected the applicant's property ( Ðokić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, §§ 55-56 - a contract of purchase in respect of a flat legally valid, applicant registered as an owner, but unable to have the flat restored to him; Matos e Silva, Lda., and Others v. Portugal, 1996, § 85 - in the absence of a formal expropriation decision restrictions on the right to property stemmed from the reduced ability to dispose of it and from the damage caused by the fact that expropriation was contemplated; but the applicants continued to work the land; and The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 278 - the recovery of an unlawfully exported cultural object through a measure that, although adopted within criminal proceedings, had civil effects). In a case where the applicants complained that their rights had been violated on account of the discrepancy between the assessments of the market value of expropriated property for the purposes of the determination of compensation and for the purposes of inheritance tax in respect of the same property, expropriation and taxation were examined separately and no violation was found. However, the combined effect of both measures was examined under the first rule and resulted in a finding of a violation ( Jokela v. Finland, 2002, §§ 61-65).","In some cases it is more difficult for the Court to qualify a measure or a series of measures as either deprivation or control of use of property, essentially because it cannot be easily assimilated to measures qualified in the existing case-law or because the series of measures consists of disparate decisions belonging to various branches of domestic law. In such cases it will probably analyse the circumstances of the case under the general principle of the first sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. This will apply in particular to situations where not just one decision, but a combination of various measures/decisions affected the applicant's property ( Ðokić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010, §§ 55-56 - a contract of purchase in respect of a flat legally valid, applicant registered as an owner, but unable to have the flat restored to him; Matos e Silva, Lda., and Others v. Portugal, 1996, § 85 - in the absence of a formal expropriation decision restrictions on the right to property stemmed from the reduced ability to dispose of it and from the damage caused by the fact that expropriation was contemplated; but the applicants continued to work the land; The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, § 278 - the recovery of an unlawfully exported cultural object through a measure that, although adopted within criminal proceedings, had civil effects; and Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, 2025, §§ 56-57, - the enforcement of an order to pay compensation resulting in the sale of the applicant company's property, all without its knowledge, and the lack of assessment of the proportionality of the compensation by the domestic courts). In a case where the applicants complained that their rights had been violated on account of the discrepancy between the assessments of the market value of expropriated property for the purposes of the determination of compensation and for the purposes of inheritance tax in respect of the same property, expropriation and taxation were examined separately and no violation was found. However, the combined effect of both measures was examined under the first rule and resulted in a finding of a violation ( Jokela v. Finland, 2002, §§ 61-65)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20260104030038__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-01-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json,apps:30085/13,Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova,30085/13,added,"Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 30085/13, 15 May 2025",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.B.4.a,Procedural factors,4,170,170,0.9832,,,"In cases where the applicants did not have the possibility of effectively challenging the measure, the Court has found that an excessive burden had been borne by them ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 49; Könyv-Tár Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2018, § 59; Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 215; and Amerisoc Center S.R.L. v. Luxembourg, 2024, § 61). The Court checks whether the procedure applied provided the applicant a fair possibility of defending his or her interests ( Bäck v. Finland, 2004, § 63). Aviolation was found on account of a refusal by the receiver of a credit union to grant its directors access to the union's accounting documents to enable them to show that it was financially sound ( Družstevni Záložna Pria and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2008, §§ 94-95). The fact of whether major arguments advanced by the applicants were carefully examined by the authorities is also relevant ( Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 2008, § 74; Novoseletskiy v. Ukraine, 2005, § 111; Bistrović v. Croatia, 2007, § 37). In this respect, the mandatory nature of the confiscation which left no discretion to the domestic authorities to assess the proportionality of the measure, deprived the applicant of any reasonable opportunity to challenge it effectively ( Yaylalı v. Serbia, 2024, §§ 56-58). Furthermore, the operation of unchallengeable presumptions of benefit resulting from expropriation ( Papachelas v. Greece [GC], 1999, §§ 53-54), and presumptions used in the context of calculating compensation for expropriation ( Katikaridis and Others v. Greece, 1996, § 49; Efstathiou and Michailidis & Co. Motel Amerika v. Greece, 2003, § 33) were held against the Governments. ).","In cases where the applicants did not have the possibility of effectively challenging the measure, the Court has found that an excessive burden had been borne by them ( Hentrich v. France, 1994, § 49; Könyv-Tár Kft and Others v. Hungary, 2018, § 59; Uzan and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 215; and Amerisoc Center S.R.L. v. Luxembourg, 2024, § 61). The Court checks whether the procedure applied provided the applicant a fair possibility of defending his or her interests ( Bäck v. Finland, 2004, § 63). For instance, a Aviolation was found on account of a refusal by the receiver of a credit union to grant its directors access to the union's accounting documents to enable them to show that it was financially sound ( Družstevni Záložna Pria and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2008, §§ 94-95) or on account of a domestic court's order to pay compensation resulting in the sale of the applicant company's property, all without its knowledge ( Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, 2025, §§ 56-59). The fact of whether major arguments advanced by the applicants were carefully examined by the authorities is Guide on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property also relevant ( Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 2008, § 74; Novoseletskiy v. Ukraine, 2005, § 111; Bistrović v. Croatia, 2007, § 37). In this respect, the mandatory nature of the confiscation which left no discretion to the domestic authorities to assess the proportionality of the measure, deprived the applicant of any reasonable opportunity to challenge it effectively ( Yaylalı v. Serbia, 2024, §§ 56-58). Furthermore, the operation of unchallengeable presumptions of benefit resulting from expropriation ( Papachelas v. Greece [GC], 1999, §§ 53-54), and presumptions used in the context of calculating compensation for expropriation ( Katikaridis and Others v. Greece, 1996, § 49; Efstathiou and Michailidis & Co. Motel Amerika v. Greece, 2003, § 33) were held against the Governments. )."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20260104030038__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-01-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json,apps:30085/13,Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova,30085/13,added,"Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 30085/13, 15 May 2025",3,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.D.3.4,Article 6,4,,273,,,,,"In addition, in a case where the enforcement of an order to pay compensation resulted in the sale of the applicant company's property, all without its knowledge, and where the domestic courts made no attempt to analyse the applicant company's arguments despite their being specific, relevant and important for the outcome of the case, the Court concluded that the State had failed to fulfil its duty to set up a proper forum for the applicant company to assert its rights effectively. It found both a violation of Article 6 and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention ( Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, 2025, §§ 47-48 and 58-59)."
1b1f8de345be,Article 1 Protocol 1,20250612193940__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20260104030038__guide_art_1_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-01-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1b1f8de345be/diff_2025-06-12__2026-01-04.json,apps:8019/16,Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC],8019/16,added,"Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 3 others, 9 July 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.D.6,Article 8,3,,291,,,,,"Furthermore, the case of Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025, concerned a systemic campaign of large-scale destruction, looting and expropriation without compensation of property belonging to civilians and private enterprises, from 11 May 2014 to 16 September 2022, in areas of Ukraine occupied by the separatists and the Russian armed forces. The Court had sufficient evidence in its possession to enable it to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that there had been an administrative practice in violation of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and, from 24 February 2022, in so far as this practice concerned the destruction and looting of homes and personal possessions, also in breach of Article 8 of the Convention ( ibid ., § 1127, in relation to Article 8, and §§ 1452-53, regarding Article 1 of Protocol No. 1)."
1d874b186d3e,Terrorism,20230923180420__guide_terrorism_eng.pdf,20251025084811__guide_terrorism_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2025-10-25,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1d874b186d3e/diff_2023-09-23__2025-10-25.json,apps:6383/17,Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania,6383/17,added,"Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania, no. 6383/17, 16 January 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.E.4,Secret detention,3,48,48,0.9967,"Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania , 2024",,"In the case of Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, 2018, the applicant submitted that the national authorities had allowed USintelligence agents to transfer him to Lithuanian territory in the framework of the secret ""extra ordinary rendition "" programme and to subject him to ill-treatment and arbitrary detention in a CIAsecret prison. The applicant also complained that no effective investigation had been initiated into his allegations. In this case the Court had had to establish the facts itself because the applicant was still being detained by the USauthorities. It found a violation of Article 3 on account, firstly, of the lack of an effective investigation into the applicant's allegations, and secondly, of the State's complicity in the CIA's actions. It also found a violation of Articles 5, 8, and 13 read in conjunction with Article 3. More specifically, the Court noted that the Lithuanian authorities had known that the CIAhad a secret prison in their territory, that it had detained the applicant for over a year and that it had subjected the latter to treatment contrary to Article 3. Furthermore, the national authorities had permitted the applicant's transfer to another USdetention site in Afghanistan (see also Nasr and Ghali v. Italy, 2016, and Al Nashiri v. Poland, 2014).","In the case of Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, 2018, the applicant submitted that the national authorities had allowed USintelligence agents to transfer him to Lithuanian territory in the framework of the secret ""extraordinary rendition "" programme and to subject him to ill-treatment and arbitrary detention in a CIAsecret prison. The applicant also complained that no effective investigation had been initiated into his allegations. In this case the Court had had to establish the facts itself because the applicant was still being detained by the USauthorities. It found a violation of Article 3 on account, firstly, of the lack of an effective investigation into the applicant's allegations, and secondly, of the State's complicity in the CIA's actions. It also found a violation of Articles 5, 8, and 13 read in conjunction with Article 3. More specifically, the Court noted that the Lithuanian authorities had known that the CIAhad a secret prison in their territory, that it had detained the applicant for over a year and that it had subjected the latter to treatment contrary to Article 3. Furthermore, the national authorities had permitted the applicant's transfer to another USdetention site in Afghanistan (see also Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania, 2024, Nasr and Ghali v. Italy, 2016, and Al Nashiri v. Poland, 2014)."
1d874b186d3e,Terrorism,20230923180420__guide_terrorism_eng.pdf,20251025084811__guide_terrorism_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2025-10-25,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1d874b186d3e/diff_2023-09-23__2025-10-25.json,apps:34749/16|79607/17,Domenjoud v. France,34749/16|79607/17,added,"Domenjoud v. France, nos. 34749/16 and 79607/17, 16 May 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,VI,Derogations in emergency situations,1,131,133,0.9552,,,"The Court had ruled that terrorism in Northern Ireland constituted a public emergency because it had for a number of years represented ""a particularly far -reaching and acute danger for the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, the institutions of the six counties and the lives of the province 's inhabitants"" ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, §§ 205 and 212; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 48; Marshall v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2001). It reached the same conclusions in respect to the PKK's terrorist actions in south-eastern Turkey ( Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, § 70), the imminent threat of serious terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom after 11 September 2001 ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 181) and the attempted military coup in Turkey in 2016 ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 91-93; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 75-77). It further specified that the requirement of imminence cannot be interpreted so narrowly as to require a State to wait for disaster to strike before taking measures to deal with it ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 177). We should also point out that in November 2015 the French authorities informed the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of their decision to derogate from the Convention pursuant to Article 15 thereof in the framework of the state of emergency introduced following the large-sale terrorist attacks perpetrated in Paris.","The Court had ruled that terrorism in Northern Ireland constituted a public emergency because it had for a number of years represented ""a particularly far -reaching and acute danger for the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, the institutions of the six counties and the lives of the province 's inhabitants"" ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, §§ 205 and 212; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 48; Marshall v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2001). It reached the same conclusions in respect to the PKK's terrorist actions in south-eastern Turkey ( Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, § 70), the imminent threat of serious terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom after 11 September 2001 ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 181) and the attempted military coup in Turkey in 2016 ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 91-93; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 75-77). It further specified that the requirement of imminence cannot be interpreted so narrowly as to require a State to wait for disaster to strike before taking measures to deal with it ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 177). We should also point out that in November 2015 the French authorities informed the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of their decision to derogate from the Convention pursuant to Article 15 thereof in the framework of the state of emergency introduced following the large-sale terrorist attacks perpetrated in Paris. In Domenjoud v. France the Court was asked to assess a situation where an individual measure was implemented for reasons different from those that justified declaring the state of emergency. It clarified that emergency laws could not be used by domestic authorities to impose restrictions on freedoms unless they were directly related to the circumstances that prompted the enactment of that legislation. However, it acknowledged that authorities might need to make operational decisions during an emergency situation to fulfill their responsibilities. Thus, there could be an indirect link between the aim pursued when declaring a state of emergency, and the justification for measures taken on the basis thereof, provided that the link was strong enough to eliminate any possibility of abuse. Furthermore, the Court emphasised the importance of ensuring that protection against arbitrariness had been effective in this case, particularly by reviewing the adequacy of the link between the measures and the state of emergency framework."
1d874b186d3e,Terrorism,20230923180420__guide_terrorism_eng.pdf,20251025084811__guide_terrorism_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2025-10-25,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1d874b186d3e/diff_2023-09-23__2025-10-25.json,apps:31913/21,M.B. v. France,31913/21,added,"M.B. v. France, no. 31913/21, 5 December 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.A,House arrest/restrictions on freedom of movement,2,,83,,"M.B. v. France , 2024",,,"The Court assessed an order for the administrative control and monitoring of an individual ( mesure individuelle de contrôle administratif et de surveillance - ""MICAS"") in M.B. v. France, 2024. The authorities issued the MICASorder in respect of the applicant on counter-terrorism grounds in 2020, prohibiting the applicant from leaving an area corresponding to four departments of the Paris region and requiring him to report daily to the police station nearest to his home for two months and eight days. Assessing the legal basis for a MICASorder, the Court found the law to be clear, as it was strictly limited to the fight against terrorism, was addressed to a relatively small number of individuals, and could not entail house arrest but only prohibit leaving a given territory and an obligation to report to the police daily. Furthermore, for a MICASorder to be issued, the authorities had to demonstrate, cumulatively, substantial grounds to believe that a person's conduct poses a particula rly grave threat to public safety and order, and that that person had links to terrorism in one of the ways defined by the law. It noted that such a measure could only be justified by concrete and tangible acts or behaviours. The Court also found that the law provided sufficient safeguards against abuse, as it regulated the duration of a MICAS, its terms and the obligations stemming from it and provided for periodic review. The MICASorder had to be reasoned and was amenable to judicial review within a particularly short period (§§ 52-56)."
1e58f64bfb7a,Article 12,20230923091656__guide_art_12_eng.pdf,20231206112748__guide_art_12_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-12-06,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/1e58f64bfb7a/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json,apps:27094/20,Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye,27094/20,added,"Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye,* no. 27094/20, 27 June 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A.5,Divorce,3,50,50,0.8681,"In Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye , 2023",,"In F. v. Switzerland, 1987, the Court found that the prohibition period imposed on the party at fault in the event of a divorce granted on the ground of adultery, which may range from one to three years, affected the very essence of the right to marry and was disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. On the other hand, in K.M. v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision, 1997, a limitation requiring compliance with the domestic law requirement that there should be a valid dissolution of a prior marriage did not amount to an unreasonable restriction on the right to re-marry.","In F. v. Switzerland, 1987, the Court found that the prohibition period imposed on the party at fault in the event of a divorce granted on the ground of adultery, which may range from one to three years, affected the very essence of the right to marry and was disproportionate to the legitimate aim  pursued. In Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye, 2023, the Court found that the refusal to exempt a woman, without her undergoing a medical examination to prove that she was not pregnant, from the 300-day waiting period imposed on divorced women wishing to remarry constituted discrimination on the grounds of sex in breach of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 12. Even assuming that determining parentage constituted a legitimate aim in the pursuit of which the waiting period in question had been imposed on divorced women, the Court found it pointless and ineffective while noting the sexist stereotypes relied on by the domestic court, namely that women had a duty to society on account of their potential role as mother and their capacity to give birth."
1e58f64bfb7a,Article 12,20231206112748__guide_art_12_eng.pdf,20250906135625__guide_art_12_eng.pdf,2023-12-06,2025-09-06,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1e58f64bfb7a/diff_2023-12-06__2025-09-06.json,apps:6167/73,X v. Federal Republic of Germany,6167/73,added,"X v. Federal Republic of Germany, no. 6167/73, Commission decision of 18 December 1974, Collection of decisions 1, p. 65",1,paragraph_text_name_match,unchanged,I.A.1,Procedural rules,3,7,7,,,,"The Court has reiterated that marriage is not considered simply as a form of expression of thought, conscience or religion protected under Article 9 of the Convention, but is governed by the specific provision of Article 12 of the Convention, which refers to the national laws governing the exercise of the right to marry (X v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1974, Commission decision). An obligation to contract a marriage in accordance with forms prescribed by law rather than a particular religious ritual is not a refusal of the right to marry (ibid.).","The Court has reiterated that marriage is not considered simply as a form of expression of thought, conscience or religion protected under Article 9 of the Convention, but is governed by the specific provision of Article 12 of the Convention, which refers to the national laws governing the exercise of the right to marry (X v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1974, Commission decision). An obligation to contract a marriage in accordance with forms prescribed by law rather than a particular religious ritual is not a refusal of the right to marry (ibid.)."
1e58f64bfb7a,Article 12,20231206112748__guide_art_12_eng.pdf,20250906135625__guide_art_12_eng.pdf,2023-12-06,2025-09-06,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/1e58f64bfb7a/diff_2023-12-06__2025-09-06.json,apps:2300/64,X v. Federal Republic of Germany,2300/64,removed,"X v. Federal Republic of Germany, no. 2300/64, Commission decision of 10 February 1967, Collection of decisions 22, pp. 73-84",1,paragraph_text_name_match,unchanged,I.A.1,Procedural rules,3,7,7,,,,"The Court has reiterated that marriage is not considered simply as a form of expression of thought, conscience or religion protected under Article 9 of the Convention, but is governed by the specific provision of Article 12 of the Convention, which refers to the national laws governing the exercise of the right to marry (X v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1974, Commission decision). An obligation to contract a marriage in accordance with forms prescribed by law rather than a particular religious ritual is not a refusal of the right to marry (ibid.).","The Court has reiterated that marriage is not considered simply as a form of expression of thought, conscience or religion protected under Article 9 of the Convention, but is governed by the specific provision of Article 12 of the Convention, which refers to the national laws governing the exercise of the right to marry (X v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1974, Commission decision). An obligation to contract a marriage in accordance with forms prescribed by law rather than a particular religious ritual is not a refusal of the right to marry (ibid.)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20230923032746__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:1162/22,Auray and Others v. France,1162/22,added,"Auray and Others v. France,* no. 1162/22, 8 February 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,I.E,Deprivation of liberty outside formal arrest and detention,2,19,19,0.9987,,"Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan , 2010|Lavents v. Latvia , 2002|Mancini v. Italy , 2001|Osypenko v. Ukraine , 2010|Riad and Idiab v. Belgium , 2008|Salayev v. Azerbaijan , 2010","The question of applicability of Article 5 has arisen in a variety of circumstances, including: ▪ the placement of individuals in psychiatric or social care institutions ( De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, 1971; Nielsen v. Denmark, 1988; H.M. v. Switzerland, 2002; H.L. v. the United Kingdom, 2004; Storck v. Germany, 2005; A. and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011; Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012); ▪ taking of an individual by paramedics and police officers to hospitals ( Aftanache v. Romania, 2020); ▪ confinement in airport transit zones ( Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019; Amuur v. France, 1996; Shamsa v. Poland, 2003; Mogoş and Others v. Romania (dec.), 2004; Mahdid and Haddar v. Austria (dec.), 2005; Riad and Idiab v. Belgium, 2008); ▪ confinement in land border transit zones ( Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019; R.R. and Others v. Hungary, 2021); ▪ questioning in a police station ( Cazan v. Romania, 2016; I.I. v. Bulgaria, 2005; Osypenko v. Ukraine, 2010; Salayev v. Azerbaijan, 2010; Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2010; Creangă v. Romania [GC], 2012); ▪ placement in a police car to draw up an administrative-offence report ( Zelčs v. Latvia, 2020); ▪ stops and searches by the police ( Foka v. Turkey, 2008; Gillan and Quinton v. the United Kingdom, 2010; Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011); ▪ ( house search Stănculeanu v. Romania, 2018); ▪ police escorting ( Rozhkov v. Russia (no. 2), 2017; Tsvetkova and Others v. Russia, 2018); ▪ crowd control measures adopted by the police on public order grounds ( Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012); ▪ house arrest ( Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], 2016; Mancini v. Italy, 2001; Lavents v. Latvia, 2002; Nikolova v. Bulgaria (no. 2), 2004; Dacosta Silva v. Spain, 2006). ▪ holding sea-migrants in reception facilities and on ships ( Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016); ▪ keeping irregular migrants in asylum hotspot facilities ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018). ▪ national lockdown on account of the Covid-19 pandemic ( Terheş v. Romania (dec), 2021).","The question of applicability of Article 5 has arisen in a variety of circumstances, including:  the placement of individuals in psychiatric or social care institutions ( De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, 1971; Nielsen v. Denmark, 1988; H.M. v. Switzerland, 2002; H.L. v. the United Kingdom, 2004; Storck v. Germany, 2005; A. and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011; Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012);  taking of an individual by paramedics and police officers to hospitals ( Aftanache v. Romania, 2020);  confinement in airport transit zones ( Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019; Amuur v. France, 1996; Shamsa v. Poland, 2003; Mogoş and Others v. Romania (dec.), 2004; Mahdid and Haddar v. Austria Riad and Idiab v. Belgium (dec.), 2005;, 2008);  confinement in land border transit zones ( Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019; R.R. and Others v. Hungary, 2021);  questioning in a police station ( Cazan v. Romania, 2016; I.I. v. Bulgaria, 2005; Osypenko v. Ukraine Salayev v. Azerbaijan Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan Creangă, 2010;, 2010;, 2010; v. Romania [GC], 2012);  placement in a police car to draw up an administrative-offence report ( Zelčs v. Latvia, 2020);  stops and searches by the police ( Foka v. Turkey, 2008; Gillan and Quinton v. the United Kingdom, 2010; Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011);  house search ( Stănculeanu v. Romania, 2018);  police escorting ( Rozhkov v. Russia (no. 2), 2017; Tsvetkova and Others v. Russia, 2018);  Austin and Others crowd control measures adopted by the police on public order grounds ( v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012; Auray and Others v. France, * 2024);  Buza dji v. the Republic of Moldova Mancini v. Italy Lavents house arrest ( [GC], 2016;, 2001; v. Latvia, 2002; Nikolova v. Bulgaria (no. 2), 2004; Dacosta Silva v. Spain, 2006).  Khlaifia and Others v. Italy holding sea-migrants in reception facilities and on ships ( [GC], 2016);  keeping irregular migrants in asylum hotspot facilities ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018).  Terheş v. Romania national lockdown on account of the Covid-19 pandemic ( (dec), 2021)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20230923032746__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:10207/21|10209/21,Demirtaş and Yüksekdağ Şenoğlu v. Türkiye,10207/21|10209/21,added,"Demirtaş and Yüksekdağ Şenoğlu v. Türkiye, nos. 10207/21 and 10209/21, 6 June 2023",1,citation_field_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.D.4,Procedural guarantees,3,,270,,"ğlu v. Türkiye , 2023",,,"Akey element of an individual's right to effective assistance by a lawyer is the confidentiality of information exchanged between them. While the Court has tolerated certain restrictions imposed on lawyer-client contacts in cases of terrorism and organised crime, derogations from the fundamental principle of respect for lawyer-client confidentiality can only be allowed in exceptional cases and must Demirtaş and Yüksekdağ be accompanied by adequate and sufficient safeguards against abuse ( Şenoğlu v. Türkiye, 2023, §§ 104-106, where the applicants were deprived of effective legal assistance in order to appeal against their pre-trial detention on account of the surveillance by the prison authorities of their meetings with their lawyers and the seizure of documents exchanged between them)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20230923032746__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:25285/15,Karaca v. Türkiye,25285/15,added,"Karaca v. Türkiye, no. 25285/15, 20 June 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,III.C.2,Meaning of “reasonable suspicion”,3,95,95,0.8092,"Karaca v. Türkiye , 2023",,"Further, it must not appear that the alleged offences themselves were related to the exercise of the applicant's rights under the Convention ( Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 318; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 148; Ragıp Zarakolu v. Turkey, 2020, § 41).","Further, it must not appear that the alleged offences themselves were related to the exercise of the applicant's rights under the Convention ( Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], 2020, § 318; Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 148; Ragıp Zarakolu v. Turkey, 2020, § 41). When an unlawful detention constitutes an interference with one of the freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, it cannot be regarded in principle as an interference prescribed by national law ( Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, 2020, § 230; see also Karaca v. Türkiye, 2023, §§ 154-160, concerning the effect of the applicant's lawful detention on the assessment of the interference with his freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20230923032746__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:61808/19,Yılmaz Aydemir v. Türkiye,61808/19,added,"Yılmaz Aydemir v. Türkiye, no. 61808/19, 23 May 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.D.2,Applicability of the provision,3,247,247,0.9427,"ılmaz Aydemir v. Türkiye , 2023",,"Where the Contracting States provide for procedures which go beyond the requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, the provision's guarantees have to be respected also in these procedures. Article 5 § 4 has thus been found to be applicable in the post-conviction period because domestic law provided that a person is detained on remand until his or her conviction becomes final, including during appeal proceedings, and accorded the same procedural rights to all remand prisoners ( Stollenwerk v. Germany, 2017, § 36).","Where the Contracting States provide for procedures which go beyond the requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, the provision's guarantees have to be respected also in these procedures. Article 5 § 4 has thus been found to be applicable in the post-conviction period because domestic law provided that a person is detained on remand until his or her conviction becomes final, including during appeal proceedings, and accorded the same procedural rights to all remand prisoners ( Stollenwerk v. Germany, 2017, § 36; see also Yılmaz Aydemir v. Türkiye, 2023, §§ 40-41, where domestic law afforded the relevant procedural guarantees to both pre- and and post-conviction detainees)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20230923032746__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:61808/19,Yılmaz Aydemir v. Türkiye,61808/19,added,"Yılmaz Aydemir v. Türkiye, no. 61808/19, 23 May 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,IV.D.4,Procedural guarantees,3,271,272,0.9787,,"Stollenwerk v. Germany , 2017","The principle of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms must equally be respected in the proceedings before the appeal court ( Çatal v. Turkey, 2012, §§ 33-34 and the cases referred to therein) as well as in the proceedings which the Contracting States, as a matter of choice, make available to post-conviction detainees ( Stollenwerk v. Germany, 2017, § 44).","The principle of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms must equally be respected in the proceedings before the appeal court ( Çatal v. Turkey, 2012, §§ 33-34 and the cases referred to therein) as well as in the proceedings which the Contracting States, as a matter of choice, make available to Stollenwerk v. Germany Yılmaz Aydemir v. Türkiye post-conviction detainees (, 2017, § 44;, 2023, §§ 42-45)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:59/17,Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye,59/17,added,"Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, no. 59/17, 23 April 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.B,Compliance with national law,2,29,29,0.9866,"Paci v. Belgium , 2018|Pirozzi v. Belgium , 2018|ın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye , 2024","Paci v. Belgium Pirozzi v. Belgium , 2018","In order to meet the requirement of lawfulness, detention must be ""in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law"". The Convention refers essentially to national law but also, where appropriate, to other applicable legal standards, including those which have their source in international law ( Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], 2010, § 79; Toniolo v. San Marino and Italy, 2012, § 46) or European law ( Paci v. Belgium Pirozzi v. Belgium, 2018, § 64 and, 2018, §§ 45-46, concerning detention on the basis of a European Arrest Warrant). In all cases it establishes the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of the laws concerned ( ibid .)","In order to meet the requirement of lawfulness, detention must be ""in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law"". The Convention refers essentially to national law but also, where appropriate, to other applicable legal standards, including those which have their source in international law ( Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], 2010, § 79; Toniolo v. San Marino and Italy, 2012, § 46; Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, 2024, §§ 115-129) or European law ( Paci v. Belgium, 2018, § 64 and Pirozzi v. Belgium, 2018, §§ 45-46, concerning detention on the basis of a European Arrest Warrant). In all cases it establishes the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of the laws concerned ( ibid .)"
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:59/17,Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye,59/17,added,"Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, no. 59/17, 23 April 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.E,The principle of legal certainty,2,,34,,"ın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye , 2024",,,"The principle of legal certainty may be compromised if domestic courts introduce exceptions in their case-law which run counter to the wording of the applicable statutory provisions or adopt an extensive interpretation negating procedural safeguards afforded by law ( Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, 2024, § 115)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:59/17,Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye,59/17,added,"Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, no. 59/17, 23 April 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.E,The principle of legal certainty,2,38,39,0.9782,"ın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye , 2024",,"The requirements of legal certainty become even more paramount where a judge has been deprived of his liberty ( Baş v. Turkey, 2020, § 158). Where domestic law has granted judicial protection to members of the judiciary in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions, it is essential that such arrangements should be properly complied with. Given the prominent place that the judiciary occupies among State organs in a democratic society and the growing importance attached to the separation of powers and to the necessity of safeguarding the independence of the judiciary, the Court must be particularly attentive to the protection of members of the judiciary when reviewing the manner in which a detention order was implemented from the standpoint of the provisions of the Convention ( Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, § 102; Turan and Others v. Turkey, 2021, § 82).","The requirements of legal certainty become even more paramount where a judge has been deprived of his liberty ( Baş v. Turkey, 2020, § 158). Where domestic law has granted judicial protection to members of the judiciary in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions, it is essential that such arrangements should be properly complied with. Given the prominent place that the judiciary occupies among State organs in a democratic society and the growing importance attached to the separation of powers and to the necessity of safeguarding the independence of the judiciary, the Court must be particularly attentive to the protection of members of the judiciary when reviewing the manner in which a detention order was implemented from the standpoint of the provisions of the Convention ( Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, § 102; Turan and Others v. Turkey, 2021, § 82). The principles set out in the Court's case-law relating to the independence of the domestic judiciary apply mutatis mutandis in respect of international judges and courts, their independence being equally a conditio sine qua non for the proper administration of justice ( Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, 2024, § 113)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:24607/20,B.A. v. Cyprus,24607/20,added,"B.A. v. Cyprus, no. 24607/20, 2 July 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.F.1,Detention to prevent unauthorised entry into country,3,,144,,"B.A. v. Cyprus , 2024",,,"While the passage of time is not decisive for assessing whether detention falls under the scope of the first limb, it remains relevant for determining whether a sufficiently close connection exists between the immigration detention and the prevention of unauthorised entry. Strict scrutiny is needed when more time has lapsed and the person is in the meantime physically present on the territory of a State ( M.B. v. the Netherlands, 2024, §§ 74-75, where the applicant's immigration detention on public order grounds following his criminal law detention on terrorism related charges was found to be arbitrary; see also B.A. v. Cyprus, 2024, §§ 62-64, where the detention of an asylum- seeker on national security grounds was equally considered not to have been closely connected with the aim of preventing unauthorised entry)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:38283/18,Bogay and Others v. Ukraine,38283/18,added,"Bogay and Others v. Ukraine, no. 38283/18, 3 April 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.E,Deprivation of liberty outside formal arrest and detention,2,19,19,0.9953,"Auray and Others v. France , 2024|Bogay and Others v. Ukraine , 2025|Domenjoud v. France , 2024|Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan , 2010|Lavents v. Latvia , 2002|Mancini v. Italy , 2001|Osypenko v. Ukraine , 2010|Riad and Idiab v. Belgium , 2008|Salayev v. Azerbaijan , 2010",,"The question of applicability of Article 5 has arisen in a variety of circumstances, including:  the placement of individuals in psychiatric or social care institutions ( De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, 1971; Nielsen v. Denmark, 1988; H.M. v. Switzerland, 2002; H.L. v. the United Kingdom, 2004; Storck v. Germany, 2005; A. and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011; Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012);  taking of an individual by paramedics and police officers to hospitals ( Aftanache v. Romania, 2020);  confinement in airport transit zones ( Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019; Amuur v. France, 1996; Shamsa v. Poland, 2003; Mogoş and Others v. Romania (dec.), 2004; Mahdid and Haddar v. Austria Riad and Idiab v. Belgium (dec.), 2005;, 2008);  confinement in land border transit zones ( Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019; R.R. and Others v. Hungary, 2021);  questioning in a police station ( Cazan v. Romania, 2016; I.I. v. Bulgaria, 2005; Osypenko v. Ukraine Salayev v. Azerbaijan Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan Creangă, 2010;, 2010;, 2010; v. Romania [GC], 2012);  placement in a police car to draw up an administrative-offence report ( Zelčs v. Latvia, 2020);  stops and searches by the police ( Foka v. Turkey, 2008; Gillan and Quinton v. the United Kingdom, 2010; Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011);  house search ( Stănculeanu v. Romania, 2018);  police escorting ( Rozhkov v. Russia (no. 2), 2017; Tsvetkova and Others v. Russia, 2018);  Austin and Others crowd control measures adopted by the police on public order grounds ( v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012; Auray and Others v. France, * 2024);  Buza dji v. the Republic of Moldova Mancini v. Italy Lavents house arrest ( [GC], 2016;, 2001; v. Latvia, 2002; Nikolova v. Bulgaria (no. 2), 2004; Dacosta Silva v. Spain, 2006).  Khlaifia and Others v. Italy holding sea-migrants in reception facilities and on ships ( [GC], 2016);  keeping irregular migrants in asylum hotspot facilities ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018).  Terheş v. Romania national lockdown on account of the Covid-19 pandemic ( (dec), 2021).","The question of applicability of Article 5 has arisen in a variety of circumstances, including: ▪ the placement of individuals in psychiatric or social care institutions ( De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, 1971; Nielsen v. Denmark, 1988; H.M. v. Switzerland, 2002; H.L. v. the United Kingdom, 2004; Storck v. Germany, 2005; A. and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011; Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012); ▪ taking of an individual by paramedics and police officers to hospitals ( Aftanache v. Romania, 2020); ▪ confinement in airport transit zones ( Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019; Amuur v. France, 1996; Shamsa v. Poland, 2003; Mogoş and Others v. Romania (dec.), 2004; Mahdid and Haddar v. Austria (dec.), 2005; Riad and Idiab v. Belgium, 2008); ▪ confinement in land border transit zones ( Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019; R.R. and Others v. Hungary, 2021); ▪ questioning in a police station ( Cazan v. Romania, 2016; I.I. v. Bulgaria, 2005; Osypenko v. Ukraine, 2010; Salayev v. Azerbaijan, 2010; Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2010; Creangă v. Romania [GC], 2012; Bogay and Others v. Ukraine, 2025); ▪ placement in a police car to draw up an administrative-offence report ( Zelčs v. Latvia, 2020); ▪ confinement in a courtyard during a demonstration ( Siedlecka v. Poland *, 2025); ▪ stops and searches by the police ( Foka v. Turkey, 2008; Gillan and Quinton v. the United Kingdom, 2010; Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011); ▪ house search ( Stănculeanu v. Romania, 2018); ▪ police escorting ( Rozhkov v. Russia (no. 2), 2017; Tsvetkova and Others v. Russia, 2018); ▪ crowd control measures adopted by the police on public order grounds ( Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012; Auray and Others v. France, 2024); ▪ house arrest ( Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], 2016; Mancini v. Italy, 2001; Lavents v. Latvia, 2002; Nikolova v. Bulgaria (no. 2), 2004; Dacosta Silva v. Spain, 2006). ▪ holding sea-migrants in reception facilities and on ships ( Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016); ▪ keeping irregular migrants in asylum hotspot facilities ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018); ▪ national lockdown on account of the Covid-19 pandemic ( Terheş v. Romania (dec), 2021); ▪ preventive home-curfew orders issued under state-of-emergency legislation ( Domenjoud v. France, 2024)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:42975/19,Coulibaly v. Belgium*,42975/19,added,"Coulibaly v. Belgium*, no. 42975/19, 24 July 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,IV.D.2,Applicability of the provision,3,243,248,0.9706,,,"While Article 5 § 4 normally contemplates situations in which an individual takes proceedings while in detention, the provision could also apply where the individual is no longer in detention during appeal proceedings the outcome of which is crucial in determining the lawfulness of the individual's detention ( Oravec v. Croatia, 2017, § 65). While the guarantee of speediness is no longer relevant for the purpose of Article 5 § 4 after the person's release, the guarantee of effectiveness of the review continues to apply even thereafter since a former detainee may well have a legitimate interest in the determination of the lawfulness of his or her detention even after having been released ( Kováčik v. Slovakia, 2011, § 77; Osmanović v. Croatia, 2012, § 49). In particular, a decision on the issue of lawfulness may affect the ""enforceable right to compensation"" under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention ( S.T.S. v. the Netherlands, 2011, § 61).","While Article 5 § 4 normally contemplates situations in which an individual takes proceedings while in detention, the provision could also apply where the individual is no longer in detention during appeal proceedings the outcome of which is crucial in determining the lawfulness of the individual's detention ( Oravec v. Croatia, 2017, § 65). While the guarantee of speediness is no longer relevant for the purpose of Article 5 § 4 after the person's release, the guarantee of effectiveness of the review continues to apply even thereafter since a former detainee may well have a legitimate interest in the determination of the lawfulness of his or her detention even after having been released ( Kováčik v. Slovakia, 2011, § 77; Osmanović v. Croatia, 2012, § 49). In particular, a decision on the issue of lawfulness may affect the ""enforceable right to compensation"" under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention ( S.T.S. v. the Netherlands, 2011, § 61). The mere fact of declaring an appeal moot fo llowing a detainee's release does not necessarily contravene Article 5 § 4 ( Coulibaly v. Belgium *, 2025, §§ 47-51, where a foreign national was repatriated before the lawfulness of his administrative detention could be determined by a final judicial instance, but he still had the possibility of claiming compensation for the allegedly unlawful detention)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:19358/17,Cramesteter v. Italy,19358/17,added,"Cramesteter v. Italy, no. 19358/17, 6 June 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B,Compliance with national law,2,30,30,0.9549,"Cramesteter v. Italy , 2024",,"For example, the Court found that there had been a violation of Article 5 where the authorities had failed to lodge an application for extension of a detention order within the time-limit prescribed by law ( G.K. v. Poland, 2004, § 76). By contrast, an alleged breach of a circular concerning the manner in which inquiries had to be conducted into certain types of offences did not invalidate the domestic legal basis for arrest and subsequent detention ( Talat Tepe v. Turkey, 2004, § 62). Where the trial court had refused to release the applicant despite the Constitutional Court's decision finding his detention to be unlawful, the applicant's continued pre-trial detention could not be regarded as ""in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law"" ( Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 118; Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 139).","For example, the Court found that there had been a violation of Article 5 where the authorities had failed to lodge an application for extension of a detention order within the time-limit prescribed by law ( G.K. v. Poland, 2004, § 76). By contrast, an alleged breach of a circular concerning the manner in which inquiries had to be conducted into certain types of offences did not invalidate the domestic legal basis for arrest and subsequent detention ( Talat Tepe v. Turkey, 2004, § 62). Where the trial court had refused to release the applicant despite the Constitutional Court's decision finding his detention to be unlawful, the applicant's continued pre-trial detention could not be regarded as ""in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law"" ( Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 118; Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 139). Abreach of Article 5 § 1 was found also where the applicant was kept in a psychiatric facility beyond the period provided for by domestic law introduced after the detention order was issued, the unlawfulness of his detention having been acknowledged by the domestic courts ( Cramesteter v. Italy, 2024, §§ 53-56)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:615/21,Cviková v. Slovakia,615/21,added,"Cviková v. Slovakia, nos. 615/21 and 2 others, 13 June 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.C.2,General principles,3,,210,,"Cviková v. Slovakia , 2024",,,"In view of the close affinity between the relevant principles developed under Article 5 §§ 1 (c) and 3 of the Convention, the Court can decide to examine a complaint relating to pre-trial detention under both provisions simultaneously ( Cviková v. Slovakia, 2024, § 71)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:34749/16|79607/17,Domenjoud v. France,34749/16|79607/17,added,"Domenjoud v. France, nos. 34749/16 and 79607/17, 16 May 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.E,Deprivation of liberty outside formal arrest and detention,2,19,19,0.9953,"Auray and Others v. France , 2024|Bogay and Others v. Ukraine , 2025|Domenjoud v. France , 2024|Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan , 2010|Lavents v. Latvia , 2002|Mancini v. Italy , 2001|Osypenko v. Ukraine , 2010|Riad and Idiab v. Belgium , 2008|Salayev v. Azerbaijan , 2010",,"The question of applicability of Article 5 has arisen in a variety of circumstances, including:  the placement of individuals in psychiatric or social care institutions ( De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, 1971; Nielsen v. Denmark, 1988; H.M. v. Switzerland, 2002; H.L. v. the United Kingdom, 2004; Storck v. Germany, 2005; A. and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011; Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012);  taking of an individual by paramedics and police officers to hospitals ( Aftanache v. Romania, 2020);  confinement in airport transit zones ( Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019; Amuur v. France, 1996; Shamsa v. Poland, 2003; Mogoş and Others v. Romania (dec.), 2004; Mahdid and Haddar v. Austria Riad and Idiab v. Belgium (dec.), 2005;, 2008);  confinement in land border transit zones ( Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019; R.R. and Others v. Hungary, 2021);  questioning in a police station ( Cazan v. Romania, 2016; I.I. v. Bulgaria, 2005; Osypenko v. Ukraine Salayev v. Azerbaijan Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan Creangă, 2010;, 2010;, 2010; v. Romania [GC], 2012);  placement in a police car to draw up an administrative-offence report ( Zelčs v. Latvia, 2020);  stops and searches by the police ( Foka v. Turkey, 2008; Gillan and Quinton v. the United Kingdom, 2010; Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011);  house search ( Stănculeanu v. Romania, 2018);  police escorting ( Rozhkov v. Russia (no. 2), 2017; Tsvetkova and Others v. Russia, 2018);  Austin and Others crowd control measures adopted by the police on public order grounds ( v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012; Auray and Others v. France, * 2024);  Buza dji v. the Republic of Moldova Mancini v. Italy Lavents house arrest ( [GC], 2016;, 2001; v. Latvia, 2002; Nikolova v. Bulgaria (no. 2), 2004; Dacosta Silva v. Spain, 2006).  Khlaifia and Others v. Italy holding sea-migrants in reception facilities and on ships ( [GC], 2016);  keeping irregular migrants in asylum hotspot facilities ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018).  Terheş v. Romania national lockdown on account of the Covid-19 pandemic ( (dec), 2021).","The question of applicability of Article 5 has arisen in a variety of circumstances, including: ▪ the placement of individuals in psychiatric or social care institutions ( De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, 1971; Nielsen v. Denmark, 1988; H.M. v. Switzerland, 2002; H.L. v. the United Kingdom, 2004; Storck v. Germany, 2005; A. and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011; Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012); ▪ taking of an individual by paramedics and police officers to hospitals ( Aftanache v. Romania, 2020); ▪ confinement in airport transit zones ( Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019; Amuur v. France, 1996; Shamsa v. Poland, 2003; Mogoş and Others v. Romania (dec.), 2004; Mahdid and Haddar v. Austria (dec.), 2005; Riad and Idiab v. Belgium, 2008); ▪ confinement in land border transit zones ( Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019; R.R. and Others v. Hungary, 2021); ▪ questioning in a police station ( Cazan v. Romania, 2016; I.I. v. Bulgaria, 2005; Osypenko v. Ukraine, 2010; Salayev v. Azerbaijan, 2010; Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2010; Creangă v. Romania [GC], 2012; Bogay and Others v. Ukraine, 2025); ▪ placement in a police car to draw up an administrative-offence report ( Zelčs v. Latvia, 2020); ▪ confinement in a courtyard during a demonstration ( Siedlecka v. Poland *, 2025); ▪ stops and searches by the police ( Foka v. Turkey, 2008; Gillan and Quinton v. the United Kingdom, 2010; Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011); ▪ house search ( Stănculeanu v. Romania, 2018); ▪ police escorting ( Rozhkov v. Russia (no. 2), 2017; Tsvetkova and Others v. Russia, 2018); ▪ crowd control measures adopted by the police on public order grounds ( Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012; Auray and Others v. France, 2024); ▪ house arrest ( Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], 2016; Mancini v. Italy, 2001; Lavents v. Latvia, 2002; Nikolova v. Bulgaria (no. 2), 2004; Dacosta Silva v. Spain, 2006). ▪ holding sea-migrants in reception facilities and on ships ( Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016); ▪ keeping irregular migrants in asylum hotspot facilities ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018); ▪ national lockdown on account of the Covid-19 pandemic ( Terheş v. Romania (dec), 2021); ▪ preventive home-curfew orders issued under state-of-emergency legislation ( Domenjoud v. France, 2024)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:5297/16,Ishkhanyan v. Armenia,5297/16,added,"Ishkhanyan v. Armenia, no. 5297/16, 13 February 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.C.2,Meaning of “reasonable suspicion”,3,96,97,0.9597,"Ishkhanyan v. Armenia , 2025",,"In assessing whether the minimum standard for the reasonableness of a suspicion required for an individual's arrest has been met, the Court has regard to the general context of the facts of a particular case including the applicant's status, the sequence of the events, the manner in which the investigations were carried out and the authorities' conduct ( Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, §§ 113-131). The minimum standard was not met when the applicants' arrest and detention on suspicion of having committed the crime of mass disorder were tainted by arbitrariness and formed part of a strategy of the authorities to hinder and put an end to peaceful protests ( Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine, 2021, §§ 464-477).","In assessing whether the minimum standard for the reasonableness of a suspicion required for an individual's arrest has been met, the Court has regard to the general context of the facts of a particular case including the applicant's status, the sequence of the events, the manner in which the investigations were carried out and the authorities'conduct ( Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, §§ 113-131; see also Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (no. 4), 2025, §§ 207-208 for a public disorder context). The minimum standard was not met when the applicants'arrest and detention on suspicion of having committed the crime of mass disorder were tainted by arbitrariness and formed part of a strategy of the authorities to hinder and put an end to peaceful protests ( Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine, 2021, §§ 464-477). No reasonable suspicion was found to exist where the applicant was a victim of an arrest conducted en masse without any individualised assessment of the criminality of his actions ( Ishkhanyan v. Armenia, 2025, §§ 158-162)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:1766/23,J.B. and Others v. Malta,1766/23,added,"J.B. and Others v. Malta, no. 1766/23, 22 October 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.D.3,The nature of the review required,3,251,257,0.9942,"Ali Osman Özmen v. Turkey , 2016|J.B. and Others v. Malta , 2024",,"The ""court"" to which the detained person has access for the purposes of Article 5 § 4 does not have to be a court of law of the classical kind integrated within the standard judicial machinery of the country ( Weeks v. the United Kingdom, 1987, § 61). It must however be a body of ""judicial character"" offering certain procedural guarantees. Thus the ""court"" must be independent both of the executive Stephens v. Malta (no. 1), Ali Osman Özmen v. Turkey and of the parties to the case ( 2009, § 95;, 2016, § 87, Baş v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 266-267, where the Court confirmed that the term ""court"" referred to in Article 5 § 4 must be construed as a body which enjoys the same qualities of independence and impartiality as are required of the ""tribunal"" mentioned in Article 6).","The ""court"" to which the detained person has access for the purposes of Article 5 § 4 does not have to be a court of law of the classical kind integrated within the standard judicial machinery of the country ( Weeks v. the United Kingdom, 1987, § 61). It must however be a body of ""judicial character"" offering certain procedural guarantees. Thus the ""court"" must be independent both of the executive and of the parties to the case ( Stephens v. Malta (no. 1), 2009, § 95; Ali Osman Özmen v. Turkey, 2016, § 87, Baş v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 266-267; J.B. and Others v. Malta, 2024, § 143, where the Court confirmed that the term ""court"" referred to in Article 5 § 4 must be construed as a body which enjoys the same qualities of independence and impartiality as are required of the ""tribunal"" mentioned in Article 6)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:20183/21,Lazăr v. Romania,20183/21,added,"Lazăr v. Romania, no. 20183/21, 9 April 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.F.2,Detention with a view to deportation or extradition,3,,157,,"Matthews and Johnson v. Romania , 2024|ăr v. Romania ,2024",,,"The existence or absence of fixed time-limits cannot be considered in the abstract, but should be viewed in the context of a detention system taken as a whole, having regard to the particular facts of each individual case. Even where an applicant has been kept in detention for an indeterminate period, the necessity of procedural safeguards is decisive for the Court's analysis ( Lazăr v. Romania,2024, § 97; see also Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, §§ 124-127, concerning detention under the concept of force majeure )."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:20183/21,Lazăr v. Romania,20183/21,added,"Lazăr v. Romania, no. 20183/21, 9 April 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.F.2,Detention with a view to deportation or extradition,3,150,153,0.9875,"ăr v. Romania ,2024",,"To avoid being branded as arbitrary, detention under Article 5 § 1 (f) must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely connected to the ground of detention relied on by the Government; the place and conditions of detention should be appropriate; and the length of the detention should not exceed that reasonably required for the purpose pursued ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2009, § 164; Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 117-19 with further references).","To avoid being branded as arbitrary, detention under Article 5 § 1 (f) must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely connected to the ground of detention relied on by the Government; the place and conditions of detention should be appropriate; and the length of the detention should not exceed that reasonably required for the purpose pursued ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2009, § 164; Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 117-19 with further references; Lazăr v. Romania,2024, §§ 108-111)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:71008/16,M.B. v. the Netherlands,71008/16,added,"M.B. v. the Netherlands, no. 71008/16, 23 April 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.F.1,Detention to prevent unauthorised entry into country,3,,144,,"B.A. v. Cyprus , 2024",,,"While the passage of time is not decisive for assessing whether detention falls under the scope of the first limb, it remains relevant for determining whether a sufficiently close connection exists between the immigration detention and the prevention of unauthorised entry. Strict scrutiny is needed when more time has lapsed and the person is in the meantime physically present on the territory of a State ( M.B. v. the Netherlands, 2024, §§ 74-75, where the applicant's immigration detention on public order grounds following his criminal law detention on terrorism related charges was found to be arbitrary; see also B.A. v. Cyprus, 2024, §§ 62-64, where the detention of an asylum- seeker on national security grounds was equally considered not to have been closely connected with the aim of preventing unauthorised entry)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:38239/22,M.B. v. Spain,38239/22,added,"M.B. v. Spain, no. 38239/22, 6 February 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,III.E.3,Detention of persons of unsound mind,3,123,124,0.9872,"Kadusic v. Switzerland , 2018|M.B. v. Spain , 2025","Kadusic v. S witzerland , 2018","The relevant time at which a person must be reliably established to be of unsound mind, for the requirements of sub-paragraph (e) of Article 5 § 1, is the date of the adoption of the measure depriving that person of his liberty as a result of that condition ( Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 2018, § 134; O.H. v. Germany, 2011, § 78). However, changes, if any, to the mental condition of the detainee following the adoption if the detention order must be taken into account ( Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 2018, § 134). Medical expert reports relied on by the authorities must therefore be sufficiently recent ( Kadusic v. Switzerland, 2018, §§ 44 and 55).","The relevant time at which a person must be reliably established to be of "" unsound mind "", for the requirements of sub-paragraph (e) of Article 5 § 1, is the date of the adoption of the measure depriving that person of his liberty as a result of that condition ( M.B. v. Spain, 2025, §§ 73 and 78; Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 2018, § 134; O.H. v. Germany, 2011, § 78). However, changes, if any, to the mental condition of the detainee following the adoption if the detention order must be taken into account ( Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 2018, § 134). Medical expert reports relied on by the authorities must therefore be sufficiently recent ( Kadusic v. Switzerland, 2018, §§ 44 and 55)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:30814/22,Martinez Fernandez v. Hungary,30814/22,added,"Martinez Fernandez v. Hungary, no. 30814/22, 27 May 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.E.3,Detention of persons of unsound mind,3,,136,,"Martinez Fernandez v. Hungary , 2025",,,"The decision to administer tranquillising medication to a patient before a court hearing requires careful consideration by both mental health professionals and the courts, particularly regarding how the medication might affect the patient's ability to mea ningfully participate in the proceedings ( Martinez Fernandez v. Hungary, 2025, §§ 71-73)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:30814/22,Martinez Fernandez v. Hungary,30814/22,added,"Martinez Fernandez v. Hungary, no. 30814/22, 27 May 2025",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.E.3,Detention of persons of unsound mind,3,134,135,0.9682,"Martinez Fernandez v. Hungary , 2025",,"The mere appointment of a lawyer, without that lawyer actually providing legal assistance in the proceedings, could not satisfy the requirements of necessary ""legal assistance"" for persons confined as being of ""unsound mind"". An effective legal representation of persons with disabilities requires an enhanced duty of supervision of their legal representatives by the competent domestic courts ( M.S. v. Croatia (no. 2), 2015, § 154; see also V.K. v. Russia, 2017, concerning a failure of a court-appointed lawyer to provide effective legal assistance and a manifest failure of the domestic courts to take that defect into consideration).","The mere appointment of a lawyer, without that lawyer actually providing legal assistance in the proceedings, could not satisfy the requirements of necessary ""legal assistance"" for persons confined as being of ""unsound mind"". An effective legal representation of persons with disabilities requires an enhanced duty of supervision of their legal representatives by the competent domestic courts ( M.S. v. Croatia (no. 2), 2015, § 154; see also V.K. v. Russia, 2017, concerning a failure of a court-appointed lawyer to provide effective legal assistance and a manifest failure of the domestic courts to take that defect into consideration, and Martinez Fernandez v. Hungary, 2025, concerning a failure of the guardian ad litem to effectively represent the applicant, reflecting a systemic problem)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:19124/21|20085/21,Matthews and Johnson v. Romania,19124/21|20085/21,added,"Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, nos. 19124/21 and 20085/21, 9 April 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.F.2,Detention with a view to deportation or extradition,3,,157,,"Matthews and Johnson v. Romania , 2024|ăr v. Romania ,2024",,,"The existence or absence of fixed time-limits cannot be considered in the abstract, but should be viewed in the context of a detention system taken as a whole, having regard to the particular facts of each individual case. Even where an applicant has been kept in detention for an indeterminate period, the necessity of procedural safeguards is decisive for the Court's analysis ( Lazăr v. Romania,2024, § 97; see also Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, §§ 124-127, concerning detention under the concept of force majeure )."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:19124/21|20085/21,Matthews and Johnson v. Romania,19124/21|20085/21,added,"Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, nos. 19124/21 and 20085/21, 9 April 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.F.2,Detention with a view to deportation or extradition,3,158,162,0.9924,"Azimov v. Russia , 2013|Matthews and Johnson v. Romania , 2024",,"The implementation of an interim measure following an indication by the Court to a State Party that it would be desirable not to return an individual to a particular country does not in itself have any bearing on whether the deprivation of liberty to which that individual may be subject complies with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, 2007, § 74). Detention Azimov v. Russia should still be lawful and not arbitrary (, 2013, § 169). The fact that the application of such a measure prevents the individual's deportation does not render his detention unlawful, provided that the expulsion proceedings are still pending and the duration of his continued detention is not unreasonable ( S.P. v. Belgium (dec.), 2011; Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, 2011, § 120). 1","The implementation of an interim measure following an indication by the Court to a State Party that it would be desirable not to return an individual to a particular country does not in itself have any bearing on whether the deprivation of liberty to which that individual may be subject complies with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, 2007, § 74). Detention should still be lawful and not arbitrary ( Azimov v. Russia, 2013, § 169). The fact that the application of such a measure prevents the individual's deportation does not render his detention unlawful, provided that the expulsion proceedings are still pending and the duration of his continued detention is not unreasonable ( S.P. v. Belgium (dec.), 2011; Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, 2011, § 120; Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, § 128). 1"
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:13609/20,Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (no. 4)*,13609/20,added,"Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (no. 4)*, no. 13609/20, 8 July 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.C.2,Meaning of “reasonable suspicion”,3,96,97,0.9597,"Ishkhanyan v. Armenia , 2025",,"In assessing whether the minimum standard for the reasonableness of a suspicion required for an individual's arrest has been met, the Court has regard to the general context of the facts of a particular case including the applicant's status, the sequence of the events, the manner in which the investigations were carried out and the authorities' conduct ( Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, §§ 113-131). The minimum standard was not met when the applicants' arrest and detention on suspicion of having committed the crime of mass disorder were tainted by arbitrariness and formed part of a strategy of the authorities to hinder and put an end to peaceful protests ( Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine, 2021, §§ 464-477).","In assessing whether the minimum standard for the reasonableness of a suspicion required for an individual's arrest has been met, the Court has regard to the general context of the facts of a particular case including the applicant's status, the sequence of the events, the manner in which the investigations were carried out and the authorities'conduct ( Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, §§ 113-131; see also Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (no. 4), 2025, §§ 207-208 for a public disorder context). The minimum standard was not met when the applicants'arrest and detention on suspicion of having committed the crime of mass disorder were tainted by arbitrariness and formed part of a strategy of the authorities to hinder and put an end to peaceful protests ( Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine, 2021, §§ 464-477). No reasonable suspicion was found to exist where the applicant was a victim of an arrest conducted en masse without any individualised assessment of the criminality of his actions ( Ishkhanyan v. Armenia, 2025, §§ 158-162)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:13609/20,Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (no. 4)*,13609/20,added,"Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (no. 4)*, no. 13609/20, 8 July 2025",2,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.D.4,Procedural guarantees,3,269,276,0.9981,"Reinprecht v. Austria , 2005",,"The proceedings must be adversarial and must always ensure ""equality of arms"" between the Reinprecht v. Austria A. and Others v. the United Kingdom parties (, 2005, § 31; [GC], 2009, § 204). In remand cases, since the persistence of a reasonable suspicion that the accused person has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of the continued detention, the detainee must be given an opportunity effectively to challenge the basis of the allegations against him. This may require the court to hear witnesses whose testimony appears to have a bearing on the continuing lawfulness of the detention ( Ţurcan v. Moldova, 2007, §§ 67-70). Equality of arms is not ensured if the applicant, or his counsel, is denied access to those documents in the investigation file which are essential in order effectively to challenge the lawfulness of his detention ( Ragıp Zarakolu v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 59-61; Ovsjannikov v. Estonia, 2014, § 72; Fodale v. Italy, 2006, § 41; and Korneykova v. Ukraine, 2012, § 68). Even if the detainee has not been allowed unlimited access to the investigation file, Article 5 § 4 has been found to have been complied with when the detainee had sufficient knowledge of the content of those items of evidence that formed the basis for his pre-trial detention and thus had an opportunity to effectively challenge his detention ( Atilla Taş v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 151-154, with further references). It may also be essential that the individual concerned should not only have the opportunity to be heard in person but that he should also have the effective assistance of his lawyer ( Cernák v. Slovakia, 2013, § 78).","The proceedings must be adversarial and must always ensure ""equality of arms"" between the parties ( Reinprecht v. Austria, 2005, § 31; A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 204). In remand cases, since the persistence of a reasonable suspicion that the accused person has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of the continued detention, the detainee must be given an opportunity effectively to challenge the basis of the allegations against him. This may require the court to hear witnesses whose testimony appears to have a bearing on the continuing lawfulness of the detention ( Ţurcan v. Moldova, 2007, §§ 67-70). Equality of arms is not ensured if the applicant, or his counsel, is denied access to those documents in the investigation file which are essential in order effectively to challenge the lawfulness of his detention ( Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (no. 4) *, 2025, §§ 281-283; Ragıp Zarakolu v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 59-61; Ovsjannikov v. Estonia, 2014, § 72; Fodale v. Italy, 2006, § 41; and Korneykova v. Ukraine, 2012, § 68). Even if the detainee has not been allowed unlimited access to the investigation file, Article 5 § 4 has been found to have been complied with when the detainee had sufficient knowledge of the content of those items of evidence that formed the basis for his pre-trial detention and thus had an opportunity to effectively challenge his detention ( Atilla Taş v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 151-154, with further references). It may also be essential that the individual concerned should not only have the opportunity to be heard in person but that he should also have the effective assistance of his lawyer ( Cernák v. Slovakia, 2013, § 78)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:13609/20,Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (no. 4)*,13609/20,added,"Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (no. 4)*, no. 13609/20, 8 July 2025",3,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,IV.D.5.b,Relevant factors to be taken into consideration when assessing speediness,4,289,296,0.9666,,,"In exceptional situations, the complexity of the case may justify the length of periods which in an ordinary context cannot be considered as ""speedy"" ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 165-167, and Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 137-139, where the Court found no violation of Article 5 § 4 in respect of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court lasting for periods between fourteen and sixteen months, concerning new and complicated issues under the state of emergency; see also Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 2018, §§ 265-275, where a period of eight months and twenty-three days of proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court was found to comply with the speediness requirement, having regard in particular to the complexity of the issues raised by a new system of preventive detention).","In exceptional situations, the complexity of the case may justify the length of periods which in an ordinary context cannot be considered as ""speedy"" ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 165-167, and Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 137-139, where the Court found no violation of Article 5 § 4 in respect of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court lasting for periods between fourteen and sixteen months, concerning new and complicated issues under the state of emergency; see also Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 2018, §§ 265-275, where a period of eight months and twenty-three days of proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court was found to comply with the speediness requirement, having regard in particular to the complexity of the issues raised by a new system of preventive detention). However, the excessive workload of the Constitutional Court cannot be used as a perpetual justification for excessively long procedures ( Selahattin Demirtaş v. Türkiye (no. 4) *, 2025, § 152, where a period of four years could not be regarded as ""speedy"")."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:13375/18,Siedlecka v. Poland*,13375/18,added,"Siedlecka v. Poland*, no. 13375/18, 31 July 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.E,Deprivation of liberty outside formal arrest and detention,2,19,19,0.9953,"Auray and Others v. France , 2024|Bogay and Others v. Ukraine , 2025|Domenjoud v. France , 2024|Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan , 2010|Lavents v. Latvia , 2002|Mancini v. Italy , 2001|Osypenko v. Ukraine , 2010|Riad and Idiab v. Belgium , 2008|Salayev v. Azerbaijan , 2010",,"The question of applicability of Article 5 has arisen in a variety of circumstances, including:  the placement of individuals in psychiatric or social care institutions ( De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, 1971; Nielsen v. Denmark, 1988; H.M. v. Switzerland, 2002; H.L. v. the United Kingdom, 2004; Storck v. Germany, 2005; A. and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011; Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012);  taking of an individual by paramedics and police officers to hospitals ( Aftanache v. Romania, 2020);  confinement in airport transit zones ( Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019; Amuur v. France, 1996; Shamsa v. Poland, 2003; Mogoş and Others v. Romania (dec.), 2004; Mahdid and Haddar v. Austria Riad and Idiab v. Belgium (dec.), 2005;, 2008);  confinement in land border transit zones ( Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019; R.R. and Others v. Hungary, 2021);  questioning in a police station ( Cazan v. Romania, 2016; I.I. v. Bulgaria, 2005; Osypenko v. Ukraine Salayev v. Azerbaijan Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan Creangă, 2010;, 2010;, 2010; v. Romania [GC], 2012);  placement in a police car to draw up an administrative-offence report ( Zelčs v. Latvia, 2020);  stops and searches by the police ( Foka v. Turkey, 2008; Gillan and Quinton v. the United Kingdom, 2010; Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011);  house search ( Stănculeanu v. Romania, 2018);  police escorting ( Rozhkov v. Russia (no. 2), 2017; Tsvetkova and Others v. Russia, 2018);  Austin and Others crowd control measures adopted by the police on public order grounds ( v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012; Auray and Others v. France, * 2024);  Buza dji v. the Republic of Moldova Mancini v. Italy Lavents house arrest ( [GC], 2016;, 2001; v. Latvia, 2002; Nikolova v. Bulgaria (no. 2), 2004; Dacosta Silva v. Spain, 2006).  Khlaifia and Others v. Italy holding sea-migrants in reception facilities and on ships ( [GC], 2016);  keeping irregular migrants in asylum hotspot facilities ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018).  Terheş v. Romania national lockdown on account of the Covid-19 pandemic ( (dec), 2021).","The question of applicability of Article 5 has arisen in a variety of circumstances, including: ▪ the placement of individuals in psychiatric or social care institutions ( De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, 1971; Nielsen v. Denmark, 1988; H.M. v. Switzerland, 2002; H.L. v. the United Kingdom, 2004; Storck v. Germany, 2005; A. and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011; Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012); ▪ taking of an individual by paramedics and police officers to hospitals ( Aftanache v. Romania, 2020); ▪ confinement in airport transit zones ( Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019; Amuur v. France, 1996; Shamsa v. Poland, 2003; Mogoş and Others v. Romania (dec.), 2004; Mahdid and Haddar v. Austria (dec.), 2005; Riad and Idiab v. Belgium, 2008); ▪ confinement in land border transit zones ( Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019; R.R. and Others v. Hungary, 2021); ▪ questioning in a police station ( Cazan v. Romania, 2016; I.I. v. Bulgaria, 2005; Osypenko v. Ukraine, 2010; Salayev v. Azerbaijan, 2010; Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2010; Creangă v. Romania [GC], 2012; Bogay and Others v. Ukraine, 2025); ▪ placement in a police car to draw up an administrative-offence report ( Zelčs v. Latvia, 2020); ▪ confinement in a courtyard during a demonstration ( Siedlecka v. Poland *, 2025); ▪ stops and searches by the police ( Foka v. Turkey, 2008; Gillan and Quinton v. the United Kingdom, 2010; Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011); ▪ house search ( Stănculeanu v. Romania, 2018); ▪ police escorting ( Rozhkov v. Russia (no. 2), 2017; Tsvetkova and Others v. Russia, 2018); ▪ crowd control measures adopted by the police on public order grounds ( Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012; Auray and Others v. France, 2024); ▪ house arrest ( Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], 2016; Mancini v. Italy, 2001; Lavents v. Latvia, 2002; Nikolova v. Bulgaria (no. 2), 2004; Dacosta Silva v. Spain, 2006). ▪ holding sea-migrants in reception facilities and on ships ( Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016); ▪ keeping irregular migrants in asylum hotspot facilities ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018); ▪ national lockdown on account of the Covid-19 pandemic ( Terheş v. Romania (dec), 2021); ▪ preventive home-curfew orders issued under state-of-emergency legislation ( Domenjoud v. France, 2024)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:13968/22,Spišák v. the Czech Republic,13968/22,added,"Spišák v. the Czech Republic, no. 13968/22, 20 June 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.D.2,Applicability of the provision,3,,254,,,,,"While the Contracting States are not required to provide for an automatic periodic review of a judicial character, if a State decides to set up such a system, it must do so in a manner compatible with Article 14. Where national legislation guarantees an automatic periodic review of pre-trial detention to one category of detainees, this falls within the ambit of Article 5 for the purposes of the applicability of Article 14 taken in conjunction with that provision ( Spišák v. the Czech Republic, 2024, §§ 72 and 74, concerning different periods of automatic judicial review for juveniles and adults)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:13968/22,Spišák v. the Czech Republic,13968/22,added,"Spišák v. the Czech Republic, no. 13968/22, 20 June 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.D.3,The nature of the review required,3,,260,,,,,"The particular vulnerability of minors requires the State to ensure that the extension of the detention of a juvenile is made at short intervals and that the juvenile concerned appears regularly before a court, which may also be an important guarantee against ill-treatment ( Spišák v. the Czech Republic, 2024, § 82)."
22935893a6e6,Article 5,20240409165434__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,20251128111224__guide_art_5_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/22935893a6e6/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-28.json,apps:21180/15,Spivak v. Ukraine,21180/15,added,"Spivak v. Ukraine, no. 21180/15, 5 June 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.D.3,The nature of the review required,3,257,264,0.9039,"Raudevs v. Latvia , 2013|Spivak v. Ukraine , 2025|X. v. Finland , 2012",,"Aperson of unsound mind who is compulsorily confined in a psychiatric institution for a lengthy period is entitled to take proceedings ""at reasonable intervals"" to put in issue the lawfulness of his detention ( M.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2013, § 77, for a summary of the applicable principles). Asystem of periodic review in which the initiative lies solely with the authorities is not sufficient on its X. v. Finland Raudevs v. Latvia own (, 2012, § 170;, 2013, § 82).","Aperson of unsound mind who is compulsorily confined in a psychiatric institution for a lengthy period is entitled to take proceedings ""at reasonable intervals"" to put in issue the lawfulness of his detention ( M.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2013, § 77, for a summary of the applicable principles). Asystem of periodic review in which the initiative lies solely with the authorities is not sufficient on its own ( X. v. Finland, 2012, § 170; Raudevs v. Latvia, 2013, § 82; and Spivak v. Ukraine, 2025, §§ 136-138, where the Court found that, in addition to the general lack of opportunity for psychiatric patients to initiate a review of their confinement at the material time, the periodic ex officio judicial review in hearings held in the applicant's forced absence was marked by a manifest lack of diligence and was incompatible with the basic requirements of justice (§§ 140-148)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20230923081110__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20240329075624__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-29,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-29.json,apps:31172/19,Jehovah's Witnesses v. Finland,31172/19,added,"Jehovah's Witnesses v. Finland, no. 31172/19, 9 May 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.E,Overlaps between the safeguards of Article 9 and the other Convention provisions,2,56,56,0.9993,"Ossewaarde v. Russia , 2023|T.C. v. Italy , 2022|Witnesses v. Finland , 2023",,"By its very nature, the substantive content of Article 9 of the Convention may sometimes overlap with the content of other provisions of the Convention; in other words, one and the same complaint submitted to the Court can sometimes come under more than one article. In such cases the Court usually opts for assessing the complaint under only one article, which it considers more relevant in the light of the specific circumstances of the case; however, in so doing, it also bears the other article(s) in mind and interprets the article which it had opted to consider in the light of the latter. In any event, the Convention must be read as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions ( Aygün v. Belgium, 2022, § 71). The articles most likely to be involved alongside Article 9 for the same facts and the same complaints are as follows: (a) Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (right to a fair trial, particularly the right of access to a tribunal). In a case concerning a refusal by the Greek Court of Cassation to recognise the legal personality of the Cathedral of the Roman Catholic diocese of Crete, thereby denying it locus standi to protect its property, the Court decided to assess the applicant body's complaints solely under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention rather than under Article 9 ( Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, 1997, §§ 33 and 50). Similarly, in a case of an alleged failure to enforce a final judgment acknowledging the right of a parish and its members to bury their dead in the local cemetery in accordance with their specific rites, the Court decided to consider the complaint solely under Article 6 § 1 ( Greek Catholic Parish of Pesceana v. Romania (dec.), 2015, § 43); (b) Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private and/or family life). The Court has considered applications: - solely under Article 8, on its own or in conjunction with Article 14: for example, as regards a decision by the domestic courts to establish the under-age children's residence with one of the parents essentially because the other parent was a Jehovah's Witness ( Hoffmann v. Austria, 1993; Palau-Martinez v. France, 2003; Ismailova v. Russia, 2007). The Court pointed out that the practical arrangements for exercising parental authority over children defined by the domestic courts could not, as such, infringe an applicant's freedom to manifest his or her religion ( Deschomets v. France (dec.), 2006); - under Article 8, read in the light of Article 9: as regards the transfer of a civil servant because of his religious convictions, which were known to others but nonetheless were solely a private matter, and also his wife's religious behaviour ( Sodan v. Turkey, 2016, § 30), or the fostering-out of children, disregarding the biological parents'wishes, particularly as regards preserving the children's connection with their cultural and religious roots ( Abdi Ibrahim v. Norway [GC], 2021, §§ 134-142; Kılıc v. Austria, 2023, §§ 106-107 and 145); - under Article 9, taken alone: as regards the placement of a child in a foster family without ensuring that the latter respected her religious opinions and those of her family or origin, where the complaint came from the child herself ( Loste v. France, 2022, § 110); - under Articles 8 and 9, examined jointly: as regards the refusal to grant the applicants'request to transfer their sons'bodies to their country of origin, so that they could be buried in accordance with their religious beliefs ( Aygün v. Belgium, 2022, §§ 51, 60 and 91-92); - under Article 14 taken together with Article 8, read in the light of Article 9: concerning a revocable and reviewable order prohibiting a father from actively involving his young daughter in his religious practice, although no restriction had been imposed with regard to the mother's religion ( T.C. v. Italy, no. 54032/18, § 30, 19 May 2022). (c) Article 10 (freedom of expression). The Court considered applications: - solely under Article 10: for example, as regards a prohibition imposed by the competent State body on an independent radio station broadcasting a paid advertisement of a religious nature ( Murphy v. Ireland, 2003), of the refusal by the competent body to grant a broadcasting licence for a radio station with Christian religious programming ( Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Anatoliy Elenkov v. Bulgaria, 2007). Thus, in so far as the applicant complains of interference with the expression of his beliefs and opinions by broadcasting information, Article 10 constitutes a lex specialis in relation to Article 9, so that a separate assessment under the latter is unnecessary ( Balsytė -Li deikienė v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005); - under Article 10 read in the light of Article 9: for example, as regards a prohibition on publishing and distributing religious books ( Ibragim Ibragimov and Others v. Russia, 2018, § 78), or the withdrawal of a distribution permit for such material and proceedings brought against the persons involved in their distribution ( Taganrog LRO and Others v. Russia, 2022, § 218); also, the official designation of texts published by a religious organisation or on its internet site as ""extremist"" (ibid., §§ 197, 207, 224-226 and 233). (d) Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association). The Court has considered applications: solely under Article 9: for example, as regards a complaint submitted by a conscientious objector who did not belong to any religious or pacifist organisation, and who relied on Article 11 to allege that the rejection of his request for exemption from military service constituted a breach of his negative freedom not to be a follower of a particular religion or a member of any kind of organisation ( Papavasilakis v. Greece, 2016, §§ 34-35) ; ▪ under Article 9 as interpreted in the light of Article 11: for example as regards State interference in a dispute between two rival groups within the same religious community ( Hassan and Tchaouch v. Bulgaria [GC], 2000, § 65), the dissolution of a religious organisation ( Jehovah's Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia, 2010, §§ 102-103), the protracted refusal to recognise the legal personality of a religious community ( Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, 2008, § 60), or measures to prevent a religious association from building a place of worship on a plot of land which it owned ( The Religious Denomination of Jehovah's Witnesses in Bulgaria v. Bulgaria, 2020, § 80) ; ▪ under Article 9 as interpreted in the light of Articles 11 and 6 § 1: for example as regards a refusal by the domestic authorities to register changes to the statutes of a religious organisation geared to ratifying the organisation's change of denomination ( Svyato- Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, 2007, § 152); ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of association) as interpreted in the light of Article 9 - for example as regards a refusal to register a religious organisation ( Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese (Greek-Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Pe ć Patriarchy) v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2017, § 61), or to renew its registration ( Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 2006, §§ 74-75; Bektashi Community and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2018, § 46). See, to converse effect, the judgments in the cases of Genov v. Bulgaria, 2017, § 38, Metodiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2017, § 26; Christian Religious Organization of Jehovah's Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia, 2022, § 45; and Ilyin and Others v. Ukraine, 2022, § 41, in which the Court decided to examine the refusal to register a religious organisation under Article 9, read in the light of Article 11; ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of assembly) as interpreted in the light of Article 9 - for example as regards a refusal to renew the registration of a religious organisation ( Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 2006, §§ 74-75); ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of assembly) as interpreted in the light of Article 9: for example as regards a denial of access for a group practising Neo-Druidism to the historic site of Stonehenge to celebrate the summer solstice ( Pendragon v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 19 October 1998; to converse effect, see also Chappell v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 14 July 1987), or a refusal by the domestic authorities to allow adherents of a minority religious movement to hold public meetings to promote their faith ( Centre of Societies for Krishna Consciousness in Russia and Frolov v. Russia, 2021, § 46); (e) Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property). The Court has chosen to consider cases solely under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: for example as regards the obligation on landowners who are personally opposed to hunting to tolerate it on their land ( Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], 1999; Herrmann v. Germany [GC], 2012); (f) Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (right of parents to respect for their religious and philosophical convictions in the framework of their children's education). The Court has chosen to consider cases ▪ solely under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1: for example as regards the administration of compulsory classes in religious culture and morals in State schools, and the restricted opportunities for administering such classes ( Mansur Yalçın and Others v. Turkey, 2014), or a refusal by educational authorities to grant children complete exemption from compulsory classes on Christianity ( Folgerø and Others v. Norway [GC], 2007); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 9 of the Convention taken alone, finding no violation of the former on the basis of an elaborate argumentation and no violation of the latter with simple reference to that argumentation ( Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 1976); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 as interpreted in the light of Article 9: for example as regards the compulsory presence of crucifixes in classrooms in State schools ( Lautsi and Others v. Italy [GC], 2011); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 for the parents and Article 9 of the Convention for the child, as regards punishment inflicted by a head teacher on a pupil for refusing to take part in a school parade ( Valsamis v. Greece, 1996), or participation by a student in a religious ceremony at school without his parents'consent ( Perovy v. Russia, 2020). ▪ solely under Article 9: for example, as regards a refusal to exempt the applicants'children from compulsory mixed swimming lessons ( Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v. Switzerland, 2017, §§ 35 and 90) - essentially because the respondent State, Switzerland, had not ratified Protocol No. 1.","By its very nature, the substantive content of Article 9 of the Convention may sometimes overlap with the content of other provisions of the Convention; in other words, one and the same complaint submitted to the Court can sometimes come under more than one article. In such cases the Court usually opts for assessing the complaint under only one article, which it considers more relevant in the light of the specific circumstances of the case; however, in so doing, it also bears the other article(s) in mind and interprets the article which it had opted to consider in the light of the latter. In any event, the Convention must be read as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions ( Aygün v. Belgium, 2022, § 71). The articles most likely to be involved alongside Article 9 for the same facts and the same complaints are as follows: (a) Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (right to a fair trial, particularly the right of access to a tribunal). In a case concerning a refusal by the Greek Court of Cassation to recognise the legal personality of the Cathedral of the Roman Catholic diocese of Crete, thereby denying it locus standi to protect its property, the Court decided to assess the applicant body's complaints solely under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention rather than under Article 9 ( Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, 1997, §§ 33 and 50). Similarly, in a case of an alleged failure to enforce a final judgment acknowledging the right of a parish and its members to bury their dead in the local cemetery in accordance with their specific rites, the Court decided to consider the complaint solely under Article 6 § 1 ( Greek Catholic Parish of Pesceana v. Romania (dec.), 2015, § 43); (b) Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private and/or family life). The Court has considered applications: ▪ solely under Article 8, on its own or in conjunction with Article 14: for example, as regards a decision by the domestic courts to establish the under-age children's residence with one of the parents essentially because the other parent was a Jehovah's Witness ( Hoffmann v. Austria, 1993; Palau-Martinez v. France, 2003; Ismailova v. Russia, 2007). The Court pointed out that the practical arrangements for exercising parental authority over children defined by the domestic courts could not, as such, infringe an applicant's freedom to manifest his or her religion ( Deschomets v. France (dec.), 2006); ▪ under Article 8, read in the light of Article 9: as regards the transfer of a civil servant because of his religious convictions, which were known to others but nonetheless were solely a private matter, and also his wife's religious behaviour ( Sodan v. Turkey, 2016, § 30), or the fostering-out of children, disregarding the biological parents'wishes, particularly as regards preserving the children's connection with their cultural and religious roots ( Abdi Ibrahim v. Norway [GC], 2021, §§ 134-142; Kılıc v. Austria, 2023, §§ 106-107 and 145); ▪ under Article 9, taken alone: as regards the placement of a child in a foster family without ensuring that the latter respected her religious opinions and those of her family or origin, where the complaint came from the child herself ( Loste v. France, 2022, § 110); ▪ under Articles 8 and 9, examined jointly: as regards the refusal to grant the applicants'request to transfer their sons'bodies to their country of origin, so that they could be buried in accordance with their religious beliefs ( Aygün v. Belgium, 2022, §§ 51, 60 and 91-92); ▪ under Article 14 taken together with Article 8, read in the light of Article 9: concerning a revocable and reviewable order prohibiting a father from actively involving his young daughter in his religious practice, although no restriction had been imposed with regard to the mother's religion ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 30). (c) Article 10 (freedom of expression). The Court considered applications: ▪ solely under Article 10: for example, as regards a prohibition imposed by the competent State body on an independent radio station broadcasting a paid advertisement of a religious nature ( Murphy v. Ireland, 2003), of the refusal by the competent body to grant a broadcasting licence for a radio station with Christian religious programming ( Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Anatoliy Elenkov v. Bulgaria, 2007). Thus, in so far as the applicant complains of interference with the expression of his beliefs and opinions by broadcasting information, Article 10 constitutes a lex specialis in relation to Article 9, so that a separate assessment under the latter is unnecessary ( Balsytė - Lideikienė v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005). This is also the case with regard to the collection and processing of personal data by a religious organisation or by its members for the purpose of missionary activity ( Jehovah's Witnesses v. Finland, 2023, § 62). ▪ under Article 10 read in the light of Article 9: for example, as regards a prohibition on publishing and distributing religious books ( Ibragim Ibragimov and Others v. Russia, 2018, § 78), or the withdrawal of a distribution permit for such material and proceedings brought against the persons involved in their distribution ( Taganrog LRO and Others v. Russia, 2022, § 218); also, the official designation of texts published by a religious organisation or on its internet site as ""extremist"" (ibid., §§ 197, 207, 224-226 and 233). (d) Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association). The Court has considered applications: ▪ solely under Article 9: for example, as regards a complaint submitted by a conscientious objector who did not belong to any religious or pacifist organisation, and who relied on Article 11 to allege that the rejection of his request for exemption from military service constituted a breach of his negative freedom not to be a follower of a particular religion or a member of any kind of organisation ( Papavasilakis v. Greece, 2016, §§ 34-35), or an administrative fine imposed on an applicant for having organised Bible meetings in his home without first notifying the authorities ( Ossewaarde v. Russia, 2023, § 29); ▪ under Article 9 as interpreted in the light of Article 11: for example as regards State interference in a dispute between two rival groups within the same religious community ( Hassan and Tchaouch v. Bulgaria [GC], 2000, § 65), the dissolution of a religious organisation ( Jehovah's Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia, 2010, §§ 102-103), the protracted refusal to recognise the legal personality of a religious community ( Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, 2008, § 60), or measures to prevent a religious association from building a place of worship on a plot of land which it owned ( The Religious Denomination of Jehovah's Witnesses in Bulgaria v. Bulgaria, 2020, § 80); ▪ under Article 9 as interpreted in the light of Articles 11 and 6 § 1: for example as regards a refusal by the domestic authorities to register changes to the statutes of a religious organisation geared to ratifying the organisation's change of denomination ( Svyato- Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, 2007, § 152); ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of association) as interpreted in the light of Article 9 - for example as regards a refusal to register a religious organisation ( Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese (Greek- Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Peć Patriarchy) v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2017, § 61), or to renew its registration ( Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 2006, §§ 74-75; Bektashi Community and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2018, § 46). See, to converse effect, the judgments in the cases of Genov v. Bulgaria, 2017, § 38, Metodiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2017, § 26; Christian Religious Organization of Jehovah's Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia, 2022, § 45; and Ilyin and Others v. Ukraine, 2022, § 41, in which the Court decided to examine the refusal to register a religious organisation under Article 9, read in the light of Article 11; ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of assembly) as interpreted in the light of Article 9 - for example as regards a refusal to renew the registration of a religious organisation ( Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 2006, §§ 74-75); ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of assembly) as interpreted in the light of Article 9: for example as regards a denial of access for a group practising Neo-Druidism to the historic site of Stonehenge to celebrate the summer solstice ( Pendragon v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 19 October 1998; to converse effect, see also Chappell v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 14 July 1987), or a refusal by the domestic authorities to allow adherents of a minority religious movement to hold public meetings to promote their faith ( Centre of Societies for Krishna Consciousness in Russia and Frolov v. Russia, 2021, § 46); (e) Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property). The Court has chosen to consider cases solely under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: for example as regards the obligation on landowners who are personally opposed to hunting to tolerate it on their land ( Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], 1999; Herrmann v. Germany [GC], 2012); (f) Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (right of parents to respect for their religious and philosophical convictions in the framework of their children's education). The Court has chosen to consider cases ▪ solely under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1: for example as regards the administration of compulsory classes in religious culture and morals in State schools, and the restricted opportunities for administering such classes ( Ma nsur Yalçın and Others v. Turkey, 2014), or a refusal by educational authorities to grant children complete exemption from compulsory classes on Christianity ( Folgerø and Others v. Norway [GC], 2007); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 9 of the Convention taken alone, finding no violation of the former on the basis of an elaborate argumentation and no violation of the latter with simple reference to that argumentation ( Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 1976); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 as interpreted in the light of Article 9: for example as regards the compulsory presence of crucifixes in classrooms in State schools ( Lautsi and Others v. Italy [GC], 2011); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 for the parents and Article 9 of the Convention for the child, as regards punishment inflicted by a head teacher on a pupil for refusing to take part in a school parade ( Valsamis v. Greece, 1996), or participation by a student in a religious ceremony at school without his parents'consent ( Perovy v. Russia, 2020). ▪ solely under Article 9: for example, as regards a refusal to exempt the applicants'children from compulsory mixed swimming lessons ( Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v. Switzerland, 2017, §§ 35 and 90) - essentially because the respondent State, Switzerland, had not ratified Protocol No. 1."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20230923081110__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20240329075624__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-29,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-29.json,apps:31172/19,Jehovah's Witnesses v. Finland,31172/19,added,"Jehovah's Witnesses v. Finland, no. 31172/19, 9 May 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.6,Preaching and proselytism,3,,136,,"Witnesses v. Finland , 2023",,,"The Court held that there had been no violation of Article 9 in the case of the Jehovah's Witnesses religious community in Finland, which had been prohibited by the national data- protection ombudsman from collecting and processing personal data during door-to-door preaching without meeting the general prerequisites for processing personal and sensitive data specified in the law, that is, without the unambiguous consent of the individuals concerned (but without any sanctions having been imposed). The final judgment confirming that measure had been based on the response from the Court of Justice of the European Union (""CJEU"") to a request for a preliminary ruling, finding that the applicant community should be considered a ""controller"" within the meaning of Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. The Court found that the domestic courts had acted within their margin of appreciation in striking a fair balance between the competing interests at stake, namely the applicant community's right to manifest its religion (Article 9), and the right of the individuals concerned to respect for their private life (Article 8). In particular, the Court considered that the simple fact of asking for, and receiving, the data subject's consent did not hinder the essence of the applicant community's freedom of rel igion or give rise to a ""chilling effect"" in exercising that freedom ( Jehovah's Witnesses v. Finland, 2023, §§ 72-99)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20230923081110__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20240329075624__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-29,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-29.json,apps:27227/17,Ossewaarde v. Russia,27227/17,added,"Ossewaarde v. Russia, no. 27227/17, 7 March 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.E,Overlaps between the safeguards of Article 9 and the other Convention provisions,2,56,56,0.9993,"Ossewaarde v. Russia , 2023|T.C. v. Italy , 2022|Witnesses v. Finland , 2023",,"By its very nature, the substantive content of Article 9 of the Convention may sometimes overlap with the content of other provisions of the Convention; in other words, one and the same complaint submitted to the Court can sometimes come under more than one article. In such cases the Court usually opts for assessing the complaint under only one article, which it considers more relevant in the light of the specific circumstances of the case; however, in so doing, it also bears the other article(s) in mind and interprets the article which it had opted to consider in the light of the latter. In any event, the Convention must be read as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions ( Aygün v. Belgium, 2022, § 71). The articles most likely to be involved alongside Article 9 for the same facts and the same complaints are as follows: (a) Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (right to a fair trial, particularly the right of access to a tribunal). In a case concerning a refusal by the Greek Court of Cassation to recognise the legal personality of the Cathedral of the Roman Catholic diocese of Crete, thereby denying it locus standi to protect its property, the Court decided to assess the applicant body's complaints solely under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention rather than under Article 9 ( Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, 1997, §§ 33 and 50). Similarly, in a case of an alleged failure to enforce a final judgment acknowledging the right of a parish and its members to bury their dead in the local cemetery in accordance with their specific rites, the Court decided to consider the complaint solely under Article 6 § 1 ( Greek Catholic Parish of Pesceana v. Romania (dec.), 2015, § 43); (b) Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private and/or family life). The Court has considered applications: - solely under Article 8, on its own or in conjunction with Article 14: for example, as regards a decision by the domestic courts to establish the under-age children's residence with one of the parents essentially because the other parent was a Jehovah's Witness ( Hoffmann v. Austria, 1993; Palau-Martinez v. France, 2003; Ismailova v. Russia, 2007). The Court pointed out that the practical arrangements for exercising parental authority over children defined by the domestic courts could not, as such, infringe an applicant's freedom to manifest his or her religion ( Deschomets v. France (dec.), 2006); - under Article 8, read in the light of Article 9: as regards the transfer of a civil servant because of his religious convictions, which were known to others but nonetheless were solely a private matter, and also his wife's religious behaviour ( Sodan v. Turkey, 2016, § 30), or the fostering-out of children, disregarding the biological parents'wishes, particularly as regards preserving the children's connection with their cultural and religious roots ( Abdi Ibrahim v. Norway [GC], 2021, §§ 134-142; Kılıc v. Austria, 2023, §§ 106-107 and 145); - under Article 9, taken alone: as regards the placement of a child in a foster family without ensuring that the latter respected her religious opinions and those of her family or origin, where the complaint came from the child herself ( Loste v. France, 2022, § 110); - under Articles 8 and 9, examined jointly: as regards the refusal to grant the applicants'request to transfer their sons'bodies to their country of origin, so that they could be buried in accordance with their religious beliefs ( Aygün v. Belgium, 2022, §§ 51, 60 and 91-92); - under Article 14 taken together with Article 8, read in the light of Article 9: concerning a revocable and reviewable order prohibiting a father from actively involving his young daughter in his religious practice, although no restriction had been imposed with regard to the mother's religion ( T.C. v. Italy, no. 54032/18, § 30, 19 May 2022). (c) Article 10 (freedom of expression). The Court considered applications: - solely under Article 10: for example, as regards a prohibition imposed by the competent State body on an independent radio station broadcasting a paid advertisement of a religious nature ( Murphy v. Ireland, 2003), of the refusal by the competent body to grant a broadcasting licence for a radio station with Christian religious programming ( Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Anatoliy Elenkov v. Bulgaria, 2007). Thus, in so far as the applicant complains of interference with the expression of his beliefs and opinions by broadcasting information, Article 10 constitutes a lex specialis in relation to Article 9, so that a separate assessment under the latter is unnecessary ( Balsytė -Li deikienė v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005); - under Article 10 read in the light of Article 9: for example, as regards a prohibition on publishing and distributing religious books ( Ibragim Ibragimov and Others v. Russia, 2018, § 78), or the withdrawal of a distribution permit for such material and proceedings brought against the persons involved in their distribution ( Taganrog LRO and Others v. Russia, 2022, § 218); also, the official designation of texts published by a religious organisation or on its internet site as ""extremist"" (ibid., §§ 197, 207, 224-226 and 233). (d) Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association). The Court has considered applications: solely under Article 9: for example, as regards a complaint submitted by a conscientious objector who did not belong to any religious or pacifist organisation, and who relied on Article 11 to allege that the rejection of his request for exemption from military service constituted a breach of his negative freedom not to be a follower of a particular religion or a member of any kind of organisation ( Papavasilakis v. Greece, 2016, §§ 34-35) ; ▪ under Article 9 as interpreted in the light of Article 11: for example as regards State interference in a dispute between two rival groups within the same religious community ( Hassan and Tchaouch v. Bulgaria [GC], 2000, § 65), the dissolution of a religious organisation ( Jehovah's Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia, 2010, §§ 102-103), the protracted refusal to recognise the legal personality of a religious community ( Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, 2008, § 60), or measures to prevent a religious association from building a place of worship on a plot of land which it owned ( The Religious Denomination of Jehovah's Witnesses in Bulgaria v. Bulgaria, 2020, § 80) ; ▪ under Article 9 as interpreted in the light of Articles 11 and 6 § 1: for example as regards a refusal by the domestic authorities to register changes to the statutes of a religious organisation geared to ratifying the organisation's change of denomination ( Svyato- Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, 2007, § 152); ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of association) as interpreted in the light of Article 9 - for example as regards a refusal to register a religious organisation ( Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese (Greek-Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Pe ć Patriarchy) v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2017, § 61), or to renew its registration ( Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 2006, §§ 74-75; Bektashi Community and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2018, § 46). See, to converse effect, the judgments in the cases of Genov v. Bulgaria, 2017, § 38, Metodiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2017, § 26; Christian Religious Organization of Jehovah's Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia, 2022, § 45; and Ilyin and Others v. Ukraine, 2022, § 41, in which the Court decided to examine the refusal to register a religious organisation under Article 9, read in the light of Article 11; ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of assembly) as interpreted in the light of Article 9 - for example as regards a refusal to renew the registration of a religious organisation ( Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 2006, §§ 74-75); ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of assembly) as interpreted in the light of Article 9: for example as regards a denial of access for a group practising Neo-Druidism to the historic site of Stonehenge to celebrate the summer solstice ( Pendragon v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 19 October 1998; to converse effect, see also Chappell v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 14 July 1987), or a refusal by the domestic authorities to allow adherents of a minority religious movement to hold public meetings to promote their faith ( Centre of Societies for Krishna Consciousness in Russia and Frolov v. Russia, 2021, § 46); (e) Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property). The Court has chosen to consider cases solely under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: for example as regards the obligation on landowners who are personally opposed to hunting to tolerate it on their land ( Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], 1999; Herrmann v. Germany [GC], 2012); (f) Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (right of parents to respect for their religious and philosophical convictions in the framework of their children's education). The Court has chosen to consider cases ▪ solely under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1: for example as regards the administration of compulsory classes in religious culture and morals in State schools, and the restricted opportunities for administering such classes ( Mansur Yalçın and Others v. Turkey, 2014), or a refusal by educational authorities to grant children complete exemption from compulsory classes on Christianity ( Folgerø and Others v. Norway [GC], 2007); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 9 of the Convention taken alone, finding no violation of the former on the basis of an elaborate argumentation and no violation of the latter with simple reference to that argumentation ( Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 1976); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 as interpreted in the light of Article 9: for example as regards the compulsory presence of crucifixes in classrooms in State schools ( Lautsi and Others v. Italy [GC], 2011); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 for the parents and Article 9 of the Convention for the child, as regards punishment inflicted by a head teacher on a pupil for refusing to take part in a school parade ( Valsamis v. Greece, 1996), or participation by a student in a religious ceremony at school without his parents'consent ( Perovy v. Russia, 2020). ▪ solely under Article 9: for example, as regards a refusal to exempt the applicants'children from compulsory mixed swimming lessons ( Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v. Switzerland, 2017, §§ 35 and 90) - essentially because the respondent State, Switzerland, had not ratified Protocol No. 1.","By its very nature, the substantive content of Article 9 of the Convention may sometimes overlap with the content of other provisions of the Convention; in other words, one and the same complaint submitted to the Court can sometimes come under more than one article. In such cases the Court usually opts for assessing the complaint under only one article, which it considers more relevant in the light of the specific circumstances of the case; however, in so doing, it also bears the other article(s) in mind and interprets the article which it had opted to consider in the light of the latter. In any event, the Convention must be read as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions ( Aygün v. Belgium, 2022, § 71). The articles most likely to be involved alongside Article 9 for the same facts and the same complaints are as follows: (a) Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (right to a fair trial, particularly the right of access to a tribunal). In a case concerning a refusal by the Greek Court of Cassation to recognise the legal personality of the Cathedral of the Roman Catholic diocese of Crete, thereby denying it locus standi to protect its property, the Court decided to assess the applicant body's complaints solely under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention rather than under Article 9 ( Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, 1997, §§ 33 and 50). Similarly, in a case of an alleged failure to enforce a final judgment acknowledging the right of a parish and its members to bury their dead in the local cemetery in accordance with their specific rites, the Court decided to consider the complaint solely under Article 6 § 1 ( Greek Catholic Parish of Pesceana v. Romania (dec.), 2015, § 43); (b) Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private and/or family life). The Court has considered applications: ▪ solely under Article 8, on its own or in conjunction with Article 14: for example, as regards a decision by the domestic courts to establish the under-age children's residence with one of the parents essentially because the other parent was a Jehovah's Witness ( Hoffmann v. Austria, 1993; Palau-Martinez v. France, 2003; Ismailova v. Russia, 2007). The Court pointed out that the practical arrangements for exercising parental authority over children defined by the domestic courts could not, as such, infringe an applicant's freedom to manifest his or her religion ( Deschomets v. France (dec.), 2006); ▪ under Article 8, read in the light of Article 9: as regards the transfer of a civil servant because of his religious convictions, which were known to others but nonetheless were solely a private matter, and also his wife's religious behaviour ( Sodan v. Turkey, 2016, § 30), or the fostering-out of children, disregarding the biological parents'wishes, particularly as regards preserving the children's connection with their cultural and religious roots ( Abdi Ibrahim v. Norway [GC], 2021, §§ 134-142; Kılıc v. Austria, 2023, §§ 106-107 and 145); ▪ under Article 9, taken alone: as regards the placement of a child in a foster family without ensuring that the latter respected her religious opinions and those of her family or origin, where the complaint came from the child herself ( Loste v. France, 2022, § 110); ▪ under Articles 8 and 9, examined jointly: as regards the refusal to grant the applicants'request to transfer their sons'bodies to their country of origin, so that they could be buried in accordance with their religious beliefs ( Aygün v. Belgium, 2022, §§ 51, 60 and 91-92); ▪ under Article 14 taken together with Article 8, read in the light of Article 9: concerning a revocable and reviewable order prohibiting a father from actively involving his young daughter in his religious practice, although no restriction had been imposed with regard to the mother's religion ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 30). (c) Article 10 (freedom of expression). The Court considered applications: ▪ solely under Article 10: for example, as regards a prohibition imposed by the competent State body on an independent radio station broadcasting a paid advertisement of a religious nature ( Murphy v. Ireland, 2003), of the refusal by the competent body to grant a broadcasting licence for a radio station with Christian religious programming ( Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Anatoliy Elenkov v. Bulgaria, 2007). Thus, in so far as the applicant complains of interference with the expression of his beliefs and opinions by broadcasting information, Article 10 constitutes a lex specialis in relation to Article 9, so that a separate assessment under the latter is unnecessary ( Balsytė - Lideikienė v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005). This is also the case with regard to the collection and processing of personal data by a religious organisation or by its members for the purpose of missionary activity ( Jehovah's Witnesses v. Finland, 2023, § 62). ▪ under Article 10 read in the light of Article 9: for example, as regards a prohibition on publishing and distributing religious books ( Ibragim Ibragimov and Others v. Russia, 2018, § 78), or the withdrawal of a distribution permit for such material and proceedings brought against the persons involved in their distribution ( Taganrog LRO and Others v. Russia, 2022, § 218); also, the official designation of texts published by a religious organisation or on its internet site as ""extremist"" (ibid., §§ 197, 207, 224-226 and 233). (d) Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association). The Court has considered applications: ▪ solely under Article 9: for example, as regards a complaint submitted by a conscientious objector who did not belong to any religious or pacifist organisation, and who relied on Article 11 to allege that the rejection of his request for exemption from military service constituted a breach of his negative freedom not to be a follower of a particular religion or a member of any kind of organisation ( Papavasilakis v. Greece, 2016, §§ 34-35), or an administrative fine imposed on an applicant for having organised Bible meetings in his home without first notifying the authorities ( Ossewaarde v. Russia, 2023, § 29); ▪ under Article 9 as interpreted in the light of Article 11: for example as regards State interference in a dispute between two rival groups within the same religious community ( Hassan and Tchaouch v. Bulgaria [GC], 2000, § 65), the dissolution of a religious organisation ( Jehovah's Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia, 2010, §§ 102-103), the protracted refusal to recognise the legal personality of a religious community ( Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, 2008, § 60), or measures to prevent a religious association from building a place of worship on a plot of land which it owned ( The Religious Denomination of Jehovah's Witnesses in Bulgaria v. Bulgaria, 2020, § 80); ▪ under Article 9 as interpreted in the light of Articles 11 and 6 § 1: for example as regards a refusal by the domestic authorities to register changes to the statutes of a religious organisation geared to ratifying the organisation's change of denomination ( Svyato- Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, 2007, § 152); ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of association) as interpreted in the light of Article 9 - for example as regards a refusal to register a religious organisation ( Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese (Greek- Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Peć Patriarchy) v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2017, § 61), or to renew its registration ( Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 2006, §§ 74-75; Bektashi Community and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2018, § 46). See, to converse effect, the judgments in the cases of Genov v. Bulgaria, 2017, § 38, Metodiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2017, § 26; Christian Religious Organization of Jehovah's Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia, 2022, § 45; and Ilyin and Others v. Ukraine, 2022, § 41, in which the Court decided to examine the refusal to register a religious organisation under Article 9, read in the light of Article 11; ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of assembly) as interpreted in the light of Article 9 - for example as regards a refusal to renew the registration of a religious organisation ( Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 2006, §§ 74-75); ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of assembly) as interpreted in the light of Article 9: for example as regards a denial of access for a group practising Neo-Druidism to the historic site of Stonehenge to celebrate the summer solstice ( Pendragon v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 19 October 1998; to converse effect, see also Chappell v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 14 July 1987), or a refusal by the domestic authorities to allow adherents of a minority religious movement to hold public meetings to promote their faith ( Centre of Societies for Krishna Consciousness in Russia and Frolov v. Russia, 2021, § 46); (e) Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property). The Court has chosen to consider cases solely under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: for example as regards the obligation on landowners who are personally opposed to hunting to tolerate it on their land ( Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], 1999; Herrmann v. Germany [GC], 2012); (f) Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (right of parents to respect for their religious and philosophical convictions in the framework of their children's education). The Court has chosen to consider cases ▪ solely under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1: for example as regards the administration of compulsory classes in religious culture and morals in State schools, and the restricted opportunities for administering such classes ( Ma nsur Yalçın and Others v. Turkey, 2014), or a refusal by educational authorities to grant children complete exemption from compulsory classes on Christianity ( Folgerø and Others v. Norway [GC], 2007); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 9 of the Convention taken alone, finding no violation of the former on the basis of an elaborate argumentation and no violation of the latter with simple reference to that argumentation ( Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 1976); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 as interpreted in the light of Article 9: for example as regards the compulsory presence of crucifixes in classrooms in State schools ( Lautsi and Others v. Italy [GC], 2011); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 for the parents and Article 9 of the Convention for the child, as regards punishment inflicted by a head teacher on a pupil for refusing to take part in a school parade ( Valsamis v. Greece, 1996), or participation by a student in a religious ceremony at school without his parents'consent ( Perovy v. Russia, 2020). ▪ solely under Article 9: for example, as regards a refusal to exempt the applicants'children from compulsory mixed swimming lessons ( Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v. Switzerland, 2017, §§ 35 and 90) - essentially because the respondent State, Switzerland, had not ratified Protocol No. 1."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20230923081110__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20240329075624__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-29,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-29.json,apps:27227/17,Ossewaarde v. Russia,27227/17,added,"Ossewaarde v. Russia, no. 27227/17, 7 March 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.E,Overlaps between the safeguards of Article 9 and the other Convention provisions,2,58,58,0.9291,"Ossewaarde v. Russia , 2023",,"In connection with Article 14, prohibiting discrimination in the exercise of Convention rights, the Court may consider that the inequality of treatment complained of by the applicants has already been duly taken into account in the analysis having led it to find a violation of Article 9 taken alone. In such cases it is unnecessary to examine the same facts under Article 14 ( Church of Scientology of Moscow v. Russia, 2007, § 101; Centre of Societies for Krishna Consciousness in Russia and Frolov v. Russia, 2021, §§ 44).","In connection with Article 14, prohibiting discrimination in the exercise of Convention rights, the Court may consider that the inequality of treatment complained of by the applicants has already been duly taken into account in the analysis having led it to find a violation of Article 9 taken alone. In such cases it is unnecessary to examine the same facts under Article 14 ( Church of Scientology of Moscow v. Russia, 2007, § 101; Centre of Societies for Krishna Consciousness in Russia and Frolov v. Russia, 2021, §§ 44). In other situations, the Court may examine the merits of the Article-14 complaint even after having found a violation of Article 9 taken separately. Thus, in the Ossewaarde v. Russia, 2023, case, it found a violation of Article 14 on account of the application of a provision of domestic law sanctioning illegal missionary activity more severely when the individual concerned was a non-national of the respondent State ( Ibid., §§ 54-57)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20230923081110__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20240329075624__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-29,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-29.json,apps:27227/17,Ossewaarde v. Russia,27227/17,added,"Ossewaarde v. Russia, no. 27227/17, 7 March 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.6,Preaching and proselytism,3,,130,,"Kokkinakis v. Greece , 1993|Nasirov and Others v. Azerbaijan , 2020|Ossewaarde v. Russia , 2023",,,"Freedom to manifest one's religion comprises, in principle, the right to attempt to convince and convert other people, for example through ""teaching"", failing which, moreover, ""freedom to change [one's] religion or belief"", enshrined in Article 9 of the Convention, would be likely to remain a dead letter ( Kokkinakis v. Greece, 1993, § 31; Nasirov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 60). Indeed, missionary work is a vital dimension of a religion, which involves not just affirming one's beliefs but also inviting others to consider those beliefs and seeking to persuade them of their validity, thereby converting them to one's religion or cause ( Ossewaarde v. Russia, 2023, § 39). In particular, the State can neither eliminate the possibility of spontaneous religious discussion among members and non- members of a given religion nor burden religious expression with restrictions greater than those applicable to other types of expression. Equally, the State is not permitted to make it an offence for a person to engage in individual evangelism, for example by prohibiting such activities in residential premises that are not owned or rented by a religious association or by subjecting these activities to the requirement of prior authorisation from a religious association (ibid., § 44)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20230923081110__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20240329075624__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-29,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-29.json,apps:27227/17,Ossewaarde v. Russia,27227/17,added,"Ossewaarde v. Russia, no. 27227/17, 7 March 2023",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,II.B.6,Preaching and proselytism,3,131,132,0.8309,"Ossewaarde v. Russia , 2023",,"For example, the Court found a violation of Article 9 in a case where the applicant, a Jehovah's Witness, had been arrested and criminally convicted of going to the home of the wife of the local Orthodox Church cantor and holding a discussion of a religious nature with her ( Kokkinakis v. Greece, 1993).","For example, the Court found a violation of Article 9: ▪ in a case where the applicant, a Jehovah's Witness, had been arrested and criminally convicted of going to the home of the wife of the local Orthodox Church cantor and holding a discussion of a religious nature with her ( Kokkinakis v. Greece, 1993). ▪ in a case where the applicant, an American Baptist who lived in Russia, received an administrative fine for having organised regular gatherings in his home to worship and discuss the Bible, after having invited the participants personally, left invitations in their letter boxes and posted information about religious meetings in public places such as notice boards. He was charged and convicted of conducting missionary activities without notifying the authorities about the establishment of a religious group, although he was acting in an individual capacity and did not wish to create any kind of formal group ( Ossewaarde v. Russia, 2023, §§ 42-46)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20230923081110__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20240329075624__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-29,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-29.json,apps:27227/17,Ossewaarde v. Russia,27227/17,added,"Ossewaarde v. Russia, no. 27227/17, 7 March 2023",5,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.7,Freedom of religious worship,3,136,138,0.9967,"Ossewaarde v. Russia , 2023",,"For example, the Court found a violation of freedom of religion in the following cases: ▪ measures regulating the religious life of Greek Cypriots of Orthodox faith enclaved in the ""Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus"", preventing them from leaving their villages to attend religious ceremonies in places of worship elsewhere or to visit a monastery ( Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 2001, §§ 243-246); ▪ the dispersal by the Russian police of a Sunday service held by Jehovah's Witnesses in the assembly hall of a State vocational secondary school, which the national Jehovah's Witnesses organisation rented on the basis of a lawfully concluded lease agreement. The police measure had been clearly unlawful and arbitrary, even in the light of domestic law ( Kuznetsov and Others v. Russia, 2007). In another similar case the Court found a violation because of the dispersal of an annual Jehovah's Witnesses celebration held in the Agricultural Academy assembly hall, which had also been rented in conformity with domestic law. The impugned operation had been conducted by a large number of police officers, including an armed unit of the Special Police Force; the applicants were arrested and remanded in custody for several hours. Leaving aside the issue of the lawfulness of the interference, the Court found that it had clearly not been ""necessary in a democratic society"" ( Krupko and Others v. Russia, 2014); ▪ the dispersal by the Moldovan police of a prayer meeting held by a group of Muslims in a private house and the imposition on the applicant of an administrative fine for ""practising a religion not recognised by the State"" ( Masaev v. Moldova, 2009); ▪ the break-up by the Bulgarian police of a gathering of adherents of the Reverend Moon's Unification Church in an adherent's home, followed by a search of the apartment with the public prosecutor's authorisation, and finally, the seizure of books, recordings and other items, all because the religious community had not been registered by the State. The impugned measures had manifestly lacked any legal basis in domestic law. Furthermore, the domestic legislation had been unclear as regards the possibility of holding religious gatherings where the organisation in question had not been registered; at the material time there had been an administrative practice, supported by some domestic precedents, of declaring such gatherings unlawful ( Boychev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011); ▪ the summonsing of an applicant to attend the local police station and her questioning on the subject of her religious beliefs, followed by a search of her home, accompanied by seizure of books and recordings, and lastly, a police warning ordering the applicant to discontinue the meetings in her home of the evangelical congregation to which she belonged. The Court concluded that there had been no statutory basis for the interference as the impugned measures had been implemented in the absence of any criminal investigation, in flagrant breach of domestic law ( Dimitrova v. Bulgaria, 2015); ▪ a prison sentence passed on the applicants for having taken part in a Muslim religious ceremony ( mevlüt ) held on the premises of a political party in remembrance of three members of an illegal organisation who had been killed by the security forces. The Court took the view that the mere fact that the ceremony in question had been organised on the premises of a political party in which symbols of a terrorist organisation were displayed did not deprive the participants of the protection guaranteed by Article 9. In this case the penalty had not met the requirements of clarity and foreseeability since it would have been impossible to foresee that mere participation in a religious service would fall within the scope of the Law on the prevention of terrorism ( Güler and Uğur v. Turkey, 2014).","For example, the Court found a violation of freedom of religion in the following cases: ▪ measures regulating the religious life of Greek Cypriots of Orthodox faith enclaved in the ""Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus"", preventing them from leaving their villages to attend religious ceremonies in places of worship elsewhere or to visit a monastery ( Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 2001, §§ 243-246); ▪ the dispersal by the Russian police of a Sunday service held by Jehovah's Witnesses in the assembly hall of a State vocational secondary school, which the national Jehovah's Witnesses organisation rented on the basis of a lawfully concluded lease agreement. The police measure had been clearly unlawful and arbitrary, even in the light of domestic law ( Kuznetsov and Others v. Russia, 2007). In another similar case the Court found a violation because of the dispersal of an annual Jehovah's Witnesses celebration held in the Agricultural Academy assembly hall, which had also been rented in conformity with domestic law. The impugned operation had been conducted by a large number of police officers, including an armed unit of the Special Police Force; the applicants were arrested and remanded in custody for several hours. Leaving aside the issue of the lawfulness of the interference, the Court found that it had clearly not been ""necessary in a democratic society"" ( Krupko and Others v. Russia, 2014); ▪ the dispersal by the Moldovan police of a prayer meeting held by a group of Muslims in a private house and the imposition on the applicant of an administrative fine for ""practising a religion not recognised by the State"" ( Masaev v. Moldova, 2009); ▪ the imposition of an administrative fine on an American Baptist missionary who was resident in Russia, for having organised regular gatherings in his home for worship and Bible reading without having notified the authorities; acting in an individual capacity rather than on behalf of a religious association, he could not be considered to meet the legal requirements as amended by Parliament ( Ossewaarde v. Russia, 2023); ▪ the break-up by the Bulgarian police of a gathering of adherents of the Reverend Moon's Unification Church in an adherent's home, followed by a search of the apartment with the public prosecutor's authorisation, and finally, the seizure of books, recordings and other items, all because the religious community had not been registered by the State. The impugned measures had manifestly lacked any legal basis in domestic law. Furthermore, the domestic legislation had been unclear as regards the possibility of holding religious gatherings where the organisation in question had not been registered; at the material time there had been an administrative practice, supported by some domestic precedents, of declaring such gatherings unlawful ( Boychev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011); ▪ the summonsing of an applicant to attend the local police station and her questioning on the subject of her religious beliefs, followed by a search of her home, accompanied by seizure of books and recordings, and lastly, a police warning ordering the applicant to discontinue the meetings in her home of the evangelical congregation to which she belonged. The Court concluded that there had been no statutory basis for the interference as the impugned measures had been implemented in the absence of any criminal investigation, in flagrant breach of domestic law ( Dimitrova v. Bulgaria, 2015); ▪ a prison sentence passed on the applicants for having taken part in a Muslim religious ceremony ( mevlüt ) held on the premises of a political party in remembrance of three members of an illegal organisation who had been killed by the security forces. The Court took the view that the mere fact that the ceremony in question had been organised on the premises of a political party in which symbols of a terrorist organisation were displayed did not deprive the participants of the protection guaranteed by Article 9. In this case the penalty had not met the requirements of clarity and foreseeability since it would have been impossible to foresee that mere participation in a religious service would fall within the scope of the Law on the prevention of terrorism ( Güler and Uğur v. Turkey, 2014)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20240329075624__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20240913070507__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2024-03-29,2024-09-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-03-29__2024-09-13.json,apps:16760/22,Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*,16760/22,added,"Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, nos. 16760/22 and 8 others, 13 February 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B,Convictions protected under Article 9,2,16,16,0.98,"Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, nos. 16760/22 and 8 others, 13 February 2024",,"If a personal or collective conviction is to benefit from the right to ""freedom of thought, conscience and religion"" it must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. Provided this condition is satisfied, the State's duty of neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any power on the State's part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways in which those beliefs are expressed (Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2013, § 81). Therefore, it is not the Court's task to enter into any controversy in that sphere or to determine what principles and beliefs are to be considered central to any given religion or to enter into any other sort of interpretation of religious questions (İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2016, § 69; Kovaļkovs v. Latvia (dec.), 2012, § 60). In particular, a debate among religious scholars concerning the historical foundations of a given religion and the merits of the demands of its followers does not suffice to deny the religious nature of those beliefs (Ancient Baltic religious association ""Romuva"" v. Lithuania, 2021, §§ 118-119). Hence in referring, for the purposes of its reasoning, to specific religious terms and concepts, the Court does not attach any particular significance to those terms beyond the finding that Article 9 is applicable to them (ibid. [GC], § 69). As a general rule, the fact that there is a debate within the religious community in question regarding the basic precepts of its faith and its demands vis-à-vis the State changes nothing for the purposes of the application of Article 9 (ibid. [GC], § 134).","If a personal or collective conviction is to benefit from the right to ""freedom of thought, conscience and religion"" it must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. Provided this condition is satisfied, the State's duty of neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any power on the State's part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways in which those beliefs are expressed (Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2013, § 81). Therefore, it is not the Court's task to enter into any controversy in that sphere or to determine what principles and beliefs are to be considered central to any given religion or to enter into any other sort of interpretation of religious questions (İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2016, § 69; Kovaļkovs v. Latvia (dec.), 2012, § 60; Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, 2024, § 86). In particular, a debate among religious scholars concerning the historical foundations of a given religion and the merits of the demands of its followers does not suffice to deny the religious nature of those beliefs (Ancient Baltic religious association ""Romuva"" v. Lithuania, 2021, §§ 118-119). Hence in referring, for the purposes of its reasoning, to specific religious terms and concepts, the Court does not attach any particular significance to those terms beyond the finding that Article 9 is applicable to them (ibid. [GC], § 69). As a general rule, the fact that there is a debate within the religious community in question regarding the basic precepts of its faith and its demands vis-à-vis the State changes nothing for the purposes of the application of Article 9 (ibid. [GC], § 134)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20240329075624__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20240913070507__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2024-03-29,2024-09-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-03-29__2024-09-13.json,apps:16760/22,Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*,16760/22,added,"Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, nos. 16760/22 and 8 others, 13 February 2024",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.D.1,Interference in the exercise of protected rights and justification thereof,3,,39,,"Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, nos. 16760/22 and 8 others, 13 February 2024",,,"The protection of animal welfare can be linked to the concept of ""public morals"" within the meaning of Article 9 § 2 of the Convention. Unlike the law of the European Union (EU), which established animal welfare as a general-interest objective under EUlaw, the Convention does not seek to protect animal welfare as such; accordingly, Article 9 § 2 does not contain an explicit reference to the protection of animal welfare in the exhaustive list of legitimate aims. However, ""public morals"" cannot be understood as being intended solely to protect human dignity in the sphere of relations between individuals. Having regard to the fact that the Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions and the notions currently prevailing in democratic States; that this ""living instrument"" doctrine concerns not only the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention but also the reasons justifying the limitations that might be imposed on them, in view of societal and legislative developments since the Convention was adopted; that the concept of ""morals"" is inherently evolutive; that the Convention is not indifferent to the living environment of individuals covered by its protection; and that the protection of animal welfare is an ethical value to which contemporary democratic societies attach growing importance, it must be concluded that a respondent Government can rely on ""public morals"" as a legitimate aim in support of a measure aimed at reducing an animal's suffering at the point of its slaughter (Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, 2024, §§ 92-101)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20240329075624__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20240913070507__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2024-03-29,2024-09-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-03-29__2024-09-13.json,apps:16760/22,Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*,16760/22,added,"Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, nos. 16760/22 and 8 others, 13 February 2024",3,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.D.1,Interference in the exercise of protected rights and justification thereof,3,,50,,"Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, nos. 16760/22 and 8 others, 13 February 2024",,,"In cases where the Court is not called upon to balance two rights which are of equal value under the Convention - for example, if the interference is intended to protect animal welfare, which, in contrast to European Union law, is not one of the ""goods"" or values protected as such by the Convention - it is for the Court to assess whether the interference with freedom of religion is justified in principle and whether it is proportionate in the light of the legitimate aim pursued, having regard to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national authorities in this area (Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, 2024, § 107)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20240329075624__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20240913070507__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2024-03-29,2024-09-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-03-29__2024-09-13.json,apps:16760/22,Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*,16760/22,added,"Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, nos. 16760/22 and 8 others, 13 February 2024",4,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.D.1,Interference in the exercise of protected rights and justification thereof,3,,53,,"Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, nos. 16760/22 and 8 others, 13 February 2024",,,"In addition, the quality of the parliamentary and judicial scrutiny of the necessity of the measure carried out at national level is of particular importance, in particular in determining the application of the relevant margin of appreciation. When a general rule is in issue, it is particularly important to consider the quality of the parliamentary scrutiny; this includes, among other aspects, the scale of the consultation of the groups affected by the disputed measure and the efforts made by the legislatures to evaluate its impact on the fundamental right relied upon and to weigh up the competing rights and interests in the course of a throughout legislative process. With regard to judicial scrutiny, where the domestic courts have, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity which governs the Convention, ruled on the case before them by providing sufficiently detailed reasons in the light of the principles set out in its case-law, the Court will require strong reasons to substitute its own assessment for that of the domestic courts (Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, 2024, §§ 108-111)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20240329075624__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20240913070507__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2024-03-29,2024-09-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-03-29__2024-09-13.json,apps:16760/22,Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*,16760/22,added,"Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, nos. 16760/22 and 8 others, 13 February 2024",5,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.D.1,Interference in the exercise of protected rights and justification thereof,3,36,37,0.952,"Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, nos. 16760/22 and 8 others, 13 February 2024",,"Under the terms of Article 9 § 2 of the Convention, the legitimate aims liable to justify interference in an individual's manifestation of his religion or beliefs are public safety, the protection of public order, health and morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This enumeration of legitimate aims is strictly exhaustive and the definition of the aims is necessarily restrictive; if a limitation of this freedom is to be compatible with the Convention it must, in particular, pursue an aim that can be linked to one of those listed in this provision (Svyato- Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, 2007, §§ 132 and 137; S.A.S. v. France [GC], 2014, § 113).","Under the terms of Article 9 § 2 of the Convention, the legitimate aims liable to justify interference in an individual's manifestation of his religion or beliefs are public safety, the protection of public order, health and morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This enumeration of legitimate aims is strictly exhaustive and the definition of the aims is necessarily restrictive; if a limitation of this freedom is to be compatible with the Convention it must, in particular, pursue an aim that can be linked to one of those listed in this provision (Svyato- Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, 2007, §§ 132 and 137; S.A.S. v. France [GC], 2014, § 113; Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, 2024, § 91)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20240329075624__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20240913070507__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2024-03-29,2024-09-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-03-29__2024-09-13.json,apps:16760/22,Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*,16760/22,added,"Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, nos. 16760/22 and 8 others, 13 February 2024",6,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.3,Observance of dietary laws and ritual slaughter,3,,102,,"Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, nos. 16760/22 and 8 others, 13 February 2024",,,"The observance of dietary laws dictated by a religion or a philosophical system is a ""practice"" which is protected by Article 9 § 1 of the Convention (Cha'are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France [GC], 2000, §§ 73-74; Jakóbski v. Poland, 2010; Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, 2024, § 65). In two cases the Court found a violation of Article 9 owing to a prison administration's refusal to provide the applicants, prisoners of Buddhist faith, with meat-free meals, even though such an arrangement would not have been an excessive burden on the prisons in question (Jakóbski v. Poland, 2010; Vartic v. Romania (no. 2), 2013). In the second of these cited cases, in particular, the applicant had only been able to obtain a diet for sick prisoners which contained meat. The Court noted that the applicant had very little scope for receiving food which complied with his religion, especially after the Minister of Justice prohibited food parcels being received by post (ibid., §§ 47-50)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20240329075624__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20240913070507__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2024-03-29,2024-09-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-03-29__2024-09-13.json,apps:16760/22,Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*,16760/22,added,"Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, nos. 16760/22 and 8 others, 13 February 2024",7,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.3,Observance of dietary laws and ritual slaughter,3,,105,,"Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, nos. 16760/22 and 8 others, 13 February 2024",,,"The Court has also found no violation of Article 9, taken separately or in conjunction with Article 14, with regard to the obligation, imposed by the Belgian regional parliaments, to stun animals prior to ritual slaughter. In the relevant case, the Flemish Region and the Walloon Region had ended the religious exception to that obligation, replacing it with an obligation to use a reversible stunning procedure which could not result in the animal's death where slaughter was of a ritual nature. In contrast, the religious exception continued to apply in the Brussels-Capital Region, where the regional Parliament had examined but rejected draft legislation on abolishing the exception. The Belgian Constitutional Court had confirmed the constitutionality of the contested decrees, on the basis, inter alia, of a judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJUE) which had concluded that the relevant provisions of EUlaw (in particular, the Charter of Fundamental Rights), did not preclude national legislation which required, in the context of ritual slaughter, a reversible stunning procedure which would not result in the animal's death. The Court acknowledged that in the given case there had been an interference with the freedom of religion of the applicants (several Muslim organisations and several Muslim or Jewish believers), but that this interference pursued the legitimate aim of protection of ""public morals"", encompassing, among other concepts, animal welfare. Having regard to the margin of appreciation accorded to the State in this area, to the quality and coherence of the parliamentary scrutiny and the subsequent two-tier judicial scrutiny (by the CJUE and the Constitutional Court), and to the fact that the applicants could still obtain meat from animals slaughtered in line with the Jewish or Muslim rites and without stunning, from the Brussels-Capital Region or from abroad, the Court held that the interference complained of was not disproportionate. Lastly, the Court concluded that there had been no discrimination contrary to Article 14, whether between the Jewish or Muslim believers and hunters or fishermen (since the conditions for killing the animal differed substantially), between the Jewish or Muslim believers and the rest of the population, and between the Jewish believers and the Muslim believers (Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, 2024, § 65)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20240329075624__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20240913070507__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2024-03-29,2024-09-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-03-29__2024-09-13.json,apps:24225/19,Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia,24225/19,added,"Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia, no. 24225/19, 30 November 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.C.1,"Protection against physical, verbal or symbolic attacks by third persons",3,,271,,"Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia, no. 24225/19, 30 November 2023",,,"In the same line of reasoning the Court found a violation: ▪ of Article 9, alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention (prohibition of discrimination), in the case of a physical assault on a peaceful meeting of Jehovah's Witnesses by a group of individuals led by a defrocked Orthodox priest, during which the applicants had been violently beaten and humiliated; their religious literature had been burnt before their eyes. The police had refused to intervene promptly in situ in order to protect the applicants; subsequently, the applicants had been faced with total indifference on the part of the relevant authorities, which, out of hostility towards the Jehovah's Witness religion, had refused to implement the applicable law or take any action on their complaints (Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, 2007; see also Begheluri v. Georgia, 2014 and Tsartsidze and Others v. Georgia, 2017, which also involved acts of intimidation from the police themselves); ▪ of Article 9 alone (but not Article 14), in the case of a demonstration which had turned violent - but had been lawful because it had previously been declared in conformity with the law - and which had been organised by members of a political party in protest against Friday prayers held inside and outside the Mosque in Sofia, the Bulgarian capital (threatening shouts and gestures; egg-throwing; loudspeakers placed on the Mosque roof in order to drown out the call to prayer; attempted burning of prayer mats; physical assaults on members of the congregation by demonstrators having forced their way into the Mosque, etc.). In this case the Bulgarian authorities had not done all that could reasonably have been expected of them to ensure the freedom of both sides to exercise their respective rights. Being aware of the highly negative position adopted by the party in question vis-à-vis Islam and the Turks, the authorities could have minimised the risk of violence by allocating the demonstrators specific areas at a safe distance from the Mosque, but they had failed to do so. Furthermore, the number of police officers present on the spot was clearly insufficient to control the situation, and they behaved too passively to protect the members of the congregation. Lastly, the investigation instigated by the authorities after the events did not satisfy the requisite effectiveness criteria (Karaahmed v. Bulgaria, 2015). ▪ of Articles 8 (respect for private life) and 9 taken in conjunction with Article 14, in the case of several applicants who wished to open a Muslim boarding school in a building that they had rented in Kobuleti (Georgia), but who had been unable to do so on account of hostile protests by the local population, with collusion from the police and other local authorities. The applicants had been victims of a blockade of the entrance to the school building and subjected to insults and verbal abuse because of their adherence to Islam; moreover, at one point a pig had been killed in front of the school and its head nailed to the entrance door. In addition, the municipality had not performed its contractual obligation and had refused to connect the school to the town's sewage system, in spite of an order from the Supreme Court to so do. The Court noted that the police and other Georgian authorities had, through their inaction, failed to protect the applicants against those attacks and had not conducted an effective investigation capable of identifying the persons responsible and establishing whether there had been prejudice grounds for their actions (Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia, 2023)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20240329075624__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20240913070507__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2024-03-29,2024-09-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-03-29__2024-09-13.json,apps:24225/19,Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia,24225/19,added,"Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia, no. 24225/19, 30 November 2023",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.C.1,"Protection against physical, verbal or symbolic attacks by third persons",3,3,3,0.969,"Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia, no. 24225/19, 30 November 2023",,"it is incumbent on the Court, in exercising its power of European review, to verify, in the light of the case as a whole, whether the national authorities have struck a fair balance among the various competing rights enshrined in the Convention. In doing so, the Court should not act with the benefit of hindsight. Nor should it simply substitute its view for that of the national authorities who, in any given case, are much better placed to assess where the appropriate balance lay and how best to achieve that balance. That is particularly true where it is the police who must in practice strike that balance. Having regard to the difficulties in policing modern societies, the positive obligations on the police or on other authorities must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on them (Karaahmed v. Bulgaria, 2015, §§ 91-96).","it is incumbent on the Court, in exercising its power of European review, to verify, in the light of the case as a whole, whether the national authorities have struck a fair balance among the various competing rights enshrined in the Convention. In doing so, the Court should not act with the benefit of hindsight. Nor should it simply substitute its view for that of the national authorities who, in any given case, are much better placed to assess where the appropriate balance lay and how best to achieve that balance. That is particularly true where it is the police who must in practice strike that balance. Having regard to the difficulties in policing modern societies, the positive obligations on the police or on other authorities must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on them (Karaahmed v. Bulgaria, 2015, §§ 91-96); Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia, 2023, § 83)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20240329075624__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20240913070507__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2024-03-29,2024-09-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-03-29__2024-09-13.json,apps:43082/14,Hamzayan v. Armenia*,43082/14,added,"Hamzayan v. Armenia*, no. 43082/14, § 51, 6 February 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B,Convictions protected under Article 9,2,15,15,0.858,"Hamzayan v. Armenia*, no. 43082/14, § 51, 6 February 2024",,"In that connection, the Court points out that the Convention is designed to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective. The right enshrined in Article 9 would be highly theoretical and illusory if the degree of discretion granted to States allowed them to interpret the notion of religious denomination so restrictively as to deprive a non-traditional and minority form of a religion of legal protection. Such limitative definitions have a direct impact on the exercise of the right to freedom of religion and are liable to curtail the exercise of that right by denying the religious nature of a faith. At all events, these definitions may not be interpreted to the detriment of non-traditional forms of religion (İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2016, § 114).","In that connection, the Court points out that the Convention is designed to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective. The right enshrined in Article 9 would be highly theoretical and illusory if the degree of discretion granted to States allowed them to interpret the notion of religious denomination so restrictively as to deprive a non-traditional and minority form of a religion of legal protection. Such limitative definitions have a direct impact on the exercise of the right to freedom of religion and are liable to curtail the exercise of that right by denying the religious nature of a faith. At all events, these definitions may not be interpreted to the detriment of non-traditional forms of religion (İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2016, § 114). In addition, it would be fundamentally inconsistent with the logic of Article 9 to limit the rights guaranteed under that provision solely to the religions and registered religious organisations recognised by the State, and to followers of them (Hamzayan v. Armenia*, 2024)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20240329075624__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20240913070507__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2024-03-29,2024-09-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-03-29__2024-09-13.json,apps:43082/14,Hamzayan v. Armenia*,43082/14,added,"Hamzayan v. Armenia*, no. 43082/14, § 51, 6 February 2024",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.7,Preaching and proselytism,3,,141,,"Hamzayan v. Armenia*, no. 43082/14, § 51, 6 February 2024",,,"For example, the Court found a violation of Article 9: - in a case where the applicant, a Jehovah's Witness, had been arrested and criminally convicted of going to the home of the wife of the local Orthodox Church cantor and holding a discussion of a religious nature with her (Kokkinakis v. Greece, 1993); see also Hamzayan v. Armenia*, 2024, concerning similar facts, in which the finding of a violation resulted from the absence of an adequate legal basis within the meaning of Article 9 § 2); - in a case where the applicant, an American Baptist who lived in Russia, received an administrative fine for having organised regular gatherings in his home to worship and discuss the Bible, after having invited the participants personally, left invitations in their letter boxes and posted information about religious meetings in public places such as notice boards. He was charged and convicted of conducting missionary activities without notifying the authorities about the establishment of a religious group, although he was acting in an individual capacity and did not wish to create any kind of formal group (Ossewaarde v. Russia, 2023, §§ 42-46)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20240329075624__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20240913070507__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2024-03-29,2024-09-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-03-29__2024-09-13.json,apps:43082/14,Hamzayan v. Armenia*,43082/14,added,"Hamzayan v. Armenia*, no. 43082/14, § 51, 6 February 2024",3,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A.2,"Recognition, registration and dissolution of religious organisations",3,,186,,"Hamzayan v. Armenia*, no. 43082/14, § 51, 6 February 2024",,,"It would be fundamentally inconsistent with the logic of Article 9 to limit the exercise of the rights guaranteed by this provision merely to religious organisations that have been registered or recognised by the State, and their members (Hamzayan v. Armenia*, 2024). At the same time, a mere tolerance by the national authorities of the activities of a non-recognised religious organisation is no substitute for recognition if recognition alone is capable of conferring rights on those concerned (Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, 2001, § 129; İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2016, § 127). Even where legislation expressly authorises the operation of unregistered religious groups, that is insufficient if domestic law reserves a whole series of rights essential for conducting religious activities for registered organisations with legal personality (Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, 2007, § 122). Those rights include those to own or rent property, to maintain bank accounts, to hire employees, to ensure judicial protection of the community, its members and its assets, to establish places of worship, to hold religious services in places accessible to the public, to produce, obtain and distribute religious literature, to create educational institutions, and to maintain contacts for international exchanges and conferences (Kimlya and Others v. Russia, 2009, §§ 85-86; Genov v. Bulgaria, 2017, § 37). Moreover, one of the means of exercising the right to manifest one's religion, especially for a religious community, in its collective dimension, is the possibility of guaranteeing the judicial protection of the community, its members and its assets, so that Article 9 must be seen not only in the light of Article 11, but also in the light of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on the right to a fair trial and to access to a tribunal (Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, 2007, § 152; Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, 2008, § 63)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20240329075624__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20240913070507__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2024-03-29,2024-09-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-03-29__2024-09-13.json,apps:34015/17|26896/18,Sardar Babayev v. Azerbaijan,34015/17|26896/18,added,"Sardar Babayev v. Azerbaijan, nos. 34015/17 and 26896/18, 1 February 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.8,Freedom of religious worship,3,,147,,"Sardar Babayev v. Azerbaijan, nos. 34015/17 and 26896/18, 1 February 2024",,,"While the State may place limitations on manifestation of a religion through worship and preaching in accordance with Article 9 § 2 of the Convention, a criminal punishment imposed solely on account of a personal characteristic of the celebrant (such as his or her place of religious education) without regulating the content of the religious expression in question (such as, for example, incitement to hatred or another expression that is incompatible with the values of a democratic society) does not sit well with the requirements of this provision (Sardar Babayev v. Azerbaijan*, 2024, §§ 75-78)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20240329075624__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20240913070507__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2024-03-29,2024-09-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-03-29__2024-09-13.json,apps:34015/17|26896/18,Sardar Babayev v. Azerbaijan,34015/17|26896/18,added,"Sardar Babayev v. Azerbaijan, nos. 34015/17 and 26896/18, 1 February 2024",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.8,Freedom of religious worship,3,,148,,"Sardar Babayev v. Azerbaijan, nos. 34015/17 and 26896/18, 1 February 2024",,,"For example, the Court found a violation of freedom of religion in the following cases: ▪ measures regulating the religious life of Greek Cypriots of Orthodox faith enclaved in the ""Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus"", preventing them from leaving their villages to attend religious ceremonies in places of worship elsewhere or to visit a monastery (Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 2001, §§ 243-246); ▪ the dispersal by the Russian police of a Sunday service held by Jehovah's Witnesses in the assembly hall of a State vocational secondary school, which the national Jehovah's Witnesses organisation rented on the basis of a lawfully concluded lease agreement. The police measure had been clearly unlawful and arbitrary, even in the light of domestic law (Kuznetsov and Others v. Russia, 2007). In another similar case the Court found a violation because of the dispersal of an annual Jehovah's Witnesses celebration held in the Agricultural Academy assembly hall, which had also been rented in conformity with domestic law. The impugned operation had been conducted by a large number of police officers, including an armed unit of the Special Police Force; the applicants were arrested and remanded in custody for several hours. Leaving aside the issue of the lawfulness of the interference, the Court found that it had clearly not been ""necessary in a democratic society"" (Krupko and Others v. Russia, 2014); ▪ the dispersal by the Moldovan police of a prayer meeting held by a group of Muslims in a private house and the imposition on the applicant of an administrative fine for ""practising a religion not recognised by the State"" (Masaev v. Moldova, 2009); ▪ the imposition of an administrative fine on an American Baptist missionary who was resident in Russia, for having organised regular gatherings in his home for worship and Bible reading without having notified the authorities; acting in an individual capacity rather than on behalf of a religious association, he could not be considered to meet the legal requirements as amended by Parliament (Ossewaarde v. Russia, 2023); ▪ the break-up by the Bulgarian police of a gathering of adherents of the Reverend Moon's Unification Church in an adherent's home, followed by a search of the apartment with the public prosecutor's authorisation, and finally, the seizure of books, recordings and other items, all because the religious community had not been registered by the State. The impugned measures had manifestly lacked any legal basis in domestic law. Furthermore, the domestic legislation had been unclear as regards the possibility of holding religious gatherings where the organisation in question had not been registered; at the material time there had been an administrative practice, supported by some domestic precedents, of declaring such gatherings unlawful (Boychev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011); ▪ the summonsing of an applicant to attend the local police station and her questioning on the subject of her religious beliefs, followed by a search of her home, accompanied by seizure of books and recordings, and lastly, a police warning ordering the applicant to discontinue the meetings in her home of the evangelical congregation to which she belonged. The Court concluded that there had been no statutory basis for the interference as the impugned measures had been implemented in the absence of any criminal investigation, in flagrant breach of domestic law (Dimitrova v. Bulgaria, 2015); ▪ a prison sentence passed on the applicants for having taken part in a Muslim religious ceremony (mevlüt) held on the premises of a political party in remembrance of three members of an illegal organisation who had been killed by the security forces. The Court took the view that the mere fact that the ceremony in question had been organised on the premises of a political party in which symbols of a terrorist organisation were displayed did not deprive the participants of the protection guaranteed by Article 9. In this case the penalty had not met the requirements of clarity and foreseeability since it would have been impossible to foresee that mere participation in a religious service would fall within the scope of the Law on the prevention of terrorism (Güler and Uğur v. Turkey, 2014). ▪ the arrest and sentencing to imprisonment of a mullah (member of the clergy) for having preached and conducted Friday prayers in a mosque, on the sole ground that he was a national of the respondent State who had obtained his religious education abroad. The Court considered that such a measure, targeting the place of the applicant's studies rather than the content of the relevant religious expression or the manner of its delivery, could not be regarded as ""necessary in a democratic society"" in order to protect the democratic order, fight against religious extremism and counter the negative influence of foreign ideologies (Sardar Babayev v. Azerbaijan*, 2024, §§ 75-78)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20240913070507__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20250506182911__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2024-09-13,2025-05-06,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-09-13__2025-05-06.json,apps:64220/19,Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria,64220/19,added,"Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria, no. 64220/19, 5 March 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B,Convictions protected under Article 9,2,15,15,0.9942,"Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria , 2024|Hamzayan v. Armenia , 2024",,"In that connection, the Court points out that the Convention is designed to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective. The right enshrined in Article 9 would be highly theoretical and illusory if the degree of discretion granted to States allowed them to interpret the notion of religious denomination so restrictively as to deprive a non-traditional and minority form of a religion of legal protection. Such limitative definitions have a direct impact on the exercise of the right to freedom of religion and are liable to curtail the exercise of that right by denying the religious nature of a faith. At all events, these definitions may not be interpreted to the detriment of non-traditional forms of religion ( İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2016, § 114). In addition, it would be fundamentally inconsistent with the logic of Article 9 to limit the rights guaranteed under that provision solely to the religions and registered religious organisations recognised by the State, and to followers of them ( Hamzayan v. Armenia *, 2024).","In that connection, the Court points out that the Convention is designed to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective. The right enshrined in Article 9 would be highly theoretical and illusory if the degree of discretion granted to States allowed them to interpret the notion of religious denomination so restrictively as to deprive a non-traditional and minority form of a religion of legal protection. Such limitative definitions have a direct impact on the exercise of the right to freedom of religion and are liable to curtail the exercise of that right by denying the religious nature of a faith. At all events, these definitions may not be interpreted to the detriment of non-traditional forms of religion ( İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2016, § 114, and Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria, 2024, § 48). In addition, it would be fundamentally inconsistent with the logic of Article 9 to limit the rights guaranteed under that provision solely to the religions and registered religious organisations recognised by the State, and to followers of them ( Hamzayan v. Armenia, 2024)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20240913070507__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20250506182911__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2024-09-13,2025-05-06,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-09-13__2025-05-06.json,apps:64220/19,Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria,64220/19,added,"Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria, no. 64220/19, 5 March 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.A.2,"Recognition, registration and dissolution of religious organisations",3,188,190,0.9934,"Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria , 2024",,"As regards the recognition and registration of religious communities, States are empowered to verify whether a movement or association is conducting, for ostensibly religious purposes, activities harmful to the population or endangering public security. Since it cannot be ruled out that an organisation's programme might conceal objectives and intentions different from the ones it proclaims, to verify that it does not the content of the programme might be compared with the organisation's actions and the positions it defends ( Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, 2001, §§ 105 and 125). The State may also require the statutes of a religious association to clearly define the corresponding beliefs and observance, so that the public can differentiate the various denominations and in order to avoid confrontation among the different religious communities ( Metodiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2017, §§ 40 and 45). Accordingly, the refusal to register a religious organisation on the ground that it has not provided the authorities with a description of the fundamental precepts of the religion in question may be justified by the need to establish whether that organisation presents any danger for a democratic society and the fundamental interests recognised by Article 9 § 2 ( Cârmuirea Spirituală a Musulmanilor din Republica Moldova v. Moldova (dec.), 2005; Church of Scientology of Moscow v. Russia, 2007, § 93; Lajda and Others v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2009). This was also the case with regard to a religious community's refusal to cooperate with the public authorities and allow them to investigate allegations of abusive practices that were, a priori, credible ( Ilyin and Others v. Ukraine, 2022, § 66). Nevertheless, although States do have a right of scrutiny concerning the conformity of the objectives and activities of a religious association with the rules established by legislation, they must use it sparingly, in a manner compatible with their obligations under the Convention and subject to the purview of the organs of the Convention ( Jehovah's Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia, 2010, § 100; Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese (Greek- Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Peć Patriarchy) v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2017, § 94).","As regards the recognition and registration of religious communities, States are empowered to verify whether a movement or association is conducting, for ostensibly religious purposes, activities harmful to the population or endangering public security. Since it cannot be ruled out that an organisation's programme might conceal objectives and intentions different from the ones it proclaims, to verify that it does not the content of the programme might be compared with the organisation's actions and the positions it defends ( Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, 2001, §§ 105 and 125). The State may also require the statutes of a religious association to clearly define the corresponding beliefs and observance, so that the public can differentiate the various denominations and in order to avoid confrontation among the different religious communities ( Metodiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2017, §§ 40 and 45; Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria, 2024, § 55). Accordingly, the refusal to register a religious organisation on the ground that it has not provided the authorities with a description of the fundamental precepts of the religion in question may be justified by the need to establish whether that organisation presents any danger for a democratic society and the fundamental interests recognised by Article 9 § 2 ( Cârmuirea Spirituală a Musulmanilor din Republica Moldova v. Moldova (dec.), 2005; Church of Scientology of Moscow v. Russia, 2007, § 93; Lajda and Others v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2009). This was also the case with regard to a religious community's refusal to cooperate with the public authorities and allow them to investigate allegations of abusive practices that were, a priori, credible ( Ilyin and Others v. Ukraine, 2022, § 66). Nevertheless, although States do have a right of scrutiny concerning the conformity of the objectives and activities of a religious association with the rules established by legislation, they must use it sparingly, in a manner compatible with their obligations under the Convention and subject to the purview of the organs of the Convention ( Jehovah's Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia, 2010, § 100; Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese (Greek- Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Peć Patriarchy) v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2017, § 94; Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria, 2024, § 55)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20240913070507__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20250506182911__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2024-09-13,2025-05-06,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-09-13__2025-05-06.json,apps:64220/19,Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria,64220/19,added,"Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria, no. 64220/19, 5 March 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.A.2,"Recognition, registration and dissolution of religious organisations",3,191,193,0.999,"Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria , 2024",,"For example, the Court found a violation of Article 9 of the Convention (taken alone and/or in conjunction with Article 14) in the following cases: ▪ the Moldovan authorities'refusal to grant legal recognition to the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, an autonomous Orthodox Church operating under the authority of the Patriarchate of Bucharest (the Romanian Orthodox Church), on the ground that such recognition would infringe the interests of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova, which comes under the Patriarchate of Moscow (the Russian Orthodox Church), which is already recognised by the Government. Lacking legal recognition, the applicant church was unable to engage in its activities; its priests could not conduct divine service, its members could not meet to practise their religion and, moreover, lacking legal personality, it was not entitled to judicial protection of its assets or allowed to defend itself against acts of intimidation. By denying recognition on the ground that the applicant church was only a ""schismatic group"" within the Orthodox Church, the Moldovan Government had failed in their duty of neutrality and impartiality. For the remainder, the Government's submissions accusing the applicant church of jeopardising the country's territorial integrity and social stability were manifestly ill-founded ( Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, 2001); ▪ in the same context as the foregoing case: a refusal by a local authority to issue the applicants with a certificate which they needed in order to register the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, on the ground that the Metropolitan Church of Moldova was already registered and operated in the area in question; the Court found that the impugned interference was not ""prescribed by law"" ( Fusu Arcadie and Others v. the Republic of Moldova, 2012); ▪ a refusal by the competent administrative authority to register the applicant Church despite a judgment ordering it to do so; in this case the Court found that the impugned interference was not ""prescribed by law"" ( Biserica Adevărat Ortodoxă din Moldova and Others v. Moldova, 2007; ▪ a refusal by the Bulgarian authorities to register a new religious association entitled "" Ahmadiyya Muslim Community"" as a denomination, on the grounds that its statutes did not set out sufficiently clear and full information on the beliefs and observance of the Ahmadi denomination, which made it difficult to distinguish it from the Muslim religion as already recognised. In this case Bulgarian law did not set out any specific provisions on how detailed such a description of beliefs and observance should be and what specific information should be entered on the registration application form, which could in practice allow the authorities to refuse to register any new religious association holding the same doctrine as a pre-existing denomination ( Metodiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2017); ▪ a time-lapse of twenty years between the lodging with the Austrian authorities of an application for legal recognition by a Jehovah's Witnesses congregation and the authorities'decision finally to grant it ""registered"" religious organisation status. The Court also found that there had been discrimination in breach of Article 14 as a result of the refusal to grant the applicant community ""recognised religious society"" status, whi ch embraced legal personality and bestowed a whole series of privileges under domestic law, on the ground that it had not operated as a ""registered"" organisation in Austria for a minimum of ten years. The respondent Government had not demonstrated the existence of any objective and reasonable justification for this difference in treatment, especially since the ""ten - year"" requirement had not been applied to another religious community in a similar situation to that of the Jehovah's Witnesses ( Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, 2008; ▪ the Russian authorities'refusal to register two local branches of the Church of Scientology as ""religious organisations"", which would have automatically given them legal entity status, on the ground that they had not been operating in Russia as ""religious groups"" (without legal personality) for at least fifteen years. Finding a violation of Article 9 interpreted in the light of Article 11, the Court noted that the respondent Government had not mentioned any overriding social need in support of the impugned restriction or any relevant and sufficient reason justifying such a long waiting period; in particular, it had never been contended that the applicants - as a group or as individuals - had conducted or intended to conduct any unlawful activities or had pursued aims other than those of religious worship, teaching, practice and observance. The reason for the denial of registration had been purely formal, unrelated to the operation of the groups in question, and the only ""offence"" of which the applicants had been found guilty was their intention to apply for the registration of an association of a ""religious nature"" which had not existed in the region for a minimum of fifteen years ( Kimlya and Others v. Russia, 2009). In another very similar case, one of the reasons given for rejecting the application for registration was the fact that the local municipal council had no competence to issue such a certificate. In contrast to the Kimlya and Others v. Russia case, the Court found that the interference had not been ""prescribed by law"" and that it was therefore unnecessary to consider the issue of its proportionality ( Church of Scientology of St Petersburg and Others v. Russia, 2014); ▪ the Croatian Government's arbitrary and discriminatory refusal to conclude with the applicants, several Reformist Churches, a cooperation agreement in public-interest fields enabling these Churches to provide religious education in State schools and guarantee recognition of the civil effects of marriages celebrated by their ministers. In this case the Government had justified its refusal by the fact that the applicants had not satisfied, either individually or jointly, the criteria set forth in a governmental instruction for the purposes of concluding such agreements. Nevertheless, several other communities had been exempted from the numerical criterion, and as to the historical criterion (""historic religious communities of European cultural circle""), the Government had not explained why the applicant Churches, of the Protestant reformist tradition, failed to satisfy it. The Court therefore found a violation of Article 14 of the Convention ( Savez crkava ""Riječ života"" and Others v. Croatia, 2010). ▪ the Lithuanian Parliament's discriminatory refusal to grant the status of "" State-recognised "" religious association (affording privileges similar to those mentioned in the aforementioned Croatian case) to a Neo-Pagan association, even though it satisfied the legal conditions for such status. In this case, it had transpired from statements made by various MPs that the refusal had been motivated by arguments relating to the substance of the religious beliefs in question (unsubstantiated national security arguments; doubts as to the "" religious "" nature of the activities of the applicant association and to the very existence of the beliefs which it claimed to hold; the alleged attack on the Christian faith of the majority of the population and the interests of the Roman Catholic Church). Since those grounds were clearly incompatible with the State's duty of neutrality and impartiality, the Court found a violation of Article 14 of the Convention ( Ancient Baltic religious association ""Romuva"" v. Lithuania, 2021).","For example, the Court found a violation of Article 9 of the Convention (taken alone and/or in conjunction with Article 14) in the following cases: ▪ the Moldovan authorities'refusal to grant legal recognition to the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, an autonomous Orthodox Church operating under the authority of the Patriarchate of Bucharest (the Romanian Orthodox Church), on the ground that such recognition would infringe the interests of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova, which comes under the Patriarchate of Moscow (the Russian Orthodox Church), which is already recognised by the Government. Lacking legal recognition, the applicant church was unable to engage in its activities; its priests could not conduct divine service, its members could not meet to practise their religion and, moreover, lacking legal personality, it was not entitled to judicial protection of its assets or allowed to defend itself against acts of intimidation. By denying recognition on the ground that the applicant church was only a ""schismatic group"" within the Orthodox Church, the Moldovan Government had failed in their duty of neutrality and impartiality. For the remainder, the Government's submissions accusing the applicant church of jeopardising the country's territorial integrity and social stability were manifestly ill-founded ( Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, 2001); ▪ in the same context as the foregoing case: a refusal by a local authority to issue the applicants with a certificate which they needed in order to register the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, on the ground that the Metropolitan Church of Moldova was already registered and operated in the area in question; the Court found that the impugned interference was not ""prescribed by law"" ( Fusu Arcadie and Others v. the Republic of Moldova, 2012); ▪ a refusal by the competent administrative authority to register the applicant Church despite a judgment ordering it to do so; in this case the Court found that the impugned interference was not ""prescribed by law"" ( Biserica Adevărat Ortodoxă din Moldova and Others v. Moldova, 2007; ▪ a refusal by the Bulgarian authorities to register a new religious association entitled "" Ahmadiyya Muslim Community"" as a denomination, on the grounds that its statutes did not set out sufficiently clear and full information on the beliefs and observance of the Ahmadi denomination, which made it difficult to distinguish it from the Muslim religion as already recognised. In this case Bulgarian law did not set out any specific provisions on how detailed such a description of beliefs and observance should be and what specific information should be entered on the registration application form, which could in practice allow the authorities to refuse to register any new religious association holding the same doctrine as a pre-existing denomination ( Metodiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2017); ▪ a time-lapse of twenty years between the lodging with the Austrian authorities of an application for legal recognition by a Jehovah's Witnesses congregation and the authorities'decision finally to grant it ""registered"" religious organisation status. The Court also found that there had been discrimination in breach of Article 14 as a result of the refusal to grant the applicant community ""recognised religious society"" status, which embraced legal personality and bestowed a whole series of privileges under domestic law, on the ground that it had not operated as a ""registered"" organisation in Austria for a minimum of ten years. The respondent Government had not demonstrated the existence of any objective and reasonable justification for this difference in treatment, especially since the ""ten - year"" requirement had not been applied to another religious community in a similar situation to that of the Jehovah's Witnesses ( Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, 2008; ▪ the prolonged refusal of the Austrian authorities to register an association, which acted as an umbrella entity for several Alevi associations, as a ""registered"" religious organisation, essentially on the grounds of similarities between its statutes and those of another religious group that had requested registration during the same period ( Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria, 2024); ▪ the Russian authorities'refusal to register two local branches of the Church of Scientology as ""religious organisations"", which would have automatically given them legal entity status, on the ground that they had not been operating in Russia as ""religious groups"" (without legal personality) for at least fifteen years. Finding a violation of Article 9 interpreted in the light of Article 11, the Court noted that the respondent Government had not mentioned any overriding social need in support of the impugned restriction or any relevant and sufficient reason justifying such a long waiting period; in particular, it had never been contended that the applicants - as a group or as individuals - had conducted or intended to conduct any unlawful activities or had pursued aims other than those of religious worship, teaching, practice and observance. The reason for the denial of registration had been purely formal, unrelated to the operation of the groups in question, and the only ""offence"" of which the applicants had been found guilty was th eir intention to apply for the registration of an association of a ""religious nature"" which had not existed in the region for a minimum of fifteen years ( Kimlya and Others v. Russia, 2009). In another very similar case, one of the reasons given for rejecting the application for registration was the fact that the local municipal council had no competence to issue such a certificate. In contrast to the Kimlya and Others v. Russia case, the Court found that the interference had not been ""prescribed by law"" and that it was therefore unnecessary to consider the issue of its proportionality ( Church of Scientology of St Petersburg and Others v. Russia, 2014); ▪ the Croatian Government's arbitrary and discriminatory refusal to conclude with the applicants, several Reformist Churches, a cooperation agreement in public-interest fields enabling these Churches to provide religious education in State schools and guarantee recognition of the civil effects of marriages celebrated by their ministers. In this case the Government had justified its refusal by the fact that the applicants had not satisfied, either individually or jointly, the criteria set forth in a governmental instruction for the purposes of concluding such agreements. Nevertheless, several other communities had been exempted from the numerical criterion, and as to the historical criterion (""historic religious communities of European cultural circle""), the Govern ment had not explained why the applicant Churches, of the Protestant reformist tradition, failed to satisfy it. The Court therefore found a violation of Article 14 of the Convention ( Savez crkava ""Riječ života"" and Others v. Croatia, 2010). ▪ the Lithuanian Parliament's discriminatory refusal to grant the status of "" State-recognised "" religious association (affording privileges similar to those mentioned in the aforementioned Croatian case) to a Neo-Pagan association, even though it satisfied the legal conditions for such status. In this case, it had transpired from statements made by various MPs that the refusal had been motivated by arguments relating to the substance of the religious beliefs in question (unsubstantiated national security arguments; doubts as to the "" religious "" nature of the activities of the applicant association and to the very existence of the beliefs which it claimed to hold; the alleged attack on the Christian faith of the majority of the population and the interests of the Roman Catholic Church). Since those grounds were clearly incompatible with the State's duty of neutrality and impartiality, the Court found a violation of Article 14 of the Convention ( Ancient Baltic religious association ""Romuva"" v. Lithuania, 2021)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20240913070507__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20250506182911__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2024-09-13,2025-05-06,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-09-13__2025-05-06.json,apps:18382/15,Kanatli v. Türkiye,18382/15,added,"Kanatli v. Türkiye, no. 18382/15, 12 March 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B,Convictions protected under Article 9,2,17,17,0.9993,"Kanatli v. Türkiye , 2024",,"The organs of the Convention have explicitly or implicitly acknowledged that the safeguards of Article 9 § 1 of the Convention apply to: (a) the ""major"" or ""ancient"" world religions which have existed for millennia or for several centuries, such as: ▪ Alevism ( Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı v. Turkey, 2014; İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey, 2016) ▪ Buddhism ( Jakóbski v. Poland, 2010) ▪ the different Christian denominations (among many other authorities, Svyato- Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, 2007; Savez crkava ""Riječ života"" and Others v. Croatia, 2010) ▪ the various forms of Hinduism, including the Hare Krishna movement ( Kovaļkovs v. Latvia (dec.), 2012; Genov v. Bulgaria, 2017) ▪ the various forms of Islam ( Hassan and Tchaouch v. Bulgaria [GC], 2000; Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], 2005), including Ahmadism ( Metodiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2017) ▪ Judaism ( Cha'are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France [GC], 2000; Francesco Sessa v. Italy, 2012) ▪ Sikhism ( Phull v. France (dec.), 2005; Jasvir Singh v. France (dec.), 2009) ▪ Taoism ( X. v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 18 May 1976) (b) new or relatively new religions or spiritual practices such as: ▪ Aumism of Mandarom ( Association des Chevaliers du Lotus d'Or v. France, 2013) ▪ the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh movement, known as Osho movement ( Leela Förderkreis e.V. and Others v. Germany, 2008; Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, § 121) ▪ the Reverend Sun Myung Moon's Unification Church ( Nolan and K. v. Russia, 2009; Boychev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011) ▪ Mormonism, or the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints ( The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. the United Kingdom, 2014) ▪ the Raëlian Movement ( F.L. v. France (dec.), 2005) ▪ Neo-Paganism ( Ásatrúarfélagið v. Iceland (dec.), 2012); Ancient Baltic religious association ""Romuva"" v. Lithuania, 2021) ▪ Falun Gong, or Falun Dafa ( A.O. Falun Dafa and Others v. Moldova, 2021) ▪ the ""Santo Daime"" religion, whose rituals include the use of a hallucinogenic substance known as "" ayahuasca "" ( Fränklin-Beentjes and CEFLU-Luz da Floresta v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2014) ▪ the Jehovah's Witnesses ( Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, 2008; Jehovah's Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia, 2010) (c) various coherent and sincerely-held philosophical convictions, such as: ▪ pacifism ( Arrowsmith v. the United Kingdom, Commission report of 12 October 1978, § 69) ▪ principled opposition to military service ( Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC], 2011) ▪ veganism and opposition to the manipulation of products of animal origin or tested on animals ( W. v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 10 February 1993) ▪ opposition to abortion ( Knudsen v. Norway, Commission decision of 8 March 1985; Van Schijndel and Others v. the Netherlands, Commission decision of 10 September 1997) ▪ a doctor's opinions on alternative medicine, constituting a form of manifestation of medical philosophy ( Nyyssönen v. Finland, Commission decision of 15 January 1998) ▪ the conviction that marriage is a lifelong union between a man and a woman and rejection of homosexual unions ( Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2013) ▪ attachment to secularism ( Lautsi and Others v. Italy [GC], 2011, § 58; Hamidović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017, § 35).","The organs of the Convention have explicitly or implicitly acknowledged that the safeguards of Article 9 § 1 of the Convention apply to: (a) the ""major"" or ""ancient"" world reli gions which have existed for millennia or for several centuries, such as: ▪ Alevism ( Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı v. Turkey, 2014; İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey, 2016) ▪ Buddhism ( Jakóbski v. Poland, 2010) ▪ the different Christian denominations (among many other authorities, Svyato- Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, 2007; Savez crkava ""Riječ života"" and Others v. Croatia, 2010) ▪ the various forms of Hinduism, including the Hare Krishna movement ( Kovaļkovs v. Latvia (dec.), 2012; Genov v. Bulgaria, 2017) ▪ the various forms of Islam ( Hassan and Tchaouch v. Bulgaria [GC], 2000; Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], 2005), including Ahmadism ( Metodiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2017) ▪ Judaism ( Cha'are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France [GC], 2000; Francesco Sessa v. Italy, 2012) ▪ Sikhism ( Phull v. France (dec.), 2005; Jasvir Singh v. France (dec.), 2009) ▪ Taoism ( X. v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 18 May 1976) (b) new or relatively new religions or spiritual practices such as: ▪ Aumism of Mandarom ( Association des Chevaliers du Lotus d'Or v. France, 2013) ▪ the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh movement, known as Osho movement ( Leela Förderkreis e.V. and Others v. Germany, 2008; Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, § 121) ▪ the Reverend Sun Myung Moon's Unification Church ( Nolan and K. v. Russia, 2009; Boychev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011) ▪ Mormonism, or the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints ( The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. the United Kingdom, 2014) ▪ the Raëlian Movement ( F.L. v. France (dec.), 2005) ▪ Neo-Paganism ( Ásatrúarfélagið v. Iceland (dec.), 2012); Ancient Baltic religious association ""Romuva"" v. Lithuania, 2021) ▪ Falun Gong, or Falun Dafa ( A.O. Falun Dafa and Others v. Moldova, 2021) ▪ the ""Santo Daime"" religion, whose rituals include the use of a hallucinogenic substance known as "" ayahuasca "" ( Fränklin-Beentjes and CEFLU-Luz da Floresta v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2014) ▪ the Jehovah's Witnesses ( Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, 2008; Jehovah's Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia, 2010) (c) various coherent and sincerely-held philosophical convictions, such as: ▪ pacifism ( Arrowsmith v. the United Kingdom, Commission report of 12 October 1978, § 69; Kanatli v. Türkiye, 2024, § 45); ▪ principled opposition to military service ( Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC], 2011) ▪ veganism and opposition to the manipulation of products of animal origin or tested on animals ( W. v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 10 February 1993) ▪ opposition to abortion ( Knudsen v. Norway, Commission decision of 8 March 1985; Van Schijndel and Others v. the Netherlands, Commission decision of 10 September 1997) ▪ a doctor's opinions on alternative medicine, constituting a form of manifestation of medical philosophy ( Nyyssönen v. Finland, Commission decision of 15 January 1998) ▪ the conviction that marriage is a lifelong union between a man and a woman and rejection of homosexual unions ( Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2013) ▪ attachment to secularism ( Lautsi and Others v. Italy [GC], 2011, § 58; Hamidović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017, § 35)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20240913070507__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20250506182911__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2024-09-13,2025-05-06,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-09-13__2025-05-06.json,apps:18382/15,Kanatli v. Türkiye,18382/15,added,"Kanatli v. Türkiye, no. 18382/15, 12 March 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A.2,Conscientious objection: the right not to act contrary to one ’ s conscience and convictions,3,,72,,"Kanatli v. Türkiye , 2024",,,"The guarantees of Article 9 apply not only to compulsory military service in the strict sense of the term, but also to recurring service as a reservist, occurring after the main phase of compulsory service and constituting an extension of military duty. Thus, the Court has recognised that the State's duty to respect conscientious objection extended to service as a reservist, which usually lasted one day (but was liable for a total period of 30 days per year), performed in military barracks under the authority and supervision of army officers ( Kanatli v. Türkiye, 2024, §§ 49-50, 66)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20240913070507__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20250506182911__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2024-09-13,2025-05-06,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-09-13__2025-05-06.json,apps:18382/15,Kanatli v. Türkiye,18382/15,added,"Kanatli v. Türkiye, no. 18382/15, 12 March 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.2,Conscientious objection: the right not to act contrary to one ’ s conscience and convictions,3,75,76,0.9822,"Kanatli v. Türkiye , 2024",,"All the aforementioned cases concerned conscientious objectors who were Jehovah's Witnesses. However, the Court also found violations of Article 9 in two cases of pacifists who mentioned no religious beliefs. In those cases the Court concentrated on the State's positive obligations, finding a violation as a result of the lack of an effective and accessible procedure under the Turkish legal system whereby the applicants might have ascertained whether they could claim conscientious objector status ( Savda v. Turkey, 2012; Tarhan v. Turkey, 2012). Previously, in a case against Romania, the applicant had complained that he had been a victim of discrimination as a result of the national authorities'refusal to register him as a conscientious objector, because under domestic law only objectors who put forward religious reasons could lay claim to such status, whereas he himself was quite simply a pacifist. Nevertheless, as the applicant had never been convicted or prosecuted and compulsory military service in peacetime had meanwhile been abolished in Romania, the Court consi dered that he could no longer claim to be a ""victim"" of the alleged violation ( T.N.B. v. Romania (dec.), 2010). In another case, the Court tacitly presumed that the request of a self-declared pacifist to be assigned to civilian service instead of compulsory military service fell within the scope of Article 9 of the Convention, but eventually found no violation of that Article ( Dyagilev v. Russia, 2020). Generally speaking, a person does not necessarily have to adhere to an actual religion or belong to a pacifist organisation in order to be recognised as a conscientious objector ( Papavasilakis v. Greece, 2016).","All the aforementioned cases concerned conscientious objectors who were Jehovah's Witnesses. However, the Court also found violations of Article 9 in three cases of pacifists who mentioned no religious beliefs. In those cases the Court concentrated on the State's positive obligations, finding a violation as a result of the lack of an effective and accessible procedure under the Turkish legal system whereby the applicants might have ascertained whether they could claim conscientious objector status ( Savda v. Turkey, 2012; Tarhan v. Turkey, 2012; Kanatli v. Türkiye, 2024, § 67). The case of Kanatli v. Türkiye concerned an individual who declared himself a conscientious objector after having performed the initial active period of military service and two subsequent annual periods of military service as a reservist ( ibid., § 46). Previously, in a case against Romania, the applicant had complained that he had been a victim of discrimination as a result of the national authorities'refusal to register him as a conscientious objector, because under domestic law only objectors who put forward religious reasons could lay claim to such status, whereas he himself was quite simply a pacifist. Nevertheless, as the applicant had never been convicted or prosecuted and compulsory military service in peacetime had meanwhile been abolished in Romania, the Court considered that he could no longer claim to be a ""victim"" of the alleged violatio n ( T.N.B. v. Romania (dec.), 2010). In another case, the Court tacitly presumed that the request of a self-declared pacifist to be assigned to civilian service instead of compulsory military service fell within the scope of Article 9 of the Convention, but eventually found no violation of that Article ( Dyagilev v. Russia, 2020). Generally speaking, a person does not necessarily have to adhere to an actual religion or belong to a pacifist organisation in order to be recognised as a conscientious objector ( Papavasilakis v. Greece, 2016)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20240913070507__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20250506182911__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2024-09-13,2025-05-06,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-09-13__2025-05-06.json,apps:50681/20,Mikyas and Others v. Belgium (dec.),50681/20,added,"Mikyas and Others v. Belgium (dec.), no. 50681/20, 9 April 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.B.4,Wearing of religious clothing and symbols,3,111,112,0.9372,,,"As regards the second hypothesis of wearing religious symbols and clothing in State educational institutions, the Court has always emphasised that States enjoy a very extensive margin of appreciation in this field. It is not possible to discern throughout Europe a uniform conception of the significance of religion in society, and the meaning or impact of the public expression of a religious belief will differ according to time and context. Rules in this sphere will consequently vary from one country to another according to national traditions and the requirements imposed by the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others and to maintain public order. Accordingly, the choice of the extent and form such regulations should take must inevitably be left, up to a point, to the State concerned, as it will depend on the specific domestic context ( Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], 2005, § 109). The cases which have been assessed by the Court from this point of view break down into two different categories based on whether the applicant demanding the right to wear religious clothing was a teacher or a student (or pupil).","As regards the second hypothesis of wearing religious symbols and clothing in State educational institutions, the Court has always emphasised that States enjoy a very extensive margin of appreciation in this field. It is not possible to discern throughout Europe a uniform conception of the significance of religion in society, and the meaning or impact of the public expression of a religious belief will differ according to time and context. Rules in this sphere will consequently vary from one country to another according to national traditions and the requirements imposed by the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others and to maintain public order. Accordingly, the choice of the extent and form such regulations should take must inevitably be left, up to a point, to the State concerned, as it will depend on the specific domestic context ( Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], 2005, § 109). Thus, for example, the concept of neutrality in public education, understood as forbidding, in a general manner, the wearing of visible symbols of religious belief by pupils, does not in itself run counter to Article 9 of the Convention and the values underpinning it. The option, open to the national decision-maker, to implement another concept of neutrality does not imply that the concept of a general prohibition is contrary to Article 9 ( Mikyas and Others v. Belgium (dec.), § 70)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20240913070507__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20250506182911__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2024-09-13,2025-05-06,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2024-09-13__2025-05-06.json,apps:50681/20,Mikyas and Others v. Belgium (dec.),50681/20,added,"Mikyas and Others v. Belgium (dec.), no. 50681/20, 9 April 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.B.4,Wearing of religious clothing and symbols,3,114,116,0.9962,,,"As regards pupils and students, the Court found no violation of Article 9 or manifest ill- foundedness vis-à-vis the complaints raised in the following cases: ▪ a prohibition on a medical student in a Turkish State university wearing the Islamic headscarf in class. In view of the specific history of Turkey and its particular constitutional system, the Court recognised the legitimacy of the efforts expended by the national authorities to maintain the principle of secularism, one of the fundamental principles of the Turkish State as interpreted by the Turkish Constitutional Court. The Court considered this notion of secularism to be consistent with the values underpinning the Convention and compatible with the rule of law and respect for human rights and democracy. In finding no violation of Article 9, the Court drew on the following considerations: the Turkish constitutional system emphasised gender equality, one of the fundamental principles underpinning the Convention and one of the goals pursued by the member States of the Council of Europe; the issue of the Islamic headscarf could not be assessed in the context of Turkey without considering the potential impact of this symbol, presented or perceived as a mandatory religious duty, on those who did not wear it; according to the Turkish courts wearing the headscarf had taken on a political meaning in the country; Turkey had extremist movements endeavouring to impose on society as a whole their religious symbols and conception of a society founded on religious precepts. Against such a background, the impugned regulations constituted a measure geared to attaining the aforementioned legitimate aims and thereby preserving pluralism in the university ( Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], 2005); ▪ a prohibition on pupils at "" İmam -Hatip "" secondary schools (Turkish State -funded religious secondary schools) wearing the Islamic headscarf outside of Koran classes and a ban on class attendance by pupils wearing the headscarf. The Court noted that the relevant Turkish regulations required all secondary school pupils to wear a uniform and to attend school bare- headed; in the "" İmam -Hatip "" schools there was one exception, to the effect that girls could cover their heads during Koran lessons. Consequently, the impugned regulations comprised provisions of a general nature applicable to all pupils regardless of their religious beliefs; the provisions pursued the legitimate aim of preserving the neutrality of secondary education for teenagers liable to be exposed to a risk of pressure ( Köse and Others v. Turkey (dec.), 2006); ▪ the refusal by French State secondary schools to admit pupils wearing headscarves to physical education and sports classes and their subsequent exclusion from school for non- compliance with compulsory school attendance. While acknowledging the compatibility of the French secular model with the values underpinning the Convention, the Court took account of domestic case-law from which it transpired that the wearing of religious signs was not inherently incompatible with the principle of secularism in schools, but became so according to the conditions in which they were worn and the possible consequences of wearing such a sign. The Court acknowledged that it was not unreasonable to consider that wearing a veil such as the Islamic headscarf was incompatible on health and safety grounds with practising a sport. It noted in particular that the disciplinary proceedings against the applicants had fully satisfied the obligation to balance all the interests at stake. The respondent State had therefore not overstepped its margin of appreciation ( Dogru v. France, 2008; Kervanci v. France, 2008); ▪ a prohibition on pupils at State primary and secondary schools in France wearing ""signs or clothing ostentatiously manifesting their religious affiliation"", which prohibition was general and not confined solely to physical education and sports classes, and the subsequent exclusion of pupils for wearing an Islamic headscarf or a Sikh turban or "" keski "" (""mini - turban"") on the school premises. The Court considered that the aim of protecting the constitutional principle of secularism in conformity with the values underpinning the Convention was sufficient to justify the impugned measure. Moreover, the Court held that the head teacher's decision to refuse to authorise Muslim pupils to wear their headscarves and then remove them on entering the classroom, or to replace them with a cap or a bandana devoid of any religious connotations, or to authorise Sikh pupils to replace their turbans with keskis, was not contrary to Article 9 of the Convention because it fell well within the State's margin of appreciation ( Gamaleddyn v. France (dec.), 2009; Aktas v. France (dec.), 2009; Ranjit Singh v. France (dec.), 2009; Jasvir Singh v. France (dec.), 2009).","As regards pupils and students, the Court found no violation of Article 9 or manifest ill- foundedness vis-à-vis the complaints raised in the following cases: ▪ a prohibition on a medical student in a Turkish State university wearing the Islamic headscarf in class. In view of the specific history of Turkey and its particular constitutional system, the Court recognised the legitimacy of the efforts expended by the national authorities to maintain the principle of secularism, one of the fundamental principles of the Turkish State as interpreted by the Turkish Constitutional Court. The Court considered this notion of secularism to be consistent with the values underpinning the Convention and compatible with the rule of law and respect for human rights and democracy. In finding no violation of Article 9, the Court drew on the following considerations: the Turkish constitutional system emphasised gender equality, one of the fundamental principles underpinning the Convention and one of the goals pursued by the member States of the Council of Europe; the issue of the Islamic headscarf could not be assessed in the context of Turkey without considering the potential impact of this symbol, presented or perceived as a mandatory religious duty, on those who did not wear it; according to the Turkish courts wearing the headscarf had taken on a political meaning in the country; Turkey had extremist movements endeavouring to impose on society as a whole their religious symbols and conception of a society founded on religious precepts. Against such a background, the impugned regulations constituted a measure geared to attaining the aforementioned legitimate aims and thereby preserving pluralism in the university ( Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], 2005); ▪ a prohibition on pupils at "" İmam -Hatip "" secondary schools (Turkish State -funded religious secondary schools) wearing the Islamic headscarf outside of Koran classes and a ban on class attendance by pupils wearing the headscarf. The Court noted that the relevant Turkish regulations required all secondary school pupils to wear a uniform and to attend school bare- headed; in the "" İmam -Hatip "" schools there was one exception, to the effect that girls could cover their heads during Koran lessons. Consequently, the impugned regulations comprised provisions of a general nature applicable to all pupils regardless of their religious beliefs; the provisions pursued the legitimate aim of preserving the neutrality of secondary education for teenagers liable to be exposed to a risk of pressure ( Köse and Others v. Turkey (dec.), 2006); ▪ the refusal by French State secondary schools to admit pupils wearing headscarves to physical education and sports classes and their subsequent exclusion from school for non- compliance with compulsory school attendance. While acknowledging the compatibility of the French secular model with the values underpinning the Convention, the Court took account of domestic case-law from which it transpired that the wearing of religious signs was not inherently incompatible with the principle of secularism in schools, but became so according to the conditions in which they were worn and the possible consequences of wearing such a sign. The Court acknowledged that it was not unreasonable to consider that wearing a veil such as the Islamic headscarf was incompatible on health and safety grounds with practising a sport. It noted in particular that the disciplinary proceedings against the applicants had fully satisfied the obligation to balance all the interests at stake. The respondent State had therefore not overstepped its margin of appreciation ( Dogru v. France, 2008; Kervanci v. France, 2008); ▪ a prohibition on pupils at State primary and secondary schools in France wearing ""signs or clothing ostentatiously manifesting their religious affiliation"", which prohibition was general and not confined solely to physical education and sports classes, and the subsequent exclusion of pupils for wearing an Islamic headscarf or a Sikh turban or "" keski "" (""mini - turban"") on the school premises. The Court considered that the aim of protecting the constitutional principle of secularism in conformity with the values underpinning the Convention was sufficient to justify the impugned measure. Moreover, the Court held that the head teacher's decision to refuse to authorise Muslim pupils to wear their headscarves and then remove them on entering the classroom, or to replace them with a cap or a bandana devoid of any religious connotations, or to authorise Sikh pupils to replace their turbans with keskis, was not contrary to Article 9 of the Convention because it fell well within the State's margin of appreciation ( Gamaleddyn v. France (dec.), 2009; Aktas v. France (dec.), 2009; Ranjit Singh v. France (dec.), 2009; Jasvir Singh v. France (dec.), 2009). ▪ The absolute prohibition on wearing any visible symbols of religious belief by pupils in schools established and managed by the Flemish Community of Belgium; the Belgian concept of neutrality in education was in itself compatible with Article 9, the contested ban applied without distinction to visible symbols of all religions and beliefs, and the applicants themselves had freely chosen to attend schools within the Community education system, in the context of the freedom of choice in education that was guaranteed by the State ( Mikyas and Others v. Belgium (dec.))."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20250506182911__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20250531233030__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2025-05-06,2025-05-31,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2025-05-06__2025-05-31.json,apps:25636/22,Lindholm and the Estate after Leif Lindholm v. Denmark,25636/22,added,"Lindholm and the Estate after Leif Lindholm v. Denmark, no 25636/22, 5 November 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I.E,Overlaps between the safeguards of Article 9 and the other Convention provisions,2,61,61,0.9996,"Lindholm and the Estate after Leif Lindholm v. Denmark , 2024|Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia , 2022","Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia, 2022","By its very nature, the substantive content of Article 9 of the Convention may sometimes overlap with the content of other provisions of the Convention; in other words, one and the same complaint submitted to the Court can sometimes come under more than one article. In such cases the Court usually opts for assessing the complaint under only one article, which it considers more relevant in the light of the specific circumstances of the case; however, in so doing, it also bears the other article(s) in mind and interprets the article which it had opted to consider in the light of the latter. In any event, the Convention must be read as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions ( Aygün v. Belgium, 2022, § 71). The articles most likely to be involved alongside Article 9 for the same facts and the same complaints are as follows: (a) Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (right to a fair trial, particularly the right of access to a tribunal). In a case concerning a refusal by the Greek Court of Cassation to recognise the legal personality of the Cathedral of the Roman Catholic diocese of Crete, thereby denying it locus standi to protect its property, the Court decided to assess the applicant body's complaints solely under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention rather than under Article 9 ( Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, 1997, §§ 33 and 50). Similarly, in a case of an alleged failure to enforce a final judgment acknowledging the right of a parish and its members to bury their dead in the local cemetery in accordance with their specific rites, the Court decided to consider the complaint solely under Article 6 § 1 ( Greek Catholic Parish of Pesceana v. Romania (dec.), 2015, § 43); (b) Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private and/or family life). The Court has considered applications: ▪ solely under Article 8, on its own or in conjunction with Article 14: for example, as regards a decision by the domestic courts to establish the under-age children's residence with one of the parents essentially because the other parent was a Jehovah's Witness ( Hoffmann v. Austria, 1993; Palau-Martinez v. France, 2003; Ismailova v. Russia, 2007). The Court pointed out that the practical arrangements for exercising parental authority over children defined by the domestic courts could not, as such, infringe an applicant's freedom to manifest his or her religion ( Deschomets v. France (dec.), 2006); ▪ under Article 8, read in the light of Article 9: as regards the transfer of a civil servant because of his religious convictions, which were known to others but nonetheless were solely a private matter, and also his wife's religious behaviour ( Sodan v. Turkey, 2016, § 30), or the fostering-out of children, disregarding the biological parents'wishes, particularly as regards preserving the children's connection with their cultural and religious roots ( Abdi Ibrahim v. Norway [GC], 2021, §§ 134-142; Kılıc v. Austria, 2023, §§ 106-107 and 145); ▪ under Article 9, taken alone: as regards the placement of a child in a foster family without ensuring that the latter respected her religious opinions and those of her family or origin, where the complaint came from the child herself ( Loste v. France, 2022, § 110); ▪ under Articles 8 and 9, examined jointly: as regards the refusal to grant the applicants'request to transfer their sons'bodies to their country of origin, so that they could be buried in accordance with their religious beliefs ( Aygün v. Belgium, 2022, §§ 51, 60 and 91-92); ▪ under Article 14 taken together with Article 8, read in the light of Article 9: concerning a revocable and reviewable order prohibiting a father from actively involving his young daughter in his religious practice, although no restriction had been imposed with regard to the mother's religion ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 30). ▪ under Articles 8, 9 and 14 taken together: as regards inaction by the police and the other national authorities when confronted by insults and verbal abuse, barricading of buildings and other similar discriminatory activities by the local population against members of a religious minority ( Georgia Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia, 2023, § 79). (c) Article 10 (freedom of expression). The Court considered applications: ▪ solely under Article 10: for example, as regards a prohibition imposed by the competent State body on an independent radio station broadcasting a paid advertisement of a religious nature ( Murphy v. Ireland, 2003), of the refusal by the competent body to grant a broadcasting licence for a radio station with Christian religious programming ( Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Anatoliy Elenkov v. Bulgaria, 2007). Thus, in so far as the applicant complains of interference with the expression of his beliefs and opinions by broadcasting information, Article 10 constitutes a lex specialis in relation to Article 9, so that a separate assessment under the latter is unnecessary ( Balsytė - Lideikienė v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005). This is also the case with regard to the collection and processing of personal data by a religious organisation or by its members for the purpose of missionary activity ( Jehovah's Witnesses v. Finland, 2023, § 62). ▪ under Article 10 read in the light of Article 9: for example, as regards a prohibition on publishing and distributing religious books ( Ibragim Ibragimov and Others v. Russia, 2018, § 78), or the withdrawal of a distribution permit for such material and proceedings brought against the persons involved in their distribution ( Taganrog LRO and Others v. Russia, 2022, § 218); also, the official designation of texts published by a religious organisation or on its internet site as ""extremist"" (ibid., §§ 197, 207, 224-226 and 233). (d) Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association). The Court has considered applications: ▪ solely under Article 9: for example, as regards a complaint submitted by a conscientious objector who did not belong to any religious or pacifist organisation, and who relied on Article 11 to allege that the rejection of his request for exemption from military service constituted a breach of his negative freedom not to be a follower of a particular religion or a member of any kind of organisation ( Papavasilakis v. Greece, 2016, §§ 34-35), or an administrative fine imposed on an applicant for having organised Bible meetings in his home without first notifying the authorities ( Ossewaarde v. Russia, 2023, § 29); ▪ under Article 9 as interpreted in the light of Article 11: for example as regards State interference in a dispute between two rival groups within the same religious community ( Hassan and Tchaouch v. Bulgaria [GC], 2000, § 65), the dissolution of a religious organisation ( Jehovah's Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia, 2010, §§ 102-103), the protracted refusal to recognise the legal personality of a religious community ( Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, 2008, § 60), or measures to prevent a religious association from building a place of worship on a plot of land which it owned ( The Religious Denomination of Jehovah's Witnesses in Bulgaria v. Bulgaria, 2020, § 80); ▪ under Article 9 as interpreted in the light of Articles 11 and 6 § 1: for example as regards a refusal by the domestic authorities to register changes to the statutes of a religious organisation geared to ratifying the organisation's change of denomination ( Svyato- Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, 2007, § 152); ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of association) as interpreted in the light of Article 9 - for example as regards a refusal to register a religious organisation ( Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese (Greek- Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Peć Patriarchy) v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2017, § 61), or to renew its registration ( Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 2006, §§ 74-75; Bektashi Community and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2018, § 46). See, to converse effect, the judgments in the cases of Genov v. Bulgaria, 2017, § 38, Metodiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2017, § 26; Christian Religious Organization of Jehovah's Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia, 2022, § 45; and Ilyin and Others v. Ukraine, 2022, § 41, in which the Court decided to examine the refusal to register a religious organisation under Article 9, read in the light of Article 11; ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of assembly) as interpreted in the light of Article 9 - for example as regards a refusal to renew the registration of a religious organisation ( Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 2006, §§ 74-75); ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of assembly) as interpreted in the light of Article 9: for example as regards a denial of access for a group practising Neo-Druidism to the historic site of Stonehenge to celebrate the summer solstice ( Pendragon v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 19 October 1998; to converse effect, see also Chappell v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 14 July 1987), or a refusal by the domestic authorities to allow adherents of a minority religious movement to hold public meetings to promote their faith ( Centre of Societies for Krishna Consciousness in Russia and Frolov v. Russia, 2021, § 46); (e) Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property). The Court has chosen to consider cases solely under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: for example as regards the obligation on landowners who are personally opposed to hunting to tolerate it on their land ( Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], 1999; Herrmann v. Germany [GC], 2012); (f) Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (right of parents to respect for their religious and philosophical convictions in the framework of their children's education). The Court has chosen to consider cases ▪ solely under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1: for example as regards the administration of compulsory classes in religious culture and morals in State schools, and the restricted opportunities for administering such classes ( Mansur Yalçın and Others v. Turkey, 2014), or a refusal by educational authorities to grant children complete exemption from compulsory classes on Christianity ( Folgerø and Others v. Norway [GC], 2007); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 9 of the Convention taken alone, finding no violation of the former on the basis of an elaborate argumentation and no violation of the latter with simple reference to that argumentation ( Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 1976); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 as interpreted in the light of Article 9: for example as regards the compulsory presence of crucifixes in classrooms in State schools ( Lautsi and Others v. Italy [GC], 2011); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 for the parents and Article 9 of the Convention for the child, as regards punishment inflicted by a head teacher on a pupil for refusing to take part in a school parade ( Valsamis v. Greece, 1996), or participation by a student in a religious ceremony at school without his parents'consent ( Perovy v. Russia, 2020). ▪ solely under Article 9: for example, as regards a refusal to exempt the applicants'children from compulsory mixed swimming lessons ( Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v. Switzerland, 2017, §§ 35 and 90) - essentially because the respondent State, Switzerland, had not ratified Protocol No. 1.","By its very nature, the substantive content of Article 9 of the Convention may sometimes overlap with the content of other provisions of the Convention; in other words, one and the same complaint submitted to the Court can sometimes come under more than one article. In such cases the Court usually opts for assessing the complaint under only one article, which it considers more relevant in the light of the specific circumstances of the case; however, in so doing, it also bears the other article(s) in mind and interprets the Article which it had opted to consider in the light of the latter. In any event, the Convention must be read as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions ( Aygün v. Belgium, 2022, § 71). The Articles most likely to be involved alongside Article 9 for the same facts and the same complaints are as follows: (a) Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (right to a fair trial, particularly the right of access to a tribunal). In a case concerning a refusal by the Greek Court of Cassation to recognise the legal personality of the Cathedral of the Roman Catholic diocese of Crete, thereby denying it locus standi to protect its property, the Court decided to assess the applicant body's complaints solely under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention rather than under Article 9 ( Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, 1997, §§ 33 and 50). Similarly, in a case of an alleged failure to enforce a final judgment acknowledging the right of a parish and its members to bury their dead in the local cemetery in accordance with their specific rites, the Court decided to consider the complaint solely under Article 6 § 1 ( Greek Catholic Parish of Pesceana v. Romania (dec.), 2015, § 43); (b) Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private and/or family life). The Court has considered applications: ▪ solely under Article 8, on its own or in conjunction with Article 14: for example, as regards a decision by the domestic courts to establish the under-age children's residence with one of the parents essentially because the other parent was a Jehovah's Witness ( Hoffmann v. Austria, 1993; Palau-Martinez v. France, 2003; Ismailova v. Russia, 2007). The Court pointed out that the practical arrangements for exercising parental authority over children defined by the domestic courts could not, as such, infringe an applicant's freedom to manifest his or her religion ( Deschomets v. France (dec.), 2006); ▪ under Article 8, read in the light of Article 9: as regards the transfer of a civil servant because of his religious convictions, which were known to others but nonetheless were solely a private matter, and also his wife's religious behaviour ( Sodan v. Turkey, 2016, § 30), or the fostering-out of children, disregarding the biological parents'wishes, particularly as regards preserving the children's connection with their cultural and religious roots ( Abdi Ibrahim v. Norway [GC], 2021, §§ 134-142; Kılıc v. Austria, 2023, §§ 106-107 and 145), or the refusal of blood transfusions by Jehovah's Witnesses, a question principally pertaining to autonomy and self-determination, in which the issue at stake was broader than freedom of religion ( Pindo Mulla v. Spain [GC], 2024, §§ 97-98; Lindholm and the Estate after Leif Lindholm v. Denmark, 2024, § 62); ▪ under Article 9, taken alone: as regards the placement of a child in a foster family without ensuring that the latter respected her religious opinions and those of her family or origin, where the complaint came from the child herself ( Loste v. France, 2022, § 110); ▪ under Articles 8 and 9, examined jointly: as regards the refusal to grant the applicants'request to transfer their sons'bodies to their country of origin, so that they could be buried in accordance with their religious beliefs ( Aygün v. Belgium, 2022, §§ 51, 60 and 91-92); ▪ under Article 14 taken together with Article 8, read in the light of Article 9: concerning a revocable and reviewable order prohibiting a father from actively involving his young daughter in his religious practice, although no restriction had been imposed with regard to the mother's religion ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 30). ▪ under Articles 8, 9 and 14 taken together: as regards inaction by the police and the other national authorities when confronted by insults and verbal abuse, barricading of buildings and other similar discriminatory activities by the local population against members of a religious minority ( Georgia Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia, 2023, § 79). (c) Article 10 (freedom of expression). The Court considered applications: ▪ solely under Article 10: for example, as regards a prohibition imposed by the competent State body on an independent radio station broadcasting a paid advertisement of a religious nature ( Murphy v. Ireland, 2003), of the refusal by the competent body to grant a broadcasting licence for a radio station with Christian religious programming ( Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Anatoliy Elenkov v. Bulgaria, 2007). Thus, in so far as the applicant complains of interference with the expression of his beliefs and opinions by broadcasting information, Article 10 constitutes a lex specialis in relation to Article 9, so that a separate assessment under the latter is unnecessary ( Balsytė - Lideikienė v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005). This is also the case with regard to the collection and processing of personal data by a religious organisation or by its members for the purpose of missionary activity ( Jehovah's Witnesses v. Finland, 2023, § 62). ▪ under Article 10 read in the light of Article 9: for example, as regards a prohibition on publishing and distributing religious books ( Ibragim Ibragimov and Others v. Russia, 2018, § 78), or the withdrawal of a distribution permit for such material and proceedings brought against the persons involved in their distribution ( Taganrog LRO and Others v. Russia, 2022, § 218); also, the official designation of texts published by a religious organisation or on its internet site as ""extremist"" ( ibid ., §§ 197, 207, 224-226 and 233). (d) Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association). The Court has considered applications: ▪ solely under Article 9: for example, as regards a complaint submitted by a conscientious objector who did not belong to any religious or pacifist organisation, and who relied on Article 11 to allege that the rejection of his request for exemption from military service constituted a breach of his negative freedom not to be a follower of a particular religion or a member of any kind of organisation ( Papavasilakis v. Greece, 2016, §§ 34-35), or an administrative fine imposed on an applicant for having organised Bible meetings in his home without first notifying the authorities ( Ossewaarde v. Russia, 2023, § 29); ▪ under Article 9 as interpreted in the light of Article 11: for example as regards State interference in a dispute between two rival groups within the same religious community ( Hassan and Tchaouch v. Bulgaria [GC], 2000, § 65), the dissolution of a religious organisation ( Jehovah's Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia, 2010, §§ 102-103), the protracted refusal to recognise the legal personality of a religious community ( Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, 2008, § 60), or measures to prevent a religious association from building a place of worship on a plot of land which it owned ( The Religious Denomination of Jehovah's Witnesses in Bulgaria v. Bulgaria, 2020, § 80); ▪ under Article 9 as interpreted in the light of Articles 11 and 6 § 1: for example as regards a refusal by the domestic authorities to register changes to the statutes of a religious organisation geared to ratifying the organisation's change of denomination ( Svyato- Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, 2007, § 152); ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of association) as interpreted in the light of Article 9 - for example as regards a refusal to register a religious organisation ( Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese (Greek- Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Peć Patriarchy) v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2017, § 61), or to renew its registration ( Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 2006, §§ 74-75; Bektashi Community and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2018, § 46). See, to converse effect, the judgments in the cases of Genov v. Bulgaria, 2017, § 38, Metodiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2017, § 26; Christian Religious Organization of Jehovah's Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia, 2022, § 45; and Ilyin and Others v. Ukraine, 2022, § 41, in which the Court decided to examine the refusal to register a religious organisation under Article 9, read in the light of Article 11; ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of assembly) as interpreted in the light of Article 9 - for example as regards a refusal to renew the registration of a religious organisation ( Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 2006, §§ 74-75); ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of assembly) as interpreted in the light of Article 9: for example as regards a denial of access for a group practising Neo-Druidism to the historic site of Stonehenge to celebrate the summer solstice ( Pendragon v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 19 October 1998; to converse effect, see also Chappell v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 14 July 1987), or a refusal by the domestic authorities to allow adherents of a minority religious movement to hold public meetings to promote their faith ( Centre of Societies for Krishna Consciousness in Russia and Frolov v. Russia, 2021, § 46); (e) Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property). The Court has chosen to consider cases solely under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: for example as regards the obligation on landowners who are personally opposed to hunting to tolerate it on their land ( Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], 1999; Herrmann v. Germany [GC], 2012); (f) Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (right of parents to respect for their religious and philosophical convictions in the framework of their children's education). The Court has chosen to consider cases ▪ solely under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1: for example as regards the administration of compulsory classes in religious culture and morals in State schools, and the restricted opportunities for administering such classes ( Mansur Yalçın and Others v. Turkey, 2014), or a refusal by educational authorities to grant children complete exemption from compulsory classes on Christianity ( Folgerø and Others v. Norway [GC], 2007); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 9 of the Convention taken alone, finding no violation of the former on the basis of an elaborate argumentation and no violation of the latter with simple reference to that argumentation ( Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 1976); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 as interpreted in the light of Article 9: for example as regards the compulsory presence of crucifixes in classrooms in State schools ( Lautsi and Others v. Italy [GC], 2011); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 for the parents and Article 9 of the Convention for the child, as regards punishment inflicted by a head teacher on a pupil for refusing to take part in a school parade ( Valsamis v. Greece, 1996), or participation by a student in a religious ceremony at school without his parents'consent ( Perovy v. Russia, 2020). ▪ solely under Article 9: for example, as regards a refusal to exempt the applicants'children from compulsory mixed swimming lessons ( Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v. Switzerland, 2017, §§ 35 and 90) - essentially because the respondent State, Switzerland, had not ratified Protocol No. 1."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20250506182911__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20250531233030__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2025-05-06,2025-05-31,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2025-05-06__2025-05-31.json,apps:15541/20,Pindo Mulla v. Spain [GC],15541/20,added,"Pindo Mulla v. Spain [GC], no. 15541/20, 17 September 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I.E,Overlaps between the safeguards of Article 9 and the other Convention provisions,2,61,61,0.9996,"Lindholm and the Estate after Leif Lindholm v. Denmark , 2024|Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia , 2022","Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia, 2022","By its very nature, the substantive content of Article 9 of the Convention may sometimes overlap with the content of other provisions of the Convention; in other words, one and the same complaint submitted to the Court can sometimes come under more than one article. In such cases the Court usually opts for assessing the complaint under only one article, which it considers more relevant in the light of the specific circumstances of the case; however, in so doing, it also bears the other article(s) in mind and interprets the article which it had opted to consider in the light of the latter. In any event, the Convention must be read as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions ( Aygün v. Belgium, 2022, § 71). The articles most likely to be involved alongside Article 9 for the same facts and the same complaints are as follows: (a) Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (right to a fair trial, particularly the right of access to a tribunal). In a case concerning a refusal by the Greek Court of Cassation to recognise the legal personality of the Cathedral of the Roman Catholic diocese of Crete, thereby denying it locus standi to protect its property, the Court decided to assess the applicant body's complaints solely under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention rather than under Article 9 ( Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, 1997, §§ 33 and 50). Similarly, in a case of an alleged failure to enforce a final judgment acknowledging the right of a parish and its members to bury their dead in the local cemetery in accordance with their specific rites, the Court decided to consider the complaint solely under Article 6 § 1 ( Greek Catholic Parish of Pesceana v. Romania (dec.), 2015, § 43); (b) Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private and/or family life). The Court has considered applications: ▪ solely under Article 8, on its own or in conjunction with Article 14: for example, as regards a decision by the domestic courts to establish the under-age children's residence with one of the parents essentially because the other parent was a Jehovah's Witness ( Hoffmann v. Austria, 1993; Palau-Martinez v. France, 2003; Ismailova v. Russia, 2007). The Court pointed out that the practical arrangements for exercising parental authority over children defined by the domestic courts could not, as such, infringe an applicant's freedom to manifest his or her religion ( Deschomets v. France (dec.), 2006); ▪ under Article 8, read in the light of Article 9: as regards the transfer of a civil servant because of his religious convictions, which were known to others but nonetheless were solely a private matter, and also his wife's religious behaviour ( Sodan v. Turkey, 2016, § 30), or the fostering-out of children, disregarding the biological parents'wishes, particularly as regards preserving the children's connection with their cultural and religious roots ( Abdi Ibrahim v. Norway [GC], 2021, §§ 134-142; Kılıc v. Austria, 2023, §§ 106-107 and 145); ▪ under Article 9, taken alone: as regards the placement of a child in a foster family without ensuring that the latter respected her religious opinions and those of her family or origin, where the complaint came from the child herself ( Loste v. France, 2022, § 110); ▪ under Articles 8 and 9, examined jointly: as regards the refusal to grant the applicants'request to transfer their sons'bodies to their country of origin, so that they could be buried in accordance with their religious beliefs ( Aygün v. Belgium, 2022, §§ 51, 60 and 91-92); ▪ under Article 14 taken together with Article 8, read in the light of Article 9: concerning a revocable and reviewable order prohibiting a father from actively involving his young daughter in his religious practice, although no restriction had been imposed with regard to the mother's religion ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 30). ▪ under Articles 8, 9 and 14 taken together: as regards inaction by the police and the other national authorities when confronted by insults and verbal abuse, barricading of buildings and other similar discriminatory activities by the local population against members of a religious minority ( Georgia Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia, 2023, § 79). (c) Article 10 (freedom of expression). The Court considered applications: ▪ solely under Article 10: for example, as regards a prohibition imposed by the competent State body on an independent radio station broadcasting a paid advertisement of a religious nature ( Murphy v. Ireland, 2003), of the refusal by the competent body to grant a broadcasting licence for a radio station with Christian religious programming ( Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Anatoliy Elenkov v. Bulgaria, 2007). Thus, in so far as the applicant complains of interference with the expression of his beliefs and opinions by broadcasting information, Article 10 constitutes a lex specialis in relation to Article 9, so that a separate assessment under the latter is unnecessary ( Balsytė - Lideikienė v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005). This is also the case with regard to the collection and processing of personal data by a religious organisation or by its members for the purpose of missionary activity ( Jehovah's Witnesses v. Finland, 2023, § 62). ▪ under Article 10 read in the light of Article 9: for example, as regards a prohibition on publishing and distributing religious books ( Ibragim Ibragimov and Others v. Russia, 2018, § 78), or the withdrawal of a distribution permit for such material and proceedings brought against the persons involved in their distribution ( Taganrog LRO and Others v. Russia, 2022, § 218); also, the official designation of texts published by a religious organisation or on its internet site as ""extremist"" (ibid., §§ 197, 207, 224-226 and 233). (d) Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association). The Court has considered applications: ▪ solely under Article 9: for example, as regards a complaint submitted by a conscientious objector who did not belong to any religious or pacifist organisation, and who relied on Article 11 to allege that the rejection of his request for exemption from military service constituted a breach of his negative freedom not to be a follower of a particular religion or a member of any kind of organisation ( Papavasilakis v. Greece, 2016, §§ 34-35), or an administrative fine imposed on an applicant for having organised Bible meetings in his home without first notifying the authorities ( Ossewaarde v. Russia, 2023, § 29); ▪ under Article 9 as interpreted in the light of Article 11: for example as regards State interference in a dispute between two rival groups within the same religious community ( Hassan and Tchaouch v. Bulgaria [GC], 2000, § 65), the dissolution of a religious organisation ( Jehovah's Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia, 2010, §§ 102-103), the protracted refusal to recognise the legal personality of a religious community ( Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, 2008, § 60), or measures to prevent a religious association from building a place of worship on a plot of land which it owned ( The Religious Denomination of Jehovah's Witnesses in Bulgaria v. Bulgaria, 2020, § 80); ▪ under Article 9 as interpreted in the light of Articles 11 and 6 § 1: for example as regards a refusal by the domestic authorities to register changes to the statutes of a religious organisation geared to ratifying the organisation's change of denomination ( Svyato- Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, 2007, § 152); ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of association) as interpreted in the light of Article 9 - for example as regards a refusal to register a religious organisation ( Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese (Greek- Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Peć Patriarchy) v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2017, § 61), or to renew its registration ( Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 2006, §§ 74-75; Bektashi Community and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2018, § 46). See, to converse effect, the judgments in the cases of Genov v. Bulgaria, 2017, § 38, Metodiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2017, § 26; Christian Religious Organization of Jehovah's Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia, 2022, § 45; and Ilyin and Others v. Ukraine, 2022, § 41, in which the Court decided to examine the refusal to register a religious organisation under Article 9, read in the light of Article 11; ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of assembly) as interpreted in the light of Article 9 - for example as regards a refusal to renew the registration of a religious organisation ( Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 2006, §§ 74-75); ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of assembly) as interpreted in the light of Article 9: for example as regards a denial of access for a group practising Neo-Druidism to the historic site of Stonehenge to celebrate the summer solstice ( Pendragon v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 19 October 1998; to converse effect, see also Chappell v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 14 July 1987), or a refusal by the domestic authorities to allow adherents of a minority religious movement to hold public meetings to promote their faith ( Centre of Societies for Krishna Consciousness in Russia and Frolov v. Russia, 2021, § 46); (e) Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property). The Court has chosen to consider cases solely under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: for example as regards the obligation on landowners who are personally opposed to hunting to tolerate it on their land ( Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], 1999; Herrmann v. Germany [GC], 2012); (f) Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (right of parents to respect for their religious and philosophical convictions in the framework of their children's education). The Court has chosen to consider cases ▪ solely under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1: for example as regards the administration of compulsory classes in religious culture and morals in State schools, and the restricted opportunities for administering such classes ( Mansur Yalçın and Others v. Turkey, 2014), or a refusal by educational authorities to grant children complete exemption from compulsory classes on Christianity ( Folgerø and Others v. Norway [GC], 2007); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 9 of the Convention taken alone, finding no violation of the former on the basis of an elaborate argumentation and no violation of the latter with simple reference to that argumentation ( Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 1976); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 as interpreted in the light of Article 9: for example as regards the compulsory presence of crucifixes in classrooms in State schools ( Lautsi and Others v. Italy [GC], 2011); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 for the parents and Article 9 of the Convention for the child, as regards punishment inflicted by a head teacher on a pupil for refusing to take part in a school parade ( Valsamis v. Greece, 1996), or participation by a student in a religious ceremony at school without his parents'consent ( Perovy v. Russia, 2020). ▪ solely under Article 9: for example, as regards a refusal to exempt the applicants'children from compulsory mixed swimming lessons ( Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v. Switzerland, 2017, §§ 35 and 90) - essentially because the respondent State, Switzerland, had not ratified Protocol No. 1.","By its very nature, the substantive content of Article 9 of the Convention may sometimes overlap with the content of other provisions of the Convention; in other words, one and the same complaint submitted to the Court can sometimes come under more than one article. In such cases the Court usually opts for assessing the complaint under only one article, which it considers more relevant in the light of the specific circumstances of the case; however, in so doing, it also bears the other article(s) in mind and interprets the Article which it had opted to consider in the light of the latter. In any event, the Convention must be read as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions ( Aygün v. Belgium, 2022, § 71). The Articles most likely to be involved alongside Article 9 for the same facts and the same complaints are as follows: (a) Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (right to a fair trial, particularly the right of access to a tribunal). In a case concerning a refusal by the Greek Court of Cassation to recognise the legal personality of the Cathedral of the Roman Catholic diocese of Crete, thereby denying it locus standi to protect its property, the Court decided to assess the applicant body's complaints solely under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention rather than under Article 9 ( Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, 1997, §§ 33 and 50). Similarly, in a case of an alleged failure to enforce a final judgment acknowledging the right of a parish and its members to bury their dead in the local cemetery in accordance with their specific rites, the Court decided to consider the complaint solely under Article 6 § 1 ( Greek Catholic Parish of Pesceana v. Romania (dec.), 2015, § 43); (b) Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private and/or family life). The Court has considered applications: ▪ solely under Article 8, on its own or in conjunction with Article 14: for example, as regards a decision by the domestic courts to establish the under-age children's residence with one of the parents essentially because the other parent was a Jehovah's Witness ( Hoffmann v. Austria, 1993; Palau-Martinez v. France, 2003; Ismailova v. Russia, 2007). The Court pointed out that the practical arrangements for exercising parental authority over children defined by the domestic courts could not, as such, infringe an applicant's freedom to manifest his or her religion ( Deschomets v. France (dec.), 2006); ▪ under Article 8, read in the light of Article 9: as regards the transfer of a civil servant because of his religious convictions, which were known to others but nonetheless were solely a private matter, and also his wife's religious behaviour ( Sodan v. Turkey, 2016, § 30), or the fostering-out of children, disregarding the biological parents'wishes, particularly as regards preserving the children's connection with their cultural and religious roots ( Abdi Ibrahim v. Norway [GC], 2021, §§ 134-142; Kılıc v. Austria, 2023, §§ 106-107 and 145), or the refusal of blood transfusions by Jehovah's Witnesses, a question principally pertaining to autonomy and self-determination, in which the issue at stake was broader than freedom of religion ( Pindo Mulla v. Spain [GC], 2024, §§ 97-98; Lindholm and the Estate after Leif Lindholm v. Denmark, 2024, § 62); ▪ under Article 9, taken alone: as regards the placement of a child in a foster family without ensuring that the latter respected her religious opinions and those of her family or origin, where the complaint came from the child herself ( Loste v. France, 2022, § 110); ▪ under Articles 8 and 9, examined jointly: as regards the refusal to grant the applicants'request to transfer their sons'bodies to their country of origin, so that they could be buried in accordance with their religious beliefs ( Aygün v. Belgium, 2022, §§ 51, 60 and 91-92); ▪ under Article 14 taken together with Article 8, read in the light of Article 9: concerning a revocable and reviewable order prohibiting a father from actively involving his young daughter in his religious practice, although no restriction had been imposed with regard to the mother's religion ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 30). ▪ under Articles 8, 9 and 14 taken together: as regards inaction by the police and the other national authorities when confronted by insults and verbal abuse, barricading of buildings and other similar discriminatory activities by the local population against members of a religious minority ( Georgia Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia, 2023, § 79). (c) Article 10 (freedom of expression). The Court considered applications: ▪ solely under Article 10: for example, as regards a prohibition imposed by the competent State body on an independent radio station broadcasting a paid advertisement of a religious nature ( Murphy v. Ireland, 2003), of the refusal by the competent body to grant a broadcasting licence for a radio station with Christian religious programming ( Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Anatoliy Elenkov v. Bulgaria, 2007). Thus, in so far as the applicant complains of interference with the expression of his beliefs and opinions by broadcasting information, Article 10 constitutes a lex specialis in relation to Article 9, so that a separate assessment under the latter is unnecessary ( Balsytė - Lideikienė v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005). This is also the case with regard to the collection and processing of personal data by a religious organisation or by its members for the purpose of missionary activity ( Jehovah's Witnesses v. Finland, 2023, § 62). ▪ under Article 10 read in the light of Article 9: for example, as regards a prohibition on publishing and distributing religious books ( Ibragim Ibragimov and Others v. Russia, 2018, § 78), or the withdrawal of a distribution permit for such material and proceedings brought against the persons involved in their distribution ( Taganrog LRO and Others v. Russia, 2022, § 218); also, the official designation of texts published by a religious organisation or on its internet site as ""extremist"" ( ibid ., §§ 197, 207, 224-226 and 233). (d) Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association). The Court has considered applications: ▪ solely under Article 9: for example, as regards a complaint submitted by a conscientious objector who did not belong to any religious or pacifist organisation, and who relied on Article 11 to allege that the rejection of his request for exemption from military service constituted a breach of his negative freedom not to be a follower of a particular religion or a member of any kind of organisation ( Papavasilakis v. Greece, 2016, §§ 34-35), or an administrative fine imposed on an applicant for having organised Bible meetings in his home without first notifying the authorities ( Ossewaarde v. Russia, 2023, § 29); ▪ under Article 9 as interpreted in the light of Article 11: for example as regards State interference in a dispute between two rival groups within the same religious community ( Hassan and Tchaouch v. Bulgaria [GC], 2000, § 65), the dissolution of a religious organisation ( Jehovah's Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia, 2010, §§ 102-103), the protracted refusal to recognise the legal personality of a religious community ( Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, 2008, § 60), or measures to prevent a religious association from building a place of worship on a plot of land which it owned ( The Religious Denomination of Jehovah's Witnesses in Bulgaria v. Bulgaria, 2020, § 80); ▪ under Article 9 as interpreted in the light of Articles 11 and 6 § 1: for example as regards a refusal by the domestic authorities to register changes to the statutes of a religious organisation geared to ratifying the organisation's change of denomination ( Svyato- Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, 2007, § 152); ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of association) as interpreted in the light of Article 9 - for example as regards a refusal to register a religious organisation ( Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese (Greek- Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Peć Patriarchy) v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2017, § 61), or to renew its registration ( Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 2006, §§ 74-75; Bektashi Community and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2018, § 46). See, to converse effect, the judgments in the cases of Genov v. Bulgaria, 2017, § 38, Metodiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2017, § 26; Christian Religious Organization of Jehovah's Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia, 2022, § 45; and Ilyin and Others v. Ukraine, 2022, § 41, in which the Court decided to examine the refusal to register a religious organisation under Article 9, read in the light of Article 11; ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of assembly) as interpreted in the light of Article 9 - for example as regards a refusal to renew the registration of a religious organisation ( Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, 2006, §§ 74-75); ▪ under Article 11 (freedom of assembly) as interpreted in the light of Article 9: for example as regards a denial of access for a group practising Neo-Druidism to the historic site of Stonehenge to celebrate the summer solstice ( Pendragon v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 19 October 1998; to converse effect, see also Chappell v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision of 14 July 1987), or a refusal by the domestic authorities to allow adherents of a minority religious movement to hold public meetings to promote their faith ( Centre of Societies for Krishna Consciousness in Russia and Frolov v. Russia, 2021, § 46); (e) Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property). The Court has chosen to consider cases solely under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: for example as regards the obligation on landowners who are personally opposed to hunting to tolerate it on their land ( Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], 1999; Herrmann v. Germany [GC], 2012); (f) Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (right of parents to respect for their religious and philosophical convictions in the framework of their children's education). The Court has chosen to consider cases ▪ solely under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1: for example as regards the administration of compulsory classes in religious culture and morals in State schools, and the restricted opportunities for administering such classes ( Mansur Yalçın and Others v. Turkey, 2014), or a refusal by educational authorities to grant children complete exemption from compulsory classes on Christianity ( Folgerø and Others v. Norway [GC], 2007); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 9 of the Convention taken alone, finding no violation of the former on the basis of an elaborate argumentation and no violation of the latter with simple reference to that argumentation ( Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 1976); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 as interpreted in the light of Article 9: for example as regards the compulsory presence of crucifixes in classrooms in State schools ( Lautsi and Others v. Italy [GC], 2011); ▪ under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 for the parents and Article 9 of the Convention for the child, as regards punishment inflicted by a head teacher on a pupil for refusing to take part in a school parade ( Valsamis v. Greece, 1996), or participation by a student in a religious ceremony at school without his parents'consent ( Perovy v. Russia, 2020). ▪ solely under Article 9: for example, as regards a refusal to exempt the applicants'children from compulsory mixed swimming lessons ( Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v. Switzerland, 2017, §§ 35 and 90) - essentially because the respondent State, Switzerland, had not ratified Protocol No. 1."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20250506182911__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20250531233030__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2025-05-06,2025-05-31,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2025-05-06__2025-05-31.json,apps:15541/20,Pindo Mulla v. Spain [GC],15541/20,added,"Pindo Mulla v. Spain [GC], no. 15541/20, 17 September 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.B.2,Freedom of religion and physical and mental health issues,3,100,100,0.9986,,,"The Court has ruled that the refusal of blood transfusions freely consented by Jehovah's Witnesses is, in principle, a matter for the individual's personal autonomy and as such is protected by Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention. In this context, the Court firstly noted that refusing a transfusion could not be equated with suicide because the Jehovah's Witnesses did not refuse medical treatment in general; transfusion was the only medical procedure which they rejected on religious grounds. Even if the patient refuses a transfusion which, according to considered medical opinion, is absolutely essential in order to save his life or to prevent irreparable damage to his health, the Court has held that the freedom to conduct one's life in a manner of one's own choosing includes freedom to pursue activities perceived to be of a physically harmful or dangerous nature for the individual concerned. In the sphere of medical assistance, even where refusal to accept a particular treatment might have a fatal outcome, the imposition of medical treatment without the consent of a mentally competent adult patient would interfere with his or her right to physical integrity and impinge on the rights protected under Article 8. However, if such personal freedom is to be genuine patients must be able to make choices in line with their own opinions and values - even if those choices seem irrational, ill-advised or rash to others. Having considered the relevant domestic legislation, the Court found that it provided sufficient protection for both the freedom of choice of adult patients and the objective interests of minors (by empowering the courts to overrule the parents'opposition to medical treatment likely to save the child's life). Consequently, the prohibition of blood transfusions in the teaching of the Jehovah's Witnesses cannot serve as justification for dissolving the organisation and prohibiting its activities ( Jehovah's Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia, 2010, §§ 131-144; Taganrog LRO and Others v. Russia, 2022, §§ 162-165).","The Court has ruled that the refusal of blood transfusions freely consented by Jehovah's Witnesses is, in principle, a matter for the individual's personal autonomy and as such is protected by Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention ( Pindo Mulla v. Spain [GC], 2024, § 97). In this context, the Court firstly noted that refusing a transfusion could not be equated with suicide because the Jehovah's Witnesses did not refuse medical treatment in general; transfusion was the only medical procedure which they rejected on religious grounds. Even if the patient refuses a transfusion which, according to considered medical opinion, is absolutely essential in order to save his life or to prevent irreparable damage to his health, the Court has held that the freedom to conduct one's life in a manner of one's own choosing includes freedom to pursue activities perceived to be of a physically harmful or dangerous nature for the individual concerned. In the sphere of medical assistance, even where refusal to accept a particular treatment might have a fatal outcome, the imposition of medical treatment without the consent of a mentally competent adult patient would interfere with his or her right to physical integrity and impinge on the rights protected under Article 8. However, if such personal freedom is to be genuine patients must be able to make choices in line with their own opinions and values - even if those choices seem irrational, ill-advised or rash to others. Having considered the relevant domestic legislation, the Court found that it provided sufficient protection for both the freedom of choice of adult patients and the objective interests of minors (by empowering the courts to overrule the parents'opposition to medical treatment likely to save the child's life). Consequently, the prohibition of blood transfusions in the teaching of the Jehovah's Witnesses cannot serve as justification for dissolving the organisation and prohibiting its activities ( Jehovah's Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia, 2010, §§ 131-144; Taganrog LRO and Others v. Russia, 2022, §§ 162-165)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20250531233030__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20251122212600__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2025-05-31,2025-11-22,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2025-05-31__2025-11-22.json,apps:81028/17,Rafiyev v. Azerbaijan*,81028/17,added,"Rafiyev v. Azerbaijan*, no. 81028/17, 8 July 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.B.8,Freedom of religious worship,3,149,151,0.9344,,,"While the State may place limitations on manifestation of a religion through worship and preaching in accordance with Article 9 § 2 of the Convention, a criminal punishment imposed solely on account of a personal characteristic of the celebrant (such as his or her place of religious education) without regulating the content of the religious expression in question (such as, for example, incitement to hatred or another expression that is incompatible with the values of a democratic society) does not sit well with the requirements of this provision ( Sardar Babayev v. Azerbaijan, 2024, §§ 75-78).","While States can put in place a requirement that religious denominations be registered in a manner compatible with Articles 9 and 11 of the Convention, it does not follow that sanctioning an individual member of an unregistered religious organisation for praying or otherwise manifesting his or her religious belief is compatible with the Convention ( Rafiyev v. Azerbaijan *, 2025, § 60). Moreover, while the State may place limitations on manifestation of a religion through worship and preaching in accordance with Article 9 § 2 of the Convention, a criminal punishment imposed solely on account of a personal characteristic of the celebrant (such as his or her place of religious education) without regulating the content of the religious expression in question (such as, for example, incitement to hatred or another expression that is incompatible with the values of a democratic society) does not sit well with the requirements of this provision ( Sardar Babayev v. Azerbaijan, 2024, §§ 75-78)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20250531233030__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20251122212600__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2025-05-31,2025-11-22,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2025-05-31__2025-11-22.json,apps:81028/17,Rafiyev v. Azerbaijan*,81028/17,added,"Rafiyev v. Azerbaijan*, no. 81028/17, 8 July 2025",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.B.8,Freedom of religious worship,3,150,152,0.9989,,,"For example, the Court found a violation of freedom of religion in the following cases: ▪ measures regulating the religious life of Greek Cypriots of Orthodox faith enclaved in the ""Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus"", preventing them from leaving their villages to attend religious ceremonies in places of worship elsewhere or to visit a monastery ( Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 2001, §§ 243-246); ▪ the dispersal by the Russian police of a Sunday service held by Jehovah's Witnesses in the assembly hall of a State vocational secondary school, which the national Jehovah's Witnesses organisation rented on the basis of a lawfully concluded lease agreement. The police measure had been clearly unlawful and arbitrary, even in the light of domestic law ( Kuznetsov and Others v. Russia, 2007). In another similar case the Court found a violation because of the dispersal of an annual Jehovah's Witnesses celebration held in the Agricultural Academy assembly hall, which had also been rented in conformity with domestic law. The impugned operation had been conducted by a large number of police officers, including an armed unit of the Special Police Force; the applicants were arrested and remanded in custody for several hours. Leaving aside the issue of the lawfulness of the interference, the Court found that it had clearly not been ""necessary in a democratic society"" ( Krupko and Others v. Russia, 2014); ▪ the dispersal by the Moldovan police of a prayer meeting held by a group of Muslims in a private house and the imposition on the applicant of an administrative fine for ""practisi ng a religion not recognised by the State"" ( Masaev v. Moldova, 2009); ▪ the imposition of an administrative fine on an American Baptist missionary who was resident in Russia, for having organised regular gatherings in his home for worship and Bible reading without having notified the authorities; acting in an individual capacity rather than on behalf of a religious association, he could not be considered to meet the legal requirements as amended by Parliament ( Ossewaarde v. Russia, 2023); ▪ the break-up by the Bulgarian police of a gathering of adherents of the Reverend Moon's Unification Church in an adherent's home, followed by a search of the apartment with the public prosecutor's authorisation, and finally, the seizure of books, recordings and other items, all because the religious community had not been registered by the State. The impugned measures had manifestly lacked any legal basis in domestic law. Furthermore, the domestic legislation had been unclear as regards the possibility of holding religious gatherings where the organisation in question had not been registered; at the material time there had been an administrative practice, supported by some domestic precedents, of declaring such gatherings unlawful ( Boychev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011); ▪ the summonsing of an applicant to attend the local police station and her questioning on the subject of her religious beliefs, followed by a search of her home, accompanied by seizure of books and recordings, and lastly, a police warning ordering the applicant to discontinue the meetings in her home of the evangelical congregation to which she belonged. The Court concluded that there had been no statutory basis for the interference as the impugned measures had been implemented in the absence of any criminal investigation, in flagrant breach of domestic law ( Dimitrova v. Bulgaria, 2015); ▪ a prison sentence passed on the applicants for having taken part in a Muslim religious ceremony ( mevlüt ) held on the premises of a political party in remembrance of three members of an illegal organisation who had been killed by the security forces. The Court took the view that the mere fact that the ceremony in question had been organised on the premises of a political party in which symbols of a terrorist organisation were displayed did not deprive the participants of the protection guaranteed by Article 9. In this case the penalty had not met the requirements of clarity and foreseeability since it would have been impossible to foresee that mere participation in a religious service would fall within the scope of the Law on the prevention of terrorism ( Güler and Uğur v. Turkey, 2014). ▪ the arrest and sentencing to imprisonment of a mullah (member of the clergy) for having preached and conducted Friday prayers in a mosque, on the sole ground that he was a national of the respondent State who had obtained his religious education abroad. The Court considered that such a measure, targeting the place of the applicant's studies rather than the content of the relevant religious expression or the manner of its delivery, could not be regarded as ""necessary in a democratic society"" in order to protect the democratic order, fight against religious extremism and counter the negative influence of foreign ideologies ( Sardar Babayev v. Azerbaijan, 2024, §§ 75-78).","For example, the Court found a violation of freedom of religion in the following cases: ▪ measures regulating the religious life of Greek Cypriots of Orthodox faith enclaved in the ""Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus"", preventing them from leaving their villages to attend religious ceremonies in places of worship elsewhere or to visit a monastery ( Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 2001, §§ 243-246); ▪ the dispersal by the Russian police of a Sunday service held by Jehovah's Witnesses in the assembly hall of a State vocational secondary school, which the national Jehovah's Witnesses organisation rented on the basis of a lawfully concluded lease agreement. The police measure had been clearly unlawful and arbitrary, even in the light of domestic law ( Kuznetsov and Others v. Russia, 2007). In another similar case the Court found a violation because of the dispersal of an annual Jehovah's Witnesses celebration held in the Agricultural Academy assembly hall, which had also been rented in conformity with domestic law. The impugned operation had been conducted by a large number of police officers, including an armed unit of the Special Police Force; the applicants were arrested and remanded in custody for several hours. Leaving aside the issue of the lawfulness of the interference, the Court found that it had clearly not been ""necessary in a democratic society"" ( Krupko and Others v. Russia, 2014); ▪ the dispersal by the Moldovan police of a prayer meeting held by a group of Muslims in a private house and the imposition on the applicant of an administrative fine f or ""practising a religion not recognised by the State"" ( Masaev v. Moldova, 2009), and the arrest and subsequent administrative conviction of a follower of the Nurism school of Islam for participation in an unauthorised religious meeting on private premises in Azerbaijan ( Rafiyev v. Azerbaijan *, 2025); ▪ the imposition of an administrative fine on an American Baptist missionary who was resident in Russia, for having organised regular gatherings in his home for worship and Bible reading without having notified the authorities; acting in an individual capacity rather than on behalf of a religious association, he could not be considered to meet the legal requirements as amended by Parliament ( Ossewaarde v. Russia, 2023); ▪ the break-up by the Bulgarian police of a gathering of adherents of the Reverend Moon's Unification Church in an adherent's home, followed by a search of the apartment with the public prosecutor's authorisation, and finally, the seizure of books, recordings and other items, all because the religious community had not been registered by the State. The impugned measures had manifestly lacked any legal basis in domestic law. Furthermore, the domestic legislation had been unclear as regards the possibility of holding religious gatherings where the organisation in question had not been registered; at the material time there had been an administrative practice, supported by some domestic precedents, of declaring such gatherings unlawful ( Boychev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011); ▪ the summonsing of an applicant to attend the local police station and her questioning on the subject of her religious beliefs, followed by a search of her home, accompanied by seizure of books and recordings, and lastly, a police warning ordering the applicant to discontinue the meetings in her home of the evangelical congregation to which she belonged. The Court concluded that there had been no statutory basis for the interference as the impugned measures had been implemented in the absence of any criminal investigation, in flagrant breach of domestic law ( Dimitrova v. Bulgaria, 2015); ▪ a prison sentence passed on the applicants for having taken part in a Muslim religious ceremony ( mevlüt ) held on the premises of a political party in remembrance of three members of an illegal organisation who had been killed by the security forces. The Court took the view that the mere fact that the ceremony in question had been organised on the premises of a political party in which symbols of a terrorist organisation were displayed did not deprive the participants of the protection guaranteed by Article 9. In this case the penalty had not met the requirements of clarity and foreseeability since it would have been impossible to foresee that mere participation in a religious service would fall within the scope of the Law on the prevention of terrorism ( Güler and Uğur v. Turkey, 2014). ▪ the arrest and sentencing to imprisonment of a mullah (member of the clergy) for having preached and conducted Friday prayers in a mosque, on the sole ground that he was a national of the respondent State who had obtained his religious education abroad. The Court considered that such a measure, targeting the place of the applicant's studies rather than the content of the relevant religious expression or the manner of its delivery, could not be regarded as ""necessary in a democratic society"" in order to protect the democratic order, fight against religious extremism and counter the negative influence of foreign ideologies ( Sardar Babayev v. Azerbaijan, 2024, §§ 75-78)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20250531233030__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20251122212600__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2025-05-31,2025-11-22,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2025-05-31__2025-11-22.json,apps:8019/16,Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC],8019/16,added,"Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 3 others, 9 July 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.B,Convictions protected under Article 9,2,15,15,0.9826,,,"In that connection, the Court points out that the Convention is designed to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective. The right enshrined in Article 9 would be highly theoretical and illusory if the degree of discretion granted to States allowed them to interpret the notion of religious denomination so restrictively as to deprive a non-traditional and minority form of a religion of legal protection. Such limitative definitions have a direct impact on the exercise of the right to freedom of religion and are liable to curtail the exercise of that right by denying the religious nature of a faith. At all events, these definitions may not be interpreted to the detriment of non-traditional forms of religion ( İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2016, § 114, and Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria, 2024, § 48). In addition, it would be fundamentally inconsistent with the logic of Article 9 to limit the rights guaranteed under that provision solely to the religions and registered religious organisations recognised by the State, and to followers of them ( Hamzayan v. Armenia, 2024).","In that connection, the Court points out that the Convention is designed to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective. The right enshrined in Article 9 would be highly theoretical and illusory if the degree of discretion granted to States allowed them to interpret the notion of religious denomination so restrictively as to deprive a non-traditional and minority form of a religion of legal protection. Such limitative definitions have a direct impact on the exercise of the right to freedom of religion and are liable to curtail the exercise of that right by denying the religious nature of a faith. At all events, these definitions may not be interpreted to the detriment of non-traditional forms of religion ( İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2016, § 114, and Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria, 2024, § 48). In addition, it would be fundamentally inconsistent with the logic of Article 9 to limit the rights guaranteed under that provision solely to the religions and registered religious organisations recognised by the State, and to followers of them ( Hamzayan v. Armenia, 2024). It is questionable whether any law purporting to limit the right guaranteed by Article 9 to manifest one's religion to the followers of registered religious organisations only would satisfy the ""lawfulness"" requirement in light of the fundamental inconsistency of such a law with the requirements of that provision ( Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025, § 1275)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20250531233030__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20251122212600__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2025-05-31,2025-11-22,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2025-05-31__2025-11-22.json,apps:8019/16,Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC],8019/16,added,"Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 3 others, 9 July 2025",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.F,The safeguards of Article 9 in the context of a military conflict,2,,64,,,,,"In the context of a military conflict, the Court has indicated that it must be kept in mind that the obligation to respect the religious convictions and practices of persons in occupied territory has already been codified in Article 46 of the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (""the Hague Regulations""), and that respect for convictions and religious practices is recognised in Article 75(1) of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977 (""AP I"") as a fundamental guarantee for all persons who are in the power of a party to the conflict. Moreover, Article 15 AP Icodifies the obligation to respect and protect civilian religious personnel in all circumstances. Serious violations of freedom of religion under Article 9 can therefore also breach the requirements of international humanitarian law ( Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025, §§ 1267-69)."
2fbc08fc30bd,Article 9,20250531233030__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,20251122212600__guide_art_9_eng.pdf,2025-05-31,2025-11-22,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/2fbc08fc30bd/diff_2025-05-31__2025-11-22.json,apps:8019/16,Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC],8019/16,added,"Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 3 others, 9 July 2025",3,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.F,The safeguards of Article 9 in the context of a military conflict,2,,65,,,,,"Thus, the Court found a violation of Article 9 in the context of the armed conflict in Ukraine, encompassing the events in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (in the east of Ukraine), which began in the spring of 2014, and the events throughout Ukraine from 24 February 2022 (the start of the full-scale military invasion by the Russian Federation). More precisely, it established the existence of an administrative practice of intimidation, harassment and persecution of religious groups, aside from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. The Court found that since 2014 freedom of religion has been significantly curtailed in the occupied territories and that this had continued after the 2022 invasion. Reported acts included, inter alia, the harassment and prosecution of religious figures of other religions or Christian churches as well as civilians engaging in worship in the context of those religions and churches, in breach of the requirements of international humanitarian law; seizure of places of worship by separatists; ill-treatment, abduction and, in some cases the killing of religious leaders; banning of religious material deemed to be ""extremist"" by separatist administrations and institutions, with Members of the Jehovah's Witnesses particularly targeted; introduction of formal requirements for the mandatory registration and operation of religious groups which were applied restrictively to refuse registration to a number of religious organisations on undisclosed grounds; banning religious organisations as ""extremist"" organisations and seizing, destroying and banning, their religious material and publications; seizing immovable property; prosecution of religious leaders and parishioners for organising or attending illegal gatherings. "" Extremism laws"" and other provisions purporting to ban ""sects"" had been applied in newly occupied territories to justify the confiscation of religious material and prevent religious worship by those outside the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate community. Furthermore, in 2022 the Russian occupation administration had ""nationalised"" property from religious communities and repurposed it for their own ends. The Court held that the unlawful deprivation of liberty, ill-treatment, torture and extrajudicial killing of civilians on account of their belonging to or practising their religion, plainly could not be justified under Article 9 § 2. As to the other measures taken, the Court found that they were not ""prescribed by law"". In addition, it was unlikely that the measures taken in pursuance of purported legal acts proscribing extremism would satisfy the ""quality of law"" requirement inherent in ""lawfulness"" on account of the absence of safeguards to protect agains t an excessively broad interpretation of the concept of ""extremism"" by the separatist entities and other occupation authorities. It was also questionable whether a law, purporting to limit the right to manifest one's religion to the followers of registered religious organisations only, would satisfy the ""lawfulness"" requirement in light of the fundamental inconsistency of such a law with the requirements of Article 9 of the Convention ( Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025, § 1267-77)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:15736/22,Alppi v. Finland (dec.),15736/22,added,"Alppi v. Finland (dec.), no. 15736/22, 28 November 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.A.1,Effective participation in the proceedings,3,,168,,"Alppi v. Finland (dec.), no. 15736/22, 28 November 2023",,,"In Alppi v. Finland (dec.), 2023, §§ 18-24, concerning a hearing via video link during the COVID- 19 pandemic, the Court found that the use of a video link served a legitimate aim, namely to reduce the spread of COVID-19. The Court also laid emphasis on the fact that the proceedings essentially related to more technical legal issues relevant to the sentencing in a situation where the applicant's guilt had already been established. The Court therefore declared the applicant's complaint under Article 6 § 1 inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:17053/20,Bavčar v. Slovenia,17053/20,added,"Bavčar v. Slovenia, no. 17053/20, 7 September 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VI.A.2.b,Statements by public officials,4,,392,,"Bavčar v. Slovenia, no. 17053/20, 7 September 2023",,,"By contrast, in Bavčar v. Slovenia, 2023, § 109-125, the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 2 in relation to statements made by the Minister of Justice and Prime Minister concerning the applicant, an important political and economic figure, suggesting pressure on the judges examining the applicant's case on appeal. The Court noted a close temporal proximity between the first-instance conviction, the Minister's statement and the subsequent adjudication of the appeal by the appeal court. The Court considered that the cumulative effect of statements was capable of prejudicing the decision-making of the appeal court and of encouraging the public to believe the applicant guilty before proven so with final effect."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:3016/16,Bogdan v. Ukraine,3016/16,added,"Bogdan v. Ukraine, no. 3016/16, 8 February 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VI.B.3.c.i.§117,c Waiver of the right of access to a lawyer,6,,489,,"Bogdan v. Ukraine, no. 3016/16, 8 February 2024",,,"In any event, it is in the first place the trial court's duty to establish in a convincing manner whether or not an applicant's confessions and waivers of legal assistance were voluntary. Any flaw in respect of the confessions and waivers should be rectified in order for the proceedings as a whole to be considered fair. Afailure to examine the circumstances surrounding an applicant's waiver would be tantamount to depriving the applicant of the possibility of remedying a situation, contrary to the requirements of the Convention (Türk v. Turkey, 2017, §§ 53-54; Rodionov v. Russia, 2018, § 167). Drug withdrawal symptoms constitute a form of vulnerability which may, in principle, cast doubt on the validity of a waiver of the right to a lawyer and which imposes upon the domestic courts the duty to establish whether, despite this vulnerability, the waiver was voluntary (Bogdan v. Ukraine,* 2024, §§ 57-69, § 75)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:31349/20,Chkhartishvili v. Georgia,31349/20,added,"Chkhartishvili v. Georgia, no. 31349/20, 11 May 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.B.2.b,Presence at the trial,4,,309,,"Chkhartishvili v. Georgia, no. 31349/20, 11 May 2023",,,"Lastly, an issue with regard to the requirement of presence at the hearing arises when an accused is prevented from taking part in his trial on the grounds of his improper behaviour (Idalov v. Russia [GC], 2012, § 175; Marguš v. Croatia [GC], 2014, § 90; Ananyev v. Russia, 2009, § 43; Suslov and Batikyan v. Ukraine, 2022, §§ 135-141; Chkhartishvili v. Georgia, 2023, §§ 32-38)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:67414/11,Cupiał v. Poland,67414/11,added,"Cupiał v. Poland, no. 67414/11, 9 March 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.A.3,Reasoning of judicial decisions,3,,198,,"Cupiał v. Poland, no. 67414/11, 9 March 2023|Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",,,"While courts are not obliged to give a detailed answer to every argument raised (Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands, 1994, § 61), it must be clear from the decision that the essential issues of the case have been addressed (Boldea v. Romania, 2007, § 30; Lobzhanidze and Peradze v. Georgia, 2020, § 66) and that a specific and explicit reply has been given to the arguments which are decisive for the outcome of the case (Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [GC], 2017, § 84; S.C. IMH Suceava S.R.L. v. Romania, 2013, § 40, concerning contradictions in the assessment of evidence; Karimov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 29, concerning the allegations of imprisonment for debt). In examining the fairness of criminal proceedings, the Court has held in particular that by ignoring a specific, pertinent and important point made by the accused, the domestic courts fall short of their obligations under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, §§ 337-341; Cupiał v. Poland, 2023, § 57)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:25852/18,Deliktaş v. Türkiye,25852/18,added,"Deliktaş v. Türkiye, no. 25852/18, 12 December 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.B.2.c,Presence at the appeal hearing,4,,314,,"Deliktaş v. Türkiye, no. 25852/18, 12 December 2023",,,"Even where the court of appeal has jurisdiction to review the case both as to the facts and as to the law, Article 6 does not always require a right to a public hearing, still less a right to appear in person (Fejde v. Sweden, 1991, § 31). However, where in the circumstances of a case an appellate court is called upon to examine a case on the facts and the law and to make a full assessment of the question of the applicant's guilt or innocence, it cannot, as a matter of a fair trial, properly determine those issues without a direct assessment of the evidence given in person by the accused claiming that he or she has not committed the act alleged to constitute a criminal offence (Deliktaş v. Türkiye, 2023, § 44). In order to decide the question of the necessity of an accused's presence, regard must be had to the specific features of the proceedings in question and to the manner in which the applicant's interests were actually presented and protected before the appellate court, particularly in the light of the nature of the issues to be decided by it (Seliwiak v. Poland, 2009, § 54; Sibgatullin v. Russia, 2009, § 36)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:19990/20,Erik Adamčo v. Slovakia,19990/20,added,"Erik Adamčo v. Slovakia, no. 19990/20, 1 June 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.A.5,Administration of evidence,3,,245,,"Erik Adamčo v. Slovakia, no. 19990/20, 1 June 2023",,,"In Adamčo v. Slovakia, 2019, §§ 56-71, concerning the conviction based to a decisive degree on statements by an accomplice arising from a plea-bargaining arrangement, the Court found a violation of Article 6 of the Convention having regard to the following considerations: the statement constituted, if not the sole, then at least the decisive evidence against the applicant; the failure by the domestic courts to examine the wider context in which the witness obtained advantages from the prosecution; the fact that the plea-bargaining agreement with the prosecution was concluded without the judicial involvement; and the domestic courts' failure to provide the relevant reasoning concerning the applicant's arguments (see also Erik Adamčo v. Slovakia, 2023)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:1269/13,European Air Transport Leipzig GmbH v. Belgium,1269/13,added,"European Air Transport Leipzig GmbH v. Belgium, nos. 1269/13 and others, 11 July 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.A,"The notion of a ""tribunal""",2,,82,,"European Air Transport Leipzig GmbH v. Belgium, nos. 1269/13 and others, 11 July 2023",,,"In assessing whether, in a given case, the extent of the review carried out by the domestic courts was sufficient, the Court has held that it must have regard to the powers of the judicial body in question and to such factors as: (a) the subject-matter of the dispute; (b) the procedural guarantees available in the administrative proceedings subject to the judicial control; and (c) the method of review, the judge's decision-making powers and the grounds for his or her decision, assessed, in the context of the judicial proceedings in question, in the light of the substance of the dispute, the issues it raises and the arguments put forward in this connection (European Air Transport Leipzig GmbH v. Belgium, 2023, § 54)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:28232/22,Figurka v. Ukraine,28232/22,added,"Figurka v. Ukraine,* no. 28232/22, 16 November 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.C.2.b.i.§40,a The exercise of different judicial functions,6,,137,,,,,"The absence of a prosecutor during the criminal trial, which may put the judge in the position of the prosecuting authority while conducting the questioning and adducing evidence against an applicant, raises another issue concerning impartiality. In this regard, the Court has explained that the judge is the ultimate guardian of the proceedings and that it is normally the task of a public authority in case of public prosecution to present and substantiate the criminal charge with a view to adversarial argument with the other parties. Therefore, confusing the two roles in the proceedings is a potential breach of the requirement of impartiality under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (Karelin v. Russia, 2016, §§ 51-85; see, by contrast, Makarashvili and Others v. Georgia, 2022, § 59, where, under domestic law, even in the absence of a prosecutor at trial, the author of the administrative-offence report on the basis of which the proceedings are instituted (the police officer) acts as a party to those proceedings; and Figurka v. Ukraine,* 2023, §§ 30-44, where the appeal court did not take up, or was not put in a position requiring it to take, the role of a prosecuting party)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:57378/18,Georgiou v. Greece,57378/18,added,"Georgiou v. Greece, no. 57378/18, 14 March 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.A.3.§52,Reasons for decisions given by juries,4,,212,,"Georgiou v. Greece, no. 57378/18, 14 March 2023",,,"In Baydar v. the Netherlands, 2018 (§§ 45-53), in the context of a decision by the domestic superior court refusing to refer a question to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for a preliminary ruling (the relevant principles set out in the context of the civil limb in Dhahbi v. Italy, 2014, § 31), the Court had regard to the principle according to which courts of cassation comply with their obligation to provide sufficient reasoning when they base themselves on a specific legal provision, without further reasoning, in dismissing cassation appeals which do not have any prospects of success (Talmane v. Latvia, 2016, § 29). It held that this case-law was in line with the principles set out in Dhahbi v. Italy, 2014, and concluded that a reference to the relevant legal provision by the superior court, with an indication that there was no need to seek a preliminary ruling since the matter did not raise a legal issue that needed to be determined, provided for an implied acknowledgment that a referral to the CJEUcould not lead to a different outcome in the case. The Court thus considered that this satisfied the requirement of a sufficient reasoning under Article 6 § 1. By contrast, in Georgiou v. Greece, 2023, §§ 22-26, the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 in relation to the Court of Cassation's failure to examine, without giving any reasons, the applicant's request to seek a preliminary ruling from the CJEU."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:19750/13,Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC],19750/13,added,"Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 19750/13, 1 June 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A,General principles,2,,16,,"Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 19750/13, 1 June 2023",,,"The Court's established case-law sets out three criteria, commonly known as the ""Engel criteria"", to be considered in determining whether or not there was a ""criminal charge"". The first is the legal classification of the offence under national law, the second is the very nature of the offence, and the third is the degree of severity of the penalty that the person concerned risks incurring (Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 113). These criteria are examined in detail further below."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:19750/13,Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC],19750/13,added,"Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 19750/13, 1 June 2023",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.§16.2,Procedural rules,3,,68,,"Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 19750/13, 1 June 2023",,,"These are, for example, the admissibility requirements for an appeal. Article 6 of the Convention does not compel the Contracting States to set up courts of appeal or of cassation (Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 136; Dorado Baúlde v. Spain (dec.), 2015, § 18). However, where such courts do exist, the guarantees of Article 6 must be complied with, for instance in that it guarantees to an applicant an effective right of access to the court (Maresti v. Croatia, 2009, § 33; Reichman v. France, 2016, § 29)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:19750/13,Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC],19750/13,added,"Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 19750/13, 1 June 2023",3,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.A.5,Administration of evidence,3,,247,,"Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 19750/13, 1 June 2023",,,"Lastly, it should be noted that in some very specific circumstances, a positive obligation may arise on the part of the authorities to investigate and collect evidence in favour of the accused (Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, § 130). In V.C.L. and A.N. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, §§ 195-200, concerning a case of human trafficking where the victims of trafficking were prosecuted for drug- related offences (committed in relation to their trafficking), the Court stressed that evidence concerning an accused's status as a victim of trafficking should be considered as a ""fundamental aspect"" of the defence which he or she should be able to secure without restriction. In this connection, the Court referred to the positive obligation on the State under Article 4 of the Convention to investigate situations of potential trafficking.5 In the case at issue, the Court considered that the lack of a proper assessment of the applicants' status as victims of trafficking prevented the authorities from securing evidence which may have constituted a fundamental aspect of their defence."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:10644/17,Hamdani v. Switzerland,10644/17,added,"Hamdani v. Switzerland, no. 10644/17, 28 March 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VI.B.3.d,Legal aid,4,,503,,"Hamdani v. Switzerland, no. 10644/17, 28 March 2023",,,"In Hamdani v. Switzerland, 2023, §§ 32-38, the applicant had been refused the right to a legal aid lawyer on the basis of an assessment by the domestic courts which the Court found to be inadequate, considering that the two criteria of Article 6 § 3 (c) - lack of means and complexity of the merits - required the appointment of a legal aid lawyer. However, given that the lawyer in question, irrespective of the unjustified refusal to grant legal aid, continued representing the applicant pro bono, the Court considered that the applicant had been provided with effective legal representation and that therefore the overall fairness of the proceedings was not undermined. The Court therefore found no violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:16783/20,Irodotou v. Cyprus,16783/20,added,"Irodotou v. Cyprus, no. 16783/20, 23 May 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A,The fundamental principles,2,,7,,"Irodotou v. Cyprus, no. 16783/20, 23 May 2023|Panju v. Belgium (no. 2), no. 49072/21, 23 May 2023|Sperisen v. Switzerland, no. 22060/20, 13 June 2023",,,"In the absence of special circumstances, a complaint relating to Article 6 of the Convention is declared inadmissible as premature when it concerns criminal proceedings pending before the domestic courts (Sperisen v. Switzerland, 2023, § 48). Aperson may not claim to be a victim of a violation of his or her right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention which, according to him or her, occurred in the course of proceedings in which he or she was acquitted or which were discontinued (Khlyustov v. Russia, 2013, § 103; see, however, Kerimoğlu v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 44-57, as regards the loss of victim status once it has been acquired). The dismissal of charges against an applicant deprives him or her of the victim status for the alleged breaches of the Article 6 rights (Batmaz v. Turkey, 2014, § 36; see Panju v. Belgium (No. 2), 2023, §§ 75, in the length of proceedings context, see, by contrast, Irodotou v. Cyprus, 2023, § 63). Moreover, the Court has held that an applicant cannot complain of a breach of his or her Article 6 rights if the domestic courts only applied a measure suspending the pronouncement of a criminal sanction against him or her (Kerman v. Turkey, 2016, §§ 100-106)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:42180/19,Jakutavičius v. Lithuania,42180/19,added,"Jakutavičius v. Lithuania,* no. 42180/19, 13 February 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.5,"Different stages of criminal proceedings, ancillary proceedings and subsequent remedies",3,,57,,"Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.), no. 38744/21, 12 December 2023",,,"The criminal limb of Article 6 § 1 does not apply to the proceedings relating to the costs and expenses of the criminal proceedings. In such proceedings, Article 6 § 1 may apply in its civil limb (Jakutavičius v. Lithuania,* 2024, §§ 55-60; see also Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.), 2023, §§ 26-28, where Article 6 § 1 did not apply due to the absence of a right under the relevant domestic law)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:47834/19,Lalik v. Poland,47834/19,added,"Lalik v. Poland, no. 47834/19, 11 May 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VI.B.3.c.i.§115,a Scope of the right,6,,467,,"Lalik v. Poland, no. 47834/19, 11 May 2023",,,"In Beuze v. Belgium [GC] (2018, §§ 125-130), drawing on its previous case-law, the Court explained that the aims pursued by the right of access to a lawyer include the following: prevention of a miscarriage of justice and, above all, the fulfilment of the aims of Article 6, notably equality of arms between the investigating or prosecuting authorities and the accused; counterweight to the vulnerability of suspects in police custody; fundamental safeguard against coercion and ill-treatment of suspects by the police; ensuring respect for the right of an accused not to incriminate him/herself and to remain silent, which can - just as the right of access to a lawyer as such - be guaranteed only if he or she is properly notified of these rights. In this connection, immediate access to a lawyer able to provide information about procedural rights is likely to prevent unfairness arising from the lack of appropriate information on rights. Moreover, the Court has held that the receipt by the accused of information about the rights to remain silent, not to incriminate himself and to consult a lawyer is one of the guarantees enabling him to exercise his defence rights (Lalik v. Poland, 2023, § 62)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:60569/09,Leka v. Albania,60569/09,added,"Leka v. Albania,* no. 60569/09, 5 March 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VI.B.1.c,Reclassification of the charge,4,,422,,,,,"Areclassification of the offence is considered to be sufficiently foreseeable to the accused if it concerns an element which is intrinsic to the accusation (De Salvador Torres v. Spain, 1996, § 33; Sadak and Others v. Turkey (no. 1), 2001, §§ 52 and 56; Juha Nuutinen v. Finland, 2007, § 32). Whether the elements of the reclassified offence were debated in the proceedings is a further relevant consideration (Penev v. Bulgaria, 2010, § 41; Leka v. Albania,* 2024, § 78)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:3324/19,Mehmet Zeki Doğan v. Türkiye (no. 2),3324/19,added,"Mehmet Zeki Doğan v. Türkiye (no. 2), no. 3324/19, 13 February 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.A.5,Administration of evidence,3,,234,,"Mehmet Zeki Doğan v. Türkiye (no. 2), no. 3324/19, 13 February 2024|Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",,,"As to the examination of the nature of the alleged unlawfulness in question, the above test has been applied in cases concerning complaints that evidence obtained in breach of the defence rights has been used in the proceedings. This concerns, for instance, the use of evidence obtained through an identification parade (Laska and Lika v. Albania, 2010), an improper taking of samples from a suspect for a forensic analysis (Horvatić v. Croatia, 2013), exertion of pressure on a co-accused, including the questioning of a co-accused in the absence of a lawyer (Erkapić v. Croatia, 2013; Dominka v. Slovakia (dec.), 2018; Stephens v. Malta (no. 3), 2020, §§ 64-67; Tonkov v. Belgium, 2022, §§ 64-68; see also Mehmet Zeki Doğan v. Türkiye (no. 2),* 2024, §§ 79-88, concerning the use of statements of the co-accused in the absence of a lawyer in the reopened criminal proceedings following the Court's finding of a violation of Art 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) in the first application bought by the applicant); use of intelligence information against an accused (Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, § 316); use of planted evidence against an accused (Layijov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 64; Sakit Zahidov v. Azerbaijan, 2015, §§ 46-49; Kobiashvili v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 56-58), unfair use of other incriminating witness and material evidence against an accused (Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2017; Ayetullah Ay v. Turkey, 2020); use of self-incriminating statements in the proceedings (Belugin v. Russia, 2019, § 68-80); and use of expert evidence in the proceedings (Erduran and Em Export Dış Tic A.Ş. v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 107-112; see also Avagyan v. Armenia, 2018, § 41; Gülağacı v. Turkey (dec.), 2021, §§ 35-40; and Zayidov v. Azerbaijan (no. 3), 2023, § 89)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:39712/16,Nadir Yıldırım and Others v. Türkiye,39712/16,added,"Nadir Yıldırım and Others v. Türkiye,* no. 39712/16, 28 November 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VI.A.2.a,Statements by judicial authorities,4,,382,,,,,"The presumption of innocence will be violated if a judicial decision concerning a person charged with a criminal offence reflects an opinion that he is guilty before he has been proved guilty according to law. In this connection, the lack of intention to breach the right to the presumption of innocence cannot rule out a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention (Avaz Zeynalov v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 69). It suffices, even in the absence of any formal finding, that there is some reasoning suggesting that the court regards the accused as guilty (see, as the leading authority, Minelli v. Switzerland, 1983, § 37; and, more recently, Nerattini v. Greece, 2008, § 23; Didu v. Romania, 2009, § 41; Gutsanovi v. Bulgaria, 2013, §§ 202-203). Apremature expression of such an opinion by the tribunal itself will inevitably fall foul of this presumption (Nešťák v. Slovakia, 2007, § 88; Garycki v. Poland, 2007, § 66). Thus, an expression of ""firm conviction that the applicant had again committed an offence"" during the proceedings for suspension of a prison sentence on probation violated Article 6 § 2 (El Kaada v. Germany, 2015, §§ 61-63). Similarly, a breach of the presumption of innocence was found in relation to the wording used by the trial court president in investigatory reports drawn up for the lifting of the applicants' parliamentary immunity, which applicants had been elected as members of Parliament while criminal proceedings were pending against them (Nadir Yıldırım and Others v. Türkiye,* 2023, §§ 71-76)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:43627/16|71667/16,Okropiridze v. Georgia,43627/16|71667/16,added,"Okropiridze v. Georgia, nos. 43627/16 and 71667/16, 7 September 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.C.2.a.§37,ii. Objective approach,5,,126,,"Okropiridze v. Georgia, nos. 43627/16 and 71667/16, 7 September 2023",,,"By contrast, in Okropiridze v. Georgia, 2023, §§ 68-75, where an issue arose as regards the impartiality of a jury after various high officials made prejudicial statements concerning the applicant's case, the Court took into account the procedural safeguards put in place by the domestic court to dispel any objectively held fears or misgivings about the impartiality of the jury. In particular, the Court found no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention having regard to the following circumstances: the relevant court had issued a statement asking the media and the parties to the proceedings to abstain from making any statements or comments in connection with the applicant's trial, all jury selection hearings had been closed to the parties, during the jury selection process potential jurors were explicitly asked whether they had heard or read anything about the case, and one such person had been dismissed from the jury specifically on that ground, and jurors were warned that they were required to decide the case on the evidence presented in court only and to disregard any extraneous material which had come to their attention."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:48309/17,Orhan Şahin v. Türkiye,48309/17,added,"Orhan Şahin v. Türkiye,* no. 48309/17, 12 March 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.A.7,The principle of immediacy,3,,275,,,,,"In Cerovšek and Božičnik v. Slovenia (2017, §§ 37-48) the Court found a violation of Article 6 because the reasons for the verdicts against the applicants, that is, their conviction and sentence, had not given by the single judge who had pronounced them but by other judges, who had not participated in the trial (see also Svanidze v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 34-38, concerning the replacement of the trial judge by a substitute judge who did not participate in the examination of evidence; and Orhan Şahin v. Türkiye,* 2024, §§ 57-62, where none of the judges on the three-judge bench, that ultimately convicted the applicant following a re-trial had taken part in the earlier stages of the criminal proceedings against the applicant or had heard evidence from the witness whose statements were central to the applicant's conviction)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:49072/21,Panju v. Belgium (no. 2),49072/21,added,"Panju v. Belgium (no. 2), no. 49072/21, 23 May 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A,The fundamental principles,2,,7,,"Irodotou v. Cyprus, no. 16783/20, 23 May 2023|Panju v. Belgium (no. 2), no. 49072/21, 23 May 2023|Sperisen v. Switzerland, no. 22060/20, 13 June 2023",,,"In the absence of special circumstances, a complaint relating to Article 6 of the Convention is declared inadmissible as premature when it concerns criminal proceedings pending before the domestic courts (Sperisen v. Switzerland, 2023, § 48). Aperson may not claim to be a victim of a violation of his or her right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention which, according to him or her, occurred in the course of proceedings in which he or she was acquitted or which were discontinued (Khlyustov v. Russia, 2013, § 103; see, however, Kerimoğlu v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 44-57, as regards the loss of victim status once it has been acquired). The dismissal of charges against an applicant deprives him or her of the victim status for the alleged breaches of the Article 6 rights (Batmaz v. Turkey, 2014, § 36; see Panju v. Belgium (No. 2), 2023, §§ 75, in the length of proceedings context, see, by contrast, Irodotou v. Cyprus, 2023, § 63). Moreover, the Court has held that an applicant cannot complain of a breach of his or her Article 6 rights if the domestic courts only applied a measure suspending the pronouncement of a criminal sanction against him or her (Kerman v. Turkey, 2016, §§ 100-106)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:39272/15,Repeşco and Repeşcu v. the Republic of Moldova,39272/15,added,"Repeşco and Repeşcu v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 39272/15, 3 October 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.A.5,Administration of evidence,3,,232,,"Repeşco and Repeşcu v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 39272/15, 3 October 2023",,,"It is not, therefore, the role of the Court to determine, as a matter of principle, whether particular types of evidence - for example, evidence obtained unlawfully in terms of domestic law - may be admissible. The question which must be answered is whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the evidence was obtained, were fair (Ayetullah Ay v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 123-130). This involves an examination of the alleged unlawfulness in question and, where the violation of another Convention right is concerned, the nature of the violation found (Khan v. the United Kingdom, 2000, § 34; P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 76; Allan v. the United Kingdom, 2002, § 42). Thus, for instance, the Court criticised the approach taken by the domestic courts to give decisive weight to the statements of the arresting police officers concerning the charges of rebellion against the applicant where the Government themselves recognised (in an unilateral declaration) that the circumstances of the arrest had been contrary to the prohibition of degrading treatment under Article 3 of the Convention (Boutaffala v. Belgium, §§ 87-88; see also Repeşco and Repeşcu v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 29-33)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:20148/09,Rigolio v. Italy,20148/09,added,"Rigolio v. Italy, no. 20148/09, 9 March 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VI.A.2.a,Statements by judicial authorities,4,,384,,"Rigolio v. Italy, no. 20148/09, 9 March 2023",,,"What is important in the application of the provision of Article 6 § 2 is the true meaning of the statements in question, not their literal form (Lavents v. Latvia, 2002, § 126). Even the regrettable use of some unfortunate language does not have to be decisive as to the lack of respect for the presumption of innocence, given the nature and context of the particular proceedings (Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 126; Lähteenmäki v. Estonia, 2016, § 45; Rigolio v. Italy, 2023, § 95). Thus, a potentially prejudicial statement cited from an expert report did not violate the presumption of innocence in proceedings for a conditional release from prison when a close reading of the judicial decision excluded an understanding which would touch upon the applicant's reputation and the way he is perceived by the public. However, the Court stressed that it would have been more prudent for the domestic court to either clearly distance itself from the expert's misleading statements, or to advise the expert to refrain from making unsolicited statements about the applicant's criminal liability in order to avoid the misconception that questions of guilt and innocence could be in any way relevant to the proceedings at hand (Müller v. Germany, 2014, §§ 51-52)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:44764/16,Roccella v. Italy,44764/16,added,"Roccella v. Italy, no. 44764/16, 15 June 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.5,"Different stages of criminal proceedings, ancillary proceedings and subsequent remedies",3,,53,,"Roccella v. Italy, no. 44764/16, 15 June 2023",,,"Article 6 § 1 is applicable throughout the entirety of proceedings for the determination of any ""criminal charge"", including the sentencing process (for instance, confiscation proceedings enabling the national courts to assess the amount at which a confiscation order should be set, in Phillips v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 39; see also Aleksandr Dementyev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 23-26, concerning the determination of the aggregate sentence involving the conversion of the term of community work into the prison term). Where the determination of a ""criminal charge"" acquires the force of res judicata, but the case nevertheless continues in order to determine any civil liability linked to the commission of an offence, the civil limb applies to the subsequent proceedings even if they are conducted before a criminal court (Roccella v. Italy, 2023, §§ 31-36)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:38744/21,Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.),38744/21,added,"Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.), no. 38744/21, 12 December 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.5,"Different stages of criminal proceedings, ancillary proceedings and subsequent remedies",3,,57,,"Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.), no. 38744/21, 12 December 2023",,,"The criminal limb of Article 6 § 1 does not apply to the proceedings relating to the costs and expenses of the criminal proceedings. In such proceedings, Article 6 § 1 may apply in its civil limb (Jakutavičius v. Lithuania,* 2024, §§ 55-60; see also Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.), 2023, §§ 26-28, where Article 6 § 1 did not apply due to the absence of a right under the relevant domestic law)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:19920/20,Škoberne v. Slovenia,19920/20,added,"Škoberne v. Slovenia,* no. 19920/20, 15 February 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VI.B.4.c,Right to call witnesses for the defence,4,,565,,,,,"In Kikabidze v. Georgia, 2021, §§ 56-60, the Court examined a situation where the defence application to admit a list of witnesses to be called on behalf of the defence into evidence was rejected on procedural grounds because the defence had produced the list after the expiry of the relevant time-limit. The de facto outcome of that decision was that in the course of the jury trial - introduced in the domestic legal order shortly before the trial in the applicant's case - not a single witness was heard on behalf of the defence. The Court found that state of affairs troubling, particularly given the nature of the subject matter of the criminal case (an aggravated murder committed in prison in the presence of some seventy prisoners), the absence of evidence other than witnesses, and the fact that the case was decided by a jury. The Court therefore considered that, from the point of view of the Convention requirements of fair trial, and the applicant's right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him, the decision to exclude all witnesses proposed by the defence had to be motivated by weighty reasons going beyond the issue of the applicant's compliance with a procedural time-limit. On the facts of the case, the Court found that the presiding judge's rejection of the defence witness list in its entirety resulted from a rigid and restrictive application of domestic law to the applicant's detriment, which was particularly troubling given the absence of established judicial practice following implementation of the cardinal reform of the criminal procedure shortly before the applicant's trial (see also Škoberne v. Slovenia,* 2024, §§ 104-111; see, by contrast, Rusishvili v. Georgia, §§ 49-52)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:56440/15,Snijders v. the Netherlands,56440/15,added,"Snijders v. the Netherlands,* no. 56440/15, 6 February 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VI.B.4.b.§131.§132,a Anonymous witnesses,6,,548,,,,,"If the anonymity of prosecution witnesses is maintained, the defence will be faced with difficulties which criminal proceedings should not normally involve. In such cases, the handicap faced by the defence must be sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the judicial authorities (Doorson v. the Netherlands, 1996, § 72; Van Mechelen and Others v. the Netherlands, 1997, § 54; Haas v. Germany (dec.), 2005; Asani v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2018, § 37). In cases where the statement of an absent witness was considered the sole or decisive evidence or where such evidence carried significant weight, the Court must subject the proceedings in which a statement of anonymous witness is used in evidence to the most searching scrutiny. In view of this, the Court must be satisfied that there are sufficient counterbalancing factors, including the existence of strong procedural safeguards, to permit a fair and proper assessment of the reliability of that evidence to take place (Snijders v. the Netherlands,* 2024, § 67)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:22060/20,Sperisen v. Switzerland,22060/20,added,"Sperisen v. Switzerland, no. 22060/20, 13 June 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A,The fundamental principles,2,,7,,"Irodotou v. Cyprus, no. 16783/20, 23 May 2023|Panju v. Belgium (no. 2), no. 49072/21, 23 May 2023|Sperisen v. Switzerland, no. 22060/20, 13 June 2023",,,"In the absence of special circumstances, a complaint relating to Article 6 of the Convention is declared inadmissible as premature when it concerns criminal proceedings pending before the domestic courts (Sperisen v. Switzerland, 2023, § 48). Aperson may not claim to be a victim of a violation of his or her right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention which, according to him or her, occurred in the course of proceedings in which he or she was acquitted or which were discontinued (Khlyustov v. Russia, 2013, § 103; see, however, Kerimoğlu v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 44-57, as regards the loss of victim status once it has been acquired). The dismissal of charges against an applicant deprives him or her of the victim status for the alleged breaches of the Article 6 rights (Batmaz v. Turkey, 2014, § 36; see Panju v. Belgium (No. 2), 2023, §§ 75, in the length of proceedings context, see, by contrast, Irodotou v. Cyprus, 2023, § 63). Moreover, the Court has held that an applicant cannot complain of a breach of his or her Article 6 rights if the domestic courts only applied a measure suspending the pronouncement of a criminal sanction against him or her (Kerman v. Turkey, 2016, §§ 100-106)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:57818/18,Strassenmeyer v. Germany,57818/18,added,"Strassenmeyer v. Germany, no. 57818/18, 2 May 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VI.B.4.b.§131.§134,c Witnesses who refuse to testify in court,6,,554,,"Strassenmeyer v. Germany, no. 57818/18, 2 May 2023",,,"In some instances, a witness' refusal to give a statement or answer questions in court may be justified in view of the special nature of the witness' position in the proceedings. This will be the case, for instance, if a co-accused uses one's right to protection against self-incrimination (Vidgen v. the Netherlands, 2012, § 42; Strassenmeyer v. Germany, 2023, § 74). The same is true for a former co- suspect refusing to give a statement or answer questions at the hearing as a witness (Sievert v. Germany, 2012, §§ 59-61), or a former co-suspect who is facing the charges of perjury for trying to change his initial statement inculpating the applicant (Cabral v. the Netherlands, 2018, § 34). Moreover, this may concern a witness who relied on testimonial privilege in order to not testify at the trial due to her relationship with one of the co-accused (Sofri and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2003) or a witness who refused to give a statement due to a fear of reprisals (Breijer v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2018, §§ 32-33)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:25551/18,Tadić v. Croatia,25551/18,added,"Tadić v. Croatia, no. 25551/18, 28 November 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.C.2.b.i.§41.§43, Other links,7,,155,,"Tadić v. Croatia, no. 25551/18, 28 November 2023",,,"In Tadić v. Croatia, 2023, §§ 62-80, the Court found the applicant's fears as regards the lack of impartiality of the Supreme Court not objectively justified where the Supreme Court's president had allegedly played a role in criminal offences for which the applicant was tried, relating to an attempt to influence the Supreme Court itself in a case against a well-known politician, and gave testimony as a prosecution witness in the applicant's trial. The Court noted that the president's testimony was neither the ""sole"" nor ""decisive"" evidence for the outcome of his case, that the applicant was given the opportunity to cross-examine the president before the trial court and that he made his allegations against the president for the first time in his appeals against the trial court's judgment. Moreover, the Supreme Court judges who examined the applicant's appeals were sufficiently independent from the president and free from any undue influence from him."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:21181/19|51751/20,Tuleya v. Poland,21181/19|51751/20,added,"Tuleya v. Poland, nos. 21181/19 and 51751/20, 6 July 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.2,"Administrative, tax, customs, financial and competition-law proceedings and other special proceedings",3,,45,,"Tuleya v. Poland, nos. 21181/19 and 51751/20, 6 July 2023",,,"In Tuleya v. Poland, 2023, §§ 280-300, in the specific context of judicial independence relating to the lifting of immunity against a judge, the Court has found that even though the applicant had not yet been formally charged in the criminal proceedings opened in connection with a suspicion against him, following a resolution of the relevant disciplinary body lifting his immunity, the applicant's situation had become substantially affected by actions taken by the authorities as a result of a suspicion against him, resulting in the application of the criminal limb of Article 6 § 1."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:58073/17,U.Y. v. Türkiye,58073/17,added,"U.Y. v. Türkiye, no. 58073/17, 10 October 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VI.A.1.c,Subsequent proceedings,4,,373,,"U.Y. v. Türkiye, no. 58073/17, 10 October 2023",,,"The Court has considered the applicability of Article 6 § 2 to judicial decisions taken following the conclusion of criminal proceedings concerning, inter alia (Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 98 with further references):  a former accused's obligation to bear court costs and prosecution costs;  a former accused's request for compensation for detention on remand or other inconvenience caused by the criminal proceedings, it being understood that Article 6 § 2 does not guarantee the right to compensation for pre-trial detention in the case of dismissal of charges or acquittal, and thus the mere refusal of compensation does not in itself raise an issue from the perspective of the presumption of innocence (Cheema v. Belgium, 2016, § 23);  a former accused's request for defence costs (see further Lutz v. Germany, 1987, § 59, where the Court held that neither Article 6 § 2 nor any other provision of the Convention gives a person charged with a criminal offence a right to reimbursement of his costs where proceedings taken against him are discontinued);  a former accused's request for compensation for damage caused by an unlawful or wrongful investigation or prosecution;  imposition of civil liability to pay compensation to the victim;  refusal of civil claims lodged by the applicant against insurers;  maintenance in force of a child care order, after the prosecution decided not to bring charges against the parent for child abuse;  disciplinary or dismissal issues (Teodor v. Romania, 2013, §§ 42-46, concerning civil dismissal proceedings; U.Y. v. Türkiye, 2023, § 33);  revocation of the applicant's right to social housing;  request for conditional release from prison (Müller v. Germany, 2014, § 35);  proceedings for reopening of criminal proceedings, following the Court's finding of a violation of the Convention in an earlier case, where the applicants were treated as convicted persons and their criminal record for the initial conviction was kept (Dicle and Sadak v. Turkey, 2015, §§ 61-66);  confiscation of an applicant's land even though the criminal case against him had been dismissed as statute-barred (G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, §§ 314-318);  conviction in the subsequent administrative proceedings (qualified as ""criminal"" within the autonomous meaning of the Convention) following an applicant's acquittal on the same charges in the criminal proceedings (Kapetanios and Others v. Greece, 2015, § 88);  dismissal by domestic courts of an applicant's appeal against the prosecutor's decision considering that he was guilty of the offences for which he had been indicted even though the criminal proceedings initiated against him had been discontinued as time-barred (Caraian v. Romania, 2015, §§ 74-77)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:22431/20,Ugulava v. Georgia (No. 2),22431/20,added,"Ugulava v. Georgia (No. 2),* no. 22431/20, 1 February 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.C.2.b.i.§40,a The exercise of different judicial functions,6,,134,,,,,"In Ugulava v. Georgia (No. 2),* 2024, §§ 57-65, the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 in relation to the inclusion of a former Prosecutor General on the Supreme Court bench that had ruled on the applicant's points-of-law appeal. The Court noted that the judge at issue held the position of Prosecutor General when the applicant's case was examined by the appeal court and the appeal on points-of-law was prepared by the General Prosecutor's Office. In this connection, the Court had regard to the Prosecutor General's role and extensive powers within the prosecution service, as well as the high-profile nature of the trial conducted in a politically sensitive context."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:15669/20,Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC],15669/20,added,"Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.A.2.a,Equality of arms,4,,181,,"Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",,,"In this regard, the requirement of a fair trial does not impose on a trial court an obligation to order an expert opinion or any other investigative measure merely because a party has requested it. Where the defence insists on the court hearing a witness or taking other evidence (such as an expert report, for instance), it is for the domestic courts to decide whether it is necessary or advisable to accept that evidence for examination at the trial. The domestic court is free, subject to compliance with the terms of the Convention, to refuse to call witnesses proposed by the defence (Huseyn and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2011, § 196; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 718 and 721; Poletan and Azirovik v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2016, § 95). However, where there was no information in the case file showing that the data, on which the applicant's convictions was based, had been subjected to examination for verification of their integrity, the defence had a legitimate interest in seeking their examination by independent experts and the courts had a duty to properly respond to such requests (see Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, §§ 332-333 where the domestic courts' failure to respond to such a request raised an issue under Article 6 § 1)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:15669/20,Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC],15669/20,added,"Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.A.2.b,Adversarial hearing (disclosure of evidence),4,,190,,"Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",,,"In many cases where the evidence in question has never been revealed, it would not be possible for the Court to attempt to weigh the relevant interest involved against that of the accused without having sight of the material. It must therefore scrutinise the decision-making procedure to ensure that, as far as possible, it complied with the requirements to provide adversarial proceedings and equality of arms and incorporated adequate safeguards to protect the interests of the accused, including a proper opportunity to prepare one's defence, as required by Article 6 (Dowsett v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 42-43; Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, § 330; Leas v. Estonia, 2012, § 78). In that connection, the domestic courts' failure to indicate the reasons as to why, and upon whose decision evidence was undisclosed, may deprive the defence of the opportunity to present any counter-arguments, such as to contest the validity of those reasons or to dispute that all efforts had been made to strike a fair balance between the competing interests at play and to ensure the rights of the defence (Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, § 331)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:15669/20,Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC],15669/20,added,"Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",3,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.A.2.b,Adversarial hearing (disclosure of evidence),4,,193,,"Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",,,"In the context of disclosure of evidence, complex issues may arise concerning the disclosure of electronic data, which may constitute a certain mass of information in hands of the prosecution. In such a case, an important safeguard in the sifting process is to ensure that the defence is provided with an opportunity to be involved in the laying-down of the criteria for determining what might be relevant for disclosure (Sigurður Einarsson and Others v. Iceland, 2019, § 90; see also Rook v. Germany, §§ 67 and 72). Moreover, as regards identified or tagged data, any refusal to allow the defence to have further searches of such data carried out in principle raises an issue with regard to the provision of adequate facilities for the preparation of the defence (Sigurður Einarsson and Others v. Iceland, 2019, § 91). Furthermore, the fact that the electronic evidence, -which played a decisive role for the applicant's conviction- tallied with another set of data does not necessarily remove his or her procedural rights with respect to the former data (Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, § 328). In principle, the inability of the defence to have direct access to the evidence and to test its integrity and reliability first-hand places a greater onus on the domestic courts to subject those issues to the most searching scrutiny (ibid., § 334). Thus, in Yüksel Yalçınkaya the applicant's inability to comment on the full extent of the decrypted material concerning him, in particular the content of his messages on an application called ByLock, which was added to the case file after his conviction became final, was regarded as falling short of the requirement of ""fair balance"" between the parties, and constituted one of the reasons leading to the finding of a violation of Article 6 § 1 (ibid., §§ 335-336)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:15669/20,Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC],15669/20,added,"Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",4,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.A.3,Reasoning of judicial decisions,3,,198,,"Cupiał v. Poland, no. 67414/11, 9 March 2023|Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",,,"While courts are not obliged to give a detailed answer to every argument raised (Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands, 1994, § 61), it must be clear from the decision that the essential issues of the case have been addressed (Boldea v. Romania, 2007, § 30; Lobzhanidze and Peradze v. Georgia, 2020, § 66) and that a specific and explicit reply has been given to the arguments which are decisive for the outcome of the case (Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [GC], 2017, § 84; S.C. IMH Suceava S.R.L. v. Romania, 2013, § 40, concerning contradictions in the assessment of evidence; Karimov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 29, concerning the allegations of imprisonment for debt). In examining the fairness of criminal proceedings, the Court has held in particular that by ignoring a specific, pertinent and important point made by the accused, the domestic courts fall short of their obligations under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, §§ 337-341; Cupiał v. Poland, 2023, § 57)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:15669/20,Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC],15669/20,added,"Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",5,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.A.3,Reasoning of judicial decisions,3,,200,,"Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",,,"With regard to the manner in which the domestic judicial decisions are reasoned, a distinct issue arises when such decisions can be qualified as arbitrary to the point of prejudicing the fairness of proceedings. However, this will be the case only if no reasons are provided for a decision or if the reasons given are based on a manifest factual or legal error committed by the domestic court, resulting in a ""denial of justice"" (Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [GC], 2017, § 85; Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, § 304, with further references; Navalnyy and Ofitserov v. Russia, 2016, § 119, concerning a politically motivated prosecution and conviction; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 83; Paixão Moreira Sá Fernandes v. Portugal, 2020, § 72; and Spasov v. Romania, 2022, concerning a conviction based on domestic-law provisions that were manifestly contrary to directly applicable EU Regulations taking precedence)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:15669/20,Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC],15669/20,added,"Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",6,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.A.5,Administration of evidence,3,,231,,"Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",,,"While Article 6 guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence as such, which is primarily a matter for regulation under national law (Schenk v. Switzerland, 1988, §§ 45-46; Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [GC], 2017, § 83; Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, § 302; Heglas v. the Czech Republic, 2007, § 84)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:15669/20,Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC],15669/20,added,"Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",7,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.A.5,Administration of evidence,3,,233,,"Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",,,"In determining whether the proceedings as a whole were fair, regard must also be had to whether the rights of the defence have been respected. In particular, it must be examined whether the applicant was given an opportunity to challenge the authenticity of the evidence and to oppose its use in circumstances where the principles of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms between the prosecution and the defence were respected (Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, § 324). In addition, the quality of the evidence must be taken into consideration, as must the circumstances in which it was obtained and whether these circumstances cast doubt on its reliability or accuracy. The question whether the applicant's challenges to the evidence were properly examined by the domestic courts, that is whether the applicant was truly ""heard"", and whether the courts supported their decisions with relevant and adequate reasoning, are also factors to be taken into account in conducting this assessment (ibid.). While no problem of fairness necessarily arises where the evidence obtained was unsupported by other material, it may be noted that where the evidence is very strong and there is no risk of its being unreliable, the need for supporting evidence is correspondingly weaker (Bykov v. Russia [GC], 2009, § 89; Jalloh v. Germany [GC], 2006, § 96). In this connection, the Court also attaches weight to whether the evidence in question was or was not decisive for the outcome of the criminal proceedings (Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], 2010, § 164)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:15669/20,Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC],15669/20,added,"Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",8,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.A.5,Administration of evidence,3,,234,,"Mehmet Zeki Doğan v. Türkiye (no. 2), no. 3324/19, 13 February 2024|Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",,,"As to the examination of the nature of the alleged unlawfulness in question, the above test has been applied in cases concerning complaints that evidence obtained in breach of the defence rights has been used in the proceedings. This concerns, for instance, the use of evidence obtained through an identification parade (Laska and Lika v. Albania, 2010), an improper taking of samples from a suspect for a forensic analysis (Horvatić v. Croatia, 2013), exertion of pressure on a co-accused, including the questioning of a co-accused in the absence of a lawyer (Erkapić v. Croatia, 2013; Dominka v. Slovakia (dec.), 2018; Stephens v. Malta (no. 3), 2020, §§ 64-67; Tonkov v. Belgium, 2022, §§ 64-68; see also Mehmet Zeki Doğan v. Türkiye (no. 2),* 2024, §§ 79-88, concerning the use of statements of the co-accused in the absence of a lawyer in the reopened criminal proceedings following the Court's finding of a violation of Art 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) in the first application bought by the applicant); use of intelligence information against an accused (Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, § 316); use of planted evidence against an accused (Layijov v. Azerbaijan, 2014, § 64; Sakit Zahidov v. Azerbaijan, 2015, §§ 46-49; Kobiashvili v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 56-58), unfair use of other incriminating witness and material evidence against an accused (Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2017; Ayetullah Ay v. Turkey, 2020); use of self-incriminating statements in the proceedings (Belugin v. Russia, 2019, § 68-80); and use of expert evidence in the proceedings (Erduran and Em Export Dış Tic A.Ş. v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 107-112; see also Avagyan v. Armenia, 2018, § 41; Gülağacı v. Turkey (dec.), 2021, §§ 35-40; and Zayidov v. Azerbaijan (no. 3), 2023, § 89)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20230911235812__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2023-09-11__2024-04-09.json,apps:15669/20,Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC],15669/20,added,"Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",9,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.A.5,Administration of evidence,3,,236,,"Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",,,"As regards, in particular, electronic evidence, the Court admitted that it differs in many respects from traditional forms of evidence, including as regards its nature and the special technologies required for its collection, securing, processing and analysis. In particular, electronic evidence raises distinct reliability issues as it is inherently more prone to destruction, damage, alteration or manipulation. For that reason, the use of untested electronic evidence in criminal proceedings may involve particular difficulties for the judiciary and it may therefore diminish the ability of national judges to establish its authenticity, accuracy and integrity. However, these factors do not in the abstract call for the safeguards under Article 6 § 1 to be applied differently, be it more strictly or more leniently (Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, §§ 312-313). While the fight against terrorism may necessitate resorting to electronic evidence attesting to an individual's use of an encrypted messaging system linked with a terrorist organisation, the right to a fair trial applies to all types of criminal offence, from the most straightforward to the most complex, and the evidence obtained, whether electronic or not, may not be used by the domestic courts in a manner that undermines the basic tenets of a fair trial (ibid. § 344). Thus, there was a violation of Article 6 § 1 where the domestic courts failed to, inter alia, address the defence submissions aimed at challenging the integrity and reliability of the electronic evidence on which the applicant's conviction was based, as well as the accuracy and veracity of the conclusions drawn by those courts from the same data (ibid. §§ 333-334 and 337-341)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2024-09-30,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json,apps:62199/19,Bosev v. Bulgaria,62199/19,added,"Bosev v. Bulgaria, no. 62199/19, 4 June 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A,The fundamental principles,2,7,7,0.9971,"Batmaz v. Turkey , 2014",,"In the absence of special circumstances, a complaint relating to Article 6 of the Convention is declared inadmissible as premature when it concerns criminal proceedings pending before the domestic courts ( Sperisen v. Switzerland, 2023, § 48). Aperson may not claim to be a victim of a violation of his or her right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention which, according to him or her, occurred in the course of proceedings in which he or she was acquitted or which were discontinued ( Khlyustov v. Russia, 2013, § 103; see, however, Kerimoğlu v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 44-57, as regards the loss of victim status once it has been acquired). The dismissal of charges against an applicant deprives him or her of the victim status for the alleged breaches of the Article 6 rights Batmaz v. Turkey Panju v. Belgium (No. 2) (, 2014, § 36; see, 2023, §§ 75, in the length of proceedings context, see, by contrast, Irodotou v. Cyprus, 2023, § 63). Moreover, the Court has held that an applicant cannot complain of a breach of his or her Article 6 rights if the domestic courts only applied a measure suspending the pronouncement of a criminal sanction against him or her ( Kerman v. Turkey, 2016, §§ 100-106).","In the absence of special circumstances, a complaint relating to Article 6 of the Convention is declared inadmissible as premature when it concerns criminal proceedings pending before the domestic courts ( Sperisen v. Switzerland, 2023, § 48); see also Bosev v. Bulgaria,* 2024, § 42). Aperson may not claim to be a victim of a violation of his or her right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention which, according to him or her, occurred in the course of proceedings in which he or she was acquitted or which were discontinued ( Khlyustov v. Russia, 2013, § 103; see, however, Kerimoğlu v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 44-57, as regards the loss of victim status once it has been acquired). The dismissal of charges against an applicant deprives him or her of the victim status for the alleged breaches of the Article 6 rights ( Batmaz v. Turkey, 2014, § 36; see Panju v. Belgium (No. 2), 2023, §§ 75, in the length of proceedings context, see, by contrast, Irodotou v. Cyprus, 2023, § 63). Moreover, the Court has held that an applicant cannot complain of a breach of his or her Article 6 rights if the domestic courts only applied a measure suspending the pronouncement of a criminal sanction against him or her ( Kerman v. Turkey, 2016, §§ 100-106)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2024-09-30,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json,apps:49904/21,Gravier v. France,49904/21,added,"Gravier v. France,* no. 49904/21, 4 July 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,VI.A.2,Prejudicial statements,3,381,385,0.9508,,"Marinoni v. Italy , 2021|O. v. Norway , 2003|Paraponiaris v. Greece , 2008|Sekanina v. Austria , 1993","The voicing of suspicions regarding an accused's innocence is conceivable as long as the conclusion of criminal proceedings has not resulted in a decision on the merits of the accusation ( Sekanina v. Austria, 1993, § 30). However, once an acquittal has become final, the voicing of any Rushiti v. Austria suspicions of guilt is incompatible with the presumption of innocence (, 2000, § 31; O. v. Norway, 2003, § 39; Geerings v. the Netherlands, 2007, § 49; Paraponiaris v. Greece, 2008, § 32; Marinoni v. Italy, 2021, §§ 48 and 59). Nevertheless, in this context, in cases of unfortunate language the Court has considered it necessary to look at the context of the proceedings as a whole and their special features. These features became decisive factors in the assessment of whether that statement gave rise to a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. The Court considered that these features were also applicable where the language of a judgment might be misunderstood but can, on the basis of a correct assessment of the domestic law context, not be qualified as a statement of criminal guilt ( Fleischner v. Germany, 2019, § 65, and Milachikj v. North Macedonia, 2021, §§ 38-40; by contrast, Pasquini v. San Marino (no. 2), 2020, where the impugned statements amounted to an unequivocal imputation of criminal liability that could not be explained by the particular domestic context; see also Felix Guţu v. the Republic of Moldova, 2020).","In cases of unfortunate language the Court has considered it necessary to look at the context of the proceedings as a whole and their special features. These features became decisive factors in the assessment of whether that statement gave rise to a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. The Court considered that these features were also applicable where the language of a judgment might be misunderstood but can, on the basis of a correct assessment of the domestic law context, not be qualified as a statement of criminal guilt ( Fleischner v. Germany, 2019, § 65, and Milachikj v. North Macedonia, 2021, §§ 38-40; by contrast, Pasquini v. San Marino (no. 2), 2020, and Gravier v. France,* 2024, where the impugned statements amounted to an unequivocal imputation of criminal liability that could not be explained by the particular domestic context; see also Felix Guţu v. the Republic of Moldova, 2020)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2024-09-30,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json,apps:59464/21|13079/22,Khachapuridze and Khachidze v. Georgia,59464/21|13079/22,added,"Khachapuridze and Khachidze v. Georgia,* nos. 59464/21 and 13079/22, 29 August 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,V.B.2.b,Presence at the trial,4,309,311,0.9551,,,"Lastly, an issue with regard to the requirement of presence at the hearing arises when an accused Idalov v. Russia is prevented from taking part in his trial on the grounds of his improper behaviour ( [GC], 2012, § 175; Marguš v. Croatia [GC], 2014, § 90; Ananyev v. Russia, 2009, § 43; Suslov and Batikyan v. Ukraine, 2022, §§ 135-141; Chkhartishvili v. Georgia, 2023, §§ 32-38).","Lastly, an issue with regard to the requirement of presence at the hearing arises when an accused is prevented from taking part in his trial on the grounds of his improper behaviour ( Idalov v. Russia [GC], 2012, § 175; Marguš v. Croatia [GC], 2014, § 90; Ananyev v. Russia, 2009, § 43; Suslov and Batikyan v. Ukraine, 2022, §§ 135-141; Chkhartishvili v. Georgia, 2023, §§ 32-38; see also, in the context of online hearings, Khachapuridze and Khachidze v. Georgia,* 2024, §§ 134-141)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2024-09-30,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json,apps:59464/21|13079/22,Khachapuridze and Khachidze v. Georgia,59464/21|13079/22,added,"Khachapuridze and Khachidze v. Georgia,* nos. 59464/21 and 13079/22, 29 August 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,V.B.2.b,Presence at the trial,4,310,312,0.9851,,,"In this context, the Court has held that it is essential for the proper administration of justice that dignity, order and decorum be observed in the courtroom as the hallmarks of judicial proceedings. The flagrant disregard by a defendant of elementary standards of proper conduct neither can, nor should, be tolerated. However, when an applicant's behaviour might be of such a nature as to justify his removal and the continuation of his trial in his absence, it is incumbent on the presiding judge to establish that the applicant could have reasonably foreseen what the consequences of his ongoing conduct would be prior to the decision to order his removal from the courtroom ( Idalov v. Russia [GC], 2012, §§ 176-177). Moreover, the relevant consideration is whether the applicant's lawyer was able to exercise the rights of the defence in the applicant's absence ( Marguš v. Croatia [GC], 2014, § 90) and whether the matter was addressed and if appropriate remedied in the appeal proceedings ( Idalov v. Russia [GC], 2012, § 179).","In this context, the Court has held that it is essential for the proper administration of justice that dignity, order and decorum be observed in the courtroom as the hallmarks of judicial proceedings. The flagrant disregard by a defendant of elementary standards of proper conduct neither can, nor should, be tolerated. However, when an applicant's behaviour might be of such a nature as to justify his removal and the continuation of his trial in his absence, it is incumbent on the presiding judge to establish that the applicant could have reasonably foreseen what the consequences of his ongoing conduct would be prior to the decision to order his removal from the courtroom ( Idalov v. Russia [GC], 2012, §§ 176-177; see Khachapuridze and Khachidze v. Georgia,* 2024, § 139, where, in the context of an online hearing, the Court noted that the applicant could have been ""muted"" if he continued with the disruptive behaviour). Moreover, the relevant consideration is whether the applicant's lawyer was able to exercise the rights of the defence in the applicant's absence ( Marguš v. Croatia [GC], 2014, § 90) and whether the matter was addressed and if appropriate remedied in the appeal proceedings ( Idalov v. Russia [GC], 2012, § 179)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2024-09-30,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json,apps:13459/15,L.T. v. Ukraine,13459/15,added,"L.T. v. Ukraine, no. 13459/15, 6 June 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.B.2,"Administrative, tax, customs, financial and competition-law proceedings and other special proceedings",3,44,44,0.9616,"Gaggl v. Austria , 2022|L.T. v. Ukraine , 2024|This will depend on the special features of domestic proceedings and the manner of their operation in practice Valeriy Lopata v. Russia , 2012|ć v. Croatia , 2019","Valeriy Lopata v. Russia , 2012|ć v. Croatia Gaggl v. Austria , 2019","In some instances, the criminal limb of Article 6 may be applicable to the proceedings for placement of mentally disturbed offenders in a psychiatric hospital. This will depend on the special features of domestic proceedings and the manner of their operation in practice ( Kerr v. the United Kingdom (dec), 2003, and Antoine v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2003, where the criminal limb did not apply; contrast them with Valeriy Lopata v. Russia, 2012, § 120; Vasenin v. Russia, 2016, § 130; Hodžić v. Croatia Gaggl v. Austria, 2019, §§ 48-51; and, 2022, where the criminal limb did apply).","The criminal limb of Article 6 may be applicable to the proceedings for placement of mentally disturbed offenders in a psychiatric hospital. This will depend on the special features of domestic proceedings and the manner of their operation in practice Valeriy Lopata v. Russia, 2012, § 120; Vasenin v. Russia, 2016, § 130; Hodžić v. Croatia, 2019, §§ 48-51; Gaggl v. Austria, 2022; and L.T. v. Ukraine, 2024, § 47; see Kerr v. the United Kingdom (dec), 2003, and Antoine v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2003, where the criminal limb did not apply)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2024-09-30,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json,apps:32483/19|35049/19,Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom [GC],32483/19|35049/19,added,"Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 32483/19 and 35049/19, 11 June 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,VI.A.1.c,Subsequent proceedings,4,371,373,0.9907,,,"The presumption of innocence also protects individuals who have been acquitted of a criminal charge, or in respect of whom criminal proceedings have been discontinued, from being treated by public officials and authorities as though they are in fact guilty of the offence with which they have been charged. Without protection to ensure respect for the acquittal or the discontinuation decision in any other proceedings, the guarantees of Article 6 § 2 could risk becoming theoretical and illusory. What is also at stake once the criminal proceedings have concluded is the person's reputation and the way in which that person is perceived by the public ( Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 94). To a certain extent, the protection afforded under Article 6 § 2 in this connection may overlap with the G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy protection afforded by Article 8 ( (merits) [GC], 2018, § 314).","The presumption of innocence also protects individuals who have been acquitted of a criminal charge, or in respect of whom criminal proceedings have been discontinued, from being treated by public officials and authorities as though they are in fact guilty of the offence with which they have been charged. Without protection to ensure respect for the acquittal or the discontinuation decision in any other proceedings, the guarantees of Article 6 § 2 could risk becoming theoretical and illusory. What is also at stake once the criminal proceedings have concluded is the person's reputation and the way in which that person is perceived by the public ( Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 94). To a certain extent, the protection afforded under Article 6 § 2 in this connection may overlap with the protection afforded by Article 8 ( G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, § 314; see also Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2024, § 109)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2024-09-30,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json,apps:32483/19|35049/19,Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom [GC],32483/19|35049/19,added,"Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 32483/19 and 35049/19, 11 June 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,VI.A.1.c,Subsequent proceedings,4,372,374,0.9962,,,"Whenever the question of the applicability of Article 6 § 2 arises in the context of subsequent proceedings, the applicant must demonstrate the existence of a link between the concluded criminal proceedings and the subsequent proceedings. Such a link is likely to be present, for example, where the subsequent proceedings require an examination of the outcome of the prior criminal proceedings and, in particular, where they oblige the court to analyse the criminal judgment; to engage in a review or evaluation of the evidence in the criminal file; to assess the applicant's participation in some or all of the events leading to the criminal charge; or to comment on the subsisting indications of the applicant's possible guilt ( Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 104; see also Martínez Agirre and Others v. Spain (dec.), 2019, §§ 46-52, where no link was established between the subsequent compensation proceedings and the earlier criminal investigations).","Whenever the question of the applicability of Article 6 § 2 arises in the context of subsequent proceedings, the applicant must demonstrate the existence of a link between the concluded criminal proceedings and the subsequent proceedings. Such a link is likely to be present, for example, where the subsequent proceedings require an examination of the outcome of the prior criminal proceedings and, in particular, where they oblige the court to analyse the criminal judgment; to engage in a review or evaluation of the evidence in the criminal file; to assess the applicant's participation in some or all of the events leading to the criminal charge; or to comment on the subsisting indications of the applicant's possible guilt ( Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 104; Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2024, § 122; see also Martínez Agirre and Others v. Spain (dec.), 2019, §§ 46-52, where no link was established between the subsequent compensation proceedings and the earlier criminal investigations)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2024-09-30,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json,apps:32483/19|35049/19,Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom [GC],32483/19|35049/19,added,"Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 32483/19 and 35049/19, 11 June 2024",3,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,VI.A.1.c,Subsequent proceedings,4,373,375,0.9981,,,"The Court has considered the applicability of Article 6 § 2 to judicial decisions taken following the conclusion of criminal proceedings concerning, inter alia ( Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 98 with further references):  a former accused's obligation to bear court costs and prosecution costs;  a former accused's request for compensation for detention on remand or other inconvenience caused by the criminal proceedings, it being understood that Article 6 § 2 does not guarantee the right to compensation for pre-trial detention in the case of dismissal of charges or acquittal, and thus the mere refusal of compensation does not in itself raise an issue from the perspective of the presumption of innocence ( Cheema v. Belgium, 2016, § 23);  a former accused's request for defence costs (see further Lutz v. Germany, 1987, § 59, where the Court held that neither Article 6 § 2 nor any other provision of the Convention gives a person charged with a criminal offence a right to reimbursement of his costs where proceedings taken against him are discontinued);  a former accused's request for compensation for damage caused by an unlawful or wrongful investigation or prosecution;  imposition of civil liability to pay compensation to the victim;  refusal of civil claims lodged by the applicant against insurers;  maintenance in force of a child care order, after the prosecution decided not to bring charges against the parent for child abuse;  disciplinary or dismissal issues ( Teodor v. Romania, 2013, §§ 42-46, concerning civil dismissal proceedings; U.Y. v. Türkiye, 2023, § 33);  revocation of the applicant's right to social housing;  request for conditional release from prison ( Müller v. Germany, 2014, § 35);  proceedings for reopening of criminal proceedings, following the Court's finding of a violation of the Convention in an earlier case, where the applicants were treated as convicted persons and their criminal record for the initial conviction was kept ( Dicle and Sadak v. Turkey, 2015, §§ 61-66);  confiscation of an applicant's land even though the criminal case against him had been dismissed as statute-barred ( G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, §§ 314-318);  conviction in the subsequent administrative proceedings (qualified as ""criminal"" within the autonomous meaning of the Convention) following an applicant's acquittal on the same charges in the criminal proceedings ( Kapetanios and Others v. Greece, 2015, § 88);  dismissal by domestic courts of an applicant's appeal against the prosecutor's decision considering that he was guilty of the offences for which he had been indicted even though the criminal proceedings initiated against him had been discontinued as time-barred ( Caraian v. Romania, 2015, §§ 74-77).","The Court has considered the applicability of Article 6 § 2 to judicial decisions taken following the conclusion of criminal proceedings concerning, inter alia ( Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, § 98, and Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2024, § 107, with further references): ▪ a former accused's obligation to bear court costs and prosecution costs; ▪ a former accused's request for compensation for detention on remand or other inconvenience caused by the criminal proceedings, it being understood that Article 6 § 2 does not guarantee the right to compensation for pre-trial detention in the case of dismissal of charges or acquittal, and thus the mere refusal of compensation does not in itself raise an issue from the perspective of the presumption of innocence ( Cheema v. Belgium, 2016, § 23); ▪ a former accused's request for defence costs (see further Lutz v. Germany, 1987, § 59, where the Court held that neither Article 6 § 2 nor any other provision of the Convention gives a person charged with a criminal offence a right to reimbursement of his costs where proceedings taken against him are discontinued); ▪ a former accused's request for compensation for damage caused by an unlawful or wrongful investigation or prosecution; ▪ imposition of civil liability to pay compensation to the victim; ▪ refusal of civil claims lodged by the applicant against insurers; ▪ maintenance in force of a child care order, after the prosecution decided not to bring charges against the parent for child abuse; ▪ disciplinary or dismissal issues ( Teodor v. Romania, 2013, §§ 42-46, concerning civil dismissal proceedings; U.Y. v. Türkiye, 2023, § 33); ▪ revocation of the applicant's right to social housing; ▪ request for conditional release from prison ( Müller v. Germany, 2014, § 35); ▪ proceedings for reopening of criminal proceedings, following the Court's finding of a violation of the Convention in an earlier case, where the applicants were treated as convicted persons and their criminal record for the initial conviction was kept ( Dicle and Sadak v. Turkey, 2015, §§ 61-66); ▪ confiscation of an applicant's land even though the criminal case against him had been dismissed as statute-barred ( G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, §§ 314-318); ▪ conviction in the subsequent administrative proceedings (qualified as "" criminal "" within the autonomous meaning of the Convention) following an applicant's acquittal on the same charges in the criminal proceedings ( Kapetanios and Others v. Greece, 2015, § 88); ▪ dismissal by domestic courts of an applicant's appeal against the prosecutor's decision considering that he was guilty of the offences for which he had been indicted even though the criminal proceedings initiated against him had been discontinued as time-barred ( Caraian v. Romania, 2015, §§ 74-77)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2024-09-30,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json,apps:32483/19|35049/19,Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom [GC],32483/19|35049/19,added,"Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 32483/19 and 35049/19, 11 June 2024",4,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VI.A.2,Prejudicial statements,3,,384,,,,,"However, in Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2024, §§ 167-169, the Court decided to abandon the distinction made between the discontinuation of the proceedings and acquittal. It held that regardless of the nature of the subsequent linked proceedings, and regardless of whether the criminal proceedings ended in an acquittal or a discontinuance, the decisions and reasoning of the domestic courts or other authorities in those subsequent linked proceedings, when considered as a whole, and in the context of the exercise which they are required by domestic law to undertake, will violate Article 6 § 2 of the Convention in its second aspect if they amounted to the imputation of criminal liability to the applicant. To impute criminal liability to a person is to reflect an opinion that he or she is guilty to the criminal standard of the commission of a criminal offence. The Court explained that this approach reflected the fact that at national level judges may be required, outside the context of a criminal charge, to sit in cases arising out of the same facts as a previous criminal charge which did not result in a conviction. The protection afforded by Article 6 § 2 in its second aspect should not be interpreted in such a way as to preclude national courts in subsequent proceedings - in which they are exercising a different function to that of the criminal judge, in accordance with the relevant provisions of domestic law - from engaging with the same facts as were decided in the previous criminal proceedings, provided that in doing so they do not impute criminal liability to the person concerned. Aperson who was acquitted or in respect of whom criminal proceedings were discontinued will remain subject to the ordinary application of domestic rules as to evidence and the standard of proof outside criminal trials."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240409165839__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2024-09-30,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json,apps:52855/19,Rytikov v. Ukraine,52855/19,added,"Rytikov v. Ukraine, no. 52855/19, 23 May 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,VI.A.2,Prejudicial statements,3,375,377,0.9708,"Rytikov v. Ukraine , 2024",,"Article 6 § 2 is not only a procedural guarantee. It is also aimed at preventing the undermining of a fair criminal trial by prejudicial statements made in close connection with those proceedings (see Kasatkin v. Russia (dec.), 2021, § 22, and Mamaladze v. Georgia, 2022, §§ 62-67, concerning the issue of remedies in relation to the prejudicial statements).","Article 6 § 2 is not only a procedural guarantee. It is also aimed at preventing the undermining of a fair criminal trial by prejudicial statements made in close connection with those proceedings (see Kasatkin v. Russia (dec.), 2021, § 22, and Mamaladze v. Georgia, 2022, §§ 62-67, concerning the issue of remedies in relation to the prejudicial statements; see also Rytikov v. Ukraine, 2024, § 44)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-12,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json,apps:16678/22,C.O. v. Germany,16678/22,added,"C.O. v. Germany, no. 16678/22, 17 September 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,VI.A.1.b,Parallel proceedings,4,368,371,0.9806,"C.O. v. Germany , 2024",,"In all such parallel proceedings, courts are obliged to refrain from any statements that may have a prejudicial effect on the pending proceedings, even if they are not binding. In this connection, the Court has held that if the nature of the charges makes it unavoidable for the involvement of third parties to be established in one set of proceedings, and those findings would be consequential on the assessment of the legal responsibility of the third parties tried separately, this should be considered as a serious obstacle for disjoining the cases. Any decision to examine cases with such strong factual ties in separate criminal proceedings must be based on a careful assessment of all countervailing interests, and the co-accused must be given an opportunity to object to the cases being separated ( Navalnyy and Ofitserov v. Russia, 2016, § 104).","In all such parallel proceedings, courts are obliged to refrain from any statements that may have a prejudicial effect on the pending proceedings, even if they are not binding (see, for instance, C.O. v. Germany, 2024, §§ 61-71 where the domestic court was found to have complied with that obligation). In this connection, the Court has held that if the nature of the charges makes it unavoidable for the involvement of third parties to be established in one set of proceedings, and those findings would be consequential on the assessment of the legal responsibility of the third parties tried separately, this should be considered as a serious obstacle for disjoining the cases. Any decision to examine cases with such strong factual ties in separate criminal proceedings must be based on a careful assessment of all countervailing interests, and the co-accused must be given an opportunity to object to the cases being separated ( Navalnyy and Ofitserov v. Russia, 2016, § 104)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-12,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json,apps:21766/22,Cavca v. the Republic of Moldova,21766/22,added,"Cavca v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 21766/22, 9 January 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.1,Disciplinary proceedings and professional integrity tests,3,,34,,,,,"Undercover professional integrity testing, used in the context of the fight against corruption and focussed not on gathering evidence for any criminal investigation, but rather on determining the level of corruptibility in a specific group of persons (public officials), which may result in disciplinary sanctions, including dismissal was also not ""criminal"" for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention ( Cavca v. the Republic of Moldova, 2024, §§ 34-35) ."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-12,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json,apps:36013/13,Cosovan v. the Republic of Moldova (no. 2),36013/13,added,"Cosovan v. the Republic of Moldova (no. 2), no. 36013/13, 8 October 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,VI.A.2,Prejudicial statements,3,385,388,0.9837,"Gravier v. France , 2024",,"In cases of unfortunate language the Court has considered it necessary to look at the context of the proceedings as a whole and their special features. These features became decisive factors in the assessment of whether that statement gave rise to a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. The Court considered that these features were also applicable where the language of a judgment might be misunderstood but can, on the basis of a correct assessment of the domestic law context, not be qualified as a statement of criminal guilt ( Fleischner v. Germany, 2019, § 65, and Milachikj v. North Macedonia, 2021, §§ 38-40; by contrast, Pasquini v. San Marino (no. 2), 2020, and Gravier v. France,* 2024, where the impugned statements amounted to an unequivocal imputation of criminal liability that could not be explained by the particular domestic context; see also Felix Guţu v. the Republic of Moldova, 2020).","In cases of unfortunate language the Court has considered it necessary to look at the context of the proceedings as a whole and their special features. These features became decisive factors in the assessment of whether that statement gave rise to a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. The Court considered that these features were also applicable where the language of a judgment might be misunderstood but can, on the basis of a correct assessment of the domestic law context, not be qualified as a statement of criminal guilt ( Gomes Costa v. Portugal *, 2025, §§ 119-23; Cosovan v. the Republic of Moldova (no. 2), 2024, §§ 30-42; Fleischner v. Germany, 2019, § 65, and Milachikj v. North Macedonia, 2021, §§ 38-40; by contrast, Pasquini v. San Marino (no. 2), 2020, and Gravier v. France, 2024, where the impugned statements amounted to an unequivocal imputation of criminal liability that could not be explained by the particular domestic context; see also Machalický v. the Czech Republic, 2024, §§ 57-60, and Felix Guţu v. the Republic of Moldova, 2020)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-12,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json,apps:30970/19,Espírito Santo Silva Salgado v. Portugal,30970/19,added,"Espírito Santo Silva Salgado v. Portugal, no. 30970/19, 3 December 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.A,The notion of a “tribunal”,2,81,82,0.996,"Espírito Santo Silva Salgado v. Portugal , 2024",,"Thus, for instance, c onferring the prosecution and punishment of minor ""criminal"" offences on administrative authorities is not inconsistent with the Convention provided that the person concerned is enabled to take any decision thus made against him before a tribunal that does offer the guarantees of Article 6 ( Öztürk v. Germany, 1984, § 56; A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy, 2011; Flisar v. Slovenia, 2018, § 33). Therefore, decisions taken by administrative authorities which do not themselves satisfy the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention must be subject to subsequent review by a "" judicial body that has full jurisdiction "" . The defining characteristics of such a body include the power to quash in all respects, on questions of fact and law, the decision of the body below ( Schmautzer v. Austria, 1995, § 36; Gradinger v. Austria, 1995, § 44; Grande Stevens and Others v. Italy, 2014, § 139): for instance, administrative courts carrying out a judicial review that went beyond a ""formal"" review of legality and included a detailed analysis of the appropriateness and proportionality of the penalty imposed by the administrative authority ( A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy, 2011, §§ 63-67, in respect of a fine imposed by an independent regulatory authority in charge of competition). Similarly, a judicial review may satisfy Article 6 requirements even if it is the law itself which determines the sanction in accordance with the seriousness of the offence ( Malige v. France, 1998, §§ 46-51, in respect of the deduction of points from a driving licence).","Thus, for instance, c onferring the prosecution and punishment of minor ""criminal"" offences on administrative authorities is not inconsistent with the Convention provided that the person concerned is enabled to take any decision thus made against him before a tribunal that does offer the guarantees of Article 6 ( Öztürk v. Germany, 1984, § 56; A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy, 2011; Flisar v. Slovenia, 2018, § 33). Therefore, decisions taken by administrative authorities which do not themselves satisfy the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention must be subject to subsequent review by a "" judicial body that has full jurisdiction "" (see, for instance, Espírito Santo Silva Salgado v. Portugal, 2024, § 69). The defining characteristics of such a body include the power to quash in all respects, on questions of fact and law, the decision of the body below ( Schmautzer v. Austria, 1995, § 36; Gradinger v. Austria, 1995, § 44; Grande Stevens and Others v. Italy, 2014, § 139): for instance, administrative courts carrying out a judicial review that went beyond a ""formal"" review of legality and included a detailed analysis of the appropriateness and proportionality of the penalty imposed by the administrative authority ( A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy, 2011, §§ 63-67, in respect of a fine imposed by an independent regulatory authority in charge of competition). Similarly, a judicial review may satisfy Article 6 requirements even if it is the law itself which determines the sanction in accordance with the seriousness of the offence ( Malige v. France, 1998, §§ 46-51, in respect of the deduction of points from a driving licence)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-12,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json,apps:30970/19,Espírito Santo Silva Salgado v. Portugal,30970/19,added,"Espírito Santo Silva Salgado v. Portugal, no. 30970/19, 3 December 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,VI.A.2.b,Statements by public officials,4,394,397,0.9713,"Espírito Santo Silva Salgado v. Portugal , 2024",,"The Court has emphasised the importance of the choice of words by public officials in their statements before a person has been tried and found guilty of an offence ( Daktaras v. Lithuania, 2000, § 41; Arrigo and Vella v. Malta (dec.), 2005; Khuzhin and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 94). For instance, in Gutsanovi v. Bulgaria (2013, §§ 195-201) the Court found that statements of the Minister of the Interior following the applicant's arrest, but before his appearance before a judge, published in a journal in which he stressed that what the applicant had done represented an elaborate system of machination over a number of years, violated the presumption of innocence under Article 6 § 2. On the other hand, spontaneous statements of the Prime Minister in a television show related to the applicant's placement in pre-trial detention did not cast into doubt the applicant's presumption of innocence.","The Court has emphasised the importance of the choice of words by public officials in their statements before a person has been tried and found guilty of an offence ( Daktaras v. Lithuania, 2000, § 41; Arrigo and Vella v. Malta (dec.), 2005; Khuzhin and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 94). For instance, in Gutsanovi v. Bulgaria (2013, §§ 195-201) the Court found that statements of the Minister of the Interior following the applicant's arrest, but before his appearance before a judge, published in a journal in which he stressed that what the applicant had done represented an elaborate system of machination over a number of years, violated the presumption of innocence under Article 6 § 2 On the other hand, spontaneous statements of the Prime Minister in a television show related to the applicant's placement in pre-trial detention did not cast into doubt the applicant's presumption of innocence (see also, Espírito Santo Silva Salgado v. Portugal, 2024, §§ 93-96 where no violation was found, as the statements of the governor of the Bank of Portugal neither targeted the applicant personally, nor made an express link with the proceedings against him)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-12,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json,apps:61280/21,Ezeoke v. the United Kingdom*,61280/21,added,"Ezeoke v. the United Kingdom*, no. 61280/21, 25 February 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,I.A,The fundamental principles,2,6,6,0.8283,,,"Article 6 does not guarantee the right not to be criminally prosecuted ( International Bank for Commerce and Development AD and Others v. Bulgaria, 2016, § 129). Nor does it guarantee an absolute right to obtain a judgment in respect of criminal accusations against an applicant, in particular when there is no fundamental irreversible detrimental effect on the parties ( Kart v. Turkey [GC], 2009, § 113).","Article 6 does not guarantee the right not to be criminally prosecuted ( International Bank for Commerce and Development AD and Others v. Bulgaria, 2016, § 129). Nor does it guarantee an absolute right to obtain a judgment in respect of criminal accusations against an applicant, in particular when there is no fundamental irreversible detrimental effect on the parties ( Kart v. Turkey [GC], 2009, § 113). Moreover, in the context of jury trials, the Court has held that successive trials do not, by and of themselves, raise an issue under Article 6 § 1, as there may well be a clear public interest in a jury deciding one way or another whether the charge was established ( Ezeoke v. the United Kingdom, 2025, § 45)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-12,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json,apps:61280/21,Ezeoke v. the United Kingdom*,61280/21,added,"Ezeoke v. the United Kingdom*, no. 61280/21, 25 February 2025",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.C.2.b,Criteria,4,,360,,,,,"Moreover, in the event of successive trials the State will be under a responsibility to proceed with particular diligence, and it will be incumbent on the authorities to ensure any delay is kept to an absolute minimum. In such a context, and even in the absence of unusually long and unexplained periods of inactivity attributable to the State, a delay caused by the belated application of exceptional arrangements to ensure quick proceedings in one of the trials despite the Covid-19 pandemic, gave rise to a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention when combined with other factors, for instance a lapse of one year between the application for permission to appeal and its refusal ( Ezeoke v. the United Kingdom, 2025, §§ 45-49)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-12,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json,apps:34916/16,Gomes Costa v. Portugal*,34916/16,added,"Gomes Costa v. Portugal*, no. 34916/16, 25 February 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,VI.A.2,Prejudicial statements,3,385,388,0.9837,"Gravier v. France , 2024",,"In cases of unfortunate language the Court has considered it necessary to look at the context of the proceedings as a whole and their special features. These features became decisive factors in the assessment of whether that statement gave rise to a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. The Court considered that these features were also applicable where the language of a judgment might be misunderstood but can, on the basis of a correct assessment of the domestic law context, not be qualified as a statement of criminal guilt ( Fleischner v. Germany, 2019, § 65, and Milachikj v. North Macedonia, 2021, §§ 38-40; by contrast, Pasquini v. San Marino (no. 2), 2020, and Gravier v. France,* 2024, where the impugned statements amounted to an unequivocal imputation of criminal liability that could not be explained by the particular domestic context; see also Felix Guţu v. the Republic of Moldova, 2020).","In cases of unfortunate language the Court has considered it necessary to look at the context of the proceedings as a whole and their special features. These features became decisive factors in the assessment of whether that statement gave rise to a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. The Court considered that these features were also applicable where the language of a judgment might be misunderstood but can, on the basis of a correct assessment of the domestic law context, not be qualified as a statement of criminal guilt ( Gomes Costa v. Portugal *, 2025, §§ 119-23; Cosovan v. the Republic of Moldova (no. 2), 2024, §§ 30-42; Fleischner v. Germany, 2019, § 65, and Milachikj v. North Macedonia, 2021, §§ 38-40; by contrast, Pasquini v. San Marino (no. 2), 2020, and Gravier v. France, 2024, where the impugned statements amounted to an unequivocal imputation of criminal liability that could not be explained by the particular domestic context; see also Machalický v. the Czech Republic, 2024, §§ 57-60, and Felix Guţu v. the Republic of Moldova, 2020)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-12,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json,apps:11027/22,Kezerashvili v. Georgia,11027/22,added,"Kezerashvili v. Georgia, no. 11027/22, 5 December 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.B.2.c,Presence at the appeal hearing,4,319,321,0.9453,"Kezerashvili v. Georgia , 2024",,"However, an accused may waive his right to participate or be heard in the appeal proceedings, either expressly or by his conduct ( Kashlev v. Estonia, §§ 45-46; Hernández Royo v. Spain, § 39; Bivolaru v. Romania (no. 2), §§ 138-146). Nevertheless, a waiver of the right to participate in the proceedings may not, in itself, imply a waiver of the right to be heard in the proceedings ( Maestri and Others v. Italy, §§ 56-58). In each case it is important to establish whether the relevant court did all what could reasonably be expected of it to secure the applicant's participation in the proceedings. Questioning via video-link could be a measure ensuring effective participation in the proceedings ( Bivolaru v. Romania (no. 2), §§ 138-139, 144-145).","However, an accused may waive his right to participate or be heard in the appeal proceedings, either expressly or by his conduct ( Kashlev v. Estonia, §§ 45-46; Hernández Royo v. Spain, § 39; Bivolaru v. Romania (no. 2), §§ 138-146). Nevertheless, a waiver of the right to participate in the proceedings may not, in itself, imply a waiver of the right to be heard in the proceedings ( Maestri and Others v. Italy, §§ 56-58). However, if the applicant chose not to personally take part in any of the hearings held by the lower courts and explicitly instructed his lawyers to defend his interests, no issue concerning the right to be present arises from the Supreme Court's decision to overturn his acquittal without holding an oral hearing which may have otherwise been necessary ( Kezerashvili v. Georgia, 2024, § 114). In each case it is important to establish whether the relevant court did all what could reasonably be expected of it to secure the applicant's participation in the proceedings. Questioning via video-link could be a measure ensuring effective participation in the proceedings ( Bivolaru v. Romania (no. 2), §§ 138-139, 144-145)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-12,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json,apps:11027/22,Kezerashvili v. Georgia,11027/22,added,"Kezerashvili v. Georgia, no. 11027/22, 5 December 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,VI.A.2,Prejudicial statements,3,377,380,0.9807,"Kezerashvili v. Georgia , 2024",,"Article 6 § 2 is not only a procedural guarantee. It is also aimed at preventing the undermining of a fair criminal trial by prejudicial statements made in close connection with those proceedings (see Kasatkin v. Russia (dec.), 2021, § 22, and Mamaladze v. Georgia, 2022, §§ 62-67, concerning the issue of remedies in relation to the prejudicial statements; see also Rytikov v. Ukraine, 2024, § 44).","Article 6 § 2 is not only a procedural guarantee. It is also aimed at preventing the undermining of a fair criminal trial by prejudicial statements made in close connection with those proceedings (see Kasatkin v. Russia (dec.), 2021, § 22, and Mamaladze v. Georgia, 2022, §§ 62-67, concerning the issue of remedies in relation to the prejudicial statements; see also Rytikov v. Ukraine, 2024, § 44, and Kezerashvili v. Georgia, 2024, §§ 67-68)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-12,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json,apps:42760/16,Machalický v. the Czech Republic,42760/16,added,"Machalický v. the Czech Republic, no. 42760/16, 10 October 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,VI.A.2,Prejudicial statements,3,385,388,0.9837,"Gravier v. France , 2024",,"In cases of unfortunate language the Court has considered it necessary to look at the context of the proceedings as a whole and their special features. These features became decisive factors in the assessment of whether that statement gave rise to a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. The Court considered that these features were also applicable where the language of a judgment might be misunderstood but can, on the basis of a correct assessment of the domestic law context, not be qualified as a statement of criminal guilt ( Fleischner v. Germany, 2019, § 65, and Milachikj v. North Macedonia, 2021, §§ 38-40; by contrast, Pasquini v. San Marino (no. 2), 2020, and Gravier v. France,* 2024, where the impugned statements amounted to an unequivocal imputation of criminal liability that could not be explained by the particular domestic context; see also Felix Guţu v. the Republic of Moldova, 2020).","In cases of unfortunate language the Court has considered it necessary to look at the context of the proceedings as a whole and their special features. These features became decisive factors in the assessment of whether that statement gave rise to a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. The Court considered that these features were also applicable where the language of a judgment might be misunderstood but can, on the basis of a correct assessment of the domestic law context, not be qualified as a statement of criminal guilt ( Gomes Costa v. Portugal *, 2025, §§ 119-23; Cosovan v. the Republic of Moldova (no. 2), 2024, §§ 30-42; Fleischner v. Germany, 2019, § 65, and Milachikj v. North Macedonia, 2021, §§ 38-40; by contrast, Pasquini v. San Marino (no. 2), 2020, and Gravier v. France, 2024, where the impugned statements amounted to an unequivocal imputation of criminal liability that could not be explained by the particular domestic context; see also Machalický v. the Czech Republic, 2024, §§ 57-60, and Felix Guţu v. the Republic of Moldova, 2020)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-12,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json,apps:37324/16,Miron v. Romania,37324/16,added,"Miron v. Romania, no. 37324/16, 5 November 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.A.7,The principle of immediacy,3,277,278,0.9717,"Miron v. Romania , 2024",,"In Cerovšek and Božičnik v. Slovenia (2017, §§ 37-48) the Court found a violation of Article 6 because the reasons for the verdicts against the applicants, that is, their conviction and sentence, had not given by the single judge who had pronounced them but by other judges, who had not participated in the trial (see also Svanidze v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 34-38, concerning the replacement of the trial judge by a substitute judge who did not participate in the examination of evidence; and Orhan Şahin v. Türkiye, 2024, §§ 57-62, where none of the judges on the three-judge bench, that ultimately convicted the applicant following a re-trial had taken part in the earlier stages of the criminal proceedings against the applicant or had heard evidence from the witness whose statements were central to the applicant's conviction).","In Cerovšek and Božičnik v. Slovenia (2017, §§ 37-48) the Court found a violation of Article 6 because the reasons for the verdicts against the applicants, that is, their conviction and sentence, had not given by the single judge who had pronounced them but by other judges, who had not participated in the trial (see also Svanidze v. Georgia, 2019, §§ 34-38, concerning the replacement of the trial judge by a substitute judge who did not participate in the examination of evidence; and Orhan Şahin v. Türkiye, 2024, §§ 57-62, where none of the judges on the three-judge bench, that ultimately convicted the applicant following a re-trial had taken part in the earlier stages of the criminal proceedings against the applicant or had heard evidence from the witness whose statements were central to the applicant's conviction; see, by contrast, Miron v. Romania, 2024, §§ 27-35 where no issue arose due to the ""extremely limited"" role played by the witnesses who had not been directly examined, the applicant's failure to contest their credibility, and the existence of procedural safeguards, such as the availability of the audio recordings of their testimonies)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-12,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json,apps:20224/18,Union des Mutuelles d'Assurances Monceau v. France (dec.),20224/18,added,"Union des Mutuelles d'Assurances Monceau v. France (dec.), no. 20224/18, 1 October 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.A,The fundamental principles,2,9,9,0.9005,,,"On the other hand, Article 6 does not prohibit a fine to be imposed on the surviving company in respect of an infringement committed by its merged subsidiary, where the core business is continued by the parent company ( Carrefour France v. France (dec.), 2019).","On the other hand, Article 6 does not prohibit a fine to be imposed on the surviving company in respect of an infringement committed by its merged subsidiary, where the core business is continued by the parent company ( Carrefour France v. France (dec.), 2019) or where there is economic and functional continuity between the absorbed and the absorbing company ( Union des Mutuelles d'Assurances Monceau v. France (dec.), 2024)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-12,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json,apps:20224/18,Union des Mutuelles d'Assurances Monceau v. France (dec.),20224/18,added,"Union des Mutuelles d'Assurances Monceau v. France (dec.), no. 20224/18, 1 October 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.B.2,"Administrative, tax, customs, financial and competition-law proceedings and other special proceedings",3,42,43,0.9863,,,"Article 6 under its criminal head has been held to apply to customs law ( Salabiaku v. France, 1988) to penalties imposed by a court with jurisdiction in budgetary and financial matters ( Guisset v. France, 2000) and to certain administrative authorities with powers in the spheres of economic, financial and competition law ( Lilly France S.A. v. France (dec.), 2002; Dubus S.A. v. France, 2009; A. Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l. v. Italy, 2011; Produkcija Plus Storitveno podjetje d.o.o. v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 45-46; by contrast Prina v. Romania (dec.), 2020), including market manipulations ( Grande Stevens and Others v. Italy, 2014, §§ 94-101).","Article 6 under its criminal head has been held to apply to customs law ( Salabiaku v. France, 1988) to penalties imposed by a court with jurisdiction in budgetary and financial matters ( Guisset v. France, 2000) and to certain administrative authorities with powers in the spheres of economic, financial and competition law ( Lilly France S.A. v. France (dec.), 2002; Dubus S.A. v. France, 2009; A. Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l. v. Italy, 2011; Produkcija Plus Storitveno podjetje d.o.o. v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 45-46; and Union des Mutuelles d'Assurances Monceau v. France (dec.), 2024; by contrast Prina v. Romania (dec.), 2020), including market manipulations ( Grande Stevens and Others v. Italy, 2014, §§ 94-101)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-12,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json,apps:26760/22,Zahariev v. North Macedonia,26760/22,added,"Zahariev v. North Macedonia, no. 26760/22, 5 November 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.A.3,Reasoning of judicial decisions,3,200,201,0.9927,"Zahariev v. North Macedonia , 2024",,"While courts are not obliged to give a detailed answer to every argument raised (Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands, 1994, § 61), it must be clear from the decision that the essential issues of the case have been addressed ( Boldea v. Romania, 2007, § 30; Lobzhanidze and Peradze v. Georgia, 2020, § 66) and that a specific and explicit reply has been given to the arguments which are decisive for the outcome of the case ( Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [GC], 2017, § 84; S.C. IMH Suceava S.R.L. v. Romania, 2013, § 40, concerning contradictions in the assessment of evidence; Karimov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 29, concerning the allegations of imprisonment for debt). In examining the fairness of criminal proceedings, the Court has held in particular that by ignoring a specific, pertinent and important point made by the accused, the domestic courts fall short of their obligations under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention ( Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, §§ 337-341; Cupiał v. Poland, 2023, § 57).","While courts are not obliged to give a detailed answer to every argument raised ( Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands, 1994, § 61), it must be clear from the decision that the essential issues of the case have been addressed ( Boldea v. Romania, 2007, § 30; Lobzhanidze and Peradze v. Georgia, 2020, § 66) and that a specific and explicit reply has been given to the arguments which are decisive for the outcome of the case ( Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [GC], 2017, § 84; S.C. IMH Suceava S.R.L. v. Romania, 2013, § 40, concerning contradictions in the assessment of evidence; Karimov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 29, concerning the allegations of imprisonment for debt). In examining the fairness of criminal proceedings, the Court has held in particular that by ignoring a specific, pertinent and important point made by the accused, the domestic courts fall short of their obligations under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention ( Yüksel Yal çınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, §§ 337-341; Cupiał v. Poland, 2023, § 57; and Zahariev v. North Macedonia, 2024, §§ 49-50)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20240930062643__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-12,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-12.json,apps:63277/19,Zakrzweski v. Poland,63277/19,added,"Zakrzweski v. Poland, no. 63277/19, 14 November 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.5,"Different stages of criminal proceedings, ancillary proceedings and subsequent remedies",3,60,61,0.9717,"Zakrzweski v. Poland , 2024",,"However, should an extraordinary remedy lead automatically or in the specific circumstances to a full reconsideration of the case, Articl e 6 applies in the usual way to the ""reconsideration"" proceedings. Moreover, the Court has held that Article 6 is applicable in certain instances where the proceedings, although characterised as ""extraordinary"" or ""exceptional"" in domestic law, were deemed to be similar in nature and scope to ordinary appeal proceedings, the national characterisation of the proceedings not being regarded as decisive for the issue of applicability. In sum, the nature, scope and specific features of the relevant extraordinary procedure in the legal system concerned may be such as to bring that procedure within the ambit of Article 6 § 1 ( Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [GC], 2017, §§ 60-72; see further, for instance, Serrano Contreras v. Spain (no. 2), 2021, §§ 27-28).","However, should an extraordinary remedy lead automatically or in the specific circumstances to a full reconsideration of the case, Article 6 applies in the usual way to the ""reconsideration"" proceedings. Moreover, the Court has held that Article 6 is applicable in certain instances where the proceedings, although characterised as ""extraordinary"" or ""exceptional"" in domestic law, were deemed to be similar in nature and scope to ordinary appeal proceedings, the national characterisation of the proceedings not being regarded as decisive for the issue of applicability. For instance, the Court found that Article 6 applied to a remedy classified as extraordinary in domestic law, where the domestic court was called upon to determine the charge against the applicant ( Zakrzweski v. Poland, 2024, § 42). In sum, the nature, scope and specific features of the relevant extraordinary procedure in the legal system concerned may be such as to bring that procedure within the ambit of Article 6 § 1 ( Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [GC], 2017, §§ 60-72; see further, for instance, Serrano Contreras v. Spain (no. 2), 2021, §§ 27-28)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20260217143525__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json,apps:21492/17,Anna Maria Ciccone v. Italy,21492/17,added,"Anna Maria Ciccone v. Italy, no. 21492/17, 5 June 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.A.7,The principle of immediacy,3,280,280,0.9951,"Anna Maria Ciccone v. Italy , 2025",,"An issue related to the principle of immediacy may also arise when the appeal court overturns the decision of a lower court acquitting an applicant of the criminal charges without a fresh examination of the evidence, including the hearing of witnesses ( Hanu v. Romania, 2013, § 40; Lazu v. the Republic of Moldova, 2016, § 43). Similarly, the principle of immediacy is relevant in case of a change in the composition of the trial court when the case is remitted for retrial before a different judge. Moreover, in such a situation, the principles of the Court's case-law concerning the right to examine witnesses for the prosecution are of relevance ( Famulyak v. Ukraine (dec.), 2019, §§ 36-38; Chernika v. Ukraine, 2020, §§ 40-46 and 54). 9","An issue related to the principle of immediacy may also arise when the appeal court overturns the decision of a lower court acquitting an applicant of the criminal charges without a fresh examination of the evidence, including the hearing of witnesses ( Hanu v. Romania, 2013, § 40; Lazu v. the Republic of Moldova, 2016, § 43; Anna Maria Ciccone v. Italy, 2025, § 58). Similarly, the principle of immediacy is relevant in case of a change in the composition of the trial court when the case is remitted for retrial before a different judge. Moreover, in such a situation, the principles of the Court's case-law concerning the right to examine witnesses for the prosecution are of relevance ( Famulyak v. Ukraine (dec.), 2019, §§ 36-38; Chernika v. Ukraine, 2020, §§ 40-46 and 54). 9"
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20260217143525__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json,apps:21492/17,Anna Maria Ciccone v. Italy,21492/17,added,"Anna Maria Ciccone v. Italy, no. 21492/17, 5 June 2025",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,VI.B.4.§4,ii. Non-attendance of witnesses at trial,4,544,545,0.9922,,,"In view of the autonomous meaning given to the term ""witness"", the above principles concerning absent witnesses are accordingly relevant in cases of absent expert witnesses. ( Constantinides v. Greece, 2016, §§ 37-52). However, in this context, the Court has explained that the role of an expert witness can be distinguished from that of an eyewitness, who must give to the court his personal recollection of a particular event. In analysing whether the appearance in person of an expert at the trial was necessary, the Court is therefore primarily guided by the principles enshrined in the concept of a ""fair trial"" under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, and in particular by the guarantees of ""adversarial proceedings"" and ""equality of arms"" (see, for instance, Kartoyev and Others v. Russia, 2021, §§ 74 and 81). Nevertheless, some of the Court 's approaches to the examination in person of ""witnesses"" under Article 6 § 3 (d) may be applied, mutatis mutandis, with due regard to the difference in their status and role ( Danilov v. Russia, 2020, § 109).","In view of the autonomous meaning given to the term ""witness"", the above principles concerning absent witnesses are accordingly relevant in cases of absent expert witnesses. ( Constantinides v. Greece, 2016, §§ 37-52). However, in this context, the Court has explained that the role of an expert witness can be distinguished from that of an eyewitness, who must give to the court his personal recollection of a particular event. In analysing whether the appearance in person of an expert at the trial was necessary, the Court is therefore primarily guided by the principles enshrined in the concept of a ""fair trial"" under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, and in particular by the guarantees of ""adversarial proc eedings"" and ""equality of arms"" (see, for instance, Kartoyev and Others v. Russia, 2021, §§ 74 and 81; Anna Maria Ciccone v. Italy, § 47). Nevertheless, some of the Court's approaches to the examination in person of ""witnesses"" under Article 6 § 3 (d) may be applied, mutatis mutandis, with due regard to the difference in their status and role ( Danilov v. Russia, 2020, § 109)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20260217143525__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json,apps:54241/12,Bagnall v. the United Kingdom (dec.),54241/12,added,"Bagnall v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 54241/12, 8 July 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,VI.A.1.a,Criminal proceedings,4,366,366,0.8409,,,"Once an accused has properly been proved guilty, Article 6 § 2 can have no application in relation to allegations made about the accused's character and conduct as part of the sentencing process ( Bikas v. Germany, 2018, § 57), unless such accusations are of such a nature and degree as to amount to the bringing of a new ""charge"" within the autonomous Convention meaning ( Böhmer v. Germany, 2002, § 55; Geerings v. the Netherlands, 2007, § 43; Phillips v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 35).","Once an accused has properly been proved guilty, Article 6 § 2 can have no application in relation to allegations made about the accused's character and conduct as part of the sentencing process ( Bikas v. Germany, 2018, § 57), unless such accusations are of such a nature and degree as to amount to the bringing of a new ""charge"" within the autonomous Convention meaning ( Böhmer v. Germany, 2002, § 55; Geerings v. the Netherlands, 2007, § 43; Phillips v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 35). Accordingly, in a number of cases the Court found that Article 6 § 2 did not apply to the proceedings concerning the so- called ""extended confiscation"", that is confiscation following a criminal conviction that went beyond the direct proceeds of the crime for which a person was convicted, where the courts were satisfied that the property seized was derived from criminal conduct ( Briggs-Price v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2025, §§ 85-101; Sharma v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2025, §§ 51-61; Bagnall v. the United Kingdom (dec.), §§ 90-101, 2025; Koli v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2025, §§ 46-56)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20260217143525__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json,apps:59494/09,Briggs-Price v. the United Kingdom (dec.),59494/09,added,"Briggs-Price v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 59494/09, 8 July 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,VI.A.1.a,Criminal proceedings,4,366,366,0.8409,,,"Once an accused has properly been proved guilty, Article 6 § 2 can have no application in relation to allegations made about the accused's character and conduct as part of the sentencing process ( Bikas v. Germany, 2018, § 57), unless such accusations are of such a nature and degree as to amount to the bringing of a new ""charge"" within the autonomous Convention meaning ( Böhmer v. Germany, 2002, § 55; Geerings v. the Netherlands, 2007, § 43; Phillips v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 35).","Once an accused has properly been proved guilty, Article 6 § 2 can have no application in relation to allegations made about the accused's character and conduct as part of the sentencing process ( Bikas v. Germany, 2018, § 57), unless such accusations are of such a nature and degree as to amount to the bringing of a new ""charge"" within the autonomous Convention meaning ( Böhmer v. Germany, 2002, § 55; Geerings v. the Netherlands, 2007, § 43; Phillips v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 35). Accordingly, in a number of cases the Court found that Article 6 § 2 did not apply to the proceedings concerning the so- called ""extended confiscation"", that is confiscation following a criminal conviction that went beyond the direct proceeds of the crime for which a person was convicted, where the courts were satisfied that the property seized was derived from criminal conduct ( Briggs-Price v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2025, §§ 85-101; Sharma v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2025, §§ 51-61; Bagnall v. the United Kingdom (dec.), §§ 90-101, 2025; Koli v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2025, §§ 46-56)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20260217143525__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json,apps:42881/18,Bülent Bekdemir v. Türkiye,42881/18,added,"Bülent Bekdemir v. Türkiye, no. 42881/18, 17 June 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A,The fundamental principles,2,3,3,0.9938,"Bülent Bekdemir v. Türkiye , 2025",,"Where a procedural defect has been identified, it falls to the domestic courts in the first place to carry out the assessment as to whether that procedural shortcoming has been remedied in the course of the ensuing proceedings, the lack of an assessment to that effect in itself being prima facie incompatible with the requirements of a fair trial according to Article 6 of the Convention ( Mehmet Zeki Çelebi v. Turkey, 2020, 51). Moreover, the cumulative effect of various procedural defects may lead to a violation of Article 6 even if each defect, taken alone, would not have convinced the Court that the proceedings were unfair ( Mirilashvili v. Russia, 2008, 165).","Where a procedural defect has been identified, it falls to the domestic courts in the first place to carry out the assessment as to whether that procedural shortcoming has been remedied in the course of the ensuing proceedings, the lack of an assessment to that effect in itself being prima facie incompatible with the requirements of a fair trial according to Article 6 of the Convention ( Mehmet Zeki Çelebi v. Turkey, 2020, 51; Bülent Bekdemir v. Türkiye, 2025, §§ 56-57). Moreover, the cumulative effect of various procedural defects may lead to a violation of Article 6 even if each defect, taken alone, would not have convinced the Court that the proceedings were unfair ( Mirilashvili v. Russia, 2008, 165)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20260217143525__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json,apps:38110/18,Engels v. Belgium,38110/18,added,"Engels v. Belgium, no. 38110/18, 27 May 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,VI.B.4.§4,ii. Non-attendance of witnesses at trial,4,543,544,0.9967,"Engels v. Belgium , 2025",,"In Schatschaschwili v. Germany [GC] (2015, §§ 126-131, with further references) the Court identified certain elements that may be relevant in this context: ▪ Whether the domestic courts approached the untested evidence of an absent witness with caution, having regard to the fact that such evidence carries less weight, and whether they provided detailed reasoning as to why they considered that evidence to be reliable, while having regard also to the other evidence available ( Przydział v. Poland, 2016, § 53; Daştan v. Turkey, 2017, § 31). Any directions given to the jury by the trial judge regarding the absent witnesses'evidence is another important consideration ( Simon Price v. the United Kingdom, 2016,§ 130); ▪ Existence of a video recording of the absent witness's questioning at the investigation stage; ▪ Availability at trial of corroborative evidence supporting the untested witness statement, such as statements made at trial by persons to whom the absent witness reported the events immediately after their occurrence; further factual evidence, forensic evidence and expert reports; similarity in the description of events by other witnesses, in particular if such witnesses are cross-examined at trial; ▪ The possibility for the defence to put its own questions to the witness indirectly, for instance in writing, in the course of the trial, or, where appropriate, in the pre-trial stage of the proceedings ( Paić v. Croatia, 2016, § 47). However, pre-trial confrontations conducted before an investigator who did not meet the requirements of independence and impartiality, who had the largely discretionary power to block questions and in which the applicants were unrepresented, are not a substitute for the examination of witnesses in open court ( Chernika v. Ukraine, 2020, § 45); ▪ Possibility for the applicant or defence counsel to question the witness during the investigation stage. These pre-trial hearings are an important procedural safeguard which can compensate for the handicap faced by the defence on account of absence of a witness from the trial ( Palchik v. Ukraine, 2017, § 50). Moreover, the Court has accepted that in exceptional circumstances there may be reasons for hearing evidence from a witness in the absence of the person against whom the statement is to be made on the condition that his lawyer was present during the questioning ( Šmajgl v. Slovenia, 2016, § 63). However, there may nevertheless be circumstances where the defence counsel's involvement alone may not suffice to uphold the rights of the defence and the absence of a direct confrontation between a witness and the accused might entail a real handicap for the latter. Whether an applicant's direct confrontation with the witness against him or her was needed, is a matter to be determined on the facts of each case on the basis of the Court's criteria for the assessment of the overall fairness of the proceedings under Article 6 § 3 (d) ( Fikret Karahan v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 39-40); ▪ The defendant must be afforded the opportunity to give his or her own version of the events and to cast doubt on the credibility of the absent witness. However, this cannot, of itself, be regarded a sufficient counterbalancing factor to compensate for the handicap under which the defence laboured ( Palchik v. Ukraine, 2017, § 48). Moreover, domestic courts must provide sufficient reasoning when dismissing the arguments put forward by the defence ( Prăjină v. Romania, 2014, § 58). In this connection, the Court has not been ready to accept a purely formal examination of the deficiencies in the questioning of witnesses by the domestic higher courts when their reasoning could be seen as seeking to validate the flawed procedure rather than providing the applicant with any counterbalancing factors to compensate for the handicaps under which the defence laboured in the face of its inability to examine a witness ( Al Alo v. Slovakia, 2022, § 65). Also, in some instances, an effective possibility to cast doubt on the credibility of the absent witness evidence may depend on the availability to the defence of all the material in the file related to the events to which the witness'statement relates ( Yakuba v. Ukraine, 2019, §§ 49-51).","In Schatschaschwili v. Germany [GC] (2015, §§ 126-131, with further references) the Court identified certain elements that may be relevant in this context: ▪ Whether the domestic courts approached the untested evidence of an absent witness with caution, having regard to the fact that such evidence carries less weight, and whether they provided detailed reasoning as to why they considered that evidence to be reliable, while having regard also to the other evidence available ( Przydział v. Poland, 2016, § 53; Daştan v. Turkey, 2017, § 31). Any directions given to the jury by the trial judge regarding the absent witnesses'evidence is another important consideration ( Simon Price v. the United Kingdom, 2016,§ 130); ▪ Existence of a video recording of the absent witness's questioning at the investigation stage; ▪ Availability at trial of corroborative evidence supporting the untested witness statement, such as statements made at trial by persons to whom the absent witness reported the events immediately after their occurrence; further factual evidence, forensic evidence and expert reports; similarity in the description of events by other witnesses, in particular if such witnesses are cross-examined at trial; ▪ The possibility for the defence to put its own questions to the witness indirectly, for instance in writing, in the course of the trial, or, where appropriate, in the pre-trial stage of the proceedings ( Paić v. Croatia, 2016, § 47). However, pre-trial confrontations conducted before an investigator who did not meet the requirements of independence and impartiality, who had the largely discretionary power to block questions and in which the applicants were unrepresented, are not a substitute for the examination of witnesses in open court ( Chernika v. Ukraine, 2020, § 45); ▪ Possibility for the applicant or defence counsel to question the witness during the investigation stage. These pre-trial hearings are an important procedural safeguard which can compensate for the handicap faced by the defence on account of absence of a witness from the trial ( Palchik v. Ukraine, 2017, § 50). Moreover, the Court has accepted that in exceptional circumstances there may be reasons for hearing evidence from a witness in the absence of the person against whom the statement is to be made on the condition that his lawyer was present during the questioning ( Šmajgl v. Slovenia, 2016, § 63). However, there may nevertheless be circumstances where the defence counsel's involvement alone may not suffice to uphold the rights of the defence and the absence of a direct confrontation between a witness and the accused might entail a real handicap for the latter. Whether an applicant's direct confrontation with the witness against him or her was needed, is a matter to be determined on the facts of each case on the basis of the Court's criteria for the assessment of the overall fairness of the proceedings under Article 6 § 3 (d) ( Fikret Karahan v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 39-40). Where the applicant, assisted by a lawyer, had a possibility to request cross-examination of witnesses (his co-defendants tried separately because of his unavailability) at earlier stages in the procedure but only requested cross-examination late at the appeal stage (that request was refused), the Court found such conduct by the applicant a relevant factor in finding that the proceedings were fair ( Engels v. Belgium, 2025, §§ 51-52); ▪ The defendant must be afforded the opportunity to give his or her own version of the events and to cast doubt on the credibility of the absent witness. However, this cannot, of itself, be regarded a sufficient counterbalancing factor to compensate for the handicap under which the defence laboured ( Palchik v. Ukraine, 2017, § 48). Moreover, domestic courts must provide sufficient reasoning when dismissing the arguments put forward by the defence ( Prăjină v. Romania, 2014, § 58). In this connection, the Court has not been ready to accept a purely formal examination of the deficiencies in the questioning of witnesses by the domestic higher courts when their reasoning could be seen as seeking to validate the flawed procedure rather than providing the applicant with any counterbalancing factors to compensate for the handicaps under which the defence laboured in the face of its inability to examine a witness ( Al Alo v. Slovakia, 2022, § 65). Also, in some instances, an effective possibility to cast doubt on the credibility of the absent witness evidence may depend on the availability to the defence of all the material in the file related to the events to which the witness'statement relates ( Yakuba v. Ukraine, 2019, §§ 49-51)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20260217143525__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json,apps:56712/21,F.S.M. v. Spain,56712/21,added,"F.S.M. v. Spain, no. 56712/21, 13 March 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.A.1,Effective participation in the proceedings,3,167,167,0.9981,"F.S.M. v. Spain , 2025",,"An issue concerning lack of effective participation in the proceedings may also arise with regard to a failure of the domestic authorities to accommodate the needs of vulnerable defendants ( Hasáliková v. Slovakia, 2021, § 69, concerning defendants with intellectual impairments). Thus, as regards the juvenile defendants in trial proceedings, the Court has held that the criminal proceedings must be so organised as to respect the principle of the best interests of the child. It is essential that a child charged with an offence is dealt with in a manner which fully takes into account his or her age, level of maturity and intellectual and emotional capacities, and that steps are taken to promote his ability to understand and participate in the proceedings ( V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], 1999, §§ 85-86). The right of a juvenile defendant to effectively participate in his criminal trial requires that the authorities deal with him with due regard to his vulnerability and capacities from the first stage of his involvement in a criminal investigation and, in particular, during any questioning by the police. The authorities must take steps to reduce as far as possible the child's feelings of intimidation and inhibition and to ensure that he has a broad understanding of the nature of the investigation and the stakes, including the significance of any potential penalty as well as his rights of defence and, in particular, his right to remain silent ( Blokhin v. Russia [GC], 2016, 195).","An issue concerning lack of effective participation in the proceedings may also arise with regard to a failure of the domestic authorities to accommodate the needs of vulnerable defendants ( Hasáliková v. Slovakia, 2021, § 69, F.S.M. v. Spain, 2025, § 64, concerning defendants with intellectual impairments). Thus, as regards the juvenile defendants in trial proceedings, the Court has held that the criminal proceedings must be so organised as to respect the principle of the best interests of the child. It is essential that a child charged with an offence is dealt with in a manner which fully takes into account his or her age, level of maturity and intellectual and emotional capacities, and that steps are taken to promote his ability to understand and participate in the proceedings ( V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], 1999, §§ 85-86). The right of a juvenile defendant to effectively participate in his criminal trial requires that the authorities deal with him with due regard to his vulnerability and capacities from the first stage of his involvement in a criminal investigation and, in particular, during any questioning by the police. The authorities must take steps to reduce as far as possible the child's feelings of intimidation and inhibition and to ensure that he has a broad understanding of the nature of the investigation and the stakes, including the significance of any potential penalty as well as his rights of defence and, in particular, his right to remain silent ( Blokhin v. Russia [GC], 2016, 195)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20260217143525__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json,apps:52302/19,Federici v. France,52302/19,added,"Federici v. France, no. 52302/19, 3 April 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,VI.A.4,Courtroom arrangements,3,406,405,0.6224,"Federici v. France , 2025",,"The requirement for car owners to identify the driver at the time of a suspected traffic offence is not incompatible with Article 6 of the Convention ( O'Halloran and Francis v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2007).","The Court indicated that systematic unjustified placement of defendants in cages or glass cabins could, depedning on the circumstances, raise an issue of respect for fundamental rights of defendants ( Federici v. France, 2025, § 69). In finding a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of unjustified placement of applicants in a metal cage in the courtroom, the Court notably took into account that such placement undermined the presumption of innocence ( Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], 2014, § 133). However, the Court found no breach of Article 6 § 2 where the domestic court found that it was not possible to make an exception to the usual practice of placement in a glass box in view of the previous conduct of the applicant, who had been a fugitive from justice, and where the glass box placement did not have humiliating aspects and did not limit the applicant's movement or communication with lawyers ( Federici v. France, 2025, §§ 69-73)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20260217143525__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json,apps:58671/12,Koli v. the United Kingdom (dec.),58671/12,added,"Koli v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 58671/12, 1 July 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,VI.A.1.a,Criminal proceedings,4,366,366,0.8409,,,"Once an accused has properly been proved guilty, Article 6 § 2 can have no application in relation to allegations made about the accused's character and conduct as part of the sentencing process ( Bikas v. Germany, 2018, § 57), unless such accusations are of such a nature and degree as to amount to the bringing of a new ""charge"" within the autonomous Convention meaning ( Böhmer v. Germany, 2002, § 55; Geerings v. the Netherlands, 2007, § 43; Phillips v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 35).","Once an accused has properly been proved guilty, Article 6 § 2 can have no application in relation to allegations made about the accused's character and conduct as part of the sentencing process ( Bikas v. Germany, 2018, § 57), unless such accusations are of such a nature and degree as to amount to the bringing of a new ""charge"" within the autonomous Convention meaning ( Böhmer v. Germany, 2002, § 55; Geerings v. the Netherlands, 2007, § 43; Phillips v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 35). Accordingly, in a number of cases the Court found that Article 6 § 2 did not apply to the proceedings concerning the so- called ""extended confiscation"", that is confiscation following a criminal conviction that went beyond the direct proceeds of the crime for which a person was convicted, where the courts were satisfied that the property seized was derived from criminal conduct ( Briggs-Price v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2025, §§ 85-101; Sharma v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2025, §§ 51-61; Bagnall v. the United Kingdom (dec.), §§ 90-101, 2025; Koli v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2025, §§ 46-56)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20260217143525__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json,apps:23963/21,Krpelík v. the Czech Republic,23963/21,added,"Krpelík v. the Czech Republic, no. 23963/21, 12 June 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,VI.B.3.c,Legal assistance i. Access to a lawyer,4,495,496,0.9624,,,"Asuspect cannot be found to have waived one's right to legal assistance if one has not promptly received information about this right after arrest ( Simeonovi v. Bulgaria [GC], 2017, § 118). Similarly, in the context of procedural action taken without relevant procedural safeguards, waiver of the right to a lawyer by signing a pre-printed p hrase ""No lawyer sought"" is of questionable value for the purpose of demonstrating the unequivocal character of the waiver by an applicant ( Bozkaya v. Turkey, 2017, § 48; Rodionov v. Russia, 2018, § 155; contrast with Sklyar v. Russia, 2017, §§ 22-25, where the applicant clearly waived his right to a lawyer on the record). Apossible earlier waiver, even if validly made, will no longer be considered valid if an applicant subsequently made an explicit request to access a lawyer ( Artur Parkhomenko v. Ukraine, 2017, § 81). Moreover, if an applicant has been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment by the police, it cannot be considered that in such circumstances he or she validly waived his right of access to a lawyer ( Turbylev v. Russia, 2015, § 96).","Asuspect cannot be found to have waived one's right to legal assistance if one has not promptly received information about this right after arrest ( Simeonovi v. Bulgaria [GC], 2017, § 118). Similarly, in the context of procedural action taken without relevant procedural safeguards, waiver of the right to a lawyer by signing a pre-printed p hrase ""No lawyer sought"" is of questionable value for the purpose of demonstrating the unequivocal character of the waiver by an applicant ( Bozkaya v. Turkey, 2017, § 48; Rodionov v. Russia, 2018, § 155; contrast with Sklyar v. Russia, 2017, §§ 22-25, where the applicant clearly waived his right to a lawyer on the record). Apossible earlier waiver, even if validly made, will no longer be considered valid if an applicant subsequently made an explicit request to access a lawyer ( Artur Parkhomenko v. Ukraine, 2017, § 81). Moreover, if an applicant has been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment by the police, it cannot be considered that in such circumstances he or she validly waived his right of access to a lawyer ( Turbylev v. Russia, 2015, § 96). Where the applicant suffered from intellectual disabilities and information about his right to a lawyer had been provided only on pre-printed forms formulated in a complex way by references to domestic legal provisions, the Court concluded that the waiver of the right to legal representation had not been attended by minimum safeguards commensurate with its importance ( Krpelík v. the Czech Republic, 2025, §§ 79-88)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20260217143525__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json,apps:42635/20,Leost v. France (dec.),42635/20,added,"Leost v. France (dec.), no. 42635/20, 27 May 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,V.B.3,Exceptions to the rule of publicity,3,328,328,0.935,,,"Although in criminal proceedings there is a high expectation of publicity, it may on occasion be necessary under Article 6 to limit the open and public nature of proceedings in order, for example, to protect the safety or privacy of witnesses or to promote the free exchange of information and opinion in the pursuit of justice ( B. and P. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 37; see also Frâncu v. Romania, 2020, from the perspective of Article 8).","Although in criminal proceedings there is a high expectation of publicity, it may on occasion be necessary under Article 6 to limit the open and public nature of proceedings in order, for example, to protect the safety or privacy of witnesses or to promote the free exchange of information and opinion in the pursuit of justice ( B. and P. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 37; see also Frâncu v. Romania, 2020, from the perspective of Article 8). Taking and publishing without authorisation of photographs of participants in trial hearings can be legitimately restricted in the interests of the protection the reputation of others and of maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary ( Leost v. France (dec.), §§ 41-65)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20260217143525__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json,apps:32324/22,Ravier v. France,32324/22,added,"Ravier v. France, no. 32324/22, 19 June 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,VI.A.2,Prejudicial statements,3,388,388,0.9969,"Gomes Costa v. Portugal , 2025|Ravier v. France , 2025",,"In cases of unfortunate language the Court has considered it necessary to look at the context of the proceedings as a whole and their special features. These features became decisive factors in the assessment of whether that statement gave rise to a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. The Court considered that these features were also applicable where the language of a judgment might be misunderstood but can, on the basis of a correct assessment of the domestic law context, not be qualified as a statement of criminal guilt ( Gomes Costa v. Portugal *, 2025, §§ 119-23; Cosovan v. the Republic of Moldova (no. 2), 2024, §§ 30-42; Fleischner v. Germany, 2019, § 65, and Milachikj v. North Macedonia, 2021, §§ 38-40; by contrast, Pasquini v. San Marino (no. 2), 2020, and Gravier v. France, 2024, where the impugned statements amounted to an unequivocal imputation of criminal liability that could not be explained by the particular domestic context; see also Machalický v. the Czech Republic, 2024, §§ 57-60, and Felix Guţu v. the Republic of Moldova, 2020).","In cases of unfortunate language the Court has considered it necessary to look at the context of the proceedings as a whole and their special features. These features became decisive factors in the assessment of whether that statement gave rise to a violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. The Court considered that these features were also applicable where the language of a judgment might be misunderstood but can, on the basis of a correct assessment of the domestic law context, not be qualified as a statement of criminal guilt ( Gomes Costa v. Portugal, 2025, §§ 119-23; Cosovan v. the Republic of Moldova (no. 2), 2024, §§ 30-42; Fleischner v. Germany, 2019, § 65, Milachikj v. North Macedonia, 2021, §§ 38-40; Ravier v. France, 2025, §§ 36-45; by contrast, Pasquini v. San Marino (no. 2), 2020, and Gravier v. France, 2024, where the impugned statements amounted to an unequivocal imputation of criminal liability that could not be explained by the particular domestic context; see also Machalický v. the Czech Republic, 2024, §§ 57-60, and Felix Guţu v. the Republic of Moldova, 2020)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20260217143525__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json,name:sharma v united kingdom dec::2025,Sharma v. the United Kingdom (dec.),,added,"Sharma v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 1 July 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,VI.A.1.a,Criminal proceedings,4,366,366,0.8409,,,"Once an accused has properly been proved guilty, Article 6 § 2 can have no application in relation to allegations made about the accused's character and conduct as part of the sentencing process ( Bikas v. Germany, 2018, § 57), unless such accusations are of such a nature and degree as to amount to the bringing of a new ""charge"" within the autonomous Convention meaning ( Böhmer v. Germany, 2002, § 55; Geerings v. the Netherlands, 2007, § 43; Phillips v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 35).","Once an accused has properly been proved guilty, Article 6 § 2 can have no application in relation to allegations made about the accused's character and conduct as part of the sentencing process ( Bikas v. Germany, 2018, § 57), unless such accusations are of such a nature and degree as to amount to the bringing of a new ""charge"" within the autonomous Convention meaning ( Böhmer v. Germany, 2002, § 55; Geerings v. the Netherlands, 2007, § 43; Phillips v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 35). Accordingly, in a number of cases the Court found that Article 6 § 2 did not apply to the proceedings concerning the so- called ""extended confiscation"", that is confiscation following a criminal conviction that went beyond the direct proceeds of the crime for which a person was convicted, where the courts were satisfied that the property seized was derived from criminal conduct ( Briggs-Price v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2025, §§ 85-101; Sharma v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2025, §§ 51-61; Bagnall v. the United Kingdom (dec.), §§ 90-101, 2025; Koli v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2025, §§ 46-56)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20260217143525__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json,apps:16497/20,Sytnyk v. Ukraine,16497/20,added,"Sytnyk v. Ukraine, no. 16497/20, 24 April 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.A.3,Reasoning of judicial decisions,3,203,203,0.9407,"Sytnyk v. Ukraine , 2025",,"With regard to the manner in which the domestic judicial decisions are reasoned, a distinct issue arises when such decisions can be qualified as arbitrary to the point of prejudicing the fairness of proceedings. However, this will be the case only if no reasons are provided for a decision or if the reasons given are based on a manifest factual or legal error committed by the domestic court, resulting in a ""denial of justice"" ( Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [GC], 2017, § 85; Y üksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, § 304, with further references; Navalnyy and Ofitserov v. Russia, 2016, § 119, concerning a politically motivated prosecution and conviction; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 83; Paixão Moreira Sá Fernandes v. Portugal, 2020, § 72; and Spasov v. Romania, 2022, concerning a conviction based on domestic-law provisions that were manifestly contrary to directly applicable EU Regulations taking precedence).","With regard to the manner in which the domestic judicial decisions are reasoned, a distinct issue arises when such decisions can be qualified as arbitrary to the point of prejudicing the fairness of proceedings. However, this will be the case only if no reasons are provided for a decision or if the reasons given are based on a manifest factual or legal error committed by the domestic court, resulting in a ""denial of justice"" ( Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [GC], 2017, § 85; Y üksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, § 304, with further references; Navalnyy and Ofitserov v. Russia, 2016, § 119, concerning a politically motivated prosecution and conviction; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 83; Paixão Moreira Sá Fernandes v. Portugal, 2020, § 72; and Spasov v. Romania, 2022, concerning a conviction based on domestic-law provisions that were manifestly contrary to directly applicable EU Regulations taking precedence). Moreover, criminal proceedings were also regarded as manifestly unreasonable in a case where the domestic courts neither addressed the applicant's serious arguments regarding the quality and reliability of the decisive evidence nor took into account the witness evidence from the defence ( Sytnyk v. Ukraine, 2025, §§ 77-82)."
4026b1621d4a,Article 6 Criminal,20250612193940__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,20260217143525__guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf,2025-06-12,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/4026b1621d4a/diff_2025-06-12__2026-02-17.json,apps:15736/16,Vachik Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia,15736/16,added,"Vachik Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, no. 15736/16 and 2 others, 15 May 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.2,"Administrative, tax, customs, financial and competition-law proceedings and other special proceedings",3,39,39,0.9881,"Vachik Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia , 2025",,"The following administrative offences may fall within the ambit of the criminal head of Article 6: ▪ road-traffic offences punishable by fines or driving restrictions, such as penalty points or disqualifications ( Lutz v. Germany, 1987, § 182; Schmautzer v. Austria, 1995; Malige v. France, 1998; Marčan v. Croatia, 2014, § 33; Igor Pascari v. the Republic of Moldova, 2016, §§ 20-23; by contrast, Matijašić v. Croatia (dec.), 2021); ▪ minor offences of causing a nuisance or a breach of the peace ( Lauko v. Slovakia, 1998; Nicoleta Gheorghe v. Romania, 2012, §§ 25-26; Şimşek, Andiç and Boğatekin v. Turkey (dec.), 2020, which the Court declared inadmissible on the grounds that there had been no significant disadvantage); ▪ offences against social-security legislation ( Hüseyin Turan v. Turkey, 2008, §§ 18-21, for a failure to declare employment, despite the modest nature of the fine imposed); ▪ administrative offence of promoting and distributing material promoting ethnic hatred, punishable by an administrative warning and the confiscation of the publication in question ( Balsytė - Lideikienė v. Lithuania, 2008, § 61); ▪ administrative offence related to the holding of a public assembly ( Kasparov and Others v. Russia, 2013, § 39-45; Mikhaylova v. Russia, 2015, §§ 50-75).","The following administrative offences may fall within the ambit of the criminal head of Article 6: ▪ road-traffic offences punishable by fines or driving restrictions, such as penalty points or disqualifications ( Lutz v. Germany, 1987, § 182; Schmautzer v. Austria, 1995; Malige v. France, 1998; Marčan v. Croatia, 2014, § 33; Igor Pascari v. the Republic of Moldova, 2016, §§ 20-23; by contrast, Matijašić v. Croatia (dec.), 2021); ▪ minor offences of causing a nuisance or a breach of the peace ( Lauko v. Slovakia, 1998; Nicoleta Gheorghe v. Romania, 2012, §§ 25-26; Şimşek, Andiç and Boğatekin v. Turkey (dec.), 2020, which the Court declared inadmissible on the grounds that there had been no significant disadvantage); ▪ offences against social-security legislation ( Hüseyin Turan v. Turkey, 2008, §§ 18-21, for a failure to declare employment, despite the modest nature of the fine imposed); ▪ administrative offence of promoting and distributing material promoting ethnic hatred, punishable by an administrative warning and the confiscation of the publication in question ( Balsytė - Lideikienė v. Lithuania, 2008, § 61); ▪ administrative offence related to the holding of a public assembly ( Kasparov and Others v. Russia, 2013, § 39-45; Mikhaylova v. Russia, 2015, §§ 50-75; and disobeying a police order in the context of a public protest ( Vachik Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, 2025, §§ 71-74)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20230923024152__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-12-18,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-18.json,apps:36418/20,Navalnyy v. Russia (No. 3),36418/20,added,"Navalnyy v. Russia (No. 3), no. 36418/20, 6 June 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.E,The nature and degree of scrutiny,2,,157,,"Navalnyy v. Russia (No. 3), no. 36418/20, 6 June 2023|Nemtsova v. Russia, no. 43146/15, 11 July 2023",,,"Similarly, where the victim was a prominent politician and an opposition leader, the Court considered that it was vital to explore whether there was a possible political motive for his murder and whether certain State officials could have been involved (Nemtsova v. Russia, 2023, §§ 117 -127; see also Navalnyy v. Russia (No. 3), where the authorities refused to institute criminal proceedings into the attempted murder of a prominent opposition figure with a substance identified as a chemical nerve agent)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20230923024152__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-12-18,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-18.json,apps:43146/15,Nemtsova v. Russia,43146/15,added,"Nemtsova v. Russia, no. 43146/15, 11 July 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.E,The nature and degree of scrutiny,2,,157,,"Navalnyy v. Russia (No. 3), no. 36418/20, 6 June 2023|Nemtsova v. Russia, no. 43146/15, 11 July 2023",,,"Similarly, where the victim was a prominent politician and an opposition leader, the Court considered that it was vital to explore whether there was a possible political motive for his murder and whether certain State officials could have been involved (Nemtsova v. Russia, 2023, §§ 117 -127; see also Navalnyy v. Russia (No. 3), where the authorities refused to institute criminal proceedings into the attempted murder of a prominent opposition figure with a substance identified as a chemical nerve agent)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20230923024152__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-12-18,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-18.json,apps:43146/15,Nemtsova v. Russia,43146/15,added,"Nemtsova v. Russia, no. 43146/15, 11 July 2023",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.E,The nature and degree of scrutiny,2,154,155,0.953,"Nemtsova v. Russia, no. 43146/15, 11 July 2023",,"In cases of contract killing, the Court took the view that the investigation could not be considered adequate in the absence of genuine and serious investigative efforts taken with the view to identifying the intellectual author of the crime, that is, the person or people who had commissioned the assassination. In such cases the domestic authorities' scrutiny had to aim to go beyond identification of a hitman (Mazepa and Others v. Russia, 2018, §§ 75-79).","In cases of contract killing, the Court took the view that the investigation could not be considered adequate in the absence of genuine and serious investigative efforts taken with the view to identifying the intellectual author of the crime, that is, the person or people who had commissioned the assassination. In such cases the domestic authorities' scrutiny had to aim to go beyond identification of a hitman (Mazepa and Others v. Russia, 2018, §§ 75-79; see also Nemtsova v. Russia, 2023, §§ 111 and 116)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20230923024152__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-12-18,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-18.json,apps:5049/14|5122/14,Pitsiladi and Vasilellis v. Greece,5049/14|5122/14,added,"Pitsiladi and Vasilellis v. Greece, nos. 5049/14 and 5122/14, 6 June 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.4.a,General population,4,,55,,"Pitsiladi and Vasilellis v. Greece, nos. 5049/14 and 5122/14, 6 June 2023",,,"Where applicants were unable to obtain access to funds raised, in order to pay for the medical treatment abroad of their dying son, due to a statutory prohibition, the question whether Article 2 was applicable was left open, since the Court found that, in any event, having regard to the particular circumstances, there was no failure on the part of the State to comply with the requirements of that provision to protect life (Pitsiladi and Vasilellis v. Greece, §§ 54-55)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20230923024152__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-12-18,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-18.json,apps:56070/18,Stoyanova v. Bulgaria,56070/18,added,"Stoyanova v. Bulgaria, no. 56070/18, 16 June 2022",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,IV.I,Investigation of hate crimes,2,192,194,0.997,,,"When investigating violent attacks, the authorities must take all reasonable steps to unmask any possible discriminatory motives for them. Treating violence with a discriminatory intent on an equal footing with violence having no such overtones is tantamount to turning a blind eye to the specific nature of acts that are particularly destructive of fundamental rights (Stoyanova v. Bulgaria, 2022, § 64). Failure to make a distinction in the manner in which situations that are essentially different are handled may constitute unjustified treatment irreconcilable with Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 2 (Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005, § 160).","When investigating violent attacks, the authorities must take all reasonable steps to unmask any possible discriminatory motives for them. Treating violence with a discriminatory intent on an equal footing with violence having no such overtones is tantamount to turning a blind eye to the specific nature of acts that are particularly destructive of fundamental rights (Stoyanova v. Bulgaria, 2018, § 64). Failure to make a distinction in the manner in which situations that are essentially different are handled may constitute unjustified treatment irreconcilable with Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 2 (Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005, § 160)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20230923024152__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-12-18,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-18.json,apps:56070/08,Stoyanova v. Bulgaria,56070/08,removed,"Stoyanova v. Bulgaria, no. 56070/08, 16 June 2022",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,IV.I,Investigation of hate crimes,2,192,194,0.997,,,"When investigating violent attacks, the authorities must take all reasonable steps to unmask any possible discriminatory motives for them. Treating violence with a discriminatory intent on an equal footing with violence having no such overtones is tantamount to turning a blind eye to the specific nature of acts that are particularly destructive of fundamental rights (Stoyanova v. Bulgaria, 2022, § 64). Failure to make a distinction in the manner in which situations that are essentially different are handled may constitute unjustified treatment irreconcilable with Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 2 (Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005, § 160).","When investigating violent attacks, the authorities must take all reasonable steps to unmask any possible discriminatory motives for them. Treating violence with a discriminatory intent on an equal footing with violence having no such overtones is tantamount to turning a blind eye to the specific nature of acts that are particularly destructive of fundamental rights (Stoyanova v. Bulgaria, 2018, § 64). Failure to make a distinction in the manner in which situations that are essentially different are handled may constitute unjustified treatment irreconcilable with Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 2 (Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005, § 160)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20230923024152__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-12-18,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-18.json,apps:56070/18,Stoyanova v. Bulgaria,56070/18,added,"Stoyanova v. Bulgaria, no. 56070/18, 16 June 2022",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,IV.I,Investigation of hate crimes,2,195,197,0.995,,,"The duty to respond appropriately to such attacks extends to the judicial proceedings in which it is decided whether and how to convict and punish alleged perpetrators (Stoyanova v. Bulgaria, 2022, § 64). For example, where the applicant's son was murdered by three men who perceived him as being homosexual, the Court found a violation of Article 14 taken together with Article 2 because the domestic courts could not attach any tangible legal consequences to the homophobic motives of the crime when sentencing the perpetrators. This stemmed from a lacuna in the criminal law where murder, motivated by hostility towards the victim on account of his or her actual or presumed sexual orientation, is not as such an ""aggravated"" offence or otherwise treated as a more serious offence on account of the special discriminatory motive which underlies it (Stoyanova v. Bulgaria, 2022, §§ 70-76).","The duty to respond appropriately to such attacks extends to the judicial proceedings in which it is decided whether and how to convict and punish alleged perpetrators (Stoyanova v. Bulgaria, 2018, § 64). For example, where the applicant's son was murdered by three men who perceived him as being homosexual, the Court found a violation of Article 14 taken together with Article 2 because the domestic courts could not attach any tangible legal consequences to the homophobic motives of the crime when sentencing the perpetrators. This stemmed from a lacuna in the criminal law where murder, motivated by hostility towards the victim on account of his or her actual or presumed sexual orientation, is not as such an ""aggravated"" offence or otherwise treated as a more serious offence on account of the special discriminatory motive which underlies it (Stoyanova v. Bulgaria, 2018, §§ 70-76)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20230923024152__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-12-18,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-18.json,apps:56070/08,Stoyanova v. Bulgaria,56070/08,removed,"Stoyanova v. Bulgaria, no. 56070/08, 16 June 2022",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,IV.I,Investigation of hate crimes,2,195,197,0.995,,,"The duty to respond appropriately to such attacks extends to the judicial proceedings in which it is decided whether and how to convict and punish alleged perpetrators (Stoyanova v. Bulgaria, 2022, § 64). For example, where the applicant's son was murdered by three men who perceived him as being homosexual, the Court found a violation of Article 14 taken together with Article 2 because the domestic courts could not attach any tangible legal consequences to the homophobic motives of the crime when sentencing the perpetrators. This stemmed from a lacuna in the criminal law where murder, motivated by hostility towards the victim on account of his or her actual or presumed sexual orientation, is not as such an ""aggravated"" offence or otherwise treated as a more serious offence on account of the special discriminatory motive which underlies it (Stoyanova v. Bulgaria, 2022, §§ 70-76).","The duty to respond appropriately to such attacks extends to the judicial proceedings in which it is decided whether and how to convict and punish alleged perpetrators (Stoyanova v. Bulgaria, 2018, § 64). For example, where the applicant's son was murdered by three men who perceived him as being homosexual, the Court found a violation of Article 14 taken together with Article 2 because the domestic courts could not attach any tangible legal consequences to the homophobic motives of the crime when sentencing the perpetrators. This stemmed from a lacuna in the criminal law where murder, motivated by hostility towards the victim on account of his or her actual or presumed sexual orientation, is not as such an ""aggravated"" offence or otherwise treated as a more serious offence on account of the special discriminatory motive which underlies it (Stoyanova v. Bulgaria, 2018, §§ 70-76)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-12-18,2025-01-22,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json,apps:2264/12,Ainis and Others v. Italy,2264/12,added,"Ainis and Others v. Italy, no. 2264/12, 14 September 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B,The scope of the positive obligations of the State,2,15,16,0.914,"Ainis and Others v. Italy , 2023",,"Nonetheless, in the very particular context of detention, the Court has held that there are certain basic precautions which the authorities are expected to take in all cases in order to minimise any potential risk to protect the health and well-being of persons deprived of their liberty ( Daraibou v. Croatia, 2023, § 84 and the cases cited therein).","Nonetheless, in the very particular context of detention, the Court has held that there are certain basic precautions which the authorities are expected to take in all cases in order to minimise any potential risk to protect the health and well-being of persons deprived of their liberty ( Daraibou v. Croatia, 2023, § 84; see also Ainis and Others v. Italy, 2023, § 58 where the applicant's relative died of a drug overdose while in police custody)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-12-18,2025-01-22,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json,apps:6383/17,Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania,6383/17,added,"Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania, no. 6383/17, 16 January 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.A.2,State responsibility under Article 2 in extradition and expulsion cases,3,1,1,0.992,"Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania , 2024",,"Note that the Russian Federation ceased to be a member of the Council of Europe on 16 March 2022 and ceased to be a party to the Convention on 16 September 2022. At the date of the latest update to this Guide, the numbers of signatures and ratifications for Protocol No. 6 is still accurate.. As regards Protocol No. 13, it has been signed by all member States of the Council of Europe and ratified by all but one (Azerbaijan). of being subjected to the death penalty there ( Al Nashiri v. Poland, 2014, § 577; F.G. v. Sweden [GC], 2016, § 110).","Note that the Russian Federation ceased to be a member of the Council of Europe on 16 March 2022 and ceased to be a party to the Convention on 16 September 2022. At the date of the latest update to this Guide, the numbers of signatures and ratifications for Protocol No. 6 is still accurate. As regards Protocol No. 13, it has been signed by all member States of the Council of Europe and ratified by all but one (Azerbaijan). of being subjected to the death penalty there ( Al Nashiri v. Poland, 2014, § 577; F.G. v. Sweden [GC], 2016, § 110; Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania, 2024, § 258)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-12-18,2025-01-22,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json,apps:3566/16,Alkhatib and Others v. Greece,3566/16,added,"Alkhatib and Others v. Greece, no. 3566/16, 16 January 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.B.2.c,Illustrations,4,,105,,"In Alkhatib and Others v. Greece , 2024",,,"In Alkhatib and Others v. Greece, 2024a member of the applicants'family, who was travelling in a boat with other migrants with a view to illegally entering Greece, sustained a serious gunshot wound as a result of shots fired by the coast guard. The Court found that the respondent State had failed to put in place an adequate legal and administrative framework governing the use of potentially lethal force in maritime surveillance operations, given the uncertainty of the applicable legal framework in such circumstances (§§ 130-132)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-12-18,2025-01-22,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json,apps:29906/14,Dimaksyan v. Armenia,29906/14,added,"Dimaksyan v. Armenia, no. 29906/14, 17 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.B,The scope of the positive obligations of the State,2,12,13,0.9953,"Albekov and Others v. Russia , 2008|Anna Todorova v. Bulgaria , 2011|Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008|Dimaksyan v. Armenia , 2023|Durdaj and Others v. Albania , 2023|Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye , 2023|Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012|şa and Erkan Erol v. Turkey , 2006","Others v. Russia, 2012|şa and Erkan Erol v. Turkey Albekov and Others v. Russia , 2006","Thus, the Court has found positive obligations to arise under Article 2 in a number of different contexts, such as, for example:  in the context of healthcare ( Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], 2022; Vo v. France [GC], 2004);  in the context of dangerous activities, including industrial or environmental disasters Öneryıldız v. Turkey Budayeva and Others v. Russia, Kolyadenko and ( [GC], 2004; 2008,; Others v. Russia, 2012,; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014; M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015);  in the context of incidents on board a ship ( Leray and Others v. France (dec.), 2001), on trains ( Kalender v. Turkey, 2009), on a construction site ( Pereira Henriques v. Luxembourg, 2006), Koceski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at a playground ( (dec.), 2013); or at a school ( Ilbeyi Kemaloğlu and Meriye Kemaloğlu v. Turkey, 2012);  Rajkowska v. Poland Anna Todorova v. Bulgaria in the context of road safety ( (dec.), 2007;, 2011); the provision of emergency services ( Furdík v. Slovakia (dec.), 2008); or diving operations in deep sea ( Vilnes and Others v. Norway, 2013);  in the context of medical care and assistance given to vulnerable persons institutionalised in State facilities ( Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, 2013; Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania Dumpe v. Latvia [GC], 2014; (dec.), 201).  In the context of the State's failure to properly secure an area mined by the military ( Paşa and Erkan Erol v. Turkey Albekov and Others v. Russia, 2006;, 2008); to secure and supervise a firing range containing unexploded ordonance ( Oruk v. Turkey, 2014); and to react promptly to a disappearance in life-threatening circumstances ( Osmanoğlu v. Turkey, 2008; Dodov v. Bulgaria, 2008).  In the context of an operation to rescue migrants who were drowning while trying to cross borders at sea ( Safi and Others v. Greece, 2022) or a river ( Alhowais v. Hungary, 2023).","Thus, the Court has found positive obligations to arise under Article 2 in a number of different contexts, such as, for example: ▪ in the context of healthcare ( Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], 2002; Vo v. France [GC], 2004); ▪ in the context of dangerous activities, including industrial or environmental disasters ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008; Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014; M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015; Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023; Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, 2023); ▪ in the context of incidents on board a ship ( Leray and Others v. France (dec.), 2001), on trains ( Kalender v. Turkey, 2009), on a construction site ( Pereira Henriques v. Luxembourg, 2006), at a playground ( Koceski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), 2013); or at a school ( Ilbeyi Kemaloğlu and Meriye Kemaloğlu v. Turkey, 2012); ▪ in the context of road safety ( Rajkowska v. Poland (dec.), 2007; Anna Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2011); the provision of emergency services ( Furdík v. Slovakia (dec.), 2008); or diving operations in deep sea ( Vilnes and Others v. Norway, 2013); ▪ in the context of medical care and assistance given to vulnerable persons institutionalised in State facilities ( Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, 2013; Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], 2014; Dumpe v. Latvia (dec.), 2018); ▪ in the context of the State's failure to properly secure an area mined by the military ( Paşa and Erkan Erol v. Turkey, 2006; Albekov and Others v. Russia, 2008); to secure and supervise a firing range containing unexploded ordonance ( Oruk v. Turkey, 2014); and to react promptly to a disappearance in life-threatening circumstances ( Osmanoğlu v. Turkey, 2008; Dodov v. Bulgaria, 2008); ▪ in the context of an operation to rescue migrants who were drowning while trying to cross borders at sea ( Safi and Others v. Greece, 2022) or a river ( Alhowais v. Hungary, 2023); ▪ in the context of emergency medical assistance to military servicemen ( Dimaksyan v. Armenia, 2023)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-12-18,2025-01-22,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json,apps:29906/14,Dimaksyan v. Armenia,29906/14,added,"Dimaksyan v. Armenia, no. 29906/14, 17 October 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.F.2,Adequacy,3,169,174,0.982,"Benzer and Others v. Turkey , 2013|Dimaksyan v. Armenia , 2023|Mazepa and Others v. Russia , 2018",,"The Court has found the investigation inadequate when, for example:  the investigation into a fatal shooting by the police during an attempted arrest had been undermined by shortcomings such as the failure to test the hands of officers in question for gunshot residue; to stage a reconstruction of the incident; to examine their weapons or ammunition; the lack of an adequate pictorial record of the trauma caused to the victim's body by the fatal bullet; and the failure to separate the officers involved in the incident before their questioning ( Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], 2007, §§ 326-332);  the forensic investigation was defective ( Tanlı v. Turkey, 2001, § 153);  the authorities accepted the version of facts presented by the accused State agents without hearing any further witnesses ( Özalp and Others v. Turkey, 2004, § 45) or placed heavy reliance on the report prepared by them ( İkincisoy v. Turkey, 2004, § 78);  no investigation had been conducted into the flight log which constituted a key element in the possible identification and prosecution of those responsible for the bombing of civilian Benzer and Others v. Turkey villages by military aircraft (, 2013, § 196);  the investigation into the contract killing of an investigative journalist focused only on a Mazepa and Others v. Russia single line of inquiry without exploring other allegations (, 2018, §§ 77-79).","The Court has found the investigation inadequate when, for example: ▪ the investigation into a fatal shooting by the police during an attempted arrest had been undermined by shortcomings such as the failure to test the hands of officers in question for gunshot residue; to stage a reconstruction of the incident; to examine their weapons or ammunition; the lack of an adequate pictorial record of the trauma caused to the victim's body by the fatal bullet; and the failure to separate the officers involved in the incident before their questioning ( Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], 2007, §§ 326-332); ▪ the forensic investigation was defective ( Tanlı v. Turkey, 2001, § 153); ▪ the authorities accepted the version of facts presented by the accused State agents without hearing any further witnesses ( Özalp and Others v. Turkey, 2004, § 45) or placed heavy reliance on the report prepared by them ( İkincisoy v. Turkey, 2004, § 78); ▪ no investigation had been conducted into the flight log which constituted a key element in the possible identification and prosecution of those responsible for the bombing of civilian villages by military aircraft ( Benzer and Others v. Turkey, 2013, § 196); ▪ the investigation into the contract killing of an investigative journalist focused only on a single line of inquiry without exploring other allegations ( Mazepa and Others v. Russia, 2018, §§ 77-79); ▪ the investigation into the circumstances leading to the death of the applicant's son following his accidental shooting by a fellow conscript during his military service failed to elucidate some important factual matters, such as the overall time taken for the hospital transfer as well as the nature and origins of a number of injuries detected during the autopsy ( Dimaksyan v. Armenia, 2023, § 102)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-12-18,2025-01-22,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json,apps:63543/09,Durdaj and Others v. Albania,63543/09,added,"Durdaj and Others v. Albania, nos. 63543/09 and 3 others, 7 November 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.B,The scope of the positive obligations of the State,2,12,13,0.9953,"Albekov and Others v. Russia , 2008|Anna Todorova v. Bulgaria , 2011|Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008|Dimaksyan v. Armenia , 2023|Durdaj and Others v. Albania , 2023|Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye , 2023|Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012|şa and Erkan Erol v. Turkey , 2006","Others v. Russia, 2012|şa and Erkan Erol v. Turkey Albekov and Others v. Russia , 2006","Thus, the Court has found positive obligations to arise under Article 2 in a number of different contexts, such as, for example:  in the context of healthcare ( Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], 2022; Vo v. France [GC], 2004);  in the context of dangerous activities, including industrial or environmental disasters Öneryıldız v. Turkey Budayeva and Others v. Russia, Kolyadenko and ( [GC], 2004; 2008,; Others v. Russia, 2012,; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014; M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015);  in the context of incidents on board a ship ( Leray and Others v. France (dec.), 2001), on trains ( Kalender v. Turkey, 2009), on a construction site ( Pereira Henriques v. Luxembourg, 2006), Koceski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at a playground ( (dec.), 2013); or at a school ( Ilbeyi Kemaloğlu and Meriye Kemaloğlu v. Turkey, 2012);  Rajkowska v. Poland Anna Todorova v. Bulgaria in the context of road safety ( (dec.), 2007;, 2011); the provision of emergency services ( Furdík v. Slovakia (dec.), 2008); or diving operations in deep sea ( Vilnes and Others v. Norway, 2013);  in the context of medical care and assistance given to vulnerable persons institutionalised in State facilities ( Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, 2013; Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania Dumpe v. Latvia [GC], 2014; (dec.), 201).  In the context of the State's failure to properly secure an area mined by the military ( Paşa and Erkan Erol v. Turkey Albekov and Others v. Russia, 2006;, 2008); to secure and supervise a firing range containing unexploded ordonance ( Oruk v. Turkey, 2014); and to react promptly to a disappearance in life-threatening circumstances ( Osmanoğlu v. Turkey, 2008; Dodov v. Bulgaria, 2008).  In the context of an operation to rescue migrants who were drowning while trying to cross borders at sea ( Safi and Others v. Greece, 2022) or a river ( Alhowais v. Hungary, 2023).","Thus, the Court has found positive obligations to arise under Article 2 in a number of different contexts, such as, for example: ▪ in the context of healthcare ( Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], 2002; Vo v. France [GC], 2004); ▪ in the context of dangerous activities, including industrial or environmental disasters ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008; Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014; M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015; Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023; Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, 2023); ▪ in the context of incidents on board a ship ( Leray and Others v. France (dec.), 2001), on trains ( Kalender v. Turkey, 2009), on a construction site ( Pereira Henriques v. Luxembourg, 2006), at a playground ( Koceski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), 2013); or at a school ( Ilbeyi Kemaloğlu and Meriye Kemaloğlu v. Turkey, 2012); ▪ in the context of road safety ( Rajkowska v. Poland (dec.), 2007; Anna Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2011); the provision of emergency services ( Furdík v. Slovakia (dec.), 2008); or diving operations in deep sea ( Vilnes and Others v. Norway, 2013); ▪ in the context of medical care and assistance given to vulnerable persons institutionalised in State facilities ( Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, 2013; Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], 2014; Dumpe v. Latvia (dec.), 2018); ▪ in the context of the State's failure to properly secure an area mined by the military ( Paşa and Erkan Erol v. Turkey, 2006; Albekov and Others v. Russia, 2008); to secure and supervise a firing range containing unexploded ordonance ( Oruk v. Turkey, 2014); and to react promptly to a disappearance in life-threatening circumstances ( Osmanoğlu v. Turkey, 2008; Dodov v. Bulgaria, 2008); ▪ in the context of an operation to rescue migrants who were drowning while trying to cross borders at sea ( Safi and Others v. Greece, 2022) or a river ( Alhowais v. Hungary, 2023); ▪ in the context of emergency medical assistance to military servicemen ( Dimaksyan v. Armenia, 2023)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-12-18,2025-01-22,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json,apps:63543/09,Durdaj and Others v. Albania,63543/09,added,"Durdaj and Others v. Albania, nos. 63543/09 and 3 others, 7 November 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,IV.F.3,Promptness and reasonable expedition,3,174,179,0.9821,"Durdaj and Others v. Albania , 2023","ć v. Croatia , 2014","The Court has found that the domestic authorities have,, failed to investigate with sufficient promptness and reasonable expedition in the following cases:  Kelly and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 136: the inquest proceedings into the killing of the applicants' relatives by the security forces in an operation commenced eight years after the deaths;  Nafiye Çetin and Others v. Turkey, 2009, § 42: the criminal proceedings instituted with a view to elucidating the facts and identify and punish those responsible for the death of their relative in police custody were pending for almost fifteen years;  Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], 2014, § 348: the investigation into the killing of Mr Mocanu during 1990 demonstrations against the Romanian regime was pending, overall, for more than twenty-three years;  Hemsworth v. the United Kingdom, 2013, § 74: the inquest hearing began 13 years after the killing of the applicants' relatives allegedly by security forces in Northern Ireland;  Jelić v. Croatia, 2014, § 91: the investigation into the abduction and killing of the applicant's husband in 1991 was plagued by inexplicable delays;  Mazepa and Others v. Russia, 2018, § 81: the investigation into the contract killing of an investigative journalist, notably, as regards the identity of the persons who had commissioned the crime, was still pending after more than eleven years.","The Court has found that the domestic authorities have, inter alia, failed to investigate with sufficient promptness and reasonable expedition in the following cases: ▪ Kelly and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 136: the inquest proceedings into the killing of the applicants'relatives by the security forces in an operation commenced eight years after the deaths; ▪ Nafiye Çetin and Others v. Turkey, 2009, § 42: the criminal proceedings instituted with a view to elucidating the facts and identify and punish those responsible for the death of their relative in police custody were pending for almost fifteen years; ▪ Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], 2014, § 348: the investigation into the killing of Mr Mocanu during 1990 demonstrations against the Romanian regime was pending, overall, for more than twenty-three years; ▪ Hemsworth v. the United Kingdom, 2013, § 74: the inquest hearing began 13 years after the killing of the applicants'relatives allegedly by security forces in Northern Ireland; ▪ Jelić v. Croatia, 2014, § 91: the investigation into the abduction and killing of the applicant's husband in 1991 was plagued by inexplicable delays; ▪ Mazepa and Others v. Russia, 2018, § 81: the investigation into the contract killing of an investigative journalist, notably, as regards the identity of the persons who had commissioned the crime, was still pending after more than eleven years; ▪ Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023, § 235: the criminal proceedings against a high level State official, concerning his role in the explosion of a weapon decommissioning facility that resulted in deaths and grievous bodily injuries, were still pending more than fourteen years after the events."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-12-18,2025-01-22,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json,apps:63543/09,Durdaj and Others v. Albania,63543/09,added,"Durdaj and Others v. Albania, nos. 63543/09 and 3 others, 7 November 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,IV.L.1,General principles,3,214,219,0.9964,"Durdaj and Others v. Albania , 2023|Sinim v. Turkey , 2017","ć v. Croatia , 2021","Nevertheless, even in the context of non-intentional infringements of the right to life, there may be exceptional circumstances where an effective criminal investigation is necessary to satisfy the requirement of Article 2 of the Convention ( Cevrioğlu v. Turkey, 2016, § 54; Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], 2017, § 215). The Court has found such exceptional circumstances to arise in cases where the negligence which led to an infringement of the right to life went, inter alia, beyond a mere error of judgment or carelessness. Such as for example:  in the context of dangerous industrial activities ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 71);  in the context of a denial of healthcare ( Asiye Genç v. Turkey, 2015, § 73);  in the context of military activities ( Oruk v. Turkey, 2014, §§ 50 and 65);  Sinim v. Turkey in the context of transportation of dangerous goods (, 2017, §§ 62-64);  in the context of road safety ( Smiljanić v. Croatia, 2021, § 93);  in the context of police inaction in a domestic violence case ( Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021, §§ 59-60; see also Penati v. Italy, 2021, §§ 158-162, where the Court has also required a criminal investigation into the killing of a child by his father during a protected contact session organized by the social welfare department).","Nevertheless, even in the context of non-intentional infringements of the right to life, there may be exceptional circumstances where an effective criminal investigation is necessary to satisfy the requirement of Article 2 of the Convention ( Cevrioğlu v. Turkey, 2016, § 54; Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], 2017, § 215). The Court has found such exceptional circumstances to arise in cases where the negligence which led to an infringement of the right to life went, inter alia, beyond a mere error of judgment or carelessness. Such as for example: ▪ in the context of dangerous industrial activities ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 71; Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023, § 184); ▪ in the context of a denial of healthcare ( Asiye Genç v. Turkey, 2015, § 73); ▪ in the context of military activities ( Oruk v. Turkey, 2014, §§ 50 and 65); ▪ in the context of transportation of dangerous goods ( Sinim v. Turkey, 2017, §§ 62-64); ▪ in the context of road safety ( Smiljanić v. Croatia, 2021, § 93); ▪ in the context of police inaction in a domestic violence case ( Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021, §§ 59-60; see also Penati v. Italy, 2021, §§ 158-162, where the Court has also required a criminal investigation into the killing of a child by his father during a protected contact session organized by the social welfare department)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-12-18,2025-01-22,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json,apps:42749/19,Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye,42749/19,added,"Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, no. 42749/19, 21 November 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.B,The scope of the positive obligations of the State,2,12,13,0.9953,"Albekov and Others v. Russia , 2008|Anna Todorova v. Bulgaria , 2011|Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008|Dimaksyan v. Armenia , 2023|Durdaj and Others v. Albania , 2023|Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye , 2023|Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012|şa and Erkan Erol v. Turkey , 2006","Others v. Russia, 2012|şa and Erkan Erol v. Turkey Albekov and Others v. Russia , 2006","Thus, the Court has found positive obligations to arise under Article 2 in a number of different contexts, such as, for example:  in the context of healthcare ( Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], 2022; Vo v. France [GC], 2004);  in the context of dangerous activities, including industrial or environmental disasters Öneryıldız v. Turkey Budayeva and Others v. Russia, Kolyadenko and ( [GC], 2004; 2008,; Others v. Russia, 2012,; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014; M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015);  in the context of incidents on board a ship ( Leray and Others v. France (dec.), 2001), on trains ( Kalender v. Turkey, 2009), on a construction site ( Pereira Henriques v. Luxembourg, 2006), Koceski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at a playground ( (dec.), 2013); or at a school ( Ilbeyi Kemaloğlu and Meriye Kemaloğlu v. Turkey, 2012);  Rajkowska v. Poland Anna Todorova v. Bulgaria in the context of road safety ( (dec.), 2007;, 2011); the provision of emergency services ( Furdík v. Slovakia (dec.), 2008); or diving operations in deep sea ( Vilnes and Others v. Norway, 2013);  in the context of medical care and assistance given to vulnerable persons institutionalised in State facilities ( Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, 2013; Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania Dumpe v. Latvia [GC], 2014; (dec.), 201).  In the context of the State's failure to properly secure an area mined by the military ( Paşa and Erkan Erol v. Turkey Albekov and Others v. Russia, 2006;, 2008); to secure and supervise a firing range containing unexploded ordonance ( Oruk v. Turkey, 2014); and to react promptly to a disappearance in life-threatening circumstances ( Osmanoğlu v. Turkey, 2008; Dodov v. Bulgaria, 2008).  In the context of an operation to rescue migrants who were drowning while trying to cross borders at sea ( Safi and Others v. Greece, 2022) or a river ( Alhowais v. Hungary, 2023).","Thus, the Court has found positive obligations to arise under Article 2 in a number of different contexts, such as, for example: ▪ in the context of healthcare ( Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], 2002; Vo v. France [GC], 2004); ▪ in the context of dangerous activities, including industrial or environmental disasters ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008; Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014; M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015; Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023; Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, 2023); ▪ in the context of incidents on board a ship ( Leray and Others v. France (dec.), 2001), on trains ( Kalender v. Turkey, 2009), on a construction site ( Pereira Henriques v. Luxembourg, 2006), at a playground ( Koceski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), 2013); or at a school ( Ilbeyi Kemaloğlu and Meriye Kemaloğlu v. Turkey, 2012); ▪ in the context of road safety ( Rajkowska v. Poland (dec.), 2007; Anna Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2011); the provision of emergency services ( Furdík v. Slovakia (dec.), 2008); or diving operations in deep sea ( Vilnes and Others v. Norway, 2013); ▪ in the context of medical care and assistance given to vulnerable persons institutionalised in State facilities ( Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, 2013; Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], 2014; Dumpe v. Latvia (dec.), 2018); ▪ in the context of the State's failure to properly secure an area mined by the military ( Paşa and Erkan Erol v. Turkey, 2006; Albekov and Others v. Russia, 2008); to secure and supervise a firing range containing unexploded ordonance ( Oruk v. Turkey, 2014); and to react promptly to a disappearance in life-threatening circumstances ( Osmanoğlu v. Turkey, 2008; Dodov v. Bulgaria, 2008); ▪ in the context of an operation to rescue migrants who were drowning while trying to cross borders at sea ( Safi and Others v. Greece, 2022) or a river ( Alhowais v. Hungary, 2023); ▪ in the context of emergency medical assistance to military servicemen ( Dimaksyan v. Armenia, 2023)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-12-18,2025-01-22,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json,apps:42749/19,Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye,42749/19,added,"Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, no. 42749/19, 21 November 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.3,Protection of persons from environmental or industrial disasters,3,,45,,"Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye , 2023",,,"While States have no control over natural events such as earthquakes, it is nonetheless the responsibility of States to ensure the prevention of foreseeable natural risks and to adopt measures aimed at reducing their effects in order to minimise their catastrophic dimension. In this respect, the scope of the obligation of prevention, which remains an obligation of means, consists of strengthening the State's capacity to deal with this type of natural and violent phenomenon ( Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, 2023, § 128)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-12-18,2025-01-22,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json,apps:67351/13,Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia,67351/13,added,"Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia, no. 67351/13, 17 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.C.1,Protection of persons from lethal use of force by non-State actors,3,24,25,0.9875,"A and B v. Georgia , 2022|Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia , 2023|Opuz v. Turkey , 2009|Others v. Croatia , 2009|Tkhelidze v. Georgia , 2021","Tkhelidze v. Georgia A and B v. Georgia 2009|ć and Others v. Croatia , 2009","The Court has considered the State to have an obligation to take preventive operational measures to protect one or more individuals identifiable in advance as the potential target of a lethal act in contexts such as:  Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom murder of a prisoner (, 2002, §57);  domestic violence ( Branko Tomašić and Others v. Croatia, 2009, §§ 52-53; Opuz v. Turkey, Tkhelidze v. Georgia A and B v. Georgia 2009, § 129;, 2021, § 57;, 2022, § 49);  protection of witnesses in criminal proceedings ( Van Colle v. the United Kingdom, 2012, and A and B v. Romania, 2020, § 118);  killing of individuals in a conflict zone ( Kılıç v. Turkey, 2000, § 63; Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, 2000, § 88);  killing of a conscript during military service ( Yabansu and Others v. Turkey, 2013, § 91).  kidnapping of an individual ( Olewnik- Cieplińska and Olewnik v. Poland, 2019, § 125).","The Court has considered the State to have an obligation to take preventive operational measures to protect one or more individuals identifiable in advance as the potential target of a lethal act in contexts such as: ▪ murder of a prisoner ( Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, 2002, §57); ▪ domestic violence ( Branko Tomašić and Others v. Croatia, 2009, §§ 52-53; Opuz v. Turkey, 2009, § 129; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021, § 57; A and B v. Georgia, 2022, § 49); ▪ protection of witnesses in criminal proceedings ( Van Colle v. the United Kingdom, 2012, and A and B v. Romania, 2020, § 118); ▪ killing of individuals in a conflict zone ( Kılıç v. Turkey, 2000, § 63; Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, 2000, § 88); killing of a conscript during military service by a fellow conscript ( Yabansu and Others v. Turkey, 2013, § 91; see also Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia, 2023). ▪ kidnapping of an individual ( Olewnik- Cieplińska and Olewnik v. Poland, 2019, § 125)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-12-18,2025-01-22,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json,apps:55009/20,Huci v. Romania,55009/20,added,"Huci v. Romania, no.55009/20, 16 April 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.L.2.b,Cases concerning accidents,4,226,231,0.9787,"Huci v. Romania , 2024",,"By contrast, the Court considered that there was no failure to provide a mechanism whereby criminal, disciplinary or civil responsibility of persons who may be held answerable could be established in:  Furdík v. Slovakia (dec.), 2008, (death of a climber);  Koceski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), 2013, § 28 (death of a child in a playground when heavy concrete pillars fell on top of her);  Cavit Tınarlıoğlu v. Turkey, 2016, § 125 (serious injuries sustained by an applicant when he was struck by a motor boat while swimming in a bathing area that had not been cordoned off);  Mikhno v. Ukraine, 2016, § 151 (military aircraft crash killing spectators at a public air show);  Çakmak v. Turkey (dec.), 2017, § 34 (electrocution of the applicants' relative while picking up pinecones from a tree in the garden of a primary school);  Aktaş v. Turkey (dec.), 2019, § 29 (death of the applicant's son when his motorcycle collided with a pickup truck).","By contrast, the Court considered that there was no failure to provide a mechanism whereby criminal, disciplinary or civil responsibility of persons who may be held answerable could be established in: ▪ Furdík v. Slovakia (dec.), 2008, (death of a climber); ▪ Koceski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), 2013, § 28 (death of a child in a playground when heavy concrete pillars fell on top of her); ▪ Cavit Tınarlıoğlu v. Turkey, 2016, § 125 (serious injuries sustained by an applicant when he was struck by a motor boat while swimming in a bathing area that had not been cordoned off); ▪ Mikhno v. Ukraine, 2016, § 151 (military aircraft crash killing spectators at a public air show); ▪ Çakmak v. Turkey (dec.), 2017, § 34 (electrocution of the applicants'relative while picking up pinecones from a tree in the garden of a primary school); ▪ Aktaş v. Turkey (dec.), 2019, § 29 (death of the applicant's son when his motorcycle collided with a pickup truck). ▪ Huci v. Romania, 2024, §§ 59-60 (death of the applicants'relative in a crash of an uncertified small ultralight motorised airplane during a test flight)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-12-18,2025-01-22,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json,apps:21882/09|6189/10,Israilov v. Russia,21882/09|6189/10,added,"Israilov v. Russia, nos. 21882/09 and 6189/10, 24 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.J,Procedural obligations in trans-border contexts,2,203,208,0.9716,"Israilov v. Russia , 2023",,"In cases where an effective investigation into an unlawful killing which occurred within the jurisdiction of one Contracting State requires the involvement of more than one Contracting State, the Convention's special character as a collective enforcement treaty entails in principle an obligation on the part of the States concerned to cooperate effectively with each other in order to elucidate the circumstances of the killing and to bring the perpetrators to justice. Thus, Article 2 may require from both States a two-way obligation to cooperate with each other, implying at the same time an obligation to seek assistance and an obligation to afford assistance. The nature and scope of these Güzelyurtlu and Others obligations depend, however, on the circumstances of each particular case ( v. Cyprus and Turkey [GC], 2019, §§ 232-233). For instance, in a recent case it was held that a Member State of the European Union must cooperate with another Member State within the framework of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) system and duly consider whether to surrender an alleged terrorist Romeo Castaño v. Belgium fugitive for prosecution (, 2019, §§ 41-42 and 79-82).","In cases where an effective investigation into an unlawful killing which occurred within the jurisdiction of one Contracting State requires the involvement of more than one Contracting State, the Convention's special character as a collective enforcement treaty entails in principle an obligation on the part of the States concerned to cooperate effectively with each other in order to elucidate the circumstances of the killing and to bring the perpetrators to justice. Thus, Article 2 may require from both States a two-way obligation to cooperate with each other, implying at the same time an obligation to seek assistance and an obligation to afford assistance. The nature and scope of these obligations depend, however, on the circumstances of each particular case ( Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey [GC], 2019, §§ 232-233; see Israilov v. Russia, 2023, §§ 121-126 and 127-136, concerning the Russian authorities failure to cooperate with Austrian authorities in the investigation into the murder of the applicant's son in Austria; see also Romeo Castaño v. Belgium, where the Court considered that a Member State of the European Union must cooperate with another Member State within the framework of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) system and duly consider whether to surrender an alleged terrorist fugitive for prosecution (2019, §§ 41-42 and 79-82)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-12-18,2025-01-22,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json,apps:23093/20,Selçuk v. Türkiye,23093/20,added,"Selçuk v. Türkiye,no.23093/20, 9 July 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C,Applicability of Article 2 in near death situations,2,4,4,0.9964,"Selçuk v. Türkiye , 2024",,"The Court has emphasised on many occasions that Article 2 of the Convention may come into play even if a person whose right to life was allegedly breached did not die. In particular, the Court has held that in exceptional circumstances, depending on considerations such as the degree and type of force used and the nature of the injuries, use of force by State agents which does not result in death may disclose a violation of Article 2 of the Convention, if the behaviour of the State agents, by its very nature, puts the applicant's life at serious risk even though the latter survives ( Makaratzis v. Greece [GC], 2004, § 55; Soare and Others v. Romania, 2011, §§ 108-109; Trévalec v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 55-61). In all other cases where a person is assaulted or ill-treated by State agents, their complaints will rather fall to be examined under Article 3 of the Convention ( Makaratzis v. Greece [GC], 2004, § 51; İlhan v. Turkey [GC], 2000, § 76). In cases concerning applicants who survived a potentially lethal attack by non-State actors, the Court has adopted a similar approach to the one taken in respect of cases concerning use of force by State agents ( Yotova v. Bulgaria, 2012, § 69).","The Court has emphasised on many occasions that Article 2 of the Convention may come into play even if a person whose right to life was allegedly breached did not die. In particular, the Court has held that in exceptional circumstances, depending on considerations such as the degree and type of force used and the nature of the injuries, use of force by State agents which does not result in death may disclose a violation of Article 2 of the Convention, if the behaviour of the State agents, by its very nature, puts the applicant's life at serious risk even though the latter survives ( Makaratzis v. Greece [GC], 2004, § 55; Soare and Others v. Romania, 2011, §§ 108-109; Trévalec v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 55-61). In all other cases where a person is assaulted or ill-treated by State agents, their complaints will rather fall to be examined under Article 3 of the Convention ( Makaratzis v. Greece [GC], 2004, § 51; İlhan v. Turkey [GC], 2000, § 76). In cases concerning applicants who survived a potentially lethal attack by non-State actors, the Court has adopted a similar approach to the one taken in respect of cases concerning use of force by State agents ( Yotova v. Bulgaria, 2012, § 69; see also Selçuk v. Türkiye, 2024, § 73)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-12-18,2025-01-22,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json,apps:23093/20,Selçuk v. Türkiye,23093/20,added,"Selçuk v. Türkiye,no.23093/20, 9 July 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C.1,Protection of persons from lethal use of force by non-State actors,3,25,26,0.9549,"Selçuk v. Türkiye , 2024",,"The Court has also applied the aforementioned principles to cases giving rise to an obligation to afford general protection to society in certain specific contexts, such as:  murder committed by convicts on prison leave or placed under a semi-custodial regime ( Mastromatteo v. Italy [GC], 2002, § 69);  killing by convicted murderer following his release on licence ( Choreftakis and Choreftaki v. Greece, 2012, §§ 48-49);  killing by an off-duty police officer ( Gorovenky and Bugara v. Ukraine, 2012, § 32);  murder of a lawyer by her client's mentally disturbed husband ( Bljakaj and Others v. Croatia, 2014, § 121);  killings perpetrated during a large-scale hostage-taking by terrorists ( Tagayeva and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 482-492; by contrast, Finogenov and Others v. Russia (dec.), 2010, § 173).","The Court has also applied the aforementioned principles to cases giving rise to an obligation to afford general protection to society in certain specific contexts, such as: ▪ murder committed by convicts on prison leave or placed under a semi-custodial regime ( Mastromatteo v. Italy [GC], 2002, § 69); ▪ killing by convicted murderer following his release on licence ( Choreftakis and Choreftaki v. Greece, 2012, §§ 48-49); ▪ killing by an off-duty police officer ( Gorovenky and Bugara v. Ukraine, 2012, § 32); ▪ murder of a lawyer by her client's mentally disturbed husband ( Bljakaj and Others v. Croatia, 2014, § 121); ▪ killings perpetrated during a large-scale hostage-taking by terrorists ( Tagayeva and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 482-492; by contrast, Finogenov and Others v. Russia (dec.), 2010, § 173); ▪ injuries sustained by the applicant in the course of a demonstration following a terrorist attack where a hundred people died ( Selçuk v. Türkiye, 2024, §§ 96-97)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-12-18,2025-01-22,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json,apps:47909/19,T.V. v. Croatia,47909/19,added,"T.V. v. Croatia, no. 47909/19, 11 June 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.C.1,Death hastened by use of specific arrest techniques,3,,124,,"T.V. v. Croatia , 2024",,,"In a recent case where the applicant's partner, who had a history of mental health problems, died during a police intervention, the Court could not exclude that his death was caused by his immobilisation in prone position, since he died shortly thereafter as he was being transported to a hospital. However, in order to engage the international responsibility of the respondent State, it considered that it was also necessary that the State agents were reasonably able to realise that the victim was in a state of vulnerability requiring a high degree of precaution in the choice of ""usual"" arrest techniques ( T.V. v. Croatia, 2024, § 58; see also V v. the Czech Republic, 2023, § 99, which concerned the death of a psychiatric hospital patient following his repeated tasing by the police followed by the administration of a tranquiliser by a nurse)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-12-18,2025-01-22,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json,apps:20958/14|38334/18,"Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), [GC]",20958/14|38334/18,added,"Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), [GC], nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, 25 June 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.C.5.a,Presumption of death,4,,138,,,,,"Where the Ukrainian Government maintained that the Russian Federation was responsible for an administrative practice of enforced disappearances in Crimea, the Court held that, when determining the existence of such a practice, the overall examination should not be confined only to those individuals who had ultimately remained unaccounted for. While the presumption of death applied only to those individuals, having regard to the overall context including the large number of instances of irregular deprivation of liberty perpetrated by persons whose acts entailed the responsibility of Russia, the fact that victims were those perceived as opponents to the events that unfolded in Crimea at the time and the fact that the abductions followed a particular pattern and were used as a means to intimidate and persecute such individuals to supress the existing opposition in Crimea to the Russian ""occupation"", the Court considered that there had been ""sufficiently numerous"" instances of abduction to amount to a pattern or system (""repetition of acts"") which was itself life - threatening to engage the applicability of Article 2 as regards that administrative practice ( Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), [GC], 2024, § 970)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-12-18,2025-01-22,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json,apps:26074/18,V v. the Czech Republic,26074/18,added,"V v. the Czech Republic, no. 26074/18, 7 December 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.C.1,Death hastened by use of specific arrest techniques,3,,124,,"T.V. v. Croatia , 2024",,,"In a recent case where the applicant's partner, who had a history of mental health problems, died during a police intervention, the Court could not exclude that his death was caused by his immobilisation in prone position, since he died shortly thereafter as he was being transported to a hospital. However, in order to engage the international responsibility of the respondent State, it considered that it was also necessary that the State agents were reasonably able to realise that the victim was in a state of vulnerability requiring a high degree of precaution in the choice of ""usual"" arrest techniques ( T.V. v. Croatia, 2024, § 58; see also V v. the Czech Republic, 2023, § 99, which concerned the death of a psychiatric hospital patient following his repeated tasing by the police followed by the administration of a tranquiliser by a nurse)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20231218132744__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2023-12-18,2025-01-22,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2023-12-18__2025-01-22.json,apps:53600/20,"Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland, [GC]",53600/20,added,"Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland, [GC], no. 53600/20, 9 April 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.C,Applicability of Article 2 in near death situations,2,,10,,,,,"The Court has recently clarified that, in order for Article 2 to apply to complaints about State action and/or inaction in the context of climate change, it needs to be determined that there is a ""real and imminent"" risk to life, understood as referring to a serious, genuine and sufficiently ascertainable threat to the life of a specific applicant, containing an element of material and temporal proximity of the threat to the harm impugned by the applicant (Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland, [GC], 2024, § 513)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250619203315__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2025-01-22,2025-06-19,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-01-22__2025-06-19.json,apps:1718/21,A.P. v. Austria,1718/21,added,"A.P. v. Austria, no. 1718/21, 26 November 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.F.2,Adequacy,3,174,174,0.9982,"A.P. v. Austria, 2024",,"The Court has found the investigation inadequate when, for example: ▪ the investigation into a fatal shooting by the police during an attempted arrest had been undermined by shortcomings such as the failure to test the hands of officers in question for gunshot residue; to stage a reconstruction of the incident; to examine their weapons or ammunition; the lack of an adequate pictorial record of the trauma caused to the victim's body by the fatal bullet; and the failure to separate the officers involved in the incident before their questioning ( Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], 2007, §§ 326-332); ▪ the forensic investigation was defective ( Tanlı v. Turkey, 2001, § 153); ▪ the authorities accepted the version of facts presented by the accused State agents without hearing any further witnesses ( Özalp and Others v. Turkey, 2004, § 45) or placed heavy reliance on the report prepared by them ( İkincisoy v. Turkey, 2004, § 78); ▪ no investigation had been conducted into the flight log which constituted a key element in the possible identification and prosecution of those responsible for the bombing of civilian villages by military aircraft ( Benzer and Others v. Turkey, 2013, § 196); ▪ the investigation into the contract killing of an investigative journalist focused only on a single line of inquiry without exploring other allegations ( Mazepa and Others v. Russia, 2018, §§ 77-79); ▪ the investigation into the circumstances leading to the death of the applicant's son following his accidental shooting by a fellow conscript during his military service failed to elucidate some important factual matters, such as the overall time taken for the hospital transfer as well as the nature and origins of a number of injuries detected during the autopsy ( Dimaksyan v. Armenia, 2023, § 102).","The Court has found the investigation inadequate when, for example: ▪ the investigation into a fatal shooting by the police during an attempted arrest had been undermined by shortcomings such as the failure to test the hands of officers in question for gunshot residue; to stage a reconstruction of the incident; to examine their weapons or ammunition; the lack of an adequate pictorial record of the trauma caused to the victim's body by the fatal bullet; and the failure to separate the officers involved in the incident before their questioning ( Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], 2007, §§ 326-332); ▪ the forensic investigation was defective ( Tanlı v. Turkey, 2001, § 153; see by contrast A.P. v. Austria, 2024, §§ 154-58); ▪ the authorities accepted the version of facts presented by the accused State agents without hearing any further witnesses ( Özalp and Others v. Turkey, 2004, § 45) or placed heavy reliance on the report prepared by them ( İkincisoy v. Turkey, 2004, § 78); ▪ no investigation had been conducted into the flight log which constituted a key element in the possible identification and prosecution of those responsible for the bombing of civilian villages by military aircraft ( Benzer and Others v. Turkey, 2013, § 196); ▪ the investigation into the contract killing of an investigative journalist focused only on a single line of inquiry without exploring other allegations ( Mazepa and Others v. Russia, 2018, §§ 77-79); ▪ the investigation into the circumstances leading to the death of the applicant's son following his accidental shooting by a fellow conscript during his military service failed to elucidate some important factual matters, such as the overall time taken for the hospital transfer as well as the nature and origins of a number of injuries detected during the autopsy ( Dimaksyan v. Armenia, 2023, § 102)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250619203315__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2025-01-22,2025-06-19,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-01-22__2025-06-19.json,apps:9375/20,Bagirova v. Azerbaijan,9375/20,added,"Bagirova v. Azerbaijan, no. 9375/20, 10 October 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.B.1.b,Burden of proof,4,94,94,0.9968,"Bagirova v. Azerbaijan , 2024",,"In fact, the Court has underlined that, in all cases where it is unable to establish the exact circumstances of a case for reasons objectively attributable to the State authorities, it is for the respondent Government to explain, in a satisfactory and convincing manner, the sequence of events and to exhibit solid evidence that can refute the applicant's allegations ( Mansuroğlu v. Turkey, 2008, § 80 and Carter v. Russia, 2021, § 152). The Court has also noted the difficulties for applicants to obtain the necessary evidence in support of allegations in cases where the respondent Government are in possession of the relevant documentation and fail to submit it. If the authorities then fail to disclose crucial documents to enable the Court to establish the facts or otherwise provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation, strong inferences may be drawn ( Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2009, § 184). The Court's reliance on evidence obtained as a result of the domestic investigation and on the facts established within the domestic proceedings will largely depend on the quality of the domestic investigative process, its thoroughness and consistency ( Tagayeva and Others v. Russia, 2017, § 586 and Lapshin v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 95).","In fact, the Court has underlined that, in all cases where it is unable to establish the exact circumstances of a case for reasons objectively attributable to the State authorities, it is for the respondent Government to explain, in a satisfactory and convincing manner, the sequence of events and to exhibit solid evidence that can refute the applicant's allegations ( Mansuroğlu v. Turkey, 2008, § 80 and Carter v. Russia, 2021, § 152; see, for example, Bagirova v. Azerbaijan, 2024, §§ 66-69). The Court has also noted the difficulties for applicants to obtain the necessary evidence in support of allegations in cases where the respondent Government are in possession of the relevant documentation and fail to submit it. If the authorities then fail to disclose crucial documents to enable the Court to establish the facts or otherwise provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation, strong inferences may be drawn ( Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2009, § 184). The Court's reliance on evidence obtained as a result of the domestic investigation and on the facts established within the domestic proceedings will largely depend on the quality of the domestic investigative process, its thoroughness and consistency ( Tagayeva and Others v. Russia, 2017, § 586 and Lapshin v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 95)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250619203315__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2025-01-22,2025-06-19,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-01-22__2025-06-19.json,apps:39742/14,Cannavacciuolo and Others v Italy,39742/14,added,"Cannavacciuolo and Others v Italy, no. 39742/14 and 3 others, 30 January 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.C,Applicability of Article 2 in near death situations,2,10,10,0.9077,,,"The Court has recently clarified that, in order for Article 2 to apply to complaints about State action and/or inaction in the context of climate change, it needs to be determined that there is a ""real and imminent"" risk to life, understood as referring to a serious, genuine and sufficiently ascertainable threat to the life of a specific applicant, containing an element of material and temporal proximity of the threat to the harm impugned by the applicant (Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland, [GC], 2024, § 513).","The Court has recently clarified that, in order for Article 2 to apply to complaints about State action and/or inaction in the context of climate change, it needs to be determined that there is a ""real and imminent"" risk to life, understood as referring to a serious, genuine and sufficiently ascertainable threat to the life of a specific applicant, containing an element of material and temporal proximity of the threat to the harm impugned by the applicant (Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland, [GC], 2024, § 513). The case of Cannavacciuolo and Others v Italy, 2025, §§ 384-392 concerned a particularly complex and widespread form of pollution stemming from illegal dumping, burying and/or uncontrolled abandonment of hazardous, special and urban waste, often carried out by criminal organized groups and frequently combined with incineration. The Court accepted the existence of a sufficiently serious, genuine and ascertainable risk to life, which was also imminent given the applicants'residence over a considerable period in the municipalities officially identified by the domestic authorities as being affected by systematic large-scale pollution."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250619203315__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2025-01-22,2025-06-19,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-01-22__2025-06-19.json,apps:5576/19,Ceyhan v. Türkiye,5576/19,added,"Ceyhan v. Türkiye, no 5576/19, 3 December 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.L.1,General principles,3,219,219,0.9976,"Ceyhan v. Türkiye , 2024",,"Nevertheless, even in the context of non-intentional infringements of the right to life, there may be exceptional circumstances where an effective criminal investigation is necessary to satisfy the requirement of Article 2 of the Convention ( Cevrioğlu v. Turkey, 2016, § 54; Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], 2017, § 215). The Court has found such exceptional circumstances to arise in cases where the negligence which led to an infringement of the right to life went, inter alia, beyond a mere error of judgment or carelessness. Such as for example: ▪ in the context of dangerous industrial activities ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 71; Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023, § 184); ▪ in the context of a denial of healthcare ( Asiye Genç v. Turkey, 2015, § 73); ▪ in the context of military activities ( Oruk v. Turkey, 2014, §§ 50 and 65); ▪ in the context of transportation of dangerous goods ( Sinim v. Turkey, 2017, §§ 62-64); ▪ in the context of road safety ( Smiljanić v. Croatia, 2021, § 93); ▪ in the context of police inaction in a domestic violence case ( Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021, §§ 59-60; see also Penati v. Italy, 2021, §§ 158-162, where the Court has also required a criminal investigation into the killing of a child by his father during a protected contact session organized by the social welfare department).","Nevertheless, even in the context of non-intentional infringements of the right to life, there may be exceptional circumstances where an effective criminal investigation is necessary to satisfy the requirement of Article 2 of the Convention ( Cevrioğlu v. Turkey, 2016, § 54; Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], 2017, § 215). The Court has found such exceptional circumstances to arise in cases where the negligence which led to an infringement of the right to life went, inter alia, beyond a mere error of judgment or carelessness. Such as for example: ▪ in the context of dangerous industrial activities ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 71; Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023, § 184); ▪ in the context of a denial of healthcare ( Asiye Genç v. Turkey, 2015, § 73); ▪ in the context of military activities ( Oruk v. Turkey, 2014, §§ 50 and 65) see also Ceyhan v. Türkiye, 2024, §§ 85-87; ▪ in the context of transportation of dangerous goods ( Sinim v. Turkey, 2017, §§ 62-64); ▪ in the context of road safety ( Smiljanić v. Croatia, 2021, § 93); ▪ in the context of police inaction in a domestic violence case ( Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021, §§ 59-60; see also Penati v. Italy, 2021, §§ 158-162, where the Court has also required a criminal investigation into the killing of a child by his father during a protected contact session organized by the social welfare department)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250619203315__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2025-01-22,2025-06-19,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-01-22__2025-06-19.json,apps:22525/21|47626/21,Fraisse and Others v France,22525/21|47626/21,added,"Fraisse and Others v France, nos 22525/21 and 47626/21, 27 February 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.F.2,Adequacy,3,175,175,0.9822,"Fraisse and Others v. France , 2025",,"By contrast, having regard to the various steps undertaken by the domestic authorities, the Court did not find an issue with respect to the adequacy of the investigation in: ▪ Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey [GC], 2015, § 209, which concerned the investigation into the death of the applicants'son and brother during his military service; ▪ Armani Da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2016, § 286, which concerned the investigation into the fatal shooting of person mistakenly identified as a suspected terrorist; ▪ Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], 2011, § 309, which concerned the investigation into the fatal shooting of a demonstrator by a member of the security forces during a G8 summit; ▪ Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2011, §§ 64-66, which concerned the investigation into the disappearance of the applicant's husband during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. ▪ Tunç v. Turkey (dec.), 2022, §§ 96-97, which concerned the authorities'investigation into the disappearance of the applicants'relative, against whom criminal proceedings were pending for his alleged involvement in a terrorist organisation.","By contrast, having regard to the various steps undertaken by the domestic authorities, the Court did not find an issue with respect to the adequacy of the investigation in: ▪ Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey [GC], 2015, § 209, which concerned the investigation into the death of the applicants'son and brother during his military service; ▪ Armani Da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2016, § 286, which concerned the investigation into the fatal shooting of person mistakenly identified as a suspected terrorist; ▪ Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], 2011, § 309, which concerned the investigation into the fatal shooting of a demonstrator by a member of the security forces during a G8 summit; ▪ Palić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2011, §§ 64-66, which concerned the investigation into the disappearance of the applicant's husband during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina; ▪ Tunç v. Turkey (dec.), 2022, §§ 96-97, which concerned the authorities'investigation into the disappearance of the applicants'relative, against whom criminal proceedings were pending for his alleged involvement in a terrorist organisation; ▪ Fraisse and Others v. France, 2025, §§ 161-162, which concerned the investigation into the death of a student as a result of an explosion of a stun grenade launched by a gendarme during violence clashes between protesters and mobile gendarmes forces."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20250122170132__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20250619203315__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2025-01-22,2025-06-19,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-01-22__2025-06-19.json,apps:57507/19,Svrtan v. Croatia,57507/19,added,"Svrtan v. Croatia, no. 57507/19, 3 December 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C.1,Protection of persons from lethal use of force by non-State actors,3,27,27,0.925,"Svrtan v. Croatia, 2024",,"In a recent case the authorities did not preventively confiscate a gun from a student whose internet postings prior to committing school killings, while not containing specific threats, cast doubt on his fitness to safely possess a firearm. The Court has laid emphasis on the fact that the use of firearms entails a high level of inherent risk to life and that therefore the State had to put in place and rigorously apply a system of adequate and effective safeguards designed to counteract and prevent any improper and dangerous use of such weapons ( Kotilainen and Others v. Finland, 2020, § 88).","In a recent case the authorities did not preventively confiscate a gun from a student whose internet postings prior to committing school killings, while not containing specific threats, cast doubt on his fitness to safely possess a firearm. The Court has laid emphasis on the fact that the use of firearms entails a high level of inherent risk to life and that therefore the State had to put in place and rigorously apply a system of adequate and effective safeguards designed to counteract and prevent any improper and dangerous use of such weapons ( Kotilainen and Others v. Finland, 2020, § 88; see also Svrtan v. Croatia, 2024, § 99 where, in the context of the phenomenon of widespread illegal possession of weapons post-war, the applicants'son was killed by a person with an alleged history of alcohol abuse, violent behavior and unlawful possession of firearms."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20250619203315__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20251215180904__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2025-06-19,2025-12-15,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-06-19__2025-12-15.json,apps:22776/18,Almukhlas and Al-Maliki v. Greece,22776/18,added,"Almukhlas and Al-Maliki v. Greece, no. 22776/18, 25 March 2025",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.B.3.b.§39,iii. Illustrations,5,121,123,0.953,"Almukhlas and Al-Maliki v. Greece, no. 22776/18, 25 March 2025",,"The Court did not consider that the use of force was strictly proportionate or absolutely necessary in the pursuit of one of the aims delineated in paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Convention in: ▪ Güleç v. Turkey, 1998, § 71, where the applicant's son was killed during a demonstration where the security forces - confronted with acts of violence - and not having any batons, riot shields, water cannon, rubber bullets or tear gas - deployed machine guns; see also Evrim Öktem v. Turkey, 2008, where a minor was seriously injured by stray bullet fired from a police officer's gun during an operation to break up a demonstration; see also Fraisse and Others v France, 2025, § 135 where the applicants' relative died as a result of an explosion of a stun grenade launched by a gendarme during violent clashes between protesters and mobile gendarmes forces. ▪ Kakoulli v. Turkey, 2005, § 121, where an unarmed Greek-Cypriot, who had entered into the buffer zone between northern and southern Cyprus, was shot dead by Turkish soldiers; ▪ Wasilewska and Kałucka v. Poland, 2010, § 57, where a suspect was shot dead during a police operation; ▪ Trévalec v. Belgium, 2011, § 87, where a journalist was shot by a special operations police unit which had not been informed that his presence in the police operation had been authorised; ▪ Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005, § 109, where two unarmed Roma fugitives were shot dead by military police during an attempted arrest; ▪ Tagayeva and Others v. Russia, 2017, § 611, where a number of hostages were killed in the course of a rescue operation in the context of a large scale hostage-taking by terrorists in a school in Beslan, North Ossetia; see, by contrast, Finogenov and Others v. Russia, 2011, §§ 226 and 236, where a number of hostages were killed in the course of a rescue operation in the context of hostage-taking by terrorists in a theatre in Moscow; ▪ Kukhalashvili and Others v. Georgia, 2020, §157, where indiscriminate and excessive use of lethal force was used by the police during an anti-riot operation in prison; ▪ Yukhymovych v. Ukraine, 2020, § 86, where the applicant's son was killed during a police operation organized in the context of a criminal investigation into extortion; ▪ Pârvu v. Romania, 2022, § 87, where the applicant's husband, wrongly identified as a dangerous fugitive, was shot in the head by a police officer in the course of a planned operation to capture him. ▪ Alkhatib and Others v. Greece, 2024, § 155, where the applicant's relative, who was travelling in a boat with a view to illegally entering Greece, was shot by the coast guard.","The Court did not consider that the use of force was strictly proportionate or absolutely necessary in the pursuit of one of the aims delineated in paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Convention in: ▪ Güleç v. Turkey, 1998, § 71, where the applicant's son was killed during a demonstration where the security forces - confronted with acts of violence - and not having any batons, riot shields, water cannon, rubber bullets or tear gas - deployed machine guns; see also Evrim Öktem v. Turkey, 2008, where a minor was seriously injured by stray bullet fired from a police officer's gun during an operation to break up a demonstration; see also Fraisse and Others v. France, 2025, § 135 where the applicants' relative died as a result of an explosion of a stun grenade launched by a gendarme during violent clashes between protesters and mobile gendarmes forces. ▪ Kakoulli v. Turkey, 2005, § 121, where an unarmed Greek-Cypriot, who had entered into the buffer zone between northern and southern Cyprus, was shot dead by Turkish soldiers; ▪ Wasilewska and Kałucka v. Poland, 2010, § 57, where a suspect was shot dead during a police operation; ▪ Trévalec v. Belgium, 2011, § 87, where a journalist was shot by a special operations police unit which had not been informed that his presence in the police operation had been authorised; ▪ Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005, § 109, where two unarmed Roma fugitives were shot dead by military police during an attempted arrest; ▪ Tagayeva and Others v. Russia, 2017, § 611, where a number of hostages were killed in the course of a rescue operation in the context of a large scale hostage-taking by terrorists in a school in Beslan, North Ossetia; see, by contrast, Finogenov and Others v. Russia, 2011, §§ 226 and 236, where a number of hostages were killed in the course of a rescue operation in the context of hostage-taking by terrorists in a theatre in Moscow; ▪ Kukhalashvili and Others v. Georgia, 2020, §157, where indiscriminate and excessive use of lethal force was used by the police during an anti-riot operation in prison; ▪ Yukhymovych v. Ukraine, 2020, § 86, where the applicant's son was killed during a police operation organized in the context of a criminal investigation into extortion; ▪ Pârvu v. Romania, 2022, § 87, where the applicant's husband, wrongly identified as a dangerous fugitive, was shot in the head by a police officer in the course of a planned operation to capture him. ▪ Alkhatib and Others v. Greece, 2024, § 155, where the applicant's relative, who was travelling in a boat with a view to illegally entering Greece, was shot by a coast guard. See also Almukhlas and Al-Maliki v. Greece, 2025, § 154 where a minor hiding on a boat illegally transporting migrants was shot by a coast guard who was aiming at one of the skippers during an operation to intercept the boat."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20250619203315__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20251215180904__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2025-06-19,2025-12-15,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-06-19__2025-12-15.json,apps:35950/20,Hasani v. Sweden,35950/20,added,"Hasani v. Sweden, no. 35950/20, 6 March 2025",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.2,Protection of persons from self-harm,3,,40,,"Hasani v. Sweden, no. 35950/20, 6 March 2025",,,"Likewise, the Court found the State's positive obligation engaged in the very particular circumstances where a young asylum-seeker - unaccompanied by adult family members, suffering from visual impairment and mental health problems and dependent to a large extent on the care and accommodation provided by the Swedish authorities - committed suicide (Hasani v. Sweden, 2025, § 70)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20250619203315__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20251215180904__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2025-06-19,2025-12-15,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-06-19__2025-12-15.json,apps:35950/20,Hasani v. Sweden,35950/20,added,"Hasani v. Sweden, no. 35950/20, 6 March 2025",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C.2,Protection of persons from self-harm,3,39,39,0.84,"Hasani v. Sweden, no. 35950/20, 6 March 2025",,"In a case where the applicant's wife set herself on fire in protest at a forced eviction, the Court held that, in a situation where an individual threatens to take his or her own life in plain view of State agents and, moreover, where this threat is an emotional reaction directly induced by the State agents' actions or demands, the latter should treat this threat with the utmost seriousness as constituting an imminent risk to that individual's life, regardless of how unexpected that threat might have been. In such circumstances, if the State agents become aware of such a threat sufficiently in advance, a positive obligation arises under Article 2 requiring them to prevent this threat from materialising by any means which are reasonable and feasible in the circumstances (Mikayil Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2009, § 115).","The Court has underlined that, when considering whether the duty to take preventive operational measures arises in a particular situation, it takes account of the context in which a death takes place, and the degree of control that the authorities exercise over the events (Hasani v. Sweden, 2025, § 64). For example, in a case where the applicant's wife set herself on fire in protest at a forced eviction, the Court held that, in a situation where an individual threatens to take his or her own life in plain view of State agents and, moreover, where this threat is an emotional reaction directly induced by the State agents' actions or demands, the latter should treat this threat with the utmost seriousness as constituting an imminent risk to that individual's life, regardless of how unexpected that threat might have been. In such circumstances, if the State agents become aware of such a threat sufficiently in advance, a positive obligation arises under Article 2 requiring them to prevent this threat from materialising by any means which are reasonable and feasible in the circumstances (Mikayil Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2009, § 115)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20250619203315__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20251215180904__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2025-06-19,2025-12-15,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-06-19__2025-12-15.json,apps:51781/22,Kalkan v. Denmark,51781/22,added,"Kalkan v. Denmark, no. 51781/22, 27 May 2025",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.B.2.c,Illustrations,4,,108,,"Kalkan v. Denmark, no. 51781/22, 27 May 2025",,,"Where the applicant's son died, after being restrained by prison officers in a prone position leg lock for about thirteen minutes while trying to move him to another cell, the Court considered that the authorities had failed to give prison guards clear and adequate instructions on the use of the prone position when restraining prisoners and that, due to their failure to train their law-enforcement officials, the prison officers involved in the incident had lacked the high level of competence required when dealing with a situation that presented a risk to life (see Kalkan v. Denmark, 2025, § 129)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20250619203315__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20251215180904__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2025-06-19,2025-12-15,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-06-19__2025-12-15.json,apps:56114/18,N.D. v. Switzerland,56114/18,added,"N.D. v. Switzerland, no. 56114/18, 3 April 2025",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C.1,Protection of persons from lethal use of force by non-State actors,3,25,25,0.985,"N.D. v. Switzerland, no. 56114/18, 3 April 2025",,"The Court has considered the State to have an obligation to take preventive operational measures to protect one or more individuals identifiable in advance as the potential target of a lethal act in contexts such as: ▪ murder of a prisoner (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, 2002, §57); ▪ domestic violence (Branko Tomašić and Others v. Croatia, 2009, §§ 52-53; Opuz v. Turkey, 2009, § 129; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021, § 57; A and B v. Georgia, 2022, § 49); ▪ protection of witnesses in criminal proceedings (Van Colle v. the United Kingdom, 2012, and A and B v. Romania, 2020, § 118); ▪ killing of individuals in a conflict zone (Kılıç v. Turkey, 2000, § 63; Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, 2000, § 88); killing of a conscript during military service by a fellow conscript (Yabansu and Others v. Turkey, 2013, § 91; see also Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia, 2023). ▪ kidnapping of an individual (Olewnik-Cieplińska and Olewnik v. Poland, 2019, § 125).","The Court has considered the State to have an obligation to take preventive operational measures to protect one or more individuals identifiable in advance as the potential target of a lethal act in contexts such as: ▪ murder of a prisoner (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, 2002, §57); ▪ domestic violence (Branko Tomašić and Others v. Croatia, 2009, §§ 52-53; Opuz v. Turkey, 2009, § 129; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021, § 57; A and B v. Georgia, 2022, § 49; N.D. v. Switzerland, 2025, § 67); ▪ protection of witnesses in criminal proceedings (Van Colle v. the United Kingdom, 2012, and A and B v. Romania, 2020, § 118); ▪ killing of individuals in a conflict zone (Kılıç v. Turkey, 2000, § 63; Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, 2000, § 88); killing of a conscript during military service by a fellow conscript (Yabansu and Others v. Turkey, 2013, § 91; see also Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia, 2023). ▪ kidnapping of an individual (Olewnik-Cieplińska and Olewnik v. Poland, 2019, § 125)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20250619203315__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20251215180904__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2025-06-19,2025-12-15,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-06-19__2025-12-15.json,apps:8019/16,Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC],8019/16,added,"Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 3 others, 9 July 2025",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.C.3,Extra-judicial killings,3,,129,,"Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 3 others, 9 July 2025",,,"The Court has also been confronted with applications where it is undisputed that the applicants' relatives died in circumstances falling outside the exceptions set out in the second paragraph of Article 2. In these cases, if the Court, on the basis of the evidence in the case-file, establishes that the applicants' relatives were killed by State agents or with their connivance or acquiescence, it will find the respondent Government liable for their death (Avşar v. Turkey, 2001, §§ 413-416; Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia, 2005, § 147; Estamirov and Others v. Russia, 2006, § 114; Musayeva and Others v. Russia, 2007, § 155; Amuyeva and Others v. Russia, 2010, §§ 83-84; see also Lapshin v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 119, where the applicant survived an attempt to his life while in prison and by contrast Denizci and Others v. Cyprus, 2001, § 373; Buldan v. Turkey, 2004, § 81; Nuray Şen v. Turkey (no. 2), 2004, § 173; Seyhan v. Turkey, 2004, § 82 and Carter v. Russia, 2021, §§ 170-172; see also Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025, §§ 1034-1045, where the Court found Russia responsible for an administrative practice of extrajudicial killing of civilians and Ukrainian military personnel hors de combat in occupied territory in Ukraine)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20250619203315__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20251215180904__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2025-06-19,2025-12-15,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-06-19__2025-12-15.json,apps:8019/16,Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC],8019/16,added,"Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 3 others, 9 July 2025",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.C.4,Security or military operations,3,,134,,"Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 3 others, 9 July 2025",,,"For example, in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025, the Court found Russia responsible for an administrative practice of military attacks in Ukraine, in the context of the conduct of hostilities in the period between 11 May 2014 and 16 September 2022, in breach of that State's both negative and positive obligations (§ 772). As regards the complaint concerning the downing of flight MH17 as a consequence of the firing, from separatist-controlled territory, of a missile supplied by Russia, resulting in the deaths of all 298 civilians on board, the Court noted that a conflict between Article 2 of the Convention and the provisions of international humanitarian law might arise if the impugned act was compatible with the latter. However, it found that the launching of the missile towards the aircraft was an indiscriminate attack in breach of international humanitarian law, and thus not constituting a lawful act of war. Therefore, no potential conflict could arise from the absence in Article 2 § 2 of the Convention of any accommodation of deaths compatible with international humanitarian law. It went on to find that the intentional use of force leading to the deprivation of the lives of the civilians on board the flight could not be justified under any of the grounds listed in Article 2 § 2 (§§ 452-462). The Court further found that the Russian federation had also failed to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those on board the flight by deploying such a missile in an area where civilian flights had still been operating and by failing to undertake a number of measures which could have significantly reduced or even eliminated the risk, posed by the deployment of such a missile, to civilians travelling in civilian aircraft over eastern Ukraine (§§ 463-466)."
415c8994e0ed,Article 2,20250619203315__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,20251215180904__guide_art_2_eng.pdf,2025-06-19,2025-12-15,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/415c8994e0ed/diff_2025-06-19__2025-12-15.json,apps:8019/16,Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC],8019/16,added,"Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 3 others, 9 July 2025",3,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.K,Procedural obligations in the context of armed conflict,2,,215,,"Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 3 others, 9 July 2025",,,"In Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025, the Court found that Russia had failed to conduct an effective investigation into the downing of flight MH17 as a consequence of the firing, from separatist-controlled territory, of a missile supplied by Russia, resulting in the deaths of all 298 civilians on board. In this regard, it noted, inter alia: that inquiries made by the authorities had been piecemeal, focusing on certain aspects of the incident with a view to showing the lack of any Russian involvement and deflecting responsibility into Ukraine; that the next-of- kin of those killed had not been involved in any inquiries and had not been directly informed of the outcome; and that the authorities had failed to cooperate effectively with the investigation of the international joint investigation team (JIT)."
41c295afbaa0,Article 7,20230923043629__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,20240329131345__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-29,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-29.json,apps:28186/19|29092/19,Jasuitis and Šimaitis v. Lithuania,28186/19|29092/19,added,"Jasuitis and Šimaitis v. Lithuania, nos. 28186/19 and 29092/19, 12 December 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.B.2,Judicial interpretation: clarification of legal rules,3,37,37,0.9335,"Jorgic v. Germany , 2007|Total S.A. and Vitol S.A. v. France , 2023|Šimaitis v. Lithuania , 2023",,"As regards the compatibility of the domestic judicial interpretation with the essence of the offence, the Court must determine whether that interpretation was in line with the wording of the provision of the criminal legislation in question as read in its context, and whether or not it was unreasonable (see, among many other authorities, Jorgic v. Germany, §§ 104-108, as regards the crime of genocide). The Court has also stressed that that conduct does not fall outside the scope of the criminal law merely because it also constitutes a disciplinary offence ( Norman v. the United Kingdom, § 68).","As regards the compatibility of the domestic judicial interpretation with the essence of the offence, the Court must determine whether that interpretation was in line with the wording of the provision of the criminal legislation in question as read in its context, and whether or not it was unreasonable ( Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, §§ 255-268, as regards the crime of membership of an armed terrorist organisation; Jorgic v. Germany, 2007, §§ 104-108, as regards the crime of genocide; Total S.A. and Vitol S.A. v. France, 2023, §§ 58-71, as regards the crime of bribing foreign public officials; Jasuitis and Šimaitis v. Lithuania, 2023, §§ 119-140, as regards the crime of trafficking in human beings). The Court has also stressed that that conduct does not fall outside the scope of the criminal law merely because it also constitutes a disciplinary offence ( Norman v. the United Kingdom, 2021, § 68)."
41c295afbaa0,Article 7,20230923043629__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,20240329131345__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-29,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-29.json,apps:34634/18|43546/18,Total S.A. and Vitol S.A. v. France,34634/18|43546/18,added,"Total S.A. and Vitol S.A. v. France, nos. 34634/18 and 43546/18, 12 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III,Principle that only the law can define a crime and prescribe a penalty,1,24,24,0.9696,"Total S.A. and Vitol S.A. v. France , 2023",,"Given the subsidiary nature of the Convention system, it is not the Court's function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention ( Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany [GC], § 49; Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania [GC], § 160), and unless the assessment conducted by the domestic courts is manifestly arbitrary ( Kononov v. Latvia [GC], § 189). Even though the Court is not called upon to rule on the legal classification of the offence or the applicant's individual criminal responsibility, that being primarily a matter for assessment by the domestic courts ( ibid., § 187; Rohlena v. the Czech Republic [GC], § 51), Article 7 § 1 requires the Court to examine whether there was a contemporaneous legal basis for the applicant's conviction and, in particular, it must satisfy itself that the result reached by the relevant domestic courts was compatible with Article 7 of the Convention. To accord a lesser power of review to the Court would render Article 7 devoid of purpose ( ibid., § 52; Kononov v. Latvia [GC], § 198; Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania [GC], § 161).","Given the subsidiary nature of the Convention system, it is not the Court's function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention ( Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany [GC], 2001, § 49; Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania [GC], 2015, § 160), and unless the assessment conducted by the domestic courts is manifestly arbitrary ( Kononov v. Latvia [GC], 2010, § 189). This also applies where domestic law refers to rules of general international law or international agreements, or where national courts apply principles of international law ( Total S.A. and Vitol S.A. v. France, 2023, § 57). Even though the Court is not called upon to rule on the legal classification of the offence or the applicant's individual criminal responsibility, that being primarily a matter for assessment by the domestic courts ( ibid., § 187; Rohlena v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2015, § 51), Article 7 § 1 requires the Court to examine whether there was a contemporaneous legal basis for the applicant's conviction and, in particular, it must satisfy itself that the result reached by the relevant domestic courts was compatible with Article 7 of the Convention. To accord a lesser power of review to the Court would render Article 7 devoid of purpose ( ibid., § 52; Kononov v. Latvia [GC], 2010, § 198; Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania [GC], 2015, § 161)."
41c295afbaa0,Article 7,20230923043629__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,20240329131345__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-29,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-29.json,apps:34634/18|43546/18,Total S.A. and Vitol S.A. v. France,34634/18|43546/18,added,"Total S.A. and Vitol S.A. v. France, nos. 34634/18 and 43546/18, 12 October 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.B.2,Judicial interpretation: clarification of legal rules,3,37,37,0.9335,"Jorgic v. Germany , 2007|Total S.A. and Vitol S.A. v. France , 2023|Šimaitis v. Lithuania , 2023",,"As regards the compatibility of the domestic judicial interpretation with the essence of the offence, the Court must determine whether that interpretation was in line with the wording of the provision of the criminal legislation in question as read in its context, and whether or not it was unreasonable (see, among many other authorities, Jorgic v. Germany, §§ 104-108, as regards the crime of genocide). The Court has also stressed that that conduct does not fall outside the scope of the criminal law merely because it also constitutes a disciplinary offence ( Norman v. the United Kingdom, § 68).","As regards the compatibility of the domestic judicial interpretation with the essence of the offence, the Court must determine whether that interpretation was in line with the wording of the provision of the criminal legislation in question as read in its context, and whether or not it was unreasonable ( Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, §§ 255-268, as regards the crime of membership of an armed terrorist organisation; Jorgic v. Germany, 2007, §§ 104-108, as regards the crime of genocide; Total S.A. and Vitol S.A. v. France, 2023, §§ 58-71, as regards the crime of bribing foreign public officials; Jasuitis and Šimaitis v. Lithuania, 2023, §§ 119-140, as regards the crime of trafficking in human beings). The Court has also stressed that that conduct does not fall outside the scope of the criminal law merely because it also constitutes a disciplinary offence ( Norman v. the United Kingdom, 2021, § 68)."
41c295afbaa0,Article 7,20230923043629__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,20240329131345__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-29,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-29.json,apps:15669/20,Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC],15669/20,added,"Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.B.1,General considerations,3,29,29,0.9922,,,"It follows that in principle, there can only be a ""penalty"" within the meaning of Article 7 if an element of personal liability has been established in respect of the perpetrator of the offence. There is a clear correlation between the degree of foreseeability of a criminal-law provision and the personal liability of the offender. Thus Article 7 requires a mental link disclosing an element of liability in the conduct of the actual perpetrator of the offence if a penalty is to be imposed ( G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], §§ 242 and 246). There may, however, be certain forms of objective liability stemming from presumptions of liability, provided they comply with the Convention, particularly Article 6 § 2 ( ibid ., § 243).","It follows that in principle, there can only be a ""penalty"" within the meaning of Article 7 if an element of personal liability has been established in respect of the perpetrator of the offence. There is a clear correlation between the degree of foreseeability of a criminal-law provision and the personal liability of the offender. Thus Article 7 requires a mental link disclosing an element of liability in the conduct of the actual perpetrator of the offence if a penalty is to be imposed ( G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy (merits) [GC], 2018, §§ 242 and 246; Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, §§ 264 and 268). There may, however, be certain forms of objective liability stemming from presumptions of liability, provided they comply with the Convention, particularly Article 6 § 2 ( ibid ., § 243)."
41c295afbaa0,Article 7,20230923043629__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,20240329131345__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-29,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-29.json,apps:15669/20,Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC],15669/20,added,"Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.B.2,Judicial interpretation: clarification of legal rules,3,37,37,0.9335,"Jorgic v. Germany , 2007|Total S.A. and Vitol S.A. v. France , 2023|Šimaitis v. Lithuania , 2023",,"As regards the compatibility of the domestic judicial interpretation with the essence of the offence, the Court must determine whether that interpretation was in line with the wording of the provision of the criminal legislation in question as read in its context, and whether or not it was unreasonable (see, among many other authorities, Jorgic v. Germany, §§ 104-108, as regards the crime of genocide). The Court has also stressed that that conduct does not fall outside the scope of the criminal law merely because it also constitutes a disciplinary offence ( Norman v. the United Kingdom, § 68).","As regards the compatibility of the domestic judicial interpretation with the essence of the offence, the Court must determine whether that interpretation was in line with the wording of the provision of the criminal legislation in question as read in its context, and whether or not it was unreasonable ( Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, §§ 255-268, as regards the crime of membership of an armed terrorist organisation; Jorgic v. Germany, 2007, §§ 104-108, as regards the crime of genocide; Total S.A. and Vitol S.A. v. France, 2023, §§ 58-71, as regards the crime of bribing foreign public officials; Jasuitis and Šimaitis v. Lithuania, 2023, §§ 119-140, as regards the crime of trafficking in human beings). The Court has also stressed that that conduct does not fall outside the scope of the criminal law merely because it also constitutes a disciplinary offence ( Norman v. the United Kingdom, 2021, § 68)."
41c295afbaa0,Article 7,20230923043629__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,20240329131345__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-29,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-29.json,apps:15669/20,Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC],15669/20,added,"Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",3,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.B.2,Judicial interpretation: clarification of legal rules,3,42,42,0.9966,"Dragotoniu and Militaru-Pidhorni v. Romania , 2007|Navalnyye v. Russia , 2017|Parmak and Bakir v. Turkey , 2019|Tristan v. Moldova , 2023",,"The Court has found that the foreseeability requirement was not met in cases of an extensive interpretation of criminal law to the accused's disadvantage ( in malam partem ), both where that interpretation stems from an unforeseeable case-law reversal ( Dragotoniu and Militaru-Pidhorni v. Romania, §§ 39-48) or from an interpretation by analogy which is incompatible with the essence of the offence (for example, the conviction for genocide in Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania [GC], §§ 179-186), and where there has been an extensive and unforeseeable interpretation of an offence to the accused's disadvantage that is incompatible with the very essence of that offence ( Navalnyye v. Russia, § 68; Parmak and Bakir v. Turkey, § 76; Tristan v. Moldova *, § 67). It may also find against a State on the grounds of a conviction for an offence resulting from case-law development consolidated after the commission of that offence (for example, the offence of aiding and abetting a mafia-type organisation from the outside in Contrada v. Italy (no. 3), §§ 64-76), or the case of a conviction based on an ambiguous domestic law provision which had offered divergent interpretations ( Žaja v. Croatia, §§ 99-106). In that connection, an inconsistent case-law lacks the required precision to avoid all risk of arbitrariness and enable individuals to foresee the consequences of their actions ( ibid., § 103).","The Court has found that the foreseeability requirement was not met in cases of an extensive interpretation of criminal law to the accused's disadvantage ( in malam partem ), both where that interpretation stems from an unforeseeable case-law reversal ( Dragotoniu and Militaru-Pidhorni v. Romania, 2007, §§ 39-48) or from an interpretation by analogy which is incompatible with the essence of the offence (for example, the conviction for genocide in Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania [GC], 2015, §§ 179-186), and where there has been an extensive and unforeseeable interpretation of an offence to the accused's disadvantage that is incompatible with the very essence of that offence ( Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, § 271; Navalnyye v. Russia, 2017, § 68; Parmak and Bakir v. Turkey, 2019, § 76; Tristan v. Moldova, 2023, § 67). It may also find against a State on the grounds of a conviction for an offence resulting from case-law development consolidated after the commission of that offence (for example, the offence of aiding and abetting a mafia-type organisation from the outside in Contrada v. Italy (no. 3), 2015, §§ 64-76), or the case of a conviction based on an ambiguous domestic law provision which had offered divergent interpretations ( Žaja v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 99-106). In that connection, an inconsistent case-law lacks the required precision to avoid all risk of arbitrariness and enable individuals to foresee the consequences of their actions ( ibid., § 103)."
41c295afbaa0,Article 7,20230923043629__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,20240329131345__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-29,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-29.json,apps:15669/20,Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC],15669/20,added,"Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",4,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,VII,Measures indicated by the Court in cases of violation of Article 7 of the Convention,1,65,65,0.8161,,,"Under Article 46 of the Convention the Contracting Parties undertook to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties, execution being supervised by the Committee of Ministers. Arespondent State which is found to have violated the Convention or the Protocols thereto is required not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction (Article 41 of the Convention) but also to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in their domestic legal order to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to redress so far as possible the effects. Furthermore, it is understood that the respondent State remains free to choose the means by which it will discharge its legal obligation under Article 46 of the Convention, provided that such means are compatible with the conclusions set out in the Court's judgment ( Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], § 249).","In the context of the execution of judgments in accordance with Article 46 of the Convention, a judgment in which the Court finds a breach of the Convention imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation to put an end to the breach found and make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing before the breach. The Court's judgments are, however, essentially declaratory in nature. Accordingly, the Contracting States that are parties to a case are in principle free to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the means whereby they will comply with a judgment in which the Court has found a breach - including any general and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in their domestic legal order -, provided that the execution is carried out in good faith and in a manner compatible with the ""conclusions and spirit"" of the judgment ( Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, § 404)."
41c295afbaa0,Article 7,20240329131345__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,20250604140804__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,2024-03-29,2025-06-04,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2024-03-29__2025-06-04.json,apps:71250/16,Cesarano v. Italy,71250/16,added,"Cesarano v. Italy, 71250/16, 17 October 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V,Principle of retrospective application of more favourable criminal law,1,62,62,0.9961,"Cesarano v. Italy , 2024",,"In determining whether a law passed after an offence has allegedly been committed is more or less favourable to the accused than the law that was in force at the time of the alleged commission of the offence, regard must be had to the specific circumstances of the case - the principle of concretisation ( Advisory opinion concerning the use of the ""blanket reference"" or ""legislation by reference"" technique in the definition of an offence and the standards of comparison between the criminal law in force at the time of the commission of the offence and the amended criminal law, [GC], 2020, §§ 86-92).","In determining whether a law passed after an offence has allegedly been committed is more or less favourable to the accused than the law that was in force at the time of the alleged commission of the offence, regard must be had to the specific circumstances of the case - the principle of concretisation ( Advisory opinion concerning the use of the ""blanket reference"" or ""legislation by reference"" technique in the definition of an offence and the standards of comparison between the criminal law in force at the time of the commission of the offence and the amended criminal law, [GC], 2020, §§ 86-92; Cesarano v. Italy, 2024, §§ 63 and 84)."
41c295afbaa0,Article 7,20240329131345__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,20250604140804__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,2024-03-29,2025-06-04,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2024-03-29__2025-06-04.json,apps:38998/20,Delga v. France,38998/20,added,"Delga v. France, no. 38998/20, 9 July 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.B.2,Judicial interpretation: clarification of legal rules,3,38,38,0.9911,"Delga v. France , 2024|Saakashvili v. Georgia , 2024|Sacharuk v. Lithuania , 2024",,"As regards the reasonable foreseeability of the judicial interpretation, the Court must assess whether the applicant could reasonably have foreseen at the material time, if necessary with the assistance of a lawyer, that he risked being charged with and convicted of the crime in question ( Jorgic v. Germany, 2007, §§ 109-113), and that he would incur the penalty which that offence carried. The Court must ascertain whether the judicial interpretation of the criminal law merely continued a perceptible line of case-law development ( S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 1995, and C.R. v. the United Kingdom, 1995, concerning rape and attempted rape of two women by their husbands, in which the Court noted that the essentially debasing character of rape is so manifest that the decisions of the British courts should be deemed foreseeable and in conformity with the fundamental objectives of the Convention, "" the very essence of which is respect for human dignity and human freedom "" ), or whether the courts had adopted a new approach which the applicant could not have foreseen ( Pessino v. France, 2006, § 36; Dragotoniu and Militaru-Pidhorni v. Romania, 2007, § 44; Del Río Prada v. Spain, §§ 111-117; see, conversely, Arrozpide Sarasola and Others v. Spain, 2018, §§ 124-130, concerning an isolated judgment not backed by any case-law which might have inspired legitimate expectations in the applicants, followed a few months later by a landmark judgment from the Plenary Supreme Court determining the impugned issue). In assessing the foreseeability of a judicial interpretation, no decisive importance should be attached to a lack of comparable precedents ( K.A. and A.D. v. Belgium, 2005, §§ 55-58, concerning sadomasochistic practices which led to a conviction for actual bodily harm, the unusual violence of which was underscored by the Court; see also Soros v. France, 2011, § 58). Where the domestic courts are called on to interpret a provision of criminal law for the first time, an interpretation of the scope of the offence which was consistent with the essence of that offence must, as a rule, be considered as foreseeable ( Jorgic v. Germany, 2007, § 109, where the applicant was the first person to be convicted of genocide under a provision of the Criminal Code). Even a new interpretation of the scope of an existing offence may be reasonably foreseeable for the purposes of Article 7, provided that it is reasonable in terms of domestic law and consistent with the essence of the offence (see, as regards a new interpretation of the concept of tax evasion, Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 791-821, where the Court found that criminal law on taxation could be sufficiently flexible to adapt to new situations, without, however, becoming unpredictable). In any event, the domestic courts must exercise special diligence to clarify the elements of an offence in terms that make it foreseeable and compatible with its essence ( Parmak and Bakir v. Turkey, 2019, § 77).","As regards the reasonable foreseeability of the judicial interpretation, the Court must assess whether the applicant could reasonably have foreseen at the material time, if necessary with the assistance of a lawyer, that he risked being charged with and convicted of the crime in question ( Jorgic v. Germany, 2007, §§ 109-113; Delga v. France, 2024, §§ 65-72), and that he would incur the penalty which that offence carried. The Court must ascertain whether the judicial interpretation of the criminal law merely continued a perceptible line of case-law development ( S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 1995, and C.R. v. the United Kingdom, 1995, concerning rape and attempted rape of two women by their husbands, in which the Court noted that the essentially debasing character of rape is so manifest that the decisions of the British courts should be deemed foreseeable and in conformity with the fundamental objectives of the Convention, "" the very essence of which is respect for human dignity and human freedom "" ), or whether the courts had adopted a new approach which the applicant could not have foreseen ( Pessino v. France, 2006, § 36; Dragotoniu and Militaru-Pidhorni v. Romania, 2007, § 44; Del Río Prada v. Spain, §§ 111-117; see, conversely, Arrozpide Sarasola and Others v. Spain, 2018, §§ 124-130, concerning an isolated judgment not backed by any case-law which might have inspired legitimate expectations in the applicants, followed a few months later by a landmark judgment from the Plenary Supreme Court determining the impugned issue). In assessing the foreseeability of a judicial interpretation, no decisive importance should be attached to a lack of comparable precedents ( K.A. and A.D. v. Belgium, 2005, §§ 55-58, concerning sadomasochistic practices which led to a conviction for actual bodily harm, the unusual violence of which was underscored by the Court; Soros v. France, 2011, § 58; Sacharuk v. Lithuania, 2024, § 158, concerning the voting of some members of parliament instead of the others; Saakashvili v. Georgia, 2024, § 152, concerning the first criminal proceedings for abuse of official authority instituted against a former head of State in relation to an act committed while in office and in the exercise of a discretionary power). Where the domestic courts are called on to interpret a provision of criminal law for the first time, an interpretation of the scope of the offence which was consistent with the essence of that offence must, as a rule, be considered as foreseeable ( Jorgic v. Germany, 2007, § 109, where the applicant was the first person to be convicted of genocide under a provision of the Criminal Code). Even a new interpretation of the scope of an existing offence may be reasonably foreseeable for the purposes of Article 7, provided that it is reasonable in terms of domestic law and consistent with the essence of the offence (see, as regards a new interpretation of the concept of tax evasion, Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 791-821, where the Court found that criminal law on taxation could be sufficiently flexible to adapt to new situations, without, however, becoming unpredictable; Sacharuk v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 156-159, as regards a new interpretation of the concept of'major non-pecuniary damage to the State'insofar casting a vote for another member of parliament is concerned). In any event, the domestic courts must exercise special diligence to clarify the elements of an offence in terms that make it foreseeable and compatible with its essence ( Parmak and Bakir v. Turkey, 2019, § 77)."
41c295afbaa0,Article 7,20240329131345__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,20250604140804__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,2024-03-29,2025-06-04,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2024-03-29__2025-06-04.json,apps:47269/18,Garofalo and Others v. Italy (dec.),47269/18,added,"Garofalo and Others v. Italy (dec.), 47269/18 and 3 others, 21 January 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.D.1,General considerations,3,15,15,0.9979,,,"Conversely, the following are excluded from the concept of ""penalty"" : ▪ preventive measures (including mandatory hospitalisation) imposed on a person lacking criminal responsibility ( Berland v. France, 2015, §§ 39-47); ▪ preventive detention ordered by a trial court following conviction for serious criminal offences, whose conditions of execution were substantially altered under a new legislative framework with a view to treating the prisoner's mental disorder (in particular, in a specialised centre rather than an ordinary prison), such that the measure evolved over time and no longer constituted a penalty ( Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 2018, §§ 210-236) ; ▪ inclusion of an individual on a police or judicial register of sex or violent offenders for preventive and deterrent purposes ( Adamson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 1999; Gardel v. France, 2009, §§ 39-47); ▪ DNAprofiling of convicted persons by the authorities ( Van der Velden v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2006); ▪ detention geared to preventing an individual from engaging in unlawful activities, in view of its preventive nature ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 19); ▪ prohibition of residence (imposed in addition to a prison sentence) following a criminal conviction, the ban being treated as equivalent to a public-order measure ( Renna v. France, 1997, Commission decision; see, mutatis mutandis, under the criminal head of Article 6 § 1, Maaouia v. France [GC], 2000, § 39); ▪ an administrative expulsion order or prohibition of residence ( Vikulov and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2004; C.G. and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2007); ▪ transfer of a sentenced person to another country under the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, which measure is geared to promoting the person's social reintegration into his country of origin ( Szabó v. Sweden (dec.), 2006; Giza v. Poland (dec.), 2010, § 30, as regards the surrender of a sentenced person under the EU Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the procedure for surrenders between Member States,); ▪ a preventive property confiscation order based on suspected belonging to mafia-type organisations, which order was not conditional upon any prior criminal conviction ( M. v. Italy, Commission decision of 1991); ▪ special police surveillance or house arrest of a dangerous person designed to prevent the perpetration of criminal offences ( Mucci v. Italy, Commission decision of 1998; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 43, as regards the criminal aspect of Article 6 § 1); ▪ administrative surveillance for preventive purposes, after convicted persons had served their sentences, as well as subsequent restrictions on their freedom of movement and reporting obligations ( Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, §§ 70-82); ▪ a confiscation order imposed in the framework of criminal proceedings against third parties ( Yildirim v. Italy (dec.), 2003; Bowler International Unit v. France, 2009, §§ 65-68); ▪ a confiscation of assets considered to have illicit origins imposed at the end of the criminal proceedings against the applicants, despite their acquittal on money laundering charges ( Balsamo v. San Marino, 2019, §§ 60-65); ▪ a forfeiture of criminal assets following conviction, ordered in a separate set of proceedings, and considered to be comparable to a civil forfeiture in rem ( Ulemek v. Serbia (dec.), 2021, §§ 46-57); ▪ revocation of an MP's parliamentary mandate and declaration that he had become ineligible following the dissolution of a political party ( Sobac ı v. Turkey (dec.), 2007); ▪ disqualification from standing for election and removal from elected office (Parliament) on account of a final criminal conviction for corruption ( Galan v. Italy (dec.), 2021, §§ 70-97); ▪ impeachment and declaration of ineligibility against a President following impeachment proceedings for serious violation of the Constitution ( Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, §§ 65-68); ▪ suspension of a civil servant's pension rights following disciplinary proceedings ( Haioun v. France (dec.), 2004); ▪ three weekends in solitary confinement ( A. v. Spain, Commission decision of 13 October 1986; Payet v. France, 2011, §§ 94-100, under the criminal aspect of Article 6); ▪ social isolation of a prisoner owing to the fact that the applicant was the only inmate of the prison, in respect of which the Court found that this was such an extraordinary measure that a State could not be reasonably expected to provide details in its legislation on the regime to be applied in such cases ( Öcalan v. Turkey (no. 2), 2001, § 187); ▪ a tax reassessment following the forfeiture of favourable tax treatment, where no penalty had been imposed on the applicant company ( Société Oxygène Plus v. France (dec.), 2016, §§ 40-51); ▪ revocation of license to act as a liquidator in insolvency proceedings ( Rola v. Slovenia, 2019, §§ 60-66); ▪ disciplinary suspension in a professional sports context ( Platini v. Switzerland (dec.), 2020, §§ 44-49).","Conversely, the following are excluded from the concept of ""penalty"" : ▪ preventive measures (including mandatory hospitalisation) imposed on a person lacking criminal responsibility ( Berland v. France, 2015, §§ 39-47); ▪ preventive detention ordered by a trial court following conviction for serious criminal offences, whose conditions of execution were substantially altered under a new legislative framework with a view to treating the prisoner's mental disorder (in particular, in a specialised centre rather than an ordinary prison), such that the measure evolved over time and no longer constituted a penalty ( Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 2018, §§ 210-236) ; ▪ inclusion of an individual on a police or judicial register of sex or violent offenders for preventive and deterrent purposes ( Adamson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 1999; Gardel v. France, 2009, §§ 39-47); ▪ DNAprofiling of convicted persons by the authorities ( Van der Velden v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2006); ▪ detention geared to preventing an individual from engaging in unlawful activities, in view of its preventive nature ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 19); ▪ prohibition of residence (imposed in addition to a prison sentence) following a criminal conviction, the ban being treated as equivalent to a public-order measure ( Renna v. France, 1997, Commission decision; see, mutatis mutandis, under the criminal head of Article 6 § 1, Maaouia v. France [GC], 2000, § 39); ▪ an administrative expulsion order or prohibition of residence ( Vikulov and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2004; C.G. and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2007); ▪ transfer of a sentenced person to another country under the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, which measure is geared to promoting the person's social reintegration into his country of origin ( Szabó v. Sweden (dec.), 2006; Giza v. Poland (dec.), 2010, § 30, as regards the surrender of a sentenced person under the EU Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the procedure for surrenders between Member States,); ▪ a preventive property confiscation order based on suspected belonging to mafia-type organisations, which order was not conditional upon any prior criminal conviction ( Garofalo and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2025, §§ 80-82 and 99-141); ▪ special police surveillance or house arrest of a dangerous person designed to prevent the perpetration of criminal offences ( Mucci v. Italy, Commission decision of 1998; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 43, as regards the criminal aspect of Article 6 § 1); ▪ administrative surveillance for preventive purposes, after convicted persons had served their sentences, as well as subsequent restrictions on their freedom of movement and reporting obligations ( Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, §§ 70-82); ▪ a confiscation order imposed in the framework of criminal proceedings against third parties ( Yildirim v. Italy (dec.), 2003; Bowler International Unit v. France, 2009, §§ 65-68); ▪ a confiscation of assets considered to have illicit origins imposed at the end of the criminal proceedings against the applicants, despite their acquittal on money laundering charges ( Balsamo v. San Marino, 2019, §§ 60-65); ▪ a forfeiture of criminal assets following conviction, ordered in a separate set of proceedings, and considered to be comparable to a civil forfeiture in rem ( Ulemek v. Serbia (dec.), 2021, §§ 46-57); ▪ revocation of an MP's parliamentary mandate and declaration that he had become ineligible following the dissolution of a political party ( Sobac ı v. Turkey (dec.), 2007); ▪ disqualification from standing for election and removal from elected office (Parliament) on account of a final criminal conviction for corruption ( Galan v. Italy (dec.), 2021, §§ 70-97); ▪ impeachment and declaration of ineligibility against a President following impeachment proceedings for serious violation of the Constitution ( Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, §§ 65-68); ▪ suspension of a civil servant's pension rights following disciplinary proceedings ( Haioun v. France (dec.), 2004); ▪ three weekends in solitary confinement ( A. v. Spain, Commission decision of 13 October 1986; Payet v. France, 2011, §§ 94-100, under the criminal aspect of Article 6); ▪ social isolation of a prisoner owing to the fact that the applicant was the only inmate of the prison, in respect of which the Court found that this was such an extraordinary measure that a State could not be reasonably expected to provide details in its legislation on the regime to be applied in such cases ( Öcalan v. Turkey (no. 2), 2001, § 187); ▪ a tax reassessment following the forfeiture of favourable tax treatment, where no penalty had been imposed on the applicant company ( Société Oxygène Plus v. France (dec.), 2016, §§ 40-51); ▪ revocation of license to act as a liquidator in insolvency proceedings ( Rola v. Slovenia, 2019, §§ 60-66); ▪ disciplinary suspension in a professional sports context ( Platini v. Switzerland (dec.), 2020, §§ 44-49); ▪ demolition order issued by a criminal judge in view of its predominantly restorative nature under national law ( Longo (dec.), 2024, §§ 62-68)."
41c295afbaa0,Article 7,20240329131345__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,20250604140804__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,2024-03-29,2025-06-04,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2024-03-29__2025-06-04.json,apps:12386/86,M. v. Italy,12386/86,removed,"M. v. Italy, no. 12386/86, Commission decision of 15 April 1991, Decisions and Reports 70",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.D.1,General considerations,3,15,15,0.9979,,,"Conversely, the following are excluded from the concept of ""penalty"" : ▪ preventive measures (including mandatory hospitalisation) imposed on a person lacking criminal responsibility ( Berland v. France, 2015, §§ 39-47); ▪ preventive detention ordered by a trial court following conviction for serious criminal offences, whose conditions of execution were substantially altered under a new legislative framework with a view to treating the prisoner's mental disorder (in particular, in a specialised centre rather than an ordinary prison), such that the measure evolved over time and no longer constituted a penalty ( Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 2018, §§ 210-236) ; ▪ inclusion of an individual on a police or judicial register of sex or violent offenders for preventive and deterrent purposes ( Adamson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 1999; Gardel v. France, 2009, §§ 39-47); ▪ DNAprofiling of convicted persons by the authorities ( Van der Velden v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2006); ▪ detention geared to preventing an individual from engaging in unlawful activities, in view of its preventive nature ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 19); ▪ prohibition of residence (imposed in addition to a prison sentence) following a criminal conviction, the ban being treated as equivalent to a public-order measure ( Renna v. France, 1997, Commission decision; see, mutatis mutandis, under the criminal head of Article 6 § 1, Maaouia v. France [GC], 2000, § 39); ▪ an administrative expulsion order or prohibition of residence ( Vikulov and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2004; C.G. and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2007); ▪ transfer of a sentenced person to another country under the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, which measure is geared to promoting the person's social reintegration into his country of origin ( Szabó v. Sweden (dec.), 2006; Giza v. Poland (dec.), 2010, § 30, as regards the surrender of a sentenced person under the EU Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the procedure for surrenders between Member States,); ▪ a preventive property confiscation order based on suspected belonging to mafia-type organisations, which order was not conditional upon any prior criminal conviction ( M. v. Italy, Commission decision of 1991); ▪ special police surveillance or house arrest of a dangerous person designed to prevent the perpetration of criminal offences ( Mucci v. Italy, Commission decision of 1998; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 43, as regards the criminal aspect of Article 6 § 1); ▪ administrative surveillance for preventive purposes, after convicted persons had served their sentences, as well as subsequent restrictions on their freedom of movement and reporting obligations ( Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, §§ 70-82); ▪ a confiscation order imposed in the framework of criminal proceedings against third parties ( Yildirim v. Italy (dec.), 2003; Bowler International Unit v. France, 2009, §§ 65-68); ▪ a confiscation of assets considered to have illicit origins imposed at the end of the criminal proceedings against the applicants, despite their acquittal on money laundering charges ( Balsamo v. San Marino, 2019, §§ 60-65); ▪ a forfeiture of criminal assets following conviction, ordered in a separate set of proceedings, and considered to be comparable to a civil forfeiture in rem ( Ulemek v. Serbia (dec.), 2021, §§ 46-57); ▪ revocation of an MP's parliamentary mandate and declaration that he had become ineligible following the dissolution of a political party ( Sobac ı v. Turkey (dec.), 2007); ▪ disqualification from standing for election and removal from elected office (Parliament) on account of a final criminal conviction for corruption ( Galan v. Italy (dec.), 2021, §§ 70-97); ▪ impeachment and declaration of ineligibility against a President following impeachment proceedings for serious violation of the Constitution ( Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, §§ 65-68); ▪ suspension of a civil servant's pension rights following disciplinary proceedings ( Haioun v. France (dec.), 2004); ▪ three weekends in solitary confinement ( A. v. Spain, Commission decision of 13 October 1986; Payet v. France, 2011, §§ 94-100, under the criminal aspect of Article 6); ▪ social isolation of a prisoner owing to the fact that the applicant was the only inmate of the prison, in respect of which the Court found that this was such an extraordinary measure that a State could not be reasonably expected to provide details in its legislation on the regime to be applied in such cases ( Öcalan v. Turkey (no. 2), 2001, § 187); ▪ a tax reassessment following the forfeiture of favourable tax treatment, where no penalty had been imposed on the applicant company ( Société Oxygène Plus v. France (dec.), 2016, §§ 40-51); ▪ revocation of license to act as a liquidator in insolvency proceedings ( Rola v. Slovenia, 2019, §§ 60-66); ▪ disciplinary suspension in a professional sports context ( Platini v. Switzerland (dec.), 2020, §§ 44-49).","Conversely, the following are excluded from the concept of ""penalty"" : ▪ preventive measures (including mandatory hospitalisation) imposed on a person lacking criminal responsibility ( Berland v. France, 2015, §§ 39-47); ▪ preventive detention ordered by a trial court following conviction for serious criminal offences, whose conditions of execution were substantially altered under a new legislative framework with a view to treating the prisoner's mental disorder (in particular, in a specialised centre rather than an ordinary prison), such that the measure evolved over time and no longer constituted a penalty ( Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], 2018, §§ 210-236) ; ▪ inclusion of an individual on a police or judicial register of sex or violent offenders for preventive and deterrent purposes ( Adamson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 1999; Gardel v. France, 2009, §§ 39-47); ▪ DNAprofiling of convicted persons by the authorities ( Van der Velden v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2006); ▪ detention geared to preventing an individual from engaging in unlawful activities, in view of its preventive nature ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 19); ▪ prohibition of residence (imposed in addition to a prison sentence) following a criminal conviction, the ban being treated as equivalent to a public-order measure ( Renna v. France, 1997, Commission decision; see, mutatis mutandis, under the criminal head of Article 6 § 1, Maaouia v. France [GC], 2000, § 39); ▪ an administrative expulsion order or prohibition of residence ( Vikulov and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2004; C.G. and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2007); ▪ transfer of a sentenced person to another country under the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, which measure is geared to promoting the person's social reintegration into his country of origin ( Szabó v. Sweden (dec.), 2006; Giza v. Poland (dec.), 2010, § 30, as regards the surrender of a sentenced person under the EU Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the procedure for surrenders between Member States,); ▪ a preventive property confiscation order based on suspected belonging to mafia-type organisations, which order was not conditional upon any prior criminal conviction ( Garofalo and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2025, §§ 80-82 and 99-141); ▪ special police surveillance or house arrest of a dangerous person designed to prevent the perpetration of criminal offences ( Mucci v. Italy, Commission decision of 1998; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 43, as regards the criminal aspect of Article 6 § 1); ▪ administrative surveillance for preventive purposes, after convicted persons had served their sentences, as well as subsequent restrictions on their freedom of movement and reporting obligations ( Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, §§ 70-82); ▪ a confiscation order imposed in the framework of criminal proceedings against third parties ( Yildirim v. Italy (dec.), 2003; Bowler International Unit v. France, 2009, §§ 65-68); ▪ a confiscation of assets considered to have illicit origins imposed at the end of the criminal proceedings against the applicants, despite their acquittal on money laundering charges ( Balsamo v. San Marino, 2019, §§ 60-65); ▪ a forfeiture of criminal assets following conviction, ordered in a separate set of proceedings, and considered to be comparable to a civil forfeiture in rem ( Ulemek v. Serbia (dec.), 2021, §§ 46-57); ▪ revocation of an MP's parliamentary mandate and declaration that he had become ineligible following the dissolution of a political party ( Sobac ı v. Turkey (dec.), 2007); ▪ disqualification from standing for election and removal from elected office (Parliament) on account of a final criminal conviction for corruption ( Galan v. Italy (dec.), 2021, §§ 70-97); ▪ impeachment and declaration of ineligibility against a President following impeachment proceedings for serious violation of the Constitution ( Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, §§ 65-68); ▪ suspension of a civil servant's pension rights following disciplinary proceedings ( Haioun v. France (dec.), 2004); ▪ three weekends in solitary confinement ( A. v. Spain, Commission decision of 13 October 1986; Payet v. France, 2011, §§ 94-100, under the criminal aspect of Article 6); ▪ social isolation of a prisoner owing to the fact that the applicant was the only inmate of the prison, in respect of which the Court found that this was such an extraordinary measure that a State could not be reasonably expected to provide details in its legislation on the regime to be applied in such cases ( Öcalan v. Turkey (no. 2), 2001, § 187); ▪ a tax reassessment following the forfeiture of favourable tax treatment, where no penalty had been imposed on the applicant company ( Société Oxygène Plus v. France (dec.), 2016, §§ 40-51); ▪ revocation of license to act as a liquidator in insolvency proceedings ( Rola v. Slovenia, 2019, §§ 60-66); ▪ disciplinary suspension in a professional sports context ( Platini v. Switzerland (dec.), 2020, §§ 44-49); ▪ demolition order issued by a criminal judge in view of its predominantly restorative nature under national law ( Longo (dec.), 2024, §§ 62-68)."
41c295afbaa0,Article 7,20240329131345__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,20250604140804__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,2024-03-29,2025-06-04,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2024-03-29__2025-06-04.json,apps:6232/20|22394/20,Saakashvili v. Georgia,6232/20|22394/20,added,"Saakashvili v. Georgia, nos. 6232/20 and 22394/20, 23 May 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.B.1,General considerations,3,31,31,0.9886,"Saakashvili v. Georgia , 2024",,"While using the ""blanket reference"" or ""legislation by reference"" technique in criminalising acts or omissions is not in itself incompatible with the requirements of Article 7, the referencing provision and the referenced provision, read together, must enable the individual concerned to foresee, if needs be with the help of appropriate legal advice, what conduct would make him or her criminally liable ( Advisory opinion concerning the use of the ""blanket reference"" or ""legislation by reference"" technique in the definition of an offence and the standards of comparison between the criminal law in force at the time of the commission of the offence and the amended criminal law [GC]; 2020, § 74). This requirement applies equally to situations where the referenced provision has a higher hierarchical rank in the legal order concerned or a higher level of abstraction than the referencing provision. The most effective way of ensuring clarity and foreseeability is for the reference to be explicit, and for the referencing provision to set out the constituent elements of the offence. Moreover, the referenced provisions may not extend the scope of criminalisation as set out by the referencing provision (ibid. ).","While using the ""blanket reference"" or ""legislation by reference"" technique in criminalising acts or omissions is not in itself incompatible with the requirements of Article 7, the referencing provision and the referenced provision, read together, must enable the individual concerned to foresee, if needs be with the help of appropriate legal advice, what conduct would make him or her criminally liable ( Advisory opinion concerning the use of the ""blanket reference"" or ""legislation by reference"" technique in the definition of an offence and the standards of comparison between the criminal law in force at the time of the commission of the offence and the amended criminal law [GC], 2020, § 74; Saakashvili v. Georgia, 2024, §§ 145-146). This requirement applies equally to situations where the referenced provision has a higher hierarchical rank in the legal order concerned or a higher level of abstraction than the referencing provision. The most effective way of ensuring clarity and foreseeability is for the reference to be explicit, and for the referencing provision to set out the constituent elements of the offence. Moreover, the referenced provisions may not extend the scope of criminalisation as set out by the referencing provision (http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=003-6708535-9264619Advisory opinion concerning the use of the ""blanket reference"" or ""legislation by reference"" technique in the definition of an offence and the standards of comparison between the criminal law in force at the time of the commission of the offence and the amended criminal law [GC], 2020, § 74)."
41c295afbaa0,Article 7,20240329131345__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,20250604140804__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,2024-03-29,2025-06-04,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2024-03-29__2025-06-04.json,apps:6232/20|22394/20,Saakashvili v. Georgia,6232/20|22394/20,added,"Saakashvili v. Georgia, nos. 6232/20 and 22394/20, 23 May 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.B.2,Judicial interpretation: clarification of legal rules,3,38,38,0.9911,"Delga v. France , 2024|Saakashvili v. Georgia , 2024|Sacharuk v. Lithuania , 2024",,"As regards the reasonable foreseeability of the judicial interpretation, the Court must assess whether the applicant could reasonably have foreseen at the material time, if necessary with the assistance of a lawyer, that he risked being charged with and convicted of the crime in question ( Jorgic v. Germany, 2007, §§ 109-113), and that he would incur the penalty which that offence carried. The Court must ascertain whether the judicial interpretation of the criminal law merely continued a perceptible line of case-law development ( S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 1995, and C.R. v. the United Kingdom, 1995, concerning rape and attempted rape of two women by their husbands, in which the Court noted that the essentially debasing character of rape is so manifest that the decisions of the British courts should be deemed foreseeable and in conformity with the fundamental objectives of the Convention, "" the very essence of which is respect for human dignity and human freedom "" ), or whether the courts had adopted a new approach which the applicant could not have foreseen ( Pessino v. France, 2006, § 36; Dragotoniu and Militaru-Pidhorni v. Romania, 2007, § 44; Del Río Prada v. Spain, §§ 111-117; see, conversely, Arrozpide Sarasola and Others v. Spain, 2018, §§ 124-130, concerning an isolated judgment not backed by any case-law which might have inspired legitimate expectations in the applicants, followed a few months later by a landmark judgment from the Plenary Supreme Court determining the impugned issue). In assessing the foreseeability of a judicial interpretation, no decisive importance should be attached to a lack of comparable precedents ( K.A. and A.D. v. Belgium, 2005, §§ 55-58, concerning sadomasochistic practices which led to a conviction for actual bodily harm, the unusual violence of which was underscored by the Court; see also Soros v. France, 2011, § 58). Where the domestic courts are called on to interpret a provision of criminal law for the first time, an interpretation of the scope of the offence which was consistent with the essence of that offence must, as a rule, be considered as foreseeable ( Jorgic v. Germany, 2007, § 109, where the applicant was the first person to be convicted of genocide under a provision of the Criminal Code). Even a new interpretation of the scope of an existing offence may be reasonably foreseeable for the purposes of Article 7, provided that it is reasonable in terms of domestic law and consistent with the essence of the offence (see, as regards a new interpretation of the concept of tax evasion, Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 791-821, where the Court found that criminal law on taxation could be sufficiently flexible to adapt to new situations, without, however, becoming unpredictable). In any event, the domestic courts must exercise special diligence to clarify the elements of an offence in terms that make it foreseeable and compatible with its essence ( Parmak and Bakir v. Turkey, 2019, § 77).","As regards the reasonable foreseeability of the judicial interpretation, the Court must assess whether the applicant could reasonably have foreseen at the material time, if necessary with the assistance of a lawyer, that he risked being charged with and convicted of the crime in question ( Jorgic v. Germany, 2007, §§ 109-113; Delga v. France, 2024, §§ 65-72), and that he would incur the penalty which that offence carried. The Court must ascertain whether the judicial interpretation of the criminal law merely continued a perceptible line of case-law development ( S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 1995, and C.R. v. the United Kingdom, 1995, concerning rape and attempted rape of two women by their husbands, in which the Court noted that the essentially debasing character of rape is so manifest that the decisions of the British courts should be deemed foreseeable and in conformity with the fundamental objectives of the Convention, "" the very essence of which is respect for human dignity and human freedom "" ), or whether the courts had adopted a new approach which the applicant could not have foreseen ( Pessino v. France, 2006, § 36; Dragotoniu and Militaru-Pidhorni v. Romania, 2007, § 44; Del Río Prada v. Spain, §§ 111-117; see, conversely, Arrozpide Sarasola and Others v. Spain, 2018, §§ 124-130, concerning an isolated judgment not backed by any case-law which might have inspired legitimate expectations in the applicants, followed a few months later by a landmark judgment from the Plenary Supreme Court determining the impugned issue). In assessing the foreseeability of a judicial interpretation, no decisive importance should be attached to a lack of comparable precedents ( K.A. and A.D. v. Belgium, 2005, §§ 55-58, concerning sadomasochistic practices which led to a conviction for actual bodily harm, the unusual violence of which was underscored by the Court; Soros v. France, 2011, § 58; Sacharuk v. Lithuania, 2024, § 158, concerning the voting of some members of parliament instead of the others; Saakashvili v. Georgia, 2024, § 152, concerning the first criminal proceedings for abuse of official authority instituted against a former head of State in relation to an act committed while in office and in the exercise of a discretionary power). Where the domestic courts are called on to interpret a provision of criminal law for the first time, an interpretation of the scope of the offence which was consistent with the essence of that offence must, as a rule, be considered as foreseeable ( Jorgic v. Germany, 2007, § 109, where the applicant was the first person to be convicted of genocide under a provision of the Criminal Code). Even a new interpretation of the scope of an existing offence may be reasonably foreseeable for the purposes of Article 7, provided that it is reasonable in terms of domestic law and consistent with the essence of the offence (see, as regards a new interpretation of the concept of tax evasion, Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 791-821, where the Court found that criminal law on taxation could be sufficiently flexible to adapt to new situations, without, however, becoming unpredictable; Sacharuk v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 156-159, as regards a new interpretation of the concept of'major non-pecuniary damage to the State'insofar casting a vote for another member of parliament is concerned). In any event, the domestic courts must exercise special diligence to clarify the elements of an offence in terms that make it foreseeable and compatible with its essence ( Parmak and Bakir v. Turkey, 2019, § 77)."
41c295afbaa0,Article 7,20240329131345__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,20250604140804__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,2024-03-29,2025-06-04,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2024-03-29__2025-06-04.json,apps:39300/18,Sacharuk v. Lithuania,39300/18,added,"Sacharuk v. Lithuania, no. 39300/18, 23 April 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.B.2,Judicial interpretation: clarification of legal rules,3,38,38,0.9911,"Delga v. France , 2024|Saakashvili v. Georgia , 2024|Sacharuk v. Lithuania , 2024",,"As regards the reasonable foreseeability of the judicial interpretation, the Court must assess whether the applicant could reasonably have foreseen at the material time, if necessary with the assistance of a lawyer, that he risked being charged with and convicted of the crime in question ( Jorgic v. Germany, 2007, §§ 109-113), and that he would incur the penalty which that offence carried. The Court must ascertain whether the judicial interpretation of the criminal law merely continued a perceptible line of case-law development ( S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 1995, and C.R. v. the United Kingdom, 1995, concerning rape and attempted rape of two women by their husbands, in which the Court noted that the essentially debasing character of rape is so manifest that the decisions of the British courts should be deemed foreseeable and in conformity with the fundamental objectives of the Convention, "" the very essence of which is respect for human dignity and human freedom "" ), or whether the courts had adopted a new approach which the applicant could not have foreseen ( Pessino v. France, 2006, § 36; Dragotoniu and Militaru-Pidhorni v. Romania, 2007, § 44; Del Río Prada v. Spain, §§ 111-117; see, conversely, Arrozpide Sarasola and Others v. Spain, 2018, §§ 124-130, concerning an isolated judgment not backed by any case-law which might have inspired legitimate expectations in the applicants, followed a few months later by a landmark judgment from the Plenary Supreme Court determining the impugned issue). In assessing the foreseeability of a judicial interpretation, no decisive importance should be attached to a lack of comparable precedents ( K.A. and A.D. v. Belgium, 2005, §§ 55-58, concerning sadomasochistic practices which led to a conviction for actual bodily harm, the unusual violence of which was underscored by the Court; see also Soros v. France, 2011, § 58). Where the domestic courts are called on to interpret a provision of criminal law for the first time, an interpretation of the scope of the offence which was consistent with the essence of that offence must, as a rule, be considered as foreseeable ( Jorgic v. Germany, 2007, § 109, where the applicant was the first person to be convicted of genocide under a provision of the Criminal Code). Even a new interpretation of the scope of an existing offence may be reasonably foreseeable for the purposes of Article 7, provided that it is reasonable in terms of domestic law and consistent with the essence of the offence (see, as regards a new interpretation of the concept of tax evasion, Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 791-821, where the Court found that criminal law on taxation could be sufficiently flexible to adapt to new situations, without, however, becoming unpredictable). In any event, the domestic courts must exercise special diligence to clarify the elements of an offence in terms that make it foreseeable and compatible with its essence ( Parmak and Bakir v. Turkey, 2019, § 77).","As regards the reasonable foreseeability of the judicial interpretation, the Court must assess whether the applicant could reasonably have foreseen at the material time, if necessary with the assistance of a lawyer, that he risked being charged with and convicted of the crime in question ( Jorgic v. Germany, 2007, §§ 109-113; Delga v. France, 2024, §§ 65-72), and that he would incur the penalty which that offence carried. The Court must ascertain whether the judicial interpretation of the criminal law merely continued a perceptible line of case-law development ( S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 1995, and C.R. v. the United Kingdom, 1995, concerning rape and attempted rape of two women by their husbands, in which the Court noted that the essentially debasing character of rape is so manifest that the decisions of the British courts should be deemed foreseeable and in conformity with the fundamental objectives of the Convention, "" the very essence of which is respect for human dignity and human freedom "" ), or whether the courts had adopted a new approach which the applicant could not have foreseen ( Pessino v. France, 2006, § 36; Dragotoniu and Militaru-Pidhorni v. Romania, 2007, § 44; Del Río Prada v. Spain, §§ 111-117; see, conversely, Arrozpide Sarasola and Others v. Spain, 2018, §§ 124-130, concerning an isolated judgment not backed by any case-law which might have inspired legitimate expectations in the applicants, followed a few months later by a landmark judgment from the Plenary Supreme Court determining the impugned issue). In assessing the foreseeability of a judicial interpretation, no decisive importance should be attached to a lack of comparable precedents ( K.A. and A.D. v. Belgium, 2005, §§ 55-58, concerning sadomasochistic practices which led to a conviction for actual bodily harm, the unusual violence of which was underscored by the Court; Soros v. France, 2011, § 58; Sacharuk v. Lithuania, 2024, § 158, concerning the voting of some members of parliament instead of the others; Saakashvili v. Georgia, 2024, § 152, concerning the first criminal proceedings for abuse of official authority instituted against a former head of State in relation to an act committed while in office and in the exercise of a discretionary power). Where the domestic courts are called on to interpret a provision of criminal law for the first time, an interpretation of the scope of the offence which was consistent with the essence of that offence must, as a rule, be considered as foreseeable ( Jorgic v. Germany, 2007, § 109, where the applicant was the first person to be convicted of genocide under a provision of the Criminal Code). Even a new interpretation of the scope of an existing offence may be reasonably foreseeable for the purposes of Article 7, provided that it is reasonable in terms of domestic law and consistent with the essence of the offence (see, as regards a new interpretation of the concept of tax evasion, Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 791-821, where the Court found that criminal law on taxation could be sufficiently flexible to adapt to new situations, without, however, becoming unpredictable; Sacharuk v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 156-159, as regards a new interpretation of the concept of'major non-pecuniary damage to the State'insofar casting a vote for another member of parliament is concerned). In any event, the domestic courts must exercise special diligence to clarify the elements of an offence in terms that make it foreseeable and compatible with its essence ( Parmak and Bakir v. Turkey, 2019, § 77)."
41c295afbaa0,Article 7,20240329131345__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,20250604140804__guide_art_7_eng.pdf,2024-03-29,2025-06-04,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/41c295afbaa0/diff_2024-03-29__2025-06-04.json,apps:39300/18,Sacharuk v. Lithuania,39300/18,added,"Sacharuk v. Lithuania, no. 39300/18, 23 April 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.B.2,Judicial interpretation: clarification of legal rules,3,40,40,0.9864,"Sacharuk v. Lithuania , 2024",,"Although under certain circumstances a long-lasting toleration of certain types of conduct, otherwise punishable under the criminal law, may grow into a de facto decriminalisation of such conduct in certain cases, the mere fact that other individuals were not prosecuted or convicted cannot absolve the sentenced applicant from criminal liability or render his conviction unforeseeable for the purposes of Article 7 ( Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 816-820).","Although under certain circumstances a long-lasting toleration of certain types of conduct, otherwise punishable under the criminal law, may grow into a de facto decriminalisation of such conduct in certain cases, the mere fact that other individuals were not prosecuted or convicted cannot absolve the sentenced applicant from criminal liability or render his conviction unforeseeable for the purposes of Article 7 ( Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013, §§ 816-820; Sacharuk v. Lithuania, 2024, § 153)."
54e38e09f96e,Article 2 Protocol 1,20230923140435__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20231206105032__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-12-06,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/54e38e09f96e/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json,apps:24408/16,Szolcsán v. Hungary,24408/16,added,"Szolcsán v. Hungary, no. 24408/16, 30 March 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C.3,Ethnic origin,3,58,61,0.9991,"Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary , 2013|Lavida and Others v. Greece , 2013|Sampanis and Others v. Greece , 2008|Szolcsán v. Hungary , 2023",,"However, the mere enrolment in schools of Roma children does not suffice for a finding of compliance with Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. In this connection, the Court has relied extensively on reports by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) ( Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC]; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC]). The enrolment must also take place in satisfactory conditions. The Court accepted that a State's decision to retain the special-school system was motivated by the desire to find a solution for children with special educational needs (ibid., § 198). Similarly, temporary placement of children in a separate class on the ground that they lack an adequate command of the language is not, as such, automatically in breach of Article 14 ( Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], § 157). However, the misplacement of Roma children in special schools has a long history across Europe ( Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, § 115). Consequently, schooling arrangements for Roma children must be attended by safeguards that ensure that the State takes into account their special needs ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], § 207; Sampanis and Others v. Greece, § 103). The decision must be transparent and based on clearly defined criteria, not only ethnic origin (ibid., § 89; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], § 182). Lastly, such measures cannot be regarded as reasonable and proportionate where they result in an education which compounds the difficulties of Roma children and compromises their subsequent personal development instead of tackling their real problems or helping them to integrate into the ordinary schools and develop the skills that would facilitate life among the majority population ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, § 207). Alack of discriminatory intent is not sufficient. The States are under a positive obligation to take positive effective measures against segregation ( Lavida and Others v. Greece, § 73; Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 77-78).","However, the mere enrolment in schools of Roma children does not suffice for a finding of compliance with Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. In this connection, the Court has relied extensively on reports by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) ( Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007). The enrolment must also take place in satisfactory conditions. The Court accepted that a State's decision to retain the special-school system was motivated by the desire to find a solution for children with special educational needs (ibid., § 198). Similarly, temporary placement of children in a separate class on the ground that they lack an adequate command of the language is not, as such, automatically in breach of Article 14 ( Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010, § 157). However, the misplacement of Roma children in special schools has a long history across Europe ( Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 2013, § 115). Consequently, schooling arrangements for Roma children must be attended by safeguards that ensure that the State takes into account their special needs ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 207; Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008, § 103). The decision must be transparent and based on clearly defined criteria, not only ethnic origin (ibid., § 89; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010, § 182). Lastly, such measures cannot be regarded as reasonable and proportionate where they result in an education which compounds the difficulties of Roma children and compromises their subsequent personal development instead of tackling their real problems or helping them to integrate into the ordinary schools and develop the skills that would facilitate life among the majority population ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, § 207). Alack of discriminatory intent is not sufficient. The States are under a positive obligation to take positive effective measures against segregation ( Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013, § 73; Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 77-78; Szolcsán v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 55-59)."
54e38e09f96e,Article 2 Protocol 1,20230923140435__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20231206105032__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-12-06,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/54e38e09f96e/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json,apps:46519/20,T.H. v. Bulgaria,46519/20,added,"T.H. v. Bulgaria, no. 46519/20, 11 April 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.1,Persons with disabilities,3,,57,,"In the case of T.H. v. Bulgaria , 2023",,,"In the case of T.H. v. Bulgaria, 2023, the response of a primary school, including reasonable accommodation, to the aggressive and disruptive behaviour of child diagnosed with hyperkinetic and scholastic-skills disorder, did not constitute a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (§§ 118-123). It could not be said that the head teacher and the applicant's teacher had turned a blind eye to the pupil's disability and his resulting special needs. In devising the relevant adjustments they had engaged in a difficult balancing exercise pitting the pupil's interests against those of his classmates, including their safety, well-being and effective education."
54e38e09f96e,Article 2 Protocol 1,20230923140435__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20231206105032__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-12-06,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/54e38e09f96e/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json,apps:46519/20,T.H. v. Bulgaria,46519/20,added,"T.H. v. Bulgaria, no. 46519/20, 11 April 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C.1,Persons with disabilities,3,52,54,0.9863,"T.H. v. Bulgaria , 2023|Çam v. Turkey , 2016|Şahin v. Turkey , 2018",,"The Court has pointed out that it must have regard to the changing conditions of international and European law and respond, for example, to any emerging consensus as to the standards to be achieved. It has noted, to that effect, the importance of the fundamental principles of universality and non-discrimination in the exercise of the right to education, as enshrined in many international instruments. It has further explained that inclusive education has been recognised as the most appropriate means to guarantee those fundamental principles ( Çam v. Turkey, § 64; Sanlısoy v. Turkey (dec.), § 59). Article 14 of the Convention must be read in the light of the requirements of those instruments as regards reasonable accommodation - understood as ""necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case"" - which persons with disabilities are entitled to expect in order to ensure ""the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms"" ( Article 2 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities). Such reasonable accommodation helps to correct factual inequalities which are unjustified and therefore amount to discrimination ( Çam v. Turkey, § 65; Sanlısoy v. Turkey (dec.), § 60). It can take various forms, whether material or of another nature, and the national authorities are in principle best placed to decide on the given situation and needs ( Çam v. Turkey, § 66; Enver Şahin v. Turkey, § 68).","The Court has pointed out that it must have regard to the changing conditions of international and European law and respond, for example, to any emerging consensus as to the standards to be achieved. It has noted, to that effect, the importance of the fundamental principles of universality and non-discrimination in the exercise of the right to education, as enshrined in many international instruments. It has further explained that inclusive education has been recognised as the most appropriate means to guarantee those fundamental principles ( Çam v. Turkey, 2016, § 64; Sanlısoy v. Turkey (dec.), 2016, § 59). Article 14 of the Convention must be read in the light of the requirements of those instruments as regards reasonable accommodation - understood as ""necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case"" - which persons with disabilities are entitled to expect in order to ensure ""the enjoyment or exerc ise on an equal basis with others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms"" ( Article 2 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities). Article 14 does not require all possible adjustments which could be made to alleviate the disparities resulting from someone's disability regardless of their costs or the practicalities involved ( T.H. v. Bulgaria, 2023, § 122). Reasonable accommodation helps to correct factual inequalities which are unjustified and therefore amount to discrimination ( Çam v. Turkey, 2016, § 65; Sanlısoy v. Turkey (dec.), 2016, § 60). It can take various forms, whether material or of another nature, and the national authorities are in principle best placed to decide on the given situation and needs ( Çam v. Turkey, 2016, § 66; Enver Şahin v. Turkey, 2018, § 68)."
54e38e09f96e,Article 2 Protocol 1,20230923140435__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20231206105032__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-12-06,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/54e38e09f96e/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json,apps:66763/17,Telek v. Türkiye,66763/17,added,"Telek v. Türkiye, nos. 66763/17 and 2 others, 21 March 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A,Principle of the right to education,2,12,12,0.9803,"Mürsel Eren v. Turkey , 2006|Telek v. Türkiye , 2023|Velyo Velev v. Bulgaria , 2014",,"Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 concerns elementary schooling ( Sulak v. Turkey, Commission decision) but also secondary education ( Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], § 278), higher education ( Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], § 141; Mürsel Eren v. Turkey, § 41) and specialised courses. Thus the holders of the right guaranteed in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 are children, but also adults, or indeed any person wishing to benefit from the right to education ( Velyo Velev v. Bulgaria ).","Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 concerns elementary schooling ( Sulak v. Turkey, Commission decision, 1996) but also secondary education ( Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 2001, § 278), higher education ( Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], 2005, § 141; Mürsel Eren v. Turkey, 2006, § 41) and specialised courses including doctoral studies ( Telek v. Türkiye, 2023, §§ 133-134). Thus the holders of the right guaranteed in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 are children, but also adults, or indeed any person wishing to benefit from the right to education ( Velyo Velev v. Bulgaria, 2014)."
54e38e09f96e,Article 2 Protocol 1,20230923140435__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20231206105032__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-12-06,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/54e38e09f96e/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json,apps:66763/17,Telek v. Türkiye,66763/17,added,"Telek v. Türkiye, nos. 66763/17 and 2 others, 21 March 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.9,Higher education abroad,3,,46,,"Telek v. Türkiye , 2023",,,"From the first sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 can be derived an obligation for member States to refrain from unjustifiably hindering the exercise of the right to education in the form of studies in higher education establishments abroad ( Telek v. Türkiye, 2023, § 137). This obligation is different from any right of unconditional access to such establishments."
54e38e09f96e,Article 2 Protocol 1,20230923140435__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20231206105032__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-12-06,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/54e38e09f96e/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json,apps:66763/17,Telek v. Türkiye,66763/17,added,"Telek v. Türkiye, nos. 66763/17 and 2 others, 21 March 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.9,Higher education abroad,3,,47,,"In the case of Telek v. Türkiye , 2023",,,"In the case of Telek v. Türkiye, 2023, a number of academics could no longer pursue their doctoral studies in foreign universities (to which they had been admitted) on account of the unlawful and potentially arbitrary withdrawal of their passports for a considerable period pursuant to decrees adopted for the state of emergency. This situation had entailed a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (§§ 149-154)."
54e38e09f96e,Article 2 Protocol 1,20231206105032__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20240330184031__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2023-12-06,2024-03-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/54e38e09f96e/diff_2023-12-06__2024-03-30.json,apps:56928/19,Valiullina and Others v. Latvia,56928/19,added,"Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 56928/19 and 2 others, 14 September 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.1,Language,3,,19,,"Thus in the case of Valiullina and Others v. Latvia , 2023|Valiullina and Others v. Latvia , 2023",,,"However, the Court has found that the right enshrined in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 does not guarantee education in a specific language; it guarantees the right to receive education in a national language, i.e. an official language of the country in question ( Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 2023, § 135). Thus in the case of Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 2023 (§ 135), as Latvian was the sole official language of the State, the applicants were not entitled, by relying on Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, to complain of a reduction in the use of Russian as a language of instruction in Latvian State schools. They had not submitted any specific arguments in support of their allegation that the restrictions had had a negative impact on the possibility for them to receive an education. The Court also found that the legislative reform which had, in State schools, increased the proportion of subjects to be taught in Latvian and reduced the use of Russian did not breach Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 ( Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 2023, §§ 145-215)."
54e38e09f96e,Article 2 Protocol 1,20240330184031__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250424203515__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2025-04-24,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/54e38e09f96e/diff_2024-03-30__2025-04-24.json,apps:50942/20|2022/21,Djeri and Others v. Latvia,50942/20|2022/21,added,"Djeri and Others v. Latvia, nos. 50942/20 and 2022/21, 18 July 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A,Principle of the right to education,2,12,12,0.8974,"Djeri and Others v. Latvia , 2024",,"Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 concerns elementary schooling ( Sulak v. Turkey, Commission decision, 1996) but also secondary education ( Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 2001, § 278), higher education ( Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], 2005, § 141; Mürsel Eren v. Turkey, 2006, § 41) and specialised courses including doctoral studies ( Telek v. Türkiye, 2023, §§ 133-134). Primary and secondary education is of fundamental importance for each child's personal development and future success ( Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 144). The holders of the right guaranteed in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 are children, but also adults, or indeed any person wishing to benefit from the right to education ( Velyo Velev v. Bulgaria, 2014).","Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 concerns mandatory schooling at pre-school level (see Djeri and Others v. Latvia, 2024, §§ 118 and 122, while the Court also found there that voluntary schooling at that level, for children of between one and a half and five, where the emphasis was on their care and overall development, did not fall within its scope ( ibid., §§ 118-119 and 121); see also the reference to preschool under Article 8 in the case of Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], §§ 306-307, 2021); primary schools ( Sulak v. Turkey, Commission decision, 1996); but also secondary education ( Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 2001, § 278), higher education ( Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], 2005, § 141; Mürsel Eren v. Turkey, 2006, § 41) and specialised courses including doctoral studies ( Telek v. Türkiye, 2023, §§ 133-134). Primary and secondary education is of fundamental importance for each child's personal development and future success ( Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 144). The holders of the right guaranteed in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 are children, but also adults, or indeed any person wishing to benefit from the right to education ( Velyo Velev v. Bulgaria, 2014)."
54e38e09f96e,Article 2 Protocol 1,20240330184031__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250424203515__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2025-04-24,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/54e38e09f96e/diff_2024-03-30__2025-04-24.json,apps:50942/20|2022/21,Djeri and Others v. Latvia,50942/20|2022/21,added,"Djeri and Others v. Latvia, nos. 50942/20 and 2022/21, 18 July 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.1,Language,3,19,19,0.9687,"Court found in the case of Djeri and Others v. Latvia , 2024|Others v. Latvia , 2023",,"However, the Court has found that the right enshrined in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 does not guarantee education in a specific language; it guarantees the right to receive education in a national language, i.e. an official language of the country in question ( Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 2023, § 135). Thus in the case of Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 2023 (§ 135), as Latvian was the sole official language of the State, the applicants were not entitled, by relying on Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, to complain of a reduction in the use of Russian as a language of instruction in Latvian State schools. They had not submitted any specific arguments in support of their allegation that the restrictions had had a negative impact on the possibility for them to receive an education. The Court also found that the legislative reform which had, in State schools, increased the proportion of subjects to be taught in Latvian and reduced the use of Russian did not breach Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 ( Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 2023, §§ 145-215).","However, the Court has found that the right enshrined in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 does not guarantee education in a specific language; it guarantees the right to receive education in a national language, i.e. an official language of the country in question ( Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 2023, § 135). Thus in the case of Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 2023 (§ 135), as Latvian was the sole official language of the State, the applicants were not entitled, by relying on Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, to complain of a reduction in the use of Russian as a language of instruction in Latvian State schools. They had not submitted any specific arguments in support of their allegation that the restrictions had had a negative impact on the possibility for them to receive an education. The Court also found that the legislative reform which had, in State schools, increased the proportion of subjects to be taught in Latvian and reduced the use of Russian did not breach Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 ( Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 2023, §§ 145-147; 190-215) (for a similar approach in the context of private education, see Džibuti and Others v. Latvia, 2023, §§ 131-151). In addition, the Court found in the case of Djeri and Others v. Latvia, 2024 (§§ 138-157; §§ 166-167), that the legislative amendments to increase the use of Latvian at the mandatory second stage of public and private preschool (for children aged five to seven), leading to a reduction in the use of Russian, did not constitute a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No 1. In that case, the voluntary first stage of preschool (for children of one and a half to five) did not fall within the scope of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention (§§ 118-119 and 121)."
54e38e09f96e,Article 2 Protocol 1,20240330184031__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250424203515__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2025-04-24,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/54e38e09f96e/diff_2024-03-30__2025-04-24.json,apps:225/20,Džibuti and Others v. Latvia,225/20,added,"Džibuti and Others v. Latvia, nos. 225/20 and 2 others, 16 November 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.1,Language,3,19,19,0.9687,"Court found in the case of Djeri and Others v. Latvia , 2024|Others v. Latvia , 2023",,"However, the Court has found that the right enshrined in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 does not guarantee education in a specific language; it guarantees the right to receive education in a national language, i.e. an official language of the country in question ( Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 2023, § 135). Thus in the case of Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 2023 (§ 135), as Latvian was the sole official language of the State, the applicants were not entitled, by relying on Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, to complain of a reduction in the use of Russian as a language of instruction in Latvian State schools. They had not submitted any specific arguments in support of their allegation that the restrictions had had a negative impact on the possibility for them to receive an education. The Court also found that the legislative reform which had, in State schools, increased the proportion of subjects to be taught in Latvian and reduced the use of Russian did not breach Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 ( Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 2023, §§ 145-215).","However, the Court has found that the right enshrined in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 does not guarantee education in a specific language; it guarantees the right to receive education in a national language, i.e. an official language of the country in question ( Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 2023, § 135). Thus in the case of Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 2023 (§ 135), as Latvian was the sole official language of the State, the applicants were not entitled, by relying on Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, to complain of a reduction in the use of Russian as a language of instruction in Latvian State schools. They had not submitted any specific arguments in support of their allegation that the restrictions had had a negative impact on the possibility for them to receive an education. The Court also found that the legislative reform which had, in State schools, increased the proportion of subjects to be taught in Latvian and reduced the use of Russian did not breach Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 ( Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 2023, §§ 145-147; 190-215) (for a similar approach in the context of private education, see Džibuti and Others v. Latvia, 2023, §§ 131-151). In addition, the Court found in the case of Djeri and Others v. Latvia, 2024 (§§ 138-157; §§ 166-167), that the legislative amendments to increase the use of Latvian at the mandatory second stage of public and private preschool (for children aged five to seven), leading to a reduction in the use of Russian, did not constitute a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No 1. In that case, the voluntary first stage of preschool (for children of one and a half to five) did not fall within the scope of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention (§§ 118-119 and 121)."
54e38e09f96e,Article 2 Protocol 1,20240330184031__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250424203515__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2025-04-24,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/54e38e09f96e/diff_2024-03-30__2025-04-24.json,apps:37614/22,S. v. the Czech Republic,37614/22,added,"S. v. the Czech Republic, no. 37614/22, 7 November 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A,Principle of the right to education,2,12,12,0.8974,"Djeri and Others v. Latvia , 2024",,"Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 concerns elementary schooling ( Sulak v. Turkey, Commission decision, 1996) but also secondary education ( Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 2001, § 278), higher education ( Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], 2005, § 141; Mürsel Eren v. Turkey, 2006, § 41) and specialised courses including doctoral studies ( Telek v. Türkiye, 2023, §§ 133-134). Primary and secondary education is of fundamental importance for each child's personal development and future success ( Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 144). The holders of the right guaranteed in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 are children, but also adults, or indeed any person wishing to benefit from the right to education ( Velyo Velev v. Bulgaria, 2014).","Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 concerns mandatory schooling at pre-school level (see Djeri and Others v. Latvia, 2024, §§ 118 and 122, while the Court also found there that voluntary schooling at that level, for children of between one and a half and five, where the emphasis was on their care and overall development, did not fall within its scope ( ibid., §§ 118-119 and 121); see also the reference to preschool under Article 8 in the case of Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], §§ 306-307, 2021); primary schools ( Sulak v. Turkey, Commission decision, 1996); but also secondary education ( Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 2001, § 278), higher education ( Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], 2005, § 141; Mürsel Eren v. Turkey, 2006, § 41) and specialised courses including doctoral studies ( Telek v. Türkiye, 2023, §§ 133-134). Primary and secondary education is of fundamental importance for each child's personal development and future success ( Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 144). The holders of the right guaranteed in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 are children, but also adults, or indeed any person wishing to benefit from the right to education ( Velyo Velev v. Bulgaria, 2014)."
54e38e09f96e,Article 2 Protocol 1,20240330184031__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250424203515__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2025-04-24,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/54e38e09f96e/diff_2024-03-30__2025-04-24.json,apps:37614/22,S. v. the Czech Republic,37614/22,added,"S. v. the Czech Republic, no. 37614/22, 7 November 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,unchanged,II.B.8,Health,3,46,46,,,,"Afine imposed on a parent and the exclusion of her children from nursery school for not complying with the legal obligation to vaccinate children had not entailed a violation of Article 8 of the Convention ( Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2021). The Court thus found that it did not need to examine the applications separately under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.","Afine imposed on a parent and the exclusion of her children from nursery school for not complying with the legal obligation to vaccinate children had not entailed a violation of Article 8 of the Convention ( Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2021). The Court thus found that it did not need to examine the applications separately under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1."
54e38e09f96e,Article 2 Protocol 1,20240330184031__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250424203515__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2025-04-24,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/54e38e09f96e/diff_2024-03-30__2025-04-24.json,apps:37614/22,S. v. the Czech Republic,37614/22,added,"S. v. the Czech Republic, no. 37614/22, 7 November 2024",3,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.C.1,Persons with disabilities,3,54,54,0.9702,,,"In the case of Sanlısoy v. Turkey (dec.), 2016, the applicant had complained of a discriminatory breach of his right to education on account of his autism. After examining the facts of the case and the minor's situation, the Court found that there had not been a systemic denial of the applicant's right to education on account of his autism or a failure by the State to fulfil its obligations under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 taken together with Article 14 of the Convention. It thus dismissed the application. The same conclusion was reached in Dupin v. France (dec.), 2018, concerning an autistic child who had been denied admission to a mainstream school and directed to a specialised institution. However, the inability for an autistic child to receive the specialised learning support to which she was entitled by law, during her first two years of primary school, had entailed a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 ( G.L. v. Italy, 2020). The national authorities had not determined the child's real needs or the possible solutions to allow her to attend primary school in conditions that were equivalent as far as possible to those enjoyed by other pupils, without imposing a disproportionate or undue burden on the administration.","In the case of Sanlısoy v. Turkey (dec.), 2016, the applicant had complained of a discriminatory breach of his right to education on account of his autism. After examining the facts of the case and the minor's situation, the Court found that there had not been a systemic denial of the applicant's right to education on account of his autism or a failure by the State to fulfil its obligations under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 taken together with Article 14 of the Convention. It thus dismissed the application. The same conclusion was reached in Dupin v. France (dec.), 2018, concerning an autistic child who had been denied admission to a mainstream school and directed to a specialised institution. Similarly, in a case of an autistic child enrolled in a mainstream primary school without his parents being clear about his disability and without them displaying due cooperation, the Court noted that supportive measures had been adopted by the school once the applicant's educational needs had been identified and concluded that the school could not be blamed for not having been sufficiently diligent in securing him equivalent conditions, as far as possible, to those enjoyed by other children ( S. v. the Czech Republic, 2024, §§ 45-54). However, the inability for an autistic child to receive the specialised learning support to which she was entitled by law, during her first two years of primary school, had entailed a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 ( G.L. v. Italy, 2020). The national authorities had not determined the child's real needs or the possible solutions to allow her to attend primary school in conditions that were equivalent as far as possible to those enjoyed by other pupils, without imposing a disproportionate or undue burden on the administration."
54e38e09f96e,Article 2 Protocol 1,20240330184031__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250424203515__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2025-04-24,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/54e38e09f96e/diff_2024-03-30__2025-04-24.json,apps:37614/22,S. v. the Czech Republic,37614/22,added,"S. v. the Czech Republic, no. 37614/22, 7 November 2024",4,paragraph_text_name_match,unchanged,II.C.3,Ethnic origin,3,60,60,,,,"The Court has addressed in many cases the difficulties relating to the education of Roma children in a number of European States ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 205). As a result of their turbulent history and constant uprooting the Roma have become a specific type of disadvantaged and vulnerable minority. They therefore require special protection and this protection extends to the sphere of education (ibid., § 182).","The Court has addressed in many cases the difficulties relating to the education of Roma children in a number of European States ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 205). As a result of their turbulent history and constant uprooting the Roma have become a specific type of disadvantaged and vulnerable minority. They therefore require special protection and this protection extends to the sphere of education (ibid., § 182)."
54e38e09f96e,Article 2 Protocol 1,20240330184031__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,20250424203515__guide_art_2_protocol_1_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2025-04-24,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/54e38e09f96e/diff_2024-03-30__2025-04-24.json,apps:37614/22,S. v. the Czech Republic,37614/22,added,"S. v. the Czech Republic, no. 37614/22, 7 November 2024",5,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.C.3,Ethnic origin,3,62,62,0.9991,,,"However, the mere enrolment in schools of Roma children does not suffice for a finding of compliance with Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. In this connection, the Court has relied extensively on reports by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) ( Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007). The enrolment must also take place in satisfactory conditions. The Court accepted that a State's decision to retain the special-school system was motivated by the desire to find a solution for children with special educational needs (ibid., § 198). Similarly, temporary placement of children in a separate class on the ground that they lack an adequate command of the language is not, as such, automatically in breach of Article 14 ( Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010, § 157). However, the misplacement of Roma children in special schools has a long history across Europe ( Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 2013, § 115). Consequently, schooling arrangements for Roma children must be attended by safeguards that ensure that the State takes into account their special needs ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 207; Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008, § 103). The decision must be transparent and based on clearly defined criteria, not only ethnic origin (ibid., § 89; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010, § 182). Lastly, such measures cannot be regarded as reasonable and proportionate where they result in an education which compounds the difficulties of Roma children and compromises their subsequent personal development instead of tackling their real problems or helping them to integrate into the ordinary schools and develop the skills that would facilitate life among the majority population ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, § 207). Alack of discriminatory intent is not sufficient. The States are under a positive obligation to take positive effective measures against segregation ( Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013, § 73; Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 77-78; Szolcsán v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 55-59).","However, the mere enrolment in schools of Roma children does not suffice for a finding of compliance with Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. In this connection, the Court has relied extensively on reports by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) ( Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007). The enrolment must also take place in satisfactory conditions. The Court accepted that a State's decision to retain the special-school system was motivated by the desire to find a solution for children with special educational needs (ibid., § 198). Similarly, temporary placement of children in a separate class on the ground that they lack an adequate command of the language is not, as such, automatically in breach of Article 14 ( Oršuš and Oth ers v. Croatia [GC], 2010, § 157). However, the misplacement of Roma children in special schools has a long history across Europe ( Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 2013, § 115). Consequently, schooling arrangements for Roma children must be attended by safeguards that ensure that the State takes into account their special needs ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 207; Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008, § 85). The decision must be transparent and based on clearly defined criteria, not only ethnic origin (ibid., § 89; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010, § 182). Lastly, such measures cannot be regarded as reasonable and proportionate where they result in an education which compounds the difficulties of Roma children and compromises their subsequent personal development instead of tackling their real problems or helping them to integrate into the ordinary schools and develop the skills that would facilitate life among the majority population ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, § 207). Alack of discriminatory intent is not sufficient. The States are under a positive obligation to take positive effective measures against segregation ( Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013, § 73; Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 77-78; Szolcsán v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 55-59)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20230923090652__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20240405192605__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:62239/12,Kaymak and Others v. Türkiye,62239/12,added,"Kaymak and Others v. Türkiye, no. 62239/12, 20 June 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.D,Sanctions and disincentives,2,253,253,0.9373,"Kaymak and Others v. Türkiye , 2023",,"Criminal or disciplinary sanctions imposed on trade union members in connection with their activities are liable to deter them from legitimately participating in strikes or other actions in defence of their occupational interests, and have found to be unjustified ( Ognevenko v. Russia, 2018, § 84; Karaçay v. Turkey, 2007, § 37; Urcan and Others v. Turkey, 2008, § 34; Doğan Altun v. Turkey, 2015, § 50; Straume v. Latvia, 2022, § 112).","Criminal or disciplinary sanctions imposed on trade union members in connection with their activities are liable to deter them from legitimately participating in strikes or other actions in defence of their occupational interests, and have found to be unjustified ( Ognevenko v. Russia, 2018, § 84; Karaçay v. Turkey, 2007, § 37; Urcan and Others v. Turkey, 2008, § 34; Doğan Altun v. Turkey, 2015, § 50; Straume v. Latvia, 2022, § 112). Even minimal sanctions dissuade trade union members from freely engaging in their activities ( Kaymak and Others v. Türkiye, 2023, § 56, concerning a ""non - punitive warning"" )."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20230923090652__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20240405192605__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:58262/10,Kazan v. Türkiye,58262/10,added,"Kazan v. Türkiye, no. 58262/10, 6 June 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C,Scope of the right to freedom of assembly,2,16,16,0.9988,"Kazan v. Türkiye , 2023",,"Even if the existence of an assembly is beyond doubt, the admissibility of an Article 11 complaint may be called into question in relation to a particular applicant if he or she denies before the Court having taken part in that assembly. There must be a clear and acknowledged link between the exercise of the freedom of peaceful assembly by the applicants and the measures taken against them ( Navalnyy and Yashin v. Russia, 2014, § 52). In establishing such link the Court takes into account the applicant's initial intention, the extent of actual involvement in the assembly and the content of the pleading before the national instances and the Court ( Agit Demir v. Turkey, 2018, § 68; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, §§ 109-111; Zulkuf Murat Kahraman v. Turkey, 2019, § 45, Obote v. Russia, 2019, § 35). The fact that the applicant was sanctioned for participating in the assembly is not in itself sufficient to bring the complaint within the ambit of Article 11 if the applicant had consistently claimed that he was mistaken for a participant ( Kasparov and Others v. Russia, 2013, § 72). Article 11 of the Convention can be found to be applicable to persons merely observing a demonstration (see, for example, Galstyan v. Armenia, 2007, § 100), although they would need to make a persuasive argument that the mere presence at the rally for the purpose of observing events could be considered an exercise of their right to peaceful assembly ( Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine, 2021, § 487).","Even if the existence of an assembly is beyond doubt, the admissibility of an Article 11 complaint may be called into question in relation to a particular applicant if he or she denies before the Court having taken part in that assembly. There must be a clear and acknowledged link between the exercise of the freedom of peaceful assembly by the applicants and the measures taken against them ( Navalnyy and Yashin v. Russia, 2014, § 52). In establishing such link the Court takes into account the applicant's initial intention, the extent of actual involvement in the assembly and the content of the pleading before the national instances and the Court ( Agit Demir v. Turkey, 2018, § 68; Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, §§ 109-111; Zulkuf Murat Kahraman v. Turkey, 2019, § 45, Obote v. Russia, 2019, § 35; Kazan v. Türkiye, 2023, § 56). The fact that the applicant was sanctioned for participating in the assembly is not in itself sufficient to bring the complaint within the ambit of Article 11 if the applicant had consistently claimed that he was mistaken for a participant ( Kasparov and Others v. Russia, 2013, § 72). Article 11 of the Convention can be found to be applicable to persons merely observing a demonstration (see, for example, Galstyan v. Armenia, 2007, § 100), although they would need to make a persuasive argument that the mere presence at the rally for the purpose of observing events could be considered an exercise of their right to peaceful assembly ( Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine, 2021, § 487)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20230923090652__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20240405192605__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:58262/10,Kazan v. Türkiye,58262/10,added,"Kazan v. Türkiye, no. 58262/10, 6 June 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.E.2.§4,Prescribed by law,4,59,59,0.8713,"Kazan v. Türkiye , 2023",,"Law-enforcement measures applied with reference to legal provisions which had no connection with the intended purpose of those measures could be characterised as arbitrary and unlawful. Thus, penalties for non-compliance with the lawful order of a police officer, or for hooliganism, imposed to prevent or to punish participation in an assembly did not meet the Convention requirement of lawfulness ( Hakobyan and Others v. Armenia, 2012, § 107; Huseynli and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 98).","Law-enforcement measures applied with reference to legal provisions which had no connection with the intended purpose of those measures could be characterised as arbitrary and unlawful. Thus, penalties for non-compliance with the lawful order of a police officer, or for hooliganism, imposed to prevent or to punish participation in an assembly did not meet the Convention requirement of lawfulness ( Hakobyan and Others v. Armenia, 2012, § 107; Huseynli and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2016, § 98). In the same vein, a decision ordering the applicant to pay, jointly with 45 other individuals, damages to reimburse medical expenses paid to police officers injured during a demonstration, despite being acquitted in criminal proceedings, was found to be arbitrary for lack of a foreseeable legal basis in domestic law ( Kazan v. Türkiye, 2023, §§ 67-73)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20230923090652__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20240405192605__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:2134/23,Pivkina and Others v. Russia (dec.),2134/23,added,"Pivkina and Others v. Russia (dec.), nos. 2134/23 and 6 others, 6 June 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.E.1,Interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of assembly,3,48,48,0.9183,,,"The right to freedom of assembly is not absolute; it can be subject to restrictions in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 11. An interference with the exercise of that right does not need to amount to an outright ban, legal or de facto, but can consist in various other measures taken by the authorities ( Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC], 2015, § 100).","The right to freedom of assembly is not absolute; it can be subject to restrictions in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 11. An interference with the exercise of that right does not need to amount to an outright ban, legal or de facto, but can consist in various other measures taken by the authorities ( Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC], 2015, § 100). Acts constitutive of interference must be taken to encompass any restrictive measures taken against an applicant in connection with his or her expressive conduct ( Pivkina and Others v. Russia (dec.), 2023, § 76)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240405192605__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json,apps:37949/18,Andrey Rylkov Foundation and Others v. Russia,37949/18,added,"Andrey Rylkov Foundation and Others v. Russia,* nos. 37949/18 and 83 others, 18 June 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.D.1,Prescribed by law,3,,157,,,,,"In Andrey Rylkov Foundation and Others v. Russia,* 2024, the Court similarly found that the law on ""undesirable organisations"" failed to satisfy the ""prescribed by law"" criterion as it was not formulated with sufficient precision to enable the applicant organisations to foresee that their lawful actions would result in their designation as ""undesirable"" and a prohibition of their activities in Russia. In addition, there were no effective judicial safeguards against the essentially unrestricted discretion granted to the executive authorities (§§ 89-95)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240405192605__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json,apps:26821/17,Association of People of Silesian Nationality (in liquidation) v. Poland,26821/17,added,"Association of People of Silesian Nationality (in liquidation) v. Poland, no. 26821/17, 14 March 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.E.2,Minority associations,3,,215,,,,,"In Association of People of Silesian Nationality (in liquidation) v. Poland, 2024, the authorities ordered the dissolution of the applicant association on the grounds that the name of the association would be misleading to the public as it was linked to a non-existent nation. For the Court, this reasoning was not sufficient to justify the dissolution order in the absence of any concrete evidence that the use of the words ""Silesian Nationality"" constituted a real threat to public order (§§ 51-54)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240405192605__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json,apps:1162/22,Auray and Others v. France,1162/22,added,"Auray and Others v. France, no. 1162/22, 8 February 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.E.1,Interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of assembly,3,51,52,0.9768,"Auray and Others v. France , 2024",,"Arefusal to allow an individual to travel for the purpose of attending a meeting amounts to an interference as well ( Djavit An v. Turkey, 2003, §§ 61-62; see also Kasparov v. Russia, 2016, § 67, and Alıcı and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 48, both concerning the applicants'unjustified deprivation of liberty on their way to demonstrations preventing them from taking part in the events). So too do measures taken by the authorities during a rally, such as its dispersal or the arrest of those taking part in it, and penalties imposed for having taken part in ( Kasparov and Others v. Russia, 2013, § 84; Gafgaz Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2015, § 50). Police applying force against peaceful participants during the dispersal of an assembly or for maintaining public order constitutes an interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly ( Laguna Guzman v. Spain, 2020, § 42; Zakharov and Varzhabetyan v. Russia, 2020, § 88).","Arefusal to allow an individual to travel for the purpose of attending a meeting amounts to an interference as well ( Djavit An v. Turkey, 2003, §§ 61-62; see also Kasparov v. Russia, 2016, § 67, and Alıcı and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, § 48, both concerning the applicants'unjustified deprivation of liberty on their way to demonstrations preventing them from taking part in the events; see also Auray and Others v. France, 2024, §§ 65-74 and 84-95, concerning the applicants prevented from attending an assembly by the police applying the ""kettling"" technique ). So too do measures taken by the authorities during a rally, such as its dispersal or the arrest of those taking part in it, and penalties imposed for having taken part in ( Kasparov and Others v. Russia, 2013, § 84; Gafgaz Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 2015, § 50). Police applying force against peaceful participants during the dispersal of an assembly or for maintaining public order constitutes an interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly ( Laguna Guzman v. Spain, 2020, § 42; Zakharov and Varzhabetyan v. Russia, 2020, § 88)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240405192605__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json,apps:9987/14,Boronenkov v. Ukraine (dec.),9987/14,added,"Boronenkov v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 9987/14, 2 April 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,I.A,Importance of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and its link with the right to freedom of expression,2,2,2,0.8181,,,"In view of the fundamental nature of this right, the Court has been reluctant to accept objections that the applicants have suffered no ""significant disadvantage"" and to dismiss Article 11 complaints with reference to Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention ( Berladir and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 34; Öğrü v. Turkey, 2017, § 18).","In view of the fundamental nature of this right, the Court has been reluctant to accept objections that the applicants have suffered no ""significant disadvantage"" and to dismiss Article 11 complaints with reference to Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention ( Berladir and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 34; Öğrü v. Turkey, 2017, § 18). However, the Court found that the applicant did not suffer a significant disadvantage where he was able to hold the prohibited rally for its full intended duration, about four hours, and was only sanctioned with a rather modest fine (39 euros). He did not argue that it was a substantial amount, and it could not be said in the circumstances to have had any ""chilling effect"" on the applicant's exercise of his right to freedom of assembly ( Boronenkov v. Ukraine (dec.), §§ 17-23)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240405192605__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json,apps:21286/15,Dianova and Others v. Russia,21286/15,added,"Dianova and Others v. Russia,* nos. 21286/15 and 4 others, 10 September 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B.2,Assembly as a form of expression and expression of opinion during assembly: Articles 10 and,3,,9,,"Novikova and Others v. Russia , 2016|Primov and Others v. Russia , 2014",,,"The Court has attached importance to the fact that those taking part in an assembly are not only seeking to express their opinion, but to do so together with others ( Primov and Others v. Russia, 2014, § 91). Demonstrations carried out by a solo participant are therefore examined under Article 10, taking into account, where appropriate, the general principles established in the context of Article 11 ( Novikova and Others v. Russia, 2016, § 91). Afive-day huger strike in a public place intended as a solo demonstration but being joined by two others, fell within the notion of ""peaceful assembly"" under Article 11 ( Dianova and Others v. Russia,* § 63)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240405192605__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json,apps:21286/15,Dianova and Others v. Russia,21286/15,added,"Dianova and Others v. Russia,* nos. 21286/15 and 4 others, 10 September 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.E.2.a,Prescribed by law,4,,59,,,,,"Accordingly, the domestic legal provisions allowing the executive to propose a change of location, time or manner of conduct of public events and lacking adequate and effective legal safeguards against arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of those powers were found not to meet the Convention ""quality of law"" requirements in Lashmankin and Others v. Russia (2017, § 430). In the same vein, the executive authorities'wide discretion in deciding what behaviour constituted a "" public event "" subject to official notification in the absence of criteria distinguishing it from an informal gathering, led the Court to doubt that the administrative law-enforcement measures for non-compliance with the noti fication procedure were ""prescribed by law"" ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, §§ 117-118; see also Dianova and Others v. Russia,* §§ 66-68)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240405192605__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json,apps:59433/18,Humpert and Others v. Germany [GC],59433/18,added,"Humpert and Others v. Germany [GC], nos. 59433/18 and 3 others, 14 December 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.B,Essential elements and the Court ’ s approach,2,244,248,0.9907,,,"This list is non-exhaustive and subject to evolution depending on particular developments in labour relations. The Court will take into account elements of international law other than the Convention, the interpretation of such elements by competent organs, and the practice of European States reflecting their common values ( Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], 2008, §§ 85 and 146; Manole and ""Romanian Farmers Direct"" v. Romania, 2015, § 67). It would be inconsistent with this method for the Court to adopt in relation to Article 11 an interpretation of the scope of freedom of association of trade unions that is much narrower than that which prevails in international law ( National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v. the United Kingdom, 2014, § 76).","This list is non-exhaustive and subject to evolution depending on particular developments in labour relations. The Court will take into account elements of international law other than the Convention, the interpretation of such elements by competent organs, and the practice of European States reflecting their common values ( Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], 2008, §§ 85 and 146; Manole and ""Romanian Farmers Direct"" v. Romania, 2015, § 67; Humpert and Others v. Germany [GC], 2023, § 101). It would be inconsistent with this method for the Court to adopt in relation to Article 11 an interpretation of the scope of freedom of association of trade unions that is much narrower than that which prevails in international law ( National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v. the United Kingdom, 2014, § 76)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240405192605__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json,apps:59433/18,Humpert and Others v. Germany [GC],59433/18,added,"Humpert and Others v. Germany [GC], nos. 59433/18 and 3 others, 14 December 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.H,Right to strike,2,,281,,,,,"While the Court had previously left open the question whether a prohibition on strikes affected an essential element of trade-union freedom, in Humpert and Others v. Germany [GC], 2023, it clarified that the question could not be answered in the abstract or by looking at such a prohibition in isolation. An assessment of all the circumstances of the case was required, considering the totality of the measures taken by the respondent State to secure trade-union freedom, and alternative means and rights granted to trade unions and their members to defend their interests. Other aspects of labour relations in the system concerned, such as collective bargaining, the sector concerned and the functions performed by the particular workers, were also relevant for that assessment (§§ 109-110)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240405192605__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json,apps:11214/19,Internationale Humanitäre Hilfsorganisation e. v. v. Germany,11214/19,added,"Internationale Humanitäre Hilfsorganisation e. v. v. Germany, no. 11214/19, 10 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.D.3.b,Severity of interference and the requirement of proportionality,4,172,175,0.9857,"Internationale Humanitäre Hilfsorganisation e. v. v. Germany , 2023",,"In order to satisfy the proportionality principle in cases of dissolution, the authorities must show that there are no other means of achieving the same aims that would interfere less seriously with the right of freedom of association ( Adana TAYAD v. Turkey, 2020, § 36; Association Rhino and Others, 2011, § 65; Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház and Others, 2014, § 96). The Court has however recognised that there may be cases in which the choice of measures available to the authorities for responding to a ""pressing social need"" in relation to the perceived harmful consequences linked to the existence or activities of an association is unavoidably limited ( Gorzelik and Others v. Poland [GC], 2004, § 105; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, §§ 119-120).","In order to satisfy the proportionality principle in cases of dissolution, the authorities must show that there are no other means of achieving the same aims that would interfere less seriously with the right of freedom of association ( Adana TAYAD v. Turkey, 2020, § 36; Association Rhino and Others, 2011, § 65; Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház and Others, 2014, § 96; Internationale Humanitäre Hilfsorganisation e. v. v. Germany, 2023, §§ 95-97). The Court has however recognised that there may be cases in which the choice of measures available to the authorities for responding to a ""pressing social need"" in relation to the perceived harmful consequences linked to the existence or activities of an association is unavoidably limited ( Gorzelik and Others v. Poland [GC], 2004, § 105; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, §§ 119-120)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240405192605__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json,apps:11214/19,Internationale Humanitäre Hilfsorganisation e. v. v. Germany,11214/19,added,"Internationale Humanitäre Hilfsorganisation e. v. v. Germany, no. 11214/19, 10 October 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.D.3.b,Severity of interference and the requirement of proportionality,4,174,177,0.9669,"Internationale Humanitäre Hilfsorganisation e. v. v. Germany , 2023",,"For example, the Court has found the dissolution of a party or another association justified where it: ▪ strived for a State based on Sharia ( Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and others v. Turkey, 2003; Zehra Foundation and Others v. Turkey, 2018, ; Kalifatstaat v. Germany (dec.), 2006; ▪ had links with a terrorist organisation ( Herri Batasuna and Batasuna v. Spain, 2009); ▪ was involved in anti-Roma rallies and paramilitary parading ( Vona v. Hungary, 2013,); ▪ was involved in repeated acts of violence related to football matches ( Les Authentiks and Supras Auteuil 91 v. France, 2016); ▪ had the characteristics of a private militia and was engaged in violence and public-order disturbances ( Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020).","For example, the Court has found the dissolution of a party or another association justified where it: ▪ strived for a State based on Sharia ( Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and others v. Turkey, 2003; Zehra Foundation and Others v. Turkey, 2018, ; Kalifatstaat v. Germany (dec.), 2006; ▪ had links with a terrorist organisation ( Herri Batasuna and Batasuna v. Spain, 2009); ▪ was involved in anti-Roma rallies and paramilitary parading ( Vona v. Hungary, 2013,); ▪ was involved in repeated acts of violence related to football matches ( Les Authentiks and Supras Auteuil 91 v. France, 2016); ▪ had the characteristics of a private militia and was engaged in violence and public-order disturbances ( Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020); ▪ provided considerable financial donations to charitable societies linked to the terrorist organisation Hamas ( Internationale Humanitäre Hilfsorganisation e. v. v. Germany, 2023)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240405192605__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json,apps:11214/19,Internationale Humanitäre Hilfsorganisation e. v. v. Germany,11214/19,added,"Internationale Humanitäre Hilfsorganisation e. v. v. Germany, no. 11214/19, 10 October 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.D.3.§4,Extent of the Court ’ s review,4,160,163,0.9904,"Internationale Humanitäre Hilfsorganisation e. v. v. Germany , 2023",,"The intensity of the Court's scrutiny depends on the type of association and the nature of its activities. In view of the difference in the importance for a democracy between a political party and a non-political association, only the former is subject to the most rigorous scrutiny of the necessity of a restriction on the right to associate ( Vona v. Hungary, 2013, § 58; Les Authentiks and Supras Auteuil 91 v. France, 2016, §§ 74 and 84). The national authorities benefit from a broader margin of appreciation in their assessment of the necessity of interference also in cases of incitement to violence against an individual, a representative of the State or a section of the population ( Les Authentiks and Supras Auteuil 91 v. France, 2016, § 84; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 121). The Court has also recognised that an association whose leaders put forward a policy which does not respect the rules of democracy or which is aimed at its destruction and the flouting of the rights and freedoms recognised in a democracy can be subject to penalties ( Zehra Foundation and Others v. Turkey, 2018, § 54). The State's power to protect its institutions and citizens from associations that might jeopardise them must however be used sparingly ( Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház and Others, 2014, § 79).","The intensity of the Court's scrutiny depends on the type of association and the nature of its activities. In view of the difference in the importance for a democracy between a political party and a non-political association, only the former is subject to the most rigorous scrutiny of the necessity of a restriction on the right to associate ( Vona v. Hungary, 2013, § 58; Les Authentiks and Supras Auteuil 91 v. France, 2016, §§ 74 and 84). The national authorities benefit from a broader margin of appreciation in their assessment of the necessity of interference also in cases of incitement to violence against an individual, a representative of the State or a section of the population ( Les Authentiks and Supras Auteuil 91 v. France, 2016, § 84; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 121) and when taking measures aimed at fighting international terrorism in general ( Internationale Humanitäre Hilfsorganisation e. v. v. Germany, 2023, §§ 75-76 and 85-89). The Court has also recognised that an association whose leaders put forward a policy which does not respect the rules of democracy or which is aimed at its destruction and the flouting of the rights and freedoms recognised in a democracy can be subject to penalties ( Zehra Foundation and Others v. Turkey, 2018, § 54). The State's power to protect its institutions and citizens from associations that might jeopardise them must however be used sparingly ( Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház and Others, 2014, § 79)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240405192605__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json,apps:56896/17,Laurijsen and Others v. the Netherlands,56896/17,added,"Laurijsen and Others v. the Netherlands, nos. 56896/17 and 4 others, 21 November 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.B.2,Assembly as a form of expression and expression of opinion during assembly: Articles 10 and,3,11,12,0.9804,,,"On the other hand, actions obstructing activities of a particular nature fall to be examined under Article 10, or under both Articles 10 and 11. Thus, a protest aimed at physically impeding a hunt or the construction of a motorway constituted expressions of opinion within the meaning of Article 10 ( Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1998, § 92). In a case brought by Greenpeace activists who had maneuvered dinghies in such a manner as to obstruct whaling the Court proceeded on the assumption that Articles 10 and/or 11 could be relied on by the applicants, but did not consider it necessary in the circumstances to attribute the complaint to one or both provision(s) ( Drieman and Others v. Norway (dec.), 2000) 2 . On the other hand, a demonstration designed to obstruct Parliament's work as a form of protest, was examined under Article 11 alone, regard being had to the nature and intention of the event ( Makarashvili and Others v. Georgia, 2022, § 92).","On the other hand, actions obstructing activities of a particular nature fall to be examined under Article 10, or under both Articles 10 and 11. Thus, a protest aimed at physically impeding a hunt or the construction of a motorway constituted expressions of opinion within the meaning of Article 10 ( Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1998, § 92). In a case brought by Greenpeace activists who had maneuvered dinghies in such a manner as to obstruct whaling the Court proceeded on the assumption that Articles 10 and/or 11 could be relied on by the applicants, but did not consider it necessary in the circumstances to attribute the complaint to one or both provision(s) ( Drieman and Others v. Norway (dec.), 2000) . On the other hand, a demonstration designed to obstruct Parliament's work as a form of protest, was examined under Article 11 alone, regard being had to the nature and intention of the event ( Makarashvili and Others v. Georgia, 2022, § 92). In the same vein, a protest against the announced eviction of a squatted building, which involved obstructive non-violent conduct, was also examined under Article 11of the Convention ( Laurijsen and Others v. the Netherlands, 2024, §§ 54-59)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240405192605__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json,apps:56896/17,Laurijsen and Others v. the Netherlands,56896/17,added,"Laurijsen and Others v. the Netherlands, nos. 56896/17 and 4 others, 21 November 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.C.3,Peaceful assembly,3,27,28,0.9889,,,"Obstructing traffic arteries as part of a demonstration is conduct which is, by itself, considered peaceful. Although not an uncommon occurrence in the context of the exercise of freedom of assembly in modern societies, physical conduct purposely obstructing traffic and the ordinary course of life in order to seriously disrupt the activities carried out by others is not at the core of that freedom as protected by Article 11 of the Convention. This state of affairs has implications for any assessment of ""necessity"" under the second par agraph of Article 11 ( Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC], 2015, § 97 with further references and examples). Likewise, occupation of public buildings is generally regarded as peaceful conduct, despite its unlawfulness and the disruptions it may cause ( Cisse v. France, 2002, §§ 39-40; Tuskia and Others v. Georgia, 2018, § 73; Annenkov and Others v. Russia, 2017, § 126).","Obstructing traffic arteries as part of a demonstration is conduct which is, by itself, considered peaceful. Although not an uncommon occurrence in the context of the exercise of freedom of assembly in modern societies, physical conduct purposely obstructing traffic and the ordinary course of life in order to seriously disrupt the activities carried out by others is not at the core of that freedom as protected by Article 11 of the Convention. This state of affairs has implications for any assessment of ""necessity"" under the second paragraph of Article 11 ( Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC], 2015, § 97 with further references and examples; see also Laurijsen and Others v. the Netherlands, 2024, §§ 54-59). Likewise, occupation of public buildings is generally regarded as peaceful conduct, despite its unlawfulness and the disruptions it may cause ( Cisse v. France, 2002, §§ 39-40; Tuskia and Others v. Georgia, 2018, § 73; Annenkov and Others v. Russia, 2017, § 126)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240405192605__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json,apps:26604/16,Waldner v. France,26604/16,added,"Waldner v. France, no. 26604/16, 7 December 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C.5,Negative freedom of association,3,144,145,0.9373,"Waldner v. France , 2023",,"Although an obligation to join a particular association may not always be contrary to the Convention, a form of such an obligation which strikes at the very substance of the freedom of association guaranteed by Article 11, will constitute an interference with that freedom ( Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 55, and Sørensen and Rasmussen [GC], 2006, § 56, concerning ""closed shop"" agreements making employment dependent on trade union membership; Sigurður A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, 1993, § 36, relating to an obligation imposed by law on taxicab drivers to be members of a specific organisation for taxicab operators; Mytilinaios and Kostakis v. Greece, 2015, concerning an obligation of winegrowers to be members of a union, §§ 53 and 65).","Although an obligation to join a particular association may not always be contrary to the Convention, a form of such an obligation which strikes at the very substance of the freedom of association guaranteed by Article 11, will constitute an interference with that freedom ( Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 55, and Sørensen and Rasmussen [GC], 2006, § 56, concerning ""closed shop"" agreements making employment dependent on trade union membership; Sigurður A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, 1993, § 36, relating to an obligation imposed by law on taxicab drivers to be members of a specific organisation for taxicab operators; Mytilinaios and Kostakis v. Greece, 2015, concerning an obligation of winegrowers to be members of a union, §§ 53 and 65; see also Waldner v. France, 2023, § 59, concerning an increase in the applicant's professional tax liability on the grounds that he was not a member of a management association approved by the tax authorities, where the Court examined the case only under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240405192605__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-30.json,apps:15669/20,Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC],15669/20,added,"Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, 26 September 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.D.1,Prescribed by law,3,,158,,,,,"In Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, the domestic courts had extended the scope of the relevant criminal law provision in an unforeseeable manner when relying on the applicant's membership of a trade union and an association - both of which had been operating lawfully at the material time - to corroborate his conviction, thereby depriving him of the minimum protection against arbitrary interference (§§ 389-396)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20251210133318__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-12-10,31 August 2024,31 August 2025,2024-08-31,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json,apps:55789/19,Almaz and Others v. Türkiye (dec.),55789/19,added,"Almaz and Others v. Türkiye (dec.), nos. 55789/19 and 3 others, 19 November 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.H,Right to strike,2,,283,,,,,"Strike action is protected by Article 11 only in so far as it is called by trade-union organisations and considered as being effectively - and not merely presumed to be - part of trade-union activity ( Barış and Others v. Turkey (dec.), 2021, § 45). In addition, there has to be a link between such action and the professional interests of trade-union members ( Almaz and Others v. Türkiye (dec.), 2024, §§ 62-63; Kaya v. Türkiye (dec.), §§ 58-59; and Ercan and Others v. Türkiye (dec.), 2025, §§ 61-64, where Article 11 was found to be inapplicable to industrial action about matters of general or political interest, but not intended to defend the applicants'own professional or socio-economic interests)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20251210133318__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-12-10,31 August 2024,31 August 2025,2024-08-31,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json,apps:35834/22,Bodson and Others v. Belgium,35834/22,added,"Bodson and Others v. Belgium, nos. 35834/22 and 15 others, 16 January 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C.3,Peaceful assembly,3,28,29,0.9769,"In Bodson and Others v. Belgium , 2025",,"Obstructing traffic arteries as part of a demonstration is conduct which is, by itself, considered peaceful. Although not an uncommon occurrence in the context of the exercise of freedom of assembly in modern societies, physical conduct purposely obstructing traffic and the ordinary course of life in order to seriously disrupt the activities carried out by others is not at the core of that freedom as protected by Article 11 of the Convention. This state of affairs has implications for any assessment of ""necessity"" under the second paragraph of Article 11 ( Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC], 2015, § 97 with further references and examples; see also Laurijsen and Others v. the Netherlands, 2024, §§ 54-59). Likewise, occupation of public buildings is generally regarded as peaceful conduct, despite its unlawfulness and the disruptions it may cause ( Cisse v. France, 2002, §§ 39-40; Tuskia and Others v. Georgia, 2018, § 73; Annenkov and Others v. Russia, 2017, § 126).","Obstructing traffic arteries as part of a demonstration is conduct which is, by itself, considered peaceful. Although not an uncommon occurrence in the context of the exercise of freedom of assembly in modern societies, physical conduct purposely obstructing traffic and the ordinary course of life in order to seriously disrupt the activities carried out by others is not at the core of that freedom as protected by Article 11 of the Convention. This state of affairs has implications for any assessment of ""necessity"" under the second paragraph of Article 11 ( Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC], 2015, § 97 with further references and examples; see also Laurijsen and Others v. the Netherlands, 2024, §§ 54-59). In Bodson and Others v. Belgium, 2025, where the applicants had blocked a motorway as part of a strike and were convicted of traffic obstruction, the Court found Article 11 to be applicable in the absence of violent intent (§ 81). Likewise, occupation of public buildings is generally regarded as peaceful conduct, despite its unlawfulness and the disruptions it may cause ( Cisse v. France, 2002, §§ 39-40; Tuskia and Others v. Georgia, 2018, § 73; Annenkov and Others v. Russia, 2017, § 126)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20251210133318__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-12-10,31 August 2024,31 August 2025,2024-08-31,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json,apps:35834/22,Bodson and Others v. Belgium,35834/22,added,"Bodson and Others v. Belgium, nos. 35834/22 and 15 others, 16 January 2025",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.G,Reprehensible conduct,2,,115,,"Bodson and Others v. Belgium , 2025",,,"Similarly, where protestors contributed to the obstruction of a motorway, and this was dangerous, the conduct was regarded as ""reprehensible"" . In this case, the fact that the applicants were not the cause of the obstruction did not mean that the measures taken, in respect of them taking part and contributing to a dangerous obstruction of traffic, were incompatible with Article 11. The fact that the applicants did not personally commit acts of violence, or incite others during the obstruction, was not sufficient to conclude there was not reprehensible conduct ( Bodson and Others v. Belgium, 2025, §§ 104 and 109)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20251210133318__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-12-10,31 August 2024,31 August 2025,2024-08-31,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json,apps:38283/18,Bogay and Others v. Ukraine,38283/18,added,"Bogay and Others v. Ukraine, no. 38283/18, 3 April 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C.3,Peaceful assembly,3,26,27,0.9132,"Bogay and Others v. Ukraine , 2025",,"The burden of proving violent intentions on the part of the assembly organisers lies with the authorities ( Christian Democratic People's Party v. Moldova (no. 2), 2010, § 23).","The burden of proving violent intentions on the part of the assembly organisers lies with the authorities ( Christian Democratic People's Party v. Moldova (no. 2), 2010, § 23, and Bogay and Others v. Ukraine, 2025, §§ 71-75)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20251210133318__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-12-10,31 August 2024,31 August 2025,2024-08-31,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json,apps:38283/18,Bogay and Others v. Ukraine,38283/18,added,"Bogay and Others v. Ukraine, no. 38283/18, 3 April 2025",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C.3,Peaceful assembly,3,32,33,0.9673,"Bogay and Others v. Ukraine , 2025",,"To establish whether an applicant may claim the protection of Article 11, the Court takes into account (i) whether the assembly intended to be peaceful and whether the organisers had violent intentions; (ii) whether the applicant had demonstrated violent intentions when joining the assembly; and (iii) whether the applicant had inflicted bodily harm on anyone ( Gülcü v. Turkey, 2016, § 97; and Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine, 2021, § 491). If the initially peaceful assembly escalated into violence and both sides - demonstrators and police - became involved in violent acts, it is sometimes necessary to examine who started the violence ( Primov and Others v. Russia, 2014, § 157; Çiçek and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 137-141). On the basis of these criteria the Court dismissed as incompatible ratione materiae the complaint of an applicant found guilty of deliberate acts contributing to the onset of clashes in a previously peaceful assembly (he was leading a group of people to break through the police cordon), noting the significance of this particular event among other factors causative of the escalation of violence at the assembly venue ( Razvozzhayev v. Russia and Ukraine and Udaltsov v. Russia, 2019, §§ 282-285).","To establish whether an applicant may claim the protection of Article 11, the Court takes into account (i) whether the assembly intended to be peaceful and whether the organisers had violent intentions; (ii) whether the applicant had demonstrated violent intentions when joining the assembly; and (iii) whether the applicant had inflicted bodily harm on anyone ( Gülcü v. Turkey, 2016, § 97; and Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine, 2021, § 491; see also Harutyunyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), 2025, § 30). If the initially peaceful assembly escalated into violence and both sides - demonstrators and police - became involved in violent acts, it is sometimes necessary to examine who started the violence ( Primov and Others v. Russia, 2014, § 157; Çiçek and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 137-141). On the basis of these criteria the Court dismissed as incompatible ratione materiae the complaint of an applicant found guilty of deliberate acts contributing to the onset of clashes in a previously peaceful assembly (he was leading a group of people to break through the police cordon), noting the significance of this particular event among other factors causative of the escalation of violence at the assembly venue ( Razvozzhayev v. Russia and Ukraine and Udaltsov v. Russia, 2019, §§ 282-285). Similarly, the Court dismissed as incompatible ratione materiae the complaints of an organiser of a protest and his supporters who were found to have had violent intentions on account of: statements explicitly referencing violence and the intention to take over government buildings; the organiser having armed his supporters for that purpose; and the bodily harm inflicted on police officers as a result of the clashes which ensued ( Harutyunyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), 2025, §§ 30-38; compare and contrast Bogay and Others v. Ukraine, 2025, §§ 71-75)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20251210133318__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-12-10,31 August 2024,31 August 2025,2024-08-31,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json,apps:50763/22,Ercan and Others v. Türkiye (dec.),50763/22,added,"Ercan and Others v. Türkiye (dec.), 50763/22, 4 February 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.H,Right to strike,2,,283,,,,,"Strike action is protected by Article 11 only in so far as it is called by trade-union organisations and considered as being effectively - and not merely presumed to be - part of trade-union activity ( Barış and Others v. Turkey (dec.), 2021, § 45). In addition, there has to be a link between such action and the professional interests of trade-union members ( Almaz and Others v. Türkiye (dec.), 2024, §§ 62-63; Kaya v. Türkiye (dec.), §§ 58-59; and Ercan and Others v. Türkiye (dec.), 2025, §§ 61-64, where Article 11 was found to be inapplicable to industrial action about matters of general or political interest, but not intended to defend the applicants'own professional or socio-economic interests)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20251210133318__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-12-10,31 August 2024,31 August 2025,2024-08-31,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json,apps:45401/15,Harutyunyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.),45401/15,added,"Harutyunyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), no. 45401/15, 1 April 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C.3,Peaceful assembly,3,32,33,0.9673,"Bogay and Others v. Ukraine , 2025",,"To establish whether an applicant may claim the protection of Article 11, the Court takes into account (i) whether the assembly intended to be peaceful and whether the organisers had violent intentions; (ii) whether the applicant had demonstrated violent intentions when joining the assembly; and (iii) whether the applicant had inflicted bodily harm on anyone ( Gülcü v. Turkey, 2016, § 97; and Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine, 2021, § 491). If the initially peaceful assembly escalated into violence and both sides - demonstrators and police - became involved in violent acts, it is sometimes necessary to examine who started the violence ( Primov and Others v. Russia, 2014, § 157; Çiçek and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 137-141). On the basis of these criteria the Court dismissed as incompatible ratione materiae the complaint of an applicant found guilty of deliberate acts contributing to the onset of clashes in a previously peaceful assembly (he was leading a group of people to break through the police cordon), noting the significance of this particular event among other factors causative of the escalation of violence at the assembly venue ( Razvozzhayev v. Russia and Ukraine and Udaltsov v. Russia, 2019, §§ 282-285).","To establish whether an applicant may claim the protection of Article 11, the Court takes into account (i) whether the assembly intended to be peaceful and whether the organisers had violent intentions; (ii) whether the applicant had demonstrated violent intentions when joining the assembly; and (iii) whether the applicant had inflicted bodily harm on anyone ( Gülcü v. Turkey, 2016, § 97; and Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine, 2021, § 491; see also Harutyunyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), 2025, § 30). If the initially peaceful assembly escalated into violence and both sides - demonstrators and police - became involved in violent acts, it is sometimes necessary to examine who started the violence ( Primov and Others v. Russia, 2014, § 157; Çiçek and Others v. Türkiye, 2022, §§ 137-141). On the basis of these criteria the Court dismissed as incompatible ratione materiae the complaint of an applicant found guilty of deliberate acts contributing to the onset of clashes in a previously peaceful assembly (he was leading a group of people to break through the police cordon), noting the significance of this particular event among other factors causative of the escalation of violence at the assembly venue ( Razvozzhayev v. Russia and Ukraine and Udaltsov v. Russia, 2019, §§ 282-285). Similarly, the Court dismissed as incompatible ratione materiae the complaints of an organiser of a protest and his supporters who were found to have had violent intentions on account of: statements explicitly referencing violence and the intention to take over government buildings; the organiser having armed his supporters for that purpose; and the bodily harm inflicted on police officers as a result of the clashes which ensued ( Harutyunyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), 2025, §§ 30-38; compare and contrast Bogay and Others v. Ukraine, 2025, §§ 71-75)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20251210133318__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-12-10,31 August 2024,31 August 2025,2024-08-31,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json,apps:52977/19,Hellgren v. Finland,52977/19,added,"Hellgren v. Finland, no. 52977/19, 17 December 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.H,Right to strike,2,,282,,"Hellgren v. Finland , 2024",,,"Article 11 applies also to a ""selective strike"" called by a trade union where an employee refuses to perform certain work tasks ( Hellgren v. Finland, 2024, § 63)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20251210133318__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-12-10,31 August 2024,31 August 2025,2024-08-31,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json,apps:51194/19,Kaya v. Türkiye (dec.),51194/19,added,"Kaya v. Türkiye (dec.), no. 51194/19, 19 November 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.H,Right to strike,2,,283,,,,,"Strike action is protected by Article 11 only in so far as it is called by trade-union organisations and considered as being effectively - and not merely presumed to be - part of trade-union activity ( Barış and Others v. Turkey (dec.), 2021, § 45). In addition, there has to be a link between such action and the professional interests of trade-union members ( Almaz and Others v. Türkiye (dec.), 2024, §§ 62-63; Kaya v. Türkiye (dec.), §§ 58-59; and Ercan and Others v. Türkiye (dec.), 2025, §§ 61-64, where Article 11 was found to be inapplicable to industrial action about matters of general or political interest, but not intended to defend the applicants'own professional or socio-economic interests)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20251210133318__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-12-10,31 August 2024,31 August 2025,2024-08-31,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json,apps:29760/21|33931/21,Mzhavanadze and Rukhadze v. Georgia,29760/21|33931/21,added,"Mzhavanadze and Rukhadze v. Georgia, nos. 29760/21 and 33931/21, 15 July 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.F.2,Unlawful assembly,3,100,104,0.9948,"Mzhavanadze and Rukhadze v. Georgia , 2025",,"Consequently, the absence of prior authorisation and the ensuing ""unlawfulness"" of the action do not give carte blanche to the authorities; they are still restricted by the proportionality requirement of Article 11 ( Primov and Others v. Russia, 2014, § 119). Thus, it should be established why the demonstration was not authorised in the first place, what the public interest at stake was, and what risks were represented by the demonstration. The method used by the police for discouraging the protestors, containing them in a particular place or dispersing the demonstration, is also an important factor in assessing the proportionality of the interference ( ibid .). Adecision whether to disperse a political rally must be based on due recognition of the privileged protection under the Convention of political speech, debate on questions of public interest and the peaceful manifestation on such matters, and remain within the authorities'narrow margin of appreciation in restricting political speech ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 133).","Consequently, the absence of prior authorisation and the ensuing ""unlawfulness"" of the action do not give carte blanche to the authorities; they are still restricted by the proportionality requirement of Article 11 ( Primov and Others v. Russia, 2014, § 119). Thus, it should be established why the demonstration was not authorised in the first place, what the public interest at stake was, and what risks were represented by the demonstration. The method used by the police for discouraging the protestors, containing them in a particular place or dispersing the demonstration, is also an important factor in assessing the proportionality of the interference ( ibid .). Adecision whether to disperse a political rally must be based on due recognition of the privileged protection under the Convention of political speech, debate on questions of public interest and the peaceful manifestation on such matters, and remain within the authorities'narrow margin of appreciation in restricting political speech ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 133; see also Mzhavanadze and Rukhadze v. Georgia, 2025, § 77)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20251210133318__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-12-10,31 August 2024,31 August 2025,2024-08-31,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json,apps:2623/16|2299/16,Rodina and Borisova v. Latvia,2623/16|2299/16,added,"Rodina and Borisova v. Latvia, nos. 2623/16 and 2299/16, 10 July 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.E.2.i,Narrow margin of appreciation for interference based on the content of views expressed during an assembly,4,74,76,0.8694,"Rodina and Borisova v. Latvia , 2025",,"The fact that a group of persons calls for autonomy or even requests secession of part of the country's territory - thus demanding fundamental constitutional and territorial changes - cannot automatically justify a prohibition of its assemblies. Demanding territorial changes in speeches and demonstrations does not automatically amount to a threat to the country's territorial integrity and national security ( Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria, 2001, § 97).","The fact that a group of persons calls for autonomy or even requests secession of part of the country's territory - thus demanding fundamental constitutional and territorial changes - cannot automatically justify a prohibition of its assemblies. Demanding territorial changes in speeches and demonstrations does not automatically amount to a threat to the country's territorial integrity and national security ( Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria, 2001, § 97). By contrast, the Court found, in respect of the domestic authorities'reasoned refusal to authorise demonstrations by an association and a private person, that there is no place in a democratic society for calls expressing the superiority of one nation over another nation or for aggressive ""war propaganda"" messages aimed at expressing support for unrecognised separatist entities in eastern Ukraine ( Rodina and Borisova v. Latvia, 2025, § 119)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20251210133318__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-12-10,31 August 2024,31 August 2025,2024-08-31,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json,apps:44241/20,Russ v. Germany,44241/20,added,"Russ v. Germany, no. 44241/20, 20 May 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.B.2,Assembly as a form of expression and expression of opinion during assembly: Articles 10 and,3,11,11,0.9855,,,"Non-violent acts committed during an assembly are protected by Article 11. Roadblocks and other physical conduct purposely obstructing traffic and the ordinary course of life were considered to fall within the terms of Article 11 ( Barraco v. France, 2009, § 39; Lucas v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2003), although the Court noted that such acts were not at the core of the freedom of peaceful assembly as protected by Article 11 of the Convention ( Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC], 2015, § 97). Installation of a banner on a wall during a demonstration was examined under Article 11 alone ( Akarsubaşı and Alçiçek v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 31-33; cf. Olga Kudrina v. Russia, 2021, § 49, where similar actions were examined under Article 10 when they were combined with throwing political leaflets out of the window), as was the making of public statements to the press near judicial buildings in defiance of the legislative ban on doing so ( Öğrü v. Turkey, 2017, § 13). Likewise, a series of protest actions including a press conference, a procession and a sit-in, all linked to a single campaign, was examined under Article 11 ( Hakim Aydin v. Turkey, 2020, § 50). In Ekrem Can and Others v. Turkey, 2022, the protest at the courthouse - where the applicants had opened a banner, chanted slogans and thrown leaflets, thereby disrupting an essential public service - namely the orderly administration of justice (§ 91) - was examined under Article 11 considered in the light of Article 10. The Court noted that the applicants'complaint concerned not only the fact that they had been prevented from making a statement, but predominantly the police intervention resulting in their forcible removal from the premises, (§ 68). Apenalty for shouting slogans and holding banners during a demonstration on account of their content is considered an interference with the right to freedom of peaceful assembly under Article 11 ( Kemal Çetin v. Turkey, 2020, § 26).","Non-violent acts committed during an assembly are protected by Article 11. Roadblocks and other physical conduct purposely obstructing traffic and the ordinary course of life were considered to fall within the terms of Article 11 ( Barraco v. France, 2009, § 39; Lucas v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2003), although the Court noted that such acts were not at the core of the freedom of peaceful assembly as protected by Article 11 of the Convention ( Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC], 2015, § 97). Installation of a banner on a wall during a demonstration was examined under Article 11 alone ( Akarsubaşı and Alçiçek v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 31-33; cf. Olga Kudrina v. Russia, 2021, § 49, where similar actions were examined under Article 10 when they were combined with throwing political leaflets out of the window), as was the making of public statements to the press near judicial buildings in defiance of the legislative ban on doing so ( Öğrü v. Turkey, 2017, § 13). Likewise, a series of protest actions including a press conference, a procession and a sit-in, all linked to a single campaign, was examined under Article 11 ( Hakim Aydin v. Turkey, 2020, § 50). In Ekrem Can and Others v. Turkey, 2022, the protest at the courthouse - where the applicants had opened a banner, chanted slogans and thrown leaflets, thereby disrupting an essential public service - namely the orderly administration of justice (§ 91) - was examined under Article 11 considered in the light of Article 10. The Court noted that the applicants'complaint concerned not only the fact that they had been prevented from making a statement, but predominantly the police intervention resulting in their forcible removal from the premises, (§ 68). Apenalty for shouting slogans and holding banners during a demonstration on account of their content is considered an interference with the right to freedom of peaceful assembly under Article 11 ( Kemal Çetin v. Turkey, 2020, § 26). In Russ v. Germany (2025, § 35) a criminal conviction for wearing a plastic visor with an inscription during a peaceful demonstration was examined under Article 11, read in the light of Article 10, since it was the wearing of the visor (a prohibited ""protective weapon"" in a demonstration) rather than the inscription which had been sanctioned."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20251210133318__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-12-10,31 August 2024,31 August 2025,2024-08-31,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json,apps:34724/18,Sagir and Others v. Greece,34724/18,added,"Sagir and Others v. Greece, no. 34724/18, 24 June 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.E.2,Minority associations,3,,221,,"In Sagir and Others v. Greece , 2025",,,"In Sagir and Others v. Greece, 2025, the authorities refused to register the ""Cultural Association of Turkish Women of the Prefecture of Xanthi"" on the grounds that its name could create confusion as to the identity of its members as there was a need to distinguish between a recognised Muslim minority and an unrecognised Turkish Minority. Highlighting that the right to free self-identification was a cornerstone of international law governing the protection of minorities in general, the Court considered that, in the absence of any threat to public order, the association's name could not, by itself, justify the non-registration of the association (§§ 48-51)."
684d373b17e9,Article 11,20240930063355__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,20251210133318__guide_art_11_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-12-10,31 August 2024,31 August 2025,2024-08-31,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/684d373b17e9/diff_2024-09-30__2025-12-10.json,apps:39056/22,Selishcheva and Others v. Russia,39056/22,added,"Selishcheva and Others v. Russia, nos. 39056/22 and 9 others, 27 May 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B.2,Assembly as a form of expression and expression of opinion during assembly: Articles 10 and,3,,13,,"Selishcheva and Others v. Russia , 2025",,,"In a case involving complaints under Articles 8, 10 and 11 of the Convention regarding the collection and storage of data about the applicants'political views and activism, and its subsequent use by the electoral authorities to deny the applicants'registration as electoral candidates, the Court examined the situation under all three provisions. After finding a breach of Article 8 of the Convention, the Court assessed the complaints under both Articles 10 and 11. The Court found that the refusal to register the applicants as candidates constituted a negative consequence of, and thus an interference with, the legitimate exercise of the their rights under Articles 10 and 11. Noting the interconnected nature of the underlying issues, the Court went on to assess the requirements of the second paragraphs of both Articles 10 and 11 together ( Selishcheva and Others v. Russia, 2025, § 45)."
6d86f7b0f9c7,Article 4 Protocol 7,20230923164453__guide_art_4_protocol_7_eng.pdf,20240329042034__guide_art_4_protocol_7_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-29,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/6d86f7b0f9c7/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-29.json,apps:19961/17,C.Y. v. Belgium,19961/17,added,"C.Y. v. Belgium, no. 19961/17, 14 November 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.B.§13, Administrative proceedings and penalties,3,,25,,"C.Y. v. Belgium, no. 19961/17, 14 November 2023",,,"In C.Y. v. Belgium, 2024, §§ 40-47, parallel criminal and administrative proceedings were pursued against a nurse for having declared to the authorities medical services not provided and services which were provided but not in compliance with the law. The Court distinguished between the reimbursement order and the fine imposed in the administrative proceedings: in so far as the administrative proceedings resulted in the reimbursement order which did not have any deterrent or repressive purpose, they raised no issue from the perspective of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, whereas the fine imposed had predominantly penal features intended to sanction the conduct in question so it was found to concern a criminal matter within the meaning of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7."
6d86f7b0f9c7,Article 4 Protocol 7,20230923164453__guide_art_4_protocol_7_eng.pdf,20240329042034__guide_art_4_protocol_7_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-29,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/6d86f7b0f9c7/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-29.json,apps:17412/16,Vasile Sorin Marin v. Romania,17412/16,added,"Vasile Sorin Marin v. Romania, no. 17412/16, 3 October 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B,Examples,2,,43,,"Vasile Sorin Marin v. Romania, no. 17412/16, 3 October 2023",,,"Vasile Sorin Marin v. Romania, 2024, §§ 46-51 concerned a duplication of proceedings - an administrative fine and criminal proceedings - for socially offensive conduct that disturbed public order. The Court found that the recapitulation of the events in the two sets of proceedings demonstrated that the same conduct, on the part of the same defendant and within the same time frame was at issue. What remained to be established was whether the facts, of the offence for which the applicant had been administratively fined and those of the criminal offence by reason of which he had been indicted, were identical or substantially the same. The legal classification in the two sets of proceedings apparently differed in one respect: the degree of severity of the disturbance. However, on the basis of the available elements, the Court found that the criminal charges brought against the applicant comprised the facts of the administrative offence in its entirety, and, conversely, the facts of the administrative offence did not contain any elements that were not present in the criminal offence with which the applicant was charged. Thus, the facts constituting the two offences had to be regarded as substantially the same for the purposes of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention."
726c25db1ffb,Article 17,20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,20240409183827__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:47833/20,Lenis v. Greece (dec.),47833/20,added,"Lenis v. Greece (dec.), no. 47833/20, 27 June 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.A.2,Groups and individuals,4,18,18,0.9912,,,"In so far as it refers to groups and individuals, the purpose of Article 17 is to make it impossible for them to derive from the Convention a right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at destroying any of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 7 of ""the Law"" part; Orban and Others v. France, 2009, § 33; Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, § 87; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 30; Šimunić v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, § 37; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 92).","In so far as it refers to groups and individuals, the purpose of Article 17 is to make it impossible for them to derive from the Convention a right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3) destroying any of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention (, 1961, § 7 of ""the Law"" part; Orban and Others v. France, 2009, § 33; Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, § 87; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 30; Šimunić v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, § 37; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 92; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 38)."
726c25db1ffb,Article 17,20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,20240409183827__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:47833/20,Lenis v. Greece (dec.),47833/20,added,"Lenis v. Greece (dec.), no. 47833/20, 27 June 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.B.1,The notion of abuse of rights,4,22,22,0.9974,,,"Article 17 is relevant where an applicant seeks to deflect a Convention provision from its real purpose by taking advantage of the right it guarantees in order to justify, promote or perform acts that: ▪ are contrary to the text and spirit of the Convention ( M'Bala M'Bala v. France (dec.), 2015; Garaudy v. France (dec.), 2003; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; W.P. and Others v. Poland (dec.), 2004; Witzsch v. Germany (no. 2) (dec.), 2005; Pastörs v. Germany, 2019, § 46); ▪ are incompatible with democracy and/or other fundamental values of the Convention ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, § 114; Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; Norwood v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 48; Romanov v. Ukraine [Committee], 2020, § 164; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 138); ▪ infringe the rights and freedoms recognised therein ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 7 of ""the Law"" part; Varela Geis v. Spain, 2013, § 40; Molnar v. Romania (dec.), 2012).","Article 17 is relevant where an applicant seeks to deflect a Convention provision from its real purpose by taking advantage of the right it guarantees in order to justify, promote or perform acts that:  M'Bala M'Bala v. France are contrary to the text and spirit of the Convention ( (dec.), 2015; Garaudy v. France (dec.), 2003; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; W.P. and Others v. Poland (dec.), 2004; Witzsch v. Germany (no. 2) (dec.), 2005; Pastörs v. Germany, 2019, § 46);  are incompatible with democracy and/or other fundamental values of the Convention Perinçek v. Switzerland Pavel Ivanov v. Russia Norwood ( [GC], 2015, § 114; (dec.), 2007; v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 48; Romanov v. Ukraine [Committee], 2020, § 164; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 138; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 57);  infringe the rights and freedoms recognised therein ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 7 of ""the Law"" part; Varela Geis v. Spain, 2013, § 40; Molnar v. Romania (dec.), 2012)."
726c25db1ffb,Article 17,20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,20240409183827__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:47833/20,Lenis v. Greece (dec.),47833/20,added,"Lenis v. Greece (dec.), no. 47833/20, 27 June 2023",3,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.4,Aims prohibited by Article 17,4,29,29,0.998,"Bala v. France Garaudy v. France , 1998",,"Article 17 prevents applicants from relying on the Convention in order to perform, promote and/or justify acts amounting to or characterised by: ▪ hatred ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, §§ 115 and 230; Molnar v. Romania (dec.), 2012; Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017; Lilliendahl v. Iceland (dec.), 2020, § 39); ▪ violence ( Hizb ut-Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012, § 73; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013, § 106; Kaptan v. Switzerland (dec.), 2001; Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017; Romanov v. Ukraine [Committee], 2020, §§ 163-166); ▪ xenophobia and racial discrimination ( Jersild v. Denmark, 1994, § 35; Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1979; Féret v. Belgium, 2009; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 134); ▪ anti-Semitism ( Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; W.P. and Others v. Poland (dec.), 2004); ▪ islamophobia ( Norwood v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004; Seurot v. France (dec.), 2004; Soulas and Others v. France, 2008; Zemmour v. France, 2022); ▪ terrorism and war crimes ( Orban and Others v. France, 2009, § 35; Leroy v. France, 2008, § 27; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, §§ 46-47); ▪ negation and revision of clearly established historical facts, such as the Holocaust ( Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 1998, § 47; M'Bala M'Bala v. France (dec.), 2015; Garaudy v. France (dec.), 2003; Witzsch v. Germany (no. 2) (dec.), 2005); ▪ contempt for victims of the Holocaust, of a war and/or of a totalitarian regime ( Witzsch v. Germany (no. 2) (dec.), 2005; Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, 2010, § 81; Vajnai v. Hungary, 2008, § 25; Fáber v. Hungary, 2012, § 58; Pastörs v. Germany [Committee], 2019, § 39); ▪ totalitarian ideology and other political ideas incompatible with democracy ( Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 1998, § 53; Vona v. Hungary, 2013, § 36; Vajnai v. Hungary, 2008, § 25; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 108-113; Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2003, § 132; Schimanek v. Austria (dec.), 2000; Kühnen v. Germany, Commission decision, 1988; German Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957).","Article 17 prevents applicants from relying on the Convention in order to perform, promote and/or justify acts amounting to or characterised by:  hatred ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, §§ 115 and 230; Molnar v. Romania (dec.), 2012; Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017; Lilliendahl v. Iceland (dec.), 2020, § 39; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 56);  violence ( Hizb ut - Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012, § 73; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013, § 106; Kaptan v. Switzerland (dec.), 2001; Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017; Romanov v. Ukraine [Committee], 2020, §§ 163-166; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 56);  xenophobia and racial discrimination ( Jersild v. Denmark, 1994, § 35; Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1979; Féret v. Belgium, 2009; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 134);  anti-Semitism ( Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; W.P. and Others v. Poland (dec.), 2004);  islamophobia ( Norwood v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004; Seurot v. France (dec.), 2004; Soulas and Others v. France, 2008; Zemmour v. France, 2022);  terrorism and war crimes ( Orban and Others v. France, 2009, § 35; Leroy v. France, 2008, Roj TV A/S v. Denmark § 27; (dec.), 2018, §§ 46-47);  negation and revision of clearly established historical facts, such as the Holocaust ( Lehideux and Isorni v. France M'Bala M'Bala v. France Garaudy v. France, 1998, § 47; (dec.), 2015; (dec.), 2003; Witzsch v. Germany (no. 2) (dec.), 2005);  Witzsch contempt for victims of the Holocaust, of a war and/or of a totalitarian regime ( v. Germany (no. 2) (dec.), 2005; Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, 2010, § 81; Vajnai v. Hungary, 2008, § 25; Fáber v. Hungary, 2012, § 58; Pastörs v. Germany [Committee], 2019, § 39);  totalitarian ideology and other political ideas incompatible with democracy ( Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 1998, § 53; Vona v. Hungary, 2013, § 36; Vajnai v. Hungary, 2008, § 25; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party), 2013, §§ 108-113; and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2003, § 132; Schimanek v. Austria (dec.), 2000; Kühnen v. Germany, Commission decision, 1988; German Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957)."
726c25db1ffb,Article 17,20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,20240409183827__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:47833/20,Lenis v. Greece (dec.),47833/20,added,"Lenis v. Greece (dec.), no. 47833/20, 27 June 2023",4,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.5,Importance of context,4,,40,,,,,"The Court also has regard to the character of the group targeted by the impugned conduct or speech, notably whether the targeted group requires enhanced protection on account of its low acceptance in the particular national context and/or the marginalisation and victimisation to which such a group has historically been, and continues to be, subjected (for example, gender and sexual minorities) ( Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 51)."
726c25db1ffb,Article 17,20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,20240409183827__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:47833/20,Lenis v. Greece (dec.),47833/20,added,"Lenis v. Greece (dec.), no. 47833/20, 27 June 2023",5,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.5,Importance of context,4,,41,,,,,"The Court also takes into consideration the question of whether the impugned acts relate directly to an issue of high importance in modern European society (for example, the protection of people's dignity and human value irrespective of sexual orientation)( Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 55)."
726c25db1ffb,Article 17,20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,20240409183827__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:47833/20,Lenis v. Greece (dec.),47833/20,added,"Lenis v. Greece (dec.), no. 47833/20, 27 June 2023",6,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.6,Impact of impugned conduct,4,,45,,,,,"Arelevant consideration in this respect is also the applicant's power to influence. In Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, when applying directly Article 17, the Court took into account the applicant's ability to influence many people, in view of his position as a senior official of the Orthodox Church to which the majority of the Greek population belongs (§§ 49 and 50)."
726c25db1ffb,Article 17,20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,20240409183827__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:47833/20,Lenis v. Greece (dec.),47833/20,added,"Lenis v. Greece (dec.), no. 47833/20, 27 June 2023",7,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.C.1,Direct application,4,49,52,0.9891,"Saybatalov v. Russia , 2013","Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia , 2013","Where an applicant is essentially seeking to use a substantive Convention provision as a basis for a right to perform any act or to engage in any activity aimed at destroying any of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention, the Court applies Article 17 and rejects his or her complaint as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 ( Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017, § 37; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013).","Where an applicant is essentially seeking to use a substantive Convention provision as a basis for a right to perform any act or to engage in any activity aimed at destroying any of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention, the Court applies Article 17 and rejects his or her complaint as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 Pavel Ivanov v. Russia Belkacem v. Belgium Kasymakhunov and and 4 ( (dec.), 2007; (dec.), 2017, § 37; Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 58)."
726c25db1ffb,Article 17,20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,20240409183827__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:47833/20,Lenis v. Greece (dec.),47833/20,added,"Lenis v. Greece (dec.), no. 47833/20, 27 June 2023",8,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.C.5,Rights covered by Article 17,4,69,72,0.9993,,,"The Convention bodies have thus far applied Article 17 in conjunction with the following substantive provisions: ▪ Article 9 ( Hizb ut-Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; German Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957; Vasilyev and Others v. Russia [Committee], 2020); ▪ Article 10 ( Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017; M'Bala M'Bala v. France (dec.), 2015; Hizb ut-Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; German Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957; Norwood v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004; Garaudy v. France (dec.), 2003; Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1979; Witzsch v. Germany (no. 2) (dec.), 2005; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018; Romanov v. Ukraine [Committee], 2020; Vasilyev and Others v. Russia [Committee], 2020). ▪ Article 11 ( Hizb ut-Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; W.P. and Others v. Poland (dec.), 2004; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 139; German Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957; Vasilyev and Others v. Russia [Committee], 2020); ▪ Article 13 in conjunction with Article 14 ( Hizb ut-Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012); ▪ Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 9, 10 and/or 11 ( Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; Norwood v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004; Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; W.P. and Others v. Poland (dec.), 2004; Vasilyev and Others v. Russia [Committee], 2020); ▪ Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 ( Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1979).","The Convention bodies have thus far applied Article 17 in conjunction with the following substantive provisions:  Article 9 ( Hizb ut - Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; German Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957; Vasilyev and Others v. Russia [Committee], 2020);  Article 10 ( Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017; M'Bala M'Bala v. France Hizb ut - Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2015; (dec.), 2012; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; German Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957; Norwood v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004; Garaudy v. France Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2003;, Commission decision, 1979; Witzsch v. Germany (no. 2) (dec.), 2005; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018; Romanov v. Ukraine [Committee], 2020; Vasilyev and Others v. Russia [Committee], 2020; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023).  Article 11 ( Hizb ut - Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013; W.P. and Others v. Poland (dec.), 2004; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 139; German Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957; Vasilyev and Others v. Russia [Committee], 2020);  Article 13 in conjunction with Article 14 ( Hizb ut - Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012);  Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 9, 10 and/or 11 ( v. Russia, 2013; Norwood v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004; Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; W.P. and Others v. Poland (dec.), 2004; Vasilyev and Others v. Russia [Committee], 2020);  Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 ( Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1979)."
726c25db1ffb,Article 17,20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,20240409183827__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:47833/20,Lenis v. Greece (dec.),47833/20,added,"Lenis v. Greece (dec.), no. 47833/20, 27 June 2023",9,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.6,When to apply Article 17,4,,77,,"Kilin v. Russia , 2021|Mukhin v. Russia , 2021|Pastörs v. Germany , 2019",,,"The applicant's intention, or the purpose pursued by him/her, is a particularly relevant consideration for determining whether Article 17 is applicable. The Court takes into account the domestic courts' assessment of this point ( Kilin v. Russia, 2021, § 72; Pastörs v. Germany, 2019, § 46; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, §§ 43 and 46-47) or the lack thereof ( Mukhin v. Russia, 2021, §§ 156 and 183). In this connection, the Court examines whether the domestic courts based their findings on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts ( Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 44)."
726c25db1ffb,Article 17,20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,20240409183827__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:47833/20,Lenis v. Greece (dec.),47833/20,added,"Lenis v. Greece (dec.), no. 47833/20, 27 June 2023",10,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.6,When to apply Article 17,4,,80,,"Ayoub and Others v. France , 2020|Leroy v. France , 2008|Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia , 2023|Soulas and Others v. France , 2008",,,"In order to justify the application of Article 17, the display of prohibited aims should take its gravest forms ( Lilliendahl v. Iceland (dec.), 2020, §§ 34 and 39; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 56; Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 74). It should be sufficiently serious ( Soulas and Others v. France, 2008, § 48) and unequivocal ( Leroy v. France, 2008, § 27; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 134)."
726c25db1ffb,Article 17,20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,20240409183827__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:47833/20,Lenis v. Greece (dec.),47833/20,added,"Lenis v. Greece (dec.), no. 47833/20, 27 June 2023",11,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.C.6,When to apply Article 17,4,71,74,0.9821,"Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria , 2023","Pastörs v. Germany , 2019|Z.B. v. France , 2021","Article 17 is only applicable on an exceptional basis and in extreme cases ( Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, § 87 in fine ; Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, § 114; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 46; Šimunić v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, § 38; Pastörs v. Germany, 2019, § 37; Z.B. v. France, 2021, § 24; Zemmour v. France, 2022, § 26). The threshold for its applicability is therefore high ( Lilliendahl v. Iceland (dec.), 2020, § 26).","Article 17 is only applicable on an exceptional basis and in extreme cases ( Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, § 87 in fine ; Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, § 114; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 46; Šimunić v. Croatia Pastörs v. Germany Z.B. v. France (dec.), 2019, § 38;, 2019, § 37;, 2021, § 24; Zemmour v. France, 2022, § 26; Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria, 2023, § 78; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 52). The threshold for its applicability is therefore high ( Lilliendahl v. Iceland (dec.), 2020, § 26)."
726c25db1ffb,Article 17,20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,20240409183827__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:47833/20,Lenis v. Greece (dec.),47833/20,added,"Lenis v. Greece (dec.), no. 47833/20, 27 June 2023",12,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.C.6,When to apply Article 17,4,72,75,0.9905,"Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria , 2023","Pastörs v. Germany , 2019|Vona v. Hungary , 2013|Z.B. v. France , 2021","Article 17 should only be resorted to if it is immediately clear that the applicant attempted to rely on the Convention to engage in an activity or perform acts that are clearly contrary to the values of the Convention and aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms laid down in it ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, §§ 114-115; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 31; Šimunić v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, § 38; Pastörs v. Germany, 2019, § 37; Lilliendahl v. Iceland (dec.), 2020, §§ 25-26; Z.B. v. France, 2021, § 26; Zemmour v. France, 2022, § 26). In other words, it should be applied if prima facie the applicant's conduct reveals an act aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention or an intention to engage in such an act ( Vona v. Hungary, 2013, § 38).","Article 17 should only be resorted to if it is immediately clear that the applicant attempted to rely on the Convention to engage in an activity or perform acts that are clearly contrary to the values of the Convention and aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms laid down in it ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, §§ 114-115; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 31; Šimunić v. Croatia Pastörs v. Germany Lilliendahl v. Iceland Z.B. (dec.), 2019, § 38;, 2019, § 37; (dec.), 2020, §§ 25-26; v. France, 2021, § 26; Zemmour v. France, 2022, § 26; Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria, 2023, § 78; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, §§ 52-53). In other words, it should be applied if prima facie the applicant's conduct reveals an act aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention Vona v. Hungary or an intention to engage in such an act (, 2013, § 38)."
726c25db1ffb,Article 17,20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,20240409183827__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:47833/20,Lenis v. Greece (dec.),47833/20,added,"Lenis v. Greece (dec.), no. 47833/20, 27 June 2023",13,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,II.C.6,When to apply Article 17,4,77,82,0.9043,,"Zemmour v. France , 2022","At the same time, the shocking and controversial character of the impugned act or statement is not sufficient per se to reach the threshold for the applicability of Article 17 ( Zemmour v. France, 2022, § 28).","At the same time, the shocking and controversial character of the impugned act or statement is per se Zemmour v. France not sufficient to reach the threshold for the applicability of Article 17 (, 2022, § 28). The Court verifies whether the impugned statements go beyond the expression of opinion, even in offending, hostile, or aggressive terms ( Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 47)."
726c25db1ffb,Article 17,20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,20240409183827__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:47833/20,Lenis v. Greece (dec.),47833/20,added,"Lenis v. Greece (dec.), no. 47833/20, 27 June 2023",14,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.C.6,When to apply Article 17,4,78,83,0.9905,"Pavel Ivanov v. Russia German Communist Party Commission decision, 1979","Z.B. v. France , 2021","The cases where Article 17 was applied directly can be characterised by the following features: ▪ a general and vehement attack on a particular group ( Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017, § 33), for instance, linking the group as a whole with a particular grave criminal act ( Norwood v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004); ▪ radical and far-reaching character of the prohibited aims and measures proposed in pursuit thereof ( Hizb ut-Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012, § 73; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 106-112; Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1979; Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; German Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957; Romanov v. Ukraine [Committee], 2020, § 163; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, §§ 131 and 133); ▪ repetitive and/or systematic displays of prohibited aims ( Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017, § 33; Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; M'Bala M'Bala v. France (dec.), 2015, § 37; Garaudy v. France (dec.), 2003; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 45; see also the analysis in Z.B. v. France, 2021, § 26).","The cases where Article 17 was applied directly can be characterised by the following features:  a general and vehement attack on a particular group ( Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017, § 33), for instance, denying the entire group their human nature, coupled with incitement to violence ( Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, §§ 47 and 54) or linking the group as a whole with a particular grave criminal act ( Norwood v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004);  radical and far-reaching character of the prohibited aims and measures proposed in pursuit thereof ( Hizb ut - Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2012, § 73; Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 106-112; Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, Pavel Ivanov v. Russia German Communist Party Commission decision, 1979; (dec.), 2007; (KPD) v. Germany, Commission decision, 1957; Romanov v. Ukraine [Committee], 2020, § 163; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, §§ 131 and 133);  repetitive and/or systematic displays of prohibited aims ( Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), 2017, § 33; Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), 2007; M'Bala M'Bala v. France (dec.), 2015, § 37; Garaudy v. France Roj TV A/S v. Denmark Z.B. (dec.), 2003; (dec.), 2018, § 45; see also the analysis in v. France, 2021, § 26)."
726c25db1ffb,Article 17,20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,20240409183827__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:47833/20,Lenis v. Greece (dec.),47833/20,added,"Lenis v. Greece (dec.), no. 47833/20, 27 June 2023",15,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.B.1,Article 17 applied,4,,108,,,,,"In Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, the Court held that the applicant, a senior official of the Greek Orthodox Church, could not rely on Article 10, by reason of Article 17, when challenging his conviction on account of dehumanising homophobic statements coupled with multiple incitements to violence."
726c25db1ffb,Article 17,20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,20240409183827__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:47833/20,Lenis v. Greece (dec.),47833/20,added,"Lenis v. Greece (dec.), no. 47833/20, 27 June 2023",16,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,III.E.3,Homophobia a. Article 17 applied,4,147,173,0.6942,,"In Féret v. Belgium , 2009","In Féret v. Belgium, 2009, the applicant, chairman of an extreme right-wing party, was convicted on account of the distribution, in an electoral campaign, of leaflets presenting non-European immigrant communities as criminally-minded and keen to exploit the benefits they derived from living in Belgium, and seeking to make fun of them. The leaflets carried slogans including ""Stand up against the Islamification of Belgium"", ""Stop the sham integration policy"" and ""Send non -European job- seekers home"". In the Court' s view, the contents of the impugned leaflets did not justify the application of Article 17. However, the interference with the applicant's freedom of expression did not entail a breach of Article 10. Fostering the exclusion of foreigners was a fundamental attack on their rights. Political speech that stirred hatred based on religious, ethnic or cultural prejudices was a threat to social peace and political stability in democratic States, especially in the electoral context, where the impact of racist or xenophobic comments grew more harmful. Insults, ridicule or defamation aimed at specific population groups or incitation to discrimination, as in the instant case, sufficed for the authorities to give priority to fighting hate speech.","In Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, the Court held that the online statements of a senior official of the Greek Orthodox Church, which denied LGBTIpeople their human nature and called for violence, amounted to the gravest from of hate speech. Taking into account the applicant's power to influence many people and the risk of harmful consequences, the Court, by virtue of Article 17, rejected the applicant's complaint under Article 10 regarding his conviction for such speech."
726c25db1ffb,Article 17,20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,20240409183827__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:39954/09|3465/17,Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia,39954/09|3465/17,added,"Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, nos. 39954/09 and 3465/17, 30 May 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.6,When to apply Article 17,4,,80,,"Ayoub and Others v. France , 2020|Leroy v. France , 2008|Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia , 2023|Soulas and Others v. France , 2008",,,"In order to justify the application of Article 17, the display of prohibited aims should take its gravest forms ( Lilliendahl v. Iceland (dec.), 2020, §§ 34 and 39; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 56; Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 74). It should be sufficiently serious ( Soulas and Others v. France, 2008, § 48) and unequivocal ( Leroy v. France, 2008, § 27; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 134)."
726c25db1ffb,Article 17,20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,20240409183827__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:39954/09|3465/17,Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia,39954/09|3465/17,added,"Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, nos. 39954/09 and 3465/17, 30 May 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C.7,Aid in interpretation of substantive provisions of the Convention,4,88,93,0.9882,"Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia , 2023",,"The Court can also rely on Article 17 when examining the question of whether the domestic authorities discharged their positive obligation under Article 8, taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14, to afford redress to individual members of a social group in respect of public statements alleged to have negatively stereotyped that group. In this connection, Article 17 comes into play when the Court considers the following issues: in the first place, whether the authorities assessed the tenor of the impugned statements in an adequate manner, notably their capacity to stigmatise the affected group and arouse hatred and prejudice against its members; and secondly, whether they struck a proper balance between the aggrieved party 's right to respect for his or her ""private life"" and the right of the author of the statements to freedom of expression ( Budinova and Chaprazov v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 93-94; Behar and Gutman v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 104-105).","The Court can also rely on Article 17 when examining the question of whether the domestic authorities discharged their positive obligation under Article 8, taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14, to afford redress to individual members of a social group in respect of public statements alleged to have negatively stereotyped that group. In this connection, Article 17 comes into play when the Court considers the following issues: in the first place, whether the authorities assessed the tenor of the impugned statements in an adequate manner, notably their capacity to stigmatise the affected group and arouse hatred and prejudice against its members; and secondly, whether they struck a proper balance between the aggrieved party's right to respect for his or her ""private life"" and the right of the author of the statements to freedom of expression ( Budinova and Chaprazov v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 93-94; Behar and Gutman v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 104-105; see also Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 74 and 84-85)."
726c25db1ffb,Article 17,20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,20240409183827__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:36658/18,Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria,36658/18,added,"Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria, no. 36658/18, 27 June 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.B.5,Importance of context,4,37,37,0.9275,,,"In order to establish whether the applicant pursues any of the aims prohibited by Article 17, the Court examines the ""main content"", ""general tone"" or ""general tenor"" of his or her acts ( M'Bala M'Bala v. France (dec.), 2015, § 41; Garaudy v. France (dec.), 2003; Seurot v. France (dec.), 2004) and their ""immediate and wider context"" ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, § 239; regarding particularly the immediate context, see Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, 2022).","In order to establish whether the applicant pursues any of the aims prohibited by Article 17, the Court examines the ""main content"", ""general tone"" or ""general tenor"" of his or her acts taken as a whole ( M'Bala M'Bala v. France (dec.), 2015, § 41; Garaudy v. France (dec.), 2003; Seurot v. France Lenis v. Greece Perinçek (dec.), 2004; (dec.), 2023, § 47) and their ""immediate and wider context"" ( v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, § 239; regarding particularly the immediate context, see Yuksekdag Senoglu and Others v. Türkiye, 2022). The relevant context is first and foremost that of the country in which Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria Lenis v. Greece the impugned acts have taken place (, 2023, § 78; (dec.), 2023, § 51)."
726c25db1ffb,Article 17,20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,20240409183827__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:36658/18,Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria,36658/18,added,"Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria, no. 36658/18, 27 June 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.C.6,When to apply Article 17,4,71,74,0.9821,"Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria , 2023","Pastörs v. Germany , 2019|Z.B. v. France , 2021","Article 17 is only applicable on an exceptional basis and in extreme cases ( Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, § 87 in fine ; Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, § 114; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 46; Šimunić v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, § 38; Pastörs v. Germany, 2019, § 37; Z.B. v. France, 2021, § 24; Zemmour v. France, 2022, § 26). The threshold for its applicability is therefore high ( Lilliendahl v. Iceland (dec.), 2020, § 26).","Article 17 is only applicable on an exceptional basis and in extreme cases ( Paksas v. Lithuania [GC], 2011, § 87 in fine ; Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, § 114; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 46; Šimunić v. Croatia Pastörs v. Germany Z.B. v. France (dec.), 2019, § 38;, 2019, § 37;, 2021, § 24; Zemmour v. France, 2022, § 26; Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria, 2023, § 78; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, § 52). The threshold for its applicability is therefore high ( Lilliendahl v. Iceland (dec.), 2020, § 26)."
726c25db1ffb,Article 17,20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,20240409183827__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:36658/18,Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria,36658/18,added,"Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria, no. 36658/18, 27 June 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.C.6,When to apply Article 17,4,72,75,0.9905,"Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria , 2023","Pastörs v. Germany , 2019|Vona v. Hungary , 2013|Z.B. v. France , 2021","Article 17 should only be resorted to if it is immediately clear that the applicant attempted to rely on the Convention to engage in an activity or perform acts that are clearly contrary to the values of the Convention and aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms laid down in it ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, §§ 114-115; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 31; Šimunić v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, § 38; Pastörs v. Germany, 2019, § 37; Lilliendahl v. Iceland (dec.), 2020, §§ 25-26; Z.B. v. France, 2021, § 26; Zemmour v. France, 2022, § 26). In other words, it should be applied if prima facie the applicant's conduct reveals an act aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention or an intention to engage in such an act ( Vona v. Hungary, 2013, § 38).","Article 17 should only be resorted to if it is immediately clear that the applicant attempted to rely on the Convention to engage in an activity or perform acts that are clearly contrary to the values of the Convention and aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms laid down in it ( Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], 2015, §§ 114-115; Roj TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), 2018, § 31; Šimunić v. Croatia Pastörs v. Germany Lilliendahl v. Iceland Z.B. (dec.), 2019, § 38;, 2019, § 37; (dec.), 2020, §§ 25-26; v. France, 2021, § 26; Zemmour v. France, 2022, § 26; Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria, 2023, § 78; Lenis v. Greece (dec.), 2023, §§ 52-53). In other words, it should be applied if prima facie the applicant's conduct reveals an act aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention Vona v. Hungary or an intention to engage in such an act (, 2013, § 38)."
726c25db1ffb,Article 17,20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,20240409183827__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:36658/18,Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria,36658/18,added,"Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria, no. 36658/18, 27 June 2023",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C.7,Aid in interpretation of substantive provisions of the Convention,4,81,86,0.9788,"Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria , 2023",,"The Court relies on Article 17 as an aid in the interpretation of the substantive provisions of the Convention ( Z.B. v. France, 2021, § 27; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 101; Zemmour v. France, 2022, §§ 28 and 61).","The Court relies on Article 17 as an aid in the interpretation of the substantive provisions of the Convention ( Z.B. v. France, 2021, § 27; Ayoub and Others v. France, 2020, § 101; Zemmour v. France, 2022, §§ 28 and 61; Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria, 2023, § 122)."
726c25db1ffb,Article 17,20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,20240409183827__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:36658/18,Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria,36658/18,added,"Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria, no. 36658/18, 27 June 2023",5,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.C.7,Aid in interpretation of substantive provisions of the Convention,4,85,90,0.9772,"Zemmour v. France Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria , 2022","Zemmour v. France , 2022","The Court may also resort to Article 17 at the merits stage of its examination, even after finding that the case at hand does not warrant the application of this provision ( Z.B. v. France, 2021, § 27; Zemmour v. France, 2022, §§ 28 and 61).","The Court may also resort to Article 17 at the merits stage of its examination, even after finding that the case at hand does not warrant the application of this provision ( Z.B. v. France, 2021, § 27; Zemmour v. France Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria, 2022, §§ 28 and 61;, 2023, § 122)."
726c25db1ffb,Article 17,20230923094714__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,20240409183827__guide_art_17_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,29 February 2024,2023-02-28,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/726c25db1ffb/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:36658/18,Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria,36658/18,added,"Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria, no. 36658/18, 27 June 2023",6,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.D.b,Article 17 not applied,4,,136,,"The case of Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria , 2023",,,"The case of Zhablyanov v. Bulgaria, 2023, concerns the applicant's removal from his position as Deputy Speaker of Parliament in response to his statements disparaging the victims of the communist regime and justifying an extraordinary criminal ""tribunal"" which had operated as part of the repressive regime in the early years after the Second World War. While Article 17 was not applied directly, it guided the Court in its assessment of the necessity of the interference. Finding no violation of Article 10, the Court particularly relied on the context, notably a special moral responsibility of the States which have experienced communist repressions and atrocities to distance themselves therefrom."
762f0abff297,Article 4,20230923031645__guide_art_4_eng.pdf,20240930062355__guide_art_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,31 August 2024,2023-02-28,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/762f0abff297/diff_2023-09-23__2024-09-30.json,apps:28186/19|29092/19,Jasuitis and Šimaitis v. Lithuania,28186/19|29092/19,added,"Jasuitis and Šimaitis v. Lithuania, nos. 28186/19 and 29092/19, 12 December 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.C,Specific context of human trafficking,2,,13,,"Jasuitis and Šimaitis v. Lithuania, nos. 28186/19 and 29092/19, 12 December 2023",,,"In Jasuitis and Šimaitis v. Lithuania, 2023, §§ 119-140, the Court dealt with the interaction between Article 4 and Article 7 of the Convention and found that the applicants' conviction of trafficking in human beings - in line with the respondent State's positive obligations under Article 4 - was a foreseeable consequence of their actions."
762f0abff297,Article 4,20230923031645__guide_art_4_eng.pdf,20240930062355__guide_art_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,31 August 2024,2023-02-28,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/762f0abff297/diff_2023-09-23__2024-09-30.json,apps:18269/18,Krachunova v. Bulgaria,18269/18,added,"Krachunova v. Bulgaria, no. 18269/18, 28 November 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C,Specific context of human trafficking,2,11,11,0.932,"Krachunova v. Bulgaria, no. 18269/18, 28 November 2023",,"In S.M. v. Croatia [GC], the Court clarified that conduct or a situation may give rise to an issue of human trafficking under Article 4, only if all the three constituent elements of the international definition of human trafficking, under the Anti-Trafficking Convention and the Palermo Protocol, are present: (1) an action (the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons); (2) the means (threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability, or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person); (3) an exploitative purpose (including, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs) (§§ 290 and 303). From the perspective of Article 4, the concept of human trafficking relates to both national and transnational trafficking in human beings, irrespective of whether or not connected with organised crime (§§ 296 and 303; see also Zoletic and Others v. Azerbaijan, § 155).","In S.M. v. Croatia [GC], 2020, the Court clarified that conduct or a situation may give rise to an issue of human trafficking under Article 4, only if all the three constituent elements of the international definition of human trafficking, under the Anti-Trafficking Convention and the Palermo Protocol, are present: (1) an action (the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons); (2) the means (threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability, or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person); (3) an exploitative purpose (including, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs) (§§ 290 and 303; and in respect of the ""means"" element Krachunova v. Bulgaria, 2023, §§ 148-154). From the perspective of Article 4, the concept of human trafficking relates to both national and transnational trafficking in human beings, irrespective of whether or not connected with organised crime (S.M. v. Croatia [GC], §§ 296 and 303; see also Zoletic and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 155)."
762f0abff297,Article 4,20230923031645__guide_art_4_eng.pdf,20240930062355__guide_art_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-09-30,28 February 2023,31 August 2024,2023-02-28,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/762f0abff297/diff_2023-09-23__2024-09-30.json,apps:18269/18,Krachunova v. Bulgaria,18269/18,added,"Krachunova v. Bulgaria, no. 18269/18, 28 November 2023",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,The positive obligation to put in place an appropriate legislative and administrative framework,2,,58,,"Krachunova v. Bulgaria, no. 18269/18, 28 November 2023",,,"In this connection, the Court has held that the spectrum of safeguards set out in national legislation must be adequate to ensure the practical and effective protection of the rights of victims or potential victims of trafficking. It, accordingly, considered that, in addition to criminal law measures to punish traffickers, Article 4 requires member States to put in place adequate measures regulating businesses often used as a cover for human trafficking. Furthermore, a State's immigration rules must address relevant concerns relating to encouragement, facilitation or tolerance of trafficking (Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, 2010, § 284). Moreover, States are required to provide relevant training for law enforcement and immigration officials (ibid., § 287). The Court further found that States have a positive obligation to enable the victims of trafficking to claim compensation from their traffickers in respect of lost earnings (Krachunova v. Bulgaria, 2023, § 177): as to earnings obtained through prostitution, non-compliance with that positive obligation cannot be automatically justified on the grounds of morality and has to be assessed in the light of the compelling public policy against human trafficking and in favour of protecting its victims (§§ 189-193)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20230923015702__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-11-14,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-14.json,apps:22515/14,Bryan and Others v. Russia*,22515/14,added,"Bryan and Others v. Russia*, no. 22515/14, 27 June 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.B.2.e,Use of force by a State ’ s agents operating outside its territory,4,79,80,0.9978,,,"The Court thus acknowledged that the applicants were under the "" jurisdiction "" of the relevant respondent States in the following situations: ▪ the applicant, the leader of the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers'Party), who had been arrested by Turkish security agents in the international zone of Nairobi airport (Kenya) and flown back to Turkey. The Court noted - and the Turkish Government did not dispute - that, directly after being handed over to the Turkish officials by the Kenyan officials, the applicant was effectively under Turkish authority and therefore within the ""jurisdiction"" of that State, even though in this instance Turkey exercised its authority outside its territory. It is true that the applicant was physically forced to return to Turkey by Turkish officials and was under their authority and control following his arrest and return to Turkey ( Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], 2005, § 91); ▪ the applicants, two Iraqis who had been charged with involvement in the murder of two British soldiers shortly after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, been held in a British detention facility near Baghdad, and had complained that their imminent handover to the Iraqi authorities would expose them to a real risk of execution by hanging. The Court held that inasmuch as the control exercised by the United Kingdom over its military detention facilities in Iraq and the individuals held there had been absolute and exclusive de facto and de jure, the applicants should be deemed to have been within the respondent State's jurisdiction ( Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2009, §§ 86-89); ▪ the applicants, crew members of a cargo ship registered in Cambodia and intercepted off the Cape Verde islands by the French navy under suspicion of transporting large quantities of drugs, were confined to their quarters under military guard until the ship's arrival in Brest. The Court found that as France had exercised full and exclusive control over the ship and its crew, at least de facto, from the time of its interception, in a continuous and uninterrupted manner until they were tried in France, the applicants had been effectively within France's jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention ( Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], 2010, § 67). ▪ the applicants, a group of Somali and Eritrean nationals, who had been attempting to reach the Italian coast on board three vessels, were intercepted at sea by Italian Revenue Police and Coastguard ships, transferred on to Italian military ships and taken back to Libya, from whence they had departed. Reiterating the principle of international law stating that a vessel sailing on the high seas is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the State of the flag it is flying, the Court rejected the design ation ""rescue on the high seas"" used by the Government to describe the events, and attached no importance to the allegedly low level of control exercised over the applicants by the agents of the Italian State. Indeed, the whole series of events had occurred on board Italian military ships, with crews made up exclusively of national servicemen. From the time of their arrival on board those ships until their handover to the Libyan authorities the applicants had been under the continuous and exclusive de jure and de facto control of the Italian authorities ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, §§ 76-82).","The Court thus acknowledged that the applicants were under the "" jurisdiction "" of the relevant respondent States in the following situations: ▪ The applicant, the leader of the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers'Party), who had been arrested by Turkish security agents in the international zone of Nairobi airport (Kenya) and flown back to Turkey. The Court noted - and the Turkish Government did not dispute - that, directly after being handed over to the Turkish officials by the Kenyan officials, the applicant was effectively under Turkish authority and therefore within the ""jurisdiction"" of that State, even though in this instance Turkey exercised its authority outside its territory. It is true that the applicant was physically forced to return to Turkey by Turkish officials and was under their authority and control following his arrest and return to Turkey ( Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], 2005, § 91). ▪ The applicants, two Iraqis who had been charged with involvement in the murder of two British soldiers shortly after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, been held in a British detention facility near Baghdad, and had complained that their imminent handover to the Iraqi authorities would expose them to a real risk of execution by hanging. The Court held that inasmuch as the control exercised by the United Kingdom over its military detention facilities in Iraq and the individuals held there had been absolute and exclusive de facto and de jure, the applicants should be deemed to have been within the respondent State's jurisdiction ( Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2009, §§ 86-89). ▪ The applicants, crew members of a cargo ship registered in Cambodia and intercepted off the Cape Verde islands by the French navy under suspicion of transporting large quantities of drugs, were confined to their quarters under military guard until the ship's arrival in Brest. The Court found that as France had exercised full and exclusive control over the ship and its crew, at least de facto, from the time of its interception, in a continuous and uninterrupted manner until they were tried in France, the applicants had been effectively within France's jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention ( Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], 2010, § 67). The Court reached the same conclusion in a case concerning a group of Greenpeace activists confined to their ship, which had been intercepted by the Russian coastguard and escorted to the Russian port of Mourmansk ( Bryan and Others v. Russia*, 2023, § 37). ▪ The applicants, a group of Somali and Eritrean nationals, who had been attempting to reach the Italian coast on board three vessels, were intercepted at sea by Italian Revenue Police and Coastguard ships, transferred on to Italian military ships and taken back to Libya, from whence they had departed. Reiterating the principle of international law stating that a vessel sailing on the high seas is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the State of the flag it is flying, the Court rejected the design ation ""rescue on the high seas"" used by the Government to describe the events, and attached no importance to the allegedly low level of control exercised over the applicants by the agents of the Italian State. Indeed, the whole series of events had occurred on board Italian military ships, with crews made up exclusively of national servicemen. From the time of their arrival on board those ships until their handover to the Libyan authorities the applicants had been under the continuous and exclusive de jure and de facto control of the Italian authorities ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, §§ 76-82)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20230923015702__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-11-14,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-14.json,apps:39611/18,Georgia v. Russia (IV) (dec.),39611/18,added,"Georgia v. Russia (IV) (dec.), no. 39611/18, 28 March 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.B.3.§4,ii. Creation of an entity unrecognised by the international community,4,112,113,0.9991,,,"The third case examined by the Court was that of the two separatist entities established in Georgia, that is to say South Ossetia and Abkhazia, especially during and after the armed conflict between Georgia and Russia in August 2008, the climax of a long series of tensions, provocations and incidents between the two countries. In its observations, the Russian Government had acknowledged a substantial Russian military presence after the cessation of hostilities and provided numerous indications showing the extent of the economic and financial support that the Russian Federation had provided and continued to provide to South Ossetia and to Abkhazia. the EU's Fact- Finding Mission also emphasised the relationship of dependency not only in economic and financial, but also in military and political terms; the information provided was also revealing as to the pre- existing relationship of subordination between the separatist entities and the Russian Federation, which had lasted throughout the active phase of the hostilities and after the cessation of hostilities. In its report, the EU's Fact-Finding Mission had spoken of "" creeping annexation "" of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia. The Court considered that the Russian Federation had exercised effective control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia (as well as a "" buffer zone "" located in undisputed Georgian territory) during the period from the date of cessation of active hostilities and the date of the official withdrawal of Russian troops. Even after that period, the strong Russian presence and the South Ossetian and Abkhazian authorities'dependency on the Russian Federation, on whom their survival depended, as was shown particularly by the cooperation and assistance agreements signed with the latter, indicated that there had been continued ""effective control"" over the two territories. The events which had occurred after the ceasefire had therefore fallen within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention ( Georgia v. Russia (II), 2021, §§ 161-175).","The third case examined by the Court was that of the two separatist entities established in Georgia, that is to say South Ossetia and Abkhazia, especially during and after the armed conflict between Georgia and Russia in August 2008, the climax of a long series of tensions, provocations and incidents between the two countries. In its observations, the Russian Government had acknowledged a substantial Russian military presence after the cessation of hostilities and provided numerous indications showing the extent of the economic and financial support that the Russian Federation had provided and continued to provide to South Ossetia and to Abkhazia. the EU's Fact- Finding Mission also emphasised the relationship of dependency not only in economic and financial, but also in military and political terms; the information provided was also revealing as to the pre- existing relationship of subordination between the separatist entities and the Russian Federation, which had lasted throughout the active phase of the hostilities and after the cessation of hostilities. In its report, the EU's Fact-Finding Mission had spoken of "" creeping annexation "" of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia. The Court considered that the Russian Federation had exercised effective control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia (as well as a "" buffer zone "" located in undisputed Georgian territory) during the period from the date of cessation of active hostilities and the date of the official withdrawal of Russian troops. Even after that period, the strong Russian presence and the South Ossetian and Abkhazian authorities'dependency on the Russian Federation, on whom their survival depended, as was shown particularly by the cooperation and assistance agreements signed with the latter, indicated that there had been continued ""effective control"" over the two territories. The events which had occurred after the ceasefire had therefore fallen within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention ( Georgia v. Russia (II), 2021, §§ 161-175; Georgia v. Russia (IV) (dec.), 2023, §§ 43-45)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20230923015702__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-11-14,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-14.json,apps:29999/04|41424/04,Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia,29999/04|41424/04,added,"Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, nos. 29999/04 and 41424/04, 7 March 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B,Exceptions to the territoriality principle,2,,53,,"Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia , 2023",,,"Although responsibility for an alleged violation cannot be imputed to a State on the basis of events that took place before the date of its ratification of the Convention, the Court may still, in determining the question of jurisdiction, take account of facts relating to earlier events if they are indicative of a continuing situation which persisted after that date ( Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], 2015, § 171; Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 321)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20230923015702__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-11-14,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-14.json,apps:29999/04|41424/04,Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia,29999/04|41424/04,added,"Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, nos. 29999/04 and 41424/04, 7 March 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B,Exceptions to the territoriality principle,2,51,51,0.9894,"Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia , 2023",,"To date, the Court has recognised a number of exceptional circumstances capable of giving rise to the exercise of jurisdiction by a Contracting State outside its own territorial boundaries. In each case, the question whether there are exceptional circumstances which require and justify a finding by the Court that the State was exercising jurisdiction extraterritorially must be determined with reference to the specific facts of the case ( Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2011, § 132). Indeed, while international law does not exclude a State's extraterritorial exercise of its jurisdiction, the suggested bases of such jurisdiction (including nationality and flag) are, as a general rule, defined and limited by the sovereign territorial rights of the other relevant States ( M.N. and Others v. Belgium (dec.) [GC], 2020, § 99).","To date, the Court has recognised a number of exceptional circumstances capable of giving rise to the exercise of jurisdiction by a Contracting State outside its own territorial boundaries. In each case, the question whether there are exceptional circumstances which require and justify a finding by the Court that the State was exercising jurisdiction extraterritorially must be determined with reference to the specific facts of the case ( Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2011, § 132; Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 313). Indeed, while international law does not exclude a State's extraterritorial exercise of its jurisdiction, the suggested bases of such jurisdiction (including nationality and flag) are, as a general rule, defined and limited by the sovereign territorial rights of the other relevant States ( M.N. and Others v. Belgium (dec.) [GC], 2020, § 99)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20230923015702__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-11-14,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-14.json,apps:29999/04|41424/04,Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia,29999/04|41424/04,added,"Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, nos. 29999/04 and 41424/04, 7 March 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.3.b,Jurisdiction of a State undergoing foreign military action (or military action unrecognised by the international community) within its territory,4,122,124,0.9963,"Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia , 2023",,"When a Contracting State is prevented from exercising authority over its whole territory due to an exceptional factual situation, it does not cease to have jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention over the part of its territory which is temporarily beyond its control ( Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, § 130). Such a factual situation nonetheless has the effect of reducing the scope of that jurisdiction, in that the commitment entered into by the Contracting State under Article 1 must be examined by the Court solely in the light of the State's positive obligations in respect of persons present in its territory. The State in question must endeavour, with all the legal and diplomatic means available to it vis-à-vis foreign States and international organisations, to continue to guarantee the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention. Although it is not for the Court to indicate which measures the authorities should take in order to comply with their obligations most effectively, it must verify that the measures actually taken were appropriate and sufficient in the present case. When faced with a partial or total failure to act, the Court's task is to determine to what extent a minimum effort was nevertheless possible and whether it should have been made. Determining that question is especially necessary in cases concerning an alleged infringement of absolute rights such as those guaranteed by Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 333-334).","When a Contracting State is prevented from exercising authority over its whole territory due to an exceptional factual situation, it does not cease to have jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention over the part of its territory which is temporarily beyond its control ( Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, § 130; Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 317). Such a factual situation nonetheless has the effect of reducing the scope of that jurisdiction, in that the commitment entered into by the Contracting State under Article 1 must be examined by the Court solely in the light of the State's positive obligations in respect of persons present in its territory. The State in question must endeavour, with all the legal and diplomatic means available to it vis-à-vis foreign States and international organisations, to continue to guarantee the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention. Although it is not for the Court to indicate which measures the authorities should take in order to comply with their obligations most effectively, it must verify that the measures actually taken were appropriate and sufficient in the present case. When faced with a partial or total failure to act, the Court's task is to determine to what extent a minimum effort was nevertheless possible and whether it should have been made. Determining that question is especially necessary in cases concerning an alleged infringement of absolute rights such as those guaranteed by Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 333-334)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20230923015702__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-11-14,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-14.json,apps:29999/04|41424/04,Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia,29999/04|41424/04,added,"Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, nos. 29999/04 and 41424/04, 7 March 2023",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.3.b,Jurisdiction of a State undergoing foreign military action (or military action unrecognised by the international community) within its territory,4,123,125,0.9872,"Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia , 2023",,"Generally speaking, the following six positive obligations incumbent on the "" passive "" State can be identified in the Court's existing case-law: a. Three general obligations i. to affirm and reaffirm its sovereignty over the territory in issue ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 339-341 and 343; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 108); ii. to refrain from providing any kind of support to the regime unrecognised by the international community ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, § 345); iii. to actively attempt to (re -establish control over the disputed territory ( ibid ., § 341-344; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 108); b. Three special obligations relating to individual applicants i. to attempt to resolve the applicants'situation by political and diplomatic means ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 346-347; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 109); ii. to attempt to resolve the applicants'situation by appropriate practical and technical means ( Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 147); iii. to take the appropriate judicial action to protect the applicants'rights ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 346-347; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 110).","Generally speaking, the following six positive obligations incumbent on the "" passive "" State can be identified in the Court's existing case-law: a. Three general obligations i. to affirm and reaffirm its sovereignty over the territory in issue ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 339-341 and 343; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 108); ii. to refrain from providing any kind of support to the regime unrecognised by the international community ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, § 345); iii. to actively attempt to (re -establish control over the disputed territory ( ibid ., § 341-344; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 108; Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 400-401). b. Three special obligations relating to individual applicants i. to attempt to resolve the applicants'situation by political and diplomatic means ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 346-347; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 109; Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 401-403); ii. to attempt to resolve the applicants'situation by appropriate practical and technical means ( Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 147; Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 405-406); iii. to take the appropriate judicial action to protect the applicants'rights ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 346-347; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 110)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20230923015702__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-11-14,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-14.json,apps:29999/04|41424/04,Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia,29999/04|41424/04,added,"Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, nos. 29999/04 and 41424/04, 7 March 2023",5,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.3.b,Jurisdiction of a State undergoing foreign military action (or military action unrecognised by the international community) within its territory,4,124,126,0.9853,"Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia , 2023",,"Furthermore, the Court has held that the efforts expended by the "" passive "" State in question to honour the six above-mentioned obligations should be constant and relevant ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 348-352; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 111; Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 148). However, the question whether the State in question has fulfilled its positive obligations as defined by the Court's case-law must be decided in the light of the individual case rather than with reference to Article 1 of the Convention.","Furthermore, the Court has held that the efforts expended by the "" passive "" State in question to honour the six above-mentioned obligations should be constant and relevant ( Ilaşcu a nd Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 348-352; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 111; Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 148). However, the question whether the State in question has fulfilled its positive obligations as defined by the Court's case-law must be decided in the light of the individual case rather than with reference to Article 1 of the Convention (see, for example, Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 398-410)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20230923015702__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-11-14,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-14.json,apps:29999/04|41424/04,Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia,29999/04|41424/04,added,"Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, nos. 29999/04 and 41424/04, 7 March 2023",6,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B.3.§4,ii. Creation of an entity unrecognised by the international community,4,,115,,"Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia , 2023",,,"Concerning Abkhazia, the Court has also recognised the existence of "" effective control"" by Russia over its territory for a period preceding the armed conflict of 2008. It found in the relevant case that since the armed conflict between Georgians and Abkhazians in 1992, Russia had not ceased to extend and strengthen its influence over this region militarily, politically, economically and culturally. In its assessment the Court relied on a long series of factual circumstances; for example, the fact that the peace-keeping forces in Abkhazia were made up of Russian military personnel; that the majority of the population of Abkhazia had been given Russian nationality after 2002; that Abkhazia used Russian currency as its means of payment and was economically heavily dependent on Russia; lastly, according to the repeated statements of its ( de facto Abkhaz) leaders, Abkhazia had in some ways become part of Russia. In sum, Abkhazia was only able to survive because of Russia's sustained and substantial political and economic support, and of Russia's military influence, which was sufficient for it to be considered ""dissuasive"" and as such decisive in practice . It followed that the conduct of the de facto authorities of that region fell within Russia's jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention ( Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 323-340)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:46454/11,Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania,46454/11,added,"Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, no. 46454/11, 31 May 2018",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,§1,Introduction,1,9,9,0.9755,"Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania , 2018|Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania , 2024",,"Whether the acts which form the basis of the applicant's complaints fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent State and whether that State is in fact responsible for those acts under the Convention are very different questions; the latter more typically falls to be determined by the Court at the merits stage ( Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 1995, §§ 61 and 64). Adistinction must also be drawn between the issue of jurisdiction, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, and that of the imputability of the alleged violation to the actions or omissions of the respondent State, the latter issue being examined from the angle of the application's compatibility ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention ( Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 1996, § 52). The Court usually considers the notions of imputability and responsibility as going together, the State only engaging its responsibility under the Convention if the alleged violation could be imputed to it. In some specific cases, however, the Court is careful to distinguish between the two notions and to examine them separately ( Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], 2004, § 144).","Whether the acts which form the basis of the applicant's complaints fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent State and whether that State is in fact responsible for those acts under the Convention are very different questions; the latter more typically falls to be determined by the Court at the merits stage ( Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 1995, §§ 61 and 64; Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 others (dec.) [GC], 2024, § 178). Adistinction must also be drawn between the issue of jurisdiction, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, and that of the imputability of the alleged violation to the actions or omissions of the respondent State, the latter issue being examined from the angle of the application's compatibility ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention ( Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 1996, § 52). Questions of responsibility and imputability are often intrinsically linked to the establishment of the facts of the case and the assessment of evidence; the Court will thus address these issues in the light of its findings on the particular facts of the case ( Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 411 and 584-585; Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 127, 157 and 161-163). The Court usually considers the notions of imputability and responsibility as going together, such that the State's responsibility under the Convention is only engaged if the alleged violation could be attributed to it. In some specific cases, however, the Court is careful to distinguish between the two notions and to examine them separately ( Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], 2004, § 144)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:6383/17,Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania,6383/17,added,"Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania, no. 6383/17, 16 January 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,§1,Introduction,1,9,9,0.9755,"Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania , 2018|Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania , 2024",,"Whether the acts which form the basis of the applicant's complaints fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent State and whether that State is in fact responsible for those acts under the Convention are very different questions; the latter more typically falls to be determined by the Court at the merits stage ( Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 1995, §§ 61 and 64). Adistinction must also be drawn between the issue of jurisdiction, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, and that of the imputability of the alleged violation to the actions or omissions of the respondent State, the latter issue being examined from the angle of the application's compatibility ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention ( Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 1996, § 52). The Court usually considers the notions of imputability and responsibility as going together, the State only engaging its responsibility under the Convention if the alleged violation could be imputed to it. In some specific cases, however, the Court is careful to distinguish between the two notions and to examine them separately ( Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], 2004, § 144).","Whether the acts which form the basis of the applicant's complaints fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent State and whether that State is in fact responsible for those acts under the Convention are very different questions; the latter more typically falls to be determined by the Court at the merits stage ( Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 1995, §§ 61 and 64; Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 others (dec.) [GC], 2024, § 178). Adistinction must also be drawn between the issue of jurisdiction, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, and that of the imputability of the alleged violation to the actions or omissions of the respondent State, the latter issue being examined from the angle of the application's compatibility ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention ( Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 1996, § 52). Questions of responsibility and imputability are often intrinsically linked to the establishment of the facts of the case and the assessment of evidence; the Court will thus address these issues in the light of its findings on the particular facts of the case ( Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 411 and 584-585; Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 127, 157 and 161-163). The Court usually considers the notions of imputability and responsibility as going together, such that the State's responsibility under the Convention is only engaged if the alleged violation could be attributed to it. In some specific cases, however, the Court is careful to distinguish between the two notions and to examine them separately ( Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], 2004, § 144)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:25589/16,Aliyev v. Armenia (dec.),25589/16,added,"Aliyev v. Armenia (dec.), no. 25589/16, 12 September 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B.1.c,General observation and further developments,4,,68,,,,,"Subsequently, in a number o f cases against Armenia and Azerbaijan, concerning the ""Four -Day War"" of 2016, brought by individuals living in the war zone, either on the territory of the ""Republic of Nagorno- Karabakh"", or close to the line of contact (but within the internationally recognised territory of Azerbaijan), the Court reached the same conclusion as in the case of Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, cited above. As regards the ""Republic of Nagorno - Karabakh"" it noted that Azerbaijan no longer controlled it since the first Nagorno-Karabakh war of 1992-1994. It had involved heavy shelling of towns and villages on either side of the line of contact for four days, resulting in many dead, wounded and temporarily homeless people as well as considerable damage to property and infrastructure on both sides. In these circumstances, and without any indication to the contrary, it was not a situation of ""effective control"" over an area . The active phase of hostilities under examination in the present case concerned bombing and artillery shelling by the armed forces on both sides of the conflict, seeking to put the enemy force hors de combat and capture territory. The factual elements of the case did not reveal any instance of control over or proximity to the alleged victims of a violation. In these circumstances, there could not be said to have been ""State agent authority and control"" over those individuals. The Court thus found that neither Armenia nor Azerbaij an had ""jurisdiction"" within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention ( Allahverdiyev v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, §§ 28-33; Aliyev v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, §§ 24-29; Ohanyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2023, §§ 30-37; Hakobyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2023, §§ 28-35)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:25576/16,Allahverdiyev v. Armenia (dec.),25576/16,added,"Allahverdiyev v. Armenia (dec.), no. 25576/16, 12 September 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B.1.c,General observation and further developments,4,,68,,,,,"Subsequently, in a number o f cases against Armenia and Azerbaijan, concerning the ""Four -Day War"" of 2016, brought by individuals living in the war zone, either on the territory of the ""Republic of Nagorno- Karabakh"", or close to the line of contact (but within the internationally recognised territory of Azerbaijan), the Court reached the same conclusion as in the case of Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, cited above. As regards the ""Republic of Nagorno - Karabakh"" it noted that Azerbaijan no longer controlled it since the first Nagorno-Karabakh war of 1992-1994. It had involved heavy shelling of towns and villages on either side of the line of contact for four days, resulting in many dead, wounded and temporarily homeless people as well as considerable damage to property and infrastructure on both sides. In these circumstances, and without any indication to the contrary, it was not a situation of ""effective control"" over an area . The active phase of hostilities under examination in the present case concerned bombing and artillery shelling by the armed forces on both sides of the conflict, seeking to put the enemy force hors de combat and capture territory. The factual elements of the case did not reveal any instance of control over or proximity to the alleged victims of a violation. In these circumstances, there could not be said to have been ""State agent authority and control"" over those individuals. The Court thus found that neither Armenia nor Azerbaij an had ""jurisdiction"" within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention ( Allahverdiyev v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, §§ 28-33; Aliyev v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, §§ 24-29; Ohanyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2023, §§ 30-37; Hakobyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2023, §§ 28-35)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:25576/16,Allahverdiyev v. Armenia (dec.),25576/16,added,"Allahverdiyev v. Armenia (dec.), no. 25576/16, 12 September 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.B.3.§4,ii. Creation of an entity unrecognised by the international community,4,116,123,0.9866,,,"Finally, the fourth situation examined by the Court concerned the responsibility of Armenia for acts committed in the ""Republic of Nagorno- Karabakh"" established in an area of Azerbaijan. At the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast ( the "" NKAO "" ) had been an autonomous province situated within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic ( "" the Azerbaijan SSR "" ). There had been no common border between the NKAO and the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (""the Armenian SSR""), which had been separated by Azerbaijani territory. In 1988 armed hostilities broke out in this region. In September 1991 - shortly after Azerbaijan had proclaimed its independence from the Soviet Union - the NKAOsoviet announced the foundation of the ""Nagorno -Karabakh Republic "" ( ""the NKR "" ), comprising the NKAO and the Shahumyan district of Azerbaijan. Following a referendum held in December 1991 (and boycotted by the Azeri population) in which 99.9 % of voters had come down in favour of the secession of the "" NKR "", the latter reaffirmed its independence from Azerbaijan in January 1992. After that the conflict gradually escalated into full-scale war. By the end of 1993 the ethnic Armenian troops had gained control over almost the entire territory of the former NKAO and seven adjacent Azerbaijani regions. In May 1994 the belligerents signed a ceasefire agreement, which is still in force. The self-proclaimed independence of the "" NKR "" has not been recognised by any State or international organisation ( Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], 2015, §§ 12-31; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, §§ 14-28).","Finally, the fourth situation examined by the Court concerned the responsibility of Armenia for acts committed in the former ""Republic of Nagorno- Karabakh"" established in an area of Azerbaijan. At the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast ( the "" NKAO "" ) had been an autonomous province situated within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic ( "" the Azerbaijan SSR "" ). There had been no common border between the NKAO and the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (""the Armenian SSR""), which had been separated by Azerbaijani territory. In 1988 armed hostilities broke out in this region. In September 1991 - shortly after Azerbaijan had proclaimed its independence from the Soviet Union - the NKAOsoviet announced the foundation of the ""Nagorno -Karabakh Republic "" ( ""the NKR "" ), comprising the NKAO and the Shahumyan district of Azerbaijan. Following a referendum held in December 1991 (and boycotted by the Azeri population) in which 99.9 % of voters had come down in favour of the secession of the "" NKR "", the latter reaffirmed its independence from Azerbaijan in January 1992. After that the conflict gradually escalated into full-scale war. By the end of 1993 the ethnic Armenian troops had gained control over almost the entire territory of the former NKAO and seven adjacent Azerbaijani regions. In May 1994 the belligerents signed a ceasefire agreement. The self-proclaimed independence of the "" NKR "" had not been recognised by any State or international organisation ( Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], 2015, §§ 12-31; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, §§ 14-28). Later on, in the night of 1 to 2 April 2016, violent armed clashes broke out near the contact line between the ""NKR"" and Azerbaijan ( sometimes referred to as the ""Four - Day War"" ). They lasted until 5 April 2016, but other clashes occurred later in the month ( Allahverdiyev v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, § 5; Hakobyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2023, § 5)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:22302/10,Arlewin v. Sweden,22302/10,added,"Arlewin v. Sweden, no. 22302/10, 1 March 2016",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.6,Cross-border transfer or control of data,3,,53,,"In the case of Arlewin v. Sweden , 2016",,,"In the case of Arlewin v. Sweden, 2016, the applicant had brought, in the Swedish courts, a private prosecution for gross defamation against the anchorman of a television programme in which accusations had been made against him. His claim had been rejected for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the programme, even though it had been recorded in Sweden and broadcast live to a Swedish audience, had been transmitted by a company registered in the United Kingdom and was thus considered not to have emanated from Sweden. According to the Swedish courts, it was the United Kingdom, not Sweden, which had jurisdiction to deal with the applicant's defamation proceedings as, under the ""country of origin principle"" laid down by the EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive, jurisdiction had to be determined primarily with reference to the country where the broadcaster's head office was located and where its editorial decisions were taken. Taking the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (right of access to a court), the Court joined the question of the respondent State's jurisdiction to the merits and examined whether the Swedish courts had had good reason to consider that they lacked jurisdiction. Rejecting their interpretation of EUlaw, it found that Swedish jurisdiction was not barred by a binding provision of EUlaw. The Court further noted that the content, production and broadcasting of the television programme as well as its implications had very strong connections to Sweden. There had, therefore, been a prima facie obligation on Sweden to secure the applicant's right of access to court. The fact that the applicant might have had access to a court in a different country did not affect Sweden's responsibility under Article 1 of the Convention. The Court thus dismissed the admissibility objection raised by the respondent Government and, on the merits, found a violation of Article 6 § 1."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:58170/13,Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC],58170/13,added,"Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 58170/13 and 2 others, 25 May 2021",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.6,Cross-border transfer or control of data,3,,54,,,,,"In the case of Wieder and Guarnieri v. the United Kingdom, 2023, the Court ruled for the first time on the application of the territoriality principle in cases of interception, extraction, filtering, storage, analysis and dissemination of electronic communications from and/or to a country other than the respondent State. Two researchers living in the USA and Germany had complained that such measures had been taken against them by the UKintelligence services. Referring to its analysis of the UK's bulk interception of communications in Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2021, the Court reiterated that the principal interference with the rights of the sender or recipient was the searching, examination and use of the intercepted communications. All these actions had been carried out by the UKintelligence agencies acting within United Kingdom territory. The Court rejected the Government's contention that any interference could not be separated from the person of each applicant and would therefore have produced effects only where they themselves were located. In its case-law on Articles 6 § 1 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 the Court had always considered that an interference occurred where the possession was interfered with, rather than where the owner was located. In the circumstances, the interference with the applicants'rights therefore fell within the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent State ( Wieder and Guarnieri v. the United Kingdom, 2023, §§ 88-95)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:2327/20,Couso Permuy v. Spain,2327/20,added,"Couso Permuy v. Spain, no. 2327/20, 25 July 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.A.4,The jurisdictional link created by the commencement of civil or criminal proceedings,3,37,38,0.9992,,,"Thus, even if the events at the origin of a court case occurred outside the territory of the respondent State, where a person brings a civil action concerning those events before the courts of that State there is an undeniable "" jurisdictional link "" for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention, to the extent that the rights secured under Article 6 § 1 are at stake - obviously without prejudice to the outcome of proceedings ( Marković and Others v. Italy [GC], 2006, § 54; see also Chagos Islanders v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2012, § 66). Indeed, if the domestic law recognises a right to bring an action and if the right claimed is one which prima facie possesses the characteristics required by Article 6 of the Convention, the Court sees no reason why such domestic proceedings should not be subjected to the same level of scrutiny as any other proceedings brought at the national level. Even though the extraterritorial nature of the events alleged to have been at the origin of an action may have an effect on the applicability of Article 6 and the final outcome of the proceedings, it cannot under any circumstances affect the jurisdiction ratione loci and ratione personae of the State concerned. If civil proceedings are brought in the domestic courts, the State is required by Article 1 of the Convention to secure in those proceedings respect for the rights protected by Article 6 ( Marković and Others v. Italy [GC], 2006, §§ 53-54). In the cited case, the Court had examined the objection as to incompatibility ratione loci raised by the respondent Government, to the effect that the civil action brought by the applicants before the Italian courts had concerned events of an extraterritorial nature (an air strike by NATOforces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).","Thus, even if the events at the origin of a court case occurred outside the territory of the respondent State, where a person brings a civil action concerning those events before the courts of that State there is an undeniable "" jurisdictional link "" for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention, to the extent that the rights secured under Article 6 § 1 are at stake - obviously without prejudice to the outcome of proceedings ( Marković and Others v. Italy [GC], 2006, § 54; Couso Permuy v. Spain *, 2024, § 99; see also Chagos Islanders v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2012, § 66). Indeed, if the domestic law recognises a right to bring an action and if the right claimed is one which prima facie possesses the characteristics required by Article 6 of the Convention, the Court sees no reason why such domestic proceedings should not be subjected to the same level of scrutiny as any other proceedings brought at the national level. Even though the extraterritorial nature of the events alleged to have been at the origin of an action may have an effect on the applicability of Article 6 and the final outcome of the proceedings, it cannot under any circumstances affect the jurisdiction ratione loci and ratione personae of the State concerned. If civil proceedings are brought in the domestic courts, the State is required by Article 1 of the Convention to secure in those proceedings respect for the rights protected by Article 6 ( Marković and Others v. Italy [GC], 2006, §§ 53-54). In the cited case, the Court had examined the objection as to incompatibility ratione loci raised by the respondent Government, to the effect that the civil action brought by the applicants before the Italian courts had concerned events of an extraterritorial nature (an air strike by NATOforces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:29906/14,Dimaksyan v. Armenia,29906/14,added,"Dimaksyan v. Armenia, no. 29906/14, 17 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.3.§4,ii. Creation of an entity unrecognised by the international community,4,118,126,0.9316,"Dimaksyan v. Armenia , 2023|Hamzayan v. Armenia , 2024|Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia , 2023|Varyan v. Armenia , 2024",,"The Court reached the same conclusion concerning Armenian jurisdiction in the following cases: ▪ a community of Jehovah 's Witnesses to whom the ""NKR"" had denied registration as a religious organisation ( Christian Religious Organization of Jehovah's Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 47-49); ▪ an Armenian national convicted by the ""NKR"" courts for refusing to perform compulsory military service in that entity ( Avanesyan v. Armenia, 2021, §§ 36-37); ▪ Armenian nationals who were ill-treated or killed during compulsory military service in the ""NKR"" ( Zalyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, §§ 213-215; Muradyan v. Armenia, 2016, §§ 123-127; Mirzoyan v. Armenia, 2019, § 56; Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 88-92). In Mirzoyan v. Armenia, 2019, the Court applied both jurisdictional criteria - territorial and personal -, as the direct victim had been killed in Armenian-controlled territory by an Armenian officer ( ibid ., § 56), whereas in those other cases, the territorial criterion alone had been sufficient (see the comparison between the two cases in Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 91-92).","The Court reached the same conclusion concerning Armenian jurisdiction in the following cases: ▪ a community of Jehovah 's Witnesses to whom the ""NKR"" had denied registration as a religious organisation ( Christian Religious Organization of Jehovah's Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 47-49) and a member of the Jehovah 's Witnesses on whom the ""NKR"" had imposed an administrative fine for discussing the Bible with another person at the latter's home ( Hamzayan v. Armenia, 2024, §§ 26-27); ▪ an Armenian national convicted by the ""NKR"" courts for refusing to perform compulsory military service in that entity ( Avanesyan v. Armenia, 2021, §§ 36-37); ▪ Armenian nationals who were ill-treated or killed during compulsory military service in the ""NKR"" ( Zalyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, §§ 213-215; Muradyan v. Armenia, 2016, §§ 123-127; Mirzoyan v. Armenia, 2019, § 56; Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 88-92; Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia, 2023, §§ 59-63; Dimaksyan v. Armenia, 2023, §§ 42-44; Varyan v. Armenia, 2024, §§ 67-70). In Mirzoyan v. Armenia, 2019, the Court applied both jurisdictional criteria - territorial and personal -, as the direct victim had been killed in Armenian-controlled territory by an Armenian officer (ibid., § 56), whereas in those other cases, the territorial criterion alone had been sufficient (see the comparison between the two cases in Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 91-92, and in Varyan v. Armenia, 2024, § 70). In Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia, the Court refused to draw a distinction between the substantive and procedural limbs of Article 2 of the Convention, finding that the facts of the case fell within the jurisdiction of the respondent State, with regard both to the substantive limb (the killing of the applicants'sons by an Armenian soldier in the service of the ""NKR"" ) and to the procedural limb (investigation by Armenian authorities; ibid., §§ 57-63)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:39371/20,Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 others (dec.) [GC],39371/20,added,"Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 others (dec.) [GC], no. 39371/20, 9 April 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.1,The territoriality principle in the traditional sense of the term,3,,30,,,,,"In the specific context of the State's positive obligations in matters of climate change, the Court found that individuals living on the territory of a Contracting Party were within its jurisdiction for such purposes. The issue of responsibility, however, is a separate matter to be examined, if necessary, in relation to the merits of the complaint ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, § 287, 9 April 2024; Duarte Agostinho and Others v Portugal and 32 Others (dec.) [GC], 2024, § 178)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:39371/20,Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 others (dec.) [GC],39371/20,added,"Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 others (dec.) [GC], no. 39371/20, 9 April 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B.2.a,General comments,4,,72,,,,,"In response to reliance by applicants on a test of ""control over the applicant's Convention interests"", the Court found that extraterritorial jurisdiction required control over the person himself or herself rather than the person's interests as such. It did not consider that the scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction could be expanded in such a manner, which would entail a radical departure from established principles under Article 1 ( Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Others (dec.) [GC], 2024, §§ 205-206)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:39371/20,Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 others (dec.) [GC],39371/20,added,"Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 others (dec.) [GC], no. 39371/20, 9 April 2024",3,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.B.2.b,Acts of diplomatic or consular agents,4,70,76,0.9448,,,"The Court found that Belgium had no jurisdiction over four Syrian nationals who had unsuccessfully applied for visas at the Belgian Embassy in Lebanon, relying on the risk of ill- treatment in their country of origin. First of all, the applicants were not Belgian nationals seeking to benefit from the protection of their embassy. Secondly, at no time did the diplomatic agents exercise de facto control over the applicants. The latter freely chose to present themselves at the Belgian embassy in Beirut, and to submit their visa applications there - as indeed they could have chosen to approach any other embassy; they were then free to leave the premises of the Belgian embassy without any hindrance ( M.N. and Others v. Belgium (dec.) [GC], 2020, § 118). In this connection, it is irrelevant that the diplomatic agents had, as in the present case, merely a ""letter box"" role, or to ascertain who was responsible for taking the decisions, whether the Belgian authorities in the national territory or the diplomatic agents posted abroad ( ibid ., § 114).","The Court found that Belgium had no jurisdiction over four Syrian nationals who had unsuccessfully applied for visas at the Belgian Embassy in Lebanon, relying on the risk of ill- treatment in their country of origin. First of all, the applicants were not Belgian nationals seeking to benefit from the protection of their embassy. Secondly, at no time did the diplomatic agents exercise de facto control over the applicants. The latter freely chose to present themselves at the Belgian embassy in Beirut, and to submit their visa applications there - as indeed they could have chosen to approach any other embassy; they were then free to leave the premises of the Belgian embassy without any hindrance ( M.N. and Others v. Belgium (dec.) [GC], 2020, § 118). In this connection, it is irrelevant that the diplomatic agents had, as in th e present case, merely a ""letter box"" role, or to ascertain who was responsible for taking the decisions, whether the Belgian authorities in the national territory or the diplomatic agents posted abroad ( ibid ., § 114). The Court subsequently explained that its reference to ""exceptional circumstances"" had not been intended to establish a distinct jurisdictional test. Within the specific context of that case, in which the applicants had sought to rely on a combination of supposed substantive and procedural links to Belgium, it was noted that an assessment of any ""exceptional circumstances"" require d the Court "" to explore the nature of the link between the applicants and the respondent State and to ascertain whether the latter effectively exercised authority or control over them"". In other words, the assessment was ultimately one of effective authority or control over the applicants, in line with established case-law ( Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Others (dec.) [GC], 2024, § 188)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:39371/20,Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 others (dec.) [GC],39371/20,added,"Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 others (dec.) [GC], no. 39371/20, 9 April 2024",4,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B.4,Specific case of climate change,3,,136,,,,,"In the case of Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Others (dec.) [GC], 2024, a group of Portuguese nationals resident in Portugal alleged a violation of various Articles of the Convention owing to the existing, and serious future, impacts of climate change imputable to their home country and thirty-two other Contracting States, and specifically those in relation to heatwaves, wildfires and smoke from wildfires, which affected their lives, well-being, mental health and the amenities of their homes. The Court found that all the applicants were under the (territorial) jurisdiction of Portugal but not under that of the other respondent States. The existing case-law provided no basis for establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction of the other States, even taking account of developments in the existing case-law on such jurisdiction as put forward by the applicants, relying on a number of ""exceptional circumstances"" and ""special features"". Noting the specific characteristics of climate - change cases as a universal and cross-border issue, the Court found that they could not in themselves serve as a basis for creating by way of judicial interpretation a novel ground for extraterritorial jurisdiction or as justification for expanding on the existing grounds. First, it was not possible to consider that the proposed positive obligations of States in the field of climate change could be a sufficient ground for holding that the State had jurisdiction over individuals outside its territory or otherwise outside its authority and control. Further, the fact that through their Portuguese nationality the applicants also enjoyed EUcitizenship could not serve to establish a jurisdictional link between them and the twenty-six respondent States that were also EUmember States. Secondly, the Convention was not designed to provide general protection of the environment as such or specifically adapted to deal with this particular aspect. Accepting the applicants'argument to the contrary would entail a radical departure from the rationale of the Convention protection system, which was primarily and fundamentally based on the principles of territorial jurisdiction and subsidiarity. Thirdly, as regards the applicants'reliance on a test of ""control over the applicants' Convention interests"", according to the Court' s established case-law, extraterritorial jurisdiction as conceived under Article 1 of the Convention required control over the person himself or herself rather than the person's interests as such. Reliance on such a criterion for establishing the State's extraterritorial jurisdiction would lead to a critical lack of foreseeability of the Convention's reach and to an untenable level of uncertainty for States (ibid., §§ 181-213)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:39371/20,Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 others (dec.) [GC],39371/20,added,"Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 others (dec.) [GC], no. 39371/20, 9 April 2024",5,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,§1,Introduction,1,9,9,0.9755,"Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania , 2018|Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania , 2024",,"Whether the acts which form the basis of the applicant's complaints fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent State and whether that State is in fact responsible for those acts under the Convention are very different questions; the latter more typically falls to be determined by the Court at the merits stage ( Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 1995, §§ 61 and 64). Adistinction must also be drawn between the issue of jurisdiction, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, and that of the imputability of the alleged violation to the actions or omissions of the respondent State, the latter issue being examined from the angle of the application's compatibility ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention ( Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 1996, § 52). The Court usually considers the notions of imputability and responsibility as going together, the State only engaging its responsibility under the Convention if the alleged violation could be imputed to it. In some specific cases, however, the Court is careful to distinguish between the two notions and to examine them separately ( Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], 2004, § 144).","Whether the acts which form the basis of the applicant's complaints fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent State and whether that State is in fact responsible for those acts under the Convention are very different questions; the latter more typically falls to be determined by the Court at the merits stage ( Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 1995, §§ 61 and 64; Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 others (dec.) [GC], 2024, § 178). Adistinction must also be drawn between the issue of jurisdiction, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, and that of the imputability of the alleged violation to the actions or omissions of the respondent State, the latter issue being examined from the angle of the application's compatibility ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention ( Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 1996, § 52). Questions of responsibility and imputability are often intrinsically linked to the establishment of the facts of the case and the assessment of evidence; the Court will thus address these issues in the light of its findings on the particular facts of the case ( Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 411 and 584-585; Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 127, 157 and 161-163). The Court usually considers the notions of imputability and responsibility as going together, such that the State's responsibility under the Convention is only engaged if the alleged violation could be attributed to it. In some specific cases, however, the Court is careful to distinguish between the two notions and to examine them separately ( Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], 2004, § 144)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:42224/11,Eriomenco v. Republic of Moldova and Russia,42224/11,added,"Eriomenco v. Republic of Moldova and Russia, no. 42224/11, 9 May 2017",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.3.§4,ii. Creation of an entity unrecognised by the international community,4,112,119,0.9978,"Eriomenco v. Republic of Moldova and Russia , 2017|Lypovchenko and Halabudenco v. Republic of Moldova and Russia , 2024",,"This conclusion as regards Russia's responsibility vis-à-vis Transdniestria was reiterated in the following cases: ▪ In the case of Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, concerning the continued detention of two of the four applicants in Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, after and despite the delivery of the Grand Chamber judgment in this case. The Court sought to establish whether Russia's policy of supporting the Transdniestrian separatist regime had changed between 2004 and 2007, the date of the applicants'release. It noted that Russia continued to enjoy a close relationship with the ""Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria"", amounting to providing political, financial and economic support to the separatist regime. Moreover, the Court found that the Russian army (troops, equipment and ammunition) had, at the date of the applicants'release, still been stationed on Moldovan territory in breach of the Russian Federation's undertakings to withdraw completely and in breach of Moldovan legislation. The applicants had therefore fallen within Russia's ""jurisdiction"" for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention ( Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, §§ 116-120). ▪ In the case of Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, concerning a complaint lodged by children and parents belonging to the Moldovan community in Transdniestria regarding the effects of a language policy adopted in 1992 and 1994 by the separatist regime prohibiting the use of the Latin alphabet in schools, as well as the subsequent measures to implement that policy. Having reiterated its finding already set out in the Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC] (2004) and Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia (2011) judgments, the Court noted that Russia was continuing to provide military, economic and political support to the Transdniestrian separatists (gas supplies, payment des pensions, etc.). The impugned facts therefore fell within the jurisdiction of Russia, even if no Russian agents had been directly involved in the measures adopted against the applicants'schools ( Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, §§ 116-123). ▪ In the case of Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, concerning the detention of a man suspected of fraud, as ordered by the courts of the ""Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria "" ( "" MRT "" ). Given the absence of any relevant new information to the contrary, the Court considered that its conclusion concerning Russia's jurisdiction expressed in all the above-mentioned judgments continued to be valid for the period under consideration in that case (§§ 109-111); see the same reasoning in respect of a subsequent period in Apcov v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia, 2017, § 24).","This conclusion as regards Russia's responsibility vis-à-vis Transdniestria was reiterated in the following cases: ▪ In the case of Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, concerning the continued detention of two of the four applicants in Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, after and despite the delivery of the Grand Chamber judgment in this case. The Court sought to establish whether Russia's policy of supporting the Transdniestrian separatist regime had changed between 2004 and 2007, the date of the applicants'release. It noted that Russia continued to enjoy a close relationship with the ""Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria"", amounting to providing political, financial and economic support to the separatist regime. Moreover, the Court found that the Russian army (troops, equipment and ammunition) had, at the date of the applicants'release, still been stationed on Moldovan territory in breach of the Russian Federation's undertakings to withdraw completely and in breach of Moldovan legislation. The applicants had therefore fallen within Russia's ""jurisdiction"" for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention ( Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, §§ 116-120). ▪ In the case of Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, concerning a complaint lodged by children and parents belonging to the Moldovan community in Transdniestria regarding the effects of a language policy adopted in 1992 and 1994 by the separatist regime prohibiting the use of the Latin alphabet in schools, as well as the subsequent measures to implement that policy. Having reiterated its finding already set out in the Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC] (2004) and Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia (2011) judgments, the Court noted that Russia was continuing to provide military, economic and political support to the Transdniestrian separatists (gas supplies, payment des pensions, etc.). The impugned facts therefore fell within the jurisdiction of Russia, even if no Russian agents had been directly involved in the measures adopted against the applicants'schools ( Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, §§ 116-123). ▪ In the case of Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, concerning the detention of a man suspected of fraud, as ordered by the courts of the ""Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria "" ( "" MRT "" ). Given the absence of any relevant new information to the contrary, the Court considered that its conclusion concerning Russia's jurisdiction expressed in all the above-mentioned judgments continued to be valid for the period under consideration in that case (§§ 109-111); see the same reasoning in respect of a subsequent period in Apcov v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia, 2017, § 24; Eriomenco v. Republic of Moldova and Russia, 2017, § 47; Lypovchenko and Halabudenco v. Republic of Moldova and Russia, 2024, § 87)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:25344/20,Friedrich and Others v. Poland,25344/20,added,"Friedrich and Others v. Poland, nos. 25344/20 and 17 others, 20 June 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A.1,The territoriality principle in the traditional sense of the term,3,19,19,0.9826,"Friedrich and Others v. Poland , 2024|Gurbanov v. Armenia , 2023",,"A State's jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 is primarily territorial . In accordance with Article 31 § 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, the Court has interpreted the words ""within their jurisdiction"" by ascertaining the ordinary meaning to be given to the phrase in its context and in the light of the object and purpose of the Convention ( M.N. and Others v. Belgium (dec.) [GC], 2020, § 99). Accordingly, Article 1 of the Convention must be considered to reflect this ordinary and essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction, other bases of jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of each case ( Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], 2001, §§ 61, 67, 71, also Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 104, and the references therein).","A State's jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 is primarily territorial . In accordance with Article 31 § 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, the Court has interpreted the words ""within their jurisdiction"" by ascertaining the ordinary meaning to be given to the phrase in its context and in the light of the object and purpose of the Convention ( M.N. and Others v. Belgium (dec.) [GC], 2020, § 99). Accordingly, Article 1 of the Convention must be considered to reflect this ordinary and essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction, other bases of jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of each case ( Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], 2001, §§ 61, 67, 71, also Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 104, and the references therein); for very clear examples of application of the territorial criterion see Gurbanov v. Armenia, 2023, §§ 22-26, and as regards ports and territorial waters, Friedrich and Others v. Poland, 2024, § 113)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:7432/17,Gurbanov v. Armenia,7432/17,added,"Gurbanov v. Armenia, no. 7432/17, 5 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A.1,The territoriality principle in the traditional sense of the term,3,19,19,0.9826,"Friedrich and Others v. Poland , 2024|Gurbanov v. Armenia , 2023",,"A State's jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 is primarily territorial . In accordance with Article 31 § 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, the Court has interpreted the words ""within their jurisdiction"" by ascertaining the ordinary meaning to be given to the phrase in its context and in the light of the object and purpose of the Convention ( M.N. and Others v. Belgium (dec.) [GC], 2020, § 99). Accordingly, Article 1 of the Convention must be considered to reflect this ordinary and essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction, other bases of jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of each case ( Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], 2001, §§ 61, 67, 71, also Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 104, and the references therein).","A State's jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 is primarily territorial . In accordance with Article 31 § 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, the Court has interpreted the words ""within their jurisdiction"" by ascertaining the ordinary meaning to be given to the phrase in its context and in the light of the object and purpose of the Convention ( M.N. and Others v. Belgium (dec.) [GC], 2020, § 99). Accordingly, Article 1 of the Convention must be considered to reflect this ordinary and essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction, other bases of jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of each case ( Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], 2001, §§ 61, 67, 71, also Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 104, and the references therein); for very clear examples of application of the territorial criterion see Gurbanov v. Armenia, 2023, §§ 22-26, and as regards ports and territorial waters, Friedrich and Others v. Poland, 2024, § 113)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:74566/16|74573/16,Hakobyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.),74566/16|74573/16,added,"Hakobyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), nos. 74566/16 and 74573/16, 12 September 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B.1.c,General observation and further developments,4,,68,,,,,"Subsequently, in a number o f cases against Armenia and Azerbaijan, concerning the ""Four -Day War"" of 2016, brought by individuals living in the war zone, either on the territory of the ""Republic of Nagorno- Karabakh"", or close to the line of contact (but within the internationally recognised territory of Azerbaijan), the Court reached the same conclusion as in the case of Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, cited above. As regards the ""Republic of Nagorno - Karabakh"" it noted that Azerbaijan no longer controlled it since the first Nagorno-Karabakh war of 1992-1994. It had involved heavy shelling of towns and villages on either side of the line of contact for four days, resulting in many dead, wounded and temporarily homeless people as well as considerable damage to property and infrastructure on both sides. In these circumstances, and without any indication to the contrary, it was not a situation of ""effective control"" over an area . The active phase of hostilities under examination in the present case concerned bombing and artillery shelling by the armed forces on both sides of the conflict, seeking to put the enemy force hors de combat and capture territory. The factual elements of the case did not reveal any instance of control over or proximity to the alleged victims of a violation. In these circumstances, there could not be said to have been ""State agent authority and control"" over those individuals. The Court thus found that neither Armenia nor Azerbaij an had ""jurisdiction"" within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention ( Allahverdiyev v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, §§ 28-33; Aliyev v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, §§ 24-29; Ohanyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2023, §§ 30-37; Hakobyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2023, §§ 28-35)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:74566/16|74573/16,Hakobyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.),74566/16|74573/16,added,"Hakobyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), nos. 74566/16 and 74573/16, 12 September 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.B.3.§4,ii. Creation of an entity unrecognised by the international community,4,116,123,0.9866,,,"Finally, the fourth situation examined by the Court concerned the responsibility of Armenia for acts committed in the ""Republic of Nagorno- Karabakh"" established in an area of Azerbaijan. At the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast ( the "" NKAO "" ) had been an autonomous province situated within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic ( "" the Azerbaijan SSR "" ). There had been no common border between the NKAO and the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (""the Armenian SSR""), which had been separated by Azerbaijani territory. In 1988 armed hostilities broke out in this region. In September 1991 - shortly after Azerbaijan had proclaimed its independence from the Soviet Union - the NKAOsoviet announced the foundation of the ""Nagorno -Karabakh Republic "" ( ""the NKR "" ), comprising the NKAO and the Shahumyan district of Azerbaijan. Following a referendum held in December 1991 (and boycotted by the Azeri population) in which 99.9 % of voters had come down in favour of the secession of the "" NKR "", the latter reaffirmed its independence from Azerbaijan in January 1992. After that the conflict gradually escalated into full-scale war. By the end of 1993 the ethnic Armenian troops had gained control over almost the entire territory of the former NKAO and seven adjacent Azerbaijani regions. In May 1994 the belligerents signed a ceasefire agreement, which is still in force. The self-proclaimed independence of the "" NKR "" has not been recognised by any State or international organisation ( Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], 2015, §§ 12-31; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, §§ 14-28).","Finally, the fourth situation examined by the Court concerned the responsibility of Armenia for acts committed in the former ""Republic of Nagorno- Karabakh"" established in an area of Azerbaijan. At the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast ( the "" NKAO "" ) had been an autonomous province situated within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic ( "" the Azerbaijan SSR "" ). There had been no common border between the NKAO and the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (""the Armenian SSR""), which had been separated by Azerbaijani territory. In 1988 armed hostilities broke out in this region. In September 1991 - shortly after Azerbaijan had proclaimed its independence from the Soviet Union - the NKAOsoviet announced the foundation of the ""Nagorno -Karabakh Republic "" ( ""the NKR "" ), comprising the NKAO and the Shahumyan district of Azerbaijan. Following a referendum held in December 1991 (and boycotted by the Azeri population) in which 99.9 % of voters had come down in favour of the secession of the "" NKR "", the latter reaffirmed its independence from Azerbaijan in January 1992. After that the conflict gradually escalated into full-scale war. By the end of 1993 the ethnic Armenian troops had gained control over almost the entire territory of the former NKAO and seven adjacent Azerbaijani regions. In May 1994 the belligerents signed a ceasefire agreement. The self-proclaimed independence of the "" NKR "" had not been recognised by any State or international organisation ( Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], 2015, §§ 12-31; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, §§ 14-28). Later on, in the night of 1 to 2 April 2016, violent armed clashes broke out near the contact line between the ""NKR"" and Azerbaijan ( sometimes referred to as the ""Four - Day War"" ). They lasted until 5 April 2016, but other clashes occurred later in the month ( Allahverdiyev v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, § 5; Hakobyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2023, § 5)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:43082/14,Hamzayan v. Armenia,43082/14,added,"Hamzayan v. Armenia, no. 43082/14, 6 February 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B.3.§4,ii. Creation of an entity unrecognised by the international community,4,,124,,"Hamzayan v. Armenia , 2024|Nana Muradyan v. Armenia , 2022|Varyan v. Armenia , 2024",,,"On 27 September 2020 a new war broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh. It lasted 44 days until 10 November 2020 when a ceasefire agreement, signed the previous day, entered into force. Subsequent events led to the official dissolution of the ""NKR"" on 28 September 2023 with effect from 1 January 2024. The Court has taken note of those changes; however, the cases it has examined to date concern events that predate this fresh conflict ( Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 91; Hamzayan v. Armenia, 2024, § 26; Varyan v. Armenia, 2024, § 70)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:43082/14,Hamzayan v. Armenia,43082/14,added,"Hamzayan v. Armenia, no. 43082/14, 6 February 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.3.§4,ii. Creation of an entity unrecognised by the international community,4,118,126,0.9316,"Dimaksyan v. Armenia , 2023|Hamzayan v. Armenia , 2024|Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia , 2023|Varyan v. Armenia , 2024",,"The Court reached the same conclusion concerning Armenian jurisdiction in the following cases: ▪ a community of Jehovah 's Witnesses to whom the ""NKR"" had denied registration as a religious organisation ( Christian Religious Organization of Jehovah's Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 47-49); ▪ an Armenian national convicted by the ""NKR"" courts for refusing to perform compulsory military service in that entity ( Avanesyan v. Armenia, 2021, §§ 36-37); ▪ Armenian nationals who were ill-treated or killed during compulsory military service in the ""NKR"" ( Zalyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, §§ 213-215; Muradyan v. Armenia, 2016, §§ 123-127; Mirzoyan v. Armenia, 2019, § 56; Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 88-92). In Mirzoyan v. Armenia, 2019, the Court applied both jurisdictional criteria - territorial and personal -, as the direct victim had been killed in Armenian-controlled territory by an Armenian officer ( ibid ., § 56), whereas in those other cases, the territorial criterion alone had been sufficient (see the comparison between the two cases in Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 91-92).","The Court reached the same conclusion concerning Armenian jurisdiction in the following cases: ▪ a community of Jehovah 's Witnesses to whom the ""NKR"" had denied registration as a religious organisation ( Christian Religious Organization of Jehovah's Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 47-49) and a member of the Jehovah 's Witnesses on whom the ""NKR"" had imposed an administrative fine for discussing the Bible with another person at the latter's home ( Hamzayan v. Armenia, 2024, §§ 26-27); ▪ an Armenian national convicted by the ""NKR"" courts for refusing to perform compulsory military service in that entity ( Avanesyan v. Armenia, 2021, §§ 36-37); ▪ Armenian nationals who were ill-treated or killed during compulsory military service in the ""NKR"" ( Zalyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, §§ 213-215; Muradyan v. Armenia, 2016, §§ 123-127; Mirzoyan v. Armenia, 2019, § 56; Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 88-92; Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia, 2023, §§ 59-63; Dimaksyan v. Armenia, 2023, §§ 42-44; Varyan v. Armenia, 2024, §§ 67-70). In Mirzoyan v. Armenia, 2019, the Court applied both jurisdictional criteria - territorial and personal -, as the direct victim had been killed in Armenian-controlled territory by an Armenian officer (ibid., § 56), whereas in those other cases, the territorial criterion alone had been sufficient (see the comparison between the two cases in Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 91-92, and in Varyan v. Armenia, 2024, § 70). In Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia, the Court refused to draw a distinction between the substantive and procedural limbs of Article 2 of the Convention, finding that the facts of the case fell within the jurisdiction of the respondent State, with regard both to the substantive limb (the killing of the applicants'sons by an Armenian soldier in the service of the ""NKR"" ) and to the procedural limb (investigation by Armenian authorities; ibid., §§ 57-63)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:67351/13,Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia,67351/13,added,"Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia, no. 67351/13, 17 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.3.§4,ii. Creation of an entity unrecognised by the international community,4,118,126,0.9316,"Dimaksyan v. Armenia , 2023|Hamzayan v. Armenia , 2024|Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia , 2023|Varyan v. Armenia , 2024",,"The Court reached the same conclusion concerning Armenian jurisdiction in the following cases: ▪ a community of Jehovah 's Witnesses to whom the ""NKR"" had denied registration as a religious organisation ( Christian Religious Organization of Jehovah's Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 47-49); ▪ an Armenian national convicted by the ""NKR"" courts for refusing to perform compulsory military service in that entity ( Avanesyan v. Armenia, 2021, §§ 36-37); ▪ Armenian nationals who were ill-treated or killed during compulsory military service in the ""NKR"" ( Zalyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, §§ 213-215; Muradyan v. Armenia, 2016, §§ 123-127; Mirzoyan v. Armenia, 2019, § 56; Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 88-92). In Mirzoyan v. Armenia, 2019, the Court applied both jurisdictional criteria - territorial and personal -, as the direct victim had been killed in Armenian-controlled territory by an Armenian officer ( ibid ., § 56), whereas in those other cases, the territorial criterion alone had been sufficient (see the comparison between the two cases in Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 91-92).","The Court reached the same conclusion concerning Armenian jurisdiction in the following cases: ▪ a community of Jehovah 's Witnesses to whom the ""NKR"" had denied registration as a religious organisation ( Christian Religious Organization of Jehovah's Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 47-49) and a member of the Jehovah 's Witnesses on whom the ""NKR"" had imposed an administrative fine for discussing the Bible with another person at the latter's home ( Hamzayan v. Armenia, 2024, §§ 26-27); ▪ an Armenian national convicted by the ""NKR"" courts for refusing to perform compulsory military service in that entity ( Avanesyan v. Armenia, 2021, §§ 36-37); ▪ Armenian nationals who were ill-treated or killed during compulsory military service in the ""NKR"" ( Zalyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, §§ 213-215; Muradyan v. Armenia, 2016, §§ 123-127; Mirzoyan v. Armenia, 2019, § 56; Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 88-92; Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia, 2023, §§ 59-63; Dimaksyan v. Armenia, 2023, §§ 42-44; Varyan v. Armenia, 2024, §§ 67-70). In Mirzoyan v. Armenia, 2019, the Court applied both jurisdictional criteria - territorial and personal -, as the direct victim had been killed in Armenian-controlled territory by an Armenian officer (ibid., § 56), whereas in those other cases, the territorial criterion alone had been sufficient (see the comparison between the two cases in Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 91-92, and in Varyan v. Armenia, 2024, § 70). In Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia, the Court refused to draw a distinction between the substantive and procedural limbs of Article 2 of the Convention, finding that the facts of the case fell within the jurisdiction of the respondent State, with regard both to the substantive limb (the killing of the applicants'sons by an Armenian soldier in the service of the ""NKR"" ) and to the procedural limb (investigation by Armenian authorities; ibid., §§ 57-63)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:21882/09|6189/10,Israilov v. Russia,21882/09|6189/10,added,"Israilov v. Russia, nos. 21882/09 and 6189/10, 24 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.4,The jurisdictional link created by the commencement of civil or criminal proceedings,3,,48,,"In the case of Israilov v. Russia , 2023",,,"In the case of Israilov v. Russia, 2023, the son of the applicant, a Russian national from Chechnya who had fled to Austria to avoid having to continue working for the secret services of Ramzan Kadyrov, President of the Chechen Republic, had been murdered in Vienna by a commando. The Austrian authorities had convicted three Russian nationals of Chechen origin for the crime. There was evidence that, a few months before the crime, the applicant's son had been contacted in Austria by an individual from Chechnya who had reportedly informed the Austrian police that he had been instructed to bring the victim back to Chechnya or to "" resolve the problem"" . During the trial, the Austrian authorities, seeking to determine to what extent the Chechen leaders (in particular Mr Kadyrov) had been involved in the crime, had sent a letter of request for legal assistance to the Russian authorities, whose response had been belated and incomplete, according to the applicant. Before the Court, the applicant reproached the Russian authorities for failing to fulfil their positive obligation under Article 2 of the Convention, and in particular for not assisting the Austrian authorities. Without having sufficient information the Court was unable to establish whether the preliminary investigation in Russia corresponded to the first basis of jurisdiction defined in Güzelyurtlu and Others, 2019. However, it concluded that there had been ""special features"", in particular the fact that the Austrian letter of request, far from being manifestly unreasonable, was based on precise facts, cited precise names, and was aimed at clarifying the circumstances surrounding Umar Israilov's murder and the identity of those responsible for it. The Court thus had jurisdiction to examine whether Russia, acting on its own territory, had complied with its positive obligation to investigate precise facts within the limits of its own jurisdiction ( Israilov v. Russia, §§ 105-110)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:40926/16|73942/17,Lypovchenko and Halabudenco v. Republic of Moldova and Russia,40926/16|73942/17,added,"Lypovchenko and Halabudenco v. Republic of Moldova and Russia, nos. 40926/16 and 73942/17, 20 February 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.3.§4,ii. Creation of an entity unrecognised by the international community,4,112,119,0.9978,"Eriomenco v. Republic of Moldova and Russia , 2017|Lypovchenko and Halabudenco v. Republic of Moldova and Russia , 2024",,"This conclusion as regards Russia's responsibility vis-à-vis Transdniestria was reiterated in the following cases: ▪ In the case of Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, concerning the continued detention of two of the four applicants in Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, after and despite the delivery of the Grand Chamber judgment in this case. The Court sought to establish whether Russia's policy of supporting the Transdniestrian separatist regime had changed between 2004 and 2007, the date of the applicants'release. It noted that Russia continued to enjoy a close relationship with the ""Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria"", amounting to providing political, financial and economic support to the separatist regime. Moreover, the Court found that the Russian army (troops, equipment and ammunition) had, at the date of the applicants'release, still been stationed on Moldovan territory in breach of the Russian Federation's undertakings to withdraw completely and in breach of Moldovan legislation. The applicants had therefore fallen within Russia's ""jurisdiction"" for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention ( Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, §§ 116-120). ▪ In the case of Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, concerning a complaint lodged by children and parents belonging to the Moldovan community in Transdniestria regarding the effects of a language policy adopted in 1992 and 1994 by the separatist regime prohibiting the use of the Latin alphabet in schools, as well as the subsequent measures to implement that policy. Having reiterated its finding already set out in the Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC] (2004) and Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia (2011) judgments, the Court noted that Russia was continuing to provide military, economic and political support to the Transdniestrian separatists (gas supplies, payment des pensions, etc.). The impugned facts therefore fell within the jurisdiction of Russia, even if no Russian agents had been directly involved in the measures adopted against the applicants'schools ( Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, §§ 116-123). ▪ In the case of Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, concerning the detention of a man suspected of fraud, as ordered by the courts of the ""Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria "" ( "" MRT "" ). Given the absence of any relevant new information to the contrary, the Court considered that its conclusion concerning Russia's jurisdiction expressed in all the above-mentioned judgments continued to be valid for the period under consideration in that case (§§ 109-111); see the same reasoning in respect of a subsequent period in Apcov v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia, 2017, § 24).","This conclusion as regards Russia's responsibility vis-à-vis Transdniestria was reiterated in the following cases: ▪ In the case of Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, concerning the continued detention of two of the four applicants in Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, after and despite the delivery of the Grand Chamber judgment in this case. The Court sought to establish whether Russia's policy of supporting the Transdniestrian separatist regime had changed between 2004 and 2007, the date of the applicants'release. It noted that Russia continued to enjoy a close relationship with the ""Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria"", amounting to providing political, financial and economic support to the separatist regime. Moreover, the Court found that the Russian army (troops, equipment and ammunition) had, at the date of the applicants'release, still been stationed on Moldovan territory in breach of the Russian Federation's undertakings to withdraw completely and in breach of Moldovan legislation. The applicants had therefore fallen within Russia's ""jurisdiction"" for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention ( Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, §§ 116-120). ▪ In the case of Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, concerning a complaint lodged by children and parents belonging to the Moldovan community in Transdniestria regarding the effects of a language policy adopted in 1992 and 1994 by the separatist regime prohibiting the use of the Latin alphabet in schools, as well as the subsequent measures to implement that policy. Having reiterated its finding already set out in the Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC] (2004) and Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia (2011) judgments, the Court noted that Russia was continuing to provide military, economic and political support to the Transdniestrian separatists (gas supplies, payment des pensions, etc.). The impugned facts therefore fell within the jurisdiction of Russia, even if no Russian agents had been directly involved in the measures adopted against the applicants'schools ( Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, §§ 116-123). ▪ In the case of Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, concerning the detention of a man suspected of fraud, as ordered by the courts of the ""Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria "" ( "" MRT "" ). Given the absence of any relevant new information to the contrary, the Court considered that its conclusion concerning Russia's jurisdiction expressed in all the above-mentioned judgments continued to be valid for the period under consideration in that case (§§ 109-111); see the same reasoning in respect of a subsequent period in Apcov v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia, 2017, § 24; Eriomenco v. Republic of Moldova and Russia, 2017, § 47; Lypovchenko and Halabudenco v. Republic of Moldova and Russia, 2024, § 87)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:3963/18,Matkava and Others v. Russia,3963/18,added,"Matkava and Others v. Russia, no. 3963/18, 19 December 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B.2.e,Use of force by a State ’ s agents operating outside its territory,4,,88,,"Matkava and Others v. Russia , 2023",,,"The Court also found that Russia had jurisdiction in the case of a man who had been shot dead on Georgian territory near the de facto border with Abkhazia (entity not recognised as a State by the international community) by an Abkhazian ""border guard"" who had crossed the border and was outside Abkhazian territory. Having previously found that the acts of agents of the de facto Abkhazian authorities fell within the jurisdiction of Russia and were attributable to the latter without it being necessary to provi de proof of ""detailed control"" of each of their actions, the Court found that the direct victim fell within the respondent State's jurisdiction even though he had been killed on territory over which it had no control ( Matkava and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 100-105)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:3963/18,Matkava and Others v. Russia,3963/18,added,"Matkava and Others v. Russia, no. 3963/18, 19 December 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.3.§4,ii. Creation of an entity unrecognised by the international community,4,115,122,0.9807,"Matkava and Others v. Russia , 2023",,"Concerning Abkhazia, the Court has also recognised the existence of "" effective control"" by Russia over its territory for a period preceding the armed conflict of 2008. It found in the relevant case that since the armed conflict between Georgians and Abkhazians in 1992, Russia had not ceased to extend and strengthen its influence over this region militarily, politically, economically and culturally. In its assessment the Court relied on a long series of factual circumstances; for example, the fact that the peace-keeping forces in Abkhazia were made up of Russian military personnel; that the majority of the population of Abkhazia had been given Russian nationality after 2002; that Abkhazia used Russian currency as its means of payment and was economically heavily dependent on Russia; lastly, according to the repeated statements of its ( de facto Abkhaz) leaders, Abkhazia had in some ways become part of Russia. In sum, Abkhazia was only able to survive because of Russia's sustained and substantial political and economic support, and of Russia's military influence, which was sufficient for it to be considered ""dissuasive"" and as such decisive in practice . It followed that the conduct of the de facto authorities of that region fell within Russia's jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention ( Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 323-340).","Concerning Abkhazia, the Court has also recognised the existence of ""effective control"" by Russia over its territory for a period preceding the armed conflict of 2008. It found in the relevant case that since the armed conflict between Georgians and Abkhazians in 1992, Russia had not ceased to extend and strengthen its influence over this region militarily, politically, economically and culturally. In its assessment the Court relied on a long series of factual circumstances; for example, the fact that the peace-keeping forces in Abkhazia were made up of Russian military personnel; that the majority of the population of Abkhazia had been given Russian nationality after 2002; that Abkhazia used Russian currency as its means of payment and was economically heavily dependent on Russia; lastly, according to the repeated statements of its ( de facto Abkhazian) leaders, Abkhazia had in some ways become part of Russia. In sum, Abkhazia was only able to survive because of Russia's sustained and substantial political and economic support, and of Russia's military influence, which was sufficient for it to be considered ""dissuasive"" and as such decisive in practice . It followed that the conduct of the de facto authorities of that region fell within Russia's jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention ( Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 323-340). The same was true for actions of members of the Abkhazian armed forces, which were imputable to Russia without it being necessary to provide proof of ""detailed control"" of each of those actions ( Matkava and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 96)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:3963/18,Matkava and Others v. Russia,3963/18,added,"Matkava and Others v. Russia, no. 3963/18, 19 December 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.A.2,The possibility of drawing inferences,3,145,155,0.9819,"In the case of Matkava and Others v. Russia , 2023",,"Article 38 of the Convention requires the Contracting States to furnish all necessary facilities to the Court, whether it is conducting a fact-finding investigation or performing its general duties as regards the examination of applications. The conduct of the parties when evidence is being obtained may therefore also be taken into account and inferences may be drawn from such conduct ( Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC] (dec.), 2020, §§ 256 and 380, Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, § 341; Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), § 437). In the past the Court has drawn inferences from a failure by the respondent Government to supply the documents requested of them ( Timurtaş v. Turkey, 2000, §§ 66-72; Akkum and Others v. Turkey, 2005, §§ 185-190 and 225; Çelikbilek v. Turkey, 2005, §§ 56-63; El-Masri v. former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], 2012, §§ 152-167). In the case of El-Masri, the Court found that the burden of proof should shift to the Government once it had established prima facie evidence in favour of the applicant's version of events. The Government had failed to provide documents or a satisfactory explanation of how the events in question had occurred. In such circumstances, the Court could draw inferences from the available material and the authorities'conduct and found the applicant's allegations sufficiently convincing and established beyond reasonable doubt ( ibid ., §§ 165-167).","Article 38 of the Convention requires the Contracting States to furnish all necessary facilities to the Court, whether it is conducting a fact-finding investigation or performing its general duties as regards the examination of applications. The conduct of the parties when evidence is being obtained may therefore also be taken into account and inferences may be drawn from such conduct ( Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC] (dec.), 2020, §§ 256 and 380, Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, § 341; Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), § 437). In the past the Court has drawn inferences from a failure by the respondent Government to supply the documents requested of them ( Timurtaş v. Turkey, 2000, §§ 66-72; Akkum and Others v. Turkey, 2005, §§ 185-190 and 225; Çelikbilek v. Turkey, 2005, §§ 56-63; El-Masri v. former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], 2012, §§ 152-167). In the case of El-Masri, the Court found that the burden of proof should shift to the Government once it had established prima facie evidence in favour of the applicant's version of events. The Government had failed to provide documents or a satisfactory explanation of how the events in question had occurred. In such circumstances, the Court could draw inferences from the available material and the authorities'conduct and found the applicant's allegations sufficiently convincing and established beyond reasonable doubt (ibid., §§ 165-167). In the case of Matkava and Others v. Russia, 2023, the Court drew conclusions from the refusal by the Russian authorities to open an investigation and provide documents relating to the investigation by the de facto authorities of the ""Republic of Abkhazia"", an entity not recognised as a State under international law and controlled by Russia (ibid., §§ 102-103)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:42126/15|42127/15,O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia,42126/15|42127/15,added,"O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, nos. 42126/15 and 42127/15, 19 December 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B.3.b,Jurisdiction of a State undergoing foreign military action (or military action unrecognised by the international community) within its territory,4,,135,,"O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia , 2023",,,"Moreover, failings of a legal system and decisions of de facto ""courts"" of entities not recognised by the international community cannot be imputed to the ""passive"" State ( O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 88)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:42126/15|42127/15,O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia,42126/15|42127/15,added,"O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, nos. 42126/15 and 42127/15, 19 December 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.3.b,Jurisdiction of a State undergoing foreign military action (or military action unrecognised by the international community) within its territory,4,124,132,0.9942,"O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia , 2023",,"When a Contracting State is prevented from exercising authority over its whole territory due to an exceptional factual situation, it does not cease to have jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention over the part of its territory which is temporarily beyond its control ( Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, § 130; Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 317). Such a factual situation nonetheless has the effect of reducing the scope of that jurisdiction, in that the commitment entered into by the Contracting State under Article 1 must be examined by the Court solely in the light of the State's positive obligations in respect of persons present in its territory. The State in question must endeavour, with all the legal and diplomatic means available to it vis-à-vis foreign States and international organisations, to continue to guarantee the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention. Although it is not for the Court to indicate which measures the authorities should take in order to comply with their obligations most effectively, it must verify that the measures actually taken were appropriate and sufficient in the present case. When faced with a partial or total failure to act, the Court's task is to determine to what extent a minimum effort was nevertheless possible and whether it should have been made. Determining that question is especially necessary in cases concerning an alleged infringement of absolute rights such as those guaranteed by Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 333-334).","When a Contracting State is prevented from exercising authority over its whole territory due to an exceptional factual situation, it does not cease to have jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention over the part of its territory which is temporarily beyond its control ( Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, § 130; Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 317; O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 60). Such a factual situation nonetheless has the effect of reducing the scope of that jurisdiction, in that the commitment entered into by the Contracting State under Article 1 must be examined by the Court solely in the light of the State's positive obligations in respect of persons present in its territory. The State in question must endeavour, with all the legal and diplomatic means available to it vis-à-vis foreign States and international organisations, to continue to guarantee the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention. Although it is not for the Court to indicate which measures the authorities should take in order to comply with their obligations most effectively, it must verify that the measures actually taken were appropriate and sufficient in the present case. When faced with a partial or total failure to act, the Court's task is to determine to what extent a minimum effort was nevertheless possible and whether it should have been made. Determining that question is especially necessary in cases concerning an alleged infringement of absolute rights such as those guaranteed by Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 333-334)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:42126/15|42127/15,O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia,42126/15|42127/15,added,"O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, nos. 42126/15 and 42127/15, 19 December 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.3.b,Jurisdiction of a State undergoing foreign military action (or military action unrecognised by the international community) within its territory,4,125,133,0.9898,"O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia , 2023",,"Generally speaking, the following six positive obligations incumbent on the "" passive "" State can be identified in the Court's existing case-law: a. Three general obligations i. to affirm and reaffirm its sovereignty over the territory in issue ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 339-341 and 343; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 108); ii. to refrain from providing any kind of support to the regime unrecognised by the international community ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, § 345); iii. to actively attempt to (re -establish control over the disputed territory ( ibid ., § 341-344; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 108; Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 400-401). b. Three special obligations relating to individual applicants i. to attempt to resolve the applicants'situation by political and diplomatic means ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 346-347; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 109; Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 401-403); ii. to attempt to resolve the applicants'situation by appropriate practical and technical means ( Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 147; Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 405-406); iii. to take the appropriate judicial action to protect the applicants'rights ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 346-347; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 110).","Generally speaking, the following six positive obligations incumbent on the "" passive "" State can be identified in the Court's existing case-law: a. Three general obligations i. to affirm and reaffirm its sovereignty over the territory in issue ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 339-341 and 343; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 108); ii. to refrain from providing any kind of support to the regime unrecognised by the international community ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, § 345); iii. to actively attempt to (re -establish control over the disputed territory ( ibid ., § 341-344; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 108; Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 400-401; O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 79). b. Three special obligations relating to individual applicants i. to attempt to resolve the applicants'situation by political and diplomatic means ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 346-347; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 109; Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 401-403; O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 80); ii. to attempt to resolve the applicants'situation by appropriate practical and technical means ( Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 147; Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 405-406); iii. to take the appropriate judicial action to protect the applicants'rights ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 346-347; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 110)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:42126/15|42127/15,O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia,42126/15|42127/15,added,"O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, nos. 42126/15 and 42127/15, 19 December 2023",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.3.b,Jurisdiction of a State undergoing foreign military action (or military action unrecognised by the international community) within its territory,4,126,134,0.9774,"O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia , 2023",,"Furthermore, the Court has held that the efforts expended by the "" passive "" State in question to honour the six above-mentioned obligations should be constant and relevant ( Ilaşcu a nd Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 348-352; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 111; Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 148). However, the question whether the State in question has fulfilled its positive obligations as defined by the Court's case-law must be decided in the light of the individual case rather than with reference to Article 1 of the Convention (see, for example, Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 398-410).","Furthermore, the Court has held that the efforts expended by the "" passive "" State in question to honour the six above-mentioned obligations should be constant and relevant ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 348-352; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 111; Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 148). However, the question whether the State in question has fulfilled its positive obligations as defined by the Court's case-law must be decided in the light of the individual case rather than with reference to Article 1 of the Convention (see, for example, Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 398-410; O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 60)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:42126/15|42127/15,O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia,42126/15|42127/15,added,"O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, nos. 42126/15 and 42127/15, 19 December 2023",5,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.3.§4,ii. Creation of an entity unrecognised by the international community,4,113,120,0.9976,"O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia , 2023",,"The third case examined by the Court was that of the two separatist entities established in Georgia, that is to say South Ossetia and Abkhazia, especially during and after the armed conflict between Georgia and Russia in August 2008, the climax of a long series of tensions, provocations and incidents between the two countries. In its observations, the Russian Government had acknowledged a substantial Russian military presence after the cessation of hostilities and provided numerous indications showing the extent of the economic and financial support that the Russian Federation had provided and continued to provide to South Ossetia and to Abkhazia. the EU's Fact- Finding Mission also emphasised the relationship of dependency not only in economic and financial, but also in military and political terms; the information provided was also revealing as to the pre- existing relationship of subordination between the separatist entities and the Russian Federation, which had lasted throughout the active phase of the hostilities and after the cessation of hostilities. In its report, the EU's Fact-Finding Mission had spoken of "" creeping annexation "" of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia. The Court considered that the Russian Federation had exercised effective control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia (as well as a "" buffer zone "" located in undisputed Georgian territory) during the period from the date of cessation of active hostilities and the date of the official withdrawal of Russian troops. Even after that period, the strong Russian presence and the South Ossetian and Abkhazian authorities'dependency on the Russian Federation, on whom their survival depended, as was shown particularly by the cooperation and assistance agreements signed with the latter, indicated that there had been continued ""effective control"" over the two territories. The events which had occurred after the ceasefire had therefore fallen within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention ( Georgia v. Russia (II), 2021, §§ 161-175; Georgia v. Russia (IV) (dec.), 2023, §§ 43-45).","The third case examined by the Court was that of the two separatist entities established in Georgia, that is to say South Ossetia and Abkhazia, especially during and after the armed conflict between Georgia and Russia in August 2008, the climax of a long series of tensions, provocations and incidents between the two countries. In its observations, the Russian Government had acknowledged a substantial Russian military presence after the cessation of hostilities and provided numerous indications showing the extent of the economic and financial support that the Russian Federation had provided and continued to provide to South Ossetia and to Abkhazia. the EU's Fact- Finding Mission also emphasised the relationship of dependency not only in economic and financial, but also in military and political terms; the information provided was also revealing as to the pre- existing relationship of subordination between the separatist entities and the Russian Federation, which had lasted throughout the active phase of the hostilities and after the cessation of hostilities. In its report, the EU's Fact-Finding Mission had spoken of "" creeping annexation "" of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia. The Court considered that the Russian Federation had exercised effective control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia (as well as a "" buffer zone "" located in undisputed Georgian territory) during the period from the date of cessation of active hostilities and the date of the official withdrawal of Russian troops. Even after that period, the strong Russian presence and the South Ossetian and Abkhazian authorities'dependency on the Russian Federation, on whom their survival depended, as was shown particularly by the cooperation and assistance agreements signed with the latter, indicated that there had been continued ""effective control"" over the two territories. The events which had occurred after the ceasefire had therefore fallen within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention ( Georgia v. Russia (II), 2021, §§ 161-175; Georgia v. Russia (IV) (dec.), 2023, §§ 43-45; O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 61)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:74508/16,Ohanyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.),74508/16,added,"Ohanyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), no. 74508/16, 12 September 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B.1.c,General observation and further developments,4,,68,,,,,"Subsequently, in a number o f cases against Armenia and Azerbaijan, concerning the ""Four -Day War"" of 2016, brought by individuals living in the war zone, either on the territory of the ""Republic of Nagorno- Karabakh"", or close to the line of contact (but within the internationally recognised territory of Azerbaijan), the Court reached the same conclusion as in the case of Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, cited above. As regards the ""Republic of Nagorno - Karabakh"" it noted that Azerbaijan no longer controlled it since the first Nagorno-Karabakh war of 1992-1994. It had involved heavy shelling of towns and villages on either side of the line of contact for four days, resulting in many dead, wounded and temporarily homeless people as well as considerable damage to property and infrastructure on both sides. In these circumstances, and without any indication to the contrary, it was not a situation of ""effective control"" over an area . The active phase of hostilities under examination in the present case concerned bombing and artillery shelling by the armed forces on both sides of the conflict, seeking to put the enemy force hors de combat and capture territory. The factual elements of the case did not reveal any instance of control over or proximity to the alleged victims of a violation. In these circumstances, there could not be said to have been ""State agent authority and control"" over those individuals. The Court thus found that neither Armenia nor Azerbaij an had ""jurisdiction"" within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention ( Allahverdiyev v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, §§ 28-33; Aliyev v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, §§ 24-29; Ohanyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2023, §§ 30-37; Hakobyan v. Azerbaijan (dec.), 2023, §§ 28-35)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:35271/19,The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy,35271/19,added,"The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, no. 35271/19, 2 May 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,§1,Introduction,1,10,10,0.9508,"The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy , 2024",,"Unlike jurisdiction, issues of attribution and the responsibility of the respondent State under the Convention for the acts complained of fall to be examined at the merits stage of the proceedings. It is, however, important to clarify that this concerns the evidential question whether the act or omission complained of was in fact attributable to a State agent as alleged. It does not preclude an assessment, at the admissibility stage, of whether particular individuals or entities could be considered State agents such that any actions shown at the later merits stage to have been taken by them would be capable of giving rise to the responsibility of the State in question ( Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, § 550; see also the approach adopted in Cyprus v. Turkey, Commission decision, 1975, (D.R.) 2, p. 32, § 84, pp. 125 and 151).","Unlike jurisdiction, issues of attribution and the responsibility of the respondent State under the Convention for the acts complained of fall to be examined at the merits stage of the proceedings. It is, however, important to clarify that this concerns only the evidential question whether the act or omission complained of was in fact attributable to a State agent as alleged. It does not preclude an assessment, at the admissibility stage, of whether particular individuals or entities could be considered State agents such that any actions shown at the later merits stage to have been taken by them would be capable of giving rise to the responsibility of the State in question ( Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] (dec.), 2022, § 550; see also the approach adopted in Cyprus v. Turkey, Commission decision, 1975, (D.R.) 2, p. 32, § 84, pp. 125 and 151). Similarly, as to the general principles determining the attribution of an extraterritorial act, the Court may determine the matter at the admissibility stage; for example, it was at this stage that it established a general rule that would be applicable in matters of international legal and judicial cooperation, whereby an act initiated by a requesting State on the basis of its own domestic law and followed up by the requested State in response to its treaty obligations may be attributed to the requesting State even if the act was executed (or is supposed to have been executed) by the requested State ( The J. Paul Getty Trust and Others v. Italy, 2024, §§ 237-239)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:48998/14,Varyan v. Armenia,48998/14,added,"Varyan v. Armenia, no. 48998/14, 4 June 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B.3.§4,ii. Creation of an entity unrecognised by the international community,4,,124,,"Hamzayan v. Armenia , 2024|Nana Muradyan v. Armenia , 2022|Varyan v. Armenia , 2024",,,"On 27 September 2020 a new war broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh. It lasted 44 days until 10 November 2020 when a ceasefire agreement, signed the previous day, entered into force. Subsequent events led to the official dissolution of the ""NKR"" on 28 September 2023 with effect from 1 January 2024. The Court has taken note of those changes; however, the cases it has examined to date concern events that predate this fresh conflict ( Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 91; Hamzayan v. Armenia, 2024, § 26; Varyan v. Armenia, 2024, § 70)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:48998/14,Varyan v. Armenia,48998/14,added,"Varyan v. Armenia, no. 48998/14, 4 June 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.3.§4,ii. Creation of an entity unrecognised by the international community,4,118,126,0.9316,"Dimaksyan v. Armenia , 2023|Hamzayan v. Armenia , 2024|Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia , 2023|Varyan v. Armenia , 2024",,"The Court reached the same conclusion concerning Armenian jurisdiction in the following cases: ▪ a community of Jehovah 's Witnesses to whom the ""NKR"" had denied registration as a religious organisation ( Christian Religious Organization of Jehovah's Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 47-49); ▪ an Armenian national convicted by the ""NKR"" courts for refusing to perform compulsory military service in that entity ( Avanesyan v. Armenia, 2021, §§ 36-37); ▪ Armenian nationals who were ill-treated or killed during compulsory military service in the ""NKR"" ( Zalyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, §§ 213-215; Muradyan v. Armenia, 2016, §§ 123-127; Mirzoyan v. Armenia, 2019, § 56; Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 88-92). In Mirzoyan v. Armenia, 2019, the Court applied both jurisdictional criteria - territorial and personal -, as the direct victim had been killed in Armenian-controlled territory by an Armenian officer ( ibid ., § 56), whereas in those other cases, the territorial criterion alone had been sufficient (see the comparison between the two cases in Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 91-92).","The Court reached the same conclusion concerning Armenian jurisdiction in the following cases: ▪ a community of Jehovah 's Witnesses to whom the ""NKR"" had denied registration as a religious organisation ( Christian Religious Organization of Jehovah's Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 47-49) and a member of the Jehovah 's Witnesses on whom the ""NKR"" had imposed an administrative fine for discussing the Bible with another person at the latter's home ( Hamzayan v. Armenia, 2024, §§ 26-27); ▪ an Armenian national convicted by the ""NKR"" courts for refusing to perform compulsory military service in that entity ( Avanesyan v. Armenia, 2021, §§ 36-37); ▪ Armenian nationals who were ill-treated or killed during compulsory military service in the ""NKR"" ( Zalyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, §§ 213-215; Muradyan v. Armenia, 2016, §§ 123-127; Mirzoyan v. Armenia, 2019, § 56; Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 88-92; Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia, 2023, §§ 59-63; Dimaksyan v. Armenia, 2023, §§ 42-44; Varyan v. Armenia, 2024, §§ 67-70). In Mirzoyan v. Armenia, 2019, the Court applied both jurisdictional criteria - territorial and personal -, as the direct victim had been killed in Armenian-controlled territory by an Armenian officer (ibid., § 56), whereas in those other cases, the territorial criterion alone had been sufficient (see the comparison between the two cases in Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 91-92, and in Varyan v. Armenia, 2024, § 70). In Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia, the Court refused to draw a distinction between the substantive and procedural limbs of Article 2 of the Convention, finding that the facts of the case fell within the jurisdiction of the respondent State, with regard both to the substantive limb (the killing of the applicants'sons by an Armenian soldier in the service of the ""NKR"" ) and to the procedural limb (investigation by Armenian authorities; ibid., §§ 57-63)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20231114174510__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2023-11-14,2024-12-19,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2023-11-14__2024-12-19.json,apps:64371/16|64407/16,Wieder and Guarnieri v. the United Kingdom,64371/16|64407/16,added,"Wieder and Guarnieri v. the United Kingdom, nos. 64371/16 and 64407/16, 12 September 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.6,Cross-border transfer or control of data,3,,54,,,,,"In the case of Wieder and Guarnieri v. the United Kingdom, 2023, the Court ruled for the first time on the application of the territoriality principle in cases of interception, extraction, filtering, storage, analysis and dissemination of electronic communications from and/or to a country other than the respondent State. Two researchers living in the USA and Germany had complained that such measures had been taken against them by the UKintelligence services. Referring to its analysis of the UK's bulk interception of communications in Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2021, the Court reiterated that the principal interference with the rights of the sender or recipient was the searching, examination and use of the intercepted communications. All these actions had been carried out by the UKintelligence agencies acting within United Kingdom territory. The Court rejected the Government's contention that any interference could not be separated from the person of each applicant and would therefore have produced effects only where they themselves were located. In its case-law on Articles 6 § 1 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 the Court had always considered that an interference occurred where the possession was interfered with, rather than where the owner was located. In the circumstances, the interference with the applicants'rights therefore fell within the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent State ( Wieder and Guarnieri v. the United Kingdom, 2023, §§ 88-95)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20250626081924__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2024-12-19,2025-06-26,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2024-12-19__2025-06-26.json,apps:44715/20|47930/21,A.L. v. France and E.J. v. France (dec.),44715/20|47930/21,added,"A.L. v. France and E.J. v. France (dec.), nos. 44715/20 and 47930/21, 24 September 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.6,Cross-border transfer or control of data,3,,56,,,,,"The joined cases A.L. v. France and E.J. v. France (dec.), 2024, concerned EncroChat, an encrypted mobile-phone communication tool of which 66,000 copies had been distributed covertly between 2016 and 2020 in 122 countries. The French authorities had retrieved data from terminals linked to the EncroChat network and had then transmitted them to the UKlaw-enforcement authorities pursuant to a European Investigation Order (EIO). The French Government had raised an objection of inadmissibility alleging that the facts of the case fell outside the jurisdiction of France. The Court noted that the impugned data had been retrieved by means of a remote data hack conducted in the context of investigations that had been entrusted to French investigators acting under the authority of French judges and prosecutors; the retrieval operations had been conducted from French territory and the hack had been launched from a server located there. The retrieval measure was thus attributable to France. The fact that the retrieval operation had produced part of its effects outside this territory, by enabling remote access to data from handsets located abroad, did not affect this finding. The data pertaining to EncroChat users located in the United Kingdom had been collected by the French investigators prior to their transfer to the UK National Crime Agency, on the instructions of a French prosecutor. The fact that the EncroChat users located in the United Kingdom had been identified only after enforcement of the EIOdid not release France from its responsibility under Article 1. It had not been submitted that the retrieved data had been stored outside France. The facts thus fell within the respondent State's jurisdiction ( ibid., §§ 100-105)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20250626081924__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2024-12-19,2025-06-26,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2024-12-19__2025-06-26.json,apps:32879/18,Ioannides v. Cyprus,32879/18,added,"Ioannides v. Cyprus, 32879/18, 16 January 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B.3.b,Jurisdiction of a State undergoing foreign military action (or military action unrecognised by the international community) within its territory,4,,137,,"Thus for example in the case of Ioannides v. Cyprus , 2025",,,"Thus for example in the case of Ioannides v. Cyprus, 2025, the applicant was the owner of a house situated in the buffer zone (created after the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974) inaccessible to the public and not under the effective control of Cyprus. This house had been, at least for a while, occupied by the UNpeacekeeping force (UNFICYP). The Court found that the property had, without doubt, fallen within the jurisdiction of Cyprus. However, the scope of that jurisdiction had to be assessed in relation to each of the applicant's specific complaints and by making a distinction between situations where the lack of effective control by the State over part of its territory left only positive obligations there, and situations where the existence of full control over the individuals concerned entailed its direct responsibility ( ibid., §§ 79-80). Ruling on the merits, the Court found no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (right to the protection of property) on account of the applicant's inability to access the house in question, on the ground that, having only positive obligations as described above, Cyprus had taken all the measures which were still in its power and in accordance with its obligations under international law, in particular by cooperating with UNFICYP ( ibid., §§ 101-104). However, the Court found a violation of the same provision on account of the refusal by Cyprus to pay the applicant any rent for the occupation of her house by UNFICYP, Cyprus having agreed to the use of the house and having remained free to decide on the conditions. The alleged interference was thus directly attributable to the respondent State ( ibid., §§ 105-107)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20250626081924__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2024-12-19,2025-06-26,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2024-12-19__2025-06-26.json,apps:32879/18,Ioannides v. Cyprus,32879/18,added,"Ioannides v. Cyprus, 32879/18, 16 January 2025",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.B.3.b,Jurisdiction of a State undergoing foreign military action (or military action unrecognised by the international community) within its territory,4,127,129,0.9976,,,"The responsibility of a "" passive "" Contracting State, that is to say a State which is undergoing military action launched by another State (whether or not a Party to the Convention) or by a local regime unrecognised by the international community, follows a different logic from that of an "" active "" State. The Court does not seek to establish whether or not that State holds "" jurisdiction "", because it is deemed to exercise the latter normally throughout its territory; the Court therefore always starts from the presumption that the facts of the case fall within the jurisdiction of the "" passive "" State. On the other hand, in exceptional circumstances, where the State is unable to exercise its authority in a part of its territory, that presumption may be limited . In other words, there is a presumption of jurisdiction (or competence), and the Court must determine whether there are any valid reasons to rebut that presumption ( Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], 2004, § 139).","The responsibility of a "" passive "" Contracting State, that is to say a State which is undergoing military action launched by another State (whether or not a Party to the Convention) or by a local regime unrecognised by the international community, follows a different logic from that of an "" active "" State. The Court does not seek to establish whether or not that State holds "" jurisdiction "", because it is deemed to exercise the latter normally throughout its territory; the Court therefore always starts from the presumption that the facts of the case fall within the jurisdiction of the "" passive "" State ( Ioannides v. Cyprus *, 2025, § 75). On the other hand, in exceptional circumstances, where the State is unable to exercise its authority in a part of its territory, that presumption may be limited . In other words, there is a presumption of jurisdiction (or competence), and the Court must determine whether there are any valid reasons to rebut that presumption ( Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], 2004, § 139)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20250626081924__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2024-12-19,2025-06-26,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2024-12-19__2025-06-26.json,apps:32879/18,Ioannides v. Cyprus,32879/18,added,"Ioannides v. Cyprus, 32879/18, 16 January 2025",3,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.3.b,Jurisdiction of a State undergoing foreign military action (or military action unrecognised by the international community) within its territory,4,132,134,0.979,"Taganova and Others v. Georgia and Russia , 2024",,"When a Contracting State is prevented from exercising authority over its whole territory due to an exceptional factual situation, it does not cease to have jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention over the part of its territory which is temporarily beyond its control ( Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, § 130; Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 317; O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 60). Such a factual situation nonetheless has the effect of reducing the scope of that jurisdiction, in that the commitment entered into by the Contracting State under Article 1 must be examined by the Court solely in the light of the State's positive obligations in respect of persons present in its territory. The State in question must endeavour, with all the legal and diplomatic means available to it vis-à-vis foreign States and international organisations, to continue to guarantee the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention. Although it is not for the Court to indicate which measures the authorities should take in order to comply with their obligations most effectively, it must verify that the measures actually taken were appropriate and sufficient in the present case. When faced with a partial or total failure to act, the Court's task is to determine to what extent a minimum effort was nevertheless possible and whether it should have been made. Determining that question is especially necessary in cases concerning an alleged infringement of absolute rights such as those guaranteed by Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 333-334).","When a Contracting State is prevented from exercising authority over its whole territory due to an exceptional factual situation, it does not cease to have jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention over the part of its territory which is temporarily beyond its control ( Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, § 130; Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 317; O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 60; Taganova and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2024, § 213 ; Ioannides v. Cyprus *, 2025, § 75). Thus, in a case concerning the inability of the applicants to dispose of their property in the region of Abkhazia, after leaving it behind when the hostilities began in that region in the early 1990s, the Court found that, as it was recognised in international law as being part of Georgia, Abkhazia fell within the jurisdiction of that State ( Taganova and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2024, §§ 213-214). Such a factual situation nonetheless has the effect of reducing the scope of that jurisdiction, in that the commitment entered into by the Contracting State under Article 1 must be examined by the Court solely in the light of the State's positive obligations in respect of persons present in its territory. The State in question must endeavour, with all the legal and diplomatic means available to it vis-à-vis foreign States and international organisations, to continue to guarantee the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention. Although it is not for the Court to indicate which measures the authorities should take in order to comply with their obligations most effectively, it must verify that the measures actually taken were appropriate and sufficient in the present case. When faced with a partial or total failure to act, the Court's task is to determine to what extent a minimum effort was nevertheless possible and whether it should have been made. Determining that question is especially necessary in cases concerning an alleged infringement of absolute rights such as those guaranteed by Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 333-334)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20250626081924__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2024-12-19,2025-06-26,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2024-12-19__2025-06-26.json,apps:32879/18,Ioannides v. Cyprus,32879/18,added,"Ioannides v. Cyprus, 32879/18, 16 January 2025",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.3.b,Jurisdiction of a State undergoing foreign military action (or military action unrecognised by the international community) within its territory,4,134,136,0.9967,"Ioannides v. Cyprus , 2025",,"Furthermore, the Court has held that the efforts expended by the "" passive "" State in question to honour the six above-mentioned obligations should be constant and relevant ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 348-352; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 111; Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 148). However, the question whether the State in question has fulfilled its positive obligations as defined by the Court's case-law must be decided in the light of the individual case rather than with reference to Article 1 of the Convention (see, for example, Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 398-410; O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 60).","Furthermore, the Court has held that the efforts expended by the "" passive "" State in question to honour the six above-mentioned obligations should be constant and relevant ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 348-352; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 111; Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2012, § 148). However, the question whether the State in question has fulfilled its positive obligations as defined by the Court's case-law must be decided in the light of the individual case rather than with reference to Article 1 of the Convention (see, for example, Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 398-410; O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 60). Ioannides v. Cyprus, 2025, § 79)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20250626081924__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2024-12-19,2025-06-26,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2024-12-19__2025-06-26.json,apps:51448/15,Petrosyan v. Armenia,51448/15,added,"Petrosyan v. Armenia, no. 51448/15, 9 January 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.3.§4,ii. Creation of an entity unrecognised by the international community,4,124,126,0.9789,"Petrosyan v. Armenia , 2025",,"On 27 September 2020 a new war broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh. It lasted 44 days until 10 November 2020 when a ceasefire agreement, signed the previous day, entered into force. Subsequent events led to the official dissolution of the ""NKR"" on 28 September 2023 with effect from 1 January 2024. The Court has taken note of those changes; however, the cases it has examined to date concern events that predate this fresh conflict ( Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 91; Hamzayan v. Armenia, 2024, § 26; Varyan v. Armenia, 2024, § 70).","On 27 September 2020 a new war broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh. It lasted 44 days until 10 November 2020 when a ceasefire agreement, signed the previous day, entered into force. Subsequent events led to the offici al dissolution of the ""NKR"" on 28 September 2023 with effect from 1 January 2024. The Court has taken note of those changes; however, the cases it has examined to date concern events that predate this fresh conflict ( Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 91; Hamzayan v. Armenia, 2024, § 26; Varyan v. Armenia, 2024, § 70; Petrosyan v. Armenia, 2025, § 98)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20250626081924__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2024-12-19,2025-06-26,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2024-12-19__2025-06-26.json,apps:51448/15,Petrosyan v. Armenia,51448/15,added,"Petrosyan v. Armenia, no. 51448/15, 9 January 2025",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.3.§4,ii. Creation of an entity unrecognised by the international community,4,126,128,0.9993,"Petrosyan v. Armenia , 2025",,"The Court reached the same conclusion concerning Armenian jurisdiction in the following cases: ▪ a community of Jehovah 's Witnesses to whom the ""NKR"" had denied registration as a religious organisation ( Christian Religious Organization of Jehovah's Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 47-49) and a member of the Jehovah 's Witnesses on whom the ""NKR"" had imposed an administrative fine for discussing the Bible with another person at the latter's home ( Hamzayan v. Armenia, 2024, §§ 26-27); ▪ an Armenian national convicted by the ""NKR"" courts for refusing to perform compulsory military service in that entity ( Avanesyan v. Armenia, 2021, §§ 36-37); ▪ Armenian nationals who were ill-treated or killed during compulsory military service in the ""NKR"" ( Zalyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, §§ 213-215; Muradyan v. Armenia, 2016, §§ 123-127; Mirzoyan v. Armenia, 2019, § 56; Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 88-92; Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia, 2023, §§ 59-63; Dimaksyan v. Armenia, 2023, §§ 42-44; Varyan v. Armenia, 2024, §§ 67-70). In Mirzoyan v. Armenia, 2019, the Court applied both jurisdictional criteria - territorial and personal -, as the direct victim had been killed in Armenian-controlled territory by an Armenian officer (ibid., § 56), whereas in those other cases, the territorial criterion alone had been sufficient (see the comparison between the two cases in Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 91-92, and in Varyan v. Armenia, 2024, § 70). In Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia, the Court refused to draw a distinction between the substantive and procedural limbs of Article 2 of the Convention, finding that the facts of the case fell within the jurisdiction of the respondent State, with regard both to the substantive limb (the killing of the applicants'sons by an Armenian soldier in the service of the ""NKR"" ) and to the procedural limb (investigation by Armenian authorities; ibid., §§ 57-63).","The Court reached the same conclusion concerning Armenian jurisdiction in the following cases: ▪ a community of Jehovah 's Witnesses to whom the ""NKR"" had denied registration as a religious organisation ( Christian Religious Organization of Jehovah's Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 47-49) and a member of the Jehovah 's Witnesses on whom the ""NKR"" had imposed an administrative fine for discussing the Bible with another person at the latter's home ( Hamzayan v. Armenia, 2024, §§ 26-27); ▪ an Armenian national convicted by the ""NKR"" courts for refusing to perform compulsory military service in that entity ( Avanesyan v. Armenia, 2021, §§ 36-37); ▪ Armenian nationals who were ill-treated or killed during compulsory military service in the ""NKR"" ( Zalyan and Others v. Armenia, 2016, §§ 213-215; Muradyan v. Armenia, 2016, §§ 123-127; Mirzoyan v. Armenia, 2019, § 56; Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 88-92; Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia, 2023, §§ 59-63; Dimaksyan v. Armenia, 2023, §§ 42-44; Varyan v. Armenia, 2024, §§ 67-70; Petrosyan v. Armenia, 2025, §§ 97-102). In Mirzoyan v. Armenia, 2019, the Court applied both jurisdictional criteria - territorial and personal -, as the direct victim had been killed in Armenian-controlled territory by an Armenian officer ( ibid ., § 56), whereas in those other cases, the territorial criterion alone had been sufficient (see the comparison between the two cases in Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, 2022, §§ 91-92, and in Varyan v. Armenia, 2024, § 70). In Hovhannisyan and Karapetyan v. Armenia, the Court refused to draw a distinction between the substantive and procedural limbs of Article 2 of the Convention, finding that the facts of the case fell within the jurisdiction of the respondent State, with regard both to the substantive limb (the killing of the applicants'sons by an Armenian soldier in the service of the ""NKR"" ) and to the procedural limb (investigation by Armenian authorities; ibid ., §§ 57-63)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20250626081924__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2024-12-19,2025-06-26,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2024-12-19__2025-06-26.json,apps:32514/22,Petrović and Others v. Croatia*,32514/22,added,"Petrović and Others v. Croatia*, nos. 32514/22 and 2 others, 14 January 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.1,The territoriality principle in the traditional sense of the term,3,,30,,,,,"The case of Petrović and Others v. Croatia *, 2025, concerned the suspicion of three mothers that their new-born babies, born between 1986 and 1994 on Croatian territory, had not fallen ill and died, contrary to the affirmations of the public hospitals concerned, but had been abducted and illegal proposed for adoption. The respondent Government had objected that they had no jurisdiction ratione loci, arguing firstly that the first applicant's children had been born in Vukovar at a time when it had not been under Croatian control and, secondly, that two of the babies had been transferred to a hospital in Serbia, where they had died. The duty to provide the applicants with relevant information had thus fallen to the Serbian authorities. The Court considered that it had jurisdiction to examine whether Croatia had fulfilled its positive obligation to provide the applicants with final and/or credible information about what had happened to their children, including those born in Vukovar during the above-mentioned period, and similarly the question of the extent to which Croatia could have, within the limits of its own territorial sovereignty, taken steps to provide information on the fate of the babies transferred to Serbia ( ibid., §§ 107-113)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20250626081924__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2024-12-19,2025-06-26,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2024-12-19__2025-06-26.json,apps:18102/04,Taganova and Others v. Georgia and Russia,18102/04,added,"Taganova and Others v. Georgia and Russia, nos. 18102/04 and 4 others, 17 December 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.3.b,Jurisdiction of a State undergoing foreign military action (or military action unrecognised by the international community) within its territory,4,132,134,0.979,"Taganova and Others v. Georgia and Russia , 2024",,"When a Contracting State is prevented from exercising authority over its whole territory due to an exceptional factual situation, it does not cease to have jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention over the part of its territory which is temporarily beyond its control ( Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, § 130; Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 317; O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 60). Such a factual situation nonetheless has the effect of reducing the scope of that jurisdiction, in that the commitment entered into by the Contracting State under Article 1 must be examined by the Court solely in the light of the State's positive obligations in respect of persons present in its territory. The State in question must endeavour, with all the legal and diplomatic means available to it vis-à-vis foreign States and international organisations, to continue to guarantee the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention. Although it is not for the Court to indicate which measures the authorities should take in order to comply with their obligations most effectively, it must verify that the measures actually taken were appropriate and sufficient in the present case. When faced with a partial or total failure to act, the Court's task is to determine to what extent a minimum effort was nevertheless possible and whether it should have been made. Determining that question is especially necessary in cases concerning an alleged infringement of absolute rights such as those guaranteed by Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 333-334).","When a Contracting State is prevented from exercising authority over its whole territory due to an exceptional factual situation, it does not cease to have jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention over the part of its territory which is temporarily beyond its control ( Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2015, § 130; Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 317; O.J. and J.O. v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, § 60; Taganova and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2024, § 213 ; Ioannides v. Cyprus *, 2025, § 75). Thus, in a case concerning the inability of the applicants to dispose of their property in the region of Abkhazia, after leaving it behind when the hostilities began in that region in the early 1990s, the Court found that, as it was recognised in international law as being part of Georgia, Abkhazia fell within the jurisdiction of that State ( Taganova and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2024, §§ 213-214). Such a factual situation nonetheless has the effect of reducing the scope of that jurisdiction, in that the commitment entered into by the Contracting State under Article 1 must be examined by the Court solely in the light of the State's positive obligations in respect of persons present in its territory. The State in question must endeavour, with all the legal and diplomatic means available to it vis-à-vis foreign States and international organisations, to continue to guarantee the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention. Although it is not for the Court to indicate which measures the authorities should take in order to comply with their obligations most effectively, it must verify that the measures actually taken were appropriate and sufficient in the present case. When faced with a partial or total failure to act, the Court's task is to determine to what extent a minimum effort was nevertheless possible and whether it should have been made. Determining that question is especially necessary in cases concerning an alleged infringement of absolute rights such as those guaranteed by Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention ( Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], 2004, §§ 333-334)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20250626081924__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2024-12-19,2025-06-26,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2024-12-19__2025-06-26.json,apps:18102/04,Taganova and Others v. Georgia and Russia,18102/04,added,"Taganova and Others v. Georgia and Russia, nos. 18102/04 and 4 others, 17 December 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.3.§4,ii. Creation of an entity unrecognised by the international community,4,122,124,0.9958,"Taganova and Others v. Georgia and Russia , 2024",,"Concerning Abkhazia, the Court has also recognised the existence of ""effective control"" by Russia over its territory for a period preceding the armed conflict of 2008. It found in the relevant case that since the armed conflict between Georgians and Abkhazians in 1992, Russia had not ceased to extend and strengthen its influence over this region militarily, politically, economically and culturally. In its assessment the Court relied on a long series of factual circumstances; for example, the fact that the peace-keeping forces in Abkhazia were made up of Russian military personnel; that the majority of the population of Abkhazia had been given Russian nationality after 2002; that Abkhazia used Russian currency as its means of payment and was economically heavily dependent on Russia; lastly, according to the repeated statements of its ( de facto Abkhazian) leaders, Abkhazia had in some ways become part of Russia. In sum, Abkhazia was only able to survive because of Russia's sustained and substantial political and economic support, and of Russia's military influence, which was sufficient for it to be considered ""dissuasive"" and as such decisive in practice . It followed that the conduct of the de facto authorities of that region fell within Russia's jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention ( Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 323-340). The same was true for actions of members of the Abkhazian armed forces, which were imputable to Russia without it being necessary to provide proof of ""detailed control"" of each of those actions ( Matkava and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 96).","Concerning Abkhazia, the Court has also recognised the existence of ""effective control"" by Russia over its territory for a period preceding the armed conflict of 2008. It found in the relevant case that since the armed conflict between Georgians and Abkhazians in 1992, Russia had not ceased to extend and strengthen its influence over this region militarily, politically, economically and culturally. In its assessment the Court relied on a long series of factual circumstances; for example, the fact that the peace-keeping forces in Abkhazia were made up of Russian military personnel; that the majority of the population of Abkhazia had been given Russian nationality after 2002; that Abkhazia used Russian currency as its means of payment and was economically heavily dependent on Russia; lastly, according to the repeated statements of its (de facto Abkhazian) leaders, Abkhazia had in some ways become part of Russia. In sum, Abkhazia was only able to survive because of Russia's sustained and substantial political and economic support, and of Russia's military influence, which was sufficient for it to be considered ""dissuasive"" and as such decisive in practice . It followed that the conduct of the de facto authorities of that region fell within Russia's jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention ( Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2023, §§ 323-340; Taganova and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2024, § 216). The same was true for actions of members of the Abkhazian armed forces, which were imputable to Russia without it being necessary to provide proof of ""detailed control"" of each of those a ctions ( Matkava and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 96)."
7a059e452dbd,Article 1,20241219144949__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,20250626081924__guide_art_1_eng.pdf,2024-12-19,2025-06-26,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/7a059e452dbd/diff_2024-12-19__2025-06-26.json,apps:53600/20,Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC],53600/20,added,"Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, 9 April 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.A.1,The territoriality principle in the traditional sense of the term,3,30,31,0.9939,,,"In the specific context of the State's positive obligations in matters of climate change, the Court found that individuals living on the territory of a Contracting Party were within its jurisdiction for such purposes. The issue of responsibility, however, is a separate matter to be examined, if necessary, in relation to the merits of the complaint ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, § 287, 9 April 2024; Duarte Agostinho and Others v Portugal and 32 Others (dec.) [GC], 2024, § 178).","In the specific context of the State's positive obligations in matters of climate change, the Court found that individuals living on the territory of a Contracting Party were within its jurisdiction for such purposes. The issue of responsibility, however, is a separate matter to be examined, if necessary, in relation to the merits of the complaint ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], § 287, 2024; Duarte Agostinho and Others v Portugal and 32 Others (dec.) [GC], 2024, § 178)."
7b2999efc3b7,Article 4 Protocol 4,20230923162023__guide_art_4_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240409193035__guide_art_4_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7b2999efc3b7/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:21329/18,J.A. and Others v. Italy,21329/18,added,"J.A. and Others v. Italy, no. 21329/18, 30 March 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,III,Examples of collective expulsions,1,23,23,0.9724,,"In M.H. and Others v. Croatia , 2021","In M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, an Afghan family of fourteen alleged that they had been denied the opportunity to seek asylum by the Croatian police officers and been ordered to return to Serbia by following the train tracks. There was no material evidence that the applicants had entered Croatia. Having regard to the applicants'specific and consistent account as well as to a large number of reports by various bodies concerning summary returns of persons entering Croatia in an unauthorised manner, the Court found that there was prima facie evidence in favour of the applicants'version of events. As the Government had not submitted a single argument capable of refuting that prima facie evidence, the Court considered the applicants'version of the events to be truthful (§§ 268-274). As the respondent State had not shown that it had provided the applicants with genuine and effective access to procedures for legal entry (see paragraph 12 above), the applicants'expulsion, without individual assessment of their circumstances, was in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No.4 (§§ 293-304).","In, 2021, an Afghan family of fourteen alleged that they had been denied the opportunity to seek asylum by the Croatian police officers and been ordered to return to Serbia by following the train tracks. There was no material evidence that the applicants had entered Croatia. Having regard to the applicants' specific and consistent account as well as to a large number of reports by various bodies concerning summary returns of persons entering Croatia in an unauthorised manner, the Court found that there was prima facie evidence in favour of the applicants' version of events. As the Government had not submitted a single argument capable of refuting that prima facie evidence, the Court considered the applicants' version of the events to be truthful (§§ 268-274). As the respondent State had not shown that it had provided the applicants with genuine and effective access to procedures for legal entry (see paragraph 12 above), the applicants' expulsion, without individual assessment of their circumstances, was in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No.4 (§§ 293-304). J.A. and Others v. Italy"
7b2999efc3b7,Article 4 Protocol 4,20240409193035__guide_art_4_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240930065715__guide_art_4_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7b2999efc3b7/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json,apps:56417/19|44245/20,S.S. and Others v. Hungary,56417/19|44245/20,added,"S.S. and Others v. Hungary, nos. 56417/19 and 44245/20, 12 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II,The notion of “ collective expulsion ”,1,13,13,0.9876,"S.S. and Others v. Hungary , 2023|Sherov and Others v. Poland ,2024",,"Where migrants entered the respondent State's territory in an unauthorised manner and, following their apprehension near the border, were provided with access to a means of legal entry through the appropriate border procedure, the Court did not apply the aforementioned two-tier test, but instead assessed - in order to determine whether the expulsion was ""collective"" in nature - whether the individuals were afforded, prior to the adoption of expulsion orders, an effective possibility of submitting arguments against their removal and whether there were sufficient guarantees demonstrating that their personal circumstances had been genuinely and individually taken into account ( Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, § 62). Such test is, essentially, similar to the one applied to individuals who present themselves at a point of legal entry, such as a border checkpoint (see M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 204-211; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-84; and M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69). Whether the requirements of this test are satisfied is a question of fact, which is to be determined by having regard to, in so far as pertinent in a given case, supporting evidence provided by the parties, including as to whether an identification process was conducted and under what conditions (whether persons were trained to conduct interviews, whether information was provided, in a language the individuals understood, about the possibility to lodge an asylum application and to request legal aid, whether interpreters were present, and whether the individuals were able, in practice, to consult lawyers and to lodge asylum applications) as well as to independent reports ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 185; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014, §§ 214-225; Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 245-254; Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, §§ 63-71; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 206-210; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-83; M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69).","Where migrants entered the respondent State's territory in an unauthorised manner and, following their apprehension near the border, were provided with access to a means of legal entry through the appropriate border procedure, the Court did not apply the aforementioned two-tier test, but instead assessed - in order to determine whether the expulsion was ""collective"" in nature - whether the individuals were afforded, prior to the adoption of expulsion orders, an effective possibility of submitting arguments against their removal and whether there were sufficient guarantees demonstrating that their personal circumstances had been genuinely and individually taken into account ( Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, § 62). Such test is, essentially, similar to the one applied to individuals who present themselves at a point of legal entry, such as a border checkpoint (see M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 204-211; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-84, M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69, and Sherov and Others v. Poland,2024, §§ 59-61) or at an airport (see S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 48-51, where the Court considered that it did not absolve the authorities of their obligation under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 that the applicants had initially sought to enter the respondent State by using counterfeit documents). Whether the requirements of this test are satisfied is a question of fact, which is to be determined by having regard to, in so far as pertinent in a given case, supporting evidence provided by the parties, including as to whether an identification process was conducted and under what conditions (whether persons were trained to conduct interviews, whether information was provided, in a language the individuals understood, about the possibility to lodge an asylum application and to request legal aid, whether interpreters were present, and whether the individuals were able, in practice, to consult lawyers and to lodge asylum applications) as well as to independent reports ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 185; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014, §§ 214-225; Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 245-254; Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, §§ 63-71; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 206-210; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-83; M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69)."
7b2999efc3b7,Article 4 Protocol 4,20240409193035__guide_art_4_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240930065715__guide_art_4_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7b2999efc3b7/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json,apps:56417/19|44245/20,S.S. and Others v. Hungary,56417/19|44245/20,added,"S.S. and Others v. Hungary, nos. 56417/19 and 44245/20, 12 October 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III,Examples of collective expulsions,1,,22,,"In S.S. and Others v. Hungary , 2023",,,"In S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023, the applicants arrived at an international airport and sought to enter the respondent State with counterfeit documents, which they had used to travel there. Following the discovery of the counterfeit nature of the travel documents at the border check and the applicants'arrest, they requested asylum. They were then removed to the external side of the border fence between Hungary and Serbia because domestic law provided that asylum applications could only be lodged in a transit zone between those two countries. The Court considered that the applicants had not been afforded an effective opportunity to submit arguments against their removal to Serbia, a country from which they had not come."
7b2999efc3b7,Article 4 Protocol 4,20240409193035__guide_art_4_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240930065715__guide_art_4_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7b2999efc3b7/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json,apps:54029/17,Sherov and Others v. Poland,54029/17,added,"Sherov and Others v. Poland, nos. 54029/17 and 3 others, 4 April 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II,The notion of “ collective expulsion ”,1,13,13,0.9876,"S.S. and Others v. Hungary , 2023|Sherov and Others v. Poland ,2024",,"Where migrants entered the respondent State's territory in an unauthorised manner and, following their apprehension near the border, were provided with access to a means of legal entry through the appropriate border procedure, the Court did not apply the aforementioned two-tier test, but instead assessed - in order to determine whether the expulsion was ""collective"" in nature - whether the individuals were afforded, prior to the adoption of expulsion orders, an effective possibility of submitting arguments against their removal and whether there were sufficient guarantees demonstrating that their personal circumstances had been genuinely and individually taken into account ( Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, § 62). Such test is, essentially, similar to the one applied to individuals who present themselves at a point of legal entry, such as a border checkpoint (see M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 204-211; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-84; and M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69). Whether the requirements of this test are satisfied is a question of fact, which is to be determined by having regard to, in so far as pertinent in a given case, supporting evidence provided by the parties, including as to whether an identification process was conducted and under what conditions (whether persons were trained to conduct interviews, whether information was provided, in a language the individuals understood, about the possibility to lodge an asylum application and to request legal aid, whether interpreters were present, and whether the individuals were able, in practice, to consult lawyers and to lodge asylum applications) as well as to independent reports ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 185; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014, §§ 214-225; Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 245-254; Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, §§ 63-71; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 206-210; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-83; M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69).","Where migrants entered the respondent State's territory in an unauthorised manner and, following their apprehension near the border, were provided with access to a means of legal entry through the appropriate border procedure, the Court did not apply the aforementioned two-tier test, but instead assessed - in order to determine whether the expulsion was ""collective"" in nature - whether the individuals were afforded, prior to the adoption of expulsion orders, an effective possibility of submitting arguments against their removal and whether there were sufficient guarantees demonstrating that their personal circumstances had been genuinely and individually taken into account ( Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, § 62). Such test is, essentially, similar to the one applied to individuals who present themselves at a point of legal entry, such as a border checkpoint (see M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 204-211; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-84, M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69, and Sherov and Others v. Poland,2024, §§ 59-61) or at an airport (see S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 48-51, where the Court considered that it did not absolve the authorities of their obligation under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 that the applicants had initially sought to enter the respondent State by using counterfeit documents). Whether the requirements of this test are satisfied is a question of fact, which is to be determined by having regard to, in so far as pertinent in a given case, supporting evidence provided by the parties, including as to whether an identification process was conducted and under what conditions (whether persons were trained to conduct interviews, whether information was provided, in a language the individuals understood, about the possibility to lodge an asylum application and to request legal aid, whether interpreters were present, and whether the individuals were able, in practice, to consult lawyers and to lodge asylum applications) as well as to independent reports ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 185; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014, §§ 214-225; Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 245-254; Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, §§ 63-71; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 206-210; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-83; M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69)."
7b2999efc3b7,Article 4 Protocol 4,20240409193035__guide_art_4_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240930065715__guide_art_4_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7b2999efc3b7/diff_2024-04-09__2024-09-30.json,apps:54029/17,Sherov and Others v. Poland,54029/17,added,"Sherov and Others v. Poland, nos. 54029/17 and 3 others, 4 April 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III,Examples of collective expulsions,1,21,21,0.9894,"Sherov and Others v. Poland , 2024",,"In M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, the applicants had an arguable claim under Article 3, presented themselves at the border checkpoints and tried to enter the respondent State in a legal manner by making use of the procedure to submit an asylum application that should have been available to them under domestic law. Even though they were interviewed individually by the border guards and received individual decisions refusing them entry into Poland, the Court considered that their statements concerning their wish to apply for asylum were disregarded and that the decisions with which they were issued did not properly reflect the reasons given by the applicants to justify their fear of persecution. Moreover, the applicants were not allowed to consult lawyers and were even denied access to lawyers who were present at the border checkpoint. The Court concluded that the decisions refusing the applicants' entry to Poland were not taken with proper regard to their individual situations and were part of a wider policy of refusing to receive asylum applications from persons presenting at the Polish-Belarusian border and of returning those persons to Belarus (see also D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021).","In M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, the applicants had an arguable claim under Article 3, presented themselves at the border checkpoints and tried to enter the respondent State in a legal manner by making use of the procedure to submit an asylum application that should have been available to them under domestic law. Even though they were interviewed individually by the border guards and received individual decisions refusing them entry into Poland, the Court considered that their statements concerning their wish to apply for asylum were disregarded and that the decisions with which they were issued did not properly reflect the reasons given by the applicants to justify their fear of persecution. Moreover, the applicants were not allowed to consult lawyers and were even denied access to lawyers who were present at the border checkpoint. The Court concluded that the decisions refusing the applicants'entry to Poland were not taken with proper regard to their individual situations and were part of a wider policy of refusing to receive asylum applications from persons presenting at the Polish-Belarusian border and of returning those persons to Belarus (see also D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, as well as, with regard to the situation at the Polish-Ukrainian border, Sherov and Others v. Poland, 2024)."
7b2999efc3b7,Article 4 Protocol 4,20240930065715__guide_art_4_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20250918070134__guide_art_4_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/7b2999efc3b7/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json,apps:39090/20,M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus,39090/20,added,"M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus, no. 39090/20, 8 October 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II,The notion of “ collective expulsion ”,1,12,12,0.9935,"M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus , 2024",,"The burden of proof for showing that the applicants did have genuine and effective access to procedures for legal entry is on the respondent State and all cases decided thus far have turned on whether the State had satisfied that burden of proof (location of the border crossing points, modalities for lodging applications there, availability of interpreters/legal assistance enabling asylum-seekers to be informed of their rights and information showing that applications had actually been made at those border points: compare N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, §§ 212-217, A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 116-122, and contrast Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 63-67; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 295-304). In N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, the Court was satisfied with the evidence provided by the respondent Government that the applicants did have genuine and effective access to a procedure for legal entry, in particular the possibility to lodge asylum applications at the Beni Enzar border crossing point, as other individuals had done before. The Court reached a similar conclusion in A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022. By contrast, in M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, the respondent Government did not provide specific information on the asylum procedures at the border with Serbia at the relevant time, such as the location of the border crossing points, the modalities for lodging applications there, the availability of interpreters and legal assistance, and information showing that applications had actually been made at those border points, which led the Court to conclude that it was unable to examine whether the legal avenue, to which the Government had referred by pointing to legislative provisions, was genuinely and effectively accessible to the applicants. In Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021, the Court found that the applicant did not have genuine and effective access to a means of legal entry: the only possibilities to legally enter Hungary (two transit zones) were located forty kilometres or more away, access thereto was limited (admission limited to fifteen applicants for international protection per transit zone per day and a requirement to register on a waiting list beforehand, to which the applicant, as a single man, did not or would not have had access), and there was no formal procedure accompanied by appropriate safeguards governing the admission.","The burden of proof for showing that the applicants did have genuine and effective access to procedures for legal entry is on the respondent State and all cases decided thus far have turned on whether the State had satisfied that burden of proof (location of the border crossing points, modalities for lodging applications there, availability of interpreters/legal assistance enabling asylum-seekers to be informed of their rights and information showing that applications had actually been made at those border points: compare N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, §§ 212-217, A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 116-122, and contrast Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 63-67; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 295-304). In N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, the Court was satisfied with the evidence provided by the respondent Government that the applicants did have genuine and effective access to a procedure for legal entry, in particular the possibility to lodge asylum applications at the Beni Enzar border crossing point, as other individuals had done before. The Court reached a similar conclusion in A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022. By contrast, in M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, the respondent Government did not provide specific information on the asylum procedures at the border with Serbia at the relevant time, such as the location of the border crossing points, the modalities for lodging applications there, the availability of interpreters and legal assistance, and information showing that applications had actually been made at those border points, which led the Court to conclude that it was unable to examine whether the legal avenue, to which the Government had referred by pointing to legislative provisions, was genuinely and effectively accessible to the applicants. In Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021, the Court found that the applicant did not have genuine and effective access to a means of legal entry: the only possibilities to legally enter Hungary (two transit zones) were located forty kilometres or more away, access thereto was limited (admission limited to fifteen applicants for international protection per transit zone per day and a requirement to register on a waiting list beforehand, to which the applicant, as a single man, did not or would not have had access), and there was no formal procedure accompanied by appropriate safeguards governing the admission. An entry visa subject to financial and other requirements does not constitute a genuine and effective means of legal entry for individuals trying to seek asylum ( M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus, 2024, § 118)."
7b2999efc3b7,Article 4 Protocol 4,20240930065715__guide_art_4_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20250918070134__guide_art_4_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/7b2999efc3b7/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json,apps:39090/20,M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus,39090/20,added,"M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus, no. 39090/20, 8 October 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III,Examples of collective expulsions,1,17,18,0.9556,"The Court reached a similar conclusion in M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus , 2024",,"In Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, the transfer of the applicants (Somali and Eritrean nationals) to Libya had been carried out without any examination of each individual situation. No identification procedure had been carried out by the Italian authorities, who had merely embarked the applicants and then disembarked them in Libya. Moreover, the personnel aboard the military ships were not trained to conduct individual interviews and were not assisted by interpreters or legal advisers. The Court concluded that the removal of the applicants had been of a collective nature, in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 ( ibid., §§ 185-186).","In Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, the transfer of the applicants (Somali and Eritrean nationals) to Libya had been carried out without any examination of each individual situation. No identification procedure had been carried out by the Italian authorities, who had merely embarked the applicants and then disembarked them in Libya. Moreover, the personnel aboard the military ships were not trained to conduct individual interviews and were not assisted by interpreters or legal advisers. The Court concluded that the removal of the applicants had been of a collective nature, in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 ( ibid., §§ 185-186). The Court reached a similar conclusion in M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus, 2024, where the applicants, Syrian nationals, were intercepted by the Cypriot coastguard in Cypriot territorial waters and summarily removed to Lebanon (§§ 115-119)."
7b2999efc3b7,Article 4 Protocol 4,20240930065715__guide_art_4_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20250918070134__guide_art_4_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/7b2999efc3b7/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json,apps:60778/19,M.D. and Others v. Hungary,60778/19,added,"M.D. and Others v. Hungary, no. 60778/19, 19 September 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II,The notion of “ collective expulsion ”,1,,15,,"In M.D. and Others v. Hungary , 2024",,,"In M.D. and Others v. Hungary, 2024, the Court dealt with a situation in which the respondent State had submitted that the applicants had left the country voluntarily and found that, even assuming that the right under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 could be waived, the requirements of effective waiver were, in any event, not met and that the applicants had been subjected to an ""expulsion"" (§§ 30-48)."
7b2999efc3b7,Article 4 Protocol 4,20240930065715__guide_art_4_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20250918070134__guide_art_4_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/7b2999efc3b7/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json,apps:60778/19,M.D. and Others v. Hungary,60778/19,added,"M.D. and Others v. Hungary, no. 60778/19, 19 September 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III,Examples of collective expulsions,1,,24,,"In M.D. and Others v. Hungary , 2024",,,"In M.D. and Others v. Hungary, 2024, the applicants, Afghan nationals whose asylum applications were rejected on the basis that they had come from a safe third country, were removed to that third country (Serbia) without a valid decision, as the authorities of the respondent State had amended the removal decision and changed the destination country to the applicants'country of origin after the third country's refusal to readmit the applicants."
7ff3d5fc46dd,Prisoners' rights,20230923174222__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:24074/19,Canavcı and Others v. Türkiye,24074/19,added,"Canavcı and Others v. Türkiye,* nos. 24074/19 and 2 others, 16 November 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VIII.A,Access to legal advice,2,,285,,,,,"In Canavcı and Others v. Türkiye,* 2023, §§ 91-109, in relation to the monitoring and recording (, including by means of ethical devices), of the prisoners'meetings with their lawyers, the Court found a violation of Article 8 on the grounds that the discretion enjoyed by the public prosecutors in imposing restrictions on the applicants' communication with their lawyers was not subject to any conditions, that the scope of that discretion and the manner of its exercise were not defined and that no other specific guarantees were provided in that regard. In these circumstances, the Court considered that the adoption of the impugned measures against the applicants, although enforced for a limited period and during the state of emergency in Türkiye, was liable to be arbitrary and incompatible with the requirement of lawfulness."
7ff3d5fc46dd,Prisoners' rights,20230923174222__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:76680/17,D v. Latvia,76680/17,added,"D v. Latvia,* no. 76680/17, 11 January 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.D,Inter-prisoner violence,2,,216,,,,,"In D v. Latvia,* 2024, §§ 49-52, even in the absence of physical ill-treatment, the Court found Article 3 to be applicable in relation to the existence of an informal prison hierarchy and the applicant's position in the lowest caste of that hierarchy. The Court had regard, in particular, to the physical and symbolic separation faced by prisoners in the category to which the applicant belong. They faced many arbitrary restrictions on using shared resources, had separate benches, toilets, and dining areas and were not allowed to queue with other prisoners for the shop or medical care, they were also banned from joining in sports or using common showers, their beds were less comfortable and located towards the periphery of shared spaces, and they were tasked with performing menial jobs, such as cleaning and doing laundry for the other inmates. The Court found that such physical and symbolic separation has had the effect of sending a potent message of inferiority, thereby undermining the human dignity of prisoners in the applicant's situ ation, and thus constituted degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention."
7ff3d5fc46dd,Prisoners' rights,20230923174222__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:27753/19,El-Asmar v. Denmark,27753/19,added,"El-Asmar v. Denmark, no. 27753/19, 3 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.A,Use of force,2,187,188,0.9916,"In El-Asmar v. Denmark , 2023",,"In the context of the use of special equipment to restrain a prisoner, it should be noted that in Tali v. Estonia, 2014, concerning the use of pepper spray against an aggressive prisoner and his confinement to a restraint bed for more than three hours, the Court found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. As regards the use of the pepper spray, the Court noted that it was a potentially dangerous substance that should not be used in confined spaces. If exceptionally it needed to be used in open spaces, there should be clearly defined safeguards in place. Pepper spray should never be deployed against a prisoner who had already been brought under control. Although pepper spray was not considered a chemical weapon and its use was authorised for the purpose of law enforcement, it could produce different adverse effects on a prisoner's health. In the case at issue, having regard to those potentially serious effects, on the one hand, and the alternative equipment at the disposal of the prison guards, on the other, the Court found that the circumstances had not justified the use of the spray. The Court also did not consider that the applicant's restraint on the bed for a significant period of time to be justified.","In the context of the use of special equipment to restrain a prisoner, it should be noted that in Tali v. Estonia, 2014, concerning the use of pepper spray against an aggressive prisoner and his confinement to a restraint bed for more than three hours, the Court found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. As regards the use of the pepper spray, the Court noted that it was a potentially dangerous substance that should not be used in confined spaces. If exceptionally it needed to be used in open spaces, there should be clearly defined safeguards in place. Pepper spray should never be deployed against a prisoner who had already been brought under control. Although pepper spray was not considered a chemical weapon and its use was authorised for the purpose of law enforcement, it could produce different adverse effects on a prisoner's health. In the case at issue, having regard to those potentially serious effects, on the one hand, and the alternative equipment at the disposal of the prison guards, on the other, the Court found that the circumstances had not justified the use of the spray. The Court also did not consider that the applicant's restraint on the bed for a significant period of time to be justified. In El-Asmar v. Denmark, 2023, §§ 75-80, the Court considered that the use of pepper spray was not justified as being strictly necessary, in particular, due to the absence of any prior warning."
7ff3d5fc46dd,Prisoners' rights,20230923174222__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:60846/19,Halit Kara v. Türkiye,60846/19,added,"Halit Kara v. Türkiye,* no. 60846/19, 12 December 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.A,Family contacts and visits,2,77,77,0.9924,,,"In this context a distinction is to be drawn between the application of a special prison regime or special visiting arrangements during the criminal investigations, where the measures could reasonably be considered necessary in order to achieve the legitimate aim pursued, and the extended application of such regime. To that end, the necessity of extending the application of the special regime needs to be assessed with the greatest care by the relevant authorities ( Enea v. Italy [GC], 2009, §§ 125-131; Khoroshenko v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 124). The Court has also stressed that Article 8 of the Convention requires the States to take into account the interests of the prisoner and his or her family members and to evaluate them not in terms of broad generalities but in relation to the specific situation ( Deltuva v. Lithuania, 2023, § 42).","In this context a distinction is to be drawn between the application of a special prison regime or special visiting arrangements during the criminal investigations, where the measures could reasonably be considered necessary in order to achieve the legitimate aim pursued, and the extended application of such regime. To that end, the necessity of extending the application of the special regime needs to be assessed with the greatest care by the relevant authorities ( Enea v. Italy [GC], 2009, §§ 125-131; Khoroshenko v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 124). The Court has also stressed that Article 8 of the Convention requires the States to take into account the interests of the prisoner and his or her family members and to evaluate them not in terms of broad generalities but in relation to the specific situation ( Deltuva v. Lithuania, 2023, § 42; see also, for instance, Halit Kara v. Türkiye,* 2023, §§ 51-60)."
7ff3d5fc46dd,Prisoners' rights,20230923174222__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:35614/19,"İlerde and Others v. Türkiye,",35614/19,added,"İlerde and Others v. Türkiye,* nos. 35614/19 and 10 others, 5 December 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.C,Accommodation,2,34,34,0.9627,,,"As regards the methodology for the calculation of the minimum personal space allocated to a detainee in multi-occupancy accommodation, the Court relies on the CPT's methodology on the matter according to which the in-cell sanitary facility should not be counted in the overall surface area of the cell. On the other hand, calculation of the available surface area in the cell includes space occupied by furniture. What is important in this assessment is whether detainees had a possibility to move around within the cell normally ( Muršić v. Croatia, 2016, § 114; see also Lautaru and Seed v. Greece, 2020, § 54, where a kitchenette is calculated in the overall surface area of the cell).","As regards the methodology for the calculation of the minimum personal space allocated to a detainee in multi-occupancy accommodation, the Court relies on the CPT's methodology on the matter according to which the in-cell sanitary facility should not be counted in the overall surface area of the cell. On the other hand, calculation of the available surface area in the cell includes space occupied by furniture. What is important in this assessment is whether detainees had a possibility to move around within the cell normally ( Muršić v. Croatia, 2016, § 114; see also Lautaru and Seed v. Greece, 2020, § 54, where a kitchenette is calculated in the overall surface area of the cell; and İlerde and Others v. Türkiye,* 2023, §§ 173-175, individual outdoor yard annexed to each cell and available during daylight hours as well as the sanitary facilities, were excluded from calculation of floor space for each prisoner)."
7ff3d5fc46dd,Prisoners' rights,20230923174222__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:30138/21,Miranda Magro v. Portugal,30138/21,added,"Miranda Magro v. Portugal,* no. 30138/21, 9 January 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,IV.D,Mental health care,2,151,152,0.9936,,,"In this connection, the Court has accepted that the mere fact that an individual was not placed in an appropriate facility did not automatically render his or her detention unlawful, a certain delay in admission to a clinic or hospital being acceptable if it is related to a disparity between the available and required capacity of mental institutions. Nevertheless, a significant delay in admission to such institutions and thus in treatment of the person concerned will obviously affect the prospects of the treatment's success, and may entail a breach of Article 5 ( Pankiewicz v. Poland, 2008, § 45, where the Court held that a delay of two months and twenty-five days was excessive, given the harmful effects on the applicant's health of his compulsory confinement in an ordinary detention centre; see also Sy v. Italy, 2022, §§ 82-89 and 134-135, concerning the detention for two years in an ordinary prison of a person suffering from personality disorder and bipolar disorder, in poor conditions and without any overall therapeutic strategy to treat his condition).","In this connection, the Court has accepted that the mere fact that an individual was not placed in an appropriate facility did not automatically render his or her detention unlawful, a certain delay in admission to a clinic or hospital being acceptable if it is related to a disparity between the available and required capacity of mental institutions. Nevertheless, a significant delay in admission to such institutions and thus in treatment of the person concerned will obviously affect the prospects of the treatment's success, and may entail a breach of Article 5 ( Pankiewicz v. Poland, 2008, § 45, where the Court held that a delay of two months and twenty-five days was excessive, given the harmful effects on the applicant's health of his compulsory confinement in an ordinary detention centre; see also Sy v. Italy, 2022, §§ 82-89 and 134-135, concerning the detention for two years in an ordinary prison of a person suffering from personality disorder and bipolar disorder, in poor conditions and without any overall therapeutic strategy to treat his condition; see further Miranda Magro v. Portugal,* 2024, §§ 75-82 and 91-96)."
7ff3d5fc46dd,Prisoners' rights,20230923174222__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:68958/17,Myslihaka and Others v. Albania,68958/17,added,"Myslihaka and Others v. Albania, nos. 68958/17 and 5 others, 24 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XIV,Right to vote,1,,339,,"In Myslihaka and Others v. Albania , 2023",,,"In Myslihaka and Others v. Albania, 2023, §§ 65-75, the Court found that a statutory voting ban preventing serving prisoners convicted of serious criminal offences from voting in parliamentary elections was not in breach of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. It noted that the restriction was not general or universal and was limited to a specific list of offences affecting thus a restricted number of individuals. The application of the restriction was conditional on the nature and gravity of the offence committed and ending when prison sentence served. In the case at issue, there was a discernible and sufficient link between offences committed by the applicants and the withdrawal of their voting rights."
7ff3d5fc46dd,Prisoners' rights,20230923174222__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:14139/21,Narbutas v. Lithuania,14139/21,added,"Narbutas v. Lithuania,* no. 14139/21, 19 December 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.A,General principles,2,,110,,"Wenerski v. Poland , 2009",,,"Further, Article 3 imposes an obligation on the State to protect the physical well-being of persons deprived of their liberty by, among other things, providing them with the requisite medical care ( Kudła v. Poland [GC], 2000, § 94; Paladi v. Moldova [GC], 2009, § 71; Blokhin v. Russia [GC], 2016, § 136). Thus, the Court has held on many occasions that lack of appropriate medical care may amount to treatment contrary to Article 3 ( Ibid. ; Wenerski v. Poland, 2009, §§ 56-65). This may also concern restrictions imposed on an applicant's access to healthcare in the context of house arrest ( Narbutas v. Lithuania,* 2023, §§ 170-177)."
7ff3d5fc46dd,Prisoners' rights,20230923174222__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:35943/18,Pintus v. Italy,35943/18,added,"Pintus v. Italy,* no. 35943/18, 1 February 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,IV.A,General principles,2,108,108,0.9785,,,"Under Article 2, the Court has stressed that this provision enjoins the States not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also lays down a positive obligation on the States to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within their jurisdiction. In the context of prisoners, the Court has previously had occasion to emphasise that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and that the authorities are under a duty to protect them ( Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2017, § 53). The obligation to protect the life of individuals in custody implies an obligation for the authorities to provide them with the medical care necessary to safeguard their life ( Jasinskis v. Latvia, 2010, § 60; Hilmioğlu v. Turkey (dec.), 2020, § 70).","Under Article 2, the Court has stressed that this provision enjoins the States not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also lays down a positive obligation on the States to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within their jurisdiction. In the context of prisoners, the Court has previously had occasion to emphasise that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and that the authorities are under a duty to protect them ( Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan, 2017, § 53). The obligation to protect the life of individuals in custody implies an obligation for the authorities to provide them with the medical care necessary to safeguard their life ( Jasinskis v. Latvia, 2010, § 60; Hilmioğlu v. Turkey (dec.), 2020, § 70), which, in the circumstances of a case, may also include adequate mental health care and treatment ( Pintus v Italy,* 2024, §§ 46-54)."
7ff3d5fc46dd,Prisoners' rights,20230923174222__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:3501/20,Schmidt and Šmigol v. Estonia,3501/20,added,"Schmidt and Šmigol v. Estonia, nos. 3501/20 and 2 others, 28 November 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VI.B,Solitary confinement,2,,238,,"Šmigol v. Estonia , 2023",,,"In Schmidt and Šmigol v. Estonia, 2023, §§ 133, 140 and 149-163, the Court expressed strong concerns about the use of solitary confinement, as a disciplinary measure, for long and consecutive periods of time. It noted that prolonged solitary confinement entailed an inherent risk of harmful effect on any person's mental health, irrespective of the material or other conditions surrounding it. The Court therefore considered that the practice of long consecutive periods of solitary confinement was, in principle, incompatible with Article 3, save for the Government being able to present compelling reasons as to the existence of exceptional circumstances that would justify such a practice and to show that such disciplinary punishment was indeed used as a last resort. In the case at hand, the Court found that the prolonged periods of solitary confinement (the first applicant 566 days uninterruptedly and the second applicant spending 482 practically uninterruptedly), without alternating it with adequate periods of regular prison regime, subjected the applicants to hardship going beyond the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention. The Court therefore found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention."
7ff3d5fc46dd,Prisoners' rights,20230923174222__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:4312/13,Tarricone v. Italy,4312/13,added,"Tarricone v. Italy,* no. 4312/13, 8 February 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,IV.D,Mental health care,2,146,147,0.9924,,,"As regards the treatment of prisoners with mental health problems, the Court has consistently held that Article 3 of the Convention requires States to ensure that the health and well-being of prisoners are adequately secured by, among other things, providing them with the requisite medical assistance ( S ławomir Musiał v. Poland, 2009, § 87). In this context, obligations under Article 3 may go so far as to impose an obligation on the State to transfer mentally ill prisoners to special facilities in order to receive adequate treatment ( Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], 2016, § 105; Raffray Taddei v. France, 2010, § 63).","As regards the treatment of prisoners with mental health problems, the Court has consistently held that Article 3 of the Convention requires States to ensure that the health and well-being of prisoners are adequately secured by, among other things, providing them with the requisite medical assistance ( S ławomir Musiał v. Poland, 2009, § 87; Tarricone v. Italy,* 2024, §§ 71-80). In this context, obligations under Article 3 may go so far as to impose an obligation on the State to transfer mentally ill prisoners to special facilities in order to receive adequate treatment ( Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], 2016, § 105; Raffray Taddei v. France, 2010, § 63)."
7ff3d5fc46dd,Prisoners' rights,20230923174222__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-05,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-05.json,apps:37522/16,Vukušić v. Croatia,37522/16,added,"Vukušić v. Croatia, no. 37522/16, 14 November 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.C,Disciplinary measures and punishment,2,,205,,"ć v. Croatia , 2023",,,"In Vukušić v. Croatia, 2023, §§ 32-42, the Court found a breach of Article 3 in relation to an unjustified prolonged placement of a prisoner, without clothing, in a specially secured padded cell and with lights continuously on, which also included restraining his hands and ankles for four days, applied in order to prevent him from harming himself or others."
7ff3d5fc46dd,Prisoners' rights,20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,20240928174327__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-28.json,apps:45709/20,Bechi v. Romania,45709/20,added,"Bechi v. Romania,* no. 45709/20, 25 June 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,XV,Prohibition of discrimination,1,,359,,,,,"By contrast, in Bechi v. Romania,* 2024, §§ 56-65, the Court found that the placement of a HIVpositive prisoner in prison hospital was necessitated by the particular circumstances characterising Romanian prisons as found by the CPT (severe overcrowding, poor material and hygienic conditions, a lack of medical confidentiality and high levels of prejudice against people living with HIV) and that his placement there was aimed at offering him greater comfort and regular follow-up treatment. In this connection, the Court stressed that any differential treatment vis-à-vis ordinary detainees was aimed at providing the applicant with better conditions tailored to his medical needs and well-being, which amounted to an objective and reasonable justification within the meaning of Article 14 of the Convention."
7ff3d5fc46dd,Prisoners' rights,20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,20240928174327__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-28.json,apps:26564/16,Clasens v. Belgium,26564/16,added,"Clasens v. Belgium, no. 26564/16, 28 May 2019",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C,Accommodation,2,5,5,0.848,"Clasens v. Belgium, no. 26564/16, 28 May 2019|Leroy and Others v. France, nos. 32439/19 and 2 others, 18 April 2024",,"See further, Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. ▪ the reductions in the required minimum personal space of 3 sq. m are short, occasional and minor; ▪ such reductions are accompanied by sufficient freedom of movement outside the cell and adequate out-of-cell activities; and ▪ the applicant is confined in what is, when viewed generally, an appropriate detention facility, and there are no other aggravating aspects of the conditions of his or her detention.","See further, Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. ▪ the reductions in the required minimum personal space of 3 sq. m are short, occasional and minor; ▪ such reductions are accompanied by sufficient freedom of movement outside the cell and adequate out-of-cell activities; and ▪ the applicant is confined in what is, when viewed generally, an appropriate detention facility, and there are no other aggravating aspects of the conditions of his or her detention (see Clasens v. Belgium, 2019, §§ 34-39, and Leroy and Others v. France, 2024, §§ 111-115, where the conditions of detention were aggravated due to industrial actions by prison staff)."
7ff3d5fc46dd,Prisoners' rights,20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,20240928174327__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-28.json,apps:32439/19,Leroy and Others v. France,32439/19,added,"Leroy and Others v. France, nos. 32439/19 and 2 others, 18 April 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C,Accommodation,2,5,5,0.848,"Clasens v. Belgium, no. 26564/16, 28 May 2019|Leroy and Others v. France, nos. 32439/19 and 2 others, 18 April 2024",,"See further, Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. ▪ the reductions in the required minimum personal space of 3 sq. m are short, occasional and minor; ▪ such reductions are accompanied by sufficient freedom of movement outside the cell and adequate out-of-cell activities; and ▪ the applicant is confined in what is, when viewed generally, an appropriate detention facility, and there are no other aggravating aspects of the conditions of his or her detention.","See further, Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. ▪ the reductions in the required minimum personal space of 3 sq. m are short, occasional and minor; ▪ such reductions are accompanied by sufficient freedom of movement outside the cell and adequate out-of-cell activities; and ▪ the applicant is confined in what is, when viewed generally, an appropriate detention facility, and there are no other aggravating aspects of the conditions of his or her detention (see Clasens v. Belgium, 2019, §§ 34-39, and Leroy and Others v. France, 2024, §§ 111-115, where the conditions of detention were aggravated due to industrial actions by prison staff)."
7ff3d5fc46dd,Prisoners' rights,20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,20240928174327__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-28.json,apps:32439/19,Leroy and Others v. France,32439/19,added,"Leroy and Others v. France, nos. 32439/19 and 2 others, 18 April 2024",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.H,Searches and control,2,,59,,"Leroy and Others v. France, nos. 32439/19 and 2 others, 18 April 2024",,,"Thus, body searches may be necessary on occasion to ensure prison security or to prevent disorder or crime (Leroy and Others v. France, 2024, §§ 95-98, concerning pat-down searches through the outer clothes by special forces exceptionally deployed to ensure the safety of a prison during a protest action by the prison staff after a knife attack on two prison officers). The same in principle applies to strip searches (Iwańczuk v. Poland, 2001, § 59; Van der Ven v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 60). However, repeated, random strip searches of a prisoner without a legitimate purpose will run counter to Article 3 (Roth v. Germany, 2020, §§ 70-72). Similarly, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for refusing to undergo unnecessary strip searches involving an anal inspection may run counter to Article 8 of the Convention (Syrianos v. Greece, §§ 85-91). Even single instances of strip searching could amount to degrading treatment in view of the manner in which the strip search was carried out, the possibility that its aim was to humiliate and debase and where there was no justification for it (Valašinas v. Lithuania, 2001, § 117)."
7ff3d5fc46dd,Prisoners' rights,20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,20240928174327__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-28.json,apps:28791/10,Namık Yüksel v. Türkiye,28791/10,added,"Namık Yüksel v. Türkiye,* no. 28791/10, 27 August 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,Family contacts and visits,2,,83,,,,,"By contrast, in Namık Yüksel v. Türkiye,* 2024, § 61, the Court found no violation of Article 8 regarding restrictions imposed on the applicant's contact with his four-year-old son staying with his wife in the same prison. The Court considered that the domestic authorities, by allowing the applicant to have one hour weekly non-contact visits with son and one hour monthly contact visits with wife and son, had taken all necessary steps that could have been reasonably expected of them to ensure the applicant's contact with the child."
7ff3d5fc46dd,Prisoners' rights,20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,20240928174327__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-28.json,apps:8826/20,Namazli v. Azerbaijan,8826/20,added,"Namazli v. Azerbaijan,* no. 8826/20, 20 June 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VIII.A,Access to legal advice,2,,285,,,,,"The authorities must ensure confidentiality of communication between a prisoner and his or her lawyer, which may extend to other legal representatives (A.B. v. the Netherlands, 2002, § 86). Thus, for instance, the Court has found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention as regardsthe inspection of a lawyer's documents by prison staff before and after meeting his client in prison in the absence of any suspicion of wrongdoing and in a situation where such inspection was not regulated by a clear and detailed framework or safeguards against possible abuse or arbitrariness (Namazli v. Azerbaijan,* 2024, §§ 42-54)."
7ff3d5fc46dd,Prisoners' rights,20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,20240928174327__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-28.json,apps:35402/20,Sahraoui and Others v. France,35402/20,added,"Sahraoui and Others v. France,* no. 35402/20, 11 July 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.E,Drug addiction,2,,167,,,,,"Similarly, in Sahraoui and Others v. France,* 2024, §§ 70-74, the Court found that the death of a drug addict as a result of his serious chronic health conditions, which had first manifested themselves even prior to the applicant's imprisonment, and the misuse by the applicant of prescribed psychotropic medication in prison, which he had spontaneously and clandestinely procured (by either smuggling or stealing) from another inmate, did not suggest that there had been an omission in his supervision by the authorities within the meaning of Article 2 of the Convention."
7ff3d5fc46dd,Prisoners' rights,20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,20240928174327__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-28.json,apps:17/19,Spînu v. Romania (No. 2) (dec.),17/19,added,"Spînu v. Romania (No. 2) (dec.), no. 17/19, 18 June 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,Family contacts and visits,2,,88,,"Spînu v. Romania (No. 2) (dec.), no. 17/19, 18 June 2024",,,"The Court has also dealt with a number of cases concerning the rejection of a prisoner's request for permission to visit an ailing relative or attend a relatives' funeral under Article 8 of the Convention (Płoski v. Poland, 2002, §§ 26-39; Schemkamper v. France, 2005, §§ 19-36; see also Spînu v. Romania (No. 2) (dec.), 2024, §§ 33-40, where the Court left it open whether there was an interference with Article 8 regarding an unsubstantiated request for a family visit to an ailing relative by a prisoner). However, the Court has found that the refusal of leave to visit a sick relative does not attain a minimum level of severity as to fall within the scope of Article 3 (Sannino v. Italy (dec.), 2005)."
7ff3d5fc46dd,Prisoners' rights,20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,20240928174327__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-28.json,apps:38129/15,Temporale v. Italy,38129/15,added,"Temporale v. Italy,* no. 38129/15, 20 June 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.D,Mental health care,2,,149,,,,,"In determining whether the detention of an ill person is compatible with Article 3 of the Convention, the Court takes into consideration the individual's health and the effect of the manner of execution of his or her detention on him or her. It has held that the conditions of detention must under no circumstances arouse in the person deprived of his liberty feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing him and possibly breaking his physical and moral resistance. On this point, the Court has recognised that detainees with mental disorders are more vulnerable than ordinary detainees, and that certain requirements of prison life pose a greater risk that their health will suffer, exacerbating the risk that they suffer from a feeling of inferiority, and are necessarily a source of stress and anxiety. Such a situation calls for an increased vigilance in reviewing whether the Convention has been complied with (Rooman v. Belgium [GC], 2019, § 145). The assessment of the situation of these particular individuals also has to take into consideration the vulnerability of those persons and, in some cases, their inability to complain coherently or at all about how they are affected by any particular treatment (Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], 2016, § 106; Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 1992, § 82; Aerts v. Belgium, 1998, § 66). Moreover, if the domestic authorities decide to place an individual suffering from serious health problems, including mental disorders, in detention, they have a duty of special care to ensure that the conditions of detention correspond to the specific needs of the person concerned (Temporale v. Italy,* 2024, § 79)."
7ff3d5fc46dd,Prisoners' rights,20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,20240928174327__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-28.json,apps:31842/20,W.W. v. Poland,31842/20,added,"W.W. v. Poland,* no. 31842/20, 11 July 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VII.E,Other special categories of detainees,2,,283,,,,,"In W.W. v. Poland,* 2024, §§ 91-95 the Court found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention regarding the refusal to allow a transgender person to continue hormone therapy in prison - which had earlier been granted to her in another prison - and instead obliging her to undergo further medical assessments. The Court considered that the impugned decision touched on the applicant's freedom to define her gender identity, one of the most basic essentials of self-determination. In the case at issue, there were strong elements before the domestic authorities indicating that hormone therapy was an appropriate medical treatment for the applicant's state of health with a beneficial effect on her. Thus, a disproportionate burden was placed on the applicant to prove the necessity of the prescribed medical treatment by undergoing an additional medical consultation. The Court also noted that the applicant was particularly vulnerable as an imprisoned transgender person undergoing a gender reassignment procedure, thus requiring enhanced protection from the authorities."
7ff3d5fc46dd,Prisoners' rights,20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,20240928174327__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-28.json,apps:22321/19,Wick v. Germany,22321/19,added,"Wick v. Germany, no. 22321/19, 4 June 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VIII.B,Effective participation in domestic judicial proceedings,2,,298,,"Wick v. Germany, no. 22321/19, 4 June 2024",,,"In Wick v. Germany, 2024, § 102, the applicant was unable to obtain a court decision on the merits of his actions against the application of measures of a special prison regime (separation and video surveillance) because he was constantly transferred and the domestic courts considered that those actions had become moot after his transfer. The Court found that that approach of the domestic courts unduly restricted the applicant's right of access to a court under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention."
7ff3d5fc46dd,Prisoners' rights,20240405074848__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,20240928174327__guide_prisoners_rights_eng.pdf,2024-04-05,2024-09-28,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/7ff3d5fc46dd/diff_2024-04-05__2024-09-28.json,apps:17389/20,Yasak v. Türkiye,17389/20,added,"Yasak v. Türkiye,* no. 17389/20, 27 August 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,II.E,Clothing and bedding,2,45,45,0.862,,,"An issue of inadequate bedding often arises in the context of a wider problem of prison overcrowding. The Court's case-law endorses the principle of one prisoner one bed. In many cases the Court has found a breach of Article 3 of the Convention where prisoners did not have an individual sleeping place and had to take turns to sleep (Ananyev and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 146, with further references). The Court therefore stressed that each detainee must have an individual sleeping place in the cell (Ibid., § 148(a)). It also important to bear in mind the hygiene requirements related to adequate bedding.6","An issue of inadequate bedding often arises in the context of a wider problem of prison overcrowding. The Court's case-law endorses the principle of one prisoner one bed. In many cases the Court has found a breach of Article 3 of the Convention where prisoners did not have an individual sleeping place and had to take turns to sleep (Ananyev and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 146, with further references). The Court therefore stressed that each detainee must have an individual sleeping place in the cell (Ibid., § 148(a)). It also important to bear in mind the hygiene requirements related to adequate bedding.6 However, the fact that a prisoner may need to sleep on a mattress placed on the floor is not, taken in isolation, sufficient to amount to a violation of Article 3 (Yasak v. Türkiye,* 2024, §§ 113-114)."
8ad6b528df3f,Rights of the child,20241205111155__guide_rights_of_the_child_eng.pdf,20250601155424__guide_rights_of_the_child_eng.pdf,2024-12-05,2025-06-01,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/8ad6b528df3f/diff_2024-12-05__2025-06-01.json,apps:29359/22,Salay v. Slovakia*,29359/22,added,"Salay v. Slovakia*, no. 29359/22, 27 February 2025",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.B.2.c,Ethnic origin,4,92,93,0.99,"Salay v. Slovakia*, no. 29359/22, 27 February 2025",,"In this connexion, the Court has examined cases in which Roma children are systematically placed in separate classes or schools, whether temporarily (Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010) or on a longer and nationwide basis (D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007). The Court has also dealt with cases amounting to segregation of Roma children at a local level, in public schools attended almost exclusively by Roma children, and found a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013; Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022; Szolcsán v. Hungary, 2023) because the applicants were subjected to a disparity in treatment for which there was no objective and reasonable justification, or Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 of the Convention (X and Others v. Albania, 2022), the authorities having failed to adopt timely and appropriate desegregating measures to correct factual inequality and prevent the perpetuation of the subsequent discrimination, although such measures had been called for at domestic and European levels (Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022).","In this connexion, the Court has examined cases in which Roma children are systematically placed in separate classes or schools, whether temporarily (Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010) or on a longer and nationwide basis (D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007; Salay v. Slovakia*, 2025). The Court has also dealt with cases amounting to segregation of Roma children at a local level, in public schools attended almost exclusively by Roma children, and found a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013; Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022; Szolcsán v. Hungary, 2023) because the applicants were subjected to a disparity in treatment for which there was no objective and reasonable justification, or Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 of the Convention (X and Others v. Albania, 2022), the authorities having failed to adopt timely and appropriate desegregating measures to correct factual inequality and prevent the perpetuation of the subsequent discrimination, although such measures had been called for at domestic and European levels (Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022)."
8ad6b528df3f,Rights of the child,20241205111155__guide_rights_of_the_child_eng.pdf,20250601155424__guide_rights_of_the_child_eng.pdf,2024-12-05,2025-06-01,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/8ad6b528df3f/diff_2024-12-05__2025-06-01.json,apps:27746/22|28291/22,X and Others v. Slovenia,27746/22|28291/22,added,"X and Others v. Slovenia, nos. 27746/22 and 28291/22, 19 December 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A,"Custody, access and contact rights",2,35,35,0.862,"X and Others v. Slovenia, nos. 27746/22 and 28291/22, 19 December 2024",,"The Court has also found that the right to private and family life of a divorced couple's daughter had been violated as regards the length of the custody proceedings and, taking into account her age and maturity, the failure of the domestic courts to allow her to express her views on which parent should take care of her (M. and M. v. Croatia, 2015, §§ 171-172; compare Q and R v. Slovenia, 2022, in which a child psychiatrist had assessed the children and considered that they were not capable of forming a view). In C v. Croatia, 2020, it found that the authorities had breached the right to family life of a child at the centre of custody proceedings because he did not have an opportunity to be heard by the competent judicial authorities and a guardian ad litem had not been appointed to represent his views (§§ 77-82).","The Court has also found that the right to private and family life of a divorced couple's daughter had been violated as regards the length of the custody proceedings and, taking into account her age and maturity, the failure of the domestic courts to allow her to express her views on which parent should take care of her (M. and M. v. Croatia, 2015, §§ 171-172; compare Q and R v. Slovenia, 2022, in which a child psychiatrist had assessed the children and considered that they were not capable of forming a view). In C v. Croatia, 2020, it found that the authorities had breached the right to family life of a child at the centre of custody proceedings because he did not have an opportunity to be heard by the competent judicial authorities and a guardian ad litem had not been appointed to represent his views (§§ 77-82). In X and Others v. Slovenia, 2024, § 175, the domestic courts' failure to ensure proper representation of the applicant children's interests during the contact and custody proceedings amounted, in itself, to a breach of their right to respect for their family life."
8ad6b528df3f,Rights of the child,20241205111155__guide_rights_of_the_child_eng.pdf,20250601155424__guide_rights_of_the_child_eng.pdf,2024-12-05,2025-06-01,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/8ad6b528df3f/diff_2024-12-05__2025-06-01.json,apps:27746/22|28291/22,X and Others v. Slovenia,27746/22|28291/22,added,"X and Others v. Slovenia, nos. 27746/22 and 28291/22, 19 December 2024",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B,Taking children into care,2,,55,,"X and Others v. Slovenia, nos. 27746/22 and 28291/22, 19 December 2024",,,"The discontinuation of contact between children and their mother, with the aim of preventing alienation from their father with whom they were subsequently placed, constituted a violation of Article 8 in X and Others v. Slovenia, 2024. The domestic courts had failed to carry out an in-depth examination of the entire family situation, evaluate the impact of the discontinuation of contact with the mother on the children or consider other suitable and less severe measures (§§ 155-172)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:56064/16,Aktay v. Türkiye (dec.),56064/16,added,"Aktay v. Türkiye (dec.), no. 56064/16, 9 January 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.1,“Genuine and serious” “dispute” with a decisive outcome,3,,12,,,,,"Disciplinary proceedings that do not directly interfere with the right to continue to practise a profession, since such an outcome requires the institution of separate proceedings, are likewise not ""decisive"" for the purposes of Article 6 ( Marušić v. Croatia (dec.), 2017, §§ 74-75; see, in a different context, Morawska v. Poland (dec.), 2020, § 72). In Aktay v. Türkiye (dec.), 2024, §§ 36 - 46, the applicant complained that the imposition of a disciplinary fine for professional misconduct in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court had affected his rights to practise as a lawyer and had affected his professional reputation. The Court did not accept this argument finding that no other measures, besides the fine as such, has been taken against the applicant, and the effect of that incident on his reputation was minimal. Most importantly, the Court noted that that the disciplinary measure taken by the Constitutional Court was of a procedural nature, aimed at ensuring the proper administration of justice, and did not involve the determination of civil rights or obligations: the fact that there was a ""pecuniary"" element was not in itself sufficient to attract the applicability of Article 6 § 1 under its ""civil"" head."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:56064/16,Aktay v. Türkiye (dec.),56064/16,added,"Aktay v. Türkiye (dec.), no. 56064/16, 9 January 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.E,Excluded matters,2,,93,,,,,"Merely showing that a dispute is ""pecuniary"" in nature is not in itself sufficient to attract the applicability of Article 6 § 1 under its civil head ( Ferrazzini v. Italy [GC], 2001, § 25). Thus, a procedural measure, imposed by a court in the interests of the proper administration of justice, does not by itself attract protection of Article 6 under its ""civil"" head, even if it involves a pecuniary fine (see Aktay v. Türkiye (dec.), 2024, §§ 36 - 46)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:48173/18,Cangı and Others v. Türkiye,48173/18,added,"Cangı and Others v. Türkiye, no. 48173/18, 14 November 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.1,“Genuine and serious” “dispute” with a decisive outcome,3,,11,,"In Okyay and Others v. Turkey , 2004|ı and Others v. Türkiye , 2023",,,"In Okyay and Others v. Turkey, 2004, § 65, the Court found that the applicant's constitutional right to ""live in a healthy environment"" has been affected by the operation of a thermal plant, due to the risks it posed for the life and health of the Aegean region's population, to which the applicants belonged. Even though, in that case, the applicants did not suffer any economic or other loss, they had a standing under Turkish law to complain about the power plants'hazardous activities, and the domestic courts ruled in their favour. As a result, the Court found Article 6 applicable to the domestic proceedings. By contrast, in Cangı and Others v. Türkiye, 2023, the Court found that only those applicants who lived in ""close proximity"" to the gold mine may claim that the proceedings concerning the eventual closure of the mine have been directly decisive for their civil rights. As to those applicants who participated in those proceedings as ""public watchdogs"", and who were not ""directly and personally affected"" by the operations of the mine, their complaints under Article 6 were declared inadmissible ratione materiae (§§ 33 - 38)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:48173/18,Cangı and Others v. Türkiye,48173/18,added,"Cangı and Others v. Türkiye, no. 48173/18, 14 November 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.A.6.b,Expert opinions,4,,449,,"ı and Others v. Türkiye , 2023",,,"As with witnesses, parties should be able to put questions to the experts, but this right is also not absolute: thus, in Cangı and Others v. Türkiye, 2023, the Court concluded that the questions formulated by the domestic courts to the experts were sufficient to address the central issue of the case, and that the applicants did not argue before the Court that their questions, which the domestic courts refused to put to the experts, could have been decisive or concerned a key issue that had been left unassessed (§§ 48-51). However, the Court found a violation of Article 6 since the applicants had not had an opportunity to acquaint themselves with the materials on which the main experts had relied in reaching their conclusions (§§ 52-55)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:39247/14,Davchev v. Bulgaria (dec.),39247/14,added,"Davchev v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 39247/14, 19 September 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.2,Existence of an arguable right or obligation in domestic law,3,,36,,,,,"That being said, not every change in a position or functions of a public official would automatically affect his or her rights under the domestic law. Thus, in Davchev v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2023, the Court concluded that Bulgarian law had not conferred on the applicant any right to continue performing his function as an administrative head of the investigation department, and had not set out procedural or substantive rules for early termination of such a function. Such positions had been excluded from the scope of the constitutional guarantee of independence of the prosecution magistrates, and the effects of that change on the applicant's renumeration or reputation had been minimal. The Court concluded that the administrative function performed by the applicant had been rather an ""advantage which it was not possible to have recognised in the courts"" : therefore, Article 6 was not applicable. The Court's reference to the fact that the considerations of the judicial independence had not been at stake in that case is worth noting (§§ 37 and 39)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:25240/20,Gyulumyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.),25240/20,added,"Gyulumyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), nos. 25240/20 and 3 others, 21 November 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.2,Existence of an arguable right or obligation in domestic law,3,,23,,"ąk and others v. Poland , 2023",,,"As to the point in time to which the assessment of whether or not there was an ""arguable"" right in domestic law should relate in the event of a change in the law, see Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 110, and Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, § 285, where the Court found that the question whether a right ""existed"" under domestic law could not be answered on the basis of the new legislation. Accordingly, the fact that the applicants'respective terms of office (as President of the Supreme Court/a member of the National Council of the Judiciary) had been terminated ex lege could not be regarded as removing, retrospectively, the "" arguability "" of the "" right "" that they could have claimed under Article 6 § 1 in accordance with the rules in force at the time of their appointment. In Stoianoglo v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 29, the Court applied a similar approach to the proceedings in which the Prosecutor General tried to contest his suspension. For the Court, the question whether or not the Prosecutor General had a defendable right to continue exercising his functions should be answered, not on the basis of the new legislation, but rather on the basis of the legislation which existed at the moment when he had been appointed. Similarly, the Court concluded that the applicants had had a defendable right in the case of Pająk and others v. Poland, 2023, §§ 120-125, which concerned the application of a new legislation which lowered the retirement age for judges and had introduced a new procedure for extending the mandate beyond the new (lower) age of retirement. Thus, the Court found that the applicant, a civil servant, had a right to certain conditions of service even when, following a legislative reform, the scope of this right, or the procedural modalities of exercising it, has been changed. Similarly, in Gyulumyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, the Court applied the same approach to a dispute arising out of the early termination of mandates of several judges and the President of the Constitutional Court, even though this termination had resulted automatically from a constitutional amendment (§§ 65 - 67)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:25240/20,Gyulumyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.),25240/20,added,"Gyulumyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), nos. 25240/20 and 3 others, 21 November 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,I.C.1.a,Does the law exclude access to a court for that particular type of dispute?,4,45,61,0.929,,,"The judgment in Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, ""refined"" the first condition of the Vilho Eskelinen test. Thus, ""the first condition can be regarded as fulfilled where, even without an express provision to this effect, it has been clearly shown that domestic law excludes access to a court for the type of dispute concerned"" . In short, this condition is satisfied, firstly, "" where domestic law contains an explicit exclusion of access to a court. Secondly, the same condition may also be satisfied where the exclusion in question is of an implicit nature, in particular where it stems from a systemic interpretation of the applicable legal framework or the whole body of legal regulation "" (§§ 288-292).","The judgment in Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, ""refined"" the first condition of the Vilho Eskelinen test. Thus, ""the first condition can be regar ded as fulfilled where, even without an express provision to this effect, it has been clearly shown that domestic law excludes access to a court for the type of dispute concerned"" . In short, this condition is satisfied, firstly, "" where domestic law contains an explicit exclusion of access to a court. Secondly, the same condition may also be satisfied where the exclusion in question is of an implicit nature, in particular where it stems from a systemic interpretation of the applicable legal framework or the whole body of legal regulation "" (§§ 288-292). This approach may be illustrated by the case of Gyulumyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, where the Court noted that the applicants (judges of the constitutional court who had lost their mandates as a result of a constitutional amendment) did not have access to court in the light of ""a systemic interpretation of the applicable legal framework or the whole body of legal regulation"" which excluded any possibility of judicial review of the constitutional amendments (§ 70)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:25240/20,Gyulumyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.),25240/20,added,"Gyulumyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), nos. 25240/20 and 3 others, 21 November 2023",3,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.C.2,Disputes involving judges and prosecutors,3,,76,,,,,"The specific situation of judges of a constitutional court was analysied by the Court in Gyulumyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), 2023. In that case judges of the constitutional court lost their mandates as a result of a constitutional amendment and were unable to complain about it. The Court noted, applying the second part of the Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland test, that the termination of the mandate of the constitutional court judges had resulted from the 2020 constitutional amendments. It would be inconceivable to give to the ordinary courts the power to review the amendments and the ensuing loss of the mandates (§ 70). Therefore, it would be for the judges of the Constitutional Court to decide on their own situation, which run against the principle of nemo iudex in causa sua . The Court recalled that the principle of irremovability of judges was not absolute. Having examined the history of the constitutional reform in Armenia, the Court concluded that the 2020 reform pursed legitimate aims (§ 78), and was not directed specifically at the applicants (§ 84). The Court also analysed the ""doctrine of necessity"" which would allow, exceptionally, a judge - who should be otherwise disqualified - to decide the case, in order to avoid injustice. However, the Court concluded that the ""doctrine of necessity"" was not applicable in casu, noting that the impugned amendment had adverse consequences solely for the applicants themselves. The Court concluded that the principle the principle nemo iudex in causa sua should prevail, and the applicants'inability to have the loss of their mandates reviewed by a court (which meant, in the particular circumstances, by themselves) had been justified."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:49439/21,Hanževački v. Croatia,49439/21,added,"Hanževački v. Croatia, no. 49439/21, 5 September 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1,A right that is practical and effective,3,131,142,0.9348,"Legros and Others v. France , 2023",,"In Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 on account of the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion for an appeal to the Supreme Court after the appeal had been lodged (§ 45). Referring to the principle of legal certainty, the Court found that the emergence of the new criterion had not been foreseeable for the applicant (§§ 38-39) and that she had therefore been unable to remedy any potential effects of the application of the new criterion (§§ 40-43). See also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 39-40.","In Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 on account of the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion for an appeal to the Supreme Court after the appeal had been lodged (§ 45). Referring to the principle of legal certainty, the Court found that the emergence of the new criterion had not been foreseeable for the applicant (§§ 38-39) and that she had therefore been unable to remedy any potential effects of the application of the new criterion (§§ 40-43). Similarly, in Hanževački v. Croatia, §§ 36-41, the Court concluded that an unforeseeable retroactive imposition of a procedural condition for lodging a constitutional complaint - a condition which the applicant could no longer fulfil - impaired the applicant's right to a court to such an extent that the very essence of that right was impaired. See also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 39-40, and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149 - 165."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:42180/19,Jakutavičius v. Lithuania,42180/19,added,"Jakutavičius v. Lithuania, no. 42180/19, 13 February 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1,A right that is practical and effective,3,40,136,0.99,"Aït-Mouhoub v. France , 1998|Benghezal v. France , 2022|Elcomp sp. z o.o. v. Poland , 2021|García Manibardo v. Spain , 2000|In Stankov v. Bulgaria , 2007|Klauz v. Croatia , 2013|Kreuz v. Poland , 2001|Laçi v. Albania , 2021|Legros and Others v. France , 2023|Melnyk v. Ukraine , 2006|Nalbant and Others v. Turkey , 2022|Podbielski and PPU Polpure v. Poland , 2005|Stankiewicz v. Poland , 2006|Weissman and Others v. Romania , 2006|ć v. Croatia , 2016|ć v. Croatia , 2021|ć v. Croatia , 2022|čius v. Lithuania , 2020|čius v. Lithuania , 2024|ğlu v. Turkey , 2021|Ş. v. Turkey , 2013",,"Litigants are nevertheless required to act with the requisite diligence ( Kamenova v. Bulgaria, 2018, §§ 52-55; compare Çela v. Albania, 2022, § 39).  The Court held in Ivanova and Ivashova v. Russia, 2017, that the national courts should not interpret domestic law in an inflexible manner with the effect of imposing an obligation with which litigants could not possibly comply. Requiring an appeal to be lodged within one month of the date on which the registry drew up a full copy of the court's decision - rather than the point at which the appellant actually had knowledge of the decision - amounted to making the expiry of the relevant deadline dependent on a factor entirely outside the appellant's control. The Court found that the right of appeal should have become effective from the point at which the applicant could effectively apprise herself of the full text of the decision.  limitation periods for bringing a claim (see, regarding harm to physical integrity, the case-law references cited in paragraphs 53-55 of Sanofi Pasteur v. France, 2020, including Howald Moor and Others v. Switzerland, 2014, §§ 79-80; Yagtzilar and Others v. Greece, 2001, § 27; see also the cases cited in Loste v. France, 2022, §§ 68-70). For example, the Court has found a violation of the right of access to a court in a number of cases in which the discontinuation of criminal proceedings and the resulting failure to examine a civil claim were due to a lack of diligence on the national authorities'part ( Atanasova v. Bulgaria, 2008, §§ 35-47). Excessive delays in the examination of a claim may also render the right of access to a court meaningless ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013).  the granting of leave to appeal out of time and the resulting acceptance of an ordinary appeal lodged after a significant period of time, for reasons that do not appear especially convincing, may entail a breach of the principle of legal certainty and the right to a court ( Magomedov and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 87-89, where late appeals benefiting the competent authorities were accepted following the extension without any valid reason of the time-limit for appealing).  the length of preliminary investigations, attributable to the authorities, preventing the applicant from joining criminal proceedings as a civil party claiming damages or from making a civil compensation claim ( Petrella v. Italy, 2021, §§ 51-53 and references cited).  delay by the national authorities in examining an application by the applicant (challenging the selection procedure for a post for which she had applied), with the result that the proceedings were terminated on the grounds that there was no legal interest in pursuing the application as the administrative decision at issue had expired ( Frezadou v. Greece, 2018, § 47 - compare and contrast with Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 72). More generally, in exceptional cases where proceedings are kept pending for an excessive period, this may impair the right of access to a court ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013, § 57). The unjustified lack of a decision for a particularly lengthy period by the court dealing with the case may be regarded as a denial of justice; the remedy used by the applicant may thus become deprived of all effectiveness where the court concerned does not manage to settle the dispute in good time, as required by the circumstances of the case and what is at stake ( Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 60). ▪ by issues relating to jurisdiction (see, for example, Arlewin v. Sweden, 2016, concerning a television programme broadcast from another European Union country) or an excessively restrictive interpretation of the scope of an association's stated aim, depriving it of its right of access to a court ( Association Burestop 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 71). Furthermore, where an action for damages is brought against it, the State has a positive obligation to facilitate the identification of the respondent authority ( Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-71). ▪ by issues of evidence, where the requirements for the burden of proof are overly rigid ( Tence v. Slovenia, 2016, §§ 35-38); concerning formalism in the presentation of evidence, see Efstratiou and Others v. Greece, 2020, §§ 44 et seq. ▪ by the existence of procedural bars preventing or limiting the possibilities of applying to a court:  a particularly strict interpretation by the domestic courts of a procedural rule (excessive formalism) may deprive applicants of their right of access to a court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 97; Pérez de Rada Cavanilles v. Spain, 1998, § 49; Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Sotiris and Nikos Koutras ATTEE v. Greece, 2000, § 20; Běleš and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 50; RTBF v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 71-72 and 74; Miessen v. Belgium, 2016, §§ 72-74; Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, § 34; and for a constitutional court, Dos Santos Calado and Others v. Portugal, 2020, §§ 118-130), bearing in mind that an unreasonable construction of a procedural requirement impairs the right to effective judicial protection ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 37). The general principles established in Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 80-99, also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the procedural rules of a court called upon to rule at first and last instance (see Makrylakis v. Greece, 2022, §§ 36, 38-50, which emphasises the specificity of a situation where the case is examined by a single court, § 49). As regards the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion after an appeal has been lodged, this raises an issue concerning the principle of legal certainty ( Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, §§ 35-45); see also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40).  consideration of the value of the subject matter of the dispute (ratione valoris admissibility threshold) in order to determine the jurisdiction of a higher court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], § 73, §§ 85-86);  the requirements linked to execution of an earlier ruling may impair the right of access to a court, for instance where the applicant's lack of funds makes it impossible for him even to begin to comply with the earlier judgment ( Annoni di Gussola and Others v. France, 2000, § 56; compare with Arvanitakis v. France (dec.), 2000);  procedural rules barring certain subjects of law from taking court proceedings ( The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 1994, § 83; Philis v. Greece (no. 1), 1991, § 65; Lupaş and Others v. Romania, 2006, §§ 64-67; and, regarding adults lacking capacity, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012, §§ 241-45; Nataliya Mikhaylenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 40; Nikolyan v. Armenia, 2019; and compare with R.P. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ by the limits of the judicial review available, for example where a complaint to the administrative courts against a presidential decree could only give rise to a review of compliance with external formalities in the adoption of the decree, whereas the applicant's complaint called for an examination of the merits and of the internal legality of the decree ( Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 153-154, concerning the premature removal of a prosecutor), and a fortiori by the unavailability of a judicial review (see Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, §§ 76-77, concerning the automatic temporary suspension of a judge pending the examination of her appeal against a decision to remove her from office). In the context of family-law disputes, in Plazzi v. Switzerland (§§ 44-67) and Roth v. Switzerland, 2022, (§ 77), concerning the cancellation without judicial review of the suspensive effect of appeals by fathers, thereby enabling their children to leave the country with their mothers and removing the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, the Court found a violation, emphasising that the urgency invoked had not been serious enough to justify preventing the fathers from applying to a court before the cancellation of suspensive effect became applicable (see Plazzi v. Switzerland, 2022, §§ 58-59, and the special nature of proceedings under family law). ▪ In Xavier Lucas v. France, 2022, by giving precedence to the rule that applications to the Court of Appeal had to be made electronically (e-justice), while disregarding the practical hurdles faced by the applicant in doing so, the Court of Cassation had adopted a formalistic approach which was not necessary to ensure legal certainty or the proper administration of justice and which was therefore ""excessive"" (§ 57).","In the specific circumstances of a case, the practical and effective nature of the right of access to a court may be impaired, for instance: ▪ by the prohibitive cost of the proceedings in view of the individual's financial capacity:  the excessive amount of security for costs in the context of an application to join criminal proceedings as a civil party ( Aït-Mouhoub v. France, 1998, §§ 57-58; García Manibardo v. Spain, 2000, §§ 38-45);  excessive court fees ( Kreuz v. Poland, 2001, §§ 60-67; Podbielski and PPU Polpure v. Poland, 2005, §§ 65-66; Weissman and Others v. Romania, 2006, § 42; Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-70, and conversely, Reuther v. Germany (dec.), 2003). In these cases the Court considered the question of court fees that had been imposed prior to the institution of civil proceedings and had had the effect of hindering access to a court at first instance or at a subsequent stage of the proceedings for applicants who were unable to pay (contrast Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, 1995, §§ 62-67, regarding the payment of a security as a precondition for lodging an appeal). The Court has pointed out that where there is a possibility of an exemption from stamp duty for a court application following an assessment of the applicant's financial situation, the authorities must give a decision promptly ( Laçi v. Albania, 2021, §§ 53-60), and diligence is also expected of the applicant ( Elcomp sp. z o.o. v. Poland, 2021, § 41). If the State has a system for calculating court fees linked to the amount in dispute, in order to comply with Article 6 the system must be sufficiently flexible to allow for the possibility of total or partial exemption from payment or a reduction in the amount payable (see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 39 and 40, and see §§ 41-45, where the applicant company had been forced to abandon its appeal because it was unable to pay the fees imposed on it). In Stankov v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 53, the Court held that substantial court fees imposed at the end of proceedings could also amount to a restriction on the right to a court (see, more specifically, for cases concerning the excessive length of proceedings, an acquittal or unjustified pre-trial detention, §§ 59 and 62, and a claim for compensation for assault, Čolić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 58-59); see also, regarding the refusal to reimburse legal costs, Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 68-69 and § 74; and compare with proceedings challenging the costs payable following judicial proceedings, Taratukhin v. Russia (dec.), 2020, §§ 36 et seq. For a recent summary of the case-law, see Benghezal v. France, 2022, §§ 43-45. In cases concerning court fees, regard should also be had to the litigant's conduct ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 120) or the manifest lack of any prospect of success of an action ( Marić v. Croatia (dec.), 2020, §§ 58 and 60, concerning the obligation to bear the full costs of the State's representation, and § 52, concerning the obligation for the losing party to pay litigation costs (the ""loser pays"" rule)); see also Stankiewicz v. Poland, 2006, §§ 62 et seq.; Klauz v. Croatia, 2013, §§ 77 et seq.; and Cindrić and Bešlić v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 119-123). With regard to litigation costs for proceedings that did not give rise to a decision on the merits, see Karahasanoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 136-137. Lastly, the Court has objected to the rule whereby each party has to bear its own costs regardless of the outcome of the proceedings ( Zustović v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-106, and see also §§ 99-100 for the State's duty to bear the cost of its errors in that context); it also examined the rule that each party was to bear its own costs without exception in Dragan Kovačević v. Croatia, 2022, §§ 67-85, and stressed the importance of giving reasons for a decision refusing to reimburse the costs incurred by the successful party (§ 83). However, the Court found no violation of Article 6 on account of a rule of domestic law which provided that costs of the litigation should be reimbursed to a party acquitted in the administrative proceedings only in cases where the relevant authorities had acted unlawfully ( Jakutavičius v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 80 - 86). The Court noted that the applicant himself had contributed to the decision of the police to impose a sanction: although that sanction had later been annulled, the Court was unable to find that the applicant had been made to bear the mistakes of the State authorities. Thus, the fact that the applicant had to cover his own costs in the administrative-law proceedings did not violate his right of access to a court ( ibid ., §§ 84 - 85; compare with Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.), 2023, concerning the absence in domestic law of an arguable right to obtain reimbursement of costs incurred by a defendant acquitted in a criminal case). For the imposition of excessive court fees on a commercial company, see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 39.  The imposition of fines in order to prevent a build-up of cases before the courts and to ensure the proper administration of justice is not, as such, incompatible with the right of access to a court. However, the amount of such fines is an important factor to take into account ( Sace Elektrik Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş. v. Turkey, 2013, §§ 26 et seq., concerning a mandatory fine of 10% of the bid in the event of an unsuccessful attempt to challenge a public auction). ▪ by issues relating to time-limits:  the time taken to hear an appeal leading to its being declared inadmissible ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2006, § 26). For the unforeseeable application of a new time-limit introduced after the lodging of a complaint, in breach of the principle of legal certainty, see Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149 - 165. Litigants are nevertheless required to act with the requisite diligence ( Kamenova v. Bulgaria, 2018, §§ 52-55; compare Çela v. Albania, 2022, § 39).  The Court held in Ivanova and Ivashova v. Russia, 2017, that the national courts should not interpret domestic law in an inflexible manner with the effect of imposing an obligation with which litigants could not possibly comply. Requiring an appeal to be lodged within one month of the date on which the registry drew up a full copy of the court's decision - rather than the point at which the appellant actually had knowledge of the decision - amounted to making the expiry of the relevant deadline dependent on a factor entirely outside the appellant's control. The Court found that the right of appeal should have become effective from the point at which the applicant could effectively apprise herself of the full text of the decision.  limitation periods for bringing a claim (see, regarding harm to physical integrity, the case-law references cited in paragraphs 53-55 of Sanofi Pasteur v. France, 2020, including Howald Moor and Others v. Switzerland, 2014, §§ 79-80; Yagtzilar and Others v. Greece, 2001, § 27; see also the cases cited in Loste v. France, 2022, §§ 68-70). For example, the Court has found a violation of the right of access to a court in a number of cases in which the discontinuation of criminal proceedings and the resulting failure to examine a civil claim were due to a lack of diligence on the national authorities'part ( Atanasova v. Bulgaria, 2008, §§ 35-47). Excessive delays in the examination of a claim may also render the right of access to a court meaningless ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013).  the granting of leave to appeal out of time and the resulting acceptance of an ordinary appeal lodged after a significant period of time, for reasons that do not appear especially convincing, may entail a breach of the principle of legal certainty and the right to a court ( Magomedov and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 87-89, where late appeals benefiting the competent authorities were accepted following the extension without any valid reason of the time-limit for appealing).  the length of preliminary investigations, attributable to the authorities, preventing the applicant from joining criminal proceedings as a civil party claiming damages or from making a civil compensation claim ( Petrella v. Italy, 2021, §§ 51-53 and references cited).  delay by the national authorities in examining an application by the applicant (challenging the selection procedure for a post for which she had applied), with the result that the proceedings were terminated on the grounds that there was no legal interest in pursuing the application as the administrative decision at issue had expired ( Frezadou v. Greece, 2018, § 47 - compare and contrast with Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 72). More generally, in exceptional cases where proceedings are kept pending for an excessive period, this may impair the right of access to a court ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013, § 57). The unjustified lack of a decision for a particularly lengthy period by the court dealing with the case may be regarded as a denial of justice; the remedy used by the applicant may thus become deprived of all effectiveness where the court concerned does not manage to settle the dispute in good time, as required by the circumstances of the case and what is at stake ( Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 60). ▪ by issues relating to jurisdiction (see, for example, Arlewin v. Sweden, 2016, concerning a television programme broadcast from another European Union country) or an excessively restrictive interpretation of the scope of an association's stated aim, depriving it of its right of access to a court ( Association Burestop 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 71). Furthermore, where an action for damages is brought against it, the State has a positive obligation to facilitate the identification of the respondent authority ( Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-71). ▪ by issues of evidence, where the requirements for the burden of proof are overly rigid ( Tence v. Slovenia, 2016, §§ 35-38); concerning formalism in the presentation of evidence, see Efstratiou and Others v. Greece, 2020, §§ 44 et seq. ▪ by the existence of procedural bars preventing or limiting the possibilities of applying to a court:  a particularly strict interpretation by the domestic courts of a procedural rule (excessive formalism) may deprive applicants of their right of access to a court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 97; Pérez de Rada Cavanilles v. Spain, 1998, § 49; Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Sotiris and Nikos Koutras ATTEE v. Greece, 2000, § 20; Běleš and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 50; RTBF v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 71-72 and 74; Miessen v. Belgium, 2016, §§ 72-74; Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, § 34; and for a constitutional court, Dos Santos Calado and Others v. Portugal, 2020, §§ 118-130), bearing in mind that an unreasonable construction of a procedural requirement impairs the right to effective judicial protection ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 37). The general principles established in Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 80-99, also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the procedural rules of a court called upon to rule at first and last instance (see Makrylakis v. Greece, 2022, §§ 36, 38-50, which emphasises the specificity of a situation where the case is examined by a single court, § 49). As regards the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion after an appeal has been lodged, this raises an issue concerning the principle of legal certainty ( Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, §§ 35-45); see also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149 - 165).  consideration of the value of the subject matter of the dispute (ratione valoris admissibility threshold) in order to determine the jurisdiction of a higher court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], § 73, §§ 85-86);  the requirements linked to execution of an earlier ruling may impair the right of access to a court, for instance where the applicant's lack of funds makes it impossible for him even to begin to comply with the earlier judgment ( Annoni di Gussola and Others v. France, 2000, § 56; compare with Arvanitakis v. France (dec.), 2000);  procedural rules barring certain subjects of law from taking court proceedings ( The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 1994, § 83; Philis v. Greece (no. 1), 1991, § 65; Lupaş and Others v. Romania, 2006, §§ 64-67; and, regarding adults lacking capacity, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012, §§ 241-45; Nataliya Mikhaylenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 40; Nikolyan v. Armenia, 2019; and compare with R.P. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ by the limits of the judicial review available, for example where a complaint to the administrative courts against a presidential decree could only give rise to a review of compliance with external formalities in the adoption of the decree, whereas the applicant's complaint called for an examination of the merits and of the internal legality of the decree ( Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 153-154, concerning the premature removal of a prosecutor), and a fortiori by the unavailability of a judicial review (see Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, §§ 76-77, concerning the automatic temporary suspension of a judge pending the examination of her appeal against a decision to remove her from office). In the context of family-law disputes, in Plazzi v. Switzerland (§§ 44-67) and Roth v. Switzerland, 2022, (§ 77), concerning the cancellation without judicial review of the suspensive effect of appeals by fathers, thereby enabling their children to leave the country with their mothers and removing the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, the Court found a violation, emphasising that the urgency invoked had not been serious enough to justify preventing the fathers from applying to a court before the cancellation of suspensive effect became applicable (see Plazzi v. Switzerland, 2022, §§ 58-59, and the special nature of proceedings under family law). ▪ In Xavier Lucas v. France, 2022, by giving precedence to the rule that applications to the Court of Appeal had to be made electronically (e-justice), while disregarding the practical hurdles faced by the applicant in doing so, the Court of Cassation had adopted a formalistic approach which was not necessary to ensure legal certainty or the proper administration of justice and which was therefore ""excessive"" (§ 57)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:4976/20,Jann-Zwicker and Jann v. Switzerland,4976/20,added,"Jann-Zwicker and Jann v. Switzerland, no. 4976/20, 13 February 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A.2,"Limitations: court fees, time-limits, mandatory legal representation, immunities etc.",3,,157,,"Jann-Zwicker and Jann v. Switzerland , 2024",,,"The statutory time-limits pursue a legitimate aim of preserving legal certainty; however, these time-limits should be proportionate to this aim: thus, in Jann-Zwicker and Jann v. Switzerland, 2024, §§ 78-81, the Court found that claims related to the damage to health caused by exposure to asbestos would nearly always be time ‐ barred, mainly because a (potentially) very long ""latency period"" between exposure to asbestos and the manifestation of asbestos-caused cancer. Such statutory time- limits, therefore, disproportionately encroached on the applicants'right of access to a court (§§ 78 - 83)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:72173/17,Legros and Others v. France,72173/17,added,"Legros and Others v. France, nos. 72173/17 and 17 others, 9 November 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1,A right that is practical and effective,3,40,136,0.99,"Aït-Mouhoub v. France , 1998|Benghezal v. France , 2022|Elcomp sp. z o.o. v. Poland , 2021|García Manibardo v. Spain , 2000|In Stankov v. Bulgaria , 2007|Klauz v. Croatia , 2013|Kreuz v. Poland , 2001|Laçi v. Albania , 2021|Legros and Others v. France , 2023|Melnyk v. Ukraine , 2006|Nalbant and Others v. Turkey , 2022|Podbielski and PPU Polpure v. Poland , 2005|Stankiewicz v. Poland , 2006|Weissman and Others v. Romania , 2006|ć v. Croatia , 2016|ć v. Croatia , 2021|ć v. Croatia , 2022|čius v. Lithuania , 2020|čius v. Lithuania , 2024|ğlu v. Turkey , 2021|Ş. v. Turkey , 2013",,"Litigants are nevertheless required to act with the requisite diligence ( Kamenova v. Bulgaria, 2018, §§ 52-55; compare Çela v. Albania, 2022, § 39).  The Court held in Ivanova and Ivashova v. Russia, 2017, that the national courts should not interpret domestic law in an inflexible manner with the effect of imposing an obligation with which litigants could not possibly comply. Requiring an appeal to be lodged within one month of the date on which the registry drew up a full copy of the court's decision - rather than the point at which the appellant actually had knowledge of the decision - amounted to making the expiry of the relevant deadline dependent on a factor entirely outside the appellant's control. The Court found that the right of appeal should have become effective from the point at which the applicant could effectively apprise herself of the full text of the decision.  limitation periods for bringing a claim (see, regarding harm to physical integrity, the case-law references cited in paragraphs 53-55 of Sanofi Pasteur v. France, 2020, including Howald Moor and Others v. Switzerland, 2014, §§ 79-80; Yagtzilar and Others v. Greece, 2001, § 27; see also the cases cited in Loste v. France, 2022, §§ 68-70). For example, the Court has found a violation of the right of access to a court in a number of cases in which the discontinuation of criminal proceedings and the resulting failure to examine a civil claim were due to a lack of diligence on the national authorities'part ( Atanasova v. Bulgaria, 2008, §§ 35-47). Excessive delays in the examination of a claim may also render the right of access to a court meaningless ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013).  the granting of leave to appeal out of time and the resulting acceptance of an ordinary appeal lodged after a significant period of time, for reasons that do not appear especially convincing, may entail a breach of the principle of legal certainty and the right to a court ( Magomedov and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 87-89, where late appeals benefiting the competent authorities were accepted following the extension without any valid reason of the time-limit for appealing).  the length of preliminary investigations, attributable to the authorities, preventing the applicant from joining criminal proceedings as a civil party claiming damages or from making a civil compensation claim ( Petrella v. Italy, 2021, §§ 51-53 and references cited).  delay by the national authorities in examining an application by the applicant (challenging the selection procedure for a post for which she had applied), with the result that the proceedings were terminated on the grounds that there was no legal interest in pursuing the application as the administrative decision at issue had expired ( Frezadou v. Greece, 2018, § 47 - compare and contrast with Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 72). More generally, in exceptional cases where proceedings are kept pending for an excessive period, this may impair the right of access to a court ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013, § 57). The unjustified lack of a decision for a particularly lengthy period by the court dealing with the case may be regarded as a denial of justice; the remedy used by the applicant may thus become deprived of all effectiveness where the court concerned does not manage to settle the dispute in good time, as required by the circumstances of the case and what is at stake ( Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 60). ▪ by issues relating to jurisdiction (see, for example, Arlewin v. Sweden, 2016, concerning a television programme broadcast from another European Union country) or an excessively restrictive interpretation of the scope of an association's stated aim, depriving it of its right of access to a court ( Association Burestop 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 71). Furthermore, where an action for damages is brought against it, the State has a positive obligation to facilitate the identification of the respondent authority ( Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-71). ▪ by issues of evidence, where the requirements for the burden of proof are overly rigid ( Tence v. Slovenia, 2016, §§ 35-38); concerning formalism in the presentation of evidence, see Efstratiou and Others v. Greece, 2020, §§ 44 et seq. ▪ by the existence of procedural bars preventing or limiting the possibilities of applying to a court:  a particularly strict interpretation by the domestic courts of a procedural rule (excessive formalism) may deprive applicants of their right of access to a court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 97; Pérez de Rada Cavanilles v. Spain, 1998, § 49; Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Sotiris and Nikos Koutras ATTEE v. Greece, 2000, § 20; Běleš and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 50; RTBF v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 71-72 and 74; Miessen v. Belgium, 2016, §§ 72-74; Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, § 34; and for a constitutional court, Dos Santos Calado and Others v. Portugal, 2020, §§ 118-130), bearing in mind that an unreasonable construction of a procedural requirement impairs the right to effective judicial protection ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 37). The general principles established in Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 80-99, also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the procedural rules of a court called upon to rule at first and last instance (see Makrylakis v. Greece, 2022, §§ 36, 38-50, which emphasises the specificity of a situation where the case is examined by a single court, § 49). As regards the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion after an appeal has been lodged, this raises an issue concerning the principle of legal certainty ( Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, §§ 35-45); see also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40).  consideration of the value of the subject matter of the dispute (ratione valoris admissibility threshold) in order to determine the jurisdiction of a higher court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], § 73, §§ 85-86);  the requirements linked to execution of an earlier ruling may impair the right of access to a court, for instance where the applicant's lack of funds makes it impossible for him even to begin to comply with the earlier judgment ( Annoni di Gussola and Others v. France, 2000, § 56; compare with Arvanitakis v. France (dec.), 2000);  procedural rules barring certain subjects of law from taking court proceedings ( The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 1994, § 83; Philis v. Greece (no. 1), 1991, § 65; Lupaş and Others v. Romania, 2006, §§ 64-67; and, regarding adults lacking capacity, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012, §§ 241-45; Nataliya Mikhaylenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 40; Nikolyan v. Armenia, 2019; and compare with R.P. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ by the limits of the judicial review available, for example where a complaint to the administrative courts against a presidential decree could only give rise to a review of compliance with external formalities in the adoption of the decree, whereas the applicant's complaint called for an examination of the merits and of the internal legality of the decree ( Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 153-154, concerning the premature removal of a prosecutor), and a fortiori by the unavailability of a judicial review (see Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, §§ 76-77, concerning the automatic temporary suspension of a judge pending the examination of her appeal against a decision to remove her from office). In the context of family-law disputes, in Plazzi v. Switzerland (§§ 44-67) and Roth v. Switzerland, 2022, (§ 77), concerning the cancellation without judicial review of the suspensive effect of appeals by fathers, thereby enabling their children to leave the country with their mothers and removing the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, the Court found a violation, emphasising that the urgency invoked had not been serious enough to justify preventing the fathers from applying to a court before the cancellation of suspensive effect became applicable (see Plazzi v. Switzerland, 2022, §§ 58-59, and the special nature of proceedings under family law). ▪ In Xavier Lucas v. France, 2022, by giving precedence to the rule that applications to the Court of Appeal had to be made electronically (e-justice), while disregarding the practical hurdles faced by the applicant in doing so, the Court of Cassation had adopted a formalistic approach which was not necessary to ensure legal certainty or the proper administration of justice and which was therefore ""excessive"" (§ 57).","In the specific circumstances of a case, the practical and effective nature of the right of access to a court may be impaired, for instance: ▪ by the prohibitive cost of the proceedings in view of the individual's financial capacity:  the excessive amount of security for costs in the context of an application to join criminal proceedings as a civil party ( Aït-Mouhoub v. France, 1998, §§ 57-58; García Manibardo v. Spain, 2000, §§ 38-45);  excessive court fees ( Kreuz v. Poland, 2001, §§ 60-67; Podbielski and PPU Polpure v. Poland, 2005, §§ 65-66; Weissman and Others v. Romania, 2006, § 42; Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-70, and conversely, Reuther v. Germany (dec.), 2003). In these cases the Court considered the question of court fees that had been imposed prior to the institution of civil proceedings and had had the effect of hindering access to a court at first instance or at a subsequent stage of the proceedings for applicants who were unable to pay (contrast Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, 1995, §§ 62-67, regarding the payment of a security as a precondition for lodging an appeal). The Court has pointed out that where there is a possibility of an exemption from stamp duty for a court application following an assessment of the applicant's financial situation, the authorities must give a decision promptly ( Laçi v. Albania, 2021, §§ 53-60), and diligence is also expected of the applicant ( Elcomp sp. z o.o. v. Poland, 2021, § 41). If the State has a system for calculating court fees linked to the amount in dispute, in order to comply with Article 6 the system must be sufficiently flexible to allow for the possibility of total or partial exemption from payment or a reduction in the amount payable (see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 39 and 40, and see §§ 41-45, where the applicant company had been forced to abandon its appeal because it was unable to pay the fees imposed on it). In Stankov v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 53, the Court held that substantial court fees imposed at the end of proceedings could also amount to a restriction on the right to a court (see, more specifically, for cases concerning the excessive length of proceedings, an acquittal or unjustified pre-trial detention, §§ 59 and 62, and a claim for compensation for assault, Čolić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 58-59); see also, regarding the refusal to reimburse legal costs, Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 68-69 and § 74; and compare with proceedings challenging the costs payable following judicial proceedings, Taratukhin v. Russia (dec.), 2020, §§ 36 et seq. For a recent summary of the case-law, see Benghezal v. France, 2022, §§ 43-45. In cases concerning court fees, regard should also be had to the litigant's conduct ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 120) or the manifest lack of any prospect of success of an action ( Marić v. Croatia (dec.), 2020, §§ 58 and 60, concerning the obligation to bear the full costs of the State's representation, and § 52, concerning the obligation for the losing party to pay litigation costs (the ""loser pays"" rule)); see also Stankiewicz v. Poland, 2006, §§ 62 et seq.; Klauz v. Croatia, 2013, §§ 77 et seq.; and Cindrić and Bešlić v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 119-123). With regard to litigation costs for proceedings that did not give rise to a decision on the merits, see Karahasanoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 136-137. Lastly, the Court has objected to the rule whereby each party has to bear its own costs regardless of the outcome of the proceedings ( Zustović v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-106, and see also §§ 99-100 for the State's duty to bear the cost of its errors in that context); it also examined the rule that each party was to bear its own costs without exception in Dragan Kovačević v. Croatia, 2022, §§ 67-85, and stressed the importance of giving reasons for a decision refusing to reimburse the costs incurred by the successful party (§ 83). However, the Court found no violation of Article 6 on account of a rule of domestic law which provided that costs of the litigation should be reimbursed to a party acquitted in the administrative proceedings only in cases where the relevant authorities had acted unlawfully ( Jakutavičius v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 80 - 86). The Court noted that the applicant himself had contributed to the decision of the police to impose a sanction: although that sanction had later been annulled, the Court was unable to find that the applicant had been made to bear the mistakes of the State authorities. Thus, the fact that the applicant had to cover his own costs in the administrative-law proceedings did not violate his right of access to a court ( ibid ., §§ 84 - 85; compare with Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.), 2023, concerning the absence in domestic law of an arguable right to obtain reimbursement of costs incurred by a defendant acquitted in a criminal case). For the imposition of excessive court fees on a commercial company, see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 39.  The imposition of fines in order to prevent a build-up of cases before the courts and to ensure the proper administration of justice is not, as such, incompatible with the right of access to a court. However, the amount of such fines is an important factor to take into account ( Sace Elektrik Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş. v. Turkey, 2013, §§ 26 et seq., concerning a mandatory fine of 10% of the bid in the event of an unsuccessful attempt to challenge a public auction). ▪ by issues relating to time-limits:  the time taken to hear an appeal leading to its being declared inadmissible ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2006, § 26). For the unforeseeable application of a new time-limit introduced after the lodging of a complaint, in breach of the principle of legal certainty, see Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149 - 165. Litigants are nevertheless required to act with the requisite diligence ( Kamenova v. Bulgaria, 2018, §§ 52-55; compare Çela v. Albania, 2022, § 39).  The Court held in Ivanova and Ivashova v. Russia, 2017, that the national courts should not interpret domestic law in an inflexible manner with the effect of imposing an obligation with which litigants could not possibly comply. Requiring an appeal to be lodged within one month of the date on which the registry drew up a full copy of the court's decision - rather than the point at which the appellant actually had knowledge of the decision - amounted to making the expiry of the relevant deadline dependent on a factor entirely outside the appellant's control. The Court found that the right of appeal should have become effective from the point at which the applicant could effectively apprise herself of the full text of the decision.  limitation periods for bringing a claim (see, regarding harm to physical integrity, the case-law references cited in paragraphs 53-55 of Sanofi Pasteur v. France, 2020, including Howald Moor and Others v. Switzerland, 2014, §§ 79-80; Yagtzilar and Others v. Greece, 2001, § 27; see also the cases cited in Loste v. France, 2022, §§ 68-70). For example, the Court has found a violation of the right of access to a court in a number of cases in which the discontinuation of criminal proceedings and the resulting failure to examine a civil claim were due to a lack of diligence on the national authorities'part ( Atanasova v. Bulgaria, 2008, §§ 35-47). Excessive delays in the examination of a claim may also render the right of access to a court meaningless ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013).  the granting of leave to appeal out of time and the resulting acceptance of an ordinary appeal lodged after a significant period of time, for reasons that do not appear especially convincing, may entail a breach of the principle of legal certainty and the right to a court ( Magomedov and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 87-89, where late appeals benefiting the competent authorities were accepted following the extension without any valid reason of the time-limit for appealing).  the length of preliminary investigations, attributable to the authorities, preventing the applicant from joining criminal proceedings as a civil party claiming damages or from making a civil compensation claim ( Petrella v. Italy, 2021, §§ 51-53 and references cited).  delay by the national authorities in examining an application by the applicant (challenging the selection procedure for a post for which she had applied), with the result that the proceedings were terminated on the grounds that there was no legal interest in pursuing the application as the administrative decision at issue had expired ( Frezadou v. Greece, 2018, § 47 - compare and contrast with Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 72). More generally, in exceptional cases where proceedings are kept pending for an excessive period, this may impair the right of access to a court ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013, § 57). The unjustified lack of a decision for a particularly lengthy period by the court dealing with the case may be regarded as a denial of justice; the remedy used by the applicant may thus become deprived of all effectiveness where the court concerned does not manage to settle the dispute in good time, as required by the circumstances of the case and what is at stake ( Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 60). ▪ by issues relating to jurisdiction (see, for example, Arlewin v. Sweden, 2016, concerning a television programme broadcast from another European Union country) or an excessively restrictive interpretation of the scope of an association's stated aim, depriving it of its right of access to a court ( Association Burestop 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 71). Furthermore, where an action for damages is brought against it, the State has a positive obligation to facilitate the identification of the respondent authority ( Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-71). ▪ by issues of evidence, where the requirements for the burden of proof are overly rigid ( Tence v. Slovenia, 2016, §§ 35-38); concerning formalism in the presentation of evidence, see Efstratiou and Others v. Greece, 2020, §§ 44 et seq. ▪ by the existence of procedural bars preventing or limiting the possibilities of applying to a court:  a particularly strict interpretation by the domestic courts of a procedural rule (excessive formalism) may deprive applicants of their right of access to a court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 97; Pérez de Rada Cavanilles v. Spain, 1998, § 49; Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Sotiris and Nikos Koutras ATTEE v. Greece, 2000, § 20; Běleš and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 50; RTBF v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 71-72 and 74; Miessen v. Belgium, 2016, §§ 72-74; Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, § 34; and for a constitutional court, Dos Santos Calado and Others v. Portugal, 2020, §§ 118-130), bearing in mind that an unreasonable construction of a procedural requirement impairs the right to effective judicial protection ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 37). The general principles established in Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 80-99, also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the procedural rules of a court called upon to rule at first and last instance (see Makrylakis v. Greece, 2022, §§ 36, 38-50, which emphasises the specificity of a situation where the case is examined by a single court, § 49). As regards the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion after an appeal has been lodged, this raises an issue concerning the principle of legal certainty ( Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, §§ 35-45); see also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149 - 165).  consideration of the value of the subject matter of the dispute (ratione valoris admissibility threshold) in order to determine the jurisdiction of a higher court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], § 73, §§ 85-86);  the requirements linked to execution of an earlier ruling may impair the right of access to a court, for instance where the applicant's lack of funds makes it impossible for him even to begin to comply with the earlier judgment ( Annoni di Gussola and Others v. France, 2000, § 56; compare with Arvanitakis v. France (dec.), 2000);  procedural rules barring certain subjects of law from taking court proceedings ( The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 1994, § 83; Philis v. Greece (no. 1), 1991, § 65; Lupaş and Others v. Romania, 2006, §§ 64-67; and, regarding adults lacking capacity, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012, §§ 241-45; Nataliya Mikhaylenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 40; Nikolyan v. Armenia, 2019; and compare with R.P. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ by the limits of the judicial review available, for example where a complaint to the administrative courts against a presidential decree could only give rise to a review of compliance with external formalities in the adoption of the decree, whereas the applicant's complaint called for an examination of the merits and of the internal legality of the decree ( Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 153-154, concerning the premature removal of a prosecutor), and a fortiori by the unavailability of a judicial review (see Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, §§ 76-77, concerning the automatic temporary suspension of a judge pending the examination of her appeal against a decision to remove her from office). In the context of family-law disputes, in Plazzi v. Switzerland (§§ 44-67) and Roth v. Switzerland, 2022, (§ 77), concerning the cancellation without judicial review of the suspensive effect of appeals by fathers, thereby enabling their children to leave the country with their mothers and removing the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, the Court found a violation, emphasising that the urgency invoked had not been serious enough to justify preventing the fathers from applying to a court before the cancellation of suspensive effect became applicable (see Plazzi v. Switzerland, 2022, §§ 58-59, and the special nature of proceedings under family law). ▪ In Xavier Lucas v. France, 2022, by giving precedence to the rule that applications to the Court of Appeal had to be made electronically (e-justice), while disregarding the practical hurdles faced by the applicant in doing so, the Court of Cassation had adopted a formalistic approach which was not necessary to ensure legal certainty or the proper administration of justice and which was therefore ""excessive"" (§ 57)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:72173/17,Legros and Others v. France,72173/17,added,"Legros and Others v. France, nos. 72173/17 and 17 others, 9 November 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,II.A.1,A right that is practical and effective,3,126,140,0.7767,"Legros and Others v. France , 2023","Aït-Mouhoub v. France , 1998|Benghezal v. France , 2022|Elcomp sp. z o.o. v. Poland , 2021|García Manibardo v. Spain , 2000|Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania , 2011|In Stankov v. Bulgaria , 2007|Klauz v. Croatia , 2013|Kreuz v. Poland , 2001|Laçi v. Albania , 2021|Melnyk v. Ukraine , 2006|Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain , 2000|Nalbant and Others v. Turkey , 2022|Podbielski and PPU Polpure v. Poland , 2005|Stankiewicz v. Poland , 2006|Weissman and Others v. Romania , 2006|Çela v. Albania , 2022|ć v. Croatia , 2016|ć v. Croatia , 2021|ć v. Croatia , 2022|čius v. Lithuania , 2020|ğlu v. Turkey , 2021|Ş. v. Turkey , 2013","In the specific circumstances of a case, the practical and effective nature of the right of access to a court may be impaired, for instance: ▪ by the prohibitive cost of the proceedings in view of the individual's financial capacity:  the excessive amount of security for costs in the context of an application to join criminal proceedings as a civil party ( Aït-Mouhoub v. France, 1998, §§ 57-58; García Manibardo v. Spain, 2000, §§ 38-45);  excessive court fees ( Kreuz v. Poland, 2001, §§ 60-67; Podbielski and PPU Polpure v. Poland, 2005, §§ 65-66; Weissman and Others v. Romania, 2006, § 42; Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-70, and conversely, Reuther v. Germany (dec.), 2003). In these cases the Court considered the question of court fees that had been imposed prior to the institution of civil proceedings and had had the effect of hindering access to a court at first instance or at a subsequent stage of the proceedings for applicants who were unable to pay (contrast Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, 1995, §§ 62-67, regarding the payment of a security as a precondition for lodging an appeal). The Court has pointed out that where there is a possibility of an exemption from stamp duty for a court application following an assessment of the applicant's financial situation, the authorities must give a decision promptly ( Laçi v. Albania, 2021, §§ 53-60), and diligence is also expected of the applicant ( Elcomp sp. z o.o. v. Poland, 2021, § 41). If the State has a system for calculating court fees linked to the amount in dispute, in order to comply with Article 6 the system must be sufficiently flexible to allow for the possibility of total or partial exemption from payment or a reduction in the amount payable (see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 39 and 40, and see §§ 41-45, where the applicant company had been forced to abandon its appeal because it was unable to pay the fees imposed on it). In Stankov v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 53, the Court held that substantial court fees imposed at the end of proceedings could also amount to a restriction on the right to a court (see, more specifically, for cases concerning the excessive length of proceedings, an acquittal or unjustified pre-trial detention, §§ 59 and 62, and a claim for compensation for assault, Čolić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 58-59); see also, regarding the refusal to reimburse legal costs, Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 68-69 and § 74; and compare with proceedings challenging the costs payable following judicial proceedings, Taratukhin v. Russia (dec.), 2020, §§ 36 et seq. For a recent summary of the case-law, see Benghezal v. France, 2022, §§ 43-45. In cases concerning court fees, regard should also be had to the litigant's conduct ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 120) or the manifest lack of any prospect of success of an action ( Marić v. Croatia (dec.), 2020, §§ 58 and 60, concerning the obligation to bear the full costs of the State's representation, and § 52, concerning the obligation for the losing party to pay litigation costs (the ""loser pays"" rule)); see also Stankiewicz v. Poland, 2006, §§ 62 et seq.; Klauz v. Croatia, 2013, §§ 77 et seq.; and Cindrić and Bešlić v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 119-123). With regard to litigation costs for proceedings that did not give rise to a decision on the merits, see Karahasanoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 136-137. Lastly, the Court has objected to the rule whereby each party has to bear its own costs regardless of the outcome of the proceedings ( Zustović v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-106, and see also §§ 99-100 for the State's duty to bear the cost of its errors in that context); it also examined the rule that each party was to bear its own costs without exception in Dragan Kovačević v. Croatia, 2022, §§ 67-85, and stressed the importance of giving reasons for a decision refusing to reimburse the costs incurred by the successful party (§ 83). For the imposition of excessive court fees on a commercial company, see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 39.  The imposition of fines in order to prevent a build-up of cases before the courts and to ensure the proper administration of justice is not, as such, incompatible with the right of access to a court. However, the amount of such fines is an important factor to take into account ( Sace Elektrik Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş. v. Turkey, 2013, §§ 26 et seq., concerning a mandatory fine of 10% of the bid in the event of an unsuccessful attempt to challenge a public auction). ▪ by issues relating to time-limits:  the time taken to hear an appeal leading to its being declared inadmissible ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2006, § 26). For the unforeseeable application of a new time-limit introduced after the lodging of a complaint, in breach of the principle of legal certainty, see Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34","The requirement of ""foreseeability"" does not necessarily mean that every restriction or procedural condtition for introducing a case or lodging an appeal should always be clearly formulated in the law itself: judge-made restrictions may also be acceptable. Thus, in Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 134 - 148, the applicants'appeals against various administrative acts were rejected as belated with reference to a judgment of the French Conseil d'État which had introduced a time-limit for such appeals. This new time-limit was a reversal of the previously existing case-law under which appeals against that particular category of administrative acts could have been introduced and accepted for examination indefinitely. The new rule, formulated by the Conseil d'État, made such appeals inadmissible if they were introduced after a "" reasonable period "", generally of one year from the moment when the litigant became aware of the contested act. That time-limit could be extended in the particular circumstances, on a case-by-case basis. The Court noted that the time-limit introduced by the Conseil d'État was sufficiently long, that this new rule served the interests of legal certainty and good administration of justice, and that it allowed for exceptions. The Court concluded that this manner of formulating restrictions to the right of access to court was not incompatible with Article 6 of the Convention (§ 148). By contrast, the Court found a violation of Article 6 on account of the retroactive application of this new rule to the proceedings which had already been underway when this rule had been formulated (§§ 149 - 162). The Court noted, in particular, that such development could not have been foreseen by the applicants, and that, although this new time-limit was subject to extension, the reasons for obtaining such an extension had not been defined in the case-law at the time. The Government failed to explain why the introduction of this new time-limit could not have been postponed (§ 160). The Court concluded that the application of this new inadmissibility criteria to the applicants'complaints pending before the administrative courts had breached their right of access to court."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:72173/17,Legros and Others v. France,72173/17,added,"Legros and Others v. France, nos. 72173/17 and 17 others, 9 November 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1,A right that is practical and effective,3,131,142,0.9348,"Legros and Others v. France , 2023",,"In Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 on account of the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion for an appeal to the Supreme Court after the appeal had been lodged (§ 45). Referring to the principle of legal certainty, the Court found that the emergence of the new criterion had not been foreseeable for the applicant (§§ 38-39) and that she had therefore been unable to remedy any potential effects of the application of the new criterion (§§ 40-43). See also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 39-40.","In Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 on account of the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion for an appeal to the Supreme Court after the appeal had been lodged (§ 45). Referring to the principle of legal certainty, the Court found that the emergence of the new criterion had not been foreseeable for the applicant (§§ 38-39) and that she had therefore been unable to remedy any potential effects of the application of the new criterion (§§ 40-43). Similarly, in Hanževački v. Croatia, §§ 36-41, the Court concluded that an unforeseeable retroactive imposition of a procedural condition for lodging a constitutional complaint - a condition which the applicant could no longer fulfil - impaired the applicant's right to a court to such an extent that the very essence of that right was impaired. See also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 39-40, and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149 - 165."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:4465/18,Molchanova v. Ukraine (dec.),4465/18,added,"Molchanova v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 4465/18, 26 September 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,IV.C.1,Determination of the length of the proceedings,3,498,515,0.9263,,"Koziy v. Ukraine , 2009","Thus, in some circumstances, the reasonable time may begin to run even before the issue of the writ commencing proceedings before the court to which the claimant submits the dispute ( Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], 2007, § 65; Golder v. the United Kingdom, 1975, § 32 in fine ; Erkner and Hofauer v. Austria, 1987, § 64). However, this is exceptional and has been accepted where, for example, certain preliminary steps were a necessary preamble to the proceedings ( Blake v. the United Kingdom, 2006, § 40). For the case of a civil-party claim, see Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], 2019, §§ 207-208; Arnoldi v. Italy, 2017, §§ 25-40; and Koziy v. Ukraine, 2009, § 25).","Thus, in some circumstances, the reasonable time may begin to run even before the issue of the writ commencing proceedings before the court to which the claimant submits the dispute ( Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], 2007, § 65; Golder v. the United Kingdom, 1975, § 32 in fine ; Erkner and Hofauer v. Austria, 1987, § 64). However, this is exceptional and has been accepted where, for example, certain preliminary steps were a necessary preamble to the proceedings ( Blake v. the United Kingdom, 2006, § 40). For the case of a civil-party claim introduced within the framework of criminal proceedings, see Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], 2019, §§ 207-208; Arnoldi v. Italy, 2017, §§ 25-40; see also Molchanova v. Ukraine (dec.), 2023, § 28 in which the Court calculated the overall length of the proceedings from the moment a civil claim was introduced by the applicant within the criminal case concerning the death of her son)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:25226/18,Pająk and Others v. Poland,25226/18,added,"Pająk and Others v. Poland, nos. 25226/18 and 3 others, 24 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.2,Existence of an arguable right or obligation in domestic law,3,,23,,"ąk and others v. Poland , 2023",,,"As to the point in time to which the assessment of whether or not there was an ""arguable"" right in domestic law should relate in the event of a change in the law, see Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 110, and Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, § 285, where the Court found that the question whether a right ""existed"" under domestic law could not be answered on the basis of the new legislation. Accordingly, the fact that the applicants'respective terms of office (as President of the Supreme Court/a member of the National Council of the Judiciary) had been terminated ex lege could not be regarded as removing, retrospectively, the "" arguability "" of the "" right "" that they could have claimed under Article 6 § 1 in accordance with the rules in force at the time of their appointment. In Stoianoglo v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 29, the Court applied a similar approach to the proceedings in which the Prosecutor General tried to contest his suspension. For the Court, the question whether or not the Prosecutor General had a defendable right to continue exercising his functions should be answered, not on the basis of the new legislation, but rather on the basis of the legislation which existed at the moment when he had been appointed. Similarly, the Court concluded that the applicants had had a defendable right in the case of Pająk and others v. Poland, 2023, §§ 120-125, which concerned the application of a new legislation which lowered the retirement age for judges and had introduced a new procedure for extending the mandate beyond the new (lower) age of retirement. Thus, the Court found that the applicant, a civil servant, had a right to certain conditions of service even when, following a legislative reform, the scope of this right, or the procedural modalities of exercising it, has been changed. Similarly, in Gyulumyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, the Court applied the same approach to a dispute arising out of the early termination of mandates of several judges and the President of the Constitutional Court, even though this termination had resulted automatically from a constitutional amendment (§§ 65 - 67)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:25226/18,Pająk and Others v. Poland,25226/18,added,"Pająk and Others v. Poland, nos. 25226/18 and 3 others, 24 October 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.C.1.b,Are there any objective grounds in the State ’ s interest justifying the exclusion?,4,,68,,"ąk and others v. Poland , 2023",,,"Thus, insofar as the second criterion of the Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland test is concerned, the Court distinguished between the situation of judges and that of the military personnel and other top-level civil servants who are subordinated to the hierarchy of the executive branch. This distinction has been made explicit in Pająk and others v. Poland, 2023, § 138. In that case the Court noted that the special bond of trust and loyalty which exists between the State and some categories of civil servants (like military officers, for example) may justify limitations on access to courts in relation to some service-related disputes. However, this justification does not apply to judges, whose position is determined by the imperative of preserving judicial independence. The Court in that case concluded, in the light of the international standards on judicial independence, that judges should have access to court in matters related to an early termination of their mandate (or of a particular administrative function within the judiciary), be it as a result of a disciplinary sanctions or by virtue of the new rules governing the duration of such mandate, including the new rules on the retirement age (§ 139)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:66292/14,Pengezov v. Bulgaria,66292/14,added,"Pengezov v. Bulgaria, no. 66292/14, 10 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,I.D,Applicability of Article 6 to proceedings other than main proceedings,2,83,81,0.7379,"Camelia Bogdan v. Romania , 2020|Loquifer v. Belgium , 2021|Pengezov v. Bulgaria , 2023",,"According to Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], 2007, disputes relating to public servants do not fall within the scope of Article 6 when the following two criteria are met: the State in its national law must have expressly - or implicitly, as clarified in Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, § 292) - excluded access to a ""tribunal"" for the post or category of staff in question, and the exclusion must be justified on "" objective grounds in the State's interest "" ( Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], 2007, § 62, with the clarifications set out in Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, §§ 261 and 299-300; see also Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 103; Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2017, § 107). According to the approach adopted in Vilho Eskelinen, the mere fact that the applicant is in a sector or department which participates in the exercise of power conferred by public law is not in itself decisive. Moreover, any exclusion of the application of Article 6 has to be compatible with the rule of law. For this to be the case, it must be based on an instrument of general application ( Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 117) and not a provision directed at a specific individual, since laws which are directed against specific persons are contrary to the rule of law ( Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, § 296, § 299). The Grzęda v. Poland judgment adds that if the subject matter of the case is closely related to judicial independence, this will have an impact on the examination of the second condition of the Vilho Eskelinen test (§ 300). Very few cases have given rise to a finding that both conditions of the Vilho Eskelinen test were satisfied.","Preliminary proceedings, like those concerned with the grant of an interim measure such as an injunction, were not normally considered to ""determine"" civil rights and obligations. However, in 2009, the Court departed from its previous case-law and took a new approach. In Micallef v. Malta [GC], 2009, §§ 80-86, the Court established that the applicability of Article 6 to interim measures will depend on whether certain conditions are fulfilled. Firstly, the right at stake in both the main and the injunction proceedings should be ""civil"" within the meaning of the Convention. Secondly, the nature of the interim measure, its object and purpose as well as its effects on the right in question should be scrutinised. Whenever an interim measure can be considered effectively to determine the civil right or obligation at stake, notwithstanding the length of time it is in force, Article 6 will be applicable (see also, for the temporary suspension of a judge in the context of disciplinary proceedings, Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, § 70, and for a preventive administrative measure of temporary suspension during ongoing criminal proceedings, Loquifer v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 34-35; see also Pengezov v. Bulgaria, 2023, § 37)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:38744/21,Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.),38744/21,added,"Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.) no. 38744/21, 25 January 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1,A right that is practical and effective,3,40,136,0.99,"Aït-Mouhoub v. France , 1998|Benghezal v. France , 2022|Elcomp sp. z o.o. v. Poland , 2021|García Manibardo v. Spain , 2000|In Stankov v. Bulgaria , 2007|Klauz v. Croatia , 2013|Kreuz v. Poland , 2001|Laçi v. Albania , 2021|Legros and Others v. France , 2023|Melnyk v. Ukraine , 2006|Nalbant and Others v. Turkey , 2022|Podbielski and PPU Polpure v. Poland , 2005|Stankiewicz v. Poland , 2006|Weissman and Others v. Romania , 2006|ć v. Croatia , 2016|ć v. Croatia , 2021|ć v. Croatia , 2022|čius v. Lithuania , 2020|čius v. Lithuania , 2024|ğlu v. Turkey , 2021|Ş. v. Turkey , 2013",,"Litigants are nevertheless required to act with the requisite diligence ( Kamenova v. Bulgaria, 2018, §§ 52-55; compare Çela v. Albania, 2022, § 39).  The Court held in Ivanova and Ivashova v. Russia, 2017, that the national courts should not interpret domestic law in an inflexible manner with the effect of imposing an obligation with which litigants could not possibly comply. Requiring an appeal to be lodged within one month of the date on which the registry drew up a full copy of the court's decision - rather than the point at which the appellant actually had knowledge of the decision - amounted to making the expiry of the relevant deadline dependent on a factor entirely outside the appellant's control. The Court found that the right of appeal should have become effective from the point at which the applicant could effectively apprise herself of the full text of the decision.  limitation periods for bringing a claim (see, regarding harm to physical integrity, the case-law references cited in paragraphs 53-55 of Sanofi Pasteur v. France, 2020, including Howald Moor and Others v. Switzerland, 2014, §§ 79-80; Yagtzilar and Others v. Greece, 2001, § 27; see also the cases cited in Loste v. France, 2022, §§ 68-70). For example, the Court has found a violation of the right of access to a court in a number of cases in which the discontinuation of criminal proceedings and the resulting failure to examine a civil claim were due to a lack of diligence on the national authorities'part ( Atanasova v. Bulgaria, 2008, §§ 35-47). Excessive delays in the examination of a claim may also render the right of access to a court meaningless ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013).  the granting of leave to appeal out of time and the resulting acceptance of an ordinary appeal lodged after a significant period of time, for reasons that do not appear especially convincing, may entail a breach of the principle of legal certainty and the right to a court ( Magomedov and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 87-89, where late appeals benefiting the competent authorities were accepted following the extension without any valid reason of the time-limit for appealing).  the length of preliminary investigations, attributable to the authorities, preventing the applicant from joining criminal proceedings as a civil party claiming damages or from making a civil compensation claim ( Petrella v. Italy, 2021, §§ 51-53 and references cited).  delay by the national authorities in examining an application by the applicant (challenging the selection procedure for a post for which she had applied), with the result that the proceedings were terminated on the grounds that there was no legal interest in pursuing the application as the administrative decision at issue had expired ( Frezadou v. Greece, 2018, § 47 - compare and contrast with Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 72). More generally, in exceptional cases where proceedings are kept pending for an excessive period, this may impair the right of access to a court ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013, § 57). The unjustified lack of a decision for a particularly lengthy period by the court dealing with the case may be regarded as a denial of justice; the remedy used by the applicant may thus become deprived of all effectiveness where the court concerned does not manage to settle the dispute in good time, as required by the circumstances of the case and what is at stake ( Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 60). ▪ by issues relating to jurisdiction (see, for example, Arlewin v. Sweden, 2016, concerning a television programme broadcast from another European Union country) or an excessively restrictive interpretation of the scope of an association's stated aim, depriving it of its right of access to a court ( Association Burestop 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 71). Furthermore, where an action for damages is brought against it, the State has a positive obligation to facilitate the identification of the respondent authority ( Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-71). ▪ by issues of evidence, where the requirements for the burden of proof are overly rigid ( Tence v. Slovenia, 2016, §§ 35-38); concerning formalism in the presentation of evidence, see Efstratiou and Others v. Greece, 2020, §§ 44 et seq. ▪ by the existence of procedural bars preventing or limiting the possibilities of applying to a court:  a particularly strict interpretation by the domestic courts of a procedural rule (excessive formalism) may deprive applicants of their right of access to a court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 97; Pérez de Rada Cavanilles v. Spain, 1998, § 49; Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Sotiris and Nikos Koutras ATTEE v. Greece, 2000, § 20; Běleš and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 50; RTBF v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 71-72 and 74; Miessen v. Belgium, 2016, §§ 72-74; Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, § 34; and for a constitutional court, Dos Santos Calado and Others v. Portugal, 2020, §§ 118-130), bearing in mind that an unreasonable construction of a procedural requirement impairs the right to effective judicial protection ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 37). The general principles established in Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 80-99, also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the procedural rules of a court called upon to rule at first and last instance (see Makrylakis v. Greece, 2022, §§ 36, 38-50, which emphasises the specificity of a situation where the case is examined by a single court, § 49). As regards the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion after an appeal has been lodged, this raises an issue concerning the principle of legal certainty ( Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, §§ 35-45); see also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40).  consideration of the value of the subject matter of the dispute (ratione valoris admissibility threshold) in order to determine the jurisdiction of a higher court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], § 73, §§ 85-86);  the requirements linked to execution of an earlier ruling may impair the right of access to a court, for instance where the applicant's lack of funds makes it impossible for him even to begin to comply with the earlier judgment ( Annoni di Gussola and Others v. France, 2000, § 56; compare with Arvanitakis v. France (dec.), 2000);  procedural rules barring certain subjects of law from taking court proceedings ( The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 1994, § 83; Philis v. Greece (no. 1), 1991, § 65; Lupaş and Others v. Romania, 2006, §§ 64-67; and, regarding adults lacking capacity, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012, §§ 241-45; Nataliya Mikhaylenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 40; Nikolyan v. Armenia, 2019; and compare with R.P. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ by the limits of the judicial review available, for example where a complaint to the administrative courts against a presidential decree could only give rise to a review of compliance with external formalities in the adoption of the decree, whereas the applicant's complaint called for an examination of the merits and of the internal legality of the decree ( Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 153-154, concerning the premature removal of a prosecutor), and a fortiori by the unavailability of a judicial review (see Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, §§ 76-77, concerning the automatic temporary suspension of a judge pending the examination of her appeal against a decision to remove her from office). In the context of family-law disputes, in Plazzi v. Switzerland (§§ 44-67) and Roth v. Switzerland, 2022, (§ 77), concerning the cancellation without judicial review of the suspensive effect of appeals by fathers, thereby enabling their children to leave the country with their mothers and removing the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, the Court found a violation, emphasising that the urgency invoked had not been serious enough to justify preventing the fathers from applying to a court before the cancellation of suspensive effect became applicable (see Plazzi v. Switzerland, 2022, §§ 58-59, and the special nature of proceedings under family law). ▪ In Xavier Lucas v. France, 2022, by giving precedence to the rule that applications to the Court of Appeal had to be made electronically (e-justice), while disregarding the practical hurdles faced by the applicant in doing so, the Court of Cassation had adopted a formalistic approach which was not necessary to ensure legal certainty or the proper administration of justice and which was therefore ""excessive"" (§ 57).","In the specific circumstances of a case, the practical and effective nature of the right of access to a court may be impaired, for instance: ▪ by the prohibitive cost of the proceedings in view of the individual's financial capacity:  the excessive amount of security for costs in the context of an application to join criminal proceedings as a civil party ( Aït-Mouhoub v. France, 1998, §§ 57-58; García Manibardo v. Spain, 2000, §§ 38-45);  excessive court fees ( Kreuz v. Poland, 2001, §§ 60-67; Podbielski and PPU Polpure v. Poland, 2005, §§ 65-66; Weissman and Others v. Romania, 2006, § 42; Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-70, and conversely, Reuther v. Germany (dec.), 2003). In these cases the Court considered the question of court fees that had been imposed prior to the institution of civil proceedings and had had the effect of hindering access to a court at first instance or at a subsequent stage of the proceedings for applicants who were unable to pay (contrast Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, 1995, §§ 62-67, regarding the payment of a security as a precondition for lodging an appeal). The Court has pointed out that where there is a possibility of an exemption from stamp duty for a court application following an assessment of the applicant's financial situation, the authorities must give a decision promptly ( Laçi v. Albania, 2021, §§ 53-60), and diligence is also expected of the applicant ( Elcomp sp. z o.o. v. Poland, 2021, § 41). If the State has a system for calculating court fees linked to the amount in dispute, in order to comply with Article 6 the system must be sufficiently flexible to allow for the possibility of total or partial exemption from payment or a reduction in the amount payable (see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 39 and 40, and see §§ 41-45, where the applicant company had been forced to abandon its appeal because it was unable to pay the fees imposed on it). In Stankov v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 53, the Court held that substantial court fees imposed at the end of proceedings could also amount to a restriction on the right to a court (see, more specifically, for cases concerning the excessive length of proceedings, an acquittal or unjustified pre-trial detention, §§ 59 and 62, and a claim for compensation for assault, Čolić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 58-59); see also, regarding the refusal to reimburse legal costs, Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 68-69 and § 74; and compare with proceedings challenging the costs payable following judicial proceedings, Taratukhin v. Russia (dec.), 2020, §§ 36 et seq. For a recent summary of the case-law, see Benghezal v. France, 2022, §§ 43-45. In cases concerning court fees, regard should also be had to the litigant's conduct ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 120) or the manifest lack of any prospect of success of an action ( Marić v. Croatia (dec.), 2020, §§ 58 and 60, concerning the obligation to bear the full costs of the State's representation, and § 52, concerning the obligation for the losing party to pay litigation costs (the ""loser pays"" rule)); see also Stankiewicz v. Poland, 2006, §§ 62 et seq.; Klauz v. Croatia, 2013, §§ 77 et seq.; and Cindrić and Bešlić v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 119-123). With regard to litigation costs for proceedings that did not give rise to a decision on the merits, see Karahasanoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 136-137. Lastly, the Court has objected to the rule whereby each party has to bear its own costs regardless of the outcome of the proceedings ( Zustović v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-106, and see also §§ 99-100 for the State's duty to bear the cost of its errors in that context); it also examined the rule that each party was to bear its own costs without exception in Dragan Kovačević v. Croatia, 2022, §§ 67-85, and stressed the importance of giving reasons for a decision refusing to reimburse the costs incurred by the successful party (§ 83). However, the Court found no violation of Article 6 on account of a rule of domestic law which provided that costs of the litigation should be reimbursed to a party acquitted in the administrative proceedings only in cases where the relevant authorities had acted unlawfully ( Jakutavičius v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 80 - 86). The Court noted that the applicant himself had contributed to the decision of the police to impose a sanction: although that sanction had later been annulled, the Court was unable to find that the applicant had been made to bear the mistakes of the State authorities. Thus, the fact that the applicant had to cover his own costs in the administrative-law proceedings did not violate his right of access to a court ( ibid ., §§ 84 - 85; compare with Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.), 2023, concerning the absence in domestic law of an arguable right to obtain reimbursement of costs incurred by a defendant acquitted in a criminal case). For the imposition of excessive court fees on a commercial company, see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 39.  The imposition of fines in order to prevent a build-up of cases before the courts and to ensure the proper administration of justice is not, as such, incompatible with the right of access to a court. However, the amount of such fines is an important factor to take into account ( Sace Elektrik Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş. v. Turkey, 2013, §§ 26 et seq., concerning a mandatory fine of 10% of the bid in the event of an unsuccessful attempt to challenge a public auction). ▪ by issues relating to time-limits:  the time taken to hear an appeal leading to its being declared inadmissible ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2006, § 26). For the unforeseeable application of a new time-limit introduced after the lodging of a complaint, in breach of the principle of legal certainty, see Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149 - 165. Litigants are nevertheless required to act with the requisite diligence ( Kamenova v. Bulgaria, 2018, §§ 52-55; compare Çela v. Albania, 2022, § 39).  The Court held in Ivanova and Ivashova v. Russia, 2017, that the national courts should not interpret domestic law in an inflexible manner with the effect of imposing an obligation with which litigants could not possibly comply. Requiring an appeal to be lodged within one month of the date on which the registry drew up a full copy of the court's decision - rather than the point at which the appellant actually had knowledge of the decision - amounted to making the expiry of the relevant deadline dependent on a factor entirely outside the appellant's control. The Court found that the right of appeal should have become effective from the point at which the applicant could effectively apprise herself of the full text of the decision.  limitation periods for bringing a claim (see, regarding harm to physical integrity, the case-law references cited in paragraphs 53-55 of Sanofi Pasteur v. France, 2020, including Howald Moor and Others v. Switzerland, 2014, §§ 79-80; Yagtzilar and Others v. Greece, 2001, § 27; see also the cases cited in Loste v. France, 2022, §§ 68-70). For example, the Court has found a violation of the right of access to a court in a number of cases in which the discontinuation of criminal proceedings and the resulting failure to examine a civil claim were due to a lack of diligence on the national authorities'part ( Atanasova v. Bulgaria, 2008, §§ 35-47). Excessive delays in the examination of a claim may also render the right of access to a court meaningless ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013).  the granting of leave to appeal out of time and the resulting acceptance of an ordinary appeal lodged after a significant period of time, for reasons that do not appear especially convincing, may entail a breach of the principle of legal certainty and the right to a court ( Magomedov and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 87-89, where late appeals benefiting the competent authorities were accepted following the extension without any valid reason of the time-limit for appealing).  the length of preliminary investigations, attributable to the authorities, preventing the applicant from joining criminal proceedings as a civil party claiming damages or from making a civil compensation claim ( Petrella v. Italy, 2021, §§ 51-53 and references cited).  delay by the national authorities in examining an application by the applicant (challenging the selection procedure for a post for which she had applied), with the result that the proceedings were terminated on the grounds that there was no legal interest in pursuing the application as the administrative decision at issue had expired ( Frezadou v. Greece, 2018, § 47 - compare and contrast with Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 72). More generally, in exceptional cases where proceedings are kept pending for an excessive period, this may impair the right of access to a court ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013, § 57). The unjustified lack of a decision for a particularly lengthy period by the court dealing with the case may be regarded as a denial of justice; the remedy used by the applicant may thus become deprived of all effectiveness where the court concerned does not manage to settle the dispute in good time, as required by the circumstances of the case and what is at stake ( Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 60). ▪ by issues relating to jurisdiction (see, for example, Arlewin v. Sweden, 2016, concerning a television programme broadcast from another European Union country) or an excessively restrictive interpretation of the scope of an association's stated aim, depriving it of its right of access to a court ( Association Burestop 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 71). Furthermore, where an action for damages is brought against it, the State has a positive obligation to facilitate the identification of the respondent authority ( Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-71). ▪ by issues of evidence, where the requirements for the burden of proof are overly rigid ( Tence v. Slovenia, 2016, §§ 35-38); concerning formalism in the presentation of evidence, see Efstratiou and Others v. Greece, 2020, §§ 44 et seq. ▪ by the existence of procedural bars preventing or limiting the possibilities of applying to a court:  a particularly strict interpretation by the domestic courts of a procedural rule (excessive formalism) may deprive applicants of their right of access to a court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 97; Pérez de Rada Cavanilles v. Spain, 1998, § 49; Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Sotiris and Nikos Koutras ATTEE v. Greece, 2000, § 20; Běleš and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 50; RTBF v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 71-72 and 74; Miessen v. Belgium, 2016, §§ 72-74; Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, § 34; and for a constitutional court, Dos Santos Calado and Others v. Portugal, 2020, §§ 118-130), bearing in mind that an unreasonable construction of a procedural requirement impairs the right to effective judicial protection ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 37). The general principles established in Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 80-99, also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the procedural rules of a court called upon to rule at first and last instance (see Makrylakis v. Greece, 2022, §§ 36, 38-50, which emphasises the specificity of a situation where the case is examined by a single court, § 49). As regards the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion after an appeal has been lodged, this raises an issue concerning the principle of legal certainty ( Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, §§ 35-45); see also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149 - 165).  consideration of the value of the subject matter of the dispute (ratione valoris admissibility threshold) in order to determine the jurisdiction of a higher court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], § 73, §§ 85-86);  the requirements linked to execution of an earlier ruling may impair the right of access to a court, for instance where the applicant's lack of funds makes it impossible for him even to begin to comply with the earlier judgment ( Annoni di Gussola and Others v. France, 2000, § 56; compare with Arvanitakis v. France (dec.), 2000);  procedural rules barring certain subjects of law from taking court proceedings ( The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 1994, § 83; Philis v. Greece (no. 1), 1991, § 65; Lupaş and Others v. Romania, 2006, §§ 64-67; and, regarding adults lacking capacity, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012, §§ 241-45; Nataliya Mikhaylenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 40; Nikolyan v. Armenia, 2019; and compare with R.P. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ by the limits of the judicial review available, for example where a complaint to the administrative courts against a presidential decree could only give rise to a review of compliance with external formalities in the adoption of the decree, whereas the applicant's complaint called for an examination of the merits and of the internal legality of the decree ( Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 153-154, concerning the premature removal of a prosecutor), and a fortiori by the unavailability of a judicial review (see Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, §§ 76-77, concerning the automatic temporary suspension of a judge pending the examination of her appeal against a decision to remove her from office). In the context of family-law disputes, in Plazzi v. Switzerland (§§ 44-67) and Roth v. Switzerland, 2022, (§ 77), concerning the cancellation without judicial review of the suspensive effect of appeals by fathers, thereby enabling their children to leave the country with their mothers and removing the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, the Court found a violation, emphasising that the urgency invoked had not been serious enough to justify preventing the fathers from applying to a court before the cancellation of suspensive effect became applicable (see Plazzi v. Switzerland, 2022, §§ 58-59, and the special nature of proceedings under family law). ▪ In Xavier Lucas v. France, 2022, by giving precedence to the rule that applications to the Court of Appeal had to be made electronically (e-justice), while disregarding the practical hurdles faced by the applicant in doing so, the Court of Cassation had adopted a formalistic approach which was not necessary to ensure legal certainty or the proper administration of justice and which was therefore ""excessive"" (§ 57)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:38744/21,Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.),38744/21,added,"Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.) no. 38744/21, 25 January 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.1,Granting of legal aid,3,,183,,,,,"Where national law does not provide for the right of the defendant in criminal proceedings to obtain reimbursement of the legal costs incurred in those proceedings, even following acquittal, no ""defendable right"" exists, and, therefore, Article 6, under its ""civil limb"", is inapplicable to the proceedings related to the recovery of such costs ( Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.), 2024, §§ 23 - 29; see also in this respect the Guide on Article 6 criminal, in particular Section VI-B-3 on the legal assistance and Section VI-A-1-b on the obligation of the accused to bear costs from the standpoint of the respect for the presumption of innocense)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:19371/22,Stoianoglo v. the Republic of Moldova,19371/22,added,"Stoianoglo v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 19371/22, 24 October 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.2,Existence of an arguable right or obligation in domestic law,3,,23,,"ąk and others v. Poland , 2023",,,"As to the point in time to which the assessment of whether or not there was an ""arguable"" right in domestic law should relate in the event of a change in the law, see Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 110, and Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, § 285, where the Court found that the question whether a right ""existed"" under domestic law could not be answered on the basis of the new legislation. Accordingly, the fact that the applicants'respective terms of office (as President of the Supreme Court/a member of the National Council of the Judiciary) had been terminated ex lege could not be regarded as removing, retrospectively, the "" arguability "" of the "" right "" that they could have claimed under Article 6 § 1 in accordance with the rules in force at the time of their appointment. In Stoianoglo v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 29, the Court applied a similar approach to the proceedings in which the Prosecutor General tried to contest his suspension. For the Court, the question whether or not the Prosecutor General had a defendable right to continue exercising his functions should be answered, not on the basis of the new legislation, but rather on the basis of the legislation which existed at the moment when he had been appointed. Similarly, the Court concluded that the applicants had had a defendable right in the case of Pająk and others v. Poland, 2023, §§ 120-125, which concerned the application of a new legislation which lowered the retirement age for judges and had introduced a new procedure for extending the mandate beyond the new (lower) age of retirement. Thus, the Court found that the applicant, a civil servant, had a right to certain conditions of service even when, following a legislative reform, the scope of this right, or the procedural modalities of exercising it, has been changed. Similarly, in Gyulumyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, the Court applied the same approach to a dispute arising out of the early termination of mandates of several judges and the President of the Constitutional Court, even though this termination had resulted automatically from a constitutional amendment (§§ 65 - 67)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:19371/22,Stoianoglo v. the Republic of Moldova,19371/22,added,"Stoianoglo v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 19371/22, 24 October 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,I.C,Disputes involving public servants,2,77,59,0.6105,,"Sablon v. Belgium , 2001","Applications to have proceedings reopened/extraordinary appeal proceedings : The case of Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], 2015 clarified the Court's case-law concerning the applicability of Article 6 to extraordinary appeals in civil judicial proceedings. The Convention does not in principle guarantee a right to have a terminated case reopened and Article 6 is not applicable to proceedings concerning an application for the reopening of civil proceedings which have been terminated by a final decision ( Sablon v. Belgium, 2001, § 86). This reasoning also applies to an application to reopen proceedings after the Court has found a violation of the Convention ( Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2), 2007, § 24). Article 6 is therefore deemed inapplicable to them. This is because, in so far as the matter is covered by the principle of res judicata of a final judgment in national proceedings, it cannot in principle be maintained that a subsequent extraordinary application or appeal seeking revision of that judgment gives rise to an arguable claim as to the existence of a right recognised under national law or that the outcome of the proceedings involving a decision on whether or not to reconsider the same case is decisive for the ""determination of ... civil rights and obligations"" ( Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], 2015, §§ 44-45).","Accordingly, the State cannot rely on an applicant's status as a civil servant to exclude him or her from the protection afforded by Article 6 unless two conditions are fulfilled. Firstly, domestic law must have excluded access to a court for the post or category of staff in question either expressely or implicitly, as clarified in Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, § 292 (see also Stoianoglo v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 30-35, in the context of a dispute involving a public prosecutor). Secondly, the exclusion must be justified on ""objective grounds in the State' s inte rest"" ( see Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], 2007, § 62, with the clarifications set out in Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, §§ 299-300; see also the section on ""Excluded matters"" below )."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:19371/22,Stoianoglo v. the Republic of Moldova,19371/22,added,"Stoianoglo v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 19371/22, 24 October 2023",3,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.C.2,Disputes involving judges and prosecutors,3,,75,,,,,"In Stoianoglo v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 30-35, which concerned the suspension of the Prosecutor General from office, the Court emphasised that, under Article 6, only judges, and not prosecutors, should be independent. That being said, prosecutors should also enjoy protection from arbitrary interferences by public authorities with their functions, and the line separating judges and prosecutors, insofar as their independence is concerned, is difficult to draw, especially where the law of the respondent State itself does not make any clear distinction between judges and prosecutors in this regard (§§ 38 and 39). The Court concluded that there had been no objective grounds for excluding such disputes from the scope of guarantees of Article 6, under the second part of the Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland test."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:19371/22,Stoianoglo v. the Republic of Moldova,19371/22,added,"Stoianoglo v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 19371/22, 24 October 2023",4,paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,I.C.2,Disputes involving judges and prosecutors,3,55,77,0.9957,,,"The Court has applied the Vilho Eskelinen criteria to all types of disputes concerning judges, including those relating to recruitment or appointment ( Juričić v. Croatia, 2011), career or promotion ( Dzhidzheva-Trendafilova v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2012, and Tsanova-Gecheva v. Bulgaria, 2015, §§ 85-87), transfer ( Tosti v. Italy (dec.), 2009, and Bilgen v. Turkey, 2021, § 79), suspension ( Paluda v. Slovakia, 2017, §§ 33-34, and Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, § 70), disciplinary proceedings ( Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, § 120; Di Giovanni v. Italy, 2013, §§ 36-37; and Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, § 80; for a reprimand issued to a judge, see Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 42-45 and the case-law references cited), as well as dismissal ( Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, 2013, §§ 91 and 96; Kulykov and Others v. Ukraine, 2017, §§ 118 and 132; Sturua v. Georgia, 2017, § 27; Kamenos v. Cyprus, 2017, §§ 82-88; and Olujić v. Croatia, 2009, §§ 31-43), reduction in salary following conviction for a serious disciplinary offence ( Harabin v. Slovakia, 2012, §§ 118-123), removal from post (for example, President of the Supreme Court, President of the Court of Appeal or Vice- President of the Regional Court) while remaining a judge ( Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, §§ 34 and 107-111; Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, § 54; and Broda and Bojara v. Poland, 2021, §§ 121-123), or judges being prevented from exercising their judicial functions after legislative reform ( Gumenyuk and Others v. Ukraine, 2021, §§ 61 and 65-67). It has also applied the Vilho Eskelinen criteria to a dispute regarding the premature termination of the term of office of a chief prosecutor ( Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 124-125), to an appeal by a prosecutor against a presidential decree ordering his transfer ( Zalli v. Albania (dec.), 2011, and case-law references cited), and to the demotion of a prosecutor ( Čivinskaitė v. Lithuania, 2020, § 95).","The Court has applied the Vilho Eskelinen criteria to all types of disputes concerning judges, including those relating to recruitment or appointment ( Juričić v. Croatia, 2011), career or promotion ( Dzhidzheva-Trendafilova v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2012, and Tsanova-Gecheva v. Bulgaria, 2015, §§ 85-87), transfer ( Tosti v. Italy (dec.), 2009, and Bilgen v. Turkey, 2021, § 79), suspension ( Paluda v. Slovakia, 2017, §§ 33-34, and Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, § 70), disciplinary proceedings ( Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, § 120; Di Giovanni v. Italy, 2013, §§ 36-37; and Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, § 80; for a reprimand issued to a judge, see Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 42-45 and the case-law references cited), as well as dismissal ( Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, 2013, §§ 91 and 96; Kulykov and Others v. Ukraine, 2017, §§ 118 and 132; Sturua v. Georgia, 2017, § 27; Kamenos v. Cyprus, 2017, §§ 82-88; and Olujić v. Croatia, 2009, §§ 31-43), reduction in salary following conviction for a serious disciplinary offence ( Harabin v. Slovakia, 2012, §§ 118-123), removal from post (for example, President of the Supreme Court, President of the Court of Appeal or Vice- President of the Regional Court) while remaining a judge ( Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, §§ 34 and 107-111; Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, § 54; and Broda and Bojara v. Poland, 2021, §§ 121-123), or judges being prevented from exercising their judicial functions after legislative reform ( Gumenyuk and Others v. Ukraine, 2021, §§ 61 and 65-67). It has also applied the Vilho Eskelinen criteria to a dispute regarding the premature termination of the term of office of a chief prosecutor ( Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 124-125), to an appeal by a prosecutor against a presidential decree ordering his transfer ( Zalli v. Albania (dec.), 2011, and case-law references cited), and to the demotion of a prosecutor ( Čivinskaitė v. Lithuania, 2020, § 95) and the suspension of the Prosecutor General ( Stoianoglo v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 30-35)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:24269/18,Stylianidis v. Cyprus (dec.),24269/18,added,"Stylianidis v. Cyprus (dec.), no. 24269/18, 8 February 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.2,Existence of an arguable right or obligation in domestic law,3,,29,,,,,"Whether or not the applicant had a right to a ""fair procedure"" which is attached to the excerc ise of discretion by a public authority depends on the state of domestic law and practice at the relevant time. Thus, in Stylianidis v. Cyprus (dec.), 2024, the Court decided that the refusal to promote the applicant to a position of President of a district court had not affected the applicant 's ""civil right"". The Court observed, in particular, that the decision of the appointing authority - the Supreme Council of Judicature (the SCJ) - had been taken in the absence of any legal provision regulating the promotion procedure, and on the basis of very general criteria such as ability and merit. The SCJ's power on the matter had been purely discretionary, no ""fair procedure"" had been established and the co urts consistently refused to treat such decisions as subject to judicial review, which led the Court to conclude that the applicant had not had an actionable right (§§ 40-46)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:70267/17,Țîmpău v. Romania,70267/17,added,"Țîmpău v. Romania, no. 70267/17, 5 December 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.2,Existence of an arguable right or obligation in domestic law,3,,38,,"ău v. Romania , 2023",,,"To decide whether the applicant had an ""arguable right"" it is necessary to look into the nature of controversy which is at the heart of the case. Thus, in Ţîmpău v. Romania, 2023, §§ 119 - 140, the applicant, a school teacher of Orthodox religion, was dismissed following a decision of the Archbishop to withdraw the "" endorsement "", which, under the law, was a pre-condition for the continuation of her contract with the school. The applicant did not challenge the decision of the Archbishop before the ecclesiastical courts, but tried to contest her dismissal before the State court competent to hear labour disputes. The State court, however, refused to review the Archbishop's decision, as it was governed by the laws specific to that religious denomination and not by the ordinary secular law. The Court concluded that in essence the applicant tried to defend, before the State courts, a right which was not recognised under domestic law."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:70267/17,Țîmpău v. Romania,70267/17,added,"Țîmpău v. Romania, no. 70267/17, 5 December 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match|paragraph_text_app_match,minor_edit,I.A.3,“Civil” nature of the right or obligation,3,39,45,0.988,,,"Article 6 § 1 is also applicable to a civil action seeking compensation for ill-treatment allegedly committed by agents of the State ( Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, § 92), for a period of detention followed by a reversal of the conviction ( Georgiadis v. Greece, 1997, §§ 35-36), or to a claim against a public authority for compensation for non-pecuniary damage and costs ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, § 78) or to the withdrawal of security clearance that had been issued to an applicant to enable him to carry out his duties as deputy to a Vice-Minister of Defence ( Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2017, §§ 113-127).","Article 6 § 1 is also applicable to a civil action seeking compensation for ill-treatment allegedly committed by agents of the State ( Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, § 92), for a period of detention followed by a reversal of the conviction ( Georgiadis v. Greece, 1997, §§ 35-36), or to a claim against a public authority for compensation for non-pecuniary damage and costs ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, § 78) or to the withdrawal of security clearance that had been issued to an applicant to enable him to carry out his duties as deputy to a Vice-Minister Ţîmpău v. Romania, no. 70267/17, § ..., 5 December 2023 of Defence ( Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2017, §§ 113-127)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:46131/19,Toivanen v. Finland,46131/19,added,"Toivanen v. Finland, no. 46131/19, 9 November 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.B.1,Principles,3,,270,,"Miracle Europe Kft v. Hungary , 2016|Toivanen v. Finland , 2023",,,"Complaints concerning the allegedly arbitrary assignment or transfer of a civil case to a different judge or a composition have been examined by the Court either under the heading of a guarantee of a ""tribunal established by law"" (see, for example, Miracle Europe Kft v. Hungary, 2016, §§ 56 - 67) or sometime under a more general heading of ""fair trial"" (see, for example, Toivanen v. Finland, 2023, §§ 33-39). In that latter case the applicant complained of a transfer of his case from a panel of three judges to a n ""extended panel "" of five judges. This transfer was decided by Judge L., acting President of the court, after the panel of three judges deliberated on the case. Judge L. sat on the extended panel and decided together with the majority. The Court noted that the transfer had been in accordance with the applicable rules, which gave the acting President of the court the discretion to order such a transfer. The exercise of that discretion was surrounded by procedural safeguards: in particular, the law set out criteria for transferring cases, and Judge L. gave her reasons in a written statement. Moreover, the transfer of the case had not led to any loss of opportunity for the applicant to participate in the decision-making process. The Court concluded that this transfer did not perturb the overall fairness of the proceedings ( ibid ., §§ 33-39)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:50849/21,Wałęsa v. Poland,50849/21,added,"Wałęsa v. Poland, no. 50849/21, 23 November 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A.4.b,Right not to have a final judicial decision called into question,4,,257,,"ęsa v. Poland , 2023",,,"Whether or not an extraordinary reopening of the case violates the principle of res judicata depends, not only on the nature of the purported error which the reopening seeks to correct, but also on who seeks the reopening, at what moment in time, for what reason, who decides on it, and with what effect. In the case of Wałęsa v. Poland, 2023, the Court developed a test to analyse the reopening proceedings. The Prosecutor General obtained the reopening of a case decided in the final instance seven years earlier, which concerned certain allegations against the former President of Poland, Lech Wałęsa. The Court, first of all, noted that the power of reopening of this high-profile case was entrusted by law to the Prosecutor General who was at the same time the Minister of Justice, and who, in this role, wielded considerable authority over the courts and the bodies of judicial governance. This created ""more than a hypothetical risk"" that this legal remedy might in practice become a tool of political supervision over court judgments by the executive (§ 231), the Court noting that the Prosecutor General had a personal political interest in the outcome of the case (§§ 253 - 254). The second element assessed by the Court in this regard was the grounds for lodging the extraordinary appeal. The Court observed that the reopening of a case for the sake of restoring ""social justice"", which was a generic and vague term, opened the door to possible arbitrariness, misuse of that legal remedy and abuse of process. Similarly, reference to ""an obvious contradiction between significant findings of the court and the content of evidence collected in the case"" transformed the e xtraordinary review chamber into a court of a third or even fourth degree of jurisdiction, thus revealing the nature of the extraordinary appeal as an ""ordinary appeal in disguise"" (§§ 232 - 235). The third element analysed by the Court was the timing of the extraordinary appeal: under the transitional provisions of the law, it could have been introduced in civil cases without virtually any time-limit, even in respect of the proceedings closed over twenty years before the legislation took effect, which the Court found to be incompatible with the requirements of the rule of law (§§ 236 - 237). The fourth element criticized by the Court was the broad power of review which the extraordinary appeal chamber had, and which permitted it to review not only the questions of law but also the facts of the case, which practically allowed it to extinguish the entirety of finally terminated proceedings (§ 238). Finally, the Court noted that the extraordinary review had been entrusted to a body which cannot be considered a ""tribunal"" in Convention terms, due to the gross irregularities in the process of its formation (§ 239). Having applied those criteria to the facts of the case (§§ 240 - 256), the Court concluded that the departure from the principles of res judicata had not been justified by ""circumstances of a substantial and compelling character"" ."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240218053355__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-02-18,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-02-18__2024-09-30.json,apps:50849/21,Wałęsa v. Poland,50849/21,added,"Wałęsa v. Poland, no. 50849/21, 23 November 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.C.2.i,Manner of appointment of a body ’ s members,4,,301,,"Juszczyszyn v. Poland , 2022|Reczkowicz v. Poland , 2021|Tuleya v. Poland , 2023|ęsa v. Poland , 2023",,,"The composition of the body which appoints judges, namely the National Council of the Judiciary, the NCJ, has been at the center of the Court's attention in a number of cases concerning Poland. In the first cases of this group the system of judicial appointments was analysed not under the heading of ""independence"" but through the prism of the guarantee of the ""tribunal established by law"" (see, for example, Reczkowicz v. Poland, 2021, § 284, which concerned the legitimacy of the court which dealt with the applicant's case), or, alternatively, in the light of the guarantee of ""access to court"" (see, for example, Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, §§ 344 - 350, which concerned the impossibility for a member of the NCJ to obtain judicial review of the early termination of his mandate). In these cases the Court noted the negative effects of the 2017 judicial reform on the independence of the NCJ and of the Polish judiciary in general ( Reczkowicz v. Poland, 2021, § 274, and Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, § 348). The Court also observed (in Reczkowicz, §§ 280-281 and 284, and later in Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, § 214), that the underlying institutional problems are the same both in terms of compliance with the requirement of ""established by law"" and of the independence of the courts which dealt with the applicants'cases. Finally, in the case of Tuleya v. Poland, 2023, the Court found a breach of "" the right to an independent and impartial tribunal established by law "" (§ 345). In a nutshell, the Court concluded that both the independence of the judges of the Supreme Court and the condtition of a tribunal ""established by law"" were compromised because of the lack of independence of the NCJwhich appointed those judges. Following the 2017 reform, the judicial community had been deprived of the right to delegate judicial members to the NCJ, a right afforded to it under the previous legislation and recognised by international standards, and ""the legislative and executive powers had a chieved a decisive influence on the composition of the NCJ"" (see Tuleya v. Poland, 2023, § 337, in respect of the independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court; see also Wałęsa v. Poland, 2023, in respect of the independence of the Extraordinary Review Chamber of the Supreme Court, §§ 168 - 176)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:48045/15,Benghezal v. France,48045/15,added,"Benghezal v. France, no. 48045/15, 24 March 2022",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.F.7,Other Articles,3,119,130,0.9356,"Benghezal v. France , 2022|Moskalj v. Croatia , 2024",,"In Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania, 2020, § 49, the Court examined under Article 6 § 1 the applicants'complaint concerning the refusal of the domestic courts to award them legal costs after successful litigation, whereas the applicants had raised the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention (compare Taratukhin v. Russia (dec.), 2020, § 27, and for the recovery of amounts due, see Gogić v. Croatia, 2020, § 45). In Cindrić and Bešlić v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 119-123, concerning the payment of litigation costs consisting of fees for public officials, the Court examined the complaint under both Articles (§§ 110 and 119-123; compare with Bursać and Others v. Croatia, 2022, §§ 107-108). See also Zustović v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 98-100, and Čolić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 39-48, for a summary of the case-law.","The Court considers complaints about awards of legal costs under various Articles, mostly under Article 6 § 1 (in the context of the guarantee of effective access to court, see Benghezal v. France, 2022, §§ 43-45), but also under Article 13, Article 1 of Protocol no. 1, and, in the criminal-law context, under Article 6 para 2 (see Guide on Article 6 criminal, in particular Section VI-B-3 on the legal assistance and Section VI-A-1-b on the obligation of the accused to bear costs from the standpoint of the respect for the presumption of innocence). In Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania, 2020, § 49, the Court examined under Article 6 § 1 the applicants'complaint concerning the refusal of the domestic courts to award them legal costs after successful litigation, whereas the applicants had raised the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention (compare Taratukhin v. Russia (dec.), 2020, § 27, and for the recovery of amounts due, see Gogić v. Croatia, 2020, § 45). In Cindrić and Bešlić v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 119-123, concerning the payment of litigation costs consisting of fees for public officials, the Court examined the complaint under both Articles (§§ 110 and 119-123; compare with Bursać and Others v. Croatia, 2022, §§ 107-108. See also Zustović v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 98-100, and Čolić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 39-48, for a summary of the case- law and see Moskalj v. Croatia, 2024, § 96, where the Court examined the question of legal costs only under the ""access to court"" guarantee and not under Article 1 of Protocol no. 1)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:48045/15,Benghezal v. France,48045/15,added,"Benghezal v. France, no. 48045/15, 24 March 2022",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.A.1,A right that is practical and effective,3,136,148,0.9989,,,"In the specific circumstances of a case, the practical and effective nature of the right of access to a court may be impaired, for instance: ▪ by the prohibitive cost of the proceedings in view of the individual's financial capacity:  the excessive amount of security for costs in the context of an application to join criminal proceedings as a civil party ( Aït-Mouhoub v. France, 1998, §§ 57-58; García Manibardo v. Spain, 2000, §§ 38-45);  excessive court fees ( Kreuz v. Poland, 2001, §§ 60-67; Podbielski and PPU Polpure v. Poland, 2005, §§ 65-66; Weissman and Others v. Romania, 2006, § 42; Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-70, and conversely, Reuther v. Germany (dec.), 2003). In these cases the Court considered the question of court fees that had been imposed prior to the institution of civil proceedings and had had the effect of hindering access to a court at first instance or at a subsequent stage of the proceedings for applicants who were unable to pay (contrast Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, 1995, §§ 62-67, regarding the payment of a security as a precondition for lodging an appeal). The Court has pointed out that where there is a possibility of an exemption from stamp duty for a court application following an assessment of the applicant's financial situation, the authorities must give a decision promptly ( Laçi v. Albania, 2021, §§ 53-60), and diligence is also expected of the applicant ( Elcomp sp. z o.o. v. Poland, 2021, § 41). If the State has a system for calculating court fees linked to the amount in dispute, in order to comply with Article 6 the system must be sufficiently flexible to allow for the possibility of total or partial exemption from payment or a reduction in the amount payable (see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 39 and 40, and see §§ 41-45, where the applicant company had been forced to abandon its appeal because it was unable to pay the fees imposed on it). In Stankov v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 53, the Court held that substantial court fees imposed at the end of proceedings could also amount to a restriction on the right to a court (see, more specifically, for cases concerning the excessive length of proceedings, an acquittal or unjustified pre-trial detention, §§ 59 and 62, and a claim for compensation for assault, Čolić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 58-59); see also, regarding the refusal to reimburse legal costs, Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 68-69 and § 74; and compare with proceedings challenging the costs payable following judicial proceedings, Taratukhin v. Russia (dec.), 2020, §§ 36 et seq. For a recent summary of the case-law, see Benghezal v. France, 2022, §§ 43-45. In cases concerning court fees, regard should also be had to the litigant's conduct ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 120) or the manifest lack of any prospect of success of an action ( Marić v. Croatia (dec.), 2020, §§ 58 and 60, concerning the obligation to bear the full costs of the State's representation, and § 52, concerning the obligation for the losing party to pay litigation costs (the ""loser pays"" rule)); see also Stankiewicz v. Poland, 2006, §§ 62 et seq.; Klauz v. Croatia, 2013, §§ 77 et seq.; and Cindrić and Bešlić v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 119-123). With regard to litigation costs for proceedings that did not give rise to a decision on the merits, see Karahasanoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 136-137. Lastly, the Court has objected to the rule whereby each party has to bear its own costs regardless of the outcome of the proceedings ( Zustović v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-106, and see also §§ 99-100 for the State's duty to bear the cost of its errors in that context); it also examined the rule that each party was to bear its own costs without exception in Dragan Kovačević v. Croatia, 2022, §§ 67-85, and stressed the importance of giving reasons for a decision refusing to reimburse the costs incurred by the successful party (§ 83). However, the Court found no violation of Article 6 on account of a rule of domestic law which provided that costs of the litigation should be reimbursed to a party acquitted in the administrative proceedings only in cases where the relevant authorities had acted unlawfully ( Jakutavičius v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 80 - 86). The Court noted that the applicant himself had contributed to the decision of the police to impose a sanction: although that sanction had later been annulled, the Court was unable to find that the applicant had been made to bear the mistakes of the State authorities. Thus, the fact that the applicant had to cover his own costs in the administrative-law proceedings did not violate his right of access to a court ( ibid ., §§ 84 - 85; compare with Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.), 2023, concerning the absence in domestic law of an arguable right to obtain reimbursement of costs incurred by a defendant acquitted in a criminal case). For the imposition of excessive court fees on a commercial company, see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 39.  The imposition of fines in order to prevent a build-up of cases before the courts and to ensure the proper administration of justice is not, as such, incompatible with the right of access to a court. However, the amount of such fines is an important factor to take into account ( Sace Elektrik Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş. v. Turkey, 2013, §§ 26 et seq., concerning a mandatory fine of 10% of the bid in the event of an unsuccessful attempt to challenge a public auction). ▪ by issues relating to time-limits:  the time taken to hear an appeal leading to its being declared inadmissible ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2006, § 26). For the unforeseeable application of a new time-limit introduced after the lodging of a complaint, in breach of the principle of legal certainty, see Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149 - 165. Litigants are nevertheless required to act with the requisite diligence ( Kamenova v. Bulgaria, 2018, §§ 52-55; compare Çela v. Albania, 2022, § 39).  The Court held in Ivanova and Ivashova v. Russia, 2017, that the national courts should not interpret domestic law in an inflexible manner with the effect of imposing an obligation with which litigants could not possibly comply. Requiring an appeal to be lodged within one month of the date on which the registry drew up a full copy of the court's decision - rather than the point at which the appellant actually had knowledge of the decision - amounted to making the expiry of the relevant deadline dependent on a factor entirely outside the appellant's control. The Court found that the right of appeal should have become effective from the point at which the applicant could effectively apprise herself of the full text of the decision.  limitation periods for bringing a claim (see, regarding harm to physical integrity, the case-law references cited in paragraphs 53-55 of Sanofi Pasteur v. France, 2020, including Howald Moor and Others v. Switzerland, 2014, §§ 79-80; Yagtzilar and Others v. Greece, 2001, § 27; see also the cases cited in Loste v. France, 2022, §§ 68-70). For example, the Court has found a violation of the right of access to a court in a number of cases in which the discontinuation of criminal proceedings and the resulting failure to examine a civil claim were due to a lack of diligence on the national authorities'part ( Atanasova v. Bulgaria, 2008, §§ 35-47). Excessive delays in the examination of a claim may also render the right of access to a court meaningless ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013).  the granting of leave to appeal out of time and the resulting acceptance of an ordinary appeal lodged after a significant period of time, for reasons that do not appear especially convincing, may entail a breach of the principle of legal certainty and the right to a court ( Magomedov and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 87-89, where late appeals benefiting the competent authorities were accepted following the extension without any valid reason of the time-limit for appealing).  the length of preliminary investigations, attributable to the authorities, preventing the applicant from joining criminal proceedings as a civil party claiming damages or from making a civil compensation claim ( Petrella v. Italy, 2021, §§ 51-53 and references cited).  delay by the national authorities in examining an application by the applicant (challenging the selection procedure for a post for which she had applied), with the result that the proceedings were terminated on the grounds that there was no legal interest in pursuing the application as the administrative decision at issue had expired ( Frezadou v. Greece, 2018, § 47 - compare and contrast with Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 72). More generally, in exceptional cases where proceedings are kept pending for an excessive period, this may impair the right of access to a court ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013, § 57). The unjustified lack of a decision for a particularly lengthy period by the court dealing with the case may be regarded as a denial of justice; the remedy used by the applicant may thus become deprived of all effectiveness where the court concerned does not manage to settle the dispute in good time, as required by the circumstances of the case and what is at stake ( Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 60). ▪ by issues relating to jurisdiction (see, for example, Arlewin v. Sweden, 2016, concerning a television programme broadcast from another European Union country) or an excessively restrictive interpretation of the scope of an association's stated aim, depriving it of its right of access to a court ( Association Burestop 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 71). Furthermore, where an action for damages is brought against it, the State has a positive obligation to facilitate the identification of the respondent authority ( Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-71). ▪ by issues of evidence, where the requirements for the burden of proof are overly rigid ( Tence v. Slovenia, 2016, §§ 35-38); concerning formalism in the presentation of evidence, see Efstratiou and Others v. Greece, 2020, §§ 44 et seq. ▪ by the existence of procedural bars preventing or limiting the possibilities of applying to a court:  a particularly strict interpretation by the domestic courts of a procedural rule (excessive formalism) may deprive applicants of their right of access to a court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 97; Pérez de Rada Cavanilles v. Spain, 1998, § 49; Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Sotiris and Nikos Koutras ATTEE v. Greece, 2000, § 20; Běleš and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 50; RTBF v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 71-72 and 74; Miessen v. Belgium, 2016, §§ 72-74; Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, § 34; and for a constitutional court, Dos Santos Calado and Others v. Portugal, 2020, §§ 118-130), bearing in mind that an unreasonable construction of a procedural requirement impairs the right to effective judicial protection ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 37). The general principles established in Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 80-99, also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the procedural rules of a court called upon to rule at first and last instance (see Makrylakis v. Greece, 2022, §§ 36, 38-50, which emphasises the specificity of a situation where the case is examined by a single court, § 49). As regards the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion after an appeal has been lodged, this raises an issue concerning the principle of legal certainty ( Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, §§ 35-45); see also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149 - 165).  consideration of the value of the subject matter of the dispute (ratione valoris admissibility threshold) in order to determine the jurisdiction of a higher court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], § 73, §§ 85-86);  the requirements linked to execution of an earlier ruling may impair the right of access to a court, for instance where the applicant's lack of funds makes it impossible for him even to begin to comply with the earlier judgment ( Annoni di Gussola and Others v. France, 2000, § 56; compare with Arvanitakis v. France (dec.), 2000);  procedural rules barring certain subjects of law from taking court proceedings ( The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 1994, § 83; Philis v. Greece (no. 1), 1991, § 65; Lupaş and Others v. Romania, 2006, §§ 64-67; and, regarding adults lacking capacity, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012, §§ 241-45; Nataliya Mikhaylenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 40; Nikolyan v. Armenia, 2019; and compare with R.P. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ by the limits of the judicial review available, for example where a complaint to the administrative courts against a presidential decree could only give rise to a review of compliance with external formalities in the adoption of the decree, whereas the applicant's complaint called for an examination of the merits and of the internal legality of the decree ( Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 153-154, concerning the premature removal of a prosecutor), and a fortiori by the unavailability of a judicial review (see Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, §§ 76-77, concerning the automatic temporary suspension of a judge pending the examination of her appeal against a decision to remove her from office). In the context of family-law disputes, in Plazzi v. Switzerland (§§ 44-67) and Roth v. Switzerland, 2022, (§ 77), concerning the cancellation without judicial review of the suspensive effect of appeals by fathers, thereby enabling their children to leave the country with their mothers and removing the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, the Court found a violation, emphasising that the urgency invoked had not been serious enough to justify preventing the fathers from applying to a court before the cancellation of suspensive effect became applicable (see Plazzi v. Switzerland, 2022, §§ 58-59, and the special nature of proceedings under family law). ▪ In Xavier Lucas v. France, 2022, by giving precedence to the rule that applications to the Court of Appeal had to be made electronically (e-justice), while disregarding the practical hurdles faced by the applicant in doing so, the Court of Cassation had adopted a formalistic approach which was not necessary to ensure legal certainty or the proper administration of justice and which was therefore ""excessive"" (§ 57).","In the specific circumstances of a case, the practical and effective nature of the right of access to a court may be impaired, for instance: ▪ by the prohibitive cost of the proceedings in view of the individual's financial capacity:  the excessive amount of security for costs in the context of an application to join criminal proceedings as a civil party ( Aït-Mouhoub v. France, 1998, §§ 57-58; García Manibardo v. Spain, 2000, §§ 38-45);  excessive court fees ( Kreuz v. Poland, 2001, §§ 60-67; Podbielski and PPU Polpure v. Poland, 2005, §§ 65-66; Weissman and Others v. Romania, 2006, § 42; Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-70, and conversely, Reuther v. Germany (dec.), 2003). In these cases the Court considered the question of court fees that had been imposed prior to the institution of civil proceedings and had had the effect of hindering access to a court at first instance or at a subsequent stage of the proceedings for applicants who were unable to pay (contrast Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, 1995, §§ 62-67, regarding the payment of a security as a precondition for lodging an appeal). The Court has pointed out that where there is a possibility of an exemption from stamp duty for a court application following an assessment of the applicant's financial situation, the authorities must give a decision promptly ( Laçi v. Albania, 2021, §§ 53-60), and diligence is also expected of the applicant ( Elcomp sp. z o.o. v. Poland, 2021, § 41). If the State has a system for calculating court fees linked to the amount in dispute, in order to comply with Article 6 the system must be sufficiently flexible to allow for the possibility of total or partial exemption from payment or a reduction in the amount payable (see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 39 and 40, and see §§ 41-45, where the applicant company had been forced to abandon its appeal because it was unable to pay the fees imposed on it). In Stankov v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 53, the Court held that substantial court fees imposed at the end of proceedings could also amount to a restriction on the right to a court (see, more specifically, for cases concerning the excessive length of proceedings, an acquittal or unjustified pre-trial detention, §§ 59 and 62, and a claim for compensation for assault, Čolić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 58-59); see also, regarding the refusal to reimburse legal costs, Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 68-69 and § 74; and compare with proceedings challenging the costs payable following judicial proceedings, Taratukhin v. Russia (dec.), 2020, §§ 36 et seq. For a recent summary of the case-law, see Benghezal v. France, 2022, §§ 43-45. In cases concerning court fees, regard should also be had to the litigant's conduct ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 120) or the manifest lack of any prospect of success of an action ( Marić v. Croatia (dec.), 2020, §§ 58 and 60, concerning the obligation to bear the full costs of the State's representation, and § 52, concerning the obligation for the losing party to pay litigation costs (the ""loser pays"" rule)); see also Stankiewicz v. Poland, 2006, §§ 62 et seq.; Klauz v. Croatia, 2013, §§ 77 et seq.; and Cindrić and Bešlić v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 119-123). With regard to litigation costs for proceedings that did not give rise to a decision on the merits, see Karahasanoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 136-137. Lastly, the Court has objected to the rule whereby each party has to bear its own costs regardless of the outcome of the proceedings ( Zustović v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-106, and see also §§ 99-100 for the State's duty to bear the cost of its errors in that context); it also examined the rule that each party was to bear its own costs without exception in Dragan Kovačević v. Croatia, 2022, §§ 67-85, and stressed the importance of giving reasons for a decision refusing to reimburse the costs incurred by the successful party (§ 83). However, the Court found no violation of Article 6 on account of a rule of domestic law which provided that costs of the litigation should be reimbursed to a party acquitted in the administrative proceedings only in cases where the relevant authorities had acted unlawfully ( Jakutavičius v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 80 - 86). The Court noted that the applicant himself had contributed to the decision of the police to impose a sanction: although that sanction had later been annulled, the Court was unable to find that the applicant had been made to bear the mistakes of the State authorities. Thus, the fact that the applicant had to cover his own costs in the administrative-law proceedings did not violate his right of access to a court ( ibid ., §§ 84 - 85; compare with Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.), 2023, concerning the absence in domestic law of an arguable right to obtain reimbursement of costs incurred by a defendant acquitted in a criminal case). For the imposition of excessive court fees on a commercial company, see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 39. Applicants seeking exemption from court fees should act with due diligence when presenting evidence to the courts concerning their financial standing. In Centrum Handlowe Agora SP. Z O.O. v. Poland (dec.), 2024, the applicant company was required to substantiate its long-term inability to pay the court fees but failed to do so (it failed to formulate explicitly an argument relating to the seizures of its accounts). Even though the documents confirming the seizures were attached to the applicant company's application for an exemption, without any explicit argument in this regard the domestic courts could not be expected to make further inquiries in this matter: the applicant company, by not acting with due diligence, deprived the domestic courts of the opportunity to comprehensively evaluate its financial situation (§ 32).  The imposition of fines in order to prevent a build-up of cases before the courts and to ensure the proper administration of justice is not, as such, incompatible with the right of access to a court. However, the amount of such fines is an important factor to take into account ( Sace Elektrik Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş. v. Turkey, 2013, §§ 26 et seq., concerning a mandatory fine of 10% of the bid in the event of an unsuccessful attempt to challenge a public auction). ▪ by issues relating to time-limits:  the time taken to hear an appeal leading to its being declared inadmissible ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2006, § 26). For the unforeseeable application of a new time-limit introduced after the lodging of a complaint, in breach of the principle of legal certainty, see Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149-165. Litigants are nevertheless required to act with the requisite diligence ( Kamenova v. Bulgaria, 2018, §§ 52-55; compare Çela v. Albania, 2022, § 39).  The Court held in Ivanova and Ivashova v. Russia, 2017, that the national courts should not interpret domestic law in an inflexible manner with the effect of imposing an obligation with which litigants could not possibly comply. Requiring an appeal to be lodged within one month of the date on which the registry drew up a full copy of the court's decision-rather than the point at which the appellant actually had knowledge of the decision-amounted to making the expiry of the relevant deadline dependent on a factor entirely outside the appellant's control. The Court found that the right of appeal should have become effective from the point at which the applicant could effectively apprise herself of the full text of the decision.  limitation periods for bringing a claim (see, regarding harm to physical integrity, the case-law references cited in paragraphs 53-55 of Sanofi Pasteur v. France, 2020, including Howald Moor and Others v. Switzerland, 2014, §§ 79-80; Yagtzilar and Others v. Greece, 2001, § 27; see also the cases cited in Loste v. France, 2022, §§ 68-70). For example, the Court has found a violation of the right of access to a court in a number of cases in which the discontinuation of criminal proceedings and the resulting failure to examine a civil claim were due to a lack of diligence on the national authorities'part ( Atanasova v. Bulgaria, 2008, §§ 35-47. Compare Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC], 2024). Excessive delays in the examination of a claim may also render the right of access to a court meaningless ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013).  the granting of leave to appeal out of time and the resulting acceptance of an ordinary appeal lodged after a significant period of time, for reasons that do not appear especially convincing, may entail a breach of the principle of legal certainty and the right to a court ( Magomedov and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 87-89, where late appeals benefiting the competent authorities were accepted following the extension without any valid reason of the time-limit for appealing).  the length of preliminary investigations, attributable to the authorities, preventing the applicant from joining criminal proceedings as a civil party claiming damages or from making a civil compensation claim ( Petrella v. Italy, 2021, §§ 51-53 and references cited - Compare Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC], 2024, §§ 137-140).  delay by the national authorities in examining an application by the applicant (challenging the selection procedure for a post for which she had applied), with the result that the proceedings were terminated on the grounds that there was no legal interest in pursuing the application as the administrative decision at issue had expired ( Frezadou v. Greece, 2018, § 47 - compare and contrast with Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 72). More generally, in exceptional cases where proceedings are kept pending for an excessive period, this may impair the right of access to a court ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013, § 57). The unjustified lack of a decision for a particularly lengthy period by the court dealing with the case may be regarded as a denial of justice; the remedy used by the applicant may thus become deprived of all effectiveness where the court concerned does not manage to settle the dispute in good time, as required by the circumstances of the case and what is at stake ( Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 60). ▪ by issues relating to jurisdiction (see, for example, Arlewin v. Sweden, 2016, concerning a television programme broadcast from another European Union country) or an excessively restrictive interpretation of the scope of an association's stated aim, depriving it of its right of access to a court ( Association Burestop 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 71). Furthermore, where an action for damages is brought against it, the State has a positive obligation to facilitate the identification of the respondent authority ( Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-71). ▪ by issues of evidence, where the requirements for the burden of proof are overly rigid ( Tence v. Slovenia, 2016, §§ 35-38); concerning formalism in the presentation of evidence, see Efstratiou and Others v. Greece, 2020, §§ 44 et seq. ▪ by the existence of procedural bars preventing or limiting the possibilities of applying to a court:  a particularly strict interpretation by the domestic courts of a procedural rule (excessive formalism) may deprive applicants of their right of access to a court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 97; Pérez de Rada Cavanilles v. Spain, 1998, § 49; Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Sotiris and Nikos Koutras ATTEE v. Greece, 2000, § 20; Běleš and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 50; RTBF v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 71-72 and 74; Miessen v. Belgium, 2016, §§ 72-74; Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, § 34; and for a constitutional court, Dos Santos Calado and Others v. Portugal, 2020, §§ 118-130), bearing in mind that an unreasonable construction of a procedural requirement impairs the right to effective judicial protection ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 37). The general principles established in Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 80-99, also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the procedural rules of a court called upon to rule at first and last instance (see Makrylakis v. Greece, 2022, §§ 36, 38-50, which emphasises the specificity of a situation where the case is examined by a single court, § 49). As regards the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion after an appeal has been lodged, this raises an issue concerning the principle of legal certainty ( Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, §§ 35-45); see also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149-165).  consideration of the value of the subject matter of the dispute (ratione valoris admissibility threshold) in order to determine the jurisdiction of a higher court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], § 73, §§ 85-86);  the requirements linked to execution of an earlier ruling may impair the right of access to a court, for instance where the applicant's lack of funds makes it impossible for him even to begin to comply with the earlier judgment ( Annoni di Gussola and Others v. France, 2000, § 56; compare with Arvanitakis v. France (dec.), 2000);  procedural rules barring certain subjects of law from taking court proceedings ( The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 1994, § 83; Philis v. Greece (no. 1), 1991, § 65; Lupaş and Others v. Romania, 2006, §§ 64-67; and, regarding adults lacking capacity, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012, §§ 241-45; Nataliya Mikhaylenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 40; Nikolyan v. Armenia, 2019; and compare with R.P. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ by the limits of the judicial review available, for example where a complaint to the administrative courts against a presidential decree could only give rise to a review of compliance with external formalities in the adoption of the decree, whereas the applicant's complaint called for an examination of the merits and of the internal legality of the decree ( Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 153-154, concerning the premature removal of a prosecutor), and a fortiori by the unavailability of a judicial review (see Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, §§ 76-77, concerning the automatic temporary suspension of a judge pending the examination of her appeal against a decision to remove her from office). In the context of family-law disputes, in Plazzi v. Switzerland (§§ 44-67) and Roth v. Switzerland, 2022, (§ 77), concerning the cancellation without judicial review of the suspensive effect of appeals by fathers, thereby enabling their children to leave the country with their mothers and removing the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, the Court found a violation, emphasising that the urgency invoked had not been serious enough to justify preventing the fathers from applying to a court before the cancellation of suspensive effect became applicable (see Plazzi v. Switzerland, 2022, §§ 58-59, and the special nature of proceedings under family law). ▪ In Xavier Lucas v. France, 2022, by giving precedence to the rule that applications to the Court of Appeal had to be made electronically (e-justice), while disregarding the practical hurdles faced by the applicant in doing so, the Court of Cassation had adopted a formalistic approach which was not necessary to ensure legal certainty or the proper administration of justice and which was therefore ""excessive"" (§ 57)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:21766/22,Cavca v. the Republic of Moldova,21766/22,added,"Cavca v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 21766/22, 9 January 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.C.1.a,Does the law exclude access to a court for that particular type of dispute?,4,64,74,0.9962,,,"If the applicant had access to a court under national law, Article 6 applies (even to active army officers and their claims before the military courts: Pridatchenko and Others v. Russia, 2007, § 47). For the purpose of applying the Vilho Eskelinen, 2007, test, there is nothing to prevent the Court from characterising a particular domestic body outside the judiciary as a ""tribunal"" ( Xhoxhaj v. Albania, 2021, §§ 284-288). In that context, therefore, an administrative or parliamentary body set up by law as a transitional measure ( ibid., § 288) may be viewed as a ""tribunal"", thereby rendering Article 6 applicable to civil servants'disputes determined by that body ( Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, 2013, § 88; Grace Gatt v. Malta, 2019, §§ 61-62, and case-law references cited). It should be noted that the fact that there is no possibility of reviewing the decision complained of does not in itself mean that access to a court is excluded for the purposes of the first condition ( Kamenos v. Cyprus, 2017, §§ 75 and 84; see also Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 122-123). In Kamenos v. Cyprus, 2017, the applicant had received a disciplinary punishment from a single body, the Supreme Council of Judicature, whose decision was final (§ 84). The Council had nevertheless constituted a ""tribunal"" within the meaning of Article 6, and the dismissed civil servant had therefore had access to a court for the purposes of the first condition of the Vilho Eskelinen test.","If the applicant had access to a court under national law, Article 6 applies - see, for example, Cavca v. the Republic of Moldova, 2025, § 37 (even to active army officers and their claims before the military courts: Pridatchenko and Others v. Russia, 2007, § 47). For the purpose of applying the Vilho Eskelinen, 2007, test, there is nothing to prevent the Court from characterising a particular domestic body outside the judiciary as a ""tribunal"" ( Xhoxhaj v. Albania, 2021, §§ 284-288). In that context, therefore, an administrative or parliamentary body set up by law as a transitional measure ( ibid., § 288) may be viewed as a ""tribunal"", thereby rendering Article 6 applicable to civil servants'disputes determined by that body ( Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, 2013, § 88; Grace Gatt v. Malta, 2019, §§ 61-62, and case-law references cited). It should be noted that the fact that there is no possibility of reviewing the decision complained of does not in itself mean that access to a court is excluded for the purposes of the first condition ( Kamenos v. Cyprus, 2017, §§ 75 and 84; see also Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 122-123). In Kamenos v. Cyprus, 2017, the applicant had received a disciplinary punishment from a single body, the Supreme Council of Judicature, whose decision was final (§ 84). The Council had nevertheless constituted a ""tribunal"" within the meaning of Article 6, and the dismissed civil servant had therefore had access to a court for the purposes of the first condition of the Vilho Eskelinen test."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:21766/22,Cavca v. the Republic of Moldova,21766/22,added,"Cavca v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 21766/22, 9 January 2025",2,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,I.F.3,Article 6 § 1 (fair criminal trial),3,108,119,0.8392,,,"In its case-law, when it examines proceedings falling under the civil head of Article 6, the Court may find it necessary to draw inspiration from its approach to criminal-law matters ( Mihail Mihăilescu v. Romania, 2021, § 75, and under Fairness: General principles below, and vice versa, Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], 2020, §§ 209 and 250; see also Peleki v. Greece, 2020, §§ 55-56).","In its case-law, when it examines proceedings falling under the civil head of Article 6, the Court may find it necessary to draw inspiration from its approach to criminal-law matters ( Mihail Mihăilescu v. Romania, 2021, § 75, and under Fairness: General principles below, and vice versa, Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], 2020, §§ 209 and 250; see also Peleki v. Greece, 2020, §§ 55-56; see also Cavca v. the Republic of Moldova, 2025, regarding the extent to which the fair trial guarantees developed in the Court's case-law in respect of entrapment in the context of criminal proceedings are applicable to a ""disciplinary"" entrapment)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:21766/22,Cavca v. the Republic of Moldova,21766/22,added,"Cavca v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 21766/22, 9 January 2025",3,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.A.2.b,Examples and limits,4,,422,,,,,"Entrapment . In Cavca v. the Republic of Moldova, 2025, the Court considered the application of the Court's case-law on entrapment in a criminal context to undercover professional integrity testing of a state official of a disciplinary nature. While the case-law on entrapment by investigative authorities under the criminal limb of Article 6 § 1 was not applicable as such, the Court decided that it could draw on those principles when examining the present disciplinary proceedings following integrity testing although it had to take into account of the fact that those testing operations did not amount to entrapment and are not as such incompatible with Article 6 § 1. The planning, execution and evaluation of the results of such an operation should be accompanied by procedural safeguards. At the planning stage of random integrity testing of an entire group of officials the authorities must clearly identify,and prove the existence of, a risk of corrupt behaviour within that group. The existence of prior suspicions in respect of specific individuals is of lesser importance than in criminal proceedings. However, if the person concerned raises an arguable claim of entrapment in the ensuing civil proceedings, the domestic courts must properly examine it and draw the relevant conclusions."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:8928/13,Centrum Handlowe Agora SP. Z O.O. v. Poland (dec.),8928/13,added,"Centrum Handlowe Agora SP. Z O.O. v. Poland (dec.), no. 8928/13, 20 February 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.A.1,A right that is practical and effective,3,136,148,0.9989,,,"In the specific circumstances of a case, the practical and effective nature of the right of access to a court may be impaired, for instance: ▪ by the prohibitive cost of the proceedings in view of the individual's financial capacity:  the excessive amount of security for costs in the context of an application to join criminal proceedings as a civil party ( Aït-Mouhoub v. France, 1998, §§ 57-58; García Manibardo v. Spain, 2000, §§ 38-45);  excessive court fees ( Kreuz v. Poland, 2001, §§ 60-67; Podbielski and PPU Polpure v. Poland, 2005, §§ 65-66; Weissman and Others v. Romania, 2006, § 42; Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-70, and conversely, Reuther v. Germany (dec.), 2003). In these cases the Court considered the question of court fees that had been imposed prior to the institution of civil proceedings and had had the effect of hindering access to a court at first instance or at a subsequent stage of the proceedings for applicants who were unable to pay (contrast Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, 1995, §§ 62-67, regarding the payment of a security as a precondition for lodging an appeal). The Court has pointed out that where there is a possibility of an exemption from stamp duty for a court application following an assessment of the applicant's financial situation, the authorities must give a decision promptly ( Laçi v. Albania, 2021, §§ 53-60), and diligence is also expected of the applicant ( Elcomp sp. z o.o. v. Poland, 2021, § 41). If the State has a system for calculating court fees linked to the amount in dispute, in order to comply with Article 6 the system must be sufficiently flexible to allow for the possibility of total or partial exemption from payment or a reduction in the amount payable (see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 39 and 40, and see §§ 41-45, where the applicant company had been forced to abandon its appeal because it was unable to pay the fees imposed on it). In Stankov v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 53, the Court held that substantial court fees imposed at the end of proceedings could also amount to a restriction on the right to a court (see, more specifically, for cases concerning the excessive length of proceedings, an acquittal or unjustified pre-trial detention, §§ 59 and 62, and a claim for compensation for assault, Čolić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 58-59); see also, regarding the refusal to reimburse legal costs, Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 68-69 and § 74; and compare with proceedings challenging the costs payable following judicial proceedings, Taratukhin v. Russia (dec.), 2020, §§ 36 et seq. For a recent summary of the case-law, see Benghezal v. France, 2022, §§ 43-45. In cases concerning court fees, regard should also be had to the litigant's conduct ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 120) or the manifest lack of any prospect of success of an action ( Marić v. Croatia (dec.), 2020, §§ 58 and 60, concerning the obligation to bear the full costs of the State's representation, and § 52, concerning the obligation for the losing party to pay litigation costs (the ""loser pays"" rule)); see also Stankiewicz v. Poland, 2006, §§ 62 et seq.; Klauz v. Croatia, 2013, §§ 77 et seq.; and Cindrić and Bešlić v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 119-123). With regard to litigation costs for proceedings that did not give rise to a decision on the merits, see Karahasanoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 136-137. Lastly, the Court has objected to the rule whereby each party has to bear its own costs regardless of the outcome of the proceedings ( Zustović v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-106, and see also §§ 99-100 for the State's duty to bear the cost of its errors in that context); it also examined the rule that each party was to bear its own costs without exception in Dragan Kovačević v. Croatia, 2022, §§ 67-85, and stressed the importance of giving reasons for a decision refusing to reimburse the costs incurred by the successful party (§ 83). However, the Court found no violation of Article 6 on account of a rule of domestic law which provided that costs of the litigation should be reimbursed to a party acquitted in the administrative proceedings only in cases where the relevant authorities had acted unlawfully ( Jakutavičius v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 80 - 86). The Court noted that the applicant himself had contributed to the decision of the police to impose a sanction: although that sanction had later been annulled, the Court was unable to find that the applicant had been made to bear the mistakes of the State authorities. Thus, the fact that the applicant had to cover his own costs in the administrative-law proceedings did not violate his right of access to a court ( ibid ., §§ 84 - 85; compare with Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.), 2023, concerning the absence in domestic law of an arguable right to obtain reimbursement of costs incurred by a defendant acquitted in a criminal case). For the imposition of excessive court fees on a commercial company, see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 39.  The imposition of fines in order to prevent a build-up of cases before the courts and to ensure the proper administration of justice is not, as such, incompatible with the right of access to a court. However, the amount of such fines is an important factor to take into account ( Sace Elektrik Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş. v. Turkey, 2013, §§ 26 et seq., concerning a mandatory fine of 10% of the bid in the event of an unsuccessful attempt to challenge a public auction). ▪ by issues relating to time-limits:  the time taken to hear an appeal leading to its being declared inadmissible ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2006, § 26). For the unforeseeable application of a new time-limit introduced after the lodging of a complaint, in breach of the principle of legal certainty, see Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149 - 165. Litigants are nevertheless required to act with the requisite diligence ( Kamenova v. Bulgaria, 2018, §§ 52-55; compare Çela v. Albania, 2022, § 39).  The Court held in Ivanova and Ivashova v. Russia, 2017, that the national courts should not interpret domestic law in an inflexible manner with the effect of imposing an obligation with which litigants could not possibly comply. Requiring an appeal to be lodged within one month of the date on which the registry drew up a full copy of the court's decision - rather than the point at which the appellant actually had knowledge of the decision - amounted to making the expiry of the relevant deadline dependent on a factor entirely outside the appellant's control. The Court found that the right of appeal should have become effective from the point at which the applicant could effectively apprise herself of the full text of the decision.  limitation periods for bringing a claim (see, regarding harm to physical integrity, the case-law references cited in paragraphs 53-55 of Sanofi Pasteur v. France, 2020, including Howald Moor and Others v. Switzerland, 2014, §§ 79-80; Yagtzilar and Others v. Greece, 2001, § 27; see also the cases cited in Loste v. France, 2022, §§ 68-70). For example, the Court has found a violation of the right of access to a court in a number of cases in which the discontinuation of criminal proceedings and the resulting failure to examine a civil claim were due to a lack of diligence on the national authorities'part ( Atanasova v. Bulgaria, 2008, §§ 35-47). Excessive delays in the examination of a claim may also render the right of access to a court meaningless ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013).  the granting of leave to appeal out of time and the resulting acceptance of an ordinary appeal lodged after a significant period of time, for reasons that do not appear especially convincing, may entail a breach of the principle of legal certainty and the right to a court ( Magomedov and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 87-89, where late appeals benefiting the competent authorities were accepted following the extension without any valid reason of the time-limit for appealing).  the length of preliminary investigations, attributable to the authorities, preventing the applicant from joining criminal proceedings as a civil party claiming damages or from making a civil compensation claim ( Petrella v. Italy, 2021, §§ 51-53 and references cited).  delay by the national authorities in examining an application by the applicant (challenging the selection procedure for a post for which she had applied), with the result that the proceedings were terminated on the grounds that there was no legal interest in pursuing the application as the administrative decision at issue had expired ( Frezadou v. Greece, 2018, § 47 - compare and contrast with Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 72). More generally, in exceptional cases where proceedings are kept pending for an excessive period, this may impair the right of access to a court ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013, § 57). The unjustified lack of a decision for a particularly lengthy period by the court dealing with the case may be regarded as a denial of justice; the remedy used by the applicant may thus become deprived of all effectiveness where the court concerned does not manage to settle the dispute in good time, as required by the circumstances of the case and what is at stake ( Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 60). ▪ by issues relating to jurisdiction (see, for example, Arlewin v. Sweden, 2016, concerning a television programme broadcast from another European Union country) or an excessively restrictive interpretation of the scope of an association's stated aim, depriving it of its right of access to a court ( Association Burestop 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 71). Furthermore, where an action for damages is brought against it, the State has a positive obligation to facilitate the identification of the respondent authority ( Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-71). ▪ by issues of evidence, where the requirements for the burden of proof are overly rigid ( Tence v. Slovenia, 2016, §§ 35-38); concerning formalism in the presentation of evidence, see Efstratiou and Others v. Greece, 2020, §§ 44 et seq. ▪ by the existence of procedural bars preventing or limiting the possibilities of applying to a court:  a particularly strict interpretation by the domestic courts of a procedural rule (excessive formalism) may deprive applicants of their right of access to a court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 97; Pérez de Rada Cavanilles v. Spain, 1998, § 49; Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Sotiris and Nikos Koutras ATTEE v. Greece, 2000, § 20; Běleš and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 50; RTBF v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 71-72 and 74; Miessen v. Belgium, 2016, §§ 72-74; Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, § 34; and for a constitutional court, Dos Santos Calado and Others v. Portugal, 2020, §§ 118-130), bearing in mind that an unreasonable construction of a procedural requirement impairs the right to effective judicial protection ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 37). The general principles established in Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 80-99, also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the procedural rules of a court called upon to rule at first and last instance (see Makrylakis v. Greece, 2022, §§ 36, 38-50, which emphasises the specificity of a situation where the case is examined by a single court, § 49). As regards the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion after an appeal has been lodged, this raises an issue concerning the principle of legal certainty ( Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, §§ 35-45); see also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149 - 165).  consideration of the value of the subject matter of the dispute (ratione valoris admissibility threshold) in order to determine the jurisdiction of a higher court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], § 73, §§ 85-86);  the requirements linked to execution of an earlier ruling may impair the right of access to a court, for instance where the applicant's lack of funds makes it impossible for him even to begin to comply with the earlier judgment ( Annoni di Gussola and Others v. France, 2000, § 56; compare with Arvanitakis v. France (dec.), 2000);  procedural rules barring certain subjects of law from taking court proceedings ( The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 1994, § 83; Philis v. Greece (no. 1), 1991, § 65; Lupaş and Others v. Romania, 2006, §§ 64-67; and, regarding adults lacking capacity, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012, §§ 241-45; Nataliya Mikhaylenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 40; Nikolyan v. Armenia, 2019; and compare with R.P. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ by the limits of the judicial review available, for example where a complaint to the administrative courts against a presidential decree could only give rise to a review of compliance with external formalities in the adoption of the decree, whereas the applicant's complaint called for an examination of the merits and of the internal legality of the decree ( Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 153-154, concerning the premature removal of a prosecutor), and a fortiori by the unavailability of a judicial review (see Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, §§ 76-77, concerning the automatic temporary suspension of a judge pending the examination of her appeal against a decision to remove her from office). In the context of family-law disputes, in Plazzi v. Switzerland (§§ 44-67) and Roth v. Switzerland, 2022, (§ 77), concerning the cancellation without judicial review of the suspensive effect of appeals by fathers, thereby enabling their children to leave the country with their mothers and removing the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, the Court found a violation, emphasising that the urgency invoked had not been serious enough to justify preventing the fathers from applying to a court before the cancellation of suspensive effect became applicable (see Plazzi v. Switzerland, 2022, §§ 58-59, and the special nature of proceedings under family law). ▪ In Xavier Lucas v. France, 2022, by giving precedence to the rule that applications to the Court of Appeal had to be made electronically (e-justice), while disregarding the practical hurdles faced by the applicant in doing so, the Court of Cassation had adopted a formalistic approach which was not necessary to ensure legal certainty or the proper administration of justice and which was therefore ""excessive"" (§ 57).","In the specific circumstances of a case, the practical and effective nature of the right of access to a court may be impaired, for instance: ▪ by the prohibitive cost of the proceedings in view of the individual's financial capacity:  the excessive amount of security for costs in the context of an application to join criminal proceedings as a civil party ( Aït-Mouhoub v. France, 1998, §§ 57-58; García Manibardo v. Spain, 2000, §§ 38-45);  excessive court fees ( Kreuz v. Poland, 2001, §§ 60-67; Podbielski and PPU Polpure v. Poland, 2005, §§ 65-66; Weissman and Others v. Romania, 2006, § 42; Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-70, and conversely, Reuther v. Germany (dec.), 2003). In these cases the Court considered the question of court fees that had been imposed prior to the institution of civil proceedings and had had the effect of hindering access to a court at first instance or at a subsequent stage of the proceedings for applicants who were unable to pay (contrast Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, 1995, §§ 62-67, regarding the payment of a security as a precondition for lodging an appeal). The Court has pointed out that where there is a possibility of an exemption from stamp duty for a court application following an assessment of the applicant's financial situation, the authorities must give a decision promptly ( Laçi v. Albania, 2021, §§ 53-60), and diligence is also expected of the applicant ( Elcomp sp. z o.o. v. Poland, 2021, § 41). If the State has a system for calculating court fees linked to the amount in dispute, in order to comply with Article 6 the system must be sufficiently flexible to allow for the possibility of total or partial exemption from payment or a reduction in the amount payable (see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 39 and 40, and see §§ 41-45, where the applicant company had been forced to abandon its appeal because it was unable to pay the fees imposed on it). In Stankov v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 53, the Court held that substantial court fees imposed at the end of proceedings could also amount to a restriction on the right to a court (see, more specifically, for cases concerning the excessive length of proceedings, an acquittal or unjustified pre-trial detention, §§ 59 and 62, and a claim for compensation for assault, Čolić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 58-59); see also, regarding the refusal to reimburse legal costs, Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 68-69 and § 74; and compare with proceedings challenging the costs payable following judicial proceedings, Taratukhin v. Russia (dec.), 2020, §§ 36 et seq. For a recent summary of the case-law, see Benghezal v. France, 2022, §§ 43-45. In cases concerning court fees, regard should also be had to the litigant's conduct ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 120) or the manifest lack of any prospect of success of an action ( Marić v. Croatia (dec.), 2020, §§ 58 and 60, concerning the obligation to bear the full costs of the State's representation, and § 52, concerning the obligation for the losing party to pay litigation costs (the ""loser pays"" rule)); see also Stankiewicz v. Poland, 2006, §§ 62 et seq.; Klauz v. Croatia, 2013, §§ 77 et seq.; and Cindrić and Bešlić v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 119-123). With regard to litigation costs for proceedings that did not give rise to a decision on the merits, see Karahasanoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 136-137. Lastly, the Court has objected to the rule whereby each party has to bear its own costs regardless of the outcome of the proceedings ( Zustović v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-106, and see also §§ 99-100 for the State's duty to bear the cost of its errors in that context); it also examined the rule that each party was to bear its own costs without exception in Dragan Kovačević v. Croatia, 2022, §§ 67-85, and stressed the importance of giving reasons for a decision refusing to reimburse the costs incurred by the successful party (§ 83). However, the Court found no violation of Article 6 on account of a rule of domestic law which provided that costs of the litigation should be reimbursed to a party acquitted in the administrative proceedings only in cases where the relevant authorities had acted unlawfully ( Jakutavičius v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 80 - 86). The Court noted that the applicant himself had contributed to the decision of the police to impose a sanction: although that sanction had later been annulled, the Court was unable to find that the applicant had been made to bear the mistakes of the State authorities. Thus, the fact that the applicant had to cover his own costs in the administrative-law proceedings did not violate his right of access to a court ( ibid ., §§ 84 - 85; compare with Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.), 2023, concerning the absence in domestic law of an arguable right to obtain reimbursement of costs incurred by a defendant acquitted in a criminal case). For the imposition of excessive court fees on a commercial company, see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 39. Applicants seeking exemption from court fees should act with due diligence when presenting evidence to the courts concerning their financial standing. In Centrum Handlowe Agora SP. Z O.O. v. Poland (dec.), 2024, the applicant company was required to substantiate its long-term inability to pay the court fees but failed to do so (it failed to formulate explicitly an argument relating to the seizures of its accounts). Even though the documents confirming the seizures were attached to the applicant company's application for an exemption, without any explicit argument in this regard the domestic courts could not be expected to make further inquiries in this matter: the applicant company, by not acting with due diligence, deprived the domestic courts of the opportunity to comprehensively evaluate its financial situation (§ 32).  The imposition of fines in order to prevent a build-up of cases before the courts and to ensure the proper administration of justice is not, as such, incompatible with the right of access to a court. However, the amount of such fines is an important factor to take into account ( Sace Elektrik Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş. v. Turkey, 2013, §§ 26 et seq., concerning a mandatory fine of 10% of the bid in the event of an unsuccessful attempt to challenge a public auction). ▪ by issues relating to time-limits:  the time taken to hear an appeal leading to its being declared inadmissible ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2006, § 26). For the unforeseeable application of a new time-limit introduced after the lodging of a complaint, in breach of the principle of legal certainty, see Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149-165. Litigants are nevertheless required to act with the requisite diligence ( Kamenova v. Bulgaria, 2018, §§ 52-55; compare Çela v. Albania, 2022, § 39).  The Court held in Ivanova and Ivashova v. Russia, 2017, that the national courts should not interpret domestic law in an inflexible manner with the effect of imposing an obligation with which litigants could not possibly comply. Requiring an appeal to be lodged within one month of the date on which the registry drew up a full copy of the court's decision-rather than the point at which the appellant actually had knowledge of the decision-amounted to making the expiry of the relevant deadline dependent on a factor entirely outside the appellant's control. The Court found that the right of appeal should have become effective from the point at which the applicant could effectively apprise herself of the full text of the decision.  limitation periods for bringing a claim (see, regarding harm to physical integrity, the case-law references cited in paragraphs 53-55 of Sanofi Pasteur v. France, 2020, including Howald Moor and Others v. Switzerland, 2014, §§ 79-80; Yagtzilar and Others v. Greece, 2001, § 27; see also the cases cited in Loste v. France, 2022, §§ 68-70). For example, the Court has found a violation of the right of access to a court in a number of cases in which the discontinuation of criminal proceedings and the resulting failure to examine a civil claim were due to a lack of diligence on the national authorities'part ( Atanasova v. Bulgaria, 2008, §§ 35-47. Compare Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC], 2024). Excessive delays in the examination of a claim may also render the right of access to a court meaningless ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013).  the granting of leave to appeal out of time and the resulting acceptance of an ordinary appeal lodged after a significant period of time, for reasons that do not appear especially convincing, may entail a breach of the principle of legal certainty and the right to a court ( Magomedov and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 87-89, where late appeals benefiting the competent authorities were accepted following the extension without any valid reason of the time-limit for appealing).  the length of preliminary investigations, attributable to the authorities, preventing the applicant from joining criminal proceedings as a civil party claiming damages or from making a civil compensation claim ( Petrella v. Italy, 2021, §§ 51-53 and references cited - Compare Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC], 2024, §§ 137-140).  delay by the national authorities in examining an application by the applicant (challenging the selection procedure for a post for which she had applied), with the result that the proceedings were terminated on the grounds that there was no legal interest in pursuing the application as the administrative decision at issue had expired ( Frezadou v. Greece, 2018, § 47 - compare and contrast with Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 72). More generally, in exceptional cases where proceedings are kept pending for an excessive period, this may impair the right of access to a court ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013, § 57). The unjustified lack of a decision for a particularly lengthy period by the court dealing with the case may be regarded as a denial of justice; the remedy used by the applicant may thus become deprived of all effectiveness where the court concerned does not manage to settle the dispute in good time, as required by the circumstances of the case and what is at stake ( Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 60). ▪ by issues relating to jurisdiction (see, for example, Arlewin v. Sweden, 2016, concerning a television programme broadcast from another European Union country) or an excessively restrictive interpretation of the scope of an association's stated aim, depriving it of its right of access to a court ( Association Burestop 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 71). Furthermore, where an action for damages is brought against it, the State has a positive obligation to facilitate the identification of the respondent authority ( Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-71). ▪ by issues of evidence, where the requirements for the burden of proof are overly rigid ( Tence v. Slovenia, 2016, §§ 35-38); concerning formalism in the presentation of evidence, see Efstratiou and Others v. Greece, 2020, §§ 44 et seq. ▪ by the existence of procedural bars preventing or limiting the possibilities of applying to a court:  a particularly strict interpretation by the domestic courts of a procedural rule (excessive formalism) may deprive applicants of their right of access to a court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 97; Pérez de Rada Cavanilles v. Spain, 1998, § 49; Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Sotiris and Nikos Koutras ATTEE v. Greece, 2000, § 20; Běleš and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 50; RTBF v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 71-72 and 74; Miessen v. Belgium, 2016, §§ 72-74; Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, § 34; and for a constitutional court, Dos Santos Calado and Others v. Portugal, 2020, §§ 118-130), bearing in mind that an unreasonable construction of a procedural requirement impairs the right to effective judicial protection ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 37). The general principles established in Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 80-99, also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the procedural rules of a court called upon to rule at first and last instance (see Makrylakis v. Greece, 2022, §§ 36, 38-50, which emphasises the specificity of a situation where the case is examined by a single court, § 49). As regards the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion after an appeal has been lodged, this raises an issue concerning the principle of legal certainty ( Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, §§ 35-45); see also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149-165).  consideration of the value of the subject matter of the dispute (ratione valoris admissibility threshold) in order to determine the jurisdiction of a higher court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], § 73, §§ 85-86);  the requirements linked to execution of an earlier ruling may impair the right of access to a court, for instance where the applicant's lack of funds makes it impossible for him even to begin to comply with the earlier judgment ( Annoni di Gussola and Others v. France, 2000, § 56; compare with Arvanitakis v. France (dec.), 2000);  procedural rules barring certain subjects of law from taking court proceedings ( The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 1994, § 83; Philis v. Greece (no. 1), 1991, § 65; Lupaş and Others v. Romania, 2006, §§ 64-67; and, regarding adults lacking capacity, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012, §§ 241-45; Nataliya Mikhaylenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 40; Nikolyan v. Armenia, 2019; and compare with R.P. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ by the limits of the judicial review available, for example where a complaint to the administrative courts against a presidential decree could only give rise to a review of compliance with external formalities in the adoption of the decree, whereas the applicant's complaint called for an examination of the merits and of the internal legality of the decree ( Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 153-154, concerning the premature removal of a prosecutor), and a fortiori by the unavailability of a judicial review (see Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, §§ 76-77, concerning the automatic temporary suspension of a judge pending the examination of her appeal against a decision to remove her from office). In the context of family-law disputes, in Plazzi v. Switzerland (§§ 44-67) and Roth v. Switzerland, 2022, (§ 77), concerning the cancellation without judicial review of the suspensive effect of appeals by fathers, thereby enabling their children to leave the country with their mothers and removing the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, the Court found a violation, emphasising that the urgency invoked had not been serious enough to justify preventing the fathers from applying to a court before the cancellation of suspensive effect became applicable (see Plazzi v. Switzerland, 2022, §§ 58-59, and the special nature of proceedings under family law). ▪ In Xavier Lucas v. France, 2022, by giving precedence to the rule that applications to the Court of Appeal had to be made electronically (e-justice), while disregarding the practical hurdles faced by the applicant in doing so, the Court of Cassation had adopted a formalistic approach which was not necessary to ensure legal certainty or the proper administration of justice and which was therefore ""excessive"" (§ 57)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:15771/20|53712/21,Chambeau and Streiff v. France (dec.),15771/20|53712/21,added,"Chambeau and Streiff v. France (dec.), nos. 15771/20 and 53712/21, 5 November 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A.2,"Limitations: court fees, time-limits, mandatory legal representation, immunities etc.",3,,171,,,,,"The absence of statutory time-limits for bringing a claim does not automatically undermine the principle of legal certainty: thus, in Chambeau and Streiff v. France (dec.), 2024, the applicants, both lawyers, were disbarred in 2019 and 2021 respectively, for a grave disciplinary violation which had occurred in 1995, but which had been discovered only in 2015. The Court noted that, as regards the first applicant, the domestic courts applied, by analogy, the 3-years'prescription period applicable to disciplinary proceedings against civil servants. As to the second applicant, the domestic courts decided that the period between the discovery of the breach and the final conviction in the disciplinary case was not ""excessive or contrary to the fair trial guarantees"". The domestic courts thereby either applied a prescription period or assessed whether the time elapsed had had any effect on the fairness of the proceedings, and also took into account this factor in determining the sanction. The Court also noted that the time factor did not affect the possibility for the applicants to adequately defend themselves against disciplinary charges and that the conviction had been based on written evidence and on the questioning of witnesses implicated in the case. The Court concluded that, in the circumstances, the mere absence of a statutory time-limit in the French law for that type of disciplinary offences did not violate Article 6 (§§ 48 - 58)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:2327/20,Couso Permuy v. Spain,2327/20,added,"Couso Permuy v. Spain, no. 2327/20, 25 July 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A.2,Existence of an arguable right or obligation in domestic law,3,22,24,0.9655,"Couso Permuy v. Spain , 2024|Tamazount and Others v. France , 2024",,"It should be noted that it is the right as asserted by the claimant in the domestic proceedings that must be taken into account in order to assess whether Article 6 § 1 is applicable ( Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2013, § 120). Where, at the outset of the proceedings, there was a genuine and serious dispute about the existence of such a right, the fact that the domestic courts concluded that the right did not exist does not retrospectively deprive the applicant's complaint of its arguability ( Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, §§ 88-89; see also, where the domestic courts were called upon to decide for the first time on the issue in question, Markovic and Others v. Italy [GC], 2006, §§ 100-02; compare and contrast with Károly Nagy v. Hungary [GC], 2017, §§ 75-77 and X and Others v. Russia, 2020, § 47).","It should be noted that it is the right as asserted by the claimant in the domestic proceedings that must be taken into account in order to assess whether Article 6 § 1 is applicable ( Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2013, § 120). Where, at the outset of the proceedings, there was a genuine and serious dispute about the existence of such a right, the fact that the domestic courts concluded that the right did not exist does not retrospectively deprive the applicant's complaint of its arguability ( Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, §§ 88-89; see also, where the domestic courts were called upon to decide for the first time on the issue in question, Markovic and Others v. Italy [GC], 2006, §§ 100-02; and Tamazount and Others v. France, 2024, § 109; compare and contrast with Károly Nagy v. Hungary [GC], 2017, §§ 75-77 and X and Others v. Russia, 2020, § 47). Similarly, where the applicant tried to obtain compensation for the death of a relative which occurred as a result of an alleged war crime committed abroad by foreign nationals, Article 6 was considered applicable even though, ultimately, the national courts concluded that they had no jurisdiction to adjudicate such disputes ( Couso Permuy v. Spain, 2024, §§ 109 - 111)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:2327/20,Couso Permuy v. Spain,2327/20,added,"Couso Permuy v. Spain, no. 2327/20, 25 July 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,II.A.2,"Limitations: court fees, time-limits, mandatory legal representation, immunities etc.",3,159,173,0.826,"These principles were confirmed in Couso Permuy v. Spain , 2024",,"Restrictions on the national courts'jurisdiction to deal with acts carried out abroad : such restrictions may pursue legitimate aims linked to the principles of the proper administration of justice and maintaining the effectiveness of domestic judicial decisions (concerning the lack of universal civil jurisdiction in matters involving torture, see Naït-Liman v. Switzerland [GC], 2018, § 122, and also §§ 218-220, concerning access to a court to seek compensation; Hussein and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 59-73).","Restrictions on the national courts'jurisdiction to deal with acts carried out abroad: such restrictions may pursue legitimate aims linked to the principles of the proper administration of justice and maintaining the effectiveness of domestic judicial decisions (concerning the lack of universal civil jurisdiction in matters involving torture, see Naït-Liman v. Switzerland [GC], 2018, § 122, and also §§ 218-220, concerning access to a court to seek compensation; Hussein and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 59-73). These principles were confirmed in Couso Permuy v. Spain, 2024, where the Court noted (§ 142) that States have no obligation under international law to search for war criminals outside its territory and to claim jurisdiction to prosecute/try them when there are no jurisdictional links with the State whatsoever and that it is not arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable for a State to limit universal jurisdiction only to those cases where there is a sufficient link to that State (§ 147)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:2327/20,Couso Permuy v. Spain,2327/20,added,"Couso Permuy v. Spain, no. 2327/20, 25 July 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.A.2.b,Examples and limits,4,391,413,0.9909,"Convention. In Zafferani and Others v. San Marino , 2025|The Court held in Couso Permuy v. Spain , 2024",,"Entry into force of a law when a case to which the State is a party is still pending ( Vegotex International S.A. v. Belgium [GC], 2022, §§ 92-93 and 102 and the case-law references cited): although in principle the legislature is not prevented from regulating, through new retrospective provisions, rights derived from the laws in force, the principle of the rule of law and the notion of a fair hearing enshrined in Article 6 preclude any interference by the legislature with the administration of justice designed to influence the judicial determination of a dispute, save on compelling grounds of the general interest ( Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, 1994, § 49; Zielinski and Pradal and Gonzalez and Others v. France [GC], 1999, § 57; Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], 2006, § 126). There are dangers inherent in the use of retrospective legislation which has the effect of influencing the judicial determination of a dispute to which the State is a party, including where the effect is to make pending litigation unwinnable for the claimant. Respect for the rule of law and the notion of a fair trial require that any reasons adduced to justify such measures be treated with the greatest possible degree of circumspection ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society et Yorkshire Building Society c. Royaume-Uni, 1997, § 112). The Court found violations, for example, in respect of: ▪ intervention by the legislature - at a time when proceedings to which the State was party had been pending for nine years and the applicants had a final, enforceable judgment against the State - to influence the imminent outcome of the case in the State's favour ( Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, 1994, §§ 49-50); ▪ a law which decisively influenced the imminent outcome of a case in favour of the State ( Zielinski, Pradal, Gonzalez and Others v. France [GC], 1999, § 59); ▪ the enactment, at a crucial point in proceedings before the Court of Cassation, of a law which for practical purposes resolved substantive issues and made carrying on with the litigation pointless ( Papageorgiou v. Greece, 1997); ▪ a decision of an appellate court based, even subsidiarily, on a law enacted in the course of proceedings and which affected the outcome of the proceedings ( Anagnostopoulos and Others v. Greece, 2000, §§ 20-21); ▪ recourse by the State to retrospective legislation influencing the judicial determination of a pending dispute to which the State was a party, without demonstrating that there were ""compelling general - interest reasons"" for such action. The Court pointed out, in particular, that financial considerations could not by themselves warrant the legislature taking the place of the courts in order to settle disputes ( Azienda Agricola Silverfunghi S.a.s. and Others v. Italy, 2014, §§ 76 and 88-89). However, Article 6 § 1 cannot be interpreted as preventing any interference by the authorities with pending legal proceedings to which they are party. In other cases the Court has held that the considerations relied on by the respondent State were based on the compelling public-interest motives required to justify the retroactive effect of the law ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 112; Forrer-Niedenthal v. Germany, 2003, § 64; OGIS-Institut Stanislas, OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and Others v. France, 2004, §§ 71-72; EEG-Slachthuis Verbist Izegem v. Belgium (dec.), 2005; Hôpital local Saint-Pierre d'Oléron and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 72-73).","Entry into force of a law when a case to which the State is a party is still pending ( Vegotex International S.A. v. Belgium [GC], 2022, §§ 92-93 and 102 and the case-law references cited): although in principle the legislature is not prevented from regulating, through new retrospective provisions, rights derived from the laws in force, the principle of the rule of law and the notion of a fair hearing enshrined in Article 6 preclude any interference by the legislature with the administration of justice designed to influence the judicial determination of a dispute, save on compelling grounds of the general interest ( Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, 1994, § 49; Zielinski and Pradal and Gonzalez and Others v. France [GC], 1999, § 57; Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], 2006, § 126). There are dangers inherent in the use of retrospective legislation which has the effect of influencing the judicial determination of a dispute to which the State is a party, including where the effect is to make pending litigation unwinnable for the claimant. Respect for the rule of law and the notion of a fair trial require that any reasons adduced to justify such measures be treated with the greatest possible degree of circumspection ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society et Yorkshire Building Society c. Royaume-Uni, 1997, § 112). The Court found violations, for example, in respect of: ▪ intervention by the legislature - at a time when proceedings to which the State was party had been pending for nine years and the applicants had a final, enforceable judgment against the State - to influence the imminent outcome of the case in the State's favour ( Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, 1994, §§ 49-50); ▪ a law which decisively influenced the imminent outcome of a case in favour of the State ( Zielinski, Pradal, Gonzalez and Others v. France [GC], 1999, § 59); ▪ the enactment, at a crucial point in proceedings before the Court of Cassation, of a law which for practical purposes resolved substantive issues and made carrying on with the litigation pointless ( Papageorgiou v. Greece, 1997); ▪ a decision of an appellate court based, even subsidiarily, on a law enacted in the course of proceedings and which affected the outcome of the proceedings ( Anagnostopoulos and Others v. Greece, 2000, §§ 20-21); ▪ recourse by the State to retrospective legislation influencing the judicial determination of a pending dispute to which the State was a party, without demonstrating that there were ""compelling general - interest reasons"" for such action. The Court pointed out, in particular, that financial considerations could not by themselves warrant the legislature taking the place of the courts in order to settle disputes ( Azienda Agricola Silverfunghi S.a.s. and Others v. Italy, 2014, §§ 76 and 88-89). However, Article 6 § 1 cannot be interpreted as preventing any interference by the authorities with pending legal proceedings to which they are party. In other cases the Court has held that the considerations relied on by the respondent State were based on the compelling public-interest motives required to justify the retroactive effect of the law ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 112; Forrer-Niedenthal v. Germany, 2003, § 64; OGIS-Institut Stanislas, OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and Others v. France, 2004, §§ 71-72; EEG-Slachthuis Verbist Izegem v. Belgium (dec.), 2005; Hôpital local Saint-Pierre d'Oléron and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 72-73). The Court held in Couso Permuy v. Spain, 2024, that the legislature is not prohibited from regulating the conduct of civil matters by means of implementing new provisions with retroactive effect: what is prohibited, as a general rule, is an interference by the legislature with the administration of justice for the purpose of influencing the judicial outcome of litigation, unless there are ""overriding grounds of public interest"" for doing so (§ 133). In OGIS-Institut Stanislas, OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and Others v. France, 2004 the legislature had intervened to correct a technical flaw and to fill a legal vacuum and the applicants had sought to obtain a windfall by taking advantage of a loophole in the regulations: the Court found no breach of Article 6 of the Convention. In Zafferani and Others v. San Marino, 2025, the Court concluded that Article 6 was breached in the absence of such a legislative vacuum and in the absence of ""sufficiently compelling reasons for making [the legislation] immediately and retrospectively applicable to pending proceedings"" with retrospective effect to the detriment of the applicants and to the benefit of the State (§ 54)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:25373/16,E.T. v. the Republic of Moldova,25373/16,added,"E.T. v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 25373/16, 12 November 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A.2,"Limitations: court fees, time-limits, mandatory legal representation, immunities etc.",3,,185,,,,,"Access to court may be limited in the national legal order by the rules on standing . The case of E.T. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2024, concerned the inability of the applicant, who had been found to lack legal capacity (mental illness) to bring a court action aimed at restoring her legal capacity, other than through her guardian (with whom she had a strained relationship) or through certain officials. While there may be relevant reasons to limit an incapacitated person's access to a court (such as for the person's own protection), in the present case the guardianship regime was not limited in time and no automatic periodic review of this regime was provided. Neither did domestic law provide for any intermediary solutions in respect of varying degrees of incapacitation. The Court found therefore that the applicant's inability to directly seek restoration of her legal capacity at the material time was a disproportionate hindrance impairing the very essence of her right of access to a court, while stressing that the State remains free to determine the procedure by which such direct access to court (to challenge the legal incapacitation regime) is to be realised so as to ensure that courts are not overburdened with excessive and manifestly ill-founded applications (§ 48)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:6319/21,Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC],6319/21,added,"Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC], nos. 6319/21 and 2 others, 24 September 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B,Extension to other types of disputes,2,,56,,,,,"The principles governing the applicability of Article 6 under its civil head, in the context of criminal proceedings where the applicant has ""victim"" status, has been summarised in Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC], 2024, §§ 88 - 93. For Article 6 in its civil limb to be applicable, the following conditions should be met. In the first place, under domestic law the applicant (a victim of a crime) must have a substantive civil right (such as compensation for damage sustained), and a procedural right of action to pursue that civil right within the impugned criminal proceedings. Secondly, the victim must clearly demonstrate the importance he or she attaches to securing the civil right, by invoking that right via the appropriate channel, in accordance with the tenets of the domestic legal framework. Thus, if the law provide s for a formal status of ""civil party"" in criminal proceedings, Article 6 would apply only when the applicant has lodged a formal request to obtain such status (in less formalistic systems Article 6 would apply when the applicant's pursuance of a civil right has become clear). Article 6 would not be applicable where the applicant tried to pursue the civil right by prima facie invalid (procedurally or substantively) means, or where it was inappropriate for the applicant to attempt to bring such claims through the criminal avenue, such as would be the case, for matters of purely civil nature, or if statutory limitation periods or any relevant time-limits applicable at that stage had already expired. Thirdly, the civil right being pursued in the criminal proceedings must not be actively pursued in parallel elsewhere. Fourthly, the criminal proceedings must be decisive for the civil right in issue, in particular because under domestic law the judge had to determine the civil claim, or because the judge has done so in practice, or because the criminal proceedings prevailed over any civil proceedings (i.e. would bring to an end any parallel civil proceedings, or the determination of the civil claim would be bound by the findings in the criminal proceedings, etc.)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:6319/21,Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC],6319/21,added,"Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC], nos. 6319/21 and 2 others, 24 September 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.F.3,Article 6 § 1 (fair criminal trial),3,109,120,0.9432,,,"It should be noted that the conduct of criminal proceedings may in some cases have a potential impact on the fairness of the determination of a "" civil "" dispute (see in particular the specific question of a civil party or civil rights associated with a criminal investigation procedure in Mihail Mihăilescu v. Romania, 2021, §§ 74-89, including the question of res judicata ; Victor Laurențiu Marin v. Romania, 2021, §§ 144-150; and Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], 2019, §§ 192-201).","It should be noted that the conduct of criminal proceedings may in some cases have a potential impact on the fairness of the determination of a "" civil "" dispute (see in particular the specific question of a civil party or civil rights associated with a criminal investigation procedure in Mihail Mihăilescu v. Romania, 2021, §§ 74-89, including the question of res judicata ; Victor Laurențiu Marin v. Romania, 2021, §§ 144-150; and Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], 2019, §§ 192-201. In Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC], 2024, §§ 88 - 93 where it was found thatthe discontinuation of a criminal case did not necessarily predetermine the outcome of the civil proceedings and that the applicants'diligence in pursuing a civil claim had to be assessed)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:6319/21,Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC],6319/21,added,"Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC], nos. 6319/21 and 2 others, 24 September 2024",3,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A.1,A right that is practical and effective,3,,145,,,,,"However, the authorities'failure to ""act with the requisite diligence"" does not automatically breach the applicant's access to court, at least not where the applicant himself failed to act diligently. Thus, in Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC], 2024, the applicant alleged that he had been a victim of school bullying in 2015: a criminal investigation was opened but the investigative judge failed to take any practical steps to elucidate those allegations and, in 2020, the investigation was discontinued as the charges became time-barred. The Court acknowledged, on the one hand, that the discontinuation of the criminal case was due to the authorities'inaction and resulted from a serious disfunction of the domestic system. However, the Court also found that the applicant had also lacked thenecessary diligence in pursuing his interests: he did not initiate any criminal or civil proceedings until 2019, when the request to join the criminal proceedings was lodged. This request was made only a few days before the expiration of the limitation period in respect of the alleged offence, which had been committed three and a half years earlier. Furthermore, the applicant had alternative legal avenues at his disposal: he could have lodged a civil claim separately from the criminal proceedings. The limitation period on the civil claims was significantly longer than the one provided for the criminal offence: even a potential suspension of the civil proceedings pending the (ineffective) criminal investigation would not lead to the civil claim being time-barred. Finally, the applicant failed to introduce a civil claim after the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings. The Court concluded that, despite the dysfunction of the domestic system as regards the criminal investigation, it could not be said that the applicant was denied access to a court for the determination of his civil rights (§§ 141-152)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:6319/21,Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC],6319/21,added,"Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC], nos. 6319/21 and 2 others, 24 September 2024",4,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.A.1,A right that is practical and effective,3,136,148,0.9989,,,"In the specific circumstances of a case, the practical and effective nature of the right of access to a court may be impaired, for instance: ▪ by the prohibitive cost of the proceedings in view of the individual's financial capacity:  the excessive amount of security for costs in the context of an application to join criminal proceedings as a civil party ( Aït-Mouhoub v. France, 1998, §§ 57-58; García Manibardo v. Spain, 2000, §§ 38-45);  excessive court fees ( Kreuz v. Poland, 2001, §§ 60-67; Podbielski and PPU Polpure v. Poland, 2005, §§ 65-66; Weissman and Others v. Romania, 2006, § 42; Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-70, and conversely, Reuther v. Germany (dec.), 2003). In these cases the Court considered the question of court fees that had been imposed prior to the institution of civil proceedings and had had the effect of hindering access to a court at first instance or at a subsequent stage of the proceedings for applicants who were unable to pay (contrast Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, 1995, §§ 62-67, regarding the payment of a security as a precondition for lodging an appeal). The Court has pointed out that where there is a possibility of an exemption from stamp duty for a court application following an assessment of the applicant's financial situation, the authorities must give a decision promptly ( Laçi v. Albania, 2021, §§ 53-60), and diligence is also expected of the applicant ( Elcomp sp. z o.o. v. Poland, 2021, § 41). If the State has a system for calculating court fees linked to the amount in dispute, in order to comply with Article 6 the system must be sufficiently flexible to allow for the possibility of total or partial exemption from payment or a reduction in the amount payable (see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 39 and 40, and see §§ 41-45, where the applicant company had been forced to abandon its appeal because it was unable to pay the fees imposed on it). In Stankov v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 53, the Court held that substantial court fees imposed at the end of proceedings could also amount to a restriction on the right to a court (see, more specifically, for cases concerning the excessive length of proceedings, an acquittal or unjustified pre-trial detention, §§ 59 and 62, and a claim for compensation for assault, Čolić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 58-59); see also, regarding the refusal to reimburse legal costs, Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 68-69 and § 74; and compare with proceedings challenging the costs payable following judicial proceedings, Taratukhin v. Russia (dec.), 2020, §§ 36 et seq. For a recent summary of the case-law, see Benghezal v. France, 2022, §§ 43-45. In cases concerning court fees, regard should also be had to the litigant's conduct ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 120) or the manifest lack of any prospect of success of an action ( Marić v. Croatia (dec.), 2020, §§ 58 and 60, concerning the obligation to bear the full costs of the State's representation, and § 52, concerning the obligation for the losing party to pay litigation costs (the ""loser pays"" rule)); see also Stankiewicz v. Poland, 2006, §§ 62 et seq.; Klauz v. Croatia, 2013, §§ 77 et seq.; and Cindrić and Bešlić v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 119-123). With regard to litigation costs for proceedings that did not give rise to a decision on the merits, see Karahasanoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 136-137. Lastly, the Court has objected to the rule whereby each party has to bear its own costs regardless of the outcome of the proceedings ( Zustović v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-106, and see also §§ 99-100 for the State's duty to bear the cost of its errors in that context); it also examined the rule that each party was to bear its own costs without exception in Dragan Kovačević v. Croatia, 2022, §§ 67-85, and stressed the importance of giving reasons for a decision refusing to reimburse the costs incurred by the successful party (§ 83). However, the Court found no violation of Article 6 on account of a rule of domestic law which provided that costs of the litigation should be reimbursed to a party acquitted in the administrative proceedings only in cases where the relevant authorities had acted unlawfully ( Jakutavičius v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 80 - 86). The Court noted that the applicant himself had contributed to the decision of the police to impose a sanction: although that sanction had later been annulled, the Court was unable to find that the applicant had been made to bear the mistakes of the State authorities. Thus, the fact that the applicant had to cover his own costs in the administrative-law proceedings did not violate his right of access to a court ( ibid ., §§ 84 - 85; compare with Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.), 2023, concerning the absence in domestic law of an arguable right to obtain reimbursement of costs incurred by a defendant acquitted in a criminal case). For the imposition of excessive court fees on a commercial company, see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 39.  The imposition of fines in order to prevent a build-up of cases before the courts and to ensure the proper administration of justice is not, as such, incompatible with the right of access to a court. However, the amount of such fines is an important factor to take into account ( Sace Elektrik Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş. v. Turkey, 2013, §§ 26 et seq., concerning a mandatory fine of 10% of the bid in the event of an unsuccessful attempt to challenge a public auction). ▪ by issues relating to time-limits:  the time taken to hear an appeal leading to its being declared inadmissible ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2006, § 26). For the unforeseeable application of a new time-limit introduced after the lodging of a complaint, in breach of the principle of legal certainty, see Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149 - 165. Litigants are nevertheless required to act with the requisite diligence ( Kamenova v. Bulgaria, 2018, §§ 52-55; compare Çela v. Albania, 2022, § 39).  The Court held in Ivanova and Ivashova v. Russia, 2017, that the national courts should not interpret domestic law in an inflexible manner with the effect of imposing an obligation with which litigants could not possibly comply. Requiring an appeal to be lodged within one month of the date on which the registry drew up a full copy of the court's decision - rather than the point at which the appellant actually had knowledge of the decision - amounted to making the expiry of the relevant deadline dependent on a factor entirely outside the appellant's control. The Court found that the right of appeal should have become effective from the point at which the applicant could effectively apprise herself of the full text of the decision.  limitation periods for bringing a claim (see, regarding harm to physical integrity, the case-law references cited in paragraphs 53-55 of Sanofi Pasteur v. France, 2020, including Howald Moor and Others v. Switzerland, 2014, §§ 79-80; Yagtzilar and Others v. Greece, 2001, § 27; see also the cases cited in Loste v. France, 2022, §§ 68-70). For example, the Court has found a violation of the right of access to a court in a number of cases in which the discontinuation of criminal proceedings and the resulting failure to examine a civil claim were due to a lack of diligence on the national authorities'part ( Atanasova v. Bulgaria, 2008, §§ 35-47). Excessive delays in the examination of a claim may also render the right of access to a court meaningless ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013).  the granting of leave to appeal out of time and the resulting acceptance of an ordinary appeal lodged after a significant period of time, for reasons that do not appear especially convincing, may entail a breach of the principle of legal certainty and the right to a court ( Magomedov and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 87-89, where late appeals benefiting the competent authorities were accepted following the extension without any valid reason of the time-limit for appealing).  the length of preliminary investigations, attributable to the authorities, preventing the applicant from joining criminal proceedings as a civil party claiming damages or from making a civil compensation claim ( Petrella v. Italy, 2021, §§ 51-53 and references cited).  delay by the national authorities in examining an application by the applicant (challenging the selection procedure for a post for which she had applied), with the result that the proceedings were terminated on the grounds that there was no legal interest in pursuing the application as the administrative decision at issue had expired ( Frezadou v. Greece, 2018, § 47 - compare and contrast with Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 72). More generally, in exceptional cases where proceedings are kept pending for an excessive period, this may impair the right of access to a court ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013, § 57). The unjustified lack of a decision for a particularly lengthy period by the court dealing with the case may be regarded as a denial of justice; the remedy used by the applicant may thus become deprived of all effectiveness where the court concerned does not manage to settle the dispute in good time, as required by the circumstances of the case and what is at stake ( Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 60). ▪ by issues relating to jurisdiction (see, for example, Arlewin v. Sweden, 2016, concerning a television programme broadcast from another European Union country) or an excessively restrictive interpretation of the scope of an association's stated aim, depriving it of its right of access to a court ( Association Burestop 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 71). Furthermore, where an action for damages is brought against it, the State has a positive obligation to facilitate the identification of the respondent authority ( Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-71). ▪ by issues of evidence, where the requirements for the burden of proof are overly rigid ( Tence v. Slovenia, 2016, §§ 35-38); concerning formalism in the presentation of evidence, see Efstratiou and Others v. Greece, 2020, §§ 44 et seq. ▪ by the existence of procedural bars preventing or limiting the possibilities of applying to a court:  a particularly strict interpretation by the domestic courts of a procedural rule (excessive formalism) may deprive applicants of their right of access to a court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 97; Pérez de Rada Cavanilles v. Spain, 1998, § 49; Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Sotiris and Nikos Koutras ATTEE v. Greece, 2000, § 20; Běleš and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 50; RTBF v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 71-72 and 74; Miessen v. Belgium, 2016, §§ 72-74; Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, § 34; and for a constitutional court, Dos Santos Calado and Others v. Portugal, 2020, §§ 118-130), bearing in mind that an unreasonable construction of a procedural requirement impairs the right to effective judicial protection ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 37). The general principles established in Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 80-99, also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the procedural rules of a court called upon to rule at first and last instance (see Makrylakis v. Greece, 2022, §§ 36, 38-50, which emphasises the specificity of a situation where the case is examined by a single court, § 49). As regards the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion after an appeal has been lodged, this raises an issue concerning the principle of legal certainty ( Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, §§ 35-45); see also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149 - 165).  consideration of the value of the subject matter of the dispute (ratione valoris admissibility threshold) in order to determine the jurisdiction of a higher court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], § 73, §§ 85-86);  the requirements linked to execution of an earlier ruling may impair the right of access to a court, for instance where the applicant's lack of funds makes it impossible for him even to begin to comply with the earlier judgment ( Annoni di Gussola and Others v. France, 2000, § 56; compare with Arvanitakis v. France (dec.), 2000);  procedural rules barring certain subjects of law from taking court proceedings ( The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 1994, § 83; Philis v. Greece (no. 1), 1991, § 65; Lupaş and Others v. Romania, 2006, §§ 64-67; and, regarding adults lacking capacity, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012, §§ 241-45; Nataliya Mikhaylenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 40; Nikolyan v. Armenia, 2019; and compare with R.P. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ by the limits of the judicial review available, for example where a complaint to the administrative courts against a presidential decree could only give rise to a review of compliance with external formalities in the adoption of the decree, whereas the applicant's complaint called for an examination of the merits and of the internal legality of the decree ( Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 153-154, concerning the premature removal of a prosecutor), and a fortiori by the unavailability of a judicial review (see Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, §§ 76-77, concerning the automatic temporary suspension of a judge pending the examination of her appeal against a decision to remove her from office). In the context of family-law disputes, in Plazzi v. Switzerland (§§ 44-67) and Roth v. Switzerland, 2022, (§ 77), concerning the cancellation without judicial review of the suspensive effect of appeals by fathers, thereby enabling their children to leave the country with their mothers and removing the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, the Court found a violation, emphasising that the urgency invoked had not been serious enough to justify preventing the fathers from applying to a court before the cancellation of suspensive effect became applicable (see Plazzi v. Switzerland, 2022, §§ 58-59, and the special nature of proceedings under family law). ▪ In Xavier Lucas v. France, 2022, by giving precedence to the rule that applications to the Court of Appeal had to be made electronically (e-justice), while disregarding the practical hurdles faced by the applicant in doing so, the Court of Cassation had adopted a formalistic approach which was not necessary to ensure legal certainty or the proper administration of justice and which was therefore ""excessive"" (§ 57).","In the specific circumstances of a case, the practical and effective nature of the right of access to a court may be impaired, for instance: ▪ by the prohibitive cost of the proceedings in view of the individual's financial capacity:  the excessive amount of security for costs in the context of an application to join criminal proceedings as a civil party ( Aït-Mouhoub v. France, 1998, §§ 57-58; García Manibardo v. Spain, 2000, §§ 38-45);  excessive court fees ( Kreuz v. Poland, 2001, §§ 60-67; Podbielski and PPU Polpure v. Poland, 2005, §§ 65-66; Weissman and Others v. Romania, 2006, § 42; Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-70, and conversely, Reuther v. Germany (dec.), 2003). In these cases the Court considered the question of court fees that had been imposed prior to the institution of civil proceedings and had had the effect of hindering access to a court at first instance or at a subsequent stage of the proceedings for applicants who were unable to pay (contrast Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, 1995, §§ 62-67, regarding the payment of a security as a precondition for lodging an appeal). The Court has pointed out that where there is a possibility of an exemption from stamp duty for a court application following an assessment of the applicant's financial situation, the authorities must give a decision promptly ( Laçi v. Albania, 2021, §§ 53-60), and diligence is also expected of the applicant ( Elcomp sp. z o.o. v. Poland, 2021, § 41). If the State has a system for calculating court fees linked to the amount in dispute, in order to comply with Article 6 the system must be sufficiently flexible to allow for the possibility of total or partial exemption from payment or a reduction in the amount payable (see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 39 and 40, and see §§ 41-45, where the applicant company had been forced to abandon its appeal because it was unable to pay the fees imposed on it). In Stankov v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 53, the Court held that substantial court fees imposed at the end of proceedings could also amount to a restriction on the right to a court (see, more specifically, for cases concerning the excessive length of proceedings, an acquittal or unjustified pre-trial detention, §§ 59 and 62, and a claim for compensation for assault, Čolić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 58-59); see also, regarding the refusal to reimburse legal costs, Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 68-69 and § 74; and compare with proceedings challenging the costs payable following judicial proceedings, Taratukhin v. Russia (dec.), 2020, §§ 36 et seq. For a recent summary of the case-law, see Benghezal v. France, 2022, §§ 43-45. In cases concerning court fees, regard should also be had to the litigant's conduct ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 120) or the manifest lack of any prospect of success of an action ( Marić v. Croatia (dec.), 2020, §§ 58 and 60, concerning the obligation to bear the full costs of the State's representation, and § 52, concerning the obligation for the losing party to pay litigation costs (the ""loser pays"" rule)); see also Stankiewicz v. Poland, 2006, §§ 62 et seq.; Klauz v. Croatia, 2013, §§ 77 et seq.; and Cindrić and Bešlić v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 119-123). With regard to litigation costs for proceedings that did not give rise to a decision on the merits, see Karahasanoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 136-137. Lastly, the Court has objected to the rule whereby each party has to bear its own costs regardless of the outcome of the proceedings ( Zustović v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-106, and see also §§ 99-100 for the State's duty to bear the cost of its errors in that context); it also examined the rule that each party was to bear its own costs without exception in Dragan Kovačević v. Croatia, 2022, §§ 67-85, and stressed the importance of giving reasons for a decision refusing to reimburse the costs incurred by the successful party (§ 83). However, the Court found no violation of Article 6 on account of a rule of domestic law which provided that costs of the litigation should be reimbursed to a party acquitted in the administrative proceedings only in cases where the relevant authorities had acted unlawfully ( Jakutavičius v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 80 - 86). The Court noted that the applicant himself had contributed to the decision of the police to impose a sanction: although that sanction had later been annulled, the Court was unable to find that the applicant had been made to bear the mistakes of the State authorities. Thus, the fact that the applicant had to cover his own costs in the administrative-law proceedings did not violate his right of access to a court ( ibid ., §§ 84 - 85; compare with Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.), 2023, concerning the absence in domestic law of an arguable right to obtain reimbursement of costs incurred by a defendant acquitted in a criminal case). For the imposition of excessive court fees on a commercial company, see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 39. Applicants seeking exemption from court fees should act with due diligence when presenting evidence to the courts concerning their financial standing. In Centrum Handlowe Agora SP. Z O.O. v. Poland (dec.), 2024, the applicant company was required to substantiate its long-term inability to pay the court fees but failed to do so (it failed to formulate explicitly an argument relating to the seizures of its accounts). Even though the documents confirming the seizures were attached to the applicant company's application for an exemption, without any explicit argument in this regard the domestic courts could not be expected to make further inquiries in this matter: the applicant company, by not acting with due diligence, deprived the domestic courts of the opportunity to comprehensively evaluate its financial situation (§ 32).  The imposition of fines in order to prevent a build-up of cases before the courts and to ensure the proper administration of justice is not, as such, incompatible with the right of access to a court. However, the amount of such fines is an important factor to take into account ( Sace Elektrik Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş. v. Turkey, 2013, §§ 26 et seq., concerning a mandatory fine of 10% of the bid in the event of an unsuccessful attempt to challenge a public auction). ▪ by issues relating to time-limits:  the time taken to hear an appeal leading to its being declared inadmissible ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2006, § 26). For the unforeseeable application of a new time-limit introduced after the lodging of a complaint, in breach of the principle of legal certainty, see Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149-165. Litigants are nevertheless required to act with the requisite diligence ( Kamenova v. Bulgaria, 2018, §§ 52-55; compare Çela v. Albania, 2022, § 39).  The Court held in Ivanova and Ivashova v. Russia, 2017, that the national courts should not interpret domestic law in an inflexible manner with the effect of imposing an obligation with which litigants could not possibly comply. Requiring an appeal to be lodged within one month of the date on which the registry drew up a full copy of the court's decision-rather than the point at which the appellant actually had knowledge of the decision-amounted to making the expiry of the relevant deadline dependent on a factor entirely outside the appellant's control. The Court found that the right of appeal should have become effective from the point at which the applicant could effectively apprise herself of the full text of the decision.  limitation periods for bringing a claim (see, regarding harm to physical integrity, the case-law references cited in paragraphs 53-55 of Sanofi Pasteur v. France, 2020, including Howald Moor and Others v. Switzerland, 2014, §§ 79-80; Yagtzilar and Others v. Greece, 2001, § 27; see also the cases cited in Loste v. France, 2022, §§ 68-70). For example, the Court has found a violation of the right of access to a court in a number of cases in which the discontinuation of criminal proceedings and the resulting failure to examine a civil claim were due to a lack of diligence on the national authorities'part ( Atanasova v. Bulgaria, 2008, §§ 35-47. Compare Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC], 2024). Excessive delays in the examination of a claim may also render the right of access to a court meaningless ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013).  the granting of leave to appeal out of time and the resulting acceptance of an ordinary appeal lodged after a significant period of time, for reasons that do not appear especially convincing, may entail a breach of the principle of legal certainty and the right to a court ( Magomedov and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 87-89, where late appeals benefiting the competent authorities were accepted following the extension without any valid reason of the time-limit for appealing).  the length of preliminary investigations, attributable to the authorities, preventing the applicant from joining criminal proceedings as a civil party claiming damages or from making a civil compensation claim ( Petrella v. Italy, 2021, §§ 51-53 and references cited - Compare Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC], 2024, §§ 137-140).  delay by the national authorities in examining an application by the applicant (challenging the selection procedure for a post for which she had applied), with the result that the proceedings were terminated on the grounds that there was no legal interest in pursuing the application as the administrative decision at issue had expired ( Frezadou v. Greece, 2018, § 47 - compare and contrast with Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 72). More generally, in exceptional cases where proceedings are kept pending for an excessive period, this may impair the right of access to a court ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013, § 57). The unjustified lack of a decision for a particularly lengthy period by the court dealing with the case may be regarded as a denial of justice; the remedy used by the applicant may thus become deprived of all effectiveness where the court concerned does not manage to settle the dispute in good time, as required by the circumstances of the case and what is at stake ( Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 60). ▪ by issues relating to jurisdiction (see, for example, Arlewin v. Sweden, 2016, concerning a television programme broadcast from another European Union country) or an excessively restrictive interpretation of the scope of an association's stated aim, depriving it of its right of access to a court ( Association Burestop 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 71). Furthermore, where an action for damages is brought against it, the State has a positive obligation to facilitate the identification of the respondent authority ( Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-71). ▪ by issues of evidence, where the requirements for the burden of proof are overly rigid ( Tence v. Slovenia, 2016, §§ 35-38); concerning formalism in the presentation of evidence, see Efstratiou and Others v. Greece, 2020, §§ 44 et seq. ▪ by the existence of procedural bars preventing or limiting the possibilities of applying to a court:  a particularly strict interpretation by the domestic courts of a procedural rule (excessive formalism) may deprive applicants of their right of access to a court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 97; Pérez de Rada Cavanilles v. Spain, 1998, § 49; Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Sotiris and Nikos Koutras ATTEE v. Greece, 2000, § 20; Běleš and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 50; RTBF v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 71-72 and 74; Miessen v. Belgium, 2016, §§ 72-74; Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, § 34; and for a constitutional court, Dos Santos Calado and Others v. Portugal, 2020, §§ 118-130), bearing in mind that an unreasonable construction of a procedural requirement impairs the right to effective judicial protection ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 37). The general principles established in Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 80-99, also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the procedural rules of a court called upon to rule at first and last instance (see Makrylakis v. Greece, 2022, §§ 36, 38-50, which emphasises the specificity of a situation where the case is examined by a single court, § 49). As regards the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion after an appeal has been lodged, this raises an issue concerning the principle of legal certainty ( Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, §§ 35-45); see also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149-165).  consideration of the value of the subject matter of the dispute (ratione valoris admissibility threshold) in order to determine the jurisdiction of a higher court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], § 73, §§ 85-86);  the requirements linked to execution of an earlier ruling may impair the right of access to a court, for instance where the applicant's lack of funds makes it impossible for him even to begin to comply with the earlier judgment ( Annoni di Gussola and Others v. France, 2000, § 56; compare with Arvanitakis v. France (dec.), 2000);  procedural rules barring certain subjects of law from taking court proceedings ( The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 1994, § 83; Philis v. Greece (no. 1), 1991, § 65; Lupaş and Others v. Romania, 2006, §§ 64-67; and, regarding adults lacking capacity, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012, §§ 241-45; Nataliya Mikhaylenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 40; Nikolyan v. Armenia, 2019; and compare with R.P. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ by the limits of the judicial review available, for example where a complaint to the administrative courts against a presidential decree could only give rise to a review of compliance with external formalities in the adoption of the decree, whereas the applicant's complaint called for an examination of the merits and of the internal legality of the decree ( Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 153-154, concerning the premature removal of a prosecutor), and a fortiori by the unavailability of a judicial review (see Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, §§ 76-77, concerning the automatic temporary suspension of a judge pending the examination of her appeal against a decision to remove her from office). In the context of family-law disputes, in Plazzi v. Switzerland (§§ 44-67) and Roth v. Switzerland, 2022, (§ 77), concerning the cancellation without judicial review of the suspensive effect of appeals by fathers, thereby enabling their children to leave the country with their mothers and removing the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, the Court found a violation, emphasising that the urgency invoked had not been serious enough to justify preventing the fathers from applying to a court before the cancellation of suspensive effect became applicable (see Plazzi v. Switzerland, 2022, §§ 58-59, and the special nature of proceedings under family law). ▪ In Xavier Lucas v. France, 2022, by giving precedence to the rule that applications to the Court of Appeal had to be made electronically (e-justice), while disregarding the practical hurdles faced by the applicant in doing so, the Court of Cassation had adopted a formalistic approach which was not necessary to ensure legal certainty or the proper administration of justice and which was therefore ""excessive"" (§ 57)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:6319/21,Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC],6319/21,added,"Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC], nos. 6319/21 and 2 others, 24 September 2024",5,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,IV.A.2.a,Principles,4,362,384,0.9614,,,"The conduct of criminal proceedings may in some cases have a potential impact on the fairness of the determination of a ""civil"" dispute. In particular, the specific question of a civil party or civil rights associated with a criminal investigation procedure may raise an issue in terms of a fair trial if, during this preliminary stage of the criminal proceedings, civil rights are irretrievably undermined for the purposes of the subsequent civil dispute (see the applicable principles in Mihail Mihăilescu v. Romania, 2021, §§ 74-89, including the question of res judicata, and the requisite level of protection, § 90, and also Victor Laurențiu Marin v. Romania, 2021, §§ 144-150, and Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], 2019).","The conduct of criminal proceedings may in some cases have a potential impact on the fairness of the determination of a ""civil"" dispute. In particular, the specific question of a civil party or civil rights associated with a criminal investigation procedure may raise an issue in terms of a fair trial if, during this preliminary stage of the criminal proceedings, civil rights are irretrievably undermined for the purposes of the subsequent civil dispute (see the applicable principles in Mihail Mihăilescu v. Romania, 2021, §§ 74-89, including the question of res judicata, and the requisite level of protection, § 90, and also Victor Laurențiu Marin v. Romania, 2021, §§ 144-150, and Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], 2019. Compare Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC], 2024, §§ 88 - 93, where the Court concluded that flawed criminal proceedings did not necessarily predetermine the outcome of the civil proceedings and where it assessed the applicants'diligence in asserting their civil claim within the framework of criminal proceedings)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:64220/19,Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria,64220/19,added,"Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria, no. 64220/19, 5 March 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B,Extension to other types of disputes,2,,65,,"Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria , 2024|Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria , 2008",,,"Article 6 is applicable to the proceedings related to the recognition of a group as a religious society ( Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, 2008, § 107). However, where a group has a legal personality and can operate, the group has to show that its registration as a ""religious community"" (a special category of religious association under national law) could affect its civil-law position for the Court to find that Article 6 would be applicable ( Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria, 2024, §§ 70 - 71)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:78664/17,Justine v. France,78664/17,added,"Justine v. France, no. 78664/17, 21 November 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,II.A.1,A right that is practical and effective,3,130,141,0.8399,"Cañete de Goñi v. Spain , 2002|Justine v. France , 2024|Patricolo and Others v. Italy , 2024","Cañete de Goñi v. Spain , 2020","The rules governing the formal steps to be taken and the time-limits to be complied with in lodging an appeal or an application for judicial review are aimed at ensuring the proper administration of justice and compliance, in particular, with the principle of legal certainty ( Cañete de Goñi v. Spain, 2020, § 36). That being so, the rules in question, or their application, should not prevent litigants from using an available remedy ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 36; Zvolský and Zvolská v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 51). In particular, each case should be assessed in the light of the special features of the proceedings in question ( Kurşun v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 103-104). In applying procedural rules, the courts must avoid both excessive formalism that would impair the fairness of the Guide to Article 13 of the Convention - Right to an effective remedy proceedings and excessive flexibility such as would render nugatory the procedural requirements laid down in statutes ( Hasan Tunç and Others v. Turkey, 2017, §§ 32-33).","The rules governing the formal steps to be taken and the time-limits to be complied with in lodging an appeal or an application for judicial review are aimed at ensuring the proper administration of justice and compliance, in particular, with the principle of legal certainty ( Cañete de Goñi v. Spain, 2002, § 36). That being so, the rules in question, or their application, should not prevent litigants from using an available remedy ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 36; Zvolský and Zvolská v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 51). In particular, each case should be assessed in the light of the special features of the proceedings in question ( Kurşun v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 103-104). In applying procedural rules, the courts must avoid both excessive formalism that would impair the fairness of the proceedings and excessive flexibility such as would render nugatory the procedural requirements laid down in statutes ( Hasan Tunç and Others v. Turkey, 2017, §§ 32-33). Thus, in Patricolo and Others v. Italy, 2024, the applicants'appeals on a point of law had been rejected without examination given the applicants'failure to append to their cassation appeal a copy of the notice of service of the lower court's judgment. The obligation of an appellant party to file such notice allows the Court of Cassation to assess whether the deadline for bringing an appeal has been complied with. In more recent jurisprudence, the Court of Cassation reconsidered the previous strict approach and established that appeals whose compliance with time-limits could be immediately and directly assessed from the case-file should not be declared inadmissible, even if the notice was missing. Those in one group of applicants failed to submit a notice and the information about the date of the service of the contested judgments was not available in their case-files: while they argued that they should have been able to remedy their procedural error by filing the notice later, the Court disagreed observing that accepting late submissions would have frustrated the aim of ensuring the expeditious conduct of proceedings, their cases had been examined at two levels of jurisdiction and concluded that the Court of Cassation had good reason to declare the appeal inadmissible (§§ 77-85). The applicants in the second group submitted the notice in the format of an email from a lower court and a copy of the contested judgement which they had received electronically. While the Court of Cassation construed the existing rules narrowly, insisting that only properly certified paper copies should be accepted, the Court noted that the documents received by the applicants from the lower court were in the electronic format, that the integrity of documents filed with a court is generally ensured by criminal and disciplinary sanctions so that declaring the appeals inadmissible, without giving the applicants a fair chance to submit the proper certification at a later stage and especially in a transitional phase from paper to electronic proceedings, went beyond the aim of ensuring legal certainty and the proper administration of justice. There had therefore been a violation of Article 6 in respect of this second group of applicants (§§ 94 - 104). Similarly, in Justine v. France, 2024, the applicant's appeal to the Court of Cassation was rejected on purely formal grounds: under the applicable rules, a copy of the contested judgment should have been attached to the appeal but the applicant's lawyer, by mistake, attached a copy of another judgement (related to a connected case). When the Court of Cassation informed him about this mistake, the applicant's lawyer, within one day, submitted a copy of the correct judgment. Nevertheless, the appeal was dismissed as belated. The Court criticised this approach noting, in particular, that the formal error had been corrected before the rapporteur has been appointed to the case and that this error had therefore no bearing on the proper administration of justice. This inadmissibility objection has been raised by the Court of Cassation proprio motu at a very advanced stage of the proceedings when the case has been already ready to be adjudicated on the merits. The Court concluded that this formalistic approach deprived the applicant of her right of access to court (§§ 42 - 51). Guide to Article 13 of the Convention - Right to an effective remedy"
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:84388/17,Kural v. Türkiye,84388/17,added,"Kural v. Türkiye, no. 84388/17, 19 March 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.C.1.a,Does the law exclude access to a court for that particular type of dispute?,4,,70,,"Kural v. Türkiye , 2024",,,"Where domestic law unequivocally grants a civil servant access to Court with an employment-related dispute, the first condition of the Vilho Eskelinen test for excluding the applicability of Article 6 is not met, which makes Article 6 applicable - see for example, Kural v. Türkiye, 2024, § 36, which concerned a transfer of a police officer to a different post."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:84388/17,Kural v. Türkiye,84388/17,added,"Kural v. Türkiye, no. 84388/17, 19 March 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,I.D,Applicability of Article 6 to proceedings other than main proceedings,2,84,94,0.7871,"Kural v. Türkiye , 2024",,"Article 6 is applicable to interim proceedings which pursue the same purpose as the pending main proceedings, where the interim injunction is immediately enforceable and entails a ruling on the same right ( RTBF v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 64-65).","Article 6 is applicable to interim proceedings which pursue the same purpose as the pending main proceedings, where the interim injunction is immediately enforceable and entails a ruling on the same right ( RTBF v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 64-65). For example, Article 6 was found to be applicable to the non-enforcement of a stay-of-execution decision by an administrative court which was final and enforceable, but which the authorities failed to comply with ( Kural v. Türkiye, 2024, § 37) and which concerned the transfer of a police officer to a different post."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:84388/17,Kural v. Türkiye,84388/17,added,"Kural v. Türkiye, no. 84388/17, 19 March 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,III.A.4.a,Right to prompt implementation of a final and binding judicial decision,4,223,241,0.8288,"Kural v. Türkiye , 2024",,"Article 6 § 1 protects the implementation of final, binding judicial decisions (as distinct from the implementation of decisions which may be subject to review by a higher court) ( Ouzounis and Others v. Greece, 2002, § 21).","Article 6 § 1 protects the implementation of final, binding judicial decisions (as distinct from the implementation of decisions which may be subject to review by a higher court) ( Ouzounis and Others v. Greece, 2002, § 21). Non-implementation of a non-final judicial decision - even if it is immediately enforceable under domestic law - is not incompatible with Article 6 ( Kural v. Türkiye, 2024, § 28)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:58901/19,Kurkut and Others v. Türkiye,58901/19,added,"Kurkut and Others v. Türkiye, nos. 58901/19 and 6 others, 25 June 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.A.4,Adversarial proceedings,3,425,449,0.9933,"Kurkut and Others v. Türkiye , 2024",,"Examples of infringement of the right to adversarial proceedings as a result of non-disclosure of the following documents or evidence: ▪ in proceedings concerning the placement of a child, of reports by the social services containing information about the child and details of the background to the case and making recommendations, even though the parents were informed of their content at the hearing ( McMichael v. the United Kingdom, 1995, § 80); ▪ evidence adduced by the public prosecutor, irrespective of whether he was or was not regarded as a ""party"", since he was in a position, above all by virtue of the authority conferred on him by his functions, to influence the court's decision in a manner that might be unfavourable to the person concerned ( Ferreira Alves v. Portugal (no. 3), 2007, §§ 36-39); ▪ a note from the lower court to the appellate court aimed at influencing the latter court's decision, even though the note did not set out any new facts or arguments ( ibid., § 41); ▪ documents obtained directly by the judges, containing reasoned opinions on the merits of the case ( K.S. v. Finland, 2001, §§ 23-24); ▪ opinions on the subject matter of the dispute issued by State institutions that were not parties to the proceedings ( Vorotņikova v. Latvia, 2021, §§ 24-25); ▪ substantive written observations submitted to the Constitutional Court, which took them into account ( Janáček v. the Czech Republic, 2023, §§ 52-54).","Examples of infringement of the right to adversarial proceedings as a result of non-disclosure of the following documents or evidence: ▪ in proceedings concerning the placement of a child, of reports by the social services containing information about the child and details of the background to the case and making recommendations, even though the parents were informed of their content at the hearing ( McMichael v. the United Kingdom, 1995, § 80); ▪ evidence adduced by the public prosecutor, irrespective of whether he was or was not regarded as a ""party"", since he was in a position, above all by virtue of the authority conferred on him by his functions, to influence the court's decision in a manner that might be unfavourable to the person concerned ( Ferreira Alves v. Portugal (no. 3), 2007, §§ 36-39); ▪ a note from the lower court to the appellate court aimed at influencing the latter court's decision, even though the note did not set out any new facts or arguments ( ibid., § 41); ▪ documents obtained directly by the judges, containing reasoned opinions on the merits of the case ( K.S. v. Finland, 2001, §§ 23-24); ▪ opinions on the subject matter of the dispute issued by State institutions that were not parties to the proceedings ( Vorotņikova v. Latvia, 2021, §§ 24-25); ▪ substantive written observations submitted to the Constitutional Court, which took them into account ( Janáček v. the Czech Republic, 2023, §§ 52-54); ▪ results of the security background checks (in the proceedings concerning the appointment of the applicant to a position of a civil servant, Kurkut and Others v. Türkiye, 2024, §§ 105-109)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:47070/20,Levrault v. Monaco (dec.),47070/20,added,"Levrault v. Monaco (dec.), no. 47070/20, 8 July 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.1,“Genuine and serious” “dispute” with a decisive outcome,3,,18,,,,,"In Levrault v. Monaco (dec.), 2024, the applicant - a detached French judge seconded to work in Monaco - complained that his secondment had not been extended, contrary to the usual practice and to a positive preliminary opinion of the competent Monegasque authority. The Court noted, however, that such secondments took place in the context of diplomatic relations, were not binding on the authorities of Monaco and did not create a ""right"" for the applicant. The Court also noted ( § 57) that a ""right"" for the applicant can be deduced neither from the constitutional principles guaranteeing judicial independence (given a very specific legislative framework of temporary secondments) nor from the particular context in which the applicant exercised his original mandate, nor from the ""interests of service"" to which the applicant referred. Onl y a sovereign act by the Government of Monaco could create such a right: no such act had ever been issued. The Court concluded that Article 6 was not applicable. The applicability of Article 6 to interim proceedings (i.e. those which are not directly decisive for the main subject-matter of the case) is discussed in sub-section Dbelow."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:47070/20,Levrault v. Monaco (dec.),47070/20,added,"Levrault v. Monaco (dec.), no. 47070/20, 8 July 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.C.2,Disputes involving judges and prosecutors,3,73,83,0.97,,,"In Bilgen v. Turkey, 2021, the Court clarified the conditions for the applicability of Article 6 (civil limb) to complaints by judges of a lack of access to a court (see the first condition of the Vilho Eskelinen test) in order to challenge a unilateral decision affecting their professional life (a transfer). The Court had regard to the importance of safeguarding the autonomy and independence of the judiciary for the preservation of the rule of law. Accordingly, in disputes of this kind it had to determine whether the national judicial system ensured the protection of judges against a potentially arbitrary decision affecting their career or professional status (in this case, a transfer to a lower court - see §§ 57-59, §§ 61-63). The dispute thus concerned their ""right"", within the meaning of the Convention (drawing inspiration from international sources), to be protected against an arbitrary transfer or appointment (§ 64).","In Bilgen v. Turkey, 2021, the Court clarified the conditions for the applicability of Article 6 (civil limb) to complaints by judges of a lack of access to a court (see the first condition of the Vilho Eskelinen test) in order to challenge a unilateral decision affecting their professional life (a transfer). The Court had regard to the importance of safeguarding the autonomy and independence of the judiciary for the preservation of the rule of law. Accordingly, in disputes of this kind it had to determine whether the national judicial system ensured the protection of judges against a potentially arbitrary decision affecting their career or professional status (in this case, a transfer to a lower court - see §§ 57-59, §§ 61-63). The dispute thus concerned their ""right"", within the meaning of the Convention (drawing inspiration from international sources), to be protected against an arbitrary transfer or appointment (§ 64). However, compare this approach to Levrault v. Monaco (dec.), 2024, which concerned the extension of the term of office of a French judge seconded to work in Monaco. The Court noted that the secondments had taken place in the context of diplomatic relations which did not bind the Monegasque authorities/ did not create a ""right"" for the ap plicant and neither could the existence of a ""right"" be deduced from the constitutional principles guaranteeing judicial independence."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:31029/15,Loizides v. Cyprus,31029/15,added,"Loizides v. Cyprus, no. 31029/15, 5 July 2022",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1,A right that is practical and effective,3,145,157,0.8524,"Loizides v. Cyprus , 2022|Meli and Swinkels Family Brewers N.V. v. Albania , 2024",,"Furthermore, Article 6 § 1 guarantees not only the right to institute proceedings but also the right to obtain a determination of the dispute by a court ( Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], 2016, § 86; Kutić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 25 and 32, regarding the staying of proceedings; Aćimović v. Croatia, 2003, § 41; Beneficio Cappella Paolini v. San Marino, 2004, § 29 concerning a denial of justice; Marini v. Albania, 2007, §§ 118-123, concerning a refusal to take a final decision on the applicant's constitutional appeal as a result of a tied vote, and Gogić v. Croatia, 2020, §§ 40-41, concerning the consequences of errors by the judicial authorities).","Furthermore, Article 6 § 1 guarantees not only the right to institute proceedings but also the right to obtain a determination of the dispute by a court ( Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], 2016, § 86; Kutić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 25 and 32, regarding the staying of proceedings; Aćimović v. Croatia, 2003, § 41; Beneficio Cappella Paolini v. San Marino, 2004, § 29 concerning a denial of justice; Marini v. Albania, 2007, §§ 118-123, concerning a refusal to take a final decision on the applicant's constitutional appeal as a result of a tied vote, and Gogić v. Croatia, 2020, §§ 40-41, concerning the consequences of errors by the judicial authorities). Atied vote does not constitute a violation of Article 6 of itself - for example, where a tied vote results in a rejection of an appeal and the grounds for the rejection can be deduced from the judges'opinions expressed during the vote, the Court concluded that Article 6 was not breached ( Loizides v. Cyprus, 2022, §§ 41-50). However, in Meli and Swinkels Family Brewers N.V. v. Albania, 2024, the tied vote was not accompanied by any description of the Constitutional Court's reasoning (the decision only indicated the results of the voting). Since the crux of the applicants'complaint before the Constitutional Court was precisely the lack of proper reasoning by the lower courts'judgments, the Court did not accept the Government's argument that the Constitutional Court should be deemed to have endorsed the reasoning of the lower courts (§ 73). ‐"
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:13303/21,M.M. v. France (dec.),13303/21,added,"M.M. v. France (dec.), no. 13303/21, 16 April 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,II.A.2,"Limitations: court fees, time-limits, mandatory legal representation, immunities etc.",3,163,178,0.9931,,"Ndayegamiye- Mporamazina v. Switzerland , 2019","Jurisdictional immunity of foreign States: the grant of immunity is to be seen not as qualifying a substantive right but as a procedural bar on the national courts'power to determine the right ( J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 58-59). Aforeign State may waive its right to immunity before the courts of another State by giving clear and unequivocal consent ( Ndayegamiye-Mporamazina v. Switzerland, 2019, §§ 57 and 59). In cases where the application of the principle of State immunity from jurisdiction restricts the exercise of the right of access to a court, it must be ascertained whether the circumstances of the case justify such restriction (for example, Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany [GC], 2001, §§ 51-70). The restriction must pursue a legitimate aim and be proportionate to that aim ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, § 59; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, §§ 51-54). The grant of sovereign immunity to a State in civil proceedings pursues the ""legitimate aim"" of complying with international law to promote comity and good relations between States ( Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 34; Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 54; Treska v. Albania and Italy (dec.), 2006; J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, § 60). As to whether the measure taken is proportionate (see the summary of the principles in J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 61 and 63), it may in some cases impair the very essence of the individual's right of access to a court ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, § 74; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, § 49; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, 2016, § 95), while in other cases it may not ( Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 67; Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 39; McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], 2001, § 38; and more recently, J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, § 75, where the Court found that the national court had not departed from the generally recognised rules of international law on State immunity). In the absence of an alternative remedy, there is not ipso facto a violation of the right of access to a court ( Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2013), although the Court found that the existence of an alternative would be desirable in the specific circumstances of the case of J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021 (§ 71). ▪ State immunity from jurisdiction has been circumscribed by developments in customary international law.  Thus, the Court has noted a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of employment-related disputes, with the exception, however, of those concerning the recruitment of embassy staff ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, §§ 63 et seq.; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, §§ 53-54 and 57-58; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, 2016, § 89, concerning the dismissal of embassy staff members; see also Wallishauser v. Austria, 2012, concerning the service of a summons in proceedings against a foreign State relating to salary arrears). As regards disputes concerning a contract of employment concluded between embassies or permanent missions and their support staff, the Court has always protected both nationals of the forum State (the State where the work is performed) and non-nationals living there ( Ndayegamiye- Mporamazina v. Switzerland, 2019, §§ 49 and 61 and references cited). This consistent approach is in line with codified international custom: in principle, a foreign State cannot rely on immunity from jurisdiction in the context of a dispute concerning a contract of employment executed in the territory of the forum State. However, there are exceptions to that principle, in particular where ""the employee is a national of the employer State at the time when the proceeding is instituted, unless this person has his or her permanent residence in the State of the forum"" ( ibid., §§ 61-63). In the case cited, unlike the previous cases, the applicant was a national of the employer State (Burundi) when she brought her case before the Swiss courts, and was not permanently resident in the forum State (Switzerland), where she worked at the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Burundi to the United Nations. The observance by Switzerland of the Republic of Burundi's immunity from jurisdiction in respect of the applicant's claim of unfair dismissal was compatible with the generally recognised rules of international law on State immunity (§ 66).  Arestrictive approach to immunity may also be taken in relation to commercial transactions between the State and foreign private individuals ( Oleynikov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 61 and 66). ▪ On the other hand, the Court noted in 2001 that, while there appeared to be a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of personal injury caused by an act or omission within the forum State, that practice was by no means universal ( McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], 2001, § 38). ▪ In J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, the Court did not uphold the applicants'argument that State immunity from jurisdiction could not be maintained in cases involving inhuman or degrading treatment (see §§ 64 et seq., including the summary of precedents concerning other serious violations of human rights law, international humanitarian law, or jus cogens norms). In addition, the Court held in 2014 that while there was some emerging support in favour of a special rule or exception in public international law in cases concerning civil claims for torture lodged against foreign State officials, the bulk of the authority was to the effect that the State's right to immunity could not be circumvented by suing its servants or agents instead ( Jones and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2014, §§ 213-15, concerning the refusal to consider the applicants'civil claim in respect of torture allegations on account of the immunity invoked by the State in question and its officials). ▪ State immunity from execution is not in itself contrary to Article 6 § 1. The Court noted in 2005 that all the international legal instruments governing State immunity set forth the general principle that, subject to certain strictly delimited exceptions, foreign States enjoyed immunity from execution in the territory of the forum State ( Manoilescu and Dobrescu v. Romania and Russia (dec.), 2005, § 73). By way of illustration, the Court held in 2002 that ""although the Greek courts ordered the German State to pay damages to the applicants, this did not necessarily oblige the Greek State to ensure that the applicants could recover their debt through enforcement proceedings in Greece"" ( Kalogeropoulou and Others v. Greece and Germany (dec.), 2002). These decisions are valid in relation to the state of international law at the relevant time and do not preclude future developments in that law.","Jurisdictional immunity of foreign States: the grant of immunity is to be seen not as qualifying a substantive right but as a procedural bar on the national courts'power to determine the right ( J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 58-59). Aforeign State may waive its right to immunity before the courts of another State by giving clear and unequivocal consent ( Ndayegamiye-Mporamazina v. Switzerland, 2019, §§ 57 and 59). In cases where the application of the principle of State immunity from jurisdiction restricts the exercise of the right of access to a court, it must be ascertained whether the circumstances of the case justify such restriction (for example, Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany [GC], 2001, §§ 51-70). The restriction must pursue a legitimate aim and be proportionate to that aim ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, § 59; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, §§ 51-54). The grant of sovereign immunity to a State in civil proceedings pursues the ""legitimate aim"" of complying with international law to promote comity and good relations between States ( Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 34; Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 54; Treska v. Albania and Italy (dec.), 2006; J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, § 60). As to whether the measure taken is proportionate (see the summary of the principles in J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 61 and 63), it may in some cases impair the very essence of the individual's right of access to a court ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, § 74; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, § 49; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, 2016, § 95), while in other cases it may not ( Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 67; Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 39; McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], 2001, § 38; and more recently, J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, § 75, where the Court found that the national court had not departed from the generally recognised rules of international law on State immunity). In the absence of an alternative remedy, there is not ipso facto a violation of the right of access to a court ( Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2013), although the Court found that the existence of an alternative would be desirable in the specific circumstances of the case of J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021 (§ 71). M.M. v. France (dec.), 2024 concerned the refusal of the French courts to institute criminal proceedings against an acting foreign head of State for torture committed in that State, given his immunity from foreign prosecution, the Court found that such immunity did not prevent the applicant from re-introducing a complaint against this head of State after the end of his mandate or before an international court (§ 88), and that, although the criminal proceedings in which the applicant presented his civil claims have been not been pursued, the matter has been examined by the courts at several levels of jurisdiction (§ 89). ▪ State immunity from jurisdiction has been circumscribed by developments in customary international law.  Thus, the Court has noted a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of employment-related disputes, with the exception, however, of those concerning the recruitment of embassy staff ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, §§ 63 et seq.; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, §§ 53-54 and 57-58; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, 2016, § 89, concerning the dismissal of embassy staff members; see also Wallishauser v. Austria, 2012, concerning the service of a summons in proceedings against a foreign State relating to salary arrears). As regards disputes concerning a contract of employment concluded between embassies or permanent missions and their support staff, the Court has always protected both nationals of the forum State (the State where the work is performed) and non-nationals living there ( Ndayegamiye-Mporamazina v. Switzerland, 2019, §§ 49 and 61 and references cited). This consistent approach is in line with codified international custom: in principle, a foreign State cannot rely on immunity from jurisdiction in the context of a dispute concerning a contract of employment executed in the territory of the forum State. Ho wever, there are exceptions to that principle, in particular where ""the employee is a national of the employer State at the time when the proceeding is instituted, unless this person has his or her permanent residence in the State of the forum"" ( ibid., §§ 61-63). In the case cited, unlike the previous cases, the applicant was a national of the employer State (Burundi) when she brought her case before the Swiss courts, and was not permanently resident in the forum State (Switzerland), where she worked at the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Burundi to the United Nations. The observance by Switzerland of the Republic of Burundi's immunity from jurisdiction in respect of the applicant's claim of unfair dismissal was compatible with the generally recognised rules of international law on State immunity (§ 66).  Arestrictive approach to immunity may also be taken in relation to commercial transactions between the State and foreign private individuals ( Oleynikov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 61 and 66). ▪ On the other hand, the Court noted in 2001 that, while there appeared to be a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of personal injury caused by an act or omission within the forum State, that practice was by no means universal ( McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], 2001, § 38). ▪ In J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, the Court did not uphold the applicants'argument that State immunity from jurisdiction could not be maintained in cases involving inhuman or degrading treatment (see §§ 64 et seq., including the summary of precedents concerning other serious violations of human rights law, international humanitarian law, or jus cogens norms). In addition, the Court held in 2014 that while there was some emerging support in favour of a special rule or exception in public international law in cases concerning civil claims for torture lodged against foreign State officials, the bulk of the authority was to the effect that the State's right to immunity could not be circumvented by suing its servants or agents instead ( Jones and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2014, §§ 213-15, concerning the refusal to consider the applicants'civil claim in respect of torture allegations on account of the immunity invoked by the State in question and its officials). In Sassi and Benchellali v. France (dec.), 2024, the Court confirmed thisapproach: despite the special status of the prohibition of torture in the international law, international law still grants immunity to the State or agents of the State against tort actions related to the acts of torture. The Court added that, although the French investigative authorities in the end discontinued the criminal prosecution of the American officials allegedly responsible for the ill-treatment of the applicant (who had been detained in the Guantanamo military base prison, with reference to the immunity of the persons indicated as possible defendants, the authorities had taken steps to investigate the case and the question of immunity had been discussed at all levels jurisdiction, including the Court of Cassation (§ 64). ▪ State immunity from execution is not in itself contrary to Article 6 § 1. The Court noted in 2005 that all the international legal instruments governing State immunity set forth the general principle that, subject to certain strictly delimited exceptions, foreign States enjoyed immunity from execution in the territory of the forum State ( Manoilescu and Dobrescu v. Romania and Russia (dec.), 2005, § 73). By way of illustration, the Court held in 2002 that ""although the Greek courts ordered the German Sta te to pay damages to the applicants, this did not necessarily oblige the Greek State to ensure that the applicants could recover their debt through enforcement proceedings in Greece"" ( Kalogeropoulou and Others v. Greece and Germany (dec.), 2002). These decisions are valid in relation to the state of international law at the relevant time and do not preclude future developments in that law."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:41373/21|48801/21,Meli and Swinkels Family Brewers N.V. v. Albania,41373/21|48801/21,added,"Meli and Swinkels Family Brewers N.V. v. Albania, nos. 41373/21 and 48801/21, 16 July 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1,A right that is practical and effective,3,145,157,0.8524,"Loizides v. Cyprus , 2022|Meli and Swinkels Family Brewers N.V. v. Albania , 2024",,"Furthermore, Article 6 § 1 guarantees not only the right to institute proceedings but also the right to obtain a determination of the dispute by a court ( Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], 2016, § 86; Kutić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 25 and 32, regarding the staying of proceedings; Aćimović v. Croatia, 2003, § 41; Beneficio Cappella Paolini v. San Marino, 2004, § 29 concerning a denial of justice; Marini v. Albania, 2007, §§ 118-123, concerning a refusal to take a final decision on the applicant's constitutional appeal as a result of a tied vote, and Gogić v. Croatia, 2020, §§ 40-41, concerning the consequences of errors by the judicial authorities).","Furthermore, Article 6 § 1 guarantees not only the right to institute proceedings but also the right to obtain a determination of the dispute by a court ( Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], 2016, § 86; Kutić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 25 and 32, regarding the staying of proceedings; Aćimović v. Croatia, 2003, § 41; Beneficio Cappella Paolini v. San Marino, 2004, § 29 concerning a denial of justice; Marini v. Albania, 2007, §§ 118-123, concerning a refusal to take a final decision on the applicant's constitutional appeal as a result of a tied vote, and Gogić v. Croatia, 2020, §§ 40-41, concerning the consequences of errors by the judicial authorities). Atied vote does not constitute a violation of Article 6 of itself - for example, where a tied vote results in a rejection of an appeal and the grounds for the rejection can be deduced from the judges'opinions expressed during the vote, the Court concluded that Article 6 was not breached ( Loizides v. Cyprus, 2022, §§ 41-50). However, in Meli and Swinkels Family Brewers N.V. v. Albania, 2024, the tied vote was not accompanied by any description of the Constitutional Court's reasoning (the decision only indicated the results of the voting). Since the crux of the applicants'complaint before the Constitutional Court was precisely the lack of proper reasoning by the lower courts'judgments, the Court did not accept the Government's argument that the Constitutional Court should be deemed to have endorsed the reasoning of the lower courts (§ 73). ‐"
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:60272/21,Moskalj v. Croatia,60272/21,added,"Moskalj v. Croatia, no. 60272/21, 15 October 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.F.7,Other Articles,3,119,130,0.9356,"Benghezal v. France , 2022|Moskalj v. Croatia , 2024",,"In Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania, 2020, § 49, the Court examined under Article 6 § 1 the applicants'complaint concerning the refusal of the domestic courts to award them legal costs after successful litigation, whereas the applicants had raised the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention (compare Taratukhin v. Russia (dec.), 2020, § 27, and for the recovery of amounts due, see Gogić v. Croatia, 2020, § 45). In Cindrić and Bešlić v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 119-123, concerning the payment of litigation costs consisting of fees for public officials, the Court examined the complaint under both Articles (§§ 110 and 119-123; compare with Bursać and Others v. Croatia, 2022, §§ 107-108). See also Zustović v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 98-100, and Čolić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 39-48, for a summary of the case-law.","The Court considers complaints about awards of legal costs under various Articles, mostly under Article 6 § 1 (in the context of the guarantee of effective access to court, see Benghezal v. France, 2022, §§ 43-45), but also under Article 13, Article 1 of Protocol no. 1, and, in the criminal-law context, under Article 6 para 2 (see Guide on Article 6 criminal, in particular Section VI-B-3 on the legal assistance and Section VI-A-1-b on the obligation of the accused to bear costs from the standpoint of the respect for the presumption of innocence). In Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania, 2020, § 49, the Court examined under Article 6 § 1 the applicants'complaint concerning the refusal of the domestic courts to award them legal costs after successful litigation, whereas the applicants had raised the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention (compare Taratukhin v. Russia (dec.), 2020, § 27, and for the recovery of amounts due, see Gogić v. Croatia, 2020, § 45). In Cindrić and Bešlić v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 119-123, concerning the payment of litigation costs consisting of fees for public officials, the Court examined the complaint under both Articles (§§ 110 and 119-123; compare with Bursać and Others v. Croatia, 2022, §§ 107-108. See also Zustović v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 98-100, and Čolić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 39-48, for a summary of the case- law and see Moskalj v. Croatia, 2024, § 96, where the Court examined the question of legal costs only under the ""access to court"" guarantee and not under Article 1 of Protocol no. 1)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:60272/21,Moskalj v. Croatia,60272/21,added,"Moskalj v. Croatia, no. 60272/21, 15 October 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.1,Granting of legal aid,3,,200,,"In Moskalj v. Croatia , 2024",,,"The need to reimburse particularly high legal costs may represent an obstacle to access to court, even if the applicant was in fact capable of advancing them. In Moskalj v. Croatia, 2024, the Court explained that, where legal costs incurred by the litigant and not reimbursed to him exceed the amount of the main compensation awarded, the whole litigation is made pointless and renders the applicant's right to a court merely theoretical and illusory (§ 84). In such situations the Court does not need to examine whether the costs imposed a disproportionate financial burden on the applicant. The Court also noted that the domestic courts had also failed to provide any detailed reasons for refusing to award costs and that, at the same time, the proceedings were complex enough to require legal representation. Indeed it had been also open to the domestic courts to award her a reduced amount. The Court concluded that the restriction of the applicant's access to court was disproportionate."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:37943/17,Patricolo and Others v. Italy,37943/17,added,"Patricolo and Others v. Italy, nos. 37943/17 and 2 others, 23 May 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,II.A.1,A right that is practical and effective,3,130,141,0.8399,"Cañete de Goñi v. Spain , 2002|Justine v. France , 2024|Patricolo and Others v. Italy , 2024","Cañete de Goñi v. Spain , 2020","The rules governing the formal steps to be taken and the time-limits to be complied with in lodging an appeal or an application for judicial review are aimed at ensuring the proper administration of justice and compliance, in particular, with the principle of legal certainty ( Cañete de Goñi v. Spain, 2020, § 36). That being so, the rules in question, or their application, should not prevent litigants from using an available remedy ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 36; Zvolský and Zvolská v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 51). In particular, each case should be assessed in the light of the special features of the proceedings in question ( Kurşun v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 103-104). In applying procedural rules, the courts must avoid both excessive formalism that would impair the fairness of the Guide to Article 13 of the Convention - Right to an effective remedy proceedings and excessive flexibility such as would render nugatory the procedural requirements laid down in statutes ( Hasan Tunç and Others v. Turkey, 2017, §§ 32-33).","The rules governing the formal steps to be taken and the time-limits to be complied with in lodging an appeal or an application for judicial review are aimed at ensuring the proper administration of justice and compliance, in particular, with the principle of legal certainty ( Cañete de Goñi v. Spain, 2002, § 36). That being so, the rules in question, or their application, should not prevent litigants from using an available remedy ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 36; Zvolský and Zvolská v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 51). In particular, each case should be assessed in the light of the special features of the proceedings in question ( Kurşun v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 103-104). In applying procedural rules, the courts must avoid both excessive formalism that would impair the fairness of the proceedings and excessive flexibility such as would render nugatory the procedural requirements laid down in statutes ( Hasan Tunç and Others v. Turkey, 2017, §§ 32-33). Thus, in Patricolo and Others v. Italy, 2024, the applicants'appeals on a point of law had been rejected without examination given the applicants'failure to append to their cassation appeal a copy of the notice of service of the lower court's judgment. The obligation of an appellant party to file such notice allows the Court of Cassation to assess whether the deadline for bringing an appeal has been complied with. In more recent jurisprudence, the Court of Cassation reconsidered the previous strict approach and established that appeals whose compliance with time-limits could be immediately and directly assessed from the case-file should not be declared inadmissible, even if the notice was missing. Those in one group of applicants failed to submit a notice and the information about the date of the service of the contested judgments was not available in their case-files: while they argued that they should have been able to remedy their procedural error by filing the notice later, the Court disagreed observing that accepting late submissions would have frustrated the aim of ensuring the expeditious conduct of proceedings, their cases had been examined at two levels of jurisdiction and concluded that the Court of Cassation had good reason to declare the appeal inadmissible (§§ 77-85). The applicants in the second group submitted the notice in the format of an email from a lower court and a copy of the contested judgement which they had received electronically. While the Court of Cassation construed the existing rules narrowly, insisting that only properly certified paper copies should be accepted, the Court noted that the documents received by the applicants from the lower court were in the electronic format, that the integrity of documents filed with a court is generally ensured by criminal and disciplinary sanctions so that declaring the appeals inadmissible, without giving the applicants a fair chance to submit the proper certification at a later stage and especially in a transitional phase from paper to electronic proceedings, went beyond the aim of ensuring legal certainty and the proper administration of justice. There had therefore been a violation of Article 6 in respect of this second group of applicants (§§ 94 - 104). Similarly, in Justine v. France, 2024, the applicant's appeal to the Court of Cassation was rejected on purely formal grounds: under the applicable rules, a copy of the contested judgment should have been attached to the appeal but the applicant's lawyer, by mistake, attached a copy of another judgement (related to a connected case). When the Court of Cassation informed him about this mistake, the applicant's lawyer, within one day, submitted a copy of the correct judgment. Nevertheless, the appeal was dismissed as belated. The Court criticised this approach noting, in particular, that the formal error had been corrected before the rapporteur has been appointed to the case and that this error had therefore no bearing on the proper administration of justice. This inadmissibility objection has been raised by the Court of Cassation proprio motu at a very advanced stage of the proceedings when the case has been already ready to be adjudicated on the merits. The Court concluded that this formalistic approach deprived the applicant of her right of access to court (§§ 42 - 51). Guide to Article 13 of the Convention - Right to an effective remedy"
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:40825/98,Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria,40825/98,added,"Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, no. 40825/98, 31 July 2008",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B,Extension to other types of disputes,2,,65,,"Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria , 2024|Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria , 2008",,,"Article 6 is applicable to the proceedings related to the recognition of a group as a religious society ( Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, 2008, § 107). However, where a group has a legal personality and can operate, the group has to show that its registration as a ""religious community"" (a special category of religious association under national law) could affect its civil-law position for the Court to find that Article 6 would be applicable ( Föderation der Aleviten Gemeinden in Österreich v. Austria, 2024, §§ 70 - 71)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:35884/21|35886/21,Sassi and Benchellali v. France (dec.),35884/21|35886/21,added,"Sassi and Benchellali v. France (dec.), nos. 35884/21 and 35886/21, 15 October 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,II.A.2,"Limitations: court fees, time-limits, mandatory legal representation, immunities etc.",3,163,178,0.9931,,"Ndayegamiye- Mporamazina v. Switzerland , 2019","Jurisdictional immunity of foreign States: the grant of immunity is to be seen not as qualifying a substantive right but as a procedural bar on the national courts'power to determine the right ( J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 58-59). Aforeign State may waive its right to immunity before the courts of another State by giving clear and unequivocal consent ( Ndayegamiye-Mporamazina v. Switzerland, 2019, §§ 57 and 59). In cases where the application of the principle of State immunity from jurisdiction restricts the exercise of the right of access to a court, it must be ascertained whether the circumstances of the case justify such restriction (for example, Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany [GC], 2001, §§ 51-70). The restriction must pursue a legitimate aim and be proportionate to that aim ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, § 59; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, §§ 51-54). The grant of sovereign immunity to a State in civil proceedings pursues the ""legitimate aim"" of complying with international law to promote comity and good relations between States ( Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 34; Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 54; Treska v. Albania and Italy (dec.), 2006; J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, § 60). As to whether the measure taken is proportionate (see the summary of the principles in J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 61 and 63), it may in some cases impair the very essence of the individual's right of access to a court ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, § 74; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, § 49; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, 2016, § 95), while in other cases it may not ( Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 67; Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 39; McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], 2001, § 38; and more recently, J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, § 75, where the Court found that the national court had not departed from the generally recognised rules of international law on State immunity). In the absence of an alternative remedy, there is not ipso facto a violation of the right of access to a court ( Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2013), although the Court found that the existence of an alternative would be desirable in the specific circumstances of the case of J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021 (§ 71). ▪ State immunity from jurisdiction has been circumscribed by developments in customary international law.  Thus, the Court has noted a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of employment-related disputes, with the exception, however, of those concerning the recruitment of embassy staff ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, §§ 63 et seq.; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, §§ 53-54 and 57-58; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, 2016, § 89, concerning the dismissal of embassy staff members; see also Wallishauser v. Austria, 2012, concerning the service of a summons in proceedings against a foreign State relating to salary arrears). As regards disputes concerning a contract of employment concluded between embassies or permanent missions and their support staff, the Court has always protected both nationals of the forum State (the State where the work is performed) and non-nationals living there ( Ndayegamiye- Mporamazina v. Switzerland, 2019, §§ 49 and 61 and references cited). This consistent approach is in line with codified international custom: in principle, a foreign State cannot rely on immunity from jurisdiction in the context of a dispute concerning a contract of employment executed in the territory of the forum State. However, there are exceptions to that principle, in particular where ""the employee is a national of the employer State at the time when the proceeding is instituted, unless this person has his or her permanent residence in the State of the forum"" ( ibid., §§ 61-63). In the case cited, unlike the previous cases, the applicant was a national of the employer State (Burundi) when she brought her case before the Swiss courts, and was not permanently resident in the forum State (Switzerland), where she worked at the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Burundi to the United Nations. The observance by Switzerland of the Republic of Burundi's immunity from jurisdiction in respect of the applicant's claim of unfair dismissal was compatible with the generally recognised rules of international law on State immunity (§ 66).  Arestrictive approach to immunity may also be taken in relation to commercial transactions between the State and foreign private individuals ( Oleynikov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 61 and 66). ▪ On the other hand, the Court noted in 2001 that, while there appeared to be a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of personal injury caused by an act or omission within the forum State, that practice was by no means universal ( McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], 2001, § 38). ▪ In J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, the Court did not uphold the applicants'argument that State immunity from jurisdiction could not be maintained in cases involving inhuman or degrading treatment (see §§ 64 et seq., including the summary of precedents concerning other serious violations of human rights law, international humanitarian law, or jus cogens norms). In addition, the Court held in 2014 that while there was some emerging support in favour of a special rule or exception in public international law in cases concerning civil claims for torture lodged against foreign State officials, the bulk of the authority was to the effect that the State's right to immunity could not be circumvented by suing its servants or agents instead ( Jones and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2014, §§ 213-15, concerning the refusal to consider the applicants'civil claim in respect of torture allegations on account of the immunity invoked by the State in question and its officials). ▪ State immunity from execution is not in itself contrary to Article 6 § 1. The Court noted in 2005 that all the international legal instruments governing State immunity set forth the general principle that, subject to certain strictly delimited exceptions, foreign States enjoyed immunity from execution in the territory of the forum State ( Manoilescu and Dobrescu v. Romania and Russia (dec.), 2005, § 73). By way of illustration, the Court held in 2002 that ""although the Greek courts ordered the German State to pay damages to the applicants, this did not necessarily oblige the Greek State to ensure that the applicants could recover their debt through enforcement proceedings in Greece"" ( Kalogeropoulou and Others v. Greece and Germany (dec.), 2002). These decisions are valid in relation to the state of international law at the relevant time and do not preclude future developments in that law.","Jurisdictional immunity of foreign States: the grant of immunity is to be seen not as qualifying a substantive right but as a procedural bar on the national courts'power to determine the right ( J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 58-59). Aforeign State may waive its right to immunity before the courts of another State by giving clear and unequivocal consent ( Ndayegamiye-Mporamazina v. Switzerland, 2019, §§ 57 and 59). In cases where the application of the principle of State immunity from jurisdiction restricts the exercise of the right of access to a court, it must be ascertained whether the circumstances of the case justify such restriction (for example, Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany [GC], 2001, §§ 51-70). The restriction must pursue a legitimate aim and be proportionate to that aim ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, § 59; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, §§ 51-54). The grant of sovereign immunity to a State in civil proceedings pursues the ""legitimate aim"" of complying with international law to promote comity and good relations between States ( Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 34; Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 54; Treska v. Albania and Italy (dec.), 2006; J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, § 60). As to whether the measure taken is proportionate (see the summary of the principles in J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, §§ 61 and 63), it may in some cases impair the very essence of the individual's right of access to a court ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, § 74; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, § 49; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, 2016, § 95), while in other cases it may not ( Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 67; Fogarty v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 39; McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], 2001, § 38; and more recently, J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, § 75, where the Court found that the national court had not departed from the generally recognised rules of international law on State immunity). In the absence of an alternative remedy, there is not ipso facto a violation of the right of access to a court ( Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2013), although the Court found that the existence of an alternative would be desirable in the specific circumstances of the case of J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021 (§ 71). M.M. v. France (dec.), 2024 concerned the refusal of the French courts to institute criminal proceedings against an acting foreign head of State for torture committed in that State, given his immunity from foreign prosecution, the Court found that such immunity did not prevent the applicant from re-introducing a complaint against this head of State after the end of his mandate or before an international court (§ 88), and that, although the criminal proceedings in which the applicant presented his civil claims have been not been pursued, the matter has been examined by the courts at several levels of jurisdiction (§ 89). ▪ State immunity from jurisdiction has been circumscribed by developments in customary international law.  Thus, the Court has noted a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of employment-related disputes, with the exception, however, of those concerning the recruitment of embassy staff ( Cudak v. Lithuania [GC], 2010, §§ 63 et seq.; Sabeh El Leil v. France [GC], 2011, §§ 53-54 and 57-58; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, 2016, § 89, concerning the dismissal of embassy staff members; see also Wallishauser v. Austria, 2012, concerning the service of a summons in proceedings against a foreign State relating to salary arrears). As regards disputes concerning a contract of employment concluded between embassies or permanent missions and their support staff, the Court has always protected both nationals of the forum State (the State where the work is performed) and non-nationals living there ( Ndayegamiye-Mporamazina v. Switzerland, 2019, §§ 49 and 61 and references cited). This consistent approach is in line with codified international custom: in principle, a foreign State cannot rely on immunity from jurisdiction in the context of a dispute concerning a contract of employment executed in the territory of the forum State. Ho wever, there are exceptions to that principle, in particular where ""the employee is a national of the employer State at the time when the proceeding is instituted, unless this person has his or her permanent residence in the State of the forum"" ( ibid., §§ 61-63). In the case cited, unlike the previous cases, the applicant was a national of the employer State (Burundi) when she brought her case before the Swiss courts, and was not permanently resident in the forum State (Switzerland), where she worked at the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Burundi to the United Nations. The observance by Switzerland of the Republic of Burundi's immunity from jurisdiction in respect of the applicant's claim of unfair dismissal was compatible with the generally recognised rules of international law on State immunity (§ 66).  Arestrictive approach to immunity may also be taken in relation to commercial transactions between the State and foreign private individuals ( Oleynikov v. Russia, 2013, §§ 61 and 66). ▪ On the other hand, the Court noted in 2001 that, while there appeared to be a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of personal injury caused by an act or omission within the forum State, that practice was by no means universal ( McElhinney v. Ireland [GC], 2001, § 38). ▪ In J.C. and Others v. Belgium, 2021, the Court did not uphold the applicants'argument that State immunity from jurisdiction could not be maintained in cases involving inhuman or degrading treatment (see §§ 64 et seq., including the summary of precedents concerning other serious violations of human rights law, international humanitarian law, or jus cogens norms). In addition, the Court held in 2014 that while there was some emerging support in favour of a special rule or exception in public international law in cases concerning civil claims for torture lodged against foreign State officials, the bulk of the authority was to the effect that the State's right to immunity could not be circumvented by suing its servants or agents instead ( Jones and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2014, §§ 213-15, concerning the refusal to consider the applicants'civil claim in respect of torture allegations on account of the immunity invoked by the State in question and its officials). In Sassi and Benchellali v. France (dec.), 2024, the Court confirmed thisapproach: despite the special status of the prohibition of torture in the international law, international law still grants immunity to the State or agents of the State against tort actions related to the acts of torture. The Court added that, although the French investigative authorities in the end discontinued the criminal prosecution of the American officials allegedly responsible for the ill-treatment of the applicant (who had been detained in the Guantanamo military base prison, with reference to the immunity of the persons indicated as possible defendants, the authorities had taken steps to investigate the case and the question of immunity had been discussed at all levels jurisdiction, including the Court of Cassation (§ 64). ▪ State immunity from execution is not in itself contrary to Article 6 § 1. The Court noted in 2005 that all the international legal instruments governing State immunity set forth the general principle that, subject to certain strictly delimited exceptions, foreign States enjoyed immunity from execution in the territory of the forum State ( Manoilescu and Dobrescu v. Romania and Russia (dec.), 2005, § 73). By way of illustration, the Court held in 2002 that ""although the Greek courts ordered the German Sta te to pay damages to the applicants, this did not necessarily oblige the Greek State to ensure that the applicants could recover their debt through enforcement proceedings in Greece"" ( Kalogeropoulou and Others v. Greece and Germany (dec.), 2002). These decisions are valid in relation to the state of international law at the relevant time and do not preclude future developments in that law."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:20140/23,Suren Antonyan v. Armenia,20140/23,added,"Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, no. 20140/23, 23 January 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.A.1,Autonomous concept,3,194,211,0.9721,"Suren Antonyan v. Armenia , 2025",,"For the purposes of Article 6 § 1 a ""tribunal"" need not be a court of law integrated within the standard judicial machinery of the country concerned ( Xhoxhaj v. Albania, 2021, § 284, concerning a body set up to re-evaluate the ability of judges and prosecutors to perform their functions; Ali Rıza and Others v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 194-195 and 202-204, and Mutu and Pechstein v. Switzerland, 2018, § 139, concerning arbitration). It may be set up to deal with a specific subject matter which can be appropriately administered outside the ordinary court system. What is important to ensure compliance with Article 6 § 1 are the guarantees, both substantive and procedural, which are in place ( Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], 2020; Rolf Gustafson v. Sweden, 1997, § 45). Thus, a body that does not observe the procedural safeguards under Article 6 cannot be regarded as a ""tribunal"" established by law ( Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 99-105, concerning disciplinary proceedings for judges).","For the purposes of Article 6 § 1 a ""tribunal"" need not be a court of law integrated within the standard judicial machinery of the country concerned ( Xhoxhaj v. Albania, 2021, § 284, concerning a body set up to re-evaluate the ability of judges and prosecutors to perform their functions; Ali Rıza and Others v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 194-195 and 202-204, and Mutu and Pechstein v. Switzerland, 2018, § 139, concerning arbitration; Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, 2025, §§ 101-104, concerning the Supreme Judicial Council which examined disciplinary cases against judges and which possessed all of the characteristics of a tribunal in disciplinary matters). It may be set up to deal with a specific subject matter which can be appropriately administered outside the ordinary court system. What is important to ensure compliance with Article 6 § 1 are the guarantees, both substantive and procedural, which are in place ( Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], 2020; Rolf Gustafson v. Sweden, 1997, § 45). Thus, a body that does not observe the procedural safeguards under Article 6 cannot be regarded as a ""tribunal"" established by law ( Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 99-105, concerning disciplinary proceedings for judges)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:20140/23,Suren Antonyan v. Armenia,20140/23,added,"Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, no. 20140/23, 23 January 2025",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.A.1,Autonomous concept,3,199,216,0.9855,,,"Lastly, the Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], 2020, judgment added that the very notion of a ""tribunal"" implied that it should be composed of judges selected on the basis of merit - that is, judges who fulfil the requirements of technical competence and moral integrity to perform the judicial functions required of it in a State governed by the rule of law (§§ 220-221). Arigorous process for the appointment of ordinary judges is of paramount importance to ensure that the most qualified candidates in both these respects are appointed to judicial posts. The higher a "" tribunal "" is placed in the judicial hierarchy, the more demanding the applicable selection criteria should be. Furthermore, non-professional judges may be subject to different selection criteria, particularly when it comes to the requisite technical competencies. Such merit-based selection not only ensures the technical capacity of a judicial body to deliver justice as a ""tribunal"", but it is a lso crucial in terms of ensuring public confidence in the judiciary and serves as a supplementary guarantee of the personal independence of judges (§ 222) - see also Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 80, concerning professors of law).","Lastly, the Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], 2020, judgment added that the very notion of a ""tribunal"" implied that it should be composed of judges selected on the basis of merit - that is, judges who fulfil the requirements of technical competence and moral integrity to perform the judicial functions required of it in a State governed by the rule of law (§§ 220-221). Arigorous process for the appointment of ordinary judges is of paramount importance to ensure that the most qualified candidates in both these respects are appointed to judicial posts. The higher a "" tribunal "" is placed in the judicial hierarchy, the more demanding the applicable selection criteria should be. Furthermore, non-professional judges may be subject to different selection criteria, particularly when it comes to the requisite technical competencies. Such merit-based selection not only ensures the technical capacity of a judicial body to deliver justice as a ""tribunal"", but it is also crucial in terms of ensuring public confidence in the judiciary and serves as a supplementary guarantee of the personal independence of judges (§ 222) - see also Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 80, concerning professors of law; compare with Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, 23 January 2025, §§ 105 - 119, where the Court examined the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council as a whole, including the manner of election of its lay members)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:20140/23,Suren Antonyan v. Armenia,20140/23,added,"Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, no. 20140/23, 23 January 2025",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A.2,Level of jurisdiction,3,,219,,"Suren Antonyan v. Armenia , 2025",,,"Article 6 1 does not require the State to set up a second degree of jurisdiction in civil matters. Thus, in Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, 2025, the applicant, a judge, had his disciplinary case decided by the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), acting as a court and no appeal was possible against the decision of the SJC. The Court concluded that the absence of an appellate review of the disciplinary decisions of the SJChad not violated the applicant access to a ""court"" under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (§§ 124-128)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:20140/23,Suren Antonyan v. Armenia,20140/23,added,"Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, no. 20140/23, 23 January 2025",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.A.3,Review by a court having full jurisdiction,3,208,226,0.9724,"See Suren Antonyan v. Armenia , 2025",,"Where an administrative body determining disputes over ""civil rights and obligations"" does not satisfy all the requirements of Article 6 § 1, no violation of the Convention can be found if the proceedings before that body are ""subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of Article 6 § 1"", that is, if any structural or procedural shortcomings identified in the proceedings before the administrative authority are remedied in the course of the subsequent review by a judicial body with full jurisdiction ( Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, § 132; Peleki v. Greece, 2020, §§ 58-60; Thierry v. France (dec.), 2023, §§ 27 and 34-41). Thus, where Article 6 § 1 is applicable to disciplinary proceedings, the Convention requires implementation of at least one of the two following mechanisms: either the professional disciplinary bodies themselves comply with the requirements of that Article, or they do not so comply but are subject to subsequent review by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of that Article ( Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 61 and the case-law references cited).","Where an administrative body determining disputes over ""civil rights and obligations"" does not satisfy all the requirements of Article 6 § 1, no violation of the Convention can be found if the proceedings before that body are ""subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of Article 6 § 1"", that is, if any structural or procedural shortcomings identified in the proceedings before the administrative authority are remedied in the course of the subsequent review by a judicial body with full jurisdiction ( Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, § 132; Peleki v. Greece, 2020, §§ 58-60; Thierry v. France (dec.), 2023, §§ 27 and 34-41). Thus, where Article 6 § 1 is applicable to disciplinary proceedings, the Convention requires implementation of at least one of the two following mechanisms: either the professional disciplinary bodies themselves comply with the requirements of that Article, or they do not so comply but are subject to subsequent review by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of that Article ( Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 61 and the case-law references cited). See Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, 2025, where the Court concluded that where a disciplinary authority - the Supreme Judicial Council (the SJC) - has all attributes of a tribunal - Article 6 cannot be interpreted as also requiring an appeal to a court of law even though the impartiality of the SJCwas at issue (see §§ 101 - 104, and 124 - 129)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:20140/23,Suren Antonyan v. Armenia,20140/23,added,"Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, no. 20140/23, 23 January 2025",5,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.C.2,An independent tribunal,3,286,305,0.9983,"Suren Antonyan v. Armenia , 2025",,"Although the notion of the separation of powers between the political organs of government and the judiciary has assumed growing importance in the Court's case-law, neither Article 6 nor any other provision of the Convention requires States to comply with any theoretical constitutional concepts regarding the permissible limits of the powers'interaction. The question is always whether, in a given case, the requirements of the Convention are met ( Kleyn and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], 2003, § 193; Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá [GC], 2018, § 144). Indeed, the notion of independence of a tribunal entails the existence of procedural safeguards to separate the judiciary from other powers ( Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], 2020, § 215). Moreover, in assessing the independence of a court within the meaning of Article 6 § 1, regard must be had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members, a question which pertains to the domain of the establishment of a ""tribunal"" (§ 232, emphasising the interaction between the requirements of ""independence"", "" impartialit y"" and a "" tribunal established by law"" ). With regard to the separation of powers and the necessity of safeguarding the independence of the judiciary ( Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 75), the Court has been attentive to the need to protect members of the judiciary against measures potentially undermining their independence and autonomy, including from the standpoint of the applicability of Article 6 § 1 and access to a court (see the summary of principles in Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, §§ 298 and 300-309, which apply not only to judges'adjudicating role but also to other official functions closely connected with the judicial system, such as membership of the National Council of the Judiciary, §§ 303-307; see also Bilgen v. Turkey, 2021, § 58 in fine ) and in relation to a hearing in disciplinary proceedings ( Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, § 196). Whatever system is chosen by member States, they must abide by their obligation to secure judicial independence. Where a judicial council has been established, the State authorities should be under an obligation to ensure its independence from the executive and legislative powers, especially in order to safeguard the integrity of the judicial appointment process. The removal, or threat of removal, of a judicial member of the National Council of the Judiciary during his or her term of office has the potential to affect the personal independence of that member in the exercise of his or her duties ( Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, §§ 300-309). Additionally, the presence, even in a merely passive role, of a member of the government within a body empowered to impose disciplinary sanctions on judges is in itself highly problematic in terms of the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, and particularly the requirement that the disciplinary body be independent. The presence of the Prosecutor General within a body concerned with the disciplining of judges is problematic with regard to the impartiality and independence requirements under Article 6. As to the process for selecting professors of law for appointment to the Supreme Judicial Council (in French - Conseil supérieur de la magistrature, CSM ), it must provide sufficient guarantees of independence ( Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 75-76, concerning the presence of ex officio members of the CSM, including the Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General, and of professors of law, who had been selected without sufficient guarantees of independence).","Although the notion of the separation of powers between the political organs of government and the judiciary has assumed growing importance in the Court's case-law, neither Article 6 nor any other provision of the Convention requires States to comply with any theoretical constitutional concepts regarding the permissible limits of the powers'interaction. The question is always whether, in a given case, the requirements of the Convention are met ( Kleyn and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], 2003, § 193; Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá [GC], 2018, § 144). Indeed, the notion of independence of a tribunal entails the existence of procedural safeguards to separate the judiciary from other powers ( Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], 2020, § 215). Moreover, in assessing the independence of a court within the meaning of Article 6 § 1, regard must be had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members, a question which pertains to the domain of the establishment of a ""tribunal"" (§ 232, emphasising the interaction between the requirements of ""independence"", "" impartialit y"" and a "" tribunal established by law"" ). 20 With regard to the separation of powers and the necessity of safeguarding the independence of the judiciary ( Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 75), the Court has been attentive to the need to protect members of the judiciary against measures potentially undermining their independence and autonomy, including from the standpoint of the applicability of Article 6 § 1 and access to a court (see the summary of principles in Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, §§ 298 and 300-309, which apply not only to judges'adjudicating role but also to other official functions closely connected with the judicial system, such as membership of the National Council of the Judiciary, §§ 303-307; see also Bilgen v. Turkey, 2021, § 58 in fine) and in relation to a hearing in disciplinary proceedings ( Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, § 196). Whatever system is chosen by member States, they must abide by their obligation to secure judicial independence. Where a judicial council has been established, the State authorities should be under an obligation to ensure its independence from the executive and legislative powers, especially in order to safeguard the integrity of the judicial appointment process. The removal, or threat of removal, of a judicial member of the National Council of the Judiciary during his or her term of office has the potential to affect the personal independence of that member in the exercise of his or her duties ( Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, §§ 300-309). Additionally, the presence, even in a merely passive role, of a member of the government within a body empowered to impose disciplinary sanctions on judges is in itself highly problematic in terms of the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, and particularly the requirement that the disciplinary body be independent. The presence of the Prosecutor General within a body concerned with the disciplining of judges is problematic with regard to the impartiality and independence requirements under Article 6. As to the process for selecting professors of law for appointment to the Supreme Judicial Council (in French- Conseil supérieur de la magistrature, CSM ), it must provide sufficient guarantees of independence ( Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 75-76, concerning the presence of ex officio members of the CSM, including the Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General, and of professors of law, who had been selected without sufficient guarantees of independence; compare with Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, 2025, where the Court was satisfied that the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council, together with the manner of appointment of its non-judge members, provided sufficient guarantees of the independence of the body)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:20140/23,Suren Antonyan v. Armenia,20140/23,added,"Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, no. 20140/23, 23 January 2025",6,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.C.2.3,An impartial tribunal,4,,329,,"In Suren Antonyan v. Armenia , 2025|Otegi Mondragon and Others v. Spain , 2018|Sigríður Elín Sigfúsdóttir v. Iceland , 2020|Stoimenovikj and Miloshevikj v. North Macedonia , 2021",,,"In a case where it had been alleged that doubts as to the impartiality of one or more judges sitting on a bench was sufficient to find that the bench as a whole had lacked impartiality, the Court found that, in view of the secrecy of the deliberations, it was impossible to ascertain the actual influence of the judge or judges concerned on the collegial work of the bench in question, and hence the partiality of one judge might likely raise legitimate doubt about the impartiality of the whole composition ( Morice v. France [GC], 2015, § 89; Mitrinovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2015, § 46; Stoimenovikj and Miloshevikj v. North Macedonia, 2021, § 39; see also, mutatis mutandis, Otegi Mondragon and Others v. Spain, 2018, § 67; Sigríður Elín Sigfúsdóttir v. Iceland, 2020, § 57 and, for the case of two members of a bench, Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 78. However, see In Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, 2025, the Court noted that the judge at issue was the chair of the disciplinary court and the rapporteur in the applicant's case leading the discussions, and that the applicants'request seeking recusal of the Chair had been not been seriously examined by that court (§§ 139 and 140)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:20140/23,Suren Antonyan v. Armenia,20140/23,added,"Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, no. 20140/23, 23 January 2025",7,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.C.2.d,Specific case of judges ’ independence vis-à-vis the High Council of the Judiciary,4,297,316,0.9806,"Suren Antonyan v. Armenia , 2025",,"The fact that judges appealing against decisions of the High Council of the Judiciary (or equivalent body) come under the authority of the same body as regards their careers and disciplinary proceedings against them has been examined in the cases of Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, § 79 and Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, 2013, § 130 (violations), and Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, §§ 157-165 (no violation). The Court assessed and compared the disciplinary systems for the judiciary in the States concerned in order to determin e whether there were any ""serious structural deficiencies"" or ""an appearance of bias within the disciplinary body for the judiciary"" ( Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, §§ 157-160) and whether the requirement of independence was complied with ( ibid., §§ 161-163). See also above concerning the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council.","The fact that judges appealing against decisions of the High Council of the Judiciary (or equivalent body) come under the authority of the same body as regards their careers and disciplinary proceedings against them has been examined in the cases of Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, § 79 and Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, 2013, § 130 (violations), and Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, §§ 157-165 (no violation). The Court assessed and compared the disciplinary systems for the judiciary in the States concerned in order to determine whether there were any ""serious structural deficiencies"" or ""an appearance of bias within the disciplinary body for the judiciary"" ( Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, §§ 157-160) and whether the requirement of independence was complied with ( ibid., §§ 161-163). Note that High Councils of the Judiciary or similar bodies can also carry out the role of disciplinary courts: Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, 2025, §§ 101 - 104. See also above concerning the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:20140/23,Suren Antonyan v. Armenia,20140/23,added,"Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, no. 20140/23, 23 January 2025",8,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.C.2.i,Manner of appointment of a body ’ s members,4,,321,,"Suren Antonyan v. Armenia , 2025",,,"The composition of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), acting as a court in disciplinary matters, was examined in Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, 2025. The SJCwas composed of five judicial members (judges elected by their peers) and five lay members, elected by the Parliament. While that composition ensured sufficient independence of the SJC, the Court noted certain flaws in the process of nomination of lay members of the SJC: the procedure could be more transparent, inclusive and certain additional requirements related to political neutrality of the candidates could be welcome. However, despite those flaws the current model of the SJCwas found to offer sufficient safeguards: the judges elected by their peers represented half of the SJC; in contrast to certain soft-law instruments, the Convention does not require that judicial members be in a ""substantial majority"" in such bodies, so the minimal standard of judicial representation had been complied with; there were strict eligibility requirements related to the professional qualifications and experience of the candidates; candidates underwent integrity checks and could be questioned in a plenary Parliament session; and the National Assembly could elect a non-judicial member only with three-fifths of the votes. The Court further stressed that the members of the SJCwere elected for a or a fixed term of five years: their irremovability during this term was guaranteed by law; they could not engage in any paid secondary activity; they received the same social guarantees as judges; they were bound by the rules of conduct for judges; and they did not depend on either the executive or the legislature. The SJCitself had enjoyed managerial and budgetary autonomy and the Chairman of the SJCplayed a predominantly administrative role having no powers vis-à-vis individual members (§§ 105 - 119). The Court concluded that the SJCdid not lack independence."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:17131/19,Tamazount and others v. France,17131/19,added,"Tamazount and others v. France, nos. 17131/19 and 4 others, 4 April 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A.2,Existence of an arguable right or obligation in domestic law,3,22,24,0.9655,"Couso Permuy v. Spain , 2024|Tamazount and Others v. France , 2024",,"It should be noted that it is the right as asserted by the claimant in the domestic proceedings that must be taken into account in order to assess whether Article 6 § 1 is applicable ( Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2013, § 120). Where, at the outset of the proceedings, there was a genuine and serious dispute about the existence of such a right, the fact that the domestic courts concluded that the right did not exist does not retrospectively deprive the applicant's complaint of its arguability ( Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, §§ 88-89; see also, where the domestic courts were called upon to decide for the first time on the issue in question, Markovic and Others v. Italy [GC], 2006, §§ 100-02; compare and contrast with Károly Nagy v. Hungary [GC], 2017, §§ 75-77 and X and Others v. Russia, 2020, § 47).","It should be noted that it is the right as asserted by the claimant in the domestic proceedings that must be taken into account in order to assess whether Article 6 § 1 is applicable ( Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2013, § 120). Where, at the outset of the proceedings, there was a genuine and serious dispute about the existence of such a right, the fact that the domestic courts concluded that the right did not exist does not retrospectively deprive the applicant's complaint of its arguability ( Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, §§ 88-89; see also, where the domestic courts were called upon to decide for the first time on the issue in question, Markovic and Others v. Italy [GC], 2006, §§ 100-02; and Tamazount and Others v. France, 2024, § 109; compare and contrast with Károly Nagy v. Hungary [GC], 2017, §§ 75-77 and X and Others v. Russia, 2020, § 47). Similarly, where the applicant tried to obtain compensation for the death of a relative which occurred as a result of an alleged war crime committed abroad by foreign nationals, Article 6 was considered applicable even though, ultimately, the national courts concluded that they had no jurisdiction to adjudicate such disputes ( Couso Permuy v. Spain, 2024, §§ 109 - 111)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:17131/19,Tamazount and others v. France,17131/19,added,"Tamazount and others v. France, nos. 17131/19 and 4 others, 4 April 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A.2,"Limitations: court fees, time-limits, mandatory legal representation, immunities etc.",3,,174,,"The lack of jurisdiction to examine a complaint may be based on the doctrine of acts of the government or acts of State. Quite often such acts are of a diplomatic or military character. Thus in Tamazount and Others v. France , 2024",,,"The lack of jurisdiction to examine a complaint may be based on the doctrine of acts of the government or acts of State. Quite often such acts are of a diplomatic or military character. Thus in Tamazount and Others v. France, 2024, the applicants claimed that, following the independence of Alegria, France had failed to take measures to protect harkis (members of the Algerian auxiliary forces who had collaborated with the French military before the independence) from reprisals. The French administrative courts refused to examine the applicants'compensation claims lodged on the basis of State liability for negligence, referring to the doctrine of acts of State. The Court concluded that this restriction had pursued a legitimate aim (preserving the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary) which meant that the courts could not call into question diplomatic decisions. The acts and omissions imputed by the applicant to the French State could not be disassociated with such diplomatic acts. At the same time, the refusal to examine the applicant's claims based on the State's alleged negligence did not exclude a possibility to invoke the strict liability of the State. Thus, the limitation on the applicants'access to court was not absolute and thus it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (§§ 112-127)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:46514/15,TMMOB and Karakuş Candan v. Türkiye,46514/15,added,"TMMOB and Karakuş Candan v. Türkiye, no. 46514/15, 11 June 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.2,Existence of an arguable right or obligation in domestic law,3,,37,,"ş Candan v. Türkiye , 2024",,,"However, this does not mean that associations must be able to bring court proceedings in the general public interest and in any area: the domestic law must recognise that associations have certain rights in a particular sphere and may participate in the decision-making process in this regard, as demonstrated by TMMOB and Karakuş Candan v. Türkiye, 2024. In this case, a chamber of architects brought proceedings complaining about an urban development plan which affected a historic site. The Court concluded that the outcome of those proceedings had no direct bearing on the applicant association 's ""civil rights"" and that Article 6 was therefore inapplicable (§§ 46 and 47)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:10233/20,"Ukrkava, TOV v. Ukraine",10233/20,added,"Ukrkava, TOV v. Ukraine,* no. 10233/20, 6 February 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,IV.A.3.b,Scope and limits of the Court ’ s supervision,4,407,430,0.9357,,,"The aribtrariness of the domestic court's conclusions may take the form of a failure to engage with important legal arguments relevant for the outcome of the case. Thus, in the case of Aykhan Akhundov v. Azerbaijan, 2023, the applicant's title to real estate was annulled by the Azerbaijani courts with reference to some irregularities in the property title of a company from whom the applicant had acquired that property several years before. In reaching that conclusion, the Azerbaijani courts failed to address the question of time-limits which could have barred a counterclaim introduced by the company (§ 96) and had also misinterpreted or failed to consider the position of a State authority (competent for the registration of real estate) which supported the applicant's claims (§ 103). Lastly, in this context, a lack of judicial coordination and diligence may have had an undeniable impact on the applicant's fate ( Tel v. Turkey, 2017, § 67). In conclusion, a ""denial of justice"" will occur if no reasons are provided or the reasons given are based on a ""manifest"" factual or legal error committed by the domestic court ( Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, § 77, referring to Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [GC], 2017, § 85, in the criminal sphere).","The arbitrariness of the domestic court's conclusions may take the form of a failure to engage with important legal arguments relevant for the outcome of the case. Thus, in the case of Aykhan Akhundov v. Azerbaijan, 2023, the applicant's title to real estate was annulled by the Azerbaijani courts with reference to some irregularities in the property title of a company from whom the applicant had acquired that property several years before. In reaching that conclusion, the Azerbaijani courts failed to address the question of time-limits which could have barred a counterclaim introduced by the company (§ 96) and had also misinterpreted or failed to consider the position of a State authority (competent for the registration of real estate) which supported the applicant's claims (§ 103). Lastly, in this context, a lack of judicial coordination and diligence may have had an undeniable impact on the applicant's fate ( Tel v. Turkey, 2017, § 67). In Ukrkava, TOV v. Ukraine,* 2025, the applicant company complained that the Supreme Court had refused to apply a clear and unambiguous provision of domestic law regarding the time-limits applicable to certain notary-endorsed writs. While the applicant company argued that the opposing party (a bank) has missed the time-limit for enforcing the writ set for disputes between legal persons in the Notary Act, the Supreme Court decided that, for the sake of uniformity, the time-limit should be the same, for legal and natural persons, as under the civil code. The Court stressed that, in principle, a superior national court may legitimately operate a change of interpretation if justified by important considerations and if applied with due regard to its effects on pre-existing situations. However, in the case at hand the considerations of ""uniformity"" were not sufficient to jus tify such a departure from the clear text of the law, and the Supreme Court failed to demonstrate any negative effects of the difference between the time-limits for bringing claims under the relevant civil legislation and under the Notary Act. The Court concluded that the reinterpretation of the unequivocal provisions of the Notary Act on time- limits ""rendered the outcome of the proceedings unforeseeable and was contrary to the principle of legal certainty"", in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (§§ 46 - 50). In conclusion, a ""denial of justice"" will occur if no reasons are provided or the reasons given are based on a ""manifest"" factual or legal error committed by the domestic court ( Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, § 77, referring to Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [GC], 2017, § 85, in the criminal sphere)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:53600/20,Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC],53600/20,added,"Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, 9 April 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.1,“Genuine and serious” “dispute” with a decisive outcome,3,,17,,,,,"In Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], 2024, in the context of climate change litigation, the Court concluded that the action brought by an environmental association before the national courts and concerning the Government's failure to implement the emission reduction targets set by the legislation had a direct and sufficient link to its members'civil rights to life, health, and physical integrity, bearing in mind the role of such associations in the climate-change context: the applicant association had an actual and sufficiently close connection to the impugned matter and to its individual members seeking protection against the adverse effects of climate change, and acted as a means through which the rights of those affected by climate change could be defended. At the same time, the Court refused to acknowledge that the domestic proceedings were ""directly decisive"" for the individual applicants who had also participated in these proceedings, because the effects of the government 's inaction were not ""imminent and certain"" (§ § 619 - 625)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:53600/20,Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC],53600/20,added,"Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, 9 April 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.2,Existence of an arguable right or obligation in domestic law,3,,45,,,,,"The question of whether a right is recognised - at least on an arguable basis - in domestic law was examined in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], 2024, in the context of climate change litigation. While some elements of the action instituted by the applicant association concerned requests for legislative and regulatory action and thus were outside the scope of Article 6 § 1, the action also aimed at enforcing the target of 20% for the reduction of dangerous emissions set in the law and thus concerned the lack of effective implementation of the mitigation measures provided under the existing law. The Court also concluded that the right to life and the right to the protection of health and physical integrity were ""civil"", in the Swiss legal order (§§ 615 - 619)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:22321/19,Wick v. Germany,22321/19,added,"Wick v. Germany, no. 22321/19, 4 June 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.2,Existence of an arguable right or obligation in domestic law,3,,27,,"Wick v. Germany , 2024",,,"Thus, in Wick v. Germany, 2024, the applicant contested a series of decisions regarding his repeated transfers from one prison to another. Under German law there is no right to serve a sentence in a particular penitentiary institution and there is an important discretionary element in any decision of the prison administration to transfer an inmate. Since, however, the reasonableness of such decisions may be contested in courts meaning that the authorities'discretion was not unlimited, the applicant had a ""right"" within the me aning of Article 6 of the Convention (§ 76)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:22321/19,Wick v. Germany,22321/19,added,"Wick v. Germany, no. 22321/19, 4 June 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B,Extension to other types of disputes,2,,58,,"In Wick v. Germany , 2024",,,"In Wick v. Germany, 2024, the Court concluded that placing the applicant inmate in an isolation cell, dramatically reducing his social contacts, as well as video surveillance measures which interfered with his intimacy, impacted on his ""civil rights"" ( § 74). In the same case, the Court found that frequent transfers from one prison to another for short periods of time - even though those prisons were not in remote or isolated places - might have had an impact on his social and private life and, in particular, on the therapy he has been undergoing and thus on his ""civil"" rights ( § 77)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:22321/19,Wick v. Germany,22321/19,added,"Wick v. Germany, no. 22321/19, 4 June 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A.1,A right that is practical and effective,3,,163,,"In Wick v. Germany , 2024",,,"The right of access to court may be rendered ineffective if the respondent authorities escape judicial control by changing the applicant's legal situation. In Wick v. Germany, 2024 the applicant repeatedly complained to the courts about his frequent transfers from one prison to another, but his complaints were left without examination: the courts either considered that these were temporary measures not subject to the judicial review, or refused to examine his complaints as they were moot because, in the meantime, the applicant had already been transferred to another prison (§§ 99-103)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:27746/22|28291/22,X and Others v. Slovenia,27746/22|28291/22,added,"X and Others v. Slovenia, nos. 27746/22 and 28291/22, 19 December 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.B.1,Principles,3,,289,,"In X and Others v. Slovenia , 2024",,,"In X and Others v. Slovenia, 2024, the applicant argued that her case had been assigned to a particular judge in breach of the ""lawful judge"" principle and in breach of the chronological and alphabetical order of allocation set out in the relevant legislation. The authorities claimed that the impugned allocation of cases ensured an equal distribution of the workload amongst the judges. The Court noted that, while the ""equal distribution of workload"" was a relevant consideration, this could not constitute a stand-alone basis for the distribution of cases. By assigning family-law cases to the judge with the lowest number of unresolved cases of this type on a particular day, the President of the District Court had effectively assigned these cases to a particular judge, contrary to the objective pre-established criteria and defying the clear purpose of the domestic law to ensure randomness in the assignments of cases, while the remainder of civil-law cases were apparently redistributed to other judges in a manner that observed both the workload and other criteria set out in the law, thus ensuring the required randomness. The Court concluded that the irregularities in question were of such gravity that they undermined the very essence of the right to be tried by a tribunal established in accordance with the law (§§ 119 - 128)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:38127/22,Zafferani and Others v. San Marino,38127/22,added,"Zafferani and Others v. San Marino, nos. 38127/22 and 6 others, 9 January 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A.2,Existence of an arguable right or obligation in domestic law,3,23,25,0.9959,"In Zafferani and Others v. San Marino , 2025",,"As to the point in time to which the assessment of whether or not there was an ""arguable"" right in domestic law should relate in the event of a change in the law, see Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 110, and Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, § 285, where the Court found that the question whether a right ""existed"" under domestic law could not be answered on the basis of the new legislation. Accordingly, the fact that the applicants'respective terms of office (as President of the Supreme Court/a member of the National Council of the Judiciary) had been terminated ex lege could not be regarded as removing, retrospectively, the "" arguability "" of the "" right "" that they could have claimed under Article 6 § 1 in accordance with the rules in force at the time of their appointment. In Stoianoglo v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 29, the Court applied a similar approach to the proceedings in which the Prosecutor General tried to contest his suspension. For the Court, the question whether or not the Prosecutor General had a defendable right to continue exercising his functions should be answered, not on the basis of the new legislation, but rather on the basis of the legislation which existed at the moment when he had been appointed. Similarly, the Court concluded that the applicants had had a defendable right in the case of Pająk and others v. Poland, 2023, §§ 120-125, which concerned the application of a new legislation which lowered the retirement age for judges and had introduced a new procedure for extending the mandate beyond the new (lower) age of retirement. Thus, the Court found that the applicant, a civil servant, had a right to certain conditions of service even when, following a legislative reform, the scope of this right, or the procedural modalities of exercising it, has been changed. Similarly, in Gyulumyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, the Court applied the same approach to a dispute arising out of the early termination of mandates of several judges and the President of the Constitutional Court, even though this termination had resulted automatically from a constitutional amendment (§§ 65 - 67).","As to the point in time to which the assessment of whether or not there was an ""arguable"" right in domestic law should relate in the event of a change in the law, see Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, § 110, and Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, § 285, where the Court found that the question whether a right ""existed"" under domestic law could not be answered on the basis of the new legislation. Accordingly, the fact that the applicants'respective terms of office (as President of the Supreme Court/a member of the National Council of the Judiciary) had been terminated ex lege could not be regarded as removing, retrospectively, the "" arguability "" of the "" right "" that they could have claimed under Article 6 § 1 in accordance with the rules in force at the time of their appointment. In Stoianoglo v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 29, the Court applied a similar approach to the proceedings in which the Prosecutor General tried to contest his suspension. For the Court, the question whether or not the Prosecutor General had a defendable right to continue exercising his functions should be answered, not on the basis of the new legislation, but rather on the basis of the legislation which existed at the moment when he had been appointed. Similarly, the Court concluded that the applicants had had a defendable right in the case of Pająk and others v. Poland, 2023, §§ 120-125, which concerned the application of a new legislation which lowered the retirement age for judges and had introduced a new procedure for extending the mandate beyond the new (lower) age of retirement. Thus, the Court found that the applicant, a civil servant, had a right to certain conditions of service even when, following a legislative reform, the scope of this right, or the procedural modalities of exercising it, has been changed. Similarly, in Gyulumyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), 2023, the Court applied the same approach to a dispute arising out of the early termination of mandates of several judges and the President of the Constitutional Court, even though this termination had resulted automatically from a constitutional amendment (§§ 65 - 67). In Zafferani and Others v. San Marino, 2025, the Court concluded that the applicant had a civil right to claim salary arrears even though the right to obtain those arrears have been retroactively withdrawn by legislation during the proceedings (§§ 32 - 36)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:38127/22,Zafferani and Others v. San Marino,38127/22,added,"Zafferani and Others v. San Marino, nos. 38127/22 and 6 others, 9 January 2025",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.A.2.b,Examples and limits,4,391,413,0.9909,"Convention. In Zafferani and Others v. San Marino , 2025|The Court held in Couso Permuy v. Spain , 2024",,"Entry into force of a law when a case to which the State is a party is still pending ( Vegotex International S.A. v. Belgium [GC], 2022, §§ 92-93 and 102 and the case-law references cited): although in principle the legislature is not prevented from regulating, through new retrospective provisions, rights derived from the laws in force, the principle of the rule of law and the notion of a fair hearing enshrined in Article 6 preclude any interference by the legislature with the administration of justice designed to influence the judicial determination of a dispute, save on compelling grounds of the general interest ( Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, 1994, § 49; Zielinski and Pradal and Gonzalez and Others v. France [GC], 1999, § 57; Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], 2006, § 126). There are dangers inherent in the use of retrospective legislation which has the effect of influencing the judicial determination of a dispute to which the State is a party, including where the effect is to make pending litigation unwinnable for the claimant. Respect for the rule of law and the notion of a fair trial require that any reasons adduced to justify such measures be treated with the greatest possible degree of circumspection ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society et Yorkshire Building Society c. Royaume-Uni, 1997, § 112). The Court found violations, for example, in respect of: ▪ intervention by the legislature - at a time when proceedings to which the State was party had been pending for nine years and the applicants had a final, enforceable judgment against the State - to influence the imminent outcome of the case in the State's favour ( Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, 1994, §§ 49-50); ▪ a law which decisively influenced the imminent outcome of a case in favour of the State ( Zielinski, Pradal, Gonzalez and Others v. France [GC], 1999, § 59); ▪ the enactment, at a crucial point in proceedings before the Court of Cassation, of a law which for practical purposes resolved substantive issues and made carrying on with the litigation pointless ( Papageorgiou v. Greece, 1997); ▪ a decision of an appellate court based, even subsidiarily, on a law enacted in the course of proceedings and which affected the outcome of the proceedings ( Anagnostopoulos and Others v. Greece, 2000, §§ 20-21); ▪ recourse by the State to retrospective legislation influencing the judicial determination of a pending dispute to which the State was a party, without demonstrating that there were ""compelling general - interest reasons"" for such action. The Court pointed out, in particular, that financial considerations could not by themselves warrant the legislature taking the place of the courts in order to settle disputes ( Azienda Agricola Silverfunghi S.a.s. and Others v. Italy, 2014, §§ 76 and 88-89). However, Article 6 § 1 cannot be interpreted as preventing any interference by the authorities with pending legal proceedings to which they are party. In other cases the Court has held that the considerations relied on by the respondent State were based on the compelling public-interest motives required to justify the retroactive effect of the law ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 112; Forrer-Niedenthal v. Germany, 2003, § 64; OGIS-Institut Stanislas, OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and Others v. France, 2004, §§ 71-72; EEG-Slachthuis Verbist Izegem v. Belgium (dec.), 2005; Hôpital local Saint-Pierre d'Oléron and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 72-73).","Entry into force of a law when a case to which the State is a party is still pending ( Vegotex International S.A. v. Belgium [GC], 2022, §§ 92-93 and 102 and the case-law references cited): although in principle the legislature is not prevented from regulating, through new retrospective provisions, rights derived from the laws in force, the principle of the rule of law and the notion of a fair hearing enshrined in Article 6 preclude any interference by the legislature with the administration of justice designed to influence the judicial determination of a dispute, save on compelling grounds of the general interest ( Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, 1994, § 49; Zielinski and Pradal and Gonzalez and Others v. France [GC], 1999, § 57; Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], 2006, § 126). There are dangers inherent in the use of retrospective legislation which has the effect of influencing the judicial determination of a dispute to which the State is a party, including where the effect is to make pending litigation unwinnable for the claimant. Respect for the rule of law and the notion of a fair trial require that any reasons adduced to justify such measures be treated with the greatest possible degree of circumspection ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society et Yorkshire Building Society c. Royaume-Uni, 1997, § 112). The Court found violations, for example, in respect of: ▪ intervention by the legislature - at a time when proceedings to which the State was party had been pending for nine years and the applicants had a final, enforceable judgment against the State - to influence the imminent outcome of the case in the State's favour ( Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, 1994, §§ 49-50); ▪ a law which decisively influenced the imminent outcome of a case in favour of the State ( Zielinski, Pradal, Gonzalez and Others v. France [GC], 1999, § 59); ▪ the enactment, at a crucial point in proceedings before the Court of Cassation, of a law which for practical purposes resolved substantive issues and made carrying on with the litigation pointless ( Papageorgiou v. Greece, 1997); ▪ a decision of an appellate court based, even subsidiarily, on a law enacted in the course of proceedings and which affected the outcome of the proceedings ( Anagnostopoulos and Others v. Greece, 2000, §§ 20-21); ▪ recourse by the State to retrospective legislation influencing the judicial determination of a pending dispute to which the State was a party, without demonstrating that there were ""compelling general - interest reasons"" for such action. The Court pointed out, in particular, that financial considerations could not by themselves warrant the legislature taking the place of the courts in order to settle disputes ( Azienda Agricola Silverfunghi S.a.s. and Others v. Italy, 2014, §§ 76 and 88-89). However, Article 6 § 1 cannot be interpreted as preventing any interference by the authorities with pending legal proceedings to which they are party. In other cases the Court has held that the considerations relied on by the respondent State were based on the compelling public-interest motives required to justify the retroactive effect of the law ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 112; Forrer-Niedenthal v. Germany, 2003, § 64; OGIS-Institut Stanislas, OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and Others v. France, 2004, §§ 71-72; EEG-Slachthuis Verbist Izegem v. Belgium (dec.), 2005; Hôpital local Saint-Pierre d'Oléron and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 72-73). The Court held in Couso Permuy v. Spain, 2024, that the legislature is not prohibited from regulating the conduct of civil matters by means of implementing new provisions with retroactive effect: what is prohibited, as a general rule, is an interference by the legislature with the administration of justice for the purpose of influencing the judicial outcome of litigation, unless there are ""overriding grounds of public interest"" for doing so (§ 133). In OGIS-Institut Stanislas, OGEC Saint-Pie X and Blanche de Castille and Others v. France, 2004 the legislature had intervened to correct a technical flaw and to fill a legal vacuum and the applicants had sought to obtain a windfall by taking advantage of a loophole in the regulations: the Court found no breach of Article 6 of the Convention. In Zafferani and Others v. San Marino, 2025, the Court concluded that Article 6 was breached in the absence of such a legislative vacuum and in the absence of ""sufficiently compelling reasons for making [the legislation] immediately and retrospectively applicable to pending proceedings"" with retrospective effect to the detriment of the applicants and to the benefit of the State (§ 54)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:57246/21,Zouboulidis v. Greece (no. 3),57246/21,added,"Zouboulidis v. Greece (no. 3), no. 57246/21, 4 June 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A.2,Existence of an arguable right or obligation in domestic law,3,,28,,,,,"In Zouboulidis v. Greece (no. 3), 2024, the Court examined whether the right to claim damages for a judicial error existed in the domestic legal order. In 1998 the applicant's appeal in a civil case was declared inadmissible. In 2007 the Court found a breach of Article 6 (access to court) on account of an overly formalistic application of the admissibility criteria in those proceedings. Soon afterwards the applicant sued the State for damages for the judicial error in the original proceedings. He argued that, if that error had not taken place, he would have been paid a certain service-related benefit. The administrative courts (two instances) applying, by analogy, the law on State liability for damages, found that the applicant had a right to compensation but only in the case of a "" manifest error "" . Since the error of the Greek courts in the original proceedings was not ""manifest"", the applicant' s claim for damages was dismissed on the merits. In 2021 the Supreme Administrative Court (the SAC) reversed those judgments, finding that the administrative courts had had no jurisdiction to examine such claims because Greek law at the time did not provide for the right to be compensated for a judicial, even though such compensation might have been required by the Constitution. The law only established rules on the liability of other State bodies for misconduct and should not have been applied by analogy to the misconduct of the judiciary. The Court noted that administrative courts at two instances had considered the applicant's case on the merits, and, as regards the position of the SAC, if the relevant legislation on State liability for the judicial errors was enacted, the case would have been considered on the merits (§ 37). The narrow approach by the SACdid not remove arguability of the applicant's claim. The Court concluded that, in such conditions, Article 6 was applicable to the proceedings at issue."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20240930062548__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-06-26,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2024-09-30__2025-06-26.json,apps:57246/21,Zouboulidis v. Greece (no. 3),57246/21,added,"Zouboulidis v. Greece (no. 3), no. 57246/21, 4 June 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.A.3.c,Consistency of domestic case-law,4,,444,,,,,"Inconsistency of domestic case-law has been examined by the Court, not only under the heading of ""fairness"", but sometimes under the heading of ""access to court"". Thus, in Zouboulidis v. Greece (no. 3) the applicant brought proceedings before the administrative court claiming damages for a judicial error which had happened in another set of legal proceedings. At the time, the law provided for compensation for damage caused by manifest misconduct by other State authorities and not the courts. In a series of judgments, this law has been applied by analogy to judicial errors: in the applicant's case the courts at two instances did the same. However, the Supreme Administrative Court refused to apply the law by analogy and concluded that there was a gap in the legislation since the legislator had failed to establish conditions for compensation for damage caused by the judiciary and that, in absence of such specific regulations, the administrative courts had no jurisdiction to examine such claims. The Court found that the applicant's right of access to court had been violated because the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court excluded any further possibility for the applicant to pursue his claims and because for more than seven years this legislative gap has been known to the domestic courts but have not been remedied by the legislature (§§ 75 - 84)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20260217135653__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2025-06-26,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json,apps:4986/24,A and B v. Malta,4986/24,added,"A and B v. Malta, no. 4986/24, 24 June 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.D,Applicability of Article 6 to proceedings other than main proceedings,2,,94,,"In A and B v. Malta , 2025",,,"In A and B v. Malta, 2025, § 38, the Court found Article 6 to be applicable to recusal proceedings, provided that the procedure to challenge the judge is not a separate one, but rather part of the main civil proceedings (to be distinguished from Schreiber and Boetsch v. France (dec.), 2003)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20260217135653__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2025-06-26,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json,apps:22077/19,Green v. the United Kingdom,22077/19,added,"Green v. the United Kingdom, no. 22077/19, 8 April 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.A.2,"Limitations: court fees, time-limits, mandatory legal representation, immunities etc.",3,179,179,0.9745,,,"Parliamentary immunity: it is a long-standing practice for States generally to confer varying degrees of immunity on parliamentarians, with the aim of allowing free speech for representatives of the people and preventing partisan complaints from interfering with parliamentary functions (see the summary of the relevant principles in Bakoyanni v. Greece, 2022, §§ 58-62; C.G.I.L. and Cofferati v. Italy (no. 2), 2010, § 44). Hence, parliamentary immunity may be compatible with Article 6, provided that it: ▪ pursues legitimate aims: protecting free speech in Parliament and maintaining the separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary ( A. v. the United Kingdom, 2002, §§ 75-77 and 79); ▪ is not disproportionate to the aims sought to be achieved (if the person concerned has reasonable alternative means to protect effectively his or her rights ( ibid., § 86) and immunity attaches only to the exercise of parliamentary functions ( ibid., § 84; Zollmann v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2010). Alack of any clear connection with parliamentary activity calls for a narrow interpretation of the concept of proportionality between the aim sought to be achieved and the means employed ( Cordova v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, § 64; Syngelidis v. Greece, 2010, § 44 and the case-law references cited). Individuals'right of access to a court cannot be restricted in a manner incompatible with Article 6 § 1 whenever the impugned remarks were made by a member of Parliament ( Cordova v. Italy (no. 1), 2003, § 63; C.G.I.L. and Cofferati v. Italy (no. 2), 2010, §§ 46-50, where, in addition, the victims did not have any reasonable alternative means to protect their rights).","Parliamentary immunity: it is a long-standing practice for States generally to confer varying degrees of immunity on parliamentarians, with the aim of allowing free speech for representatives of the people and preventing partisan complaints from interfering with parliamentary functions (see the summary of the relevant principles in Bakoyanni v. Greece, 2022, §§ 58-62; C.G.I.L. and Cofferati v. Italy (no. 2), 2010, § 44). The regulation of parliamentary immunity belongs to the realm of parliamentary law, in respect of which a wide margin of appreciation is left to member States ( Green v. the United Kingdom, 2025, § 77). Hence, parliamentary immunity may be compatible with Article 6, provided that it: ▪ pursues legitimate aims: protecting free speech in Parliament and maintaining the separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary ( A. v. the United Kingdom, 2002, §§ 75-77 and 79); ▪ is not disproportionate to the aims sought to be achieved (if the person concerned has reasonable alternative means to protect effectively his or her rights ( ibid., § 86) and immunity attaches only to the exercise of parliamentary functions ( ibid., § 84; Zollmann v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2010). Alack of any clear connection with parliamentary activity calls for a narrow interpretation of the concept of proportionality between the aim sought to be achieved and the means employed ( Cordova v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, § 64; Syngelidis v. Greece, 2010, § 44 and the case-law references cited). Individuals'right of access to a court cannot be restricted in a manner incompatible with Article 6 §1 whenever the impugned remarks were made by a member of Parliament ( Cordova v. Italy (no. 1), 2003, § 63; C.G.I.L. and Cofferati v. Italy (no. 2), 2010, §§ 46-50, where, in addition, the victims did not have any reasonable alternative means to protect their rights). For the Court to compel national authorities to provide for a legal remedy against the use of parliamentary privilege would be incompatible with the wide margin of appreciation afforded to member States in such matters ( Green v. the United Kingdom, 2025, § 101)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20260217135653__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2025-06-26,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json,apps:41120/17,K.V. Mediterranean Tours Limited v. Türkiye,41120/17,added,"K.V. Mediterranean Tours Limited v. Türkiye, no. 41120/17, 10 June 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.A.2.b,Examples and limits,4,420,421,0.9966,"K.V. Mediterranean Tours Limited v. Türkiye , 2025",,"The conditions in which the proceedings took place must therefore be examined, and in particular whether the proceedings were adversarial and complied with the equality of arms principle (compare Kress v. France [GC], 2001, § 76, and Göç v. Turkey [GC], 2002, §§ 55-57; see also Marc-Antoine v. France (dec.), 2013), in order to determine whether the situation was attributable to the litigant's conduct, or to the attitude of the authorities or the applicable legislation ( Fretté v. France, 2002, §§ 49-51). For the procedure before the Court of Justice of the European Communities/of the European Union: Cooperatieve Producentenorganisatie van de Nederlandse Kokkelvisserij U.A. v. Netherlands (dec.), 2009. 421. Limits: ▪ Equality of arms does not entail a party's right to have disclosed to him or her, before the hearing, submissions which have not been disclosed to the other party to the proceedings or to the reporting judge or the judges of the trial bench ( Kress v. France [GC], 2001, § 73). ▪ There is no point in recognising a right that has no real reach or substance: that would be the case if the right relied on under the Convention would have had no incidence on the outcome of the case because the legal solution adopted was legally unobjectionable ( Stepinska v. France, 2004, § 18). ▪ With reference again to situations where the applicant - who was party to the domestic proceedings - has complained that he or she did not receive a copy of evidence or observations sent to the judge, the Court has in some cases applied the new ""significant disadvantage"" admissibility criterion ( Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention), which was introduced in 2010. According to this criterion, a violation of a right, however real from a purely legal point of view, must attain a minimum level of severity to warrant consideration by the Court, in accordance with the principle de minimis non curat praetor . In that context, complaints concerning the failure to provide applicants with a copy of evidence adduced or observations filed have been declared inadmissible by the Court for lack of a significant disadvantage ( Janáček v. the Czech Republic, 2023, § 51 and the examples cited; Holub v. the Czech Republic (dec), 2010; Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional v. Portugal (dec.), 2012, §§ 36-40; Kılıç and Others v. Turkey (dec.), 2013; and contrast Janáček v. the Czech Republic, 2023, § 53; Colloredo Mannsfeld v. the Czech Republic, 2016, §§ 33-34). This approach has been applied, for example, where the document in question contained nothing new for the applicant and clearly had no influence, through its nature or content, on the court's decision; this is even more evident where the national court has itself stated that it did not take into account the document which was not communicated to the applicant ( Cavajda v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2011. ▪ The fact that a similar point of view is defended before a court by several parties does not necessarily place the opposing party in a position of ""substantial disadvantage"" when presenting his or her case ( Yvon v. France, 2003, § 32 in fine).","The conditions in which the proceedings took place must therefore be examined, and in particular whether the proceedings were adversarial and complied with the equality of arms principle (compare Kress v. France [GC], 2001, § 76, and Göç v. Turkey [GC], 2002, §§ 55-57; see also Marc-Antoine v. France (dec.), 2013), in order to determine whether the situation was attributable to the litigant's conduct, or to the attitude of the authorities or the applicable legislation ( Fretté v. France, 2002, §§ 49-51). For the procedure before the Court of Justice of the European Communities/of the European Union: Cooperatieve Producentenorganisatie van de Nederlandse Kokkelvisserij U.A. v. Netherlands (dec.), 422. Limits: ▪ The mere fact of the participation of a third party in the proceedings does not violate the principle of a fair trial, provided that the applicant can present his or her arguments and respond to the third party ( K.V. Mediterranean Tours Limited v. Türkiye, 2025, § 81). ▪ Equality of arms does not entail a party's right to have disclosed to him or her, before the hearing, submissions which have not been disclosed to the other party to the proceedings or to the reporting judge or the judges of the trial bench ( Kress v. France [GC], 2001, § 73). ▪ There is no point in recognising a right that has no real reach or substance: that would be the case if the right relied on under the Convention would have had no incidence on the outcome of the case because the legal solution adopted was legally unobjectionable ( Stepinska v. France, 2004, § 18). ▪ With reference again to situations where the applicant - who was party to the domestic proceedings - has complained that he or she did not receive a copy of evidence or observations sent to the judge, the Court has in some cases applied the new ""significant disadvantage"" admissibility criterion ( Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention), which was introduced in 2010. According to this criterion, a violation of a right, however real from a purely legal point of view, must attain a minimum level of severity to warrant consideration by the Court, in accordance with the principle de minimis non curat praetor. In that context, complaints concerning the failure to provide applicants with a copy of evidence adduced or observations filed have been declared inadmissible by the Court for lack of a significant disadvantage ( Janáček v. the Czech Republic, 2023, § 51 and the examples cited; Holub v. the Czech Republic (dec), 2010; Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional v. Portugal (dec.), 2012, §§ 36-40; Kılıç and Others v. Turkey (dec.), 2013; and contrast Janáček v. the Czech Republic, 2023, § 53; Colloredo Mannsfeld v. the Czech Republic, 2016, §§ 33-34). This approach has been applied, for example, where the document in question contained nothing new for the applicant and clearly had no influence, through its nature or content, on the court's decision; this is even more evident where the national court has itself stated that it did not take into account the document which was not communicated to the applicant ( Cavajda v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2011. ▪ The fact that a similar point of view is defended before a court by several parties does not necessarily place the opposing party in a position of ""substantial disadvantage"" when presenting his or her case ( Yvon v. France, 2003, § 32 in fine)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20260217135653__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2025-06-26,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json,apps:41120/17,K.V. Mediterranean Tours Limited v. Türkiye,41120/17,added,"K.V. Mediterranean Tours Limited v. Türkiye, no. 41120/17, 10 June 2025",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.A.4,Adversarial proceedings,3,448,449,0.999,"K.V. Mediterranean Tours Limited v. Türkiye , 2025",,"Content (subject to the limits outlined below): the right to adversarial proceedings means in principle the opportunity for the parties to a criminal or civil trial to have knowledge of and comment on all evidence adduced or observations filed, even by an independent member of the national legal service, with a view to influencing the court's decision ( Kress v. France [GC], 2001, §§ 65 and 74; Ruiz-Mateos v. Spain, 1993, § 63; McMichael v. the United Kingdom, 1995, § 80; Vermeulen v. Belgium, 1996, § 33; Lobo Machado v. Portugal, 1996, § 31). This guarantee is not limited to the observations filed by parties to proceedings but is applied to other situations, including with respect to evidence and opinions obtained on a court's initiative (see Vorotņikova v. Latvia, 2021, § 26). This requirement may also apply before a constitutional court (see the summary of the relevant case-law in Janáček v. the Czech Republic, 2023, §§ 47-54 ; Milatová and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2005, §§ 63-66; Gaspari v. Slovenia, 2009, § 53). ▪ The actual effect on the court's decision is of little consequence ( Nideröst-Huber v. Switzerland, 1997, § 27; Ziegler v. Switzerland, 2002, § 38). ▪ The adversarial principle is just as valid for the parties to the proceedings, or for third parties ( Ferreira Alves v. Portugal (no. 3), 2007, § 38), as it is for an independent member of the national legal service, a representative of the administration, the lower court or the court hearing the case ( Köksoy v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 34-35 and case-law references cited). This principle also applies to opinions issued by State institutions that are important for settling the dispute, even if they are non-binding ( Vorotņikova v. Latvia, 2021, § 24). ▪ The right to adversarial proceedings must be capable of being exercised in satisfactory conditions: a party to the proceedings must have the possibility to familiarise itself with the evidence before the court, as well as the possibility to comment on its existence, contents and authenticity in an appropriate form and within an appropriate time ( Krčmář and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2000, § 42; Immeubles Groupe Kosser v. France, 2002, § 26), if necessary by obtaining an adjournment ( Yvon v. France, 2003, § 39). It is not sufficient that the applicant is able to consult the case file at the court registry and obtain a copy of the document in question ( Göç v. Turkey [GC], 2002, § 57). ▪ The parties should have the opportunity to make known any evidence needed for their claims to succeed ( Clinique des Acacias and Others v. France, 2005, § 37). ▪ It is for the parties to a dispute alone to decide whether a document produced by the other party or evidence given by witnesses calls for their comments. Litigants'confidence in the workings of justice is based on the knowledge that they have had the opportunity to express their views on every document in the file (including documents obtained by the court of its own motion: K.S. v. Finland, 2001, § 22; Nideröst-Huber v. Switzerland, 1997, § 29; Pellegrini v. Italy, 2001, § 45). For an application involving the Constitutional Court, see Janáček v. the Czech Republic, 2023, § 53.","Content (subject to the limits outlined below): the right to adversarial proceedings means in principle the opportunity for the parties to a criminal or civil trial to have knowledge of and comment on all evidence adduced or observations filed, even by an independent member of the national legal service, with a view to influencing the court's decision ( Kress v. France [GC], 2001, §§ 65 and 74; Ruiz-Mateos v. Spain, 1993, § 63; McMichael v. the United Kingdom, 1995, § 80; Vermeulen v. Belgium, 1996, § 33; Lobo Machado v. Portugal, 1996, § 31). This guarantee is not limited to the observations filed by parties to proceedings but is applied to other situations, including with respect to evidence and opinions obtained on a court's initiative (see Vorotņikova v. Latvia, 2021, § 26). This requirement may also apply before a constitutional court (see the summary of the relevant case-law in Janáček v. the Czech Republic, 2023, §§ 47-54 ; Milatová and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2005, §§ 63-66; Gaspari v. Slovenia, 2009, § 53). ▪ The actual effect on the court's decision is of little consequence ( Nideröst-Huber v. Switzerland, 1997, § 27; Ziegler v. Switzerland, 2002, § 38). ▪ The adversarial principle is just as valid for the parties to the proceedings, or for third parties ( Ferreira Alves v. Portugal (no. 3), 2007, § 38; K.V. Mediterranean Tours Limited v. Türkiye, 2025, § 84), as it is for an independent member of the national legal service, a representative of the administration, the lower court or the court hearing the case ( Köksoy v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 34-35 and case-law references cited). This principle also applies to opinions issued by State institutions that are important for settling the dispute, even if they are non-binding ( Vorotņikova v. Latvia, 2021, § 24). ▪ The right to adversarial proceedings must be capable of being exercised in satisfactory conditions: a party to the proceedings must have the possibility to familiarise itself with the evidence before the court, as well as the possibility to comment on its existence, contents and authenticity in an appropriate form and within an appropriate time ( Krčmář and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2000, § 42; Immeubles Groupe Kosser v. France, 2002, § 26), if necessary by obtaining an adjournment ( Yvon v. France, 2003, § 39). It is not sufficient that the applicant is able to consult the case file at the court registry and obtain a copy of the document in question ( Göç v. Turkey [GC], 2002, § 57). ▪ The parties should have the opportunity to make known any evidence needed for their claims to succeed ( Clinique des Acacias and Others v. France, 2005, § 37). ▪ It is for the parties to a dispute alone to decide whether a document produced by the other party or evidence given by witnesses calls for their comments. Litigants'confidence in the workings of justice is based on the knowledge that they have had the opportunity to express their views on every document in the file (including documents obtained by the court of its own motion: K.S. v. Finland, 2001, § 22; Nideröst-Huber v. Switzerland, 1997, § 29; Pellegrini v. Italy, 2001, § 45). For an application involving the Constitutional Court, see Janáček v. the Czech Republic, 2023, § 53."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20260217135653__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2025-06-26,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json,apps:30671/08,Maširević v. Serbia,30671/08,added,"Maširević v. Serbia, no. 30671/08, 11 February 2014",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.A.2,"Limitations: court fees, time-limits, mandatory legal representation, immunities etc.",3,168,168,1.0,,,"Where access to a court is restricted by law or in practice, the Court examines whether the restriction affects the substance of the right and, in particular, whether it pursues a "" legitimate aim "" (which must be indicated by the respondent Government: Oorzhak v. Russia, 2021, §§ 20-22) and whether there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved: Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom, 1985, § 57. With regard to the proportionality of the restriction, the scope of the State's margin of appreciation may depend, inter alia, on the relevant international law in this area ( Naït-Liman v. Switzerland [GC], 2018, §§ 173-174). That being said, even common procedural limitations may disproportionately restrict access to court according to the circumstances of the case. Thus, for example, while mandatory legal representation was seen as acceptable in the proceedings before the court of cassation ( Maširević v. Serbia, 2014, § 47), in Kitanovska and Barbulovski v. North Macedonia, 2023, the Court found that that the cost of hiring a lawyer to present a simple and repetitive case before a court of first instance had been too high, compared to the value of the claim. Moreover, the first instance court had no power to exempt the claimant from such costs and did not allow her to re-submit her claim through a lawyer. In such circumstances, the requirement of mandatory legal representation was disproportionate (§§ 57-61). In cases involving issues that are subject to constant developments in the member States, the scope of the margin of appreciation may also depend on whether there is a ""European consensus"" or at least a certain trend among the member States ( Naït-Liman v. Switzerland [GC], 2018, § 175). No violation of Article 6 § 1 can be found if the restriction is compatible with the principles established by the Court.","Where access to a court is restricted by law or in practice, the Court examines whether the restriction affects the substance of the right and, in particular, whether it pursues a "" legitimate aim "" (which must be indicated by the respondent Government: Oorzhak v. Russia, 2021, §§ 20-22) and whether there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved: Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom, 1985, § 57. With regard to the proportionality of the restriction, the scope of the State's margin of appreciation may depend, inter alia, on the relevant international law in this area ( Naït-Liman v. Switzerland [GC], 2018, §§ 173-174). That being said, even common procedural limitations may disproportionately restrict access to court according to the circumstances of the case. Thus, for example, while mandatory legal representation was seen as acceptable in the proceedings before the court of cassation ( Maširević v. Serbia, 2014, § 47), in Kitanovska and Barbulovski v. North Macedonia, 2023, the Court found that that the cost of hiring a lawyer to present a simple and repetitive case before a court of first instance had been too high, compared to the value of the claim. Moreover, the first instance court had no power to exempt the claimant from such costs and did not allow her to re-submit her claim through a lawyer. In such circumstances, the requirement of mandatory legal representation was disproportionate (§§ 57-61). In cases involving issues that are subject to constant developments in the member States, the scope of the margin of appreciation may also depend on whether there is a ""European consensus"" or at least a certain trend among the member States ( Naït-Liman v. Switzerland [GC], 2018, § 175). No violation of Article 6 §1 can be found if the restriction is compatible with the principles established by the Court."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20260217135653__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2025-06-26,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json,apps:7428/17,Mustafa and Mustafova v. Bulgaria,7428/17,added,"Mustafa and Mustafova v. Bulgaria, no. 7428/17, 1 July 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A.2,Existence of an arguable right or obligation in domestic law,3,44,44,0.9861,"Mustafa and Mustafova v. Bulgaria , 2025",,"The case which gave rise to Advisory Opinion P16-2022-001, 2023 concerned the adoption of an adult person by his aunt, who was a sister of the biological mother of the former. The biological mother opposed the adoption. She was questioned in court as a witness, but the Finnish courts refused to recognise her standing as an interested party and to bring an appeal. The Court noted that, under national law, the courtswhere not required to consider, in the adult adoption proceedings, the interests of any other party but the adoptee and the person seeking to become an adoptive partent. Bearing in mind the content and rationale of the relevant statutory provisions, the Court concluded that the right claimed by the biological mother did not exist, even on arguable grounds, in domestic law.","The case which gave rise to Advisory Opinion P16-2022-001, 2023 concerned the adoption of an adult person by his aunt, who was a sister of the biological mother of the former. The biological mother opposed the adoption. She was questioned in court as a witness, but the Finnish courts refused to recognise her standing as an interested party and to bring an appeal. The Court noted that, under national law, the courts where not required to consider, in the adult adoption proceedings, the interests of any other party but the adoptee and the person seeking to become an adoptive parent. Bearing in mind the content and rationale of the relevant statutory provisions, the Court concluded that the right claimed by the biological mother did not exist, even on arguable grounds, in domestic law (compare and contrast with Mustafa and Mustafova v. Bulgaria, 2025, §§ 42-47)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20260217135653__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2025-06-26,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json,apps:56297/21,Sadomski v. Poland,56297/21,added,"Sadomski v. Poland, no. 56297/21, 9 May 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,I.C.1.a,Does the law exclude access to a court for that particular type of dispute?,4,76,75,0.791,"In Sadomski v. Poland , 2025","In Kamenos v. Cyprus , 2017|Kamenos v. Cyprus , 2017|Kövesi v. Romania , 2020","It should be noted that the fact that there is no possibility of reviewing the decision complained of does not in itself mean that access to a court is excluded for the purposes of the first condition ( Kamenos v. Cyprus, 2017, §§ 75 and 84; see also Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 122-123). In Kamenos v. Cyprus, 2017, the applicant had received a disciplinary punishment from a single body, the Supreme Council of Judicature, whose decision was final (§ 84). The Council had nevertheless constituted a ""tribunal"" within the meaning of Article 6, and the dismissed civil servant had therefore had access to a court for the purposes of the first condition of the Vilho Eskelinen test.","There may also be particular circumstances where the Court must determine whether access to a court had been excluded under domestic law before, rather than at the time when, the impugned measure concerning the applicant was adopted ( Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, §§ 115-16). In Sadomski v. Poland, 2025, the possibility to review the decision of the national council of the judiciary in the matters of appointments, was removed, by way of a legislative intervention, while the appointment competition (in which the applicant participated) was still pending. The Court found that the first condition of the Vilho Eskelinen test had not been met (§ 61)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20260217135653__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2025-06-26,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json,apps:56297/21,Sadomski v. Poland,56297/21,added,"Sadomski v. Poland, no. 56297/21, 9 May 2025",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C.2,Disputes involving judges and prosecutors,3,82,81,0.9947,"Sadomski v. Poland , 2025",,"The Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018 judgment gave a detailed summary of the case-law and relevant principles concerning the application of Article 6 to ordinary labour disputes involving judges (see §§ 46-49 and the relevant precedents, §§ 52-55 - see also Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, § 120, and Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 62-63); it should be borne in mind that disciplinary proceedings are also concerned (see, for example, Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, § 65 et seq., and see above). The Bilgen v. Turkey, 2021, judgment clarified that this included disputes concerning a measure that had considerable effects on a judge's professional life and career even without any direct impact in pecuniary terms or on private or family life (§§ 68-69). The case of Dolińska -Ficek and Ozimek v. Poland, 2021, concerned two judges who had applied for another post in a higher court (§ 231, and see the summary of the case-law concerning judges in §§ 227-228).","The Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018 judgment gave a detailed summary of the case-law and relevant principles concerning the application of Article 6 to ordinary labour disputes involving judges (see §§ 46-49 and the relevant precedents, §§ 52-55 - see also Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, § 120, and Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 62-63); it should be borne in mind that disciplinary proceedings are also concerned (see, for example, Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, § 65 et seq., and see above). The Bilgen v. Turkey, 2021, judgment clarified that this included disputes concerning a measure that had considerable effects on a judge's professional life and career even without any direct impact in pecuniary terms or on private or family life (§§ 68-69). The case of Dolińska -Ficek and Ozimek v. Poland, 2021, concerned two judges who had applied for another post in a higher court (§ 231, and see the summary of the case-law concerning judges in §§ 227-228; see also Sadomski v. Poland, 2025, § 57)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20260217135653__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2025-06-26,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json,apps:56297/21,Sadomski v. Poland,56297/21,added,"Sadomski v. Poland, no. 56297/21, 9 May 2025",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A,Access to a court,2,138,138,0.9604,"In Sadomski v. Poland , 2025",,"In Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, the Court noted the growing importance which international and Council of Europe instruments, the case-law of international courts and the practice of other international bodies were attaching to procedural fairness in cases involving the removal or dismissal of judges, including the intervention of an authority independent of the executive and legislative powers in respect of every decision affecting the termination of office of a judge (§ 121 - and see Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, §§ 327 and 345). In Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, the same considerations were applied to prosecutors (§ 156). See also, with regard to disciplinary matters, Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, §§ 176-186, and Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 99-104; and for a compulsory transfer, Bilgen v. Turkey, 2021, § 63. In Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, the applicant had been prematurely removed from his position as a judicial member of the National Council of the Judiciary by operation of the law without any possibility of judicial oversight (§§ 345-348). The Court held that similar procedural safeguards to those that should be available in cases of dismissal or removal of judges should likewise be available where a judicial member of the National Council of the Judiciary (the body with responsibility for safeguarding judicial independence) had been removed from that position (§ 345). In such circumstances, regard should be had to "" the strong public interest in upholding the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law"", and, if there had been reforms of the judicial system by the government, to the overall context in which they had taken place (§§ 346 and 348-349).","In Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, the Court noted the growing importance which international and Council of Europe instruments, the case-law of international courts and the practice of other international bodies were attaching to procedural fairness in cases involving the removal or dismissal of judges, including the intervention of an authority independent of the executive and legislative powers in respect of every decision affecting the termination of office of a judge (§ 121 - and see Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, §§ 327 and 345). In Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, the same considerations were applied to prosecutors (§ 156). See also, with regard to disciplinary matters, Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], 2018, §§ 176-186, and Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 99-104; and for a compulsory transfer, Bilgen v. Turkey, 2021, § 63. In Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, the applicant had been prematurely removed from his position as a judicial member of the National Council of the Judiciary by operation of the law without any possibility of judicial oversight (§§ 345-348). The Court held that similar procedural safeguards to those that should be available in cases of dismissal or removal of judges should likewise be available where a judicial member of the National Council of the Judiciary (the body with responsibility for safeguarding judicial independence) had been removed from that position (§ 345). In such circumstances, regard should be had to "" the strong public interest in upholding the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law"", and, if there had been reforms of the judicial system by the government, to the overall context in which they had taken place (§§ 346 and 348-349). In Sadomski v. Poland, 2025, the applicant, a rejected candidate in a competition for judicial posts in the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, complained that his right to judicial review had been taken away as the competition was underway. In particular, in spite of the Supreme Administrative Court's order to stay the implementation of the contested resolution of the National Council of the Judiciary, the President of the Republic had proceeded with the appointment of the candidates recommended by the NCJ. Moreover, legislative amendments aimed at extinguishing the right of judicial review were introduced after the competition had gotten underway and after the applicant had lodged his appeal. While the Supreme Administrative Court had disapplied those amendments and ruled in the applicant's favour, the Court concluded that the interim order and then the final judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court were rendered inoperative to the applicant's detriment, thus depriving the domestic rulings of all practical effects. There has been accordingly a violation of the applicant's right to a court."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20260217135653__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2025-06-26,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json,apps:58751/00,Schreiber and Boetsch v. France (dec.),58751/00,added,"Schreiber and Boetsch v. France (dec.), no. 58751/00, ECHR 2003-XII",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.D,Applicability of Article 6 to proceedings other than main proceedings,2,,94,,"In A and B v. Malta , 2025",,,"In A and B v. Malta, 2025, § 38, the Court found Article 6 to be applicable to recusal proceedings, provided that the procedure to challenge the judge is not a separate one, but rather part of the main civil proceedings (to be distinguished from Schreiber and Boetsch v. France (dec.), 2003)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20260217135653__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2025-06-26,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json,apps:30085/13,Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova,30085/13,added,"Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 30085/13, 15 May 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,IV.A.4,Adversarial proceedings,3,451,452,0.9261,,,"Afailure to observe the adversarial principle may be remedied by the appellate body, as long as it has ""full jurisdiction"" within the meaning of the case -law. Similarly, a procedural shortcoming on the part of an appellate court may be corrected by the lower court to which the case has been remitted ( Köksoy v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 36-39).","Afailure to observe the adversarial principle may be remedied by the appellate body, as long as it has ""full jurisdiction"" within the meaning of the case -law. Similarly, a procedural shortcoming on the part of an appellate court may be corrected by the lower court to which the case has been remitted ( Köksoy v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 36-39). See also Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, §§ 38 - 41, concerning the absence of the applicant company in the first-instance court proceedings, which have been remedied in the appellate proceedings."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20260217135653__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2025-06-26,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json,apps:30085/13,Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova,30085/13,added,"Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 30085/13, 15 May 2025",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,IV.A.4.5,Equality of arms,4,455,456,0.9956,,,"Content: maintaining a ""fair balance"" between the parties. Equality of arms im plies that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case - including his evidence - under conditions that do not place him at a "" substantial disadvantage "" vis-à-vis the other party ( Kress v. France [GC], 2001, § 72; Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greec e, 1994, § 46; Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2017, § 146; Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands, 1993, § 33). ▪ This principle, which covers all aspects of procedural law in the Contracting States, is also applicable in the specific sphere of service of judicial documents on the parties, although Article 6 § 1 cannot be interpreted as prescribing a specific form of service of documents ( Avotiņš v. Latvia [GC], 2016, § 119). ▪ It is inadmissible for one party to make submissions to a court without the knowledge of the other and on which the latter has no opportunity to comment. It is a matter for the parties alone to assess whether a submission deserves a reaction ( APEH Üldözötteinek Szövetsége and Others v. Hungary, 2000, § 42) and more recently Janáček v. the Czech Republic, 2023, § 53. See also the limits mentioned above. ▪ However, if observations submitted to the court are not communicated to either of the parties there will be no infringement of equality of arms as such ( Kress v. France [GC], 2001, § 73), but rather of the broader fairness of the proceedings ( Nideröst-Huber v. Switzerland, 1997, §§ 23-24; Clinique des Acacias and Others v. France, 2005, §§ 36-37).","Content: maintaining a ""fair balance"" between the parties. Equality of arms implies that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case - including his evidence - under conditions that do not place him at a "" substantial disadvantage "" vis-à-vis the other party ( Kress v. France [GC], 2001, § 72; Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greec e, 1994, § 46; Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2017, § 146; Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands, 1993, § 33; Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, 2025, § 36). ▪ This principle, which covers all aspects of procedural law in the Contracting States, is also applicable in the specific sphere of service of judicial documents on the parties, although Article 6 §1 cannot be interpreted as prescribing a specific form of service of documents ( Avotiņš v. Latvia [GC], 2016, § 119). ▪ It is inadmissible for one party to make submissions to a court without the knowledge of the other and on which the latter has no opportunity to comment. It is a matter for the parties alone to assess whether a submission deserves a reaction ( APEH Üldözötteinek Szövetsége and Others v. Hungary, 2000, § 42) and more recently Janáček v. the Czech Republic, 2023, § 53. See also the limits mentioned above. ▪ However, if observations submitted to the court are not communicated to either of the parties there will be no infringement of equality of arms as such ( Kress v. France [GC], 2001, § 73), but rather of the broader fairness of the proceedings ( Nideröst-Huber v. Switzerland, 1997, §§ 23-24; Clinique des Acacias and Others v. France, 2005, §§ 36-37)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20260217135653__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2025-06-26,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json,apps:30085/13,Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova,30085/13,added,"Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 30085/13, 15 May 2025",3,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,IV.A.7,Reasoning of judicial decisions,3,494,495,0.9485,,,"However, where a party's submission is decisive for the outcome of the proceedings, it requires a specific and express reply ( Ruiz Torija v. Spain, 1994, § 30; Hiro Balani v. Spain, 1994, § 28; and compare Petrović and Others v. Montenegro, 2018, § 43).","However, where a party's submission is decisive for the outcome of the proceedings, it requires a specific and express reply ( Ruiz Torija v. Spain, 1994, § 30; Hiro Balani v. Spain, 1994, § 28; Seksimp Group SRL v. the Republic of Moldova, 2025, § 47; and compare Petrović and Others v. Montenegro, 2018, § 43)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20260217135653__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2025-06-26,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json,apps:10934/21,Semenya v. Switzerland [GC],10934/21,added,"Semenya v. Switzerland [GC], no. 10934/21, 10 July 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.B.1,Principle,3,187,187,0.9662,,,"In the Contracting States'domestic legal systems, a waiver of a person's right to have his or case heard by a court or tribunal is frequently encountered in civil matters, notably in the shape of arbitration clauses in contracts. The waiver, which has undeniable advantages for the individual concerned as well as for the administration of justice, does not in principle offend against the Convention ( Deweer v. Belgium, 1980, § 49; Pastore v. Italy (dec.), 1999). Article 6 does not therefore preclude the setting up of arbitration tribunals in order to settle certain disputes ( Transado-Transportes Fluviais Do Sado, S.A. v. Portugal (dec.), 2003). The parties to a case are free to decide that the ordinary courts are not required to deal with certain disputes potentially arising from the performance of a contract. In accepting an arbitration clause, the parties voluntarily waive certain rights enshrined in the Convention ( Eiffage S.A. and Others v. Switzerland (dec.), 2009; Tabbane v. Switzerland (dec.), 2016, § 27). There may be a legitimate reason for limiting the right to direct individual access to an arbitration tribunal ( Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 197).","In the Contracting States'domestic legal systems, a waiver of a person's right to have his or case heard by a court or tribunal is frequently encountered in civil matters, notably in the shape of arbitration clauses in contracts. The waiver, which has undeniable advantages for the individual concerned as well as for the administration of justice, does not in principle offend against the Convention ( Deweer v. Belgium, 1980, § 49; Pastore v. Italy (dec.), 1999). Article 6 does not therefore preclude the setting up of arbitration tribunals in order to settle certain disputes ( Transado-Transportes Fluviais Do Sado, S.A. v. Portugal (dec.), 2003; Semenya v. Switzerland [GC], 2025, § 195; however, see further in Semenya on the question of the compulsory nature of certain arbitration clauses, which may require a ""particular rigour"" in the examination of the arbitration awards by the ordinary courts of law - see §§ 199 - 210). The parties to a case are free to decide that the ordinary courts are not required to deal with certain disputes potentially arising from the performance of a contract. In accepting an arbitration clause, the parties voluntarily waive certain rights enshrined in the Convention ( Semenya v. Switzerland [GC], 2025, § 197 and case-law references cited; Eiffage S.A. and Others v. Switzerland (dec.), 2009). There may be a legitimate reason for limiting the right to direct individual access to an arbitration tribunal ( Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1986, § 197)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20260217135653__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2025-06-26,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json,apps:10934/21,Semenya v. Switzerland [GC],10934/21,added,"Semenya v. Switzerland [GC], no. 10934/21, 10 July 2025",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.2,Conditions,3,,191,,,,,"In the field of international sports competition, the fact that arbitration is imposed by a private entity rather than by law is not sufficient to give rise to a violation of Article 6 §1. However, it is necessary to have regard to the fact that sports arbitration occurs in the context of structural imbalance characterising the relationship between sportspersons and the sport governing bodies: the latter are in a position to dictate conditions in their relationship with sportspersons, in that they regulate international sports competitions, are able to impose the mandatory and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), and exercise structural control over the international sports arbitration system. Therefore, in a situation where the CAS's exclusive jurisdiction is imposed on a sportsperson by a sport governing body, the arbitration procedure should afford the safeguards provided for in Article 6 §1 ( Semenya v. Switzerland [GC], 2025, §§ 199-205). Where the ""civil"" right at stake corresponds under domestic law to fundamental rights, respect for the right to a fair hearing requires a "" particularly rigorous "" examination of the applicant's case by the ordinary courts of law which are entitled to conduct the review of the decision of the arbitration tribunal (§ 209). Applying those principles, the Court considered that, in examining the complaint brought by the applicant - a professional athlete with differences of sex development and concerning regulations by a sport governing body requiring her to lower her natural testosterone level in order to compete in women's category in international competitions - the Federal Supreme Court 's review of the CASaward from the standpoint of its compatibility with the requirements of the domestic public policy ( ordre public) did not fulfil the requirements of particular rigour, not least owing to its very restrictive interpretation of the notion of public policy (§ 238)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20260217135653__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2025-06-26,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json,apps:10934/21,Semenya v. Switzerland [GC],10934/21,added,"Semenya v. Switzerland [GC], no. 10934/21, 10 July 2025",3,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.B.2,Conditions,3,188,188,0.9632,,,"Persons may waive their right to a court in favour of arbitration, provided that such waiver is permissible and is established freely and unequivocally ( Suda v. the Czech Republic, 2010, §§ 48-49 and case-law references cited; Tabbane v. Switzerland (dec.), 2016, §§ 26-27 and 30). In a democratic society too great an importance attaches to the right to a court for its benefit to be forfeited solely by reason of the fact that an individual is a party to a settlement reached in the course of a procedure ancillary to court proceedings ( Suda v. the Czech Republic, 2010, § 48). The waiver must be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate to its importance ( Eiffage S.A. and Others v. Switzerland (dec.), 2009; Tabbane v. Switzerland (dec.), 2016, § 31).","Persons may waive their right to a court in favour of arbitration, provided that such waiver is established freely, lawfully and unequivocally ( Semenya v. Switzerland [GC], 2025, § 197; Suda v. the Czech Republic, 2010, §§ 48-49 and case-law references cited). In a democratic society too great an importance attaches to the right to a court for its benefit to be forfeited solely by reason of the fact that an individual is a party to a settlement reached in the course of a procedure ancillary to court proceedings ( Suda v. the Czech Republic, 2010, § 48). The waiver must be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate to its importance ( Semenya v. Switzerland [GC], 2025, § 197 and case-law references cited; Eiffage S.A. and Others v. Switzerland (dec.), 2009)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20260217135653__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2025-06-26,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json,apps:16497/20,Sytnyk v. Ukraine,16497/20,added,"Sytnyk v. Ukraine, no. 16497/20, 24 April 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.A.3.b,Scope and limits of the Court ’ s supervision,4,429,430,0.9763,"In Sytnyk v. Ukraine , 2025|Sytnyk v. Ukraine , 2025",,"That being so, it is extremely rare for the Court to question under Article 6 § 1 the national courts'assessment on the grounds that their findings might be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable ( Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], 2015, §§ 61-65). This was the case, for example, in Dulaurans v. France, 2000, § 38 (see also Tel v. Turkey, 2017, § 76), where the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 because of a ""manifest error of judgment"" -that is, an error of fact or law by the national court that is so ""evident"" as to be characterised as ""manifest"" in the sense that no reasonable court could ever have made it, as underlined in Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], 2015, § 61; Khamidov v. Russia, 2007, § 170, where the proceedings complained of had been ""grossly arbitrary""; Anđelković v. Serbia, 2013, § 24, and Lazarević v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2020, § 32, where there had been a ""denial of justice""; Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], 2015, where the domestic court 's reasoning was regarded as being ""grossly arbitrary"" or as entailing a ""denial of justice"": see § § 63-65 and the cases cited above, and Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 77-78 (and contrast, for example, Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, § 82, and Société anonyme d'habitations à loyers modérés Terre et Famille v. France (dec.), 2004). In Baljak and Others v. Croatia, 2021, the Court found that the domestic courts'conclusions had been ""manifestly unreasonable"", referring in particular to its case-law under Article 2 of the Convention and the fact that the courts had imposed an unattainable standard of proof on the applicants (§ 41). Along similar lines, in Carmel Saliba v. Malta, 2016, the Court found it unacceptable for a judgment to be given against an applicant in civil proceedings without any convincing reasons, on the basis of inconsistent and conflicting evidence, while disregarding the applicant's counter-arguments (§ 79).","That being so, it is extremely rare for the Court to question under Article 6 §1 the national courts'assessment on the grounds that their findings might be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable ( Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], 2015, §§ 61-65; see also, in the context of the administrative offence proceedings, Sytnyk v. Ukraine, 2025, §§ 77-82. This was the case, for example, in Dulaurans v. France, 2000, § 38 (see also Tel v. Turkey, 2017, § 76), where the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 because of a ""manifest error of judgment"" -that is, an error of fact or law by the national court that is so ""evident"" as to be characterised as ""manifest"" in the sense that no reasonable court could ever have made it, as underlined in Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], 2015, § 61; Khamidov v. Russia, 2007, § 170, where the proceedings complained of had been ""grossly arbitrary""; Anđelković v. Serbia, 2013, § 24, and Lazarević v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2020, § 32, where there had been a ""denial of justice""; Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], 2015, where the domestic court 's reasoning was regarded as being ""grossly arbitrary"" or as entailing a ""denial of justice"": see § § 63-65 and the cases cited above, and Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 77-78 (and contrast, for example, Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, § 82, and Société anonyme d'habitations à loyers modérés Terre et Famille v. France (dec.), 2004). In Baljak and Others v. Croatia, 2021, the Court found that the domestic courts'conclusions had been ""manifestly unreasonable"", referring in particular to its case-law under Article 2 of the Convention and the fact that the courts had imposed an unattainable standard of proof on the applicants (§ 41). Along similar lines, in Carmel Saliba v. Malta, 2016, the Court found it unacceptable for a judgment to be given against an applicant in civil proceedings without any convincing reasons, on the basis of inconsistent and conflicting evidence, while disregarding the applicant's counter-arguments (§ 79). In Sytnyk v. Ukraine, 2025, the Court considered that, by accepting a witness' statements as decisive evidence to convict the applicant, without addressing any of the latter's serious arguments putting in doubt its reliability, and by disregarding the defence witness evidence, the domestic courts had distributed the burden of proof in an arbitrary matter and deprived the applicant of any practical opportunity to effectively challenge the charges against him (§ 80)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20260217135653__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2025-06-26,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json,apps:16497/20,Sytnyk v. Ukraine,16497/20,added,"Sytnyk v. Ukraine, no. 16497/20, 24 April 2025",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.A.7,Reasoning of judicial decisions,3,489,490,0.9928,"Sytnyk v. Ukraine , 2025",,"The guarantees enshrined in Article 6 § 1 include the obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions ( H. v. Belgium, 1987, § 53, and for a summary of the principles, Zayidov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2022, § 91). Areasoned decision shows the parties that their case has truly been heard, and thus contributes to a greater acceptance of the decision ( Magnin v. France (dec.), 2012, § 29). Afailure of a national court to address important legal arguments or to give reasons was also analysed under the heading of ""arbitrariness"" ( Aykhan Akhundov v. Azerbaijan, 2023, §§ 105 et seq.).","The guarantees enshrined in Article 6 §1 include the obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions ( H. v. Belgium, 1987, § 53, and for a summary of the principles, Zayidov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2022, § 91). Areasoned decision shows the parties that their case has truly been heard, and thus contributes to a greater acceptance of the decision ( Magnin v. France (dec.), 2012, § 29). Afailure of a national court to address important legal arguments or to give reasons was also analysed under the heading of ""arbitrariness"" ( Aykhan Akhundov v. Azerbaijan, 2023, §§ 105 et seq.; Sytnyk v. Ukraine, 2025, § 80)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20260217135653__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2025-06-26,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json,apps:15736/16,Vachik Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia,15736/16,added,"Vachik Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, no. 15736/16, 15 May 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1,A right that is practical and effective,3,141,141,0.9995,"On excessive formalism see also Vachik Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia , 2025",,"The rules governing the formal steps to be taken and the time-limits to be complied with in lodging an appeal or an application for judicial review are aimed at ensuring the proper administration of justice and compliance, in particular, with the principle of legal certainty ( Cañete de Goñi v. Spain, 2002, § 36). That being so, the rules in question, or their application, should not prevent litigants from using an available remedy ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 36; Zvolský and Zvolská v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 51). In particular, each case should be assessed in the light of the special features of the proceedings in question ( Kurşun v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 103-104). In applying procedural rules, the courts must avoid both excessive formalism that would impair the fairness of the proceedings and excessive flexibility such as would render nugatory the procedural requirements laid down in statutes ( Hasan Tunç and Others v. Turkey, 2017, §§ 32-33). Thus, in Patricolo and Others v. Italy, 2024, the applicants'appeals on a point of law had been rejected without examination given the applicants'failure to append to their cassation appeal a copy of the notice of service of the lower court's judgment. The obligation of an appellant party to file such notice allows the Court of Cassation to assess whether the deadline for bringing an appeal has been complied with. In more recent jurisprudence, the Court of Cassation reconsidered the previous strict approach and established that appeals whose compliance with time-limits could be immediately and directly assessed from the case-file should not be declared inadmissible, even if the notice was missing. Those in one group of applicants failed to submit a notice and the information about the date of the service of the contested judgments was not available in their case-files: while they argued that they should have been able to remedy their procedural error by filing the notice later, the Court disagreed observing that accepting late submissions would have frustrated the aim of ensuring the expeditious conduct of proceedings, their cases had been examined at two levels of jurisdiction and concluded that the Court of Cassation had good reason to declare the appeal inadmissible (§§ 77-85). The applicants in the second group submitted the notice in the format of an email from a lower court and a copy of the contested judgement which they had received electronically. While the Court of Cassation construed the existing rules narrowly, insisting that only properly certified paper copies should be accepted, the Court noted that the documents received by the applicants from the lower court were in the electronic format, that the integrity of documents filed with a court is generally ensured by criminal and disciplinary sanctions so that declaring the appeals inadmissible, without giving the applicants a fair chance to submit the proper certification at a later stage and especially in a transitional phase from paper to electronic proceedings, went beyond the aim of ensuring legal certainty and the proper administration of justice. There had therefore been a violation of Article 6 in respect of this second group of applicants (§§ 94 - 104). Similarly, in Justine v. France, 2024, the applicant's appeal to the Court of Cassation was rejected on purely formal grounds: under the applicable rules, a copy of the contested judgment should have been attached to the appeal but the applicant's lawyer, by mistake, attached a copy of another judgement (related to a connected case). When the Court of Cassation informed him about this mistake, the applicant's lawyer, within one day, submitted a copy of the correct judgment. Nevertheless, the appeal was dismissed as belated. The Court criticised this approach noting, in particular, that the formal error had been corrected before the rapporteur has been appointed to the case and that this error had therefore no bearing on the proper administration of justice. This inadmissibility objection has been raised by the Court of Cassation proprio motu at a very advanced stage of the proceedings when the case has been already ready to be adjudicated on the merits. The Court concluded that this formalistic approach deprived the applicant of her right of access to court (§§ 42 - 51). Guide to Article 13 of the Convention - Right to an effective remedy","The rules governing the formal steps to be taken and the time-limits to be complied with in lodging an appeal or an application for judicial review are aimed at ensuring the proper administration of justice and compliance, in particular, with the principle of legal certainty ( Cañete de Goñi v. Spain, 2002, § 36). That being so, the rules in question, or their application, should not prevent litigants from using an available remedy ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 36; Zvolský and Zvolská v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 51). In particular, each case should be assessed in the light of the special features of the proceedings in question ( Kurşun v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 103-104). In applying procedural rules, the courts must avoid both excessive formalism that would impair the fairness of the proceedings and excessive flexibility such as would render nugatory the procedural requirements laid down in statutes ( Hasan Tunç and Others v. Turkey, 2017, §§ 32-33). Thus, in Patricolo and Others v. Italy, 2024, the applicants'appeals on a point of law had been rejected without examination given the applicants'failure to append to their cassation appeal a copy of the notice of service of the lower court's judgment. The obligation of an appellant party to file such notice allows the Court of Cassation to assess whether the deadline for bringing an appeal has been complied with. In more recent jurisprudence, the Court of Cassation reconsidered the previous strict approach and established that appeals whose compliance with time-limits could be immediately and directly assessed from the case-file should not be declared inadmissible, even if the notice was missing. Those in one group of applicants failed to submit a notice and the information about the date of the service of the contested judgments was not available in their case-files: while they argued that they should have been able to remedy their procedural error by filing the notice later, the Court disagreed observing that accepting late submissions would have frustrated the aim of ensuring the expeditious conduct of proceedings, their cases had been examined at two levels of jurisdiction and concluded that the Court of Cassation had good reason to declare the appeal inadmissible (§§ 77-85). The applicants in the second group submitted the notice in the format of an email from a lower court and a copy of the contested judgement which they had received electronically. While the Court of Cassation construed the existing rules narrowly, insisting that only properly certified paper copies should be accepted, the Court noted that the documents received by the applicants from the lower court were in the electronic format, that the integrity of documents filed with a court is generally ensured by criminal and disciplinary sanctions so that declaring the appeals inadmissible, without giving the applicants a fair chance to submit the proper certification at a later stage and especially in a transitional phase from paper to electronic proceedings, went beyond the aim of ensuring legal certainty and the proper administration of justice. There had therefore been a violation of Article 6 in Guide to Article 13 of the Convention - Right to an effective remedy respect of this second group of applicants (§§ 94 - 104). Similarly, in Justine v. France, 2024, the applicant's appeal to the Court of Cassation was rejected on purely formal grounds: under the applicable rules, a copy of the contested judgment should have been attached to the appeal but the applicant's lawyer, by mistake, attached a copy of another judgement (related to a connected case). When the Court of Cassation informed him about this mistake, the applicant's lawyer, within one day, submitted a copy of the correct judgment. Nevertheless, the appeal was dismissed as belated. The Court criticised this approach noting, in particular, that the formal error had been corrected before the rapporteur has been appointed to the case and that this error had therefore no bearing on the proper administration of justice. This inadmissibility objection has been raised by the Court of Cassation proprio motu at a very advanced stage of the proceedings when the case has been already ready to be adjudicated on the merits. The Court concluded that this formalistic approach deprived the applicant of her right of access to court (§§ 42 - 51). On excessive formalism see also Vachik Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, 2025, §§ 102-106."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20260217135653__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2025-06-26,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json,apps:15736/16,Vachik Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia,15736/16,added,"Vachik Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, no. 15736/16, 15 May 2025",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1,A right that is practical and effective,3,148,148,0.9999,"Vachik Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia , 2025",,"In the specific circumstances of a case, the practical and effective nature of the right of access to a court may be impaired, for instance: ▪ by the prohibitive cost of the proceedings in view of the individual's financial capacity:  the excessive amount of security for costs in the context of an application to join criminal proceedings as a civil party ( Aït-Mouhoub v. France, 1998, §§ 57-58; García Manibardo v. Spain, 2000, §§ 38-45);  excessive court fees ( Kreuz v. Poland, 2001, §§ 60-67; Podbielski and PPU Polpure v. Poland, 2005, §§ 65-66; Weissman and Others v. Romania, 2006, § 42; Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-70, and conversely, Reuther v. Germany (dec.), 2003). In these cases the Court considered the question of court fees that had been imposed prior to the institution of civil proceedings and had had the effect of hindering access to a court at first instance or at a subsequent stage of the proceedings for applicants who were unable to pay (contrast Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, 1995, §§ 62-67, regarding the payment of a security as a precondition for lodging an appeal). The Court has pointed out that where there is a possibility of an exemption from stamp duty for a court application following an assessment of the applicant's financial situation, the authorities must give a decision promptly ( Laçi v. Albania, 2021, §§ 53-60), and diligence is also expected of the applicant ( Elcomp sp. z o.o. v. Poland, 2021, § 41). If the State has a system for calculating court fees linked to the amount in dispute, in order to comply with Article 6 the system must be sufficiently flexible to allow for the possibility of total or partial exemption from payment or a reduction in the amount payable (see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 39 and 40, and see §§ 41-45, where the applicant company had been forced to abandon its appeal because it was unable to pay the fees imposed on it). In Stankov v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 53, the Court held that substantial court fees imposed at the end of proceedings could also amount to a restriction on the right to a court (see, more specifically, for cases concerning the excessive length of proceedings, an acquittal or unjustified pre-trial detention, §§ 59 and 62, and a claim for compensation for assault, Čolić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 58-59); see also, regarding the refusal to reimburse legal costs, Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 68-69 and § 74; and compare with proceedings challenging the costs payable following judicial proceedings, Taratukhin v. Russia (dec.), 2020, §§ 36 et seq. For a recent summary of the case-law, see Benghezal v. France, 2022, §§ 43-45. In cases concerning court fees, regard should also be had to the litigant's conduct ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 120) or the manifest lack of any prospect of success of an action ( Marić v. Croatia (dec.), 2020, §§ 58 and 60, concerning the obligation to bear the full costs of the State's representation, and § 52, concerning the obligation for the losing party to pay litigation costs (the ""loser pays"" rule)); see also Stankiewicz v. Poland, 2006, §§ 62 et seq.; Klauz v. Croatia, 2013, §§ 77 et seq.; and Cindrić and Bešlić v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 119-123). With regard to litigation costs for proceedings that did not give rise to a decision on the merits, see Karahasanoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 136-137. Lastly, the Court has objected to the rule whereby each party has to bear its own costs regardless of the outcome of the proceedings ( Zustović v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-106, and see also §§ 99-100 for the State's duty to bear the cost of its errors in that context); it also examined the rule that each party was to bear its own costs without exception in Dragan Kovačević v. Croatia, 2022, §§ 67-85, and stressed the importance of giving reasons for a decision refusing to reimburse the costs incurred by the successful party (§ 83). However, the Court found no violation of Article 6 on account of a rule of domestic law which provided that costs of the litigation should be reimbursed to a party acquitted in the administrative proceedings only in cases where the relevant authorities had acted unlawfully ( Jakutavičius v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 80 - 86). The Court noted that the applicant himself had contributed to the decision of the police to impose a sanction: although that sanction had later been annulled, the Court was unable to find that the applicant had been made to bear the mistakes of the State authorities. Thus, the fact that the applicant had to cover his own costs in the administrative-law proceedings did not violate his right of access to a court ( ibid ., §§ 84 - 85; compare with Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.), 2023, concerning the absence in domestic law of an arguable right to obtain reimbursement of costs incurred by a defendant acquitted in a criminal case). For the imposition of excessive court fees on a commercial company, see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 39. Applicants seeking exemption from court fees should act with due diligence when presenting evidence to the courts concerning their financial standing. In Centrum Handlowe Agora SP. Z O.O. v. Poland (dec.), 2024, the applicant company was required to substantiate its long-term inability to pay the court fees but failed to do so (it failed to formulate explicitly an argument relating to the seizures of its accounts). Even though the documents confirming the seizures were attached to the applicant company's application for an exemption, without any explicit argument in this regard the domestic courts could not be expected to make further inquiries in this matter: the applicant company, by not acting with due diligence, deprived the domestic courts of the opportunity to comprehensively evaluate its financial situation (§ 32).  The imposition of fines in order to prevent a build-up of cases before the courts and to ensure the proper administration of justice is not, as such, incompatible with the right of access to a court. However, the amount of such fines is an important factor to take into account ( Sace Elektrik Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş. v. Turkey, 2013, §§ 26 et seq., concerning a mandatory fine of 10% of the bid in the event of an unsuccessful attempt to challenge a public auction). ▪ by issues relating to time-limits:  the time taken to hear an appeal leading to its being declared inadmissible ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2006, § 26). For the unforeseeable application of a new time-limit introduced after the lodging of a complaint, in breach of the principle of legal certainty, see Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149-165. Litigants are nevertheless required to act with the requisite diligence ( Kamenova v. Bulgaria, 2018, §§ 52-55; compare Çela v. Albania, 2022, § 39).  The Court held in Ivanova and Ivashova v. Russia, 2017, that the national courts should not interpret domestic law in an inflexible manner with the effect of imposing an obligation with which litigants could not possibly comply. Requiring an appeal to be lodged within one month of the date on which the registry drew up a full copy of the court's decision-rather than the point at which the appellant actually had knowledge of the decision-amounted to making the expiry of the relevant deadline dependent on a factor entirely outside the appellant's control. The Court found that the right of appeal should have become effective from the point at which the applicant could effectively apprise herself of the full text of the decision.  limitation periods for bringing a claim (see, regarding harm to physical integrity, the case-law references cited in paragraphs 53-55 of Sanofi Pasteur v. France, 2020, including Howald Moor and Others v. Switzerland, 2014, §§ 79-80; Yagtzilar and Others v. Greece, 2001, § 27; see also the cases cited in Loste v. France, 2022, §§ 68-70). For example, the Court has found a violation of the right of access to a court in a number of cases in which the discontinuation of criminal proceedings and the resulting failure to examine a civil claim were due to a lack of diligence on the national authorities'part ( Atanasova v. Bulgaria, 2008, §§ 35-47. Compare Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC], 2024). Excessive delays in the examination of a claim may also render the right of access to a court meaningless ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013).  the granting of leave to appeal out of time and the resulting acceptance of an ordinary appeal lodged after a significant period of time, for reasons that do not appear especially convincing, may entail a breach of the principle of legal certainty and the right to a court ( Magomedov and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 87-89, where late appeals benefiting the competent authorities were accepted following the extension without any valid reason of the time-limit for appealing).  the length of preliminary investigations, attributable to the authorities, preventing the applicant from joining criminal proceedings as a civil party claiming damages or from making a civil compensation claim ( Petrella v. Italy, 2021, §§ 51-53 and references cited - Compare Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC], 2024, §§ 137-140).  delay by the national authorities in examining an application by the applicant (challenging the selection procedure for a post for which she had applied), with the result that the proceedings were terminated on the grounds that there was no legal interest in pursuing the application as the administrative decision at issue had expired ( Frezadou v. Greece, 2018, § 47 - compare and contrast with Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 72). More generally, in exceptional cases where proceedings are kept pending for an excessive period, this may impair the right of access to a court ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013, § 57). The unjustified lack of a decision for a particularly lengthy period by the court dealing with the case may be regarded as a denial of justice; the remedy used by the applicant may thus become deprived of all effectiveness where the court concerned does not manage to settle the dispute in good time, as required by the circumstances of the case and what is at stake ( Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 60). ▪ by issues relating to jurisdiction (see, for example, Arlewin v. Sweden, 2016, concerning a television programme broadcast from another European Union country) or an excessively restrictive interpretation of the scope of an association's stated aim, depriving it of its right of access to a court ( Association Burestop 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 71). Furthermore, where an action for damages is brought against it, the State has a positive obligation to facilitate the identification of the respondent authority ( Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-71). ▪ by issues of evidence, where the requirements for the burden of proof are overly rigid ( Tence v. Slovenia, 2016, §§ 35-38); concerning formalism in the presentation of evidence, see Efstratiou and Others v. Greece, 2020, §§ 44 et seq. ▪ by the existence of procedural bars preventing or limiting the possibilities of applying to a court:  a particularly strict interpretation by the domestic courts of a procedural rule (excessive formalism) may deprive applicants of their right of access to a court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 97; Pérez de Rada Cavanilles v. Spain, 1998, § 49; Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Sotiris and Nikos Koutras ATTEE v. Greece, 2000, § 20; Běleš and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 50; RTBF v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 71-72 and 74; Miessen v. Belgium, 2016, §§ 72-74; Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, § 34; and for a constitutional court, Dos Santos Calado and Others v. Portugal, 2020, §§ 118-130), bearing in mind that an unreasonable construction of a procedural requirement impairs the right to effective judicial protection ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 37). The general principles established in Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 80-99, also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the procedural rules of a court called upon to rule at first and last instance (see Makrylakis v. Greece, 2022, §§ 36, 38-50, which emphasises the specificity of a situation where the case is examined by a single court, § 49). As regards the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion after an appeal has been lodged, this raises an issue concerning the principle of legal certainty ( Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, §§ 35-45); see also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149-165).  consideration of the value of the subject matter of the dispute (ratione valoris admissibility threshold) in order to determine the jurisdiction of a higher court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], § 73, §§ 85-86);  the requirements linked to execution of an earlier ruling may impair the right of access to a court, for instance where the applicant's lack of funds makes it impossible for him even to begin to comply with the earlier judgment ( Annoni di Gussola and Others v. France, 2000, § 56; compare with Arvanitakis v. France (dec.), 2000);  procedural rules barring certain subjects of law from taking court proceedings ( The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 1994, § 83; Philis v. Greece (no. 1), 1991, § 65; Lupaş and Others v. Romania, 2006, §§ 64-67; and, regarding adults lacking capacity, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012, §§ 241-45; Nataliya Mikhaylenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 40; Nikolyan v. Armenia, 2019; and compare with R.P. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ by the limits of the judicial review available, for example where a complaint to the administrative courts against a presidential decree could only give rise to a review of compliance with external formalities in the adoption of the decree, whereas the applicant's complaint called for an examination of the merits and of the internal legality of the decree ( Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 153-154, concerning the premature removal of a prosecutor), and a fortiori by the unavailability of a judicial review (see Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, §§ 76-77, concerning the automatic temporary suspension of a judge pending the examination of her appeal against a decision to remove her from office). In the context of family-law disputes, in Plazzi v. Switzerland (§§ 44-67) and Roth v. Switzerland, 2022, (§ 77), concerning the cancellation without judicial review of the suspensive effect of appeals by fathers, thereby enabling their children to leave the country with their mothers and removing the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, the Court found a violation, emphasising that the urgency invoked had not been serious enough to justify preventing the fathers from applying to a court before the cancellation of suspensive effect became applicable (see Plazzi v. Switzerland, 2022, §§ 58-59, and the special nature of proceedings under family law). ▪ In Xavier Lucas v. France, 2022, by giving precedence to the rule that applications to the Court of Appeal had to be made electronically (e-justice), while disregarding the practical hurdles faced by the applicant in doing so, the Court of Cassation had adopted a formalistic approach which was not necessary to ensure legal certainty or the proper administration of justice and which was therefore ""excessive"" (§ 57).","In the specific circumstances of a case, the practical and effective nature of the right of access to a court may be impaired, for instance: ▪ by the prohibitive cost of the proceedings in view of the individual's financial capacity:  the excessive amount of security for costs in the context of an application to join criminal proceedings as a civil party ( Aït-Mouhoub v. France, 1998, §§ 57-58; García Manibardo v. Spain, 2000, §§ 38-45);  excessive court fees ( Kreuz v. Poland, 2001, §§ 60-67; Podbielski and PPU Polpure v. Poland, 2005, §§ 65-66; Weissman and Others v. Romania, 2006, § 42; Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-70, and conversely, Reuther v. Germany (dec.), 2003). In these cases the Court considered the question of court fees that had been imposed prior to the institution of civil proceedings and had had the effect of hindering access to a court at first instance or at a subsequent stage of the proceedings for applicants who were unable to pay (contrast Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, 1995, §§ 62-67, regarding the payment of a security as a precondition for lodging an appeal). The Court has pointed out that where there is a possibility of an exemption from stamp duty for a court application following an assessment of the applicant's financial situation, the authorities must give a decision promptly ( Laçi v. Albania, 2021, §§ 53-60), and diligence is also expected of the applicant ( Elcomp sp. z o.o. v. Poland, 2021, § 41). If the State has a system for calculating court fees linked to the amount in dispute, in order to comply with Article 6 the system must be sufficiently flexible to allow for the possibility of total or partial exemption from payment or a reduction in the amount payable (see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 39 and 40, and see §§ 41-45, where the applicant company had been forced to abandon its appeal because it was unable to pay the fees imposed on it). In Stankov v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 53, the Court held that substantial court fees imposed at the end of proceedings could also amount to a restriction on the right to a court (see, more specifically, for cases concerning the excessive length of proceedings, an acquittal or unjustified pre-trial detention, §§ 59 and 62, and a claim for compensation for assault, Čolić v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 58-59); see also, regarding the refusal to reimburse legal costs, Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 68-69 and § 74; and compare with proceedings challenging the costs payable following judicial proceedings, Taratukhin v. Russia (dec.), 2020, §§ 36 et seq. For a recent summary of the case-law, see Benghezal v. France, 2022, §§ 43-45. In cases concerning court fees, regard should also be had to the litigant's conduct ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 120) or the manifest lack of any prospect of success of an action ( Marić v. Croatia (dec.), 2020, §§ 58 and 60, concerning the obligation to bear the full costs of the State's representation, and § 52, concerning the obligation for the losing party to pay litigation costs (the ""loser pays"" rule)); see also Stankiewicz v. Poland, 2006, §§ 62 et seq.; Klauz v. Croatia, 2013, §§ 77 et seq.; and Cindrić and Bešlić v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 119-123). With regard to litigation costs for proceedings that did not give rise to a decision on the merits, see Karahasanoğlu v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 136-137. Lastly, the Court has objected to the rule whereby each party has to bear its own costs regardless of the outcome of the proceedings ( Zustović v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 102-106, and see also §§ 99-100 for the State's duty to bear the cost of its errors in that context); it also examined the rule that each party was to bear its own costs without exception in Dragan Kovačević v. Croatia, 2022, §§ 67-85, and stressed the importance of giving reasons for a decision refusing to reimburse the costs incurred by the successful party (§ 83). However, the Court found no violation of Article 6 on account of a rule of domestic law which provided that costs of the litigation should be reimbursed to a party acquitted in the administrative proceedings only in cases where the relevant authorities had acted unlawfully ( Jakutavičius v. Lithuania, 2024, §§ 80 - 86). The Court noted that the applicant himself had contributed to the decision of the police to impose a sanction: although that sanction had later been annulled, the Court was unable to find that the applicant had been made to bear the mistakes of the State authorities. Thus, the fact that the applicant had to cover his own costs in the administrative-law proceedings did not violate his right of access to a court ( ibid ., §§ 84 - 85; compare with Rousounidou v. Cyprus (dec.), 2023, concerning the absence in domestic law of an arguable right to obtain reimbursement of costs incurred by a defendant acquitted in a criminal case). For the imposition of excessive court fees on a commercial company, see Nalbant and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 39. Applicants seeking exemption from court fees should act with due diligence when presenting evidence to the courts concerning their financial standing. In Centrum Handlowe Agora SP. Z O.O. v. Poland (dec.), 2024, the applicant company was required to substantiate its long-term inability to pay the court fees but failed to do so (it failed to formulate explicitly an argument relating to the seizures of its accounts). Even though the documents confirming the seizures were attached to the applicant company's application for an exemption, without any explicit argument in this regard the domestic courts could not be expected to make further inquiries in this matter: the applicant company, by not acting with due diligence, deprived the domestic courts of the opportunity to comprehensively evaluate its financial situation (§ 32).  The imposition of fines in order to prevent a build-up of cases before the courts and to ensure the proper administration of justice is not, as such, incompatible with the right of access to a court. However, the amount of such fines is an important factor to take into account ( Sace Elektrik Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş. v. Turkey, 2013, §§ 26 et seq., concerning a mandatory fine of 10% of the bid in the event of an unsuccessful attempt to challenge a public auction). ▪ by issues relating to time-limits:  the time taken to hear an appeal leading to its being declared inadmissible ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2006, § 26). For the unforeseeable application of a time-limit, see Vachik Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, 2025, § 100; with regard to a new time-limit introduced after the lodging of a complaint, in breach of the principle of legal certainty, see Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149-165. Litigants are nevertheless required to act with the requisite diligence ( Kamenova v. Bulgaria, 2018, §§ 52-55; compare Çela v. Albania, 2022, § 39).  The Court held in Ivanova and Ivashova v. Russia, 2017, that the national courts should not interpret domestic law in an inflexible manner with the effect of imposing an obligation with which litigants could not possibly comply. Requiring an appeal to be lodged within one month of the date on which the registry drew up a full copy of the court's decision-rather than the point at which the appellant actually had knowledge of the decision-amounted to making the expiry of the relevant deadline dependent on a factor entirely outside the appellant's control. The Court found that the right of appeal should have become effective from the point at which the applicant could effectively apprise herself of the full text of the decision.  limitation periods for bringing a claim (see, regarding harm to physical integrity, the case-law references cited in paragraphs 53-55 of Sanofi Pasteur v. France, 2020, including Howald Moor and Others v. Switzerland, 2014, §§ 79-80; Yagtzilar and Others v. Greece, 2001, § 27; see also the cases cited in Loste v. France, 2022, §§ 68-70). For example, the Court has found a violation of the right of access to a court in a number of cases in which the discontinuation of criminal proceedings and the resulting failure to examine a civil claim were due to a lack of diligence on the national authorities'part ( Atanasova v. Bulgaria, 2008, §§ 35-47. Compare Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC], 2024). Excessive delays in the examination of a claim may also render the right of access to a court meaningless ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013).  the granting of leave to appeal out of time and the resulting acceptance of an ordinary appeal lodged after a significant period of time, for reasons that do not appear especially convincing, may entail a breach of the principle of legal certainty and the right to a court ( Magomedov and Others v. Russia, 2017, §§ 87-89, where late appeals benefiting the competent authorities were accepted following the extension without any valid reason of the time-limit for appealing).  the length of preliminary investigations, attributable to the authorities, preventing the applicant from joining criminal proceedings as a civil party claiming damages or from making a civil compensation claim ( Petrella v. Italy, 2021, §§ 51-53 and references cited - Compare Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC], 2024, §§ 137-140).  delay by the national authorities in examining an application by the applicant (challenging the selection procedure for a post for which she had applied), with the result that the proceedings were terminated on the grounds that there was no legal interest in pursuing the application as the administrative decision at issue had expired ( Frezadou v. Greece, 2018, § 47 - compare and contrast with Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 72). More generally, in exceptional cases where proceedings are kept pending for an excessive period, this may impair the right of access to a court ( Kristiansen and Tyvik AS v. Norway, 2013, § 57). The unjustified lack of a decision for a particularly lengthy period by the court dealing with the case may be regarded as a denial of justice; the remedy used by the applicant may thus become deprived of all effectiveness where the court concerned does not manage to settle the dispute in good time, as required by the circumstances of the case and what is at stake ( Sailing Club of Chalkidiki ""I Kelyfos"" v. Greece, 2019, § 60). ▪ by issues relating to jurisdiction (see, for example, Arlewin v. Sweden, 2016, concerning a television programme broadcast from another European Union country) or an excessively restrictive interpretation of the scope of an association's stated aim, depriving it of its right of access to a court ( Association Burestop 55 and Others v. France, 2021, § 71). Furthermore, where an action for damages is brought against it, the State has a positive obligation to facilitate the identification of the respondent authority ( Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania, 2011, §§ 69-71). ▪ by issues of evidence, where the requirements for the burden of proof are overly rigid ( Tence v. Slovenia, 2016, §§ 35-38); concerning formalism in the presentation of evidence, see Efstratiou and Others v. Greece, 2020, §§ 44 et seq. ▪ by the existence of procedural bars preventing or limiting the possibilities of applying to a court:  a particularly strict interpretation by the domestic courts of a procedural rule (excessive formalism) may deprive applicants of their right of access to a court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, § 97; Pérez de Rada Cavanilles v. Spain, 1998, § 49; Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 38; Sotiris and Nikos Koutras ATTEE v. Greece, 2000, § 20; Běleš and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2002, § 50; RTBF v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 71-72 and 74; Miessen v. Belgium, 2016, §§ 72-74; Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, § 34; Vachik Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, 2025, §§ 103-104); and for a constitutional court, Dos Santos Calado and Others v. Portugal, 2020, §§ 118-130), bearing in mind that an unreasonable construction of a procedural requirement impairs the right to effective judicial protection ( Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, 2000, § 37). The general principles established in Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 80-99, also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the procedural rules of a court called upon to rule at first and last instance (see Makrylakis v. Greece, 2022, §§ 36, 38-50, which emphasises the specificity of a situation where the case is examined by a single court, § 49). As regards the retroactive application of a new admissibility criterion after an appeal has been lodged, this raises an issue concerning the principle of legal certainty ( Gil Sanjuan v. Spain, 2020, §§ 35-45); see also Çela v. Albania, 2022, §§ 34-40 and Legros and Others v. France, 2023, §§ 149-165).  consideration of the value of the subject matter of the dispute (ratione valoris admissibility threshold) in order to determine the jurisdiction of a higher court ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], § 73, §§ 85-86);  the requirements linked to execution of an earlier ruling may impair the right of access to a court, for instance where the applicant's lack of funds makes it impossible for him even to begin to comply with the earlier judgment ( Annoni di Gussola and Others v. France, 2000, § 56; compare with Arvanitakis v. France (dec.), 2000);  procedural rules barring certain subjects of law from taking court proceedings ( The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 1994, § 83; Philis v. Greece (no. 1), 1991, § 65; Lupaş and Others v. Romania, 2006, §§ 64-67; and, regarding adults lacking capacity, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], 2012, §§ 241-45; Nataliya Mikhaylenko v. Ukraine, 2013, § 40; Nikolyan v. Armenia, 2019; and compare with R.P. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ by the limits of the judicial review available, for example where a complaint to the administrative courts against a presidential decree could only give rise to a review of compliance with external formalities in the adoption of the decree, whereas the applicant's complaint called for an examination of the merits and of the internal legality of the decree ( Kövesi v. Romania, 2020, §§ 153-154, concerning the premature removal of a prosecutor), and a fortiori by the unavailability of a judicial review (see Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, §§ 76-77, concerning the automatic temporary suspension of a judge pending the examination of her appeal against a decision to remove her from office). In the context of family-law disputes, in Plazzi v. Switzerland (§§ 44-67) and Roth v. Switzerland, 2022, (§ 77), concerning the cancellation without judicial review of the suspensive effect of appeals by fathers, thereby enabling their children to leave the country with their mothers and removing the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, the Court found a violation, emphasising that the urgency invoked had not been serious enough to justify preventing the fathers from applying to a court before the cancellation of suspensive effect became applicable (see Plazzi v. Switzerland, 2022, §§ 58-59, and the special nature of proceedings under family law). ▪ In Xavier Lucas v. France, 2022, by giving precedence to the rule that applications to the Court of Appeal had to be made electronically (e-justice), while disregarding the practical hurdles faced by the applicant in doing so, the Court of Cassation had adopted a formalistic approach which was not necessary to ensure legal certainty or the proper administration of justice and which was therefore ""excessive"" (§ 57)."
96d370a07ab1,Article 6 Civil,20250626081847__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,20260217135653__guide_art_6_civil_eng.pdf,2025-06-26,2026-02-17,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/96d370a07ab1/diff_2025-06-26__2026-02-17.json,apps:15736/16,Vachik Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia,15736/16,added,"Vachik Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, no. 15736/16, 15 May 2025",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1,A right that is practical and effective,3,160,160,0.9967,"Vachik Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia , 2025",,"In examining the proportionality of a restriction of access to a civil court, the Court takes into account the procedural errors committed during the proceedings which prevented the applicant from enjoying such access, and determines whether the applicant was made to bear an excessive burden on account of such errors. For example, in Xavier Lucas v. France, 2022, the Court found that in view of the circumstances of the case, the applicant's lawyer could not be held accountable for the procedural error in question - the submission of an application on paper and not electronically (§§ 54-56). Reference criteria have been laid down for assessing whether it is the applicant or the competent authorities who should bear the consequences of any errors ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 90-95, § 119). Where errors were made before the lower courts, the Court has assessed the subsequent role of the Supreme Court (§§ 122-124). For example, the inadmissibility of an action may result from a series of omissions and uncertainties created by the domestic courts, for which the applicant cannot be held objectively responsible ( Makrylakis v. Greece, 2022, §§ 43-46 - see also Gogić v. Croatia, 2020, § 40).","In examining the proportionality of a restriction of access to a civil court, the Court takes into account the procedural errors committed during the proceedings which prevented the applicant from enjoying such access, and determines whether the applicant was made to bear an excessive burden on account of such errors ( Vachik Karapetyan and Others v. Armenia, 2025, § 112). For example, in Xavier Lucas v. France, 2022, the Court found that in view of the circumstances of the case, the applicant's lawyer could not be held accountable for the procedural error in question - the submission of an application on paper and not electronically (§§ 54-56). Reference criteria have been laid down for assessing whether it is the applicant or the competent authorities who should bear the consequences of any errors ( Zubac v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 90-95, § 119). Where errors were made before the lower courts, the Court has assessed the subsequent role of the Supreme Court (§§ 122-124). For example, the inadmissibility of an action may result from a series of omissions and uncertainties created by the domestic courts, for which the applicant cannot be held objectively responsible ( Makrylakis v. Greece, 2022, §§ 43-46 - see also Gogić v. Croatia, 2020, § 40)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,name:a and b v france::2023,A and B v. France,,added,"A and B v. France, 8 June 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.D.c,Ties between natural father and children,4,,362,,"A and B v. France , 2023",,,"In the context of medically assisted reproduction, the Court found no violation of Article 8 when the intended father successfully contested the recognition of his paternity of a child conceived via IVFusing gametes and an egg from donors (the second applicant), while the divorce proceedings from his spouse (the first applicant) were ongoing ( A and B v. France, 2023). The Court reiterated that the margin of appreciation was wider in matters concerning the legal status of a child than in matters concerning the relationship between parents and children, and it was a ""significant one"" in matters concerning the balancing of competing interests (§ 47). The Court found that the domestic courts gave relevant and sufficient reasons for their decisions which took into account the child's best interest (§§ 50-57)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:7246/20,A.H. and Others v. Germany,7246/20,added,"A.H. and Others v. Germany, no. 7246/20, 4 April 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,II.D.7,Gender identity,4,286,295,0.8372,"O.H. and G.H. v. Germany and A.H. and Others v. Germany , 2023",,"Under Article 8, protection is given to the personal sphere of each individual, including the right to establish details of their identity as individual human beings ( Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2002, § 90; see also Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], 2014,). For a detailed analysis of the Court's case-law on this topic, see the Case-law Guide on the Rights of LGBTIpersons .","Under Article 8, protection is given to the personal sphere of each individual, including the right ( to establish details of their identity as individual human beings Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2002, § 90; see also Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], 2014).However, the State's margin of appreciation may be wider where the complaint does not concern the entry in an official document concerning the applicant personally but rather information on a birth certificates relating to others. In this regard, the Court has held that the legal impossibility for a transgender parent's current gender to be indicated on the birth certificate of a child conceived after gender reclassification did not violate Article 8 of the Convention ( O.H. and G.H. v. Germany and A.H. and Others v. Germany, 2023). For a detailed analysis of the Court's case-law on this topic, see the Case-law Guide on the Rights of LGBTIpersons ."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:P16-2022-001,Advisory opinion on the procedural status and rights of a biological parent in proceedings for the adoption of an adult [GC],P16-2022-001,added,"Advisory opinion on the procedural status and rights of a biological parent in proceedings for the adoption of an adult [GC], request no. P16-2022-001, Supreme Court of Finland, 13 April 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.D.11,Marital and parental status,4,,314,,,,,"In the Advisory opinion on the procedural status and rights of a biological parent in proceedings for the adoption of an adult [GC], 2023, the Court reiterarted that, in the absence of any factors of dependence between the biological mother and the adopted adult or by a pecuniary or patrimonial aspect, the matter pertains to the private life of the adopter and of the adoptee (§§ 50-54). It considered that the procedure in question may be regarded as affecting a biological parent's private life, under Article 8, and consequently that parent must be given the opportunity to be heard. It went on to find, having regard to the wide margin of appreciation to which the State is entitled in the regulation of the procedure for adult adoption, that respect for Article 8 does not require that a biological parent be granted the status of a party or the right to appeal the granting of the adoption (§ 62)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:P16-2022-001,Advisory opinion on the procedural status and rights of a biological parent in proceedings for the adoption of an adult [GC],P16-2022-001,added,"Advisory opinion on the procedural status and rights of a biological parent in proceedings for the adoption of an adult [GC], request no. P16-2022-001, Supreme Court of Finland, 13 April 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.A,Definition of family life and the meaning of family,3,306,316,0.9907,,,"The notion of family life is an autonomous concept ( Marckx v. Belgium, 1979, § 31). Consequently, whether or not ""family life"" exists is essentially a qu estion of fact depending upon the real existence in practice of close personal ties ( Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 140). The Court will therefore look at de facto family ties, such as applicants living together, in the absence of any legal recognition of family life ( Johnston and Others v. Ireland, 1986, § 56). Other factors will include the length of the relationship and, in the case of couples, whether they have demonstrated their commitment to each other by having children together ( X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 36). Therefore, the notion of ""family"" in Article 8 concerns marriage -based relationships, and also other de facto ""family ties"", including between same -sex couples, where the parties are living together outside marriage or where other factors demonstrated that the relationship had sufficient constancy ( Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 140 and Oliari and Others v. Italy, 2016, § 130) 63 . ""Family life"" can extend after the age of majority on account of ""additional elements of dependence"" allowing for the existence of ""family life"" between parents and adult children (see, for instance, Belli and Arquier-Martinez v. Switzerland, 2018, § 65; Emonet and Others v. Switzerland, 2007, § 80; Bierski v. Poland, 2022, § 47; and, in the immigration context, Savran v. Denmark [GC], 2021, § 174 and the references therein).","The notion of family life is an autonomous concept ( Marckx v. Belgium, 1979, § 31). Consequently, whether or not ""family life"" exists is essentially a question of fact depending upon the real existence in practice of close personal ties ( Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 140). The Court will therefore look at de facto family ties, such as applicants living together, in the absence of any legal recognition of family life ( Johnston and Others v. Ireland, 1986, § 56). Other factors will include the length of the relationship and, in the case of couples, whether they have demonstrated their commitment to each other by having children together ( X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 36). Therefore, the notion of ""family"" in Article 8 concerns marriage -based relationships, and also other de facto ""family ties"", including between same -sex couples, where the parties are living together outside marriage or where other factors demonstrated that the relationship had sufficient constancy ( Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 140 and Oliari and Others v. Italy, 2016, § 130) . ""Family life"" can extend after the age of majority on account of ""additional elements of dependence"" allowing for the existence of ""family life"" between parents and adult children (see, for instance, Belli and Arquier-Martinez v. Switzerland, 2018, § 65; Emonet and Others v. Switzerland, 2007, § 80; Bierski v. Poland, 2022, § 47; Advisory opinion on the procedural status and rights of a biological parent in proceedings for the adoption of an adult [GC], 2023, § 50, and, in the immigration context, Savran v. Denmark [GC], 2021, § 174 and the references therein)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:22619/14,Alif Ahmadov and Others v. Azerbaijan,22619/14,added,"Alif Ahmadov and Others v. Azerbaijan, no. 22619/14, 4 May 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.C,Housing,3,457,469,0.9836,"Alif Ahmadov and Others v. Azerbaijan , 2023|Simonova v. Bulgaria , 2023",,"According to Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria, 2016, given that the right to respect for one's home under Article 8 touches u pon issues of ""central importance to the individual' s physical and moral integrity, of maintenance of relationships with others and a settled and of a secure place in the community"", the balancing exercise under that provision in cases where the interference consists of the loss of a person's only home is of a different order, with particular significance attaching to the extent of the intrusion into the personal sphere of those concerned. This can normally only be examined on a case-by-case basis. The mere possibility of obtaining judicial review of the administrative decision causing the loss of the home is thus not enough: the person concerned ""must be able to challenge that decision on the ground that it is disproportionate in view of his or her personal circumstances"" . In such proceedings, the national courts must have regard to all relevant factors and weigh the competing interests in line with the case-law principles, in which instance the margin of appreciation allowed to those courts will be a wide one and the Court will be reluctant to gainsay their assessment ( Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria, 2016, § 53 (violation); compare and contrast, Szczypiński v. Poland (dec.), 2022, §§ 66-71, where the courts did balance, on the one hand, the interest of the applicant in keeping his house and, on the other, the interests of society). Based on their decisions, the Court must be satisfied that domestic authorities assessed all the relevant circumstances and adequately addressed the applicant's arguments regarding his individual situation ( Kaminskas v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 58-65).","According to Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria, 2016, given that the right to respect for one's home under Article 8 touches upon issues of ""central importance to the individual' s physical and moral integrity, of maintenance of relationships with others and a settled and of a secure place in the community"", the balancing exercise under that provision in cases where the interference consists of the loss of a person's only home is of a different order, with particular significance attaching to the extent of the intrusion into the personal sphere of those concerned. This can normally only be examined on a case-by-case basis. The mere possibility of obtaining judicial review of the administrative decision causing the loss of the home is thus not enough: the person concerned ""must be able to challenge that decision on the ground that it is disproportionate in view of his or her personal circumstances"" . In such proceedings, the national courts must have regard to all relevant factors and weigh the competing interests in line with the case-law principles, in which instance the margin of appreciation allowed to those courts will be a wide one and the Court will be reluctant to gainsay their assessment ( Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria, 2016, § 53 (violation); see also Simonova v. Bulgaria, 2023, §§ 51-52, and Alif Ahmadov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2023, §§ 61-64, but compare and contrast, Szczypiński v. Poland (dec.), 2022, §§ 66-71, where the courts did balance, on the one hand, the interest of the applicant in keeping his house and, on the other, the interests of society). Based on their decisions, the Court must be satisfied that domestic authorities assessed all the relevant circumstances and adequately addressed the applicant's arguments regarding his individual situation ( Kaminskas v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 58-65). An attempt by the authorities at the enforcement stage to negotiate with the applicant, and/or to discuss resettlement, will not remedy the situation if the negotiations did not take place within a formal procedure entailing a comprehensive review of the proportionality of the interference in the light of the applicant's individual circumstances, and did not offer a comprehensive solution ( Simonova v. Bulgaria, 2023, § 53)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:13258/18,B.F. and Others v. Switzerland,13258/18,added,"B.F. and Others v. Switzerland, no. 13258/18, 4 July 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.D.5,Immigration and expulsion,4,,428,,"In B.F. and Others v. Switzerland , 2023",,,"In M.A. v. Denmark [GC], 2021, the Grand Chamber considered the Article 8 compatibilitiy of a three-year waiting period for applying for family reunion. It accepted that States had a wide margin of appreciation in this area. In particular, it acknowledged that resource constraints caused by an influx of asylum seekers might justify the prioritisation of Article 3 protection over and above the interests of refugees and persons in receipt of subsidiary protection to family reunification. It did not, therefore, consider that a waiting period per se offenced against Article 8 (see §§ 145-146). However, the discretion enjoyed by States in this area was not unlimited and on the facts of the case before it considered that a waiting period of three years was by any standard a long time to be separated from one's family, when (as in the applicant's case) the family member left behind remained in a country characterised by arbitrary violent attacks and ill-treatment of civilians and when insurmountable obstacles to reunification there had been recognised. This was especially so given that the actual separation period would inevitably be even longer than the waiting period. Furthermore, beyond very limited exceptions the impugned legislation had not allowed for an individualised assessment of the interest of family unity in the light of the concrete situation of the persons concerned. Nor had it provided for a review of the situation in the country of origin with a view to determining the actual prospect of return. Thus, the Court found that in the applicant's case a fair balance had not been struck between the relevant interests at stake. In B.F. and Others v. Switzerland, 2023 the four applicants had been recognised as refugees, but granted provisional admission rather than asylum, since the grounds for their refugee status arose because of their illegal exit from those countries. As a consequence, they were not entitled to family reunification: it was discretionary and subject to certain conditions being met, including their non-reliance on social assistance. Their applications for family reunification were rejected as they had not satisfied the financial independence criteria. The Court noted that the margin of apprectiation was narrower that in M.A., since there was no support in the Refugee Convention, or at national, international and European levels, for distinguishing between different types of refugee. It went on to find a violation of Article 8 in three of the four cases. These applicants had done all that could reasonably be expected of them to earn a living and to cover their and their family members'expenses, and therefore a fair balance had not been struck between the competing interests at stake. It found no violation in the case of the fourth applicant, as the Administrative Court had not overstepped its margin of appreciation in taking into account her lack of initiative in improving her financial situation."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:47196/21,C v. Italy*,47196/21,added,"C v. Italy*, no. 47196/21, 31 August 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.A,The scope of Article 8,3,4,4,1.0,,,"While Article 8 contains no explicit procedural requirements, the decision-making process involved in measures of interference must be fair and ensure due respect for the interests safeguarded by Article 8 ( Fernández Martínez v. Spain [GC], 2014, § 147). In this connection, the Court may have regard to the length of the authorities'decision-making process and any related judicial proceeding s ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, §§ 56-57).","While Article 8 contains no explicit procedural requirements, the decision-making process involved in measures of interference must be fair and ensure due respect for the interests safeguarded by Article 8 ( Fernández Martínez v. Spain [GC], 2014, § 147). In this connection, the Court may have s regard to the length of the authorities'decision-making process and any related judicial proceeding ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, §§ 56-57)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:47196/21,C v. Italy*,47196/21,added,"C v. Italy*, no. 47196/21, 31 August 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,unchanged,I.F.b,Article 6 (right to a fair trial),4,42,44,,,,"However, in some cases where family life is at stake and the applicants invoked Articles 6 and 8, the Court has decided to examine the facts solely under Article 8 (see, for instance, T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 53). According to the Court, the procedural aspect of Article 8 requires the decision-making process leading to measures of interference to be fair and to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded by the Article ( Soares de Melo v. Portugal, 2016, § 65; Santos Nunes v. Portugal, 2012, § 56; Havelka and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2007, §§ 34-35; Wallová and Walla v. the Czech Republic, 2006, § 47; Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, § 56; McMichael v. the United Kingdom, 1995, § 87; and Mehmet Ulusoy and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 109). Therefore, the Court may also have regard, under Article 8, to the form and length of the decision-making process ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 57; Macready v. the Czech Republic, 2010, § 41; and for special attention and priority treatment called for in the context of sexual abuse in order to ensure the protection of the child, see N.Ç. v. Turkey, 2021). Also, the State has to take all appropriate measures to reunite parents and children ( Santos Nunes v. Portugal, 2012, § 56).","However, in some cases where family life is at stake and the applicants invoked Articles 6 and 8, the Court has decided to examine the facts solely under Article 8 (see, for instance, T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 53). According to the Court, the procedural aspect of Article 8 requires the decision-making process leading to measures of interference to be fair and to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded by the Article ( Soares de Melo v. Portugal, 2016, § 65; Santos Nunes v. Portugal, 2012, § 56; Havelka and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2007, §§ 34-35; Wallová and Walla v. the Czech Republic, 2006, § 47; Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, § 56; McMichael v. the United Kingdom, 1995, § 87; and Mehmet Ulusoy and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 109). Therefore, the Court may also have regard, under Article 8, to the form and length of the decision-making process ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 57; Macready v. the Czech Republic, 2010, § 41; and for special attention and priority treatment called for in the context of sexual abuse in order to ensure the protection of the child, see N.Ç. v. Turkey, 2021). Also, the State has to take all appropriate measures to reunite parents and children ( Santos Nunes v. Portugal, 2012, § 56)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:47196/21,C v. Italy*,47196/21,added,"C v. Italy*, no. 47196/21, 31 August 2023",3,paragraph_text_name_match,unchanged,I.F.c,"Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion)",4,49,51,,,,"Article 8 has been interpreted and applied in the light of Article 9, for instance in the case of Abdi Ibrahim v. Norway [GC], 2021, § 142 and T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 30.","Article 8 has been interpreted and applied in the light of Article 9, for instance in the case of Abdi Ibrahim v. Norway [GC], 2021, § 142 and T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 30."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:47196/21,C v. Italy*,47196/21,added,"C v. Italy*, no. 47196/21, 31 August 2023",4,paragraph_text_name_match,unchanged,I.F.e,Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination),4,62,64,,,,"Arefusal to grant full parental and custody rights in respect of a child, based solely or decisively on considerations regarding sexual orientation, is not acceptable under the Convention ( X. v. Poland 6, 2021). Where withdrawal of parental authority had been based on a distinction essentially deriving from religious considerations, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 ( Hoffmann v. Austria, 1993, § 36, concerning the withdrawal of parental rights from the applicant after she divorced the father of their two children because she was a Jehovah's Witness; see also T.C. v. Italy, 2022, in which the Court found that an order preventing the father of a child from actively involving her in his religion (he had become a Jehovah's Witness after separating from the child's mother) did not violate Article 14 read together with Article 8 because the applicant was not treated differently from the mother on the basis of religion (§§ 40-52). In Cînța v. Romania, 2020, the domestic courts had placed restrictions on the applicant's contact-rights in respect of his daughter. The Court found a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 because the domestic courts had based their decisions on the applicant's mental disorder, without assessing the impact of the mental illness on his caring skills or the child's safety.","Arefusal to grant full parental and custody rights in respect of a child, based solely or decisively on considerations regarding sexual orientation, is not acceptable under the Convention ( X. v. Poland 6, 2021). Where withdrawal of parental authority had been based on a distinction essentially deriving from religious considerations, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 ( Hoffmann v. Austria, 1993, § 36, concerning the withdrawal of parental rights from the applicant after she divorced the father of their two children because she was a Jehovah's Witness; see also T.C. v. Italy, 2022, in which the Court found that an order preventing the father of a child from actively involving her in his religion (he had become a Jehovah's Witness after separating from the child's mother) did not violate Article 14 read together with Article 8 because the applicant was not treated differently from the mother on the basis of religion (§§ 40-52). In Cînța v. Romania, 2020, the domestic courts had placed restrictions on the applicant's contact-rights in respect of his daughter. The Court found a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 because the domestic courts had based their decisions on the applicant's mental disorder, without assessing the impact of the mental illness on his caring skills or the child's safety."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:47196/21,C v. Italy*,47196/21,added,"C v. Italy*, no. 47196/21, 31 August 2023",5,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.D.3,Legal parent-child relationship,4,,287,,,,,"In C v. Italy*, 2023, which was brought on behalf of a child born via surrogacy arrangements, the Court found a breach of the applicant's right to respect for her private life in so far as the domestic courts refused to enter, in the Italian register of births, the name of her biological father, as recorded in the applicant's foreign birth certificate. As far as the intended mother was concerned, the Court found that, since she had the right, under the domestic law, to adopt the child born via surrogacy, the refusal to enter the foreign birth certificate in the register of births did not constitute violation of the child's right to respect for her private life."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:47196/21,C v. Italy*,47196/21,added,"C v. Italy*, no. 47196/21, 31 August 2023",6,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.D.3,Legal parent-child relationship,4,274,282,0.9966,,,"Respect for private life requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as individual human beings, which includes the legal parent-child relationship ( Mennesson v. France, 2014, § 96). Therefore, Article 8 protects children born to a surrogate mother outside the member State in question, whose legal parents according to the foreign State could not register as such under domestic law (see, for a summary of the principle, for instance, D v. France, 2020, §§ 45-54). The Court does not require that States legalise surrogacy and, furthermore, States may demand proof of parentage for children born to surrogates before issuing the child's identity papers. However, the child's right to respect for his or her private life requires that domestic law provide a possibility of recognition of the legal relationship between a child born through a surrogacy arrangement abroad and the intended father, where he is the biological father ( Mennesson v. France, 2014; Labassee v. France, 2014; Foulon and Bouvet v. France, 2016).","Respect for private life requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as individual human beings, which includes the legal parent-child relationship ( Mennesson v. France, 2014, § 96). Therefore, Article 8 protects children born to a surrogate mother outside the member State in question, whose legal parents according to the foreign State could not register as such under domestic law (see, for a summary of the principle, for instance, D v. France, 2020, §§ 45-54). The Court does not require that States legalise surrogacy and, furthermore, States may demand proof of parentage for children born to surrogates before issuing the child's identity papers. However, the child's right to respect for his or her private life requires that domestic law provide a possibility of recognition of the legal relationship between a child born through a surrogacy arrangement abroad and the intended father, where he is the biological father ( Mennesson v. France, 2014; Labassee v. France, 2014; Foulon and Bouvet v. France, 2016; C v. Italy*, 2023)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:47196/21,C v. Italy*,47196/21,added,"C v. Italy*, no. 47196/21, 31 August 2023",7,paragraph_text_name_match,unchanged,III.D.d,"Parental allowances, custody/access, and contact-rights",4,359,370,,,,"In cases concerning a parent's relationship with his or her child, there is a duty to exercise exceptional diligence in view of the risk that the passage of time may result in a de facto determination of the matter ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 58). This duty, which is decisive in assessing whether a case has been heard within a reasonable time as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, also forms part of the procedural requirements implicit in Article 8 ( Ribić v. Croatia, 2015, § 92; Paparrigopoulos v. Greece, 2022, § 49). In assessing what is considered to be in the best interests of the child, the potential negative long-term consequences of losing contact with the child's parents and the positive duty to take measures to facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible have to be sufficiently weighed in the balance. It is imperative to consider the long-term effects which a permanent separation of a child from its natural mother might have ( Jansen v. Norway, 2018, § 104). As the Court pointed out in this case, the risk of abduction of the applicant's child by her father (and hence the issue of the child's protection) should not prevail over addressing sufficiently the mother's contact-rights with her child (§ 103).","In cases concerning a parent's relationship with his or her child, there is a duty to exercise exceptional diligence in view of the risk that the passage of time may result in a de facto determination of the matter ( T.C. v. Italy, 2022, § 58). This duty, which is decisive in assessing whether a case has been heard within a reasonable time as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, also forms part of the procedural requirements implicit in Article 8 ( Ribić v. Croatia, 2015, § 92; Paparrigopoulos v. Greece, 2022, § 49). In assessing what is considered to be in the best interests of the child, the potential negative long-term consequences of losing contact with the child's parents and the positive duty to take measures to facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible have to be sufficiently weighed in the balance. It is imperative to consider the long-term effects which a permanent separation of a child from its natural mother might have ( Jansen v. Norway, 2018, § 104). As the Court pointed out in this case, the risk of abduction of the applicant's child by her father (and hence the issue of the child's protection) should not prevail over addressing sufficiently the mother's contact-rights with her child (§ 103)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:46412/21,Calvi and C.G. v. Italy,46412/21,added,"Calvi and C.G. v. Italy, no. 46412/21, 6 July 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.4,Mental illness /measure of protection,4,145,151,0.9756,"Calvi and C.G. v. Italy , 2023",,"In cases where legal incapacity is imposed on mentally ill individuals, the Court has articulated procedural requirements necessary to protect Article 8 rights. The Court often addresses these Article 8 violations in conjunction with Articles 5 and 6. The Court emphasises the quality of the decision-making procedure ( Salontaji-Drobnjak v. Serbia, 2009, §§ 144-145). The Court has held that the deprivation of legal capacity undeniably constitutes a serious interference with the right to respect for a person's private life protected under Article 8. In A.N. v. Lithuania, 2016, the Court considered a domestic court decision depriving an applicant of his capacity to act independently in almost all areas of his life. At the relevant time he was no longer able to sell or buy any property on his own, work, choose a place of residence, marry, or bring a court action in Lithuania. The Court found that this amounted to an interference with his right to respect for his private life (§ 111). Interestingly, in M.K. v. Luxembourg, 2021, the Court considered the placing of an elderly person under protective supervision, not because of a mental illness, but rather on account of her extravagant spending. The Court found that the interference had remained within the margin of appreciation afforded to the judicial authorities. In particular, it noted that they had endeavoured to strike a balance between respect for the applicant's dignity and self-determination and the need to protect her and safeguard her interests in the face of her vulnerability (§§ 64-67).","In cases where legal incapacity is imposed on mentally ill individuals, the Court has articulated procedural requirements necessary to protect Article 8 rights. The Court often addresses these Article 8 violations in conjunction with Articles 5 and 6. The Court emphasises the quality of the decision-making procedure ( Salontaji-Drobnjak v. Serbia, 2009, §§ 144-145). The Court has held that the deprivation of legal capacity undeniably constitutes a serious interference with the right to respect for a person's private life protected under Article 8. In A.N. v. Lithuania, 2016, the Court considered a domestic court decision depriving an applicant of his capacity to act independently in almost all areas of his life. At the relevant time he was no longer able to sell or buy any property on his own, work, choose a place of residence, marry, or bring a court action in Lithuania. The Court found that this amounted to an interference with his right to respect for his private life (§ 111). Interestingly, in M.K. v. Luxembourg, 2021, the Court considered the placing of an elderly person under protective supervision, not because of a mental illness, but rather on account of her extravagant spending. The Court found that the interference had remained within the margin of appreciation afforded to the judicial authorities. In particular, it noted that they had endeavoured to strike a balance between respect for the applicant's dignity and self-determination and the need to protect her and safeguard her interests in the face of her vulnerability (§§ 64-67). Likewise, in Calvi and C.G. v. Italy, 2023, the Court considered the placing of an elderly person under supervision in a ""medicalised"" nursing home, not because of his health, but because of excessive profligacy and weakening of his physical and psychical condition. It found a violation of Article 8 on the ground that, while the measure was aimed at protecting the applicant's well-being, it was neither proportionate nor adapted to his individual situation, bearing in mind the choice of measures at the authorities'disposal (§§ 90 and 108)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:46412/21,Calvi and C.G. v. Italy,46412/21,added,"Calvi and C.G. v. Italy, no. 46412/21, 6 July 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.7,Disability issues,4,,172,,"In Calvi and C.G. v. Italy , 2023",,,"In Calvi and C.G. v. Italy, 2023, the Court examined a measure recognising the partial legal incapacity of an elderly person and his placement in a ""medicalised"" nursing home in social isolation for three years, and reiterated that States are required to promote the participation of disabled or ""dependent"" elderly people in the life of the community and to prevent their isolation or segregation (§ 107)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:44033/17,D.H. and Others v. North Macedonia,44033/17,added,"D.H. and Others v. North Macedonia, no. 44033/17, 18 July 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.3,Forced medical treatment and compulsory medical procedures,4,140,145,0.9124,"D.H. and Others v. North Macedonia , 2023|In D.H. and Others v. North Macedonia , 2023",,"In the context of taking evidence in criminal proceedings, the taking of a blood and saliva sample against a suspect's will constitutes a compulsory medical procedure which, even if it is of minor importance, must consequently be considered as an interference with his right to privacy ( Jalloh v. Germany [GC], 2006, § 70; Schmidt v. Germany (dec.), 2006). However, the Convention does not, as such, prohibit recourse to such a procedure in order to obtain evidence of a suspect's involvement in the commission of a criminal offence ( Jalloh v. Germany [GC], 2006, § 70). In Caruana v. Malta (dec.), 2018, the Court considered that the taking of a buccal swab, was not a priori prohibited in order to obtain evidence related to the commission of a crime when the subject of the test was not the offender, but a relevant witness (§ 32).","In the context of taking evidence in criminal proceedings, the taking of a blood and saliva sample against a suspect's will constitutes a compulsory medical procedure which, even if it is of minor importance, must consequently be considered as an interference with his right to privacy ( Jalloh v. Germany [GC], 2006, § 70; Schmidt v. Germany (dec.), 2006; D.H. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2023, § 49). However, the Convention does not, as such, prohibit recourse to such a procedure in order to obtain evidence of a suspect's involvement in the commission of a criminal offence ( Jalloh v. Germany [GC], 2006, § 70; D.H. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2023, § 52). In Caruana v. Malta (dec.), 2018, the Court considered that the taking of a buccal swab, was not a priori prohibited in order to obtain evidence related to the commission of a crime when the subject of the test was not the offender, but a relevant witness (§ 32). In D.H. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2023 (§§ 52-53) the Court rejected as manifestly ill-founded a complaint about the taking of blood samples of the applicants, all sex workers, on suspicion of an offence of spreading sexually transmitted diseases. It observed that the medical act in question had been ordered by a judge; had been performed by a medical doctor at a clinic; and it had never been alleged by the applicant that it had involved the excessive use of force or had been detrimental to their health."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:21768/19,Ghadamian v. Switzerland,21768/19,added,"Ghadamian v. Switzerland, no. 21768/19, 9 May 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.D.5,Immigration and expulsion,4,,427,,"Ghadamian v. Switzerland , 2023|Tanda-Muzinga v. France , 2014",,,"Another important consideration is whether family life was created at a time when the persons involved were aware that the immigration status of one of them was such that the persistence of that family life within the host State would from the outset be precarious ( Sarumi v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 1999; Shebashov v. Latvia (dec.), 2000). Where this is the case the removal of the non-national family member would be incompatible with Article 8 only in exceptional circumstances ( Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 1985, § 68; Mitchell v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 1998; Ajayi and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 1999; Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, 2006; Biao v. Denmark [GC], 2016, § 138). For instance, in Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], 2014, viewing several factors cumulatively, the Court found that the circumstances of the applicant's case were indeed exceptional. The family reunification process must also be adequately transparent and processed without undue delays ( Tanda-Muzinga v. France, 2014, § 82). The Court also found that special circumstances existed where an 83 year old applicant, who had been resident in Switzerland for 54 years, was refusesd a residence permit and his expulsion was ordered. He had a number of criminal convictions, the last 16 years of his residence were unlawful, and he was divorced from his wife. Nevertheless, those factors were not sufficient in view of the extremely long total duration of his stay in the country, his ties in that country established during his legal residence (including his children and grandchildren, who lived there), his advanced age, the uncertainty about his relations still remaining in his country of origin, the absence of serious criminal offences since 2005 and insufficient efforts by the national authorities for more than 20 years to expel him ( Ghadamian v. Switzerland, 2023, §§ 61-64)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:11519/20,Glukhin v. Russia,11519/20,added,"Glukhin v. Russia, no. 11519/20, 4 July 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C,"In the case of a negative obligation, was the interference conducted “in accordance with the law”?",3,17,17,0.9507,"In Glukhin v. Russia , 2023",,"The national law must be clear, foreseeable, and adequately accessible ( Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1983, § 87; for an instruction issued by the Chief Prosecutor, see Vasil Vasilev v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 92-94; for instructions issued by the Ministry of Justice, see Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 83-99). It must be sufficiently foreseeable to enable individuals to act in accordance with the law ( Lebois v. Bulgaria, 2017, §§ 66-67 with further references therein, as regards internal orders in prison), and it must demarcate clearly the scope of discretion for public authorities. For example, as the Court articulated in the surveillance context (see the outline of the requirements in Falzarano v. Italy (dec.), 2021, §§ 27-29), the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication of the conditions and circumstances in which the authorities are empowered to resort to any measures of secret surveillance and collection of data ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, § 68). In Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, the Court found a violation of Article 8 due to the lack of clarity and precision in the domestic legal provisions that had served as the legal basis of the applicant's surveillance by her insurance company after an accident.","The national law must be clear, foreseeable, and adequately accessible ( Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1983, § 87; for an instruction issued by the Chief Prosecutor, see Vasil Vasilev v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 92-94; for instructions issued by the Ministry of Justice, see Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 83-99). It must be sufficiently foreseeable to enable individuals to act in accordance with the law ( Lebois v. Bulgaria, 2017, §§ 66-67 with further references therein, as regards internal orders in prison), and it must demarcate clearly the scope of discretion for public authorities. For example, as the Court articulated in the surveillance context (see the outline of the requirements in Falzarano v. Italy (dec.), 2021, §§ 27-29), the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication of the conditions and circumstances in which the authorities are empowered to resort to any measures of secret surveillance and collection of data ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, § 68). In Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, the Court found a violation of Article 8 due to the lack of clarity and precision in the domestic legal provisions that had served as the legal basis of the applicant's surveillance by her insurance company after an accident. In Glukhin v. Russia, 2023 (§§ 82-83), the Court expressed strong doubts that the domestic legal provisions which authorised the processing of biometric personal data, including with the aid of facial recognition technology, ""in connection with the administration of justice"" met the ""quality of law"" requirement since they were widely formulated and would appear to allow the processing of such data in connection with any type of judicial proceedings. F or the ""quality of law"" requirement to be met in the context of implementing facial recognition technology, it was essential to have detailed rules governing the scope and application of measures as well as strong safeguards against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness. The need for safeguards will be all the greater where the use of live facial recognition technology is concerned."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:11519/20,Glukhin v. Russia,11519/20,added,"Glukhin v. Russia, no. 11519/20, 4 July 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C,"In the case of a negative obligation, was the interference conducted “in accordance with the law”?",3,22,23,0.9818,"Glukhin v. Russia , 2023|Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009",,"Afinding that the measure in question was not ""in accordance with the law"" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the int erference in question pursued a ""legitimate aim"" or was ""necessary in a democratic society"" ( M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be ""in accordance with the law"", as a result of an unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 ( Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been "" neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society "" (§§ 62-63).","Afinding that the measure in question was not ""in accordance with the law"" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a ""legitimate aim"" or was ""necessary in a democratic society"" ( M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be ""in accordance with the law"", as a result of a n unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 ( Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been "" neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society "" (§§ 62-63). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be ""in accordance with the law"" was so closely linked to the ""necessary in a democratic society"" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:66015/17,Jírová and Others v. the Czech Republic,66015/17,added,"Jírová and Others v. the Czech Republic, no. 66015/17, 13 April 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.A,Definition of family life and the meaning of family,3,311,321,0.9945,,,"In spite of the absence of a biological tie and of a parental relationship legally recognised by the respondent State, the Court found that there existed family life between the foster parents who had cared for a child on a temporary basis and the child in question, on account of the close personal ties between them, the role played by the adults vis-à-vis the child, and the time spent together ( Moretti and Benedetti v. Italy, 2010, § 48; Kopf and Liberda v. Austria, 2012, § 37 - compare Jessica Marchi v. Italy, 2021, where the Court found that family life did not exist between a foster mother who had obtained pre-adoption approval and the child that had lived with her for one year in the context of a ""legal risk"" placement, §§ 49-59 and the references therein).","In spite of the absence of a biological tie and of a parental relationship legally recognised by the respondent State, the Court found that there existed family life between the foster parents who had cared for a child on a temporary basis and the child in question, on account of the close personal ties between them, the role played by the adults vis-à-vis the child, and the time spent together ( Moretti and Benedetti v. Italy, 2010, § 48; Kopf and Liberda v. Austria, 2012, § 37; Jírová and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2023, §§ 71-74 - compare Jessica Marchi v. Italy, 2021, where the Court found that family life did not exist between a foster mother who had obtained pre-adoption approval and the child that had lived with her for one year in the context of a ""legal risk"" placement, §§ 49-59 and the references therein)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:66015/17,Jírová and Others v. the Czech Republic,66015/17,added,"Jírová and Others v. the Czech Republic, no. 66015/17, 13 April 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.D.g,Foster families,4,,390,,,,,"In Jírová and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2023, the applicants are the former foster parents and their former foster child who complained about a court-ordered prohibition on contact between them brought about by the foster parents'manipulative behabviour towards the child and by their attitude which was considered as causing distress and as being detrimental to the child (§§ 126-28). The Court found that the measure had corresponded to the child's best interest and that reasons adduced by the domestic courts had been relevant and sufficient."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:36345/16,L.B. v. Hungary [GC],36345/16,added,"L.B. v. Hungary [GC], no. 36345/16, 9 March 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.D,Does the interference further a legitimate aim?,3,,29,,,,,"The publication of the applicant'sidentifying data, including his full name and home address, on a tax authority website for failing to fulfil his tax obligations was found to be in pursuit of the ""interests of ... the economic well- being of the country"" as well as ""the protection of the rights and freedoms of others"" ( L.B. v. Hungary [GC], 2023, §§ 111-13)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:36345/16,L.B. v. Hungary [GC],36345/16,added,"L.B. v. Hungary [GC], no. 36345/16, 9 March 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.D,Does the interference further a legitimate aim?,3,23,24,0.9973,,,"Article 8 § 2 enumerates the legitimate aims which may justify an infringement upon the rights protected in Article 8: ""in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others"" (see Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2021, § 272). The Court has however observed that its practice is to be quite succinct when it verifies the existence of a legitimate aim within the meaning of the second paragraphs of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention ( S.A.S. v. France [GC], 2014, § 114). It is for the respondent Government to demonstrate that the interference pursued a legitimate aim ( Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, § 194; P.T. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2020, § 29). When referring to a legitimate aim, the Government must demonstrate that, in acting to penalise an applicant, the domestic authorities had that legitimate aim in mind (see, mutatis mutandis, Kilin v. Russia, 2021, § 61).","Article 8 § 2 enumerates the legitimate aims which may justify an infringement upon the rights protected in Article 8: ""in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others"" (see Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2021, § 272). The Court has however observed that its practice is to be quite succinct when it verifies the existence of a legitimate aim within the meaning of the second paragraphs of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention ( S.A.S. v. France [GC], 2014, § 114; L.B. v. Hungary [GC], 2023, § 109). It is for the respondent Government to demonstrate that the interference pursued a legitimate aim ( Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, § 194; P.T. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2020, § 29). When referring to a legitimate aim, the Government must demonstrate that, in acting to penalise an applicant, the domestic authorities had that legitimate aim in mind (see, mutatis mutandis, Kilin v. Russia, 2021, § 61)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:36345/16,L.B. v. Hungary [GC],36345/16,added,"L.B. v. Hungary [GC], no. 36345/16, 9 March 2023",3,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.D,Does the interference further a legitimate aim?,3,30,32,0.9698,,,"It has been noted that a general measure may, in some situations, be found to be a more feasible means of achieving a legitimate aim than a provision requiring a case-by-case examination, a choice that, in principle, is left to the legislature in the Member State, subject to European supervision ( Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, §§ 108-109 with further references therein). However, the Court has indicated that such an approach cannot be sustained in cases where the interference consists in the loss of a person's only home. In such cases, the balancing exercise is of a different order, with particular significance attaching to the extent of the intrusion into the personal sphere of those concerned, and can normally only be examined on a case by case basis ( Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria, 2016, § 54).","It has been noted that a general measure may, in some situations, be found to be a more feasible means of achieving a legitimate aim than a provision requiring a case-by-case examination, a choice that, in principle, is left to the legislature in the Member State, subject to European supervision ( Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013, §§ 108-109 with further references therein; L.B. v. Hungary [GC], 2023, § 125). A State can, consistently with the Convention, adopt general measures which apply to pre-defined situations regardless of the individual facts of each case even if it might result in individual hard cases ( ibid., § 117). However, the Court has indicated that such an approach cannot be sustained in cases where the interference consists in the loss of a person's only home. In such cases, the balancing exercise is of a different order, with particular significance attaching to the extent of the intrusion into the personal sphere of those concerned, and can normally only be examined on a case by case basis ( Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria, 2016, § 54)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:36345/16,L.B. v. Hungary [GC],36345/16,added,"L.B. v. Hungary [GC], no. 36345/16, 9 March 2023",4,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.E,Is the interference “necessary in a democratic society”?,3,33,35,0.996,,,"With regard to general measures taken by the national government, it emerges from the Court's case-law that, in order to determine the proportionality of a general measure, the Court must primarily assess the legislative choices underlying it. The quality of the parliamentary and judicial review of the necessity of the measure is of particular importance in this respect, including to the operation of the relevant margin of appreciation (see M.A. v. Denmark [GC], 2021, § 148, citing Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013). The procedural safeguards available to the individual will be especially material in determining whether the respondent State has, when fixing the regulatory framework, remained within its margin of appreciation. In particular, the Court must examine whether the decision-making process leading to measures of interference was fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded to the individual by Article 8 ( A.-M.V. v. Finland, 2017, §§ 82-84).","With regard to general measures taken by the national government, it emerges from the Court's case-law that, in order to determine the proportionality of a general measure, the Court must primarily assess the legislative choices underlying it. The quality of the parliamentary and judicial review of the necessity of the measure is of particular importance in this respect, including to the operation of the relevant margin of appreciation (see M.A. v. Denmark [GC], 2021, § 148, citing Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2013; L.B. v. Hungary [GC], 2023, §§ 117 and 125). The procedural safeguards available to the individual will be especially material in determining whether the respondent State has, when fixing the regulatory framework, remained within its margin of appreciation. In particular, the Court must examine whether the decision-making process leading to measures of interference was fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded to the individual by Article 8 ( A.-M.V. v. Finland, 2017, §§ 82-84)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:36345/16,L.B. v. Hungary [GC],36345/16,added,"L.B. v. Hungary [GC], no. 36345/16, 9 March 2023",5,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.A.1,Applicability in general,4,84,87,0.9929,,,"There is a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of""private life"" (see, among other authorities, Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 62; Uzun v. Germany, 2010, § 43; Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], 2012, § 95; Altay v. Turkey (no. 2), 2019, § 49) or not ( Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], 2019, §§ 128-32). However, there is nothing in the Court's established case-law which suggests that the scope of private life extends to activities ""which are of an essentially public nature"" ( ibid., § 128; see also Centre for Democracy and the Rule of Law v. Ukraine, 2020, as concerns the disclosure of information about political leaders'education and work history, §§ 114-116). Everyone has the right to live privately, away from unwanted attention ( Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 139). The home address of a person constitutes personal information that is a matter of private life and, as such, enjoys the protection afforded in that respect by Article 8 ( Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, § 30; see also, Samoylova v. Russia, 2021, § 63).","There is a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of""private life"" (see, among other authorities, Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 62; Uzun v. Germany, 2010, § 43; Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], 2012, § 95; Altay v. Turkey (no. 2), 2019, § 49) or not ( Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], 2019, §§ 128-32). However, there is nothing in the Court's established case-law which suggests that the scope of private life extends to activities ""which are of an essentially public nature"" ( ibid., § 128; see also Centre for Democracy and the Rule of Law v. Ukraine, 2020, as concerns the disclosure of information about political leaders'education and work history, §§ 114-116). Everyone has the right to live privately, away from unwanted attention ( Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 139). The home address of a person constitutes personal information that is a matter of private life and, as such, enjoys the protection afforded in that respect by Article 8 ( Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, § 30; Samoylova v. Russia, 2021, § 63; L.B. v. Hungary [GC], 2023, § 104)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:36345/16,L.B. v. Hungary [GC],36345/16,added,"L.B. v. Hungary [GC], no. 36345/16, 9 March 2023",6,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.A.1,Applicability in general,4,97,100,0.9869,,,"Article 8 cannot be relied on in order to complain of personal, social, psychological and economic suffering which is a foreseeable consequence of one's own actions, such as the commission of a criminal offence or similar misconduct ( Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, § 98 and § 121 referring to the'Gillberg exclusionary principle ' ; Evers v. Germany, 2020, § 55; M.L. v. Slovakia, 2021, § 38; see, however, Gražulevičiūtė v. Lithuania, 2021, in which the applicant denied any misconduct and the Court therefore declined to apply the ""exclusionary principle"" (§ 102)). In sum, when the negative effects complained of are limited to the consequences of the unlawful conduct which were foreseeable by the applicant, Article 8 cannot be relied upon to allege that such negative effects encroach upon private life (compare, Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, § 54).","Article 8 cannot be relied on in order to complain of personal, social, psychological and economic suffering which is a foreseeable consequence of one's own actions, such as the commission of a criminal offence or similar misconduct ( Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, § 98 and § 121 referring to the'Gillberg exclusionary principle ' ; Evers v. Germany, 2020, § 55; M.L. v. Slovakia, 2021, § 38; L.B. v. Hungary [GC], 2023, § 102; see, however, Gražulevičiūtė v. Lithuania, 2021, in which the applicant denied any miscond uct and the Court therefore declined to apply the ""exclusionary principle"" (§ 102)). In sum, when the negative effects complained of are limited to the consequences of the unlawful conduct which were foreseeable by the applicant, Article 8 cannot be relied upon to allege that such negative effects encroach upon private life (compare, Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, § 54)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:14709/07,Mayboroda v. Ukraine,14709/07,added,"Mayboroda v. Ukraine, no. 14709/07, 13 April 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.3,Forced medical treatment and compulsory medical procedures,4,,143,,"Mayboroda v. Ukraine , 2023|Reyes Jimenez v. Spain , 2022",,,"While the Convention does not establish any particular form of consent, where domestic law lays down certain express requirements, they should be complied with in order for the interference to be considered prescribed by law (see, Reyes Jimenez v. Spain, 2022, in which the applicants had given verbal consent to a procedure but the law required written consent). More generally, the setting up of some standard guidelines and formalised procedures - either at the national or the local institutional level, detailing key elements of the right to informed consent such as ""the risks"" to be discussed with patients and the scope of the practitioners'duty to contact their relatives or designated persons - is instrumental in discharging the respondent State's positive duty to set up an appropriate regulatory framework and ensure high professional standards in this area ( Mayboroda v. Ukraine, 2023, § 62). The absence of such specific regulatory instruments, which would have elaborated on key aspects of the right to informed consent, was found to be in breach of the State's relevant obligation under Article 8 ( ibid., § 64)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:14709/07,Mayboroda v. Ukraine,14709/07,added,"Mayboroda v. Ukraine, no. 14709/07, 13 April 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.3,Forced medical treatment and compulsory medical procedures,4,136,139,0.9787,"Mayboroda v. Ukraine , 2023",,"The Court has also addressed the implications of Article 8 for other cases involving forced medical treatment or medical injury (in addition to sterilisations). On some occasions, the Convention organs have found that relatively minor medical tests, which are compulsory ( Acmanne and Others v. Belgium, Commission decision, 1984; Boffa and Others v. San Marino, Commission decision, 1998; Salvetti v. Italy (dec.), 2000) or authorised by court order ( X v. Austria, Commission decision, 1979; Peters v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1994), may constitute a proportionate interference with Article 8 even without the consent of the patient. In Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2021, concerning a fine of a parent and the exclusion of children from preschool for their refusal to comply with a statutory child vaccination duty, the Court found an'interference'with the right to respect for "" private life "" of both the children and the parents (§§ 263-264).","The Court has also addressed the implications of Article 8 for other cases involving forced medical treatment or medical injury (in addition to sterilisations). On some occasions, the Convention organs have found that relatively minor medical tests, which are compulsory ( Acmanne and Others v. Belgium, Commission decision, 1984; Boffa and Others v. San Marino, Commission decision, 1998; Salvetti v. Italy (dec.), 2000) or authorised by court order ( X v. Austria, Commission decision, 1979; Peters v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1994), may constitute a proportionate interference with Article 8 even without the consent of the patient. In Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2021, concerning a fine of a parent and the exclusion of children from preschool for their refusal to comply with a statutory child vaccination duty, the Court found an'interference'with the right to respect for "" private life "" of both the children and the parents (§§ 263-264). Moreover, emergency medical interventions on life-saving grounds performed in the absence of the patients'consent are not, as such, incompatible with the Convention ( Mayboroda v. Ukraine, 2023, § 55)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:14709/07,Mayboroda v. Ukraine,14709/07,added,"Mayboroda v. Ukraine, no. 14709/07, 13 April 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.4,Mental illness /measure of protection,4,149,155,0.9971,"Mayboroda v. Ukraine , 2023",,"The Court's task is to verify the effectiveness of the remedies used by the applicants and thus to determine whether the judicial system ensured the proper implementation of the legislative and statutory framework designed to protect patients'physical integrity ( İbrahim Keskin v. Turkey, 2018, § 68 and Mehmet Ulusoy and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 90). In all cases, the system put in place to determine the cause of the violation of the integrity of the person under the responsibility of health professionals must be independent. This presupposes not only a lack of a hierarchical or institutional link, but also the formal as well as the concrete independence of all the parties responsible for assessing the facts in the context of the procedure to establish the cause of the impugned infringement ( Mehmet Ulusoy and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 93). There is a requirement of promptness and reasonable diligence in the context of medical negligence ( Vilela v. Portugal, 2021, §§ 87-88; Eryiğit v. Turkey, 2018, § 49). For example, proceedings lasting almost seven years are incompatible with Article 8 ( İbrahim Keskin v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 69-70). For a case concerning the information and consent before a surgical operation, see Reyes Jimenez v. Spain, 2022.","The Court's task is to verify the effectiveness of the remedies used by the applicants and thus to determine whether the judicial system ensured the proper implementation of the legislative and statutory framework designed to protect patients'physical integrity ( İbrahim Keskin v. Turkey, 2018, § 68 and Mehmet Ulusoy and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 90). In all cases, the system put in place to determine the cause of the violation of the integrity of the person under the responsibility of health professionals must be independent. This presupposes not only a lack of a hierarchical or institutional link, but also the formal as well as the concrete independence of all the parties responsible for assessing the facts in the context of the procedure to establish the cause of the impugned infringement ( Mehmet Ulusoy and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 93). There is a requirement of promptness and reasonable diligence in the context of medical negligence ( Vilela v. Portugal, 2021, §§ 87-88; Eryiğit v. Turkey, 2018, § 49). For example, proceedings lasting almost seven years are incompatible with Article 8 ( İbrahim Keskin v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 69-70). For the information and consent before a surgical operation, see Reyes Jimenez v. Spain, 2022; Mayboroda v. Ukraine, 2023."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:39954/09|3465/17,Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia,39954/09|3465/17,added,"Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, nos. 39954/09 and 3465/17, 30 May 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.F.e,Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination),4,57,59,0.9727,"In Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia , 2023",,"In Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, the applicants, two young men, posted a photograph of themselves kissing on a public Facebook page. This online post received hundreds of virulently homophobic comments. Although the applicants requested it, the prosecutors and domestic courts refused to prosecute, finding that the applicants'behaviour had been ""eccentric"" and did not correspond to ""traditional family values"" in the country. The Court stated that the hateful comments against the applicants and the homosexual community in general were instigated by a bigoted attitude towards that community and that the very same discriminatory state of mind was at the core of the failure on the part of the relevant public authorities to discharge their positive obligation to investigate in an effective manner whether those comments constituted incitement to hatred and violence. The Court concluded that the applicants had suffered discrimination on the ground of their sexual orientation (§§ 106-116, § 129). In Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021, the Court reiterated the obligation on the authorities'part to offer adequate protection in respect of the applicants'dignity (§ 127). As a matter of principle, in Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, the Court recalled the authorities'duty to prevent hate-motivated violence on the part of private individuals as well as to investigate the existence of a possible link between a discriminatory motive and the act of violence (whether physical or verbal) could constitute positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 and could also be seen to as part of the authorities'positive responsibilities under Article 14 of the Convention to secure the fundamental values protected by Articles 3 and 8 without discrimination.","In Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, the applicants, two young men, posted a photograph of themselves kissing on a public Facebook page. This online post received hundreds of virulently homophobic comments. Although the applicants requested it, the prosecutors and domestic courts refused to prosecute, finding that the applicants'behaviour had been ""eccentric"" and did not correspond to ""traditional family values"" in the country. The Court stated that the hateful comments against the applicants and the homosexual community in general were instigated by a bigoted attitude towards that community and that the very same discriminatory state of mind was at the core of the failure on the part of the relevant public authorities to discharge their positive obligation to investigate in an effective manner whether those comments constituted incitement to hatred and violence. The Court concluded that the applicants had suffered discrimination on the ground of their sexual orientation (§§ 106-116, § 129). In Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021, the Court reiterated the obligation on the authorities'part to offer adequate protection in respect of the applicants'dignity (§ 127). As a matter of principle, in Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, the Court recalled the authorities'duty to prevent hate-motivated violence on the part of private individuals as well as to investigate the existence of a possible link between a discriminatory motive and the act of violence (whether physical or verbal) could constitute positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 and could also be seen to as part of the authorities'positive responsibilities under Article 14 of the Convention to secure the fundamental values protected by Articles 3 and 8 without discrimination. In Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023, the applicants, members of the LGBTIcommunity, complained about negative public statements made by public officials about the LGBTIcommunity. The Court found that the applicants may claim to be victims despite the fact that they had not been directly targeted by the contested statements (§ 57). Bearing in mind the history of public hostility towards the LGBTIcommunity in Russia and the increase in homophobic hate crimes, including violent crimes, at the material time, the openly homophobic content and particularly aggressive and hostile tone of the statements, as well as the fact that they were made by influential public figures holding official posts and were published in popular newspapers with a large readership, the Court considered that the contested statements reached the ""threshold of severity"" required to be considered to affect the ""private life"" of members of the group (§§ 59 -62)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:39954/09|3465/17,Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia,39954/09|3465/17,added,"Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, nos. 39954/09 and 3465/17, 30 May 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1,Applicability in general,4,87,90,0.9977,"Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia , 2023",,"The applicability of Article 8 has been determined, in some contexts, by a severity test: see, for example, the relevant case-law on environmental issues ; an attack on a person's reputation, dismissal, demotion, non-admission to a profession or other similarly unfavourable measures, in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, §§ 111-112 and 115-117, with further references therein (see also, by way of examples, Polyakh and Others v. Ukraine, 2019, §§ 207-211; Vučina v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, §§ 44-50; Convertito and Others v. Romania, 2020; Platini v. Switzerland (dec.), 2020; M.L. v. Slovakia, 2021, § 24; Budimir v. Croatia, 2021, § 47); acts or measures of a private individual which adversely affect the physical and psychological integrity of another ( Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], 2019, § 128, in relation to a road-traffic accident; C. v. Romania, 2022, with regard to sexual harassment, §§ 50-54); and individual psychological well-being and dignity in Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 109 and 117 (see in some other fields, for instance, S.-H. v. Poland (dec.), 2021). Not every act or measure which may be said to affect adversely the moral integrity of a person necessarily gives rise to such an interference. However, once a measure is found to have seriously affected the applicant's private life, the complaint will be compatible ratione materiae with the Convention and an issue of the ""right to respect for private life"" will arise. In this regard, the question of applicability and the existence of interference with the right to respect for private life are often inextricably linked ( Vučina v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, § 32).","The applicability of Article 8 has been determined, in some contexts, by a severity test: see, for example, the relevant case-law on environmental issues ; an attack on a person's reputation, dismissal, demotion, non-admission to a profession or other similarly unfavourable measures, in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, §§ 111-112 and 115-117, with further references therein (see also, by way of examples, Polyakh and Others v. Ukraine, 2019, §§ 207-211; Vučina v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, §§ 44-50; Convertito and Others v. Romania, 2020; Platini v. Switzerland (dec.), 2020; M.L. v. Slovakia, 2021, § 24; Budimir v. Croatia, 2021, § 47); acts or measures of a private individual which adversely affect the physical and psychological integrity of another ( Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], 2019, § 128, in relation to a road-traffic accident; C. v. Romania, 2022, with regard to sexual harassment, §§ 50-54); and individual psychological well-being and dignity in Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 109 and 117; Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 59-62 22 (see in some other fields, for instance, S.-H. v. Poland (dec.), 2021). Not every act or measure which may be said to affect adversely the moral integrity of a person necessarily gives rise to such an interference. However, once a measure is found to have seriously affected the applicant's private life, the complaint will be compatible ratione materiae with the Convention and an issue of the ""right to respect for private life"" will arise. In this regard, the question of applicability and the existence of interference with the right to respect for private life are often inextricably linked ( Vučina v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, § 32)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:53568/18|54741/18,O.H. and G.H. v. Germany,53568/18|54741/18,added,"O.H. and G.H. v. Germany, nos. 53568/18 54741/18, 4 April 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,II.D.7,Gender identity,4,286,295,0.8372,"O.H. and G.H. v. Germany and A.H. and Others v. Germany , 2023",,"Under Article 8, protection is given to the personal sphere of each individual, including the right to establish details of their identity as individual human beings ( Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2002, § 90; see also Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], 2014,). For a detailed analysis of the Court's case-law on this topic, see the Case-law Guide on the Rights of LGBTIpersons .","Under Article 8, protection is given to the personal sphere of each individual, including the right ( to establish details of their identity as individual human beings Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2002, § 90; see also Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], 2014).However, the State's margin of appreciation may be wider where the complaint does not concern the entry in an official document concerning the applicant personally but rather information on a birth certificates relating to others. In this regard, the Court has held that the legal impossibility for a transgender parent's current gender to be indicated on the birth certificate of a child conceived after gender reclassification did not violate Article 8 of the Convention ( O.H. and G.H. v. Germany and A.H. and Others v. Germany, 2023). For a detailed analysis of the Court's case-law on this topic, see the Case-law Guide on the Rights of LGBTIpersons ."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:10934/21,Semenya v. Switzerland*,10934/21,added,"Semenya v. Switzerland*, no. 10934/21, 11 July 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.F.e,Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination),4,,70,,"Denisov v. Ukraine , 2018",,,"In Semenya v. Switzerland*, 2023, §§ 123-25,the Court found a violation of Article 8 taken in conjunction with Article 14 where the applicant, a professional female athlete, was forced to take hormonal treatment to lower her natural testosterone level in order to be allowed to compete in the women's category in international sport competitions. The Court found that her sexual characteristics (the elevated natural testosterone level) and the forced hormonal treatment imposed on her by World Athletics fell within the ambit of Article 8 (private life) and that her professional activity was also covered by Article 8 under both the ""reason - based approach"" and the ""consequence - based approach"" developed in Denisov v. Ukraine, 2018 ."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:10934/21,Semenya v. Switzerland*,10934/21,added,"Semenya v. Switzerland*, no. 10934/21, 11 July 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.3,Forced medical treatment and compulsory medical procedures,4,,147,,,,,"In Semenya v. Switzerland*, 2023, the Court found that forcing the applicant, a professional female athlete, to take hormonal treatment to lower her natural testosterone level in order to be allowed to compete in the women's category in international sport competitions, pertained to the applicant's personal autonomy and thus fell within the ambit of Article 8 which it found to be applicable in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention ."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:30782/16,Simonova v. Bulgaria,30782/16,added,"Simonova v. Bulgaria, no. 30782/16, 11 April 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.C,Housing,3,457,469,0.9836,"Alif Ahmadov and Others v. Azerbaijan , 2023|Simonova v. Bulgaria , 2023",,"According to Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria, 2016, given that the right to respect for one's home under Article 8 touches u pon issues of ""central importance to the individual' s physical and moral integrity, of maintenance of relationships with others and a settled and of a secure place in the community"", the balancing exercise under that provision in cases where the interference consists of the loss of a person's only home is of a different order, with particular significance attaching to the extent of the intrusion into the personal sphere of those concerned. This can normally only be examined on a case-by-case basis. The mere possibility of obtaining judicial review of the administrative decision causing the loss of the home is thus not enough: the person concerned ""must be able to challenge that decision on the ground that it is disproportionate in view of his or her personal circumstances"" . In such proceedings, the national courts must have regard to all relevant factors and weigh the competing interests in line with the case-law principles, in which instance the margin of appreciation allowed to those courts will be a wide one and the Court will be reluctant to gainsay their assessment ( Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria, 2016, § 53 (violation); compare and contrast, Szczypiński v. Poland (dec.), 2022, §§ 66-71, where the courts did balance, on the one hand, the interest of the applicant in keeping his house and, on the other, the interests of society). Based on their decisions, the Court must be satisfied that domestic authorities assessed all the relevant circumstances and adequately addressed the applicant's arguments regarding his individual situation ( Kaminskas v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 58-65).","According to Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria, 2016, given that the right to respect for one's home under Article 8 touches upon issues of ""central importance to the individual' s physical and moral integrity, of maintenance of relationships with others and a settled and of a secure place in the community"", the balancing exercise under that provision in cases where the interference consists of the loss of a person's only home is of a different order, with particular significance attaching to the extent of the intrusion into the personal sphere of those concerned. This can normally only be examined on a case-by-case basis. The mere possibility of obtaining judicial review of the administrative decision causing the loss of the home is thus not enough: the person concerned ""must be able to challenge that decision on the ground that it is disproportionate in view of his or her personal circumstances"" . In such proceedings, the national courts must have regard to all relevant factors and weigh the competing interests in line with the case-law principles, in which instance the margin of appreciation allowed to those courts will be a wide one and the Court will be reluctant to gainsay their assessment ( Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria, 2016, § 53 (violation); see also Simonova v. Bulgaria, 2023, §§ 51-52, and Alif Ahmadov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2023, §§ 61-64, but compare and contrast, Szczypiński v. Poland (dec.), 2022, §§ 66-71, where the courts did balance, on the one hand, the interest of the applicant in keeping his house and, on the other, the interests of society). Based on their decisions, the Court must be satisfied that domestic authorities assessed all the relevant circumstances and adequately addressed the applicant's arguments regarding his individual situation ( Kaminskas v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 58-65). An attempt by the authorities at the enforcement stage to negotiate with the applicant, and/or to discuss resettlement, will not remedy the situation if the negotiations did not take place within a formal procedure entailing a comprehensive review of the proportionality of the interference in the light of the applicant's individual circumstances, and did not offer a comprehensive solution ( Simonova v. Bulgaria, 2023, § 53)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:19162/19,UAB Kesko Senukai Lithuania v. Lithuania,19162/19,added,"UAB Kesko Senukai Lithuania v. Lithuania, no. 19162/19, 4 April 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,IV.D,Commercial premises,3,498,510,0.8171,"UAB Kesko Senukai Lithuania v. Lithuania , 2023",,"House searches or visits to and seizures on business premises may comply with the requirements of Article 8 ( Keslassy v. France (dec.), 2002; Société Canal Plus and Others v. France, 2010, §§ 55-57). Such measures are disproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued and therefore contrary to the rights protected by Article 8, where there are no ""relevant and sufficient"" reasons to justify them and no appropriate and sufficient safeguards against abuse ( Posevini v. Bulgaria, 2017, §§ 65-73 with further references therein; Société Colas Est and Others v. France, 2002, §§ 48-49).","House searches or visits to and seizures on business premises may comply with the requirements of Article 8 ( Keslassy v. France (dec.), 2002; Société Canal Plus and Others v. France, 2010, §§ 55-57). Such measures are disproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued and therefore contrary to the rights protected by Article 8, where there are no ""relevant and sufficient"" reasons to justify them and no appropriate and sufficient safeguards against abuse ( Posevini v. Bulgaria, 2017, §§ 65-73 with further references therein; Société Colas Est and Others v. France, 2002, §§ 48-49). The Court found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention where the administrative court refused to examine the applicant company's complaint that the Competition Council had seized or copied a large number of physical and electronic documents, and restricted the rights of its employees during the inspection, on the ground that the impugned decision had not led to any legal consequences for the applicant company ( UAB Kesko Senukai Lithuania v. Lithuania, 2023, §§ 116-127)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20230923050459__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:23851/20|24360/20,X and others v. Ireland,23851/20|24360/20,added,"X and others v. Ireland, nos. 23851/20 and 24360/20, 22 June 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.D.6,Material interests,4,426,438,0.9981,"X and others v. Ireland, 2023",,"Complaints concerning social welfare benefits may fall within the ambit of family life for the purposes of Article 8 if the subject matter of the alleged disadvantage constitutes one of the modalities of exercising the right to respect for family life, in the sense that the measures seek to promote family life and necessarily affect the way in which it is organised. Arange of factors are relevant for determining the nature of the benefit in question and they should be examined as a whole. These will include, in particular: the aim of the benefit, as determined by the Court in the light of the legislation concerned; the criteria for awarding, calculating and terminating the benefit as set forth in the relevant statutory provisions; the effects on the way in which family life is organised, as envisaged by the legislation; and the practical repercussions of the benefit, given the applicant's individual circumstances and family life throughout the period during which the benefit is paid ( Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022, § 72; Berisha v. Switzerland (dec.), 2023, §§ 39-45). Diffifculties of a purely financial nature are not encompassed in the right to respect for private life ( ibid., (dec.), 2023, §§ 46-49).","Complaints concerning social welfare benefits may fall within the ambit of family life for the purposes of Article 8 if the subject matter of the alleged disadvantage constitutes one of the modalities of exercising the right to respect for family life, in the sense that the measures seek to promote family life and necessarily affect the way in which it is organised. Arange of factors are relevant for determining the nature of the benefit in question and they should be examined as a whole. These will include, in particular: the aim of the benefit, as determined by the Court in the light of the legislation concerned; the criteria for awarding, calculating and terminating the benefit as set forth in the relevant statutory provisions; the effects on the way in which family life is organised, as envisaged by the legislation; and the practical repercussions of the benefit, given the applicant's individual circumstances and family life throughout the period during which the benefit is paid ( Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022, § 72; Berisha v. Switzerland (dec.), 2023, §§ 39-45; X and others v. Ireland, 2023, §§ 73-75). Diffifculties of a purely financial nature are not encompassed in the right to respect for private life ( ibid., (dec.), 2023, §§ 46-49)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:56578/11,A.A.K. v. Türkiye,56578/11,added,"A.A.K. v. Türkiye, no. 56578/11, 3 October 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,II.B.4,Mental illness /measure of protection,4,151,155,0.9641,,"Salontaji-Drobnjak v. Serbia , 2009","In cases where legal incapacity is imposed on mentally ill individuals, the Court has articulated procedural requirements necessary to protect Article 8 rights. The Court often addresses these Article 8 violations in conjunction with Articles 5 and 6. The Court emphasises the quality of the decision-making procedure ( Salontaji-Drobnjak v. Serbia, 2009, §§ 144-145). The Court has held that the deprivation of legal capacity undeniably constitutes a serious interference with the right to respect for a person's private life protected under Article 8. In A.N. v. Lithuania, 2016, the Court considered a domestic court decision depriving an applicant of his capacity to act independently in almost all areas of his life. At the relevant time he was no longer able to sell or buy any property on his own, work, choose a place of residence, marry, or bring a court action in Lithuania. The Court found that this amounted to an interference with his right to respect for his private life (§ 111). Interestingly, in M.K. v. Luxembourg, 2021, the Court considered the placing of an elderly person under protective supervision, not because of a mental illness, but rather on account of her extravagant spending. The Court found that the interference had remained within the margin of appreciation afforded to the judicial authorities. In particular, it noted that they had endeavoured to strike a balance between respect for the applicant's dignity and self-determination and the need to protect her and safeguard her interests in the face of her vulnerability (§§ 64-67). Likewise, in Calvi and C.G. v. Italy, 2023, the Court considered the placing of an elderly person under supervision in a ""medicalised"" nursing home, not because of his health, but because of excessive profligacy and weakening of his physical and psychical condition. It found a violation of Article 8 on the ground that, while the measure was aimed at protecting the applicant's well-being, it was neither proportionate nor adapted to his individual situation, bearing in mind the choice of measures at the authorities'disposal (§§ 90 and 108).","In cases where legal incapacity is imposed on mentally ill individuals, the Court has articulated procedural requirements necessary to protect Article 8 rights. The Court often addresses these Article 8 violations in conjunction with Articles 5 and 6. The Court emphasises the quality of the Salontaji-Drobnjak v. Serbia decision-making procedure (, 2009, §§ 144-145). The Court has held that the deprivation of legal capacity undeniably constitutes a serious interference with the right to respect for a person's private life protected under Article 8. In A.N. v. Lithuania, 2016, the Court considered a domestic court decision depriving an applicant of his capacity to act independently in almost all areas of his life. At the relevant time he was no longer able to sell or buy any property on his own, work, choose a place of residence, marry, or bring a court action in Lithuania. The Court found that this amounted to an interference with his right to respect for his private life (§ 111). However, in A.A.K. v. Türkiye (2023) the Court found no violation of Article 8. Emphasising the need for the domestic authorities to strike a balance between respect for the dignity and self-determination of the individual and the need to protect and safeguard the interests of vulnerable individuals, on the facts it considered that a fair balance had been struck. There were effective safeguards in the domestic procedure to prevent abuse by ensuring that the applicant's rights and interests were taken into account, and the applicant was involved at all stages of the proceedings, was heard in person and was able to present her arguments. The interference was a matter for competent and impartial domestic courts, and the measure they took was consistent with the legitimate objective of protecting the applicant's property interests and her well-being. Having regard to the fact that the measure was limited in time and purpose, and remedies were available under domestic law to have it lifted, there was nothing to suggest that it was disproportionate and/or unsuitable for the applicant's situation (§ 86). Interestingly, in M.K. v. Luxembourg, 2021, the Court considered the placing of an elderly person under protective supervision, not because of a mental illness, but rather on account of her extravagant spending. The Court found that the interference had remained within the margin of appreciation afforded to the judicial authorities. In particular, it noted that they had endeavoured to strike a balance between respect for the applicant's dignity and self-determination and the need to protect her and safeguard her interests in the face of her vulnerability (§§ 64-67). Likewise, in Calvi and C.G. v. Italy, 2023, the Court considered the placing of an elderly person under supervision in a ""medicalised"" nursing home, not because of his health, but because of excessive profligacy and weakening of his physical and psychical condition. It found a violation of Article 8 on the ground that, while the measure was aimed at protecting the applicant's well-being, it was neither proportionate nor adapted to his individual situation, bearing in mind the choice of measures at the authorities' disposal (§§ 90 and 108)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:17791/22,A and Others v. Italy,17791/22,added,"A and Others v. Italy, no. 17791/22, 7 September 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.B.6,End of life issues,4,169,173,0.9977,,,"The Court found that the decision to remove children from two blind parents due to a finding of inadequate care was not justified by the circumstances and violated the parents'Article 8 right to family life ( Saviny v. Ukraine, 2008). On the other hand, the Court found no violation of Article 8 with regard to a statutory scheme developed in France to compensate parents for the costs of disabled children, even when the parents would have chosen not to have the child in the absence of a mistake by the State hospital regarding the diagnosis of a genetic defect ( Maurice v. France [GC], 2005; Draon v. France [GC], 2006). The Court also provides a wide margin for States to determine the amount of aid given to parents of disabled children ( La Parola and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2000), and has held that when a State provides adequate domestic remedies for disabilities caused by inadequate care at the birth of a child, then there is no Article 8 violation ( Spyra and Kranczkowski v. Poland, 2012, §§ 99-100).","The Court found that the decision to remove children from two blind parents due to a finding of inadequate care was not justified by the circumstances and violated the parents' Article 8 right to family life ( Saviny v. Ukraine, 2008). On the other hand, the Court found no violation of Article 8 with regard to a statutory scheme developed in France to compensate parents for the costs of disabled children, even when the parents would have chosen not to have the child in the absence of a mistake by the State hospital regarding the diagnosis of a genetic defect ( Maurice v. France [GC], 2005; Draon v. France [GC], 2006). The Court also provides a wide margin for States to determine the amount of aid given to parents of disabled children ( La Parola and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2000), and has held that when a State provides adequate domestic remedies for disabilities caused by inadequate care at the birth of a child, then there is no Article 8 violation ( Spyra and Kranczkowski v. Poland, 2012, §§ 99-100)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:17791/22,A and Others v. Italy,17791/22,added,"A and Others v. Italy, no. 17791/22, 7 September 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.B.8,Issues concerning burial and deceased persons,4,181,185,1.0,,,"Although there is no explicit right to a healthy environment under the Convention ( Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2003, § 96), the Court has decided various cases in which the quality of an individual's surrounding environment is at issue, reasoning that an individual's wellbeing may be negatively impacted by unsafe or disruptive environmental conditions ( Cordella and Others v. Italy, 2019, §§ 157-160). However, an issue under Article 8 only arises if individuals are directly and seriously affected by the nuisance in question and able to prove the direct impact on their quality of life ( Çiçek and Others v. Turkey (dec.), 2020, § 32 and §§ 22-29 for a summary of the relevant case-law in the context of air pollution; Fadeyeva v. Russia, 2005, §§ 68-69, where the Court stated that a certain minimum level of adverse effects of pollution on the individual's health or quality of life must be demonstrated to engage Article 8; Chiş v. Romania (dec.), 2014, concerning the noise of a bar in the building; Thibaut v. France (dec.), 2022, concerning potential exposure to electromagnetic fields). Article 8 may apply in environmental cases whether the pollution is directly caused by the State or whether State responsibility arises from the failure to regulate private sector activities properly. The applicability of Article 8 has been determined by a severity test: see the relevant case-law on environmental issues in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, §§ 111. For instance, in Hudorovič and Others v. Slovenia, 2020, the Court clarified its case-law on health and environmental risks resulting from water pollution (§§ 112-115). Notably, it made clear that even though access to safe drinking water is not, as such, a right protected by Article 8, "" a persistent and long-standing lack of access to safe drinking water "" can have adverse consequences for health and human dignity effectively eroding the core of private life. Therefore, when these stringent conditions are fulfilled, a State's positive obligation might be triggered, depending on the specific circumstances of the case (§ 116).","Although there is no explicit right to a healthy environment under the Convention ( Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2003, § 96), the Court has decided various cases in which the quality of an individual's surrounding environment is at issue, reasoning that an individual's wellbeing may be negatively impacted by unsafe or disruptive environmental conditions ( Cordella and Others v. Italy, 2019, §§ 157-160). However, an issue under Article 8 only arises if individuals are directly and seriously affected by the nuisance in question and able to prove the direct impact on their quality of life ( Çiçek and Others v. Turkey (dec.), 2020, § 32 and §§ 22-29 for a summary of the relevant case-law in the context of air pollution; Fadeyeva v. Russia, 2005, §§ 68-69, where the Court stated that a certain minimum level of adverse effects of pollution on the individual's health or quality of life must Chiş v. Romania be demonstrated to engage Article 8; (dec.), 2014, concerning the noise of a bar in the building; Thibaut v. France (dec.), 2022, concerning potential exposure to electromagnetic fields). Article 8 may apply in environmental cases whether the pollution is directly caused by the State or whether State responsibility arises from the failure to regulate private sector activities properly. The applicability of Article 8 has been determined by a severity test: see the relevant case-law on environmental issues in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, §§ 111. For instance, in Hudorovič and Others v. Slovenia, 2020, the Court clarified its case-law on health and environmental risks resulting from water pollution (§§ 112-115). Notably, it made clear that even though access to safe drinking water is not, as such, a right protected by Article 8, ""a persistent and long-standing lack of access to safe drinking water"" can have adverse consequences for health and human dignity effectively eroding the core of private life. Therefore, when these stringent conditions are fulfilled, a State's positive obligation might be triggered, depending on the specific circumstances of the case (§ 116)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:17791/22,A and Others v. Italy,17791/22,added,"A and Others v. Italy, no. 17791/22, 7 September 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.4,Right to access personal information,4,,237,,"Guerra and Others v. Italy , 1998",,,"The right to effective access to information concerning health and reproductive rights falls within K.H. and Others v. Slovakia the scope of private and family life within the meaning of Article 8 (, 2009, § 44). There may be positive obligations inherent in effective respect for private or family life which require the State to provide essential information about risks to one's health in a timely manner ( Guerra and Others v. Italy, 1998, §§ 58 and 60). In particular, where a State engages in hazardous activities, which might have hidden adverse consequences on the health of those involved in such activities, respect for private and family life under Article 8 requires that an effective and accessible procedure be established which enables such persons to seek all relevant and appropriate information ( McGinley and Egan v. the United Kingdom, 1998, §§ 97 and 101; Roche v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2005, § 167, for instance to assess any risk to which a person may be exposed)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:17791/22,A and Others v. Italy,17791/22,added,"A and Others v. Italy, no. 17791/22, 7 September 2023",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,III.D.d,"Parental allowances, custody/access, and contact-rights",4,469,386,0.8704,"A. and Others v. Italy , 2023|Anagnostakis v. Greece , 2023|Anagnostakis v. Greece 2023|Krasicki v. Poland , 2014","According to Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria , 2016|Alif Ahmadov and Others v. Azerbaijan , 2023|Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria , 2016|Kaminskas v. Lithuania , 2020|Simonova v. Bulgaria , 2023","According to Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria, 2016, given that the right to respect for one's home under Article 8 touches upon issues of ""central importance to the individual' s physical and moral integrity, of maintenance of relationships with others and a settled and of a secure place in the community"", the balancing exercise under that provision in cases where the interference consists of the loss of a person's only home is of a different order, with particular significance attaching to the extent of the intrusion into the personal sphere of those concerned. This can normally only be examined on a case-by-case basis. The mere possibility of obtaining judicial review of the administrative decision causing the loss of the home is thus not enough: the person concerned ""must be able to challenge that decision on the ground that it is disproportionate in view of his or her personal circumstances"" . In such proceedings, the national courts must have regard to all relevant factors and weigh the competing interests in line with the case-law principles, in which instance the margin of appreciation allowed to those courts will be a wide one and the Court will be reluctant to gainsay their assessment ( Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria, 2016, § 53 (violation); see also Simonova v. Bulgaria, 2023, §§ 51-52, and Alif Ahmadov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2023, §§ 61-64, but compare and contrast, Szczypiński v. Poland (dec.), 2022, §§ 66-71, where the courts did balance, on the one hand, the interest of the applicant in keeping his house and, on the other, the interests of society). Based on their decisions, the Court must be satisfied that domestic authorities assessed all the relevant circumstances and adequately addressed the applicant's arguments regarding his individual situation ( Kaminskas v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 58-65). An attempt by the authorities at the enforcement stage to negotiate with the applicant, and/or to discuss resettlement, will not remedy the situation if the negotiations did not take place within a formal procedure entailing a comprehensive review of the proportionality of the interference in the light of the applicant's individual circumstances, and did not offer a comprehensive solution ( Simonova v. Bulgaria, 2023, § 53).","Contact disputes are by their very nature extremely sensitive for all the parties concerned and it is not necessarily an easy task for the domestic authorities to ensure enforcement of a court order where the conduct of one or both parents is far from constructive ( Krasicki v. Poland, 2014, § 90). However, a lack of cooperation between separated parents is not a factor which can, of itself, exempt the authorities from their positive obligation under Article 8: rather it imposes on the authorities an obligation to take measures to reconcile the conflicting interests of the parties ( A. and Others v. Italy, Anagnostakis v. Greece 2023, § 97;, 2023, § 58). Thus, in a case concerning the impossibility for a father, beneficiary of a witness protection programme, to exercise his contact rights with respect to his two children, the Court found a violation of Article 8. Without overlooking the specific context of the case, the Court noted the lack of diligence of the relevant national authorities to organise visits between the applicant and his children despite existing court orders to that effect. Such visits had not been organised because of the mother's enduring opposition and the negative opinions of social services, who had stated that such visits would be detrimental to the children's phycological state: however no attempts had been made to set in place any arrangements for the provision of psychological assistance and support to facilitate such visits ( A. and Others v. Italy, 2023, §§ 94-104, 121-22). Conversely, in another case about the non-enforcement of contact orders, the Court was satisfied that the domestic authorities had taken sufficient steps towards enabling the applicant's contact with his son, despite the tense relationship between the parents and the fact that the child had refused to meet with his father, and found no violation of Article 8 ( Anagnostakis v. Greece, 2023, § 59-68). It must also be noted, in this connection that, while the national authorities must do their utmost to facilitate cooperation between separated parents, any obligation to apply coercion in this area must be limited, since the interests, as well as the rights and freedoms, of all concerned must be taken into account, and more particularly the best interests of the child and his or her rights under Article 8 ( ibid ., § 62)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:26504/20,Anagnostakis v. Greece,26504/20,added,"Anagnostakis v. Greece, no. 26504/20, 10 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,III.D.d,"Parental allowances, custody/access, and contact-rights",4,469,386,0.8704,"A. and Others v. Italy , 2023|Anagnostakis v. Greece , 2023|Anagnostakis v. Greece 2023|Krasicki v. Poland , 2014","According to Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria , 2016|Alif Ahmadov and Others v. Azerbaijan , 2023|Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria , 2016|Kaminskas v. Lithuania , 2020|Simonova v. Bulgaria , 2023","According to Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria, 2016, given that the right to respect for one's home under Article 8 touches upon issues of ""central importance to the individual' s physical and moral integrity, of maintenance of relationships with others and a settled and of a secure place in the community"", the balancing exercise under that provision in cases where the interference consists of the loss of a person's only home is of a different order, with particular significance attaching to the extent of the intrusion into the personal sphere of those concerned. This can normally only be examined on a case-by-case basis. The mere possibility of obtaining judicial review of the administrative decision causing the loss of the home is thus not enough: the person concerned ""must be able to challenge that decision on the ground that it is disproportionate in view of his or her personal circumstances"" . In such proceedings, the national courts must have regard to all relevant factors and weigh the competing interests in line with the case-law principles, in which instance the margin of appreciation allowed to those courts will be a wide one and the Court will be reluctant to gainsay their assessment ( Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria, 2016, § 53 (violation); see also Simonova v. Bulgaria, 2023, §§ 51-52, and Alif Ahmadov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2023, §§ 61-64, but compare and contrast, Szczypiński v. Poland (dec.), 2022, §§ 66-71, where the courts did balance, on the one hand, the interest of the applicant in keeping his house and, on the other, the interests of society). Based on their decisions, the Court must be satisfied that domestic authorities assessed all the relevant circumstances and adequately addressed the applicant's arguments regarding his individual situation ( Kaminskas v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 58-65). An attempt by the authorities at the enforcement stage to negotiate with the applicant, and/or to discuss resettlement, will not remedy the situation if the negotiations did not take place within a formal procedure entailing a comprehensive review of the proportionality of the interference in the light of the applicant's individual circumstances, and did not offer a comprehensive solution ( Simonova v. Bulgaria, 2023, § 53).","Contact disputes are by their very nature extremely sensitive for all the parties concerned and it is not necessarily an easy task for the domestic authorities to ensure enforcement of a court order where the conduct of one or both parents is far from constructive ( Krasicki v. Poland, 2014, § 90). However, a lack of cooperation between separated parents is not a factor which can, of itself, exempt the authorities from their positive obligation under Article 8: rather it imposes on the authorities an obligation to take measures to reconcile the conflicting interests of the parties ( A. and Others v. Italy, Anagnostakis v. Greece 2023, § 97;, 2023, § 58). Thus, in a case concerning the impossibility for a father, beneficiary of a witness protection programme, to exercise his contact rights with respect to his two children, the Court found a violation of Article 8. Without overlooking the specific context of the case, the Court noted the lack of diligence of the relevant national authorities to organise visits between the applicant and his children despite existing court orders to that effect. Such visits had not been organised because of the mother's enduring opposition and the negative opinions of social services, who had stated that such visits would be detrimental to the children's phycological state: however no attempts had been made to set in place any arrangements for the provision of psychological assistance and support to facilitate such visits ( A. and Others v. Italy, 2023, §§ 94-104, 121-22). Conversely, in another case about the non-enforcement of contact orders, the Court was satisfied that the domestic authorities had taken sufficient steps towards enabling the applicant's contact with his son, despite the tense relationship between the parents and the fact that the child had refused to meet with his father, and found no violation of Article 8 ( Anagnostakis v. Greece, 2023, § 59-68). It must also be noted, in this connection that, while the national authorities must do their utmost to facilitate cooperation between separated parents, any obligation to apply coercion in this area must be limited, since the interests, as well as the rights and freedoms, of all concerned must be taken into account, and more particularly the best interests of the child and his or her rights under Article 8 ( ibid ., § 62)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:22296/20|37138/20,Baret and Caballero v. France,22296/20|37138/20,added,"Baret and Caballero v. France, nos. 22296/20 and 37138/20, 14 September 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.D.2,Parents Medically assisted procreation/right to become genetic parents,4,339,350,0.9634,"Baret and Caballero v. France , 2023",,"The Court found no violation of Article 8 where domestic law permitted the applicant's former partner to withdraw his consent to the storage and use by her of embryos created jointly by them, preventing her from ever having a child to whom she would be genetically related ( Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2007, § 82). It also found no violation of Article 8 where a woman (whose partner had his sperm collected since the couple wished to conceive a child through artificial fertilisation) was refused permission to use the cryopreserved sperm after the man's death ( Pejřilová v. the Czech Republic, 2022). The legislature only permitted the use of assisted reproduction techniques for couples whose consent was less than six months old, and the applicant's husband had died more than six months after giving his consent, with the consequence that the applicant ceased to satisfy both of the above-mentioned conditions (§ 57). The Court observed that the aim of the legislation was to protect the free will of the man who had consented to assisted reproduction, and the right of the unborn child to know his parents (§ 59). For the Court, the State had not overstepped its wide margin of appreciation (§ 63).","The Court found no violation of Article 8 where domestic law permitted the applicant's former partner to withdraw his consent to the storage and use by her of embryos created jointly by them, Evans v. the United preventing her from ever having a child to whom she would be genetically related ( Kingdom [GC], 2007, § 82). It also found no violation of Article 8 where a woman (whose partner had his sperm collected since the couple wished to conceive a child through artificial fertilisation) was Pejřilová v. the Czech refused permission to use the cryopreserved sperm after the man's death ( Republic, 2022). The legislature only permitted the use of assisted reproduction techniques for couples whose consent was less than six months old, and the applicant's husband had died more than six months after giving his consent, with the consequence that the applicant ceased to satisfy both of the above-mentioned conditions (§ 57). The Court observed that the aim of the legislation was to protect the free will of the man who had consented to assisted reproduction, and the right of the unborn child to know his parents (§ 59). For the Court, the State had not overstepped its wide margin of appreciation (§ 63). Similarly, the Court found that the legislature did not overstep its wide margin of appreciation in prohibiting, not only the use of cryopreserved sperm or embryos for posthumous assisted reproduction, but also the transfer of cryopreserved sperm or embryos to a jurisdiction where they could be used for that purpose ( Baret and Caballero v. France, 2023). The export ban was intended to prevent the risk of circumvention of the domestic prohibition and the Court accepted that it pursued the legitimate aims of the ""protection of the rights and freedoms of others"" and the ""protection of morals"". Although the applicants' husbands had consented to the posthumous use of the gametes and embryos, it could not be said that there had been an excessive interference with their right to respect for their wishes. The domestic authorities had struck a fair balance between the competing interests at stake (§§81-88)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:3000/16|7189/16,Beljic and Others v. Croatia,3000/16|7189/16,added,"Beljic and Others v. Croatia, nos. 3000/16 and 7189/16, 23 January 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.8,Issues concerning burial and deceased persons,4,179,183,0.9141,"Beljic and Others v. Croatia , 2024",,"In Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, the Court held that Article 8 applied to the exhumation of deceased persons against the will of their families in the context of criminal proceedings (§§ 107-108). With regard to the prosecutorial decision ordering exhumation, the Court found that the domestic law did not provide sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness. The applicants were thus deprived of the minimum degree of protection to which they were entitled, in violation of Article 8 (§§ 124-127).","In Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, the Court held that Article 8 applied to the exhumation of deceased persons against the will of their families in the context of criminal proceedings (§§ 107-108). With regard to the prosecutorial decision ordering exhumation, the Court found that the domestic law did not provide sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness. The applicants were thus deprived of the minimum degree of protection to which they were entitled, in violation of Article 8 (§§ 124-127). However, in Beljic and Others v. Croatia, 2024, the Court found the applicants' Article 8 claims concerning the exhumation of their relatives' remains to be manifestly ill-founded. The exhumation was to take place as part of the relocation of a cemetery in order to enable the exploitation of coal reserves and thus to provide the necessary electricity for households. The domestic bodies had examined the applicants' relevant submissions and reviewed both the lawfulness of the impugned decisions and the necessity of the impugned measure and the Administrative Court had considered the interference and found it to be lawful (§§ 98-101)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:56513/17|56515/17,C.P. and M.N. v. France,56513/17|56515/17,added,"C.P. and M.N. v. France, nos. 56513/17 and 56515/17, 12 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.D.11,Marital and parental status,4,314,323,0.9147,"Ahrens v. Germany , 2012|C.P. and M.N. v. France , 2023|I.V. v. Estonia , 2023|Marinis v. Greece , 2014|R.L. and Others v. Denmark , 2017|Rasmussen v. Denmark , 1984|Shofman v. Russia , 2005|Tsvetelin Petkov v. Bulgaria , 2014|ć v. Croatia , 2011",,"In the Advisory opinion on the procedural status and rights of a biological parent in proceedings for the adoption of an adult [GC], 2023, the Court reiterarted that, in the absence of any factors of dependence between the biological mother and the adopted adult or by a pecuniary or patrimonial aspect, the matter pertains to the private life of the adopter and of the adoptee (§§ 50-54). It considered that the procedure in question may be regarded as affecting a biological parent's private life, under Article 8, and consequently that parent must be given the opportunity to be heard. It went on to find, having regard to the wide margin of appreciation to which the State is entitled in the regulation of the procedure for adult adoption, that respect for Article 8 does not require that a biological parent be granted the status of a party or the right to appeal the granting of the adoption (§ 62).","Similarly, proceedings relating to one's identity as a parent fall under private and family life. The Court has found cases involving the determination of the legal provisions governing a father's relations with his putative child to come within the scope of private life ( Rasmussen v. Denmark, 1984, § 33; Yildirim v. Austria (dec.), 1999; Krušković v. Croatia, 2011, § 20; Ahrens v. Germany, 2012, § 60; Tsvetelin Petkov v. Bulgaria, 2014, §§ 49-59; Marinis v. Greece, 2014, § 58; I.V. v. Estonia, 2023, § 75), as does a putative father's attempt to disavow paternity ( R.L. and Others v. Denmark, 2017, § 38; Shofman v. Russia, 2005, §§ 30-32; C.P. and M.N. v. France, 2023, § 33). In addition, the right to apply A.H. and Others for adoption with a view to becoming parents falls within the scope of private life ( v. Russia, 2017, § 383). For a detailed analysis of the Court's case-law on this topic, see the Case-law Guide on Article 12 . Advisory opinion on the procedural status and rights of a biological parent in proceedings 324. In the for the adoption of an adult [GC], 2023, the Court reiterated that, in the absence of any factors of dependence between the biological mother and the adopted adult or by a pecuniary or patrimonial aspect, the matter pertains to the private life of the adopter and of the adoptee (§§ 50-54). It considered that the procedure in question may be regarded as affecting a biological parent's private life, under Article 8, and consequently that parent must be given the opportunity to be heard. It went on to find, having regard to the wide margin of appreciation to which the State is entitled in the regulation of the procedure for adult adoption, that respect for Article 8 does not require that a biological parent be granted the status of a party or the right to appeal the granting of the adoption (§ 62)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:56513/17|56515/17,C.P. and M.N. v. France,56513/17|56515/17,added,"C.P. and M.N. v. France, nos. 56513/17 and 56515/17, 12 October 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.D.c,Ties between natural father and children,4,,367,,"C.P. and M.N. v. France , 2023|Paparrigopoulos v. Greece , 2022|ălin and Others v. Romania , 2016",,,"The Court has also found a violation of Article 8 where the applicants were unable to establish their paternity due to a strict statute of limitations ( Călin and Others v. Romania, 2016, §§ 96-99; see conversely C.P. and M.N. v. France, 2023, §§ 47-57, where the Court found no violation of Article 8, since the applicant, a biological father, had found out about his paternity well before the expiration of the five-year time-limit established in the relevant statute of limitation and, could thus have taken a timely action); and it has found a violation of Article 8, read together with Article 14, where the domestic legislation treated a single father of an illegitimate child differently - vis-à-vis both the mother and the married or divorced father - by refusing to allow him to exercise parental authority without the mother's consent since there was no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the refusal and the protection of the best interests of the child ( Paparrigopoulos v. Greece, 2022, §§ 35-43)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:56513/17|56515/17,C.P. and M.N. v. France,56513/17|56515/17,added,"C.P. and M.N. v. France, nos. 56513/17 and 56515/17, 12 October 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,III.D.c,Ties between natural father and children,4,354,365,0.9902,"C.P. and M.N. v. France , 2023","Keegan v. Ireland , 1994","The Court observes that the notion of family life in Article 8 is not confined solely to marriage- based relationships and may encompass other de facto ""family"" ties where the parties ar e living together outside marriage ( Keegan v. Ireland, 1994, § 44; Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands, 1994, § 30). The application of this principle has been found to extend equally to the relationship between natural fathers and their children born out of wedlock. Further, the Court considers that Article 8 cannot be interpreted as only protecting family life which has already been established but, where the circumstances warrant it, must extend to the potential relationship which may develop between a natural father and a child born out of wedlock ( Nylund v. Finland (dec.), 1999; Shavdarov v. Bulgaria, 2010, § 40). In the latter case, the Court accepted that the presumption of paternity meant that the applicant was not able to establish paternal affiliation by law, but that he could have taken other steps to establish a parental link, hence finding no violation of Article 8.","The Court observes that the notion of family life in Article 8 is not confined solely to marriage- based relationships and may encompass other de facto ""family"" ties where the parties are living Keegan v. Ireland Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands together outside marriage (, 1994, § 44;, 1994, § 30; C.P. and M.N. v. France, 2023, § 32). The application of this principle has been found to extend equally to the relationship between natural fathers and their children born out of wedlock. Further, the Court considers that Article 8 cannot be interpreted as only protecting family life which has already been established but, where the circumstances warrant it, must extend to the potential relationship which may develop between a natural father and a child born out of wedlock ( Nylund v. Finland (dec.), 1999; Shavdarov v. Bulgaria, 2010, § 40). In the latter case, the Court accepted that the presumption of paternity meant that the applicant was not able to establish paternal affiliation by law, but that he could have taken other steps to establish a parental link, hence finding no violation of Article 8."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:56513/17|56515/17,C.P. and M.N. v. France,56513/17|56515/17,added,"C.P. and M.N. v. France, nos. 56513/17 and 56515/17, 12 October 2023",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.D.c,Ties between natural father and children,4,356,368,0.9751,"C.P. and M.N. v. France , 2023",,"In Shofman v. Russia, 2005, concerning a father's decision to bring an action contesting paternity once he had discovered that he was not the biological father of a child born two years previously, the Court found that the introduction of a time-limit for the institution of paternity proceedings could be justified by the desire to ensure legal certainty in family relations and to protect the interests of the child (§ 39). However, it held that it was not necessarily proportionate to set a time-limit of one year from the child's birth with no exceptions permitted, especially where the person concerned had not been aware of the biological reality (§ 43) (see also Paulík v. Slovakia, 2006, §§ 45-47).","In Shofman v. Russia, 2005, concerning a father's decision to bring an action contesting paternity once he had discovered that he was not the biological father of a child born two years previously, the Court found that the introduction of a time-limit for the institution of paternity proceedings could be justified by the desire to ensure legal certainty in family relations and to protect the interests of the child (§ 39). However, it held that it was not necessarily proportionate to set a time-limit of one year from the child's birth with no exceptions permitted, especially where the person concerned had not been aware of the biological reality (§ 43) (see also Paulík v. Slovakia, 2006, §§ 45-47; and, conversely, C.P. and M.N. v. France, 2023, §§ 47-57, where the relevant time-limit was five years)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:18843/20,Cherrier v. France*,18843/20,added,"Cherrier v. France*, no. 18843/20, 30 January 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.4,Right to access personal information,4,,228,,"ć v. Croatia , 2002",,,"Matters of relevance to personal development include details of a person's identity as a human being and the vital interest protected by the Convention in obtaining information necessary to discover the truth concerning important aspects of one's personal identity, such as the identity of one's parents, one's origins, and aspects of one's childhood and early development ( Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 54 and 64; Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, §§ 42 and 44; Cherrier v. France*, 2024, § 50). Birth, and in particular the circumstances in which a child is born, forms part of a child's, and subsequently the adult's, private life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 29)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:18843/20,Cherrier v. France*,18843/20,added,"Cherrier v. France*, no. 18843/20, 30 January 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.D.1,Right to personal development and autonomy,4,275,282,0.9569,"Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France , 2023",,"The Court has recognised the right to obtain information in order to discover one's origins and the identity of one's parents as an integral part of identity protected under the right to private and family life ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 29; Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Çapın v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 33-34; Boljević v. Serbia, 2020, § 28).","The Court has recognised the right to obtain information in order to discover one's origins and the identity of one's parents as an integral part of identity protected under the right to private and family life ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 29; Cherrier v. France*, 2024, § 50; Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Çapın v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 33-34; Boljević v. Serbia, 2020, § 28; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, § 109)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:18843/20,Cherrier v. France*,18843/20,added,"Cherrier v. France*, no. 18843/20, 30 January 2024",3,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.D.1,Right to personal development and autonomy,4,280,288,0.9704,,,"In Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, the applicant, who was adopted, requested access to information to identify her natural mother and natural family, but her request was rejected under a special procedure which allowed mothers to remain anonymous. The Court held that there was no violation of Article 8 as the State had struck a fair balance between the competing interests (§§ 44-49).","In Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, the applicant, who was adopted, requested access to information to identify her natural mother and natural family, but her request was rejected under a special procedure which allowed mothers to remain anonymous. The Court held that there was no violation of Article 8 as the State had struck a fair balance between the competing interests (§§ 44-49; see also Cherrier v. France*, 2024, §§ 62-66, 77 and 82)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:14925/18,Colombier v. France,14925/18,added,"Colombier v. France, no. 14925/18, 15 February 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,III.D.6,Material interests,4,437,452,0.9396,"Belli and Arquier - Martinez v. Switzerland , 2018|Colombier v. France , 2024","Belli and Arquier-Martinez v. Switzerland , 2018|čeva v. Lithuania , 2021",""" Family life "" does not include only social, moral or cultural relations; it also comprises interests of a material kind ( Belli and Arquier-Martinez v. Switzerland, 2018, § 59; Di Trizio v. Switzerland, 2016, § 60), as is shown by, among other things, maintenance obligations and the position occupied in the domestic legal systems of the majority of the Contracting States by the institution of the reserved portion of an estate (in French, ""réserve héréditaire""). The Court has thus accepted that the right of succession between children and parents, and between grandchildren and grandparents, is so closely related to family life that it comes within the ambit of Article 8 ( Marckx v. Belgium, 1979, § 52; Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra, 2004, § 26). According to Şerife Yiğit v. Turkey [GC], 2010, questions of inheritance and voluntary dispositions between near relatives appear to be intimately connected with family life (§ 95) (see also Makarčeva v. Lithuania, 2021, § 58). Article 8 does not, however, require that a child should be entitled to be recognised as the heir of a deceased person for inheritance purposes ( Haas v. the Netherlands, 2004, § 43).","""Family life"" does not include only social, moral or cultural relations; it also comprises interests of a material kind ( Belli and Arquier - Martinez v. Switzerland, 2018, § 59; Di Trizio v. Switzerland, 2016, § 60), as is shown by, among other things, maintenance obligations and the position occupied in the domestic legal systems of the majority of the Contracting States by the institution of the reserved portion of an estate (in French, ""réserve héréditaire""). The Court has thus accepted that the right of succession between children and parents, and between grandchildren and grandparents, is so closely related to family life that it comes within the ambit of Article 8 ( Marckx v. Belgium, 1979, § 52; Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra, 2004, § 26; Colombier v. France, 2024, § 35). According to Şerife Yiğit v. Turkey [GC], 2010, questions of inheritance and voluntary dispositions between near relatives Makarčeva v. Lithuania appear to be intimately connected with family life (§ 95) (see also, 2021, § 58). Article 8 does not, however, require that a child should be entitled to be recognised as the heir of a deceased person for inheritance purposes ( Haas v. the Netherlands, 2004, § 43). Conversely, where the applicant, who had sought to have the paternity of his deceased biological father recognised, had claimed before the domestic courts that he wished to inherit from his father but also sought to show that the deceased had maintained relations with him and his mother, the Court considered that the right claimed by the applicant disclosed sufficient relevant elements to fall within the scope of ""private Moldovan v. Ukraine life"" (, 2024, § 35)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:53162/21,Diaconeasa v. Romania,53162/21,added,"Diaconeasa v. Romania, no. 53162/21, 20 February 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.B.5,Health care and treatment,4,159,163,0.9923,"Diaconeasa v. Romania , 2024",,"Regarding access to health care for people with disabilities, the Court declared a case inadmissible in which a severely disabled individual sought a robotic arm to assist his mobility ( Sentges v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2003). The Court did, however, find that reducing the level of care given to a woman with limited mobility violated Article 8, but only for a limited period during which the UKdid not comply with its own laws ( McDonald v. the United Kingdom, 2014). In Jivan v. Romania, 2022, which concerned the authorities failure to classify an elderly and disabled man as requiring a personal carer, the Court did not consider that the State had struck a fair balance between the competing public and private interests at stake (§ 51).","Regarding access to health care for people with disabilities, the Court declared a case inadmissible in which a severely disabled individual sought a robotic arm to assist his mobility ( Sentges v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2003). The Court did, however, find that reducing the level of care given to a woman with limited mobility violated Article 8, but only for a limited period during which the UKdid not comply with its own laws ( McDonald v. the United Kingdom, 2014). In Jivan v. Romania, 2022, which concerned the authorities failure to classify an elderly and disabled man as requiring a personal carer, the Court did not consider that the State had struck a fair balance between the competing public and private interests at stake (§ 51; see also Diaconeasa v. Romania, 2024, § 64)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:3041/19,G.T.B. v. Spain,3041/19,added,"G.T.B. v. Spain, no. 3041/19, 16 November 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.D.6,Right to a name/identity documents,4,,302,,"G.T.B. v. Spain , 2023",,,"As regards one's identity, the Court held that respect for private life requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as individual human being, and has acknowledged the important repercussions that access to identity documents can have on personal autonomy ( G.T.B. v. Spain, 2023, § 113). In particular, the right to respect for private life should be seen as including, in principle, an individual right to have one's birth registered and consequently, where relevant, to have identity documents. Although the States generally enjoy a wide margin of appreciation concerning the appropriate means of securing the enjoyment of that right, some adaptability in the standard procedures for the delivery of identity documents may be required when the circumstances make that imperative in order to safeguard important interests protected under Article 8 of the Convention. Thus the authorities were under a positive obligation to act with due diligence in order to assist the applicant, a vulnerable minor neglected by his only parent, in obtaining his birth certificate and identity documents ( G.T.B. v. Spain, 2023, §§ 118-19, 122-24)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:21424/16|45728/17,Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France,21424/16|45728/17,added,"Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, nos. 21424/16 and 45728/17, 7 September 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.D.1,Right to personal development and autonomy,4,,290,,"In Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France , 2023",,,"In Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, the applicants, who were born through medically assisted reproduction involving a third-party donor, unsuccessfully sought access to information about that donor. The Court found no violation of Article 8 as it considered that the rule guaranteeing anonymity in gamete donations for children thus conceived before 1 September 2022 struck a fair balance between the conflicting interests at stake (§ 126). The choice by the State of the pace of the introduction of legislative reform in this field fell within its margin of appreciation (§ 123)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:21424/16|45728/17,Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France,21424/16|45728/17,added,"Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, nos. 21424/16 and 45728/17, 7 September 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.D.1,Right to personal development and autonomy,4,275,282,0.9569,"Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France , 2023",,"The Court has recognised the right to obtain information in order to discover one's origins and the identity of one's parents as an integral part of identity protected under the right to private and family life ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 29; Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Çapın v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 33-34; Boljević v. Serbia, 2020, § 28).","The Court has recognised the right to obtain information in order to discover one's origins and the identity of one's parents as an integral part of identity protected under the right to private and family life ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 29; Cherrier v. France*, 2024, § 50; Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Çapın v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 33-34; Boljević v. Serbia, 2020, § 28; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, § 109)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:7432/17,Gurbanov v. Armenia,7432/17,added,"Gurbanov v. Armenia, no. 7432/17, 5 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.B.8,Issues concerning burial and deceased persons,4,176,180,0.9589,"Gurbanov v. Armenia , 2023","Elberte v. Latvia , 2015","Family members have also challenged the length of time between death and burial and the treatment of the deceased's body before its return to the family. For example, the Court found that an extended delay in returning samples taken from the applicants'daughter's body by police, which prevented them from burying her in a timely manner, violated their Article 8 right to private and family life ( Girard v. France, 2011). It has also found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention where domestic law did not require the courts to assess - and did not permit the parents to challenge - and initial refusal to permit them to transfer their sons'bodies to Türkiye while an investigation into their murder was ongoing ( Aygün v. Belgium, 2022, §§ 68-92). The Court also found that a hospital's removal of a deceased person's organs without informing his mother and without seeking her consent was not done in accordance with law and violated her right to private life under Article 8 ( Petrova v. Latvia, 2014, §§ 97-98). In line with this case-law, the Court found a violation of Article 8 in the removal of tissue from a deceased person without the knowledge and consent of his spouse because of the lack of clarity in the domestic law and the absence of legal safeguards against arbitrariness ( Elberte v. Latvia, 2015, § 115).","Family members have also challenged the length of time between death and burial and the treatment of the deceased's body before its return to the family. For example, the Court found that an extended delay in returning samples taken from the applicants' daughter's body by police, which prevented them from burying her in a timely manner, violated their Article 8 right to private and family life ( Girard v. France, 2011). It has also found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention where domestic law did not require the courts to assess - and did not permit the parents to challenge - and initial refusal to permit them to transfer their sons' bodies to Türkiye while an investigation into their murder was ongoing ( Aygün v. Belgium, 2022, §§ 68-92). The Court also found that a hospital's removal of a deceased person's organs without informing his mother and without seeking her consent was not done in accordance with law and violated her right to private life under Article 8 ( Petrova v. Latvia, 2014, §§ 97-98). In line with this case-law, the Court found a violation of Article 8 in the removal of tissue from a deceased person without the knowledge and consent of his spouse because of the lack Elberte of clarity in the domestic law and the absence of legal safeguards against arbitrariness ( v. Latvia, 2015, § 115). However, the Court found that a delay of thirty-eight days before the body of an Azerbaijani soldier killed in Armenia was returned to his family did not violate Article 8 of the Convention ( Gurbanov v. Armenia, 2023). The Armenian authorities had been trying to establish the cause of death and, in view of the hostile relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, were waiting for a specialist from the ICRC to participate in the examination of the body. In the circumstances, the overall period of thirty-eight days which passed before the Armenian authorities returned the applicant's son's body to Azerbaijan could not be seen as unreasonable (§ 63-69). Elli Poluhas Dödsbo v. Sweden"
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:25240/20,Gyulumyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.),25240/20,added,"Gyulumyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), no. 25240/20, 21 November 2023",1,citation_field_name_match,citation_updated,II.A.2,Professional and business activities,4,106,110,0.9855,"Others v. Armenia , 2023|ău v. Romania , 2023|ąk and Others v. Poland , 2023|ş Bingöllü v. Turkey , 2021","Camelia Bogdan v. Romania , 2020|Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria , 2012|ş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021","More recently, in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, the Court, recalling a number of relevant precedents (§§ 101, 104-105, 108 and 109), set out the principles by which to assess whether employment- related disputes fall within the scope of ""private life"" under Article 8 (§ § 115-117; see also J.B. and Others v. Hungary (dec.), 2018, §§ 127-129). The Court held that there are some typical aspects of private life which may be affected in such disputes by dismissal, demotion, non-admission to a profession or other similarly unfavourable measures. In this case, the applicant was dismissed from his post as the president of a court on the basis of a failure to perform his administrative duties (managerial skills) properly. Whilst he was dismissed as president, he remained a judge in the same court. The Court did not find Article 8 applicable in this case. This was because, according to the Court, the decision concerned only his managerial skills while his professional role as a judge was not touched upon. Further, the decision did not affect his future career as a judge and neither did the decision call into question the moral or ethical aspect of his personality and character. In summary, in this situation, the dismissal had limited negative effects on the applicant's private life and did not cross the ""threshold of seriousness"" for an issue to be raised under Article 8 ( Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, §§ 126-133; see also Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, §§ 83-92, Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2012, §§ 136-145 including on the pecuniary aspect, and Gražulevičiūtė v. Lithuania, 2021, §§ 101-110, in which the Court found that disciplinary proceedings did not reach the ""threshold of seriousness"" required to engage Article 8 ; see also in another context, Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021). Following Denisov, employment-related disputes will generally only engage Article 8 either where a person loses a job because of something he of she did in private life (reason-based approach) or when the loss of job impacts on private life (consequence-based approach) (§§ 115-117). Thereafter, the consequence-based approach was applied to the prospective employment context (the consequences of a decision for the applicant's employment prospects in the civil service, and more specifically on her chances of obtaining a post as a research assistant in a public university, see Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 55-62). The test was found to have been met in the case of Constitutional Court judges dismissed for ""breach of oath"", since their dismissal had a serious impact on their inner circle, given the ensuing pecuniary losses, and on their reputation, given that the grounds for the dismissal directly concerned their personal integrity and professional competence ( Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 86). It was also found to have been met in the case of a judge suspended for over two years for having undermined the authority of the court by investigating the independence of a first instance judge ( Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, §§ 228-237).","More recently, in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, the Court, recalling a number of relevant precedents (§§ 101, 104-105, 108 and 109), set out the principles by which to assess whether employment-related disputes fall within the scope of ""private life"" under Article 8 (§§ 115-117; see also J.B. and Others v. Hungary (dec.), 2018, §§ 127-129). The Court held that there are some typical aspects of private life which may be affected in such disputes by dismissal, demotion, non-admission to a profession or other similarly unfavourable measures. In this case, the applicant was dismissed from his post as the president of a court on the basis of a failure to perform his administrative duties (managerial skills) properly. Whilst he was dismissed as president, he remained a judge in the same court. The Court did not find Article 8 applicable in this case. This was because, according to the Court, the decision concerned only his managerial skills while his professional role as a judge was not touched upon. Further, the decision did not affect his future career as a judge and neither did the decision call into question the moral or ethical aspect of his personality and character. In summary, in this situation, the dismissal had limited negative effects on the applicant's private life and did not cross the ""threshold of seriousness"" for an issue to be raised under Article 8 ( Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, Camelia Bogdan v. Romania Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria §§ 126-133; see also, 2020, §§ 83-92,, 2012, §§ 136-145 including on the pecuniary aspect, and Gražulevičiūtė v. Lithuania, 2021, §§ 101-110, in which the Court found that disciplinary proceedings did not reach the ""threshold of seriousness"" required to engage Article 8; see also in another context, Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, Denisov 2021). Following, employment-related disputes will generally only engage Article 8 either where a person loses a job because of something he or she did in private life (reason-based approach) or when the loss of job impacts on private life (consequence-based approach) (§§ 115-117). Thereafter, the consequence-based approach was applied to the prospective employment context (the consequences of a decision for the applicant's employment prospects in the civil service, and more specifically on her chances of obtaining a post as a research assistant in a public university, see Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 55-62). The test was found to have been met in the case of Constitutional Court judges dismissed for ""breach of oath"", since their dismissal had a serious impact on their inner circle, given the ensuing pecuniary losses, and on their reputation, given that the grounds for the dismissal directly concerned their personal integrity and professional competence ( Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 86). It was also found to have been met in the case of a judge suspended for over two years for having undermined the authority of the court by investigating the independence of a first instance judge ( Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, §§ 228-237) and in the case of a judge suspended for over two years following his indictment on charges unrelated to his judicial Pengezov v. Bulgaria duties (, 2023, §§ 67-72). It was also found to have been met in the case of female judges who were forced into early retirement ( Pająk and Others v. Poland, 2023, §§ 214-20). However, it was not found to have been met where Constitutional Court judges, originally appointed with life Gyulumyan and tenure, had their terms of office terminated as a result of a constitutional reform ( Others v. Armenia, 2023). The Court also found that the test had been met in the case of a lay teacher of Orthodox religion at a secondary public school whose employment had been automatically terminated after the withdrawal of her endorsement by an Archbishop ( Ţîmpău v. Romania, 2023)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:37031/21,I.V. v. Estonia,37031/21,added,"I.V. v. Estonia, no. 37031/21, 10 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.D.11,Marital and parental status,4,314,323,0.9147,"Ahrens v. Germany , 2012|C.P. and M.N. v. France , 2023|I.V. v. Estonia , 2023|Marinis v. Greece , 2014|R.L. and Others v. Denmark , 2017|Rasmussen v. Denmark , 1984|Shofman v. Russia , 2005|Tsvetelin Petkov v. Bulgaria , 2014|ć v. Croatia , 2011",,"In the Advisory opinion on the procedural status and rights of a biological parent in proceedings for the adoption of an adult [GC], 2023, the Court reiterarted that, in the absence of any factors of dependence between the biological mother and the adopted adult or by a pecuniary or patrimonial aspect, the matter pertains to the private life of the adopter and of the adoptee (§§ 50-54). It considered that the procedure in question may be regarded as affecting a biological parent's private life, under Article 8, and consequently that parent must be given the opportunity to be heard. It went on to find, having regard to the wide margin of appreciation to which the State is entitled in the regulation of the procedure for adult adoption, that respect for Article 8 does not require that a biological parent be granted the status of a party or the right to appeal the granting of the adoption (§ 62).","Similarly, proceedings relating to one's identity as a parent fall under private and family life. The Court has found cases involving the determination of the legal provisions governing a father's relations with his putative child to come within the scope of private life ( Rasmussen v. Denmark, 1984, § 33; Yildirim v. Austria (dec.), 1999; Krušković v. Croatia, 2011, § 20; Ahrens v. Germany, 2012, § 60; Tsvetelin Petkov v. Bulgaria, 2014, §§ 49-59; Marinis v. Greece, 2014, § 58; I.V. v. Estonia, 2023, § 75), as does a putative father's attempt to disavow paternity ( R.L. and Others v. Denmark, 2017, § 38; Shofman v. Russia, 2005, §§ 30-32; C.P. and M.N. v. France, 2023, § 33). In addition, the right to apply A.H. and Others for adoption with a view to becoming parents falls within the scope of private life ( v. Russia, 2017, § 383). For a detailed analysis of the Court's case-law on this topic, see the Case-law Guide on Article 12 . Advisory opinion on the procedural status and rights of a biological parent in proceedings 324. In the for the adoption of an adult [GC], 2023, the Court reiterated that, in the absence of any factors of dependence between the biological mother and the adopted adult or by a pecuniary or patrimonial aspect, the matter pertains to the private life of the adopter and of the adoptee (§§ 50-54). It considered that the procedure in question may be regarded as affecting a biological parent's private life, under Article 8, and consequently that parent must be given the opportunity to be heard. It went on to find, having regard to the wide margin of appreciation to which the State is entitled in the regulation of the procedure for adult adoption, that respect for Article 8 does not require that a biological parent be granted the status of a party or the right to appeal the granting of the adoption (§ 62)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:37031/21,I.V. v. Estonia,37031/21,added,"I.V. v. Estonia, no. 37031/21, 10 October 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.D.c,Ties between natural father and children,4,,373,,"I.V. v. Estonia , 2023|Uzbyakov v. Russia , 2020",,,"In two cases where natural fathers had unsuccessfully attempted to have adoption of their children by third persons - which had been ordered for reasons outside of those fathers' control and without their knowledge, let alone consent - annulled, the Court reproached the domestic authorities' lack of diligence, and, in particular, failure to establish all relevant circumstances before allowing the adoption ( Uzbyakov v. Russia, 2020, §§ 116-18; I.V. v. Estonia, 2023, §§ 88, 103-106) as well as the excessive formalism in the subsequent examination of those fathers' requests for annulment of the adoption orders. In the latter respect, the Court observed that the domestic courts' reliance on the absence under domestic law of formal grounds for revoking the adoption orders could not be regarded as a ""sufficient"" consideration in seeking to strike a fair balance between the competing interests at stake ( Uzbyakov v. Russia, 2020, §§ 122-23, 126; I.V. v. Estonia, 2023, §§ 114-15; see also as regards the failure of the domestic courts to perform an in-depth examination of all relevant facts in a similar Naltakyan v. Russia context,, 2021, §§ 185-92)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:17780/18,Ismayilzade v. Azerbaijan,17780/18,added,"Ismayilzade v. Azerbaijan, no. 17780/18, 18 January 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.D.6,Right to a name/identity documents,4,291,300,0.8938,"In Ismayilzade v. Azerbaijan , 2024|Ismayilzade v. Azerbaijan , 2024","Johansson v. Finland , 2007","The Court has held that forenames also fall within the ambit of ""private life"" ( Guillot v. France, 1996, §§ 21-22; Güzel Erdagöz v. Turkey, 2008, § 43; Garnaga v. Ukraine, 2013, § 36). However, the Court has found that some laws relating to the registration of names strike a proper balance, while others do not (compare Guillot v. France, 1996, with Johansson v. Finland, 2007). In relation to a change of name in the process of gender reassignment, see S.V. v. Italy, 2018, §§ 70-75 (under Gender identity below).","The Court has held that forenames also fall within the ambit of ""private life"" ( Guillot v. France, 1996, §§ 21-22; Güzel Erdagöz v. Turkey, 2008, § 43; Garnaga v. Ukraine, 2013, § 36; Ismayilzade v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 25). However, the Court has found that some laws relating to the registration Guillot v. France Johansson of names strike a proper balance, while others do not (compare, 1996, with v. Finland, 2007). In Ismayilzade v. Azerbaijan, 2024, the Court agreed with the domestic courts that the forename chosen by the applicant for her newborn son had not been in the child's best interests and found that the refusal by the authorities2 to register that name had not violated Article 8 (§§ 35-42). In relation to a change of name in the process of gender reassignment, see S.V. v. Italy, 2018, §§ 70-75 (under Gender identity below)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:17780/18,Ismayilzade v. Azerbaijan,17780/18,added,"Ismayilzade v. Azerbaijan, no. 17780/18, 18 January 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.D.6,Right to a name/identity documents,4,292,301,0.9182,"Ismayilzade v. Azerbaijan , 2024","Losonci Rose and Rose v. Switzerland , 2010|Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey , 2004","The Court has ruled that the tradition of demonstrating family unity by obliging married women to adopt the surname of their husbands is no longer compatible with the Convention ( Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, 2004, §§ 67-68). The Court has found a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) read in conjunction with Article 8 as a result of discriminatory treatment on the part of the authorities'refusal to let a binational couple keep their own surnames after marriage ( Losonci Rose and Rose v. Switzerland, 2010, § 26). The mere fact that an existing name could take on a negative connotation does not mean that the refusal to permit a change of name will automatically constitute a breach of Article 8 ( Stjerna v. Finland, 1994, § 42; Siskina and Siskins v. Latvia (dec.), 2001; Macalin Moxamed Sed Dahir v. Switzerland (dec.), 2015, § 31).","The Court has ruled that the tradition of demonstrating family unity by obliging married women Ünal Tekeli to adopt the surname of their husbands is no longer compatible with the Convention ( v. Turkey, 2004, §§ 67-68). The Court has found a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) read in conjunction with Article 8 as a result of discriminatory treatment on the part of the authorities' Losonci Rose and Rose refusal to let a binational couple keep their own surnames after marriage ( v. Switzerland, 2010, § 26). The mere fact that an existing name could take on a negative connotation does not mean that the refusal to permit a change of name will automatically constitute a breach of Article 8 ( Stjerna v. Finland, 1994, § 42; Siskina and Siskins v. Latvia (dec.), 2001; Macalin Moxamed Sed Dahir v. Switzerland (dec.), 2015, § 31). The margin of appreciation of the State in this filed is wide since the process whereby surnames and forenames are given, recognised and used is a domain in which national particularities are the strongest and in which there are virtually no points of convergence between the domestic rules of States: in each State, the use of names is influenced by a multitude of factors of an historical, linguistic, religious and cultural nature ( Ismayilzade v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 33)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:16974/14,Kaczmarek v. Poland,16974/14,added,"Kaczmarek v. Poland, no. 16974/14, 22 February 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.6,File or data gathering by security services or other organs of the State,4,,242,,"In Zoltán Varga v. Slovakia , 2021|Kaczmarek v. Poland , 2024|čák v. Slovakia , 2022",,,"In Zoltán Varga v. Slovakia, 2021, (§ 162) the applicant was a businessman whose activities - which included meetings - were surveilled at a flat belonging to him. The operation was authorised by three warrants issued by the Regional Court and at the request of the Slovak Intelligence Service. The Court noted that the lack of clarity of the applicable jurisdictional rules, and the lack of procedures for the implementation of the existing rules and flaws in their application, meant that when implementing the three warrants the intelligence service had practically enjoyed a discretion amounting to unfettered power, not being accompanied by a measure of protection against arbitrary interference as required by the rule of law. Thus, those measures were not ""in accordance with the law"" for the purposes of Article 8 § 2. The applicant in the case of Haščák v. Slovakia, 2022, was the business partner of the applicant in Zoltán Varga . His complaints were similar to those of Mr Varga. However, as there was nothing to indicate that he was himself the subject of any warrant, he also complained that the applicable framework provided no protection to persons randomly affected by surveillance measures. In finding a violation of Article 8, the Court identified this as an ""aggravating factor"" (§ 95; see also, as regards the continued storage by the authorities of surveillance material concerning the applicant collected in the course of a security operation of which she, herself, had not been a subject, and her inability to have that material destroyed, Kaczmarek v. Poland, 2024, §§ 93-96)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:40209/20,Koilova and Babulkova v. Bulgaria,40209/20,added,"Koilova and Babulkova v. Bulgaria, no. 40209/20, 5 September 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I.F.e,Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination),4,58,60,0.9816,"Koilova and Babulkova v. Bulgaria , 2023","Schalk and Kopf v. Austria , 2010","For instance, concerning same-sex couples, the Court has attached importance to the continuing international movement towards the legal recognition of same-sex unions ( Oliari and Others v. Italy, 2016, §§ 178 and 180-185), but leaves open the option for States to restrict access to marriage to different-sex couples ( Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010, § 108). See also the Case-Law Guide on Rights of LGBTIpersons .","For instance, concerning same-sex couples, the Court has attached importance to the continuing international movement towards the legal recognition of same-sex unions ( Oliari and Others v. Italy, 2016, §§ 178 and 180-185; Koilova and Babulkova v. Bulgaria, 2023), but leaves open the option for Schalk and Kopf v. Austria States to restrict access to marriage to different-sex couples (, 2010, § 108). See also the Case- Law Guide on Rights of LGBTIpersons ."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:17254/11,Krasicki v. Poland,17254/11,added,"Krasicki v. Poland, no. 17254/11, 15 April 2014",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,III.D.d,"Parental allowances, custody/access, and contact-rights",4,469,386,0.8704,"A. and Others v. Italy , 2023|Anagnostakis v. Greece , 2023|Anagnostakis v. Greece 2023|Krasicki v. Poland , 2014","According to Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria , 2016|Alif Ahmadov and Others v. Azerbaijan , 2023|Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria , 2016|Kaminskas v. Lithuania , 2020|Simonova v. Bulgaria , 2023","According to Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria, 2016, given that the right to respect for one's home under Article 8 touches upon issues of ""central importance to the individual' s physical and moral integrity, of maintenance of relationships with others and a settled and of a secure place in the community"", the balancing exercise under that provision in cases where the interference consists of the loss of a person's only home is of a different order, with particular significance attaching to the extent of the intrusion into the personal sphere of those concerned. This can normally only be examined on a case-by-case basis. The mere possibility of obtaining judicial review of the administrative decision causing the loss of the home is thus not enough: the person concerned ""must be able to challenge that decision on the ground that it is disproportionate in view of his or her personal circumstances"" . In such proceedings, the national courts must have regard to all relevant factors and weigh the competing interests in line with the case-law principles, in which instance the margin of appreciation allowed to those courts will be a wide one and the Court will be reluctant to gainsay their assessment ( Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria, 2016, § 53 (violation); see also Simonova v. Bulgaria, 2023, §§ 51-52, and Alif Ahmadov and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2023, §§ 61-64, but compare and contrast, Szczypiński v. Poland (dec.), 2022, §§ 66-71, where the courts did balance, on the one hand, the interest of the applicant in keeping his house and, on the other, the interests of society). Based on their decisions, the Court must be satisfied that domestic authorities assessed all the relevant circumstances and adequately addressed the applicant's arguments regarding his individual situation ( Kaminskas v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 58-65). An attempt by the authorities at the enforcement stage to negotiate with the applicant, and/or to discuss resettlement, will not remedy the situation if the negotiations did not take place within a formal procedure entailing a comprehensive review of the proportionality of the interference in the light of the applicant's individual circumstances, and did not offer a comprehensive solution ( Simonova v. Bulgaria, 2023, § 53).","Contact disputes are by their very nature extremely sensitive for all the parties concerned and it is not necessarily an easy task for the domestic authorities to ensure enforcement of a court order where the conduct of one or both parents is far from constructive ( Krasicki v. Poland, 2014, § 90). However, a lack of cooperation between separated parents is not a factor which can, of itself, exempt the authorities from their positive obligation under Article 8: rather it imposes on the authorities an obligation to take measures to reconcile the conflicting interests of the parties ( A. and Others v. Italy, Anagnostakis v. Greece 2023, § 97;, 2023, § 58). Thus, in a case concerning the impossibility for a father, beneficiary of a witness protection programme, to exercise his contact rights with respect to his two children, the Court found a violation of Article 8. Without overlooking the specific context of the case, the Court noted the lack of diligence of the relevant national authorities to organise visits between the applicant and his children despite existing court orders to that effect. Such visits had not been organised because of the mother's enduring opposition and the negative opinions of social services, who had stated that such visits would be detrimental to the children's phycological state: however no attempts had been made to set in place any arrangements for the provision of psychological assistance and support to facilitate such visits ( A. and Others v. Italy, 2023, §§ 94-104, 121-22). Conversely, in another case about the non-enforcement of contact orders, the Court was satisfied that the domestic authorities had taken sufficient steps towards enabling the applicant's contact with his son, despite the tense relationship between the parents and the fact that the child had refused to meet with his father, and found no violation of Article 8 ( Anagnostakis v. Greece, 2023, § 59-68). It must also be noted, in this connection that, while the national authorities must do their utmost to facilitate cooperation between separated parents, any obligation to apply coercion in this area must be limited, since the interests, as well as the rights and freedoms, of all concerned must be taken into account, and more particularly the best interests of the child and his or her rights under Article 8 ( ibid ., § 62)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:55351/17,Luca v. the Republic of Moldova,55351/17,added,"Luca v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 55351/17, 17 October 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.B.1,Victims of violence/abuse,4,128,132,0.9981,,,"In cases of domestic violence, the Court also holds States responsible for protecting victims, particularly when the risks of violence are known by State officers and when officers fail to enforce measures designed to protect victims of violence ( Levchuk v. Ukraine, 2020; Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, 2008; A v. Croatia, 2010; Hajduová v. Slovakia, 2010; Kalucza v. Hungary, 2012; B. v. Moldova, 2013). The State also has a positive responsibility to protect children from witnessing domestic violence in their homes ( Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013). The Court will also apply its child custody and care jurisprudence (see below), with particular deference to removal decisions based on patterns of domestic violence in the home ( Y.C. v. the United Kingdom, 2012). In Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, the Court emphasised the need to comprehensively address the phenomenon of domestic violence in all its forms. In examining the applicant's ' allegations of cyberbullying and her request to have the family computer searched, it found that the national authorities had been overly formalistic in dismissing any connection with the domestic violence which she had already reported to them. The applicant had been obliged to submit a new complaint alleging a breach of the confidentiality of her correspondence. In dealing with it separately, the authorities had failed to take into consideration the various forms that domestic violence could take. The case of Volodina v. Russia (no. 2), 2021, concerned the applicant's complaint that the authorities had failed to protect her against repeated cyberviolence by her partner, who had created fake profiles in her name, had published her intimate photos, had tracked her movements with the use of a GPSdevice, and had sent her death threats via social media. The Court found, in particular, that even though they had the legal tools to prosecute the applicant's partner, the authorities had not conducted an effective investigation and had at no point envisaged taking appropriate measures to protect her. They had thus failed in their obligation to protect her against serious abuse.","In cases of domestic violence, the Court also holds States responsible for protecting victims, particularly when the risks of violence are known by State officers and when officers fail to enforce measures designed to protect victims of violence ( Levchuk v. Ukraine, 2020; Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, 2008; A v. Croatia, 2010; Hajduová v. Slovakia, 2010; Kalucza v. Hungary, 2012; B. v. Moldova, 2013). The State also has a positive responsibility to protect children from witnessing domestic violence in their homes ( Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013). The Court will also apply its child custody and care jurisprudence (see below), with particular deference to removal decisions based on patterns of domestic violence in the home ( Y.C. v. the United Kingdom, 2012; Luca v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023). In Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, the Court emphasised the need to comprehensively address the phenomenon of domestic violence in all its forms. In examining the applicant's' allegations of cyberbullying and her request to have the family computer searched, it found that the national authorities had been overly formalistic in dismissing any connection with the domestic violence which she had already reported to them. The applicant had been obliged to submit a new complaint alleging a breach of the confidentiality of her correspondence. In dealing with it separately, the authorities had failed to take into consideration the various forms that domestic violence could take. The case of Volodina v. Russia (no. 2), 2021, concerned the applicant's complaint that the authorities had failed to protect her against repeated cyberviolence by her partner, who had created fake profiles in her name, had published her intimate photos, had tracked her movements with the use of a GPSdevice, and had sent her death threats via social media. The Court found, in particular, that even though they had the legal tools to prosecute the applicant's partner, the authorities had not conducted an effective investigation and had at no point envisaged taking appropriate measures to protect her. They had thus failed in their obligation to protect her against serious abuse."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:55351/17,Luca v. the Republic of Moldova,55351/17,added,"Luca v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 55351/17, 17 October 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.D.d,"Parental allowances, custody/access, and contact-rights",4,366,380,0.9796,,,"The Court has found that the failure to disclose relevant documents to parents during the procedures instituted by the authorities in placing and maintaining a child in care meant that the decision-makingprocess determining the custody and access arrangements did not afford the requisite protection of the parents'interests as safeguarded by Article 8 ( T.P. and K.M. v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 73). The refusal to order an independent psychological report and the absence of a hearing before a regional court insufficiently involved the applicant in the decision-making process regarding his parental access and thereby violated the applicant's rights under Article 8 ( Elsholz v. Germany [GC], 2000, § 53). In Petrov and X v. Russia, 2018, there was an insufficient examination of a father's application for a residence order and no relevant and sufficient reasons were adduced for a decision to make the residence order in favour of the child's mother, in violation of Article 8 (see §§ 105-114 and the review of the case-law therein). In Bierski v. Poland, 2022, the Court found the respondent State to be in breach of its positive obligation under Article 8 to take measures aimed at re-establishing contact between the applicant and his son, who had been declared incapacitated. Once the applicant's son had turned eighteen, his mother was appointed as a guardian and refused to allow the applicant's contact to continue, and the applicant had no standing before the domestic courts to protect his family life with his son (§§ 46-54).","The Court has found that the failure to disclose relevant documents to parents during the procedures instituted by the authorities in placing and maintaining a child in care meant that the decision-making process determining the custody and access arrangements did not afford the requisite protection of the parents' interests as safeguarded by Article 8 ( T.P. and K.M. v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 73). The refusal to order an independent psychological report and the absence of a hearing before a regional court insufficiently involved the applicant in the decision-making process Elsholz regarding his parental access and thereby violated the applicant's rights under Article 8 ( v. Germany [GC], 2000, § 53). In Petrov and X v. Russia, 2018, there was an insufficient examination of a father's application for a residence order and no relevant and sufficient reasons were adduced for a decision to make the residence order in favour of the child's mother, in violation of Article 8 (see §§ 105-114 and the review of the case-law therein). In Bierski v. Poland, 2022, the Court found the respondent State to be in breach of its positive obligation under Article 8 to take measures aimed at re-establishing contact between the applicant and his son, who had been declared incapacitated. Once the applicant's son had turned eighteen, his mother was appointed as a guardian and refused to allow the applicant's contact to continue, and the applicant had no standing before the domestic courts to protect his family life with his son (§§ 46-54). The court has also found that the failure of the domestic authorities to take into account incidents of domestic violence in the determination of child contact rights and, consequently, their failure to take prompt measures to support the applicant, victim of domestic violence, in maintaining contact with her children, breached their Article 8 obligations ( Luca v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 90-95)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:55351/17,Luca v. the Republic of Moldova,55351/17,added,"Luca v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 55351/17, 17 October 2023",3,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,III.D.d,"Parental allowances, custody/access, and contact-rights",4,371,385,0.9981,,"Malec v. Poland , 2016|Raw and Others v. France , 2013|Vorozhba v. Russia , 2014","States must also provide measures to ensure that custody determinations and parental rights are enforced ( Raw and Others v. France, 2013; Vorozhba v. Russia, 2014, § 97; Malec v. Poland, 2016, § 78). This may, if necessary, include investigation into the whereabouts of the child whose location has been hidden by the other parent ( Hromadka and Hromadkova v. Russia, 2014, § 168). The Court also found that in placing reliance on a series of automatic and stereotyped measures in order to secure the exercise of the father's contact rights in respect of his child, the domestic courts had not taken the appropriate measures to establish a meaningful relationship between the applicant and his child and to make the full exercise of his contact rights possible ( Giorgioni v. Italy, 2016, §§ 75-77; Macready v. the Czech Republic, 2010, § 66; Bondavalli v. Italy, 2015, §§ 81-84). Likewise, a violation was found where no new independent psychiatric evidence concerning the applicant had been taken for around 10 years ( Cincimino v. Italy, 2016, §§ 73-75). Another violation was found in the case where, over seven years, the applicant was unable to exercise his contact rights under the conditions set by the courts, owing to the opposition of the child's mother and the lack of appropriate measures taken by the domestic courts ( Strumia v. Italy, 2016, §§ 122-125). The role of the domestic courts is thus to ascertain what steps can be taken to overcome existing barriers and to facilitate contact between the child and the noncustodial parent; for example, the fact that the domestic courts had failed to consider any means that would have assisted an applicant in overcoming the barriers arising from his disability (deafness with communication by sign language, while his son was also deaf but could communicate orally) led the Court to find a violation ( Kacper Nowakowski v. Poland, 2017, § 95).","States must also provide measures to ensure that custody determinations and parental rights Raw and Others v. France Vorozhba v. Russia Malec v. Poland are enforced (, 2013;, 2014, § 97;, 2016, § 78). This may, if necessary, include investigation into the whereabouts of the child whose location has been hidden by the other parent ( Hromadka and Hromadkova v. Russia, 2014, § 168). The Court also found that in placing reliance on a series of automatic and stereotyped measures in order to secure the exercise of the father's contact rights in respect of his child, the domestic courts had not taken the appropriate measures to establish a meaningful relationship between the applicant and his child and to make the full exercise of his contact rights possible ( Giorgioni v. Italy, 2016, §§ 75-77; Macready v. the Czech Republic, 2010, § 66; Bondavalli v. Italy, 2015, §§ 81-84). Likewise, a violation was found where no new independent psychiatric evidence concerning the applicant had been taken for around 10 years ( Cincimino v. Italy, 2016, §§ 73-75). Another violation was found in the case where, over seven years, the applicant was unable to exercise his contact rights under the conditions set by the courts, owing to the opposition of the child's mother and the lack of appropriate measures taken by the domestic courts ( Strumia v. Italy, 2016, §§ 122-125; see also Luca v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 90-94). The role of the domestic courts is thus to ascertain what steps can be taken to overcome existing barriers and to facilitate contact between the child and the noncustodial parent; for example, the fact that the domestic courts had failed to consider any means that would have assisted an applicant in overcoming the barriers arising from his disability (deafness with communication by sign language, while his son was also deaf but could communicate orally) led the Court to find a violation ( Kacper Nowakowski v. Poland, 2017, § 95)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:40119/21,M.L. v. Poland,40119/21,added,"M.L. v. Poland, no. 40119/21, 14 December 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.A.1,Applicability in general,4,101,105,0.9989,"M.L. v. Poland , 2023|č and Others v. Slovenia Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania , 2020","Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania , 2020|J.L. v. Italy , 2021|Reklos and Davourlis v. Greece, 2009|č and Others v. Slovenia , 2020","In sum, there is a general acknowledgment in the Court's case-law under Article 8 of the importance of privacy and the values to which it relates (see, for instance, Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, § 95). These values include, among others, well-being and dignity ( Hudorovič and Others v. Slovenia, 2020, §§ 112-116 on living conditions; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, § 117 on psychological dignity), health issues/medical treatment ( Y.P. v. Russia, 2022, §§ 42, 50), personality development ( Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], 2012, § 95) or the right to self-determination ( Pretty v. the United Kingdom, 2002, § 61), physical ( J.L. v. Italy, 2021, § 118), physical and psychological integrity ( Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2021, § 261; Söderman v. Sweden, [GC], § 80; Paketova and Others v. Bulgaria, 2022, § 154), personal identity, of which gender identity was one component ( Y v. France, 2023, §§ 47, 75), relations with other human beings ( Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 159, Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France [GC], 2015, § 83), and the right to respect for the decisions both to have and not to have a child ( A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], 2010, § 212); aspects of social identity ( Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, § 53, including the emotional bonds created and developed between an adult and a child in situations other than the classic situations of kinship, Jessica Marchi v. Italy, 2021, § 62), the protection of personal data 23 ( M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2018, § 87; Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, § 31; Drelon v. France, 2022, § 79; Florindo de Almeida Vasconcelos Gramaxo v. Portugal, 2022, §§ 95-96) and a person's image ( Reklos and Davourlis v. Greece, 2009, § 38). It also covers personal information which individuals can legitimately expect should not be published without their consent ( M.P. v. Portugal, 2021, §§ 33-34) and may extend to certain situations after death ( Polat v. Austria, 2021, § 48 and the references therein).","In sum, there is a general acknowledgment in the Court's case-law under Article 8 of the importance of privacy and the values to which it relates (see, for instance, Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, § 95). These values include, among others, well-being and dignity ( Hudorovič and Others v. Slovenia Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 112-116 on living conditions;, 2020, § 117 on psychological dignity), health issues/medical treatment ( Y.P. v. Russia, 2022, §§ 42, 50), personality development ( Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], 2012, § 95) or the right to self-determination Pretty v. the United Kingdom J.L. v. Italy (, 2002, § 61), physical (, 2021, § 118), physical and psychological integrity ( Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2021, § 261; Söderman v. Sweden, [GC], § 80; Paketova and Others v. Bulgaria, 2022, § 154), personal identity, of which gender identity was one component ( Y v. France, 2023, §§ 47, 75), relations with other human beings Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France ( [GC], 2017, § 159, [GC], 2015, § 83), and the right to respect for the decisions both to have and not to have a child ( A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], 2010, § 212; M.L. v. Poland, 2023, § 91); aspects of social identity ( Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, § 53, including the emotional bonds created and developed between an adult and a child in situations other than the classic situations of kinship, Jessica Marchi v. Italy, 2021, § 62), the protection of personal data 23 ( M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2018, § 87; Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, § 31; Drelon v. France, 2022, § 79; Florindo de Almeida Vasconcelos Gramaxo v. Portugal, 2022, §§ 95-96) Reklos and Davourlis v. Greece, and a person's image ( 2009, § 38). It also covers personal information which individuals can legitimately expect should not be published without their consent ( M.P. v. Portugal, 2021, §§ 33-34) and may extend to certain situations after death ( Polat v. Austria, 2021, § 48 and the references therein)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:40119/21,M.L. v. Poland,40119/21,added,"M.L. v. Poland, no. 40119/21, 14 December 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.B.2,Reproductive rights,4,132,136,0.9849,"M.L. v. Poland , 2023|ąc v. Poland , 2012","P. and S. v. Poland , 2012","The Court has found that the prohibition of abortion when sought for reasons of health and/or wellbeing falls within the scope of the right to respect for one's private life and accordingly within Article 8 ( A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], 2010, §§ 214 and 245). In particular, the Court held in this context that the State's obligations include both the provision of a regulatory framework of adjudication and enforcement machinery protecting individuals'rights, and the implementation, where appropriate, of specific measures ( ibid., § 245; Tysiąc v. Poland, 2007, § 110; R.R. v. Poland, 2011, § 184). Indeed, once the State, acting within its limits of appreciation, adopts statutory regulations allowing abortion in some situations, the legal framework derived for this purpose should be shaped in a coherent manner which allows the different legitimate interests involved to be taken into account adequately and in accordance with the obligations deriving from the Convention ( A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], 2010, § 249; R. R. v. Poland, § 187; P. and S. v. Poland, 2012, § 99; Tysiąc v. Poland, 2007, § 116).","The Court has found that the prohibition of abortion when sought for reasons of health and/or well-being falls within the scope of the right to respect for one's private life and accordingly within Article 8 ( A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], 2010, §§ 214 and 245; M.L. v. Poland, 2023, §§ 93-94). In particular, the Court held in this context that the State's obligations include both the provision of a regulatory framework of adjudication and enforcement machinery protecting individuals' rights, and the implementation, where appropriate, of specific measures ( A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], 2010, § 245; Tysiąc v. Poland, 2007, § 110; R.R. v. Poland, 2011, § 184). Indeed, once the State, acting within its limits of appreciation, adopts statutory regulations allowing abortion in some situations, the legal framework derived for this purpose should be shaped in a coherent manner which allows the different legitimate interests involved to be taken into account adequately and in accordance with the obligations deriving from the Convention ( A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], 2010, § 249; R. R. v. Poland, § 187; P. and S. v. Poland Tysiąc v. Poland, 2012, § 99;, 2007, § 116)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:40119/21,M.L. v. Poland,40119/21,added,"M.L. v. Poland, no. 40119/21, 14 December 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.2,Reproductive rights,4,133,137,0.9928,"M.L. v. Poland , 2023",,"In P. and S. v. Poland, 2012, the Court reiterated that the notion of private life within the meaning of Article 8 applies both to decisions to become and not to become a parent (see also Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2007, § 71; R.R. v. Poland, 2011, § 180; Dickson v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2007, § 66; Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 163 and 215). In fact, the concept of ""private life"" does not exclude the emotional bonds created and developed between an adult and a child in situations other than the classic situations of kinship. This type of bond also pertains to individuals'life and social identity. In certain cases involving a relationship between adults and a child where there are no biological or legal ties the facts may nonetheless fall within the scope of ""private life"" ( Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 161).","In P. and S. v. Poland, 2012, the Court reiterated that the notion of private life within the meaning of Article 8 applies both to decisions to become and not to become a parent (see also Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2007, § 71; R.R. v. Poland, 2011, § 180; Dickson v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2007, § 66; Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 163 and 215; M.L. v. Poland, 2023, § 91). In fact, the concept of ""private life"" does not exclude the emotional bonds created and developed between an adult and a child in situations other than the classic situations of kinship. This type of bond also pertains to individuals' life and social identity. In certain cases involving a relationship between adults and a child where there are no biological or legal ties the facts may nonetheless fall within the scope of ""private life"" ( Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 161)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:62020/14,Moldovan v. Ukraine*,62020/14,added,"Moldovan v. Ukraine*, no. 62020/14, 14 March 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A.1,Applicability in general,4,,92,,,,,"in addition, the right of a child born out of wedlock to determine the legal relationship between him or her and his or her natural parent, even if the latter has died, falls within the scope of concept Mikulić v. Croatia Moldovan v. Ukraine* of ""private life"" (, 2002, § 53;, 2024, §§ 32 and 35)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:62020/14,Moldovan v. Ukraine*,62020/14,added,"Moldovan v. Ukraine*, no. 62020/14, 14 March 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.D.1,Right to personal development and autonomy,4,,284,,"Moldovan v. Ukraine , 2024|ć v. Croatia , 2002",,,"The Court has stated on a number of occasions that DNAtesting to establish paternity now constitutes a simple and very reliable method and that ""its probative value substantially outweighs any other evidence presented by the parties to prove or disprove the fact of an intimate relationship"" ( Moldovan v. Ukraine, 2024, § 47). Whilst it is not compulsory for States to DNAtest alleged fathers, the legal system must provide alternative means enabling an independent authority to speedily determine a paternity claim. For example in Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 52-55, the applicant was born out of an extramarital relationship and complained that the Croatian judicial system had been inefficient in determining the issue of paternity, leaving her uncertain as to her personal identity. In that case the Court held that the inefficiency of the domestic courts had left the applicant in a state of prolonged uncertainty as to her personal identity. The Croatian authorities had therefore failed to secure to the applicant the ""respect"" for her private life to which she was entitled under the ibid. Moldovan v. Ukraine Convention (, § 68). Likewise, in, 2024, §§ 46, 52-53, the applicant was unable to have the paternity of his biological father recognised by the national courts despite the fact that the DNAtest had confirmed parentage. The domestic courts refused to consider the DNAtest results as conclusive evidence, with reference to the then Family Code of 1969 which made proof of cohabitation indispensable for the recognition of paternity. The Court observed that the effects of such an approach were comparable with those of inflexible time-limits or other procedural limitations which made it impossible to establish or challenge paternity, in particular using new testing methods. It concluded that that approach of the domestic courts, combined with their failure to deal with the DNAevidence with sufficient thoroughness, amounted to a breach of their positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:62020/14,Moldovan v. Ukraine*,62020/14,added,"Moldovan v. Ukraine*, no. 62020/14, 14 March 2024",3,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,III.D.6,Material interests,4,437,452,0.9396,"Belli and Arquier - Martinez v. Switzerland , 2018|Colombier v. France , 2024","Belli and Arquier-Martinez v. Switzerland , 2018|čeva v. Lithuania , 2021",""" Family life "" does not include only social, moral or cultural relations; it also comprises interests of a material kind ( Belli and Arquier-Martinez v. Switzerland, 2018, § 59; Di Trizio v. Switzerland, 2016, § 60), as is shown by, among other things, maintenance obligations and the position occupied in the domestic legal systems of the majority of the Contracting States by the institution of the reserved portion of an estate (in French, ""réserve héréditaire""). The Court has thus accepted that the right of succession between children and parents, and between grandchildren and grandparents, is so closely related to family life that it comes within the ambit of Article 8 ( Marckx v. Belgium, 1979, § 52; Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra, 2004, § 26). According to Şerife Yiğit v. Turkey [GC], 2010, questions of inheritance and voluntary dispositions between near relatives appear to be intimately connected with family life (§ 95) (see also Makarčeva v. Lithuania, 2021, § 58). Article 8 does not, however, require that a child should be entitled to be recognised as the heir of a deceased person for inheritance purposes ( Haas v. the Netherlands, 2004, § 43).","""Family life"" does not include only social, moral or cultural relations; it also comprises interests of a material kind ( Belli and Arquier - Martinez v. Switzerland, 2018, § 59; Di Trizio v. Switzerland, 2016, § 60), as is shown by, among other things, maintenance obligations and the position occupied in the domestic legal systems of the majority of the Contracting States by the institution of the reserved portion of an estate (in French, ""réserve héréditaire""). The Court has thus accepted that the right of succession between children and parents, and between grandchildren and grandparents, is so closely related to family life that it comes within the ambit of Article 8 ( Marckx v. Belgium, 1979, § 52; Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra, 2004, § 26; Colombier v. France, 2024, § 35). According to Şerife Yiğit v. Turkey [GC], 2010, questions of inheritance and voluntary dispositions between near relatives Makarčeva v. Lithuania appear to be intimately connected with family life (§ 95) (see also, 2021, § 58). Article 8 does not, however, require that a child should be entitled to be recognised as the heir of a deceased person for inheritance purposes ( Haas v. the Netherlands, 2004, § 43). Conversely, where the applicant, who had sought to have the paternity of his deceased biological father recognised, had claimed before the domestic courts that he wished to inherit from his father but also sought to show that the deceased had maintained relations with him and his mother, the Court considered that the right claimed by the applicant disclosed sufficient relevant elements to fall within the scope of ""private Moldovan v. Ukraine life"" (, 2024, § 35)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:54366/08,Naltakyan v. Russia,54366/08,added,"Naltakyan v. Russia, no. 54366/08, 20 April 2021",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.A,Definition of family life and the meaning of family,3,319,329,0.9953,"Naltakyan v. Russia , 2021",,"Achild born of a marital relationship is ipso jure part of that ""family"" unit from the moment and by the very fact of his or her birth ( Berrehab v. the Netherlands, 1988, § 21). Thus, there exists between the child and its parents a bond amounting to family life. The existence or non-existence of ""family life"" within the meaning of Article 8 is a question of fact depending upon the real existence in practice of close personal ties, for instance the demonstrable interest and commitment by the father to the child both before and after birth ( L. v. the Netherlands, 2004, § 36).","Achild born of a marital relationship is ipso jure part of that ""family"" unit from the moment and by the very fact of his or her birth ( Berrehab v. the Netherlands, 1988, § 21; Naltakyan v. Russia, 2021, §§ 157-58). Thus, there exists between the child and its parents a bond amounting to family life. The existence or non-existence of ""family life"" within the meaning of Article 8 is a question of fact depending upon the real existence in practice of close personal ties, for instance the demonstrable interest and commitment by the father to the child both before and after birth ( L. v. the Netherlands, 2004, § 36)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:54366/08,Naltakyan v. Russia,54366/08,added,"Naltakyan v. Russia, no. 54366/08, 20 April 2021",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.D.c,Ties between natural father and children,4,,373,,"I.V. v. Estonia , 2023|Uzbyakov v. Russia , 2020",,,"In two cases where natural fathers had unsuccessfully attempted to have adoption of their children by third persons - which had been ordered for reasons outside of those fathers' control and without their knowledge, let alone consent - annulled, the Court reproached the domestic authorities' lack of diligence, and, in particular, failure to establish all relevant circumstances before allowing the adoption ( Uzbyakov v. Russia, 2020, §§ 116-18; I.V. v. Estonia, 2023, §§ 88, 103-106) as well as the excessive formalism in the subsequent examination of those fathers' requests for annulment of the adoption orders. In the latter respect, the Court observed that the domestic courts' reliance on the absence under domestic law of formal grounds for revoking the adoption orders could not be regarded as a ""sufficient"" consideration in seeking to strike a fair balance between the competing interests at stake ( Uzbyakov v. Russia, 2020, §§ 122-23, 126; I.V. v. Estonia, 2023, §§ 114-15; see also as regards the failure of the domestic courts to perform an in-depth examination of all relevant facts in a similar Naltakyan v. Russia context,, 2021, §§ 185-92)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:25226/18,Pająk and Others v. Poland,25226/18,added,"Pająk and Others v. Poland, nos. 25226/18 and 3 others, 24 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.A.2,Professional and business activities,4,106,110,0.9855,"Others v. Armenia , 2023|ău v. Romania , 2023|ąk and Others v. Poland , 2023|ş Bingöllü v. Turkey , 2021","Camelia Bogdan v. Romania , 2020|Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria , 2012|ş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021","More recently, in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, the Court, recalling a number of relevant precedents (§§ 101, 104-105, 108 and 109), set out the principles by which to assess whether employment- related disputes fall within the scope of ""private life"" under Article 8 (§ § 115-117; see also J.B. and Others v. Hungary (dec.), 2018, §§ 127-129). The Court held that there are some typical aspects of private life which may be affected in such disputes by dismissal, demotion, non-admission to a profession or other similarly unfavourable measures. In this case, the applicant was dismissed from his post as the president of a court on the basis of a failure to perform his administrative duties (managerial skills) properly. Whilst he was dismissed as president, he remained a judge in the same court. The Court did not find Article 8 applicable in this case. This was because, according to the Court, the decision concerned only his managerial skills while his professional role as a judge was not touched upon. Further, the decision did not affect his future career as a judge and neither did the decision call into question the moral or ethical aspect of his personality and character. In summary, in this situation, the dismissal had limited negative effects on the applicant's private life and did not cross the ""threshold of seriousness"" for an issue to be raised under Article 8 ( Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, §§ 126-133; see also Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, §§ 83-92, Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2012, §§ 136-145 including on the pecuniary aspect, and Gražulevičiūtė v. Lithuania, 2021, §§ 101-110, in which the Court found that disciplinary proceedings did not reach the ""threshold of seriousness"" required to engage Article 8 ; see also in another context, Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021). Following Denisov, employment-related disputes will generally only engage Article 8 either where a person loses a job because of something he of she did in private life (reason-based approach) or when the loss of job impacts on private life (consequence-based approach) (§§ 115-117). Thereafter, the consequence-based approach was applied to the prospective employment context (the consequences of a decision for the applicant's employment prospects in the civil service, and more specifically on her chances of obtaining a post as a research assistant in a public university, see Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 55-62). The test was found to have been met in the case of Constitutional Court judges dismissed for ""breach of oath"", since their dismissal had a serious impact on their inner circle, given the ensuing pecuniary losses, and on their reputation, given that the grounds for the dismissal directly concerned their personal integrity and professional competence ( Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 86). It was also found to have been met in the case of a judge suspended for over two years for having undermined the authority of the court by investigating the independence of a first instance judge ( Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, §§ 228-237).","More recently, in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, the Court, recalling a number of relevant precedents (§§ 101, 104-105, 108 and 109), set out the principles by which to assess whether employment-related disputes fall within the scope of ""private life"" under Article 8 (§§ 115-117; see also J.B. and Others v. Hungary (dec.), 2018, §§ 127-129). The Court held that there are some typical aspects of private life which may be affected in such disputes by dismissal, demotion, non-admission to a profession or other similarly unfavourable measures. In this case, the applicant was dismissed from his post as the president of a court on the basis of a failure to perform his administrative duties (managerial skills) properly. Whilst he was dismissed as president, he remained a judge in the same court. The Court did not find Article 8 applicable in this case. This was because, according to the Court, the decision concerned only his managerial skills while his professional role as a judge was not touched upon. Further, the decision did not affect his future career as a judge and neither did the decision call into question the moral or ethical aspect of his personality and character. In summary, in this situation, the dismissal had limited negative effects on the applicant's private life and did not cross the ""threshold of seriousness"" for an issue to be raised under Article 8 ( Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, Camelia Bogdan v. Romania Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria §§ 126-133; see also, 2020, §§ 83-92,, 2012, §§ 136-145 including on the pecuniary aspect, and Gražulevičiūtė v. Lithuania, 2021, §§ 101-110, in which the Court found that disciplinary proceedings did not reach the ""threshold of seriousness"" required to engage Article 8; see also in another context, Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, Denisov 2021). Following, employment-related disputes will generally only engage Article 8 either where a person loses a job because of something he or she did in private life (reason-based approach) or when the loss of job impacts on private life (consequence-based approach) (§§ 115-117). Thereafter, the consequence-based approach was applied to the prospective employment context (the consequences of a decision for the applicant's employment prospects in the civil service, and more specifically on her chances of obtaining a post as a research assistant in a public university, see Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 55-62). The test was found to have been met in the case of Constitutional Court judges dismissed for ""breach of oath"", since their dismissal had a serious impact on their inner circle, given the ensuing pecuniary losses, and on their reputation, given that the grounds for the dismissal directly concerned their personal integrity and professional competence ( Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 86). It was also found to have been met in the case of a judge suspended for over two years for having undermined the authority of the court by investigating the independence of a first instance judge ( Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, §§ 228-237) and in the case of a judge suspended for over two years following his indictment on charges unrelated to his judicial Pengezov v. Bulgaria duties (, 2023, §§ 67-72). It was also found to have been met in the case of female judges who were forced into early retirement ( Pająk and Others v. Poland, 2023, §§ 214-20). However, it was not found to have been met where Constitutional Court judges, originally appointed with life Gyulumyan and tenure, had their terms of office terminated as a result of a constitutional reform ( Others v. Armenia, 2023). The Court also found that the test had been met in the case of a lay teacher of Orthodox religion at a secondary public school whose employment had been automatically terminated after the withdrawal of her endorsement by an Archbishop ( Ţîmpău v. Romania, 2023)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:66292/14,Pengezov v. Bulgaria,66292/14,added,"Pengezov v. Bulgaria, no. 66292/14, 10 October 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.A.2,Professional and business activities,4,106,110,0.9855,"Others v. Armenia , 2023|ău v. Romania , 2023|ąk and Others v. Poland , 2023|ş Bingöllü v. Turkey , 2021","Camelia Bogdan v. Romania , 2020|Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria , 2012|ş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021","More recently, in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, the Court, recalling a number of relevant precedents (§§ 101, 104-105, 108 and 109), set out the principles by which to assess whether employment- related disputes fall within the scope of ""private life"" under Article 8 (§ § 115-117; see also J.B. and Others v. Hungary (dec.), 2018, §§ 127-129). The Court held that there are some typical aspects of private life which may be affected in such disputes by dismissal, demotion, non-admission to a profession or other similarly unfavourable measures. In this case, the applicant was dismissed from his post as the president of a court on the basis of a failure to perform his administrative duties (managerial skills) properly. Whilst he was dismissed as president, he remained a judge in the same court. The Court did not find Article 8 applicable in this case. This was because, according to the Court, the decision concerned only his managerial skills while his professional role as a judge was not touched upon. Further, the decision did not affect his future career as a judge and neither did the decision call into question the moral or ethical aspect of his personality and character. In summary, in this situation, the dismissal had limited negative effects on the applicant's private life and did not cross the ""threshold of seriousness"" for an issue to be raised under Article 8 ( Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, §§ 126-133; see also Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, §§ 83-92, Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2012, §§ 136-145 including on the pecuniary aspect, and Gražulevičiūtė v. Lithuania, 2021, §§ 101-110, in which the Court found that disciplinary proceedings did not reach the ""threshold of seriousness"" required to engage Article 8 ; see also in another context, Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021). Following Denisov, employment-related disputes will generally only engage Article 8 either where a person loses a job because of something he of she did in private life (reason-based approach) or when the loss of job impacts on private life (consequence-based approach) (§§ 115-117). Thereafter, the consequence-based approach was applied to the prospective employment context (the consequences of a decision for the applicant's employment prospects in the civil service, and more specifically on her chances of obtaining a post as a research assistant in a public university, see Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 55-62). The test was found to have been met in the case of Constitutional Court judges dismissed for ""breach of oath"", since their dismissal had a serious impact on their inner circle, given the ensuing pecuniary losses, and on their reputation, given that the grounds for the dismissal directly concerned their personal integrity and professional competence ( Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 86). It was also found to have been met in the case of a judge suspended for over two years for having undermined the authority of the court by investigating the independence of a first instance judge ( Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, §§ 228-237).","More recently, in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, the Court, recalling a number of relevant precedents (§§ 101, 104-105, 108 and 109), set out the principles by which to assess whether employment-related disputes fall within the scope of ""private life"" under Article 8 (§§ 115-117; see also J.B. and Others v. Hungary (dec.), 2018, §§ 127-129). The Court held that there are some typical aspects of private life which may be affected in such disputes by dismissal, demotion, non-admission to a profession or other similarly unfavourable measures. In this case, the applicant was dismissed from his post as the president of a court on the basis of a failure to perform his administrative duties (managerial skills) properly. Whilst he was dismissed as president, he remained a judge in the same court. The Court did not find Article 8 applicable in this case. This was because, according to the Court, the decision concerned only his managerial skills while his professional role as a judge was not touched upon. Further, the decision did not affect his future career as a judge and neither did the decision call into question the moral or ethical aspect of his personality and character. In summary, in this situation, the dismissal had limited negative effects on the applicant's private life and did not cross the ""threshold of seriousness"" for an issue to be raised under Article 8 ( Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, Camelia Bogdan v. Romania Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria §§ 126-133; see also, 2020, §§ 83-92,, 2012, §§ 136-145 including on the pecuniary aspect, and Gražulevičiūtė v. Lithuania, 2021, §§ 101-110, in which the Court found that disciplinary proceedings did not reach the ""threshold of seriousness"" required to engage Article 8; see also in another context, Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, Denisov 2021). Following, employment-related disputes will generally only engage Article 8 either where a person loses a job because of something he or she did in private life (reason-based approach) or when the loss of job impacts on private life (consequence-based approach) (§§ 115-117). Thereafter, the consequence-based approach was applied to the prospective employment context (the consequences of a decision for the applicant's employment prospects in the civil service, and more specifically on her chances of obtaining a post as a research assistant in a public university, see Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 55-62). The test was found to have been met in the case of Constitutional Court judges dismissed for ""breach of oath"", since their dismissal had a serious impact on their inner circle, given the ensuing pecuniary losses, and on their reputation, given that the grounds for the dismissal directly concerned their personal integrity and professional competence ( Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 86). It was also found to have been met in the case of a judge suspended for over two years for having undermined the authority of the court by investigating the independence of a first instance judge ( Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, §§ 228-237) and in the case of a judge suspended for over two years following his indictment on charges unrelated to his judicial Pengezov v. Bulgaria duties (, 2023, §§ 67-72). It was also found to have been met in the case of female judges who were forced into early retirement ( Pająk and Others v. Poland, 2023, §§ 214-20). However, it was not found to have been met where Constitutional Court judges, originally appointed with life Gyulumyan and tenure, had their terms of office terminated as a result of a constitutional reform ( Others v. Armenia, 2023). The Court also found that the test had been met in the case of a lay teacher of Orthodox religion at a secondary public school whose employment had been automatically terminated after the withdrawal of her endorsement by an Archbishop ( Ţîmpău v. Romania, 2023)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:33696/19,Podchasov v. Russia,33696/19,added,"Podchasov v. Russia, no. 33696/19, 13 February 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C,"In the case of a negative obligation, was the interference conducted “in accordance with the law”?",3,23,24,0.998,"Podchasov v. Russia , 2024",,"Afinding that the measure in question was not ""in accordance with the law"" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a ""legitimate aim"" or was ""necessary in a democratic society"" ( M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be ""in accordance with the law"", as a result of a n unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 ( Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been "" neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society "" (§§ 62-63). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be ""in accordance with the law"" was so closely linked to the ""necessary in a democratic society"" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78).","Afinding that the measure in question was not ""in accordance with the law"" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a ""legitimate aim"" or was ""necessary in a democratic society"" ( M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be ""in accordance with the law"", as a result of an unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 ( Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been ""neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society"" (§§ 62-63). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be ""in accordance with the law"" was so closely linked to the ""necessary in a democratic society"" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 66)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:33696/19,Podchasov v. Russia,33696/19,added,"Podchasov v. Russia, no. 33696/19, 13 February 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.C,Privacy,3,190,196,0.9068,"Podchasov v. Russia , 2024",,"As regards online activities, information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses facilitating the identification of the author of such activities, constitutes, in principle, personal data which are not accessible to the public. The use of such data may therefore fall within the scope of Article 8 ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 107-108). In that regard, the fact that the applicant had not concealed his dynamic IPaddress had not been a decisive factor for assessing whether his expectation of privacy had been reasonable (§ 116). Conversely, the anonymity linked to online activities is an important factor which must be taken into account (§ 117).","Users of telecommunications and Internet services must have a guarantee that their own privacy will be respected, although such a guarantee cannot be absolute and must yield on occasion to other legitimate imperatives, such as the prevention of disorder and crime or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others ( Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 65). In particular, as regards online activities, information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses facilitating the identification of the author of such activities, constitutes, in principle, personal data which are not accessible to the public. The use of such data may therefore fall within the scope of Article 8 ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 107-108). In that regard, the fact that the applicant had not concealed his dynamic IPaddress had not been a decisive factor for assessing whether his expectation of privacy had been reasonable (§ 116). Conversely, the anonymity linked to online activities is an important factor which must be taken into account (§ 117)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:33696/19,Podchasov v. Russia,33696/19,added,"Podchasov v. Russia, no. 33696/19, 13 February 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.6,File or data gathering by security services or other organs of the State,4,,239,,"Klass and Others v. Germany , 1978|Podchasov v. Russia 2006|Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others v. Sweden , 2006|Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary , 2016|Zoltán Varga v. Slovakia , 2021",,,"The mere existence of legislation which allows a system for the secret monitoring of communications entails a threat of surveillance for all those to whom the legislation may be applied Weber and Saravia v. Germany ( (dec.), 2006, § 78). While domestic legislatures and national authorities enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in which to assess what system of surveillance is required, the Contracting States do not enjoy unlimited discretion to subject persons within their jurisdiction to secret surveillance ( Zoltán Varga v. Slovakia, 2021, § 151). The Court has affirmed that the Contracting States may not, in the name of the struggle against espionage and terrorism, adopt whatever measures they deem appropriate; rather, whatever system of surveillance is adopted, there must be adequate and effective guarantees against abuse ( Weber and Saravia v. Germany (dec.), Podchasov v. Russia 2006, § 106; see also, 2024, § 62). Powers of secret surveillance of citizens are tolerable only in so far as strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic institutions ( Klass and Others v. Germany, 1978, § 42; Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, 2016, §§ 72-73). Such interference must be supported by relevant and sufficient reasons and must be proportionate to the legitimate aim or aims pursued ( Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others v. Sweden, 2006, § 88)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:33696/19,Podchasov v. Russia,33696/19,added,"Podchasov v. Russia, no. 33696/19, 13 February 2024",4,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.6,File or data gathering by security services or other organs of the State,4,,240,,"Sârbu v. Romania , 2023",,,"The Court found the recording of a conversation by a remote radio-transmitting device during a police covert operation without procedural safeguards to be a violation ( Bykov v. Russia [GC], 2009, Oleynik v. Russia §§ 81 and 83;, 2016, §§ 75-79). Similarly, the systematic collection and storing of data by security services on particular individuals constituted an interference with these persons' private lives, even if such data were collected in a public place ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 59; P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, §§ 57-59) or concerned exclusively the person's professional or public activities ( Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, §§ 65-67; Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44). The Court has also held that the use in criminal proceedings against an applicant, of recordings made by a co-accused at the registered office of the applicant's company, interfered with his rights under Article 8 ( Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, § 39-43). In the context of a collection, through a GPSdevice attached to a person's car, and storage of data concerning that person's whereabouts and movements Uzun v. Germany in the public sphere was also found to constitute an interference with private life (, 2010, §§ 51-53). Astorage of Internet communications and related communications data required by law, even if carried out by private actors (Internet communications organisers), will be attributable to Podchasov v. Russia the relevant State and thus will amount to an interference (, 2024, § 51)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:33696/19,Podchasov v. Russia,33696/19,added,"Podchasov v. Russia, no. 33696/19, 13 February 2024",5,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.C.7,Police surveillance,4,645,248,0.8523,"Ekimdzhiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2022|Podchasov v. Russia , 2024|ć v. Croatia , 2015|İrfan Güzel v. Turkey , 2017","Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria , 2007|Kvasnica v. Slovakia , 2009","It should be noted that in cases where the legislation permitting secret surveillance is itself contested, the lawfulness of the interference is closely related to the question whether the ""necessity"" test has been complied with, and it is therefore appropriate to address jointly the ""in accordance with the law"" and ""necessity"" requirements ( Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84). The ""quality of law"" in this sense implies that the domestic law must not only be accessible and foreseeable in its application, it must also ensure that secret surveillance measures are applied only when ""necessary in a democratic society"", in particular by providing for adequate and effective safeguards and guarantees against abuse ( Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 236). In the case cited, it was not disputed that the interceptions of mobile telephone communications had a basis in domestic law and pursued legitimate aims for the purposes of Article 8 § 2, namely the protection of national security and public safety, the prevention of crime and the protection of the economic wellbeing of the country. However, that is not enough. It is necessary also to assess the accessibility of the domestic law, the scope and duration of the secret surveillance measures, the procedures to be followed for storing, accessing, examining, using, communicating and destroying the intercepted data, the authorisation procedures, the arrangements for supervising the implementation of the measures, and any notification mechanisms and the remedies provided for by national law ( ibid., §§ 238-301), but also to verify, in so far as the available information permits, whether any shortcomings have an impact on the actual operation of the system of secret surveillance which exists ( Association for European Integration and Human Rights, and Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 92; see also, as regards bulk regimes, Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden [GC], 2022, § 274 and Big Brother Watch and Others v. The United Kingdom [GC], 2021, § 360).","Tapping and other forms of interception of telephone conversations represent a serious interference with private life and correspondence (see, for instance Dragojević v. Croatia, 2015, §§ 94-98) and must accordingly be based on a law that is precise. It is essential to have clear, detailed rules on the subject, especially as the technology available for use is continually becoming more Kruslin v. France sophisticated (, 1990, § 33). When balancing the respondent State's interest in protecting its national security through secret surveillance measures against the seriousness of the interference with an applicant's right to respect for his or her private life, the national authorities enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in choosing the means for achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national security. However, there must be adequate and effective safeguards against abuse. The Court thus takes into account the circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope and duration of the possible measures, the grounds required for ordering them, the authorities competent to authorise, carry out and supervise them, and the kind of remedy provided by the national law ( Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 232; İrfan Güzel v. Turkey, 2017, § 85, Ekimdzhiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2022, §§ 418 and 419[f]; see also Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2021; Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden [GC], 2022; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, §§)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:42541/18,Tena Arregui v. Spain,42541/18,added,"Tena Arregui v. Spain, no. 42541/18, 11 January 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,III.V.1,Scope of the concept of “correspondence”,4,528,543,0.9892,"Tena Arregui v. Spain , 2024","Saber v. Norway , 2020|Särgava v. Estonia , 2021","Technologies also come within the scope of Article 8, in particular data from a smart phone/lap top and/or the mirror image copy of it ( Saber v. Norway, 2020, § 48; Särgava v. Estonia, 2021), electronic messages (emails) ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 41; Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 72; for emails exchanged with correspondents on a casual dating site, see M.P. v. Portugal, 2021, § 34), Internet use ( Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 81 and Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, §§ 41-42), and data stored on computer servers ( Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria, 2007, § 45), including hard drives ( Petri Sallinen and Others v. Finland, 2005, § 71) and floppy disks ( Iliya Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2008, § 42).","Technologies also come within the scope of Article 8, in particular data from a smart phone/lap Saber v. Norway Särgava v. Estonia top and/or the mirror image copy of it (, 2020, § 48;, 2021), electronic messages (emails) ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 41; Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 72; Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 31; for emails exchanged with correspondents on a casual dating site, see M.P. v. Portugal, 2021, § 34), Internet use ( Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 81 and Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, §§ 41-42), and data stored on computer servers ( Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria, 2007, § 45), including hard drives ( Petri Sallinen and Others v. Finland, 2005, § 71) and floppy disks ( Iliya Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2008, § 42). Christie v. the"
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:42541/18,Tena Arregui v. Spain,42541/18,added,"Tena Arregui v. Spain, no. 42541/18, 11 January 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,III.V.2,Positive obligations,4,534,549,0.9904,"Tena Arregui v. Spain , 2024",,"To date, the Court has identified several positive obligations for States in connection with the right to respect for correspondence, for instance: ▪ the State's positive obligation when it comes to communications of a non-professional nature in the workplace ( Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 113 and 115-120). ▪ an obligation to prevent disclosure into the public domain of private conversations ( Craxi v. Italy (no 2), §§ 68-76; mutatis mutandis, M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022, § 57 ); ▪ an obligation to provide prisoners with the necessary materials to correspond with the Court in Strasbourg ( Cotleţ v. Romania, 2003, §§ 60-65; Gagiu v. Romania, 2009, §§ 91-92); ▪ an obligation to execute a Constitutional Court judgment ordering the destruction of audio cassettes containing recordings of telephone conversations between a lawyer and his client ( Chadimová v. the Czech Republic, 2006, § 146); ▪ an obligation to strike a fair balance between the right to respect for correspondence and the right to freedom of expression ( Benediktsdóttir v. Iceland (dec.), 2009); and ▪ an obligation to investigate the violation of the confidentiality of the applicant's correspondence in the context of domestic violence ( Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, where the applicant's former husband had improperly consulted her electronic accounts, including her Facebook account, and had made copies of her private conversations, documents and photographs). ▪ an obligation to protect the confidentiality of emails exchanged by the applicant on a dating website, produced without her consent by her ex-husband in civil proceedings regarding parental responsibility and divorce ( M.P. v. Portugal, 2021, § 44).","To date, the Court has identified several positive obligations for States in connection with the right to respect for correspondence, for instance:  the State's positive obligation when it comes to communications of a non-professional nature in the workplace ( Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 113 and 115-120);  an obligation to prevent disclosure into the public domain of private conversations ( Craxi v. Italy (no 2), §§ 68-76; mutatis mutandis, M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022, § 57 );  an obligation to provide prisoners with the necessary materials to correspond with the Court in Strasbourg ( Cotleţ v. Romania, 2003, §§ 60-65; Gagiu v. Romania, 2009, §§ 91-92);  an obligation to execute a Constitutional Court judgment ordering the destruction of audio cassettes containing recordings of telephone conversations between a lawyer and his client ( Chadimová v. the Czech Republic, 2006, § 146);  an obligation to strike a fair balance between the right to respect for correspondence and the right to freedom of expression ( Benediktsdóttir v. Iceland (dec.), 2009);  a positive obligation in the context of monitoring by a political party of emails of its members ( Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 35)  an obligation to investigate the violation of the confidentiality of the applicant's correspondence in the context of domestic violence ( Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, where the applicant's former husband had improperly consulted her electronic accounts, including her Facebook account, and had made copies of her private conversations, documents and photographs);  an obligation to protect the confidentiality of emails exchanged by the applicant on a dating website, produced without her consent by her ex-husband in civil proceedings regarding parental responsibility and divorce ( M.P. v. Portugal, 2021, § 44)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:70267/17,Ţîmpău v. Romania,70267/17,added,"Ţîmpău v. Romania, no. 70267/17, 5 December 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.A.2,Professional and business activities,4,106,110,0.9855,"Others v. Armenia , 2023|ău v. Romania , 2023|ąk and Others v. Poland , 2023|ş Bingöllü v. Turkey , 2021","Camelia Bogdan v. Romania , 2020|Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria , 2012|ş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021","More recently, in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, the Court, recalling a number of relevant precedents (§§ 101, 104-105, 108 and 109), set out the principles by which to assess whether employment- related disputes fall within the scope of ""private life"" under Article 8 (§ § 115-117; see also J.B. and Others v. Hungary (dec.), 2018, §§ 127-129). The Court held that there are some typical aspects of private life which may be affected in such disputes by dismissal, demotion, non-admission to a profession or other similarly unfavourable measures. In this case, the applicant was dismissed from his post as the president of a court on the basis of a failure to perform his administrative duties (managerial skills) properly. Whilst he was dismissed as president, he remained a judge in the same court. The Court did not find Article 8 applicable in this case. This was because, according to the Court, the decision concerned only his managerial skills while his professional role as a judge was not touched upon. Further, the decision did not affect his future career as a judge and neither did the decision call into question the moral or ethical aspect of his personality and character. In summary, in this situation, the dismissal had limited negative effects on the applicant's private life and did not cross the ""threshold of seriousness"" for an issue to be raised under Article 8 ( Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, §§ 126-133; see also Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, 2020, §§ 83-92, Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2012, §§ 136-145 including on the pecuniary aspect, and Gražulevičiūtė v. Lithuania, 2021, §§ 101-110, in which the Court found that disciplinary proceedings did not reach the ""threshold of seriousness"" required to engage Article 8 ; see also in another context, Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021). Following Denisov, employment-related disputes will generally only engage Article 8 either where a person loses a job because of something he of she did in private life (reason-based approach) or when the loss of job impacts on private life (consequence-based approach) (§§ 115-117). Thereafter, the consequence-based approach was applied to the prospective employment context (the consequences of a decision for the applicant's employment prospects in the civil service, and more specifically on her chances of obtaining a post as a research assistant in a public university, see Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 55-62). The test was found to have been met in the case of Constitutional Court judges dismissed for ""breach of oath"", since their dismissal had a serious impact on their inner circle, given the ensuing pecuniary losses, and on their reputation, given that the grounds for the dismissal directly concerned their personal integrity and professional competence ( Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 86). It was also found to have been met in the case of a judge suspended for over two years for having undermined the authority of the court by investigating the independence of a first instance judge ( Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, §§ 228-237).","More recently, in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, the Court, recalling a number of relevant precedents (§§ 101, 104-105, 108 and 109), set out the principles by which to assess whether employment-related disputes fall within the scope of ""private life"" under Article 8 (§§ 115-117; see also J.B. and Others v. Hungary (dec.), 2018, §§ 127-129). The Court held that there are some typical aspects of private life which may be affected in such disputes by dismissal, demotion, non-admission to a profession or other similarly unfavourable measures. In this case, the applicant was dismissed from his post as the president of a court on the basis of a failure to perform his administrative duties (managerial skills) properly. Whilst he was dismissed as president, he remained a judge in the same court. The Court did not find Article 8 applicable in this case. This was because, according to the Court, the decision concerned only his managerial skills while his professional role as a judge was not touched upon. Further, the decision did not affect his future career as a judge and neither did the decision call into question the moral or ethical aspect of his personality and character. In summary, in this situation, the dismissal had limited negative effects on the applicant's private life and did not cross the ""threshold of seriousness"" for an issue to be raised under Article 8 ( Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, Camelia Bogdan v. Romania Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria §§ 126-133; see also, 2020, §§ 83-92,, 2012, §§ 136-145 including on the pecuniary aspect, and Gražulevičiūtė v. Lithuania, 2021, §§ 101-110, in which the Court found that disciplinary proceedings did not reach the ""threshold of seriousness"" required to engage Article 8; see also in another context, Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, Denisov 2021). Following, employment-related disputes will generally only engage Article 8 either where a person loses a job because of something he or she did in private life (reason-based approach) or when the loss of job impacts on private life (consequence-based approach) (§§ 115-117). Thereafter, the consequence-based approach was applied to the prospective employment context (the consequences of a decision for the applicant's employment prospects in the civil service, and more specifically on her chances of obtaining a post as a research assistant in a public university, see Ballıktaş Bingöllü v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 55-62). The test was found to have been met in the case of Constitutional Court judges dismissed for ""breach of oath"", since their dismissal had a serious impact on their inner circle, given the ensuing pecuniary losses, and on their reputation, given that the grounds for the dismissal directly concerned their personal integrity and professional competence ( Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, 2023, § 86). It was also found to have been met in the case of a judge suspended for over two years for having undermined the authority of the court by investigating the independence of a first instance judge ( Juszczyszyn v. Poland, 2022, §§ 228-237) and in the case of a judge suspended for over two years following his indictment on charges unrelated to his judicial Pengezov v. Bulgaria duties (, 2023, §§ 67-72). It was also found to have been met in the case of female judges who were forced into early retirement ( Pająk and Others v. Poland, 2023, §§ 214-20). However, it was not found to have been met where Constitutional Court judges, originally appointed with life Gyulumyan and tenure, had their terms of office terminated as a result of a constitutional reform ( Others v. Armenia, 2023). The Court also found that the test had been met in the case of a lay teacher of Orthodox religion at a secondary public school whose employment had been automatically terminated after the withdrawal of her endorsement by an Archbishop ( Ţîmpău v. Romania, 2023)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:70267/17,Ţîmpău v. Romania,70267/17,added,"Ţîmpău v. Romania, no. 70267/17, 5 December 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.2,Protection of individual reputation; defamation,4,,221,,"Ageyevy v. Russia , 2013|ău v. Romania , 2023",,,"When balancing privacy rights under Article 8 with other Convention rights, the Court has found that the State is called upon to guarantee both rights and if the protection of one leads to an interference with the other, to choose adequate means to make this interference proportionate to the aim pursued ( Fernández Martínez v. Spain [GC], 2014, § 123). This case concerned the right to private/family life and the right of religious organisations to autonomy. The Court found that the refusal to renew the contract of a teacher of Catholic religion and morals after he publicly revealed his position as a ""married priest"" did not violate Article 8 (§ 89). The Court reached the same conclusion in a case where the employment of a lay teacher of Orthodox religion was automatically terminated following the withdrawal of her endorsement by the local Archbishop ( Ţîmpău v. Romania, 2023). As for a parent suspected of child abuse, the Court found that a failure to adequately investigate the unauthorised disclosure of confidential information or to protect the applicant's reputation and right to be presumed innocent (Article 6 § 2) violated Article 8 ( Ageyevy v. Russia, 2013, § 155)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:71160/13,Uzbyakov v. Russia,71160/13,added,"Uzbyakov v. Russia, no. 71160/13, 5 May 2020",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.D.c,Ties between natural father and children,4,,373,,"I.V. v. Estonia , 2023|Uzbyakov v. Russia , 2020",,,"In two cases where natural fathers had unsuccessfully attempted to have adoption of their children by third persons - which had been ordered for reasons outside of those fathers' control and without their knowledge, let alone consent - annulled, the Court reproached the domestic authorities' lack of diligence, and, in particular, failure to establish all relevant circumstances before allowing the adoption ( Uzbyakov v. Russia, 2020, §§ 116-18; I.V. v. Estonia, 2023, §§ 88, 103-106) as well as the excessive formalism in the subsequent examination of those fathers' requests for annulment of the adoption orders. In the latter respect, the Court observed that the domestic courts' reliance on the absence under domestic law of formal grounds for revoking the adoption orders could not be regarded as a ""sufficient"" consideration in seeking to strike a fair balance between the competing interests at stake ( Uzbyakov v. Russia, 2020, §§ 122-23, 126; I.V. v. Estonia, 2023, §§ 114-15; see also as regards the failure of the domestic courts to perform an in-depth examination of all relevant facts in a similar Naltakyan v. Russia context,, 2021, §§ 185-92)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:9525/19,Vagdalt v. Hungary,9525/19,added,"Vagdalt v. Hungary, no. 9525/19, 7 March 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.D.c,Ties between natural father and children,4,,372,,"Vagdalt v. Hungary , 2024",,,"The legal system, where a putative biological father does not have a possibility directly to challenge another man's paternity established in respect of his biological child either by legal presumption or by recognition, and where the authorities have discretionary powers to decide whether to initiate such a procedure, is not as such irreconcilable with Article 8, provided that domestic law contains safeguards allowing for the examination of all interests involved ( Vagdalt v. Hungary, 2024, § 53 and 68). At the same time, Article 8 was violated where those safeguards were not adequately applied in practice with the result that the putative father's interests were not given due consideration, and he was effectively precluded from challenging the legal father's paternity and having his own paternity recognised ( ibid., §§ 69-70)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:53600/20,Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC],53600/20,added,"Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, 9 April 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A.1,Applicability in general,4,,103,,,,,"On the other hand, in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], 2024, §§ 519 and 544, the Court recognised, for the first time, that Article 8 must be seen as encompassing a right for individuals to effective protection by the State authorities from serious adverse effects of climate change on their life, health, well-being and quality of life. The assessment of the applicability of this provision will be made on a case-by-case basis subject to the same criteria as those concerning the victim status of individuals and the legal standing of associations (§ 520). In particular, individuals will have to show that they are personally and directly affected by the authorities' action or inaction in the light of two key criteria: (a) high intensity of exposure of the applicant to the adverse effects of climate change; and (b) a pressing need to ensure the applicant's individual protection, owing to the absence or inadequacy of any reasonable measures to reduce harm (§ 487). The threshold for establishing victim status in climate change cases must be especially high (§ 488). As regards associations, in order to be recognised to have standing to lodge an application on account of the alleged failure by the relevant State to take adequate measures to protect individuals against the adverse effects of climate change on human lives and health, the association must be: (a) lawfully established in the jurisdiction concerned or have standing to act there; (b) able to demonstrate that it pursues a dedicated purpose in accordance with its statutory objectives in the defence of the human rights of its members or other affected individuals within the jurisdiction concerned, whether limited to or including collective action for the protection of those rights against the threats arising from climate change; and (c) able to demonstrate that it can be regarded as genuinely qualified and representative to act on behalf of members or other affected individuals within the jurisdiction who are subject to specific threats or adverse effects of climate change on their lives, health or well-being as protected under the Convention. In view of the specific features of recourse to legal action by associations in this context, the standing of an association to act on behalf of the members or other affected individuals within the jurisdiction concerned will not be subject to a separate requirement of showing that those on whose behalf the case has been brought would themselves have met the above-mentioned victim-status requirements for individuals in the climate-change context."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:53600/20,Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC],53600/20,added,"Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, 9 April 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,II.B.8,Issues concerning burial and deceased persons,4,187,187,0.7165,,"Drelon v. France , 2022","In a case concerning the refusal of the French blood donation serviceto accept the applicant as a blood donor based on his presumed homosexuality, the Court observed that the relevant conclusion about his sexual practices had been made only because he had refused to answer the questions about his sex life during the pre-donation medical interview. It noted that the data in question contained explicit indications of the applicant's sex life and supposed sexual orientation, reflecting the applicant's presumed sexual orientation without a proven factual basis, and that, having been collected in 2004, it was to be retained until 2278, with the result that there had been an interference with the applicant 's ""private life"" (and a mere reference to a code rather than an explicit description of sexual conduct was not considered decisive, § 86). Whilst that interference had been based on relevant and sufficient reasons, notably the protection of health and the importance of ensuring blood safety (§§ 93-95), the data collected was based on mere speculation without any proven factual basis. It also noted the excessive length of the retention of the data which made it possible for the data to be used repeatedly against the applicant, resulting in his automatic exclusion from donating blood. Accordingly, the Court found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention ( Drelon v. France, 2022, §§ 86-100).","In Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], 2024, the Court addressed, for the first time, the issue of climate change and its impact on the rights secured by the Convention. In particular, it emphasised that, to date, there had been sufficiently reliable indications that anthropogenic climate change existed, that it posed a serious current and future threat to the enjoyment of the Convention rights, and that States were aware of it and were capable of taking measures to address it effectively (§ 436). The Court introduced the concept of ""intergenerational burden-sharing"", pointing out that the relevant obligations of States extended not only to individuals currently alive, but also to future generations who were likely to bear an increasingly severe burden of the consequences of the present failures to combat climate change (§§ 419-20). It went on to recognise, for the first time, that Article 8 must be seen as encompassing a right for individuals to effective protection by the State authorities from serious adverse effects of climate change on their life, health, well-being and quality of life (§§ 519 and 544). In that connection, the Court emphasised the difference between climate change cases and ""classic"" environmental cases and established specific criteria for the assessment, in this special context, of the victim status of individuals (§§ 487-488) as well as the determination of the legal standing of associations to bring climate change cases before the Court (§§ 502-3). As regards States' positive obligations, they would include putting in place, and implementing, mitigation measures, which must be supplemented by adaptation measures aimed at alleviating the most severe or imminent consequences of climate change, as well as certain procedural safeguards as regards States' decision-making process (§§ 549-554)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:59252/19,Vinškovský v. the Czech Republic (dec.),59252/19,added,"Vinškovský v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 59252/19, 5 September 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,Definition of family life and the meaning of family,3,,332,,,,,"The Court found that there existed family ties between a child and the mother's former partner who was neither the biological nor legal parent of the child but who took care of the child for two years - such a relationship being often referred as ""social parenthood"" ( Vinškovský v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2023, §§ 40-42). The existence of a ""family life"" was also established in a case where the applicant had been raising a child in a marriage with that child's mother for five years, before, at the mother's request, it was established that he was not the child's biological father and his legal Nazarenko v. Russia paternity was annulled (, 2015, § 58)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:59252/19,Vinškovský v. the Czech Republic (dec.),59252/19,added,"Vinškovský v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 59252/19, 5 September 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,III.D.3,Children,4,342,353,0.9907,,"C.E. and Others v. France, 2022","According to well-established case- law, ""in all decisions concerning children their best interests are of paramount importance. (...) It follows that there is an obligation on States to place the best interests of the child, and also those of children as a group, at the centre of all decisions affecting their health and development"" ( Vavřičk a and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2021, §§ 287-288; Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], 2010, § 135 and, X v. Latvia [GC], 2013, § 96). The margin of appreciation is wide in cases concerning the recognition in law of filiation between children and persons with whom they have no biological link. Such cases raise ethical issues on which there is no European consensus. However, the margin may be reduced when the child-parent bond is touched. This is particularly the case of the bond of filiation, which unites a person to his parent, especially when this person is a minor. Moreover, even when the State is within its margin, its decisions are not beyond the control of the Court, which will undertake a careful examination of the arguments to ensure that an appropriate balance has been struck with regard to the child's interests ( C.E. and Others v. France, 2022, §§ 85-90).","According to well-established case-law, ""in all decisions concerning children their best interests are of paramount importance. (...) It follows that there is an obligation on States to place the best interests of the child, and also those of children as a group, at the centre of all decisions affecting their health and development"" ( Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2021, §§ 287-288; Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland X v. Latvia [GC], 2010, § 135 and, [GC], 2013, § 96). The margin of appreciation is wide in cases concerning the recognition in law of filiation between children and persons with whom they have no biological link. Such cases raise ethical issues on which there is no European consensus. However, the margin may be reduced when the child-parent bond is touched. This is particularly the case of the bond of filiation, which unites a person to his parent, especially when this person is a minor. Moreover, even when the State is within its margin, its decisions are not beyond the control of the Court, which will undertake a careful examination of the arguments to C.E. and Others ensure that an appropriate balance has been struck with regard to the child's interests ( v. France, 2022, §§ 85-90; Vinškovský v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2023, § 51 in the context of social parenthood)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:43868/18|25883/21,Wa Baile v. Switzerland,43868/18|25883/21,added,"Wa Baile v. Switzerland, nos. 43868/18 and 25883/21, 20 February 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I.B,Should the case be assessed from the perspective of a negative or positive obligation?,3,14,14,0.9783,"Muhammad v. Spain Wa Baile v. Switzerland , 2022","Muhammad v. Spain , 2022","The procedural obligation in the context of alleged racial profiling would imply the authorities'duty to investigate the existence of a possible link between racist attitudes and a State agent's act, even of a non-violent nature. That procedural obligation can be met through appropriate criminal, civil, administrative and professional avenues, the State enjoying a margin of appreciation as to the manner in which to organise its system to ensure compliance ( Basu v. Germany, 2022, §§ 31-39; Muhammad v. Spain, 2022, §§ 63-76).","The procedural obligation in the context of alleged racial profiling would imply the authorities' duty to investigate the existence of a possible link between racist attitudes and a State agent's act, even of a non-violent nature. That procedural obligation can be met through appropriate criminal, civil, administrative and professional avenues, the State enjoying a margin of appreciation as to the manner in which to organise its system to ensure compliance ( Basu v. Germany, 2022, §§ 31-39; Muhammad v. Spain Wa Baile v. Switzerland, 2022, §§ 63-76;, 2024, §§ 126-27)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:43868/18|25883/21,Wa Baile v. Switzerland,43868/18|25883/21,added,"Wa Baile v. Switzerland, nos. 43868/18 and 25883/21, 20 February 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.F.e,Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination),4,66,68,0.9666,"In Wa Baile v. Switzerland , 2024",,"As regards an identity check, allegedly based on physical or ethnic motives, the Court clarified that not every identity check of a person belonging to an ethnic minority would fall within the ambit of Article 8, thus triggering the applicability of Article 14. Such a check should attain the necessary threshold of severity so as to fall within the ambit of ""private life"". That threshold is only attained if the person concerned has an arguable claim that he or she may have been targeted on account of specific physical or ethnic characteristics. In other words, for that threshold to be met, a certain level of substantiation of such allegations is required. Such an arguable claim may exist notably where the person concerned had submitted that he or she (or persons having the same characteristics) had been the only person(s) subjected to a check and where no other grounds for the check were apparent or where any of the explanations of the officers carrying out the check disclosed specific physical or ethnic motives. The Court observed that the public nature of the check might have an effect on a person's reputation and self-respect ( Basu v. Germany, 2022, §§ 25-27; Muhammad v. Spain, 2022, §§ 49-51).","As regards an identity check, allegedly based on physical or ethnic motives, the Court clarified that not every identity check of a person belonging to an ethnic minority would fall within the ambit of Article 8, thus triggering the applicability of Article 14. Such a check should attain the necessary threshold of severity so as to fall within the ambit of ""private life"". That threshold is only attained if the person concerned has an arguable claim that he or she may have been targeted on account of specific physical or ethnic characteristics. In other words, for that threshold to be met, a certain level of substantiation of such allegations is required. Such an arguable claim may exist notably where the person concerned had submitted that he or she (or persons having the same characteristics) had been the only person(s) subjected to a check and where no other grounds for the check were apparent or where any of the explanations of the officers carrying out the check disclosed specific physical or ethnic motives. The Court observed that the public nature of the check might have an effect on a person's reputation and self-respect ( Basu v. Germany, 2022, §§ 25-27; Muhammad v. Spain, 2022, §§ 49-51). In Wa Baile v. Switzerland, 2024, §§ 71 and 102 the Court found that, bearing in mind the circumstances in which the applicant was stopped and searched in the Zurich railway station and the domestic assessment of that check, the threshold of severity was attained and the applicant thus had an arguable claim that he had been discriminated against because of his skin colour."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:43868/18|25883/21,Wa Baile v. Switzerland,43868/18|25883/21,added,"Wa Baile v. Switzerland, nos. 43868/18 and 25883/21, 20 February 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I.F.e,Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination),4,67,69,0.995,"Muhammad v. Spain Wa Baile v. Switzerland , 2022","Muhammad v. Spain , 2022","As regards the procedural obligation in this context, the authorities'duty to investigate the existence of a possible link between racist attitudes and a State agent's act, even of a non-violent nature, is to be considered as implicit in their responsibilities under Article 14 when examined in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. In particular, State authorities have an obligation to take all reasonable measures to identify whether there were racist motives and to establish whether or not ethnic hatred or prejudice may have played a role in the impugned events. The authorities must do what is reasonable in the circumstances to collect and secure the evidence, explore all practical means of discovering the truth and deliver fully reasoned, impartial and objective decisions, without omitting suspicious facts that may be indicative of racially induced violence. For an investigation to be effective, the institutions and persons responsible for carrying it out must be independent of those targeted by it: this means, not only a lack of any hierarchical or institutional connection, but also practical independence. That procedural obligation can be met through appropriate criminal, civil, administrative and professional avenues, the State enjoying a margin of appreciation as to the manner in which to organise its system to ensure compliance ( Basu v. Germany, 2022, §§ 31-39; Muhammad v. Spain, 2022, §§ 63-76).","As regards the procedural obligation in this context, the authorities' duty to investigate the existence of a possible link between racist attitudes and a State agent's act, even of a non-violent nature, is to be considered as implicit in their responsibilities under Article 14 when examined in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. In particular, State authorities have an obligation to take all reasonable measures to identify whether there were racist motives and to establish whether or not ethnic hatred or prejudice may have played a role in the impugned events. The authorities must do what is reasonable in the circumstances to collect and secure the evidence, explore all practical means of discovering the truth and deliver fully reasoned, impartial and objective decisions, without omitting suspicious facts that may be indicative of racially induced violence. For an investigation to be effective, the institutions and persons responsible for carrying it out must be independent of those targeted by it: this means, not only a lack of any hierarchical or institutional connection, but also practical independence. That procedural obligation can be met through appropriate criminal, civil, administrative and professional avenues, the State enjoying a margin of appreciation as to the manner in which to organise its system to ensure compliance ( Basu v. Germany, 2022, §§ 31-39; Muhammad v. Spain Wa Baile v. Switzerland, 2022, §§ 63-76;, 2024, § 126-27)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:43868/18|25883/21,Wa Baile v. Switzerland,43868/18|25883/21,added,"Wa Baile v. Switzerland, nos. 43868/18 and 25883/21, 20 February 2024",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.A.1,Applicability in general,4,92,95,0.9967,"Wa Baile v. Switzerland , 2024","Basu v. Germany , 2022","The Court also applied the above-mentioned severity test in cases involving identity checks, allegedly based on physical or ethnic motives. It clarified that not every identity check of a person belonging to an ethnic minority would fall within the ambit of Article 8, thus triggering the applicability of Article 14. Such a check should attain the necessary threshold of severity so as to fall within the ambit of ""private life"". That threshold is only attained if the person concerned has an arguable claim that he or she may have been targeted on account of specific physical or ethnic characteristics. Such an arguable claim may notably exist where the person concerned had submitted that he or she (or persons having the same characteristics) had been the only person(s) subjected to a check and where no other grounds for the check were apparent or where any of the explanations of the officers carrying out the check disclosed specific physical or ethnic motives. In this connection, the Court observed that the public nature of the check might have an effect on a person's reputation and self-respect ( Basu v. Germany, 2022, §§ 25-27; Muhammad v. Spain, 2022, §§ 49-51).","The Court also applied the above-mentioned severity test in cases involving identity checks, allegedly based on physical or ethnic motives. It clarified that not every identity check of a person belonging to an ethnic minority would fall within the ambit of Article 8, thus triggering the applicability of Article 14. Such a check should attain the necessary threshold of severity so as to fall within the ambit of ""private life"". That threshold is only attained if the person concerned has an arguable claim that he or she may have been targeted on account of specific physical or ethnic characteristics. Such an arguable claim may notably exist where the person concerned had submitted that he or she (or persons having the same characteristics) had been the only person(s) subjected to a check and where no other grounds for the check were apparent or where any of the explanations of the officers carrying out the check disclosed specific physical or ethnic motives. In this connection, the Court observed that Basu the public nature of the check might have an effect on a person's reputation and self-respect ( v. Germany, 2022, §§ 25-27; Muhammad v. Spain, 2022, §§ 49-51; Wa Baile v. Switzerland, 2024, §§ 71 and 102)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:43868/18|25883/21,Wa Baile v. Switzerland,43868/18|25883/21,added,"Wa Baile v. Switzerland, nos. 43868/18 and 25883/21, 20 February 2024",5,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.8,Stop and search police powers,4,,257,,,,,"In Basu v. Germany (§ 27) and Muhammad v. Spain (§ 51), 2022, the Court elaborated on the right to respect for ""private life"" regarding identity checks by the police, on a train or in the street, of persons belonging to an ethnic minority, where the applicants subjected to the check complained of Wa Baile v. Switzerland racial profiling (see also, 2024, § 102, in the context of an identity check and search of a person in a railway station because of his skin colour)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240217085228__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-06-18,31 August 2023,9 April 2024,2023-08-31,2024-04-09,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-02-17__2024-06-18.json,apps:50849/21,Wałęsa v. Poland,50849/21,added,"Wałęsa v. Poland, no. 50849/21, 23 November 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.F.b,Article 6 (right to a fair trial),4,,51,,"ęsa v. Poland , 2023",,,"In Wałęsa v. Poland, 2023, the Court examined the lawfulness of an interference with the applicant's private life (reputation) caused by the reversal by the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court (""CERPA"") of a final civil defamation judgment in the applicant's favour delivered ten years earlier, following an extraordinary appeal by the Prosecutor General. The Court relied on its findings in respect of Article 6 that CERPAdid not have the attributes of a ""tribunal"" that was ""lawful"" for the purposes of the Convention and concluded that the interference complained of could not be considered ""in accordance with the law"" (§ 290)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:49014/16,A.K. v. Russia,49014/16,added,"A.K. v. Russia, no. 49014/16, 7 May 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.10,Sexual orientation and sexual life,4,189,194,0.9582,"A.K. v. Russia , 2024|H.W. v. France , 2025",,"The margin of appreciation has been found to be narrow as regards interferences in the intimate area of an individual's sexual life ( Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 52 ). The Court has held that elements such as gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life are important elements of the personal sphere protected by Article 8 ( Drelon v. France, 2022, § 86; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, § 109; Sousa Goucha v. Portugal, 2016, § 27; B. v. France, 1992, § 63; Burghartz v. Switzerland, 1994, § 24; Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 41; Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 36; P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001).","The margin of appreciation has been found to be narrow as regards interferences in the intimate ( area of an individual's sexual life Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 52; A.K. v. Russia, 2024, § 30; H.W. v. France, 2025, § 85 ). The Court has held that elements such as gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life are important elements of the personal sphere protected by Article 8 ( Drelon v. France, 2022, § 86; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, § 109; Sousa Goucha v. Portugal, 2016, § 27; B. v. France, 1992, § 63; Burghartz v. Switzerland, 1994, § 24; Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 41; Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 36; P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001; A.K. v. Russia, 2024, § 30; H.W. v. France, 2025, § 62)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:49014/16,A.K. v. Russia,49014/16,added,"A.K. v. Russia, no. 49014/16, 7 May 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,II.B.10,Sexual orientation and sexual life,4,192,197,0.8296,"In A.K. v. Russia , 2024",,"In a series of cases, the Court held that any ban on the employment of homosexuals in the military constituted a breach of the right to respect for private life as protected by Article 8 ( Lustig- Prean and Beckett v. the United Kingdom, 1999; Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, 1999; Perkins and R. v. the United Kingdom, 2002) 37 .","In a series of cases, the Court held that any ban on the employment of homosexuals in the military constituted a breach of the right to respect for private life as protected by Article 8 ( Lustig- Prean and Beckett v. the United Kingdom, 1999; Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, 1999; Perkins and R. v. the United Kingdom, 2002) 37 . In A.K. v. Russia, 2024, §§ 40-46, the dismissal of a teacher for posting photos on social media showing affection to intimate partners was considered by the Court to be a disproportionate interference with her rights under Article 8 of the Convention. The Court held, in particular, that the dismissal of a teacher with appropriate qualifications, of good repute with students and parents and without a prior history of complaints, could not have been the necessary, sole and immediate sanction for the images whether they had stayed private or became public. Moreover, the dismissal amounted to a difference in treatment based solely on considerations of sexual orientation without particularly convincing and weighty reasons. The school administration's position and the judicial decisions referred explicitly to ""lesbian scenes"" and ""lesbian content"", ""unethically close same - sex relations"" and ""non - traditional sexual orientation"". The Cou rt reiterated that an individual's sexual orientation may not be isolated from the private and public expressions of it, which are evidently protected elements of an individual's private life. The posting of travel and partying photos showing affection towards intimate partners is a commonplace practice on social media. Consequently, the authorities'hostile reaction was unmistakably driven by the lack of acceptance of the applicant's sexuality and was, therefore, patently discriminatory. The Court found accordingly a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:29295/22,Abo v. Estonia (dec.),29295/22,added,"Abo v. Estonia (dec.), no. 29295/22, 17 September 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.D.7,Gender identity,4,314,323,0.9877,,,"The right to citizenship has been recognised by the Court, under certain circumstances, as falling Genovese v. Malta under private life (, 2011). Although the right to acquire a particular nationality is not guaranteed as such by the Convention (see, for example, S.-H. v. Poland (dec.), 2021, § 65 as concerns children born through surrogacy), the Court has found that an arbitrary refusal of citizenship may, in certain circumstances, raise an issue under Article 8 by impacting on private life ( Karassev v. Finland (dec.), 1999; Slivenko and Others v. Latvia (dec.) [GC], 2002; Genovese v. Malta, 2011). The loss of citizenship that has already been acquired may entail similar - if not greater - interference with the person's right to respect for his or her private and family life ( Ramadan v. Malta, 2016, § 85; in K2 v. the United Kingdom the context of terrorism-related activities, see for instance, (dec.), 2017, § 49; Ghoumid and Others v. France, 2020, § 43 (with regard to private life); Usmanov v. Russia, 2020, §§ 59-62; Laraba v. Denmark (dec.), 2022. Nonetheless, the revocation or annulment of citizenship as such is not incompatible with the Convention ( Usmanov v. Russia, 2020, § 65). In Usmanov v. Russia, 2020, the Court clarified and consolidated the two-pronged approach to be applied in this context (having noted the existence of various approaches to the examination of the issue). It examined (i) the consequences for the applicant and (ii) whether the measure was arbitrary (see § 58, Johansen v. Denmark Laraba v. Denmark but see also (dec.), 2022, and (dec.), 2022, in the context of terrorism). The same principles apply to the refusal of the domestic authorities to issue an applicant with an identity card ( Ahmadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 45). In this case, the domestic authorities found that the applicant had never acquired Azerbaijani citizenship and was not a citizen of the Republic of Azerbaijan in spite of the fact that he had been considered a citizen of the Republic of Azerbaijan by various State authorities from 1991 to 2008 and that there was a stamp confirming his Azerbaijani citizenship in his Soviet passport. The denial of citizenship to the applicant was not accompanied by the necessary procedural safeguards and was both arbitrary and in breach of Article 8 (see also Hashemi and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2022, §§ 46-49, in which the authorities had refused to grant identity cards to and acknowledge the citizenship of children born in Azerbaijan to refugees who were settled there). Compare the approach taken in Johansen v. Denmark (dec.), 2022, § 45 and Laraba v. Denmark (dec.), 2022, §§ 15-26.","The right to citizenship has been recognised by the Court, under certain circumstances, as falling under private life ( Genovese v. Malta, 2011). Although the right to acquire a particular nationality is not guaranteed as such by the Convention (see, for example, S.-H. v. Poland (dec.), 2021, § 65 as concerns children born through surrogacy), the Court has found that an arbitrary refusal of citizenship may, in certain circumstances, raise an issue under Article 8 by impacting on private life ( Karassev v. Finland (dec.), 1999; Slivenko and Others v. Latvia (dec.) [GC], 2002; Genovese v. Malta, 2011; Abo v. Estonia (dec.), 2024). The loss of citizenship that has already been acquired may entail similar - if not greater - interference with the person's right to respect for his or her private and family life ( Ramadan v. Malta, 2016, § 85; in the context of terrorism-related activities, see for instance, K2 v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2017, § 49; Ghoumid and Others v. France, 2020, § 43 (with regard to private life); Usmanov v. Russia, 2020, §§ 59-62; Laraba v. Denmark (dec.), 2022. Nonetheless, the revocation or annulment of citizenship as such is not incompatible with the Convention ( Usmanov v. Russia, 2020, § 65). In Usmanov v. Russia, 2020, the Court clarified and consolidated the two- pronged approach to be applied in this context (having noted the existence of various approaches to the examination of the issue). It examined (i) the consequences for the applicant and (ii) whether the measure was arbitrary (see § 58, but see also Johansen v. Denmark (dec.), 2022, and Laraba v. Denmark (dec.), 2022, in the context of terrorism). The same principles apply to the refusal of the domestic authorities to issue an applicant with an identity card ( Ahmadov v. Azerbaijan, 2020, § 45). In this case, the domestic authorities found that the applicant had never acquired Azerbaijani citizenship and was not a citizen of the Republic of Azerbaijan in spite of the fact that he had been considered a citizen of the Republic of Azerbaijan by various State authorities from 1991 to 2008 and that there was a stamp confirming his Azerbaijani citizenship in his Soviet passport. The denial of citizenship to the applicant was not accompanied by the necessary procedural safeguards and was both arbitrary and in breach of Article 8 (see also Hashemi and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2022, §§ 46-49, in which the authorities had refused to grant identity cards to and acknowledge the citizenship of children born in Azerbaijan to refugees who were settled there). Compare the approach taken in Johansen v. Denmark (dec.), 2022, § 45 and Laraba v. Denmark (dec.), 2022, §§ 15-26. In Abo v. Estonia (dec.), 2024 the domestic authorities refused to grant the applicant an Estonian citizen's identity document, on the ground that her grand mother, who had opted for Estonian citizenship in 1920 (an ""optant""), had not sett led in Estonia to validate her citizenship (§§ 4-5). Bearing in mind that the applicant continued to hold a valid Estonian long-term residence permit, the Court concluded that the impugned measure did not cross the threshold of seriousness for an issue to be raised under Article 8 of the Convention (§§ 79-80)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:28540/20,Ahmed v. the United Kingdom (dec.),28540/20,added,"Ahmed v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28540/20, 27 August 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A.2,Professional and business activities,4,,118,,,,,"The Court has considered that the exercise of public duties by a politician is akin to a ""professional occupation"" for the purposes of Article 8 ( Paterson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2024, § 57 and Ahmed v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2024, § 61). Accordingly, in Paterson and Ahmed the complaint about the lack of safeguards in the disciplinary investigation process against the applicants (a Member of Parliament and a life peer of the House of Lords) was examined in line with both the reasons-based and consequence-based approach identified in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018 ( Paterson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2024, §§ 55-71 and Ahmed v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2024, §§ 62-76). In Ahmed the Court held that any consequences of the investigation process did not cross the threshold of seriousness for an issue to be raised under Article 8 ( Ahmed v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2024, §§ 66-76). In Paterson it was not necessary for the Court to reach a firm conclusion on this question since, even if Article 8 was applicable, the Court considered that any interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life was accompanied by adequate procedural safeguards and was therefore proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued ( Paterson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2024, §§ 55-71)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:28540/20,Ahmed v. the United Kingdom (dec.),28540/20,added,"Ahmed v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28540/20, 27 August 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.A.2,Professional and business activities,4,107,107,0.8792,,,"Since Article 8 guarantees the right to a ""private social life"", it may, under certain circumstances, include professional activities ( Fernández Martínez v. Spain [GC], 2014, § 110; Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 71; Antović and Mirković v. Montenegro, 2017, § 42; Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, §§ 100 with further references therein and López Riba lda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, §§ 92-95), and commercial activities ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 130).","Since Article 8 guarantees the right to a ""private social life"", it may, under certain circumstances, include professional activities ( Fernández Martínez v. Spain [GC], 2014, § 110; Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 71; Antović and Mirković v. Montenegro, 2017, § 42; Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, §§ 100 with further references therein and López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, §§ 92-95), and commercial activities ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 130). Furthermore, the exercise of public duties by a politician is akin to a ""professional occupation"" for the purposes of Article 8 ( Paterson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2024, § 57 and Ahmed v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2024, § 61)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:81249/17,Allouche v. France,81249/17,added,"Allouche v. France, no. 81249/17, 11 April 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.F.e,Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination),4,61,61,0.9935,"In Allouche v. France , 2024|Oganezova v. Armenia , 2022",,"In Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, the applicants, two young men, posted a photograph of themselves kissing on a public Facebook page. This online post received hundreds of virulently homophobic comments. Although the applicants requested it, the prosecutors and domestic courts refused to prosecute, finding that the applicants' behaviour had been ""eccentric"" and did not correspond to ""traditional family values"" in the country. The Court stated that the hateful comments against the applicants and the homosexual community in general were instigated by a bigoted attitude towards that community and that the very same discriminatory state of mind was at the core of the failure on the part of the relevant public authorities to discharge their positive obligation to investigate in an effective manner whether those comments constituted incitement to hatred and violence. The Court concluded that the applicants had suffered discrimination on the ground of their sexual orientation (§§ 106-116, § 129). In Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021, the Court reiterated the obligation on the authorities' part to offer adequate protection in respect of the Oganezova v. Armenia applicants' dignity (§ 127). As a matter of principle, in, 2022, the Court recalled the authorities' duty to prevent hate-motivated violence on the part of private individuals as well as to investigate the existence of a possible link between a discriminatory motive and the act of violence (whether physical or verbal) could constitute positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 and could also be seen to as part of the authorities' positive responsibilities under Article 14 of the Convention to secure the fundamental values protected by Articles 3 and 8 without discrimination. In Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023, the applicants, members of the LGBTIcommunity, complained about negative public statements made by public officials about the LGBTIcommunity. The Court found that the applicants may claim to be victims despite the fact that they had not been directly targeted by the contested statements (§ 57). Bearing in mind the history of public hostility towards the LGBTIcommunity in Russia and the increase in homophobic hate crimes, including violent crimes, at the material time, the openly homophobic content and particularly aggressive and hostile tone of the statements, as well as the fact that they were made by influential public figures holding official posts and were published in popular newspapers with a large readership, the Court considered that the contested statements reached the ""threshold of severity"" required to be considered to affect the ""private life"" of members of the group (§§ 59-62).","In Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, the applicants, two young men, posted a photograph of themselves kissing on a public Facebook page. This online post received hundreds of virulently homophobic comments. Although the applicants requested it, the prosecutors and domestic courts refused to prosecute, finding that the applicants'behaviour had been ""eccentric"" and did not correspond to ""traditional family values"" in the country. The Court stated that the hateful comments against the applicants and the homosexual community in general were instigated by a bigoted attitude towards that community and that the very same discriminatory state of mind was at the core of the failure on the part of the relevant public authorities to discharge their positive obligation to investigate in an effective manner whether those comments constituted incitement to hatred and violence. The Court concluded that the applicants had suffered discrimination on the ground of their sexual orientation (§§ 106-116, § 129). In Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021, the Court reiterated the obligation on the authorities'part to offer adequate protection in respect of the applicants'dignity (§ 127). As a matter of principle, in Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, the Court recalled the authorities'duty to prevent hate-motivated violence on the part of private individuals as well as to investigate the existence of a possible link between a discriminatory motive and the act of violence (whether physical or verbal) could constitute positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 and could also be seen to as part of the authorities'positive responsibilities under Article 14 of the Convention to secure the fundamental values protected by Articles 3 and 8 without discrimination. In Allouche v. France, 2024 the Court found that the domestic authorities, in prosecuting an aggressor for death threats without taking into account the antisemitic dimension to the case, had failed to comply with their positive obligations under Articles 8 and 14. In Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023, the applicants, members of the LGBTIcommunity, complained about negative public statements made by public officials about the LGBTIcommunity. The Court found that the applicants could claim to be victims despite the fact that they had not been directly targeted by the contested statements. Bearing in mind the history of public hostility towards the LGBTIcommunity in Russia and the increase in homophobic hate crimes, including violent crimes, at the material time, the openly homophobic content and particularly aggressive and hostile tone of the statements, as well as the fact that they were made by influential public figures holding official posts and were published in popular newspapers with a large readership, the Court considered that the contested statements reached the ""threshold of severity"" required to be considered to affect the ""private life"" of members of the group (§§ 57 and 59-62)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:59/17,Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye,59/17,added,"Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, no. 59/17, 23 April 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.B.9,"Home visits, searches and seizures",4,261,268,0.9958,"ın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye , 2024",,"The Court can examine searches not only from the perspective of the ""right to home"" or the Vinks and Ribicka ""right to family life"", but also from the perspective of the ""right to private life"" ( v. Latvia, 2020, § 92; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, with regard to the inspection of the applicants' luggage and handbags, § 148). The interference must be justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8 - in other words it must be ""in accordance with the law"", pursue one or more of the legitimate aims set out in that paragraph and be ""necessary in a democratic society"" to achieve that aim ( Vinks and Ribicka v. Latvia, 2020, §§ 93-104 with further references therein). The Vinks and Ribicka case concerned an early-morning raid at the applicants' home involving a special anti-terrorist unit against the background of charges of economic crimes. The Member States, when taking measures to prevent crime and protect the rights of others, may well consider it necessary, for the purposes of special and general prevention, to resort to measures such as searches and seizures in order to obtain evidence of certain offences where it is otherwise impossible to identify a person guilty of an offence. Although the involvement of special police units may be considered necessary, in certain circumstances, having regard to the severity of the interference with the right to respect for private life of the individuals affected by such measures as well as the risk of abuse of authority and violation of human dignity, adequate and effective safeguards against abuse must be put in place (§§ 113-114, 118). As concerns the handcuffing of the applicant during her arrest in her home in her daughter's presence, see Sabani v. Belgium, 2022, §§ 59-60.","The Court can examine searches not only from the perspective of the ""right to home"" or the ""right to family life"", but also from the perspective of the ""right to private life"" ( Vinks and Ribicka v. Latvia, 2020, § 92; Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), 2020, with regard to the inspection of the applicants'luggage and handbags, § 148; Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, 2024, § 140). The interference must be justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8 - in other words it must be ""in accordance with the law"", pursue one or more of the legitimate aims set out in that paragraph and be ""necessary in a democratic society"" to achieve that aim ( Vinks and Ribicka v. Latvia, 2020, §§ 93-104 with further references therein). The Vinks and Ribicka case concerned an early-morning raid at the applicants'home involving a special anti-terrorist unit against the background of charges of economic crimes. The Member States, when taking measures to prevent crime and protect the rights of others, may well consider it necessary, for the purposes of special and general prevention, to resort to measures such as searches and seizures in order to obtain evidence of certain offences where it is otherwise impossible to identify a person guilty of an offence. Although the involvement of special police units may be considered necessary, in certain circumstances, having regard to the severity of the interference with the right to respect for private life of the individuals affected by such measures as well as the risk of abuse of authority and violation of human dignity, adequate and effective safeguards against abuse must be put in place (§§ 113-114, 118). As concerns the handcuffing of the applicant during her arrest in her home in her daughter's presence, see Sabani v. Belgium, 2022, §§ 59-60."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:59/17,Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye,59/17,added,"Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, no. 59/17, 23 April 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.C.4,Minorities and vulnerable persons,4,,517,,"Petri Sallinen and Others v. Finland , 2005|ın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye , 2024",,,"The law in question must be ""compatible with the rule of law"". In the context of searches and seizures, it must provide some protection to the individual against arbitrary interference with Article 8 rights. Thus, domestic law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances and conditions under which public authorities are empowered to resort to any such measures. Moreover, search and seizure represent a serious interference with private life, home and correspondence and must accordingly be based on a ""law"" that is particularly precise. It is essential to have clear, detailed rules on the subject ( Petri Sallinen and Others v. Finland, 2005, §§ 82 and 90). In Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, 2024, §§ 140-44, the Court found that a search and seizure of certain items at a private residence of the applicant, a judge serving at the United Nations International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, had not been ""prescribed by law"" since the domestic courts'interpretation of the applicant's diplomatic immunity had not been foreseeable, as the ordinary reading of the relevant international treaty provisions, officially confirmed by the President of the Mechanism (acting on behalf of the Secretary General of the UN) and the UN Office of Legal Affairs, had made it safe to consider that the applicant, and consequently his private residence, had in fact enjoyed full diplomatic immunity."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:59/17,Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye,59/17,added,"Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, no. 59/17, 23 April 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,IV.E,Law firms,3,528,538,0.97,"In Kruglov and Others v. Russia , 2020|Xavier Da Silveira v. France , 2010|ın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye , 2024",,"The concept of ""home"" in Article 8 § 1 of the Convention embraces not only a private individual's home but also a lawyer's office or a law firm ( Buck v. Germany, 2005, §§ 31-32; Niemietz v. Germany, 1992, §§ 30-33). Searches of the premises of a lawyer may breach legal professional privilege, which is the basis of the relationship of trust existing between a lawyer and his client ( André and Another v. France, 2008, § 41) 86 . Consequently, such measures must be accompanied by ""special procedural guarantees"" and the lawyer must have access to a remedy affording ""effective scrutiny"" to contest them. That is not the case where a remedy fails to provide for the cancellation of the impugned search Xavier Da Silveira v. France Kruglov and Others v. Russia (, 2010, §§ 37, 42 and 48). In, 2020, the Court recapitulated its case-law on effective safeguards against abuse or arbitrariness and the elements to be taken into consideration in this regard (§§ 125-132). As persecution and harassment of members of the legal profession strikes at the very heart of the Convention system, searches of lawyers' homes or offices should be subject to ""especially strict scrutiny"" (see also, §§ 102-105, concerning international legal materials on the protection of the lawyer-client relationship). Particular safeguards are also required to protect the professional confidentiality of legal advisers who are not members of the Bar (§ 137).","The concept of ""home"" in Article 8 § 1 of the Convention embraces not only a private individual's home but also a lawyer's office or a law firm ( Buck v. Germany, 2005, §§ 31-32; Niemietz v. Germany, 1992, §§ 30-33). Moreover, in Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, 2024, § 142, the Court considered that where the applicant, an international judge, had worked from home remotely, his place of residence had been in an analogous position to that of an office, and thus had been subject of a heightened protection, similar to that afforded to a lawyer's office. Searches of the premises of a lawyer may breach legal professional privilege, which is the basis of the relationship of trust existing between a lawyer and his client ( André and Another v. France, 2008, § 41) 86 . Consequently, such measures must be accompanied by ""special procedural guarantees"" and the lawyer must have access to a remedy affording ""effective scrutiny"" to contest them. That is not the case where a remedy fails to provide for the cancellation of the impugned search ( Xavier Da Silveira v. France, 2010, §§ 37, 42 and 48). In Kruglov and Others v. Russia, 2020, the Court recapitulated its case-law on effective safeguards against abuse or arbitrariness and the elements to be taken into consideration in this regard (§§ 125-132). As persecution and harassment of members of the legal profession strikes at the very heart of the Convention system, searches of lawyers'homes or offices should be subject to ""especially strict scrutiny"" (see also, §§ 102-105, concerning international legal materials on the protection of the lawyer-client relationship). Particular safeguards are also required to protect the professional confidentiality of legal advisers who are not members of the Bar (§ 137)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:24228/18,Biba v. Albania,24228/18,added,"Biba v. Albania, no. 24228/18, 7 May 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B,Should the case be assessed from the perspective of a negative or positive obligation?,3,6,6,0.9972,"Biba v. Albania , 2024",,"The principles applicable to assessing a State's positive and negative obligations under the Convention are similar (and, therefore in some instances, the Court considered that it did not need to decide which obligation was at issue, see for instance, Paketova and Others v. Bulgaria, 2022, § 163). Regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole, the aims in the second paragraph of Article 8 being of a certain relevance ( Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], 2014, § 65; Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 42; Roche v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2005, § 157). These principles may also be relevant in the education context ( F.O. v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 80-82 citing Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 27, as regards school discipline). Where the case concerns a negative obligation, the Court must assess whether the interference was consistent with the requirements of Article 8 paragraph 2, namely in accordance with the law, in pursuit of a legitimate aim, and necessary in a democratic society. This is analysed in more detail below.","The principles applicable to assessing a State's positive and negative obligations under the Convention are similar (and, therefore in some instances, the Court considered that it did not need to decide which obligation was at issue, see for instance, Paketova and Others v. Bulgaria, 2022, § 163). Regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole, the aims in the second paragraph of Article 8 being of a certain relevance ( Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], 2014, § 65; Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 42; Roche v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2005, § 157). These principles may also be relevant in the education context ( F.O. v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 80-82; Biba v. Albania, 2024, §§ 58-60, both citing Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 27, as regards school discipline). Where the case concerns a negative obligation, the Court must assess whether the interference was consistent with the requirements of Article 8 paragraph 2, namely in accordance with the law, in pursuit of a legitimate aim, and necessary in a democratic society. This is analysed in more detail below."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:24228/18,Biba v. Albania,24228/18,added,"Biba v. Albania, no. 24228/18, 7 May 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B,Should the case be assessed from the perspective of a negative or positive obligation?,3,11,11,0.9827,"Biba v. Albania , 2024|K.U. v. Finland , 2008",,"In respect of less serious acts between individuals, which may violate psychological integrity, the obligation of the State under Article 8 to maintain and apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection does not always require that an efficient criminal law provision covering the specific act be in place. The legal framework could also consist of civil law remedies capable of affording sufficient protection ( ibid., § 47; X and Y v. the Netherlands, 1985, §§ 24 and 27; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 85; Tolić and Others v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, §§ 94-95 and § 99). Moreover, as regards the right to health, the Member States have a number of positive obligations in this respect under Articles 2 and 8 ( Vasileva v. Bulgarie, §§ 63-69; İbrahim Keskin v. Turkey, 2018, § 61).","In respect of less serious acts between individuals, which may violate psychological integrity, the obligation of the State under Article 8 to maintain and apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection does not always require that an efficient criminal law provision covering the specific act be in place. The legal framework could also consist of civil law remedies capable of affording sufficient protection ( K.U. v. Finland, 2008,§ 47; X and Y v. the Netherlands, 1985, §§ 24 and 27; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 85; Tolić and Others v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, §§ 94-95 and § 99; Biba v. Albania, 2024, §§ 63-65). Moreover, as regards the right to health, the Member States have a number of positive obligations in this respect under Articles 2 and 8 ( Vasileva v. Bulgarie, §§ 63-69; İbrahim Keskin v. Turkey, 2018, § 61)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:24228/18,Biba v. Albania,24228/18,added,"Biba v. Albania, no. 24228/18, 7 May 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1,Applicability in general,4,91,91,0.926,"F.O. v. Croatia , 2021|In Biba v. Albania , 2024",,"Measures taken in the field of education may, in certain circumstances, affect the right to respect F.O. v. Croatia for private life (, 2021, § 81). The Court held that the verbal abuse of a student by his teacher, in front of his classmates, fell to be examined under the right to respect for ""private life"". It had no doubt that the insults caused emotional disturbance, which affected the applicant's psychological well-being, dignity and moral integrity, were capable of humiliating and belittling him in the eyes of others (§§ 59-61).","Measures taken in the field of education may, in certain circumstances, affect the right to respect for private life ( F.O. v. Croatia, 2021, § 81). The Court held that the verbal abuse of a student by his teacher, in front of his classmates, fell to be examined under the right to respect for "" private life "" . It had no doubt that the insults caused emotional disturbance, which affected the applicant's psychological well-being, dignity and moral integrity, were capable of humiliating and belittling him in the eyes of others (§§ 59-61). In Biba v. Albania, 2024, §§ 41-43, the Court held that an eye injury, inflicted on the applicant's son by another pupil at a private school, resulting in 90% loss of vision in that eye, had undoubtedly had an adverse effect on the boy's private life so that Article 8 was engaged."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:24228/18,Biba v. Albania,24228/18,added,"Biba v. Albania, no. 24228/18, 7 May 2024",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.A.1,Applicability in general,4,93,93,0.9955,"Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania , 2020|Biba v. Albania , 2024|Budimir v. Croatia , 2021|M.L. v. Slovakia , 2021",Budimir v. Croatia 2021,"The applicability of Article 8 has been determined, in some contexts, by a severity test: see, for example, the relevant case-law on environmental issues 1920 ; an attack on a person's reputation 21, dismissal, demotion, non-admission to a profession or other similarly unfavourable measures, in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, §§ 111-112 and 115-117, with further references therein (see also, by way of examples, Polyakh and Others v. Ukraine, 2019, §§ 207-211; Vučina v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, §§ 44-50; Convertito and Others v. Romania, 2020; Platini v. Switzerland (dec.), 2020; M.L. v. Slovakia, Budimir v. Croatia 2021, § 24;, 2021, § 47); acts or measures of a private individual which adversely affect the physical and psychological integrity of another ( Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], 2019, § 128, in relation to a road-traffic accident; C. v. Romania, 2022, with regard to sexual Beizaras and Levickas harassment, §§ 50-54); and individual psychological well-being and dignity in v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 109 and 117; Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 59-62 22 (see in some other fields, for instance, S.-H. v. Poland (dec.), 2021). Not every act or measure which may be said to affect adversely the moral integrity of a person necessarily gives rise to such an interference. However, once a measure is found to have seriously affected the applicant's private life, the complaint will be compatible ratione materiae with the Convention and an issue of the ""right to respect for private life"" will arise. In this regard, the question of applicability and the existence of interference with the right to respect for private life are often inextricably linked ( Vučina v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, § 32).","The applicability of Article 8 has been determined, in some contexts, by a severity test: see, for example, the relevant case-law on environmental issues ; an attack on a person's reputation, dismissal, demotion, non-admission to a profession or other similarly unfavourable measures, in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, §§ 111-112 and 115-117, with further references therein (see also, by way of examples, Polyakh and Others v. Ukraine, 2019, §§ 207-211; Vučina v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, §§ 44-50; Convertito and Others v. Romania, 2020; Platini v. Switzerland (dec.), 2020; M.L. v. Slovakia, 2021, § 24; Budimir v. Croatia, 2021, § 47); acts or measures of a private individual which adversely affect the physical and psychological integrity of another ( Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], 2019, § 128, in relation to a road-traffic accident; C. v. Romania, 2022, with regard to sexual harassment, §§ 50-54; Biba v. Albania, 2024, §§ 41-43, regarding an injury inflicted at school); and individual psychological well-being and dignity in Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, §§ 109 and 117; Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 59-62 22 (see in some other fields, for instance, S.-H. v. Poland (dec.), 2021). Not every act or measure which may be said to affect adversely the moral integrity of a person necessarily gives rise to such an interference. However, once a measure is found to have seriously affected the applicant's private life, the complaint will be compatible ratione materiae with the Convention and an issue of the ""right to respect for private life"" will arise. In this regard, the question of applicability and the existence of interference with the right to respect for private life are often inextricably linked ( Vučina v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, § 32)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:24228/18,Biba v. Albania,24228/18,added,"Biba v. Albania, no. 24228/18, 7 May 2024",5,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.1,Victims of violence/abuse,4,,129,,"Biba v. Albania , 2024",,,"In the context of the provision of an important public service such as education, the Court underlined that the essential role of the education authorities was to protect the health and well- being of the students, and that educational establishments were in principle under an obligation to supervise their students at all times during school hours and to take appropriate measures to prevent the use of dangerous objects by them on school premises or custody ( Biba v. Albania, 2024, §§ 59, 67 and 71-73)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:24228/18,Biba v. Albania,24228/18,added,"Biba v. Albania, no. 24228/18, 7 May 2024",6,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.B.1,Victims of violence/abuse,4,126,127,0.9929,"Biba v. Albania , 2024|E.S. and Others v. Slovakia , 2009|F.O. v. Croatia , 2021|Levchuk v. Ukraine , 2020|ć v. Montenegro , 2018","ć v. Montenegro E.S. and Others v. Slovakia , 2018","The Court has long held that the State has an affirmative responsibility to protect individuals from violence by third parties (see, for a summary of the case-law, C. v. Romania, 2022, §§ 62-66). This has been particularly true in cases involving children (for instance, the verbal abuse of a student F.O. v. Croatia by his teacher,, 2021, §§ 81-82 and §§ 88-89,) and victims of domestic violence, Buturugă v. Romania, 2020). While there are often violations of Articles 2 and 3 in such cases, Article 8 is also applied because violence threatens bodily integrity and the right to a private life ( Milićević v. Montenegro E.S. and Others v. Slovakia, 2018, §§ 54-56; and, 2009, § 44). In particular, under Article 8 the States have a duty to protect the physical and moral integrity of an individual from other persons, including cyberbullying by a person's intimate partner: Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, §§ 74, 78-79; Volodina v. Russia (no. 2), 2021, §§ 48-49, harassment/bullying by colleagues: Špadijer v. Montenegro, 2021, § 100, and sexual harassment in the workplace: C. v. Romania, 2022, §§ 67-87 (compare Dolopoulos v. Greece (dec.), 2015). To that end they are to maintain and apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection against acts of violence by private individuals (see also Sandra Janković v. Croatia, 2009, § 45). The national courts' dismissal of a claim by a victim of domestic violence to evict her husband from their shared social housing has also been found to breach Levchuk v. Ukraine her rights under Article 8 (, 2020, § 90).","The Court has long held that the State has an affirmative responsibility to protect individuals from violence by third parties (see, for a summary of the case-law, C. v. Romania, 2022, §§ 62-66). This has been particularly true in cases involving children (for instance, the verbal abuse of a student by his teacher, F.O. v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 81-82 and §§ 88-89; Biba v. Albania, 2024, §§ 59, 67 and 76) and victims of domestic violence, Buturugă v. Romania, 2020). While there are often violations of Articles 2 and 3 in such cases, Article 8 is also applied because violence threatens bodily integrity and the right to a private life ( Milićević v. Montenegro, 2018, §§ 54-56; and E.S. and Others v. Slovakia, 2009, § 44). In particular, under Article 8 the States have a duty to protect the physical and moral integrity of an individual from other persons, including cyberbullying by a person's intimate partner: Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, §§ 74, 78-79; Volodina v. Russia (no. 2), 2021, §§ 48-49, M.Ș.D. v. Romania, §§ 118-19, 3 December 2024; harassment/bullying by colleagues: Špadijer v. Montenegro, 2021, § 100, and sexual harassment in the workplace: C. v. Romania, 2022, §§ 67-87 (compare Dolopoulos v. Greece (dec.), 2015). To that end they are to maintain and apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection against acts of violence by private individuals (see also Sandra Janković v. Croatia, 2009, § 45). The national courts'dismissal of a claim by a victim of domestic violence to evict her husband from their shared social housing has also been found to breach her rights under Article 8 ( Levchuk v. Ukraine, 2020, § 90)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:11575/24,Borzykh v. Ukraine (dec.),11575/24,added,"Borzykh v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 11575/24, 19 November 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.D.5,Desired appearance,4,298,306,0.9578,,,"The Court has established that personal choices as to an individual's desired appearance, whether in public or in private, relate to the expression of his or her personality and thus fall within the notion of private life. This has included a haircut ( Popa v. Romania (dec.), 2013, §§ 32-33), denial of access to a university for wearing a beard ( Tığ v. Turkey (dec.), 2005), a ban on wearing clothing designed to conceal the face in public places for women wishing to wear a fullface veil for reasons related to their beliefs ( S.A.S. v. France [GC], 2014, §§ 106-107), and appearing naked in public places Gough v. the United Kingdom (, 2014, §§ 182-184). However, it is important to note that in each of these cases, the Court found the restriction on personal appearance to be proportionate. The absolute prohibition on growing a beard in prison was considered a violation of Article 8 because that the Government had failed to demonstrate the existence of a pressing social need to justify an absolute prohibition ( Biržietis v. Lithuania, 2016, §§ 54 and 57-58).","The Court has established that personal choices as to an individual's desired appearance, whether in public or in private, relate to the expression of his or her personality and thus fall within the notion of private life. This has included a haircut ( Popa v. Romania (dec.), 2013, §§ 32-33), denial of access to a university for wearing a beard ( Tığ v. Turkey (dec.), 2005), a ban on wearing clothing designed to conceal the face in public places for women wishing to wear a fullface veil for reasons related to their beliefs ( S.A.S. v. France [GC], 2014, §§ 106-107), and appearing naked in public places ( Gough v. the United Kingdom, 2014, §§ 182-184). However, it is important to note that in each of these cases, the Court found the restriction on personal appearance to be proportionate. The Court declared inadmissible a case where the applicant complained about a ban on wearing a particular clothing symbol to demonstrate his belonging to a specific group. Referring to the specific social and political context, the authorities' margin of appreciation and the fact that the ban in question was not a blanket one and allowed for a wide range of exceptions, the Court found the national authorities had not overstepped their margin of appreciation ( Borzykh v. Ukraine (dec.), 2024, §§ 49-54). The absolute prohibition on growing a beard in prison was considered a violation of Article 8 because that the Government had failed to demonstrate the existence of a pressing social need to justify an absolute prohibition ( Biržietis v. Lithuania, 2016, §§ 54 and 57-58)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:2507/19,Contrada v. Italy (no. 4),2507/19,added,"Contrada v. Italy (no. 4), no. 2507/19, 23 May 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.B.7,Police surveillance,4,248,255,0.9697,"Kruslin v. France , 1990",,"Tapping and other forms of interception of telephone conversations represent a serious interference with private life and correspondence (see, for instance Dragojević v. Croatia, 2015, §§ 94-98) and must accordingly be based on a law that is precise. It is essential to have clear, detailed rules on the subject, especially as the technology available for use is continually becoming more Kruslin v. France sophisticated (, 1990, § 33). When balancing the respondent State's interest in protecting its national security through secret surveillance measures against the seriousness of the interference with an applicant's right to respect for his or her private life, the national authorities enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in choosing the means for achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national security. However, there must be adequate and effective safeguards against abuse. The Court thus takes into account the circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope and duration of the possible measures, the grounds required for ordering them, the authorities competent to authorise, carry out and supervise them, and the kind of remedy provided by the national law ( Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 232; İrfan Güzel v. Turkey, 2017, § 85, Ekimdzhiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2022, §§ 418 and 419[f]; see also Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2021; Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden [GC], 2022; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, §§).","Tapping and other forms of interception of telephone conversations represent a serious interference with private life and correspondence (see, for instance Dragojević v. Croatia, 2015, §§ 94-98) and must accordingly be based on a law that is precise. It is essential to have clear, detailed rules on the subject, especially as the technology available for use is continually becoming more sophisticated ( Kruslin v. France, 1990, § 33). When balancing the respondent State's interest in protecting its national security through secret surveillance measures against the seriousness of the interference with an applicant's right to respect for his or her private life, the national authorities enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in choosing the means for achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national security. However, there must be adequate and effective safeguards against abuse. The Court thus takes into account the circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope and duration of the possible measures, the grounds required for ordering them, the authorities competent to authorise, carry out and supervise them, and the kind of remedy provided by the national law ( Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 232; İrfan Güzel v. Turkey, 2017, § 85, Ekimdzhiev and Others v. Bulgaria, 2022, §§ 418 and 419[f]; see also Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2021; Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden [GC], 2022; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 64). In Contrada v. Italy (no. 4), 2024, concerning the interception of the applicant's telephone communications for the purposes of criminal proceedings not concerning him, the Court found that the relevant domestic law lacked adequate and effective safeguards to protect the applicant from the risk of abuse given the absence of a possibility of a posteriori judicial review of the contested measure in situations such as this one (§§ 91-96)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:32312/23,Dániel Karsai v. Hungary,32312/23,added,"Dániel Karsai v. Hungary, no. 32312/23, 13 June 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.6,End of life issues,4,,173,,"In Dániel Karsai v. Hungary , 2024",,,"In Dániel Karsai v. Hungary, 2024, concerning the impossibility for the terminally ill applicant suffering from an uncurable progressive neurodegenerative disease, to avail himself of physician- assisted dying (""PAD""), the Court examined his complaint under Article 8 in the light of both the negative and positive obligations of the respondent State, considering them to be intertwined, without clearly separating them in the specific circumstances of the case: more emphasis was placed on the positive obligation with respect to the provision of PAD at home and on the negative obligation when considering the prohibition which applied to access to PADabroad, even if the Court noted that the latter could not be entirely separated from the positive aspect. It focused, in particular, on the deep ethical and societal implications of PAD, agreeing that the impugned criminal ban pursued the legitimate aims of, in particular, protecting the lives of vulnerable individuals at risk of abuse, maintaining the medical profession's ethical integrity and protecting the morals of society as a whole with regard to the meaning and value of human life (§§ 137-52). The Court further refused the argument that the existential suffering of a terminally ill patient could, as such, create an obligation for the State under Article 8 to legalise PAD. It emphasised palliative care as ensuring a dignified end of life and that the heightened state of vulnerability of a terminally ill patient warranted a fundamentally humane approach, necessarily including palliative care which is guided by compassion and high medical standards (§§ 154-58). The applicant's refusal to receive sedation constituted a legitimate personal choice which could not, in itself, require authorities to provide alternative solutions or legalise PAD (§ 155). It did not consider that criminal liability for an act of assisted suicide committed abroad, a practice that is not unusual among the Contracting States, would make the alleged interference disproportionate, but noted that the need for appropriate legal measures in the area of PAD is to be kept under review, having regard to developments in European societies and relevant international standards on medical ethics (§ 167). It concluded that, given the very complex and sensitive ethical nature of the issue at stake and the lack of a European consensus in this area (while there is a growing trend towards the legalisation of PAD, the majority of member States continue to prohibit and prosecute any assistance for suicide, including PAD), the Hungarian authorities did not overstep their wide margin of appreciation in balancing, on the one hand, the applicant's right to personal autonomy guaranteed by Article 8 and, on the other, the interest in, in particular, protecting the lives of vulnerable individuals at risk of abuse and the morals of society with regard to the value of human life. The Court found no violation of Article 8 of the Convention."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:32312/23,Dániel Karsai v. Hungary,32312/23,added,"Dániel Karsai v. Hungary, no. 32312/23, 13 June 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.D.1,Right to personal development and autonomy,4,277,284,0.9643,"Pasquinelli and Others v. San Marino , 2024",,"Article 8 protects a right to personal development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world ( Niemietz v. Germany, 1992, § 29; Pretty v. the United Kingdom, 2002, §§ 61 and 67; Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, 2013, §§ 165-167; El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], 2012, §§ 248-250, concerning the applicant's secret and extrajudicial abduction and arbitrary detention). The right to personal autonomy was relied upon, for instance, in a case of death by euthanasia where the Court had to weigh up the various competing interests at stake namely, the applicant's wish to accompany his mother in the last moments of her life and his mother's right to respect for her wishes and her personal autonomy ( Mortier v. Belgium, 2022, § 124 and § 204).","Article 8 protects a right to personal development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world ( Niemietz v. Germany, 1992, § 29; Pretty v. the United Kingdom, 2002, §§ 61 and 67; Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, 2013, §§ 165-167; El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], 2012, §§ 248-250, concerning the applicant's secret and extrajudicial abduction and arbitrary detention). The right to personal autonomy was relied upon, for instance, in a case of death by euthanasia where the Court had to weigh up the various competing interests at stake namely, the applicant's wish to accompany his mother in the last moments of her life and his mother's right to respect for her wishes and her personal autonomy ( Mortier v. Belgium, 2022, § 124 and § 204; for personal autonomy in the context of physician-assisted suicide, see also Dániel Karsai v. Hungary, § 85; for personal autonomy in the context of vaccination, see Pasquinelli and Others v. San Marino, 2024, § 77)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:44002/22,Dian v. Denmark (dec.),44002/22,added,"Dian v. Denmark (dec.), no. 44002/22, 21 May 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1,Applicability in general,4,90,90,0.9423,"In Lacatus v. Switzerland , 2021",,"In, 2021, the Court found that the imposition of a fine on the applicant for begging, and her subsequent imprisonment for non-payment, interfered with her right to respect for her ""private life"". Given the concept of human dignity underpinning the spirit of the Convention, by prohibiting begging in general and by imposing a fine on the applicant together with a prison sentence for failure to comply with the sentence imposed, the national authorities prevented her from making contact with other people in order to get help which was one of the ways she could meet her basic needs (§§ 56-60). It further found that the respondent State had overstepped its margin of appreciation as the penalty imposed on the applicant had not been proportionate either to the aim of combating organised crime or to the aim of protecting the rights of passers-by, residents and shopkeepers. Furthermore, in view of the fact that the applicant was an extremely vulnerable person, in a situation in which she had in all likelihood lacked any other means of subsistence, the Court found that her punishment had infringed her human dignity and impaired the very essence of the rights protected by Article 8 of the Convention.","In Lacatus v. Switzerland, 2021, the Court found that the imposition of a fine on the applicant for begging, and her subsequent imprisonment for non-payment, interfered with her right to respect for her "" private life "" . Given the concept of human dignity underpinning the spirit of the Convention, by prohibiting begging in general and by imposing a fine on the applicant together with a prison sentence for failure to comply with the sentence imposed, the national authorities prevented her from making contact with other people in order to get help which was one of the ways she could meet her basic needs (§§ 56-60). It further found that the respondent State had overstepped its margin of appreciation as the penalty imposed on the applicant had not been proportionate either to the aim of combating organised crime or to the aim of protecting the rights of passers-by, residents and shopkeepers. Furthermore, in view of the fact that the applicant was an extremely vulnerable person, in a situation in which she had in all likelihood lacked any other means of subsistence, the Court found that her punishment had infringed her human dignity and impaired the very essence of the rights protected by Article 8 of the Convention. In Dian v. Denmark (dec.), the Court further nuanced that approach by applying the principles and criteria set out in the Lacatus judgment. It clarified, in particular, that it had not previously acknowledged that there was a right to beg, as such, under Article 8. If the person's economic and social situation was so inhuman and precarious that his or her human dignity had been severely compromised and if begging was a means for him or her to rise above that situation, then the right to call on others for assistance through begging went to the very essence of the rights protected by Article 8 of the Convention. Those specific circumstances should be determined on a case-by-case basis. On the facts of the case, the Court examined the two criteria developed in Lacatus, namely the gravity of the applicant's economic and social situation and the extent of the ban on begging. It found, firstly, that the applicant did not really depend on begging to ensure his survival or to protect his human dignity. The Court was thus not convinced that the applicant lacked sufficient means of subsistence or that begging had been his only option to ensure his own survival or that, by the act of begging, he had adopted a particular way of life in order to rise above an inhumane and precarious situation and thus protect his human dignity. Secondly, the impugned ban was not absolute but limited to some designated places and areas. The circumstances of the present case were not therefore such as to trigger the applicability of Article 8 of the Convention."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:29550/17,Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*,29550/17,added,"Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*, no. 29550/17, 19 December 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.C,"In the case of a negative obligation, was the interference conducted “in accordance with the law”?",3,21,21,0.9162,,,"""Lawfulness"" also requires that there be adequate safeguards to ensure that an individual's Article 8 rights are respected. Domestic law must provide adequate safeguards to offer the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference ( Bykov v. Russia [GC], 2009, § 81; Vig v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 51-62).",""" Lawfulness "" also requires that there be adequate safeguards to ensure that an individual's Article 8 rights are respected. Domestic law must provide adequate safeguards to offer the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference ( Bykov v. Russia [GC], 2009, § 81; Vig v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 51-62; as regards legal persons, see Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, 2024, §§ 97, 99 and 107)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:29550/17,Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*,29550/17,added,"Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*, no. 29550/17, 19 December 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.C,"In the case of a negative obligation, was the interference conducted “in accordance with the law”?",3,24,24,0.9975,,,"Afinding that the measure in question was not ""in accordance with the law"" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a ""legitimate aim"" or was ""necessary in a democratic society"" ( M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be ""in accordance with the law"", as a result of an unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 ( Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been ""neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society"" (§§ 62-63). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be ""in accordance with the law"" was so closely linked to the ""necessary in a democratic society"" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 66).","Afinding that the measure in question was not ""in accordance with the law"" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a ""legitimate aim"" or was ""necessary in a democratic society"" ( M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be ""in accordance with the law"", as a result of a n unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 ( Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been "" neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society "" (§§ 62-63). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be ""in accordance with the law"" was so closely linked to the ""necessary in a democratic society"" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 66; Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, 2024, § 103)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:29550/17,Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*,29550/17,added,"Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*, no. 29550/17, 19 December 2024",3,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.C.4,Minorities and vulnerable persons,4,,519,,,,,"In Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, §§ 98-102, where the applicant association complained about a search at its premises and seizure of a large amount of paper and digital documents performed in the context of a parliamentary commission's inquiry concerning organised crime syndicates, the Court found that the lawfulness requirement had been met and, in particular, the guarantees provided by the domestic legal system had been sufficient to prevent abuse and arbitrariness, since the Constitution vested in such parliamentary commissions the same powers of investigation, and subjected them to the same limitations as a judicial authority, adapted where appropriate to the context of a parliamentary inquiry."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:29550/17,Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*,29550/17,added,"Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*, no. 29550/17, 19 December 2024",4,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.C.4,Minorities and vulnerable persons,4,,522,,"Halabi v. France , 2019|K.S. and M.S. v. Germany , 2016|Others v. France , 2018|Van Rossem v. Belgium , 2004|Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria , 2007|ć v. Serbia , 2020|ıldak v. Turkey , 2008",,,"The following are examples of measures which pursue legitimate aims: action by the Competition Authority to protect economic competition ( DELTA PEKÁRNY a.s. v. the Czech Republic, 2014, § 81); suppression of tax evasion ( Keslassy v. France (dec.), 2002, and K.S. and M.S. v. Germany, 2016, § 48); seeking circumstantial and material evidence in criminal cases, for example involving forgery, breach of trust and the issuing of uncovered cheques ( Van Rossem v. Belgium, 2004, § 40), murder ( Dragan Petrović v. Serbia, 2020, § 74), drug trafficking ( Işıldak v. Turkey, 2008, § 50) and illegal trade in medicines ( Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria, 2007, § 55); environmental protection and prevention of nuisance ( Halabi v. France, 2019, §§ 60-61); protecting health and the ""rights and freedoms of others"" in the context of combating doping in sport ( National Federation of Sportspersons'Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 165-166); search at an association's premises and seizure of paper and digital documents in the context of a parliamentary inquiry concerning the Mafia ( Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, § 105)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:29550/17,Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*,29550/17,added,"Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*, no. 29550/17, 19 December 2024",5,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.D,Commercial premises,3,,534,,"Bernh Larsen Holding AS and Others v. Norway , 2013",,,"The margin of appreciation afforded to the State in assessing the necessity of an interference is wider where the search measure concerns legal entities rather than individuals ( DELTA PEKÁRNY a.s. v. the Czech Republic, 2014, § 82; Bernh Larsen Holding AS and Others v. Norway, 2013, § 159; Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, 2024, § 93) ."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:29550/17,Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*,29550/17,added,"Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*, no. 29550/17, 19 December 2024",6,paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,V.A.1,Scope of the concept of “correspondence”,4,543,553,0.9904,"Saber v. Norway , 2020|Särgava v. Estonia , 2021",,"Technologies also come within the scope of Article 8, in particular data from a smart phone/lap Saber v. Norway Särgava v. Estonia top and/or the mirror image copy of it (, 2020, § 48;, 2021), electronic messages (emails) ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 41; Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 72; Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 31; for emails exchanged with correspondents on a casual dating site, see M.P. v. Portugal, 2021, § 34), Internet use ( Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 81 and Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, §§ 41-42), and data stored on computer servers ( Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria, 2007, § 45), including hard drives ( Petri Sallinen and Others v. Finland, 2005, § 71) and floppy disks ( Iliya Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2008, § 42). Christie v. the","Technologies also come within the scope of Article 8, in particular data from a smart phone/lap top and/or the mirror image copy of it ( Saber v. Norway, 2020, § 48; Särgava v. Estonia, 2021), electronic messages (emails) ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 41; Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 72; Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 31; for emails exchanged with correspondents on a casual dating site, see M.P. v. Portugal, 2021, § 34), Internet use ( Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 81 and Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, §§ 41-42), and data stored on computer servers ( Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria, 2007, § 45; Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, 2024, § 89), including hard drives ( Petri Sallinen and Others v. Finland, 2005, § 71) and floppy disks ( Iliya Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 2008, § 42)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:29550/17,Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*,29550/17,added,"Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*, no. 29550/17, 19 December 2024",7,paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,V.A.§4,Examples of “interference”,4,547,557,0.9964,"Liblik and others v. Estonia , 2019|M.N. and Others v. San Marino , 2015",Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden Roman Zakharov v. Russia 2021,"Other forms of interference with the right to respect for ""correspondence"" may include the following acts attributable to the public authorities:  screening of correspondence ( Campbell v. the United Kingdom, 1992, § 33), the making of copies ( Foxley v. the United Kingdom, 2000, § 30) or the deletion of certain passages ( Pfeifer and Plankl v. Austria, 1992, § 43);  interception by various means and recording of personal or business related conversations Amann v. Switzerland ( [GC], 2000, § 45), for example by means of telephone tapping ( Malone v. the United Kingdom, 1984, § 64, and, as regards metering, §§ 83-84, Azer Ahmadov v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 62; see also P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 42), even when carried out on the line of a third party ( Lambert v. France, 1998, § 21; Potoczka and Adamco v. Slovakia, 2023, and also for the individual not concerned by the criminal proceedings, §§ 1, 46-51);  copying the full content of the hard drive of the applicant's laptop on to an external hard drive, the mirror-image copy ( Särgava v. Estonia, 2021), or the seizure of a smart phone and the search of its mirror image copy ( Saber v. Norway, 2020, § 48);  storage of intercepted data concerning telephone, email and Internet use ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 44). The mere fact that such data may be obtained legitimately, for example from telephone bills, is no bar to finding an ""interference""; the fact that the information has not been disclosed to third parties or used in disciplinary or other proceedings against the person concerned is likewise immaterial ( ibid ., § 43); This may also concern:  the forwarding of mail to a third party ( Luordo v. Italy, 2003, §§ 72 and 75, with regard to a trustee in bankruptcy; Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 1992, §§ 87-88, with regard to the guardian of a psychiatric detainee);  the copying of electronic files, including those belonging to companies ( Bernh Larsen Holding AS and Others v. Norway, 2013, § 106);  the copying of documents containing banking data and their subsequent storage by the M.N. and Others v. San Marino authorities (, 2015, § 52); and  secret surveillance measures ( Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden Roman Zakharov v. Russia 2021; [GC], 2022; [GC], 2015, and the references cited therein). Asituation where an individual under secret surveillance happens to be a member of a company's management board does not automatically lead to Liblik and others v. Estonia an interference with that company's Article 8 rights (, 2019, § 112, in which, however, the Court saw no reason to distinguish between the correspondence of a member of the management board of the applicant companies and that of the applicant companies themselves even if no secret surveillance authorisations had been formally issued in respect of the companies).","Other forms of interference with the right t o respect for ""correspondence"" may include the following acts attributable to the public authorities: ▪ screening of correspondence ( Campbell v. the United Kingdom, 1992, § 33), the making of copies ( Foxley v. the United Kingdom, 2000, § 30) or the deletion of certain passages ( Pfeifer and Plankl v. Austria, 1992, § 43); ▪ interception by various means and recording of personal or business related conversations ( Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, § 45), for example by means of telephone tapping ( Malone v. the United Kingdom, 1984, § 64, and, as regards metering, §§ 83-84, Azer Ahmadov v. Azerbaijan, 2021, § 62; see also P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 42), even when carried out on the line of a third party ( Lambert v. France, 1998, § 21; Potoczka and Adamco v. Slovakia, 2023, and also for the individual not concerned by the criminal proceedings, §§ 1, 46-51); ▪ copying the full content of the hard drive of the applicant's laptop on to an external hard drive, the mirror-image copy ( Särgava v. Estonia, 2021), or the seizure of a smart phone and the search of its mirror image copy ( Saber v. Norway, 2020, § 48); ▪ storage of intercepted data concerning telephone, email and Internet use ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 44). The mere fact that such data may be obtained legitimately, for example from telephone bills, is no bar to finding an ""interference""; the fact that the information has not been disclosed to third parties or used in disciplinary or other proceedings against the person concerned is likewise immaterial ( ibid ., § 43); This may also concern: ▪ the forwarding of mail to a third party ( Luordo v. Italy, 2003, §§ 72 and 75, with regard to a trustee in bankruptcy; Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 1992, §§ 87-88, with regard to the guardian of a psychiatric detainee); ▪ the copying of electronic files, including those belonging to companies ( Bernh Larsen Holding AS and Others v. Norway, 2013, § 106; ); ▪ the copying of documents containing banking data and their subsequent storage by the authorities ( M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, § 52); and seizure of paper and digital documents of an association, including a list of its members ( Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, § 91); ▪ secret surveillance measures ( Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2021; Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden [GC], 2022; Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, and the references cited therein). Asituation where an individual under secret surveillance happens to be a member of a company's management board does not automatically lead to an interference with that company's Article 8 rights ( Liblik and others v. Estonia, 2019, § 112, in which, however, the Court saw no reason to distinguish between the correspondence of a member of the management board of the applicant companies and that of the applicant companies themselves even if no secret surveillance authorisations had been formally issued in respect of the companies)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:29550/17,Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*,29550/17,added,"Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*, no. 29550/17, 19 December 2024",8,paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,V.D,"Correspondence of private individuals, professionals and companies",3,223,652,0.8564,"Bernh Larsen Holding AS and Others v. Norway , 2013","M.L. v. Slovakia , 2021|ğlu and Oran v. Turkey , 2018","Although the press must not overstep certain bounds, regarding in particular protection of the reputation and rights of others ( Kaboğlu and Oran v. Turkey, 2018, § 74), its duty is nevertheless to impart - in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities - information and ideas on all matters of public interest, which the public has a right to receive, including reporting and commenting on court proceedings ( Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 2012, § 79). The Court has also stressed the importance of the proactive role of the press, namely to reveal and bring to the public's attention information capable of eliciting such interest and of giving rise to such a debate within society ( Couderc and Hachette Filipac chi Associés v. France [GC], 2015, § 114). When covering certain events, journalists have the duty to show prudence and caution (§ 140). In particular, the Court has held that that there is a distinction to be drawn between reporting facts - even if controversial - capable of contributing to a debate of general public interest in a democratic society and making tawdry allegations about an individual's private life. In respect of the former, the pre-eminent role of the press in a democracy and its duty to act as a ""public watchdog"" are important considerations in favour of a narrow construction of any limitations on freedom of expression. However, different considerations apply to press reports concentrating on sensational and, at times, lurid news, intended to titillate and entertain, which are aimed at satisfying the curiosity of a particular readership regarding aspects of a person's strictly private life. Thus, in M.L. v. Slovakia, 2021, which concerned publication in the media of information regarding the conviction of the applicant's deceased son - a parish priest - of sexual offences, the Court observed that the revealed information had been particularly intrusive as it had concerned the intimate sphere of the private life of the applicant's late son life and that his picture had also been published. It found a violation of Article 8 on the basis that such publication was not justified by considerations of the general interest (§ 53).","The question of companies'correspondence is closely linked to that of searches of their premises (reference is accordingly made to the chapter on Commercial premises). For example, in Bernh Larsen Holding AS and Others v. Norway, 2013, the Court found no violation on account of a decision ordering a company to hand over a copy of all data on the computer server it used jointly with other companies. Although the applicable law did not require prior judicial authorisation, the Court took into account the existence of effective and adequate safeguards against abuse, the interests of the companies and their employees and the public interest in effective tax inspections (§§ 172-175). However, the Court found a violation in the case of DELTA PEKÁRNY a.s. v. the Czech Republic, 2014, concerning an inspection of business premises with a view to finding circumstantial and material evidence of an unlawful pricing agreement in breach of competition rules. The Court referred to the lack of prior judicial authorisation, the lack of ex post facto review of the necessity of the measure, and the lack of rules governing the possibility of destroying the data obtained (§§ 92-93). The Court also found a violation in Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, 2024, a case concerning a search at the applicant association's premises and seizure of a large amount of materials, performed in the context of a parliamentary commission's inquiry concerning organised crime syndicates . In particular, the Court underlined that the applicant association's rights under Article 8 had been significantly affected during the search since the domestic authorities had examined and retained a large number of paper and digital documents, which included confidential information (§ 131). It also pointed to the lack of evidence or a reasonable suspicion of involvement in the matter being investigated, capable of justifying the measure (§ 124), its wide and indeterminate content (§§ 126-131), as well as the absence of sufficient counterbalancing guarantees, in particular of an independent and impartial review of the contested measure (§§ 134-145)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:13805/21,H.W. v. France,13805/21,added,"H.W. v. France, no. 13805/21, 23 January 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.10,Sexual orientation and sexual life,4,,199,,"In H.W. v. France , 2025",,,"In H.W. v. France, 2025, § 71, the Court held that a fault-based divorce with blame, attributed solely to the applicant for failure to fulfil marital duties by refusing to have sexual relations with her husband, affected her sexual life and sexual freedom and thus constituted an interference with her private life. The Court considered that the marital duty imposed on the applicant also breached the State's obligation to combat domestic and sexual violence against women ( § 89): it further found that consent to marriage did not imply consent to future sexual relations and reiterated, with reference to the obligation to prosecute marital rape, that consent must reflect the free will to engage in a specific sexual act at the time it occurs and taking into account the circumstances (§ 91). It therefore found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention (§§ 92-93)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:13805/21,H.W. v. France,13805/21,added,"H.W. v. France, no. 13805/21, 23 January 2025",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.10,Sexual orientation and sexual life,4,189,194,0.9582,"A.K. v. Russia , 2024|H.W. v. France , 2025",,"The margin of appreciation has been found to be narrow as regards interferences in the intimate area of an individual's sexual life ( Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 52 ). The Court has held that elements such as gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life are important elements of the personal sphere protected by Article 8 ( Drelon v. France, 2022, § 86; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, § 109; Sousa Goucha v. Portugal, 2016, § 27; B. v. France, 1992, § 63; Burghartz v. Switzerland, 1994, § 24; Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 41; Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 36; P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001).","The margin of appreciation has been found to be narrow as regards interferences in the intimate ( area of an individual's sexual life Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 52; A.K. v. Russia, 2024, § 30; H.W. v. France, 2025, § 85 ). The Court has held that elements such as gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life are important elements of the personal sphere protected by Article 8 ( Drelon v. France, 2022, § 86; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020, § 109; Sousa Goucha v. Portugal, 2016, § 27; B. v. France, 1992, § 63; Burghartz v. Switzerland, 1994, § 24; Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 1981, § 41; Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 36; P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001; A.K. v. Russia, 2024, § 30; H.W. v. France, 2025, § 62)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:52319/22,Le Marrec v. France (dec.),52319/22,added,"Le Marrec v. France (dec.), no. 52319/22, 5 November 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C,"In the case of a negative obligation, was the interference conducted “in accordance with the law”?",3,18,18,0.9961,"In Glukhin v. Russia , 2023",,"The national law must be clear, foreseeable, and adequately accessible ( Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1983, § 87; for an instruction issued by the Chief Prosecutor, see Vasil Vasilev v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 92-94; for instructions issued by the Ministry of Justice, see Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 83-99). It must be sufficiently foreseeable to enable individuals to act in accordance with the law ( Lebois v. Bulgaria, 2017, §§ 66-67 with further references therein, as regards internal orders in prison), and it must demarcate clearly the scope of discretion for public authorities. For example, as the Court articulated in the surveillance context (see the outline of the requirements in Falzarano v. Italy (dec.), 2021, §§ 27-29), the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication of the conditions and circumstances in which the authorities are empowered to resort to any measures of secret surveillance and collection of data ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, § 68). In Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, the Court found a violation of Article 8 due to the lack of clarity and precision in the domestic legal provisions that had served as the legal basis of the Glukhin v. Russia applicant's surveillance by her insurance company after an accident. In, 2023 (§§ 82-83), the Court expressed strong doubts that the domestic legal provisions which authorised the processing of biometric personal data, including with the aid of facial recognition technology, ""in connection with the administration of justice"" met the ""quality of law"" requirement since they were widely formulated and would appear to allow the processing of such data in connection with any type of judicial proceedings. For the ""quality of law"" requirement to be met in the context of implementing facial recognition technology, it was essential to have detailed rules governing the scope and application of measures as well as strong safeguards against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness. The need for safeguards will be all the greater where the use of live facial recognition technology is concerned.","The national law must be clear, foreseeable, and adequately accessible ( Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1983, § 87; for an instruction issued by the Chief Prosecutor, see Vasil Vasilev v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 92-94; for instructions issued by the Ministry of Justice, see Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 83-99; for a regulation published on the website of a social welfare authority, see Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 72-75). It must be sufficiently foreseeable to enable individuals to act in accordance with the law ( Lebois v. Bulgaria, 2017, §§ 66-67 with further references therein, as regards internal orders in prison), and it must demarcate clearly the scope of discretion for public authorities. For example, as the Court articulated in the surveillance context (see the outline of the requirements in Falzarano v. Italy (dec.), 2021, §§ 27-29), the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication of the conditions and circumstances in which the authorities are empowered to resort to any measures of secret surveillance and collection of data ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, § 68). In Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, the Court found a violation of Article 8 due to the lack of clarity and precision in the domestic legal provisions that had served as the legal basis of the applicant's surveillance by her insurance company after an accident. In Glukhin v. Russia, 2023 (§§ 82-83), the Court expressed strong doubts that the domestic legal provisions which authorised the processing of biometric personal data, including with the aid of facial recognition technology, ""in connection with the administration of justice"" met the ""quality of law"" requirement since they were widely formulated and would appear to allow the processing of such data in connection with any type of judicial proceedings. F or the ""quality of law"" requirement to be met in the context of implementing facial recognition technology, it was essential to have detailed rules governing the scope and application of measures as well as strong safeguards against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness. The need for safeguards will be all the greater where the use of live facial recognition technology is concerned."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:52319/22,Le Marrec v. France (dec.),52319/22,added,"Le Marrec v. France (dec.), no. 52319/22, 5 November 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.D,Does the interference further a legitimate aim?,3,30,30,0.9322,,,"The publication of the applicant'sidentifying data, including his full name and home address, on a tax authority website for failing to fulfil his tax obligations was found to be in pursuit of the ""interests of ... the economic well-being of the country"" as well as ""the protection of the rights and freedoms of L.B. v. Hungary others"" ( [GC], 2023, §§ 111-13).","The publication of the applicant's identifying data, including his full name and home address, on a tax authority website for failing to fulfil his tax obligations was found to be in pursuit of the ""interests of ... the economic well- being of the country"" as well as ""the protection of the rights and freedoms of others"" ( L.B. v. Hungary [GC], 2023, §§ 111-13). In the same vein, the processing of the applicant's IPaddress and other ""connection data"" to enable the relevant social welfare authority to locate him to prevent welfare fraud, was in the interests of the economic well-being of the country and the prevention of crime ( Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, § 76)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:52319/22,Le Marrec v. France (dec.),52319/22,added,"Le Marrec v. France (dec.), no. 52319/22, 5 November 2024",3,paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.B.C,Privacy 38,4,196,202,0.9806,,,"Users of telecommunications and Internet services must have a guarantee that their own privacy will be respected, although such a guarantee cannot be absolute and must yield on occasion to other legitimate imperatives, such as the prevention of disorder and crime or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others ( Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 65). In particular, as regards online activities, information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses facilitating the identification of the author of such activities, constitutes, in principle, personal data which are not accessible to the public. The use of such data may therefore fall within the scope of Article 8 ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 107-108). In that regard, the fact that the applicant had not concealed his dynamic IPaddress had not been a decisive factor for assessing whether his expectation of privacy had been reasonable (§ 116). Conversely, the anonymity linked to online activities is an important factor which must be taken into account (§ 117).","Users of telecommunications and Internet services must have a guarantee that their own privacy will be respected, although such a guarantee cannot be absolute and must yield on occasion to other legitimate imperatives, such as the prevention of disorder and crime or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others ( Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 65). In particular, as regards online activities, information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses facilitating the identification of the author of such activities, constitutes, in principle, personal data which are not accessible to the public. The use of such data may therefore fall within the scope of Article 8 ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 107-108; Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 51 and 54, as regards an IPaddress masked by a VPN). In that regard, the fact that the applicant had not concealed his dynamic IPaddress had not been a decisive factor for assessing whether his expectation of privacy had been reasonable ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, § 116). Conversely, the anonymity linked to online activities is an important factor which must be taken into account (§ 117)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:25636/22,Lindholm and the Estate after Leif Lindholm v. Denmark,25636/22,added,"Lindholm and the Estate after Leif Lindholm v. Denmark, no. 25636/22, 5 November 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.B.3,Forced medical treatment and compulsory medical procedures,4,214,155,0.8742,"Lindholm and the Estate after Leif Lindholm v. Denmark , 2024","Høiness v. Norway , 2019","In (dec.), 2017, the Court ruled on the scope of the right to respect for private life safeguarded by Article 8 in relation to the freedom of expression secured by Article 10 to information society service providers such as Google Inc. (§§ 83-84). It found that the State concerned had a wide margin of appreciation and emphasised the important role that such service providers performed on the Internet in facilitating access to information and debate on a wide range of political, social and cultural topics (§ 90). As regards third-party comments on a blog, the Court has emphasised that Article 8 encompasses a positive obligation on the Contracting States to ensure the effective protection of the right to respect for reputation to those within their jurisdiction ( Pihl v. Sweden (dec.), 2017, § 28; see also Høiness v. Norway, 2019). In Egill Einarsson v. Iceland (no. 2), 2017, the domestic courts declared defamatory statements on Facebook null and void, but, having regard to the circumstances of the case, declined to award the applicant damages or costs. For the Court, the decision not to grant compensation does not in itself amount to a violation of Article 8. Among other factors, the fact that the statements were published as a comment on a Facebook page amongst hundreds or thousands of other comments, and the fact that they had been removed by their author as soon as the applicant had so requested, were taken into account to examine the sufficiency of protection of the applicant's right to reputation (§§ 38-39). In Çakmak v. Turkey (dec.), 2021, the applicant sought to have criminal proceedings instituted in connection with a statement which he considered to be damaging to his reputation and which had been made on an anonymous account on Twitter; he also sought to have that statement blocked. The Court found that the authorities had not failed in their positive obligation to protect the applicant's reputation by not blocking, for technical reasons, access to the statement in question and by refusing to institute criminal proceedings, with reference to the fact that it was impossible to establish the identity of the author of the impugned statement given that the necessary information was kept on the servers of Twitter in California, and that the authorities of the United States refused to provide that information in the absence of the relevant agreement between the United States and Turkey.","In Pindo Mulla v. Spain [GC], 2024, the Court considered, for the first time, how the State's obligations - on the one hand, to safeguard patients' lives and physical integri ty and, on the other, to respect patients' personal autonomy - were to be reconciled in an emergency situation (§ 146). In that case the applicant, a Jehovah's Witness, complained about blood transfusions which she had received during an urgent life-saving surgery, despite having previously signed documents confirming her refusal of blood transfusion in all healthcare situations. The Court underlined that: (a) in the ordinary health care context, a competent, adult patient had the right to refuse, freely and consciously, medical treatment notwithstanding the very serious, even fatal, consequences that such a decision might have (§ 146); (b) in an emergency situation, where the right to life would also be in play along with an individual's right to decide autonomously on medical treatment: (i) a decision to refuse life-saving treatment must be made freely and autonomously by a person with the requisite legal capacity who was conscious of the implications of such decision; (ii) it must also be ensured that that decision - the existence of which must be known to the medical personnel - was applicable in the circumstances, in the sense that it was clear, specific and unambiguous in refusing treatment and represented the current position of the patient on the matter; and (iii) where doubts existed regarding any of the said aspects, ""reasonable efforts"" should be made to dispel those doubts or uncertainty surrounding the refusal of treatment and, where despite such efforts it was impossible to establish to the extent necessary the patient's will, it was the duty to protect that patient's life by providing essential care - that should prevail (§§ 147-150); and (c) the Contracting States had considerable discretion as regards advance medical directives and similar instruments in the medical sphere: whether to give binding legal effect to such instruments, and the related formal and practical modalities, came within their margin of appreciation (§ 151-153). On the fact of the case, the Court found a violation of Article 8, considering that the decision-making process, as it had operated in the case, had not afforded sufficient procedural safeguards to the applicant so that her personal autonomy had not been respected (§§ 154-184). Conversely, in a similar case Lindholm and the Estate after Leif Lindholm v. Denmark, 2024, concerning the administration of a blood transfusion to an unconscious Jehovah's Witness in an em ergency situation for his survival, despite his advanced medical directive refusing such measure, the Court found no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. On the basis of the criteria developed in Pindo Mulla v. Spain [GC], 2024, the Court observed that the relevant person's advanced directive had been issued more than two years prior to the emergency situation at hand, whereas the relevant national law clearly required that a refusal of blood transfusion be made in the context of the current health situation, which conditions had not been met in the present case (§§ 85-101)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:63664/19,M.A. and Others v. France,63664/19,added,"M.A. and Others v. France, nos. 63664/19 and 4 others, 25 July 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,II.D.1,Right to personal development and autonomy,4,293,289,0.8074,"In M.A. and Others v. France , 2024","State care and later adopted by another family. In Valdís Fjölnisdóttir and Others v. Iceland , 2021","In Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, the Court did not find a breach as regards the removal of a child -born by way of surrogacy abroad- from its intended parents shortly after their arrival in their home country, followed by it being taken into State care and later adopted by another family. In Valdís Fjölnisdóttir and Others v. Iceland, 2021, the Court found that the refusal to recognise a formal parental link between a same-sex couple and a non-biological child born abroad via a surrogate mother had struck a fair balance between the applicants' right to respect for ""family life"" and the general interests which the State had sought to protect by the national ban on surrogacy. It stressed, in particular, that the State had taken steps to ensure that the three applicants could continue to lead a family life, notably by a permanent foster care arrangement (§§ 71-75 ). In H. v. the United Kingdom via, 2022, the applicant was a child born a surrogacy arrangement. Prior to her birth, there was a breakdown in relations between, on the one hand, the intended fathers, one of whom was also the genetic father, and, on the other, the surrogate and her husband. Although the domestic courts granted parental responsibility to all four individuals, and custody to the intended fathers, by law the surrogate's husband was named as ""father"" on the applicant's birth certificate. Although there was a mechanism for amending the birth certificate, it required the consent of the surrogate and her husband. The applicant had not challenged the ""consent"" requirement before the domestic courts. Before the Court she complained only that her biological father was not accurately recorded on her birth certificate at the time of her birth. More specifically, she argued that there should have been a ""normative presumption"" that the birth registration of a child would accurately record the identity of the biological father, where consent was provided for conception and identification as the father. The Court declared the application inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. There was no support in its case- law for the existence of such a presumption. To date, it had not held that the intended parents had to immediately and automatically be recognised as such in law and, in its view, the State had to be afforded a wide margin of appreciation in this regard (§§ 44-58).","In M.A. and Others v. France, 2024, the Court examined for the first time the general and absolute criminalisation of the purchase of sexual services as part of a comprehensive legislative system to combat prostitution and human trafficking. The complaints had been brought by applicants who engaged in prostitution. The Court found that the legislation constituted an interference with the applicants'right to respect for private life, as well as their personal autonomy and sexual freedom, as it created a situation whose effects were directly felt by the applicants (§ 138). The Court acknowledged a wide margin of appreciation considering the lack of a general consensus on both the approach to prostitution and the use of absolute criminalisation of the purchase of sexual services as an instrument for combating human trafficking (§§ 149-153). When considering the proportionality of the measure, the Court noted the long and complex legislative process and careful examination by Parliament of all cultural, social, political and legal aspects of a complex phenomenon raising sensitive moral and ethical questions (§ 158). Additionally, it highlighted that the law intended to combat the stigmatisation and stereotypes surrounding prostitution, strengthen public policies on reducing health risks for the benefit of all persons practising prostitution, combat the prostitution of minors, and gradually eradicate prostitution by offering alternatives without prohibiting its practice (§§ 161-164). The Court thus held that, given the current state of development in the understanding, reflected in domestic law, of the issues raised by prostitution, a fair balance had been struck between the competing interests at stake in the present case. However, that approach had to be kept under review so that it could be nuanced in view of developments in European and international standards in this field (§§ 166-167)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:63664/19,M.A. and Others v. France,63664/19,added,"M.A. and Others v. France, nos. 63664/19 and 4 others, 25 July 2024",2,citation_field_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.C,Housing,3,,488,,"Kapa and Others v. Poland , 2021|Moreno Gómez v. Spain , 2004|Others v. France , 2018|ć v. Croatia , 2004",,,"The right to respect for one's home means not just the right to the actual physical area, but also to the quiet enjoyment of that area. This may involve measures that are required to be taken by the authorities, particularly regarding the enforcement of court decisions ( Cvijetić v. Croatia, 2004, §§ 51-53). An interference may be either physical, such as unauthorised entry into a person's home ( Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 2001, § 294; National Federation of Sportspersons'Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, § 154), or not physical, such as noise, smells, etc. ( Moreno Gómez v. Spain, 2004, § 53). Where noise disturbances or other nuisances go beyond the ordinary difficulties of living with neighbours, they may affect the peaceful enjoyment of one's home, whether they be caused by private individuals, business activities or public agencies ( Kapa and Others v. Poland, 2021, § 151 with further references therein)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:63664/19,M.A. and Others v. France,63664/19,added,"M.A. and Others v. France, nos. 63664/19 and 4 others, 25 July 2024",3,citation_field_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.C.4,Minorities and vulnerable persons,4,,518,,"Others v. France , 2018|Sabani v. Belgium , 2022",,,"The judgment in the case of National Federation of Sportspersons'Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, concerned the obligation imposed on high-level athletes falling wit hin a ""target group"" to give advance notification of their whereabouts so that unannounced anti - doping tests could be carried out. The Court emphasised that home visits for the purposes of such testing were very different from those carried out under court supervision, which were geared to investigating offences or seizing items of property. Such searches, by definition, struck at the heart of respect for the home and could not be treated as equivalent to the visits to the athletes'homes (§ 186). The Court considered that reducing or cancelling the obligations of which the applicant had complained could increase the dangers of doping to their health and to that of the whole sporting community, and would run counter to the European and international consensus on the need to carry out unannounced tests (§ 190). Compare with an unannounced home arrest in the immigration context: Sabani v. Belgium, 2022, §§ 41-58."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:63664/19,M.A. and Others v. France,63664/19,added,"M.A. and Others v. France, nos. 63664/19 and 4 others, 25 July 2024",4,citation_field_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.C.4,Minorities and vulnerable persons,4,,522,,"Halabi v. France , 2019|K.S. and M.S. v. Germany , 2016|Others v. France , 2018|Van Rossem v. Belgium , 2004|Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria , 2007|ć v. Serbia , 2020|ıldak v. Turkey , 2008",,,"The following are examples of measures which pursue legitimate aims: action by the Competition Authority to protect economic competition ( DELTA PEKÁRNY a.s. v. the Czech Republic, 2014, § 81); suppression of tax evasion ( Keslassy v. France (dec.), 2002, and K.S. and M.S. v. Germany, 2016, § 48); seeking circumstantial and material evidence in criminal cases, for example involving forgery, breach of trust and the issuing of uncovered cheques ( Van Rossem v. Belgium, 2004, § 40), murder ( Dragan Petrović v. Serbia, 2020, § 74), drug trafficking ( Işıldak v. Turkey, 2008, § 50) and illegal trade in medicines ( Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria, 2007, § 55); environmental protection and prevention of nuisance ( Halabi v. France, 2019, §§ 60-61); protecting health and the ""rights and freedoms of others"" in the context of combating doping in sport ( National Federation of Sportspersons'Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 165-166); search at an association's premises and seizure of paper and digital documents in the context of a parliamentary inquiry concerning the Mafia ( Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy *, § 105)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:28935/21,M.Ș.D. v. Romania,28935/21,added,"M.Ș.D. v. Romania, no. 28935/21, 3 December 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B,Should the case be assessed from the perspective of a negative or positive obligation?,3,9,9,0.9888,"D. v. Romania , 2024|K.U. v. Finland , 2008",,"While the choice of the means to secure compliance with Article 8 in the sphere of protection against acts of individuals is, in principle, within the State's margin of appreciation, effective deterrence against grave acts, where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake, requires efficient criminal law provisions. The State therefore has a positive obligation inherent in Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention to enact criminal law provisions effectively punishing rape and to apply them in practice through effective investigation and prosecution ( M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003). X and Y Children and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are entitled to effective protection ( v. the Netherlands, 1985, §§ 23-24 and 27; August v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2003; M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003). In this regard, the Court has, for example, held that the State has an obligation to K.U. v. Finland protect a minor against malicious misrepresentation (, 2008, §§ 45-49). The Court has also found the following acts to be both grave and an affront to human dignity: an intrusion into the applicant's home in the form of unauthorised entry into her flat and installation of wires and hidden video cameras inside the flat; a serious, flagrant and extraordinarily intense invasion of her private life in the form of unauthorised filming of the most intimate aspects of her private life, which had taken place in the sanctity of her home, and subsequent public dissemination of those video images; and receipt of a letter threatening her with public humiliation. Furthermore, the applicant is a well-known journalist and there was a plausible link between her professional activity and the aforementioned intrusions, whose purpose was to silence her ( Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 116).","While the choice of the means to secure compliance with Article 8 in the sphere of protection against acts of individuals is, in principle, within the State's margin of appreciation, effective deterrence against grave acts, where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake, requires efficient criminal law provisions. The State therefore has a positive obligation inherent in Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention to enact criminal law provisions effectively punishing rape and to apply them in practice through effective investigation and prosecution ( M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003). Children and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are entitled to effective protection ( X and Y v. the Netherlands, 1985, §§ 23-24 and 27; August v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2003; M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003). In this regard, the Court has, for example, held that the State has an obligation to protect a minor against malicious misrepresentation ( K.U. v. Finland, 2008, §§ 45-49). The Court has also found the following acts to be both grave and an affront to human dignity: an intrusion into the applicant's home in the form of unauthorised entry into her flat and installation of wires and hidden video cameras inside the flat; a serious, flagrant and extraordinarily intense invasion of her private life in the form of unauthorised filming of the most intimate aspects of her private life, which had taken place in the sanctity of her home, and subsequent public dissemination of those video images; and receipt of a letter threatening her with public humiliation. Furthermore, the applicant is a well-known journalist and there was a plausible link between her professional activity and the aforementioned intrusions, whose purpose was to silence her ( Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 116). The Court has also considered that, in the case of revenge pornography (online public dissemination without consent of intimate photographs of the victim by her former intimate partner), the protection of Article 8 required a criminal-law response ( M.Ș.D. v. Romania, 2024, § 125)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:28935/21,M.Ș.D. v. Romania,28935/21,added,"M.Ș.D. v. Romania, no. 28935/21, 3 December 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B,Should the case be assessed from the perspective of a negative or positive obligation?,3,12,12,0.9971,"D. v. Romania , 2024",,"In sum, the State's positive obligations under Article 8 implying that the authorities have a duty to apply criminal-law mechanisms of effective investigation and prosecution concern allegations of serious acts of violence by private parties. Nevertheless, only significant flaws in the application of the relevant mechanisms amount to a breach of the State's positive obligations under Article 8. Accordingly, the Court will not concern itself with allegations of errors or isolated omissions since it cannot replace the domestic authorities in the assessment of the facts of the case; nor can it decide B.V. and Others v. Croatia on the alleged perpetrators' criminal responsibility ( (dec.), § 151). Previous cases in which the Court found that Article 8 required an effective application of criminal-law mechanisms, in relations between private parties, concerned the sexual abuse of a mentally handicapped individual; allegations of a physical attack on the applicant; the beating of a thirteen- year-old by an adult man, causing multiple physical injuries; the beating of an individual causing a number of injuries to her head and requiring admission to hospital; and serious instances of domestic violence ( ibid., § 154, with further references therein), including serious acts of cyberviolence Volodina v. Russia (no. 2) (, 2021, §§ 57-58). In contrast, as far as concerns less serious acts between individuals which may cause injury to someone's psychological well-being, the obligation of the State under Article 8 to maintain and apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection does not always require that an efficient criminal-law provision covering the specific act be in place. The legal framework could also consist of civil-law remedies capable of affording sufficient protection ( Noveski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), 2016, § 61).","In sum, the State's positive obligations under Article 8 implying that the authorities have a duty to apply criminal-law mechanisms of effective investigation and prosecution concern allegations of serious acts of violence by private parties. Nevertheless, only significant flaws in the application of the relevant mechanisms amount to a breach of the State's positive obligations under Article 8. Accordingly, the Court will not concern itself with allegations of errors or isolated omissions since it cannot replace the domestic authorities in the assessment of the facts of the case; nor can it decide on the alleged perpetrators'criminal responsibility ( B.V. and Others v. Croatia (dec.), § 151). Previous cases in which the Court found that Article 8 required an effective application of criminal-law mechanisms, in relations between private parties, concerned the sexual abuse of a mentally handicapped individual; allegations of a physical attack on the applicant; the beating of a thirteen- year-old by an adult man, causing multiple physical injuries; the beating of an individual causing a number of injuries to her head and requiring admission to hospital; and serious instances of domestic violence ( ibid., § 154, with further references therein), including serious acts of cyberviolence ( Volodina v. Russia (no. 2), 2021, §§ 57-58, M.Ș.D. v. Romania, 2024, §§ 121 and 125). In contrast, as far as concerns less serious acts between individuals which may cause injury to someone's psychological well-being, the obligation of the State under Article 8 to maintain and apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection does not always require that an efficient criminal- law provision covering the specific act be in place. The legal framework could also consist of civil-law remedies capable of affording sufficient protection ( Noveski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), 2016, § 61)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:28935/21,M.Ș.D. v. Romania,28935/21,added,"M.Ș.D. v. Romania, no. 28935/21, 3 December 2024",3,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.B.1,Victims of violence/abuse,4,126,127,0.9929,"Biba v. Albania , 2024|E.S. and Others v. Slovakia , 2009|F.O. v. Croatia , 2021|Levchuk v. Ukraine , 2020|ć v. Montenegro , 2018","ć v. Montenegro E.S. and Others v. Slovakia , 2018","The Court has long held that the State has an affirmative responsibility to protect individuals from violence by third parties (see, for a summary of the case-law, C. v. Romania, 2022, §§ 62-66). This has been particularly true in cases involving children (for instance, the verbal abuse of a student F.O. v. Croatia by his teacher,, 2021, §§ 81-82 and §§ 88-89,) and victims of domestic violence, Buturugă v. Romania, 2020). While there are often violations of Articles 2 and 3 in such cases, Article 8 is also applied because violence threatens bodily integrity and the right to a private life ( Milićević v. Montenegro E.S. and Others v. Slovakia, 2018, §§ 54-56; and, 2009, § 44). In particular, under Article 8 the States have a duty to protect the physical and moral integrity of an individual from other persons, including cyberbullying by a person's intimate partner: Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, §§ 74, 78-79; Volodina v. Russia (no. 2), 2021, §§ 48-49, harassment/bullying by colleagues: Špadijer v. Montenegro, 2021, § 100, and sexual harassment in the workplace: C. v. Romania, 2022, §§ 67-87 (compare Dolopoulos v. Greece (dec.), 2015). To that end they are to maintain and apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection against acts of violence by private individuals (see also Sandra Janković v. Croatia, 2009, § 45). The national courts' dismissal of a claim by a victim of domestic violence to evict her husband from their shared social housing has also been found to breach Levchuk v. Ukraine her rights under Article 8 (, 2020, § 90).","The Court has long held that the State has an affirmative responsibility to protect individuals from violence by third parties (see, for a summary of the case-law, C. v. Romania, 2022, §§ 62-66). This has been particularly true in cases involving children (for instance, the verbal abuse of a student by his teacher, F.O. v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 81-82 and §§ 88-89; Biba v. Albania, 2024, §§ 59, 67 and 76) and victims of domestic violence, Buturugă v. Romania, 2020). While there are often violations of Articles 2 and 3 in such cases, Article 8 is also applied because violence threatens bodily integrity and the right to a private life ( Milićević v. Montenegro, 2018, §§ 54-56; and E.S. and Others v. Slovakia, 2009, § 44). In particular, under Article 8 the States have a duty to protect the physical and moral integrity of an individual from other persons, including cyberbullying by a person's intimate partner: Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, §§ 74, 78-79; Volodina v. Russia (no. 2), 2021, §§ 48-49, M.Ș.D. v. Romania, §§ 118-19, 3 December 2024; harassment/bullying by colleagues: Špadijer v. Montenegro, 2021, § 100, and sexual harassment in the workplace: C. v. Romania, 2022, §§ 67-87 (compare Dolopoulos v. Greece (dec.), 2015). To that end they are to maintain and apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection against acts of violence by private individuals (see also Sandra Janković v. Croatia, 2009, § 45). The national courts'dismissal of a claim by a victim of domestic violence to evict her husband from their shared social housing has also been found to breach her rights under Article 8 ( Levchuk v. Ukraine, 2020, § 90)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:28935/21,M.Ș.D. v. Romania,28935/21,added,"M.Ș.D. v. Romania, no. 28935/21, 3 December 2024",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.1,Victims of violence/abuse,4,131,133,0.9544,"D. v. Romania , 2024",,"Article 8 extends to the protection of the right of adult victims during trial ( J.L. v. Italy, 2021, § 119). For instance, in a trial for rape, it is essential that during the trial the judicial authorities avoid reproducing sexist stereotypes in court decisions, playing down gender-based violence and exposing women to secondary victimisation by making guilt-inducing and judgmental comments that were capable of undermining victims' trust in the justice system ( J.L. v. Italy, 2021, §§ 139-141). The Court has also stressed the need for protection from secondary victimisation in the course of the proceedings/investigation and from stigmatisation due to, for example, insensitive/irreverent statements that are extensively reproduced in the prosecutor's decision or a lack of explanation by the prosecutor as to the need for a confrontation in a case concerning allegations of sexual harassment ( C. v. Romania, 2022, §§ 82-85). In general, the Court has emphasized the need to take measures to protect the rights and interests of victims (§ 85).","Article 8 extends to the protection of the right of adult victims during trial ( J.L. v. Italy, 2021, § 119). For instance, in a trial for rape, it is essential that during the trial the judicial authorities avoid reproducing sexist stereotypes in court decisions, playing down gender-based violence and exposing women to secondary victimisation by making guilt-inducing and judgmental comments that were capable of undermining victims'trust in the justice system ( J.L. v. Italy, 2021, §§ 139-141). The Court has also stressed the need for protection from secondary victimisation in the course of the proceedings/investigation and from stigmatisation due to, for example, insensitive/irreverent statements that are extensively reproduced in the prosecutor's decision or a lack of explanation by the prosecutor as to the need for a confrontation in a case concerning allegations of sexual harassment ( C. v. Romania, 2022, §§ 82-85). In general, the Court has emphasized the need to take measures to protect the rights and interests of victims (§ 85). In M.Ș.D. v. Romania, 2024, §§ 147-48, the Court noted the objectionable disdain displayed by the prosecutor's office that had a demeaning and ""revictimising"" effect on victims who were involved in relationships that it considered ""centred o n an exacerbated sexuality"" owing to photographs taken of the victims in allegedly ""indecent poses"" which those victims had sent to their intimate partners: it further noted the apparent absence of (or a lack of quality in the) training centred on the needs of the victims of such acts and the prevention of ""revictimisation""."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:20949/21,Mitrevska v. North Macedonia,20949/21,added,"Mitrevska v. North Macedonia, no. 20949/21, 14 May 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.D.1,Right to personal development and autonomy,4,282,290,0.9877,"Cherrier v. France , 2024|Mitrevska v. North Macedonia , 2024",,"The Court has recognised the right to obtain information in order to discover one's origins and the identity of one's parents as an integral part of identity protected under the right to private and family life ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 29; Cherrier v. France*, 2024, § 50; Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Çapın v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 33-34; Boljević v. Serbia, 2020, § 28; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, § 109).","The Court has recognised the right to obtain information in order to discover one's origins and the identity of one's parents as an integral part of identity protected under the right to private and family life ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 29; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 50; Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Çapın v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 33-34; Boljević v. Serbia, 2020, § 28; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, § 109; Mitrevska v. North Macedonia, 2024, § 40)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:24622/22,Pasquinelli and Others v. San Marino,24622/22,added,"Pasquinelli and Others v. San Marino, no. 24622/22, 29 August 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.3,Forced medical treatment and compulsory medical procedures,4,,153,,,,,"In Pasquinelli and Others v. San Marino, a group of health care and social health workers had refused to be vaccinated against COVID-19, with the result that they had been affected by various measures, mainly related to their employment, in particular relocation to another position, or suspension from their posts. The Court distinguished the case from Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], noting that vaccinations had been voluntary under the relevant law and non- compliance had not entailed statutory sanctions or led to automatic consequences on the applicants (§§ 57-63). It further noted that vaccination choice was sufficiently linked to personal autonomy, with the result that Article 8 was applicable to the situation in question on the basis of the Denisov ""reason - based approach"" (§ § 77-78). The Court further accepted that the series of restrictive measures in the health sector, adapted to the constant evolution of the Covid-19 pandemic, had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the health, rights and freedoms of others (§§ 95-97). Furthermore, the measures were temporary and applicants were offered alternate work. In addition, those measures resulted in little financial loss for most applicants, with more substantial losses only suffered by those who refused to undertake any other socially useful work which they were offered. Such losses were considered an unavoidable consequence of a global pandemic and the exceptional and unforeseeable context in which States found themselves in at the relevant time. The Court thus concluded that there had been no violation of Article 8 (§§ 101-09)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:24622/22,Pasquinelli and Others v. San Marino,24622/22,added,"Pasquinelli and Others v. San Marino, no. 24622/22, 29 August 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.D.1,Right to personal development and autonomy,4,277,284,0.9643,"Pasquinelli and Others v. San Marino , 2024",,"Article 8 protects a right to personal development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world ( Niemietz v. Germany, 1992, § 29; Pretty v. the United Kingdom, 2002, §§ 61 and 67; Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, 2013, §§ 165-167; El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], 2012, §§ 248-250, concerning the applicant's secret and extrajudicial abduction and arbitrary detention). The right to personal autonomy was relied upon, for instance, in a case of death by euthanasia where the Court had to weigh up the various competing interests at stake namely, the applicant's wish to accompany his mother in the last moments of her life and his mother's right to respect for her wishes and her personal autonomy ( Mortier v. Belgium, 2022, § 124 and § 204).","Article 8 protects a right to personal development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world ( Niemietz v. Germany, 1992, § 29; Pretty v. the United Kingdom, 2002, §§ 61 and 67; Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, 2013, §§ 165-167; El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], 2012, §§ 248-250, concerning the applicant's secret and extrajudicial abduction and arbitrary detention). The right to personal autonomy was relied upon, for instance, in a case of death by euthanasia where the Court had to weigh up the various competing interests at stake namely, the applicant's wish to accompany his mother in the last moments of her life and his mother's right to respect for her wishes and her personal autonomy ( Mortier v. Belgium, 2022, § 124 and § 204; for personal autonomy in the context of physician-assisted suicide, see also Dániel Karsai v. Hungary, § 85; for personal autonomy in the context of vaccination, see Pasquinelli and Others v. San Marino, 2024, § 77)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:23570/22,Paterson v. the United Kingdom (dec.),23570/22,added,"Paterson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 23570/22, 3 September 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A.2,Professional and business activities,4,,118,,,,,"The Court has considered that the exercise of public duties by a politician is akin to a ""professional occupation"" for the purposes of Article 8 ( Paterson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2024, § 57 and Ahmed v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2024, § 61). Accordingly, in Paterson and Ahmed the complaint about the lack of safeguards in the disciplinary investigation process against the applicants (a Member of Parliament and a life peer of the House of Lords) was examined in line with both the reasons-based and consequence-based approach identified in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018 ( Paterson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2024, §§ 55-71 and Ahmed v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2024, §§ 62-76). In Ahmed the Court held that any consequences of the investigation process did not cross the threshold of seriousness for an issue to be raised under Article 8 ( Ahmed v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2024, §§ 66-76). In Paterson it was not necessary for the Court to reach a firm conclusion on this question since, even if Article 8 was applicable, the Court considered that any interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life was accompanied by adequate procedural safeguards and was therefore proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued ( Paterson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2024, §§ 55-71)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:23570/22,Paterson v. the United Kingdom (dec.),23570/22,added,"Paterson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 23570/22, 3 September 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.A.2,Professional and business activities,4,107,107,0.8792,,,"Since Article 8 guarantees the right to a ""private social life"", it may, under certain circumstances, include professional activities ( Fernández Martínez v. Spain [GC], 2014, § 110; Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 71; Antović and Mirković v. Montenegro, 2017, § 42; Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, §§ 100 with further references therein and López Riba lda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, §§ 92-95), and commercial activities ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 130).","Since Article 8 guarantees the right to a ""private social life"", it may, under certain circumstances, include professional activities ( Fernández Martínez v. Spain [GC], 2014, § 110; Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 71; Antović and Mirković v. Montenegro, 2017, § 42; Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, §§ 100 with further references therein and López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, §§ 92-95), and commercial activities ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 130). Furthermore, the exercise of public duties by a politician is akin to a ""professional occupation"" for the purposes of Article 8 ( Paterson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2024, § 57 and Ahmed v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2024, § 61)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:32514/22,Petrović v. Croatia*,32514/22,added,"Petrović v. Croatia*, nos. 32514/22 and 2 others, 14 January 2025",1,citation_field_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1,Applicability in general,4,92,92,1.0,"Moldovan v. Ukraine , 2024|ć v. Croatia , 2002",,"in addition, the right of a child born out of wedlock to determine the legal relationship between him or her and his or her natural parent, even if the latter has died, falls within the scope of concept Mikulić v. Croatia Moldovan v. Ukraine* of ""private life"" (, 2002, § 53;, 2024, §§ 32 and 35).","in addition, the right of a child born out of wedlock to determine the legal relationship between him or her and his or her natural parent, even if the latter has died, falls within the scope of concept of ""private life"" ( Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, § 53; Moldovan v. Ukraine, 2024, §§ 32 and 35)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:32514/22,Petrović v. Croatia*,32514/22,added,"Petrović v. Croatia*, nos. 32514/22 and 2 others, 14 January 2025",2,citation_field_name_match,citation_updated,II.B,"Physical, psychological or moral integrity",3,121,122,0.9976,"A v. Croatia , 2010|ć v. Croatia , 2009|ć v. Croatia , 2012","See also the summary of the case-law principles and references in v. Montenegro , 2021|ć v. Croatia Söderman , 2009","The Court indicated for the first time that the concept of private life covered the physical and X and Y v. the Netherlands moral integrity of the person in, 1985, § 22. That case concerned the sexual assault of a mentally disabled sixteen-year old girl and the absence of criminal law provisions to provide her with effective and practical protection (see, more recently, Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2021, § 261). Aperson's body concerns the most intimate aspect of private life ( Y.F. v. Turkey, 2003, § 33). Regarding the protection of the physical and psychological integrity of an individual from other persons, the Court has held that the authorities' positive obligations - in some cases under Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention and in other instances under Article 8 taken alone or in ibid. combination with Article 3 ( ) - may include a duty to maintain and apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection against acts of violence by private individuals ( Osman v. the United Kingdom, 1998, §§ 128-130; Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, 2008, § 65; Sandra Janković v. Croatia A v. Croatia Đorđević v. Croatia Söderman, 2009, § 45;, 2010, § 60;, 2012, §§ 141-143; v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 80). Furthermore, that legal framework must be implemented effectively in practice in order for the State to comply with its positive obligations under Article 8 ( Špadijer v. Montenegro, 2021, § 101). For a recapitulation of the case-law and the limits of the applicability of Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania Article 8 in this context, see [GC], 2019, §§ 125-132. In this case, the Court found Article 8 not applicable to a road-traffic accident which did not occur as the result of an act of violence intended to cause harm to the applicant's physical and psychological integrity Špadijer (§§ 129-132). See also the summary of the case-law principles and references in v. Montenegro, 2021, §§ 85-90.","The Court indicated for the first time that the concept of private life covered the physical and moral integrity of the person in X and Y v. the Netherlands, 1985, § 22. That case concerned the sexual assault of a mentally disabled sixteen-year old girl and the absence of criminal law provisions to provide her with effective and practical protection (see, more recently, Vavřička and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2021, § 261). Aperson's body concerns the most intimate aspect of private life ( Y.F. v. Turkey, 2003, § 33). Regarding the protection of the physical and psychological integrity of an individual from other persons, the Court has held that the authorities'positive obligations - in some cases under Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention and in other instances under Article 8 taken alone or in combination with Article 3 ( X and Y v. the Netherlands, 1985) - may include a duty to maintain and apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection against acts of violence by private individuals ( Osman v. the United Kingdom, 1998, §§ 128-130; Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, 2008, § 65; Sandra Janković v. Croatia, 2009, § 45; A v. Croatia, 2010, § 60; Đorđević v. Croatia, 2012, §§ 141-143; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 80). Furthermore, that legal framework must be implemented effectively in practice in order for the State to comply with its positive obligations under Article 8 ( Špadijer v. Montenegro, 2021, § 101). For a recapitulation of the case-law and the limits of the applicability of Article 8 in this context, see Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], 2019, §§ 125-132. In this case, the Court found Article 8 not applicable to a road-traffic accident which did not occur as the result of an act of violence intended to cause harm to the applicant's physical and psychological integrity (§§ 129-132). See also the summary of the case-law principles and references in Špadijer v. Montenegro, 2021, §§ 85-90."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:32514/22,Petrović v. Croatia*,32514/22,added,"Petrović v. Croatia*, nos. 32514/22 and 2 others, 14 January 2025",3,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.B.8,Issues concerning burial and deceased persons,4,179,184,0.9966,,,"In Hadri-Vionnet v. Switzerland, 2008, the Court found that the municipality's failure to inform the mother about the location and time of the burial of her stillborn son was not authorised by law and violated her right to private and family life under Article 8 ( Pannullo and Forte v. France, 2001). Similarly, in Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia, 2013, the Court held that the hospital's failure to give information to the applicant regarding the death of her infant son and the subsequent disappearance of his body violated Article 8, even though the child had died in 1983, because of the State's ongoing failure to provide information about what had happened. The Court also held that Russia's refusal to allow a stillborn baby to take the name of its biological father, because of the legal presumption that the mother's husband was the father, violated the mother's Article 8 rights to bury her child with the name of his true father ( Znamenskaya v. Russia, 2005).","In Hadri-Vionnet v. Switzerland, 2008, the Court found that the municipality's failure to inform the mother about the location and time of the burial of her stillborn son was not authorised by law and violated her right to private and family life under Article 8 ( Pannullo and Forte v. France, 2001). Similarly, in Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia, 2013, the Court held that the hospital's failure to give information to the applicant regarding the death of her infant son and the subsequent disappearance of his body violated Article 8, even though the child had died in 1983, because of the State's ongoing failure to provide information about what had happened (see also Petrović v. Croatia *, 2025). The Court also held that Russia's refusal to allow a stillborn baby to take the name of its biological father, because of the legal presumption that the mother's husband was the father, violated the mother's Article 8 rights to bury her child with the name of his true father ( Znamenskaya v. Russia, 2005)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:32514/22,Petrović v. Croatia*,32514/22,added,"Petrović v. Croatia*, nos. 32514/22 and 2 others, 14 January 2025",4,citation_field_name_match,paragraph_added,II.D.11,Marital and parental status,4,,332,,"A.H. and Others v. Russia , 2017|Ahrens v. Germany , 2012|C.P. and M.N. v. France , 2023|I.V. v. Estonia , 2023|Marinis v. Greece , 2014|R.L. and Others v. Denmark , 2017|Rasmussen v. Denmark , 1984|Shofman v. Russia , 2005|Tsvetelin Petkov v. Bulgaria , 2014|ć v. Croatia , 2011",,,"Similarly, proceedings relating to one's identity as a parent fall under private and family life. The Court has found cases involving the determination of the legal provisions governing a father's relations with his putative child to come within the scope of private life ( Rasmussen v. Denmark, 1984, § 33; Yildirim v. Austria (dec.), 1999; Krušković v. Croatia, 2011, § 20; Ahrens v. Germany, 2012, § 60; Tsvetelin Petkov v. Bulgaria, 2014, §§ 49-59; Marinis v. Greece, 2014, § 58; I.V. v. Estonia, 2023, § 75), as does a putative father's attempt to disavow paternity ( R.L. and Others v. Denmark, 2017, § 38; Shofman v. Russia, 2005, §§ 30-32; C.P. and M.N. v. France, 2023, § 33). In addition, the right to apply for adoption with a view to becoming parents falls within the scope of private life ( A.H. and Others v. Russia, 2017, § 383). For a detailed analysis of the Court's case-law on this topic, see the Case-law Guide on Article 12 ."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:32514/22,Petrović v. Croatia*,32514/22,added,"Petrović v. Croatia*, nos. 32514/22 and 2 others, 14 January 2025",5,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.D.a,Mutual enjoyment,4,357,366,0.8871,,,"The Court has also found that a State's continuing failure to provide an applicant with credible information as to the fate of her newborn son - who had gone missing from a State-run maternity ward shortly after birth - constituted a continuing violation of the right to mutual enjoyment and respect for her family life ( Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia, 2013, §§ 74-75; and for the measures taken by Mik and Jovanović v. Serbia the State in implementation of the said judgment, see (dec.), 2021).","The Court has also found that a State's continuing failure to provide an applicant with credible information as to the fate of her newborn son - who had gone missing from a State-run maternity ward shortly after birth - constituted a continuing violation of the right to mutual enjoyment and respect for her family life ( Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia, 2013, §§ 74-75; and for the measures taken by the State in implementation of the said judgment, see Mik and Jovanović v. Serbia (dec.), 2021). In the same vein, in the case of newborn babies having been transferred from a hospital in Croatia to a hospital Serbia, the Court considered that each State could be held accountable for its share of the responsibility for the breach in question, and asserted its jurisdiction to examine, under Article 8, the Croatian State's continued failure to provide the applicants with in formation as to the fate of their babies who were transferred from Croatia to Serbia ( Petrović v. Croatia *, 2025, §§ 107-13)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:32514/22,Petrović v. Croatia*,32514/22,added,"Petrović v. Croatia*, nos. 32514/22 and 2 others, 14 January 2025",6,citation_field_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.C,Housing,3,,488,,"Kapa and Others v. Poland , 2021|Moreno Gómez v. Spain , 2004|Others v. France , 2018|ć v. Croatia , 2004",,,"The right to respect for one's home means not just the right to the actual physical area, but also to the quiet enjoyment of that area. This may involve measures that are required to be taken by the authorities, particularly regarding the enforcement of court decisions ( Cvijetić v. Croatia, 2004, §§ 51-53). An interference may be either physical, such as unauthorised entry into a person's home ( Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 2001, § 294; National Federation of Sportspersons'Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, § 154), or not physical, such as noise, smells, etc. ( Moreno Gómez v. Spain, 2004, § 53). Where noise disturbances or other nuisances go beyond the ordinary difficulties of living with neighbours, they may affect the peaceful enjoyment of one's home, whether they be caused by private individuals, business activities or public agencies ( Kapa and Others v. Poland, 2021, § 151 with further references therein)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:32514/22,Petrović v. Croatia*,32514/22,added,"Petrović v. Croatia*, nos. 32514/22 and 2 others, 14 January 2025",7,citation_field_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.C.1,Property owners,4,,496,,"Rousk v. Sweden , 2013|ć v. Croatia , 2016",,,"It will sometimes be necessary for a member State to attach and sell an individual's home in order to secure the payment of taxes due to the State. However, these measures must be enforced in a manner which ensures that the individual's right to his or her home is respected. In a case concerning the conditions of an enforced sale at auction of a house, to repay a tax debt, the Court found a violation because the owner's interests had not been adequately protected ( Rousk v. Sweden, 2013, §§ 137-142). With regard, more generally, to reconciliation of the right to respect for one's home with the enforced sale of a house for the purposes of paying debts, see Vrzić v. Croatia, 2016, § 13."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:32514/22,Petrović v. Croatia*,32514/22,added,"Petrović v. Croatia*, nos. 32514/22 and 2 others, 14 January 2025",8,citation_field_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.C.2,Tenants,4,,500,,"Andrey Medvedev v. Russia , 2016|Bjedov v. Croatia , 2012|Gladysheva v. Russia , 2011|Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria , 2016|Kryvitska and Kryvitskyy v. Ukraine , 2010|ć v. Croatia , 2009|ć v. Croatia , 2011",,,"The Court has ruled on a number of disputes relating to the eviction of tenants (see the references cited in Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria, 2016, § 52). Anotice to quit issued by the authorities must be necessary and comply with procedural guarantees as part of a fair decision-making process before an independent tribunal complying with the requirements of Article 8 ( Connors v. the United Kingdom, 2004, §§ 81-84; Bjedov v. Croatia, 2012, §§ 70-71). It is insufficient merely to indicate that the measure is prescribed by domestic law, without taking into account the individual circumstances in question ( Ćosić v. Croatia, 2009, § 21). The measure must also pursue a legitimate objective and loss of the home must be shown to be proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued, in accordance with Article 8 § 2. Regard must therefore be had to the factual circumstances of the occupant whose legitimate interests are to be protected ( Orlić v. Croatia, 2011, § 64; Gladysheva v. Russia, 2011, §§ 94-95; Kryvitska and Kryvitskyy v. Ukraine, 2010, § 50; Andrey Medvedev v. Russia, 2016, § 55)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:32514/22,Petrović v. Croatia*,32514/22,added,"Petrović v. Croatia*, nos. 32514/22 and 2 others, 14 January 2025",9,citation_field_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.C.2,Tenants,4,,501,,"Khamidov v. Russia , 2007|Nafornita v. The Republic of Moldova , 2024|ć v. Croatia , 2016",,,"The Court has thus decided that a summary procedure for eviction of a tenant that does not offer adequate procedural guarantees would entail a violation of the Convention, even if the measure was legitimately seeking to ensure due application of the statutory housing regulations ( McCann v. the United Kingdom, 2008, § 55). Termination of a lease without any possibility of having the proportionality of the measure determined by an independent tribunal was held to infringe Article 8 in cases where the landlord was a public body ( Kay and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 74; see also Nafornita v. The Republic of Moldova, 2024, in which the Supreme Court of Justice did not weigh up the competing interests at stake, despite the fact that the evicted applicants had been lawfully resident in State-owned apartments for over eleven years). In cases where the landlord was a private individual or body, this principle did not apply automatically ( Vrzić v. Croatia, 2016, § 67; F.J.M. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2018, § 41). Furthermore, continuing occupation of a person's property in breach of an enforceable eviction order issued by a court after finding that the occupation in question was illegal infringes Article 8 ( Khamidov v. Russia, 2007, § 145)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:32514/22,Petrović v. Croatia*,32514/22,added,"Petrović v. Croatia*, nos. 32514/22 and 2 others, 14 January 2025",10,citation_field_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.C.2,Tenants,4,,502,,"ć v. Croatia , 2009",,,"In its judgment Larkos v. Cyprus [GC], 1999, the Court held that offering differential protection to tenants against eviction - according to whether they are renting State-owned property or renting from private landlords - entailed a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 (§§ 31-32). However, it is not discriminatory to make provisions only for tenants of publicly owned property to purchase their flat, with tenants of privately owned flats which they occupy being unable to do so ( Strunjak and Others v. Croatia (dec.), 2000). Moreover, it is legitimate to put in place criteria according to which social housing can be allocated, when there is insufficient supply available to satisfy demand, so long as such criteria are not arbitrary or discriminatory ( Bah v. the United Kingdom, 2011, § 49; see, more generally, on tenants of social housing Pau lić v. Croatia, 2009; Kay and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2010)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:32514/22,Petrović v. Croatia*,32514/22,added,"Petrović v. Croatia*, nos. 32514/22 and 2 others, 14 January 2025",11,citation_field_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.C.4,Minorities and vulnerable persons,4,,529,,"Camenzind v. Switzerland , 1997|Ratushna v. Ukraine , 2010|ć v. Croatia , 2009",,,"Conversely, the safeguards established by domestic law and the practicalities of the search may lead to a finding of no violation of Article 8 ( Camenzind v. Switzerland, 1997, § 46, and Paulić v. Croatia, 2009, regarding a search of limited scope geared to seizing an unauthorised telephone; Cronin v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2004, and Ratushna v. Ukraine, 2010, § 82, regarding the existence of appropriate safeguards)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:32514/22,Petrović v. Croatia*,32514/22,added,"Petrović v. Croatia*, nos. 32514/22 and 2 others, 14 January 2025",12,citation_field_name_match,paragraph_added,V.E,Surveillance of telecommunications in a criminal context 101,3,,653,,"Azer Ahmadov v. Azerbaijan , 2021|Huvig v. France , 1990|Kruslin v. France , 1990|Liblik and others v. Estonia , 2019|Potoczka and Adamco v. Slovakia , 2023|Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain , 1998|ć v. Croatia , 2015|ğlu v. Turkey , 2016",,,"The abovementioned requirements of Article 8 § 2 must of course be satisfied in this context ( Kruslin v. France, 1990, § 26; Huvig v. France, 1990, § 25). In particular, such surveillance must serve to uncover the truth. Since it represents a serious interference with the right to respect for correspondence, it must be based on a ""law"" that is particularly pr ecise ( Huvig v. France, 1990, § 32) and must form part of a legislative framework affording sufficient legal certainty ( ibid. ). The rules must be clear and detailed (the technology available for use is continually becoming more sophisticated), as well as being both accessible and foreseeable, so that anyone can foresee the consequences for themselves ( Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, 1998, §§ 59 and 61). This requirement of sufficiently clear rules concerns both the circumstances in which and the conditions on which the surveillance is authorised and carried out. Since the implementation of measures of secret surveillance of communications is not open to scrutiny by the individuals concerned or the public at large, the ""law"" would run counter to the rule of law if there were no limits to the legal discretion granted to the executive, or to a judge ( Karabeyoğlu v. Turkey, 2016, §§ 67-69 and §§ 86-88, with further references therein; Potoczka and Adamco v. Slovakia, 2023, §§ 71-73). Consequently, the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference ( Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, §§ 229-230). If there is any risk of arbitrariness in its implementation, the law will not be compatible with the lawfulness requirement ( Bykov v. Russia [GC], 2009, §§ 78-79). In such a sensitive area as recourse to secret surveillance, the competent authority must state the compelling reasons justifying such an intrusive measure, while complying with the applicable legal instruments ( Dragojević v. Croatia, 2015, §§ 94-98; see also Liblik and others v. Estonia, 2019, §§ 132-143, as to the duly reasoning of authorisations of secret surveillance). In addition, the interception of telephone conversations is not to be based on an overly broad and imprecise decision, for instance, merely authorising secret surveillance of a stabbing victim and his ""contacts"" ( Azer Ahmadov v. Azerbaijan, 2021, §§ 66, §§ 71-72; see also Potoczka and Adamco v. Slovakia, 2023, § 76)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:32514/22,Petrović v. Croatia*,32514/22,added,"Petrović v. Croatia*, nos. 32514/22 and 2 others, 14 January 2025",13,citation_field_name_match,paragraph_added,V.E,Surveillance of telecommunications in a criminal context 101,3,,655,,"Adomaitis v. Lithuania , 2022|ć v. Croatia , 2015|ğlu v. Turkey , 2016|šas v. Lithuania , 2012",,,"The phone-tapping operations can only be ordered on the basis of suspicions that can be regarded as objectively reasonable ( Karabeyoğlu v. Turkey, 2016, § 103). The Court has also underlined the importance of an authority empowered to authorise the use of secret surveillance being capable of verifying ""the existence of a reasonable suspicion against the person concerned, in particular, whether there are factual indications for suspecting that person of planning, committing or having committed criminal acts or other acts that may give rise to secret surveillance measures"" and ""whether the requested interception meets the requ irement of'necessity in a democratic society ' ... for example, whether it is possible to achieve the aims by less restrictive means"" ( Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 260; Dragojević v. Croatia, 2015, § 94). Such verification, together with the requirement to set out the relevant reasons in the decisions by which secret surveillance is authorised, constitute an important guarantee, ensuring that the measures are not ordered haphazardly, irregularly or without due and proper consideration. Hence, the authorisation and extension of a measure of telephone tapping must not be without grounds or ""general"" or ""exploratory"" ( Adomaitis v. Lithuania, 2022, § 85; Drakšas v. Lithuania, 2012, § 56)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:32514/22,Petrović v. Croatia*,32514/22,added,"Petrović v. Croatia*, nos. 32514/22 and 2 others, 14 January 2025",14,citation_field_name_match,paragraph_added,V.E,Surveillance of telecommunications in a criminal context 101,3,,656,,"Adomaitis v. Lithuania , 2022|Huvig v. France , 1990|Kruslin v. France , 1990|Liblik and others v. Estonia , 2019|Matheron v. France , 2005|Prado Bugallo v. Spain , 2003|Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain , 1998|ć v. Croatia , 2015|ğlu v. Turkey , 2016|ņikovs v. Latvia , 2016",,,"The Court has found a violation of the right to respect for correspondence, for example, in the following cases: Kruslin v. France, 1990, § 36; Huvig v. France, 1990, § 35; Malone v. the United Kingdom, 1984, § 79; Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, 1998, §§ 60-61; Prado Bugallo v. Spain, 2003, § 30; Matheron v. France, 2005, § 43; Dragojević v. Croatia, 2015, § 101; Šantare and Labazņikovs v. Latvia, 2016, § 62; Liblik and others v. Estonia, 2019, §§ 140-142 concerning the retrospective justification of orders authorising secret surveillance during criminal proceedings. As for a non-violation, see, for instance, Adomaitis v. Lithuania, 2022, §§ 81-86 and Karabeyoğlu v. Turkey, 2016, §§ 104-110 and below."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:15541/20,Pindo Mulla v. Spain [GC],15541/20,added,"Pindo Mulla v. Spain [GC], no. 15541/20, 17 September 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.B.3,Forced medical treatment and compulsory medical procedures,4,214,155,0.8742,"Lindholm and the Estate after Leif Lindholm v. Denmark , 2024","Høiness v. Norway , 2019","In (dec.), 2017, the Court ruled on the scope of the right to respect for private life safeguarded by Article 8 in relation to the freedom of expression secured by Article 10 to information society service providers such as Google Inc. (§§ 83-84). It found that the State concerned had a wide margin of appreciation and emphasised the important role that such service providers performed on the Internet in facilitating access to information and debate on a wide range of political, social and cultural topics (§ 90). As regards third-party comments on a blog, the Court has emphasised that Article 8 encompasses a positive obligation on the Contracting States to ensure the effective protection of the right to respect for reputation to those within their jurisdiction ( Pihl v. Sweden (dec.), 2017, § 28; see also Høiness v. Norway, 2019). In Egill Einarsson v. Iceland (no. 2), 2017, the domestic courts declared defamatory statements on Facebook null and void, but, having regard to the circumstances of the case, declined to award the applicant damages or costs. For the Court, the decision not to grant compensation does not in itself amount to a violation of Article 8. Among other factors, the fact that the statements were published as a comment on a Facebook page amongst hundreds or thousands of other comments, and the fact that they had been removed by their author as soon as the applicant had so requested, were taken into account to examine the sufficiency of protection of the applicant's right to reputation (§§ 38-39). In Çakmak v. Turkey (dec.), 2021, the applicant sought to have criminal proceedings instituted in connection with a statement which he considered to be damaging to his reputation and which had been made on an anonymous account on Twitter; he also sought to have that statement blocked. The Court found that the authorities had not failed in their positive obligation to protect the applicant's reputation by not blocking, for technical reasons, access to the statement in question and by refusing to institute criminal proceedings, with reference to the fact that it was impossible to establish the identity of the author of the impugned statement given that the necessary information was kept on the servers of Twitter in California, and that the authorities of the United States refused to provide that information in the absence of the relevant agreement between the United States and Turkey.","In Pindo Mulla v. Spain [GC], 2024, the Court considered, for the first time, how the State's obligations - on the one hand, to safeguard patients' lives and physical integri ty and, on the other, to respect patients' personal autonomy - were to be reconciled in an emergency situation (§ 146). In that case the applicant, a Jehovah's Witness, complained about blood transfusions which she had received during an urgent life-saving surgery, despite having previously signed documents confirming her refusal of blood transfusion in all healthcare situations. The Court underlined that: (a) in the ordinary health care context, a competent, adult patient had the right to refuse, freely and consciously, medical treatment notwithstanding the very serious, even fatal, consequences that such a decision might have (§ 146); (b) in an emergency situation, where the right to life would also be in play along with an individual's right to decide autonomously on medical treatment: (i) a decision to refuse life-saving treatment must be made freely and autonomously by a person with the requisite legal capacity who was conscious of the implications of such decision; (ii) it must also be ensured that that decision - the existence of which must be known to the medical personnel - was applicable in the circumstances, in the sense that it was clear, specific and unambiguous in refusing treatment and represented the current position of the patient on the matter; and (iii) where doubts existed regarding any of the said aspects, ""reasonable efforts"" should be made to dispel those doubts or uncertainty surrounding the refusal of treatment and, where despite such efforts it was impossible to establish to the extent necessary the patient's will, it was the duty to protect that patient's life by providing essential care - that should prevail (§§ 147-150); and (c) the Contracting States had considerable discretion as regards advance medical directives and similar instruments in the medical sphere: whether to give binding legal effect to such instruments, and the related formal and practical modalities, came within their margin of appreciation (§ 151-153). On the fact of the case, the Court found a violation of Article 8, considering that the decision-making process, as it had operated in the case, had not afforded sufficient procedural safeguards to the applicant so that her personal autonomy had not been respected (§§ 154-184). Conversely, in a similar case Lindholm and the Estate after Leif Lindholm v. Denmark, 2024, concerning the administration of a blood transfusion to an unconscious Jehovah's Witness in an em ergency situation for his survival, despite his advanced medical directive refusing such measure, the Court found no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. On the basis of the criteria developed in Pindo Mulla v. Spain [GC], 2024, the Court observed that the relevant person's advanced directive had been issued more than two years prior to the emergency situation at hand, whereas the relevant national law clearly required that a refusal of blood transfusion be made in the context of the current health situation, which conditions had not been met in the present case (§§ 85-101)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:46808/16,R.F. and Others v. Germany,46808/16,added,"R.F. and Others v. Germany, no. 46808/16, November 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.D.3,Legal parent-child relationship,4,291,299,0.9937,"R.F. and Others v. Germany , 2024",,"Respect for private life requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as individual human beings, which includes the legal parent-child relationship ( Mennesson v. France, 2014, § 96). Therefore, Article 8 protects children born to a surrogate mother outside the member State in question, whose legal parents according to the foreign State could not register as such under domestic law (see, for a summary of the principle, for instance, D v. France, 2020, §§ 45-54). The Court does not require that States legalise surrogacy and, furthermore, States may demand proof of parentage for children born to surrogates before issuing the child's identity papers. However, the child's right to respect for his or her private life requires that domestic law provide a possibility of recognition of the legal relationship between a child born through a surrogacy arrangement abroad and the intended father, where he is the biological father ( Mennesson v. France, 2014; Labassee v. France, 2014; Foulon and Bouvet v. France, 2016; C v. Italy, 2023).","Respect for private life requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as individual human beings, which includes the legal parent-child relationship ( Mennesson v. France, 2014, § 96). Therefore, Article 8 protects children born to a surrogate mother outside the member State in question, whose legal parents according to the foreign State could not register as such under domestic law (see, for a summary of the principle, for instance, D v. France, 2020, §§ 45-54). The Court does not require that States legalise surrogacy and, furthermore, States may demand proof of parentage for children born to surrogates before issuing the child's identity papers. However, the child's right to respect for his or her private life requires that domestic law provide a possibility of recognition of the legal relationship between a child born through a surrogacy arrangement abroad and the intended father, where he is the biological father ( Mennesson v. France, 2014; Labassee v. France, 2014; Foulon and Bouvet v. France, 2016; C v. Italy, 2023; R.F. and Others v. Germany, 2024)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:46808/16,R.F. and Others v. Germany,46808/16,added,"R.F. and Others v. Germany, no. 46808/16, November 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.D.3,Legal parent-child relationship,4,292,300,0.9974,"In A.M. v. Norway , 2022|R.F. and Others v. Germany , 2024",,"In its first Advisory Opinion, the Court clarified that where a child is born through a gestational surrogacy arrangement abroad, in a situation where he or she was conceived using the eggs of a third- party donor, and the intended mother is designated in a birth certificate legally established abroad as the ""legal mother"", the child's right to respect for his or her private life also requires that domestic law provide a possibility of recognition of a legal parent-child relationship with the intended mother. The choice of means by which to achieve recognition of the legal relationship between the child and the intended mother falls within the State's margin of appreciation. However, once the relationship between the child and the intended mother has become a ""practical reality"" the procedure laid down to establish recognition of the relationship in domestic law must be capable of being ""implemented promptly and efficiently"" ( Advisory opinion concerning the recognition in domestic law of a legal parent-child relationship between a child born through a gestational surrogacy arrangement abroad and the intended mother [GC]). Applying the principles of Mennesson v. France, 2014, and the before- mentioned Advisory opinion, the Court found that the obligation for children born under a surrogacy arrangement to be adopted in order to ensure the legal recognition between the genetic mother and her child did not violate the mother's right to private life ( D v. France, 2020). However, in K.K. and Others v. Denmark, 2022, it found that the refusal of the intended mother's application to adopt, where domestic law did not provide for other possibilities of recognition of a legal parent-child relationship with the intended mother, violated the children's right to respect for their private lives A.M. v. Norway (§§ 56-77). In, 2022, the applicant was the intended mother of a child born in the USvia a surrogacy arrangement. After returning to Norway, the biological father (her former partner) cut off her contact with the child and the domestic courts rejected her claims to have her parental status under USlaw recognised in Norway, and to be allowed to adopt the child. Although the Court accepted that the applicant's situation was ""particularly harsh"" it found it difficult to attribute this consequence to the authorities. Moreover, while the applicant had been put in a difficult situation, the domestic courts had examined the interests of all the parties involved and, in its view, the outcome had to be considered to fall within the margin of appreciation afforded to domestic authorities (see the States' margin of appreciation on the issue of surrogacy, § 131).","In its first Advisory Opinion, the Court clarified that where a child is born through a gestational surrogacy arrangement abroad, in a situation where he or she was conceived using the eggs of a third- party donor, and the intended mother is designated in a birth certificate legally established abroad as the ""legal mother"", the child' s right to respect for his or her private life also requires that domestic law provide a possibility of recognition of a legal parent-child relationship with the intended mother. The choice of means by which to achieve recognition of the legal relationship between the child and the intended mother falls within the State's margin of appreciation. However, once the relationship between the child and the intended mother has become a ""practical reality"" the procedure laid d own to establish recognition of the relationship in domestic law must be capable of being ""implemented promptly and efficiently"" ( Advisory opinion concerning the recognition in domestic law of a legal parent-child relationship between a child born through a gestational surrogacy arrangement abroad and the intended mother [GC]). Applying the principles of Mennesson v. France, 2014, and the before- mentioned Advisory opinion, the Court found that the obligation for children born under a surrogacy arrangement to be adopted in order to ensure the legal recognition between the genetic mother and her child did not violate the mother's right to private life ( D v. France, 2020; R.F. and Others v. Germany, 2024). However, in K.K. and Others v. Denmark, 2022, it found that the refusal of the intended mother's application to adopt, where domestic law did not provide for other possibilities of recognition of a legal parent-child relationship with the intended mother, violated the children's right to respect for their private lives (§§ 56-77). In A.M. v. Norway, 2022, the applicant was the intended mother of a child born in the USvia a surrogacy arrangement. After returning to Norway, the biological father (her former partner) cut off her contact with the child and the domestic courts rejected her claims to have her parental status under USlaw recognised in Norway, and to be allowed to adopt the child. Although the Court accepted that the applicant 's situation was ""particularly harsh"" it f ound it difficult to attribute this consequence to the authorities. Moreover, while the applicant had been put in a difficult situation, the domestic courts had examined the interests of all the parties involved and, in its view, the outcome had to be considered to fall within the margin of appreciation afforded to domestic authorities (see the States'margin of appreciation on the issue of surrogacy, § 131)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:45430/19,Toth and Crișan v. Romania*,45430/19,added,"Toth and Crișan v. Romania*, no. 45430/19, 25 February 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,I.F.c,"Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion)",4,222,56,0.8905,"M.L. v. Slovakia , 2021|Mityanin and Leonov v. Russia , 2019","Axel Springer SE an d RTL Television GmbH v. Germany , 2017|Jishkariani v. Georgia , 2018|ć v. Croatia , 2022","When balancing freedom of expression protected by Article 10 and the right to respect for private life enshrined in Article 8, the Court has applied several criteria. They include the contribution to a debate of general interest; how well known is the person concerned and what is the subject of the report; his or her prior conduct; the method of obtaining the information and its veracity; the Axel content, form and consequences of the publication; and the severity of the sanction imposed ( Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 2012, § 89-95). These criteria are not exhaustive and should be transposed and adapted in the light of the particular circumstances of the case ( Axel Springer SE an d RTL Television GmbH v. Germany, 2017, § 42; Jishkariani v. Georgia, 2018, § 46; see also McCann and Healy v. Portugal, 2022, §§ 80-81 and 98-101). For instance, in Mesić v. Croatia, 2022, the Court took into account certain additional criteria: on the one hand, the applicant's status as a politician and a high-ranking State official, and on the other, the complainant's status as an advocate (§ 86).","In cases which require the right to respect for private life to be balanced against the right to freedom of expression, the Court considers that the outcome of the application should not, in theory, vary according to whether it has been lodged with the Court under Article 8 of the Convention by the person who was the subject of the news report, or under Article 10 by the publisher. Indeed, as a matter of principle these rights deserve equal respect ( Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France [GC], 2015, § 91; Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 123; Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], 2017, § 77; McCann and Healy v. Portugal, 2022, § 80; Toth and Crișan v. Romania *, 2025, § 50). Accordingly, the margin of appreciation should in theory be the same in both cases. The non-exhaustive criteria defined by the case-law include the following ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, §§ 165-166): the contribution to a debate of public interest, the degree of notoriety of the person affected, the subject of the news report, the prior conduct of the person concerned, the content, form and consequences of the publication, and, where appropriate, the circumstances in which the photographs were taken ( Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France [GC], 2015, §§ 90-93; Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], 2012, §§ 108-113; Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 2012, §§ 89-95), the order of which may be examined differently ( M.L. v. Slovakia, 2021, §§ 35 and 36). Furthermore, in the context of an application lodged under Article 10, the Court examines the way in which the information was obtained and its veracity, and the gravity of the penalty imposed on the journalists or publishers ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 165). Some of these criteria may have more or less relevance given the particular circumstances of the case (see, for a case concerning the mass collection, processing and publication of tax data, ibid., § 166), and according to the context, other criteria may also apply ( Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], 2017, § 88). With regard to the way in which the information was obtained, the Court has held that the press should normally be entitled to rely on the content of official reports without further verification of the facts presented in the document ( Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], 1999, § 68; Mityanin and Leonov v. Russia, 2019, § 109)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:45430/19,Toth and Crișan v. Romania*,45430/19,added,"Toth and Crișan v. Romania*, no. 45430/19, 25 February 2025",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.A.1,Applicability in general,4,87,87,0.9893,,,"Private life is a broad concept incapable of exhaustive definition ( Niemietz v. Germany, 1992, § 29; Pretty v. the United Kingdom, 2002, § 61; Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 57). It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person and may ""embrace multiple aspects of the person's Denisov v. Ukraine S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom physical and social identity"" ( [GC], 2018, § 95; [GC], 2008, § 66). However, through its case-law, the Court has provided guidance as to the meaning and scope of private life for the purposes of Article 8 ( Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 159). Moreover, the generous approach to the definition of personal interests has allowed the case- law to develop in line with social and technological developments.","Private life is a broad concept incapable of exhaustive definition ( Niemietz v. Germany, 1992, § 29; Pretty v. the United Kingdom, 2002, § 61; Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 57). It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person and may ""embrace multiple aspects of the person' s physical and social identity"" ( Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, § 95; S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 66; Toth and Crișan v. Romania *, 2025, § 30). However, through its case-law, the Court has provided guidance as to the meaning and scope of private life for the purposes of Article 8 ( Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 159). Moreover, the generous approach to the definition of personal interests has allowed the case-law to develop in line with social and technological developments."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20240618070506__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2025-05-23,9 April 2024,28 February 2025,2024-04-09,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2024-06-18__2025-05-23.json,apps:42917/16,Zăicescu and Fălticineanu v. Romania,42917/16,added,"Zăicescu and Fălticineanu v. Romania, no. 42917/16, 23 April 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.D.7,Gender identity,4,,321,,"ălticineanu v. Romania , 2024",,,"In Zăicescu and Fălticineanu v. Romania, 2024, the applicants complained that the acquittal of two high-ranking military officials, previously convicted of crimes connected with the Holocaust, in extraordinary appeal proceedings not disclosed to the applicants or to the public had breached their right to private life and psychological integrity. The Court considered that the applicants, Jews and Holocaust survivors, could claim to have personally suffered emotional distress when they had found out about the relevant reopening (§§ 101-03) and that their suffering had attained the ""threshold of severity"" to fall within the scope of Article 8 (§§ 114-19). It further held that the domestic courts'failure to adduce relevant and sufficient reasons for actions leading to the revision of historical convictions, in the absence of new evidence, by reinterpreting historically established facts and denying the responsibility of State officials for the Holocaust, contrary to international law principles, as well as their failure to bring the acquittals to the public's attention or make judgments accessible, could have legitimately provoked in the applicants feelings of humiliation and vulnerability and caused them psychological trauma, with the result that Article 8, read in conjunction with Article 14, had been violated (§§ 146-155)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20251219191704__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2025-05-23,2025-12-19,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json,apps:6033/19,A.R. v. the United Kingdom,6033/19,added,"A.R. v. the United Kingdom, no. 6033/19, 1 July 2025",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C,"In the case of a negative obligation, was the interference conducted ""in accordance with the law""?",2,24,24,0.94,"A.R. v. the United Kingdom, no. 6033/19, 1 July 2025|Selishcheva and Others v. Russia, nos. 39056/22 and 9 others, 27 May 2025",,"Afinding that the measure in question was not ""in accordance with the law"" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a ""legitimate aim"" or was ""necessary in a democratic society"" (M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be ""in accordance with the law"", as a result of an unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 (Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been ""neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society"" (§§ 62-63). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be ""in accordance with the law"" was so closely linked to the ""necessary in a democratic society"" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together (S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 66; Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*, 2024, § 103).","Afinding that the measure in question was not ""in accordance with the law"" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a ""legitimate aim"" or was ""necessary in a democratic society"" (M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129; A.R. v. the United Kingdom, 2025, § 70). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be ""in accordance with the law"", as a result of an unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 (Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been ""neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society"" (§§ 62-63). In Selishcheva and Others v. Russia, 2025 the Court found that the interference was neither ""prescribed by law"" nor ""necessary in a democratic society"" (§ 37). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be ""in accordance with the law"" was so closely linked to the ""necessary in a democratic society"" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together (S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 66; Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*, 2024, § 103)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20251219191704__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2025-05-23,2025-12-19,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json,apps:6033/19,A.R. v. the United Kingdom,6033/19,added,"A.R. v. the United Kingdom, no. 6033/19, 1 July 2025",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.F.1.b,Article 6 (right to a fair trial),4,47,47,0.983,"A.R. v. the United Kingdom, no. 6033/19, 1 July 2025",,"Moreover, in several cases where a close link was found between the complaints raised under Article 6 and Article 8, the Court has considered the complaint under Article 6 as being part of the complaint under Article 8 (Anghel v. Italy, 2013, § 69; Diamante and Pelliccioni v. San Marino, 2011, § 151; Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, § 57; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, § 187). In G.B. v. Lithuania, 2016, the Court did not consider it necessary to examine separately whether there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 given that the Court had found that the applicant's procedural rights had been respected when examining her complaints under Article 8 (§ 113). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 1987, 2021, the Court found no need to give a separate ruling on the admissibility and merits of the complaint under Article 6 § 1 since it had already examined, from the standpoint of Article 8, the applicant's complaint about a violation of her procedural rights affecting her right to respect for her private life (§ 78).","Moreover, in several cases where a close link was found between the complaints raised under Article 6 and Article 8, the Court has considered the complaint under Article 6 as being part of the complaint under Article 8 (Anghel v. Italy, 2013, § 69; Diamante and Pelliccioni v. San Marino, 2011, § 151; Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, § 57; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, § 187; A.R. v. the United Kingdom, 2025, § 71). In G.B. v. Lithuania, 2016, the Court did not consider it necessary to examine separately whether there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 given that the Court had found that the applicant's procedural rights had been respected when examining her complaints under Article 8 (§ 113). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 1987, 2021, the Court found no need to give a separate ruling on the admissibility and merits of the complaint under Article 6 § 1 since it had already examined, from the standpoint of Article 8, the applicant's complaint about a violation of her procedural rights affecting her right to respect for her private life (§ 78)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20251219191704__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2025-05-23,2025-12-19,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json,apps:6033/19,A.R. v. the United Kingdom,6033/19,added,"A.R. v. the United Kingdom, no. 6033/19, 1 July 2025",3,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A.2,Professional and business activities,3,,117,,"A.R. v. the United Kingdom, no. 6033/19, 1 July 2025|M.M. v. the United Kingdom, no. 24029/07, 13 November 2012",,,"In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court considered that the decision of a judge of the Family Court to, in the first place, criticise the applicant in strong terms without giving her an adequate opportunity to respond and, then, to direct that those criticisms be shared with the local authorities where she had worked and with the relevant professional bodies, had significantly affected her ability to pursue her chosen professional activity, which in turn would have had consequential effects on the enjoyment of her right to respect for her ""private life"" within the meaning of Article 8 (§ 47). In A.R. v. the United Kingdom, 2005, the Court considered the disclosure, to a prospective employer, of a criminal charge of which the applicant had been acquitted. The Court found that the statutory regime was not in accordance with the law, and therefore in breach of Article 8, because at the relevant time the legal provisions in force, taken together with applicable guidance, left an excessively broad discretion for the competent authorities in the application of the disclosure provisions, and there was no guidance to assist employers when faced with the task of deciding how to approach information concerning criminal allegations of which an individual had been acquitted (§§ 60-70; see also M.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2012)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20251219191704__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2025-05-23,2025-12-19,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json,apps:3485/21,Andronache v. Romania (dec.),3485/21,added,"Andronache v. Romania (dec.), no. 3485/21, 17 June 2025",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III,Family life,1,,338,,"Andronache v. Romania (dec.), no. 3485/21, 17 June 2025",,,"The notion of family life is an autonomous concept (Marckx v. Belgium, 1979, § 31). Consequently, whether or not ""family life"" exists is essentially a question of fact depending upon the real existence in practice of close personal ties (Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 140). The Court will therefore look at de facto family ties, such as applicants living together, in the absence of any legal recognition of family life (Johnston and Others v. Ireland, 1986, § 56). Other factors will include the length of the relationship and, in the case of couples, whether they have demonstrated their commitment to each other by having children together (X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, 1997, § 36; Andronache v. Romania (dec.), 2025, § 54). Therefore, the notion of ""family"" in Article 8 concerns marriage-based relationships, and also other de facto ""family ties"", including between same- sex couples, where the parties are living together outside marriage or where other factors 63 See also other chapters of the Guide for further references. demonstrated that the relationship had sufficient constancy (Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 140 and Oliari and Others v. Italy, 2016, § 130)64. ""Family life"" can extend after the age of majority on account of ""additional elements of dependence"" allowing for the existence of ""family life"" between parents and adult children (see, for instance, Belli and Arquier-Martinez v. Switzerland, 2018, § 65; Emonet and Others v. Switzerland, 2007, § 80; Bierski v. Poland, 2022, § 47; Advisory opinion on the procedural status and rights of a biological parent in proceedings for the adoption of an adult [GC], 2023, § 50, and, in the immigration context, Savran v. Denmark [GC], 2021, § 174 and the references therein)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20251219191704__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2025-05-23,2025-12-19,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json,apps:3485/21,Andronache v. Romania (dec.),3485/21,added,"Andronache v. Romania (dec.), no. 3485/21, 17 June 2025",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.D.3.h,Parental authority and State care,4,,428,,"Andronache v. Romania (dec.), no. 3485/21, 17 June 2025|Van Slooten v. the Netherlands, no. 45644/18, 15 April 2025",,,"The judgment in Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway [GC], 2019, summarised the case-law principles (§§ 202-213) applicable to cases where the authorities have decided to replace the foster home arrangement with a more far-reaching type of measure, namely deprivation of parental responsibilities and authorisation of adoption. The Court has had regard to the principle that ""such measures should only be applied in exceptional circumstances and could only be justified if they were motivated by an overriding requirement pertaining to the child's best interests"" (S.S. v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 85-87, 96 and 103; Aune v. Norway, 2010, § 66). Amother's financial situation cannot, without regard for changed circumstances, justify the removal of a child from her mother's care (R.M.S. v. Spain, 2013, § 92). Likewise, a breach was found where domestic authorities had merely based their decision on the applicant's financial and social difficulties, without providing him with appropriate social assistance (Akinnibosun v. Italy, 2015, §§ 83-84). In Soares De Melo v. Portugal, 2016, the Court found a violation of Article 8 where the children of a woman living in precarious conditions were placed in care with a view to adoption, resulting in the severance of the family ties (§§ 118-123). Further, the absence of skills and experience in rearing children could hardly in itself be regarded as a legitimate ground for restricting parental authority or keeping a child in public care (Kocherov and Sergeyeva v. Russia, 2016, § 106, concerning a father with a mild intellectual disability). In Van Slooten v. the Netherlands, 2025, § 73, the domestic authorities having put considerable weight on the child's vulnerability without any in-depth analysis thereof when terminating the mother's parental authority, contributed to the finding of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. In Andronache v. Romania (dec.), 2025, the nature of the crimes committed by the father, who was the only surviving parent and serving a prison term at that time, was taken into account, among other things, in the domestic courts' assessment (§§ 54-67)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20251219191704__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2025-05-23,2025-12-19,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json,apps:4581/16,B.T. and B.K.Cs. v. Hungary,4581/16,added,"B.T. and B.K.Cs. v. Hungary, no. 4581/16, 10 June 2025",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.D.3.b,Ties between natural mother and children,4,,375,,"B.T. and B.K.Cs. v. Hungary, no. 4581/16, 10 June 2025",,,"In addition, in the decision-making process concerning the withdrawal of parental responsibility and consent to adoption, the domestic authorities have to perform a genuine balancing exercise between the interests of the child and his biological family and seriously contemplate any possibility of the child's reunification with the biological family. The Court reiterated that authorities have to take measures to facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible (Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway [GC], 2019, § 205). In this context, it is important that domestic authorities take steps to maintain contact between a child and its biological parents even after its initial removal from their care; and that they rely on fresh expert evidence (Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway [GC], 2019, §§ 220-225). In Y.I. v. Russia, 2020, the applicant, who had been taking drugs and had been unemployed, was deprived of parental authority over her three children with her two youngest being placed in public care. The Court found a violation of Article 8 (§ 96): in its view, the domestic authorities had not sufficiently justified the measures because the children were not neglected or in danger despite the mother's situation (§§ 88-91). In addition, the childcare authorities did not provide the applicant with appropriate assistance to facilitate eventual family reunification. In this context, the Court reaffirmed that the authorities' role in the social welfare field is to help persons in difficulty, to provide them with guidance in their contact with the welfare authorities and to advise them, inter alia, on how to overcome their difficulties (§ 87). The Court also took into account that the children were not only separated from their mother but also separated from each other (§ 94). Separating a newborn baby from his mother and taking him into State care against the mother's will immediately after his birth is an extremely harsh measure, requiring extraordinarily compelling reasons (B.T. and B.K.Cs. v. Hungary, 2025. §§ 77 and 88)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20251219191704__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2025-05-23,2025-12-19,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json,apps:48302/21,Demirci v. Hungary,48302/21,added,"Demirci v. Hungary, no. 48302/21, 6 May 2025",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.D.5.c,Deportation and expulsion decisions,4,,462,,"Demirci v. Hungary, no. 48302/21, 6 May 2025",,,"In immigration cases, there will be no ""family life"" between parents and adult children unless they can demonstrate additional elements of dependence other than normal emotional ties (Kwakye- Nti and Dufie v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2000; Slivenko v. Latvia [GC], 2003, § 97; A.S. v. Switzerland, 2015, § 49; Levakovic v. Denmark, 2018, §§ 35 and 44; Demirci v. Hungary, 2025, §§ 72-74). However, such ties may be taken into account under the head of ""private life"" (Slivenko v. Latvia [GC], 2003). Furthermore, the Court has accepted in a number of cases concerning young adults who have not yet founded a family of their own that their relationship with their parents and other close family members also constituted family life (Maslov v. Austria [GC], 2008, § 62; Azerkane v. the Netherlands, 2020, §§ 63-64; Bousarra v. France, 2010, § 38). In other cases, the Court found that the applicants could not invoke family relationships to their adult children due to the non-existence of elements of dependency. Nevertheless, the Court has considered that family relations with adult children are not completely irrelevant to the assessment of the applicants' family situation (see notably Savran v. Denmark [GC], 2021, § 174 and the references therein)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20251219191704__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2025-05-23,2025-12-19,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json,apps:22077/19,Green v. the United Kingdom,22077/19,added,"Green v. the United Kingdom, no. 22077/19, 8 April 2025",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.2,Protection of individual reputation; defamation,3,,232,,"Green v. the United Kingdom, no. 22077/19, 8 April 2025",,,"The case of Green v. the United Kingdom, 2025 concerned the general framework for balancing rights of privacy and freedom of expression in Parliament in the domestic legal order. The applicant's name was linked to allegations of ""serious and repeated sexual harassment, racist abuse and bullying"" in Parliament, by a member of the House of Lords, even though this information was subject to a court injunction. The applicant complained to the Court that the absence of ex ante and ex post controls on the power to use parliamentary privilege to reveal such confidential information was not compatible with Article 8. However, in keeping with the well-established constitutional principle of the autonomy of Parliament, the Court held that it was, in the first instance, for national parliaments to assess the need to restrict conduct by their Members. It should therefore be left to the State, and Parliament in particular, to determine whether and to what extent ex ante and ex post controls might be necessary to prevent its Members from revealing information subject to privacy injunctions (§§ 81-94)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20251219191704__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2025-05-23,2025-12-19,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json,apps:46949/21|24989/22|39759/22,L and Others v. France,46949/21|24989/22|39759/22,added,"L and Others v. France, nos. 46949/21, 24989/22 and 39759/22, 24 April 2025",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B,Should the case be assessed from the perspective of a negative or positive obligation?,2,9,9,0.954,"L and Others v. France, nos. 46949/21, 24989/22 and 39759/22, 24 April 2025",,"While the choice of the means to secure compliance with Article 8 in the sphere of protection against acts of individuals is, in principle, within the State's margin of appreciation, effective deterrence against grave acts, where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake, requires efficient criminal law provisions. The State therefore has a positive obligation inherent in Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention to enact criminal law provisions effectively punishing rape and to apply them in practice through effective investigation and prosecution (M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003). Children and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are entitled to effective protection (X and Y v. the Netherlands, 1985, §§ 23-24 and 27; August v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2003; M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003). In this regard, the Court has, for example, held that the State has an obligation to protect a minor against malicious misrepresentation (K.U. v. Finland, 2008, §§ 45-49). The Court has also found the following acts to be both grave and an affront to human dignity: an intrusion into the applicant's home in the form of unauthorised entry into her flat and installation of wires and hidden video cameras inside the flat; a serious, flagrant and extraordinarily intense invasion of her private life in the form of unauthorised filming of the most intimate aspects of her private life, which had taken place in the sanctity of her home, and subsequent public dissemination of those video images; and receipt of a letter threatening her with public humiliation. Furthermore, the applicant is a well-known journalist and there was a plausible link between her professional activity and the aforementioned intrusions, whose purpose was to silence her (Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 116). The Court has also considered that, in the case of revenge pornography (online public dissemination without consent of intimate photographs of the victim by her former intimate partner), the protection of Article 8 required a criminal-law response (M.Ș.D. v. Romania, 2024, § 125).","While the choice of the means to secure compliance with Article 8 in the sphere of protection against acts of individuals is, in principle, within the State's margin of appreciation, effective deterrence against grave acts, where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake, requires efficient criminal law provisions. The State therefore has a positive obligation inherent in Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention to enact criminal law provisions effectively punishing rape and to apply them in practice through effective investigation and prosecution (M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003). Children and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are entitled to effective protection (X and Y v. the Netherlands, 1985, §§ 23-24 and 27; August v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2003; M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003), and in domestic law ""consent"" must reflect the free will to have a particular sexual relationship, at the time it takes place and taking into account its circumstances (L and Others v. France, 2025, § 250). In this regard, the Court has, for example, held that the State has an obligation to protect a minor against malicious misrepresentation (K.U. v. Finland, 2008, §§ 45-49). The Court has also found the following acts to be both grave and an affront to human dignity: an intrusion into the applicant's home in the form of unauthorised entry into her flat and installation of wires and hidden video cameras inside the flat; a serious, flagrant and extraordinarily intense invasion of her private life in the form of unauthorised filming of the most intimate aspects of her private life, which had taken place in the sanctity of her home, and subsequent public dissemination of those video images; and receipt of a letter threatening her with public humiliation. Furthermore, the applicant is a well-known journalist and there was a plausible link between her professional activity and the aforementioned intrusions, whose purpose was to silence her (Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 116). The Court has also considered that, in the case of revenge pornography (online public dissemination without consent of intimate photographs of the victim by her former intimate partner), the protection of Article 8 required a criminal-law response (M.Ș.D. v. Romania, 2024, § 125)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20251219191704__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2025-05-23,2025-12-19,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json,apps:46949/21|24989/22|39759/22,L and Others v. France,46949/21|24989/22|39759/22,added,"L and Others v. France, nos. 46949/21, 24989/22 and 39759/22, 24 April 2025",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.1,Victims of violence/abuse,3,130,130,0.988,"L and Others v. France, nos. 46949/21, 24989/22 and 39759/22, 24 April 2025",,"Regarding serious acts such as rape and sexual abuse of children, where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake, it falls to the Member States to ensure that efficient criminal law provisions are in place (X and Y v. the Netherlands, 1985, § 27; M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003, § 150 and § 185, in which the approach taken by the investigator and the prosecutors in the case fell short of the requirements inherent in the States' positive obligations; M.G.C. v. Romania, 2016, § 74; A and B v. Croatia, 2019, § 112) as well as effective criminal investigations (C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania, 2012, § 72; M.P. and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011, §§ 109-110; M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003, § 152; A, B and C v. Latvia, 2016, § 174; and Y v. Bulgaria, 2020, §§ 95-96); that criminal sentences are enforced (E.G. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021, § 49); and victims have the possibility to obtain reparation and redress (C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania, 2012, § 72). However, there is no absolute right to obtain the prosecution or conviction of any particular person where there were no culpable failures in seeking to hold perpetrators of criminal offences accountable (Brecknell v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 64; Szula v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2007). See also as concerns other international instruments, A, B and C v. Latvia, 2016, § 148.","Regarding serious acts such as rape and sexual abuse of children, where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake, it falls to the Member States to ensure that efficient criminal law provisions are in place (X and Y v. the Netherlands, 1985, § 27; M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003, § 150 and § 185, in which the approach taken by the investigator and the prosecutors in the case fell short of the requirements inherent in the States' positive obligations; M.G.C. v. Romania, 2016, § 74; A and B v. Croatia, 2019, § 112; L and Others v. France, 2025, § 250); as well as effective criminal investigations (C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania, 2012, § 72; M.P. and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011, §§ 109-110; M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003, § 152; A, B and C v. Latvia, 2016, § 174; and Y v. Bulgaria, 2020, §§ 95-96); that criminal sentences are enforced (E.G. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021, § 49); and victims have the possibility to obtain reparation and redress (C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania, 2012, § 72). However, there is no absolute right to obtain the prosecution or conviction of any particular person where there were no culpable failures in seeking to hold perpetrators of criminal offences accountable (Brecknell v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 64; Szula v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2007). See also as concerns other international instruments, A, B and C v. Latvia, 2016, § 148."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20251219191704__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2025-05-23,2025-12-19,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json,apps:24029/07,M.M. v. the United Kingdom,24029/07,added,"M.M. v. the United Kingdom, no. 24029/07, 13 November 2012",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A.2,Professional and business activities,3,,117,,"A.R. v. the United Kingdom, no. 6033/19, 1 July 2025|M.M. v. the United Kingdom, no. 24029/07, 13 November 2012",,,"In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court considered that the decision of a judge of the Family Court to, in the first place, criticise the applicant in strong terms without giving her an adequate opportunity to respond and, then, to direct that those criticisms be shared with the local authorities where she had worked and with the relevant professional bodies, had significantly affected her ability to pursue her chosen professional activity, which in turn would have had consequential effects on the enjoyment of her right to respect for her ""private life"" within the meaning of Article 8 (§ 47). In A.R. v. the United Kingdom, 2005, the Court considered the disclosure, to a prospective employer, of a criminal charge of which the applicant had been acquitted. The Court found that the statutory regime was not in accordance with the law, and therefore in breach of Article 8, because at the relevant time the legal provisions in force, taken together with applicable guidance, left an excessively broad discretion for the competent authorities in the application of the disclosure provisions, and there was no guidance to assist employers when faced with the task of deciding how to approach information concerning criminal allegations of which an individual had been acquitted (§§ 60-70; see also M.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2012)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20251219191704__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2025-05-23,2025-12-19,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json,apps:12908/23|24544/23,Paic and Wernersson v. Sweden (dec.),12908/23|24544/23,added,"Paic and Wernersson v. Sweden (dec.), nos. 12908/23 and 24544/23, 20 May 2025",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.2,Reproductive rights,3,,145,,"Paic and Wernersson v. Sweden (dec.), nos. 12908/23 and 24544/23, 20 May 2025",,,"In Paic and Wernersson v. Sweden (dec.), 2025, a complaint was brought before the Court under Article 8 of the Convention about the unauthorised use of samples of the applicants' sperm, given at a public hospital in the context of fertility evaluations, to inseminate two women, resulting in conception and birth of two children. The complaint was declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, the applicants having failed to lodge a civil action for compensation before the domestic courts, which was found to be an effective remedy offering reasonable prospects of success for violations of Article 8 even when they had occurred, like in the present case, before the Convention was incorporated into domestic law, §§ 61-62."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20251219191704__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2025-05-23,2025-12-19,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json,apps:5742/22,S.O. v. Spain*,5742/22,added,"S.O. v. Spain*, no. 5742/22, 26 June 2025",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.3,Forced medical treatment and compulsory medical procedures,3,,156,,"S.O. v. Spain*, no. 5742/22, 26 June 2025",,,"S.O. v. Spain*, 2025, concerned the absence of a valid informed consent for the expansion of the scope of the applicant's breast-conserving surgery. The Court found that, in their assessment of the applicant's grievances, the domestic courts had not considered important dimensions of women's sexuality, and had not properly scrutinised the applicant's allegations, despite them being of significant importance in establishing the scope of the duty incumbent on the medical professionals involved in her care to seek her informed consent (§§ 57-59). The Court found that the practical implementation of the existing legal framework had been deficient and had not afforded sufficient respect for the applicant's autonomy, and thus concluded to a violation of Article 8 (§ 60)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20251219191704__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2025-05-23,2025-12-19,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json,apps:21669/21,Sahiner v. Austria,21669/21,added,"Sahiner v. Austria, no. 21669/21, 3 June 2025",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.D.6,Right to a name/identity documents,3,,311,,"Sahiner v. Austria, no. 21669/21, 3 June 2025",,,"The Court has held that forenames also fall within the ambit of ""private life"" (Guillot v. France, 1996, §§ 21-22; Güzel Erdagöz v. Turkey, 2008, § 43; Garnaga v. Ukraine, 2013, § 36; Ismayilzade v. Azerbaijan, 2024, § 25). However, the Court has found that some laws relating to the registration of names strike a proper balance, while others do not (compare Guillot v. France, 1996 and Sahiner v. Austria, 2025, with Johansson v. Finland, 2007). In Ismayilzade v. Azerbaijan, 2024, the Court agreed with the domestic courts that the forename chosen by the applicant for her newborn son had not been in the child's best interests and found that the refusal by the authorities2 to register that name had not violated Article 8 (§§ 35 42). In relation to a change of name in the process of gender reassignment, see S.V. v. Italy, 2018, §§ 70-75 (under Gender identity below)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20251219191704__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2025-05-23,2025-12-19,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json,apps:39056/22,Selishcheva and Others v. Russia,39056/22,added,"Selishcheva and Others v. Russia, nos. 39056/22 and 9 others, 27 May 2025",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C,"In the case of a negative obligation, was the interference conducted ""in accordance with the law""?",2,24,24,0.94,"A.R. v. the United Kingdom, no. 6033/19, 1 July 2025|Selishcheva and Others v. Russia, nos. 39056/22 and 9 others, 27 May 2025",,"Afinding that the measure in question was not ""in accordance with the law"" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a ""legitimate aim"" or was ""necessary in a democratic society"" (M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be ""in accordance with the law"", as a result of an unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 (Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been ""neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society"" (§§ 62-63). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be ""in accordance with the law"" was so closely linked to the ""necessary in a democratic society"" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together (S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 66; Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*, 2024, § 103).","Afinding that the measure in question was not ""in accordance with the law"" suffices for the Court to hold that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. It is not therefore necessary to examine whether the interference in question pursued a ""legitimate aim"" or was ""necessary in a democratic society"" (M.M. v. the Netherlands, 2003, § 46; Solska and Rybicka v. Poland, 2018, § 129; A.R. v. the United Kingdom, 2025, § 70). In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], 2016, the Court found that, regardless of whether there was a legal basis for the interference with the applicant's rights, the interference did not comply with the other conditions set out in Article 8 § 2 (§ 196). The interference can also be considered not to be ""in accordance with the law"", as a result of an unlawful measure under Article 5 § 1 (Blyudik v. Russia, 2019, § 75). In S.W. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, the Court found that the interference with the applicant's private life had been ""neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society"" (§§ 62-63). In Selishcheva and Others v. Russia, 2025 the Court found that the interference was neither ""prescribed by law"" nor ""necessary in a democratic society"" (§ 37). Lastly, in a number of cases the Court considered that the requirement for an interference to be ""in accordance with the law"" was so closely linked to the ""necessary in a democratic society"" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together (S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 66; Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy*, 2024, § 103)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20251219191704__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2025-05-23,2025-12-19,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json,apps:10934/21,Semenya v. Switzerland*,10934/21,removed,"Semenya v. Switzerland*, no. 10934/21, 11 July 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_deleted,I.F.1.e,Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination),4,72,,,,"Semenya v. Switzerland*, no. 10934/21, 11 July 2023","In Semenya v. Switzerland*, 2023, §§ 123-25,the Court found a violation of Article 8 taken in conjunction with Article 14 where the applicant, a professional female athlete, was forced to take hormonal treatment to lower her natural testosterone level in order to be allowed to compete in the women's category in international sport competitions. The Court found that her sexual characteristics (the elevated natural testosterone level) and the forced hormonal treatment imposed on her by World Athletics fell within the ambit of Article 8 (private life) and that her professional activity was also 7 See the Case-law Guide on Prisoners' rights. covered by Article 8 under both the ""reason-based approach"" and the ""consequence-based approach"" developed in Denisov v. Ukraine, 20188.",
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20251219191704__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2025-05-23,2025-12-19,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json,apps:10934/21,Semenya v. Switzerland*,10934/21,removed,"Semenya v. Switzerland*, no. 10934/21, 11 July 2023",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_deleted,II.B.3,Forced medical treatment and compulsory medical procedures,3,154,,,,"Semenya v. Switzerland*, no. 10934/21, 11 July 2023","In Semenya v. Switzerland*, 2023, the Court found that forcing the applicant, a professional female athlete, to take hormonal treatment to lower her natural testosterone level in order to be allowed to compete in the women's category in international sport competitions, pertained to the applicant's personal autonomy and thus fell within the ambit of Article 8 which it found to be applicable in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention29.",
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20251219191704__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2025-05-23,2025-12-19,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json,apps:16497/20,Sytnyk v. Ukraine,16497/20,added,"Sytnyk v. Ukraine, no. 16497/20, 24 April 2005",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.2,Protection of individual reputation; defamation,3,,215,,"Sytnyk v. Ukraine, no. 16497/20, 24 April 2005",,,"In order for Article 8 to come into play, an attack on a person's reputation must attain a certain level of seriousness and be made in a manner causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private life (Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 2012, § 83; Bédat v. Switzerland [GC], 2016, § 72; Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], 2017, § 76; Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, § 112; Balaskas v. Greece, 2020, § 40; Vučina v. Croatia (dec.), 2019, § 31; Miljević v. Croatia, 2020, §§ 61-62; De Carvalho Basso v. Portugal (dec.), 2021, § 43; M.L. v. Slovakia, 2021, § 24; Angerjärv and Greinoman v. Estonia, 2022, §§ 118-128; McCann and Healy v. Portugal, 2022, § 69; Oleg Balan v. the Republic of Moldova, 2024, § 20; Toth and Crișan v. Romania, 2025, §§ 32-34). This requirement pertains to both social and professional reputation (Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, § 112). There must also be a sufficient link between the applicant and the alleged attack on his or her reputation (Putistin v. Ukraine, 2013, § 40). The Court has accepted that an attack on a deceased's reputation may directly affect such person's close relatives (M.L. v. Slovakia, 2021, § 34). In cases that concerned allegations of criminal conduct, the Court also took into account the fact that under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, individuals have a right to be presumed innocent of any criminal offence until proven guilty (Jishkariani v. Georgia, 2018, § 41; see also McCann and Healy v. Portugal, 2022, § 95, since the statements about the applicants' alleged involvement in the disappearance of their daughter who had gone missing in 2007 in Portugal, had in fact been made after the case had been discontinued and after the inspector, who had made those statements, had retired, it was the applicants' reputation guaranteed by Article 8 and the public's perception of them which had been at stake rather than their right to be presumed innocent under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention). Furthermore, in a case where the decision-making process leading to the applicant being found guilty of a corruption-related administrative offence was seriously flawed, and in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the Court found that the decision to include his name, for an indefinite period, in a publicly accessible register of corrupt officials lacked ""relevant and sufficient"" reasons and was in violation of Article 8 (Sytnyk v. Ukraine, 2005, § 122)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20251219191704__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2025-05-23,2025-12-19,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json,apps:8019/16,Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC],8019/16,added,"Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 3 others 9, July 2025",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.6,File or data gathering by security services or other organs of the State,3,,253,,"Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 3 others 9, July 2025",,,"In Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025, the Court found that systematic and extensive data gathering from civilians in the context of filtration measures was not ""in accordance with the law"" within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. Such measures entailed downloading phone contact lists, registering identification numbers of the telephones, including IMEInumbers, collecting passport numbers, scanning for biometric indicators and questioning people on their background and political beliefs, and allowed for a creation of extensive database of the persons subjected to such measures."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20251219191704__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2025-05-23,2025-12-19,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json,apps:8019/16,Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC],8019/16,added,"Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 3 others 9, July 2025",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.D.3.e,International child abduction,4,,408,,"Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 3 others 9, July 2025",,,"The case of Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025 addressed a particular form of abduction of children: the administrative practice of transferring Ukrainian children to Russia (which did not qualify as lawful evacuation under the international humanitarian law) without parental or legal consent, coupled with the absence of any steps by the Russian authorities to secure the children's reunification with their parents or caregivers. This was followed by the facilitation of the children's adoption in Russia by way of the automatic imposition of Russian nationality on them. The Court found that this practice amounted to an interference with the children's right to respect for their private and family lives and was not ""in accordance with the law"" within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention (§§ 1567-1594)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20251219191704__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2025-05-23,2025-12-19,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json,apps:8019/16,Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC],8019/16,added,"Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 3 others 9, July 2025",3,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.A.2,"Examples of ""interference""",3,,487,,"Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 3 others 9, July 2025",,,"The following can be cited as examples of possible ""interference"" with the right to respect for one's home: ▪ deliberate destruction of the home by the authorities (Selçuk and Asker v. Turkey, 1998, § 86; Akdivar and Others v. Turkey [GC], 1996, § 88; Menteş and Others v. Turkey, 1997, § 73) or confiscation (Aboufadda v. France (dec.), 2014); demolition of home unlawfully built (Ghailan and Others v. Spain, 2012, § 55); ▪ refusal to allow displaced persons to return to their homes (Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], 2001, § 174) which may amount to a ""continuing violation"" of Article 8; ▪ the transfer of the inhabitants of a village by decision of the authorities (Noack and Others v. Germany (dec.), 2000); ▪ civilians being ""evacuated"" by being gathered, directed and at times escorted from their homes by armed men in circumstances where the alleged ""evacuation"" was not lawful under international humanitarian law (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025, § 1165-1167); ▪ civilians being forced to leave their homes due to fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression and abuse of power: the absence of direct physical force did not render the displacement voluntary given that, in the circumstances, the civilians were deprived of a genuine choice between remaining in their homes and fleeing for safety (Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], 2025, § 1166 and 1168-1171); ▪ police entry into a person's home (Gutsanovi v. Bulgaria, 2013, § 217; Sabani v. Belgium, 2022, § 41) and a search (Murray v. the United Kingdom, 1994, § 86), even where the applicant has cooperated to the extent of opening the door for the unannounced police, because a waiver of the fundamental right to protection of one's home can only be made free of coercion and on the basis of unequivocal and informed consent (Sabani v. Belgium, 2022, § 46); and a police operation to return an elderly, dependent and highly vulnerable woman to her care home (Jarrand v. France, 2021, § 75); ▪ searches and seizures (Chappell v. the United Kingdom, 1989, §§ 50-51; Funke v. France, 1993, § 48), even where the applicant has co-operated with the police (Saint-Paul Luxembourg S.A. v. Luxembourg, 2013, § 38) and where the offence giving rise to the search had been committed by a third party (Buck v. Germany, 2005), and, more generally, any measure, if it is no different in its manner of execution and its practical effects from a search, regardless of its characterisation under domestic law (Kruglov and Others v. Russia, 2020, § 123); ▪ home visits of public officials without permission, even when no search is carried out and the visit does not lead to a seizure of documents or other objects (Halabi v. France, 2019, §§ 54-56); ▪ occupation or damaging of property (Khamidov v. Russia, 2007, § 138) or expulsion from home (Orlić v. Croatia, 2011, § 56 with further references therein), including an eviction order which has not yet been enforced (Gladysheva v. Russia, 2011, § 91; Ćosić v. Croatia, 2009, § 22); ▪ the dissemination of photographic images of the interior of a country house (Samoylova v. Russia, 2021, § 66)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20251219191704__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2025-05-23,2025-12-19,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json,apps:45644/18,Van Slooten v. the Netherlands,45644/18,added,"Van Slooten v. the Netherlands, no. 45644/18, 15 April 2025",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.D.3.h,Parental authority and State care,4,,428,,"Andronache v. Romania (dec.), no. 3485/21, 17 June 2025|Van Slooten v. the Netherlands, no. 45644/18, 15 April 2025",,,"The judgment in Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway [GC], 2019, summarised the case-law principles (§§ 202-213) applicable to cases where the authorities have decided to replace the foster home arrangement with a more far-reaching type of measure, namely deprivation of parental responsibilities and authorisation of adoption. The Court has had regard to the principle that ""such measures should only be applied in exceptional circumstances and could only be justified if they were motivated by an overriding requirement pertaining to the child's best interests"" (S.S. v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 85-87, 96 and 103; Aune v. Norway, 2010, § 66). Amother's financial situation cannot, without regard for changed circumstances, justify the removal of a child from her mother's care (R.M.S. v. Spain, 2013, § 92). Likewise, a breach was found where domestic authorities had merely based their decision on the applicant's financial and social difficulties, without providing him with appropriate social assistance (Akinnibosun v. Italy, 2015, §§ 83-84). In Soares De Melo v. Portugal, 2016, the Court found a violation of Article 8 where the children of a woman living in precarious conditions were placed in care with a view to adoption, resulting in the severance of the family ties (§§ 118-123). Further, the absence of skills and experience in rearing children could hardly in itself be regarded as a legitimate ground for restricting parental authority or keeping a child in public care (Kocherov and Sergeyeva v. Russia, 2016, § 106, concerning a father with a mild intellectual disability). In Van Slooten v. the Netherlands, 2025, § 73, the domestic authorities having put considerable weight on the child's vulnerability without any in-depth analysis thereof when terminating the mother's parental authority, contributed to the finding of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. In Andronache v. Romania (dec.), 2025, the nature of the crimes committed by the father, who was the only surviving parent and serving a prison term at that time, was taken into account, among other things, in the domestic courts' assessment (§§ 54-67)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20251219191704__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2025-05-23,2025-12-19,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json,apps:45644/18,Van Slooten v. the Netherlands,45644/18,added,"Van Slooten v. the Netherlands, no. 45644/18, 15 April 2025",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.D.3.h,Parental authority and State care,4,,430,,"Van Slooten v. the Netherlands, no. 45644/18, 15 April 2025",,,"Acare order should be regarded as a temporary measure, to be discontinued as soon as circumstances permit, and any measures implementing temporary care should be consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the natural parents and the child (Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway [GC], 2019, § 208; Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1), 1988, § 81). The positive duty to take measures to facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible will begin to weigh on the competent authorities with increasing force as from the commencement of the period of care, subject always to its being balanced against the duty to consider the best interests of the child (K. and T. v. Finland [GC], 2001, § 178 and Haddad v. Spain, 2019, § 54). The Court found a violation of Article 8 where the domestic authorities, by declaring the children of the applicant adoptable, did not make all the necessary efforts to preserve the parent-child relationship (S.H. v. Italy, 2015, § 58). Aviolation was found where a mother was denied contact rights in respect of her child in foster care because of abduction risk by the father. As the Court pointed out, the risk of abduction of the applicant's child by her father (and hence the issue of his protection) should not prevail over sufficiently addressing the mother's contact rights with her child (Jansen v. Norway, 2018, §§ 103-104). The Court also found a violation of Article 8 where the authorities did not re-establish contact between a child and her father following his acquittal of charges of domestic violence and the return of two older children to his care. The Court did not find convincing the reasons relied on by the authorities and domestic courts to justify the child's placement in pre-adoption care (Haddad v. Spain, 2019, §§ 57-74). In comparison, in A and Others v. Iceland, 2022, the Supreme Court had not based its decision to deprive the first and second applicants of custody on a finding that the allegations against the first applicant were true. On the contrary, the Supreme Court recognised the final binding force of the first applicant's acquittal, but noted that that acquittal alone could not be determinative of the childcare proceedings. It proceeded to carry out an assessment of the facts of the case and the available expert evidence, without any further reference to the criminal proceedings against the first applicant or any allegedly criminal behaviour on his part. The Court therefore concluded that the domestic authorities had acted within their margin of appreciation (§§ 84-97). In Van Slooten v. the Netherlands, 2025, §§ 74-77, proceedings for terminating a mother's parental authority were at stake. In giving up on family reunification as the ultimate goal at a very early stage, without a proper assessment of the applicant's parenting capacity or adequately demonstrating why reunification would no longer be compatible with the child's best interests, the domestic authorities contributed to finding a violation of Article 8 (see also paragraph 428 above)."
99cd2ce32cf8,Article 8,20250523211813__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,20251219191704__guide_art_8_eng.pdf,2025-05-23,2025-12-19,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/99cd2ce32cf8/diff_2025-05-23__2025-12-19.json,apps:3795/22,Versaci v. Italy,3795/22,added,"Versaci v. Italy, no. 3795/22, 15 May 2025",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A.2,Professional and business activities,3,,111,,"Versaci v. Italy, no. 3795/22, 15 May 2025",,,"In Versaci v. Italy, Article 8 was found to be applicable under the reasons-based approach, in the context of a refusal by the head of police to grant the applicant a ""public security licence"", to carry out bookmaking activities on behalf of a foreign company, for not fulfilling the ""good character"" requirement in domestic law. The Court found that the impugned decision had been based not on a conduct directly attributable to the applicant but on his social or family connections with certain individuals (§§ 81-85). The Court considered that, although vague and indefinite as such, the concept of ""good character"" was sufficiently foreseeable in view of the clarifications provided in the guidance on administrative practice and in the domestic case-law (§§ 110-20)."
a94e3bc7e2bf,Article 13,20230911235824__guide_art_13_eng.pdf,20240217120356__guide_art_13_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/a94e3bc7e2bf/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-17.json,apps:49072/21,Panju v. Belgium (no. 2),49072/21,added,"Panju v. Belgium (no. 2), no. 49072/21, 23 May 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.E.b,Selected examples 4. Length of criminal proceedings,4,,173,,"Panju v. Belgium , 2014",,,"The Court found no violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 concerning a refusal to award compensation for the excessive length of criminal proceedings that had been established by the European Court ( Panju v. Belgium, 2014, §§ 54-77), given that the non-pecuniary damage had been remedied by the subsequent decision as to the inadmissibility of the proceedings ( Panju v. Belgium (no. 2), 2023, §§ 67-79)."
a94e3bc7e2bf,Article 13,20230911235824__guide_art_13_eng.pdf,20240217120356__guide_art_13_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/a94e3bc7e2bf/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-17.json,apps:37241/21,S.H. v. Malta,37241/21,added,"S.H. v. Malta, no. 37241/21, 20 December 2022",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.b,Selected examples,4,131,131,0.9945,"S.H. v. Malta , 2022",,"The Court found a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with or in the light of Article 3 in the absence of effective and suspensive remedies to address: ▪ the expulsion or extradition of applicants to States where they risked ill-treatment:  Afghanistan ( M. and Others v. Bulgaria 14, 2011, §§ 127-133; see also paragraph 231 of this Guide, on the applicant's complaint under Article 8);  Afghanistan, from Greece ( M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011, §§ 294-321);  Cameroon ( Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 106-107, with no certainty that the applicant, who was HIV-positive at an advanced stage, could receive appropriate medical treatment there);  Eritrea ( Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, 2007, §§ 58-67, where the applicant, an asylum-seeker, had been placed in the airport transit area after being refused leave to enter France);  the Russian Federation (Chechnya) via Belarus ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 219-220, concerning a refusal by border guards to register asylum applications with summary return to a third State, Belarus, together with a risk of indirect refoulement to the State of origin, the Russian Federation (Chechnya) and of ill-treatment there);  Greece, from Belgium ( M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], §§ 385-396);  India ( Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 1996, §§ 153-155, concerning a Sikh separatist accused of political activism);  Iran ( Jabari v. Turkey, 2000, §§ 49-50, where the applicant risked death by stoning for adultery);  Iran or Iraq ( Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, 2009, §§ 113-117);  Morocco ( A.C. and Others v. Spain 15, 2014, §§ 90-105, concerning individuals of Sahrawi origin whose application for international protection was rejected);  Sudan ( I.M. v. France, 2012, §§ 136-160) and Syria ( M.A. v. Cyprus 16, 2013, §§ 134-143), where only the application of Rule 39 could suspend the applicants'removal);  Syria ( S.K. v. Russia, 2013, §§ 78-99; Akkad v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 82-92, concerning remedies available under Turkish law, the use of which by the applicant had been hampered by hasty and misleading actions of the authorities prior to his removal);  Turkmenistan ( Allanazarova v. Russia, 2017, §§ 100-115); ▪ lack of information for Chechen applicants about decisions concerning their extradition to Russia ( Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2005, §§ 449-466); ▪ complaints by migrants, Somali and Eritrean nationals, intercepted on the high seas and returned to the country from which they had come, Libya, by which to obtain a thorough and rigorous assessment of their applications before the removal measure was enforced ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC] 17, 2012, §§ 201-207); ▪ rejection as inconclusive of documents submitted by asylum-seekers from Afghanistan, subject to a refusal-of-entry decision, without prior verification of their authenticity ( Singh and Others v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 86-105); ▪ risk of immediate return to Turkey without an ex nunc assessment by the Greek authorities of the applicant's personal situation ( B.A.C. v. Greece, 2016, §§ 66-67); ▪ expedited return to Turkey of a journalist, 24 hours after his arrest at the border, rendering the available remedies ineffective in practice and therefore inaccessible ( D v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 131-135).","The Court found a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with or in the light of Article 3 in the absence of effective and suspensive remedies to address: ▪ the expulsion or extradition of applicants to States where they risked ill-treatment:  Afghanistan ( M. and Others v. Bulgaria 14, 2011, §§ 127-133; see also paragraph 233 of this Guide, on the applicant's complaint under Article 8);  Afghanistan, from Greece ( M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011, §§ 294-321);  Cameroon ( Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, 2011, §§ 106-107, with no certainty that the applicant, who was HIV-positive at an advanced stage, could receive appropriate medical treatment there);  Eritrea ( Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, 2007, §§ 58-67, where the applicant, an asylum-seeker, had been placed in the airport transit area after being refused leave to enter France);  the Russian Federation (Chechnya) via Belarus ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 219-220, concerning a refusal by border guards to register asylum applications with summary return to a third State, Belarus, together with a risk of indirect refoulement to the State of origin, the Russian Federation (Chechnya) and of ill-treatment there);  Greece, from Belgium ( M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], §§ 385-396);  India ( Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 1996, §§ 153-155, concerning a Sikh separatist accused of political activism);  Iran ( Jabari v. Turkey, 2000, §§ 49-50, where the applicant risked death by stoning for adultery);  Iran or Iraq ( Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, 2009, §§ 113-117);  Morocco ( A.C. and Others v. Spain 15, 2014, §§ 90-105, concerning individuals of Sahrawi origin whose application for international protection was rejected);  Sudan ( I.M. v. France, 2012, §§ 136-160) and Syria ( M.A. v. Cyprus 16, 2013, §§ 134-143), where only the application of Rule 39 could suspend the applicants'removal);  Syria ( S.K. v. Russia, 2013, §§ 78-99; Akkad v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 82-92, concerning remedies available under Turkish law, the use of which by the applicant had been hampered by hasty and misleading actions of the authorities prior to his removal);  Turkmenistan ( Allanazarova v. Russia, 2017, §§ 100-115); ▪ lack of information for Chechen applicants about decisions concerning their extradition to Russia ( Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2005, §§ 449-466); ▪ complaints by migrants, Somali and Eritrean nationals, intercepted on the high seas and returned to the country from which they had come, Libya, by which to obtain a thorough and rigorous assessment of their applications before the removal measure was enforced ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC] 17, 2012, §§ 201-207); ▪ rejection as inconclusive of documents submitted by asylum-seekers from Afghanistan, subject to a refusal-of-entry decision, without prior verification of their authenticity ( Singh and Others v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 86-105); ▪ risk of immediate return to Turkey without an ex nunc assessment by the Greek authorities of the applicant's personal situation ( B.A.C. v. Greece, 2016, §§ 66-67); ▪ expedited return to Turkey of a journalist, 24 hours after his arrest at the border, rendering the available remedies ineffective in practice and therefore inaccessible ( D v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 131-135); ▪ denial of applicant's requests for asylum without any assessment as to the risk incurred on his return to Bangladesh on account of his investigation as a journalist into election fraud ( S.H. v. Malta, 2022, §§ 80-99)."
a94e3bc7e2bf,Article 13,20230911235824__guide_art_13_eng.pdf,20240217120356__guide_art_13_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/a94e3bc7e2bf/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-17.json,apps:10934/21,Semenya v. Switzerland,10934/21,added,"Semenya v. Switzerland, no. 10934/21, 11 July 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,II.G.j,Sex,4,205,202,0.6897,"In the case of Semenya v. Switzerland , 2023","İrfan Güzel v. Turkey , 2017","In the absence of a response to the doubts expressed by an accused as to the lawfulness of the decision to tap his phone, the Court found a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8 in the case of İrfan Güzel v. Turkey, 2017 (§§ 100-109).","In the case of Semenya v. Switzerland, 2023 (§§ 234-240), the Court found a violation of Article 13 in relation to Article 14 taken together with Article 8, in view of the ineffective remedies for discrimination against a professional athlete who, as a result of differences in sex development, was obliged by non-State regulations to take hormone treatment to decrease her natural testosterone level in order to be able to take part in international competitions in the female category. She had not been afforded sufficient institutional and procedural safeguards in Switzerland."
a94e3bc7e2bf,Article 13,20240217120356__guide_art_13_eng.pdf,20240409181346__guide_art_13_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-04-09,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/a94e3bc7e2bf/diff_2024-02-17__2024-04-09.json,apps:36318/21,Rizzo and Others v. Malta,36318/21,added,"Rizzo and Others v. Malta, no. 36318/21, 16 January 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.M.§4,Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 – Protection of property HUDOC keywords,4,,272,,"In the case of Rizzo and Others v. Malta , 2024",,,"In the case of Rizzo and Others v. Malta, 2024 (§§ 31-46), the appeal to the Constitutional Court as of 2021 had been a remedy, available in theory as well as in practice, which was accessible, capable of providing redress and offering reasonable prospects of success in relation to claims under the old rent laws. The Constitutional Court had consistently applied the specific guidelines for the award of adequate compensation indicated in Cauchi v. Malta . Moreover, domestic law had been Cauchi amended subsequent to . Anew potentially effective procedure, capable of evicting the tenant or putting in place a higher future rent, had been open to the applicants. The Court thus found no violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1."
a94e3bc7e2bf,Article 13,20240409181346__guide_art_13_eng.pdf,20250619163138__guide_art_13_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-06-19,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/a94e3bc7e2bf/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-19.json,apps:59476/21,Haugen v. Norway,59476/21,added,"Haugen v. Norway, no. 59476/21, 15 October 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.4.a,Selected examples,4,90,90,0.923,"Haugen v. Norway, no. 59476/21, 15 October 2024",,"The Court found a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with or in the light of Article 2 in the absence of a remedy providing compensation for non-pecuniary damage in cases concerning:  the suicide of a prisoner (Keenan v. the United Kingdom, 2001, §§ 129-131);  the murder of a prisoner by his cell-mate (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, 2002, §§ 98-101);  deaths caused by the accidental explosion of a rubbish tip near a slum quarter and lack of expedition in administrative proceedings (Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, §§ 150-155);  a man shot dead for refusing to obey police orders (Bubbins v. the United Kingdom, 2005, § 172);  deaths of children killed by their father, owing to a lack of police protection (Kontrová v. Slovakia, 2007, §§ 63-65);  suicide after voluntary transfer to psychiatric facility (Reynolds v. the United Kingdom, 2012, §§ 61-69).","The Court found a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with or in the light of Article 2 in the absence of a remedy providing compensation for non-pecuniary damage in cases concerning: ▪ the suicide of a prisoner (Keenan v. the United Kingdom, 2001, §§ 129-131); ▪ the murder of a prisoner by his cell-mate (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, 2002, §§ 98-101); ▪ deaths caused by the accidental explosion of a rubbish tip near a slum quarter and lack of expedition in administrative proceedings (Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, §§ 150-155); ▪ a man shot dead for refusing to obey police orders (Bubbins v. the United Kingdom, 2005, § 172); ▪ deaths of children killed by their father, owing to a lack of police protection (Kontrová v. Slovakia, 2007, §§ 63-65); ▪ suicide after voluntary transfer to psychiatric facility (Reynolds v. the United Kingdom, 2012, §§ 61-69); ▪ suicide in pre-trial detention in an ordinary prison unit of a man who suffered from psychiatric disorders (Haugen v. Norway, 2024, §§ 162-165)."
acdaf72cea98,Article 3,20230911235803__guide_art_3_eng.pdf,20240223121333__guide_art_3_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-02-23,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json,apps:39326/02,Çevik v. Turkey (no. 2),39326/02,added,"Çevik v. Turkey (no. 2), no. 39326/02, 27 August 2010",1,paragraph_text_name_match,unchanged,III.A,The scope of the positive obligations of the State,2,101,102,,,,"While no direct responsibility can be attributed to a Contracting State under the Convention for the acts of private individuals (Beganović v. Croatia, 2009, § 68) or State agents acting in their private capacity (Çevik v. Turkey, (no.2), 2010, § 33), the Court has considered that State responsibility may, nevertheless, be engaged through the obligation imposed by Article 1 of the Convention.","While no direct responsibility can be attributed to a Contracting State under the Convention for the acts of private individuals (Beganović v. Croatia, 2009, § 68) or State agents acting in their private capacity (Çevik v. Turkey, (no.2), 2010, § 33), the Court has considered that State responsibility may, nevertheless, be engaged through the obligation imposed by Article 1 of the Convention."
acdaf72cea98,Article 3,20230911235803__guide_art_3_eng.pdf,20240223121333__guide_art_3_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-02-23,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json,apps:44394/15,G.M. and Others v. the Republic of Moldova,44394/15,added,"G.M. and Others v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 44394/15, 22 February 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,unchanged,II.K.d,Involuntary sterilization and forced abortion,3,96,97,,,,"In G.M. and Others v. the Republic of Moldova, 2022, where the applicants - women with intellectual disabilities residing in a psychiatric asylum - were victims of rape by a doctor and subjected to non-consensual abortions and birth control, the Court noted that legal instruments and reports adopted by the United Nations and the Council of Europe indicated that forced abortion, sterilisation and birth control were forms of gender-based violence (§ 88). It found, in particular, that the legal framework at issue lacked: the safeguard of a requirement to obtain a valid, free and prior consent for medical interventions from intellectually disabled persons; adequate criminal legislation to dissuade the practice of non-consensual medical interventions carried out on intellectually disabled persons in general and women in particular; and other mechanisms to prevent such abuse of intellectually disabled persons in general and women in particular (§ 128).","In G.M. and Others v. the Republic of Moldova, 2022, where the applicants - women with intellectual disabilities residing in a psychiatric asylum - were victims of rape by a doctor and subjected to non-consensual abortions and birth control, the Court noted that legal instruments and reports adopted by the United Nations and the Council of Europe indicated that forced abortion, sterilisation and birth control were forms of gender-based violence (§ 88). It found, in particular, that the legal framework at issue lacked: the safeguard of a requirement to obtain a valid, free and prior consent for medical interventions from intellectually disabled persons; adequate criminal legislation to dissuade the practice of non-consensual medical interventions carried out on intellectually disabled persons in general and women in particular; and other mechanisms to prevent such abuse of intellectually disabled persons in general and women in particular (§ 128)."
acdaf72cea98,Article 3,20230911235803__guide_art_3_eng.pdf,20240223121333__guide_art_3_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-02-23,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json,apps:37928/20,Horion v. Belgium,37928/20,added,"Horion v. Belgium, no. 37928/20, 9 May 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.I.4,Life imprisonment,3,,82,,"Horion v. Belgium, no. 37928/20, 9 May 2023",,,"The continued detention of a prisoner owing to the practical impossibility of a transfer, in circumstances where his detention was no longer considered necessary by the domestic authorities, amounted to a de facto irreducible life sentence due to the lack of a realistic prospect of release (Horion v. Belgium, 2023, § 75)."
acdaf72cea98,Article 3,20230911235803__guide_art_3_eng.pdf,20240223121333__guide_art_3_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-02-23,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json,apps:33394/96,Price v. United Kingdom,33394/96,added,"Price v. United Kingdom, no. 33394/96, 10 October 2001",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.D.3,Degrading treatment or punishment,3,22,22,0.96,"S.P. and Others v. Russia, nos. 36463/11 and 10 others, 2 May 2023",,"For instance, treatment or punishment was held to be ""degrading"" when: ▪ a severely disabled person was detained in inappropriate conditions where she was dangerously cold, risked developing sores because her bed was too hard or unreachable, and was unable to go to the toilet or keep clean without the greatest of difficulty (Price v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 30; see also Vincent v. France, 2006, §§ 101-103 where the applicant, paraplegic, could not leave his cell nor move about the prison independently); ▪ the applicants hair was forcefully shaved by the prison administration, without any justification or legal basis (Yankov v. Bulgaria, 2003, §§ 120-121; see also Slyusarev v. Russia, 2010, § 44 where the applicant's glasses were confiscated after his arrest for five months, without justification and legal basis); ▪ an unaccompanied foreign minor had to live in precarious conditions in a shantytown due to the authorities' failure to execute a judicial placement order (Khan v. France, 2019, §§ 94-95); ▪ use of force on the applicants when searching their home was not strictly necessary (Ilievi and Ganchevi v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 56-57); ▪ judicial corporal punishment was inflicted on the applicant (Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 1978, § 35). ▪ the authorities failed to ensure that a twelve-year old child, who witnessed the arrest of his parents, was looked after by an adult, and was informed about the situation while his parents were held in police custody (Ioan Pop and Others v. Romania, 2016, § 65). ▪ the applicant was detained for a lengthy time in a severely overcrowded and unsanitary environment in prison (Kalashnikov v. Russia, 2002, § 102); ▪ the applicant was subjected to a strip search in an inappropriate manner, such as the making of humiliating remarks (Iwańczuk v. Poland, 2001, § 59; see also Valašinas v. Lithuania, 2001, § 117 where the applicant was stripped naked in front of a female prison officer and prison guards examined his sexual organs as well as the food he had received without gloves); ▪ the detention of an asylum-seeker for three months on police premises pending the application of an administrative measure, with no access to any recreational activities and without proper meals (Tabesh v. Greece, 2009, §§ 38-44, see also Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019, § 195 where, pending their request for asylum, the applicants were confined in inadequate conditions not fit for a lengthy stay in an airport transit zone as well as N.H. and Others v. France, 2020, § 184 where asylum seekers were destitute and lived rough for several months due to administrative delays preventing them from receiving the support for which the law provided); ▪ twenty-seven LGBTIactivists were subject to vicious verbal abuse and random physical attacks by a mob of counter demonstrators and the promised police protection was not provided in due time or adequately (Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021 § 60; see also Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, § 97 where, following a televised interview, the applicant - a well-known member of the LGBTIcommunity - was the target of a sustained and aggressive homophobic campaign, including an arson attack on her club, as well as receiving death threats and subjected to physical mobbing and hate speech); ▪ as a result of the procrastination of the health professionals in providing access to genetic tests, the applicant, who was pregnant, had had to endure six weeks of painful uncertainty concerning the health of her foetus and, when she eventually obtained the results of the tests, it was already too late for her to make an informed decision on whether to continue the pregnancy or to have recourse to a legal abortion (R.R. v. Poland, 2011, § 159). ▪ the applicant was handcuffed during a bus journey lasting around 20 hours in the context of forced deportation (Akkad v. Türkiye, 2022, § 115).","For instance, treatment or punishment was held to be ""degrading"" when: ▪ a severely disabled person was detained in inappropriate conditions where she was dangerously cold, risked developing sores because her bed was too hard or unreachable, and was unable to go to the toilet or keep clean without the greatest of difficulty (Price v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 30; see also Vincent v. France, 2006, §§ 101-103 where the applicant, paraplegic, could not leave his cell nor move about the prison independently); ▪ the applicants hair was forcefully shaved by the prison administration, without any justification or legal basis (Yankov v. Bulgaria, 2003, §§ 120-121; see also Slyusarev v. Russia, 2010, § 44 where the applicant's glasses were confiscated after his arrest for five months, without justification and legal basis); ▪ an unaccompanied foreign minor had to live in precarious conditions in a shantytown due to the authorities' failure to execute a judicial placement order (Khan v. France, 2019, §§ 94-95); ▪ use of force on the applicants when searching their home was not strictly necessary (Ilievi and Ganchevi v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 56-57); ▪ judicial corporal punishment was inflicted on the applicant (Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 1978, § 35). ▪ the authorities failed to ensure that a twelve-year old child, who witnessed the arrest of his parents, was looked after by an adult, and was informed about the situation while his parents were held in police custody (Ioan Pop and Others v. Romania, 2016, § 65). ▪ the applicant was detained for a lengthy time in a severely overcrowded and unsanitary environment in prison (Kalashnikov v. Russia, 2002, § 102); ▪ the applicant was subjected to a strip search in an inappropriate manner, such as the making of humiliating remarks (Iwańczuk v. Poland, 2001, § 59; see also Valašinas v. Lithuania, 2001, § 117 where the applicant was stripped naked in front of a female prison officer and prison guards examined his sexual organs as well as the food he had received without gloves); ▪ the detention of an asylum-seeker for three months on police premises pending the application of an administrative measure, with no access to any recreational activities and without proper meals (Tabesh v. Greece, 2009, §§ 38-44, see also Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019, § 195 where, pending their request for asylum, the applicants were confined in inadequate conditions not fit for a lengthy stay in an airport transit zone as well as N.H. and Others v. France, 2020, § 184 where asylum seekers were destitute and lived rough for several months due to administrative delays preventing them from receiving the support for which the law provided); ▪ twenty-seven LGBTIactivists were subject to vicious verbal abuse and random physical attacks by a mob of counter demonstrators and the promised police protection was not provided in due time or adequately (Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021 § 60; see also Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, § 97 where, following a televised interview, the applicant - a well-known member of the LGBTIcommunity - was the target of a sustained and aggressive homophobic campaign, including an arson attack on her club, as well as receiving death threats and subjected to physical mobbing and hate speech); ▪ as a result of the procrastination of the health professionals in providing access to genetic tests, the applicant, who was pregnant, had had to endure six weeks of painful uncertainty concerning the health of her foetus and, when she eventually obtained the results of the tests, it was already too late for her to make an informed decision on whether to continue the pregnancy or to have recourse to a legal abortion (R.R. v. Poland, 2011, § 159). ▪ the applicant was handcuffed during a bus journey lasting around 20 hours in the context of forced deportation (Akkad v. Türkiye, 2022, § 115). ▪ prisoners were segregated, humiliated, and abused by fellow inmates on account of their inferior status (""outcasts"") in an informal prisoner hierarchy. The stigmatisation, assignment to menial labour and denial of basic needs, enforced by threats of violence, had lasted for years (S.P. and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 92-96)."
acdaf72cea98,Article 3,20230911235803__guide_art_3_eng.pdf,20240223121333__guide_art_3_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-02-23,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json,apps:36463/11,S.P. and Others v. Russia,36463/11,added,"S.P. and Others v. Russia, nos. 36463/11 and 10 others, 2 May 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.D.3,Degrading treatment or punishment,3,22,22,0.96,"S.P. and Others v. Russia, nos. 36463/11 and 10 others, 2 May 2023",,"For instance, treatment or punishment was held to be ""degrading"" when: ▪ a severely disabled person was detained in inappropriate conditions where she was dangerously cold, risked developing sores because her bed was too hard or unreachable, and was unable to go to the toilet or keep clean without the greatest of difficulty (Price v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 30; see also Vincent v. France, 2006, §§ 101-103 where the applicant, paraplegic, could not leave his cell nor move about the prison independently); ▪ the applicants hair was forcefully shaved by the prison administration, without any justification or legal basis (Yankov v. Bulgaria, 2003, §§ 120-121; see also Slyusarev v. Russia, 2010, § 44 where the applicant's glasses were confiscated after his arrest for five months, without justification and legal basis); ▪ an unaccompanied foreign minor had to live in precarious conditions in a shantytown due to the authorities' failure to execute a judicial placement order (Khan v. France, 2019, §§ 94-95); ▪ use of force on the applicants when searching their home was not strictly necessary (Ilievi and Ganchevi v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 56-57); ▪ judicial corporal punishment was inflicted on the applicant (Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 1978, § 35). ▪ the authorities failed to ensure that a twelve-year old child, who witnessed the arrest of his parents, was looked after by an adult, and was informed about the situation while his parents were held in police custody (Ioan Pop and Others v. Romania, 2016, § 65). ▪ the applicant was detained for a lengthy time in a severely overcrowded and unsanitary environment in prison (Kalashnikov v. Russia, 2002, § 102); ▪ the applicant was subjected to a strip search in an inappropriate manner, such as the making of humiliating remarks (Iwańczuk v. Poland, 2001, § 59; see also Valašinas v. Lithuania, 2001, § 117 where the applicant was stripped naked in front of a female prison officer and prison guards examined his sexual organs as well as the food he had received without gloves); ▪ the detention of an asylum-seeker for three months on police premises pending the application of an administrative measure, with no access to any recreational activities and without proper meals (Tabesh v. Greece, 2009, §§ 38-44, see also Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019, § 195 where, pending their request for asylum, the applicants were confined in inadequate conditions not fit for a lengthy stay in an airport transit zone as well as N.H. and Others v. France, 2020, § 184 where asylum seekers were destitute and lived rough for several months due to administrative delays preventing them from receiving the support for which the law provided); ▪ twenty-seven LGBTIactivists were subject to vicious verbal abuse and random physical attacks by a mob of counter demonstrators and the promised police protection was not provided in due time or adequately (Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021 § 60; see also Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, § 97 where, following a televised interview, the applicant - a well-known member of the LGBTIcommunity - was the target of a sustained and aggressive homophobic campaign, including an arson attack on her club, as well as receiving death threats and subjected to physical mobbing and hate speech); ▪ as a result of the procrastination of the health professionals in providing access to genetic tests, the applicant, who was pregnant, had had to endure six weeks of painful uncertainty concerning the health of her foetus and, when she eventually obtained the results of the tests, it was already too late for her to make an informed decision on whether to continue the pregnancy or to have recourse to a legal abortion (R.R. v. Poland, 2011, § 159). ▪ the applicant was handcuffed during a bus journey lasting around 20 hours in the context of forced deportation (Akkad v. Türkiye, 2022, § 115).","For instance, treatment or punishment was held to be ""degrading"" when: ▪ a severely disabled person was detained in inappropriate conditions where she was dangerously cold, risked developing sores because her bed was too hard or unreachable, and was unable to go to the toilet or keep clean without the greatest of difficulty (Price v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 30; see also Vincent v. France, 2006, §§ 101-103 where the applicant, paraplegic, could not leave his cell nor move about the prison independently); ▪ the applicants hair was forcefully shaved by the prison administration, without any justification or legal basis (Yankov v. Bulgaria, 2003, §§ 120-121; see also Slyusarev v. Russia, 2010, § 44 where the applicant's glasses were confiscated after his arrest for five months, without justification and legal basis); ▪ an unaccompanied foreign minor had to live in precarious conditions in a shantytown due to the authorities' failure to execute a judicial placement order (Khan v. France, 2019, §§ 94-95); ▪ use of force on the applicants when searching their home was not strictly necessary (Ilievi and Ganchevi v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 56-57); ▪ judicial corporal punishment was inflicted on the applicant (Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 1978, § 35). ▪ the authorities failed to ensure that a twelve-year old child, who witnessed the arrest of his parents, was looked after by an adult, and was informed about the situation while his parents were held in police custody (Ioan Pop and Others v. Romania, 2016, § 65). ▪ the applicant was detained for a lengthy time in a severely overcrowded and unsanitary environment in prison (Kalashnikov v. Russia, 2002, § 102); ▪ the applicant was subjected to a strip search in an inappropriate manner, such as the making of humiliating remarks (Iwańczuk v. Poland, 2001, § 59; see also Valašinas v. Lithuania, 2001, § 117 where the applicant was stripped naked in front of a female prison officer and prison guards examined his sexual organs as well as the food he had received without gloves); ▪ the detention of an asylum-seeker for three months on police premises pending the application of an administrative measure, with no access to any recreational activities and without proper meals (Tabesh v. Greece, 2009, §§ 38-44, see also Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019, § 195 where, pending their request for asylum, the applicants were confined in inadequate conditions not fit for a lengthy stay in an airport transit zone as well as N.H. and Others v. France, 2020, § 184 where asylum seekers were destitute and lived rough for several months due to administrative delays preventing them from receiving the support for which the law provided); ▪ twenty-seven LGBTIactivists were subject to vicious verbal abuse and random physical attacks by a mob of counter demonstrators and the promised police protection was not provided in due time or adequately (Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021 § 60; see also Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022, § 97 where, following a televised interview, the applicant - a well-known member of the LGBTIcommunity - was the target of a sustained and aggressive homophobic campaign, including an arson attack on her club, as well as receiving death threats and subjected to physical mobbing and hate speech); ▪ as a result of the procrastination of the health professionals in providing access to genetic tests, the applicant, who was pregnant, had had to endure six weeks of painful uncertainty concerning the health of her foetus and, when she eventually obtained the results of the tests, it was already too late for her to make an informed decision on whether to continue the pregnancy or to have recourse to a legal abortion (R.R. v. Poland, 2011, § 159). ▪ the applicant was handcuffed during a bus journey lasting around 20 hours in the context of forced deportation (Akkad v. Türkiye, 2022, § 115). ▪ prisoners were segregated, humiliated, and abused by fellow inmates on account of their inferior status (""outcasts"") in an informal prisoner hierarchy. The stigmatisation, assignment to menial labour and denial of basic needs, enforced by threats of violence, had lasted for years (S.P. and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 92-96)."
acdaf72cea98,Article 3,20230911235803__guide_art_3_eng.pdf,20240223121333__guide_art_3_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-02-23,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-23.json,apps:25276/15,Verzilov and Others v. Russia,25276/15,added,"Verzilov and Others v. Russia, no. 25276/15, 29 August 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.F,Investigation of hate crimes,2,,155,,"Verzilov and Others v. Russia, no. 25276/15, 29 August 2023",,,"The same considerations arise for violence resulting from, for instance, religious intolerance or for violence motivated by gender-based discrimination or by sexual orientation (Sabalić v. Croatia, 2021, § 94; see also, for violence resulting from political intolerance, Verzilov and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 78)."
acdaf72cea98,Article 3,20240223121333__guide_art_3_eng.pdf,20240930062321__guide_art_3_eng.pdf,2024-02-23,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2024-02-23__2024-09-30.json,apps:55351/17,Luca v. the Republic of Moldova,55351/17,added,"Luca v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 55351/17, 17 October 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,III.§2,The scope of the positive obligations of the State,2,106,107,0.9982,"Filippovy v. Russia , 2022|Romanov and Others v. Russia , 2023",Filippovy v. Russia 2022,"The Court has examined the States'positive obligation to protect from ill-treatment in a number of different contexts, such as, for example: ▪ In the context of child abuse (see, for example, A. v. the United Kingdom, 1998; Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2011; Association Innocence en Danger and Association Enfance et Partage v. France, 2020); ▪ In the context of domestic violence (see, for example, T.M. and C.M. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2014; Talpis v. Italy, 2017; Volodina v. Russia, 2019, and, for cyberviolence see Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, §§ 74, 78-79); ▪ In the context of sexual crimes (see, for example, M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003; and regarding minors, see I.C. v. Romania, 2016; M.G.C. v. Romania, 2016); ▪ In the context of inter-prisoner conflicts (see, for example, Pantea v. Romania, 2003; Rodić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2008; and D.F. v. Latvia, 2013); ▪ In the context of demonstrations (see, for example, Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015, §§ 72-74, § 81; and Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021, §§ 70-78); ▪ In the context of physical and verbal harassment of a person with disabilities (see Đorđević v. Croatia, 2012); ▪ In the context of physical and verbal harassment of a minor (see V.K. v. Russia, 2017) or of an elderly person (see Irina Smirnova v. Ukraine, 2016); ▪ In the context of violence inflicted on the basis of hatred (see, for example, Škorjanec v. Croatia, 2017; Burlya and Others v. Ukraine, 2018); ▪ In the context of hazing and bullying in the military (see, for example, Filippovy v. Russia 2022).","The Court has examined the States'positive obligation to protect from ill-treatment in a number of different contexts, such as, for example: ▪ In the context of child abuse (see, for example, A. v. the United Kingdom, 1998; Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2011; Association Innocence en Danger and Association Enfance et Partage v. France, 2020); ▪ In the context of domestic violence (see, for example, T.M. and C.M. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2014; Talpis v. Italy, 2017; Volodina v. Russia, 2019; Luca v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023 and, for cyberviolence see Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, §§ 74, 78-79); ▪ In the context of sexual crimes (see, for example, M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003; and regarding minors, see I.C. v. Romania, 2016; M.G.C. v. Romania, 2016); ▪ In the context of inter-prisoner conflicts (see, for example, Pantea v. Romania, 2003; Rodić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2008; and D.F. v. Latvia, 2013); ▪ In the context of demonstrations (see, for example, Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015, §§ 72-74, § 81; and Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021, §§ 70-78; Romanov and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 71-74); ▪ In the context of physical and verbal harassment of a person with disabilities (see Đorđević v. Croatia, 2012); ▪ In the context of physical and verbal harassment of a minor (see V.K. v. Russia, 2017) or of an elderly person (see Irina Smirnova v. Ukraine, 2016); ▪ In the context of violence inflicted on the basis of hatred (see, for example, Škorjanec v. Croatia, 2017; Burlya and Others v. Ukraine, 2018); ▪ In the context of hazing and bullying in the military (see, for example, Filippovy v. Russia, 2022)."
acdaf72cea98,Article 3,20240223121333__guide_art_3_eng.pdf,20240930062321__guide_art_3_eng.pdf,2024-02-23,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/acdaf72cea98/diff_2024-02-23__2024-09-30.json,apps:58358/14,Romanov and Others v. Russia,58358/14,added,"Romanov and Others v. Russia, nos. 58358/14 and 5 others, 12 September 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,III.§2,The scope of the positive obligations of the State,2,106,107,0.9982,"Filippovy v. Russia , 2022|Romanov and Others v. Russia , 2023",Filippovy v. Russia 2022,"The Court has examined the States'positive obligation to protect from ill-treatment in a number of different contexts, such as, for example: ▪ In the context of child abuse (see, for example, A. v. the United Kingdom, 1998; Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2011; Association Innocence en Danger and Association Enfance et Partage v. France, 2020); ▪ In the context of domestic violence (see, for example, T.M. and C.M. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2014; Talpis v. Italy, 2017; Volodina v. Russia, 2019, and, for cyberviolence see Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, §§ 74, 78-79); ▪ In the context of sexual crimes (see, for example, M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003; and regarding minors, see I.C. v. Romania, 2016; M.G.C. v. Romania, 2016); ▪ In the context of inter-prisoner conflicts (see, for example, Pantea v. Romania, 2003; Rodić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2008; and D.F. v. Latvia, 2013); ▪ In the context of demonstrations (see, for example, Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015, §§ 72-74, § 81; and Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021, §§ 70-78); ▪ In the context of physical and verbal harassment of a person with disabilities (see Đorđević v. Croatia, 2012); ▪ In the context of physical and verbal harassment of a minor (see V.K. v. Russia, 2017) or of an elderly person (see Irina Smirnova v. Ukraine, 2016); ▪ In the context of violence inflicted on the basis of hatred (see, for example, Škorjanec v. Croatia, 2017; Burlya and Others v. Ukraine, 2018); ▪ In the context of hazing and bullying in the military (see, for example, Filippovy v. Russia 2022).","The Court has examined the States'positive obligation to protect from ill-treatment in a number of different contexts, such as, for example: ▪ In the context of child abuse (see, for example, A. v. the United Kingdom, 1998; Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2011; Association Innocence en Danger and Association Enfance et Partage v. France, 2020); ▪ In the context of domestic violence (see, for example, T.M. and C.M. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2014; Talpis v. Italy, 2017; Volodina v. Russia, 2019; Luca v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023 and, for cyberviolence see Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, §§ 74, 78-79); ▪ In the context of sexual crimes (see, for example, M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003; and regarding minors, see I.C. v. Romania, 2016; M.G.C. v. Romania, 2016); ▪ In the context of inter-prisoner conflicts (see, for example, Pantea v. Romania, 2003; Rodić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2008; and D.F. v. Latvia, 2013); ▪ In the context of demonstrations (see, for example, Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015, §§ 72-74, § 81; and Women's Initiatives Supporting Group and Others v. Georgia, 2021, §§ 70-78; Romanov and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 71-74); ▪ In the context of physical and verbal harassment of a person with disabilities (see Đorđević v. Croatia, 2012); ▪ In the context of physical and verbal harassment of a minor (see V.K. v. Russia, 2017) or of an elderly person (see Irina Smirnova v. Ukraine, 2016); ▪ In the context of violence inflicted on the basis of hatred (see, for example, Škorjanec v. Croatia, 2017; Burlya and Others v. Ukraine, 2018); ▪ In the context of hazing and bullying in the military (see, for example, Filippovy v. Russia, 2022)."
b8a991ab1181,Mass protests,20230923172116__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,20231206111146__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-12-06,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json,apps:31349/20,Chkhartishvili v. Georgia,31349/20,added,"Chkhartishvili v. Georgia, no. 31349/20, 11 May 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.E.2,Post-demonstration penalties,3,80,81,0.9951,"Chkhartishvili v. Georgia , 2023",,"The Court has reviewed the necessity of convictions in relation to unauthorised assemblies. It has explained that it must assess the nature and severity of the penalties imposed with a view to examining the proportionality of an interference in relation to the aim pursued. In this connection, the Court stressed that a peaceful demonstration should not, in principle, be rendered subject to the threat of a criminal sanction, and notably to deprivation of liberty. The Court therefore examines with particular scrutiny the cases where sanctions imposed by the national authorities for non-violent conduct involve a prison sentence ( Ekrem Can and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 92).","The Court has reviewed the necessity of convictions in relation to unauthorised assemblies. It has explained that it must assess the nature and severity of the penalties imposed with a view to examining the proportionality of an interference in relation to the aim pursued. In this connection, the Court stressed that a peaceful demonstration should not, in principle, be rendered subject to the threat of a criminal sanction, and notably to deprivation of liberty. The Court therefore examines with particular scrutiny the cases where sanctions imposed by the national authorities for non-violent conduct involve a prison sentence ( Ekrem Can and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 92; Chkhartishvili v. Georgia, 2023, § 60)."
b8a991ab1181,Mass protests,20230923172116__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,20231206111146__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-12-06,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json,apps:15158/19,Drozd v. Poland,15158/19,added,"Drozd v. Poland, no. 15158/19, 6 April 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A,Applicability,2,,15,,"In Drozd v. Poland , 2023",,,"In Drozd v. Poland, 2023, § 63, the Court found that a one-year ban on informal civic movement members on entering Parliament, imposed for displaying a banner during a peaceful demonstration outside its grounds, amounted to an interference with their freedom of expression. On the facts of that case, the Court found a violation of Article 10 mainly on the basis of a lack of adequate procedural safeguards in relation to the imposition of the ban in question."
b8a991ab1181,Mass protests,20230923172116__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,20231206111146__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-12-06,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json,apps:58262/10,Kazan v. Türkiye,58262/10,added,"Kazan v. Türkiye,* no. 58262/10, 6 June 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.B.4,Post demonstration sanctions,3,45,46,0.9905,,,"By contrast, in Zülküf Murat Kahraman v. Turkey, 2019, § 45, where in the domestic proceedings the applicant denied participating in a demonstration, the Court found that a criminal conviction for participation in a demonstration constituted an interference with the exercise of his right to freedom of assembly. In particular, the Court considered that the applicant's criminal conviction had been indisputably directed at activities falling within the scope of freedom of assembly. The Court explained that to hold otherwise would be tantamount to requiring him to acknowledge the acts of which he had stood accused. In this connection, the Court also had regard to the right not to incriminate oneself and stressed that not accepting that a criminal conviction constituted an interference would lock the applicant, who denied any involvement in the acts at issue, in a vicious circle that would deprive him of the protection of the Convention.","By contrast, in Zülküf Murat Kahraman v. Turkey, 2019, § 45, where in the domestic proceedings the applicant denied participating in a demonstration, the Court found that a criminal conviction for participation in a demonstration constituted an interference with the exercise of his right to freedom of assembly. In particular, the Court considered that the applicant's criminal conviction had been indisputably directed at activities falling within the scope of freedom of assembly. The Court explained that to hold otherwise would be tantamount to requiring him to acknowledge the acts of which he had stood accused. In this connection, the Court also had regard to the right not to incriminate oneself and stressed that not accepting that a criminal conviction constituted an interference would lock the applicant, who denied any involvement in the acts at issue, in a vicious circle that would deprive him of the protection of the Convention (see also Kazan v. Türkiye,* 2023, § 56, concerning an unintended gathering outside a courthouse)."
b8a991ab1181,Mass protests,20231206111146__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,20250813215218__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,2023-12-06,2025-08-13,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-12-06__2025-08-13.json,apps:1162/22,Auray and Others v. France,1162/22,added,"Auray and Others v. France, no. 1162/22, 8 February 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.A,Deprivation of liberty,3,192,199,0.971,"Auray and Others v. France , 2024",,"In Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012, the Court considered the application of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the ""kettling"" or containment of a group of people carried out by the police on public-order grounds. The Court considered that the police decided to make use of a measure of containment to control the crowd rather than having to resort to more robust methods, which might have given rise to a greater risk of injury to people within the crowd. The Court therefore found that Article 5 was not applicable. However, the Court stressed that, had it not remained necessary for the police to impose and maintain the cordon in order to prevent serious injury or damage, the coercive and restrictive nature of the measure might have been sufficient to bring it within Article 5 of the Convention.","In Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012, the Court considered the application of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the ""kettling"" or containment of a group of people carried out by the police on public-order grounds. The Court considered that the police decided to make use of a measure of containment to control the crowd rather than having to resort to more robust methods, which might have given rise to a greater risk of injury to people within the crowd. The Court therefore found that Article 5 was not applicable. However, the Court stressed that, had it not remained necessary for the police to impose and maintain the cordon in order to prevent serious injury or damage, the coercive and restrictive nature of the measure might have been sufficient to bring it within Article 5 of the Convention (see also Auray and Others v. France, 2024, §§ 65-74 and 84-95, where the Court confirmed the Austin and Others case-law, finding Article 5 inapplicable, but it examined the case under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 and found a violation of that provision on the grounds of a lack of adequate legal basis for the application of the ""kettling"" technique)."
b8a991ab1181,Mass protests,20231206111146__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,20250813215218__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,2023-12-06,2025-08-13,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-12-06__2025-08-13.json,apps:35834/22,Bodson and Others v. Belgium,35834/22,added,"Bodson and Others v. Belgium, nos. 35834/22 and 15 others, 16 January 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A,Applicability,2,,15,,"In Bodson and Others v. Belgium , 2025",,,"In Bodson and Others v. Belgium, 2025, where the applicants had blocked a motorway as part of a strike and were convicted for traffic obstruction, the Court found Article 11 to be applicable in the absence of violent intent (§ 81)."
b8a991ab1181,Mass protests,20231206111146__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,20250813215218__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,2023-12-06,2025-08-13,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-12-06__2025-08-13.json,apps:35834/22,Bodson and Others v. Belgium,35834/22,added,"Bodson and Others v. Belgium, nos. 35834/22 and 15 others, 16 January 2025",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.E.2,Post-demonstration penalties,3,85,90,0.9342,"Bodson and Others v. Belgium , 2025",,"The Court also reviewed the severity of post-demonstration penalties. In Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC], 2015, the Court considered, amongst other factors, a sixty-day custodial sentence for which execution was suspended for one year to be proportionate. The only actual consequence of the applicants'conviction was the obligation, lasting one year, to obtain authorisation if they wanted to leave their places of residence for more than seven days. The Court considered such inconvenience provoked by the applicants by blocking highways for approximately two days not disproportionate to the serious disruption of public order.","The Court also reviewed the severity of post-demonstration penalties. In Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC], 2015, the Court considered, amongst other factors, a sixty-day custodial sentence for which execution was suspended for one year to be proportionate. The only actual consequence of the applicants'conviction was the obligation, lasting one year, to obtain authorisation if they wanted to leave their places of residence for more than seven days. The Court considered such inconvenience provoked by the applicants by blocking highways for approximately two days not disproportionate to the serious disruption of public order. Likewise, suspended sentences and fines following convictions for the obstruction of a motorway were found to not be excessive, the Court noting, inter alia, the danger to persons and traffic caused and that each of the sentences were fixed individually ( Bodson and Others v. Belgium, 2025, §§ 120-121)."
b8a991ab1181,Mass protests,20231206111146__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,20250813215218__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,2023-12-06,2025-08-13,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-12-06__2025-08-13.json,apps:49363/20,Central Unitaria de Traballadores/as v. Spain,49363/20,added,"Central Unitaria de Traballadores/as v. Spain, no. 49363/20, 17 October 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.E.1.a,Refusal to authorise an assembly,4,,77,,,,,"The Court, when considering the ban on a demonstration organised by the applicant trade union, found that the COVID-19 pandemic qualified as exceptional and unforeseeable circumstances and the that interference imposed was in the context of the pressing social need of protecting individual and public health ( Central Unitaria de Traballadores/as v. Spain, 2024, §§ 83-84)."
b8a991ab1181,Mass protests,20231206111146__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,20250813215218__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,2023-12-06,2025-08-13,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-12-06__2025-08-13.json,apps:56270/21,Eckert v. France,56270/21,added,"Eckert v. France, no. 56270/21, 24 October 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.C,Lawfulness,2,,55,,"Eckert v. France , 2024",,,"In contrast, in Eckert v. France, 2024, the legal basis of the interference, an arrêté préfectoral (which clearly delimited the scope of the impugned demonstration ban to time and place) together with the relevant provision of the criminal code, was found to be sufficiently clear, accessible, and offering sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness (§§ 53-54 and 57-59)."
b8a991ab1181,Mass protests,20231206111146__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,20250813215218__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,2023-12-06,2025-08-13,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-12-06__2025-08-13.json,apps:56270/21,Eckert v. France,56270/21,added,"Eckert v. France, no. 56270/21, 24 October 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.E.1.a,Refusal to authorise an assembly,4,,76,,"In Eckert v. France , 2024",,,"In Eckert v. France, 2024, the Court held that an order banning demonstrations in a defined area on a specific day, which had followed calls on social media for protests by the "" gilet jaunes"" movement, was justified. The Court took into account factors such as the prior violence and clashes with the police during previous rallies, that there had been no dialogue with authorities because of the lack of prior notice by demonstrators as required by law, and that the ban had been strictly limited to a place and time (§§ 67-72)."
b8a991ab1181,Mass protests,20231206111146__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,20250813215218__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,2023-12-06,2025-08-13,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-12-06__2025-08-13.json,apps:56270/21,Eckert v. France,56270/21,added,"Eckert v. France, no. 56270/21, 24 October 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,I.E.2,Post-demonstration penalties,3,84,92,0.5956,"In Eckert v. France , 2024","Razvozzhayev v. Russia and Ukraine and Udaltsov v. Russia , 2019","Similarly, in Razvozzhayev v. Russia and Ukraine and Udaltsov v. Russia, 2019, the Court found the conviction of the applicants for organising ""mass disorder"" following clashes during demonstration, without sufficient scrutiny of the event organiser's own acts and intentions, to be in breach of Article","In Eckert v. France, 2024, after refusing to leave the premises at a banned demonstration, the applicant was subjected to an identity check and a 150 EURfine was imposed. Noting the pecuniary nature and moderate severity of the penalty, and the significant risk of disturbances of public disorder, the measures were found to not be disproportionate (§§ 73-75)."
b8a991ab1181,Mass protests,20231206111146__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,20250813215218__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,2023-12-06,2025-08-13,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-12-06__2025-08-13.json,apps:47626/21|22525/21,Fraisse and Others v. France,47626/21|22525/21,added,"Fraisse and Others v. France, nos. 47626/21 and 22525/21, 27 February 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A,Substantive aspect,3,,165,,"In Fraisse and Others v. France , 2025",,,"In Fraisse and Others v. France, 2025, a student died as a result of the explosion of a stun grenade launched by a gendarme during violent clashes between protestors opposed to the construction of a dam and mobile gendarmes forces. The use of force was governed by various provisions, the combination of which made the applicable legal framework complex to the point of affecting the intelligibility and accessibility of the law. The framework permitted the use of firearms without providing the necessary clarification to determine which weapon was best suited to a threat or how to use such weapons in a truly incremental manner. The Court found the legislation was neither complete nor sufficiently precise to permit a truly incremental use of force (§§ 122-24). Despite the existence of a legal basis for the use of the grenades in question, the provision of this type of weapon was problematic because of the absence of a precise and protective framework for its use (§§ 125-26). Additionally, given the shortcomings in the preparation and supervision of the operation, including the absence of a civilian authority at the scene at the relevant time, the requisite level of protection to ensure that any risk to life was kept to a minimum was not met (§§ 127-34)."
b8a991ab1181,Mass protests,20231206111146__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,20250813215218__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,2023-12-06,2025-08-13,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-12-06__2025-08-13.json,apps:10443/12,Geylani and Others v. Türkiye,10443/12,added,"Geylani and Others v. Türkiye, no. 10443/12, 12 September 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.E.1.b,Dispersing an unauthorised assembly,4,,85,,"In Geylani and Others v. Türkiye , 2023",,,"In Geylani and Others v. Türkiye, 2023, §§ 122-127, the Court found a violent dispersal of an assembly disproportionate referring, inter alia, to its findings in relation to the use of water cannon, which led to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive limb in respect of an applicant who suffered a serious injury."
b8a991ab1181,Mass protests,20231206111146__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,20250813215218__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,2023-12-06,2025-08-13,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-12-06__2025-08-13.json,apps:5297/16,Ishkhanyan v. Armenia,5297/16,added,"Ishkhanyan v. Armenia, no. 5297/16, 13 February 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.A,Deprivation of liberty,3,,201,,"In Ishkhanyan v. Armenia , 2025",,,"In Ishkhanyan v. Armenia, 2025, despite having been released earlier by oral instruction given by a senior officer, where the applicant was arrested on alleged suspicion of having engaged in hooliganism, then questioned as a witness, and finally submitted to a drug test, the Court found that he was under the exclusive control of the police. The Court held that being under the exclusive control of the police for over seven hours amounted to a deprivation of liberty (§§ 145-52)."
b8a991ab1181,Mass protests,20231206111146__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,20250813215218__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,2023-12-06,2025-08-13,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-12-06__2025-08-13.json,apps:5297/16,Ishkhanyan v. Armenia,5297/16,added,"Ishkhanyan v. Armenia, no. 5297/16, 13 February 2025",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.C,Justification grounds in Article 5 § 1,2,,212,,"In Ishkhanyan v. Armenia , 2025",,,"In Ishkhanyan v. Armenia, 2025, the applicant failed to comply with the orders of the police to desist from blocking the road during a sit-in. However he was arrested when he was leaving the area, after the dispersal of the sit-in. There was no longer any obligation that the applicant could be said to have disobeyed and thus there was no justification for the applicant's arrest under Article 5 § 1 (b) (§ 157)."
b8a991ab1181,Mass protests,20231206111146__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,20250813215218__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,2023-12-06,2025-08-13,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-12-06__2025-08-13.json,apps:5297/16,Ishkhanyan v. Armenia,5297/16,added,"Ishkhanyan v. Armenia, no. 5297/16, 13 February 2025",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.C,Justification grounds in Article 5 § 1,2,,218,,"In Ishkhanyan v. Armenia , 2025",,,"In Ishkhanyan v. Armenia, 2025, the Court, when considering the ground of justification under Article 5 § 1 (c), found that the applicant was a victim of an arrest conducted en masse without any individualised assessment of criminality. The arrest could not have been said to have been based on a reasonable suspicion of him having committed an offence as the documentation drawn up in relation to his arrest contained different legal grounds and no details concerning the acts attributed to the applicant (§§ 158-62)."
b8a991ab1181,Mass protests,20231206111146__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,20250813215218__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,2023-12-06,2025-08-13,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2023-12-06__2025-08-13.json,apps:56896/17,Laurijsen and Others v. the Netherlands,56896/17,added,"Laurijsen and Others v. the Netherlands, nos. 56896/17 and 4 others, 21 November 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.A,Applicability,2,7,7,0.9287,,,"However, Article 11 of the Convention only protects the right to ""peaceful assembly"". It does not cover a demonstration where the organisers and participants have violent intentions ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 98, and Ter-Petrosyan v. Armenia, 2019, § 53). The protection under Article 11 therefore applies to all gatherings except those where the organisers and participants have violent intentions, incite violence or otherwise reject the foundations of a democratic society ( Fáber v. Hungary, 2012, § 37; Gün and Others v. Turkey, 2013, § 49; Taranenko v. Russia, 2014, § 66).","However, Article 11 of the Convention only protects the right to ""peaceful assembly"". It does not cover a demonstration where the organisers and participants have violent intentions ( Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], 2018, § 98, and Ter-Petrosyan v. Armenia, 2019, § 53). The protection under Article 11 therefore applies to all gatherings except those where the organisers and participants have violent intentions, incite violence or otherwise reject the foundations of a democratic society ( Fáber v. Hungary, 2012, § 37; Gün and Others v. Turkey, 2013, § 49; Taranenko v. Russia, 2014, § 66). This may concern even gatherings which involve obstructive or disruptive conduct in so far as there were no violent intentions or behaviour or call for violence ( Laurijsen and Others v. the Netherlands, 2024, §§ 54-59)"
b8a991ab1181,Mass protests,20250813215218__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,20251104015705__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,2025-08-13,2025-11-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2025-08-13__2025-11-04.json,apps:38283/18,Bogay and Others v. Ukraine,38283/18,added,"Bogay and Others v. Ukraine, no. 38283/18, 3 April 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A,Applicability,2,,14,,"Bogay and Others v. Ukraine , 2025",,,"In Harutyunyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), 2025, §§ 30-38, the Court dismissed as incompatible ratione materiae the complaints of an organiser of a protest and his supporters who were found to have had violent intentions on account of: statements involving explicit reference to violence and the intention to take over government buildings; the organiser having armed his supporters for that purpose; and the bodily harm inflicted on police officers as a result of the clashes which ensued. The Court thus found that the protest fell outside the notion of ""peaceful assembly"" protected by Article 11 ( Harutyunyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), 2025, §§ 30-38; compare and contrast Bogay and Others v. Ukraine, 2025, §§ 71-75)."
b8a991ab1181,Mass protests,20250813215218__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,20251104015705__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,2025-08-13,2025-11-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2025-08-13__2025-11-04.json,apps:17710/15,Cioffi v. Italy,17710/15,added,"Cioffi v. Italy, no. 17710/15, 5 June 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.C,Procedural aspect,2,188,190,0.911,"Cioffi v. Italy , 2025|In Cioffi v. Italy , 2025",,"In Cestaro v. Italy, 2015, the applicant had been beaten and abused during a raid by the Italian police during a G8 Summit. Given the authorities'failure to identify the perpetrators of the ill- treatment and that the criminal charges in relation to the raid had become time-barred, the Court found a violation of the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention.","In Cestaro v. Italy, 2015, the applicant had been beaten and abused during a raid by the Italian police during a G8 Summit. Given the authorities'failure to identify the perpetrators of the ill- treatment and that the criminal charges in relation to the raid had become time-barred, the Court found a violation of the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention (see also Cioffi v. Italy, 2025, § 92). In Cioffi v. Italy, 2025, §§ 96 and 98 the Court also found that suspending the prison sentences and ancillary penalties, as well as non- disclosure of the officers' conviction for ill -treatment on their criminal records, was not an adequate response in view of the seriousness of the acts of which the officers were convicted in their capacity as agents of the State. The Court held that the authorities' overall response was inadequate as to its capacity to punish the inhuman and degrading treatment at issue and to provide a sufficient deterrent effect."
b8a991ab1181,Mass protests,20250813215218__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,20251104015705__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,2025-08-13,2025-11-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2025-08-13__2025-11-04.json,apps:45401/15,Harutyunyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.),45401/15,added,"Harutyunyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), no. 45401/15, 1 April 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.A,Applicability,2,,14,,"Bogay and Others v. Ukraine , 2025",,,"In Harutyunyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), 2025, §§ 30-38, the Court dismissed as incompatible ratione materiae the complaints of an organiser of a protest and his supporters who were found to have had violent intentions on account of: statements involving explicit reference to violence and the intention to take over government buildings; the organiser having armed his supporters for that purpose; and the bodily harm inflicted on police officers as a result of the clashes which ensued. The Court thus found that the protest fell outside the notion of ""peaceful assembly"" protected by Article 11 ( Harutyunyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), 2025, §§ 30-38; compare and contrast Bogay and Others v. Ukraine, 2025, §§ 71-75)."
b8a991ab1181,Mass protests,20250813215218__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,20251104015705__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,2025-08-13,2025-11-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2025-08-13__2025-11-04.json,apps:45401/15,Harutyunyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.),45401/15,added,"Harutyunyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), no. 45401/15, 1 April 2025",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.A,Applicability,2,9,9,0.9879,,,"In this connection, in Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine, 2021, § 491, concerning the Maidan protest in Ukraine, the Court explained that in order to establish whether an applicant may claim the protection of Article 11, it takes into account the following factors: (i) whether the assembly intended to be peaceful or whether the organisers had violent intentions; (ii) whether the applicant had demonstrated violent intentions when joining the assembly; and (iii) whether the applicant had inflicted bodily harm on anyone (see also Çiçek and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 136).","In this connection, in Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine, 2021, § 491, concerning the Maidan protest in Ukraine, the Court explained that in order to establish whether an applicant may claim the protection of Article 11, it takes into account the following factors: (i) whether the assembly intended to be peaceful or whether the organisers had violent intentions; (ii) whether the applicant had demonstrated violent intentions when joining the assembly; and (iii) whether the applicant had inflicted bodily harm on anyone (see also Çiçek and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 136; Harutyunyan and Others v. Armenia (dec.), 2025, § 30)."
b8a991ab1181,Mass protests,20250813215218__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,20251104015705__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,2025-08-13,2025-11-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2025-08-13__2025-11-04.json,apps:29760/21|33931/21,Mzhavanadze and Rukhadze v. Georgia,29760/21|33931/21,added,"Mzhavanadze and Rukhadze v. Georgia, nos. 29760/21 and 33931/21, 15 July 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.E,Necessity in a democratic society,2,65,66,0.9933,"Mzhavanadze and Rukhadze v. Georgia , 2025",,"An interference will be considered ""necessary in a democratic society"" for a legitimate aim if it answers a ""pressing social need"" and, in particular, if it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and if the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are ""relevant and sufficient"" ( Coster v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 104; S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 101; Obote v. Russia, 2019, § 40). However, in this co ntext, the notion ""necessary in a democratic society"" does not have the flexibility of such expressions as ""useful"" or ""desirable"" ( Gorzelik and Others v. Poland [GC], 2004, § 95). 5 Moreover, breaches of other provisions of the Convention - such as Articles 3, 5 and 6 - in relation to the participation of an applicant in a peaceful assembly have been determinative of the Court's finding of whether the related interference with the Article 11 rights was ""necessary in a democratic society"" ( Navalnyy and Gunko v. Russia, 2020, §§ 84-93; Zakharov and Varzhabetyan v. Russia, 2020, §§ 87-91).","An interference will be considered ""necessary in a democratic society"" for a legitimate aim if it answers a ""pressing social need"" and, in particular, if it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and if the reasons adduced by the national authoriti es to justify it are ""relevant and sufficient"" ( Coster v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 104; S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 101; Obote v. Russia, 2019, § 40). However, in this co ntext, the notion ""necessary in a democratic society"" does not have the flexibility of such expressions as ""useful"" or ""desirable"" ( Gorzelik and Others v. Poland [GC], 2004, § 95). 5 Moreover, breaches of other provisions of the Convention - such as Articles 3, 5 and 6 - in relation to the participation of an applicant in a peaceful assembly have been determinative of the Court's finding of whether the related interference with the Article 11 rights was ""necessary in a democratic society"" ( Navalnyy and Gunko v. Russia, 2020, §§ 84-93; Zakharov and Varzhabetyan v. Russia, 2020, §§ 87-91; Mzhavanadze and Rukhadze v. Georgia, 2025, § 79)."
b8a991ab1181,Mass protests,20250813215218__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,20251104015705__guide_mass_protests_eng.pdf,2025-08-13,2025-11-04,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/b8a991ab1181/diff_2025-08-13__2025-11-04.json,apps:44241/20,Russ v. Germany,44241/20,added,"Russ v. Germany, no. 44241/20, 20 May 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.E.2,Post-demonstration penalties,3,,97,,,,,"In Russ v. Germany (2025) §§ 51-56 the applicant's criminal conviction for wearing a plastic visor during a peaceful demonstration was found not necessary in a ""democratic society"" as the domestic courts failed to explain why carrying it constituted a threat to public safety rendering the a pplicant's criminal conviction necessary in a democratic society. The Court stated that criminal sanctions require a special justification and courts must take into account the right to freedom of assembly and decide whether a criminal conviction is proportionate and ""necessary in a democratic society"" within the meaning of Article 11 of the Convention (§ 56)."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20230923175935__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-11-27,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-27.json,apps:62239/12,Kaymak and Others v. Türkiye,62239/12,added,"Kaymak and Others v. Türkiye,* no. 62239/12, 20 June 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.F,Trade unions ’ rights in the public sector,3,,137,,,,,"In Kaymak and Others v. Türkiye,* 2023, the Court examined complaints concerning disciplinary sanctions, in the form of non-punitive warnings, imposed on civil servants for having set up a stand at a university to promote a trade union and distribute leaflets. In finding a violation of Article 11, the Court noted the lack of judicial review of the measure by the domestic courts, in particular the impact it had on the applicants'careers with regard to future promotions, appointments and advancement, as well as the possibility of heavier sanctions in the event of further disciplinary proceedings against them which was such as to cause hesitation and deter them from participating in future union activities (§§ 58-59)."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20230923175935__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-11-27,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-27.json,apps:61721/19,Kubát and Others v. the Czech Republic,61721/19,added,"Kubát and Others v. the Czech Republic,* nos. 61721/19 and 5 others, 22 June 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.E.§4,austerity measures,4,,96,,,,,"The case of Kubát and Others v. the Czech Republic,* 2023, concerned the denial of retroactive payment of the difference in judges'salaries, found to have been unconstitutionally reduced during the 2011-2014 financial crisis. The Court acknowledged the tense social and political climate in the country at the relevant time, as well as the budgetary burden that the retroactive payment would have created on the State in a period of economic crisis (§§ 89-91). In addition, it noted that the impugned measure had not risked the ability of judges to exercise their judicial functions independently and impartially, nor constituted a threat to their livelihood. Accordingly, the Court did not find a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (§§ 93-97)."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20230923175935__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-11-27,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-27.json,apps:70583/17,M.A. v. Italy,70583/17,added,"M.A. v. Italy,* no. 70583/17, 31 August 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,VI.A,Migrants/Asylum-seekers,3,202,205,0.9895,,,"The Court has come to similar conclusions in other cases involving children: ▪ Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, 2006, concerning the detention of an unaccompanied five-year-old in a centre designed for adults and incapable of meeting a child's needs, followed by her deportation without the requisite measures and precautions for her situation (§§ 50-59 and 66-71); ▪ Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, 2010, concerning the detention of four minor asylum-seekers, respectively aged seven months, three and a half years, five and seven years at the material time, accompanied by their parents, in a facility ill-equipped to receive children which had resulted in deterioration of their psychological health in particular (§§ 59-63); ▪ Popov v. France, 2012, concerning the detention of minor children, pending expulsion, accompanied by their parents, for fifteen days, in an adult environment with a strong police presence, with no activities to keep them occupied, combined with their parents'distress, which was clearly ill-suited to their age (§§ 91-103); ▪ A.B. and Others v. France, 2016, concerning the detention of a four-year-old, albeit accompanied with his parents, for eighteen days in a detention facility in which, inter alia, he was exposed to particularly high levels of noise and mixed with armed police officers in uniform during transfers to various judicial and administrative hearings which he was obliged to attend as he could not be left alone (§§ 112-115); ▪ Khan v. France, 2019, concerning the precarious living conditions of an unaccompanied foreign minor in a shantytown, an environment manifestly unsuitable for children, for several months and the failure by the authorities to execute a judicial placement order for the applicant, who was in a vulnerable position, to be provided with care and protection (§§ 81-95); ▪ Moustahi v. France, 2020, concerning the interception at sea and subsequent detention of unaccompanied minors though they being arbitrarily associated with an unrelated adult and deportation without precautions to a third State (§§ 58-70).","The Court has come to similar conclusions in other cases involving children: ▪ Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, 2006, concerning the detention of an unaccompanied five-year-old in a centre designed for adults and incapable of meeting a child's needs, followed by her deportation without the requisite measures and precautions for her situation (§§ 50-59 and 66-71); ▪ Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, 2010, concerning the detention of four minor asylum-seekers, respectively aged seven months, three and a half years, five and seven years at the material time, accompanied by their parents, in a facility ill-equipped to receive children which had resulted in deterioration of their psychological health in particular (§§ 59-63); ▪ Popov v. France, 2012, concerning the detention of minor children, pending expulsion, accompanied by their parents, for fifteen days, in an adult environment with a strong police presence, with no activities to keep them occupied, combined with their parents'distress, which was clearly ill-suited to their age (§§ 91-103); ▪ A.B. and Others v. France, 2016, concerning the detention of a four-year-old, albeit accompanied with his parents, for eighteen days in a detention facility in which, inter alia, he was exposed to particularly high levels of noise and mixed with armed police officers in uniform during transfers to various judicial and administrative hearings which he was obliged to attend as he could not be left alone (§§ 112-115); ▪ Khan v. France, 2019, concerning the precarious living conditions of an unaccompanied foreign minor in a shantytown, an environment manifestly unsuitable for children, for several months and the failure by the authorities to execute a judicial placement order for the applicant, who was in a vulnerable position, to be provided with care and protection (§§ 81-95); ▪ Moustahi v. France, 2020, concerning the interception at sea and subsequent detention of unaccompanied minors though they being arbitrarily associated with an unrelated adult and deportation without precautions to a third State (§§ 58-70); ▪ M.A. v. Italy,* 2023, concerning the placement of an unaccompanied minor asylum-seeker, allegedly a victim of sexual abuse, for almost eight months in an adult reception centre which was not equipped to provide the appropriate psychological assistance that her vulnerable situation required (§§ 41-48)."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20230923175935__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-11-27,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-27.json,apps:35289/11,Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC],35289/11,added,"Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 35289/11, 19 September 2017",1,paragraph_text_name_match,unchanged,II.B.3,National Security,4,58,58,,,,"Asimilar conclusion was reached in Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2017, concerning the lack of access in judicial review proceedings to classified information on the basis of which the applicant's security clearance enabling him to hold a post as deputy to the first Vice-Minister of Defence had been revoked. With regard to the existence of a right, and hence the applicability of Article 6 § 1, the Court noted that the applicant's ability to carry out his duties and obtain a new post in the civil service was conditional on his being authorised to access classified information. The link between the decision to revoke the applicant's security clearance and the loss of his duties and his employment was therefore more than tenuous or remote, granting him a right to challenge the lawfulness of that revocation before the courts (§§ 118-119).","Asimilar conclusion was reached in Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2017, concerning the lack of access in judicial review proceedings to classified information on the basis of which the applicant's security clearance enabling him to hold a post as deputy to the first Vice-Minister of Defence had been revoked. With regard to the existence of a right, and hence the applicability of Article 6 § 1, the Court noted that the applicant's ability to carry out his duties and obtain a new post in the civil service was conditional on his being authorised to access classified information. The link between the decision to revoke the applicant's security clearance and the loss of his duties and his employment was therefore more than tenuous or remote, granting him a right to challenge the lawfulness of that revocation before the courts (§§ 118-119)."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20230923175935__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-11-27,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-27.json,apps:35289/11,Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC],35289/11,added,"Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 35289/11, 19 September 2017",2,paragraph_text_name_match,unchanged,II.B.3,National Security,4,59,59,,,,"As to the applicant's rights in accordance with the principles of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms under Article 6 § 1, the Court observed that the domestic courts had duly exercised the powers of scrutiny available to them in such proceedings, both regarding the need to preserve the confidentiality of the classified documents and regarding the justification for the decision revoking the applicant's security clearance ( Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2017, § 154). They had considered that the disclosure of the classified information could have had the effect of disclosing the intelligence service's working methods, revealing its sources of information or leading to attempts to influence possible witnesses. In addition, the information contained specific, comprehensive and detailed information on the basis of which the domestic courts were satisfied as to its relevance for determining whether the applicant posed a national security risk ( ibid ., §§ 155-156). Therefore, having regard to the proceedings as a whole, the nature of the dispute and the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national authorities, the Court considered that the restrictions placed on the applicant's rights were offset in such a manner that the fair balance between the parties was not affected to such an extent as to impair the very essence of the applicant's right to a fair trial (§ 161).","As to the applicant's rights in accordance with the principles of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms under Article 6 § 1, the Court observed that the domestic courts had duly exercised the powers of scrutiny available to them in such proceedings, both regarding the need to preserve the confidentiality of the classified documents and regarding the justification for the decision revoking the applicant's security clearance ( Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2017, § 154). They had considered that the disclosure of the classified information could have had the effect of disclosing the intelligence service's working methods, revealing its sources of information or leading to attempts to influence possible witnesses. In addition, the information contained specific, comprehensive and detailed information on the basis of which the domestic courts were satisfied as to its relevance for determining whether the applicant posed a national security risk ( ibid ., §§ 155-156). Therefore, having regard to the proceedings as a whole, the nature of the dispute and the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national authorities, the Court considered that the restrictions placed on the applicant's rights were offset in such a manner that the fair balance between the parties was not affected to such an extent as to impair the very essence of the applicant's right to a fair trial (§ 161)."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20230923175935__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-11-27,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-27.json,apps:30782/16,Simonova v. Bulgaria,30782/16,added,"Simonova v. Bulgaria, no. 30782/16, 11 April 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.B,Eviction / Loss of home,3,179,182,0.9786,"That this was the extent of the assessment to be made by the authorities in cases of demolition of a home was confirmed in the case of Simonova v. Bulgaria , 2023",,"The Court has drawn an analogy of the Article 8 principles established in the above-mentioned cases concerning the eviction of tenants and occupiers from public housing or land with those concerning the loss of one's home, affirming its position that the assessment of the necessity of the interference in such cases involves not only issues of substance but also of procedure, namely whether the decision-making process afforded due respect to the interests protected under Article 8 ( Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria, 2016, §§ 52-53). In Ivanova and Cherkezov, concerning the order for demolition of the applicants'home for a breach of building regulations, the Court found that the intended demolition would constitute a violation of Article 8 due to the fact that the applicants did not have at their disposal a procedure enabling them to obtain a proper review of the proportionality of the measure. The domestic proceedings had only focused on the illegality of the building, not engaging with the personal circumstances of the applicants, such as the fact that this was their only home and the unavailability of alternative accommodation (§§ 56-62).","The Court has drawn an analogy of the Article 8 principles established in the above-mentioned cases concerning the eviction of tenants and occupiers from public housing or land with those concerning the loss of one's home, affirming its position that the assessment of the necessity of the interference in such cases involves not only issues of substance but also of procedure, namely whether the decision-making process afforded due respect to the interests protected under Article 8 ( Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria, 2016, §§ 52-53). In Ivanova and Cherkezov, concerning the order for demolition of the applicants'home for a breach of building regulations, the Court found that the intended demolition would constitute a violation of Article 8 due to the fact that the applicants did not have at their disposal a procedure enabling them to obtain a proper review of the proportionality of the measure. The domestic proceedings had only focused on the illegality of the building, not engaging with the personal circumstances of the applicants, such as the fact that this was their only home and the unavailability of alternative accommodation (§§ 56-62). That this was the extent of the assessment to be made by the authorities in cases of demolition of a home was confirmed in the case of Simonova v. Bulgaria, 2023, § 48, a case also concerning an order for the demolition of an unlawfully erected building. The Court found a violation of Article 8 in that the domestic authorities had failed: to consider the risk of a family, comprising of a single mother and her minor children, becoming homeless; to take steps to ensure suitable alternative accommodation; and to assess the proportionality of the measure in the applicant's specific circumstances (§§ 51-54)."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20230923175935__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-11-27,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-27.json,apps:23851/20|24360/20,X and others v. Ireland,23851/20|24360/20,added,"X and others v. Ireland,* nos. 23851/20 and 24360/20, 22 June 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.A.1,Scope,4,,143,,,,,"Moreover, in X and Others v. Ireland,* 2023, the Court examined complaints concerning the denial of a universal statutory child benefit to two mothers, lawfully present in the country, for non- fulfilment of a domestic law habitual residence criterion. Applying the criteria set down in Beeler, the Court concluded that the payment of the benefit did not fall within the ambit of Article 8, noting that beyond having an effect on family life, it could not be said that the intended purpose of the benefit was to promote family life and necessarily affect the way in which it is organised. The Court compared the facts of the case to those of Beeler, considering that the benefit would or could not have been of such significance that the applicants would - as in Beeler - have organised key aspects of their daily life, at least partially, on the strength of it. In addition, the Court noted that the period complained of had been a relatively short one (just over a year and eight months respectively) and that, although not eligible to claim the child benefit during this time, both mothers had been accommodated with their children and had received material support until their immigration status was positively determined, at which point they became eligible for, and began to receive, the benefit in question (§ 74)."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20230923175935__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-11-27,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-27.json,apps:23851/20|24360/20,X and others v. Ireland,23851/20|24360/20,added,"X and others v. Ireland,* nos. 23851/20 and 24360/20, 22 June 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,IV.A.1,Scope,4,139,141,0.9968,,,"Moreover, the Court has stressed that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 places no restriction on the Contracting State's freedom to decide whether or not to have in place any form of social security scheme, or to choose the type or amount of benefits to provide under any such scheme. If, however, a Contracting State has in force legislation providing for the payment as of right of a welfare benefit - whether conditional or not on the prior payment of contributions - that legislation must be regarded as generating a proprietary interest falling within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 for persons satisfying its requirements. In cases where the applicant has been denied all or part of a particular benefit, the Court has applied the relevant test as to whether, but for the condition of entitlement about which the applicant complains, he or she would have had a right, enforceable under domestic law, to receive the benefit in question. In addition, while under no obligation to do so, if a State decides to create a benefits scheme, it must do so in a manner which is compatible with Article 14 ( Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.) [GC], 2005, §§ 54-55; Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], 2009, § 77; Stummer v. Austria [GC], 2011, §§ 82-83; Efe v. Austria, 2013, §§ 45-46).","Moreover, the Court has stressed that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 places no restriction on the Contracting State's freedom to decide whether or not to have in place any form of social security scheme, or to choose the type or amount of benefits to provide under any such scheme. If, however, a Contracting State has in force legislation providing for the payment as of right of a welfare benefit - whether conditional or not on the prior payment of contributions - that legislation must be regarded as generating a proprietary interest falling within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 for persons satisfying its requirements. In cases where the applicant has been denied all or part of a particular benefit, the Court has applied the relevant test as to whether, but for the condition of entitlement about which the applicant complains, he or she would have had a right, enforceable under domestic law, to receive the benefit in question. In addition, while under no obligation to do so, if a State decides to create a benefits scheme, it must do so in a manner which is compatible with Article 14 ( Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.) [GC], 2005, §§ 54-55; Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], 2009, § 77; Stummer v. Austria [GC], 2011, §§ 82-83; Efe v. Austria, 2013, §§ 45-46; X and Others v. Ireland,* 2023, §§ 67-69)."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20230923175935__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-11-27,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-09-23__2023-11-27.json,apps:23851/20|24360/20,X and others v. Ireland,23851/20|24360/20,added,"X and others v. Ireland,* nos. 23851/20 and 24360/20, 22 June 2023",3,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,IV.A.2,Margin of Appreciation,4,144,147,0.9211,,,"The Court will generally allow a wide margin when it comes to general measures of economic or social strategy ( Luczak v. Poland, 2007, § 48; Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], 2009, § 83). Because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities are, in principle, better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is in the public interest on social or economic grounds, and the Court will generally respect the legislature 's policy choice unless it is ""manifestly wi thout reasonable foundation"" ( Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2006, § 52; Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 61). The Court has considered that for any welfare system to be workable, the State may have to use broad categorisations to distinguish between different groups in need ( Runkee and White v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 39).","The Court will generally allow a wide margin when it comes to general measures of economic or social strategy ( Luczak v. Poland, 2007, § 48; Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], 2009, § 83). Because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities are, in principle, better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is in the public interest on social or economic grounds, and the Court will generally respect the legislature 's policy choice unless it is ""manifestly without reasonable foundation"" ( Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2006, § 52; Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom, [GC], 2010, § 61). Indeed, the Court has emphasised the essentially national character of social security systems ( Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom, [GC], 2010, § 85; X and Others v. Ireland,* 2023, §§ 97 and 98 26 )."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20251104040747__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-11-27,2025-11-04,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json,apps:59065/21,Bernotas v. Lithuania,59065/21,added,"Bernotas v. Lithuania, no. 59065/21, 30 January 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.D,Pensions,2,,174,,"Bernotas v. Lithuania, no. 59065/21, 30 January 2024",,,"In Bernotas v. Lithuania, 2024, the Court examined a complaint on the obligation to reimburse the social security authorities for the pension (complete loss of capacity to work) paid to a person whom the applicant had accidentally injured. First, the Court noted that the domestic proceedings had afforded the applicant a reasonable opportunity to challenge the causal link between his actions and the extent of the victim's injuries (§ 105). In addition, it noted that the adjustment of the amount of the pension to reflect the changing economic reality in the country had not been arbitrary or unreasonable (§ 107). The Court also considered the possibility of a reduction of the amount of compensation: should the victim's capacity to work improve; on account of the applicant's financial situation; due to the fact that the injury had been caused unintentionally or that the victim had been compensated for a substantial part of the damage caused (§§ 108-109). Lastly, the Court observed that the authorities had taken measures aimed at alleviating the financial burden imposed on the applicant, notably by allowing him to make payments in monthly instalments (ibid.,§ 111). Accordingly, there had been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the Convention."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20251104040747__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-11-27,2025-11-04,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json,apps:20007/22,Bielau v. Austria,20007/22,added,"Bielau v. Austria, no. 20007/22, 27 August 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.C,Vaccination,2,,34,,"Bielau v. Austria, no. 20007/22, 27 August 2024",,,"The Court has also considered the subject of vaccinations in the context of restrictions on the freedom of expression enjoyed by practising doctors. In Bielau v. Austria, 2024, the Court found no violation of Article 10 where a suspended disciplinary fine had been imposed on a practising doctor for making scientifically untenable statements about the ineffectiveness of vaccines. When considering the proportionality of the interference, the Court noted that the applicant's negative statements on his website were categorical and most importantly not in line with the current state of medical science, with some not in line with reason (see, in contrast, Hertel v. Switzerland, 1998, where minority opinions were expressed in a sphere in which it was unlikely that any certainty existed) (§§ 41-42). In addition, the Court highlighted the potentially very wide impact of the applicant's statements on his website which was accessible to everyone, the special duties of doctors, the importance and positive effects of vaccination in general, and the general consensus that vaccination was one of the most successful and cost-effective health interventions (§§ 43-44). Lastly, the Court found that the sanction (a fine) was not disproportionate considering that it was disciplinary (as opposed to criminal), the amount was less than the estimated average monthly income of a doctor and very low in view of the possible scale of fines, and moreover it was suspended pending a probationary period of one year (§ 45)."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20251104040747__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-11-27,2025-11-04,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json,apps:7120/17,Brazauskienė v. Lithuania (dec.),7120/17,added,"Brazauskienė v. Lithuania (dec.), no. 7120/17, 5 December 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.A.1,Scope,3,,148,,"Brazauskienė v. Lithuania (dec.), no. 7120/17, 5 December 2023",,,"For example, in Brazauskienė v. Lithuania (dec.), 2023, concerning the refusal to grant State annuity allowance to the widow of a former President of Lithuania after Constitutional rulings annulling relevant legal provisions and legislative intervention. The Court considered that the applicant could have entertained at least a ""legitimate expectation"" that those payments would be granted and paid to her on the basis of the law as it stood at the time when she lodged her request (§§ 107-112). However, in the circumstances of the case, the Court held that the matter had been resolved as the applicant had been granted another kind of social benefit, the annuity of the widow of a signatory, which had been paid retroactively (§§ 119-120)."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20251104040747__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-11-27,2025-11-04,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json,apps:44002/22,Dian v. Denmark (dec.),44002/22,added,"Dian v. Denmark (dec.), no. 44002/22, 21 May 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.F,Labour exploitation/human trafficking,2,,106,,"Dian v. Denmark (dec.), no. 44002/22, 21 May 2024",,,"Furthermore, in Lacatus v. Switzerland, 2021, concerning the imprisonment of a poor and vulnerable Roma woman for unintrusive begging on the street, the Court, while acknowledging the importance of combating human trafficking and the exploitation of individuals, expressed doubts as to whether penalising the victims of these networks for begging was an effective measure. In this regard, it referred to a report of the Council of Europe Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) concerning Switzerland, which had found that the criminalisation of begging placed the victims of forced begging in a situation of heightened vulnerability (§§ 111-112). In view of the foregoing, and also having regard, inter alia, to the severity of the sanction and the applicant's vulnerable situation where begging was her only means of subsistence, the Court found that the penalty imposed on the applicant had not been proportionate and thus in breach of Article 8 of the Convention (§§ 107-115; see also, in contrast, Dian v. Denmark (dec.), 2024, §§ 54-55)."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20251104040747__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-11-27,2025-11-04,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json,apps:59433/18,Humpert and Others v. Germany [GC],59433/18,added,"Humpert and Others v. Germany [GC], nos. 59433/18 and 3 others, 14 December 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.F,Trade unions' rights in the public sector,2,,142,,"Humpert and Others v. Germany [GC], nos. 59433/18 and 3 others, 14 December 2023",,,"However, in Humpert v. Germany [GC], 2023, the Court nuanced the statement made in Enerji Yapı-Yol Sen v. Turkey in connection to a general ban on the strike action of civil servants, by introducing a case-by-case approach in deciding whether a prohibition on strikes affects an essential element of trade-union freedom by rendering it devoid of substance, which cannot be answered in the abstract. An assessment of all the circumstances of the case is required, considering, inter alia, the totality of the measures taken by the respondent State to secure trade-union freedom, to make their voice heard and to protect their members' occupational interests (§§ 109 and 124). The Court reiterated that, while strike action was an important part of trade-union activity, it was not the only means for trade unions and their members to protect the relevant occupational interests (§ 128). 143. In Humpert and Others v. Germany [GC], 2023, concerning disciplinary sanctions imposed on teachers with civil-servant status for participating in a strike during working hours, the Court emphasised that a variety of different institutional safeguards had been put in place to enable civil servants and their unions to defend occupational interests in the respondent State (§§ 128-135). Accordingly, unlike in Enerji Yapı-Yol Sen v. Turkey, where no proper balancing exercise had been carried out at the domestic level, the Court found that, in the specific circumstances of the case, the impugned measure reflected a thorough balancing and weighing-up of different, potentially competing, constitutional interests (§§ 145-146). There had thus been no violation of Article 11 of the Convention. 144. Furthermore, in Kaymak and Others v. Türkiye, 2023, the Court examined complaints concerning disciplinary sanctions, in the form of non-punitive warnings, imposed on civil servants for having set up a stand at a university to promote a trade union and distribute leaflets. In finding a violation of Article 11, the Court noted the lack of judicial review of the measure by the domestic courts, in particular the impact it had on the applicants' careers with regard to future promotions, appointments and advancement, as well as the possibility of heavier sanctions in the event of further disciplinary proceedings against them which was such as to cause hesitation and deter them from participating in future union activities (§§ 58-59). 145. While Junta Rectora Del Ertzainen Nazional Elkartasuna (ER.N.E.) v. Spain, 2015, concerned the refusal to allow police officers to go on strike, the Court did not find a violation of Article 11 (§ 43). It noted that the legislation restricting the right to strike did not apply to all public servants but was imposed exclusively on members of the State security forces, as guarantors of public safety (§ 37). The Court considered that the more stringent requirements imposed on them did not exceed what was necessary in a democratic society, in so far as those requirements served to protect the State's general interests and in particular to ensure national security, public safety and the prevention of disorder, principles set forth in Article 11 § 2 of the Convention (§ 38)24. 24 In § 40, the Court also agreed with the Committee of Ministers' conclusion that the restriction on the right to strike for the police was not in contravention with the European Social Charter."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20251104040747__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-11-27,2025-11-04,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json,apps:63664/19,M.A. and Others v. France,63664/19,added,"M.A. and Others v. France, nos. 63664/19 and 4 others, 25 July 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.F,Labour exploitation/human trafficking,2,,107,,"M.A. and Others v. France, nos. 63664/19 and 4 others, 25 July 2024",,,"In M.A. and Others v. France, 2024, the Court examined the general and absolute criminalisation of the purchase of sexual services as part of a comprehensive legislative system to combat prostitution and human trafficking. The complaints were brought by a number of applicants who engaged in prostitution. The Court found that the legislation constituted an interference with the applicants' right to respect for private life, as well as their personal autonomy and sexual freedom, as it created a situation whose effects were directly felt by the applicants (§ 138). The Court granted a wide margin of appreciation considering the lack of general consensus on both the approach to prostitution and the use of absolute criminalisation of the purchase of sexual services as an instrument for combating human trafficking (§§ 149-153)."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20251104040747__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-11-27,2025-11-04,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json,apps:63664/19,M.A. and Others v. France,63664/19,added,"M.A. and Others v. France, nos. 63664/19 and 4 others, 25 July 2024",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.F,Labour exploitation/human trafficking,2,,108,,"M.A. and Others v. France, nos. 63664/19 and 4 others, 25 July 2024",,,"When considering the proportionality of the measure, the Court noted the long and complex legislative process and careful examination by Parliament of all cultural, social, political and legal aspects of a complex phenomenon raising sensitive moral and ethical questions (M.A. and Others v. France, 2024, § 158). Additionally, the Court highlighted that the law intended to combat the stigmatisation and stereotypes surrounding prostitution, strengthen public policies on reducing health risks for the benefit of all prostituted persons, combat the prostitution of minors, and gradually eradicate prostitution by offering alternatives without prohibiting its practice (§§ 161-164). Having regard to all these considerations, the Court held that, given the current state of developments in the domestic law's understanding of the issues raised by prostitution, a fair balance had been struck between the competing interests at stake in the present case. However, that approach had to be kept under review so that it could be nuanced in view of developments in European and international standards in this field (§§ 166-167)."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20251104040747__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-11-27,2025-11-04,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json,apps:49066/12,Nafornița v. the Republic of Moldova,49066/12,added,"Nafornița v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 49066/12, 16 January 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.B,Eviction/Loss of home,2,,192,,"Nafornița v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 49066/12, 16 January 2024",,,"Where national authorities, in their decisions ordering and upholding the applicant's eviction, have not given any explanation or put forward any arguments demonstrating that the applicant's eviction was necessary, the Court may draw the inference that the State's legitimate interest in being able to control its property should come second to the applicant's right to respect for his home (Bjedov v. Croatia, 2012, §§ 70-71; Yordanova and Others v. Bulgaria, 2012, § 118). Yordanova and Others concerned the planned eviction of Roma from their long-established settlements without arrangements for alternative housing. The Court found that the eviction would constitute a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on the grounds that the national authorities had not taken into account the applicants' underprivileged status and had failed to provide reasons as to why the applicants' removal was necessary, in particular in the absence of alternative shelter which would render them homeless (§§ 122-134; see also, Nafornița v. the Republic of Moldova, 2024, §§ 41-42, concerning the eviction from a State-owned apartment after a lengthy lawful residency granted under an occupancy agreement)."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20251104040747__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-11-27,2025-11-04,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json,apps:25226/18,Pająk and Others v. Poland,25226/18,added,"Pająk and Others v. Poland, nos. 25226/18 and 3 others, 24 October 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A,Applicability of the Convention to employment,2,,47,,"Pająk and Others v. Poland, nos. 25226/18 and 3 others, 24 October 2023",,,"The Court adopted the consequence-based approach in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], 2018, a case concerning the dismissal of a judge from his position of president of a court, to find that the measure complained of did not have serious negative consequences for the aspects constituting the applicant's ""private life"", namely: (i) his ""inner circle""; (ii) his opportunities to establish and develop relationships with others; or (iii) his reputation. It therefore found that Article 8 was not applicable (§§ 120-134). Adifferent conclusion was reached by the Court in Polyakh and Others v. Ukraine, 2019, concerning dismissals of public officials from their posts altogether, by adopting the same approach (§§ 207-211). In Budimir v. Croatia, 2021, the Court applied the consequence-based approach to the revocation of the applicant's licence to work as a motor vehicle inspector pending criminal proceedings against him, which had resulted in his dismissal from private employment and which later ended with his acquittal on all charges (§§ 46-47). In Pająk and Others v. Poland, 2023, the Court applied the consequence- based approach to complaints in relation to legislation differentiating between men and women with regard to the retirement age of judges and the refusal to allow the applicants to exercise their functions beyond the age limit (§§ 210-220)."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20251104040747__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-11-27,2025-11-04,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json,apps:25226/18,Pająk and Others v. Poland,25226/18,added,"Pająk and Others v. Poland, nos. 25226/18 and 3 others, 24 October 2023",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.9,Access to court/effective judicial review,3,,86,,"Pająk and Others v. Poland, nos. 25226/18 and 3 others, 24 October 2023",,,"In Baka v. Hungary [GC], 2016, the Court found that the applicant's inability to have the premature termination of his mandate as president of the Supreme Court reviewed by an ordinary tribunal or other body exercising judicial powers was in breach of his right of access to a court, as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (§§ 121-122). The applicant's dismissal had been the result of legislation at constitutional level that deprived him of any possibility of seeking judicial review, which the Court considered to be doubtful as to its compatibility with the rule of law (§§ 117 and 121; see also, Grzęda v. Poland [GC], 2022, §§ 345-346, for the application of similar procedural safeguards in the context of the removal of a judge from a judicial council while he still remained a serving judge; and Pająk and Others v. Poland, 2023, §§ 196-198, for the early termination of a female judge's term by a unilateral decision of the National Council of the Judiciary). The Court also found a violation of Article 10 of the Convention in this case on account of, inter alia, the absence of effective and adequate safeguards against abuse as regards the measures that interfered with the applicant's right to freedom of expression (§§ 174-176). Indeed, the Court has found, in other similar cases, that the procedural guarantees in disciplinary sanctions (such as dismissals) constitute an important part of the protection of freedom of expression under Article 10 (Kudeshkina v. Russia, 2009, §§ 96-97, concerning the removal from office of a judge following critical statements about the judiciary)."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20251104040747__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-11-27,2025-11-04,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json,apps:25226/18,Pająk and Others v. Poland,25226/18,added,"Pająk and Others v. Poland, nos. 25226/18 and 3 others, 24 October 2023",3,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.D,Gender Equality,2,,96,,"Pająk and Others v. Poland, nos. 25226/18 and 3 others, 24 October 2023",,,"In the case of Moraru and Marin v. Romania, 2022, the Court examined complaints in relation to the inability of two female civil servants who had attained the retirement age set for women to continue to work until reaching the higher retirement age set for men. It found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.12 on the ground of discrimination based on sex, noting in particular that the blanket rule on mandatory termination of women's employment at a lower age than that set for men perpetuated a stereotypical view of gender roles and treated women as a homogenous group deprived of agency, one whose personal situations or desires in terms of professional life and career 9 The Court made reference to Articles 8 (the right of employed women to protection of maternity), 20 (the right to equal opportunities and equal treatment in matters of employment and occupation without discrimination on the grounds of sex) and 27 (the right of workers with family responsibilities to equal opportunities and equal treatment) of the European Social Charter (revised) under Council of Europe material (§ 39). 10 International Labour Organisation's (ILO) Maternity Protection Convention 2000 (No. 183). development, as well as their alignment with those of men, had been completely disregarded (§ 118). Moreover, in Pająk and Others v. Poland, 2023, the Court examined the complaints of four female judges concerning a law lowering the retirement age to sixty for female judges and to sixty-five for male judges. In finding a difference in treatment based on sex regarding the mandatory retirement age of persons from the same profession, the Court was particularly concerned with the requirement for female judges to justify their intellectual aptitude to sit as a judge by means of a medical certificate (§ 259). In addition, the Court considered that the early retirement had obvious negative repercussions on their careers as well as their prospects in terms of professional and personal development (§ 263). Accordingly, there had been a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20251104040747__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-11-27,2025-11-04,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json,apps:24622/22,Pasquinelli and Others v. San Marino,24622/22,added,"Pasquinelli and Others v. San Marino, no. 24622/22, 29 August 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.C,Vaccination,2,,32,,"Pasquinelli and Others v. San Marino, no. 24622/22, 29 August 2024",,,"In Pasquinelli and Others v. San Marino, 2024, the Court found no violation of Article 8 in respect of complaints from health care and social health workers subjected to employment measures as a result of the choice not to be vaccinated against Covid-19. The Court considered that, whether the vaccination is compulsory, or duty based, as opposed to voluntary or recommended, is relevant to determining the approach to be taken in a given case (§ 57). In the circumstances, the law neither imposed any statutory or disciplinary sanction nor lead to any automatic consequences on the applicants (such as the non-admission to nursery school for all unvaccinated children as in Vavřička and Others [GC], (§§ 59-60). Therefore, in the absence of nationwide or category-wide unescapable and serious consequences, the Court found that there was not a general vaccination duty (§§ 62-63, distinguishing the present case from Vavřička and Others [GC]."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20251104040747__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-11-27,2025-11-04,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json,apps:66292/14,Pengezov v. Bulgaria,66292/14,added,"Pengezov v. Bulgaria, no. 66292/14, 10 October 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.9,Access to court/effective judicial review,3,,87,,"Pengezov v. Bulgaria, no. 66292/14, 10 October 2023",,,"Afailure by a domestic court to conduct an in-depth, thorough examination of an applicant's arguments following dismissal and to give reasons for dismissing the latter's challenges has been found by the Court to violate the right to a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the 6 In § 215 the Court noted that no such requirement was stipulated by the relevant ILO Conventions either, and that ILO Recommendation no. 143 on Protection and Facilities to be Afforded to Workers' Representatives in the Undertaking 1971 refers instead to ""a requirement of consultation with, an advisory opinion from, or agreement of an independent body, public or private, or a joint body, before the dismissal of a workers' representative becomes final"". Convention (Pişkin v. Turkey, 2020, § 151). The Pişkin case concerned the dismissal of an employee of a public institute under an emergency legislative decree on account of his alleged links with a terrorist organisation. While the domestic courts theoretically had jurisdiction to assess the dispute between the applicant and the authorities, they did not examine the questions of law and fact presented before them. Such shortcomings in the judicial review of the applicant's complaints and in the reasoning of the judicial decisions amounted to a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (§§ 141-1507; see also Pengezov v. Bulgaria, 2023, §§ 49-53)."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20251104040747__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-11-27,2025-11-04,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json,apps:66292/14,Pengezov v. Bulgaria,66292/14,added,"Pengezov v. Bulgaria, no. 66292/14, 10 October 2023",2,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.9,Access to court/effective judicial review,3,,89,,"Pengezov v. Bulgaria, no. 66292/14, 10 October 2023",,,"In addition, in Pişkin v. Turkey, 2020, the lack of effective judicial review of the applicant's dismissal also led the Court to finding a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in that the applicant had not benefitted from the minimum degree of protection against arbitrary interference required by this provision. The Court stressed once again that, even when national security is at stake, measures affecting fundamental human rights must be subject to some form of adversarial proceedings before an independent body competent to review the reasons for the decision and relevant evidence (§§ 223-229). Indeed, a thorough and in-depth analysis of the interests at stake by domestic courts has been an important aspect in the Court's evaluation of the 'necessary in a democratic society' component under Article 8 of the Convention (Fernández Martínez v. Spain [GC], 2014, §§ 147-151; Travaš v. Croatia, 2016, §§ 108-113; Pengezov v. Bulgaria, 2023, §§ 85-87)."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20251104040747__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-11-27,2025-11-04,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json,apps:29359/22,Salay v. Slovakia,29359/22,added,"Salay v. Slovakia, no. 29359/22, 27 February 2025",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VI.C,Roma people,2,,241,,"Salay v. Slovakia, no. 29359/22, 27 February 2025",,,"The Court has found violations of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 in a number of cases concerning the right to education of Roma pupils. These cases concerned the disproportionate number of Roma children placed in special schools for children with mental disabilities (D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007; Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 2013), in Roma-only classes (Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010), in Roma-only schools (Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013), or in special classes (Salay v. Slovakia, 2025), as well as their inability to access school before being assigned to special classrooms in an annex to the main primary school buildings (Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008). In all of these cases the Court found that the differential treatment to which Roma pupils had been subject, albeit unintentional, had constituted a form of indirect discrimination."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20251104040747__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-11-27,2025-11-04,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json,apps:2412/19,Shylina v. Ukraine,2412/19,added,"Shylina v. Ukraine, no. 2412/19, 15 February 2024",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.B,Parental/Family benefits,2,,165,,"Shylina v. Ukraine, no. 2412/19, 15 February 2024",,,"On the other hand, in Shylina v. Ukraine, 2024, concerning the suspension of the payment of a special monthly allowance (aimed at supporting the applicant's family) to an internally displaced person in Ukraine, the Court found no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 for failure to comply with the legislative requirement to open a bank account in a designated State bank (§§ 42-46)."
cfca8cb0bbc6,Social rights,20231127144526__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,20251104040747__guide_social_rights_eng.pdf,2023-11-27,2025-11-04,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/cfca8cb0bbc6/diff_2023-11-27__2025-11-04.json,apps:59963/21,Zanola v. Italy (dec.),59963/21,added,"Zanola v. Italy (dec.), no. 59963/21, 21 November 2023",1,citation_field_case_key|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.A.1,Scope,3,,150,,"Zanola v. Italy (dec.), no. 59963/21, 21 November 2023",,,"Furthermore, in Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022, concerning the termination of a survivor's pension to a widower taking care full-time of his children, the Court clarified, for the purposes of the applicability of Article 14, the relevant criteria to be applied to circumscribe what falls within the 'ambit' of Article 8, under its ""family life"" aspect, in the sphere of social welfare benefits (§§ 68-72). The Court initially acknowledged that the concept of ""family life"" within the meaning of Article 8 also covered (in addition to social, moral and cultural relations) certain material interests which had necessary pecuniary consequences, but observed that that interpretation had been chiefly adopted in cases concerning a failure to recognise parent‐child relationships in law and the consequences of such failure for the transfer of property between private individuals (Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022, § 59 and the references cited therein). In addition, it noted that there were fewer cases in which complaints concerning welfare benefits had been examined by the Court under Article 8 alone. In this connection, the Court emphasised that Article 8 alone could not be interpreted as imposing any positive obligations on the State in the social security sphere, and it did not guarantee the right to a social welfare benefit (ibid., § 60 and the references cited therein; see also Zanola v. Italy (dec.), 2023, § 26, concerning access to the survivor's pension of a deceased same-sex partner). At the same time, the Court observed that the scope of Article 14, read in conjunction with Article 8, could be more extensive than that of Article 8 read alone. Indeed, where a State creates a right to a social welfare benefit, thus going beyond its obligations under Article 8, it could not, in the application of that right, take discriminatory measures within the meaning of Article 14 (Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022, §§ 61-62 and the references cited therein). In Beeler, the Court analysed the factors capable of bringing complaints concerning welfare benefits within the ambit of Article 8, as they transpired from the more numerous cases where complaints of this kind had been examined under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. The analysis of the relevant case-law revealed inconsistencies in defining the factors which trigger the applicability of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 (Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022, §§ 63-66). In particular, there were three different approaches. According to the first, applicability transpired from a combination of circumstances involving the granting of parental leave and a related allowance which in the applicants' specific situation had necessarily affected the way in which their family life had been organised (Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], 2012, §§ 129-130; Petrovic v. Austria, 1998, § 27; Topčić-Rosenberg v. Croatia, 2013, §§ 38-39). The second approach was based on the hypothesis that the fact of granting or refusing the benefit was liable to affect the way in which family life was organised (Di Trizio v. Switzerland, 2016, § 62; Belli and Arquier-Martinez v. Switzerland, 2018, §§ 65-66). The third approach consisted of a legal presumption to the effect that, in providing the benefit in question, the State was displaying its support and respect for family life (Dhahbi v. Italy, 2014, § 41; Weller v. Hungary, 2009, § 29; Fawsie v. Greece, 2010, § 28; Okpisz v. Germany, 2005, § 32; Niedzwiecki v. Germany, 2005, § 31; Yocheva and Ganeva v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 72). In order to avoid an excessive extension of the ambit of Article 8, the Court decided not to follow the second and the third approach any longer. It noted that while all financial benefits generally had a certain effect on the way in which the family life of the person concerned was managed, that fact alone could not suffice to bring them all within that ambit there (Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022, §§ 67-69). Accordingly, the Court decided to adopt the first of the above approaches as the one to be followed henceforth: for Article 14 to be applicable in this specific context, the subject matter of the alleged disadvantage must constitute one of the modalities of exercising the right to respect for family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, in the sense that the measures seek to promote family life and necessarily affect the way in which it is organised (ibid, §§ 70-72). The Court further specified a range of factors relevant for determining the nature of the benefit in question, in particular: the aim of the benefit, as determined by the Court in the light of the legislation concerned; the criteria for awarding, calculating and terminating the benefit as set forth in the relevant statutory provisions; the effects on the way in which family life is organised, as envisaged by the legislation; and the practical repercussions of the benefit, given the applicant's individual circumstances and family life throughout the period during which the benefit is paid. These factors are to be examined as a whole (Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022, §§ 72-73). In Beeler, §§ 74-82, the Court found, in the first place, that the pension in issue sought to promote family life by enabling a surviving parent to look after children without having to engage in an occupation, and, secondly, that the receipt of the pension had necessarily affected the way in which the applicant's family life had been organised throughout the relevant period. The Court observed that at the time of the applicant's wife's death in 1994, their daughters were one year and nine months old and four years old. In that situation, which made it necessary to take difficult decisions with a crucial impact on the organisation of his family life, the applicant left his job in order to devote himself full‐time to his family, in particular by looking after and bringing up his daughters. The Court thus had no doubt that the receipt of the widower's pension necessarily affected the way in which his family life was organised throughout the period concerned. The facts of the case fell therefore within the ambit of Article 8, rendering Article 14 of the Convention applicable (see also the application of the criteria established in Beeler concerning the applicability of ""family life"" to another type of social benefits, namely disability benefits, in Berisha v. Switzerland (dec.), 2023, §§ 39-45; for more on the topic, see below under ""Disability benefits/Tax relief"")."
d24a9ac722de,ECHR / EU,20240618210119__guide_eu_law_in_echr_case-law_eng.pdf,20241111181638__guide_eu_law_in_echr_case-law_eng.pdf,2024-06-18,2024-11-11,29 February 2024,31 August 2024,2024-02-29,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d24a9ac722de/diff_2024-06-18__2024-11-11.json,apps:27547/18,Büttner and Krebs v. Germany (dec.),27547/18,added,"Büttner and Krebs v. Germany (dec.), no. 27547/18, 4 June 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,I.E,Review of compatibility of national measures with European Union law and interpretation of European Union law.,2,36,36,0.9937,,Lechouritou and Others v. Germany 2016,"The Court is not competent to review the compatibility of a national measure or decision with European Union law ( K.I. v. France, 2021, § 123; see also, to similar effect, Occhetto v. Italy (dec.), 2013, § 54; Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], 2014, § 110); see also, to similar effect, Parti nationaliste basque - Organisation régionale d'Iparralde v. France, 2007, § 48; Avotiņš v. Latvia [GC], Lechouritou and Others v. Germany 2016, § 100) or to rule on the CJEU's interpretation of EUlaw ( and 26 other member States of the European Union (dec.) [committee], 2012). It is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law, if necessary in conformity with EUlaw, the Court's role being confined to ascertaining whether the effects of such adjudication are compatible with the Convention ( Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], 2014, § 110; K.I. v. France, 2021, § 123).","The Court is not competent to review the compatibility of a national measure or decision with European Union law ( K.I. v. France, 2021, § 123; see also, to similar effect, Occhetto v. Italy (dec.), 2013, § 54; Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], 2014, § 110); see also, to similar effect, Parti nationaliste basque - Organisation régionale d'Iparralde v. France, 2007, § 48; Avotiņš v. Latvia [GC], 2016, § 100) or to rule on the CJEU's interpretation of EUlaw ( Lechouritou and Others v. Germany and 26 other member States of the European Union (dec.) [committee], 2012). It is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law, if necessary in conformity with EUlaw, the Court's role being confined to ascertaining whether the effects of such adjudication are compatible with the Convention ( Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], 2014, § 110; K.I. v. France, 2021, § 123; Büttner and Krebs v. Germany (dec.), 2024, § 59)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:44033/17,D.H. and Others v. North Macedonia,44033/17,added,"D.H. and Others v. North Macedonia, no. 44033/17, 18 July 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.3.a,Impact of prior consent,4,243,247,0.9105,"D.H. and Others v. North Macedonia , 2023|Margari v. Greece , 2023",,"As regards persons under arrest or prosecution, the Court found violations of Article 8 where police services had handed over photographs of the applicants to the press without their consent ( Sciacca v. Italy, 2005, §§ 29-31; Khuzhin and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 115-118), where they had invited TVcrews to film an applicant at a police station without his consent with a view to broadcasting the images on television ( Toma v. Romania, 2009, §§ 90-93; Khmel v. Russia, 2013, § 41), or in a case 55/99 where posting up a photograph of the applicant on the ""wanted"" noticeboard had not been prescribed by law ( Guiorgui Nikolaïchvili v. Georgia, 2009, §§ 129-131).","As regards persons under arrest or prosecution, the Court found violations of Article 8 where police services had handed over photographs of the applicants to the press without their consent ( Sciacca v. Italy, 2005, §§ 29-31; Khuzhin and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 115-118; Margari v. Greece, 2023, §§ 54-60), where they had invited TVcrews to film an applicant at a police station without his consent with a view to broadcasting the images on television ( Toma v. Romania, 2009, §§ 90-93; Khmel v. Russia, 2013, § 41), where the Ministry of the Interior published on its website the applicants' photographs, taken while they were in police custody, in which their identity was not concealed ( D.H. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2023, §§ 63-65), where posting up a photograph of the applicant on the ""wanted"" noticeboard had not been prescribed by law ( Guiorgui Nikolaïchvili v. Georgia, 2009, §§ 129-131) or where the existing rules and procedures did not meet ""the quality of law"" requirement ( Negru v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 29-35)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:11519/20,Glukhin v. Russia,11519/20,added,"Glukhin v. Russia, no. 11519/20, 4 July 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I.A.1,Concept of personal data and its scope,3,9,9,0.9924,"Glukhin v. Russia , 2023","Benedik v. Slovenia , 2018","Under Article 2 of Convention 108, ""data processing"" includes : ""any operation or set of operations performed on personal data, such as the collection, storage, preservation, alteration, retrieval, disclosure, making available, erasure, or destruction of, or the carrying out of logical and/or arithmetical operations on such data"" . The development of technologies has led to an increase in the types of operations involving personal data that can constitute processing; the Court has identified the following typical examples: 8/99 ▪ The collection by the police from an Internet provider of subscriber information associated with an individual's specific dynamic IPaddress ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109). ▪ The fact of gathering and storing public information on an individual, for example about his/her political activity ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44; Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others v. Romania, 2011, §§ 167-168; Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, §§ 65-67; Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 93). ▪ The listing of an individual in a national judicial database of sex offenders ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 58), and the collection and storage of a suspect's fingerprints ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 29). ▪ The covert recording in a police station, for permanent storage, of voice samples to be used in identifying the individuals concerned, by a process of analysis in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, §§ 59-60). ▪ The filming of an individual in a police interview room by cameras installed for security reasons and totally visible, with the permanent recording of the footage and its inclusion in a montage for further use ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 41). ▪ The systematic collection and retention of GPSmonitoring data indicating the whereabouts and public movements of the subject ( Uzun v. Germany, 2010, §§ 49-53). ▪ The publication in a magazine of an article illustrated by photos of celebrities taken without their knowledge ( Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], 2012, §§ 95-99). ▪ The recording and disclosure to media of CCTVfootage showing an individual trying to commit suicide in a public place ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 59-63). ▪ The recording and storage by police of data on an individual's supposed occupation ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ The disclosure by a psychiatric hospital to journalists of highly sensitive confidential information about the private life of a patient ( Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, § 99). ▪ The collection by the State, as part of anti-doping measures in sport, of information on the whereabouts and daily pursuits, even at weekends, of high-level athletes ( National Federation of Sportspersons'Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 155-159). ▪ The systematic scanning and uploading of prisoners'private correspondence, both incoming and outgoing, onto the National Judicial Network Server ( Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-82).","Under Article 2 of Convention 108, ""data processing"" includes: ""any operation or set of operations performed on personal data, such as the collection, storage, preservation, alteration, retrieval, disclosure, making available, erasure, or destruction of, or the carrying out of logical and/or arithmetical operations on such data"". The development of technologies has led to an increase in the types of operations involving personal data that can constitute processing; the Court has identified the following typical examples:  The collection by the police from an Internet provider of subscriber information associated Benedik v. Slovenia with an individual's specific dynamic IPaddress (, 2018, §§ 108-109).  The fact of gathering and storing public information on an individual, for example about his/her political activity ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44; Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others v. Romania, 2011, §§ 167-168; Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, §§ 65-67; Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 93).  The listing of an individual in a national judicial database of sex offenders ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 58), and the collection and storage of a suspect's fingerprints ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 29).  The covert recording in a police station, for permanent storage, of voice samples to be used in identifying the individuals concerned, by a process of analysis in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, §§ 59-60).  The filming of an individual in a police interview room by cameras installed for security reasons and totally visible, with the permanent recording of the footage and its inclusion in a montage for further use ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 41).  The systematic collection and retention of GPSmonitoring data indicating the whereabouts and public movements of the subject ( Uzun v. Germany, 2010, §§ 49-53).  The publication in a magazine of an article illustrated by photos of celebrities taken without Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) their knowledge ( [GC], 2012, §§ 95-99).  The recording and disclosure to media of CCTVfootage showing an individual trying to Peck v. the United Kingdom commit suicide in a public place (, 2003, §§ 59-63).  The recording and storage by police of data on an individual's supposed occupation ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56).  The disclosure by a psychiatric hospital to journalists of highly sensitive confidential information about the private life of a patient ( Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, § 99).  The collection by the State, as part of anti-doping measures in sport, of information on the whereabouts and daily pursuits, even at weekends, of high-level athletes ( National Federation of Sportspersons' Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 155-159).  The systematic scanning and uploading of prisoners' private correspondence, both incoming and outgoing, onto the National Judicial Network Server ( Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-82).  The use of facial recognition technology to, in the first place, identify the applicant, who had held a solo demonstration without a prior notification, from the photographs and the video published on the Telegram channel and, secondly, locate and arrest him while he was travelling on the underground ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 73)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:11519/20,Glukhin v. Russia,11519/20,added,"Glukhin v. Russia, no. 11519/20, 4 July 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I.A.1,Concept of personal data and its scope,3,13,13,0.9682,"Glukhin v. Russia , 2023|Sârbu v. Romania , 2023","Benedik v. Slovenia , 2018","Asignificant element, although not necessarily decisive, is whether an individual is reasonably entitled to expect protection of his/her private life ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 37; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 80). As to on-line activities, the anonymity of personal information will be a key factor in that assessment and the fact that a subscriber to an Internet service provider had not hidden his/her dynamic IPaddress was not decisive in the assessment of whether his expectation of privacy was reasonable from an objective standpoint ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, § 116). In the workplace, an employer's instructions cannot reduce private social life in the workplace to zero. Respect for private life and for the privacy of correspondence continues to exist, even if these may be restricted in so far as necessary ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 80-81). Video recordings made in a public place using surveillance mechanisms may fall within Article 8 where their disclosure, by its manner or extent, goes beyond what the individuals could reasonably have expected ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 62; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 41-43). As regards press articles about the arrest of a television actor, illustrated by photos, the Court found that the actor 's ""legitimate expectation"" of having his private life effectively protected was reduced by the fact that he had ""actively sought the limelight"" by revealing details of his private life in a number of interviews ( Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 2012, § 101).","Asignificant element, although not necessarily decisive, is whether an individual is reasonably entitled to expect protection of his/her private life ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 37; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 80; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66). As to on-line activities, the anonymity of personal information will be a key factor in that assessment and the fact that a subscriber to an Internet service provider had not hidden his/her dynamic IPaddress was not decisive in the assessment of whether his expectation of privacy was reasonable from an objective standpoint Benedik v. Slovenia (, 2018, § 116). In the workplace, an employer's instructions cannot reduce private social life in the workplace to zero. Respect for private life and for the privacy of correspondence continues to exist, even if these may be restricted in so far as necessary ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 80-81; see also, for the professional context, Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 37-38). The monitoring of the actions or movements of an individual in a public place using surveillance mechanisms may fall within Article 8 once any systemic or permanent record of such personal data comes into existence ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66), or where their disclosure, by its manner or extent, Peck v. the United Kingdom goes beyond what the individuals could reasonably have expected (, 2003, § 62; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 41-43). As regards press articles about the arrest of a television actor, illustrated by photos, the Court found that the actor's ""legitimate expectation"" of having his private life effectively protected was reduced by the fact that he had ""actively sought the Axel Springer AG v. Germany limelight"" by revealing details of his private life in a number of interviews ( [GC], 2012, § 101)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:11519/20,Glukhin v. Russia,11519/20,added,"Glukhin v. Russia, no. 11519/20, 4 July 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A.2.§4,"ii. Data revealing political opinions, and religious or other beliefs, including philosophical",4,21,21,0.9887,"Glukhin v. Russia , 2023",,"Data revealing political opinions are regarded as a ""sensitive"" category of personal data and, in the Court's view, it is unacceptable for the national authorities to disregard this aspect by processing such data in accordance with ordinary domestic rules, without taking account of the need for eightened protection ( Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 112). In the 2019 case of Catt v. the United Kingdom, concerning the storage in a police database of data relating to a peaceful demonstrator, the national courts had merely made reference to the general data protection law in examining the lawfulness of the interference. The Court found a violation of Article 8, pointing out that the sensitive nature of the data in question should have constituted a key element of the case before the domestic 11/99 courts, as it was before the Court (ibid., § 112). The Court likewise found a violation of Article 8 in M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022, (§§ 63-64) concerning a report drawn up by the police in respect of judges and magistrates, who exercised their functions in Catalonia and who had signed a manifesto in which they had set out their legal opinion in favour of the possibility of the Catalan people's exercising the so- called ""right to decide"", the report revealing, in particular, the political views of some of the applicants.","Data revealing political opinions are regarded as a ""sensitive"" category of personal data and, in the Court's view, it is unacceptable for the national authorities to disregard this aspect by processing such data in accordance with ordinary domestic rules, without taking account of the need for heightened protection ( Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 112). In the case of Catt v. the United Kingdom, concerning the storage in a police database of data relating to a peaceful demonstrator, the national courts had merely made reference to the general data protection law in examining the lawfulness of the interference. The Court found a violation of Article 8, pointing out that the sensitive nature of the data in question should have constituted a key element of the case before the domestic courts, as it was before the Court (ibid., § 112). The Court likewise found a violation of Article 8 in M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022, (§§ 63-64) concerning a report drawn up by the police in respect of judges and magistrates, who exercised their functions in Catalonia and who had signed a manifesto in which they had set out their legal opinion in favour of the possibility of the Catalan people's exercising the so-called ""right to decide"", the report revealing, in particular, the political views of some of the applicants. The Court has also underlined that personal data revealing political opinions should attract a heightened level of protection ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, §§ 76 and 86, where the personal data of the applicant which had been processed contained information about his participation in a peaceful protest)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:11519/20,Glukhin v. Russia,11519/20,added,"Glukhin v. Russia, no. 11519/20, 4 July 2023",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.C.1,Whether the interference was lawful,3,,97,,"Glukhin v. Russia , 2023",,,"In the context of implementing facial recognition technology, the Court emphasised that, for the ""quality of law"" requirement to be met, it was essential to have detailed rules governing the scope and application of measures as well as strong safeguards against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness. The need for safeguards will be all the greater where the use of live facial recognition technology is concerned ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 82). In this case, where the Court for the first time addressed the issue of the use of such technology, it expressed strong doubts that the domestic legal provisions which authorised the processing of biometric personal data, including with the aid of facial recognition technology, ""in connection with the administration of justice"" met the ""quality of law"" requirement, since they were widely formulated and would appear to allow processing of such data in connection with any type of judicial proceedings. Domestic law did not contain any limitations on the nature of situations which might give rise to the use of facial recognition technology, the intended purposes, the categories of person who might be targeted, or on the processing of sensitive personal data. Moreover, there would appear to be no procedural safeguards accompanying the use of facial recognition technology, such as authorisation procedures, procedures to be followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained, supervisory control mechanisms or available remedies ( ibid ., § 83)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:11519/20,Glukhin v. Russia,11519/20,added,"Glukhin v. Russia, no. 11519/20, 4 July 2023",5,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C.1,Whether the interference was lawful,3,92,92,0.989,"Glukhin v. Russia , 2023",,"Lastly, in other cases the Court has found that the requirement for interference to be "" in accordance with the law "" was so closely linked to the ""necessary in a democratic society"" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155).","Lastly, in other cases the Court has found that the requirement for interference to be ""in accordance with the law"" was so closely linked to the ""necessary in a democratic society"" criterion that the two conditions had to be discussed together ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 99; Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, § 84; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 155; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 78)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:11519/20,Glukhin v. Russia,11519/20,added,"Glukhin v. Russia, no. 11519/20, 4 July 2023",6,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.C.3.d,Requirement to limit the use of data to the purpose for which they were recorded,4,121,123,0.9877,,,"In order to establish the boundary of the intimacy of private life secured by Article 8, the Court has made a distinction between surveillance of an individual's acts in a public place for security purposes, and recordings of such acts used for other purposes, going beyond what the individual concerned could have expected ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 59-62, on the filming of an applicant in a public place on security grounds where the footage was disclosed to the media; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 41-42, on a subterfuge used by the police for the purposes of identifying the applicant by video recording, going beyond the limits of the normal or foreseeable use of surveillance cameras in police stations).","In order to establish the boundary of the intimacy of private life secured by Article 8, the Court has made a distinction between surveillance of an individual's acts in a public place for security purposes, and recordings of such acts used for other purposes, going beyond what the individual concerned could have expected ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 59-62, on the filming of an Perry applicant in a public place on security grounds where the footage was disclosed to the media; v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 41-42, on a subterfuge used by the police for the purposes of identifying the applicant by video recording, going beyond the limits of the normal or foreseeable use Glukhin v. Russia of surveillance cameras in police stations;, 2023, §§ 65-73, on the use of facial recognition technology in the context of public surveillance by CCTVcameras)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:11519/20,Glukhin v. Russia,11519/20,added,"Glukhin v. Russia, no. 11519/20, 4 July 2023",7,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.2.a,Storage of personal data for the purposes of combating crime,4,199,202,0.9991,"Glukhin v. Russia , 2023",,"The interests of data subjects and the community as a whole in protecting personal data, including fingerprint and DNAinformation, may be outweighed by the legitimate interest in the prevention of crime ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 104). In order to protect their population as required, the national authorities can legitimately set up databases as an effective means of helping to punish and prevent certain offences, including the most serious types of crime, such as sex offences ( B.B. v. France, 2009, § 62; Gardel v. France, 2009, § 63; M.B. v. France, 2009, § 54). While the original taking of this information pursues the aim of linking a particular person to the particular crime of which he or she is suspected, its retention pursues the broader purpose of assisting 46/99 in the identification of future offenders ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 100). The Court cannot call into question the preventive purpose of such registers ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 63; B.B. v. France, 2009, § 62; M.B. v. France, 2009, § 54). The fight against crime, and in particular against organised crime and terrorism, which is one of the challenges faced by today's European societies, depends to a great extent on the use of modern scientific techniques of investigation and identification ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 105). At the same time, since the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, domestic law must afford appropriate safeguards to prevent any such use of personal data as may be inconsistent with the guarantees of this Article (ibid., § 103).","The interests of data subjects and the community as a whole in protecting personal data, including fingerprint and DNAinformation, may be outweighed by the legitimate interest in the prevention of crime ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 104). In order to protect their population as required, the national authorities can legitimately set up databases as an effective means of helping to punish and prevent certain offences, including the most serious types of crime, B.B. v. France Gardel v. France M.B. v. France, such as sex offences (, 2009, § 62;, 2009, § 63; 2009, § 54). While the original taking of this information pursues the aim of linking a particular person to the particular crime of which he or she is suspected, its retention pursues the broader purpose of assisting in the identification of future offenders ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 100). The Court cannot call into question the preventive purpose of such registers ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 63; B.B. v. France, 2009, § 62; M.B. v. France, 2009, § 54). The fight against crime, and in particular against organised crime and terrorism, which is one of the challenges faced by today's European societies, depends to a great extent on the use of modern scientific techniques of investigation and identification ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 105). At the same time, since the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, domestic law must afford appropriate safeguards to prevent any such use of personal data as may be inconsistent with the guarantees of this Article ( ibid., § 103; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 75)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:11519/20,Glukhin v. Russia,11519/20,added,"Glukhin v. Russia, no. 11519/20, 4 July 2023",8,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.A,"Technological advances, algorithms and artificial intelligence",2,,402,,"In the case of Glukhin v. Russia , 2023",,,"In the case of Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, the Court examined, for the first time, the question of the use by the police of facial recognition technology. That technology had been used, in the first place, to identify the applicant from the photographs and the video published on a public Telegram channel, and, secondly, to locate and arrest him while he had been travelling on the city underground. The Court noted the very intrusive nature of those measures, emphasising that a high level of justification was therefore required in order for them to be considered ""necessary in a democratic society"", with ibid the highest level of justification required for the use of live facial recognition technology ( ., § 86). In that connection, it observed that the applicant had been prosecuted for a minor offence consisting of holding a solo demonstration without a prior notification. He had never been accused of committing any reprehensible acts during his demonstration (such as the obstruction of traffic, damage to property or acts of violence). It had never been claimed that his actions presented any danger to public order or transport safety. In such circumstances, the Court considered that the use of facial recognition technology to identify the applicant, and a fortiori the use of live facial recognition technology to locate and arrest him, had not corresponded to a ""pressing social need"" and thus could not be regarded as ""necessary in a democratic society ( ibid ., §§ 88-90)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:57292/16,Hurbain v. Belgium [GC],57292/16,added,"Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], no. 57292/16, 4 July 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.A.2.c,Online storage of personal data for journalistic purposes,4,233,237,0.9617,"ęgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Poland M.L. and W.W. v. Germany , 2013","In M.L. and W.W. v. Germany , 2018|ęgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Poland , 2013","In M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2018 (§ 90), the Court stated that the press had a secondary but nonetheless valuable role in maintaining archives containing news which had previously been reported and making them available to the public. In that regard, Internet archives make a substantial contribution to preserving and making available news and information, since they constitute an important source for education and historical research, particularly as they are readily accessible to the public and are generally free ( Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), 2009, §§ 27, 45; Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Poland, 2013, § 59).","The Court has underlined that the press had a secondary but nonetheless valuable role in maintaining archives containing news which had previously been reported and making them available to the public. In that regard, Internet archives make a substantial contribution to preserving and making available news and information, since they constitute an important source for education and historical research, particularly as they are readily accessible to the public and are generally free ( Times New spapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), 2009, §§ 27 and 45; Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Poland M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2013, § 59;, 2018, § 90; see also, a case examined under Article 10, Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, § 180)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:57292/16,Hurbain v. Belgium [GC],57292/16,added,"Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], no. 57292/16, 4 July 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.3.a,“Right to be forgotten”,4,,294,,,,,"Although the concept of a ""right to be forgotten"" has only emerged recently and is still under construction, its application in practice has already acquired a number of distinctive features ( Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, §§ 191 and 194). This concept first emerged in national judicial practice in the context of the republication by the press of previously disclosed information of a judicial nature, with the person claiming a ""right to be forgotten"" effectively seeking to obtain a judgment against the person who republished the information ( ibid ., § 194). Subsequently, a new aspect of this ""right to be forgotten"" emerged in national judicial practice in the context of the digitisation of news articles, resulting in their widespread dissemination on the websites of the newspapers concerned. The effect of this dissemination was simultaneously magnified by the listing of websites by search engines. This aspect, known as the ""right to be forgotten online"", has concerned requests for the removal or alteration of data available on the Internet or for limitations on access to those data, directed against news publishers or search engine operators. In such cases, the issue is not the resurfacing of the information but rather its continued availability online ( ibid ., § 195). Generally speaking, the ""right to be forgotten"" may give rise, in practice, to various measures that can be taken by search engine operators or by news publishers. These relate either to the content of an archived article (for instance, the removal, alteration or anonymisation of the article) or to limitations on the accessibility of the information. In the latter case, limitations on access may be put in place by both search engines and news publishers ( ibid ., § 175)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:57292/16,Hurbain v. Belgium [GC],57292/16,added,"Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], no. 57292/16, 4 July 2023",3,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.3.a,“Right to be forgotten”,4,,295,,"M.L. and W.W. v. Germany , 2018|ęgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Polan d, 2013",,,"In its practice, the Court has dealt with several cases concerning requests for removal, alteration, anonymisation or de-indexing of news articles disclosing personal data of individuals. These cases were examined either under Article 8, if brought by individuals who had invoked their right to respect for their private life ( Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Polan d, 2013; M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2018), or under Article 10, if brought by journalists, editors or media owners, who had referred to Biancardi v. Italy Mediengruppe Österreich GmbHtheir right of freedom of expression (, 2021; v. Austria, 2022; Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:57292/16,Hurbain v. Belgium [GC],57292/16,added,"Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], no. 57292/16, 4 July 2023",4,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.3.a,“Right to be forgotten”,4,,298,,,,,"As regards media web archives comprising the personal data of an individual who had been the subject of a publication in the past, the Court pointed out that this context differed from situations concerning initial publication ( Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, § 205), and defined the main issue to be addressed as the continued availability of such information online rather than its original publication ibid ( ., § 174)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:57292/16,Hurbain v. Belgium [GC],57292/16,added,"Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], no. 57292/16, 4 July 2023",5,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.3.a,“Right to be forgotten”,4,,301,,,,,"In the case of Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, the Court revisited its existing case-law and adjusted the criteria to be applied for balancing of the respective rights under Article 8 and Article 10 concerning the continued availability of an electronic archived version of an article disclosing an individual's personal data. The case was brought by a newspaper publisher who had been ordered by the domestic courts to anonymise an online archived version of an article which had been published some twenty years earlier and had provided an accurate account of a fatal accident, on the ground of the ""right to be forgotten"" of a driver who had caused that accident."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:57292/16,Hurbain v. Belgium [GC],57292/16,added,"Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], no. 57292/16, 4 July 2023",6,paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,III.A.2,Data protection and freedom of expression (Article 10 of the Convention),3,322,337,0.9874,,,"Conversely, the Court has found no violation of Article 10 in several cases including: ▪ Biancardi v. Italy, 2021 (§§ 67-71) on the compatibility with Article 10 of a civil judgment against a journalist for not de-indexing sensitive information published on the Internet concerning criminal proceedings against a private individual and the journalist's decision to keep the information easily accessible in spite of the individual's opposition; ▪ Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017 (§§ 139-199), concerning a judicial decision banning the mass publication of personal taxation data; ▪ Bédat v. Switzerland [GC], 2016 (§§ 44-82), on the conviction of a journalist for publishing information covered by the secrecy of criminal investigations; ▪ Mediengruppe Österreich GmbH v. Austria, 2022 (§§ 44-73), concerning a court order for a daily newspaper not to publish a photograph with a ""convicted neo-Nazi "" caption as regards an individual indirectly connected to the campaign of a political candidate in the run-up to a presidential election, the relevant publication having taken place more than twenty years after the conviction; ▪ Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020 (§§ 85-90), concerning the withdrawal of a journalist's accreditation to search the Securitate archives, following the disclosure in several articles written by him of personal data in ""raw"" form concerning various well -known sports figures, without the relevance of the data having been assessed in the light of the declared subject of his research, namely sport in Romania under the communist regime; ▪ Giesbert and Others v. France, 2017 (§§ 77-103), concerning the courts'findings against a newspaper for publishing documents from a set of criminal proceedings before they were to be read out at a public hearing; ▪ Verlagsgruppe Droemer Knaur GmbH & Co. KG v. Germany, 2017 (§§ 36-62), concerning an order for a publishing company to pay damages for failing to carry out thorough research and for serious interference with an individual's personality rights; ▪ Kurier Zeitungsverlag und Druckerei GmbH v. Austria, 2012 (§§ 47-56), concerning the requirement to pay compensation to a child who had been the victim of sexual abuse and whose identity was disclosed in a press article. In view of the vulnerability of crime victims, their identity deserved particular protection; ▪ MGN Limited v. the United Kingdom, 2011 (§ 152), in which the Court was persuaded, among other considerations, by the fact that the disclosure in the press of details of a celebrity's therapy for drug addiction was harmful and risked causing a significant setback to her recovery; ▪ Editions Plon v. France, 2004 (§§ 22-55), on the definitive suspension of distribution of a book containing information relating to a deceased Head of State and covered by medical confidentiality.","Conversely, the Court has found no violation of Article 10 in, or declared inadmissible, several cases including:  Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023 (§§ 167-257), concerning a civil judgment ordering a newspaper publisher to anonymise the electronic online version of an article which had mentioned the full name of a driver responsible for a fatal accident that had taken place many years earlier;  Biancardi v. Italy, 2021 (§§ 67-71) concerning a civil judgment against a newspaper editor for not de-indexing sensitive information published on the Internet concerning criminal proceedings against a private individual and the journalist's decision to keep the information easily accessible in spite of the individual's opposition;  Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017 (§§ 139-199), concerning a judicial decision banning the mass publication of personal taxation data;  Bédat v. Switzerland [GC], 2016 (§§ 44-82), on the conviction of a journalist for publishing information covered by the secrecy of criminal investigations;  Mediengruppe Österreich GmbH v. Austria, 2022 (§§ 44-73), concerning a court order for a daily newspaper not to publish a photograph with a ""convicted neo-Nazi"" caption as regards an individual indirectly connected to the campaign of a political candidate in the run-up to a presidential election, the relevant publication having taken place more than twenty years after the conviction;  Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020 (§§ 85-90), concerning the withdrawal of a journalist's accreditation to search the Securitate archives, following the disclosure in several articles written by him of personal data in ""raw"" form concerning various well-known sports figures, without the relevance of the data having been assessed in the light of the declared subject of his research, namely sport in Romania under the communist regime;  Giesbert and Others v. France, 2017 (§§ 77-103), concerning the courts' findings against a newspaper for publishing documents from a set of criminal proceedings before they were to be read out at a public hearing;  Verlagsgruppe Droemer Knaur GmbH & Co. KG v. Germany, 2017 (§§ 36-62), concerning an order for a publishing company to pay damages for failing to carry out thorough research and for serious interference with an individual's personality rights;  Kurier Zeitungsverlag und Druckerei GmbH v. Austria, 2012 (§§ 47-56), concerning the requirement to pay compensation to a child who had been the victim of sexual abuse and whose identity was disclosed in a press article. In view of the vulnerability of crime victims, their identity deserved particular protection;  MGN Limited v. the United Kingdom, 2011 (§ 152), in which the Court was persuaded, among other considerations, by the fact that the disclosure in the press of details of a celebrity's therapy for drug addiction was harmful and risked causing a significant setback to her recovery;  Editions Plon v. France, 2004 (§§ 22-55), on the definitive suspension of distribution of a book containing information relating to a deceased Head of State and covered by medical confidentiality;  Mitov and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2023 (§§ 30-41), concerning anonymisation rules laid down by the President of the Supreme Administrative Court and legislation introducing a deferred-publication rule for certain criminal judgments, following which the applicants, investigative journalists, had been unable to access freely on the Internet all scanned case materials available in the database of that court."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:57292/16,Hurbain v. Belgium [GC],57292/16,added,"Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], no. 57292/16, 4 July 2023",7,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.B,Internet and search engines,2,387,403,0.9743,"Smolczewski v. Polan d, 2013",,"Internet sites are an information and communication tool particularly distinct from the printed media, especially as regards the capacity to store and transmit information ( M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2018, § 91). In the light of its accessibility and its capacity to store and communicate vast amounts of information, the Internet plays an important role in enhancing the public's access to news 88/99 and facilitating the dissemination of information generally ( Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), 2009, § 27).","Internet sites are an information and communication tool particularly distinct from the printed Węgrzynowski and media, especially as regards the capacity to store and transmit information ( Smolczewski v. Polan d, 2013, § 58; M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2018, § 91; Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, § 236). In the light of its accessibility and its capacity to store and communicate vast amounts of information, the Internet plays an important role in enhancing the public's access to news and facilitating the dissemination of information generally ( Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), 2009, § 27)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:57292/16,Hurbain v. Belgium [GC],57292/16,added,"Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], no. 57292/16, 4 July 2023",8,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,IV.B,Internet and search engines,2,388,404,0.9869,,,"The risk of harm posed by content and communications on the Internet to the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and freedoms, particularly the right to respect for private life, is certainly higher than that posed by the press, particularly on account of the important role of search engines ( M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2018, § 91 and the references cited therein).","The risk of harm posed by content and communications on the Internet to the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and freedoms, particularly the right to respect for private life, is certainly higher than that posed by the press, particularly on account of the important role of search engines ( Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, § 236; M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2018, § 91 and the references cited therein)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:57292/16,Hurbain v. Belgium [GC],57292/16,added,"Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], no. 57292/16, 4 July 2023",9,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.B,Internet and search engines,2,389,405,0.8962,"M.L. and W.W. v. Germany , 2018",,"Information containing personal data held by media outlets can easily be found by Internet users via search engines (ibid., § 97). Because of this amplifying effect on the dissemination of information and the nature of the activity underlying the publication of information, the obligations of search engines towards the individual who is the subject of the information may differ from those of the entity which originally published the information (ibid ., § 97). Hence, in a case in which two individuals had requested that the full details of their identity and their photographs be removed from the online archives of certain newspapers and radio stations after they had finished serving long prison sentences for murder (ibid ., §§ 7, 12, 33), the Court found that the balancing of the interests at stake could result in different outcomes depending on whether a request for the deletion of personal data concerned the original publisher of the information, whose activity was generally at the heart of what freedom of expression was intended to protect, or a search engine whose main interest was not in publishing the initial information about the person concerned, but in particular in facilitating identification of any available information on that person and establishing a profile of him or her (ibid ., § 97). See also paragraphs 281 and 282 above of the present Guide for more information on the ""right to be forgotten"" in the context of the online archives of media outlets containing individuals'personal data, in the case of M.L. and W.W. v. Germany .","Information containing personal data held by media outlets can easily be found by Internet users via search engines. Because of this amplifying effect on the dissemination of information and the nature of the activity underlying the publication of information, the obligations of search engines towards the individual who is the subject of the information may differ from those of the entity which originally published the information ( Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, § 207; M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, 2018, § 97). In view of the distinction between the activities and obligations of search engine operators and those of news publishers, data subjects, who seek protection of their personal data in this context, are not obliged to contact the original website, either beforehand or simultaneously, in order to exercise their rights vis-à-vis search engines, as these are two different forms of processing, each with its own grounds of legitimacy and with different impacts on the individual's rights and interests. Likewise, the examination of an action against the publisher of a news website cannot be made contingent on a prior request for delisting ( Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023, § 208). See also paragraphs 294-305 above of the present Guide for more information on the ""right to be forgotten""."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:57292/16,Hurbain v. Belgium [GC],57292/16,added,"Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], no. 57292/16, 4 July 2023",10,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,IV.B,Internet and search engines,2,391,406,0.8426,,,"The discretion afforded to States in striking a balance between the competing rights is greater where news archives of past events, rather than news reporting of current affairs, are concerned (ibid., § 45). The duty of the press to act in accordance with the principles of responsible journalism by ensuring the accuracy of historical, rather than perishable, information published is more stringent in the absence of any urgency in publishing the material (ibid., § 45).","In the Court's view, Internet archives contribute to preserving and making available news and information ( Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos . 1 and 2), 2009, § 45). Such archives constitute an important source for education and historical research, particularly as they are readily accessible to the public and are generally free ( Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], § 180). The discretion afforded to States in striking a balance between the competing rights is greater where news archives of past events, rather than news reporting of current affairs, are concerned ( Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), § 45). The duty of the press to act in accordance with the principles of responsible journalism by ensuring the accuracy of historical, rather than perishable, information published is more stringent in the absence of any urgency in publishing the material ( ibid., § 45)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:57292/16,Hurbain v. Belgium [GC],57292/16,added,"Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], no. 57292/16, 4 July 2023",11,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,IV.B,Internet and search engines,2,392,407,0.732,,"ęgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Polan d, 2013","The refusal of the courts to order the withdrawal of an article damaging the reputation of a lawyer and available in a newspaper's Internet archives was found not to be in breach of Article 8 in the case of Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Polan d, 2013 (§§ 60-70). The Court accepted that it was not the role of the judicial authorities to engage in rewriting history by ordering the removal from the public domain of all traces of publications which had in the past been found, by final judicial decisions, to amount to unjustified attacks on individual reputations (ibid., § 65). Furthermore, the legitimate interest of the public in access to the public Internet archives of the press was protected under Article 10 (ibid., § 65). It was noteworthy that the Polish courts had observed that it would be desirable to add a comment to the article on the newspaper's website informing the public of the outcome of the first set of proceedings. In the Court's view, this showed that the domestic courts had been aware of the significance which publications available to the general public on the Internet could have for the effective protection of individual rights and that they appreciated the value of the availability on the newspaper's website of full information about the judicial decisions concerning the article. The lawyer had not requested that a reference to the earlier judgments in his favour be added to the article (ibid., §§ 66-67).","In the case of Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023 (§§ 180-185) the Court noted the emergence of a consensus within Europe regarding the importance of archives, which should, as a general rule, remain authentic, reliable and complete so that the press could carry out its mission. Accordingly, the integrity of press archives should be the guiding principle in examining any request for the removal or alteration of all or part of an archived article, especially where its lawfulness had never been called into question. Such requests called for particular vigilance and thorough examination by the national authorities."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:31172/19,Jehovah's Witnesses v. Finland,31172/19,added,"Jehovah's Witnesses v. Finland, no. 31172/19, 9 May 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A.1,"Data protection and freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9 of the Convention)",3,,333,,"Witnesses v. Finland , 2023",,,"In Jehovah's Witnesses v. Finland, 2023 (§§ 80-99), the Court was called upon to decide whether a fair balance had been struck between the applicant community's right to freedom of religion and the right to privacy of persons (data subjects) whom the applicant community's members visited in the context of their door-to-door preaching. At the domestic level, the competent authorities had found that the unambiguous or express consent of data subjects had been required during that activity, when personal and sensitive data (their names and addresses) had been being collected and processed. The Court accepted that the application of the consent requirement in the context of the applicant community's door-to-door preaching - a religious activity intended to manifest or spread their faith - had constituted an interference with that community's rights under Article 9 (§ 81). At the same time, it considered that the impugned interference had been ""prescribed by law"" given, in particular, that the Supreme Administrative Court had interpreted the relevant domestic legal act, which had served as a basis for the contested measures and had itself been based on the relevant EUdirective, in line with the interpretation given by the EU Court of Justice (§§ 84-88). The measure complained of had also pursued the legitimate aim of protecting ""the rights and freedoms of others"" (§ 89) and was ""necessary in a democratic society"". In the latter respect, the Court observed that, whilst the requirement of consent was an appropriate and necessary safeguard for preventing any communication or disclosure of personal and sensitive data in the context of door-to-door preaching of the applicant community, the latter had failed to demonstrate how that requirement would hinder the essence of its right to freedom of religion (§ 95). Moreover, the relevant requirement was applicable to all religious communities and religious activities (§ 96) and no penalty, although requested, had been imposed on the applicant community (§ 97)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:36345/16,L.B. v. Hungary [GC],36345/16,added,"L.B. v. Hungary [GC], no. 36345/16, 9 March 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I,Basic definitions and principles of data protection,1,3,3,0.992,,,"The right to the protection of personal data is not an autonomous right among the various Convention rights and freedoms. The Court has nevertheless acknowledged that the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 137; Z v. Finland, 1997, § 95). This Article is the main vector through which personal data is protected in the Convention system, even though considerations related to this protection may also come into play under other provisions of the Convention and its Protocols.","The right to the protection of personal data is not an autonomous right among the various Convention rights and freedoms. The Court has nevertheless acknowledged that the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 137; Z v. Finland, 1997, § 95; L.B. v. Hungary [GC], 2023, § 103). This Article is the main vector through which personal data is protected in the Convention system, even though considerations related to this protection may also come into play under other provisions of the Convention and its Protocols."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:36345/16,L.B. v. Hungary [GC],36345/16,added,"L.B. v. Hungary [GC], no. 36345/16, 9 March 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A.1,Concept of personal data and its scope,3,15,15,0.9771,"ć v. Montenegro , 2017",,"The fact that personal data are already in the public domain or can be accessed by the public does not necessarily remove such data from the protection of Article 8 ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 134). Data of a public nature may fall within the ""private life"" of an individual when they are collected and stored in a systematic manner ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 57; Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 58-59; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 38), even without using secret surveillance methods ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44; Antovi ć and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). Article 8 of the Convention provides for the right to a form of informational self-determination, allowing individuals to rely on their right to privacy as regards data which, albeit neutral, are collected, processed and disseminated collectively and in such a form or manner that Article 8 rights may be engaged ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 137).","The fact that personal data are already in the public domain or can be accessed by the public does Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and not necessarily remove such data from the protection of Article 8 ( Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 134; L.B. v. Hungary [GC], 2023, § 104). Data of a public nature may fall within the ""private life"" of an individual when they are collected and stored in a systematic P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom Peck v. the United Kingdom, manner (, 2001, § 57; 2003, §§ 58-59; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 38), even without using secret surveillance methods ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44; Antović and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). Article 8 of the Convention provides for the right to a form of informational self-determination, allowing individuals to rely on their right to privacy as regards data which, albeit neutral, are collected, processed and disseminated collectively and in such a form or manner that Article 8 rights may be engaged ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 137; L.B. v. Hungary [GC], 2023, § 103)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:36345/16,L.B. v. Hungary [GC],36345/16,added,"L.B. v. Hungary [GC], no. 36345/16, 9 March 2023",3,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,II.A.3,Disclosure of personal data,3,234,238,0.9973,,"Z v. Finland , 1997","In several cases the Court has assessed measures entailing the disclosure of an individual's personal data by the data processor, to: ▪ another individual or a legal person ( Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 99-100, concerning the transmission by a hospital of information on a patient's state of health to a member of her family and to journalists; Y. v. Turkey (dec.), 2015, §§ 70-72, concerning the disclosure by an ambulance crew to hospital staff of information on a patient's HIV-positive status; Radu v. Republic of Moldova, 2014, § 27, concerning the disclosure by a hospital of medical information on a patient to her employer; M.C. v. the United Kingdom, 2021, § 46 concerning the disclosure by the authorities of information concerning the applicant's criminal record to her prospective employer); ▪ a public authority ( M.S. v. Sweden, 1997, § 35, concerning the disclosure by a gynaecological department of medical information on a patient to a social security fund; P.T. v. Republic of Moldova, 2020, §§ 5-6, 29-31, concerning the unnecessary inclusion of sensitive medical data on a certificate to be produced in various contexts); 53/99 ▪ the public ( Hájovský v. Slovakia, 2021 §§ 46-49, on the publication in a television news broadcast of information identifying an individual and containing a non-blurred photo of him taken covertly and under false pretence; Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 63, on the transmission to the media of a closed-circuit TVvideo showing a person attempting to commit suicide in a public place; Bremner v. Turkey, 2015, §§ 71-85, concerning the TVbroadcast of an unblurred, unpixellated image of an individual filmed by a hidden camera; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, 2019, §§ 108-132, concerning a covert video recording of a journalist in her private home and the public broadcasting of the videos; Z v. Finland, 1997, §§ 70-71, concerning the disclosure in a judicial decision transmitted to the press of an individual's identity and state of health; Apostu v. Romania, 2015, §§ 121-132, on the disclosure to the press of pieces of evidence from an investigation file; Montera v. Italy (dec.), 2002, concerning the public disclosure of a report by a parliamentary commission on a magistrate's private life and professional ethics; Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004, §§ 61-81, on the publication in the tabloid press of photographs relating to a princess's private life; Polanco Torres and Movilla Polanco v. Spain, 2010, §§ 44-54, concerning a press article based on statements by a former accountant accusing a senior judge's wife of involvement in unlawful transactions with a specified company; Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, §§ 30-31, concerning the disclosure by a mass-circulation daily newspaper of a famous actress's full postal address; Mityanin and Leonov v. Russia, 2018, §§ 111-121, on the dissemination in the press of a photograph of a suspect, accompanied by statements accusing him of various minor and serious criminal offences; and Bogomolova v. Russia, 2017, §§ 54-58, concerning the publication of a photograph of a child on the cover page of a booklet entitled ""Children need a family"", published by a Centre for Psychological, Medical and Social Suppor t).","In several cases the Court has assessed measures entailing the disclosure of an individual's personal data by the data processor, to:  another individual or a legal person ( Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 99-100, concerning the transmission by a hospital of information on a patient's state of health to a member of her family and to journalists; Y. v. Turkey (dec.), 2015, §§ 70-72, concerning the disclosure by an ambulance crew to hospital staff of information on a patient's HIV-positive status; Radu v. Republic of Moldova, 2014, § 27, concerning the disclosure by a hospital of medical M.C. v. the United Kingdom information on a patient to her employer;, 2021, § 46 concerning the disclosure by the authorities of information concerning the applicant's criminal record to her prospective employer);  a public authority ( M.S. v. Sweden, 1997, § 35, concerning the disclosure by a gynaecological department of medical information on a patient to a social security fund; P.T. v. Republic of Moldova, 2020, §§ 5-6, 29-31, concerning the unnecessary inclusion of sensitive medical data on a certificate to be produced in various contexts);  the public ( Hájovský v. Slovakia, 2021 §§ 46-49, on the publication in a television news broadcast of information identifying an individual and containing a non-blurred photo of him taken covertly and under false pretence; Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 63, on the transmission to the media of a closed-circuit TVvideo showing a person attempting to commit suicide in a public place; Bremner v. Turkey, 2015, §§ 71-85, concerning the TVbroadcast of an unblurred, unpixellated image of an individual filmed by a hidden camera; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, 2019, §§ 108-132, concerning a covert video recording of Z v. Finland a journalist in her private home and the public broadcasting of the videos;, 1997, §§ 70-71, concerning the disclosure in a judicial decision transmitted to the press of an individual's identity and state of health; Apostu v. Romania, 2015, §§ 121-132, on the Montera v. Italy disclosure to the press of pieces of evidence from an investigation file; (dec.), 2002, concerning the public disclosure of a report by a parliamentary commission on a magistrate's private life and professional ethics; Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004, §§ 61-81, on the publication in the tabloid press of photographs relating to a princess's private life; Polanco Torres and Movilla Polanco v. Spain, 2010, §§ 44-54, concerning a press article based on statements by a former accountant accusing a senior judge's wife of involvement in unlawful transactions with a specified company; Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, §§ 30-31, concerning the disclosure by a mass-circulation daily newspaper of a famous actress's full postal address; Mityanin and Leonov v. Russia, 2018, §§ 111-121, on the dissemination in the press of a photograph of a suspect, accompanied by statements accusing him of various minor and serious criminal offences; Bogomolova v. Russia, 2017, §§ 54-58, concerning the publication of a photograph of a child on the cover page of a booklet entitled ""Children need a family"", published by a Centre for Psychological, Medical and Social Support; L.B. v. Hungary [GC], 2023, concerning mandatory publication by a tax authority of the applicant's personal data, including his name and home address, on its website on the list of major tax debtors)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:36705/16,Margari v. Greece,36705/16,added,"Margari v. Greece, no. 36705/16, 20 June 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.C.3.b,Requirement of accuracy and updating of data,4,,116,,"In Margari v. Greece , 2023",,,"In Margari v. Greece, 2023, § 59, where the information published in the press on the applicant's criminal offences had inaccurately reflected the charges brought against her, the Court underlined that it was of the utmost importance that the data published, in the context of pending criminal proceedings or in the context of the investigation of criminal offences, accurately reflect the situation and the charges pending against an accused person, regard also being had to the observance of the presumption of innocence."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:36705/16,Margari v. Greece,36705/16,added,"Margari v. Greece, no. 36705/16, 20 June 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.3.a,Impact of prior consent,4,243,247,0.9105,"D.H. and Others v. North Macedonia , 2023|Margari v. Greece , 2023",,"As regards persons under arrest or prosecution, the Court found violations of Article 8 where police services had handed over photographs of the applicants to the press without their consent ( Sciacca v. Italy, 2005, §§ 29-31; Khuzhin and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 115-118), where they had invited TVcrews to film an applicant at a police station without his consent with a view to broadcasting the images on television ( Toma v. Romania, 2009, §§ 90-93; Khmel v. Russia, 2013, § 41), or in a case 55/99 where posting up a photograph of the applicant on the ""wanted"" noticeboard had not been prescribed by law ( Guiorgui Nikolaïchvili v. Georgia, 2009, §§ 129-131).","As regards persons under arrest or prosecution, the Court found violations of Article 8 where police services had handed over photographs of the applicants to the press without their consent ( Sciacca v. Italy, 2005, §§ 29-31; Khuzhin and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 115-118; Margari v. Greece, 2023, §§ 54-60), where they had invited TVcrews to film an applicant at a police station without his consent with a view to broadcasting the images on television ( Toma v. Romania, 2009, §§ 90-93; Khmel v. Russia, 2013, § 41), where the Ministry of the Interior published on its website the applicants' photographs, taken while they were in police custody, in which their identity was not concealed ( D.H. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2023, §§ 63-65), where posting up a photograph of the applicant on the ""wanted"" noticeboard had not been prescribed by law ( Guiorgui Nikolaïchvili v. Georgia, 2009, §§ 129-131) or where the existing rules and procedures did not meet ""the quality of law"" requirement ( Negru v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 29-35)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:36705/16,Margari v. Greece,36705/16,added,"Margari v. Greece, no. 36705/16, 20 June 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.3.b,Disclosure of data in the context of judicial proceedings,4,245,249,0.9863,"Margari v. Greece , 2023",,"In several cases the Court has examined measures adopted by the authorities in the context of judicial proceedings having led to the disclosure of the parties'or third parties'personal data, such as: ▪ the reproduction by a court in a divorce judgment of an extract from personal medical records ( L.L. v. France, 2006, § 46), and an order restricting to ten years the period of confidentiality of evidence produced containing medical data ( Z v. Finland, 1997, §§ 112-113); ▪ the disclosure of confidential psychiatric data on an applicant during a public hearing ( Panteleyenko v. Ukraine, 2006, § 57), and verification of a medical certificate produced in support of a request for adjournment ( Stokłosa v. Poland (dec.) 2021, §§ 43-44; ▪ the disclosure of an individual's identity and HIV-positive status in a judgment communicated to the press ( Z v. Finland, 1997, § 113); ▪ the disclosure of the full identity of a third party in a judgment without prior notification of the latter ( Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, §§ 47-51); ▪ the use of language and arguments disclosing, in a judgment, personal data of the victim, conveying stereotypes about the role of women and capable of hindering the effective protection of the victims of sexual violence in spite of a satisfactory legislative framework ( J.L. v. Italy, 2021, §§ 136-142).","In several cases the Court has examined measures adopted by the authorities in the context of judicial proceedings having led to the disclosure of the parties' or third parties' personal data, such as:  the reproduction by a court in a divorce judgment of an extract from personal medical records ( L.L. v. France, 2006, § 46), and an order restricting to ten years the period of Z v. Finland confidentiality of evidence produced containing medical data (, 1997, §§ 112-113);  the disclosure of confidential psychiatric data on an applicant during a public hearing ( Panteleyenko v. Ukraine, 2006, § 57), and verification of a medical certificate produced in support of a request for adjournment ( Stokłosa v. Poland (dec.) 2021, §§ 43-44;  the disclosure of an individual's identity and HIV-positive status in a judgment communicated to the press ( Z v. Finland, 1997, § 113);  the disclosure of the full identity of a third party in a judgment without prior notification of the latter ( Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, §§ 47-51);  the use of language and arguments disclosing, in a judgment, personal data of the victim, conveying stereotypes about the role of women and capable of hindering the effective protection of the victims of sexual violence in spite of a satisfactory legislative framework ( J.L. v. Italy, 2021, §§ 136-142);  the publication of photographs and personal data of defendants in criminal proceedings in the press ( Margari v. Greece, 2023, § 54) or on the public list of wanted persons in the public part of a police station ( Negru v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 24)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:36705/16,Margari v. Greece,36705/16,added,"Margari v. Greece, no. 36705/16, 20 June 2023",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.3.b,Disclosure of data in the context of judicial proceedings,4,246,250,0.9979,"Margari v. Greece , 2023",,"In the Court's opinion, the necessity of protecting the confidentiality of certain types of personal data may sometimes be outweighed by the interest in the investigation and prosecution of crime and in the publicity of court proceedings ( Avilkina and Others v. Russia, 2013, § 45; Z v. Finland, 1997, § 97). The competent national authorities should be afforded some leeway in striking a fair balance between, on the hand, the protection of the publicity of judicial proceedings, which is necessary to uphold trust in the courts, and on the other hand, the interests of a part or of a third person in maintaining the confidentiality of his data ( C.C. v. Spain, 2009, § 35). Any measure liable to make public an individual's personal data, whether he is a party or a third party to judicial proceedings, should meet an overriding social need ( Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, § 46) and should be limited as far as possible to that which is rendered strictly necessary by the specific features of the proceedings ( L.L. v. France, 2006, § 45).","In the Court's opinion, the necessity of protecting the confidentiality of certain types of personal data may sometimes be outweighed by the interest in the investigation and prosecution of crime and in the publicity of court proceedings ( Avilkina and Others v. Russia, 2013, § 45; Z v. Finland, 1997, § 97). The competent national authorities should be afforded some leeway in striking a fair balance between, on the hand, the protection of the publicity of judicial proceedings, which is necessary to uphold trust in the courts, and on the other hand, the interests of a part or of a third person in maintaining the confidentiality of his data ( C.C. v. Spain, 2009, § 35). Any measure liable to make public an individual's personal data, whether he is a party or a third party to judicial proceedings, should meet an overriding social need ( Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, § 46) and should be limited as far as possible to that which is rendered strictly necessary by the specific features of the proceedings ( L.L. v. France, 2006, § 45; Margari v. Greece, 2023, § 47)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:80857/17,Mitov and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.),80857/17,added,"Mitov and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 80857/17, 28 February 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,III.A.2,Data protection and freedom of expression (Article 10 of the Convention),3,322,337,0.9874,,,"Conversely, the Court has found no violation of Article 10 in several cases including: ▪ Biancardi v. Italy, 2021 (§§ 67-71) on the compatibility with Article 10 of a civil judgment against a journalist for not de-indexing sensitive information published on the Internet concerning criminal proceedings against a private individual and the journalist's decision to keep the information easily accessible in spite of the individual's opposition; ▪ Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017 (§§ 139-199), concerning a judicial decision banning the mass publication of personal taxation data; ▪ Bédat v. Switzerland [GC], 2016 (§§ 44-82), on the conviction of a journalist for publishing information covered by the secrecy of criminal investigations; ▪ Mediengruppe Österreich GmbH v. Austria, 2022 (§§ 44-73), concerning a court order for a daily newspaper not to publish a photograph with a ""convicted neo-Nazi "" caption as regards an individual indirectly connected to the campaign of a political candidate in the run-up to a presidential election, the relevant publication having taken place more than twenty years after the conviction; ▪ Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020 (§§ 85-90), concerning the withdrawal of a journalist's accreditation to search the Securitate archives, following the disclosure in several articles written by him of personal data in ""raw"" form concerning various well -known sports figures, without the relevance of the data having been assessed in the light of the declared subject of his research, namely sport in Romania under the communist regime; ▪ Giesbert and Others v. France, 2017 (§§ 77-103), concerning the courts'findings against a newspaper for publishing documents from a set of criminal proceedings before they were to be read out at a public hearing; ▪ Verlagsgruppe Droemer Knaur GmbH & Co. KG v. Germany, 2017 (§§ 36-62), concerning an order for a publishing company to pay damages for failing to carry out thorough research and for serious interference with an individual's personality rights; ▪ Kurier Zeitungsverlag und Druckerei GmbH v. Austria, 2012 (§§ 47-56), concerning the requirement to pay compensation to a child who had been the victim of sexual abuse and whose identity was disclosed in a press article. In view of the vulnerability of crime victims, their identity deserved particular protection; ▪ MGN Limited v. the United Kingdom, 2011 (§ 152), in which the Court was persuaded, among other considerations, by the fact that the disclosure in the press of details of a celebrity's therapy for drug addiction was harmful and risked causing a significant setback to her recovery; ▪ Editions Plon v. France, 2004 (§§ 22-55), on the definitive suspension of distribution of a book containing information relating to a deceased Head of State and covered by medical confidentiality.","Conversely, the Court has found no violation of Article 10 in, or declared inadmissible, several cases including:  Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023 (§§ 167-257), concerning a civil judgment ordering a newspaper publisher to anonymise the electronic online version of an article which had mentioned the full name of a driver responsible for a fatal accident that had taken place many years earlier;  Biancardi v. Italy, 2021 (§§ 67-71) concerning a civil judgment against a newspaper editor for not de-indexing sensitive information published on the Internet concerning criminal proceedings against a private individual and the journalist's decision to keep the information easily accessible in spite of the individual's opposition;  Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017 (§§ 139-199), concerning a judicial decision banning the mass publication of personal taxation data;  Bédat v. Switzerland [GC], 2016 (§§ 44-82), on the conviction of a journalist for publishing information covered by the secrecy of criminal investigations;  Mediengruppe Österreich GmbH v. Austria, 2022 (§§ 44-73), concerning a court order for a daily newspaper not to publish a photograph with a ""convicted neo-Nazi"" caption as regards an individual indirectly connected to the campaign of a political candidate in the run-up to a presidential election, the relevant publication having taken place more than twenty years after the conviction;  Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020 (§§ 85-90), concerning the withdrawal of a journalist's accreditation to search the Securitate archives, following the disclosure in several articles written by him of personal data in ""raw"" form concerning various well-known sports figures, without the relevance of the data having been assessed in the light of the declared subject of his research, namely sport in Romania under the communist regime;  Giesbert and Others v. France, 2017 (§§ 77-103), concerning the courts' findings against a newspaper for publishing documents from a set of criminal proceedings before they were to be read out at a public hearing;  Verlagsgruppe Droemer Knaur GmbH & Co. KG v. Germany, 2017 (§§ 36-62), concerning an order for a publishing company to pay damages for failing to carry out thorough research and for serious interference with an individual's personality rights;  Kurier Zeitungsverlag und Druckerei GmbH v. Austria, 2012 (§§ 47-56), concerning the requirement to pay compensation to a child who had been the victim of sexual abuse and whose identity was disclosed in a press article. In view of the vulnerability of crime victims, their identity deserved particular protection;  MGN Limited v. the United Kingdom, 2011 (§ 152), in which the Court was persuaded, among other considerations, by the fact that the disclosure in the press of details of a celebrity's therapy for drug addiction was harmful and risked causing a significant setback to her recovery;  Editions Plon v. France, 2004 (§§ 22-55), on the definitive suspension of distribution of a book containing information relating to a deceased Head of State and covered by medical confidentiality;  Mitov and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2023 (§§ 30-41), concerning anonymisation rules laid down by the President of the Supreme Administrative Court and legislation introducing a deferred-publication rule for certain criminal judgments, following which the applicants, investigative journalists, had been unable to access freely on the Internet all scanned case materials available in the database of that court."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:7336/11,Negru v. the Republic of Moldova,7336/11,added,"Negru v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 7336/11, 27 June 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,I.C.1,Whether the interference was lawful,3,95,95,0.9797,,"Dimitrov-Kazakov v. Bulgaria , 2011|In the case of Dimitrov-Kazakov v. Bulgaria , 2011|Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey , 2022|Shimovolos v. Russia , 2011","In the context of personal data collected by the authorities and stored in databases for purposes related to the prevention or punishment of crime, the Court has indicated that it is essential to have clear, detailed rules governing the scope and application of such measures, together with minimum safeguards concerning, inter alia, duration, storage, usage, access of third parties, procedures for preserving the integrity and confidentiality of data and procedures for their destruction, thus providing sufficient guarantees against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 99, 103; Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, § 86). The Court has found a violation of Article 8 in cases where the domestic law did not indicate with sufficient clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the discretion conferred on the domestic authorities ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, § 70 ; Dimitrov-Kazakov v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 33). In the case of Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011 (§ 69), the creation and maintenance of a surveillance database storing personal data, including on the movements of a human rights activist, and the procedure for its operation, were governed by a ministerial order which had never been published or otherwise made accessible to the public. In the case of Dimitrov-Kazakov v. Bulgaria, 2011 (§ 33), the registration of an individual as an ""offender"" in the police registers was based on a non-public instruction at the material time which was confidential in character and was reserved, until its subsequent declassification, for the internal use of the Interior Ministry.","In the context of personal data collected by the authorities and stored in databases for purposes related to the prevention or punishment of crime, the Court has indicated that it is essential to have clear, detailed rules governing the scope and application of such measures, together with minimum safeguards concerning, inter alia, duration, storage, usage, access of third parties, procedures for preserving the integrity and confidentiality of data and procedures for their destruction, thus providing sufficient guarantees against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2008, §§ 99, 103;, 2022, § 86). The Court has found a violation of Article 8 in cases where the domestic law did not indicate with sufficient clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the discretion conferred on the domestic authorities ( Shimovolos v. Russia, Dimitrov- Kazakov v. Bulgaria Negru v. the Republic of Moldova 2011, § 70 ;, 2011, § 33;, 2023, § 34). In the case of Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011 (§ 69), the creation and maintenance of a surveillance database storing personal data, including on the movements of a human rights activist, and the procedure for its operation, were governed by a ministerial order which had never been published or Dimitrov- Kazakov v. Bulgaria otherwise made accessible to the public. In the case of, 2011 (§ 33), the registration of an individual as an ""offender"" in the police registers was based on a non-public instruction at the material time which was confidential in character and was reserved, until its Negru v. the subsequent declassification, for the internal use of the Interior Ministry. In the case of Republic of Moldova, 2023 (§ 24), the applicant was included on the list of wanted persons, which had involved the processing of her personal data in the national integrated automated information system for recording offences, criminal cases and offenders, and her photograph was posted on the public premises of a police station on the basis of a prosecutor's decision which was taken in procedures lacking clarity whereby the prosecutor's discretion was considered to amount to a practically unfettered power."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:7336/11,Negru v. the Republic of Moldova,7336/11,added,"Negru v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 7336/11, 27 June 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.3.a,Impact of prior consent,4,243,247,0.9105,"D.H. and Others v. North Macedonia , 2023|Margari v. Greece , 2023",,"As regards persons under arrest or prosecution, the Court found violations of Article 8 where police services had handed over photographs of the applicants to the press without their consent ( Sciacca v. Italy, 2005, §§ 29-31; Khuzhin and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 115-118), where they had invited TVcrews to film an applicant at a police station without his consent with a view to broadcasting the images on television ( Toma v. Romania, 2009, §§ 90-93; Khmel v. Russia, 2013, § 41), or in a case 55/99 where posting up a photograph of the applicant on the ""wanted"" noticeboard had not been prescribed by law ( Guiorgui Nikolaïchvili v. Georgia, 2009, §§ 129-131).","As regards persons under arrest or prosecution, the Court found violations of Article 8 where police services had handed over photographs of the applicants to the press without their consent ( Sciacca v. Italy, 2005, §§ 29-31; Khuzhin and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 115-118; Margari v. Greece, 2023, §§ 54-60), where they had invited TVcrews to film an applicant at a police station without his consent with a view to broadcasting the images on television ( Toma v. Romania, 2009, §§ 90-93; Khmel v. Russia, 2013, § 41), where the Ministry of the Interior published on its website the applicants' photographs, taken while they were in police custody, in which their identity was not concealed ( D.H. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2023, §§ 63-65), where posting up a photograph of the applicant on the ""wanted"" noticeboard had not been prescribed by law ( Guiorgui Nikolaïchvili v. Georgia, 2009, §§ 129-131) or where the existing rules and procedures did not meet ""the quality of law"" requirement ( Negru v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 29-35)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:7336/11,Negru v. the Republic of Moldova,7336/11,added,"Negru v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 7336/11, 27 June 2023",3,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.3.b,Disclosure of data in the context of judicial proceedings,4,245,249,0.9863,"Margari v. Greece , 2023",,"In several cases the Court has examined measures adopted by the authorities in the context of judicial proceedings having led to the disclosure of the parties'or third parties'personal data, such as: ▪ the reproduction by a court in a divorce judgment of an extract from personal medical records ( L.L. v. France, 2006, § 46), and an order restricting to ten years the period of confidentiality of evidence produced containing medical data ( Z v. Finland, 1997, §§ 112-113); ▪ the disclosure of confidential psychiatric data on an applicant during a public hearing ( Panteleyenko v. Ukraine, 2006, § 57), and verification of a medical certificate produced in support of a request for adjournment ( Stokłosa v. Poland (dec.) 2021, §§ 43-44; ▪ the disclosure of an individual's identity and HIV-positive status in a judgment communicated to the press ( Z v. Finland, 1997, § 113); ▪ the disclosure of the full identity of a third party in a judgment without prior notification of the latter ( Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, §§ 47-51); ▪ the use of language and arguments disclosing, in a judgment, personal data of the victim, conveying stereotypes about the role of women and capable of hindering the effective protection of the victims of sexual violence in spite of a satisfactory legislative framework ( J.L. v. Italy, 2021, §§ 136-142).","In several cases the Court has examined measures adopted by the authorities in the context of judicial proceedings having led to the disclosure of the parties' or third parties' personal data, such as:  the reproduction by a court in a divorce judgment of an extract from personal medical records ( L.L. v. France, 2006, § 46), and an order restricting to ten years the period of Z v. Finland confidentiality of evidence produced containing medical data (, 1997, §§ 112-113);  the disclosure of confidential psychiatric data on an applicant during a public hearing ( Panteleyenko v. Ukraine, 2006, § 57), and verification of a medical certificate produced in support of a request for adjournment ( Stokłosa v. Poland (dec.) 2021, §§ 43-44;  the disclosure of an individual's identity and HIV-positive status in a judgment communicated to the press ( Z v. Finland, 1997, § 113);  the disclosure of the full identity of a third party in a judgment without prior notification of the latter ( Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, §§ 47-51);  the use of language and arguments disclosing, in a judgment, personal data of the victim, conveying stereotypes about the role of women and capable of hindering the effective protection of the victims of sexual violence in spite of a satisfactory legislative framework ( J.L. v. Italy, 2021, §§ 136-142);  the publication of photographs and personal data of defendants in criminal proceedings in the press ( Margari v. Greece, 2023, § 54) or on the public list of wanted persons in the public part of a police station ( Negru v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 24)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:34467/15,Sârbu v. Romania,34467/15,added,"Sârbu v. Romania, no. 34467/15, 28 March 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I.A.1,Concept of personal data and its scope,3,8,8,0.9901,"ć v. Croatia Odièvre v. France , 1989|ć v. Montenegro , 2017","Khelili v. Switzerland , 2011|M.N. and Others v. San Marino , 2015","Personal data can take very different forms. For example: ▪ Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109). ▪ Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59). ▪ Cellular samples and DNAprofiles ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints (ibid., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances (ibid., § 85). ▪ Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving sensitive details or professional activity ( M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.). ▪ Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the police ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 18, 74-81). ▪ Acopy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdök and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36). ▪ Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Antovi ć and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). ▪ Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138). ▪ Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 54-64; Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29). ▪ Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68).","Personal data can take very different forms. For example:  Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109).  Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59).  S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom Cellular samples and DNAprofiles ( [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints (ibid., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances (ibid., § 85).  Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving M.N. and Others v. San Marino sensitive details or professional activity (, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.).  Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the Khelili v. Switzerland police (, 2011, § 56).  Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 18, 74-81).  Acopy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdök and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36).  Antović and Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45).  Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138).  Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom Mikulić v. Croatia Odièvre v. France, 1989, § 39;, 2002, §§ 54-64; [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29).  Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68).  Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings Sârbu v. Romania against the applicant (, 2023, §§ 39-41)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:34467/15,Sârbu v. Romania,34467/15,added,"Sârbu v. Romania, no. 34467/15, 28 March 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I.A.1,Concept of personal data and its scope,3,13,13,0.9682,"Glukhin v. Russia , 2023|Sârbu v. Romania , 2023","Benedik v. Slovenia , 2018","Asignificant element, although not necessarily decisive, is whether an individual is reasonably entitled to expect protection of his/her private life ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 37; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 80). As to on-line activities, the anonymity of personal information will be a key factor in that assessment and the fact that a subscriber to an Internet service provider had not hidden his/her dynamic IPaddress was not decisive in the assessment of whether his expectation of privacy was reasonable from an objective standpoint ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, § 116). In the workplace, an employer's instructions cannot reduce private social life in the workplace to zero. Respect for private life and for the privacy of correspondence continues to exist, even if these may be restricted in so far as necessary ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 80-81). Video recordings made in a public place using surveillance mechanisms may fall within Article 8 where their disclosure, by its manner or extent, goes beyond what the individuals could reasonably have expected ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 62; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 41-43). As regards press articles about the arrest of a television actor, illustrated by photos, the Court found that the actor 's ""legitimate expectation"" of having his private life effectively protected was reduced by the fact that he had ""actively sought the limelight"" by revealing details of his private life in a number of interviews ( Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 2012, § 101).","Asignificant element, although not necessarily decisive, is whether an individual is reasonably entitled to expect protection of his/her private life ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 37; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 80; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66). As to on-line activities, the anonymity of personal information will be a key factor in that assessment and the fact that a subscriber to an Internet service provider had not hidden his/her dynamic IPaddress was not decisive in the assessment of whether his expectation of privacy was reasonable from an objective standpoint Benedik v. Slovenia (, 2018, § 116). In the workplace, an employer's instructions cannot reduce private social life in the workplace to zero. Respect for private life and for the privacy of correspondence continues to exist, even if these may be restricted in so far as necessary ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 80-81; see also, for the professional context, Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 37-38). The monitoring of the actions or movements of an individual in a public place using surveillance mechanisms may fall within Article 8 once any systemic or permanent record of such personal data comes into existence ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66), or where their disclosure, by its manner or extent, Peck v. the United Kingdom goes beyond what the individuals could reasonably have expected (, 2003, § 62; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 41-43). As regards press articles about the arrest of a television actor, illustrated by photos, the Court found that the actor's ""legitimate expectation"" of having his private life effectively protected was reduced by the fact that he had ""actively sought the Axel Springer AG v. Germany limelight"" by revealing details of his private life in a number of interviews ( [GC], 2012, § 101)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:34467/15,Sârbu v. Romania,34467/15,added,"Sârbu v. Romania, no. 34467/15, 28 March 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I.A.1,Concept of personal data and its scope,3,16,16,0.9958,"Sârbu v. Romania , 2023|ć v. Switzerland 2003","Uzun v. Germany, 2010","In most cases where the processing of personal data was intended to allow the authorities to conduct an investigation into the data subject or to collect evidence in judicial proceedings before the domestic courts, the Court has found that such processing fell within the scope of Article 8 and had entailed interference with the respect for the private life of the person concerned ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 39-43; Uzun v. Germany, 2010, §§ 51-52; Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, §§ 57-10/99 59 ; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 94 ; contrast Lupker and Others v. the Netherlands, 1992, on the use by the police, for the purpose of identifying the applicants, of photographs which had been voluntarily handed to the authorities or which had been taken by the police in connection with previous arrests; Friedl v. Austria, 1994, §§ 50-51, on the taking of photographs by the authorities during a demonstration with a view to opening an investigation against the applicants for traffic offences).","In most cases where the processing of personal data was intended to allow the authorities to conduct an investigation into the data subject or to collect evidence in judicial proceedings before the domestic courts, the Court has found that such processing fell within the scope of Article 8 and had entailed interference with the respect for the private life of the person concerned ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, Uzun v. Germany, Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland 2003, §§ 39-43; 2010, §§ 51-52;, 2016, §§ 57-59 ; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 94 ; Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 38 and 41; contrast Lupker and Others v. the Netherlands, 1992, on the use by the police, for the purpose of identifying the applicants, of photographs which had been voluntarily handed to the authorities or which had been taken by the police in connection with previous arrests; Friedl v. Austria, 1994, §§ 50-51, on the taking of photographs by the authorities during a demonstration with a view to opening an investigation against the applicants for traffic offences)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:34467/15,Sârbu v. Romania,34467/15,added,"Sârbu v. Romania, no. 34467/15, 28 March 2023",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I.C.1,Whether the interference was lawful,3,93,93,0.9897,"Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdjiev v. Bulgaria Roman , 2007|Sârbu v. Romania , 2023","Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdjiev v. Bulgaria , 2007","In the specific context of covert surveillance measures, such as the interception of communications, the Court has found that ""foreseeability"" cannot be understood in the same way as in many other fields. In its view, it cannot mean that an individual should be able to foresee when the authorities are likely to have recourse to such measures so that he or she can adapt his or her conduct accordingly ( Adomaitis v.Lithuania, 2022, § 83). However, especially where a power vested in the executive is exercised in secret, the risks of arbitrariness are evident. It is therefore essential to have clear, detailed rules on covert surveillance measures, especially as the technology available for use is continually becoming more sophisticated. The domestic law must be sufficiently clear to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which, and the conditions upon which, public authorities are empowered to resort to any such measures ( Malone v. the United Kingdom, 1984, § 67; Leander v. Sweden, 1987, § 51; Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, 1998, § 46; Weber and Saravia v. Germany (dec.), 2006, § 93; Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdjiev v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 75; Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 229). In addition, the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference ( Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 230).","In the specific context of covert surveillance measures, such as the interception of communications, the Court has found that ""foreseeability"" cannot be understood in the same way as in many other fields. In its view, it cannot mean that an individual should be able to foresee when the authorities are likely to have recourse to such measures so that he or she can adapt his or her conduct accordingly ( Adomaitis v.Lithuania, 2022, § 83; see also Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, § 51, where the same principles were applied in the context of covert video recording made by a private individual). However, especially where a power vested in the executive is exercised in secret, the risks of arbitrariness are evident. It is therefore essential to have clear, detailed rules on covert surveillance measures, especially as the technology available for use is continually becoming more sophisticated. The domestic law must be sufficiently clear to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which, and the conditions upon which, public authorities are empowered to resort to any such measures ( Malone v. the United Kingdom, 1984, § 67; Leander v. Sweden, 1987, § 51; Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, 1998, § 46; Weber and Saravia v. Germany (dec.), 2006, § 93; Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdjiev v. Bulgaria Roman, 2007, § 75; Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 229). In addition, the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference ( Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 230)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20230923165006__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:34467/15,Sârbu v. Romania,34467/15,added,"Sârbu v. Romania, no. 34467/15, 28 March 2023",5,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.C.2,Whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim,3,102,103,0.9563,,,"The interception of telephone conversations of the applicant - a prison director, who had been suspected of corruption - the storage of that information and its disclosure in the disciplinary proceedings, which ultimately had led to his dismissal, were found to aim at preventing acts of a corrupt nature and guaranteeing the transparency and openness of public service, and thus had pursued the legitimate aims of the prevention of disorder or crime, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others in Adomaitis v. Lithuania, 2022 (§ 84).","The interception of telephone conversations of the applicant - a prison director, who had been suspected of corruption - the storage of that information and its disclosure in the disciplinary proceedings, which ultimately had led to his dismissal, were found to aim at preventing acts of a corrupt nature and guaranteeing the transparency and openness of public service, and thus had pursued the legitimate aims of the prevention of disorder or crime, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others in Adomaitis v. Lithuania, 2022 (§ 84). Similar findings were made by the Court in respect of the covert filming of conversations made by a private individual in the professional context and subsequently used by the authorities as evidence to find the applicant guilty of corruption Sârbu v. Romania (, 2023, § 54)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:18843/20,Cherrier v. France,18843/20,added,"Cherrier v. France, no. 18843/20, 30 January 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I.A.1,Concept of personal data and its scope,3,8,8,0.9947,"Cherrier v. France , 2024|Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France , 2023|Khelili v. Switzerland , 2011|M.N. and Others v. San Marino , 2015|Sârbu v. Romania , 2023|ırdö k and Others v. Turkey , 2019","ć v. Croatia Odièvre v. France , 1989|ć v. Montenegro , 2017|ırdök and Others v. Turkey , 2019","Personal data can take very different forms. For example:  Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109).  Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59).  S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom Cellular samples and DNAprofiles ( [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints (ibid., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances (ibid., § 85).  Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving M.N. and Others v. San Marino sensitive details or professional activity (, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.).  Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the Khelili v. Switzerland police (, 2011, § 56).  Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 18, 74-81).  Acopy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdök and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36).  Antović and Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45).  Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138).  Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom Mikulić v. Croatia Odièvre v. France, 1989, § 39;, 2002, §§ 54-64; [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29).  Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68).  Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings Sârbu v. Romania against the applicant (, 2023, §§ 39-41).","Personal data can take very different forms. For example: ▪ Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109). ▪ Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59). ▪ Cellular samples and DNAprofiles ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints ( ibid ., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances ( ibid ., § 85). ▪ Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving sensitive details or professional activity ( M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.). ▪ Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the police ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 18, 74-81). ▪ Acopy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdö k and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36). ▪ Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Antovi ć and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). ▪ Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138). ▪ Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 54-64; Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, §§ 106 and 112; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 50). ▪ Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68). ▪ Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings against the applicant ( Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 39-41). 8/107"
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:18843/20,Cherrier v. France,18843/20,added,"Cherrier v. France, no. 18843/20, 30 January 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I.B,The two aspects (negative and positive) of data protection,2,71,71,0.9863,"Cherrier v. France , 2024|Podchasov v. Russia , 2024|Tena Arregui v. Spain , 2024","ć v. Switzerland , 2016","Where a measure interfering with the protection of personal data is taken by an individual or entity purely in the private sector, the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's positive obligations ( Craxi v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, §§ 68-76; Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010; Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, § 32; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 89; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 111; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain Buturugă v. Romania Volodina [GC], 2019, § 111;, 2020, §§ 60-63; v. Russia (no. 2 ), 2021, §§ 58-68; Florindo de Almeida Vasconcelos Gramaxo v. Portugal, 2022, § 111). However, where a measure has been taken by a public entity ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 39; Libert v. France, 2018, § 41; Drelon v. France, 2022, § 85) or a private body to which the State has delegated its obligations ( Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, § 47), the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's negative obligation. The Court will have to verify that the interference met the requirements of Article 8 § 2, namely that it was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. This question will be examined in more detail in the part of this guide below on the Three data protection ""tests"".","Where a measure interfering with the protection of personal data is taken by an individual or entity purely in the private sector, the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's positive obligations ( Craxi v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, §§ 68-76; Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010; Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, § 32; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 89; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 111; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 111; Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, §§ 60-63; Volodina v. Russia (no. 2 ), 2021, §§ 58-68; Florindo de Almeida Vasconcelos Gramaxo v. Portugal, 2022, § 111; Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 35). However, where a measure has been taken by a public entity ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 39; Libert v. France, 2018, § 41; Drelon v. France, 2022, § 85; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 57), a private body to which the State has delegated its obligations ( Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, § 47), or a private body pursuant to statutory requirements ( Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 52), the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's negative obligation. The Court will have to verify that the interference met the requirements of Article 8 § 2, namely that it was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. This question will be examined in more detail in the part of this guide below on the Three data protection ""tests""."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:21424/16|45728/17,Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France,21424/16|45728/17,added,"Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, nos. 21424/16 and 45728/17, 7 September 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I.A.1,Concept of personal data and its scope,3,8,8,0.9947,"Cherrier v. France , 2024|Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France , 2023|Khelili v. Switzerland , 2011|M.N. and Others v. San Marino , 2015|Sârbu v. Romania , 2023|ırdö k and Others v. Turkey , 2019","ć v. Croatia Odièvre v. France , 1989|ć v. Montenegro , 2017|ırdök and Others v. Turkey , 2019","Personal data can take very different forms. For example:  Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109).  Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59).  S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom Cellular samples and DNAprofiles ( [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints (ibid., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances (ibid., § 85).  Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving M.N. and Others v. San Marino sensitive details or professional activity (, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.).  Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the Khelili v. Switzerland police (, 2011, § 56).  Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 18, 74-81).  Acopy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdök and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36).  Antović and Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45).  Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138).  Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom Mikulić v. Croatia Odièvre v. France, 1989, § 39;, 2002, §§ 54-64; [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29).  Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68).  Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings Sârbu v. Romania against the applicant (, 2023, §§ 39-41).","Personal data can take very different forms. For example: ▪ Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109). ▪ Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59). ▪ Cellular samples and DNAprofiles ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints ( ibid ., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances ( ibid ., § 85). ▪ Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving sensitive details or professional activity ( M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.). ▪ Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the police ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 18, 74-81). ▪ Acopy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdö k and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36). ▪ Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Antovi ć and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). ▪ Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138). ▪ Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 54-64; Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, §§ 106 and 112; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 50). ▪ Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68). ▪ Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings against the applicant ( Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 39-41). 8/107"
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:21424/16|45728/17,Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France,21424/16|45728/17,added,"Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, nos. 21424/16 and 45728/17, 7 September 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B,The two aspects (negative and positive) of data protection,2,77,77,0.9963,"Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France , 2023|Khelili v. Switzerland , 2011|Leander v. Sweden , 1987",,"In cases which raise the issue of the protection of personal data, the Court has found that the State's margin of appreciation is broader: where there is no consensus in the member States of the Council of Europe as to the importance of the interest at stake, or the best means of protecting it ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 47; Breyer v. Germany, 2020, § 108); where the purely financial data at stake were not closely related to the applicant's identity ( G.S.B. v. Switzerland, 2015, § 93); and, Leander v. Sweden lastly, in matters of national security (, 1987, § 59). By contrast, the margin of appreciation afforded to national authorities was found to be narrower where, for example, personal data subject to automatic processing which considerably facilitated their access and dissemination Khelili v. Switzerland could harm a person's reputation and render his daily life more difficult (, 2011, §§ 64, 70). The same consideration is especially valid for the protection of categories of sensitive data, in particular DNAinformation, which contains the person's genetic make-up and is of great importance to both the person concerned and his or her family ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 102-103).","In cases which raise the issue of the protection of personal data, the Court has found that the State's margin of appreciation is broader: where there is no consensus in the member States of the Council of Europe as to the importance of the interest at stake, or the best means of protecting it ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 47; Breyer v. Germany, 2020, § 108; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, § 111); where the purely financial data at stake were not closely related to the applicant's identity ( G.S.B. v. Switzerland, 2015, § 93); and, lastly, in matters of national security ( Leander v. Sweden, 1987, § 59). By contrast, the margin of appreciation afforded to national authorities was found to be narrower where, for example, personal data subject to automatic processing which considerably facilitated their access and dissemination could harm a person's reputation and render his daily life more difficult ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, §§ 64, 70). The same consideration is especially valid for the protection of categories of sensitive data, in particular DNAinformation, which contains the person's genetic make-up and is of great importance to both the person concerned and his or her family ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 102-103)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:21424/16|45728/17,Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France,21424/16|45728/17,added,"Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, nos. 21424/16 and 45728/17, 7 September 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B,The two aspects (negative and positive) of data protection,2,78,78,0.995,"Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France , 2023|Guerra and Others v. Italy, 1998",,"Inherent positive obligations to ensure the effective protection of the Convention rights and freedoms may involve, for example, an obligation to secure to an individual: access within a reasonable time to information stored systematically about the individual by former State secret services concerning his or her distant past ( Haralambie v. Romania, 2009, § 79; Jarnea v. Romania, 2011, § 50; Joanna Szulc v. Poland, 2012, § 87); an ""effective and accessible procedure"" enabling an interested party to have access to ""all relevant and appropriate information"" collected and stored by public authorities in order to receive the information necessary to know and to understand the individual's childhood and early development ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 49), to discover his or her personal identity ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 42), or to identify any health risks to which Guerra and Others v. Italy, McGinley and Egan v. the United he or she has been exposed ( 1998, § 60; Kingdom, 1998, § 101; Roche v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2005, § 162).","Inherent positive obligations to ensure the effective protection of the Convention rights and freedoms may involve, for example, an obligation to secure to an individual: access within a reasonable time to information stored systematically about the individual by former State secret services concerning his or her distant past ( Haralambie v. Romania, 2009, § 79; Jarnea v. Romania, 2011, § 50; Joanna Szulc v. Poland, 2012, § 87); an ""effective and accessible procedure"" enabling an interested party to have access to ""all relevant and appropriate information"" collected and stored by public authorities in order to receive the information necessary to know and to understand the individual's childhood and early development ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 49), to discover his or her personal identity ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 42; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, § 110), or to identify any health risks to which he or she has been exposed ( Guerra and Others v. Italy, 1998, § 60; McGinley and Egan v. the United Kingdom, 1998, § 101; Roche v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2005, § 162). 23/107"
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:21424/16|45728/17,Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France,21424/16|45728/17,added,"Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, nos. 21424/16 and 45728/17, 7 September 2023",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.1,Right of access to one ’ s own data,3,285,288,0.989,"Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France , 2023|Godelli v. Italy , 2012",,"In the case of children born anonymously, the issue of access to one's origins and to information on the identity of one's biological parents is different from that of access to a case record concerning a child in care or to evidence of alleged paternity ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 43; Godelli v. Italy, 2012, § 62). Depending on the wide range of different legal systems and traditions, States had to benefit from a degree of discretion in preserving the confidentiality of the identities of biological parents ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 46; Godelli v. Italy, 2012, § 65). Anational system which provided an applicant with access to non-identifying information on his mother and his biological family, enabling her to establish some her past history, without prejudice to third-party interests, accompanied by the possibility under recently enacted legislation to call on the services of an independent body mandated to help individuals to find their biological origins in order to secure the disclosure of her mother's identity, subject to the latter's consent, was deemed compatible with Article 8 ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 49). Conversely, a system which gave blind preference to a mother's wish to remain anonymous and provided no means for an adopted child who had not been recognised at birth of applying for either access to non-identifying information on her origins or disclosure of her mother's identity, was found to be incompatible with the requirements of Article 8 Godelli v. Italy (, 2012, §§ 70-72).","In the case of children born anonymously, the issue of access to one's origins and to information on the identity of one's biological parents is different from that of access to a case record concerning a child in care or to evidence of alleged paternity ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 43; Godelli v. Italy, 2012, § 62). Depending on the wide range of different legal systems and traditions, States had to benefit from a degree of discretion in preserving the confidentiality of the identities of biological parents ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 46; Godelli v. Italy, 2012, § 65). Anational system which provided an applicant with access to non-identifying information on his mother and his biological family, enabling her to establish some her past history, without prejudice to third-party interests, accompanied by the possibility under recently enacted legislation to call on the services of an independent body mandated to help individuals to find their biological origins in order to secure the disclosure of her mother's identity, subject to the latter's consent, was deemed compatible with Article 8 ( Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, § 49; see also, as regards access of persons born through medically assisted reproduction involving a third-party donor, to information concerning that donor, Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, §§ 113-33). Conversely, a system which gave blind preference to a mother's wish to remain anonymous and provided no means for an adopted child who had not been recognised at birth of applying for either access to non-identifying information on her origins or disclosure of her mother's identity, was found to be incompatible with the requirements of Article 8 ( Godelli v. Italy, 2012, §§ 70-72)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:16974/14,Kaczmarek v. Poland,16974/14,added,"Kaczmarek v. Poland, no. 16974/14, 22 February 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C.1,Whether the interference was lawful,3,87,87,0.9941,"Kaczmarek v. Poland , 2024",,"The Court has examined in a number of cases the question whether the requirement, as stated in Article 5 of Convention 108, that personal data undergoing automatic processing must have been obtained and processed fairly and lawfully, has or has not been met. In a number of cases the Court has found a violation of Article 8 solely on the grounds of a lack of legal basis at national level to authorise measures capable of interfering with the relevant rights ( Taylor -Sabori v. the United Kingdom, 2002, §§ 17-19; Radu v. Moldova, 2014, § 31; Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 103-104; M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022, §§ 61-64).","The Court has examined in a number of cases the question whether the requirement, as stated in Article 5 of Convention 108, that personal data undergoing automatic processing must have been obtained and processed fairly and lawfully, has or has not been met. In a number of cases the Court has found a violation of Article 8 solely on the grounds of a lack of legal basis at national level to authorise measures capable of interfering with the relevant rights ( Taylor-Sabori v. the United Kingdom, 2002, §§ 17-19; Radu v. Moldova, 2014, § 31; Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 103-104; M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022, §§ 61-64; Kaczmarek v. Poland, 2024, §§ 74-80)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:16974/14,Kaczmarek v. Poland,16974/14,added,"Kaczmarek v. Poland, no. 16974/14, 22 February 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C.1,Whether the interference was lawful,3,88,88,0.9898,"Convention. In Kaczmarek v. Poland , 2024",,"In particular, in Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018 (§§ 103-104), the Court noted that neither the Government nor the national courts had indicated any provision that could have formed the legal basis for the communication, by the psychiatric hospital, of information on the health of the applicant, Taylor -Sabori v. the United Kingdom who was an adult, to his mother and to journalists. In, 2002 (§§ 17-19), where the applicant had been subjected to police surveillance by the ""cloning"" of his pager, there existed no statutory system to regulate the interception of pager messages transmitted via a private telecommunications system. In Radu v. Republic of Moldova, 2014 (§ 31), the dissemination by a public hospital of medical information on the applicant's pregnancy, state of health and treatment by her employer had not been ""in accordance with the law"". In M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022 (§§ 61-64), the police drew up a report in respect of judges and magistrates, who exercised their functions in Catalonia and who had signed a manifesto in which they had set out their legal opinion in favour of the possibility of the Catalan people exercising a so-called ""right to decide"", the report revealing the personal data, photographs, professional information and political views of some of them. The Court observed that the drawing up of the report by the police had not been provided for by law, and since the public authorities had used the personal data for a purpose other than that which justified collection, the mere existence of the police report, which had been drafted in respect of individuals whose behaviour had not implied any criminal activity, amounted to a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.","In particular, in Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018 (§§ 103-104), the Court noted that neither the Government nor the national courts had indicated any provision that could have formed the legal basis for the communication, by the psychiatric hospital, of information on the health of the applicant, who was an adult, to his mother and to journalists. In Taylor-Sabori v. the United Kingdom, 2002 (§§ 17-19), where the applicant had been subjected to police surveillance by the ""cloning"" of his pager, there existed no statutory system to regulate the interception of pager messages 25/107 transmitted via a private telecommunications system. In Radu v. Republic of Moldova, 2014 (§ 31), the dissemination by a public hospital of medical information on the applicant's pregnancy, state of health and treatment by her employer had not been ""in accordance with the law"" . In M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022 (§§ 61-64), the police drew up a report in respect of judges and magistrates, who exercised their functions in Catalonia and who had signed a manifesto in which they had set out their legal opinion in favour of the possibility of the Catalan people exercising a so- called ""right to dec ide"", the report revealing the personal data, photographs, professional information and political views of some of them. The Court observed that the drawing up of the report by the police had not been provided for by law, and since the public authorities had used the personal data for a purpose other than that which justified collection, the mere existence of the police report, which had been drafted in respect of individuals whose behaviour had not implied any criminal activity, amounted to a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. In Kaczmarek v. Poland, 2024 (§§ 74-80), where the recording of the applicant's telephone conversation was disclosed at a press conference, the Court found that the relevant provision of the law on criminal procedure, which mainly concerned the inspection of file and making copies in the course of an investigation, could not be regarded as a legal basis for that disclosure."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:16974/14,Kaczmarek v. Poland,16974/14,added,"Kaczmarek v. Poland, no. 16974/14, 22 February 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I.C.1,Whether the interference was lawful,3,89,89,0.9808,"Kaczmarek v. Poland , 2024|Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey , 2022","ć v. Switzerland , 2016","In other cases the Court found a violation of Article 8 on the ground that domestic law, which was supposed to protect personal data, was inaccessible or confidential ( Vasil Vasilev v. Bulgaria, 2021, Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey §§ 169-170;, 2022, §§ 80-99) or was not sufficiently clear and foreseeable ( Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016; Ben Faiza v. France, 2018, §§ 58-61; Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018 ; Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000; Zoltán Varga v. Slovakia, 2021, § 162; Haščák v. Slovakia, 2022, §§ 94-95). Thus in Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-99, prisoners' correspondence was scanned and uploaded onto the National Judicial Network Server on the basis of instructions issued by the Ministry of Justice, directly and specifically addressed to the public prosecutors and prison authorities, which had not been made accessible to the public in general or to the applicants in particular. In the case of Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, §§ 71-77, the provisions forming the basis of the covert surveillance to which the applicant had been subjected by her insurance company after a road accident had not indicated with sufficient clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the discretion conferred on insurance companies acting as public authorities in insurance disputes to conduct secret surveillance of insured persons. In the case of Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000 (§§ 57-62), concerning personal information held by the Romanian intelligence service, national law did not define the type of information which could be processed, the categories of individuals in respect of whom surveillance measures could be taken and in what circumstances, or the procedure to be followed. In Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018 (§ 132), certain legal provisions used by the police to obtain data on a subscriber associated with a dynamic IPaddress lacked clarity and provided no protection against arbitrary interference, as there were no safeguards against abuse or any independent monitoring of the police powers in question.","In other cases the Court found a violation of Article 8 on the ground that domestic law, which was supposed to protect personal data, was inaccessible or confidential ( Vasil Vasilev v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 169-170; Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-99) or was not sufficiently clear and foreseeable ( Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016; Ben Faiza v. France, 2018, §§ 58-61; Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018 ; Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000; Zoltán Varga v. Slovakia, 2021, § 162; Haščák v. Slovakia, 2022, §§ 94-95; Kaczmarek v. Poland, 2024, §§ 93-96). Thus in Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-99, prisoners'correspondence was scanned and uploaded onto the National Judicial Network Server on the basis of instructions issued by the Ministry of Justice, directly and specifically addressed to the public prosecutors and prison authorities, which had not been made accessible to the public in general or to the applicants in particular. In the case of Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, §§ 71-77, the provisions forming the basis of the covert surveillance to which the applicant had been subjected by her insurance company after a road accident had not indicated with sufficient clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the discretion conferred on insurance companies acting as public authorities in insurance disputes to conduct secret surveillance of insured persons. In the case of Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000 (§§ 57-62), concerning personal information held by the Romanian intelligence service, national law did not define the type of information which could be processed, the categories of individuals in respect of whom surveillance measures could be taken and in what circumstances, or the procedure to be followed. In Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018 (§ 132), certain legal provisions used by the police to obtain data on a subscriber associated with a dynamic IPaddress lacked clarity and provided no protection against arbitrary interference, as there were no safeguards against abuse or any independent monitoring of the police powers in question. Likewise, in Kaczmarek v. Poland, 2024 (§§ 93-96) the continued storage by the authorities of surveillance material regarding the applicant collected in the course of a security operation of which she, herself, had not been a subject, was based on legal provisions that lacked sufficient clarity and did not provide for any procedural guarantees with the result that the applicant had been unable to have that material destroyed."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:3866/20|9292/20,L.F. v. France (dec.),3866/20|9292/20,added,"L.F. v. France (dec.), nos. 3866/20 and 9292/20, 13 February 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A.1,Concept of personal data and its scope,3,9,9,0.9949,"Benedik v. Slovenia , 2018|N.F. and Others v. Russia , 2023",,"Under Article 2 of Convention 108, ""data processing"" includes: ""any operation or set of operations performed on personal data, such as the collection, storage, preservation, alteration, retrieval, disclosure, making available, erasure, or destruction of, or the carrying out of logical and/or arithmetical operations on such data"". The development of technologies has led to an increase in the types of operations involving personal data that can constitute processing; the Court has identified the following typical examples:  The collection by the police from an Internet provider of subscriber information associated Benedik v. Slovenia with an individual's specific dynamic IPaddress (, 2018, §§ 108-109).  The fact of gathering and storing public information on an individual, for example about his/her political activity ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44; Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others v. Romania, 2011, §§ 167-168; Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, §§ 65-67; Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 93).  The listing of an individual in a national judicial database of sex offenders ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 58), and the collection and storage of a suspect's fingerprints ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 29).  The covert recording in a police station, for permanent storage, of voice samples to be used in identifying the individuals concerned, by a process of analysis in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, §§ 59-60).  The filming of an individual in a police interview room by cameras installed for security reasons and totally visible, with the permanent recording of the footage and its inclusion in a montage for further use ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 41).  The systematic collection and retention of GPSmonitoring data indicating the whereabouts and public movements of the subject ( Uzun v. Germany, 2010, §§ 49-53).  The publication in a magazine of an article illustrated by photos of celebrities taken without Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) their knowledge ( [GC], 2012, §§ 95-99).  The recording and disclosure to media of CCTVfootage showing an individual trying to Peck v. the United Kingdom commit suicide in a public place (, 2003, §§ 59-63).  The recording and storage by police of data on an individual's supposed occupation ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56).  The disclosure by a psychiatric hospital to journalists of highly sensitive confidential information about the private life of a patient ( Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, § 99).  The collection by the State, as part of anti-doping measures in sport, of information on the whereabouts and daily pursuits, even at weekends, of high-level athletes ( National Federation of Sportspersons' Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 155-159).  The systematic scanning and uploading of prisoners' private correspondence, both incoming and outgoing, onto the National Judicial Network Server ( Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-82).  The use of facial recognition technology to, in the first place, identify the applicant, who had held a solo demonstration without a prior notification, from the photographs and the video published on the Telegram channel and, secondly, locate and arrest him while he was travelling on the underground ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 73).","Under Article 2 of Convention 108, ""data processing"" includes : ""any operation or set of operations performed on personal data, such as the collection, storage, preservation, alteration, retrieval, disclosure, making available, erasure, or destruction of, or the carrying out of logical and/or arithmetical operations on such data"" . The development of technologies has led to an increase in the types of operations involving personal data that can constitute processing; the Court has identified the following typical examples: ▪ The collection by the police from an Internet provider of subscriber information associated with an individual's specific dynamic IPaddress ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109). ▪ The fact of gathering and storing public information on an individual, for example about his/her political activity ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44; Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others v. Romania, 2011, §§ 167-168; Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, §§ 65-67; Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 93). ▪ The listing of an individual in an internal judicial database of a relevant ministry ( L.F. v. France (dec.), 2024, § 30); in a national judicial database of sex offenders ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 58); or in a national database concerning any criminal proceedings instituted against an individual ( N.F. and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 34 and 49), and the collection and storage of a suspect's fingerprints ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 29). ▪ The covert recording in a police station, for permanent storage, of voice samples to be used in identifying the individuals concerned, by a process of analysis in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, §§ 59-60). ▪ The filming of an individual in a police interview room by cameras installed for security reasons and totally visible, with the permanent recording of the footage and its inclusion in a montage for further use ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 41). ▪ The systematic collection and retention of GPSmonitoring data indicating the whereabouts and public movements of the subject ( Uzun v. Germany, 2010, §§ 49-53). ▪ The publication in a magazine of an article illustrated by photos of celebrities taken without their knowledge ( Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], 2012, §§ 95-99). ▪ The recording and disclosure to media of CCTVfootage showing an individual trying to commit suicide in a public place ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 59-63). ▪ The recording and storage by police of data on an individual's supposed occupation ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ The disclosure by a psychiatric hospital to journalists of highly sensitive confidential information about the private life of a patient ( Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, § 99). ▪ The collection by the State, as part of anti-doping measures in sport, of information on the whereabouts and daily pursuits, even at weekends, of high-level athletes ( National Federation of Sportspersons'Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 155-159). ▪ The systematic scanning and uploading of prisoners'private correspondence, both incoming and outgoing, onto the National Judicial Network Server ( Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-82). ▪ The use of facial recognition technology to, in the first place, identify the applicant, who had held a solo demonstration without a prior notification, from the photographs and the video published on the Telegram channel and, secondly, locate and arrest him while he was travelling on the underground ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 73)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:3866/20|9292/20,L.F. v. France (dec.),3866/20|9292/20,added,"L.F. v. France (dec.), nos. 3866/20 and 9292/20, 13 February 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.C.3.a,Requirement to minimise the amount of data collected or recorded,4,,112,,,,,"On the other hand, the processing of personal data, which was not ""sensitive"" within the meaning of Article 6 of Convention 108 and which was limited to factual and objective information related to legal proceedings to which an individual was a party, in an internal database of the Ministry of Justice did not fall foul of the requirements of Article 8 ( L.F. v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 34 and 40)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:3866/20|9292/20,L.F. v. France (dec.),3866/20|9292/20,added,"L.F. v. France (dec.), nos. 3866/20 and 9292/20, 13 February 2024",3,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.C.3.a,Requirement to minimise the amount of data collected or recorded,4,108,108,0.98,,,"In a number of cases the Court has examined the question whether the personal data undergoing automatic processing had been adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they had been recorded ( L.L. v. France, 2006, §§ 45-46; Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, § 51; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 147; Kruglov and Others v. Russia, 2020, § 132 in fine ).","In a number of cases the Court has examined the question whether the personal data undergoing automatic processing had been adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they had been recorded ( L.L. v. France, 2006, §§ 45-46; Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, § 51; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, 2019, § 147; Kruglov and Others v. Russia, 2020, § 132 in fine ; L.F. v. France (dec.), 2024, § 34)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:3866/20|9292/20,L.F. v. France (dec.),3866/20|9292/20,added,"L.F. v. France (dec.), nos. 3866/20 and 9292/20, 13 February 2024",4,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,II.B.3.b,Other contexts,4,309,312,0.8433,"B.B. v. France , 2009|Gardel v. France , 2009",,"In several cases relating to the retention of the personal data of individuals convicted of sexual assault, the Court found no violation of Article 8 after noting that the data subjects had been able to submit a request for deletion if the retention of their data no longer seemed relevant in view, inter alia B.B. v. France Gardel v. France, of the lapse of time since their conviction (, 2009, §§ 66-68;, 2009, §§ 67-69; M.B. v. France, 2009, §§ 58-60).","In several cases relating to the retention of the personal data of individuals convicted of sexual assault, the Court found no violation of Article 8 after noting that the data subjects had been able to submit a request for deletion if the retention of their data no longer seemed relevant in view, inter alia, of the lapse of time since their conviction ( B.B. v. France, 2009, §§ 66-68; Gardel v. France, 2009, §§ 67-69; M.B. v. France, 2009, §§ 58-60). At the same time, the absence of any possibility to request deletion of data will not necessarily amount to a breach of Article 8 and must be assessed in the light of the purpose pursued by the storage of such data, the nature of the date as well as the guarantees afforded to those concerned against the risk of arbitrariness and abuse. In particular, where the relevant data retained in an internal database of the Ministry of Justice was not ""sensitive"" within the meaning of Art icle 6 of Convention 108 and was limited to factual and objective information related to legal proceedings to which an individual was a party, and where their processing aimed at ensuring the proper administration of justice and the proper functioning of the relevant public services and was attended by appropriate guarantees (the possibility to ensure the accuracy of data and a limited period of their storage), the absence of a procedure for anticipated deletion of such data was not disproportionate ( L.F. v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 44-47)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:3537/15,N.F. and Others v. Russia,3537/15,added,"N.F. and Others v. Russia, no. 3537/15 and 8 others, 12 September 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A.1,Concept of personal data and its scope,3,9,9,0.9949,"Benedik v. Slovenia , 2018|N.F. and Others v. Russia , 2023",,"Under Article 2 of Convention 108, ""data processing"" includes: ""any operation or set of operations performed on personal data, such as the collection, storage, preservation, alteration, retrieval, disclosure, making available, erasure, or destruction of, or the carrying out of logical and/or arithmetical operations on such data"". The development of technologies has led to an increase in the types of operations involving personal data that can constitute processing; the Court has identified the following typical examples:  The collection by the police from an Internet provider of subscriber information associated Benedik v. Slovenia with an individual's specific dynamic IPaddress (, 2018, §§ 108-109).  The fact of gathering and storing public information on an individual, for example about his/her political activity ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44; Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others v. Romania, 2011, §§ 167-168; Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, §§ 65-67; Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 93).  The listing of an individual in a national judicial database of sex offenders ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 58), and the collection and storage of a suspect's fingerprints ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 29).  The covert recording in a police station, for permanent storage, of voice samples to be used in identifying the individuals concerned, by a process of analysis in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, §§ 59-60).  The filming of an individual in a police interview room by cameras installed for security reasons and totally visible, with the permanent recording of the footage and its inclusion in a montage for further use ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 41).  The systematic collection and retention of GPSmonitoring data indicating the whereabouts and public movements of the subject ( Uzun v. Germany, 2010, §§ 49-53).  The publication in a magazine of an article illustrated by photos of celebrities taken without Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) their knowledge ( [GC], 2012, §§ 95-99).  The recording and disclosure to media of CCTVfootage showing an individual trying to Peck v. the United Kingdom commit suicide in a public place (, 2003, §§ 59-63).  The recording and storage by police of data on an individual's supposed occupation ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56).  The disclosure by a psychiatric hospital to journalists of highly sensitive confidential information about the private life of a patient ( Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, § 99).  The collection by the State, as part of anti-doping measures in sport, of information on the whereabouts and daily pursuits, even at weekends, of high-level athletes ( National Federation of Sportspersons' Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 155-159).  The systematic scanning and uploading of prisoners' private correspondence, both incoming and outgoing, onto the National Judicial Network Server ( Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-82).  The use of facial recognition technology to, in the first place, identify the applicant, who had held a solo demonstration without a prior notification, from the photographs and the video published on the Telegram channel and, secondly, locate and arrest him while he was travelling on the underground ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 73).","Under Article 2 of Convention 108, ""data processing"" includes : ""any operation or set of operations performed on personal data, such as the collection, storage, preservation, alteration, retrieval, disclosure, making available, erasure, or destruction of, or the carrying out of logical and/or arithmetical operations on such data"" . The development of technologies has led to an increase in the types of operations involving personal data that can constitute processing; the Court has identified the following typical examples: ▪ The collection by the police from an Internet provider of subscriber information associated with an individual's specific dynamic IPaddress ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109). ▪ The fact of gathering and storing public information on an individual, for example about his/her political activity ( Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000, §§ 43-44; Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others v. Romania, 2011, §§ 167-168; Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, §§ 65-67; Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 93). ▪ The listing of an individual in an internal judicial database of a relevant ministry ( L.F. v. France (dec.), 2024, § 30); in a national judicial database of sex offenders ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 58); or in a national database concerning any criminal proceedings instituted against an individual ( N.F. and Others v. Russia, 2023, §§ 34 and 49), and the collection and storage of a suspect's fingerprints ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 29). ▪ The covert recording in a police station, for permanent storage, of voice samples to be used in identifying the individuals concerned, by a process of analysis in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, §§ 59-60). ▪ The filming of an individual in a police interview room by cameras installed for security reasons and totally visible, with the permanent recording of the footage and its inclusion in a montage for further use ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 41). ▪ The systematic collection and retention of GPSmonitoring data indicating the whereabouts and public movements of the subject ( Uzun v. Germany, 2010, §§ 49-53). ▪ The publication in a magazine of an article illustrated by photos of celebrities taken without their knowledge ( Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], 2012, §§ 95-99). ▪ The recording and disclosure to media of CCTVfootage showing an individual trying to commit suicide in a public place ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 59-63). ▪ The recording and storage by police of data on an individual's supposed occupation ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ The disclosure by a psychiatric hospital to journalists of highly sensitive confidential information about the private life of a patient ( Mockutė v. Lithuania, 2018, § 99). ▪ The collection by the State, as part of anti-doping measures in sport, of information on the whereabouts and daily pursuits, even at weekends, of high-level athletes ( National Federation of Sportspersons'Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, 2018, §§ 155-159). ▪ The systematic scanning and uploading of prisoners'private correspondence, both incoming and outgoing, onto the National Judicial Network Server ( Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 80-82). ▪ The use of facial recognition technology to, in the first place, identify the applicant, who had held a solo demonstration without a prior notification, from the photographs and the video published on the Telegram channel and, secondly, locate and arrest him while he was travelling on the underground ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 73)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:3537/15,N.F. and Others v. Russia,3537/15,added,"N.F. and Others v. Russia, no. 3537/15 and 8 others, 12 September 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.2.a,Storage of personal data for the purposes of combating crime,4,202,204,0.9983,"N.F. and Others v. Russia , 2023",,"The interests of data subjects and the community as a whole in protecting personal data, including fingerprint and DNAinformation, may be outweighed by the legitimate interest in the prevention of crime ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 104). In order to protect their population as required, the national authorities can legitimately set up databases as an effective means of helping to punish and prevent certain offences, including the most serious types of crime, B.B. v. France Gardel v. France M.B. v. France, such as sex offences (, 2009, § 62;, 2009, § 63; 2009, § 54). While the original taking of this information pursues the aim of linking a particular person to the particular crime of which he or she is suspected, its retention pursues the broader purpose of assisting in the identification of future offenders ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 100). The Court cannot call into question the preventive purpose of such registers ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 63; B.B. v. France, 2009, § 62; M.B. v. France, 2009, § 54). The fight against crime, and in particular against organised crime and terrorism, which is one of the challenges faced by today's European societies, depends to a great extent on the use of modern scientific techniques of investigation and identification ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 105). At the same time, since the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, domestic law must afford appropriate safeguards to prevent any such use of personal data as may be inconsistent with the guarantees of this Article ( ibid., § 103; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 75).","The interests of data subjects and the community as a whole in protecting personal data, including fingerprint and DNAinformation, may be outweighed by the legitimate interest in the prevention of crime ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 104). In order to protect their population as required, the national authorities can legitimately set up databases as an effective means of helping to punish and prevent certain offences, including the most serious types of crime, such as sex offences ( B.B. v. France, 2009, § 62; Gardel v. France, 2009, § 63; M.B. v. France, 2009, § 54; N.F. and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 44). While the original taking of this information pursues the aim of linking a particular person to the particular crime of which he or she is suspected, its retention pursues the broader purpose of assisting in the identification of future offenders ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 100). The Court cannot call into question the preventive purpose of such registers ( Gardel v. France, 2009, § 63; B.B. v. France, 2009, § 62; M.B. v. France, 2009, § 54). The fight against crime, and in particular against organised crime and terrorism, which is one of the challenges faced by today's European societies, depends to a great extent on the use of modern scientific techniques of investigation and identification ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 105). At the same time, since the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, domestic law must afford appropriate safeguards to prevent any such use of personal data as may be inconsistent with the guarantees of this Article ( ibid., § 103; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 75)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:3537/15,N.F. and Others v. Russia,3537/15,added,"N.F. and Others v. Russia, no. 3537/15 and 8 others, 12 September 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.A.2.a,Storage of personal data for the purposes of combating crime,4,203,205,0.9419,"N.F. and Others v. Russia , 2023","B.B. v. France , 2009","The Court has considered a series of cases relating to the recording in databases designed for the punishment and prevention of crime the personal data of individuals convicted of minor offences ( M.K. v. France, 2013, §§ 6, 8, 41; Aycaguer v. France, 2017, §§ 8, 43), serious offences ( B.B. v. France, 2009, §§ 6, 62; Gardel v. France, 2009, §§ 8, 9, 63; M.B. v. France, 2009, §§ 6, 54; Peruzzo and Martens v. Germany (dec.), 2013, §§ 6, 12, 37-38; Trajkovski and Chipovski v. North Macedonia, 2020, §§ 6, 12), or for a series of offences that were neither minor nor particularly serious ( P.N. v. Germany, 2020, §§ 6, 81). Other cases concerned the storage, in databases designed for the punishment and prevention of crime, of the personal data of individuals who had been suspected of committing S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom offences but who had ultimately been discharged ( [GC], 2007, §§ 10, 11, 113; M.K. v. France, 2013, §§ 7, 9, 42; Brunet v. France, 2014, §§ 6, 7, 40), acquitted ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 10, 113), or simply cautioned after the proceedings, without conviction ( M.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2012, §§ 7-9). Lastly, other cases have concerned preventive measures involving storing personal data in police files, on the basis of mere suspicions ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, § 16; Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, §§ 8, 9, 59; Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, §§ 6, 14, 119).","The Court has considered a series of cases relating to the recording in databases designed for the punishment and prevention of crime the personal data of individuals convicted of minor offences ( M.K. v. France, 2013, §§ 6, 8, 41; Aycaguer v. France, 2017, §§ 8, 43), serious offences ( B.B. 49/107 v. France, 2009, §§ 6, 62; Gardel v. France, 2009, §§ 8, 9, 63; M.B. v. France, 2009, §§ 6, 54; Peruzzo and Martens v. Germany (dec.), 2013, §§ 6, 12, 37-38; Trajkovski and Chipovski v. North Macedonia, 2020, §§ 6, 12), or for a series of offences that were neither minor nor particularly serious ( P.N. v. Germany, 2020, §§ 6, 81). Other cases concerned the storage, in databases designed for the punishment and prevention of crime, of the personal data of individuals who had been suspected of committing offences but who had ultimately been discharged ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2007, §§ 10, 11, 113; M.K. v. France, 2013, §§ 7, 9, 42; Brunet v. France, 2014, §§ 6, 7, 40), acquitted ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 10, 113), or simply cautioned after the proceedings, without conviction ( M.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2012, §§ 7-9). In one case, the applicants'personal data were collected and stored in a database of the Ministry of the Interior on the sole ground that at various times they had been subjected to criminal prosecution. The recording system in place covered not only criminal convictions - and that is irrespective of the nature and gravity of the relevant offences, and even where those convictions had been lifted or had become spent - but also situations where an individual had been subjected to criminal prosecution and the criminal proceedings were subsequently discontinued on ""non -rehabilitative ground s"" ( N.F. and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 49). Lastly, other cases have concerned preventive measures involving storing personal data in police files, on the basis of mere suspicions ( Shimovolos v. Russia, 2011, § 16; Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, §§ 8, 9, 59; Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, §§ 6, 14, 119)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:3537/15,N.F. and Others v. Russia,3537/15,added,"N.F. and Others v. Russia, no. 3537/15 and 8 others, 12 September 2023",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A.2.i,Indiscriminate and undifferentiated nature of data stored,4,,211,,"The case of N.F. and Others v. Russia , 2023",,,"The case of N.F. and Others v. Russia, 2023 (§§ 49-55), concerned a data storage system where information concerning criminal proceedings was automatically collected and stored once an individual was subjected to criminal prosecution. That system covered information on all criminal convictions, irrespective of the nature and gravity of the offence committed and irrespective of the fact whether those convictions had already been spent, as well as information on criminal proceedings that had been discontinued on ""non - rehabilitative grounds"". The Court found the scope and application of that system to be excessive. Moreover, it emphasised that the continued processing of data had been particularly intrusive for those individuals who had not been convicted of any criminal offences. As regards convicted individuals, the level of interference with their private life would also be intrusive after their convictions had become spent or were lifted by a court. In the absence of sufficient guarantees against abuse and the possibility of a review, such processing was found to be disproportionate."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:3537/15,N.F. and Others v. Russia,3537/15,added,"N.F. and Others v. Russia, no. 3537/15 and 8 others, 12 September 2023",5,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.2.i,Indiscriminate and undifferentiated nature of data stored,4,205,207,0.9866,"N.F. and Others v. Russia , 2023",,"In several cases the Court has called into question the broad scope of the data storage system installed by the authorities, which failed to draw a distinction according to the nature or degree of seriousness of the offence leading to conviction ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 41; Aycaguer v. France, 2017, § 43; Gaughran v. the United Kingdom, 2020, § 94), or depending on whether the data subject had been convicted, acquitted, discharged or merely cautioned, having been suspected of committing an offence ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 119; M.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2012, § 198; M.K. v. France, 2013, § 42 ; Brunet v. France, 2014, § 41). The Court considers that the facilities put in place by the authorities to assist in punishing and preventing certain offences cannot be implemented as part of an abusive drive to maximise the information stored in them. Indeed, without respect for the requisite proportionality vis-à-vis the legitimate aims assigned to such mechanisms, their advantages would be outweighed by the serious breaches which they would cause to the rights and freedoms which States must guarantee under the Convention to persons under their jurisdiction ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 35 ; Aycaguer v. France, 2017, § 34).","In several cases the Court has called into question the broad scope of the data storage system installed by the authorities, which failed to draw a distinction according to the nature or degree of seriousness of the offence leading to conviction ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 41; Aycaguer v. France, 2017, § 43; Gaughran v. the United Kingdom, 2020, § 94; N.F. and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 49), or depending on whether the data subject had been convicted, acquitted, discharged or merely cautioned, having been suspected of committing an offence ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 119; M.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2012, § 198; M.K. v. France, 2013, § 42 ; Brunet v. France, 2014, § 41; N.F. and Others v. Russia, 2023, § 49). The Court considers that the facilities put in place by the authorities to assist in punishing and preventing certain offences cannot be implemented as part of an abusive drive to maximise the information stored in them. Indeed, without respect for the requisite proportionality vis-à-vis the legitimate aims assigned to such mechanisms, their advantages would be outweighed by the serious breaches which they would cause to the rights and freedoms which States must guarantee under the Convention to persons under their jurisdiction ( M.K. v. France, 2013, § 35 ; Aycaguer v. France, 2017, § 34)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:33696/19,Podchasov v. Russia,33696/19,added,"Podchasov v. Russia, no. 33696/19, 13 February 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I.B,The two aspects (negative and positive) of data protection,2,71,71,0.9863,"Cherrier v. France , 2024|Podchasov v. Russia , 2024|Tena Arregui v. Spain , 2024","ć v. Switzerland , 2016","Where a measure interfering with the protection of personal data is taken by an individual or entity purely in the private sector, the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's positive obligations ( Craxi v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, §§ 68-76; Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010; Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, § 32; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 89; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 111; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain Buturugă v. Romania Volodina [GC], 2019, § 111;, 2020, §§ 60-63; v. Russia (no. 2 ), 2021, §§ 58-68; Florindo de Almeida Vasconcelos Gramaxo v. Portugal, 2022, § 111). However, where a measure has been taken by a public entity ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 39; Libert v. France, 2018, § 41; Drelon v. France, 2022, § 85) or a private body to which the State has delegated its obligations ( Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, § 47), the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's negative obligation. The Court will have to verify that the interference met the requirements of Article 8 § 2, namely that it was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. This question will be examined in more detail in the part of this guide below on the Three data protection ""tests"".","Where a measure interfering with the protection of personal data is taken by an individual or entity purely in the private sector, the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's positive obligations ( Craxi v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, §§ 68-76; Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010; Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, § 32; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 89; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 111; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 111; Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, §§ 60-63; Volodina v. Russia (no. 2 ), 2021, §§ 58-68; Florindo de Almeida Vasconcelos Gramaxo v. Portugal, 2022, § 111; Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 35). However, where a measure has been taken by a public entity ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 39; Libert v. France, 2018, § 41; Drelon v. France, 2022, § 85; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 57), a private body to which the State has delegated its obligations ( Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, § 47), or a private body pursuant to statutory requirements ( Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 52), the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's negative obligation. The Court will have to verify that the interference met the requirements of Article 8 § 2, namely that it was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. This question will be examined in more detail in the part of this guide below on the Three data protection ""tests""."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:33696/19,Podchasov v. Russia,33696/19,added,"Podchasov v. Russia, no. 33696/19, 13 February 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.A,"Technological advances, algorithms and artificial intelligence",2,395,398,0.9889,"Podchasov v. Russia , 2024",,"In cases concerning the taking and storage by the authorities, for crime-prevention purposes, of fingerprints, biological samples and DNAprofiles of persons suspected or convicted of offences, the Court has stated clearly that the use of modern scientific techniques cannot be authorised at any cost and without carefully balancing the potential benefits of the extensive use of such techniques against important private-life interests ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 112). Any State claiming a pioneer role in the development of new technologies bears special responsibility for striking the right balance in this regard (ibid., § 112). Bearing in mind the rapid pace of developments in the field of genetics and information technology, the possibility that in the future the private-life interests bound up with genetic information may be adversely affected in novel ways or in a manner which cannot be anticipated with precision today cannot be discounted (ibid., § 71).","In cases concerning the taking and storage by the authorities, for crime-prevention purposes, of fingerprints, biological samples and DNAprofiles of persons suspected or convicted of offences, the Court has stated clearly that the use of modern scientific techniques cannot be authorised at any cost and without carefully balancing the potential benefits of the extensive use of such techniques against important private-life interests ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 112; Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 62). Any State claiming a pioneer role in the development of new technologies bears special responsibility for striking the right balance in this regard ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 112). Bearing in mind the rapid pace of developments in the field of genetics and information technology, the possibility that in the future the private-life interests bound up with genetic information may be adversely affected in novel ways or in a manner which cannot be anticipated with precision today cannot be discounted ( ibid ., § 71)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:33696/19,Podchasov v. Russia,33696/19,added,"Podchasov v. Russia, no. 33696/19, 13 February 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,IV.A,"Technological advances, algorithms and artificial intelligence",2,397,400,0.7624,"Podchasov v. Russia , 2024",,"In Breyer v. Germany, 2020 (§ 88), the Court recognised, in the context of the fight against organised crime and terrorism, that modern means of telecommunications and changes in communication behaviour required that investigative tools be adapted. In the Court's view, the obligation for mobile-telephone operators to store subscriber information and make it available to the authorities on request is, in general, a suitable response to changes in communication behaviour and in the means of telecommunications. Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary","In Breyer v. Germany, 2020 (§ 88), the Court recognised, in the context of the fight against organised crime and terrorism, that modern means of telecommunications and changes in communication behaviour required that investigative tools be adapted. In the Court's view, the obligation for mobile-telephone operators to store subscriber information and make it available to the authorities on request is, in general, a suitable response to changes in communication behaviour and in the means of telecommunications. By contrast, in Podchasov v. Russia, 2024 (§§ 70-79), domestic law required Internet communications service providers to retain and store the contents of all Internet communications for six months and the related communications data for one year as well as to give law-enforcement authorities or security services access to the stored data at their request, together with information necessary to decrypt electronic messages if they were encrypted: the Court was struck by the extremely broad duty of retention and considered such an interference to have been exceptionally wide-ranging and serious. It further observed that, under domestic law, the law-enforcement or security services were not required to show the judicial authorisation to the relevant communications service provider before obtaining access to a particular person's communications. In fact, communications service providers were under an obligation to install equipment giving the said authorities direct access to the data stored. Although in such a system the need for safeguards against arbitrariness and abuse was particularly great, domestic law did not provide for such safeguards. As regards a statutory requirement to decrypt communications, it would appear that any such measures would not be limited to specific individuals and would weaken encryption for all users thus affecting everyone indiscriminately, including 94/107 individuals who posed no threat to legitimate interests; such measures therefore could not be regarded as proportionate (§§ 77-79)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:23443/23,Ramadan v. France (dec.),23443/23,added,"Ramadan v. France (dec.), no. 23443/23, 9 January 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.A.2,Data protection and freedom of expression (Article 10 of the Convention),3,337,340,0.9942,,,"Conversely, the Court has found no violation of Article 10 in, or declared inadmissible, several cases including:  Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023 (§§ 167-257), concerning a civil judgment ordering a newspaper publisher to anonymise the electronic online version of an article which had mentioned the full name of a driver responsible for a fatal accident that had taken place many years earlier;  Biancardi v. Italy, 2021 (§§ 67-71) concerning a civil judgment against a newspaper editor for not de-indexing sensitive information published on the Internet concerning criminal proceedings against a private individual and the journalist's decision to keep the information easily accessible in spite of the individual's opposition;  Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017 (§§ 139-199), concerning a judicial decision banning the mass publication of personal taxation data;  Bédat v. Switzerland [GC], 2016 (§§ 44-82), on the conviction of a journalist for publishing information covered by the secrecy of criminal investigations;  Mediengruppe Österreich GmbH v. Austria, 2022 (§§ 44-73), concerning a court order for a daily newspaper not to publish a photograph with a ""convicted neo-Nazi"" caption as regards an individual indirectly connected to the campaign of a political candidate in the run-up to a presidential election, the relevant publication having taken place more than twenty years after the conviction;  Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020 (§§ 85-90), concerning the withdrawal of a journalist's accreditation to search the Securitate archives, following the disclosure in several articles written by him of personal data in ""raw"" form concerning various well-known sports figures, without the relevance of the data having been assessed in the light of the declared subject of his research, namely sport in Romania under the communist regime;  Giesbert and Others v. France, 2017 (§§ 77-103), concerning the courts' findings against a newspaper for publishing documents from a set of criminal proceedings before they were to be read out at a public hearing;  Verlagsgruppe Droemer Knaur GmbH & Co. KG v. Germany, 2017 (§§ 36-62), concerning an order for a publishing company to pay damages for failing to carry out thorough research and for serious interference with an individual's personality rights;  Kurier Zeitungsverlag und Druckerei GmbH v. Austria, 2012 (§§ 47-56), concerning the requirement to pay compensation to a child who had been the victim of sexual abuse and whose identity was disclosed in a press article. In view of the vulnerability of crime victims, their identity deserved particular protection;  MGN Limited v. the United Kingdom, 2011 (§ 152), in which the Court was persuaded, among other considerations, by the fact that the disclosure in the press of details of a celebrity's therapy for drug addiction was harmful and risked causing a significant setback to her recovery;  Editions Plon v. France, 2004 (§§ 22-55), on the definitive suspension of distribution of a book containing information relating to a deceased Head of State and covered by medical confidentiality;  Mitov and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2023 (§§ 30-41), concerning anonymisation rules laid down by the President of the Supreme Administrative Court and legislation introducing a deferred-publication rule for certain criminal judgments, following which the applicants, investigative journalists, had been unable to access freely on the Internet all scanned case materials available in the database of that court.","Conversely, the Court has found no violation of Article 10 in, or declared inadmissible, several cases including: ▪ Hurbain v. Belgium [GC], 2023 (§§ 167-257), concerning a civil judgment ordering a newspaper publisher to anonymise the electronic online version of an article which had mentioned the full name of a driver responsible for a fatal accident that had taken place many years earlier; ▪ Biancardi v. Italy, 2021 (§§ 67-71) concerning a civil judgment against a newspaper editor for not de-indexing sensitive information published on the Internet concerning criminal proceedings against a private individual and the journalist's decision to keep the information easily accessible in spite of the individual's opposition; ▪ Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017 (§§ 139-199), concerning a judicial decision banning the mass publication of personal taxation data; ▪ Bédat v. Switzerland [GC], 2016 (§§ 44-82), on the conviction of a journalist for publishing information covered by the secrecy of criminal investigations; ▪ Mediengruppe Österreich GmbH v. Austria, 2022 (§§ 44-73), concerning a court order for a daily newspaper not to publish a photograph with a ""convicted neo-Nazi "" caption as regards an individual indirectly connected to the campaign of a political candidate in the run-up to a presidential election, the relevant publication having taken place more than twenty years after the conviction; ▪ Gafiuc v. Romania, 2020 (§§ 85-90), concerning the withdrawal of a journalist's accreditation to search the Securitate archives, following the disclosure in several articles written by him of personal data in ""raw"" form concerning various well -known sports figures, without the relevance of the data having been assessed in the light of the declared subject of his research, namely sport in Romania under the communist regime; 80/107 ▪ Giesbert and Others v. France, 2017 (§§ 77-103), concerning the courts'findings against a newspaper for publishing documents from a set of criminal proceedings before they were to be read out at a public hearing; ▪ Verlagsgruppe Droemer Knaur GmbH & Co. KG v. Germany, 2017 (§§ 36-62), concerning an order for a publishing company to pay damages for failing to carry out thorough research and for serious interference with an individual's personality rights; ▪ Kurier Zeitungsverlag und Druckerei GmbH v. Austria, 2012 (§§ 47-56), concerning the requirement to pay compensation to a child who had been the victim of sexual abuse and whose identity was disclosed in a press article. In view of the vulnerability of crime victims, their identity deserved particular protection; ▪ MGN Limited v. the United Kingdom, 2011 (§ 152), in which the Court was persuaded, among other considerations, by the fact that the disclosure in the press of details of a celebrity's therapy for drug addiction was harmful and risked causing a significant setback to her recovery; ▪ Editions Plon v. France, 2004 (§§ 22-55), on the definitive suspension of distribution of a book containing information relating to a deceased Head of State and covered by medical confidentiality; ▪ Mitov and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2023 (§§ 30-41), concerning anonymisation rules laid down by the President of the Supreme Administrative Court and legislation introducing a deferred-publication rule for certain criminal judgments, following which the applicants, investigative journalists, had been unable to access freely on the Internet all scanned case materials available in the database of that court; ▪ Ramadan v. France (dec.), 2024 (§§ 28-46), where the applicant, accused of sexual assault in ongoing criminal proceedings, disseminated in his book and two other media, information concerning the identity of the alleged victim of that assault without the latter's consent, which identity had previously been disclosed by third parties in media."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:42541/18,Tena Arregui v. Spain,42541/18,added,"Tena Arregui v. Spain, no. 42541/18, 11 January 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A.1,Concept of personal data and its scope,3,13,13,0.9884,"Benedik v. Slovenia , 2018|Tena Arregui v. Spain , 2024",,"Asignificant element, although not necessarily decisive, is whether an individual is reasonably entitled to expect protection of his/her private life ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 37; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 80; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66). As to on-line activities, the anonymity of personal information will be a key factor in that assessment and the fact that a subscriber to an Internet service provider had not hidden his/her dynamic IPaddress was not decisive in the assessment of whether his expectation of privacy was reasonable from an objective standpoint Benedik v. Slovenia (, 2018, § 116). In the workplace, an employer's instructions cannot reduce private social life in the workplace to zero. Respect for private life and for the privacy of correspondence continues to exist, even if these may be restricted in so far as necessary ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 80-81; see also, for the professional context, Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 37-38). The monitoring of the actions or movements of an individual in a public place using surveillance mechanisms may fall within Article 8 once any systemic or permanent record of such personal data comes into existence ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66), or where their disclosure, by its manner or extent, Peck v. the United Kingdom goes beyond what the individuals could reasonably have expected (, 2003, § 62; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 41-43). As regards press articles about the arrest of a television actor, illustrated by photos, the Court found that the actor's ""legitimate expectation"" of having his private life effectively protected was reduced by the fact that he had ""actively sought the Axel Springer AG v. Germany limelight"" by revealing details of his private life in a number of interviews ( [GC], 2012, § 101).","Asignificant element, although not necessarily decisive, is whether an individual is reasonably entitled to expect protection of his/her private life ( Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 37; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 80; Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66). As to on-line activities, the anonymity of personal information will be a key factor in that assessment and the fact that a subscriber to an Internet service provider had not hidden his/her dynamic IPaddress was not decisive in the assessment of whether his expectation of privacy was reasonable from an objective standpoint ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, § 116). In the workplace, an employer's instructions cannot reduce private social life in the workplace to zero. Respect for private life and for the privacy of correspondence continues to exist, even if these may be restricted in so far as necessary ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 80-81; see also, for the professional context, Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 37-38; see also in the context of monitoring by a political party of the electronic correspondence of its members, Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 38). The monitoring of the actions or movements of an individual in a public place using surveillance mechanisms may fall within Article 8 once any systemic or permanent record of such personal data comes into existence ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, § 66), or where their disclosure, by its manner or extent, goes beyond what the individuals could reasonably have expected ( Peck v. the United Kingdom, 2003, § 62; Perry v. the United Kingdom, 2003, §§ 41-43). As regards press articles about the arrest of a television actor, illustrated by photos, the Court found that the actor 's ""legitimate expectation"" of having his private life effect ively protected was reduced by the fact that he had ""actively sought the limelight"" by revealing details of his private life in a number of interviews ( Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 2012, § 101)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:42541/18,Tena Arregui v. Spain,42541/18,added,"Tena Arregui v. Spain, no. 42541/18, 11 January 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I.B,The two aspects (negative and positive) of data protection,2,71,71,0.9863,"Cherrier v. France , 2024|Podchasov v. Russia , 2024|Tena Arregui v. Spain , 2024","ć v. Switzerland , 2016","Where a measure interfering with the protection of personal data is taken by an individual or entity purely in the private sector, the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's positive obligations ( Craxi v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, §§ 68-76; Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010; Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, § 32; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 89; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 111; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain Buturugă v. Romania Volodina [GC], 2019, § 111;, 2020, §§ 60-63; v. Russia (no. 2 ), 2021, §§ 58-68; Florindo de Almeida Vasconcelos Gramaxo v. Portugal, 2022, § 111). However, where a measure has been taken by a public entity ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 39; Libert v. France, 2018, § 41; Drelon v. France, 2022, § 85) or a private body to which the State has delegated its obligations ( Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, § 47), the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's negative obligation. The Court will have to verify that the interference met the requirements of Article 8 § 2, namely that it was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. This question will be examined in more detail in the part of this guide below on the Three data protection ""tests"".","Where a measure interfering with the protection of personal data is taken by an individual or entity purely in the private sector, the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's positive obligations ( Craxi v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, §§ 68-76; Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010; Alkaya v. Turkey, 2012, § 32; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], 2013, § 89; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 111; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 111; Buturugă v. Romania, 2020, §§ 60-63; Volodina v. Russia (no. 2 ), 2021, §§ 58-68; Florindo de Almeida Vasconcelos Gramaxo v. Portugal, 2022, § 111; Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 35). However, where a measure has been taken by a public entity ( Copland v. the United Kingdom, 2007, § 39; Libert v. France, 2018, § 41; Drelon v. France, 2022, § 85; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 57), a private body to which the State has delegated its obligations ( Vukota- Bojić v. Switzerland, 2016, § 47), or a private body pursuant to statutory requirements ( Podchasov v. Russia, 2024, § 52), the Court will examine the case from the standpoint of the State's negative obligation. The Court will have to verify that the interference met the requirements of Article 8 § 2, namely that it was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. This question will be examined in more detail in the part of this guide below on the Three data protection ""tests""."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:42541/18,Tena Arregui v. Spain,42541/18,added,"Tena Arregui v. Spain, no. 42541/18, 11 January 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B,The two aspects (negative and positive) of data protection,2,76,76,0.9878,"Tena Arregui v. Spain , 2024",,"While the boundaries between the State's positive and negative obligations under the Convention do not lend themselves to precise definition, the applicable principles are nonetheless similar. In both contexts regard must be had in particular to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole, subject in any event to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 112).","While the boundaries between the State's positive and negative obligations under the Convention do not lend themselves to precise definition, the applicable principles are nonetheless similar. In both contexts regard must be had in particular to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole, subject in any event to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 112; Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 32)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:42541/18,Tena Arregui v. Spain,42541/18,added,"Tena Arregui v. Spain, no. 42541/18, 11 January 2024",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B,The two aspects (negative and positive) of data protection,2,82,82,0.9469,"Tena Arregui v. Spain , 2024",,"As regards less serious acts between individuals, such as monitoring of employees in the workplace, States may choose whether or not to enact specific legislation concerning video- surveillance ( López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 113; Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010) or the monitoring of employees' non-professional correspondence and communications ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 119). It is nevertheless for the domestic courts to ensure that any implementation by an employer of surveillance measures interfering with the right of employees to respect for their private life or correspondence is proportionate and accompanied by appropriate and Köpke v. Germany B ă rbulescu v. Romania adequate safeguards against abuse ( (dec.), 2010; [GC], 2017, § 120; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 116).","As regards less serious acts between individuals, such as monitoring of employees in the workplace, States may choose whether or not to enact specific legislation concerning video- surveillance ( López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 113; Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010) or the monitoring of employees'non-professional correspondence and communications ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 119). It is nevertheless for the domestic courts to ensure that any implementation by an employer of surveillance measures interfering with the right of employees to respect for their private life or correspondence is proportionate and accompanied by appropriate and adequate safeguards against abuse ( Köpke v. Germany (dec.), 2010; B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 120; López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], 2019, § 116; see also in the context of monitoring by a political party of the electronic correspondence of its members, Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, § 38)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240331212544__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-06-13,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-03-31__2024-06-13.json,apps:42541/18,Tena Arregui v. Spain,42541/18,added,"Tena Arregui v. Spain, no. 42541/18, 11 January 2024",5,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A.1.b,Data collection by employers in the workplace,4,,167,,"Tena Arregui v. Spain , 2024",,,"Similar principles are also applicable in other contexts, in particular, as regards monitoring by a political party of the electronic communications of its members, even though internal organisational structures of political parties are distinguishable from those or private companies and that the legal links existing between an employer and employee and between a political party and its members are fundamentally different ( Tena Arregui v. Spain, 2024, §§ 38 and 41)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20250705120234__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-07-05,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json,apps:58737/14,A.P. v. Armenia,58737/14,added,"A.P. v. Armenia, no. 58737/14, 18 June 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.A.3.b,Disclosure of data in the context of judicial proceedings,4,,269,,"In the case of A.P. v. Armenia , 2024",,,"In the case of A.P. v. Armenia, 2024 (§§ 159-162), the disclosure of the applicant's personal data, together with complete texts of judicial decisions dismissing her civil damages claim for sexual abuse, amounted to an interference with her right to respect for her private life. The information had been disclosed on a publicly accessible online official judicial database, although the applicant had made a specific requested not to publish that data. The Court found that such disclosure had lacked a legal basis in domestic law and concluded that the interference had not been ""in accordance with the law"" within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20250705120234__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-07-05,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json,apps:58737/14,A.P. v. Armenia,58737/14,added,"A.P. v. Armenia, no. 58737/14, 18 June 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.3.b,Disclosure of data in the context of judicial proceedings,4,252,257,0.9914,"A.P. v. Armenia , 2024",,"In several cases the Court has examined measures adopted by the authorities in the context of judicial proceedings having led to the disclosure of the parties'or third parties'personal data, such as: ▪ the reproduction by a court in a divorce judgment of an extract from personal medical records ( L.L. v. France, 2006, § 46), and an order restricting to ten years the period of confidentiality of evidence produced containing medical data ( Z v. Finland, 1997, §§ 112-113); ▪ the disclosure of confidential psychiatric data on an applicant during a public hearing ( Panteleyenko v. Ukraine, 2006, § 57), and verification of a medical certificate produced in support of a request for adjournment ( Stokłosa v. Poland (dec.) 2021, §§ 43-44; ▪ the disclosure of an individual's identity and HIV-positive status in a judgment communicated to the press ( Z v. Finland, 1997, § 113); ▪ the disclosure of the full identity of a third party in a judgment without prior notification of the latter ( Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, §§ 47-51); ▪ the use of language and arguments disclosing, in a judgment, personal data of the victim, conveying stereotypes about the role of women and capable of hindering the effective 59/107 protection of the victims of sexual violence in spite of a satisfactory legislative framework ( J.L. v. Italy, 2021, §§ 136-142); ▪ the publication of photographs and personal data of defendants in criminal proceedings in the press ( Margari v. Greece, 2023, § 54) or on the public list of wanted persons in the public part of a police station ( Negru v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 24).","In several cases the Court has examined measures adopted by the authorities in the context of judicial proceedings having led to the disclosure of the parties'or third parties'personal data, such as: ▪ the reproduction by a court in a divorce judgment of an extract from personal medical records ( L.L. v. France, 2006, § 46), and an order restricting to ten years the period of confidentiality of evidence produced containing medical data ( Z v. Finland, 1997, §§ 112-113); ▪ the disclosure of confidential psychiatric data on an applicant during a public hearing ( Panteleyenko v. Ukraine, 2006, § 57), and verification of a medical certificate produced in support of a request for adjournment ( Stokłosa v. Poland (dec.) 2021, §§ 43-44; ▪ the disclosure of an individual's identity and HIV-positive status in a judgment communicated to the press ( Z v. Finland, 1997, § 113); ▪ the disclosure of the full identity of a third party in a judgment without prior notification of the latter ( Vicent Del Campo v. Spain, 2018, §§ 47-51); ▪ the use of language and arguments disclosing, in a judgment, personal data of the victim, conveying stereotypes about the role of women and capable of hindering the effective protection of the victims of sexual violence in spite of a satisfactory legislative framework ( J.L. v. Italy, 2021, §§ 136-142); ▪ the publication of photographs and personal data of defendants in criminal proceedings in the press ( Margari v. Greece, 2023, § 54) or on the public list of wanted persons in the public part of a police station ( Negru v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, § 24); ▪ the disclosure of the applicant's full name and address together with complete texts of judicial decisions dismissing her claim for civil damages for sexual abuse on a publicly accessible online official judicial database ( A.P. v. Armenia, 2024, § 159)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20250705120234__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-07-05,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json,apps:25578/11,Casarini v. Italy (dec.),25578/11,added,"Casarini v. Italy (dec.), no. 25578/11, 5 November 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I.A.1,Concept of personal data and its scope,3,8,8,0.991,"ırdök and Others v. Turkey , 2019","ırdö k and Others v. Turkey , 2019","Personal data can take very different forms. For example: ▪ Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109). ▪ Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59). ▪ Cellular samples and DNAprofiles ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints ( ibid ., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances ( ibid ., § 85). ▪ Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving sensitive details or professional activity ( M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.). ▪ Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the police ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 18, 74-81). ▪ Acopy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdö k and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36). ▪ Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Antovi ć and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). ▪ Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138). ▪ Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 54-64; Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, §§ 106 and 112; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 50). ▪ Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68). ▪ Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings against the applicant ( Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 39-41). 8/107","Personal data can take very different forms. For example: ▪ Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109), including an IPaddress masked by a VPN if the applicant can be identified and located ( Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, § 54). ▪ Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59). ▪ Cellular samples and DNAprofiles ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints ( ibid ., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances ( ibid ., § 85). ▪ Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving sensitive details or professional activity ( M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.), or from the Taxpayer Information Service database, including, in particular, details on income and net assets and any pending cases with the tax authorities ( Casarini v. Italy (dec.), 2024, §§ 56-57). ▪ Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the police ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 18, §§ 74-81). ▪ Acopy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdök and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36). ▪ Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Antovi ć and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). ▪ Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138). ▪ Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 54-64; Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, §§ 106 and 112; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 50). ▪ Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68). 8/110 ▪ Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings against the applicant ( Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 39-41)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20250705120234__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-07-05,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json,apps:25578/11,Casarini v. Italy (dec.),25578/11,added,"Casarini v. Italy (dec.), no. 25578/11, 5 November 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.4,Right to benefit from special procedural safeguards and an effective procedural framework to uphold one ’ s rights,3,,330,,,,,"In Casarini v. Italy (dec.), 2024, §§ 92-105, where the applicant's personal data stored in the Taxpayer Information Service database had been, on multiple occasions, unlawfully accessed by an officer of the Revenue Police who had passed it to a journalist for publication, the Court found that a complaint to the Data Protection Authority would have been an effective remedy and thus needed to have been exhausted. Whilst not a judicial body, the Data Protection Authority was an independent 76/110 and fully autonomous administrative body, free from external pressure: proceedings before it were adversarial in nature and led to the adoption of binding decisions. Moreover, those decisions could be appealed against before the competent judicial authorities and the latter's decisions could be the subject of an appeal on points of law before the Court of Cassation."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20250705120234__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-07-05,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json,apps:25578/11,Casarini v. Italy (dec.),25578/11,added,"Casarini v. Italy (dec.), no. 25578/11, 5 November 2024",3,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.B.4,Right to benefit from special procedural safeguards and an effective procedural framework to uphold one ’ s rights,3,318,325,0.9616,,,"Restrictions imposed by law on the domestic courts'powers to compensate for damage caused by the press disclosure of confidential information on the health of identified persons and to deter the recurrence of such abuses were liable to hamper the effectiveness of any appeal, thus failing to provide the applicants with such protection of their private life as they might legitimately have expected. Thus, in Armonienė v. Lithuania, 2008 (§§ 47-48) and Biriuk v. Lithuania, 2008 (§§ 46-47), the Court found a violation of Article 8 because the Law on Provision of Information to the Public in force at the material time had set an upper limit on damages awarded to the applicants by the domestic courts following the disclosure of their HIV-positive status in the leading national daily newspaper, without their consent and revealing their identities.","Restrictions imposed by law on the domestic courts'powers to compensate for damage caused by the press disclosure of confidential information on the health of identified persons and to deter the recurrence of such abuses were liable to hamper the effectiveness of any appeal, thus failing to provide the applicants with such protection of their private life as they might legitimately have expected. Thus, in Armonienė v. Lithuania, 2008 (§§ 47-48) and Biriuk v. Lithuania, 2008 (§§ 46-47), the Court found a violation of Article 8 because the Law on Provision of Information to the Public in force at the material time had set an upper limit on damages awarded to the applicants by the domestic courts following the disclosure of their HIV-positive status in the leading national daily newspaper, without their consent and revealing their identities. Moreover, a purely compensatory remedy was found to be ineffective where the applicant complained about a continuing situation of inadequate protection of his personal data stored in a State's database (the Taxpayer Information Service) and the authorities'long-standing failure to prevent abuse in the context of access to that database ( Casarini v. Italy (dec.), 2024, § 89)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20250705120234__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-07-05,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json,apps:22790/12,Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine,22790/12,added,"Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 22790/12 and 3 others, 13 February 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C.1,Whether the interference was lawful,3,93,95,0.9976,"Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine , 2025",,"In the specific context of covert surveillance measures, such as the interception of communications, the Court has found that ""foreseeability"" cannot be understood in the same way as in many other fields. In its view, it cannot mean that an individual should be able to foresee when the authorities are likely to have recourse to such measures so that he or she can adapt his or her conduct accordingly ( Adomaitis v.Lithuania, 2022, § 83; see also Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, § 51, where the same principles were applied in the context of covert video recording made by a private individual). However, especially where a power vested in the executive is exercised in secret, the risks of arbitrariness are evident. It is therefore essential to have clear, detailed rules on covert surveillance measures, especially as the technology available for use is continually becoming more sophisticated. The domestic law must be sufficiently clear to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which, and the conditions upon which, public authorities are empowered to resort to any such measures ( Malone v. the United Kingdom, 1984, § 67; Leander v. Sweden, 1987, § 51; Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, 1998, § 46; Weber and Saravia v. Germany (dec.), 2006, § 93; Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdjiev v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 75; Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 229). In addition, the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference ( Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 230).","In the specific context of covert surveillance measures, such as the interception of communications, the Court has found that ""foreseeability"" cannot be understood in the same way as in many other fields. In its view, it cannot mean that an individual should be able to foresee when the authorities are likely to have recourse to such measures so that he or she can adapt his or her conduct accordingly ( Adomaitis v.Lithuania, 2022, § 83; see also Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, § 51, where the same principles were applied in the context of covert video recording made by a private individual). However, especially where a power vested in the executive is exercised in secret, the risks of arbitrariness are evident. It is therefore essential to have clear, detailed rules on covert surveillance measures, especially as the technology available for use is continually becoming more sophisticated. The domestic law must be sufficiently clear to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which, and the conditions upon which, public authorities are empowered to resort to any such measures ( Malone v. the United Kingdom, 1984, § 67; Leander v. Sweden, 1987, § 51; Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, 1998, § 46; Weber and Saravia v. Germany (dec.), 2006, § 93; Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdjiev v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 75; Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 229; Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine, 2025, § 88). In addition, the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference ( Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, § 230)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20250705120234__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-07-05,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json,apps:22790/12,Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine,22790/12,added,"Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 22790/12 and 3 others, 13 February 2025",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.C.1,Whether the interference was lawful,3,94,96,0.998,"Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine , 2025",,"In its case-law on the interception of communications in the context of criminal investigations, the Court has determined that, in order to prevent abuse of power, the law must at least set out the following six elements: the nature of the offences that may give rise to an interception order; the definition of the categories of persons whose communications may be intercepted; the time-limit on the implementation of the measure; the procedure to be followed for the examination, use and storage of the data collected; the precautions to be taken for the transmission of the data to other parties; and the circumstances in which intercept data may or must be deleted or destroyed ( Huvig v. France, 1990, § 34; Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, 1998, § 46; Weber and Saravia v. Germany (dec.), 2006, § 95; Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdjiev v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 76). In Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015 (§ 238), it confirmed that these same minimum safeguards also applied in cases where the interception had been implemented on national security grounds; however, in order to determine whether or not the impugned legislation was incompatible 27/107 with Article 8, the Court also took account of the following factors: the arrangements for supervising the implementation of secret surveillance measures, any notification mechanisms and the remedies provided for by national law .","In its case-law on the interception of communications in the context of criminal investigations, the Court has determined that, in order to prevent abuse of power, the law must at least set out the following six elements: the nature of the offences that may give rise to an interception order; the definition of the categories of persons whose communications may be intercepted; the time-limit on the implementation of the measure; the procedure to be followed for the examination, use and 27/110 storage of the data collected; the precautions to be taken for the transmission of the data to other parties; and the circumstances in which intercept data may or must be deleted or destroyed ( Huvig v. France, 1990, § 34; Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, 1998, § 46; Weber and Saravia v. Germany (dec.), 2006, § 95; Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdjiev v. Bulgaria, 2007, § 76; Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine, 2025, § 88). In Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015 (§ 238), it confirmed that these same minimum safeguards also applied in cases where the interception had been implemented on national security grounds; however, in order to determine whether or not the impugned legislation was incompatible with Article 8, the Court also took account of the following factors: the arrangements for supervising the implementation of secret surveillance measures, any notification mechanisms and the remedies provided for by national law ."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20250705120234__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-07-05,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json,apps:22790/12,Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine,22790/12,added,"Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 22790/12 and 3 others, 13 February 2025",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.C.3.c,Requirement that data be retained for no longer than is necessary to fulfil the purpose for which they were recorded,4,,123,,"Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine , 2025",,,"At the same time, the immediate destruction of the material collected, in particular, in the context of a covert measure, once it is qualified as irrelevant for the purpose of collection is not as such contrary to the Convention ( Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine, 2025, § 108)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20250705120234__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-07-05,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json,apps:22790/12,Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine,22790/12,added,"Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 22790/12 and 3 others, 13 February 2025",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1.i,Telephone tapping and metering,4,131,135,0.9993,"Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine , 2025",,"In the judicial framework, the Court has found violations of Article 8 in the following spheres: phone tapping and supply of records of metering to the police (list of telephone numbers called) ( Malone v. the United Kingdom, 1984, §§ 63-89); monitoring and transcription of all the applicants'commercial and private phone calls ( Huvig v. France, 1990, §§ 24-35); monitoring and recording of several of the applicant's phone conversations by tapping a third party's telephone line ( Kruslin v. France, 1990, §§ 25-36); phone tapping of a person via a third party's telephone line ( Lambert v. France, 1998, §§ 21-41); monitoring and recording by the public prosecutor of a telephone call received by an individual in his office from another individual in the then Soviet Embassy in Bern ( Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, §§ 45-62); phone tapping in the framework of a preliminary investigation ( Prado Bugallo v. Spain, 2003, §§ 28-33); telephone conversations monitored in the context of a criminal prosecution and subsequently published in the press ( Craxi v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, §§ 57-84); inclusion in the applicant's case file of a transcription from phone tapping carried out in proceedings in which he had not been involved ( Matheron v. France, 2005, §§ 27-44); monitoring of phone calls by the authorities in the absence of authorisation by the public prosecutor issued in the name of the suspect and without legislation providing sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness ( Dumitru Popescu v. Romania (no. 2), 2007, §§ 61-86); tapping of phone calls made by a lawyer for criminal investigations ( Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, §§ 80-89); insufficient safeguards against arbitrariness in domestic provisions on phone tapping ( Dragojević v. Croatia, 2015, §§ 85-102; Liblik and Others v. Estonia, 2019, §§ 132-143); lack of adequate judicial guarantees ( Moskalev v. Russia, 2017, §§ 35-45); lack of effective supervision of the recoding of phone calls in the framework of criminal proceedings ( Pruteanu v. Romania, 2015, §§ 41-58); monitoring of mobile phone calls ( Šantare and Labazņikovs v. Latvia, 2016, §§ 56-63); unjustified failure to provide ex post notification of a temporary mobile phone tapping measure ( Cevat Özel v. Turkey, 2016, §§ 29-37); and preventive monitoring of phone calls ( Mustafa Sezgin Tanrıkulu v. Turkey, 2017, §§ 45-66); the practically unlimited power of the intelligence services in carrying out surveillance of an individual and of meetings held in the flat that he owned without sufficient legal safeguards ( Zoltán Varga v. Slovakia, 2021, §§ 170-171), which also randomly affected another person without any protection being provided under domestic law for such a person ( Haščák v. Slovakia, 2022, § 95); and the interception, recording and transcription of a telephone conversation between a lawyer and one of his clients, a former defence minister, who was under covert surveillance in connection with a criminal investigation ( Vasil Vasilev v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 167-181).","In the judicial framework, the Court has found violations of Article 8 in the following spheres: phone tapping and supply of records of metering to the police (list of telephone numbers called) ( Malone v. the United Kingdom, 1984, §§ 63-89); monitoring and transcription of all the applicants'commercial and private phone calls ( Huvig v. France, 1990, §§ 24-35); monitoring and recording of several of the applicant's phone conversations by tapping a third party's telephone line ( Kruslin v. France, 1990, §§ 25-36); phone tapping of a person via a third party's telephone line ( Lambert v. France, 1998, §§ 21-41); monitoring and recording by the public prosecutor of a telephone call received by an individual in his office from another individual in the then Soviet Embassy in Bern ( Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000, §§ 45-62); phone tapping in the framework of a preliminary investigation ( Prado Bugallo v. Spain, 2003, §§ 28-33); telephone conversations monitored in the context of a criminal prosecution and subsequently published in the press ( Craxi v. Italy (no. 2), 2003, §§ 57-84); inclusion in the applicant's case file of a transcription from phone tapping carried out in proceedings in which he had not been involved ( Matheron v. France, 2005, §§ 27-44); monitoring of phone calls by the authorities in the absence of authorisation by the public prosecutor issued in the name of the suspect and without legislation providing sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness ( Dumitru Popescu v. Romania (no. 2), 2007, §§ 61-86); tapping of phone calls made by a lawyer for criminal investigations ( Kvasnica v. Slovakia, 2009, §§ 80-89); insufficient safeguards against arbitrariness in domestic provisions on phone tapping ( Dragojević v. Croatia, 2015, §§ 85-102; Liblik and Others v. Estonia, 2019, §§ 132-143; Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine, 2025, §§ 93-135); lack of adequate judicial guarantees ( Moskalev v. Russia, 2017, §§ 35-45); lack of effective supervision of the recoding of phone calls in the framework of criminal proceedings ( Pruteanu v. Romania, 2015, §§ 41-58); monitoring of mobile phone calls ( Šantare and Labazņikovs v. Latvia, 2016, §§ 56-63); unjustified failure to provide ex post notification of a temporary mobile phone tapping measure ( Cevat Özel v. Turkey, 2016, §§ 29-37); and preventive monitoring of phone calls ( Mustafa Sezgin Tanrıkulu v. Turkey, 2017, §§ 45-66); the practically unlimited power of the intelligence services in carrying out surveillance of an individual and of meetings held in the flat that he owned without sufficient legal safeguards ( Zoltán Varga v. Slovakia, 2021, §§ 170-171), which also randomly affected another person without any protection being provided under domestic law for such a person ( Haščák v. Slovakia, 2022, § 95); and the interception, recording and transcription of a telephone conversation between a lawyer and one of his clients, a former defence minister, who was under covert surveillance in connection with a criminal investigation ( Vasil Vasilev v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 167-181)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20250705120234__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-07-05,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json,apps:22790/12,Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine,22790/12,added,"Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 22790/12 and 3 others, 13 February 2025",5,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.1,Right of access to one ’ s own data,3,,287,,"Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine , 2025",,,"The immediate destruction of the material collected, in particular in the context of a covert measure, once it was qualified as irrelevant for the purpose of collection, with the result that data subjects were unable to access that material, is not as such contrary to the Convention. At the same time, data subjects may have a legitimate interest in being provided with a copy of the relevant authority 's decision ordering the destruction of the intercepted material, as well as the ""act"" of destruction ( Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine, 2025, §§ 108-109). Moreover, publicly available clear rules and guidelines for screening and destruction of intercepted materials, including rules concerning the supervision of the relevant processes by an independent body, must be put in place ( Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine, 2025, §§ 110-113)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20250705120234__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-07-05,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json,apps:22790/12,Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine,22790/12,added,"Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 22790/12 and 3 others, 13 February 2025",6,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.4,Right to benefit from special procedural safeguards and an effective procedural framework to uphold one ’ s rights,3,327,336,0.9948,"Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine , 2025",,"In the framework of secret surveillance measures, review and supervision of secret surveillance measures may come into play at three stages: when the surveillance is first ordered, while it is being carried out, or after it has been terminated. As regards the first two stages, the very nature and logic of secret surveillance dictate that not only the surveillance itself but also the accompanying review should be effected without the individual's knowledge. Consequently, since the individual will necessarily be prevented from seeking an effective remedy of his own accord or from taking a direct part in any review proceedings, it is essential that the procedures established should themselves provide adequate and equivalent guarantees safeguarding his rights. In a field where abuse is potentially so easy in individual cases and could have such harmful consequences for democratic society as a whole, it is in principle desirable to entrust supervisory control to a judge, judicial control offering the best guarantees of independence, impartiality and a proper procedure ( ibid ., § 233; Klass and Others v. Germany, 1978, §§ 55-56).","In the framework of secret surveillance measures, review and supervision of secret surveillance measures may come into play at three stages: when the surveillance is first ordered, while it is being carried out, or after it has been terminated. As regards the first two stages, the very nature and logic of secret surveillance dictate that not only the surveillance itself but also the accompanying review should be effected without the individual's knowledge. Consequently, since the individual will necessarily be prevented from seeking an effective remedy of his own accord or from taking a direct part in any review proceedings, it is essential that the procedures established should themselves provide adequate and equivalent guarantees safeguarding his rights. In a field where abuse is potentially so easy in individual cases and could have such harmful consequences for democratic society as a whole, it is in principle desirable to entrust supervisory control to a judge, judicial control offering the best guarantees of independence, impartiality and a proper procedure ( ibid ., § 233; Klass and Others v. Germany, 1978, §§ 55-56; Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine, 2025, § 88)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20250705120234__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-07-05,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json,apps:22790/12,Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine,22790/12,added,"Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 22790/12 and 3 others, 13 February 2025",7,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.4,Right to benefit from special procedural safeguards and an effective procedural framework to uphold one ’ s rights,3,330,339,0.9933,"Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine , 2025",,"For systems which do not provide for notification of the person concerned of the measures taken against him, the fact that the individuals concerned consider that their right to respect for their private lives has been infringed by a secret monitoring measure can apply to an independent and impartial body even if they were not informed in advance that their communications had been intercepted was considered by the Court as providing an important safeguard, in a case in which it found no violation of Article 8 ( Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, §§ 167, 169). Conversely, where the remedies available under the domestic system are open solely to persons with a minimum of information on the impugned measure, the Court held that those concerned had not had an effective remedy against the secret monitoring measures, in breach of Article 8 ( Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, §§ 293-298, 305).","For systems which do not provide for notification of the person concerned of the measures taken against him, the fact that the individuals concerned consider that their right to respect for their private lives has been infringed by a secret monitoring measure can apply to an independent and impartial body even if they were not informed in advance that their communications had been intercepted was considered by the Court as providing an important safeguard, in a case in which it found no violation of Article 8 ( Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 2010, §§ 167, 169). Conversely, where the remedies available under the domestic system are open solely to persons with a minimum of information on the impugned measure, the Court held that those concerned had not had an effective remedy against the secret monitoring measures, in breach of Article 8 ( Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], 2015, §§ 293-298, 305; Denysyuk and Others v. Ukraine, 2025, §§ 116-32). 78/110"
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20250705120234__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-07-05,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json,apps:29550/17,Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy,29550/17,added,"Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy, no. 29550/17, 19 December 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,I.C.3.c,Requirement that data be retained for no longer than is necessary to fulfil the purpose for which they were recorded,4,120,124,0.797,"Italia v. Italy , 2024",,"The lack of a maximum time-limit for the retention of personal data is not necessarily incompatible with Article 8 ( Gaughran v. the United Kingdom, 2020, § 88; Peruzzo and Martens v. Germany (dec.), 2013, § 46), but procedural safeguards will be all the more necessary where the storage of data depends entirely on the authorities'diligence in ensuring that its duration is proportionate ( ibid ., § 46; Aycaguer v. France, 2017, §§ 44-46).","The lack of a maximum time-limit for the retention of personal data is not necessarily incompatible with Article 8 ( Gaughran v. the United Kingdom, 2020, § 88; Peruzzo and Martens v. Germany (dec.), 2013, § 46), but procedural safeguards will be all the more necessary where the storage of data depends entirely on the authorities'diligence in ensuring that its duration is proportionate ( ibid ., § 46; Aycaguer v. France, 2017, §§ 44-46). In Grande Oriente d'Italia v. Italy, 2024, §§ 144-46a large number of documents, containing in particular personal data of the applicant association's members, had been seized during a search at the applicant association's premises, a search ordered in the context of a parliamentary inquiry concerning organised crime syndicates. The Court observed that a copy of the seized documents was still held in the archives of the relevant parliamentary commission of inquiry, notwithstanding the fact that its functions were complete and it had been dissolved, and despite the fact that under the domestic law the seized documents should have been returned, or the copies of them destroyed, at the conclusion of the inquiry. It reiterated, in that respect, that the absence of regulations requiring the destruction of copies of documents obtained through a search may be incompatible with Article 8 of the Convention."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20250705120234__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-07-05,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json,apps:52319/22,Le Marrec v. France (dec.),52319/22,added,"Le Marrec v. France (dec.), no. 52319/22, 5 November 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I.A.1,Concept of personal data and its scope,3,6,6,0.9496,"Henry Kismoun v. France , 2013","Henry Kismoun v. France, 2013","Such data cover not only information directly identifying an ind ividual (the ""data subject"" ), such as surname and forename ( Guillot v. France, 1996, §§ 21-22; Mentzen v. Latvia (dec.), 2004; Güzel Erdagöz v. Turkey, 2008, § 43; Garnaga v. Ukraine, 2013, § 36; Henry Kismoun v. France, 2013, § 25; Hájovský v. Slovakia, 2021, §§ 11-12 and 41), but also any element indirectly identifying a person such as a dynamic IP (Internet Protocol) address ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 107-108). 7/107","Such data cover not only information directly identifying an individual (the ""data subject"" ), such as surname and forename ( Guillot v. France, 1996, §§ 21-22; Mentzen v. Latvia (dec.), 2004; Güzel Erdagöz v. Turkey, 2008, § 43; Garnaga v. Ukraine, 2013, § 36; Henry Kismoun v. France, 2013, § 25; Hájovský v. Slovakia, 2021, §§ 11-12 and 41), but also any element indirectly identifying a person such 7/110 as a dynamic IP (Internet Protocol) address ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 107-108; see also, as regards an IPaddress masked by a VPN, Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 51 and 54)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20250705120234__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-07-05,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json,apps:52319/22,Le Marrec v. France (dec.),52319/22,added,"Le Marrec v. France (dec.), no. 52319/22, 5 November 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I.A.1,Concept of personal data and its scope,3,8,8,0.991,"ırdök and Others v. Turkey , 2019","ırdö k and Others v. Turkey , 2019","Personal data can take very different forms. For example: ▪ Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109). ▪ Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59). ▪ Cellular samples and DNAprofiles ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints ( ibid ., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances ( ibid ., § 85). ▪ Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving sensitive details or professional activity ( M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.). ▪ Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the police ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, §§ 18, 74-81). ▪ Acopy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdö k and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36). ▪ Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Antovi ć and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). ▪ Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138). ▪ Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 54-64; Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, §§ 106 and 112; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 50). ▪ Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68). ▪ Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings against the applicant ( Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 39-41). 8/107","Personal data can take very different forms. For example: ▪ Internet subscriber information associated with specific dynamic IPaddresses assigned at certain times ( Benedik v. Slovenia, 2018, §§ 108-109), including an IPaddress masked by a VPN if the applicant can be identified and located ( Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, § 54). ▪ Recordings taken for use as voice samples, being of a permanent nature and subject to a process of analysis directly relevant to identifying a person in the context of other personal data ( P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 59). ▪ Cellular samples and DNAprofiles ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 70-77) or finger prints ( ibid ., § 84) which, notwithstanding their objective and irrefutable character, contained unique information on the individual concerned and allowed his/her precise identification in a wide range of circumstances ( ibid ., § 85). ▪ Information on a given individual obtained from banking documents, whether involving sensitive details or professional activity ( M.N. and Others v. San Marino, 2015, §§ 51 et seq.), or from the Taxpayer Information Service database, including, in particular, details on income and net assets and any pending cases with the tax authorities ( Casarini v. Italy (dec.), 2024, §§ 56-57). ▪ Data on the occupation of an identified or identifiable individual collected and stored by the police ( Khelili v. Switzerland, 2011, § 56). ▪ Data on Internet and messaging (Yahoo) usage by an employee in the workplace, obtained through surveillance ( B ă rbulescu v. Romania [GC], 2017, § 18, §§ 74-81). ▪ Acopy of electronic data seized in a law firm, even though it had not been deciphered, transcribed or officially attributed to their owners ( Kırdök and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 36). ▪ Data collected in the context of non-covert video surveillance in a university ( Antovi ć and Mirkovi ć v. Montenegro, 2017, §§ 44-45). ▪ Information on the taxable income and assets of a large number of individuals, notwithstanding the fact that the public could access such data under certain conditions ( Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], 2017, § 138). ▪ Data on the birth and abandonment of an individual, including information needed to discover the truth about an important aspect of personal identity ( Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 1989, § 39; Mikulić v. Croatia, 2002, §§ 54-64; Odièvre v. France [GC], 2003, §§ 28-29; Gauvin-Fournis and Silliau v. France, 2023, §§ 106 and 112; Cherrier v. France, 2024, § 50). ▪ Data included in a divorce settlement, comprising details as to the division of matrimonial assets, the custody and residence of minor children, the alimony agreement and an overview of the assets/income of the applicant ( Liebscher v. Austria, 2021, §§ 31 and 68). 8/110 ▪ Video recordings of conversations made with the use of a hidden camera by an individual in the professional context which recordings were eventually used in criminal proceedings against the applicant ( Sârbu v. Romania, 2023, §§ 39-41)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20250705120234__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-07-05,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json,apps:52319/22,Le Marrec v. France (dec.),52319/22,added,"Le Marrec v. France (dec.), no. 52319/22, 5 November 2024",3,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.C.1,Whether the interference was lawful,3,,93,,,,,"In Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 72-75, the Court found that a regulation containing specific provisions concerning, in particular, the processing of IPaddresses, which regulation had been published on the website of the relevant social welfare authority, was sufficiently accessible to the public, and thus met the ""lawfulness"" requirements of Article 8 of the Convention."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20250705120234__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-07-05,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json,apps:52319/22,Le Marrec v. France (dec.),52319/22,added,"Le Marrec v. France (dec.), no. 52319/22, 5 November 2024",4,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.C.2,Whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim,3,,107,,,,,"The publication of the applicant's identifying data, including his full name and home address, on a tax authority website for failing to fulfil his tax obligations was found to be in pursuit of the ""interests of ... the economic well- being of the country"" as well as ""the protection of the rights and freedoms of others"" ( L.B. v. Hungary [GC], 2023, §§ 111-13). In the same vein, the processing of the applicant's IPaddress and other ""connection data"", which had enabled the relevant social welfare authority to locate him with a view to preventing welfare fraud, was in the interests of the economic well-being of the country and the prevention of crime ( Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, § 76)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20250705120234__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-07-05,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json,apps:52319/22,Le Marrec v. France (dec.),52319/22,added,"Le Marrec v. France (dec.), no. 52319/22, 5 November 2024",5,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.C.3.a,Requirement to minimise the amount of data collected or recorded,4,112,115,0.8734,,,"On the other hand, the processing of personal data, which was not ""sensitive"" within the meaning of Article 6 of Convention 108 and which was limited to factual and objective information related to legal proceedings to which an individual was a party, in an internal database of the Ministry of Justice did not fall foul of the requirements of Article 8 ( L.F. v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 34 and 40).","On the other hand, the processing of personal data, which was not ""sensitive"" within the meaning of Article 6 of Convention 108 and which was limited to factual and objective information related to legal proceedings to which an individual was a party, in an internal database of the Ministry of Justice did not fall foul of the requirements of Article 8 ( L.F. v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 34 and 40). Likewise, in Le Marrec v. France (dec.), 2024, §§ 78-79, the Court pointed out that the applicant's IPaddress and other ""connection data"" processed by the relevant social welfare authority, resulting in him being located as living in ""another country"", was not ""sensitive"" data within the above -mentioned meaning nor did it concern the most intimate aspects or a particularly important facet of his existence or identity:the said data contained very approximate information on the applicant and the margin of appreciation left to the domestic authorities was therefore wide."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20250705120234__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-07-05,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json,apps:62020/14,Moldovan v. Ukraine,62020/14,added,"Moldovan v. Ukraine, no. 62020/14, 14 March 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B.4,Right to benefit from special procedural safeguards and an effective procedural framework to uphold one ’ s rights,3,,332,,"Strict time-limits or procedural limitations also require scrutiny. In the case of Moldovan v. Ukraine , 2024",,,"Strict time-limits or procedural limitations also require scrutiny. In the case of Moldovan v. Ukraine, 2024, (§§ 52-53), the applicant had complained that the domestic courts dealing with his claim seeking recognition of his biological father had applied old legal provisions making proof of cohabitation indispensable for the recognition of paternity despite available DNAtesting. In the Court's view, the effects of such an approach by the domestic courts were comparable to those of inflexible time-limits or other procedural limitations. The Court concluded that this approach, combined with the domestic court's failure to deal with the DNAevidence submitted to them with sufficient thoroughness, amounted to a breach of their positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20240613075829__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20250705120234__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2024-06-13,2025-07-05,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2024-06-13__2025-07-05.json,apps:40519/15,Tonchev v. Bulgaria,40519/15,added,"Tonchev v. Bulgaria, no. 40519/15, 16 April 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.2.§4,ii. Data retention period,4,213,218,0.9962,"Tonchev v. Bulgaria , 2024",,"The length of the period for which the authorities decide to store an individual's personal data is an important, albeit not a decisive, aspect to be taken into account in assessing whether or not the 51/107 storage of personal data in a file or a database for police purposes is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The Court found violations of Article 8 in cases concerning: ▪ indefinite storage of fingerprints of and DNAdata on persons who were suspected of an offence but whose proceedings had ended with a discontinuance decision or an acquittal ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008); ▪ indefinite storage of the DNAprofiles, fingerprints and photographs of an individual found guilty of an offence, even after his conviction had been deleted from his police record on expiry of the legal time-limit ( Gaughran v. the United Kingdom, 2020); ▪ lifelong retention on a police record of all the convictions, acquittals, cautions, warnings and reprimands pertaining to one individual ( M.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ indefinite storage of the DNAprofiles of persons convicted of aggravated theft ( Trajkovski and Chipovski v. Macédoine du Nord, 2020); ▪ retention for a maximum forty years of the personal data of an individual convicted of a fairly minor offence ( Ayçaguer v. France, 2017); ▪ retention for a maximum twenty years of the fingerprints of an individual suspected, but not convicted, of stealing books ( M. K. v. France, 2013); ▪ retention for a maximum twenty years of the personal data of an individual following a complaint of violence against his partner, which case was discontinued following mediation ( Brunet v. France, 2014);","The length of the period for which the authorities decide to store an individual's personal data is an important, albeit not a decisive, aspect to be taken into account in assessing whether or not the storage of personal data in a file or a database for police purposes is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The Court found violations of Article 8 in cases concerning: ▪ indefinite storage of fingerprints of and DNAdata on persons who were suspected of an offence but whose proceedings had ended with a discontinuance decision or an acquittal ( S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008); ▪ indefinite storage of the DNAprofiles, fingerprints and photographs of an individual found guilty of an offence, even after his conviction had been deleted from his police record on expiry of the legal time-limit ( Gaughran v. the United Kingdom, 2020); ▪ lifelong retention on a police record of all the convictions, acquittals, cautions, warnings and reprimands pertaining to one individual ( M.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2012); ▪ indefinite storage of the DNAprofiles of persons convicted of aggravated theft ( Trajkovski and Chipovski v. Macédoine du Nord, 2020); ▪ retention for a maximum forty years of the personal data of an individual convicted of a fairly minor offence ( Ayçaguer v. France, 2017); ▪ retention for a maximum twenty years of the fingerprints of an individual suspected, but not convicted, of stealing books ( M. K. v. France, 2013); ▪ retention for a maximum twenty years of the personal data of an individual following a complaint of violence against his partner, which case was discontinued following mediation ( Brunet v. France, 2014); ▪ the indefinite retention of data about the applicant's substitute administrative penalty ( Tonchev v. Bulgaria, 2024);"
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20250705120234__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20260101120520__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2025-07-05,2026-01-01,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2025-07-05__2026-01-01.json,apps:6033/19,A.R. v. the United Kingdom,6033/19,added,"A.R. v. the United Kingdom, no. 6033/19, 1 July 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.C.1,Whether the interference was lawful,3,,92,,,,,"Similarly, A.R. v. the United Kingdom, 2025, § 54, the applicant had complained about the disclosure by the police, in the context of enhanced employment vetting, of information that he had been charged with rape and acquitted at trial, with a description of the circumstances of the alleged offence. The Court found that the legal provisions in force at the relevant time, taken together with the applicable guidance, left an excessively broad discretion for the competent authorities. In the absence of sufficient safeguards to afford adequate legal protection against the arbitrary exercise of ibid. that discretion, the disclosure was not in accordance with the law (, § 68)."
d5256ad78e38,Data protection,20250705120234__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,20260101120520__guide_data_protection_eng.pdf,2025-07-05,2026-01-01,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/d5256ad78e38/diff_2025-07-05__2026-01-01.json,apps:39056/22,Selishcheva and Others v. Russia,39056/22,added,"Selishcheva and Others v. Russia, nos. 39056/22 and 9 others, 27 May 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I.A.2.§4,"ii. Data revealing political opinions, and religious or other beliefs, including philosophical",4,21,21,0.9935,"Others v. Spain , 2022|Selishcheva and Others v. Russia , 2025","M.D. and Others v. Spain , 2022","Data revealing political opinions are regarded as a ""sensitive"" category of personal data and, in the Court's view, it is unacceptable for the national authorities to disregard this aspect by processing such data in accordance with ordinary domestic rules, without taking account of the need for heightened protection ( Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 112). In the case of Catt v. the United Kingdom, concerning the storage in a police database of data relating to a peaceful demonstrator, the national courts had merely made reference to the general data protection law in examining the lawfulness of the interference. The Court found a violation of Article 8, pointing out that the sensitive nature of the data in question should have constituted a key element of the case before the domestic courts, as it was before the Court ( ibid ., § 112). The Court likewise found a violation of Article 8 in M.D. and Others v. Spain, 2022, (§§ 63-64) concerning a report drawn up by the police in respect of judges and magistrates, who exercised their functions in Catalonia and who had signed a manifesto in which they had set out their legal opinion in favour of the possibility of the Catalan people's exercising the so- called ""right to decide"", th e report revealing, in particular, the political views of some of the applicants. The Court has also underlined that personal data revealing political opinions should attract a heightened level of protection ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, §§ 76 and 86, where the personal data of the applicant which had been processed contained information about his participation in a peaceful protest).","Data revealing political opinions are regarded as a ""sensitive"" category of personal data and, in the Court's view, it is unacceptable for the national authorities to disregard this aspect by processing such data in accordance with ordinary domestic rules, without taking account of the need for heightened protection ( Catt v. the United Kingdom, 2019, § 112). In the case of Catt v. the United Kingdom, concerning the storage in a police database of data relating to a peaceful demonstrator, the national courts had merely made reference to the general data protection law in examining the lawfulness of the interference. The Court found a violation of Article 8, pointing out that the sensitive nature of the data in question should have constituted a key element of the case before the domestic ibid M.D. courts, as it was before the Court ( ., § 112). The Court likewise found a violation of Article 8 in and Others v. Spain, 2022, §§ 63-64, concerning a report drawn up by the police in respect of judges and magistrates, who exercised their functions in Catalonia and who had signed a manifesto in which they had set out their legal opinion in favour of the possibility of the Catalan people's exercising the so-called ""right to decide"", the report revealing, in particular, the political views of some of the applicants. The Court has also underlined that personal data revealing political opinions should attract a heightened level of protection ( Glukhin v. Russia, 2023, §§ 76 and 86, where the personal data of the applicant which had been processed contained information about his participation in a peaceful protest, and Selishcheva and Others v. Russia, 2025, § 33, where the personal data collected concerned the applicants' political views and activities)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:31185/18,Fanouni v. France,31185/18,added,"Fanouni v. France, no. 31185/18, 15 June 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I,The structure of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4,1,14,14,0.9924,"Fanouni v. France , 2023","Gochev v. Bulgaria, 2009","The Court will opt for the ""necessity in a democratic society"" te st under paragraph 3 of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 in two types of situations: ▪ any measure restricting the right to leave any country ( Gochev v. Bulgaria, 2009, § 44; Shioshvili and Others v. Russia, 2016, § 58), be it a measure depriving the applicant entirely of that right or limiting his or her choice of destination countries to a certain geographic area ( L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, § 81; Soltysyak v. Russia, 2011, § 37; Peltonen v. Finland, Commission decision, 1995; K.S. v. Finland, Commission decision, 1995); ▪ a restriction on the exercise of the rights to freedom of movement or freedom to choose residence, which is not limited in geographical scope and applies to the entire territory of a given State ( Garib v. the Netherlands [GC], 2017, § 110; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 171).","The Court will opt for the ""necessity in a democratic society"" test under paragraph 3 of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 in two types of situations:  any Gochev v. Bulgaria, measure restricting the right to leave any country ( 2009, § 44; Shioshvili and Others v. Russia, 2016, § 58), be it a measure depriving the applicant entirely of that right or limiting his or her choice of destination countries to a certain geographic area ( L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, § 81; Soltysyak v. Russia, 2011, § 37; Peltonen v. Finland, Commission decision, 1995; K.S. v. Finland, Commission decision, 1995);  a restriction on the exercise of the rights to freedom of movement or freedom to choose residence, which is not limited in geographical scope and applies to the entire territory of a given State ( Garib v. the Netherlands [GC], 2017, § 110; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 171; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 44)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:31185/18,Fanouni v. France,31185/18,added,"Fanouni v. France, no. 31185/18, 15 June 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,III.A.1,Forms of interference,3,105,105,0.9989,"Bassani v. Italy Gasser v. Italy Di Carlo et Bonaffini v. Italy , 2003|Fanouni v. France , 2023|Labita v. Italy Poninski v. Poland 1994|Pagerie v. France Fanouni v. France Timofeyev and 2017|Postupkin v. Russia , 2021","Bassani v. Italy , 2003|Doroshenko v. Ukraine , 2011|Gasser v. Italy , 2006|Manannikov v. Russia , 2018|Vadym Melnyk v. Ukraine , 2022","The following situations have been considered to amount to a form of interference with the right to freedom of movement: ▪ a requirement not to leave one's place of residence or another specified area/municipality without permission. This requirement can be imposed:  as part of the bail conditions or as a separate measure in the context of criminal proceedings ( Fedorov and Fedorova v. Russia, 2005, § 35; Antonenkov and Others v. Ukraine, 2005, § 52; Nagy v. Hungary (dec.), 2004; Ivanov v. Ukraine, 2006, § 85; Komarova v. Russia, 2006, § 55; Hajibeyli v. Azerbaijan, 2008, § 58; Rosengren v. Romania, 2008, § 32; Nikiforenko v. Ukraine, 2010, § 55; Pokhalchuk v. Ukraine, 2010, § 94; Doroshenko v. Ukraine, 2011, § 52; Manannikov v. Russia, 2018, § 60);  during bankruptcy proceedings ( Luordo v. Italy, 2003, § 92; Goffi v. Italy, 2005, § 20; Bassani v. Italy, 2003, § 24; Gasser v. Italy, 2006, §§ 30-31; Di Carlo et Bonaffini v. Italy (dec.), 2006; Bova v. Italy (dec.), 2004; Shaw v. Italy, 2009, § 16; Bottaro v. Italy, 2003, § 54; Campagnano v. Italy, 2006, § 38);  in the context of a compulsory military service ( Golub v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [Committee], 2021, §§ 54 and 58);  as a compulsory residence order in the context of: ▪ criminal prevention measures ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 154; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Marturana v. Italy, 2008, § 190; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991; Guzzardi v. Italy, Commission decision, 1977); ▪ extradition ( Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010); ▪ expulsion ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; M v. France, Commission decision, 1984; Kenane v. France, Commission decision, 1992; Kalibi v. France, Commission decision, 1984); ▪ a prohibition on leaving home at night except in case of necessity ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 86-88; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 154; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, §§ 13 and 39; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991); ▪ a prohibition on migrants leaving a ""hotspot"" facility at night ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, § 86); ▪ an obligation to report regularly to the court ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) or the police ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 17, 84 and 89; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 154; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, §§ 13 and 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Poninski v. Poland (dec.), 2000; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991); ▪ special police supervision, including the above measures and other associated restrictions (not leaving home without informing a supervising authority, not going to bars, nightclubs, amusement arcades or brothels or attending public meetings, not associating with individuals who have a criminal record and who are subject to preventive measures) ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991); ▪ a prohibition on leaving home from 7 p.m. until 7 a.m. during week-days and the whole day during week-ends, coupled with permission to attend one's work place during week-days ( Trijonis v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005); ▪ a general lockdown in order to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, including a prohibition on leaving home on pain of a fine, except in an exhaustive number of circumstances and on production of a document attesting to valid reasons for doing so ( Terheş v. Romania (dec.), 2021, § 45); ▪ a requirement to report any change of place of residence ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) or to have it registered by the police within a specific time-limit, on pain of a fine ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66; Corley and Others v. Russia, 2021, § 72; Ananiyevy v. Russia [Committee], 2021; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125); ▪ a fine imposed on a foreigner for having stayed overnight outside his registered place of residence ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66); ▪ a prohibition on approaching a specified place (for example, a centre for asylum seekers ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193); a building site ( Cokarić and Others v. Croatia (dec.), 2006); or an abortion clinic ( Van den Dungen v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1995); ▪ a barring and protection order issued in the context of domestic violence, prohibiting a perpetrator from returning to the family home and the surrounding areas for a specified period ( Kurt v. Austria [GC], 2021, §§ 14, 25 and 183); ▪ an inability to enter a specified area of a city, or a prohibition thereof ( Bigliazzi and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2008; Olivieira v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 39; Landvreugd v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 46); ▪ ""kettling"" or containment of a crowd by a police cordon on public-order grounds ( Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012, § 67); ▪ The applicant's retention, upon release, in the courtroom on safety grounds, due to the aggressive behaviour of the public ( Vadym Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2022, § 87); ▪ extensive police monitoring of movements between a territorial entity not recognised by the international community and a government-controlled area and within the latter, coupled with the requirement to report to the police before each intended border crossing ( Denizci and Others v. Cyprus, 2001, §§ 403-406); ▪ the inability of internally displaced persons to return to their homes situated on the territory of an entity not recognised by the international community ( Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, §§ 292-301); ▪ restrictions on freedom of movement resulting from the purported ""annexation"" of territory from one State to another and the ensuing de facto transformation (by the respondent State) of the administrative border line into a State border (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], 2020, §§ 500-503); ▪ Alleged abduction and forcible transfer from a territorial entity not recognised by the international community to the State which exercises effective control over that entity (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.) [GC], 2022, §§ 895-898); ▪ police refusal to let the applicant cross the administrative border between two regions ( Timishev v. Russia, 2005, § 44; Gartukayev v. Russia, 2005, § 21); ▪ a transit ban, under legislation implementing UN Security Council Resolutions, imposed on a resident of an enclaved area by the State surrounding it; and the resulting inability to travel within the country of which the applicant was a national ( Nada v. Switzerland [GC], 2012, §§ 198 and 226-228); ▪ an obligation to provide fingerprints when applying for a passport and the subsequent storage of the fingerprints on a microchip in the passport ( Willems v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2021, §§ 23 and 38).","The following situations have been considered to amount to a form of interference with the right to freedom of movement:  a requirement not to leave one's place of residence or another specified area/municipality without permission. This requirement can be imposed:  as part of the bail conditions or as a separate measure in the context of criminal proceedings ( Fedorov and Fedorova v. Russia, 2005, § 35; Antonenkov and Others v. Ukraine, 2005, § 52; Nagy v. Hungary (dec.), 2004; Ivanov v. Ukraine, 2006, § 85; Komarova v. Russia, 2006, § 55; Hajibeyli v. Azerbaijan, 2008, § 58; Rosengren v. Romania, 2008, § 32; Nikiforenko v. Ukraine, 2010, § 55; Pokhalchuk v. Ukraine, 2010, Doroshenko v. Ukraine Manannikov v. Russia § 94;, 2011, § 52;, 2018, § 60);  during bankruptcy proceedings ( Luordo v. Italy, 2003, § 92; Goffi v. Italy, 2005, § 20; Bassani v. Italy Gasser v. Italy Di Carlo et Bonaffini v. Italy, 2003, § 24;, 2006, §§ 30-31; (dec.), 2006; Bova v. Italy (dec.), 2004; Shaw v. Italy, 2009, § 16; Bottaro v. Italy, 2003, § 54; Campagnano v. Italy, 2006, § 38);  in the context of a compulsory military service ( Golub v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [Committee], 2021, §§ 54 and 58);  as a compulsory residence order in the context of:  criminal prevention measures ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 154; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 54 ; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Marturana v. Italy, 2008, § 190; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991; Guzzardi v. Italy, Commission decision, 1977);  extradition ( Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010);  expulsion ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; M v. France, Commission decision, 1984; Kenane v. France, Commission decision, 1992; Kalibi v. France, Commission decision, 1984);  a prohibition on leaving home at night except in case of necessity ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], Pagerie v. France Fanouni v. France Timofeyev and 2017, §§ 86-88;, 2023, § 154;, 2023, § 54; Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, §§ 13 and 39; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  a prohibition on migrants leaving a ""hotspot"" facility at night ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, § 86);  an obligation to report regularly to the court ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) De Tommaso v. Italy Pagerie v. France or the police ( [GC], 2017, §§ 17, 84 and 89;, 2023, § 154; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 54; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Raimondo v. Italy, Labita v. Italy Poninski v. Poland 1994, §§ 13 and 39; [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; (dec.), 2000; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  special police supervision, including the above measures and other associated restrictions (not leaving home without informing a supervising authority, not going to bars, nightclubs, amusement arcades or brothels or attending public meetings, not associating with De individuals who have a criminal record and who are subject to preventive measures) ( Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  a prohibition on leaving home from 7 p.m. until 7 a.m. during week-days and the whole day during week-ends, coupled with permission to attend one's work place during week-days ( Trijonis v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005);  a general lockdown in order to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, including a prohibition on leaving home on pain of a fine, except in an exhaustive number of circumstances and on production of a document attesting to valid reasons for doing so ( Terheş v. Romania (dec.), 2021, § 45);  a requirement to report any change of place of residence ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) or to have it registered by the police within a specific time-limit, on pain of a fine ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66; Corley and Others v. Russia, 2021, § 72; Ananiyevy v. Russia [Committee], 2021; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125);  a fine imposed on a foreigner for having stayed overnight outside his registered place of residence ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66);  a prohibition on approaching a specified place (for example, a centre for asylum seekers ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193); a building site ( Cokarić and Others v. Croatia (dec.), 2006); or an abortion clinic ( Van den Dungen v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1995);  a barring and protection order issued in the context of domestic violence, prohibiting a perpetrator from returning to the family home and the surrounding areas for a specified period ( Kurt v. Austria [GC], 2021, §§ 14, 25 and 183);  an inability to enter a specified area of a city, or a prohibition thereof ( Bigliazzi and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2008; Olivieira v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 39; Landvreugd v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 46);  ""kettling"" or containment of a crowd by a police cordon on public-order grounds ( Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012, § 67);  The applicant's retention, upon release, in the courtroom on safety grounds, due to the Vadym Melnyk v. Ukraine aggressive behaviour of the public (, 2022, § 87);  extensive police monitoring of movements between a territorial entity not recognised by the international community and a government-controlled area and within the latter, coupled with the requirement to report to the police before each intended border crossing ( Denizci and Others v. Cyprus, 2001, §§ 403-406);  the inability of internally displaced persons to return to their homes situated on the territory of an entity not recognised by the international community ( Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, §§ 292-301);  restrictions on freedom of movement resulting from the purported ""annexation"" of territory de facto from one State to another and the ensuing transformation (by the respondent State) of the administrative border line into a State border (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], 2020, §§ 500-503);  restrictions on freedom of movement between a territorial entity not recognised by the international community and a government-controlled area stemming from ""borderisation"" process (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Georgia v. Russia (IV) (dec.), 2023);  Alleged abduction and forcible transfer from a territorial entity not recognised by the international community to the State which exercises effective control over that entity (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.) [GC], 2022, §§ 895-898);  police refusal to let the applicant cross the administrative border between two regions ( Timishev v. Russia, 2005, § 44; Gartukayev v. Russia, 2005, § 21);  a transit ban, under legislation implementing UN Security Council Resolutions, imposed on a resident of an enclaved area by the State surrounding it; and the resulting inability to travel Nada v. Switzerland within the country of which the applicant was a national ( [GC], 2012, §§ 198 and 226-228);  an obligation to provide fingerprints when applying for a passport and the subsequent storage of the fingerprints on a microchip in the passport ( Willems v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2021, §§ 23 and 38)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:31185/18,Fanouni v. France,31185/18,added,"Fanouni v. France, no. 31185/18, 15 June 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.B.1,Link between a restriction and its purported protective function,3,181,186,0.9428,"Fanouni v. France , 2023",,"The effects and specific conditions of a given measure should be suited to its purpose ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 199).","The effects and specific conditions of a given measure should be suited to its purpose ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 199; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 62)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:31185/18,Fanouni v. France,31185/18,added,"Fanouni v. France, no. 31185/18, 15 June 2023",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.B.1,Link between a restriction and its purported protective function,3,182,187,0.9613,"Fanouni v. France , 2023",,"The effectiveness of a preventive measure frequently depends on the speed of its implementation ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 199; Gochev v. Bulgaria, 2009, § 53).","The effectiveness of a preventive measure frequently depends on the speed of its implementation ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 199; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 62; Gochev v. Bulgaria, 2009, § 53)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:31185/18,Fanouni v. France,31185/18,added,"Fanouni v. France, no. 31185/18, 15 June 2023",5,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,V.B.1.c,Restrictions imposed for the purposes of crime prevention,4,193,198,0.9973,"Fanouni v. France , 2023","Vlasov and Benyash v. Russia , 2016","In order to assess whether a given restriction is sufficiently connected to the aim of crime prevention, the Court has regard to the following elements: ▪ the applicant's conduct and, in particular, the risk of offending or re-engaging in criminal conduct ( Villa v. Italy, 2010, § 46; Vlasov and Benyash v. Russia, 2016, § 35); ▪ the nature and severity of the assessed risk  to the life and health of a specific victim, for example, in the context of protective and preventive measures taken against a perpetrator of domestic violence ( Kurt v. Austria [GC], 2021, § 183);  of the applicant's engagement in terrorism ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 201); ▪ medical data ( Villa v. Italy, 2010, § 46); ▪ the nature and gravity of the offences committed by the applicant ( Villa v. Italy, 2010, § 46; Sarkizov and Others v. Bulgaria, 2012, § 66), as well as recidivism ( Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 134).","In order to assess whether a given restriction is sufficiently connected to the aim of crime prevention, the Court has regard to the following elements:  the applicant's conduct and, in particular, the risk of offending or re-engaging in criminal Villa v. Italy Vlasov and Benyash v. Russia conduct (, 2010, § 46;, 2016, § 35);  the nature and severity of the assessed risk  to the life and health of a specific victim, for example, in the context of protective and preventive measures taken against a perpetrator of domestic violence ( Kurt v. Austria [GC], 2021, § 183);  of the applicant's engagement in terrorism ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 201; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 55);  medical data ( Villa v. Italy, 2010, § 46);  the nature and gravity of the offences committed by the applicant ( Villa v. Italy, 2010, § 46; Sarkizov and Others v. Bulgaria, 2012, § 66), as well as recidivism ( Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 134)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:31185/18,Fanouni v. France,31185/18,added,"Fanouni v. France, no. 31185/18, 15 June 2023",6,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.B.1.c,Restrictions imposed for the purposes of crime prevention,4,194,199,0.9781,"Fanouni v. France , 2023",,"Where restrictions are imposed in the context of a terrorist threat, the following factors are of relevance: ▪ the seriousness and duration of such threat ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 200); ▪ the timing of restrictions, for example shortly after terrorist attacks ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 199); ▪ the existence of a set of factors and a body of evidence probative of a course of ""conduct"" amounting to a threat, for example :  such factors may include religious radicalisation, violent tendencies, criminal record;  the relevant evidence may include public statements, association with jihadists, jihadist propaganda videos found on the applicant's devices ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, §§ 198-201); ▪ general threat to the society stemming from unauthorized entry and stay in a zone of armed conflict involving a terrorist organization ( Mørck Jensen v. Denmark, 2022, § 67).","Where restrictions are imposed in the context of a terrorist threat, the following factors are of relevance:  the seriousness and duration of such threat ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 200);  the timing of restrictions, for example shortly after terrorist attacks ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 199; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 62);  the existence of a set of factors and a body of evidence probative of a course of ""conduct"" amounting to a threat, for example:  such factors may include religious radicalisation, violent tendencies, criminal record;  the relevant evidence may include public statements, association with jihadists, jihadist propaganda videos found on the applicant's devices ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, §§ 198- Fanouni 201); discovery of prohibited weapons and ammunition at the applicant's home ( v. France, 2023, §§ 55 and 62);  general threat to the society stemming from unauthorized entry and stay in a zone of armed conflict involving a terrorist organization ( Mørck Jensen v. Denmark, 2022, § 67)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:31185/18,Fanouni v. France,31185/18,added,"Fanouni v. France, no. 31185/18, 15 June 2023",7,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.B.1.c,Restrictions imposed for the purposes of crime prevention,4,195,200,0.9502,"Fanouni v. France , 2023",,"Arestriction on freedom of movement cannot be based solely on an individual's beliefs or religious practice ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 199).","Arestriction on freedom of movement cannot be based solely on an individual's beliefs or religious practice ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 199; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 62)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:31185/18,Fanouni v. France,31185/18,added,"Fanouni v. France, no. 31185/18, 15 June 2023",8,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,V.B.2.a,Requirement of an individualised assessment,4,219,224,0.991,"A. -M.V. v. Finland , 2017|Fanouni v. France , 2023","A.-M.V. v. Finland , 2017","Such assessment must include all the relevant aspects of the particular situation ( A.-M.V. v. Finland, 2017, § 89) and factors specific to the applicant ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 195), for example, his or her family, professional, financial and personal situation, his or her conduct (including, where applicable, the gravity of a breach committed and the risk of its repetition), as well as the existence of a criminal record ( Stamose v. Bulgaria, 2012, § 35).","Such assessment must include all the relevant aspects of the particular situation ( A. -M.V. v. Finland, 2017, § 89) and factors specific to the applicant ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 195; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 57), for example, his or her family, professional, financial and personal situation, his or her conduct (including, where applicable, the gravity of a breach committed and the risk of its repetition), as well as the existence of a criminal record ( Stamose v. Bulgaria, 2012, § 35)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:31185/18,Fanouni v. France,31185/18,added,"Fanouni v. France, no. 31185/18, 15 June 2023",9,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,V.B.2.c,Availability of judicial review,4,239,244,0.984,"A. - M.V. v. Finland , 2017|A. -M.V. v. Finland , 2017|Fanouni v. France , 2023|Pagerie v. France Fanouni v. France , 2023","A.- M.V. v. Finland , 2017|A.-M.V. v. Finland , 2017","The judicial review proceedings should provide the appropriate procedural safeguards ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 196). The Court may examine in particular: ▪ whether the rights of the defence were fully respected ( Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991), notably, whether the applicant had access to a lawyer and a real opportunity to obtain information on the accusations against him, which prompted the imposition of the impugned restriction on his or her freedom of movement ( Marturana v. Italy, 2008, §§ 188-189; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 207); ▪ whether the applicant was effectively able to put forward his or her arguments and whether his or her submissions were thoroughly analysed ( Popoviciu v. Romania, 2016, §§ 92-93; Bulea v. Romania, 2013, § 63; A.-M.V. v. Finland, 2017, § 90; L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, §§ 93-96; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 204); ▪ whether the domestic courts provided adequate and sufficient reasons, devoid of formalism or arbitrariness ( Ioviţă v. Romania (dec.), 2017, § 76; Căşuneanu v. Romania (dec.), 2011, §§ 53-54; Moldovan Duda v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 38; L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, §§ 95-96); ▪ whether the proceedings were adversarial ( Marturana v. Italy, 2008, § 189; Moldovan Duda v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 37); ▪ whether the applicant was involved at all stages of the proceedings and heard in person ( A.- M.V. v. Finland, 2017, § 90); ▪ whether sufficient procedural safeguards attached to the presentation in evidence of confidential documents (for example, intelligence reports) ( Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 207).","The judicial review proceedings should provide the appropriate procedural safeguards ( Pagerie v. France Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 196;, 2023, § 56). The Court may examine in particular:  whether the rights of the defence were fully respected ( Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991), notably, whether the applicant had access to a lawyer and a real opportunity to obtain information on the accusations against him, which prompted the imposition of the impugned restriction on his or her freedom of movement ( Marturana v. Italy, 2008, §§ 188-189; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 207);  whether the applicant was effectively able to put forward his or her arguments and whether his or her submissions were thoroughly analysed ( Popoviciu v. Romania, 2016, §§ 92-93; Bulea v. Romania, 2013, § 63; A. -M.V. v. Finland, 2017, § 90; L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, §§ 93-96; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 204; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 58);  whether the domestic courts provided adequate and sufficient reasons, devoid of formalism or arbitrariness ( Ioviţă v. Romania (dec.), 2017, § 76; Căşuneanu v. Romania (dec.), 2011, §§ 53-54; Moldovan Duda v. Romania (dec.), 2016, § 38; L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, §§ 95-96);  whether the proceedings were adversarial ( Marturana v. Italy, 2008, § 189; Moldovan Duda v. Romania Fanouni v. France (dec.), 2016, § 37;, 2023, § 58);  whether the applicant was involved at all stages of the proceedings and heard in person ( A. - M.V. v. Finland, 2017, § 90);  whether sufficient procedural safeguards attached to the presentation in evidence of Pagerie v. France confidential documents (for example, intelligence reports) (, 2023, § 207; Fanouni v. France, 2023, §§ 60-61)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:39611/18,Georgia v. Russia (IV) (dec.),39611/18,added,"Georgia v. Russia (IV) (dec.), no. 39611/18, 28 March 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,III.A.1,Forms of interference,3,105,105,0.9989,"Bassani v. Italy Gasser v. Italy Di Carlo et Bonaffini v. Italy , 2003|Fanouni v. France , 2023|Labita v. Italy Poninski v. Poland 1994|Pagerie v. France Fanouni v. France Timofeyev and 2017|Postupkin v. Russia , 2021","Bassani v. Italy , 2003|Doroshenko v. Ukraine , 2011|Gasser v. Italy , 2006|Manannikov v. Russia , 2018|Vadym Melnyk v. Ukraine , 2022","The following situations have been considered to amount to a form of interference with the right to freedom of movement: ▪ a requirement not to leave one's place of residence or another specified area/municipality without permission. This requirement can be imposed:  as part of the bail conditions or as a separate measure in the context of criminal proceedings ( Fedorov and Fedorova v. Russia, 2005, § 35; Antonenkov and Others v. Ukraine, 2005, § 52; Nagy v. Hungary (dec.), 2004; Ivanov v. Ukraine, 2006, § 85; Komarova v. Russia, 2006, § 55; Hajibeyli v. Azerbaijan, 2008, § 58; Rosengren v. Romania, 2008, § 32; Nikiforenko v. Ukraine, 2010, § 55; Pokhalchuk v. Ukraine, 2010, § 94; Doroshenko v. Ukraine, 2011, § 52; Manannikov v. Russia, 2018, § 60);  during bankruptcy proceedings ( Luordo v. Italy, 2003, § 92; Goffi v. Italy, 2005, § 20; Bassani v. Italy, 2003, § 24; Gasser v. Italy, 2006, §§ 30-31; Di Carlo et Bonaffini v. Italy (dec.), 2006; Bova v. Italy (dec.), 2004; Shaw v. Italy, 2009, § 16; Bottaro v. Italy, 2003, § 54; Campagnano v. Italy, 2006, § 38);  in the context of a compulsory military service ( Golub v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [Committee], 2021, §§ 54 and 58);  as a compulsory residence order in the context of: ▪ criminal prevention measures ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 154; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Marturana v. Italy, 2008, § 190; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991; Guzzardi v. Italy, Commission decision, 1977); ▪ extradition ( Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010); ▪ expulsion ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; M v. France, Commission decision, 1984; Kenane v. France, Commission decision, 1992; Kalibi v. France, Commission decision, 1984); ▪ a prohibition on leaving home at night except in case of necessity ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 86-88; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 154; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, §§ 13 and 39; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991); ▪ a prohibition on migrants leaving a ""hotspot"" facility at night ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, § 86); ▪ an obligation to report regularly to the court ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) or the police ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 17, 84 and 89; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 154; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, §§ 13 and 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Poninski v. Poland (dec.), 2000; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991); ▪ special police supervision, including the above measures and other associated restrictions (not leaving home without informing a supervising authority, not going to bars, nightclubs, amusement arcades or brothels or attending public meetings, not associating with individuals who have a criminal record and who are subject to preventive measures) ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991); ▪ a prohibition on leaving home from 7 p.m. until 7 a.m. during week-days and the whole day during week-ends, coupled with permission to attend one's work place during week-days ( Trijonis v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005); ▪ a general lockdown in order to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, including a prohibition on leaving home on pain of a fine, except in an exhaustive number of circumstances and on production of a document attesting to valid reasons for doing so ( Terheş v. Romania (dec.), 2021, § 45); ▪ a requirement to report any change of place of residence ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) or to have it registered by the police within a specific time-limit, on pain of a fine ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66; Corley and Others v. Russia, 2021, § 72; Ananiyevy v. Russia [Committee], 2021; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125); ▪ a fine imposed on a foreigner for having stayed overnight outside his registered place of residence ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66); ▪ a prohibition on approaching a specified place (for example, a centre for asylum seekers ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193); a building site ( Cokarić and Others v. Croatia (dec.), 2006); or an abortion clinic ( Van den Dungen v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1995); ▪ a barring and protection order issued in the context of domestic violence, prohibiting a perpetrator from returning to the family home and the surrounding areas for a specified period ( Kurt v. Austria [GC], 2021, §§ 14, 25 and 183); ▪ an inability to enter a specified area of a city, or a prohibition thereof ( Bigliazzi and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2008; Olivieira v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 39; Landvreugd v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 46); ▪ ""kettling"" or containment of a crowd by a police cordon on public-order grounds ( Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012, § 67); ▪ The applicant's retention, upon release, in the courtroom on safety grounds, due to the aggressive behaviour of the public ( Vadym Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2022, § 87); ▪ extensive police monitoring of movements between a territorial entity not recognised by the international community and a government-controlled area and within the latter, coupled with the requirement to report to the police before each intended border crossing ( Denizci and Others v. Cyprus, 2001, §§ 403-406); ▪ the inability of internally displaced persons to return to their homes situated on the territory of an entity not recognised by the international community ( Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, §§ 292-301); ▪ restrictions on freedom of movement resulting from the purported ""annexation"" of territory from one State to another and the ensuing de facto transformation (by the respondent State) of the administrative border line into a State border (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], 2020, §§ 500-503); ▪ Alleged abduction and forcible transfer from a territorial entity not recognised by the international community to the State which exercises effective control over that entity (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.) [GC], 2022, §§ 895-898); ▪ police refusal to let the applicant cross the administrative border between two regions ( Timishev v. Russia, 2005, § 44; Gartukayev v. Russia, 2005, § 21); ▪ a transit ban, under legislation implementing UN Security Council Resolutions, imposed on a resident of an enclaved area by the State surrounding it; and the resulting inability to travel within the country of which the applicant was a national ( Nada v. Switzerland [GC], 2012, §§ 198 and 226-228); ▪ an obligation to provide fingerprints when applying for a passport and the subsequent storage of the fingerprints on a microchip in the passport ( Willems v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2021, §§ 23 and 38).","The following situations have been considered to amount to a form of interference with the right to freedom of movement:  a requirement not to leave one's place of residence or another specified area/municipality without permission. This requirement can be imposed:  as part of the bail conditions or as a separate measure in the context of criminal proceedings ( Fedorov and Fedorova v. Russia, 2005, § 35; Antonenkov and Others v. Ukraine, 2005, § 52; Nagy v. Hungary (dec.), 2004; Ivanov v. Ukraine, 2006, § 85; Komarova v. Russia, 2006, § 55; Hajibeyli v. Azerbaijan, 2008, § 58; Rosengren v. Romania, 2008, § 32; Nikiforenko v. Ukraine, 2010, § 55; Pokhalchuk v. Ukraine, 2010, Doroshenko v. Ukraine Manannikov v. Russia § 94;, 2011, § 52;, 2018, § 60);  during bankruptcy proceedings ( Luordo v. Italy, 2003, § 92; Goffi v. Italy, 2005, § 20; Bassani v. Italy Gasser v. Italy Di Carlo et Bonaffini v. Italy, 2003, § 24;, 2006, §§ 30-31; (dec.), 2006; Bova v. Italy (dec.), 2004; Shaw v. Italy, 2009, § 16; Bottaro v. Italy, 2003, § 54; Campagnano v. Italy, 2006, § 38);  in the context of a compulsory military service ( Golub v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [Committee], 2021, §§ 54 and 58);  as a compulsory residence order in the context of:  criminal prevention measures ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 154; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 54 ; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Marturana v. Italy, 2008, § 190; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991; Guzzardi v. Italy, Commission decision, 1977);  extradition ( Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010);  expulsion ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; M v. France, Commission decision, 1984; Kenane v. France, Commission decision, 1992; Kalibi v. France, Commission decision, 1984);  a prohibition on leaving home at night except in case of necessity ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], Pagerie v. France Fanouni v. France Timofeyev and 2017, §§ 86-88;, 2023, § 154;, 2023, § 54; Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, §§ 13 and 39; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  a prohibition on migrants leaving a ""hotspot"" facility at night ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, § 86);  an obligation to report regularly to the court ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) De Tommaso v. Italy Pagerie v. France or the police ( [GC], 2017, §§ 17, 84 and 89;, 2023, § 154; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 54; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Raimondo v. Italy, Labita v. Italy Poninski v. Poland 1994, §§ 13 and 39; [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; (dec.), 2000; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  special police supervision, including the above measures and other associated restrictions (not leaving home without informing a supervising authority, not going to bars, nightclubs, amusement arcades or brothels or attending public meetings, not associating with De individuals who have a criminal record and who are subject to preventive measures) ( Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  a prohibition on leaving home from 7 p.m. until 7 a.m. during week-days and the whole day during week-ends, coupled with permission to attend one's work place during week-days ( Trijonis v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005);  a general lockdown in order to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, including a prohibition on leaving home on pain of a fine, except in an exhaustive number of circumstances and on production of a document attesting to valid reasons for doing so ( Terheş v. Romania (dec.), 2021, § 45);  a requirement to report any change of place of residence ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) or to have it registered by the police within a specific time-limit, on pain of a fine ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66; Corley and Others v. Russia, 2021, § 72; Ananiyevy v. Russia [Committee], 2021; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125);  a fine imposed on a foreigner for having stayed overnight outside his registered place of residence ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66);  a prohibition on approaching a specified place (for example, a centre for asylum seekers ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193); a building site ( Cokarić and Others v. Croatia (dec.), 2006); or an abortion clinic ( Van den Dungen v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1995);  a barring and protection order issued in the context of domestic violence, prohibiting a perpetrator from returning to the family home and the surrounding areas for a specified period ( Kurt v. Austria [GC], 2021, §§ 14, 25 and 183);  an inability to enter a specified area of a city, or a prohibition thereof ( Bigliazzi and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2008; Olivieira v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 39; Landvreugd v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 46);  ""kettling"" or containment of a crowd by a police cordon on public-order grounds ( Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012, § 67);  The applicant's retention, upon release, in the courtroom on safety grounds, due to the Vadym Melnyk v. Ukraine aggressive behaviour of the public (, 2022, § 87);  extensive police monitoring of movements between a territorial entity not recognised by the international community and a government-controlled area and within the latter, coupled with the requirement to report to the police before each intended border crossing ( Denizci and Others v. Cyprus, 2001, §§ 403-406);  the inability of internally displaced persons to return to their homes situated on the territory of an entity not recognised by the international community ( Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, §§ 292-301);  restrictions on freedom of movement resulting from the purported ""annexation"" of territory de facto from one State to another and the ensuing transformation (by the respondent State) of the administrative border line into a State border (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], 2020, §§ 500-503);  restrictions on freedom of movement between a territorial entity not recognised by the international community and a government-controlled area stemming from ""borderisation"" process (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Georgia v. Russia (IV) (dec.), 2023);  Alleged abduction and forcible transfer from a territorial entity not recognised by the international community to the State which exercises effective control over that entity (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.) [GC], 2022, §§ 895-898);  police refusal to let the applicant cross the administrative border between two regions ( Timishev v. Russia, 2005, § 44; Gartukayev v. Russia, 2005, § 21);  a transit ban, under legislation implementing UN Security Council Resolutions, imposed on a resident of an enclaved area by the State surrounding it; and the resulting inability to travel Nada v. Switzerland within the country of which the applicant was a national ( [GC], 2012, §§ 198 and 226-228);  an obligation to provide fingerprints when applying for a passport and the subsequent storage of the fingerprints on a microchip in the passport ( Willems v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2021, §§ 23 and 38)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:61365/16,S.E. v. Serbia,61365/16,added,"S.E. v. Serbia, no. 61365/16, 11 July 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.A.1,“ Everyone ”,3,25,25,0.9906,"S.E. v. Serbia , 2023","Tatishvili v. Russia, 2007","This provision has been found to apply to: ▪ aliens ( Shioshvili and Others v. Russia, 2016; L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022; Baumann v. France, 2001, Bolat v. Russia, 2006; Miażdżyk v. Poland, 2012; Roldan Texeira and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2000), ▪ stateless persons ( Mogoş and Others v. Roumania (dec.), 2004; Härginen v. Finland, Commission decision, 1998) and ▪ persons with a specific status ( ""citizen of the former USSR"" : Tatishvili v. Russia, 2007).","This provision has been found to apply to:  aliens ( Shioshvili and Others v. Russia, 2016; L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022; S.E. v. Serbia, 2023; Baumann v. France, 2001, Bolat v. Russia, 2006; Miażdżyk v. Poland, 2012; Roldan Texeira and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2000),  Mogoş and Others v. Roumania Härginen v. Finland stateless persons ( (dec.), 2004;, Commission decision, 1998) and  Tatishvili v. Russia, persons with a specific status (""citizen of the former USSR"" : 2007)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:61365/16,S.E. v. Serbia,61365/16,added,"S.E. v. Serbia, no. 61365/16, 11 July 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.A.§3,Lawfully within the territory of a State 2. “ ”,3,30,30,0.9538,"S.E. v. Serbia , 2023","L.B. v. Lithuania , 2022","While freedom to leave any country, including one's own, is guaranteed to "" everyone "" ( L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, § 59), the rights to liberty of movement and freedom to choose one's residence are granted only to those persons who are "" lawfully within the territory of a State "".","While freedom to leave any country, including one's own, is guaranteed to "" "" ( v. Lithuania, 2022, § 59; S.E. v. Serbia, 2023, § 47), the rights to liberty of movement and freedom to choose one's residence are granted only to those persons who are "" lawfully within the territory of a State ""."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:61365/16,S.E. v. Serbia,61365/16,added,"S.E. v. Serbia, no. 61365/16, 11 July 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.C.1,Questions of scope,3,,117,,"S.E. v. Serbia , 2023",,,"The possibility to comply with any such requirements should be accessible in practice to the L.B. v. Lithuania applicants (, 2022, § 95-96), which implies corresponding obligations incumbent on State authorities ( S.E. v. Serbia, 2023, §§ 80 and 84)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:61365/16,S.E. v. Serbia,61365/16,added,"S.E. v. Serbia, no. 61365/16, 11 July 2023",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.C.1,Questions of scope,3,,122,,"L.B. v. Lithuania , 2022|S.E. v. Serbia , 2023",,,"Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 cannot be considered to impose on Contracting States a general obligation to issue aliens residing on their territory with any particular document permitting them to travel abroad. However, the Court may find this provision applicable where, in view of an alien's particular individual circumstances, his right to leave any country would not be practical and effective as a result of the refusal by his host country to issue him with a travel document ( S.E. v. Serbia, 2023, §§ 47 and 75; L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, § 59)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:61365/16,S.E. v. Serbia,61365/16,added,"S.E. v. Serbia, no. 61365/16, 11 July 2023",5,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,III.C.1,Questions of scope,3,116,116,0.928,"S.E. v. Serbia , 2023","L.B. v. Lithuania , 2022","Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, and in particular paragraph 2 granting the right to leave any country including one's own, does not preclude the exercise thereof from being conditional upon compliance with formal requirements such as obtaining a valid travel document (a passport) and/or a visa ( Ioviţă v. Romania (dec.), 2017, § 74; Mogoş and Others v. Roumania (dec.), 2004), or parental consent/court judgment authorising a minor's travel ( Lolova and Popova v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2015, § 47; Ș andru v. Romania (dec.), 2014, § 23). The possibility to comply with any such requirements should be accessible in practice to the applicants ( L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, § 95-96).","Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, and in particular paragraph 2 granting the right to leave any country including one's own, does not preclude the exercise thereof from being conditional upon compliance with formal requirements such as obtaining a valid travel document (a passport) and/or a visa ( S.E. v. Serbia, 2023, § 47; Ioviţă v. Romania (dec.), 2017, § 74; Mogoş and Others v. Roumania (dec.), 2004), or parental consent/court judgment authorising a minor's travel ( Lolova and Popova v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2015, § 47; Ș andru v. Romania (dec.), 2014, § 23)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:61365/16,S.E. v. Serbia,61365/16,added,"S.E. v. Serbia, no. 61365/16, 11 July 2023",6,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.C.1,Questions of scope,3,121,123,0.8697,,,"Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 cannot be considered to impose on Contracting States a general obligation to issue aliens residing on their territory with any particular document permitting them to travel abroad. However, the Court may find this provision applicable where, in view of an alien's particular individual circumstances, his right to leave any country would not be practical and effective as a result of the refusal by his host country to issue him with a travel document. This would be the case, for example, where an alien is unable to obtain such a document from his country of origin, having fled from it with the intention of seeking asylum and is fearful of approaching its authorities. In this connection, the Court will have regard to whether the domestic law of the host country entitles lawfully resident foreign nationals to obtain an alien's passport ( L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, §§ 59-61, 90 and 93-94).","This would be the case, for example, where an alien is unable to obtain such a document from his country of origin, having fled from it with the intention of seeking asylum and is fearful of approaching its authorities. In this connection, the Court will have regard to whether the domestic law of the host country entitles lawfully resident foreign nationals to obtain an alien's passport ( L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, §§ 59-61, 90 and 93-94). Where a refugee is entitled by the domestic law of his/her host country to obtain a travel document, the authorities' inactivity will amount to an interference with his/her right to leave any country; indeed, the respondent State cannot bypass its obligations by requiring refugees to seek such a document from their country of origin, which they have fled fearing S.E. v. Serbia persecution, or to apply for the nationality of the host country (, 2023, §§ 79-81)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:61365/16,S.E. v. Serbia,61365/16,added,"S.E. v. Serbia, no. 61365/16, 11 July 2023",7,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.C.2,Forms of interference,3,,127,,"S.E. v. Serbia , 2023",,,"Both intentional or unintentional actions or omissions of a public authority may fall within the scope of Article 2 of Protocol no. 4 as long as they have the effect of excluding an applicant from the exercise of the right to leave any country ( S.E. v. Serbia, 2023, §§ 48 and 75)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:61365/16,S.E. v. Serbia,61365/16,added,"S.E. v. Serbia, no. 61365/16, 11 July 2023",8,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,III.C.2,Forms of interference,3,125,128,0.9779,"S.E. v. Serbia , 2023","Baumann v. France , 2001","An interference with the right to leave any country takes place where an applicant is prevented from travelling to any country of his or her choice to which he or she may be admitted ( Baumann v. France, 2001, § 61; Khlyustov v. Russia, 2013, § 64; De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 104; Mursaliyev and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 29; L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, § 79).","An interference with the right to leave any country takes place where an applicant is prevented any Baumann from travelling to country of his or her choice to which he or she may be admitted ( v. France, 2001, § 61; Khlyustov v. Russia, 2013, § 64; De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 104; Mursaliyev and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 29; L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, § 79; and S.E. v. Serbia, 2023, § 74)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:61365/16,S.E. v. Serbia,61365/16,added,"S.E. v. Serbia, no. 61365/16, 11 July 2023",9,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,III.C.2,Forms of interference,3,130,133,0.9951,"S.E. v. Serbia , 2023","Mørck Jensen v. Denmark , 2022","Restrictions on the exercise of the right to leave any country, including one's own, have also taken the form of: ▪ prohibition, on pain of criminal liability, on entry and stay, without permission, in areas in which a terrorist organisation is a party to an ongoing armed conflict ( Mørck Jensen v. Denmark, 2022); ▪ an interruption of the applicants'train journey by the authorities, who forced them to wait for twelve days for a transit visa ( Shioshvili and Others v. Russia, 2016); ▪ preventing a minor on a school trip from crossing the border for lack of documentation necessary to prove the non-custodial parent's consent ( Ș andru v. Romania (dec.), 2014); ▪ a courts'refusal to allow a child's travel abroad to join his parent in the absence of the other parent's consent ( Penchevi v. Bulgaria, 2015); ▪ a lengthy examination by domestic courts of an application seeking to allow a child's travel abroad to join her parent in the absence of the other parent's consent (proceedings lasting about 2 years and 10 months: Lolova and Popova v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2015, § 41); ▪ lawful detention pending expulsion, with a view to criminal proceedings or in order to serve a prison sentence ( C. v. Germany, Commission decision, 1985; X. v. Germany, Commission decision, 1977; X. v. Germany, Commission decision, 1970; X. v. Germany, Commission decision, 1970); ▪ revocation of the applicant's provisional discharge from psychiatric hospital on the grounds of her intended trip abroad without any arrangements for adequate care in the destination country ( Nordblad v. Sweden, Commission decision, 1993); ▪ issuance of a provisional passport, with a period of validity limited to one year, on account of pending criminal proceedings ( Csorba v. Hungary (dec.), 2007); ▪ the refusal to issue an aliens passport to :  a stateless person ( Härginen v. Finland, Commission decision, 1998);  a long-term resident who fled his country of origin and was unable to obtain a travel document therefrom, as he feared contacting the authorities of that country ( L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, §§ 60, 90 and 93-94); ▪ the repatriation of a foreign mentally-ill offender in detention, made conditional upon his placement in a mental hospital in his home country ( I.H. v. Austria, Commission decision, 1989).","Restrictions on the exercise of the right to leave any country, including one's own, have also taken the form of:  prohibition, on pain of criminal liability, on entry and stay, without permission, in areas in Mørck Jensen which a terrorist organisation is a party to an ongoing armed conflict ( v. Denmark, 2022);  an interruption of the applicants' train journey by the authorities, who forced them to wait for twelve days for a transit visa ( Shioshvili and Others v. Russia, 2016);  preventing a minor on a school trip from crossing the border for lack of documentation necessary to prove the non-custodial parent's consent ( Ș andru v. Romania (dec.), 2014);  a courts' refusal to allow a child's travel abroad to join his parent in the absence of the other parent's consent ( Penchevi v. Bulgaria, 2015);  a lengthy examination by domestic courts of an application seeking to allow a child's travel abroad to join her parent in the absence of the other parent's consent (proceedings lasting about 2 years and 10 months: Lolova and Popova v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2015, § 41);  lawful detention pending expulsion, with a view to criminal proceedings or in order to serve C. v. Germany X. v. Germany a prison sentence (, Commission decision, 1985;, Commission decision, 1977; X. v. Germany, Commission decision, 1970; X. v. Germany, Commission decision, 1970);  revocation of the applicant's provisional discharge from psychiatric hospital on the grounds of her intended trip abroad without any arrangements for adequate care in the destination Nordblad v. Sweden, country ( Commission decision, 1993);  issuance of a provisional passport, with a period of validity limited to one year, on account Csorba v. Hungary of pending criminal proceedings ( (dec.), 2007);  the refusal or failure to issue a travel document (for example, an aliens passport) to :  a stateless person ( Härginen v. Finland, Commission decision, 1998);  a refugee ( S.E. v. Serbia, 2023, §§ 49-50 and 79);  a long-term resident who fled his country of origin and was unable to obtain a travel document therefrom, as he feared contacting the authorities of that country ( L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, §§ 60, 90 and 93-94);  the repatriation of a foreign mentally-ill offender in detention, made conditional upon his placement in a mental hospital in his home country ( I.H. v. Austria, Commission decision, 1989)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:61365/16,S.E. v. Serbia,61365/16,added,"S.E. v. Serbia, no. 61365/16, 11 July 2023",10,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV,Lawfulness of the restriction test,1,,148,,"Khlyustov v. Russia, 2013|S.E. v. Serbia , 2023",,,"The phrase ""in accordance with the law"" requires domestic law to be compatible with the rule of law ( Khlyustov v. Russia, 2013, § 70; S.E. v. Serbia, 2023, § 82)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:61365/16,S.E. v. Serbia,61365/16,added,"S.E. v. Serbia, no. 61365/16, 11 July 2023",11,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV,Lawfulness of the restriction test,1,,149,,"S.E. v. Serbia , 2023",,,"The principle of legality, which is one of the principles stemming from the rule of law, requires the State authorities, at all levels of public power, to adopt any subsidiary regulations as required by primary legislation, by the set deadline or in a timely manner, as appropriate. Where an interference with an applicant's rights stems from the legislative inaction lasting for a considerable period of time, such a situation is in breach of the lawfulness requirement ( S.E. v. Serbia, 2023, §§ 82-85 and 88)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:61365/16,S.E. v. Serbia,61365/16,added,"S.E. v. Serbia, no. 61365/16, 11 July 2023",12,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,IV,Lawfulness of the restriction test,1,143,146,0.9959,"Mursaliyev and Others v. Azerbaijan 2007|S.E. v. Serbia , 2023","Mursaliyev and Others v. Azerbaijan , 2018|Shioshvili and Others v. Russia, 2016|Tatishvili v. Russia, 2007","Where the Court concludes that the interference with an applicant's rights under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 was not ""in accordance with law"", this finding makes it unnecessary to determine whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society, as required by paragraph 3 of this provision, or whether it was ""justified by the public interest in a democratic society, as stipulated in paragraph 4 ( Sissanis v. Romania, 2007, § 78; Tatishvili v. Russia, 2007, § 54; Shioshvili and Others v. Russia, 2016, § 61; Mursaliyev and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2018, § 35; Timishev v. Russia, 2005, § 49; Gartukayev v. Russia, 2005, § 21; Karpacheva and Karpachev v. Russia, 2011, § 26; Dzhaksybergenov v. Ukraine, 2011, § 62; Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 69; Cherepanov v. Russia, 2016, § 46; Rotaru v. the Republic of Moldova, 2020, § 34; Golub v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [Committee], 2021, §§ 60-62).","Where the Court concludes that the interference with an applicant's rights under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 was not ""in accordance with law"", this finding makes it unnecessary to determine whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society, as required by paragraph 3 of this provision, or whether it was ""justified by the public interest in a democratic society, as stipulated in paragraph 4 ( Sissanis v. Romania, 2007, § 78; Tatishvili v. Russia, Shioshvili and Others v. Russia, Mursaliyev and Others v. Azerbaijan 2007, § 54; 2016, § 61;, 2018, § 35; Timishev v. Russia, 2005, § 49; Gartukayev v. Russia, 2005, § 21; Karpacheva and Karpachev v. Russia, 2011, § 26; Dzhaksybergenov v. Ukraine, 2011, § 62; Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 69; Cherepanov v. Russia, 2016, § 46; Rotaru v. the Republic of Moldova, 2020, § 34; Golub v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [Committee], 2021, §§ 60-62; S.E. v. Serbia, 2023, § 88)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:61365/16,S.E. v. Serbia,61365/16,added,"S.E. v. Serbia, no. 61365/16, 11 July 2023",13,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.A,Legitimate aims,2,162,167,0.8938,"S.E. v. Serbia , 2023",,"The economic well-being of the country is excluded from the list of the legitimate aims under paragraph 3 of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 4, § 16).","The economic well-being of the country is excluded from the list of the legitimate aims under paragraph 3 of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 4, § 16). The economic well-being of the country and related financial considerations (for example, lack of available resources or technical solutions) cannot therefore justify restrictions which fall to be examined under the ""necessity in a democratic society"" test set out in paragraph 3 of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 ( S.E. v. Serbia, 2023, § 87)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20230923150809__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-02-17,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2023-09-23__2024-02-17.json,apps:61365/16,S.E. v. Serbia,61365/16,added,"S.E. v. Serbia, no. 61365/16, 11 July 2023",14,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.A,Legitimate aims,2,164,169,0.9731,"S.E. v. Serbia , 2023",,"For the purposes of this Article, only reasons relating to the aims referred to in the third paragraph constitute, where applicable, lawful grounds for the adoption by the relevant authorities of measures restricting freedom of movement ( Baumann v. France, 2001, § 60).","For the purposes of this Article, only reasons relating to the aims referred to in the third paragraph constitute, where applicable, lawful grounds for the adoption by the relevant authorities of measures restricting freedom of movement ( Baumann v. France, 2001, § 60; S.E. v. Serbia, 2023, § 82)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240930065636__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2024-02-17__2024-09-30.json,apps:1162/22,Auray and Others v. France*,1162/22,added,"Auray and Others v. France*, no. 1162/22, 8 February 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.C.1.b,Examples of qualification,4,66,66,0.9994,"In contrast to the case of Guzzardi v. Italy , 1980","In contrast to the case of Guzzard i v. Italy , 1980","The following examples provide an illustration of the manner in which the Court can distinguish between deprivation of liberty under Article 5 § 1 and restrictions on liberty of movement within the scope of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4:  While house arrest amounts to deprivation of liberty (see Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2016, § 104; [GC], 2017, § 87), a milder version of this measure can be considered as a restriction of freedom of movement. This was the case in Trijonis v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005, where the applicant's initial house arrest was replaced by a more lenient regime, allowing him to be at his work place during week-days and obliging him to stay at home from 7 p.m. until 7 a.m. during week-days and the whole day during week- ends.  The prohibition on leaving home at night except in the case of necessity (between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.) cannot be equated to house arrest and amounts to an interference with liberty of movement ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 86-88; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125).  In J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, the Court considered that the applicants, asylum seekers, had been deprived of their liberty during the first month of their stay in a ""hotspot"" facility (a migrant reception, identification and registration centre), but that they had been subjected only to a restriction of movement once the facility had become semi-open and they had been allowed out during the day (§ 86).  Special police supervision, together with a compulsory residence order and other associated restrictions, are examined under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, particularly where an applicant is not forced to live within a restricted area, is able to leave home during the day and have a social life, and has never sought permission to travel away from his place of residence ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Pagerie v. France, 2023, §§ 154-158; Raimondo v. Italy Labita v. Italy Guzzardi v. Italy, 1994, § 39; [GC], 2000, § 193). As an exception, in, 1980, the Court held that measures of this nature amounted to a deprivation of liberty. It attached particular significance to the combination of the following factors: the duration of the special supervision (sixteen months), the extremely small size of the area where the applicant had been confined (an unfenced area of 2.5 sq. km on an island, nine-tenths of which was occupied by a prison), the almost permanent supervision to which he had been subjected and the fact that it had been almost completely impossible for him to make social contacts (other than with his near family, fellow ""residents"" subjected to the same measure and supervisory staff) (§ 95).  Nada v. Switzerland In [GC], 2012, the Court examined the prohibition on travel through Switzerland, imposed on the applicant residing in an Italian enclave in the country, on the basis of legislation implementing UN Security Council Resolutions. As a result, the applicant was unable to leave the enclave and travel to any other part of Italy, the country of which he was a national. For the Court, the restrictions on the applicant's freedom of movement did not amount to a ""deprivation of liberty"", even though they had been maintained for a considerable length of time (six years) and the territory of the enclave was small (about 1.6 sq. km). In contrast to the case of Guzzard i v. Italy, 1980, the applicant had not been prevented from freely living and moving within the enclave and receiving visitors. Nor had he been subjected to any surveillance or obliged to report regularly to the police. Furthermore, he had been allowed to seek exemptions from the entry or transit ban and, in any event, Switzerland had the right, under international law, to prevent the entry of an alien (§§ 228-233). While Article 5 § 1 was inapplicable, the restrictions on the applicant's freedom of movement were found to be in breach of Article 8. No complaint was submitted under Article 2 of Protocol no. 4 (a Protocol not ratified by Switzerland).  Ageneral nation-wide lockdown imposed by the authorities to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, including a prohibition on leaving home on pain of a fine, was not deemed to constitute a ""deprivation of liberty"" in view of the level of intensity of the restrictions on the applicant's freedom of movement ( Terheş v. Romania (dec.), 2021, §§ 41-45). In particular, the applicant had been free to leave home for various reasons exhaustively set out in the legislation and could go to different places, at whatever time of day the situation required. He did not claim that his circumstances were not covered by any of those reasons and that he had thus been confined indoors for the entire duration of the lockdown (52 days). Moreover, unlike in the case of Guzzardi v. Italy, 1980, he had not been subject to individual surveillance and did not claim to have been forced to live in a cramped space, nor had he been deprived of all social contact. Hence the conditions of the lockdown could not be equated with house arrest. Article 5 § 1 was inapplicable. As the applicant had focused specifically on Article 5 and had not asserted his rights under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, the Court did not examine the case under the latter provision.  In Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012, the Court examined the ""kettling"" or containment of a crowd by a police cordon on public-order grounds. The coercive nature of the containment, its duration (seven hours), and its effect on the applicants, in terms of physical discomfort (no shelter, food, water or toilet facilities) and inability to leave the area, pointed towards a deprivation of liberty. However, in the particular circumstances, the containment had been the least intrusive and most effective means of preventing injury to people and property from violent demonstrators in dangerous and volatile conditions, which had persisted throughout its duration. The police had kept the situation constantly under close review and made frequent attempts at controlled release. Accordingly, on the specific and exceptional facts, the Court was unable to identify a moment when the containment could be considered to have changed from what had been, at most, a restriction on freedom of movement, to a deprivation of liberty. Had it not remained necessary to maintain the cordon in order to prevent serious injury or damage, the ""type"" of the measure would have been different, and its coercive and restrictive nature might have been sufficient to bring it within Article 5. Article 5 § 1 was inapplicable, and no complaint was submitted under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (a Protocol not ratified by the United Kingdom) (§§ 64-68).  In Vadym Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2022, the Court examined a situation where an applicant had been blocked in the courtroom for about two hours due to aggressive behaviour by the public which was dissatisfied with the court's decision to release him. In the Court's view, given the relatively short duration of the applicant's retention and to the extent that the police officers present in the courtroom had prevented the applicant from leaving immediately, the particular situation must be seen as a restriction on the applicant's freedom of movement rather than a deprivation of liberty. Article 5 did not apply, and the applicant did not raise a complaint under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (§§ 86-89).","The following examples provide an illustration of the manner in which the Court can distinguish between deprivation of liberty under Article 5 § 1 and restrictions on liberty of movement within the scope of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4:  While house arrest amounts to deprivation of liberty (see Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2016, § 104; [GC], 2017, § 87), a milder version of this measure can be considered as a restriction of freedom of movement. This was the case in Trijonis v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005, where the applicant's initial house arrest was replaced by a more lenient regime, allowing him to be at his work place during week-days and obliging him to stay at home from 7 p.m. until 7 a.m. during week-days and the whole day during week- ends.  The prohibition on leaving home at night except in the case of necessity (between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.) cannot be equated to house arrest and amounts to an interference with liberty of movement ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, § 86-88; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125).  In J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, the Court considered that the applicants, asylum seekers, had been deprived of their liberty during the first month of their stay in a ""hotspot"" facility (a migrant reception, identification and registration centre), but that they had been subjected only to a restriction of movement once the facility had become semi-open and they had been allowed out during the day (§ 86).  Special police supervision, together with a compulsory residence order and other associated restrictions, are examined under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, particularly where an applicant is not forced to live within a restricted area, is able to leave home during the day and have a social life, and has never sought permission to travel away from his place of residence ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Pagerie v. France, 2023, §§ 154-158; Raimondo v. Italy Labita v. Italy Guzzardi v. Italy, 1994, § 39; [GC], 2000, § 193). As an exception, in, 1980, the Court held that measures of this nature amounted to a deprivation of liberty. It attached particular significance to the combination of the following factors: the duration of the special supervision (sixteen months), the extremely small size of the area where the applicant had been confined (an unfenced area of 2.5 sq. km on an island, nine-tenths of which was occupied by a prison), the almost permanent supervision to which he had been subjected and the fact that it had been almost completely impossible for him to make social contacts (other than with his near family, fellow ""residents"" subjected to the same measure and supervisory staff) (§ 95).  Nada v. Switzerland In [GC], 2012, the Court examined the prohibition on travel through Switzerland, imposed on the applicant residing in an Italian enclave in the country, on the basis of legislation implementing UN Security Council Resolutions. As a result, the applicant was unable to leave the enclave and travel to any other part of Italy, the country of which he was a national. For the Court, the restrictions on the applicant's freedom of movement did not amount to a ""deprivation of liberty"", even though they had been maintained for a considerable length of time (six years) and the territory of the enclave was small (about 1.6 sq. km). In contrast to the case of Guzzardi v. Italy, 1980, the applicant had not been prevented from freely living and moving within the enclave and receiving visitors. Nor had he been subjected to any surveillance or obliged to report regularly to the police. Furthermore, he had been allowed to seek exemptions from the entry or transit ban and, in any event, Switzerland had the right, under international law, to prevent the entry of an alien (§§ 228-233). While Article 5 § 1 was inapplicable, the restrictions on the applicant's freedom of movement were found to be in breach of Article 8. No complaint was submitted under Article 2 of Protocol no. 4 (a Protocol not ratified by Switzerland).  Ageneral nation-wide lockdown imposed by the authorities to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, including a prohibition on leaving home on pain of a fine, was not deemed to constitute a ""deprivation of liberty"" in view of the level of intensity of the restrictions on the applicant's freedom of movement ( Terheş v. Romania (dec.), 2021, §§ 41-45). In particular, the applicant had been free to leave home for various reasons exhaustively set out in the legislation and could go to different places, at whatever time of day the situation required. He did not claim that his circumstances were not covered by any of those reasons and that he had thus been confined indoors for the entire duration of the lockdown (52 days). Moreover, unlike in the case of Guzzardi v. Italy, 1980, he had not been subject to individual surveillance and did not claim to have been forced to live in a cramped space, nor had he been deprived of all social contact. Hence the conditions of the lockdown could not be equated with house arrest. Article 5 § 1 was inapplicable. As the applicant had focused specifically on Article 5 and had not asserted his rights under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, the Court did not examine the case under the latter provision.  In Austin and Othe rs v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012, the Court examined the ""kettling"" or containment of a crowd by a police cordon on public-order grounds. The coercive nature of the containment, its duration (seven hours), and its effect on the applicants, in terms of physical discomfort (no shelter, food, water or toilet facilities) and inability to leave the area, pointed towards a deprivation of liberty. However, in the particular circumstances, the containment had been the least intrusive and most effective means of preventing injury to people and property from violent demonstrators in dangerous and volatile conditions, which had persisted throughout its duration. The police had kept the situation constantly under close review and made frequent attempts at controlled release. Accordingly, on the specific and exceptional facts, the Court was unable to identify a moment when the containment could be considered to have changed from what had been, at most, a restriction on freedom of movement, to a deprivation of liberty. Had it not remained necessary to maintain the cordon in order to prevent serious injury or damage, the ""type"" of the measure would have been different, and its coercive and restrictive nature might have been sufficient to bring it within Article 5. Article 5 § 1 was inapplicable, and no complaint was submitted under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (a Protocol not ratified by the United Kingdom) (§§ 64-68). The Court reached a similar finding in respect of Article 5 § 1 in Auray and Others v. France*, 2024, §§ 65-74, where it found Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to be applicable (§ 84).  In Vadym Melnyk v. Ukraine, 2022, the Court examined a situation where an applicant had been blocked in the courtroom for about two hours due to aggressive behaviour by the public which was dissatisfied with the court's decision to release him. In the Court's view, given the relatively short duration of the applicant's retention and to the extent that the police officers present in the courtroom had prevented the applicant from leaving immediately, the particular situation must be seen as a restriction on the applicant's freedom of movement rather than a deprivation of liberty. Article 5 did not apply, and the applicant did not raise a complaint under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (§§ 86-89)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240930065636__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2024-02-17__2024-09-30.json,apps:1162/22,Auray and Others v. France*,1162/22,added,"Auray and Others v. France*, no. 1162/22, 8 February 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.A.1,Forms of interference,3,105,105,0.9998,,,"The following situations have been considered to amount to a form of interference with the right to freedom of movement:  a requirement not to leave one's place of residence or another specified area/municipality without permission. This requirement can be imposed:  as part of the bail conditions or as a separate measure in the context of criminal proceedings ( Fedorov and Fedorova v. Russia, 2005, § 35; Antonenkov and Others v. Ukraine, 2005, § 52; Nagy v. Hungary (dec.), 2004; Ivanov v. Ukraine, 2006, § 85; Komarova v. Russia, 2006, § 55; Hajibeyli v. Azerbaijan, 2008, § 58; Rosengren v. Romania, 2008, § 32; Nikiforenko v. Ukraine, 2010, § 55; Pokhalchuk v. Ukraine, 2010, Doroshenko v. Ukraine Manannikov v. Russia § 94;, 2011, § 52;, 2018, § 60);  during bankruptcy proceedings ( Luordo v. Italy, 2003, § 92; Goffi v. Italy, 2005, § 20; Bassani v. Italy Gasser v. Italy Di Carlo et Bonaffini v. Italy, 2003, § 24;, 2006, §§ 30-31; (dec.), 2006; Bova v. Italy (dec.), 2004; Shaw v. Italy, 2009, § 16; Bottaro v. Italy, 2003, § 54; Campagnano v. Italy, 2006, § 38);  in the context of a compulsory military service ( Golub v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [Committee], 2021, §§ 54 and 58);  as a compulsory residence order in the context of:  criminal prevention measures ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 154; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 54 ; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Marturana v. Italy, 2008, § 190; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991; Guzzardi v. Italy, Commission decision, 1977);  extradition ( Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010);  expulsion ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; M v. France, Commission decision, 1984; Kenane v. France, Commission decision, 1992; Kalibi v. France, Commission decision, 1984);  a prohibition on leaving home at night except in case of necessity ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], Pagerie v. France Fanouni v. France Timofeyev and 2017, §§ 86-88;, 2023, § 154;, 2023, § 54; Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, §§ 13 and 39; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  a prohibition on migrants leaving a ""hotspot"" facility at night ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, § 86);  an obligation to report regularly to the court ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) De Tommaso v. Italy Pagerie v. France or the police ( [GC], 2017, §§ 17, 84 and 89;, 2023, § 154; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 54; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Raimondo v. Italy, Labita v. Italy Poninski v. Poland 1994, §§ 13 and 39; [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; (dec.), 2000; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  special police supervision, including the above measures and other associated restrictions (not leaving home without informing a supervising authority, not going to bars, nightclubs, amusement arcades or brothels or attending public meetings, not associating with De individuals who have a criminal record and who are subject to preventive measures) ( Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  a prohibition on leaving home from 7 p.m. until 7 a.m. during week-days and the whole day during week-ends, coupled with permission to attend one's work place during week-days ( Trijonis v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005);  a general lockdown in order to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, including a prohibition on leaving home on pain of a fine, except in an exhaustive number of circumstances and on production of a document attesting to valid reasons for doing so ( Terheş v. Romania (dec.), 2021, § 45);  a requirement to report any change of place of residence ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) or to have it registered by the police within a specific time-limit, on pain of a fine ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66; Corley and Others v. Russia, 2021, § 72; Ananiyevy v. Russia [Committee], 2021; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125);  a fine imposed on a foreigner for having stayed overnight outside his registered place of residence ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66);  a prohibition on approaching a specified place (for example, a centre for asylum seekers ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193); a building site ( Cokarić and Others v. Croatia (dec.), 2006); or an abortion clinic ( Van den Dungen v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1995);  a barring and protection order issued in the context of domestic violence, prohibiting a perpetrator from returning to the family home and the surrounding areas for a specified period ( Kurt v. Austria [GC], 2021, §§ 14, 25 and 183);  an inability to enter a specified area of a city, or a prohibition thereof ( Bigliazzi and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2008; Olivieira v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 39; Landvreugd v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 46);  ""kettling"" or containment of a crowd by a police cordon on public-order grounds ( Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2012, § 67);  The applicant's retention, upon release, in the courtroom on safety grounds, due to the Vadym Melnyk v. Ukraine aggressive behaviour of the public (, 2022, § 87);  extensive police monitoring of movements between a territorial entity not recognised by the international community and a government-controlled area and within the latter, coupled with the requirement to report to the police before each intended border crossing ( Denizci and Others v. Cyprus, 2001, §§ 403-406);  the inability of internally displaced persons to return to their homes situated on the territory of an entity not recognised by the international community ( Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, §§ 292-301);  restrictions on freedom of movement resulting from the purported ""annexation"" of territory de facto from one State to another and the ensuing transformation (by the respondent State) of the administrative border line into a State border (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], 2020, §§ 500-503);  restrictions on freedom of movement between a territorial entity not recognised by the international community and a government-controlled area stemming from ""borderisation"" process (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Georgia v. Russia (IV) (dec.), 2023);  Alleged abduction and forcible transfer from a territorial entity not recognised by the international community to the State which exercises effective control over that entity (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.) [GC], 2022, §§ 895-898);  police refusal to let the applicant cross the administrative border between two regions ( Timishev v. Russia, 2005, § 44; Gartukayev v. Russia, 2005, § 21);  a transit ban, under legislation implementing UN Security Council Resolutions, imposed on a resident of an enclaved area by the State surrounding it; and the resulting inability to travel Nada v. Switzerland within the country of which the applicant was a national ( [GC], 2012, §§ 198 and 226-228);  an obligation to provide fingerprints when applying for a passport and the subsequent storage of the fingerprints on a microchip in the passport ( Willems v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2021, §§ 23 and 38).","The following situations have been considered to amount to a form of interference with the right to freedom of movement:  a requirement not to leave one's place of residence or another specified area/municipality without permission. This requirement can be imposed:  as part of the bail conditions or as a separate measure in the context of criminal proceedings ( Fedorov and Fedorova v. Russia, 2005, § 35; Antonenkov and Others v. Ukraine, 2005, § 52; Nagy v. Hungary (dec.), 2004; Ivanov v. Ukraine, 2006, § 85; Komarova v. Russia, 2006, § 55; Hajibeyli v. Azerbaijan, 2008, § 58; Rosengren v. Romania, 2008, § 32; Nikiforenko v. Ukraine, 2010, § 55; Pokhalchuk v. Ukraine, 2010, Doroshenko v. Ukraine Manannikov v. Russia § 94;, 2011, § 52;, 2018, § 60);  during bankruptcy proceedings ( Luordo v. Italy, 2003, § 92; Goffi v. Italy, 2005, § 20; Bassani v. Italy Gasser v. Italy Di Carlo et Bonaffini v. Italy, 2003, § 24;, 2006, §§ 30-31; (dec.), 2006; Bova v. Italy (dec.), 2004; Shaw v. Italy, 2009, § 16; Bottaro v. Italy, 2003, § 54; Campagnano v. Italy, 2006, § 38);  in the context of a compulsory military service ( Golub v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [Committee], 2021, §§ 54 and 58);  as a compulsory residence order in the context of:  criminal prevention measures ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Pagerie v. France, 2023, § 154; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 54 ; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Marturana v. Italy, 2008, § 190; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991; Guzzardi v. Italy, Commission decision, 1977);  extradition ( Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010);  expulsion ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; M v. France, Commission decision, 1984; Kenane v. France, Commission decision, 1992; Kalibi v. France, Commission decision, 1984);  a prohibition on leaving home at night except in case of necessity ( De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], Pagerie v. France Fanouni v. France Timofeyev and 2017, §§ 86-88;, 2023, § 154;, 2023, § 54; Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, §§ 13 and 39; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  a prohibition on migrants leaving a ""hotspot"" facility at night ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, § 86);  an obligation to report regularly to the court ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) De Tommaso v. Italy Pagerie v. France or the police ( [GC], 2017, §§ 17, 84 and 89;, 2023, § 154; Fanouni v. France, 2023, § 54; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; Cipriani v. Italy (dec.), 2010; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Raimondo v. Italy, Labita v. Italy Poninski v. Poland 1994, §§ 13 and 39; [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; (dec.), 2000; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  special police supervision, including the above measures and other associated restrictions (not leaving home without informing a supervising authority, not going to bars, nightclubs, amusement arcades or brothels or attending public meetings, not associating with De individuals who have a criminal record and who are subject to preventive measures) ( Tommaso v. Italy [GC], 2017, §§ 84-89; Raimondo v. Italy, 1994, § 39; Labita v. Italy [GC], 2000, §§ 63 and 193; Vito Sante Santoro v. Italy, 2004, § 37; Villa v. Italy, 2010, §§ 43-44; S.M. v. Italy (dec.), 2013, §§ 22-23; Ciancimino v. Italy, Commission decision, 1991);  a prohibition on leaving home from 7 p.m. until 7 a.m. during week-days and the whole day during week-ends, coupled with permission to attend one's work place during week-days ( Trijonis v. Lithuania (dec.), 2005);  a general lockdown in order to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, including a prohibition on leaving home on pain of a fine, except in an exhaustive number of circumstances and on production of a document attesting to valid reasons for doing so ( Terheş v. Romania (dec.), 2021, § 45);  a requirement to report any change of place of residence ( Schmid v. Austria, Commission decision, 1985) or to have it registered by the police within a specific time-limit, on pain of a fine ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66; Corley and Others v. Russia, 2021, § 72; Ananiyevy v. Russia [Committee], 2021; Timofeyev and Postupkin v. Russia, 2021, § 125);  a fine imposed on a foreigner for having stayed overnight outside his registered place of residence ( Bolat v. Russia, 2006, § 66);  a prohibition on approaching a specified place (for example, a centre for asylum seekers ( M.S. v. Belgium, 2012, §§ 49 et 193); a building site ( Cokarić and Others v. Croatia (dec.), 2006); or an abortion clinic ( Van den Dungen v. the Netherlands, Commission decision, 1995);  a barring and protection order issued in the context of domestic violence, prohibiting a perpetrator from returning to the family home and the surrounding areas for a specified period ( Kurt v. Austria [GC], 2021, §§ 14, 25 and 183);  an inability to enter a specified area of a city, or a prohibition thereof ( Bigliazzi and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2008; Olivieira v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 39; Landvreugd v. the Netherlands, 2002, §§ 10 and 46);  ""kettling"" or containment of a crowd by a police cordon on public-order grounds ( Auray and Others v. France*, 2024, § 84);  The applicant's retention, upon release, in the courtroom on safety grounds, due to the Vadym Melnyk v. Ukraine aggressive behaviour of the public (, 2022, § 87);  extensive police monitoring of movements between a territorial entity not recognised by the international community and a government-controlled area and within the latter, coupled with the requirement to report to the police before each intended border crossing ( Denizci and Others v. Cyprus, 2001, §§ 403-406);  the inability of internally displaced persons to return to their homes situated on the territory of an entity not recognised by the international community ( Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], 2021, §§ 292-301);  restrictions on freedom of movement resulting from the purported ""annexation"" of territory de facto from one State to another and the ensuing transformation (by the respondent State) of the administrative border line into a State border (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], 2020, §§ 500-503);  restrictions on freedom of movement between a territorial entity not recognised by the international community and a government-controlled area stemming from ""borderisation"" process (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Georgia v. Russia (IV) (dec.), 2023);  Alleged abduction and forcible transfer from a territorial entity not recognised by the international community to the State which exercises effective control over that entity (complaint regarding the alleged existence of an administrative practice declared admissible: Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.) [GC], 2022, §§ 895-898);  police refusal to let the applicant cross the administrative border between two regions ( Timishev v. Russia, 2005, § 44; Gartukayev v. Russia, 2005, § 21);  a transit ban, under legislation implementing UN Security Council Resolutions, imposed on a resident of an enclaved area by the State surrounding it; and the resulting inability to travel Nada v. Switzerland within the country of which the applicant was a national ( [GC], 2012, §§ 198 and 226-228);  an obligation to provide fingerprints when applying for a passport and the subsequent storage of the fingerprints on a microchip in the passport ( Willems v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2021, §§ 23 and 38)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240930065636__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2024-02-17__2024-09-30.json,apps:1162/22,Auray and Others v. France*,1162/22,added,"Auray and Others v. France*, no. 1162/22, 8 February 2024",3,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV,Lawfulness of the restriction test,1,,163,,,,,"As a preventive measure likely to affect the fundamental rights and freedoms of peaceful demonstrators, the legal framework regulating the use of the ""kettling"" technique by the police needs to define the rules on its use with sufficient precision, setting out precisely under what circumstances and conditions it could be implemented, how it should be carried out and time-limits for its use ( Auray and Others v. France*, 2024, §§ 91-94)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240930065636__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2024-02-17__2024-09-30.json,apps:40926/16|73942/17,Lypovchenko and Halabudenco v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia*,40926/16|73942/17,added,"Lypovchenko and Halabudenco v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia*, nos. 40926/16 and 73942/17, 20 February 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,III.C.3,Measures not amounting to an interference,3,134,134,0.9949,,"Pini and Others v. Romania , 2004","In the following situations, the Convention organs did not establish any restriction on, or an issue with, the exercise of the freedom to leave any country:  where there were financial repercussions of the exercise of the right, such as:  the suspension of payment of the applicants' old-age pension in case of emigration ( Gorfunkel v. Russia, 2013, §§ 37-38; Cinnan v Sweden, Commission decision, 1988);  denial of permission to persons, who emigrated, to remove currency abroad due to outstanding tax liabilities ( S. v. Sweden, Commission decision, 1985);  the requirement that a frontier worker pay contributions to health insurance schemes both in the State of residence, where he moved, and in his home State, where he pursued his occupation ( Roux v. France, Commission decision, 1995);  the calculation of pension rights of migrant workers, who returned to retire in their home country, taking into account the lower amount of contributions paid when working abroad and resulting in a reduction of pension ( Maggio and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2010);  an inability of nationals residing abroad to obtain restitution of property, confiscated during the former communist regime as a sanction for their emigration, due to a statutory condition of permanent residence on the territory of the State concerned ( Brezny v. Slovak Republic, Commission decision, 1996);  the quashing of a final court judgment ordering restitution of property, which was confiscated during the former communist regime as a sanction for the applicant's emigration, on grounds unrelated to the merits of the dispute ( Oprescu v. Romania, 2003, §§ 33-36);  a personal choice not to enter or to leave a specific country for fear of being arrested on the basis of an outstanding arrest warrant ( E.M.B. v. Romania (dec.), 2010, §§ 32-34 and 48-49; Stapleton v. Ireland (dec.), 2010, §§ 22 and 33; Krombach v. France (dec.), 2000);  a court ruling declaring a child's removal and retention abroad unlawful, within the meaning of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, without, however, ordering her return or prohibiting her from leaving the country of origin; the ruling was considered in the light of the abducting parent's eventual agreement to return with the child ( D.J. and A. -K.R. v. Romania (dec.), 2009, § 74);  the dismissal of an application, under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, for the return of a child, without imposing any travel restrictions on the latter ( Monory v. Hungary and Romania (dec.), 2004);  the denial of permission to a noncustodial parent to travel abroad with his child when exercising contact rights ( R.R. v. Romania (no 1) (dec.), 2008; R.R. v. Romania (no 3) (dec.), 2011, §§ 203-205);  the non-enforcement of adoption orders in favour of foreign nationals and failure to hand over the adolescent children, who were opposed to their adoption abroad and otherwise were not prevented from travelling outside their home country ( Pini and Others v. Romania, 2004, §§ 195-197).","In the following situations, the Convention organs did not establish any restriction on, or an issue with, the exercise of the freedom to leave any country:  where there were financial repercussions of the exercise of the right, such as:  the suspension of payment of the applicants' old-age pension in case of emigration ( Gorfunkel v. Russia, 2013, §§ 37-38; Cinnan v Sweden, Commission decision, 1988);  denial of permission to persons, who emigrated, to remove currency abroad due to outstanding tax liabilities ( S. v. Sweden, Commission decision, 1985);  the requirement that a frontier worker pay contributions to health insurance schemes both in the State of residence, where he moved, and in his home State, where he pursued his occupation ( Roux v. France, Commission decision, 1995);  the calculation of pension rights of migrant workers, who returned to retire in their home country, taking into account the lower amount of contributions paid when working abroad and resulting in a reduction of pension ( Maggio and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2010);  an inability of nationals residing abroad to obtain restitution of property, confiscated during the former communist regime as a sanction for their emigration, due to a statutory condition of permanent residence on the territory of the State concerned ( Brezny v. Slovak Republic, Commission decision, 1996);  the quashing of a final court judgment ordering restitution of property, which was confiscated during the former communist regime as a sanction for the applicant's emigration, on grounds unrelated to the merits of the dispute ( Oprescu v. Romania, 2003, §§ 33-36); a personal choice not to enter or to leave a specific country for fear of being arrested on the basis of an outstanding arrest warrant ( E.M.B. v. Romania (dec.), 2010, §§ 32-34 and 48-49; Stapleton v. Ireland (dec.), 2010, §§ 22 and 33; Krombach v. France (dec.), 2000; compare Lypovchenko and Halabudenco v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia* and contrast, 2024, §§ 148-149, in the specific context of the applicant's choice not to return to the self- proclaimed ""Moldovan Republic of Transnistria"" (MRT) in view an unlawful search-and- de facto arrest warrant issued by a ""MRT"" court);  a court ruling declaring a child's removal and retention abroad unlawful, within the meaning of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, without, however, ordering her return or prohibiting her from leaving the country of origin; the ruling was considered in the light of the abducting parent's eventual agreement to return with the child ( D.J. and A. -K.R. v. Romania (dec.), 2009, § 74);  the dismissal of an application, under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, for the return of a child, without imposing any travel restrictions on the latter ( Monory v. Hungary and Romania (dec.), 2004);  the denial of permission to a noncustodial parent to travel abroad with his child when exercising contact rights ( R.R. v. Romania (no 1) (dec.), 2008; R.R. v. Romania (no 3) (dec.), 2011, §§ 203-205);  the non-enforcement of adoption orders in favour of foreign nationals and failure to hand over the adolescent children, who were opposed to their adoption abroad and otherwise Pini and Others v. Romania were not prevented from travelling outside their home country (, 2004, §§ 195-197)."
dbfbd08a4477,Article 2 Protocol 4,20240217131620__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,20240930065636__guide_art_2_protocol_4_eng.pdf,2024-02-17,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/dbfbd08a4477/diff_2024-02-17__2024-09-30.json,apps:42429/16,Memedova and Others v. North Macedonia,42429/16,added,"Memedova and Others v. North Macedonia, nos. 42429/16 and 2 others, 24 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.C.2,Forms of interference,3,133,133,0.9761,"Memedova and Others v. North Macedonia , 2023",,"Restrictions on the exercise of the right to leave any country, including one's own, have also taken the form of:  prohibition, on pain of criminal liability, on entry and stay, without permission, in areas in Mørck Jensen which a terrorist organisation is a party to an ongoing armed conflict ( v. Denmark, 2022);  an interruption of the applicants' train journey by the authorities, who forced them to wait for twelve days for a transit visa ( Shioshvili and Others v. Russia, 2016);  preventing a minor on a school trip from crossing the border for lack of documentation necessary to prove the non-custodial parent's consent ( Ș andru v. Romania (dec.), 2014);  a courts' refusal to allow a child's travel abroad to join his parent in the absence of the other parent's consent ( Penchevi v. Bulgaria, 2015);  a lengthy examination by domestic courts of an application seeking to allow a child's travel abroad to join her parent in the absence of the other parent's consent (proceedings lasting about 2 years and 10 months: Lolova and Popova v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2015, § 41);  lawful detention pending expulsion, with a view to criminal proceedings or in order to serve C. v. Germany X. v. Germany a prison sentence (, Commission decision, 1985;, Commission decision, 1977; X. v. Germany, Commission decision, 1970; X. v. Germany, Commission decision, 1970);  revocation of the applicant's provisional discharge from psychiatric hospital on the grounds of her intended trip abroad without any arrangements for adequate care in the destination Nordblad v. Sweden, country ( Commission decision, 1993);  issuance of a provisional passport, with a period of validity limited to one year, on account Csorba v. Hungary of pending criminal proceedings ( (dec.), 2007);  the refusal or failure to issue a travel document (for example, an aliens passport) to :  a stateless person ( Härginen v. Finland, Commission decision, 1998);  a refugee ( S.E. v. Serbia, 2023, §§ 49-50 and 79);  a long-term resident who fled his country of origin and was unable to obtain a travel document therefrom, as he feared contacting the authorities of that country ( L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, §§ 60, 90 and 93-94);  the repatriation of a foreign mentally-ill offender in detention, made conditional upon his placement in a mental hospital in his home country ( I.H. v. Austria, Commission decision, 1989).","Restrictions on the exercise of the right to leave any country, including one's own, have also taken the form of:  prohibition, on pain of criminal liability, on entry and stay, without permission, in areas in Mørck Jensen which a terrorist organisation is a party to an ongoing armed conflict ( v. Denmark, 2022);  an interruption of the applicants' train journey by the authorities, who forced them to wait for twelve days for a transit visa ( Shioshvili and Others v. Russia, 2016);  stopping the applicants, of Roma ethnicity, at the border and not allowing them to leave the country, citing the preservation of the State's relations with the EU against the background of a perceived increase in the numbers of nationals of the respondent State making unfounded asylum applications in the EU and Schengen member States, thus abusing the existing visa-free regime ( Memedova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2023);  preventing a minor on a school trip from crossing the border for lack of documentation necessary to prove the non-custodial parent's consent ( Ș andru v. Romania (dec.), 2014);  a courts' refusal to allow a child's travel abroad to join his parent in the absence of the other parent's consent ( Penchevi v. Bulgaria, 2015);  a lengthy examination by domestic courts of an application seeking to allow a child's travel abroad to join her parent in the absence of the other parent's consent (proceedings lasting about 2 years and 10 months: Lolova and Popova v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2015, § 41);  lawful detention pending expulsion, with a view to criminal proceedings or in order to serve C. v. Germany X. v. Germany a prison sentence (, Commission decision, 1985;, Commission decision, 1977; X. v. Germany, Commission decision, 1970; X. v. Germany, Commission decision, 1970);  revocation of the applicant's provisional discharge from psychiatric hospital on the grounds of her intended trip abroad without any arrangements for adequate care in the destination country ( Nordblad v. Sweden, Commission decision, 1993);  issuance of a provisional passport, with a period of validity limited to one year, on account Csorba v. Hungary of pending criminal proceedings ( (dec.), 2007);  the refusal or failure to issue a travel document (for example, an aliens passport) to :  a stateless person ( Härginen v. Finland, Commission decision, 1998);  a refugee ( S.E. v. Serbia, 2023, §§ 49-50 and 79);  a long-term resident who fled his country of origin and was unable to obtain a travel document therefrom, as he feared contacting the authorities of that country ( L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, §§ 60, 90 and 93-94);  the repatriation of a foreign mentally-ill offender in detention, made conditional upon his placement in a mental hospital in his home country ( I.H. v. Austria, Commission decision, 1989)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20230923093716__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-30,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-30.json,apps:53891/20,A.E. v. Bulgaria,53891/20,added,"A.E. v. Bulgaria, no. 53891/20, 23 May 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.B,The exception: reversal of the burden of proof,2,89,89,0.9809,"A.E. v. Bulgaria , 2023",,"Aspecific set of circumstances needs to be proven in domestic violence cases, where the applicant has to show that such violence affects mainly women and that the authorities'actions were not a simple failure or delay in dealing with domestic violence, but amounted to repeatedly condoning such violence and reflected a discriminatory attitude towards the applicant as a woman ( Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013, § 89). For example, in Talpis v. Italy, 2017, the Court considered that the applicant had demonstrated the existence of prima facie discrimination through the conclusions of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences and of the National Statistics Institute. In Opuz v. Turkey, 2009, there were no statistics presented to the Court showing that victims of domestic violence were predominantly women, and indeed it was noted that Amnesty International stated that there were no reliable data to this effect. Rather, the Court was prepared to accept the assessment of Amnesty International, a reputable international NGO and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women that violence against women was a significant problem in Turkey. On the other hand, in Y and Others v. Bulgaria, 2022, the Court held that no concrete evidence had been presented to suggest that the domestic authorities had remained generally complacent in domestic violence cases. It was established that the Bulgarian authorities did not collect or keep comprehensive statistics about the manner in which the law-enforcement authorities handled domestic-violence cases, which was a serious omission already criticized by a number of international actors in the field. In the absence of comprehensive statistics, it was however open to the applicants to attempt to substantiate their assertion with other kinds of prima facie evidence, such as for instance specialised reports. However, the three international reports they submitted urged the Bulgarian authorities to combat any discrimination against women, but they did not in terms state that the police or other authorities were consistently downplaying or unwilling to deal with domestic violence cases, or cite concrete field data on the point. Not having, in addition, established any proof of anti-female bias by the State officials dealing specifically with the victim's case, or problems with the existing legal framework for the protection of women from domestic violence in Bulgaria, the Court found no violation of Article 14 in the case.","Aspecific set of circumstances needs to be proven in domestic violence cases, where the applicant has to show that such violence affects mainly women and that the authorities'actions were not a simple failure or delay in dealing with domestic violence, but amounted to repeatedly condoning such violence and reflected a discriminatory attitude towards the applicant as a woman ( Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013, § 89). For example, in Talpis v. Italy, 2017, the Court considered that the applicant had demonstrated the existence of prima facie discrimination through the conclusions of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences and of the National Statistics Institute. In Opuz v. Turkey, 2009, there were no statistics presented to the Court showing that victims of domestic violence were predominantly women, and indeed it was noted that Amnesty International stated that there were no reliable data to this effect. Rather, the Court was prepared to accept the assessment of Amnesty International, a reputable international NGO and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women that violence against women was a significant problem in Turkey. On the other hand, in Y and Others v. Bulgaria, 2022, the Court held that no concrete evidence had been presented to suggest that the domestic authorities had remained generally complacent in domestic violence cases. It was established that the Bulgarian authorities did not collect or keep comprehensive statistics about the manner in which the law-enforcement authorities handled domestic-violence cases, which was a serious omission already criticized by a number of international actors in the field. In the absence of comprehensive statistics, it was however open to the applicants to attempt to substantiate their assertion with other kinds of prima facie evidence, such as for instance specialised reports. However, the three international reports they submitted urged the Bulgarian authorities to combat any discrimination against women, but they did not in terms state that the police or other authorities were consistently downplaying or unwilling to deal with domestic violence cases, or cite concrete field data on the point. Not having, in addition, established any proof of anti-female bias by the State officials dealing specifically with the victim's case, or problems with the existing legal framework for the protection of women from domestic violence in Bulgaria, the Court found no violation of Article 14 in the case. In contrast, in A.E. v. Bulgaria, 2023, the Court was satisfied that the evidence brought by the applicant, notably statistics as regards violence against women in Bulgaria, reported by domestic non-governmental organisations and contained in the 2017 EUtool for measuring gender equality and figures provided by the Ministry of Interior in respect of 2019 and 2020 concerning the numbers of women who reported domestic violence, was sufficient to make a prima facie case of discrimination against women, bearing also in mind that that was the third case against Bulgaria in which it found a violation of the Convention stemming from the authorities'response to acts of domestic violence against women (§§ 118-19). The Court considered that the absence of official comprehensive statistics kept by the authorities can no longer be explained as a mere omission on their part, given the level of the problem in Bulgaria and the authorities'related obligation to pay particular attention to the effects of domestic violence on women and to act accordingly (§ 120). The Court found a violation of Article 14 taken together with Article 3, observing that the way in which the legal provisions providing protection against domestic violence were worded and interpreted by the relevant authorities was bound to deprive a number of women victims of domestic violence from official prosecution and thus effective protection (§ 120)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20230923093716__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-30,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-30.json,apps:53891/20,A.E. v. Bulgaria,53891/20,added,"A.E. v. Bulgaria, no. 53891/20, 23 May 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.A,Sex,2,,113,,"In A.E. v. Bulgaria , 2023",,,"In A.E. v. Bulgaria, 2023 the applicant, a minor at that time, was victim of domestic violence at the hands of her partner. Based on the statistical evidence submitted by her, which together with the previous cases of domestic violence brought against Bulgaria demonstrated that domestic violence in Bulgaria affected predominantly women (§§ 118-19), the Court considered that the authorities had not shown what specific policies geared towards protecting victims of domestic violence and punishing the offenders they have pursued and to what effect (§ 120) and had not disproved the applicant's prima facie case of a general institutional passivity in matters related to domestic violence in Bulgaria (§ 122)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20230923093716__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-30,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-30.json,apps:53891/20,A.E. v. Bulgaria,53891/20,added,"A.E. v. Bulgaria, no. 53891/20, 23 May 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.A,Sex,2,100,100,0.9922,"A.E. v. Bulgaria , 2023",,"The Court has found that differential treatment on the grounds of sex violated Article 14 in different areas, such as ▪ equality in marriage ( Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, 2004; Burghartz v. Switzerland, 1994); ▪ access to employment ( Emel Boyraz v. Turkey, 2014); ▪ retirement age ( Moraru and Marin v. Romania, 2022); ▪ parental leave and allowances ( Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], 2012; Gruba and Others v. Russia, 2021); ▪ survivor's pensions ( Willis v. the United Kingdom, 2002; Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022); ▪ civic obligations ( Zarb Adami v. Malta, 2006; Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany, 1994); ▪ family reunification ( Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 1985); ▪ children's surnames ( Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy, 2014; León Madrid v. Spain, 2021); or ▪ domestic violence ( Opuz v. Turkey, 2009; Volodina v. Russia, 2019; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021).","The Court has found that differential treatment on the grounds of sex violated Article 14 in different areas, such as: ▪ equality in marriage ( Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, 2004; Burghartz v. Switzerland, 1994; Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye , 2023); ▪ access to employment ( Emel Boyraz v. Turkey, 2014); ▪ retirement age ( Moraru and Marin v. Romania, 2022); ▪ parental leave and allowances ( Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], 2012; Gruba and Others v. Russia, 2021); ▪ survivor's pensions ( Willis v. the United Kingdom, 2002; Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022); ▪ civic obligations ( Zarb Adami v. Malta, 2006; Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany, 1994); ▪ family reunification ( Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 1985); ▪ children's surnames ( Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy, 2014; León Madrid v. Spain, 2021); or ▪ domestic violence ( Opuz v. Turkey, 2009; Volodina v. Russia, 2019; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021; A.E. v. Bulgaria, 2023)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20230923093716__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-30,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-30.json,apps:53891/20,A.E. v. Bulgaria,53891/20,added,"A.E. v. Bulgaria, no. 53891/20, 23 May 2023",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,VI.G,Discrimination through violence,2,256,260,0.9963,"A.E. v. Bulgaria , 2023",,"The Court has examined cases of violence based on the victim's ▪ gender ( Opuz v. Turkey, 2009; Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013; Halime Kılıç v. Turkey, 2016; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021); ▪ race and ethnic origin ( Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005; Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2), 2005; Škorjanec v. Croatia, 2017; Makuchyan and Minasyan v. Azerbaijan and Hungary, 2020; Adzhigitova and Others v. Russia, 2021); ▪ religion ( Milanović v. Serbia, 2010; Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, 2007); ▪ political opinion ( Virabyan v. Armenia, 2012); and ▪ sexual orientation ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016).","The Court has examined cases of violence based on the victim's ▪ gender ( Opuz v. Turkey, 2009; Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013; Halime Kılıç v. Turkey, 2016; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021; A.E. v. Bulgaria, 2023); ▪ race and ethnic origin ( Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005; Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2), 2005; Škorjanec v. Croatia, 2017; Makuchyan and Minasyan v. Azerbaijan and Hungary, 2020; Adzhigitova and Others v. Russia, 2021); ▪ religion ( Milanović v. Serbia, 2010; Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, 2007); ▪ political opinion ( Virabyan v. Armenia, 2012); and ▪ sexual orientation ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20230923093716__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-30,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-30.json,apps:43651/22,Kovačević v. Bosnia and Herzegovina*,43651/22,added,"Kovačević v. Bosnia and Herzegovina*, no. 43651/22, 29 August 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.B,Article 1 of Protocol No. 12,2,26,26,0.9426,,,"In its first case concerning Protocol No. 12, Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], 2009, the Court examined the ineligibility of the applicants, who identified themselves as being of Roma and Jewish origin respectively, to stand for election to the House of Peoples and the State Presidency because they had not declared affiliation to any of the ""constituent peoples"" (Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs) as required by a provision of the Constitution. The Court held that the constitutional provisions which rendered the applicants ineligible for election to the State Presidency had been discriminatory under Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention.","In its first case concerning Protocol No. 12, Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], 2009, the Court examined the ineligibility of the applicants, who identified themselves as being of Roma and Jewish origin respectively, to stand for election to the House of Peoples and the State Presidency because they had not declared affiliation to any of the ""constituent peoples"" (Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs) as required by a provision of the Constitution. The Court held that the constitutional provisions which rendered the applicants ineligible for election to the State Presidency had been discriminatory under Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention. Subsequently, in Kovačević v. Bosnia and Herzegovina *, 2023, the inability of applicant, due to a combination of territorial and ethnic requirements, to vote for candidates of his choice in legislative and presidential elections at State level was also found to amount to discrimination in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 12."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20230923093716__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-30,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-30.json,apps:75135/14,Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine,75135/14,added,"Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine, no. 75135/14, 1 June 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,V.J.3,Sexual orientation,3,173,176,0.9976,"Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine , 2023|Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia , 2023|ączkowski and Others v. Poland , 2007","ączkowski a nd Others v. Poland , 2007","In 1999 the Court found for the first time a violation of Article 14 on grounds of sexual orientation in a case concerning parental rights ( Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999; see also X v. Poland, 2021). Ever since, it has examined the issue of sexual orientation in a number of other contexts involving ▪ different age of consent under criminal law for homosexual relations ( L. and v. v. Austria, 2003; S.L. v. Austria, 2003; B.B. v. the United Kingdom, 2004; Santos Couto v. Portugal, 2010); ▪ permission to adopt a child ( X and Others v. Austria [GC], 2013; E.B. v. France [GC], 2008; Gas and Dubois v. France, 2012); ▪ the right to succeed to the deceased partner's tenancy ( Karner v. Austria, 2003; Kozak v. Poland, 2010); ▪ social protection ( P.B. and J.S. v. Austria, 2010; Mata Estevez v. Spain (dec.), 2001); ▪ conditions of detention ( X v. Turkey, 2012); ▪ regulations on child maintenance ( J.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2010); ▪ civil unions ( Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], 2013); ▪ marriage ( Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010; Chapin and Charpentier v. France, 2016); ▪ family reunification ( Pajić v. Croatia, 2016; Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy, 2016); ▪ freedom of thought, conscience and religion ( Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2013); ▪ freedom of assembly and association ( Bączkowski a nd Others v. Poland, 2007; Alekseyev and Others v. Russia, 2018; Genderdoc-M v. Moldova, 2012; Zhdanov and Others v. Russia, 2019; Berkman v. Russia, 2020; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021); ▪ protection from homophobic speech or acts of violence and effectiveness of investigation ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020; Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020; Sabalić v. Croatia, 2021 ; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021; Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021; Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022).","In 1999 the Court found for the first time a violation of Article 14 on grounds of sexual orientation in a case concerning parental rights ( Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999; see also X v. Poland, 2021). Ever since, it has examined the issue of sexual orientation in a number of other contexts involving ▪ different age of consent under criminal law for homosexual relations ( L. and v. v. Austria, 2003; S.L. v. Austria, 2003; B.B. v. the United Kingdom, 2004; Santos Couto v. Portugal, 2010); ▪ permission to adopt a child ( X and Others v. Austria [GC], 2013; E.B. v. France [GC], 2008; Gas and Dubois v. France, 2012); ▪ the right to succeed to the deceased partner's tenancy ( Karner v. Austria, 2003; Kozak v. Poland, 2010); ▪ social protection ( P.B. and J.S. v. Austria, 2010; Mata Estevez v. Spain (dec.), 2001); ▪ conditions of detention ( X v. Turkey, 2012); ▪ regulations on child maintenance ( J.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2010); ▪ civil unions ( Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], 2013; Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine, 2023); ▪ marriage ( Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010; Chapin and Charpentier v. France, 2016); ▪ family reunification ( Pajić v. Croatia, 2016; Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy, 2016); ▪ freedom of thought, conscience and religion ( Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2013); ▪ freedom of assembly and association ( Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007; Alekseyev and Others v. Russia, 2018; Genderdoc-M v. Moldova, 2012; Zhdanov and Others v. Russia, 2019; Berkman v. Russia, 2020; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021); ▪ protection from homophobic speech or acts of violence and effectiveness of investigation ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020; Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020; Sabalić v. Croatia, 2021 ; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021; Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021; Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022; Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20230923093716__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-30,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-30.json,apps:39954/09|3465/17,Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia,39954/09|3465/17,added,"Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, nos. 39954/09 and 3465/17, 30 May 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.J.3,Sexual orientation,3,,183,,"In Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia , 2023",,,"In Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023, the applicants, members of the LGBTIcommunity, complained about negative public statements made by public officials about the LGBTIcommunity. The Court found that the applicants may claim to be victims of a violation the Convention despite the fact that they had not been directly targeted by the contested statements (§ 57). Bearing in mind the history of public hostility towards the LGBTIcommunity in Russia and the increase in homophobic hate crimes, including violent crimes, at the material time, the openly homophobic content and particularly aggressive and hostile tone of the statements, as well as the fact that they were made by influential public figures holding official posts and were published in popular newspapers with a large readership, the Court considered that the contested statements reached the ""threshold of severity"" required to affect the ""private life"" of members of the group (§ § 59-62). On the merits, the Court found that the domestic law contained both civil-law mechanisms and criminal-law provisions for the protection of an individual's private life against stigmatising statements, including homophobic statements (§ 79), but owing to the authorities'approach, those domestic provisions were not applied in the applicants'case, and the requisite protection was not granted to them (§ 85)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20230923093716__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-30,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-30.json,apps:39954/09|3465/17,Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia,39954/09|3465/17,added,"Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, nos. 39954/09 and 3465/17, 30 May 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,V.J.3,Sexual orientation,3,173,176,0.9976,"Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine , 2023|Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia , 2023|ączkowski and Others v. Poland , 2007","ączkowski a nd Others v. Poland , 2007","In 1999 the Court found for the first time a violation of Article 14 on grounds of sexual orientation in a case concerning parental rights ( Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999; see also X v. Poland, 2021). Ever since, it has examined the issue of sexual orientation in a number of other contexts involving ▪ different age of consent under criminal law for homosexual relations ( L. and v. v. Austria, 2003; S.L. v. Austria, 2003; B.B. v. the United Kingdom, 2004; Santos Couto v. Portugal, 2010); ▪ permission to adopt a child ( X and Others v. Austria [GC], 2013; E.B. v. France [GC], 2008; Gas and Dubois v. France, 2012); ▪ the right to succeed to the deceased partner's tenancy ( Karner v. Austria, 2003; Kozak v. Poland, 2010); ▪ social protection ( P.B. and J.S. v. Austria, 2010; Mata Estevez v. Spain (dec.), 2001); ▪ conditions of detention ( X v. Turkey, 2012); ▪ regulations on child maintenance ( J.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2010); ▪ civil unions ( Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], 2013); ▪ marriage ( Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010; Chapin and Charpentier v. France, 2016); ▪ family reunification ( Pajić v. Croatia, 2016; Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy, 2016); ▪ freedom of thought, conscience and religion ( Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2013); ▪ freedom of assembly and association ( Bączkowski a nd Others v. Poland, 2007; Alekseyev and Others v. Russia, 2018; Genderdoc-M v. Moldova, 2012; Zhdanov and Others v. Russia, 2019; Berkman v. Russia, 2020; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021); ▪ protection from homophobic speech or acts of violence and effectiveness of investigation ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020; Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020; Sabalić v. Croatia, 2021 ; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021; Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021; Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022).","In 1999 the Court found for the first time a violation of Article 14 on grounds of sexual orientation in a case concerning parental rights ( Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999; see also X v. Poland, 2021). Ever since, it has examined the issue of sexual orientation in a number of other contexts involving ▪ different age of consent under criminal law for homosexual relations ( L. and v. v. Austria, 2003; S.L. v. Austria, 2003; B.B. v. the United Kingdom, 2004; Santos Couto v. Portugal, 2010); ▪ permission to adopt a child ( X and Others v. Austria [GC], 2013; E.B. v. France [GC], 2008; Gas and Dubois v. France, 2012); ▪ the right to succeed to the deceased partner's tenancy ( Karner v. Austria, 2003; Kozak v. Poland, 2010); ▪ social protection ( P.B. and J.S. v. Austria, 2010; Mata Estevez v. Spain (dec.), 2001); ▪ conditions of detention ( X v. Turkey, 2012); ▪ regulations on child maintenance ( J.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2010); ▪ civil unions ( Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], 2013; Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine, 2023); ▪ marriage ( Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010; Chapin and Charpentier v. France, 2016); ▪ family reunification ( Pajić v. Croatia, 2016; Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy, 2016); ▪ freedom of thought, conscience and religion ( Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2013); ▪ freedom of assembly and association ( Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007; Alekseyev and Others v. Russia, 2018; Genderdoc-M v. Moldova, 2012; Zhdanov and Others v. Russia, 2019; Berkman v. Russia, 2020; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021); ▪ protection from homophobic speech or acts of violence and effectiveness of investigation ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020; Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020; Sabalić v. Croatia, 2021 ; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021; Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021; Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022; Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20230923093716__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-30,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-30.json,apps:27094/20,Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye,27094/20,added,"Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye, no. 27094/20, 27 June 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.A,Sex,2,,105,,,,,"In Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye , 2023, the Court found that the refusal to exempt a woman, without her undergoing a medical examination to prove that she was not pregnant, from the 300-day waiting period imposed on divorced women wishing to remarry constituted discrimination on the grounds of sex in breach of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 12. Even assuming that determining parentage constituted a legitimate aim in the pursuit of which the waiting period in question had been imposed on divorced women, the Court found it pointlessness and ineffective while noting the sexist stereotypes relied on by the dometic court, namely that women had a duty to society on account of their potential role as mother and their capacity to give birth."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20230923093716__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-30,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-30.json,apps:27094/20,Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye,27094/20,added,"Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye, no. 27094/20, 27 June 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.A,Sex,2,100,100,0.9922,"A.E. v. Bulgaria , 2023",,"The Court has found that differential treatment on the grounds of sex violated Article 14 in different areas, such as ▪ equality in marriage ( Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, 2004; Burghartz v. Switzerland, 1994); ▪ access to employment ( Emel Boyraz v. Turkey, 2014); ▪ retirement age ( Moraru and Marin v. Romania, 2022); ▪ parental leave and allowances ( Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], 2012; Gruba and Others v. Russia, 2021); ▪ survivor's pensions ( Willis v. the United Kingdom, 2002; Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022); ▪ civic obligations ( Zarb Adami v. Malta, 2006; Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany, 1994); ▪ family reunification ( Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 1985); ▪ children's surnames ( Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy, 2014; León Madrid v. Spain, 2021); or ▪ domestic violence ( Opuz v. Turkey, 2009; Volodina v. Russia, 2019; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021).","The Court has found that differential treatment on the grounds of sex violated Article 14 in different areas, such as: ▪ equality in marriage ( Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, 2004; Burghartz v. Switzerland, 1994; Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye , 2023); ▪ access to employment ( Emel Boyraz v. Turkey, 2014); ▪ retirement age ( Moraru and Marin v. Romania, 2022); ▪ parental leave and allowances ( Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], 2012; Gruba and Others v. Russia, 2021); ▪ survivor's pensions ( Willis v. the United Kingdom, 2002; Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022); ▪ civic obligations ( Zarb Adami v. Malta, 2006; Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany, 1994); ▪ family reunification ( Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 1985); ▪ children's surnames ( Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy, 2014; León Madrid v. Spain, 2021); or ▪ domestic violence ( Opuz v. Turkey, 2009; Volodina v. Russia, 2019; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021; A.E. v. Bulgaria, 2023)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20230923093716__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-30,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-30.json,apps:10934/21,Semenya v. Switzerland*,10934/21,added,"Semenya v. Switzerland*, no. 10934/21, 11 July 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.J.2,Gender identity,3,,173,,,,,"In Semenya v. Switzerland *, 2023, the Court examined a complaint brought by a professional athlete who had been required under non-State regulations to lower her natural testosterone levels in order to be allowed to compete in the women's category in international competitions. The Court found a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 on account of the limited institutional and judicial review, notably, of the grounds relied upon to justify the impugned regulations or of the side-effects of the hormonal treatment on the applicant (§§ 163-202)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20230923093716__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-30,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-30.json,apps:24408/16,Szolcsán v. Hungary,24408/16,added,"Szolcsán v. Hungary, no. 24408/16, 30 March 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.B,Race and colour,2,121,123,0.9928,"Szolcsan v. Hungary , 2023",,"The Court has also found violations of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 in a number of cases concerning the right to education of Roma pupils ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007; Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 2013; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010; Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013; Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008; Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022).","The Court has also found violations of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 in a number of cases concerning the right to education of Roma pupils ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007; Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 2013; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010; Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013; Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008; Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022; Szolcsan v. Hungary, 2023). 5"
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20230923093716__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-30,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-30.json,apps:24408/16,Szolcsán v. Hungary,24408/16,added,"Szolcsán v. Hungary, no. 24408/16, 30 March 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,VI.F,Right to education,2,251,255,0.9937,"Szolcsán v. Hungary , 2023",,"The Court found violations of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 in a number of cases concerning the right to education of Roma pupils. These cases concerned the disproportionate number of Roma children placed in special schools for children with mental disabilities ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007; Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 2013), in Roma-only classes ( Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010, Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022), or in Roma-only schools ( Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013); as well as their inability to access school before being assigned to special classrooms in an annex to the main primary school buildings ( Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008). In all of these cases the Court found that the differential treatment, albeit unintentional, which Roma pupils were subject to, had constituted a form of indirect discrimination ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007; Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008; Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 2013; Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013; Oršuš and Ot hers v. Croatia [GC], 2010). In X and Others v. Albania, 2022, the respondent State was required under Article 46 to take desegregation measures in an elementary school attended almost exclusively by Roma and Egyptian children.","The Court found violations of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 in a number of cases concerning the right to education of Roma pupils. These cases concerned the disproportionate number of Roma children placed in special schools for children with mental disabilities ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007; Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 2013), in Roma-only classes ( Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010, Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022), or in Roma-only schools ( Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013; Szolcsán v. Hungary, 2023); as well as their inability to access school before being assigned to special classrooms in an annex to the main primary school buildings ( Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008). In all of these cases the Court found that the differential treatment, albeit unintentional, which Roma pupils were subject to, had constituted a form of indirect discrimination ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007; Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008; Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 2013; Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013; Oršuš and Ot hers v. Croatia [GC], 2010). In X and Others v. Albania, 2022, the respondent State was required under Article 46 to take desegregation measures in an elementary school attended almost exclusively by Roma and Egyptian children (similarly in Szolcsán v. Hungary, 2023)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20230923093716__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-30,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-30.json,apps:23851/20|24360/20,X and others v. Ireland*,23851/20|24360/20,added,"X and others v. Ireland*, nos. 23851/20 and 24360/20, 22 June 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,VI.D,Social rights,2,237,241,0.9956,,,"There is no right to social security under the Convention, though it is clear from the Court's case- law that some forms of social security such as benefit payments and pensions may fall within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 because they can be deemed as ""possessions"" within the meaning of that provision ( Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2006; Luczak v. Poland, 2007; Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], 2009; Koua Poirrez v. France, 2003; Gaygusuz v. Austria, 1996; Pichkur v. Ukraine, 2013; P.C. v. Ireland, 2022), or within the ambit of Article 8, particularly when social benefits help the family unity ( Weller v. Hungary, 2009; Bah v. the United Kingdom, 2011; Gouri v. France (dec.), 2017; Belli and Arquier-Martinez v. Switzerland, 2018; Petrovic v. Austria, 1998; Okpisz v. Germany, 2005; Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022).","There is no right to social security under the Convention, though it is clear from the Court's case- law that some forms of social security such as benefit payments and pensions may fall within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 because they can be deemed as ""possessions"" within the meaning of that provision ( Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2006; Luczak v. Poland, 2007; Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], 2009; Koua Poirrez v. France, 2003; Gaygusuz v. Austria, 1996; Pichkur v. Ukraine, 2013; P.C. v. Ireland, 2022), or within the ambit of Article 8, particularly when social benefits help the family unity ( Weller v. Hungary, 2009; Bah v. the United Kingdom, 2011; Gouri v. France (dec.), 2017; Belli and Arquier-Martinez v. Switzerland, 2018; Petrovic v. Austria, 1998; Okpisz v. Germany, 2005; Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022; X and others v. Ireland*, 2023)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20230923093716__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-30,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-30.json,apps:23851/20|24360/20,X and others v. Ireland*,23851/20|24360/20,added,"X and others v. Ireland*, nos. 23851/20 and 24360/20, 22 June 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,VI.D,Social rights,2,238,242,0.9952,,,"As a result, the protection against discrimination has been found to cover a variety of social benefits such as ▪ pension payments ( Pichkur v. Ukraine, 2013; Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], 2009) or survivor's pension payment ( Aldeguer Tomás v. Spain, 2016; Willis v. the United Kingdom, 2002, Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022); ▪ unemployment benefits ( Gaygusuz v. Austria, 1996); ▪ disability benefits ( Koua Poirrez v. France, 2003; Belli and Arquier-Martinez v. Switzerland, 2018; Popovi ć and Others v. Serbia, 2020); ▪ housing benefits ( Vrountou v. Cyprus, 2015; Šaltinytė v. Lithuania, 2021); ▪ parental leave allowance ( Petrovic v. Austria, 1998); ▪ child benefits ( Okpisz v. Germany, 2005); ▪ insurance cover ( P.B. and J.S. v. Austria, 2010); or ▪ social security payment for the purposes of supporting families with children ( Weller v. Hungary, 2009).","As a result, the protection against discrimination has been found to cover a variety of social benefits such as ▪ pension payments ( Pichkur v. Ukraine, 2013; Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], 2009) or survivor's pension payment ( Aldeguer Tomás v. Spain, 2016; Willis v. the United Kingdom, 2002, Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022); ▪ unemployment benefits ( Gaygusuz v. Austria, 1996); ▪ disability benefits ( Koua Poirrez v. France, 2003; Belli and Arquier-Martinez v. Switzerland, 2018; Popovi ć and Others v. Serbia, 2020); ▪ housing benefits ( Vrountou v. Cyprus, 2015; Šaltinytė v. Lithuania, 2021); ▪ parental leave allowance ( Petrovic v. Austria, 1998); ▪ child benefits ( Okpisz v. Germany, 2005; X and others v. Ireland*, 2023); ▪ insurance cover ( P.B. and J.S. v. Austria, 2010); or ▪ social security payment for the purposes of supporting families with children ( Weller v. Hungary, 2009)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json,apps:225/20,Džibuti and Others v. Latvia,225/20,added,"Džibuti and Others v. Latvia, nos. 225/20 and 2 others, 16 November 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.C,Language,2,,133,,"In Valiullina and Others v. Latvia , 2023|Others v. Latvia , 2023|Valiullina and Others v. Latvia , 2023",,,"The Court has also clarified that the right enshrined in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 guaranteeing the right to education did not encompass the right of access to education in a specific language: it guaranteed the right to receive education in one of the national languages namely, the official languages of the country concerned ( Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 2023, § 135). In Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 2023, it found that the legislative reform increasing the proportion of subjects to be taught in Latvian in state schools and having the effect of reducing the use of Russian in education was found not to be contrary to Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (for a similar approach as regards private schools see Džibuti and Others v. Latvia, 2023)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json,apps:16760/22,Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*,16760/22,added,"Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium*, no. 16760/22 and 8 others, 13 February 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.A,Difference in treatment,2,63,63,0.9804,,,"At the same time, the Court has held that ▪ pensioners living within a country were not in a comparable situation to those living abroad as regards index-linking of pensions ( Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2010); ▪ cohabiting sisters were not in a comparable situation to spouses or civil partners as regards inheritance tax ( Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008); ▪ pensioners employed within the civil service were not in a comparable situation to those employed within the private sector as regards their pension entitlement ( Fábián v. Hungary [GC], 2017) or to those belonging to a different categories of pensioners within the public sector ( Gellérthegyi and Others v. Hungary (dec.), 2018); ▪ taxpayers who had not challenged a social contribution before it was declared unconstitutional were not in a comparable situation to those who had taken this bold initiative as regard the retroactive reimbursement of said social contribution ( Frantzeskakis and Others v. Greece (dec.), 2019); ▪ public and privately-owned kindergartens were not in a comparable position as regards the payment of subsidies ( Š poljar and Dje č ji vrti ć P č elice v. Croatia (dec.), 2020, §§ 40-44); ▪ pensioners in receipt of disability pension were not in a situation comparable to old-age pensioners as regards the possibility of recalculating their pension ( Milivojević v. Serbia (dec.), 2022); ▪ a person who had hit a police officer who was trying to arrest her was not in a situation comparable to another person who had hit a civilian ( P.W. v. Austria, 2022);","At the same time, the Court has held that  pensioners living within a country were not in a comparable situation to those living abroad as regards index-linking of pensions ( Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2010);  cohabiting sisters were not in a comparable situation to spouses or civil partners as regards Burden v. the United Kingdom inheritance tax ( [GC], 2008);  pensioners employed within the civil service were not in a comparable situation to those Fábián v. Hungary employed within the private sector as regards their pension entitlement ( [GC], 2017) or to those belonging to a different categories of pensioners within the public sector ( Gellérthegyi and Others v. Hungary (dec.), 2018);  taxpayers who had not challenged a social contribution before it was declared unconstitutional were not in a comparable situation to those who had taken this bold Frantzeskakis initiative as regard the retroactive reimbursement of said social contribution ( and Others v. Greece (dec.), 2019);  public and privately-owned kindergartens were not in a comparable position as regards the payment of subsidies ( Š poljar and Dječji vrtić P č elice v. Croatia (dec.), 2020, §§ 40-44);  pensioners in receipt of disability pension were not in a situation comparable to old-age pensioners as regards the possibility of recalculating their pension ( Milivojević v. Serbia (dec.), 2022);  a person who had hit a police officer who was trying to arrest her was not in a situation comparable to another person who had hit a civilian ( P.W. v. Austria, 2022);  Muslim believers are not in a comparable situation to fishermen and hunters in terms of the obligation to stun animals before slaughter Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium *, 2024, § 146;  Internally displaced persons were not in an analogous, or relevantly similar, situation in comparison with other recipients of social benefits ( Shylina v. Ukraine *, 2024, § 59);"
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json,apps:24225/19,Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia,24225/19,added,"Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia, no. 24225/19, 30 November 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,V.D,Religion,2,138,140,0.9935,"Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia , 2023|Hoffmann v. Austria Vojnity v. Hungary , 1993|Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Aust ria , 2008","Grzelak v. Poland , 2010|Hoffmann v. Austria , 1993|Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria , 2008|Vojnity v. Hungary , 2013","The Court has found that the difference in treatment on grounds of religion had not been sufficiently justified, thus giving rise to a breach of Article 14, in cases concerning, for example, ▪ violence based on the victims'faith ( Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, 2007; Milanović v. Serbia, 2010); ▪ the inability of certain churches to provide religious education in schools and to conclude officially recognised religious marriages ( Savez crkava ""Riječ života"" and Others v. Croatia, 2010); ▪ the refusal to grant parental rights in view of a parent's religious convictions ( Hoffmann v. Austria, 1993; Vojnity v. Hungary, 2013); ▪ the prohibition for employees of a private company to wear religious symbols although they did not cause any health or safety concerns ( Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2013; see, a contrario, Ebrahimian v. France, 2015, which was examined only from the standpoint of Article 9); ▪ the requirement of obtaining a certificate of approval for immigrants wishing to marry other than in the Church of England ( O'Donoghue and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2010); ▪ the inconsistent application of qualifying periods for eligibility to register as a religious society ( Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, 2008); ▪ the failure to provide a pupil excused from religious instruction with ethics classes and associated marks ( Grzelak v. Poland, 2010); ▪ the failure to recognse services connected with the Alevi faith as a religious public service ( İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2016) ▪ the denial of State recognition to a pagan religious association which met the eligibility criteria, on grounds incompatible with the State's duty of neutrality and impartiality ( Ancient Baltic religious association ""Romuva"" v. Lithuania, 2021); ▪ the refusal of a tax exemption for buildings used for the public practice of a non-recognised religion ( Anderlecht Christian Assembly of Jehovah's Witnesses and Others v. Belgium, 2022).","The Court has found that the difference in treatment on grounds of religion had not been sufficiently justified, thus giving rise to a breach of Article 14, in cases concerning, for example,  violence based on the victims' faith ( Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, 2007; Milanović v. Serbia, 2010);  the inability of certain churches to provide religious education in schools and to conclude officially recognised religious marriages ( Savez crkava ""Riječ života"" and Others v. Croatia, 2010);  the refusal to grant parental rights in view of a parent's religious convictions ( Hoffmann v. Austria Vojnity v. Hungary, 1993;, 2013);  the prohibition for employees of a private company to wear religious symbols although they did not cause any health or safety concerns ( Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2013; see, a contrario, Ebrahimian v. France, 2015, which was examined only from the standpoint of Article 9);  the requirement of obtaining a certificate of approval for immigrants wishing to marry other than in the Church of England ( O'Donoghue and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2010);  the inconsistent application of qualifying periods for eligibility to register as a religious society ( Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Aust ria, 2008);  the failure to provide a pupil excused from religious instruction with ethics classes and Grzelak v. Poland associated marks (, 2010);  the failure to recognse services connected with the Alevi faith as a religious public service İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey ( [GC], 2016)  the denial of State recognition to a pagan religious association which met the eligibility Ancient criteria, on grounds incompatible with the State's duty of neutrality and impartiality ( Baltic religious association ""Romuva"" v. Lithuania, 2021);  the refusal of a tax exemption for buildings used for the public practice of a non-recognised religion ( Anderlecht Christian Assembly of Jehovah's Witnesses and Others v. Belgium, 2022);  the inability to open a Muslim boarding school because of opposition by private parties ( Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia, 2023)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json,apps:24225/19,Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia,24225/19,added,"Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia, no. 24225/19, 30 November 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,VI.G,Discrimination through violence,2,260,262,0.9956,"Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia , 2023","Virabyan v. Armenia , 2012","The Court has examined cases of violence based on the victim's ▪ gender ( Opuz v. Turkey, 2009; Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013; Halime Kılıç v. Turkey, 2016; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021; A.E. v. Bulgaria, 2023); ▪ race and ethnic origin ( Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005; Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2), 2005; Škorjanec v. Croatia, 2017; Makuchyan and Minasyan v. Azerbaijan and Hungary, 2020; Adzhigitova and Others v. Russia, 2021); ▪ religion ( Milanović v. Serbia, 2010; Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, 2007); ▪ political opinion ( Virabyan v. Armenia, 2012); and ▪ sexual orientation ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016).","The Court has examined cases of violence based on the victim's  gender ( Opuz v. Turkey, 2009; Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013; Halime Kılıç v. Turkey, 2016; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021; A.E. v. Bulgaria, 2023);  race and ethnic origin ( Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005; Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2), 2005; Škorjanec v. Croatia, 2017; Makuchyan and Minasyan v. Azerbaijan and Hungary, 2020; Adzhigitova and Others v. Russia, 2021);  religion ( Milanović v. Serbia, 2010; Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, 2007; Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia, 2023);  Virabyan v. Armenia political opinion (, 2012); and  sexual orientation ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json,apps:24225/19,Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia,24225/19,added,"Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia, no. 24225/19, 30 November 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,VI.G,Discrimination through violence,2,261,263,0.9738,"Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia , 2023",,"In those cases the Court has found violations of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 2 ( Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005; Angelova and Iliev v. Bulgaria, 2007), Article 3 ( Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013; B.S. v. Spain, 2012; Abdu v. Bulgaria, 2014), Article 6 and Article 8 ( Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2), 2005) of the Convention.","In those cases the Court has found violations of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 2 ( Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005; Angelova and Iliev v. Bulgaria, 2007), Article 3 ( Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013; B.S. v. Spain, 2012; Abdu v. Bulgaria, 2014), Article 6 and Article 8 ( Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2), 2005) of the Convention, or with Article 8 and Article 9 ( Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia, 2023)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json,apps:24225/19,Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia,24225/19,added,"Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia, no. 24225/19, 30 November 2023",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,VI.G.2,Procedural aspect,3,267,269,0.9921,"Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia , 2023|Witnesses and Others v. Georgia Virabyan v. Armenia , 2007","Virabyan v. Armenia , 2012|Witnesses and Others v. Georgia , 2007","Following the case of Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005, the Court has found violations of the procedural aspect of Articles 2 or 3 read in conjunction with Article 14 in a number of cases, due to the failure of the domestic authorities to carry out an effective investigation of the discriminatory motives at the origin of the ill-treatment or death of the victims of discriminatory violence ( Bekos and Koutropoulos v. Greece, 2005; Turan Cakir v. Belgium, 2009; Abdu v. Bulgaria, 2014; Angelova and Iliev v. Bulgaria, 2007; Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013; Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, 2007; Virabyan v. Armenia, 2012; Bălşan v. Romania, 2017; Talpis v. Italy, 2017; Škorjanec v. Croatia, 2017; Adzhigitova and Others v. Russia, 2021).","Following the case of Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005, the Court has found violations of the procedural aspect of Articles 2 or 3 read in conjunction with Article 14 in a number of cases, due to the failure of the domestic authorities to carry out an effective investigation of the discriminatory motives at the origin of the ill-treatment or death of the victims of discriminatory violence ( Bekos and Koutropoulos v. Greece, 2005; Turan Cakir v. Belgium, 2009; Abdu v. Bulgaria, 2014; Angelova and Iliev v. Bulgaria, 2007; Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013; Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah' s Witnesses and Others v. Georgia Virabyan v. Armenia, 2007;, 2012; Bălşan v. Romania, 2017; Talpis v. Italy, 2017; Škorjanec v. Croatia, 2017; Adzhigitova and Others v. Russia, 2021; Georgian Muslim Relations and Others v. Georgia, 2023)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json,apps:42429/16,Memedova and Others v. North Macedonia,42429/16,added,"Memedova and Others v. North Macedonia, nos. 42429/16 and 2 others, 24 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.B,The exception: reversal of the burden of proof,2,88,88,0.9738,"Memedova and Others v. North Macedonia , 2023",,"Statistics which appear on critical examination to be reliable and significant will be sufficient to constitute the prima facie evidence the applicant is required to produce. This does not, however, mean that indirect discrimination cannot be proved without statistical evidence ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 188). Reliable national or international reports can also be used to that effect.","Statistics which appear on critical examination to be reliable and significant will be sufficient to prima facie constitute the evidence the applicant is required to produce. This does not, however, mean that indirect discrimination cannot be proved without statistical evidence ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 188). Reliable national or international reports can also be used to that effect ( Memedova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2023, §§ 91-94)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json,apps:42429/16,Memedova and Others v. North Macedonia,42429/16,added,"Memedova and Others v. North Macedonia, nos. 42429/16 and 2 others, 24 October 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,IV.B,The exception: reversal of the burden of proof,2,92,92,0.8336,"The case of Memedova and Others v. North Macedonia , 2023",,"In Basu v. Germany, 2022, the Court considered that, once there is an arguable claim that an individual may have been targeted by a police identity check on account of racial characteristics and such acts fall within the ambit of Article 8, the duty of the authorities to investigate the existence of a possible link between racist attitudes and the act of a State agent is to be considered as implicit in their responsibilities under Article 14 examined in conjunction with Article 8 ( Muhammad v. Spain, 2022, 68, Basu v. Germany, 2022, § 35).","In Basu v. Germany, 2022, the Court considered that, once there is an arguable claim that an individual may have been targeted by a police identity check on account of racial characteristics and such acts fall within the ambit of Article 8, the duty of the authorities to investigate the existence of a possible link between racist attitudes and the act of a State agent is to be considered as implicit in their responsibilities under Article 14 examined in conjunction with Article 8 ( Muhammad v. Spain, 2022, 68; Basu v. Germany, 2022, § 35). In Wa Baile v. Switzerland *, 2024, which also concerned allegations of racial profiling in an identity check in a railway station, the Court found a violation of the procedural obligations enshrined in Article 14 taken together with Article 8 because of the domestic courts' (criminal and administrative) failure to ascertain whether discriminatory motives were behind the identity check (§§ 93-103). It further reiterated that the absence of sufficient legal and administrative safeguards ran the risk of discriminatory controls taking place (§ 130) and, in the circumstances of the case, concluded that the Government had not been able to rebut the presumption of discriminatory treatment during the identity check in question (§§ 131-135), thus also finding a violation under the subatantive head of Article 14 taken together with Article 8. The case of Memedova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2023, concerned ethnic profiling of Roma people by the border guards in refusing them the right to leave the country, pursuant to an instruction issued by the Ministry of the Interior to strengthening border controls for organised groups of citizens leaving the country who were potential asylum-seekers. Relying on a number of national and international reports on the matter, the Court concluded that, despite the absence of any discriminatory wording in the internal instructions, the way in which they were applied in practice by the border officers resulted in a disproportionate number of Roma being prevented from travelling abroad. The resulting difference in treatment was found to be without any objective and reasonable justification, and thus in breach of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention (freedom of movement)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json,apps:25226/18,Pająk and Others v. Poland,25226/18,added,"Pająk and Others v. Poland, nos. 25226/18 and 3 others, 24 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.A,Sex,2,,107,,"ąk and Others v. Poland , 2023",,,"In Pająk and Others v. Poland, 2023, the Court concluded that a newly instituted difference in age between men and women in respect of early termination of their terms as judges constituted discrimination based on sex (§§ 260-63)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json,apps:25226/18,Pająk and Others v. Poland,25226/18,added,"Pająk and Others v. Poland, nos. 25226/18 and 3 others, 24 October 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,V.A,Sex,2,100,100,0.9955,"A.E. v. Bulgaria 2021|ąk and Others v. Poland , 2023","A.E. v. Bulgaria , 2023|Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy , 2014|Emel Boyraz v. Turkey , 2014|León Madrid v. Spain , 2021|Tkhelidze v. Georgia , 2021","The Court has found that differential treatment on the grounds of sex violated Article 14 in different areas, such as: ▪ equality in marriage ( Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, 2004; Burghartz v. Switzerland, 1994; Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye , 2023); ▪ access to employment ( Emel Boyraz v. Turkey, 2014); ▪ retirement age ( Moraru and Marin v. Romania, 2022); ▪ parental leave and allowances ( Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], 2012; Gruba and Others v. Russia, 2021); ▪ survivor's pensions ( Willis v. the United Kingdom, 2002; Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022); ▪ civic obligations ( Zarb Adami v. Malta, 2006; Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany, 1994); ▪ family reunification ( Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 1985); ▪ children's surnames ( Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy, 2014; León Madrid v. Spain, 2021); or ▪ domestic violence ( Opuz v. Turkey, 2009; Volodina v. Russia, 2019; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021; A.E. v. Bulgaria, 2023).","The Court has found that differential treatment on the grounds of sex violated Article 14 in different areas, such as:  equality in marriage ( Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, 2004; Burghartz v. Switzerland, 1994; Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye ∗, 2023);  Emel Boyraz v. Turkey access to employment (, 2014);  retirement age ( Moraru and Marin v. Romania, 2022; Pająk and Others v. Poland, 2023);  parental leave and allowances ( Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], 2012; Gruba and Others v. Russia, 2021);  survivor's pensions ( Willis v. the United Kingdom, 2002; Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022);  civic obligations ( Zarb Adami v. Malta, 2006; Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany, 1994);  family reunification ( Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 1985);  Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy León Madrid v. Spain children's surnames (, 2014;, 2021); or  domestic violence ( Opuz v. Turkey, 2009; Volodina v. Russia, 2019; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, A.E. v. Bulgaria 2021;, 2023)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json,apps:2412/19,Shylina v. Ukraine*,2412/19,added,"Shylina v. Ukraine*, no. 2412/19, 15 February 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.A,Difference in treatment,2,63,63,0.9804,,,"At the same time, the Court has held that ▪ pensioners living within a country were not in a comparable situation to those living abroad as regards index-linking of pensions ( Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2010); ▪ cohabiting sisters were not in a comparable situation to spouses or civil partners as regards inheritance tax ( Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008); ▪ pensioners employed within the civil service were not in a comparable situation to those employed within the private sector as regards their pension entitlement ( Fábián v. Hungary [GC], 2017) or to those belonging to a different categories of pensioners within the public sector ( Gellérthegyi and Others v. Hungary (dec.), 2018); ▪ taxpayers who had not challenged a social contribution before it was declared unconstitutional were not in a comparable situation to those who had taken this bold initiative as regard the retroactive reimbursement of said social contribution ( Frantzeskakis and Others v. Greece (dec.), 2019); ▪ public and privately-owned kindergartens were not in a comparable position as regards the payment of subsidies ( Š poljar and Dje č ji vrti ć P č elice v. Croatia (dec.), 2020, §§ 40-44); ▪ pensioners in receipt of disability pension were not in a situation comparable to old-age pensioners as regards the possibility of recalculating their pension ( Milivojević v. Serbia (dec.), 2022); ▪ a person who had hit a police officer who was trying to arrest her was not in a situation comparable to another person who had hit a civilian ( P.W. v. Austria, 2022);","At the same time, the Court has held that  pensioners living within a country were not in a comparable situation to those living abroad as regards index-linking of pensions ( Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2010);  cohabiting sisters were not in a comparable situation to spouses or civil partners as regards Burden v. the United Kingdom inheritance tax ( [GC], 2008);  pensioners employed within the civil service were not in a comparable situation to those Fábián v. Hungary employed within the private sector as regards their pension entitlement ( [GC], 2017) or to those belonging to a different categories of pensioners within the public sector ( Gellérthegyi and Others v. Hungary (dec.), 2018);  taxpayers who had not challenged a social contribution before it was declared unconstitutional were not in a comparable situation to those who had taken this bold Frantzeskakis initiative as regard the retroactive reimbursement of said social contribution ( and Others v. Greece (dec.), 2019);  public and privately-owned kindergartens were not in a comparable position as regards the payment of subsidies ( Š poljar and Dječji vrtić P č elice v. Croatia (dec.), 2020, §§ 40-44);  pensioners in receipt of disability pension were not in a situation comparable to old-age pensioners as regards the possibility of recalculating their pension ( Milivojević v. Serbia (dec.), 2022);  a person who had hit a police officer who was trying to arrest her was not in a situation comparable to another person who had hit a civilian ( P.W. v. Austria, 2022);  Muslim believers are not in a comparable situation to fishermen and hunters in terms of the obligation to stun animals before slaughter Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium *, 2024, § 146;  Internally displaced persons were not in an analogous, or relevantly similar, situation in comparison with other recipients of social benefits ( Shylina v. Ukraine *, 2024, § 59);"
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json,apps:2412/19,Shylina v. Ukraine*,2412/19,added,"Shylina v. Ukraine*, no. 2412/19, 15 February 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,V.J.9,Examples of situations not falling within “other status”,3,221,223,0.9825,,"VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland , 2001","Other examples of differences in treatment not falling within the notion of ""other status"" for the purpose of Article 14 include ▪ having or not having acquired the right to a welfare benefit ( Springett and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2010); ▪ duration and nature of an employment contract ( Peterka v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2010); ▪ holding fishing rights in different areas ( Alatulkkila and Others v. Finland, 2005); ▪ being sent on different military missions ( De Jong, Baljet and Van den Brink v. the Netherlands, 1984); ▪ different legal status with respect to restitution of taxes ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 1997); ▪ distinction between smaller and larger unions ( National union of Belgian police v. Belgium, 1975; Swedish Engine Drivers'Union v. Sweden, 1976); ▪ difference between commercial advertising and advertisements forwarding certain ideals ( VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, 2001).","Other examples of differences in treatment not falling within the notion of ""other status"" for the purpose of Article 14 include  having or not having acquired the right to a welfare benefit ( Springett and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2010);  duration and nature of an employment contract ( Peterka v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2010);  holding fishing rights in different areas ( Alatulkkila and Others v. Finland, 2005);  being sent on different military missions ( De Jong, Baljet and Van den Brink v. the Netherlands, 1984);  different legal status with respect to restitution of taxes ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 1997);  distinction between smaller and larger unions ( National union of Belgian police v. Belgium, 1975; Swedish Engine Drivers' Union v. Sweden, 1976);  difference between commercial advertising and advertisements forwarding certain ideals VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland (, 2001);  the possession or otherwise of account with a State bank ( Shylina v. Ukraine *, 2024);"
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json,apps:56928/19,Valiullina and Others v. Latvia,56928/19,added,"Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, nos. 56928/19 and 2 others, 14 September 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.C,Language,2,,133,,"In Valiullina and Others v. Latvia , 2023|Others v. Latvia , 2023|Valiullina and Others v. Latvia , 2023",,,"The Court has also clarified that the right enshrined in Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 guaranteeing the right to education did not encompass the right of access to education in a specific language: it guaranteed the right to receive education in one of the national languages namely, the official languages of the country concerned ( Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 2023, § 135). In Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, 2023, it found that the legislative reform increasing the proportion of subjects to be taught in Latvian in state schools and having the effect of reducing the use of Russian in education was found not to be contrary to Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (for a similar approach as regards private schools see Džibuti and Others v. Latvia, 2023)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json,apps:43868/18|25883/21,Wa Baile v. Switzerland*,43868/18|25883/21,added,"Wa Baile v. Switzerland*, nos. 43868/18 and 25883/21, 20 February 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,I.A.3,The material scope of the prohibition of discrimination set forth in Article 14,3,15,15,0.995,,"Basu v. Germany , 2022|Muhammad v. Spain , 2022","The Court has clarified the criteria by which to assess whether an identity check, allegedly based on physical or ethnic motives, falls within the ambit of Article 8, under its ""private life"" aspect, thus triggering the applicability of Article 14, and clarified the scope of the procedural obligations in this context. The Court considered that an arguable claim may notably exist where the person concerned submitted that he or she (or persons having the same characteristics) had been the only person(s) subjected to a check and where no other grounds for the check were apparent or where any explanations of the officers carrying out the check disclosed specific physical or ethnic motives. The Court further observed that the public nature of the check may have an effect on a person's reputation ( Muhammad v. Spain, 2022, § 50, Basu v. Germany, 2022, § 25).","The Court has clarified the criteria by which to assess whether an identity check, allegedly based on physical or ethnic motives, falls within the ambit of Article 8, under its ""private life"" aspect, thus triggering the applicability of Article 14, and clarified the scope of the procedural obligations in this context. The Court considered that an arguable claim may notably exist where the person concerned submitted that he or she (or persons having the same characteristics) had been the only person(s) subjected to a check and where no other grounds for the check were apparent or where any explanations of the officers carrying out the check disclosed specific physical or ethnic motives. The Court further observed that the public nature of the check may have an effect on a person's reputation Muhammad v. Spain Basu v. Germany Wa Baile v. Switzerland (, 2022, § 50;, 2022, § 25; *, 2024, §§ 71 and 102)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json,apps:43868/18|25883/21,Wa Baile v. Switzerland*,43868/18|25883/21,added,"Wa Baile v. Switzerland*, nos. 43868/18 and 25883/21, 20 February 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,IV.B,The exception: reversal of the burden of proof,2,92,92,0.8336,"The case of Memedova and Others v. North Macedonia , 2023",,"In Basu v. Germany, 2022, the Court considered that, once there is an arguable claim that an individual may have been targeted by a police identity check on account of racial characteristics and such acts fall within the ambit of Article 8, the duty of the authorities to investigate the existence of a possible link between racist attitudes and the act of a State agent is to be considered as implicit in their responsibilities under Article 14 examined in conjunction with Article 8 ( Muhammad v. Spain, 2022, 68, Basu v. Germany, 2022, § 35).","In Basu v. Germany, 2022, the Court considered that, once there is an arguable claim that an individual may have been targeted by a police identity check on account of racial characteristics and such acts fall within the ambit of Article 8, the duty of the authorities to investigate the existence of a possible link between racist attitudes and the act of a State agent is to be considered as implicit in their responsibilities under Article 14 examined in conjunction with Article 8 ( Muhammad v. Spain, 2022, 68; Basu v. Germany, 2022, § 35). In Wa Baile v. Switzerland *, 2024, which also concerned allegations of racial profiling in an identity check in a railway station, the Court found a violation of the procedural obligations enshrined in Article 14 taken together with Article 8 because of the domestic courts' (criminal and administrative) failure to ascertain whether discriminatory motives were behind the identity check (§§ 93-103). It further reiterated that the absence of sufficient legal and administrative safeguards ran the risk of discriminatory controls taking place (§ 130) and, in the circumstances of the case, concluded that the Government had not been able to rebut the presumption of discriminatory treatment during the identity check in question (§§ 131-135), thus also finding a violation under the subatantive head of Article 14 taken together with Article 8. The case of Memedova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2023, concerned ethnic profiling of Roma people by the border guards in refusing them the right to leave the country, pursuant to an instruction issued by the Ministry of the Interior to strengthening border controls for organised groups of citizens leaving the country who were potential asylum-seekers. Relying on a number of national and international reports on the matter, the Court concluded that, despite the absence of any discriminatory wording in the internal instructions, the way in which they were applied in practice by the border officers resulted in a disproportionate number of Roma being prevented from travelling abroad. The resulting difference in treatment was found to be without any objective and reasonable justification, and thus in breach of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention (freedom of movement)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json,apps:43868/18|25883/21,Wa Baile v. Switzerland*,43868/18|25883/21,added,"Wa Baile v. Switzerland*, nos. 43868/18 and 25883/21, 20 February 2024",3,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,V.B,Race and colour,2,129,130,0.9654,,,"In Muhammad v. Spain, 2022, the applicant and his friend, both Pakistani nationals of the same ethnicity, were requested to identify themselves on a public street allegedly on the sole grounds of their race. In Basu v. Germany, 2022, the police carried out an identity check of the applicant, a German national of Indian origin, and of his daughter, on a train, allegedly because of his dark skin colour.","In Muhammad v. Spain, 2022, the applicant and his friend, both Pakistani nationals of the same ethnicity, were requested to identify themselves on a public street allegedly on the sole grounds of their race. In Basu v. Germany, 2022, the police carried out an identity check of the applicant, a German national of Indian origin, and of his daughter, on a train, allegedly because of his dark skin colour. In Wa Baile v. Switzerland *, 2024, the applicant was stopped and searched in a railway station allegedly on the sole ground of his dark skin colour."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240330045513__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-03-30,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-03-30__2024-09-30.json,apps:43868/18|25883/21,Wa Baile v. Switzerland*,43868/18|25883/21,added,"Wa Baile v. Switzerland*, nos. 43868/18 and 25883/21, 20 February 2024",4,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,VI.G.2,Procedural aspect,3,273,275,0.9864,,"Basu v. Germany , 2022|Muhammad v. Spain , 2022","The Court considered that, once there was an arguable claim that an individual may have been targeted by a police identity check on account of racial characteristics and such acts fell into the ambit of Article 8, the duty of the authorities to investigate the existence of a possible link between racist attitudes and a State agent's act was to be considered as implicit in their responsibilities under Article 14 examined in conjunction with Article 8 ( Muhammad v. Spain, 2022, 68; Basu v. Germany, 2022, § 33).","The Court considered that, once there was an arguable claim that an individual may have been targeted by a police identity check on account of racial characteristics and such acts fell into the ambit of Article 8, the duty of the authorities to investigate the existence of a possible link between racist attitudes and a State agent's act was to be considered as implicit in their responsibilities under Article Muhammad v. Spain Basu v. Germany 14 examined in conjunction with Article 8 (, 2022, 68;, 2022, § 33; Wa Baile v. Switzerland *, 2024, § 91)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:29295/22,Abo v. Estonia (dec.),29295/22,added,"Abo v. Estonia (dec.), no. 29295/22, 17 September 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A.3,The material scope of the prohibition of discrimination set forth in Article 14,3,14,14,0.997,"Genovese v. Malta, 2011",,"The Court has thus found Article 14, read in conjunction with a substantive right, applicable to a number of circumstances. For example, it recognised that rights such as the right for a single homosexual parent to adopt a child ( E.B. v. France [GC], 2008, § 43), parental leave and parental Konstantin Markin v. Russia Genovese allowances ( [GC], 2012, § 130) and denial of citizenship ( v. Malta, 2011; Zeggai v. France, 2022) come within the scope of Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14. By the same token, the Court has found Article 14 in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 applicable to a variety of welfare benefits ( Stummer v. Austria [GC], 2011, § 82; Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2006, § 53; Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2010, §§ 64-65; Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], 2009, § 77; Fábián v. Hungary [GC], 2017, § 117; P.C. v. Ireland, 2022, § 54; see also, a contrario, Dobrowolski and Others v. Poland (dec.), 2018, where the Court held that a prisoner did not have a legitimate expectation to receive more than a half of the statutory minimum wage for work performed in prison).","The Court has thus found Article 14, read in conjunction with a substantive right, applicable to a number of circumstances. For example, it recognised that rights such as the right for a single homosexual parent to adopt a child ( E.B. v. France [GC], 2008, § 43), parental leave and parental allowances ( Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], 2012, § 130) and denial of citizenship ( Genovese v. Malta, 2011; Zeggai v. France, 2022; Abo v. Estonia (dec.), 2024) come within the scope of Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14. By the same token, the Court has found Article 14 in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 applicable to a variety of welfare benefits ( Stummer v. Austria [GC], 2011, § 82; Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2006, § 53; Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2010, §§ 64-65; Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], 2009, § 77; Fábián v. Hungary [GC], 2017, § 117; P.C. v. Ireland, 2022, § 54; see also, a contrario, Dobrowolski and Others v. Poland (dec.), 2018, where the Court held that a prisoner did not have a legitimate expectation to receive more than a half of the statutory minimum wage for work performed in prison)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:29295/22,Abo v. Estonia (dec.),29295/22,added,"Abo v. Estonia (dec.), no. 29295/22, 17 September 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.F,National or social origin,2,150,152,0.9794,"Rangelov v. Germany , 2012",,"Other cases regarding alleged discrimination on grounds of nationality concerned, for example,  the authorities' refusal to grant emergency assistance to an unemployed man because he did not have Austrian nationality ( Gaygusuz v. Austria, 1996);  the consequences of family's loss of nationality on the applicant's status as a mother of a large family and her related pension entitlement ( Zeïbek v. Greece, 2009);  an unlawfully resident alien who was refused legal aid for contesting paternity of her child ( Anakomba Yula v. Belgium, 2009);  the refusal to award the applicant a disability allowance on the ground that he was not a French national and that there was no reciprocal agreement between France and his country of nationality in respect of this benefit ( Koua Poirrez v. France, 2003);  the refusal of social therapy or relaxations in the conditions of preventive detention due to Rangelov v. Germany the applicant's foreign nationality (, 2012);  the prolonged failure of the Slovenian authorities to regularise the applicants' residence status as citizens of other former Yugoslav republics following their unlawful ""erasure"" from the register of permanent residents ( Kurić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], 2012);  the requirement on aliens without permanent residence to pay secondary-school fees ( Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria, 2011);  the refusal to grant family reunion to naturalised nationals as opposed to nationals born in the country ( Biao v. Denmark [GC], 2016);  the blanket ban applied retroactively and indiscriminately to all prospective adoptive parents from a specific foreign State ( A.H. and Others v. Russia, 2017).","Other cases regarding alleged discrimination on grounds of nationality concerned, for example, ▪ the authorities'refusal to grant emergency assistance to an unemployed man because he did not have Austrian nationality ( Gaygusuz v. Austria, 1996); ▪ the consequences of family's loss of nationality on the applicant's status as a mother of a large family and her related pension entitlement ( Zeïbek v. Greece, 2009); ▪ an unlawfully resident alien who was refused legal aid for contesting paternity of her child ( Anakomba Yula v. Belgium, 2009); ▪ the refusal to award the applicant a disability allowance on the ground that he was not a French national and that there was no reciprocal agreement between France and his country of nationality in respect of this benefit ( Koua Poirrez v. France, 2003); ▪ the refusal of social therapy or relaxations in the conditions of preventive detention due to the applicant's foreign nationality ( Rangelov v. Germany, 2012); ▪ the prolonged failure of the Slovenian authorities to regularise the applicants'residence status as citizens of other former Yugoslav republics following their unlawful ""erasure"" from the register of permanent residents ( Kurić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], 2012); ▪ the requirement on aliens without permanent residence to pay secondary-school fees ( Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria, 2011); ▪ the refusal to grant family reunion to naturalised nationals as opposed to nationals born in the country ( Biao v. Denmark [GC], 2016); ▪ the blanket ban applied retroactively and indiscriminately to all prospective adoptive parents from a specific foreign State ( A.H. and Others v. Russia, 2017); ▪ a refusal to grant the applicant Estonian citizen's identity document, on the grounds that her grandmother, who had opted for Estonian citizenship in 1920 ( an ""optant"" ), had not settled in Estonia to validate her citizenship ( Abo v. Estonia (dec.), 2024, §§ 4-5)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:29295/22,Abo v. Estonia (dec.),29295/22,added,"Abo v. Estonia (dec.), no. 29295/22, 17 September 2024",3,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.J.9,Examples of situations not falling within “other status”,3,223,229,0.9702,"Shylina v. Ukraine , 2024|VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland , 2001",,"Other examples of differences in treatment not falling within the notion of ""other status"" for the purpose of Article 14 include  having or not having acquired the right to a welfare benefit ( Springett and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2010);  duration and nature of an employment contract ( Peterka v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2010);  holding fishing rights in different areas ( Alatulkkila and Others v. Finland, 2005);  being sent on different military missions ( De Jong, Baljet and Van den Brink v. the Netherlands, 1984);  different legal status with respect to restitution of taxes ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 1997);  distinction between smaller and larger unions ( National union of Belgian police v. Belgium, 1975; Swedish Engine Drivers' Union v. Sweden, 1976);  difference between commercial advertising and advertisements forwarding certain ideals VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland (, 2001);  the possession or otherwise of account with a State bank ( Shylina v. Ukraine *, 2024);","Other examples of differences in treatment not falling within the notion of ""other status"" for the purpose of Article 14 include ▪ having or not having acquired the right to a welfare benefit ( Springett and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2010); ▪ duration and nature of an employment contract ( Peterka v. the Czech Republic (dec.), 2010); ▪ holding fishing rights in different areas ( Alatulkkila and Others v. Finland, 2005); ▪ being sent on different military missions ( De Jong, Baljet and Van den Brink v. the Netherlands, 1984); ▪ different legal status with respect to restitution of taxes ( National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 1997); ▪ distinction between smaller and larger unions ( National union of Belgian police v. Belgium, 1975; Swedish Engine Drivers'Union v. Sweden, 1976); ▪ difference between commercial advertising and advertisements forwarding certain ideals ( VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, 2001); ▪ the possession or otherwise of account with a State bank ( Shylina v. Ukraine, 2024); ▪ having applied for a citizen's identity document before or after a change of administrative practice (meant to correct the previous erroneous practice) ( Abo v. Estonia (dec.), 2024);"
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:81249/17,Allouche v. France,81249/17,added,"Allouche v. France, no. 81249/17, 11 April 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VI.G.2,Procedural aspect,3,,282,,"In Allouche v. France , 2024",,,"In Allouche v. France, 2024, the applicant complained about antisemitic insults and threats uttered against her by a private individual. The domestic courts acknowledged the antisemitic character of those threats but reclassified the offence into ""simple"" death threats, and thus did not examine the discriminatory motives behind the threats. The Court concluded that, in doing so, the domestic courts had failed to offer the applicant adequate and appropriate protection against discrimination."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:20592/21,Bakradze v. Georgia,20592/21,added,"Bakradze v. Georgia, no. 20592/21, 7 November 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.B,The exception: reversal of the burden of proof,2,93,94,0.8978,"Bakradze v. Georgia , 2024",,"The Court has also applied this rule in the context of alleged anti-union discrimination, finding that, once the applicants had demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of proof was to be shifted to the respondent, and the employer, usually having control over relevant evidence, had to demonstrate the existence of legitimate grounds for the applicants' dismissal ( Hoppen and trade union of AB Amber Grid employees v. Lithuania, 2023, § 230).","The Court has also applied this rule in the context of alleged anti-union discrimination, finding that, once the applicants had demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of proof was to be shifted to the respondent, and the employer, usually having control over relevant evidence, had to demonstrate the existence of legitimate grounds for the applicants'dismissal ( Hoppen and trade union of AB Amber Grid employees v. Lithuania, 2023, § 230). Similarly, in a case where a former judge had submitted sufficient prima facie evidence that she had been discriminated against in the decision not to reappoint her on account of her role in an NGO and her critical views of the state of the judiciary, the Court found a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, on account of the domestic courts'failure to shift the burden of proof onto the High Council of Justice to dispel the perception of bias and to demonstrate that the difference in treatment had been justified by objective reasons ( Bakradze v. Georgia, 2024, §§ 71-85)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:71671/16|40190/18,F.M. and Others v. Russia,71671/16|40190/18,added,"F.M. and Others v. Russia, nos. 71671/16 and 40190/18, 10 December 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.A,Sex,2,,116,,"In F.M. and Others v. Russia , 2024",,,"In F.M. and Others v. Russia, 2024, the applicants were foreign migrant women with an irregular immigration status, who had been trafficked and forced into servitude in Russia. The Court examined the case under Article 14 taken together with Article 4 and applied the same principles as those relevant to discrimination claims in connection with Articles 2 and 3 regarding the domestic authorities'passive response to gender-based domestic violence (§ 341). Relying on available research and statistical data, the Court established that a disproportionate number of women and girls were victims of human trafficking and were in general more vulnerable than men to exploitation through the use of force or threats (§ 342). It observed that the respondent State's poor anti-trafficking efforts, which reflected a general situation, inevitably mostly hit those disproportionately affected by trafficking, labour exploitation and related violence, notably female foreign migrant workers in an irregular situation (§ 344). The Court found a violation of Article 14 taken together with Article 4, noting that the inaction of the respondent State in honouring its positive obligations under Article 4 amounted to repeatedly condoning trafficking, labour exploitation and related gender-based violence and reflected a discriminatory attitude towards the applicants. The respondent State authorities'general and discriminatory passivity created a climate that was conducive to their trafficking and exploitation (§§ 346-47)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:71671/16|40190/18,F.M. and Others v. Russia,71671/16|40190/18,added,"F.M. and Others v. Russia, nos. 71671/16 and 40190/18, 10 December 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,V.A,Sex,2,100,101,0.9901,"A.E. v. Bulgaria , 2023|Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy , 2014|Emel Boyraz v. Turkey , 2014|F.M. and Others v. Russia , 2024|León Madrid v. Spain , 2021|Tkhelidze v. Georgia , 2021",A.E. v. Bulgaria 2021,"The Court has found that differential treatment on the grounds of sex violated Article 14 in different areas, such as:  equality in marriage ( Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, 2004; Burghartz v. Switzerland, 1994; Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye ∗, 2023);  Emel Boyraz v. Turkey access to employment (, 2014);  retirement age ( Moraru and Marin v. Romania, 2022; Pająk and Others v. Poland, 2023);  parental leave and allowances ( Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], 2012; Gruba and Others v. Russia, 2021);  survivor's pensions ( Willis v. the United Kingdom, 2002; Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022);  civic obligations ( Zarb Adami v. Malta, 2006; Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany, 1994);  family reunification ( Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 1985);  Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy León Madrid v. Spain children's surnames (, 2014;, 2021); or  domestic violence ( Opuz v. Turkey, 2009; Volodina v. Russia, 2019; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, A.E. v. Bulgaria 2021;, 2023).","The Court has found that differential treatment on the grounds of sex violated Article 14 in different areas, such as: ▪ equality in marriage ( Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, 2004; Burghartz v. Switzerland, 1994; Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye , 2023); ▪ access to employment ( Emel Boyraz v. Turkey, 2014); ▪ retirement age ( Moraru and Marin v. Romania, 2022; Pająk and Others v. Poland, 2023); ▪ parental leave and allowances ( Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], 2012; Gruba and Others v. Russia, 2021); ▪ survivor's pensions ( Willis v. the United Kingdom, 2002; Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022); ▪ civic obligations ( Zarb Adami v. Malta, 2006; Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany, 1994); ▪ family reunification ( Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 1985); ▪ children's surnames ( Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy, 2014; León Madrid v. Spain, 2021); or ▪ domestic violence ( Opuz v. Turkey, 2009; Volodina v. Russia, 2019; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021; A.E. v. Bulgaria, 2023; Vieru v. the Republic of Moldova, 2024); ▪ human trafficking and servitude ( F.M. and Others v. Russia, 2024)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:2669/19,Ferrero Quintana v. Spain,2669/19,added,"Ferrero Quintana v. Spain, no. 2669/19, 26 November 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.J.1,Age,3,,175,,"In Ferrero Quintana v. Spain , 2024",,,"In Ferrero Quintana v. Spain, 2024, the applicant complained, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 12, about an imposition of an upper age limit of 35 years of age for a public competition for becoming a police officer of the lowest rank. The Court noted that the applicant was not a member of a vulnerable group and that his complaint concerned access to public-sector employment, not the exercise of a fundamental right explicitly recognised by the Convention. In those circumstances, the Court afforded the State a wide margin of appreciation (§§ 83-85). The Court could allow that age was a relevant factor in determining a person's physical aptitude and observed that the duties of officers of the police force in question were not administrative in nature, but operational or executive, requiring a particular physical aptitude. It further considered that, whether someone possessed the required capabilities, taking into consideration the years of service he or she would be required to complete after the recruitment, required a dynamic and not a static assessment (§ 92). The Court concluded that the restriction had been necessary to ensure and maintain the functional capacity of the police force. Given that the margin of appreciation with regard to the requirements of admission to public employment in the area of police and security forces was wide, the national authorities had provided relevant and sufficient reasons to justify the necessity of the measure (§§ 100-01)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:2669/19,Ferrero Quintana v. Spain,2669/19,added,"Ferrero Quintana v. Spain, no. 2669/19, 26 November 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.J.1,Age,3,167,169,0.9015,"In Ferrero Quintana v. Spain , 2024",,"The Court has recognised that age constituted ""other status"" for the purposes of Article 14 of the Convention ( Schwizgebel v. Switzerland, 2010, § 85; Carvalho Pinto de Sousa Morais v. Portugal, 2017, § 45). However, it has not, to date, suggested that discrimination on grounds of age should be equated with other grounds of discrimination (ibid.; British Gurkha Welfare Society and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2016, § 88).","The Court has recognised that age constituted ""other status"" for the purposes of Article 14 of the Convention ( Schwizgebel v. Switzerland, 2010, § 85; Carvalho Pinto de Sousa Morais v. Portugal, 2017, § 45). However, it has not, to date, suggested that discrimination on grounds of age should be equated with other grounds of discrimination ( ibid .; British Gurkha Welfare Society and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2016, § 88). In Ferrero Quintana v. Spain, 2024, § 85, the Court found that a difference in treatment on grounds of age did not necessarily constitute an invidious kind of discrimination and did not necessarily have the same relative importance for the individual interest at stake."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:36436/22,I.C. v. the Republic of Moldova*,36436/22,added,"I.C. v. the Republic of Moldova*, no. 36436/22, 27 February 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.D,Other forms of discrimination,2,,54,,,,,"In I.C. v. the Republic of Moldova*, 2025, the applicant, a woman with intellectual disabilities, was the victim of human trafficking and sexual abuse at the hands of the family with which she was placed following her deinstitutionalisation from a State asylum. The Court established that the domestic authorities had failed to assess and give weight to the applicant's vulnerability due to her gender, intellectual disability and lifelong institutionalization (§ 217). The domestic courts had expressed views which seemed to convey stereotypes, preconceived beliefs and myths about persons with disabilities lacking agency, about a woman's role being that of a housewife who attends to the needs of a man and the family, and about domestic work carried out by women lacking any economic value (§ 221). The Court found that there was a general institutional passivity and/or lack of awareness of the phenomenon of violence against women with disabilities in Moldova. Moreover, the Court considered that the domestic authorities had failed to provide a reasonable accommodation which might have enabled the applicant to obtain justice (§ 222). It concluded to a violation of Article 14 taken together with Articles 3, 4 and 8 (§ 223)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:36436/22,I.C. v. the Republic of Moldova*,36436/22,added,"I.C. v. the Republic of Moldova*, no. 36436/22, 27 February 2025",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.J.4,Health and disability,3,,200,,,,,"In the context of human trafficking and domestic sexual abuse, I.C. v. the Republic of Moldova*, 2025, concerned the exploitation of a woman with intellectual disabilities by the family with which she had been placed following her deinstitutionalisation from a State asylum. The Court established that the domestic authorities had failed to assess and give weight to the applicant's vulnerabilities and had expressed views which seemed to convey stereotypes, preconceived beliefs and myths about persons with disabilities lacking agency, about a woman's role being that of a housewife who attends to the needs of a man and the family, and about the domestic work carried out by women lacking any economic value (§ 221)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:59180/15,Minasyan and Others v. Armenia,59180/15,added,"Minasyan and Others v. Armenia, no. 59180/15, 7 January 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.J.3,Sexual orientation,3,,190,,"The case of Minasyan and Others v. Armenia , 2025",,,"The case of Minasyan and Others v. Armenia, 2025, concerned an online newspaper Article targeting LGBTIrights activists following their public comments challenging a statement of the Armenian Eurovision jury member criticising the victory of a gay cross-dressing man in 2014. The impugned Article had been motivated by hostility against LGBTIpersons and the author of the Article had expressly incited the public to commit harmful discriminatory acts against the applicants (§ 66). The Court found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14, because the domestic courts had failed to recognise the article's hostile tone, intentions and impact on the applicants'Convention rights, as well as the discriminatory nature of the impugned statements. They also failed to carry out the requisite balancing of the competing rights in line with the Court's case-law (§§ 69-71). Furthermore, the manner in which the only (civil) remedy available to the applicants had been interpreted and applied in practice had failed to provide them with protection against hate speech and discrimination (§ 71)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:59180/15,Minasyan and Others v. Armenia,59180/15,added,"Minasyan and Others v. Armenia, no. 59180/15, 7 January 2025",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,V.J.3,Sexual orientation,3,178,182,0.9989,"Alekseyev and Others v. Russia , 2018|Chapin and Charpentier v. France , 2016|Genderdoc-M v. Moldova , 2012|Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine , 2023|Minasyan and Others v. Armenia , 2025|Schalk and Kopf v. Austria , 2010|Zhdanov and Others v. Russia , 2019","Alekseyev and Others v. Russia Genderdoc-M v. Moldova Zhdanov and Others v. Russia , 2018","In 1999 the Court found for the first time a violation of Article 14 on grounds of sexual orientation in a case concerning parental rights ( Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999; see also X v. Poland, 2021). Ever since, it has examined the issue of sexual orientation in a number of other contexts involving  different age of consent under criminal law for homosexual relations ( L. and v. v. Austria, 2003; S.L. v. Austria, 2003; B.B. v. the United Kingdom, 2004; Santos Couto v. Portugal, 2010);  permission to adopt a child ( X and Others v. Austria [GC], 2013; E.B. v. France [GC], 2008; Gas and Dubois v. France, 2012);  the right to succeed to the deceased partner's tenancy ( Karner v. Austria, 2003; Kozak v. Poland, 2010);  social protection ( P.B. and J.S. v. Austria, 2010; Mata Estevez v. Spain (dec.), 2001);  conditions of detention ( X v. Turkey, 2012);  regulations on child maintenance ( J.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2010);  Vallianatos and Others v. Greece Maymulakhin and Markiv civil unions ( [GC], 2013; v. Ukraine, 2023);  Schalk and Kopf v. Austria Chapin and Charpentier v. France marriage (, 2010;, 2016);  family reunification ( Pajić v. Croatia, 2016; Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy, 2016);  freedom of thought, conscience and religion ( Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2013);  freedom of assembly and association ( Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007; Alekseyev and Others v. Russia Genderdoc-M v. Moldova Zhdanov and Others v. Russia, 2018;, 2012;, 2019; Berkman v. Russia, 2020; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021);  protection from homophobic speech or acts of violence and effectiveness of investigation ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020; Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020; Sabalić v. Croatia, 2021 ; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021; Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021; Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022; Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023).","In 1999 the Court found for the first time a violation of Article 14 on grounds of sexual orientation in a case concerning parental rights ( Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 1999; see also X v. Poland, 2021). Ever since, it has examined the issue of sexual orientation in a number of other contexts involving ▪ different age of consent under criminal law for homosexual relations ( L. and v. v. Austria, 2003; S.L. v. Austria, 2003; B.B. v. the United Kingdom, 2004; Santos Couto v. Portugal, 2010); ▪ permission to adopt a child ( X and Others v. Austria [GC], 2013; E.B. v. France [GC], 2008; Gas and Dubois v. France, 2012); ▪ the right to succeed to the deceased partner's tenancy ( Karner v. Austria, 2003; Kozak v. Poland, 2010); ▪ social protection ( P.B. and J.S. v. Austria, 2010; Mata Estevez v. Spain (dec.), 2001); ▪ conditions of detention ( X v. Turkey, 2012); ▪ regulations on child maintenance ( J.M. v. the United Kingdom, 2010); ▪ civil unions ( Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], 2013; Maymulakhin and Markiv v. Ukraine, 2023); ▪ marriage ( Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010; Chapin and Charpentier v. France, 2016); ▪ family reunification ( Pajić v. Croatia, 2016; Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy, 2016); ▪ freedom of thought, conscience and religion ( Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2013); ▪ freedom of assembly and association ( Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007; Alekseyev and Others v. Russia, 2018; Genderdoc-M v. Moldova, 2012; Zhdanov and Others v. Russia, 2019; Berkman v. Russia, 2020; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021); ▪ protection from homophobic speech or acts of violence and effectiveness of investigation ( Identoba and Others v. Georgia, 2015; M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, 2016; Beizaras and Levickas v. Lithuania, 2020; Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia, 2020; Sabalić v. Croatia, 2021 ; Association ACCEPT and Others v. Romania, 2021; Genderdoc-M and M.D. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2021; Oganezova v. Armenia, 2022; Nepomnyashchiy and Others v. Russia, 2023; Minasyan and Others v. Armenia, 2025)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:37614/22,S. v. the Czech Republic,37614/22,added,"S. v. the Czech Republic, no. 37614/22, 7 November 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I.A.1,The ancillary nature of Article 14,3,4,4,0.9992,"B.S. v. Spain , 2012|Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia , 2022|Koua Poirrez v. France , 2003|Opuz v. Turkey , 2009|Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria , 2011|ączkowski and Others v. Poland , 2007","Koua Poirrez v. France Stummer v. Austria , 2003|Opuz v. Turkey B.S. v. Spain , 2009","However, the ancillary nature of Article 14 in no way means that the applicability of Article 14 is dependent on the existence of a violation of the substantive provision (see Section I.A.2 below). Furthermore, the material scope of application of Article 14 is not strictly limited to that of the substantive provision (see Section I.A.3 below). Consequently, the Court has found Article 14 applicable to many areas, such as  employment ( Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania, 2004; Bigaeva v. Greece, 2009);  membership of a trade union ( Danilenkov and Others v. Russia, 2009; Zakharova and Others v. Russia, 2022; Hoppen and trade union of AB Amber Grid employees v. Lithuania, 2023);  social security ( Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], 2009; Gaygusuz v. Austria, 1996; Koua Poirrez v. France Stummer v. Austria, 2003; [GC], 2011);  education ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia [GC], 2010;, 2011,, 2022);  right to respect for home ( Buckley v. the United Kingdom, 1996; Karner v. Austria, 2003);  access to justice ( Paraskeva Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2010; Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2), 2005; Anakomba Yula v. Belgium, 2009);  inheritance rights ( Fabris v. France [GC], 2013);  access to children ( Sommerfeld v. Germany [GC], 2003);  paternity ( Rasmussen v. Denmark, 1984);  Bączkowski and Others v. Poland freedom of expression, assembly and association (, 2007);  right to an effective investigation ( Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005; Opuz v. Turkey B.S. v. Spain, 2009;, 2012);  eligibility for release on parole ( Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v. Russia [GC], 2017);  eligibility for tax relief ( Guberina v. Croatia, 2016).","However, the ancillary nature of Article 14 in no way means that the applicability of Article 14 is dependent on the existence of a violation of the substantive provision (see Section I.A.2 below). Furthermore, the material scope of application of Article 14 is not strictly limited to that of the substantive provision (see Section I.A.3 below). Consequently, the Court has found Article 14 applicable to many areas, such as ▪ employment ( Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania, 2004; Bigaeva v. Greece, 2009); ▪ membership of a trade union ( Danilenkov and Others v. Russia, 2009; Zakharova and Others v. Russia, 2022; Hoppen and trade union of AB Amber Grid employees v. Lithuania, 2023); ▪ social security ( Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], 2009; Gaygusuz v. Austria, 1996; Koua Poirrez v. France, 2003; Stummer v. Austria [GC], 2011); ▪ education ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010; Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria, 2011, Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022; Salay v. Slovakia *, 2025); ▪ right to respect for home ( Buckley v. the United Kingdom, 1996; Karner v. Austria, 2003); ▪ access to justice ( Paraskeva Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2010; Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2), 2005; Anakomba Yula v. Belgium, 2009); ▪ inheritance rights ( Fabris v. France [GC], 2013); ▪ access to children ( Sommerfeld v. Germany [GC], 2003); ▪ paternity ( Rasmussen v. Denmark, 1984); ▪ freedom of expression, assembly and association ( Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007); ▪ right to an effective investigation ( Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005; Opuz v. Turkey, 2009; B.S. v. Spain, 2012); ▪ eligibility for release on parole ( Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v. Russia [GC], 2017); ▪ eligibility for tax relief ( Guberina v. Croatia, 2016)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:37614/22,S. v. the Czech Republic,37614/22,added,"S. v. the Czech Republic, no. 37614/22, 7 November 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.A,Direct and indirect discrimination,2,32,32,0.9838,,,"Article 14 does not provide a definition of what constitutes direct discrimination. The expression ""direct discrimination"" describes a ""difference in treatment of persons in analogous, or relevantly Biao v. Denmark similar situations"" and ""based on an identifiable characteristic, or 'status'"" ( [GC], 2016, § 89; Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2010, § 61; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 175; Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 60) protected by Article 14 of the Convention ( Varnas v. Lithuania, 2013, § 106; Hoogendijk v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2005). That provision thus requires that persons in a similar situation be treated in an equal manner (ibid.).","Article 14 does not provide a definition of what constitutes direct discrimination. The expression ""direct discrimination"" describes a ""difference in treatment o f persons in analogous, or relevantly similar situations"" and ""based on an identifiable characteristic, or'status '"" ( Biao v. Denmark [GC], 2016, § 89; Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2010, § 61; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 175; Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 60) protected by Article 14 of the Convention ( Varnas v. Lithuania, 2013, § 106; Hoogendijk v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2005). That provision thus requires that persons in a similar situation be treated in an equal manner ( ibid .)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:37614/22,S. v. the Czech Republic,37614/22,added,"S. v. the Czech Republic, no. 37614/22, 7 November 2024",3,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.A,Direct and indirect discrimination,2,35,35,1.0,,,"Indirect discrimination may take the form of disproportionately prejudicial effects of a general policy or measure which, though couched in neutral terms, has a particular discriminatory effect on a particular group ( Biao v. Denmark [GC], 2016, § 103; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 184; Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008, § 67). Although the policy or measure at stake may not be specifically aimed or directed at a particular group, it might nevertheless discriminate against that Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom Hoogendijk v. the group in an indirect way (, 2001, § 154; Netherlands (dec.), 2005). Indirect discrimination does not necessarily require a discriminatory intent ( Biao v. Denmark [GC], 2016, § 103; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 184). Moreover, indirect discrimination may arise from a neutral rule ( Hoogendijk v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2005), from a de facto situation ( Zarb Adami v. Malta, 2006, § 76) or from a policy ( Tapayeva and Others v. Russia, 2021, § 112).","Indirect discrimination may take the form of disproportionately prejudicial effects of a general policy or measure which, though couched in neutral terms, has a particular discriminatory effect on a particular group ( Biao v. Denmark [GC], 2016, § 103; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 184; Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008, § 67). Although the policy or measure at stake may not be specifically aimed or directed at a particular group, it might nevertheless discriminate against that group in an indirect way ( Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, 2001, § 154; Hoogendijk v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2005). Indirect discrimination does not necessarily require a discriminatory intent ( Biao v. Denmark [GC], 2016, § 103; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 184). Moreover, indirect discrimination may arise from a neutral rule ( Hoogendijk v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2005), from a de facto situation ( Zarb Adami v. Malta, 2006, § 76) or from a policy ( Tapayeva and Others v. Russia, 2021, § 112)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:37614/22,S. v. the Czech Republic,37614/22,added,"S. v. the Czech Republic, no. 37614/22, 7 November 2024",4,paragraph_text_name_match,unchanged,II.A,Direct and indirect discrimination,2,36,36,,,,"In D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, the issue was whether the manner in which the legislation was applied in practice resulted in a disproportionate number of Roma children being placed in special schools without justification, and whether such children were thereby placed at a significant disadvantage. The ""general policy or measure"" that the Court found to be discriminatory was the tests used to evaluate the children's intellectual capacities in order to decide whether to place them in normal or in ""special"" schools for children with learning disabilities. The test has been designed having in mind the mainstream Czech population and the results were not analysed in the light of the particularities and special characteristics of the Roma children who sat them. This led to indirect discrimination of Roma children who were more likely to perform poorly and were subsequently placed in ""special schools"" in a disproportionately high number in comparison to children of Czech ethnic origin (§§ 200-201).","In D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, the issue was whether the manner in which the legislation was applied in practice resulted in a disproportionate number of Roma children being placed in special schools without justification, and whether such children were thereby placed at a significant disadvantage. The ""general policy or measure"" that the Court found to be discriminatory was the tests used to evaluate the children's intellectual capacities in order to decide whether to place them in normal or in ""special"" schools for children with learning disabilities. The test has been designed having in mind the mainstream Czech population and the results were not analysed in the light of the particularities and special characteristics of the Roma children who sat them. This led to indirect discrimination of Roma children who were more likely to perform poorly and were subsequently placed in ""special schools"" in a disproportionately high number in comparison to children of Czech ethnic origin (§§ 200-201)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:37614/22,S. v. the Czech Republic,37614/22,added,"S. v. the Czech Republic, no. 37614/22, 7 November 2024",5,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C,Positive action,2,44,44,0.9943,"Muñoz Díaz v. Spain , 2009",,"According to the Court's established case-law, Article 14 does not prohibit a member State from treating groups differently in order to correct ""factual inequalities"" between them; indeed in certain circumstances a failure to attempt to correct such inequality through different treatment may in itself give rise to a breach of Article 14 ( Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy, 2016, § 81; Kurić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], 2012, § 388; Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], 2009, § 44; Muñoz Díaz v. Spain D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic Stec and Others v. the, 2009, § 48; [GC], 2007, § 175; United Kingdom [GC], 2006, § 51; Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC], 2000, § 44; the Belgian linguistic case, 1968, § 10 of ""the Law"" part).","According to the Court's established case-law, Article 14 does not prohibit a member State from treating groups differently in or der to correct ""factual inequalities"" between them ; indeed in certain circumstances a failure to attempt to correct such inequality through different treatment may in itself give rise to a breach of Article 14 ( Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy, 2016, § 81; Kurić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], 2012, § 388; Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], 2009, § 44; Muñoz Díaz v. Spain, 2009, § 48; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 175; Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2006, § 51; Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC], 2000, § 44; the Belgian linguistic case, 1968, § 10 of ""the Law"" part )."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:37614/22,S. v. the Czech Republic,37614/22,added,"S. v. the Czech Republic, no. 37614/22, 7 November 2024",6,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III,Discrimination test,1,54,55,0.9799,,,"Not all differences in treatment - or failure to treat differently persons in relevantly different situations - constitute discrimination, but only those devoid of ""an objective and reasonable justification"" ( Molla Sali v. Greece [GC], 2018, § 135; Fabris v. France [GC], 2013, § 56; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 175; Hoogendijk v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2005).","Not all differences in treatment - or failure to treat differently persons in relevantly different situations - constitute discrimination, but only those de void of ""an objective and reasonable justification"" ( Molla Sali v. Greece [GC], 2018, § 135; Fabris v. France [GC], 2013, § 56; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 175; Hoogendijk v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2005)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:37614/22,S. v. the Czech Republic,37614/22,added,"S. v. the Czech Republic, no. 37614/22, 7 November 2024",7,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.A,Difference in treatment,2,59,60,1.0,,,"In order for an issue to arise under Article 14, there must be a difference in treatment of ""persons in an analogous or relevantly similar situation"" ( Molla Sali v. Greece [GC], 2018, § 133; Fábián v. Hungary Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v. Russia X and Others [GC], 2017, § 113; [GC], 2017, § 64; v. Austria [GC], 2013, § 98; Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], 2012, § 125; Marckx v. Belgium, 1979, § 32; Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 60; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 175; Zarb Adami v. Malta, 2006, § 71; Kafkaris v. Cyprus [GC], 2008, § 160). In other words, the requirement to demonstrate an analogous position does not require that the comparator groups be identical. An applicant must demonstrate that, having regard to the particular nature of his or her complaint, he or she was in a relevantly similar situation to others treated differently ( Fábián v. Hungary Clift v. the United Kingdom Demokrat Parti v. Turkey [GC], 2017, § 113;, 2010, § 66; (dec.), 2021).","In order for an issue to arise under Article 14, there must be a difference in treatment of ""persons in an analogous or relevantly similar situation"" ( Molla Sali v. Greece [GC], 2018, § 133; Fábián v. Hungary [GC], 2017, § 113; Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v. Russia [GC], 2017, § 64; X and Others v. Austria [GC], 2013, § 98; Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], 2012, § 125; Marckx v. Belgium, 1979, § 32; Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 60; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 175; Zarb Adami v. Malta, 2006, § 71; Kafkaris v. Cyprus [GC], 2008, § 160). In other words, the requirement to demonstrate an analogous position does not require that the comparator groups be identical. An applicant must demonstrate that, having regard to the particular nature of his or her complaint, he or she was in a relevantly similar situation to others treated differently ( Fábián v. Hungary [GC], 2017, § 113; Clift v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 66; Demokrat Parti v. Turkey (dec.), 2021)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:37614/22,S. v. the Czech Republic,37614/22,added,"S. v. the Czech Republic, no. 37614/22, 7 November 2024",8,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,III.B.2,Proportionality,3,78,79,1.0,,"Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom Konstantin Markin v. Russia Beeler v. Switzerland , 1985","On the other hand, the Court has also identified certain grounds of discrimination where such margin is reduced. Indeed the Court has held time and again that no difference in treatment based exclusively or to a decisive extent on a person's ethnic origin was capable of being objectively justified in a modern democratic society built on the principles of pluralism and respect for different cultures D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina ( [GC], 2007, § 176; [GC], 2009, §§ 43-44). Similarly, differences in treatment on the basis of gender or sexual orientation may only be justified by very weighty reasons ( Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom Konstantin Markin v. Russia Beeler v. Switzerland, 1985, § 78; [GC], 2012, § 127; [GC], 2020, § 96; Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010, § 97).","On the other hand, the Court has also identified certain grounds of discrimination where such margin is reduced. Indeed the Court has held time and again that no difference in treatment based exclusively or to a decisive extent on a person's ethnic origin was capable of being objectively justified in a modern democratic society built on the principles of pluralism and respect for different cultures ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 176; Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], 2009, §§ 43-44). Similarly, differences in treatment on the basis of gender or sexual orientation may only be justified by very weighty reasons ( Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 1985, § 78; Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], 2012, § 127; Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2020, § 96; Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010, § 97)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:37614/22,S. v. the Czech Republic,37614/22,added,"S. v. the Czech Republic, no. 37614/22, 7 November 2024",9,paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,IV.A,The principle: affirmanti incumbit probatio,2,81,82,0.9984,,,"The Court applies the standard of proof ""beyond reasonable doubt"" as a normal standard for all rights set forth by the Convention. In the proceedings before the Court, there are no procedural barriers to the admissibility of evidence or pre-determined formulae for its assessment. The Court adopts the conclusions that are, in its view, supported by the free evaluation of all evidence, including such inferences as may flow from the facts and the parties' submissions. According to its established case-law, proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Moreover, the level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and, in this connection, the distribution of the burden of proof are intrinsically linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegation made and the Convention right at stake. The Court is also attentive to the seriousness that attaches to a ruling that a Contracting State has violated fundamental rights ( Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005, § 147; Timishev v. Russia, 2005, § 39; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 178; Muhammad v. Spain, 2022, § 94).","The Court applies the standard of proof ""beyond reasonable doubt"" as a normal standard for all rights set forth by the Convention. In the proceedings before the Court, there are no procedural barriers to the admissibility of evidence or pre-determined formulae for its assessment. The Court adopts the conclusions that are, in its view, supported by the free evaluation of all evidence, including such inferences as may flow from the facts and the parties'submissions. According to its established case-law, proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Moreover, the level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and, in this connection, the distribution of the burden of proof are intrinsically linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegation made and the Convention right at stake. The Court is also attentive to the seriousness that attaches to a ruling that a Contracting State has violated fundamental rights ( Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005, § 147; Timishev v. Russia, 2005, § 39; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 178; Muhammad v. Spain, 2022, § 94)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:37614/22,S. v. the Czech Republic,37614/22,added,"S. v. the Czech Republic, no. 37614/22, 7 November 2024",10,paragraph_text_name_match,unchanged,IV.B,The exception: reversal of the burden of proof,2,86,87,,,,"In order to rebut a presumption of discrimination, the State may either prove that the applicant is not actually in a similar or comparable situation to their ""comparator"", that the differential treatment is not based on the protected ground, but on other objective differences, or that the difference in treatment was justified ( Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v. Russia [GC], 2017, § 65; Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], 1999, §§ 91-92; Timishev v. Russia, 2005, § 57; Biao v. Denmark [GC], 2016, § 114; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 177).","In order to rebut a presumption of discrimination, the State may either prove that the applicant is not actually in a similar or comparable situation to their ""comparator"", that the differential treatment is not based on the protected ground, but on other objective differences, or that the difference in treatment was justified ( Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v. Russia [GC], 2017, § 65; Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], 1999, §§ 91-92; Timishev v. Russia, 2005, § 57; Biao v. Denmark [GC], 2016, § 114; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 177)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:37614/22,S. v. the Czech Republic,37614/22,added,"S. v. the Czech Republic, no. 37614/22, 7 November 2024",11,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,IV.B,The exception: reversal of the burden of proof,2,87,88,0.9958,,,"Such an approach has been mainly used in cases of alleged indirect discrimination, where the applicants may have difficulty in proving discriminatory treatment. In such cases statistical data can play an important role in helping the applicant to give rise to a presumption of discrimination. Where prima facie an applicant is able to show, on the basis of undisputed official statistics, the existence of a indication that a specific rule - although formulated in a neutral manner - in fact affects a clearly higher percentage of a group in comparison to another group, it is for the respondent Government to show that this is the result of objective factors unrelated to any discrimination ( Hooge ndijk v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2005; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2007, § 180; Di Trizio v. Switzerland, 2016, § 86).","Such an approach has been mainly used in cases of alleged indirect discrimination, where the applicants may have difficulty in proving discriminatory treatment. In such cases statistical data can play an important role in helping the applicant to give rise to a presumption of discrimination. Where an applicant is able to show, on the basis of undisputed official statistics, the existence of a prima facie indication that a specific rule - although formulated in a neutral manner - in fact affects a clearly higher percentage of a group in comparison to another group, it is for the respondent Government to show that this is the result of objective factors unrelated to any discrimination ( Hoogendijk v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2005; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, 2007, § 180; Di Trizio v. Switzerland, 2016, § 86)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:37614/22,S. v. the Czech Republic,37614/22,added,"S. v. the Czech Republic, no. 37614/22, 7 November 2024",12,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,IV.B,The exception: reversal of the burden of proof,2,88,89,1.0,,,"Statistics which appear on critical examination to be reliable and significant will be sufficient to prima facie constitute the evidence the applicant is required to produce. This does not, however, mean that indirect discrimination cannot be proved without statistical evidence ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 188). Reliable national or international reports can also be used to that effect ( Memedova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2023, §§ 91-94).","Statistics which appear on critical examination to be reliable and significant will be sufficient to constitute the prima facie evidence the applicant is required to produce. This does not, however, mean that indirect discrimination cannot be proved without statistical evidence ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 188). Reliable national or international reports can also be used to that effect ( Memedova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2023, §§ 91-94)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:37614/22,S. v. the Czech Republic,37614/22,added,"S. v. the Czech Republic, no. 37614/22, 7 November 2024",13,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,IV.B,The exception: reversal of the burden of proof,2,94,95,1.0,,,"In other discrimination cases, the practices or beliefs of others belonging to the same protected Oršuš and Others v. Croatia category may constitute sufficient proof. In [GC], 2010, concerning the placement of Roma children in Roma-only classes owing to their allegedly poor command of the Croatian language, the Court found that, unlike the case of D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, the statistics alone did not give rise to a presumption of discrimination. However, the fact that the measure of placing children in separate classes on the basis of their insufficient language skills had only applied to Roma students gave rise to a presumption of differential treatment.","In other discrimination cases, the practices or beliefs of others belonging to the same protected category may constitute sufficient proof. In Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010, concerning the placement of Roma children in Roma-only classes owing to their allegedly poor command of the Croatian language, the Court found that, unlike the case of D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, the statistics alone did not give rise to a presumption of discrimination. However, the fact that the measure of placing children in separate classes on the basis of their insufficient language skills had only applied to Roma students gave rise to a presumption of differential treatment."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:37614/22,S. v. the Czech Republic,37614/22,added,"S. v. the Czech Republic, no. 37614/22, 7 November 2024",14,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,V.B,Race and colour,2,117,119,0.9982,,,"In this context, where a difference in treatment is based on race or ethnicity, the notion of objective and reasonable justification must be interpreted as strictly as possible ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 196; Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], 2009, § 44). No difference in treatment which is based exclusively or to a decisive extent on a person's ethnic origin is capable of being objectively justified in a contemporary democratic society built on the principles of pluralism and respect for different cultures ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 176; Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], 2009, § 44; Timishev v. Russia, 2005, § 58). Nachova","In this context, where a difference in treatment is based on race or ethnicity, the notion of objective and reasonable justification must be interpreted as strictly as possible ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 196; Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], 2009, § 44). No difference in treatment which is based exclusively or to a decisive extent on a person's ethnic origin is capable of being objectively justified in a contemporary democratic society built on the principles of pluralism and respect for different cultures ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 176; Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], 2009, § 44; Timishev v. Russia, 2005, § 58)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:37614/22,S. v. the Czech Republic,37614/22,added,"S. v. the Czech Republic, no. 37614/22, 7 November 2024",15,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.B,Race and colour,2,124,126,0.9933,"Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia , 2022|Szolcsan v. Hungary , 2023",,"The Court has also found violations of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 in a number of cases concerning the right to education of Roma pupils ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007; Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 2013; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010; Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013; Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008; Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia Szolcsan v. Hungary 5, 2022;, 2023).","The Court has also found violations of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 in a number of cases concerning the right to education of Roma pupils ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007; Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 2013; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010; Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013; Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008; Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022; Szolcsan v. Hungary, 2023; Salay v. Slovakia *, 2025)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:37614/22,S. v. the Czech Republic,37614/22,added,"S. v. the Czech Republic, no. 37614/22, 7 November 2024",16,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,V.B,Race and colour,2,125,127,0.9892,,,"Moreover, with regard in particular to discrimination against Roma people, the Court has repeatedly stressed that, as a result of their turbulent history and constant uprooting, the Roma have D.H. and Others v. the Czech become a specific type of disadvantaged and vulnerable minority ( Republic [GC], 2007, § 182). Therefore, special consideration should be given to their needs and their different lifestyle both in the relevant regulatory framework and in reaching decisions in particular cases (ibid., § 181). Terna v. Italy","Moreover, with regard in particular to discrimination against Roma people, the Court has repeatedly stressed that, as a result of their turbulent history and constant uprooting, the Roma have become a specific type of disadvantaged and vulnerable minority ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007, § 182). Therefore, special consideration should be given to their needs and their different lifestyle both in the relevant regulatory framework and in reaching decisions in particular cases ( ibid ., § 181)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:37614/22,S. v. the Czech Republic,37614/22,added,"S. v. the Czech Republic, no. 37614/22, 7 November 2024",17,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.J.4,Health and disability,3,191,196,0.9367,"In G.L. v. Italy , 2020|Şahin v. Turkey , 2018",,"In the area of education, in, 2018, concerning a failure to conduct a concrete individual assessment of a disabled student's needs regarding access to university premises, the Court found a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 on the right to G.L. v. Italy education. In, 2020, a child suffering from non-verbal autism was not able to receive, in the first two years of primary school, the specialised assistance to which she was entitled under the relevant legislation. Stressing the importance of primary schooling and and the States' obligation to be particularly attentive to their choices in the area of educational needs of persons with disabilities, the Court found that the applicant had been unable to continue to attend primary school in conditions equivalent to those enjoyed by non-disabled pupils due to her disability.","In the area of education, in Enver Şahin v. Turkey, 2018, concerning a failure to conduct a concrete individual assessment of a disabled student's needs regarding access to university premises, the Court found a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 on the right to education. In G.L. v. Italy, 2020, a child suffering from non-verbal autism was not able to receive, in the first two years of primary school, the specialised assistance to which she was entitled under the relevant legislation. Stressing the importance of primary schooling and the States'obligation to be particularly attentive to their choices in the area of educational needs of persons with disabilities, the Court found that the applicant had been unable to continue to attend primary school in conditions equivalent to those enjoyed by non-disabled pupils due to her disability. However, in the case of an autistic child enrolled in a mainstream primary school without his parents being clear about his disability and without they usefully cooperating with the school, the Court noted that supportive measures had been adopted by the school once the applicant's educational needs had been identified and concluded that the school could not be blamed for not having been sufficiently diligent in securing him equivalent conditions, as far as possible, to those enjoyed by other children ( S. v. the Czech Republic, 2024, §§ 45-54)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:37614/22,S. v. the Czech Republic,37614/22,added,"S. v. the Czech Republic, no. 37614/22, 7 November 2024",18,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,VI.F,Right to education,2,257,263,1.0,"In X and Others v. Albania, 2022","š and Others v. Croatia X and Others v. Albania , 2013","The Court found violations of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 in a number of cases concerning the right to education of Roma pupils. These cases concerned the disproportionate number of Roma children placed in special schools for children with mental disabilities ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007; Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 2013), in Roma-only classes ( Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010, Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022), or in Roma-only schools ( Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013; Szolcsán v. Hungary, 2023); as well as their inability to access school before being assigned to special classrooms in an annex to the main Sampanis and Others v. Greece primary school buildings (, 2008). In all of these cases the Court found that the differential treatment, albeit unintentional, which Roma pupils were subject to, had constituted a form of indirect discrimination ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007; Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008; Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 2013; Lavida and Others v. Greece, Oršuš and Others v. Croatia X and Others v. Albania, 2013; [GC], 2010). In 2022, the respondent State was required under Article 46 to take desegregation measures in an elementary school attended almost exclusively by Roma and Egyptian children (similarly in Szolcsán v. Hungary, 2023).","The Court found violations of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 in a number of cases concerning the right to education of Roma pupils. These cases concerned the disproportionate number of Roma children placed in special schools for children with mental disabilities ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007; Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 2013), in Roma-only classes ( Or šuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010, Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022), or in Roma-only schools ( Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013; Szolcsán v. Hungary, 2023); as well as their inability to access school before being assigned to special classrooms in an annex to the main primary school buildings ( Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008). In all of these cases the Court found that the differential treatment, albeit unintentional, which Roma pupils were subject to, had constituted a form of indirect discrimination ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007; Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008; Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 2013; Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010). In X and Others v. Albania, 2022, the respondent State was required under Article 46 to take desegregation measures in an elementary school attended almost exclusively by Roma and Egyptian children (similarly in Szolcsán v. Hungary, 2023)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:29359/22,Salay v. Slovakia*,29359/22,added,"Salay v. Slovakia*, no. 29359/22, 27 February 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,I.A.1,The ancillary nature of Article 14,3,4,4,0.9992,"B.S. v. Spain , 2012|Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia , 2022|Koua Poirrez v. France , 2003|Opuz v. Turkey , 2009|Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria , 2011|ączkowski and Others v. Poland , 2007","Koua Poirrez v. France Stummer v. Austria , 2003|Opuz v. Turkey B.S. v. Spain , 2009","However, the ancillary nature of Article 14 in no way means that the applicability of Article 14 is dependent on the existence of a violation of the substantive provision (see Section I.A.2 below). Furthermore, the material scope of application of Article 14 is not strictly limited to that of the substantive provision (see Section I.A.3 below). Consequently, the Court has found Article 14 applicable to many areas, such as  employment ( Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania, 2004; Bigaeva v. Greece, 2009);  membership of a trade union ( Danilenkov and Others v. Russia, 2009; Zakharova and Others v. Russia, 2022; Hoppen and trade union of AB Amber Grid employees v. Lithuania, 2023);  social security ( Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], 2009; Gaygusuz v. Austria, 1996; Koua Poirrez v. France Stummer v. Austria, 2003; [GC], 2011);  education ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia [GC], 2010;, 2011,, 2022);  right to respect for home ( Buckley v. the United Kingdom, 1996; Karner v. Austria, 2003);  access to justice ( Paraskeva Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2010; Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2), 2005; Anakomba Yula v. Belgium, 2009);  inheritance rights ( Fabris v. France [GC], 2013);  access to children ( Sommerfeld v. Germany [GC], 2003);  paternity ( Rasmussen v. Denmark, 1984);  Bączkowski and Others v. Poland freedom of expression, assembly and association (, 2007);  right to an effective investigation ( Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005; Opuz v. Turkey B.S. v. Spain, 2009;, 2012);  eligibility for release on parole ( Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v. Russia [GC], 2017);  eligibility for tax relief ( Guberina v. Croatia, 2016).","However, the ancillary nature of Article 14 in no way means that the applicability of Article 14 is dependent on the existence of a violation of the substantive provision (see Section I.A.2 below). Furthermore, the material scope of application of Article 14 is not strictly limited to that of the substantive provision (see Section I.A.3 below). Consequently, the Court has found Article 14 applicable to many areas, such as ▪ employment ( Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania, 2004; Bigaeva v. Greece, 2009); ▪ membership of a trade union ( Danilenkov and Others v. Russia, 2009; Zakharova and Others v. Russia, 2022; Hoppen and trade union of AB Amber Grid employees v. Lithuania, 2023); ▪ social security ( Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], 2009; Gaygusuz v. Austria, 1996; Koua Poirrez v. France, 2003; Stummer v. Austria [GC], 2011); ▪ education ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010; Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria, 2011, Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022; Salay v. Slovakia *, 2025); ▪ right to respect for home ( Buckley v. the United Kingdom, 1996; Karner v. Austria, 2003); ▪ access to justice ( Paraskeva Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2010; Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2), 2005; Anakomba Yula v. Belgium, 2009); ▪ inheritance rights ( Fabris v. France [GC], 2013); ▪ access to children ( Sommerfeld v. Germany [GC], 2003); ▪ paternity ( Rasmussen v. Denmark, 1984); ▪ freedom of expression, assembly and association ( Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, 2007); ▪ right to an effective investigation ( Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], 2005; Opuz v. Turkey, 2009; B.S. v. Spain, 2012); ▪ eligibility for release on parole ( Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v. Russia [GC], 2017); ▪ eligibility for tax relief ( Guberina v. Croatia, 2016)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:29359/22,Salay v. Slovakia*,29359/22,added,"Salay v. Slovakia*, no. 29359/22, 27 February 2025",2,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.B,Race and colour,2,124,126,0.9933,"Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia , 2022|Szolcsan v. Hungary , 2023",,"The Court has also found violations of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 in a number of cases concerning the right to education of Roma pupils ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007; Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 2013; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010; Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013; Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008; Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia Szolcsan v. Hungary 5, 2022;, 2023).","The Court has also found violations of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 in a number of cases concerning the right to education of Roma pupils ( D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2007; Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary, 2013; Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2010; Lavida and Others v. Greece, 2013; Sampanis and Others v. Greece, 2008; Elmazova and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022; Szolcsan v. Hungary, 2023; Salay v. Slovakia *, 2025)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:13968/22,Spišák v. the Czech Republic,13968/22,added,"Spišák v. the Czech Republic, no. 13968/22, 20 June 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VI.K,Deprivation of liberty,2,,301,,,,,"In Spišák v. the Czech Republic, 2024, the applicant, a juvenile detainee, was subjected to different rules on the periodic review of the pre-trial detention than an adult person prosecuted for the same category of offense. The Court found that, where national legislation guaranteed an automatic periodic review to one category of detainees, that fell within the ambit of Article 5 for the purposes of the applicability of Article 14 taken in conjunction with that provision."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:38963/18,V.I. v. the Republic of Moldova,38963/18,added,"V.I. v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 38963/18, 26 March 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,V.J.4,Health and disability,3,192,197,0.9795,,,"In family matter, in Cînţa v. Romania, 2020, the domestic authorities failed to properly assess the impact that the applicant's mental illness might have had on his parenting skills or the child's safety. The Court stressed that mental illness might be a relevant factor to be taken into account when assessing the capacity of parents to care for their child. However, relying on mental illness as the decisive element, or even as one element among others, might amount to discrimination when, in the specific circumstances of the case, the mental illness did not have a bearing on the parents' ability to take care of the child. In R.P. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2012, § 89, concerning the appointment of an Official Solicitor to represent a mother with learning disabilities in child-care proceedings, the Court found that the measure the applicant had been subject to did not constitute unjustified discrimination. In fact, the Court accepted that it was necessary for the Contracting State to take measures to protect litigants in the applicant's situation and that the Official Solicitor scheme was within the State's margin of appreciation. Consequently, although the applicant was treated differently from someone with legal capacity, her situation was significantly different from such a person and the difference in treatment was objectively and reasonably justified (§ 89).","In family matter, in Cînţa v. Romania, 2020, the domestic authorities failed to properly assess the impact that the applicant's mental illness might have had on his parenting skills or the child's safety. The Court stressed that mental illness might be a relevant factor to be taken into account when assessing the capacity of parents to care for their child. However, relying on mental illness as the decisive element, or even as one element among others, might amount to discrimination when, in the specific circumstances of the case, the mental illness did not have a bearing on the parents'ability to take care of the child. In R.P. and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2012, § 89, concerning the appointment of an Official Solicitor to represent a mother with learning disabilities in child-care proceedings, the Court found that the measure the applicant had been subject to did not constitute unjustified discrimination. In fact, the Court accepted that it was necessary for the Contracting State to take measures to protect litigants in the applicant's situation and that the Official Solicitor scheme was within the State's margin of appreciation. Consequently, although the applicant was treated differently from someone with legal capacity, her situation was significantly different from such a person and the difference in treatment was objectively and reasonably justified (§ 89). In V.I. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2024, §§ 173-74, the Court found that the involuntary placement of a child in a psychiatric hospital as well as the psychiatric treatment in the absence of any therapeutical purpose, which was done because of lack of alternative care options, constituted discrimination based on the applicant's intellectual disability."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:17106/18,Vieru v. the Republic of Moldova,17106/18,added,"Vieru v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 17106/18, 19 November 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,V.A,Sex,2,100,101,0.9901,"A.E. v. Bulgaria , 2023|Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy , 2014|Emel Boyraz v. Turkey , 2014|F.M. and Others v. Russia , 2024|León Madrid v. Spain , 2021|Tkhelidze v. Georgia , 2021",A.E. v. Bulgaria 2021,"The Court has found that differential treatment on the grounds of sex violated Article 14 in different areas, such as:  equality in marriage ( Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, 2004; Burghartz v. Switzerland, 1994; Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye ∗, 2023);  Emel Boyraz v. Turkey access to employment (, 2014);  retirement age ( Moraru and Marin v. Romania, 2022; Pająk and Others v. Poland, 2023);  parental leave and allowances ( Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], 2012; Gruba and Others v. Russia, 2021);  survivor's pensions ( Willis v. the United Kingdom, 2002; Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022);  civic obligations ( Zarb Adami v. Malta, 2006; Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany, 1994);  family reunification ( Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 1985);  Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy León Madrid v. Spain children's surnames (, 2014;, 2021); or  domestic violence ( Opuz v. Turkey, 2009; Volodina v. Russia, 2019; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, A.E. v. Bulgaria 2021;, 2023).","The Court has found that differential treatment on the grounds of sex violated Article 14 in different areas, such as: ▪ equality in marriage ( Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, 2004; Burghartz v. Switzerland, 1994; Nurcan Bayraktar v. Türkiye , 2023); ▪ access to employment ( Emel Boyraz v. Turkey, 2014); ▪ retirement age ( Moraru and Marin v. Romania, 2022; Pająk and Others v. Poland, 2023); ▪ parental leave and allowances ( Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], 2012; Gruba and Others v. Russia, 2021); ▪ survivor's pensions ( Willis v. the United Kingdom, 2002; Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], 2022); ▪ civic obligations ( Zarb Adami v. Malta, 2006; Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany, 1994); ▪ family reunification ( Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 1985); ▪ children's surnames ( Cusan and Fazzo v. Italy, 2014; León Madrid v. Spain, 2021); or ▪ domestic violence ( Opuz v. Turkey, 2009; Volodina v. Russia, 2019; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021; A.E. v. Bulgaria, 2023; Vieru v. the Republic of Moldova, 2024); ▪ human trafficking and servitude ( F.M. and Others v. Russia, 2024)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:17106/18,Vieru v. the Republic of Moldova,17106/18,added,"Vieru v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 17106/18, 19 November 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,V.A,Sex,2,108,109,0.9944,"M.G. v. Turkey , 2016|Tkhelidze v. Georgia , 2021|ıç v. Turkey , 2016","ıç v. Turkey M.G. v. Turkey Tkhelidze , 2009","The Court has also dealt with a number of cases concerning domestic violence under Articles 2 and/or 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14. The Court explicitly considered domestic violence to be a form of gender-based violence, which was in turn a form of discrimination against women ( Opuz v. Turkey Halime Kılıç v. Turkey M.G. v. Turkey Tkhelidze, 2009, §§ 184-191;, 2016, § 113;, 2016, § 115; v. Georgia, 2021). In this regard the State's failure to protect women against domestic violence may breach their right to equal protection of the law and this failure does not need to be intentional ( Talpis v. Italy, 2017, § 141; Opuz v. Turkey, 2009, § 191; Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013, § 85; T.M. and C.M. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2014, § 57).","The Court has also dealt with a number of cases concerning domestic violence under Articles 2 and/or 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14. The Court explicitly considered domestic violence to be a form of gender-based violence, which was in turn a form of discrimination against women ( Opuz v. Turkey, 2009, §§ 184-191; Halime Kılıç v. Turkey, 2016, § 113; M.G. v. Turkey, 2016, § 115; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, 2021). In this regard the State's failure to protect women against domestic violence may breach their right to equal protection of the law and this failure does not need to be intentional ( Talpis v. Italy, 2017, § 141; Opuz v. Turkey, 2009, § 191; Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, 2013, § 85; T.M. and C.M. v. the Republic of Moldova, 2014, § 57; Vieru v. the Republic of Moldova, 2024)."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:42917/16,Zăicescu and Fălticineanu v. Romania,42917/16,added,"Zăicescu and Fălticineanu v. Romania, no. 42917/16, 23 April 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.G,Association with a (national) minority,2,153,155,0.9554,"ălticineanu v. Romania , 2024",,"The question of ""minority groups"" has been raised in some cases dealing with discrimination based on ethnicity. In Paraskeva Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2010, for example, the applicant of Roma origin was refused a suspended sentence by the domestic court which referred to the existence of a widespread sentiment of impunity in society, highlighting in particular the extent of this phenomenon in the case of minority groups, for whom a suspended sentence is not a conviction. The Court considered that such a decision taken together with the applicant's ethnic affiliation was likely to reveal an exemplary sentence for the Roma community by condemning a person belonging to the same minority group (§§ 38-40) and found a violation of Article 14.","The question of ""minority group s "" has been raised in some cases dealing with discrimination based on ethnicity. In Paraskeva Todorova v. Bulgaria, 2010, for example, the applicant of Roma origin was refused a suspended sentence by the domestic court which referred to the existence of a widespread sentiment of impunity in society, highlighting in particular the extent of this phenomenon in the case of minority groups, for whom a suspended sentence is not a conviction. The Court considered that such a decision taken together with the applicant's ethnic affiliation was likely to reveal an exemplary sentence for the Roma community by condemning a person belonging to the same minority group (§§ 38-40) and found a violation of Article 14. In Zăicescu and Fălticineanu v. Romania, 2024, the Court found that the applicants, two Holocaust survivors, could be seen as having a personal interest in proceedings aimed at establishing the responsibility of high-ranking members of the military for the Holocaust in Romania."
e12c697e461c,Article 14,20240930063628__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,20250523211809__guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-05-23,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e12c697e461c/diff_2024-09-30__2025-05-23.json,apps:42917/16,Zăicescu and Fălticineanu v. Romania,42917/16,added,"Zăicescu and Fălticineanu v. Romania, no. 42917/16, 23 April 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,VI.H,Access to justice,2,,287,,,,,"In Zăicescu and Fălticineanu v. Romania, § 153, 2024, which concerned the acquittal of two military men previously convicted for crimes connected with the Holocaust, the Court considered that Holocaust survivors should have been made aware of the proceedings and their outcome and noted that international principles, that already existed at the time of the retrials which led to the acquittal, mention that victims of crime must be informed of the fact that proceedings have been initiated and of the progress of their cases and must have access to justice and to proper assistance."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:4677/20,A.A. v. Sweden,4677/20,added,"A.A. v. Sweden, no. 4677/20, 13 July 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.A.1,Scope and substantive aspects of the Court ’ s assessment under Articles 2 and 3 in asylum-related removal cases,3,52,53,0.9803,"A.A. v. Sweden , 2023|M.D. and Others v. Russia , 2021|O.D. v. Bulgaria , 2019",,"The starting-point for the assessment of a real risk upon removal should be the examination of the general situation in the destination country. In this connection, and where it is relevant to do so, regard must be had to whether there is a general situation of violence existing in the country of destination ( Khasanov and Rakhmanov v. Russia [GC], § 96; Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, § 216). However, a general situation of violence will not normally in itself entail a violation of Article 3 in the event of an expulsion to the country in question, unless the level of intensity of the violence is sufficient to conclude that any removal to that country would necessarily breach Article 3 of the Convention. The Court would adopt such an approach only in the most extreme cases, where there is a real risk of ill-treatment simply by virtue of the individual concerned being exposed to such violence on returning to the country in question ( Khasanov and Rakhmanov v. Russia [GC], § 96; Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, § 218). Indeed, in cases concerning destinations with difficult security situations, the Court normally also attaches importance to additional individual risk factors (such as membership of a vulnerable group, see, most recently, concerning Syria: M.D. and Others v. Russia, §§ 104-111; and O.D. v. Bulgaria, §§ 50-55).","The starting-point for the assessment of a real risk upon removal should be the examination of the general situation in the destination country. In this connection, and where it is relevant to do so, regard must be had to whether there is a general situation of violence existing in the country of destination ( Khasanov and Rakhmanov v. Russia [GC], 2022, § 96; Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, 2011, § 216). However, a general situation of violence will not normally in itself entail a violation of Article 3 in the event of an expulsion to the country in question, unless the level of intensity of the violence is sufficient to conclude that any removal to that country would necessarily breach Article 3 of the Convention. The Court would adopt such an approach only in the most extreme cases, where there is a real risk of ill-treatment simply by virtue of the individual concerned being exposed to such violence on returning to the country in question ( Khasanov and Rakhmanov v. Russia [GC], 2022, § 96; Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, 2011, § 218; the latter case constitutes an example where that threshold was met). Indeed, in cases concerning destinations with difficult security situations, the Court normally also attaches importance to additional individual risk factors (such as membership of a vulnerable group, see, most recently, concerning Syria: M.D. and Others v. Russia, 2021, §§ 104-111; and O.D. v. Bulgaria, 2019, §§ 50-55; contrast with A.A. v. Sweden, 2023, where the Court found that the general situation in the country of destination, Libya, was serious and fragile but was not so extreme as to reach the aforementioned threshold and that there were no additional individual risk factors)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:4262/17,Ansari v. Portugal (dec.),4262/17,added,"Ansari v. Portugal (dec.), no. 4262/17, 11 April 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A.5,Extradition,3,,80,,,,,"In Ansari v. Portugal (dec.), 2023, the Court dealt with the scenario where the applicant had been extradited following diplomatic assurances, which were later allegedly not complied with and the domestic courts of the respondent State later revoked the extradition decision because the authorities of the State to which the applicant had been extradited had prosecuted him on charges other than those in respect of which the extradition had been authorised. The applicant was detained in the State to which he had been extradited when he lodged his application to the Court, by which he complained that the authorities of the respondent State had not taken the necessary measures to help him return to the respondent State or to ensure that the diplomatic assurances were complied with. The Court found that the domestic authorities had taken the measures at their disposal to follow up on the applicant's allegations (see also Boumediiene and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), 2008, where the applicants, who had been handed over by the authorities of the respondent State to USforces and were later detained in Guantanamo Bay, alleged that the authorities of the respondent State had failed to enforce judicial decisions ordering the authorities to protect the rights, and obtain the return, of the applicants)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:24917/15,Asady and Others v. Slovakia,24917/15,added,"Asady and Others v. Slovakia, no. 24917/15, 24 March 2020",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.A.2,Article 4 of Protocol No. 4,3,22,23,0.9816,"Asady and Others v. Slovakia , 2020|D.A. and Others v. Poland , 2021|J.A. and Others v. Italy , 2023|M.K. and Others v. Poland , 2020|Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece , 2014",,"Where migrants entered the respondent State's territory in an unauthorised manner and, following their apprehension near the border, were provided with access to means of legal entry through the appropriate border procedure, the Court did not apply the aforementioned two-tier test, but instead assessed - in order to determine whether the expulsion was ""collective"" in nature - whether the individuals were afforded, prior to the adoption of expulsion orders, an effective possibility of submitting arguments against their removal and whether there were sufficient guarantees demonstrating that their personal circumstances had been genuinely and individually taken into account ( Asady and Others v. Slovakia, § 62). Such test is, essentially, similar to the one applied to individuals who present themselves at a point of legal entry, such as a border checkpoint (see M.K. and Others v. Poland, §§ 204-211, D.A. and Others v. Poland, §§ 81-84, and M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), §§ 67-69). Whether the requirements of this test are satisfied is a question of fact, which is to be determined by having regard to, in so far as pertinent in a given case, supporting evidence provided by the parties, including as to whether an identification process was conducted and under what conditions (whether persons were trained to conduct interviews, whether information was provided, in a language the individuals understood, about the possibility to lodge an asylum application and to request legal aid, whether interpreters were present, and whether the individuals were able, in practice, to consult lawyers and to lodge asylum applications) as well as to independent reports ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], § 185; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, §§ 214-225; Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], §§ 245-254; Asady and Others v. Slovakia, §§ 63-71; M.K. and Others v. Poland, §§ 206-210; D.A. and Others v. Poland, §§ 81-83; M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), §§ 67-69).","Where migrants entered the respondent State's territory in an unauthorised manner and, following their apprehension near the border, were provided with access to means of legal entry through the appropriate border procedure, the Court did not apply the aforementioned two-tier test, but instead assessed - in order to determine whether the expulsion was ""collective"" in nature - whether the individuals were afforded, prior to the adoption of expulsion orders, an effective possibility of submitting arguments against their removal and whether there were sufficient guarantees demonstrating that their personal circumstances had been genuinely and individually taken into account ( Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, § 62). Such test is, essentially, similar to the one applied to individuals who present themselves at a point of legal entry, such as a border checkpoint (see M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 204-211, D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-84, and M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69). Whether the requirements of this test are satisfied is a question of fact, which is to be determined by having regard to, in so far as pertinent in a given case, supporting evidence provided by the parties, including as to whether an identification process was conducted and under what conditions (whether persons were trained to conduct interviews, whether information was provided, in a language the individuals understood, about the possibility to lodge an asylum application and to request legal aid, whether interpreters were present, and whether the individuals were able, in practice, to consult lawyers and to lodge asylum applications) as well as to independent reports ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 185; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014, §§ 214-225; Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 245-254; Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, §§ 63-71; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 206-210; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-83; M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69). For an example of a case where individuals, who did not intend to seek asylum in the respondent State, were removed in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 after having been detained for ten days in a ""hotspot"" for the registration and identification of migrants from the moment of their arrival in the respondent State, see J.A. and Others v. Italy, 2023, §§ 47 and 106-116."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:8757/20,Azzaqui v. the Netherlands,8757/20,added,"Azzaqui v. the Netherlands, no. 8757/20, 30 May 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.A.6,Expulsion of seriously ill persons,3,83,85,0.9795,,,"The removal of a person suffering from serious illness may also breach Article 8 ( Paposhvili v. Belgium [GC], §§ 221-226) and a person's mental illness has to be adequately taken into account when examining the proportionality of his or her expulsion in view of a criminal offence he or she has committed ( Savran v. Denmark [GC], §§ 184, 191-197 and 201, and see section "" Expulsion "" below) .","The removal of a person suffering from serious illness may also breach Article 8 ( Paposhvili v. Belgium [GC], 2016, §§ 221-226) and a person's mental illness has to be adequately taken into account when examining the proportionality of his or her expulsion in view of a criminal offence he or she has committed ( Savran v. Denmark [GC], 2021, §§ 184, 191-197 and 201; Azzaqui v. the Netherlands, 2023, §§ 48, 50 and 54-62; and see section "" Expulsion "" below) ."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:13258/18,B.F. and Others v. Switzerland,13258/18,added,"B.F. and Others v. Switzerland, nos. 13258/18 and 3 others, 4 July 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B,Access for the purposes of family reunification,2,,8,,"In B.F. and Others v. Switzerland , 2023",,,"In B.F. and Others v. Switzerland, 2023, the Court examined, for the first time, a case where the family reunification of (certain) recognised refugees was made subject to a requirement of non- reliance on social assistance under domestic law. The applicants, who were all recognised as refugees within the meaning of the 1951 Convention, were granted provisional admission rather than asylum, in line with domestic law, since the grounds for their refugee status arose following their departure from their countries of origin and as a result of their own actions, namely their illegal exit from those countries. Reiterating, inter alia, that there was consensus at international and European level that refugees needed to have the benefit of a more favourable family reunification procedure than other aliens, the Court considered that the particularly vulnerable situation in which refugees sur place find themselves - notably, the insurmountable obstacles to their being reunited with their family members in their country of origin, given that they now face a risk of ill-treatment there - needed to be adequately taken into account in the application of a condition (such as the requirement of non- reliance on social assistance) to their family reunification requests, with insurmountable obstacles to enjoying family life in the country of origin progressively assuming greater importance in the fair- balance assessment as time passed . The requirement of non-reliance on social assistance thus needed to be applied with sufficient flexibility, as one element of the comprehensive and individualised fair- balance assessment. In two of the four applications at hand, the Court found that the gainfully employed applicants had done all that could reasonably be expected of them to earn a living and to cover their and their family members'expenses. In a third case, the Court was not satisfied that the Federal Administrative Court had sufficiently examined whether the applicant's health would enable her to work, at least to a certain extent, and consequently whether the impugned requirement needed to be applied with flexibility in view of her health. In respect those three applications, the Court thus found a violation of Article 8. By contrast, the Court found no violation of Article 8 as regards the fourth case, considering that the Federal Administrative Court had not overstepped its margin of appreciation when it took the applicant's lack of initiative in improving her financial situation into account when balancing the competing interests. The Court further noted that it was not called upon to determine in the case at hand whether and/or to what extent the aforementioned considerations applied in scenarios in which refugees have to fulfil a requirement of non-reliance on social assistance if they submitted their applications for family reunification outside of a certain time-limit, without particular circumstances rendering the late submission objectively excusable, which question may arise in cases where European Union member States made use of the possibility afforded to them under the third subparagraph of Article 12(1) of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification (§ 106)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:13258/18,B.F. and Others v. Switzerland,13258/18,added,"B.F. and Others v. Switzerland, nos. 13258/18 and 3 others, 4 July 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B,Access for the purposes of family reunification,2,5,5,0.98,"B.F. and Others v. Switzerland , 2023",,"A State may, under certain circumstances, be required to allow the entry of an individual when it is a pre-condition for his or her exercise of certain Convention rights, in particular the right to respect for family life. At the same time, there is no obligation on a State under Article 8 to respect the choice by married couples of the country of their matrimonial residence and to accept the non-national spouses for settlement in that country. The substantive elements, which are, in general, to be taken into consideration for determining whether a State is under a positive obligation under Article 8 of the Convention to grant family reunification, have been summarised in M.A. v. Denmark [GC]: (i) status in and ties to the host country of the alien requesting family reunion and his family member concerned; (ii) whether the aliens concerned had a settled or precarious immigration status in the host country when their family life was created; (iii) whether there were insurmountable or major obstacles in the way of the family living in the country of origin of the person requesting reunification; (iv) whether children were involved; (v) whether the person requesting reunion could demonstrate that he/she had sufficient independent and lasting income, not being welfare benefits, to provide for the basic cost of subsistence of his or her family members (§§ 131-135).","A State may, under certain circumstances, be required to allow the entry of an individual when it is a pre-condition for his or her exercise of certain Convention rights, in particular the right to respect for family life. At the same time, there is no obligation on a State under Article 8 to respect the choice by married couples of the country of their matrimonial residence and to accept the non-national spouses for settlement in that country. The substantive elements, which are, in general, to be taken into consideration for determining whether a State is under a positive obligation under Article 8 of the Convention to grant family reunification, have been summarised in M.A. v. Denmark [GC], 2021: (i) status in and ties to the host country of the alien requesting family reunion and his family member concerned; (ii) whether the aliens concerned had a settled or precarious immigration status in the host country when their family life was created; (iii) whether there were insurmountable or major obstacles in the way of the family living in the country of origin of the person requesting reunification; (iv) whether children were involved; (v) whether the person requesting reunion could demonstrate that he/she had sufficient independent and lasting income, not being welfare benefits, to provide for the basic cost of subsistence of his or her family members (§§ 131-135). There exists a consensus at international and European level that refugees needed to have the benefit of a family reunification procedure that is more favourable than that foreseen for other aliens (§§ 138 and 153; B.F. and Others v. Switzerland, 2023, §§ 90, 97 and 98)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:9839/22,Bijan Balahan v. Sweden,9839/22,added,"Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, no. 9839/22, 29 June 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.A.5,Extradition,3,76,77,0.9975,"Bijan Balahan v. Sweden , 2023",,"Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two- stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez- Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. Adistinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving ""whole life prisoners"" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC].","Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two- stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez- Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. Adistinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving ""whole life prisoners"" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2022, Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, 2023, and Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), 2023."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:38703/06,Boumediiene and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.),38703/06,added,"Boumediiene and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), nos. 38703/06 and 5 others, 18 November 2008",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.A.5,Extradition,3,,80,,,,,"In Ansari v. Portugal (dec.), 2023, the Court dealt with the scenario where the applicant had been extradited following diplomatic assurances, which were later allegedly not complied with and the domestic courts of the respondent State later revoked the extradition decision because the authorities of the State to which the applicant had been extradited had prosecuted him on charges other than those in respect of which the extradition had been authorised. The applicant was detained in the State to which he had been extradited when he lodged his application to the Court, by which he complained that the authorities of the respondent State had not taken the necessary measures to help him return to the respondent State or to ensure that the diplomatic assurances were complied with. The Court found that the domestic authorities had taken the measures at their disposal to follow up on the applicant's allegations (see also Boumediiene and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), 2008, where the applicants, who had been handed over by the authorities of the respondent State to USforces and were later detained in Guantanamo Bay, alleged that the authorities of the respondent State had failed to enforce judicial decisions ordering the authorities to protect the rights, and obtain the return, of the applicants)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:49255/22,Camara v. Belgium,49255/22,added,"Camara v. Belgium, no. 49255/22, 18 July 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.D.3,Enforcement of domestic decisions for the provision of accommodation,3,48,49,0.9276,"Camara v. Belgium , 2023|In M.K. and Others v. France , 2022",,"In M.K. and Others v. France, the Court found that the decision to grant or refuse asylum-seekers and their children emergency accommodation, which right was provided for under domestic law, constituted a ""civil right"" for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 (§§ 104-118). It constituted a violation of that provision that the authorities of the respondent State's failed to enforce orders by domestic courts obliging them to find emergency accommodation for the applicants (§§ 151-164). The applicants were provided with accommodation only after the Court indicated interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (§§ 23-25, 49-51 and 73-75 and see section "" Rule 39/Interim measures "" below).","In M.K. and Others v. France, 2022, the Court found that the decision to grant or refuse asylum- seekers and their children emergency accommodation, which right was provided for under domestic law, cons tituted a ""civil right"" for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 (§§ 104-118). It constituted a violation of that provision that the authorities of the respondent State's failed to enforce orders by domestic courts obliging them to find emergency accommodation for the applicants (§§ 151-164). The applicants were provided with accommodation only after the Court indicated interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (§§ 23-25, 49-51 and 73-75 and see section "" Rule 39/Interim measures "" below). The Court similarly found a violation of Article 6 § 1 on account of the refusal to immediately execute an enforceable order requiring the authorities to provide an asylum-seeker with accommodation and material support in Camara v. Belgium, 2023. In that case, the Court also indicated under Article 46 that the respondent State was required to resolve the systemic problem of the capacity of the national authorities to comply with the legal right of asylum seekers to accommodation, including with final judicial decisions ordering such compliance (§ 145)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:13869/22,Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.),13869/22,added,"Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), no. 13869/22, 4 July 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.A.5,Extradition,3,76,77,0.9975,"Bijan Balahan v. Sweden , 2023",,"Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two- stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez- Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. Adistinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving ""whole life prisoners"" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC].","Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two- stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez- Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. Adistinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving ""whole life prisoners"" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2022, Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, 2023, and Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), 2023."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:21768/19,Ghadamian v. Switzerland,21768/19,added,"Ghadamian v. Switzerland, no. 21768/19, 9 May 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.D.1,Expulsion,3,88,90,0.9651,"Alleleh and Others v. Norway , 2022|Butt v. Norway , 2012|Ghadamian v. Switzerland , 2023|T.C.E. v. Germany , 2018",,"Where foreigners do not qualify as ""settled migrants"", because their presence in the territory of the respondent State was from the outset precarious, unlawful or based on breaches of immigration law, their removal from the respondent State will likely breach Article 8 only in exceptional circumstances (see, for example, Butt v. Norway and Alleleh and Others v. Norway, § 90). The Court also examined cases under Article 8 concerning the denial of - and whether there was a positive obligation to grant - a residence permit to individuals already present in the territory of the respondent State (see Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC]; Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands ; see also Pormes v. the Netherlands, in respect of a refusal of a residence permit to alien unlawfully staying in the host State from an early age, who only became aware of his precarious immigration status once he was an adult, and T.C.E. v. Germany, in respect of a person who had been convicted of criminal offences).","Where foreigners do not qualify as ""settled migrants"", because their presence in the territory of the respondent State was from the outset precarious, unlawful or based on breaches of immigration law, their removal from the respondent State will likely breach Article 8 only in exceptional circumstances (see, for example, Butt v. Norway, 2012, and Alleleh and Others v. Norway, 2022, § 90). The Court also examined cases under Article 8 concerning the denial of - and whether there was a positive obligation to grant - a residence permit to individuals already present in the territory of the respondent State (see Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], 2014; Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, 2006; see also Pormes v. the Netherlands, 2020, in respect of a refusal of a residence permit to alien unlawfully staying in the host State from an early age, who only became aware of his precarious immigration status once he was an adult, and T.C.E. v. Germany, 2018, in respect of a person who had been convicted of criminal offences, as well as Ghadamian v. Switzerland, 2023, in respect of a refusal to issue a residence permit to an elderly alien, resident for 49 years in the respondent State at the time of the final domestic decision, albeit unlawfully for the past sixteen years, on account of an unenforced decision to expel him after his convictions for serious criminal offences)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:21329/18,J.A. and Others v. Italy,21329/18,added,"J.A. and Others v. Italy, no. 21329/18, 30 March 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.A.2,Article 4 of Protocol No. 4,3,22,23,0.9816,"Asady and Others v. Slovakia , 2020|D.A. and Others v. Poland , 2021|J.A. and Others v. Italy , 2023|M.K. and Others v. Poland , 2020|Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece , 2014",,"Where migrants entered the respondent State's territory in an unauthorised manner and, following their apprehension near the border, were provided with access to means of legal entry through the appropriate border procedure, the Court did not apply the aforementioned two-tier test, but instead assessed - in order to determine whether the expulsion was ""collective"" in nature - whether the individuals were afforded, prior to the adoption of expulsion orders, an effective possibility of submitting arguments against their removal and whether there were sufficient guarantees demonstrating that their personal circumstances had been genuinely and individually taken into account ( Asady and Others v. Slovakia, § 62). Such test is, essentially, similar to the one applied to individuals who present themselves at a point of legal entry, such as a border checkpoint (see M.K. and Others v. Poland, §§ 204-211, D.A. and Others v. Poland, §§ 81-84, and M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), §§ 67-69). Whether the requirements of this test are satisfied is a question of fact, which is to be determined by having regard to, in so far as pertinent in a given case, supporting evidence provided by the parties, including as to whether an identification process was conducted and under what conditions (whether persons were trained to conduct interviews, whether information was provided, in a language the individuals understood, about the possibility to lodge an asylum application and to request legal aid, whether interpreters were present, and whether the individuals were able, in practice, to consult lawyers and to lodge asylum applications) as well as to independent reports ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], § 185; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, §§ 214-225; Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], §§ 245-254; Asady and Others v. Slovakia, §§ 63-71; M.K. and Others v. Poland, §§ 206-210; D.A. and Others v. Poland, §§ 81-83; M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), §§ 67-69).","Where migrants entered the respondent State's territory in an unauthorised manner and, following their apprehension near the border, were provided with access to means of legal entry through the appropriate border procedure, the Court did not apply the aforementioned two-tier test, but instead assessed - in order to determine whether the expulsion was ""collective"" in nature - whether the individuals were afforded, prior to the adoption of expulsion orders, an effective possibility of submitting arguments against their removal and whether there were sufficient guarantees demonstrating that their personal circumstances had been genuinely and individually taken into account ( Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, § 62). Such test is, essentially, similar to the one applied to individuals who present themselves at a point of legal entry, such as a border checkpoint (see M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 204-211, D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-84, and M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69). Whether the requirements of this test are satisfied is a question of fact, which is to be determined by having regard to, in so far as pertinent in a given case, supporting evidence provided by the parties, including as to whether an identification process was conducted and under what conditions (whether persons were trained to conduct interviews, whether information was provided, in a language the individuals understood, about the possibility to lodge an asylum application and to request legal aid, whether interpreters were present, and whether the individuals were able, in practice, to consult lawyers and to lodge asylum applications) as well as to independent reports ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 185; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014, §§ 214-225; Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 245-254; Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, §§ 63-71; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 206-210; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-83; M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69). For an example of a case where individuals, who did not intend to seek asylum in the respondent State, were removed in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 after having been detained for ten days in a ""hotspot"" for the registration and identification of migrants from the moment of their arrival in the respondent State, see J.A. and Others v. Italy, 2023, §§ 47 and 106-116."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:21329/18,J.A. and Others v. Italy,21329/18,added,"J.A. and Others v. Italy, no. 21329/18, 30 March 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B.1,Article 5 of the Convention,3,25,26,0.995,"In J.A. and Others v. Italy , 2023|In J.R. and Others v. Greece , 2018|O.M. and D.S. v. Ukraine , 2022|R.R. and Others v. Hungary , 2021",,"In determining the distinction between a restriction on liberty of movement and deprivation of liberty in the context of confinement of foreigners in transit zones and reception centres for the identification and registration of migrants, the factors taken into consideration by the Court may be summarised as follows: i) the applicants'individual situation and their choices; ii) the applicable legal regime of the respective country and its purpose; iii) the relevant duration, especially in the light of the purpose and the procedural protection enjoyed by applicants pending the events; and iv) the nature and degree of the actual restrictions imposed on or experienced by the applicants ( Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], § 138; Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], §§ 217-218). The Court found Article 5 of the Convention to apply to lengthy confinement in airport transit zones (see Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC]), but not to an eleven-hour stay of applicants knowingly using false identity documents ( O.M. and D.S. v. Ukraine, §§ 109-121). In respect of stays in land border transit zones, where applicants awaited the outcome of their asylum applications, the Court similarly distinguished cases on their facts. It found Article 5 not to apply to a stay of twenty-three days, which did not exceed the maximum period fixed by domestic law and during which the applicants'asylum requests were processed at administrative and judicial level ( Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], §§ 219-249). By contrast, the Court found Article 5 to apply and to have been violated in a case where the applicants stayed in the transit zone for nearly four months, with domestic law neither providing a strictly defined statutory basis nor a maximum length of detention in the transit zone ( R.R. and Others v. Hungary, §§ 74-84 and 89-92). In J.R. and Others v. Greece, the applicants, Afghan nationals, arrived on the island of Chios and were arrested and placed in the Vial ""hotspot"" facility (a migrant reception, identification and registration centre). After one month, that facility became semi-open and the applicants were allowed out during the day. The Court considered that the applicants had been deprived of their liberty within the meaning of Article 5 during the first month of their stay in the facility, but that they were subjected only to a restriction of movement, rather than a deprivation of liberty, once the facility had become semi-open.","In determining the distinction between a restriction on liberty of movement and deprivation of liberty in the context of confinement of foreigners in transit zones and reception centres for the identification and registration of migrants, the factors taken into consideration by the Court may be summarised as follows: i) the applicants'individual situation and their choices; ii) the applicable legal regime of the respective country and its purpose; iii) the relevant duration, especially in the light of the purpose and the procedural protection enjoyed by applicants pending the events; and iv) the nature and degree of the actual restrictions imposed on or experienced by the applicants ( Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019, § 138; Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, §§ 217-218). The Court found Article 5 of the Convention to apply to lengthy confinement in airport transit zones (see Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019), but not to an eleven-hour stay of applicants knowingly using false identity documents ( O.M. and D.S. v. Ukraine, 2022, §§ 109-121). In respect of stays in land border transit zones, where applicants awaited the outcome of their asylum applications, the Court similarly distinguished cases on their facts. It found Article 5 not to apply to a stay of twenty-three days, which did not exceed the maximum period fixed by domestic law and during which the applicants'asylum requests were processed at administrative and judicial level ( Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, §§ 219-249). By contrast, the Court found Article 5 to apply and to have been violated in a case where the applicants stayed in the transit zone for nearly four months, with domestic law neither providing a strictly defined statutory basis nor a maximum length of detention in the transit zone ( R.R. and Others v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 74-84 and 89-92). In J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, the applicants, Afghan nationals, arrived on the island of Chios and were arrested and placed in the Vial ""hotspot"" facility (a migrant reception, identification and registration centre). After one month, that facility became semi-open and the applicants were allowed out during the day. The Court considered that the applicants had been deprived of their liberty within the meaning of Article 5 during the first month of their stay in the facility, but that they were subjected only to a restriction of movement, rather than a deprivation of liberty, once the facility had become semi-open. In J.A. and Others v. Italy, 2023, the Court found that the applicants'retention in the Lampedusa ""hotspot"", a closed area which they could not leave, for ten days amounted to a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5, for which there was no legal basis (§§ 84-97)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:15297/09,Kanagaratnam and Others v. Belgium,15297/09,added,"Kanagaratnam and Others v. Belgium, no. 15297/09, 13 December 2011",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C.3.b,Article 3 of the Convention,4,34,35,1.0,"A.B. and Others v. France , 2016|Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta , 2016|H.M. and Others v. Hungary , 2022|Kanagaratnam and Others v. Belgium , 2011|M.D. and A.D. v. France , 2021|M.H. and Others v. Croatia , 2021|Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium , 2010|N.B. and Others v. France , 2022|Popov v. France , 2012|R.M. and Others v. France , 2016|R.R. and Others v. Hungary , 2021|Rahimi v. Greece , 2011|S.F. and Others v. Bulgaria , 2017",,"Obligations concerning the protection of migrant children may be different depending on whether they are accompanied or not ( Rahimi v. Greece, § 63; Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, § 112). However, the fact that children are accompanied by their parents throughout the period of immigration detention does not suffice to exempt the authorities from their duty to protect children and take appropriate measures in accordance with their positive obligations under Article 3 ( Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, §§ 57-58; Popov v. France, § 91; R.M. and Others v. France, § 71; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, § 192). Moreover, the conduct of the accompanying parent is not decisive for the question of whether the threshold of severity to engage Article 3 of the Convention has been reached in respect of the child ( M.D. and A.D. v. France, § 70). In cases concerning the immigration detention of accompanied children, the Court considers the following three factors to be relevant to the assessment of whether there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention: (i) the children's young age; (ii) the duration of the detention; and (iii) the suitability of the premises with regard to the specific needs of children ( A.B. and Others v. France, § 109; M.D. and A.D. v. France, § 63). In addition to the three aforementioned factors, the Court has also considered relevant the vulnerability of children in terms of their health or personal history ( Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, §§ 60-61 and 63, where children's psychological problems had been certified by doctors; Kanagaratnam and Others v. Belgium, § 67, where the children had experienced a traumatic situation in the country of origin; and M.H. and Others v. Croatia, § 201, where the children had witnessed the death of their sister near the border). Where accompanied children were detained in poor conditions, the Court found a violation of Article 3, even if the detention was of a short duration ( S.F. and Others v. Bulgaria : detention for thirty-two to forty-one hours). If the material conditions are satisfactory, the detention of accompanied children for a short period may not meet the minimum level of severity which would engage Article 3: in such cases, the duration of the detention is of paramount importance and it can lead to a violation of Article 3 ( R.M. and Others v. France, § 75 (violation of Article 3 in respect of a detention of seven-month old child for seven days)]; N.B. and Others v. France, §§ 50-53 [violation of Article in respect of a detention of an eight year old child for 14 days]; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, § 199). In certain cases, the Court found a violation of Article 3 in respect of the children, but not in respect of the accompanying parents ( Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, §§ 64-66; Popov v. France, §§ 104-105; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, §§ 205-213). In other cases, the Court has also found a violation of Article 3 in respect of the accompanying parent, in particular in view of that parent's particular vulnerability ( M.D. and A.D. v. France, § 71 (breastfeeding mother); R.R. and Others v. Hungary, §§ 62-63 and 65 (pregnant woman who had a health condition); H.M. and Others v. Hungary, § 18 (woman at advanced stage of high-risk pregnancy).","Obligations concerning the protection of migrant children may be different depending on whether they are accompanied or not ( Rahimi v. Greece, 2011, § 63; Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, 2016, § 112). However, the fact that children are accompanied by their parents throughout the period of immigration detention does not suffice to exempt the authorities from their duty to protect children and take appropriate measures in accordance with their positive obligations under Article 3 ( Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, 2010, §§ 57-58; Popov v. France, 2012, § 91; R.M. and Others v. France, 2016, § 71; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, § 192). Moreover, the conduct of the accompanying parent is not decisive for the question of whether the threshold of severity to engage Article 3 of the Convention has been reached in respect of the child ( M.D. and A.D. v. France, 2021, § 70). In cases concerning the immigration detention of accompanied children, the Court considers the following three factors to be relevant to the assessment of whether there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention: (i) the children's young age; (ii) the duration of the detention; and (iii) the suitability of the premises with regard to the specific needs of children ( A.B. and Others v. France, 2016, § 109; M.D. and A.D. v. France, 2021, § 63). In addition to the three aforementioned factors, the Court has also considered relevant the vulnerability of children in terms of their health or personal history ( Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, 2010, §§ 60-61 and 63, where children's psychological problems had been certified by doctors; Kanagaratnam and Others v. Belgium, 2011, § 67, where the children had experienced a traumatic situation in the country of origin; and M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, § 201, where the children had witnessed the death of their sister near the border). Where accompanied children were detained in poor conditions, the Court found a violation of Article 3, even if the detention was of a short duration ( S.F. and Others v. Bulgaria, 2017: detention for thirty-two to forty-one hours). If the material conditions are satisfactory, the detention of accompanied children for a short period may not meet the minimum level of severity which would engage Article 3: in such cases, the duration of the detention is of paramount importance and it can lead to a violation of Article 3 ( R.M. and Others v. France, 2016, § 75 (violation of Article 3 in respect of a detention of seven-month old child for seven days)]; N.B. and Others v. France, 2022, §§ 50-53 [violation of Article in respect of a detention of an eight year old child for 14 days]; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, § 199). In certain cases, the Court found a violation of Article 3 in respect of the children, but not in respect of the accompanying parents ( Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, 2010, §§ 64-66; Popov v. France, 2012, §§ 104-105; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 205-213). In other cases, the Court has also found a violation of Article 3 in respect of the accompanying parent, in particular in view of that parent's particular vulnerability ( M.D. and A.D. v. France, 2021, § 71 (breastfeeding mother); R.R. and Others v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 62-63 and 65 (pregnant woman who had a health condition); H.M. and Others v. Hungary, 2022, § 18 (woman at advanced stage of high- risk pregnancy)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:70583/17,M.A. v. Italy,70583/17,added,"M.A. v. Italy, no. 70583/17, 31 August 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.D.2,"Reception conditions, age-assessment procedures and freedom of movement",3,44,45,0.9899,"B.G. and Others v. France , 2020|Darboe and Camara v. Italy , 2022|In R.R. and Others v. Hungary , 2021|In Rahimi v. Greece , 2011|Khan v. France , 2019|M.A. v. Italy , 2023|M.D. v. France , 2019|N.H. and Others v. France , 2020|N.T.P. and Others v. France , 2018",,"Article 3 cannot be interpreted as obliging the High Contracting Parties to provide everyone within their jurisdiction with a home ( Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], § 99). Nor does Article 3 entail any general obligation to give refugees financial assistance to enable them to maintain a certain standard of living ( Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], § 95). However, asylum-seekers are members of a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection and there exists a broad consensus at the international and European level concerning this need for special protection, as evidenced by the Geneva Convention, the remit and the activities of the UNHCR and the standards set out in the Reception Directive ( M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], § 251). It may thus raise an issue under Article 3 if the asylum-seekers, including persons intending to lodge an asylum application, are not provided with accommodation and thus forced to live on the streets for months, with no resources or access to sanitary facilities, without any means of providing for their essential needs, in fear of assault from third parties and of expulsion ( ibid., §§ 235-264 and N.H. and Others v. France, both in respect of adults without health concerns and without children; contrast N.T.P. and Others v. France, where the applicants had been accommodated in a privately run shelter funded by the authorities and been given food and medical care and the children had been in school, and B.G. and Others v. France, where the applicants had temporarily stayed in a tented camp set up in a car park, with the authorities having taken measures to improve their material living conditions, in particular ensuring medical care, the children's schooling and their subsequent placement in a flat). States are obliged under Article 3 to protect and to take charge of unaccompanied children, which requires the authorities to identify them as such and to take measures to ensure their placement in adequate accommodation, even if the children do not lodge an asylum application in the respondent State, but intend to do so in another State, or to join family members there (see Khan v. France, concerning the situation in a makeshift camp in Calais; and Sh.D. and Others v. Greece, Austria, Croatia, Hungary, North Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia in respect of the situation in a makeshift camp in Idomeni; see also M.D. v. France regarding the reception of an asylum seeker who had identified himself as an unaccompanied minor, but in respect of whose actual age there were doubts). In Rahimi v. Greece (§§ 87-94), the Court also found a breach of Article 3 because the authorities did not offer the applicant, an unaccompanied child asylum-seeker, any assistance with accommodation following his release from detention. In R.R. and Others v. Hungary, §§ 48-65, the Court found breaches of Article 3 in view of the conditions to which the applicants were subjected during their stay in a transit zone (see also sections "" Confinement in transit zones and reception centres "" and "" Article 3 of the Convention: General principles ""and "" Children and adults with specific vulnerabilities "" above).","Article 3 cannot be interpreted as obliging the High Contracting Parties to provide everyone within their jurisdiction with a home ( Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 99). Nor does Article 3 entail any general obligation to give refugees financial assistance to enable them to maintain a certain standard of living ( Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], 2014, § 95). However, asylum-seekers are members of a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection and there exists a broad consensus at the international and European level concerning this need for special protection, as evidenced by the Geneva Convention, the remit and the activities of the UNHCR and the standards set out in the Reception Directive ( M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011, § 251). It may thus raise an issue under Article 3 if the asylum-seekers, including persons intending to lodge an asylum application, are not provided with accommodation and thus forced to live on the streets for months, with no resources or access to sanitary facilities, without any means of providing for their essential needs, in fear of assault from third parties and of expulsion ( ibid., §§ 235-264 and N.H. and Others v. France, 2020, both in respect of adults without health concerns and without children; contrast N.T.P. and Others v. France, 2018, where the applicants had been accommodated in a privately run shelter funded by the authorities and been given food and medical care and the children had been in school, and B.G. and Others v. France, 2020, where the applicants had temporarily stayed in a tented camp set up in a car park, with the authorities having taken measures to improve their material living conditions, in particular ensuring medical care, the children's schooling and their subsequent placement in a flat). States are obliged under Article 3 to protect and to take charge of unaccompanied children, which requires the authorities to identify them as such and to take measures to ensure their placement in adequate accommodation, even if the children do not lodge an asylum application in the respondent State, but intend to do so in another State, or to join family members there (see Khan v. France, 2019, concerning the situation in a makeshift camp in Calais; and Sh.D. and Others v. Greece, Austria, Croatia, Hungary, North Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia, 2019, in respect of the situation in a makeshift camp in Idomeni; see also M.D. v. France, 2019, regarding the reception of an asylum seeker who had identified himself as an unaccompanied minor, but in respect of whose actual age there were doubts). In Rahimi v. Greece, 2011, §§ 87-94, the Court also found a breach of Article 3 because the authorities did not offer the applicant, an unaccompanied child asylum-seeker, any assistance with accommodation following his release from detention. In R.R. and Others v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 48-65, the Court found breaches of Article 3 in view of the conditions to which the applicants were subjected during their stay in a transit zone (see also sections "" Confinement in transit zones and reception centres "" and "" Article 3 of the Convention: General principles "" and "" Children and adults with specific vulnerabilities "" above). The Court has found violations of Article 3 in cases where unaccompanied minor asylum-seekers were placed in reception centres for adults for several months (on account of the length and conditions of stay in Darboe and Camara v. Italy, 2022; on account of the centre, in which the particularly vulnerable applicant allegedly a victim of sexual abuse, was placed for eight months, not being equipped to provide her with appropriate psychological assistance, as well as the national authorities'prolonged inaction regarding her situation and needs as a particularly vulnerable minor in M.A. v. Italy, 2023)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:34016/18,O.D. v. Bulgaria,34016/18,added,"O.D. v. Bulgaria, no. 34016/18, 10 October 2019",1,citation_field_name_match,citation_added,II.A,Summary returns at the border and/or shortly after entry into the territory (“push - backs”),2,16,17,1.0,"A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia , 2022|D v. Bulgaria , 2021|Kebe and Others v. Ukraine , 2017|M.A. and Others v. Lithuania , 2018|M.H. and Others v. Croatia , 2021|M.K. and Others v. Poland , 2020|Shahzad v. Hungary , 2021",,"The Court has also examined cases in which border guards prevented persons from entering the respondent State's territory by not allowing them to disembark at a port ( Kebe and Others v. Ukraine ) or at a land border checkpoint ( M.A. and Others v. Lithuania ; M.K. and Others v. Poland ), and either prevented the applicants from lodging an asylum application or, where they had submitted such applications, refused to accept them and to initiate asylum proceedings. It has also examined a number of cases concerning summary returns (""push - backs"") of migrants and/or asylum -seekers who had entered the respondent State in an unauthorised manner or had tried to do so ( N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC]; Shahzad v. Hungary ; D v. Bulgaria ; M.H. and Others v. Croatia ; A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia ), under Article 3 alone, under Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention, and/or under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 as well as under Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.","The Court has also examined cases in which border guards prevented persons from entering the respondent State's territory by not allowing them to disembark at a port ( Kebe and Others v. Ukraine, 2017) or at a land border checkpoint ( M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020) and either prevented the applicants from lodging an asylum application or, where they had submitted such applications, refused to accept them and to initiate asylum proceedings. It has also examined a number of cases concerning summary returns (""push - backs"") of migrants and/or asylum - seekers who had entered the respondent State in an unauthorised manner or had tried to do so ( N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020; Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021; D v. Bulgaria, 2021; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021; A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022), under Article 3 alone, under Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention, and/or under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 as well as under Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:34016/18,O.D. v. Bulgaria,34016/18,added,"O.D. v. Bulgaria, no. 34016/18, 10 October 2019",2,citation_field_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1,Article 3 of the Convention alone and/or in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention,3,18,19,1.0,"D v. Bulgaria , 2021|D.A. and Others v. Poland , 2021|M.A. and Others v. Lithuania , 2018|M.K. and Others v. Poland , 2020|O.M. and D.S. v. Ukraine , 2022",,"To determine whether individuals sought to request asylum and/or communicated fear for their safety in the event of removal to the authorities of the respondent State, the Court has regard not only to the records of the border guards, but also to the applicant's account, supporting documents as well as to reports regarding the situation at the border, where these indicate the existence of a systemic practice of misrepresenting statements given by asylum-seekers in official notes and/or concerns regarding access to the territory and asylum procedure, to the conditions prevailing in the country of origin and/or the third country as well as to the applicants'submissions in their previous cases before the Court ( M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, §§ 107-113; M.K. and Others v. Poland, §§ 174-177; D.A. and Others v. Poland, §§ 60-63; O.M. and D.S. v. Ukraine, §§ 85-91; D v. Bulgaria, §§ 120-128; Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], §§ 123-136; M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), §§ 51-56). Individuals do not have to explicitly request asylum, nor does the wish to apply for asylum need to be expressed in a particular form ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], § 133; M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, §§ 108-109; D v. Bulgaria, §§ 120-128). In this connection, the Court has emphasised the importance of interpretation for accessing asylum procedures as well as of training officials enabling them to detect and to understand asylum requests ( M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, §§ 108-109; D v. Bulgaria, §§ 124-126). It has also considered the lack of involvement of a lawyer ( D v. Bulgaria, § 125).","To determine whether individuals sought to request asylum and/or communicated fear for their safety in the event of removal to the authorities of the respondent State, the Court has regard not only to the records of the border guards, but also to the applicant's account, supporting documents as well as to reports regarding the situation at the border, where these indicate the existence of a systemic practice of misrepresenting statements given by asylum-seekers in official notes and/or concerns regarding access to the territory and asylum procedure, to the conditions prevailing in the country of origin and/or the third country as well as to the applicants'submissions in their previous cases before the Court ( M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 107-113; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 174-177; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 60-63; O.M. and D.S. v. Ukraine, 2022, §§ 85-91; D v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 120-128; Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, §§ 123-136; M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 51-56). Individuals do not have to explicitly request asylum, nor does the wish to apply for asylum need to be expressed in a particular form ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 133; M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 108-109; D v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 120-128). In this connection, the Court has emphasised the importance of interpretation for accessing asylum procedures as well as of training officials enabling them to detect and to understand asylum requests ( M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 108-109; D v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 124-126). It has also considered the lack of involvement of a lawyer ( D v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 125)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:34016/18,O.D. v. Bulgaria,34016/18,added,"O.D. v. Bulgaria, no. 34016/18, 10 October 2019",3,citation_field_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1,Article 3 of the Convention alone and/or in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention,3,19,20,1.0,"D v. Bulgaria , 2021",,"So far, the Court has adjudicated only one case concerning a summary return to the country of origin shortly after the applicant's entry into the respondent State's territory ( D v. Bulgaria ). The applicant was part of a group of people, who had entered Bulgaria in an unauthorised manner, hiding inside a truck and wishing to transit through the country en route to Western Europe. The group was not discovered upon entry but only when the truck, having crossed through the Bulgarian territory, sought to cross the border between Bulgaria and Romania. The Romanian officials arrested all passengers, prohibited them from entering Romania and handed them over to Bulgarian officials, who detained them. It applied a two-tier test in respect of the applicant's complaint under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention (§§ 107 and 118): It examined, first, whether the applicant had sought, at least in substance, international protection by expressing to the authorities of the respondent State, prior to his removal, his fears of treatment contrary to Article 3 if he were returned to his country of origin. If the first question were answered in the affirmative, it had to be determined, as a second step, whether the authorities of the respondent State had adequately examined these risks, in a procedure in accordance with the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention, prior to returning him to his country of origin. This requires independent and rigorous scrutiny of the complaint and the possibility of suspending the implementation of the removal pending same (§ 116). In this connection, the Court reiterated the importance of guaranteeing anyone subject to a removal measure the right to obtain sufficient information to enable them to gain effective access to the relevant procedures and to substantiate their complaints (idem). In finding that the applicant had expressed his fears to the Bulgarian border police that he - as a former journalist for a Turkish newspaper and in view of the conditions prevailing in Turkey in the aftermath of the attempted coup d'état - would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if returned to Turkey, the Court did not consider it decisive that the file did not contain a written document by which the applicant had explicitly requested international protection. It had regard to the linguistic obstacles - emphasising the importance of interpretation for accessing asylum procedures -, the lack of involvement of a lawyer, the content of the applicant's statements to the border police, which had not been contested, and the conditions prevailing in Turkey at the relevant time, including in respect of journalists (§§ 120-128). The Court concluded that the Bulgarian authorities, who had hastily returned the applicant to Turkey without instituting proceedings for international protection, had removed him without examining the Article 3 risks he faced and had rendered the available remedies ineffective in practice, in breach of Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention (§§ 129-137).","So far, the Court has adjudicated only one case concerning a summary return to the country of origin shortly after the applicant's entry into the respondent State's territory ( D v. Bulgaria, 2021). The applicant was part of a group of people, who had entered Bulgaria in an unauthorised manner, hiding inside a truck and wishing to transit through the country en route to Western Europe. The group was not discovered upon entry but only when the truck, having crossed through the Bulgarian territory, sought to cross the border between Bulgaria and Romania. The Romanian officials arrested all passengers, prohibited them from entering Romania and handed them over to Bulgarian officials, who detained them. It applied a two-tier test in respect of the applicant's complaint under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention (§§ 107 and 118): It examined, first, whether the applicant had sought, at least in substance, international protection by expressing to the authorities of the respondent State, prior to his removal, his fears of treatment contrary to Article 3 if he were returned to his country of origin. If the first question were answered in the affirmative, it had to be determined, as a second step, whether the authorities of the respondent State had adequately examined these risks, in a procedure in accordance with the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention, prior to returning him to his country of origin. This requires independent and rigorous scrutiny of the complaint and the possibility of suspending the implementation of the removal pending same (§ 116). In this connection, the Court reiterated the importance of guaranteeing anyone subject to a removal measure the right to obtain sufficient information to enable them to gain effective access to the relevant procedures and to substantiate their complaints (idem). In finding that the applicant had expressed his fears to the Bulgarian border police that he - as a former journalist for a Turkish newspaper and in view of the conditions prevailing in Turkey in the aftermath of the attempted coup d'état - would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if returned to Turkey, the Court did not consider it decisive that the file did not contain a written document by which the applicant had explicitly requested international protection. It had regard to the linguistic obstacles - emphasising the importance of interpretation for accessing asylum procedures -, the lack of involvement of a lawyer, the content of the applicant's statements to the border police, which had not been contested, and the conditions prevailing in Turkey at the relevant time, including in respect of journalists (§§ 120-128). The Court concluded that the Bulgarian authorities, who had hastily returned the applicant to Turkey without instituting proceedings for international protection, had removed him without examining the Article 3 risks he faced and had rendered the available remedies ineffective in practice, in breach of Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention (§§ 129-137)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:34016/18,O.D. v. Bulgaria,34016/18,added,"O.D. v. Bulgaria, no. 34016/18, 10 October 2019",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.A.1,Scope and substantive aspects of the Court ’ s assessment under Articles 2 and 3 in asylum-related removal cases,3,52,53,0.9803,"A.A. v. Sweden , 2023|M.D. and Others v. Russia , 2021|O.D. v. Bulgaria , 2019",,"The starting-point for the assessment of a real risk upon removal should be the examination of the general situation in the destination country. In this connection, and where it is relevant to do so, regard must be had to whether there is a general situation of violence existing in the country of destination ( Khasanov and Rakhmanov v. Russia [GC], § 96; Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, § 216). However, a general situation of violence will not normally in itself entail a violation of Article 3 in the event of an expulsion to the country in question, unless the level of intensity of the violence is sufficient to conclude that any removal to that country would necessarily breach Article 3 of the Convention. The Court would adopt such an approach only in the most extreme cases, where there is a real risk of ill-treatment simply by virtue of the individual concerned being exposed to such violence on returning to the country in question ( Khasanov and Rakhmanov v. Russia [GC], § 96; Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, § 218). Indeed, in cases concerning destinations with difficult security situations, the Court normally also attaches importance to additional individual risk factors (such as membership of a vulnerable group, see, most recently, concerning Syria: M.D. and Others v. Russia, §§ 104-111; and O.D. v. Bulgaria, §§ 50-55).","The starting-point for the assessment of a real risk upon removal should be the examination of the general situation in the destination country. In this connection, and where it is relevant to do so, regard must be had to whether there is a general situation of violence existing in the country of destination ( Khasanov and Rakhmanov v. Russia [GC], 2022, § 96; Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, 2011, § 216). However, a general situation of violence will not normally in itself entail a violation of Article 3 in the event of an expulsion to the country in question, unless the level of intensity of the violence is sufficient to conclude that any removal to that country would necessarily breach Article 3 of the Convention. The Court would adopt such an approach only in the most extreme cases, where there is a real risk of ill-treatment simply by virtue of the individual concerned being exposed to such violence on returning to the country in question ( Khasanov and Rakhmanov v. Russia [GC], 2022, § 96; Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, 2011, § 218; the latter case constitutes an example where that threshold was met). Indeed, in cases concerning destinations with difficult security situations, the Court normally also attaches importance to additional individual risk factors (such as membership of a vulnerable group, see, most recently, concerning Syria: M.D. and Others v. Russia, 2021, §§ 104-111; and O.D. v. Bulgaria, 2019, §§ 50-55; contrast with A.A. v. Sweden, 2023, where the Court found that the general situation in the country of destination, Libya, was serious and fragile but was not so extreme as to reach the aforementioned threshold and that there were no additional individual risk factors)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:34016/18,O.D. v. Bulgaria,34016/18,added,"O.D. v. Bulgaria, no. 34016/18, 10 October 2019",5,citation_field_name_match,section_moved_modified,III.A.3,Procedural aspects,3,66,67,1.0,"Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey , 2009|D v. Bulgaria , 2021|I.M. v. France , 2012|M.K. and Others v. Poland , 2020|Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia , 2005",,"Where the individual has an ""arguable complaint"" that his removal would expose him to treatment contrary to Article 2 or 3 of the Convention, he must have an effective remedy, in practice as well as in law, at the domestic level in accordance with Article 13 of the Convention, which imperatively requires, inter alia, independent and rigorous scrutiny of any claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 and automatic suspensive effect ( M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], § 293: for an overview of the Court's case-law as to the requirements under Article 13 taken in conjunction with Articles 2 or 3 in removal cases, see, in particular, ibid., §§ 286-322; Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, §§ 107-117; Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, §§ 53-67; I.M. v. France; Chahal v. the United Kingdom [GC], §§ 147-154; Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, § 460). The same principles apply when considering the question of effectiveness of remedies which have to be exhausted for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention in asylum cases ( A.M. v. the Netherlands, §§ 63 and 65-69; see also M.K. and Others v. Poland, §§ 142-148 and 212-220, in respect of an immediate removal at a border crossing point). In respect of asylum-seekers the Court has found, in particular, that individuals need to have adequate information about the asylum procedure to be followed and their entitlements in a language they understand, and have access to a reliable communication system with the authorities: the Court also has regard to the availability of interpreters, whether the interviews are conducted by trained staff, whether asylum-seekers have access to legal aid, and requires that asylum-seekers be given the reasons for the decision (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], §§ 300-302, 304, and 306-310; see also Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey ; Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], § 204; and D v. Bulgaria, §§ 120-137).","Where the individual has an ""arguable complaint"" that his removal would expose him to treatment contrary to Article 2 or 3 of the Convention, he must have an effective remedy, in practice as well as in law, at the domestic level in accordance with Article 13 of the Convention, which imperatively requires, inter alia, independent and rigorous scrutiny of any claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 and automatic suspensive effect ( M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011, § 293: for an overview of the Court's case- law as to the requirements under Article 13 taken in conjunction with Articles 2 or 3 in removal cases, see, in particular, ibid., §§ 286-322; Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, 2009, §§ 107-117; Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, 2007, §§ 53-67; I.M. v. France, 2012; Chahal v. the United Kingdom [GC], 1996, §§ 147-154; Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2005, § 460). The same principles apply when considering the question of effectiveness of remedies which have to be exhausted for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention in asylum cases ( A.M. v. the Netherlands, 2016, §§ 63 and 65-69; see also M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 142-148 and 212-220, in respect of an immediate removal at a border crossing point). In respect of asylum-seekers the Court has found, in particular, that individuals need to have adequate information about the asylum procedure to be followed and their entitlements in a language they understand, and have access to a reliable communication system with the authorities: the Court also has regard to the availability of interpreters, whether the interviews are conducted by trained staff, whether asylum-seekers have access to legal aid, and requires that asylum-seekers be given the reasons for the decision (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011, §§ 300-302, 304, and 306-310; see also Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, 2009; Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 204; and D v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 120-137)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20230923171143__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-03-31,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2023-09-23__2024-03-31.json,apps:61365/16,S.E. v. Serbia,61365/16,added,"S.E. v. Serbia, no. 61365/16, 11 July 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,V.B,Freedom to leave any country,2,110,112,0.9506,"In L.B. v. Lithuania , 2022|In S.E. v. Serbia , 2023",,"In L.B. v. Lithuania the Court examined the refusal to issue a travel document to a foreign national, who was a permanent resident and a former beneficiary of subsidiary protection, in the respondent State. It found Article 2 § 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention to be applicable and to have been breached. The impugned refusal had been based on formalistic grounds without an adequate examination of the situation in his country of origin and without a proper assessment of the accessibility for the applicant to obtain a passport of that country, given that he had claimed to be afraid to contact its authorities.","In L.B. v. Lithuania, 2022, the Court examined the refusal to issue a travel document to a foreign national, who was a permanent resident and a former beneficiary of subsidiary protection, in the respondent State. It found Article 2 § 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention to be applicable and to have been breached. The impugned refusal had been based on formalistic grounds without an adequate examination of the situation in his country of origin and without a proper assessment of the accessibility for the applicant to obtain a passport of that country, given that he had claimed to be afraid to contact its authorities. In S.E. v. Serbia, 2023, the Court found a violation of Article 2 § 2 of Protocol No. 4 on account of the refusal to issue a recognised refugee with a travel document for refugees for seven years due to the absence of regulations implementing domestic asylum law. The Court also indicated under Article 46 of the Convention that the respondent State needed to complete the legislative framework and implementing regulations for an effective right to leave the country (§§ 97-98)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-09-04,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json,apps:12427/22,A.D. v. Malta,12427/22,added,"A.D. v. Malta, no. 12427/22, 17 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,II.C.3.a,Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention,4,34,36,0.7681,"A.D. v. Malta , 2023",,"For children and adults with specific vulnerabilities to be able to have the benefit of the additional safeguards against arbitrary detention which apply to them, they should have access to an assessment of their vulnerability and be informed about respective procedures (see Thimothawes v. Belgium, 2017, and Abdi Mahamud v. Malta, 2016). Lack of active steps and delays in conducting the vulnerability assessment may be a factor in raising serious doubts as to the authorities'good faith ( Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, 2016; Abdi Mahamud v. Malta, 2016).","For children and adults with specific vulnerabilities to be able to have the benefit of the additional safeguards against arbitrary detention which apply to them, they should have access to an assessment of their vulnerability and be informed about respective procedures (see Thimothawes v. Belgium, 2017, and Abdi Mahamud v. Malta, 2016). An individual is presumed to be a minor - which renders these additional safeguards applicable - if he or she claims to be a minor and there are no indications that this claim is unfounded or unreasonable, until a final age-assessment decision is taken ( A.D. v. Malta, 2023, §§ 74 and 190, and see ""Reception conditions, age-assessment procedures and freedom of movement"" below). Where an individual initially claimed to be an adult and subsequently claims to be a minor, the authorities might have legitimate concerns as to the reliability of the individual's statements that he or she is a minor and thus reasonably refrain from placing the individual in a children's facility immediately after those statements have been made ( M.H. and S.B. v. Hungary*, 2024, § 75). However, the mere fact that an individual initially claimed to be an adult cannot justify dismissing his or her later claim to be a minor without taking appropriate measures to verify his or her age, as there might be understandable reasons prompting a migrant child not to reveal his or her real age, such as not being sure of it or a fear of being separated from a group or an adult relative ( M.H. and S.B. v. Hungary*, 2024, § 75). Lack of active steps and delays in conducting the vulnerability assessment may be a factor in raising serious doubts as to the authorities' good faith ( Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, 2016; Abdi Mahamud v. Malta, 2016). The same holds true if the burden of rebutting the presumption that they are adults is placed on the detained asylum- seekers, as obtaining the necessary evidence to prove their age could be challenging and potentially M.H. and S.B. v. Hungary* impossible (, 2024, §§ 77-80)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-09-04,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json,apps:18911/17,A.E. and Others v. Italy,18911/17,added,"A.E. and Others v. Italy, nos. 18911/17 and 2 others, 16 November 2023",1,citation_field_name_match,citation_updated,II.A.2,Article 4 of Protocol No. 4,3,23,24,0.9913,"M.A. and Others v. Latvia 2021|Others v. Italy , 2023|S.S. and Others v. Hungary , 2023","D.A. and Others v. Poland , 2021|J.A. and Others v. Italy , 2023","Where migrants entered the respondent State's territory in an unauthorised manner and, following their apprehension near the border, were provided with access to means of legal entry through the appropriate border procedure, the Court did not apply the aforementioned two-tier test, but instead assessed - in order to determine whether the expulsion was ""collective"" in nature - whether the individuals were afforded, prior to the adoption of expulsion orders, an effective possibility of submitting arguments against their removal and whether there were sufficient guarantees demonstrating that their personal circumstances had been genuinely and individually taken into account ( Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, § 62). Such test is, essentially, similar to the one applied to individuals who present themselves at a point of legal entry, such as a border checkpoint (see M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 204-211, D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-84, and M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69). Whether the requirements of this test are satisfied is a question of fact, which is to be determined by having regard to, in so far as pertinent in a given case, supporting evidence provided by the parties, including as to whether an identification process was conducted and under what conditions (whether persons were trained to conduct interviews, whether information was provided, in a language the individuals understood, about the possibility to lodge an asylum application and to request legal aid, whether interpreters were present, and whether the individuals were able, in practice, to consult lawyers and to lodge asylum applications) as well as to independent reports ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 185; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014, §§ 214-225; Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 245-254; Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, §§ 63-71; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 206-210; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-83; M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69). For an example of a case where individuals, who did not intend to seek asylum in the respondent State, were removed in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 after having been detained for ten days in a ""hotspot"" for the registration and identification of migrants from the moment of their arrival in the respondent State, see J.A. and Others v. Italy, 2023, §§ 47 and 106-116.","Where migrants entered the respondent State's territory in an unauthorised manner and, following their apprehension near the border, were provided with access to means of legal entry through the appropriate border procedure, the Court did not apply the aforementioned two-tier test, but instead assessed - in order to determine whether the expulsion was ""collective"" in nature - whether the individuals were afforded, prior to the adoption of expulsion orders, an effective possibility of submitting arguments against their removal and whether there were sufficient guarantees demonstrating that their personal circumstances had been genuinely and individually taken into account ( Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, § 62). Such test is, essentially, similar to the one applied to individuals who present themselves at a point of legal entry, such as a border M.K. and Others v. Poland D.A. and Others v. Poland checkpoint (see, 2020, §§ 204-211,, 2021, §§ 81-84, and M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69) or at an airport (see S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 48-51, where the Court considered that it did not absolve the authorities of their obligation under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 that the applicants had initially sought to enter the respondent State by using counterfeit documents). Whether the requirements of this test are satisfied is a question of fact, which is to be determined by having regard to, in so far as pertinent in a given case, supporting evidence provided by the parties, including as to whether an identification process was conducted and under what conditions (whether persons were trained to conduct interviews, whether information was provided, in a language the individuals understood, about the possibility to lodge an asylum application and to request legal aid, whether interpreters were present, and whether the individuals were able, in practice, to consult lawyers and to lodge asylum applications) as well as to independent reports ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 185; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014, §§ 214-225; Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 245-254; Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, §§ 63-71; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 206-210; D.A. and Others v. Poland, M.A. and Others v. Latvia 2021, §§ 81-83; (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69). For an example of a case where individuals, who did not intend to seek asylum in the respondent State, were removed in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 after having been detained for ten days in a ""hotspot"" for the registration J.A. and and identification of migrants from the moment of their arrival in the respondent State, see Others v. Italy, 2023, §§ 47 and 106-116."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-09-04,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json,apps:18911/17,A.E. and Others v. Italy,18911/17,added,"A.E. and Others v. Italy, nos. 18911/17 and 2 others, 16 November 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.C,Transfers preceding the removal and the removal itself,2,,107,,"Akkad v. Turkey , 2022",,,"The Court found Article 5 to be applicable and breached in the case of an arrest at a border and subsequent removal by bus ( Akkad v. Turkey, 2022, §§ 40 and 101-103). It also found Article 5 applicable and breached in a case concerning the applicants' bus transfers between detention centres A.E. and Others v. Italy in the context of their attempted removal by the authorities (, 2023, §§ 104-106). In both cases, the Court also found violations of Article 3 on account of the conditions to which the applicants were subjected during their arrest and/or transfers."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-09-04,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json,apps:18911/17,A.E. and Others v. Italy,18911/17,added,"A.E. and Others v. Italy, nos. 18911/17 and 2 others, 16 November 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.C,Transfers preceding the removal and the removal itself,2,,110,,"A.E. and Others v. Italy , 2023|Thuo v. Cyprus , 2017",,,"The Court has found violations of the substantive limb of Article 3 on account of ill-treatment inflicted by public officials in connection with or during the (attempted) deportation process (see A.E. and Others v. Italy, 2023, §§ 91-94, and Shahzad v. Hungary (no. 2), 2023, §§ 72-80). It has also found violations of the procedural limb of Article 3 due to the authorities' failure to investigate effectively the applicants' complaints about alleged ill-treatment in connection with or during the deportation process (see Thuo v. Cyprus, 2017, and Shahzad v. Hungary (no. 2), 2023, §§ 55-65; see also section ""Obligations to prevent harm and to carry out an effective investigation in other migrant-specific situations"" below)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-09-04,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json,apps:3566/16,Alkhatib and Others v. Greece,3566/16,added,"Alkhatib and Others v. Greece, no. 3566/16, 16 January 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.E,"Interception, rescue operations and summary returns (“push- backs”) at sea",2,,16,,"In Alkhatib and Others v. Greece , 2024",,,"In Alkhatib and Others v. Greece, 2024, a member of the applicants' family, who was travelling in a boat with other migrants with a view to illegally entering Greece, sustained a serious gunshot wound as a result of shots fired by the coast guard. The Court found, in the first place, a violation of the procedural limb of Article 2 given the ineffective investigation: on account of the numerous inter alia shortcomings it had,, been impossible to determine whether or not the use of potentially lethal force had been justified in the particular circumstances of the case. Secondly, with respect to the substantive limb of Article 2, the Court found that the respondent State had failed to comply with its obligation to put in place an adequate legal and administrative framework governing the use of potentially lethal force in maritime surveillance operations: it found that the coast guard, who could have presumed the presence of passengers hidden on board of the boat, had not exercised due care to minimise the use of lethal force and the possible risks to life and concluded that the Government had not demonstrated that the use of force had been ""absolutely necessary"" within the meaning of Article 2 § 2 of the Convention."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-09-04,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json,apps:12510/18,Dabo v. Sweden,12510/18,added,"Dabo v. Sweden, no. 12510/18, 18 January 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,I.B,Access for the purposes of family reunification,2,8,8,0.9683,,"In B.F. and Others v. Switzerland , 2023","In B.F. and Others v. Switzerland, 2023, the Court examined, for the first time, a case where the family reunification of (certain) recognised refugees was made subject to a requirement of non- reliance on social assistance under domestic law. The applicants, who were all recognised as refugees within the meaning of the 1951 Convention, were granted provisional admission rather than asylum, in line with domestic law, since the grounds for their refugee status arose following their departure from their countries of origin and as a result of their own actions, namely their illegal exit from those countries. Reiterating, inter alia, that there was consensus at international and European level that refugees needed to have the benefit of a more favourable family reunification procedure than other aliens, the Court considered that the particularly vulnerable situation in which refugees sur place find themselves - notably, the insurmountable obstacles to their being reunited with their family members in their country of origin, given that they now face a risk of ill-treatment there - needed to be adequately taken into account in the application of a condition (such as the requirement of non- reliance on social assistance) to their family reunification requests, with insurmountable obstacles to enjoying family life in the country of origin progressively assuming greater importance in the fair- balance assessment as time passed . The requirement of non-reliance on social assistance thus needed to be applied with sufficient flexibility, as one element of the comprehensive and individualised fair- balance assessment. In two of the four applications at hand, the Court found that the gainfully employed applicants had done all that could reasonably be expected of them to earn a living and to cover their and their family members'expenses. In a third case, the Court was not satisfied that the Federal Administrative Court had sufficiently examined whether the applicant's health would enable her to work, at least to a certain extent, and consequently whether the impugned requirement needed to be applied with flexibility in view of her health. In respect those three applications, the Court thus found a violation of Article 8. By contrast, the Court found no violation of Article 8 as regards the fourth case, considering that the Federal Administrative Court had not overstepped its margin of appreciation when it took the applicant's lack of initiative in improving her financial situation into account when balancing the competing interests. The Court further noted that it was not called upon to determine in the case at hand whether and/or to what extent the aforementioned considerations applied in scenarios in which refugees have to fulfil a requirement of non-reliance on social assistance if they submitted their applications for family reunification outside of a certain time-limit, without particular circumstances rendering the late submission objectively excusable, which question may arise in cases where European Union member States made use of the possibility afforded to them under the third subparagraph of Article 12(1) of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification (§ 106).","In, 2023, the Court examined, for the first time, a case where the family reunification of (certain) recognised refugees was made subject to a requirement of non- reliance on social assistance under domestic law. The applicants, who were all recognised as refugees within the meaning of the 1951 Convention, were granted provisional admission rather than asylum, in line with domestic law, since the grounds for their refugee status arose following their departure from their countries of origin and as a result of their own actions, namely their illegal exit from those countries. Reiterating, inter alia, that there was consensus at international and European level that refugees needed to have the benefit of a more favourable family reunification procedure than other aliens, the Court considered that the particularly vulnerable situation in which refugees sur place find themselves - notably, the insurmountable obstacles to their being reunited with their family members in their country of origin, given that they now face a risk of ill-treatment there - needed to be adequately taken into account in the application of a condition (such as the requirement of non- reliance on social assistance) to their family reunification requests, with insurmountable obstacles to enjoying family life in the country of origin progressively assuming greater importance in the fair- balance assessment as time passed. The requirement of non-reliance on social assistance (which under domestic law applied to family reunification requests of refugees granted provisional admission rather than asylum) thus needed to be applied with sufficient flexibility, as one element of the comprehensive and individualised fair-balance assessment. In two of the four applications at hand, the Court found that the gainfully employed applicants had done all that could reasonably be expected of them to earn a living and to cover their and their family members' expenses. In a third case, the Court was not satisfied that the Federal Administrative Court had sufficiently examined whether the applicant's health would enable her to work, at least to a certain extent, and consequently whether the impugned requirement needed to be applied with flexibility in view of her health. In respect those three applications, the Court thus found a violation of Article 8. By contrast, the Court found no violation of Article 8 as regards the fourth case, considering that the Federal Administrative Court had not overstepped its margin of appreciation when it took the applicant's lack of initiative in improving Dabo v. Sweden, her financial situation into account when balancing the competing interests. In the Court dealt with a related but distinct question: the domestic law of the respondent State provided that refugees were exempt from having to fulfil a maintenance requirement if they applied for family reunification within three months of being granted refugee status, whereas such maintenance requirement applied if a request for family reunification was introduced at a later stage (in line with a possibility afforded under the third subparagraph of Article 12(1) of the of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification). The Court found that the refusal of the family reunification request, because the applicant had introduced it outside of that three-month time-limit in a manner which was not ""objectively excusable"" meaning he had to but failed to meet the maintenance requirement, did not breach Article 8 of the Convention. In this respect, the Court also noted that the domestic authorities had established that the applicant could lodge a fresh request for family reunification at any time and that he had had good prospects of being able to fulfil the maintenance requirement in the future in view of his profession: noting that he had not yet found employment, the Court considered that it could not be concluded that he had done all that could reasonably be expected of him to earn sufficient income to cover his and his family's expenses."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-09-04,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json,apps:30919/20,H.A. v. the United Kingdom,30919/20,added,"H.A. v. the United Kingdom, no. 30919/20, 5 December 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.A.1,Scope and substantive aspects of the Court’s assessment under Articles 2 and 3 in asylum-related removal cases,3,50,52,0.9986,,,"The right to political asylum is not contained in either the Convention or its Protocols and the Court does not itself examine the actual asylum application or verify how the States honour their obligations under the 1951 Geneva Convention or European Union law ( F.G. v. Sweden [GC], 2016, § 117; Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, 2011, §§ 212 and 226). However, the expulsion of an alien by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Articles 2 and 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question, if deported, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 in the destination country. In these circumstances, Articles 2 and 3 imply an obligation not to deport the person in question to that country ( F.G. v. Sweden, §§ 110-111). The same level of scrutiny applies to all claims of a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 regardless of the legal basis for the removal (whether extradition or expulsion, Khasanov and Rakhmanov v. Russia [GC], 2022, §94). Removal cases concerning Article 2 - notably in respect of the risk of the applicant being subjected to the death penalty - typically also raise issues under Article 3 (see section "" The death penalty: Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 13 "" below): because the relevant principles are the same for Article 2 and Article 3 assessments in removal cases, the Court either finds the issues under both Articles indissociable and examines them together (see F.G. v. Sweden [GC], 2016, § 110; L.M. and Others v. Russia, 2015, § 108) or deals with the Article 2 complaint in the context of the related main complaint under Article 3 (see J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2011, § 37).","The right to political asylum is not contained in either the Convention or its Protocols and the Court does not itself examine the actual asylum application or verify how the States honour their obligations under the 1951 Geneva Convention or European Union law ( F.G. v. Sweden [GC], 2016, § 117; H.A. v. the United Kingdom, 2023, §§ 41-42; Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, 2011, §§ 212 and 226). However, the expulsion of an alien by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Articles 2 and 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question, if deported, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 in the destination country. In these circumstances, Articles 2 and 3 imply an obligation not to deport the person in question to that country ( F.G. v. Sweden, §§ 110-111). The same level of scrutiny applies to all claims of a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 regardless of the legal basis for the removal (whether extradition or Khasanov and Rakhmanov v. Russia expulsion, [GC], 2022, §94). Removal cases concerning Article 2 - notably in respect of the risk of the applicant being subjected to the death penalty - typically also raise issues under Article 3 (see section ""The death penalty: Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 13"" below): because the relevant principles are the same for Article 2 and Article 3 assessments in removal cases, the Court either finds the issues under both Articles indissociable and examines them together (see F.G. v. Sweden [GC], 2016, § 110; L.M. and Others v. Russia, 2015, § 108) or deals with the Article 2 complaint in the context of the related main complaint under Article 3 (see J.H. v. the United Kingdom, 2011, § 37)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-09-04,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json,apps:30919/20,H.A. v. the United Kingdom,30919/20,added,"H.A. v. the United Kingdom, no. 30919/20, 5 December 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,III.A.1,Scope and substantive aspects of the Court’s assessment under Articles 2 and 3 in asylum-related removal cases,3,63,65,0.9968,"A.F. v. France M.O. v. Switzerland 2005|N. v. Sweden , 2010|R.H. v. Sweden 2016","A.F. v. France , 2015|N. v. Finland , 2005|R.H. v. Sweden , 2015","The Court has developed ample case-law in respect of all of the above-mentioned principles. By way of example, in respect of the weight attributed to country material see Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, 2011, §§ 230-234; in respect of the assessment of an applicant's credibility see N. v. Finland, 2005; A.F. v. France, 2015, and M.O. v. Switzerland, 2017; and in respect of the domestic authorities'obligation to assess the relevance, authenticity and probative value of documents put forward by an applicant - from the outset or later on - which relate to the core of their protection claims see M.D. and M.A. v. Belgium, 2016; Singh and Others v. Belgium, 2012, and M.A. v. Switzerland, 2014; for a combination of elements leading to the conclusion that the assessment of the individual risk of a journalist was insufficient see S.H. v. Malta, 2022. Again by way of example, see Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, 2011, where the Court determined the situation in the country of destination to be such that the removal would breach Article 3, having regard to the situation of general violence in Mogadishu and the lack of safe access to, and the dire conditions in, IDPcamps; see Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 2007, as regards a risk assessment in respect of an applicant who belonged to a group which is systematically at risk, and T.K. and Others v. Lithuania, 2022, for a case in which the Court considered that the domestic authorities had not carried out an adequate assessment of the existence of the practice of ill-treatment of persons who were ordinary members of a banned opposition political party (a group of which one applicant (the husband/father of the family) was a member and which the applicants alleged to be systematically at risk of ill-treatment), as well as R v. France, 2022, where the Court rejected the vulnerable group approach as regards the expulsion of a Chechen convicted of terrorist offences in France (§ 122); with regard to various forms and scenarios of gender-related persecution, such as widespread sexual violence ( M.M.R. v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2016), the alleged lack of a male support network ( R.H. v. Sweden, 2015), ill-treatment of a separated woman ( N. v. Sweden ), 2010, ill-treatment inflicted by family members in view of a relationship ( R.D. v. France, 2016, §§ 36-45), honour killings and forced marriage ( A.A. and Others v. Sweden, 2012), and female genital mutilation ( R.B.A.B. v. the Netherlands, 2016; Sow v. Belgium, 2016). As regards forced prostitution and/or return to a human trafficking network see L.O. v. France (dec.), 2015. In V.F. v. France (dec.), 2011, the Court assessed the risk under Article 4, while leaving open the extraterritorial applicability of that Article: in this latter respect, the case of M.O. v. Switzerland, 2017, concerned the risk of forced labour upon removal and the Article 4 complaint was inadmissible due to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.","The Court has developed ample case-law in respect of all of the above-mentioned principles. By way of example, in respect of the weight attributed to country material see Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, 2011, §§ 230-234; in respect of the assessment of an applicant's credibility see N. v. Finland, A.F. v. France M.O. v. Switzerland 2005;, 2015, and, 2017; and in respect of the domestic authorities' obligation to assess the relevance, authenticity and probative value of documents put forward by an applicant - from the outset or later on - which relate to the core of their protection claims see M.D. and M.A. v. Belgium, 2016; Singh and Others v. Belgium, 2012, and M.A. v. Switzerland, 2014; for a combination of elements leading to the conclusion that the assessment of the individual risk of a journalist was insufficient see S.H. v. Malta, 2022. Again by way of example, see Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, 2011, where the Court determined the situation in the country of destination to be such that the removal would breach Article 3, having regard to the situation of general violence in Mogadishu and the lack of safe access to, and the dire conditions in, IDPcamps; see Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 2007, as regards a risk assessment in respect of an applicant who belonged to a group which is systematically at risk, and T.K. and Others v. Lithuania, 2022, for a case in which the Court considered that the domestic authorities had not carried out an adequate assessment of the existence of the practice of ill-treatment of persons who were ordinary members of a banned opposition political party (a group of which one applicant (the husband/father of the family) was a member and which the applicants alleged to be systematically at risk of ill-treatment), as well as R v. France, 2022, where the Court rejected the vulnerable group approach as regards the expulsion of a Chechen convicted of terrorist offences in France (§ 122); for a case concerning an alleged risk on account of attempts to recruit the applicant to extremist armed groups if he were returned to a refugee camp see H.A. v. the United Kingdom, 2023; with regard to various forms and scenarios of gender-related persecution, such as widespread sexual violence ( M.M.R. v. the Netherlands (dec.), R.H. v. Sweden 2016), the alleged lack of a male support network (, 2015), ill-treatment of a separated woman ( N. v. Sweden, 2010), ill-treatment inflicted by family members in view of a relationship ( R.D. v. France, 2016, §§ 36-45), honour killings and forced marriage ( A.A. and Others v. Sweden, 2012), and female genital mutilation ( R.B.A.B. v. the Netherlands, 2016; Sow v. Belgium, 2016). As regards forced prostitution and/or return to a human trafficking network see L.O. v. France (dec.), 2015. In V.F. v. France (dec.), 2011, the Court assessed the risk under Article 4, while leaving open the extraterritorial applicability of that Article: in this latter respect, the case of M.O. v. Switzerland, 2017, concerned the risk of forced labour upon removal and the Article 4 complaint was inadmissible due to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-09-04,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json,apps:80206/17,J.A. and A.A. v. Türkiye*,80206/17,added,"J.A. and A.A. v. Türkiye*, no. 80206/17, 6 February 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,III.A.1,Scope and substantive aspects of the Court’s assessment under Articles 2 and 3 in asylum-related removal cases,3,60,62,0.9985,,"Shenturk and Others v. Azerbaijan , 2022","As regards the nature of the Court's assessment, the Court does not, in cases concerning the expulsion of asylum-seekers, itself examine the actual asylum applications or verify how the States honour their obligations under the Refugee Convention. Its main concern is whether effective guarantees exist that protect the applicant against arbitrary refoulement, be it direct or indirect, to the country from which he or she has fled ( F.G. v. Sweden [GC], 2016, § 117). By virtue of Article 1 of the Convention, the primary responsibility for implementing and enforcing the guaranteed rights and freedoms is laid on the national authorities. The machinery of complaint to the Court is thus subsidiary to national systems safeguarding human rights. This subsidiary character is articulated in Articles 13 and 35 § 1 of the Convention ( Khasanov and Rakhmanov v. Russia [GC], 2022, § 102; F.G. v. Sweden [GC], 2016, § 117; M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011, §§ 286-287). The Court must be satisfied, however, that the assessment made by the authorities of the Contracting State is adequate and sufficiently supported by domestic materials as well as by materials originating from other reliable and objective sources such as, for instance, other Contracting or non-Contracting States, agencies of the United Nations and reputable non-governmental organisations ( Khasanov and Rakhmanov v. Russia [GC], 2022, § 103; F.G. v. Sweden [GC], 2016, § 117; NA. v. the United Kingdom, 2008, § 119). Moreover, where domestic proceedings have taken place, it is not the Court's task to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts and, as a general rule, it is for those courts to assess the evidence before them. This should not lead, however, to an abdication of the Court's responsibility and a renunciation of all supervision of the result obtain from using domestic remedies, otherwise the rights guaranteed by the Convention would be devoid of any substance. In accordance with Article 19 of the Convention, the Court's duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention ( Khasanov and Rakhmanov v. Russia [GC], 2022, § 104). As a general principle, the national authorities are best placed to assess not just the facts but, more particularly, the credibility of witnesses since it is they who have had an opportunity to see, hear and assess the demeanour of the individual concerned ( F.G. v. Sweden [GC], 2016, § 118). Their assessment, however, is also subject to the Court's scrutiny ( Khasanov and Rakhmanov v. Russia [GC], 2022, § 105). Where, by contrast, the domestic authorities failed to examine any alleged risks of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention before removing the applicants who had lodged asylum applications to their country of origin, the Court concluded that this constituted a failure to discharge the procedural obligation under Article 3 ( Shenturk and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2022, §§ 112-117).","As regards the nature of the Court's assessment, the Court does not, in cases concerning the expulsion of asylum-seekers, itself examine the actual asylum applications or verify how the States honour their obligations under the Refugee Convention. Its main concern is whether effective guarantees exist that protect the applicant against arbitrary refoulement, be it direct or indirect, to the country from which he or she has fled ( F.G. v. Sweden [GC], 2016, § 117). By virtue of Article 1 of the Convention, the primary responsibility for implementing and enforcing the guaranteed rights and freedoms is laid on the national authorities. The machinery of complaint to the Court is thus subsidiary to national systems safeguarding human rights. This subsidiary character is articulated in Articles 13 Khasanov and Rakhmanov v. Russia F.G. v. Sweden and 35 § 1 of the Convention ( [GC], 2022, § 102; [GC], 2016, § 117; M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011, §§ 286-287). The Court must be satisfied, however, that the assessment made by the authorities of the Contracting State is adequate and sufficiently supported by domestic materials as well as by materials originating from other reliable and objective sources such as, for instance, other Contracting or non-Contracting States, agencies of the United Nations and reputable non-governmental organisations ( Khasanov and Rakhmanov v. Russia [GC], 2022, § 103; F.G. v. Sweden [GC], 2016, § 117; NA. v. the United Kingdom, 2008, § 119). Moreover, where domestic proceedings have taken place, it is not the Court's task to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts and, as a general rule, it is for those courts to assess the evidence before them. This should not lead, however, to an abdication of the Court's responsibility and a renunciation of all supervision of the result obtain from using domestic remedies, otherwise the rights guaranteed by the Convention would be devoid of any substance. In accordance with Article 19 of the Convention, the Court's duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention ( Khasanov and Rakhmanov v. Russia [GC], 2022, § 104). As a general principle, the national authorities are best placed to assess not just the facts but, more particularly, the credibility of witnesses since it is they who have had an opportunity to see, hear and assess the demeanour of the individual concerned ( F.G. v. Sweden [GC], 2016, § 118). Their assessment, however, is also subject to the Court's scrutiny ( Khasanov and Rakhmanov v. Russia [GC], 2022, § 105). Where, by contrast, the domestic authorities failed to examine any alleged risks of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention before removing the applicants who had lodged asylum applications to their country of origin, the Court concluded that this constituted a failure to Shenturk and Others v. Azerbaijan discharge the procedural obligation under Article 3 (, 2022, §§ 112-117; J.A. and A.A. v. Türkiye *, 2024, §§ 65-75)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-09-04,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json,apps:80206/17,J.A. and A.A. v. Türkiye*,80206/17,added,"J.A. and A.A. v. Türkiye*, no. 80206/17, 6 February 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,VI.B,Starting point of the four-month period in Article 2 or 3 removal cases,2,116,121,0.9927,,,"While the date of the final domestic decision providing an effective remedy is normally the starting-point for the calculation of the four-month time-limit for which Article 35 § 1 of the Convention provides, the responsibility of a sending State under Article 2 or Article 3 of the Convention is, as a rule, incurred only when steps are taken to remove the individual from its territory. The date of the State's responsibility under Article 2 or 3 corresponds to the date when that four-month time- limit starts to run for the applicant. Consequently, if a decision ordering a removal has not been enforced and the individual remains on the territory of the State wishing to remove him or her, the four-month time-limit has not yet started to run (see M.Y.H. and Others v. Sweden, 2013, §§ 38-41). The same would apply to removals concerning a sending State's responsibility for an alleged risk of a flagrant denial of rights under Article 5 and 6 in the receiving State (see section "" Flagrant denial of justice: Articles 5 and 6 "" above).","While the date of the final domestic decision providing an effective remedy is normally the starting-point for the calculation of the four-month time-limit for which Article 35 § 1 of the Convention provides, the responsibility of a sending State under Article 2 or Article 3 of the Convention is, as a rule, incurred only when steps are taken to remove the individual from its territory. The date of the State's responsibility under Article 2 or 3 corresponds to the date when that four-month time- limit starts to run for the applicant. Consequently, if a decision ordering a removal has not been enforced and the individual remains on the territory of the State wishing to remove him or her, the four-month time-limit has not yet started to run (see M.Y.H. and Others v. Sweden, 2013, §§ 38-41; J.A. and A.A. v. Türkiye *, 2024, § 41). The same would apply to removals concerning a sending State's responsibility for an alleged risk of a flagrant denial of rights under Article 5 and 6 in the receiving State (see section ""Flagrant denial of justice: Articles 5 and 6"" above)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-09-04,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json,apps:10940/17|15977/17,M.H. and S.B. v. Hungary*,10940/17|15977/17,added,"M.H. and S.B. v. Hungary*, nos. 10940/17 and 15977/17, 22 February 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.C.3.a,Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention,4,33,35,0.9948,"Yoh- Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium , 2011","A.M. and Others v. France , 2016|Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium , 2011","The immigration detention of children and adults with specific vulnerabilities will not be in conformity with Article 5 § 1(f) if the aim pursued by detention can be achieved by other less coercive measures, requiring the domestic authorities to consider alternatives to detention in the light of the specific circumstances of the individual case (as regards children: A.B. and Others v. France, 2016, § 123; Nikoghosyan and Others v. Poland, 2022, § 86; and Rahimi v. Greece, 2011, §§ 108-110; as regards an adult with a medical condition: Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, 2011; see also O.M. v. Hungary, 2016, § 53, with a view to the assessment of the vulnerability of the applicant, an LGBTIasylum-seeker, under Article 5 § 1(b)). The authorities'failure to conduct a proper assessment to determine less coercive alternatives to detention has led the Court to find a violation of Article 5 § 1 in respect of children ( Rahimi v. Greece, 2011, §§ 109-110; Popov v. France, 2012, § 119; A.B. and Others v. France, 2016, § 124; H.A and Others v. Greece, 2019, §§ 206-207; M.D. and A.D. v. France, 2021, § 89; Nikoghosyan and Others v. Poland, 2022, §§ 87-88) In certain cases concerning accompanied children, in which the authorities had dismissed the possibility of resorting to a less coercive measure on account of the accompanying parent's actions, the Court found no violation of Article 5 § 1 on the basis that the authorities had effectively investigated whether the detention was a measure of last resort for which no alternative was available ( A.M. and Others v. France, 2016, §§ 67-69; R.C. and V.C. v. France, 2016, §§ 55-57). Where children are detained with an accompanying parent and the detention decision is only issued against the parent, but not the children, the detention of the children is in breach of Article 5 § 1 ( Minasian and Others v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 40-42). Detaining children in inappropriate conditions within the meaning of Article 3, may of itself lead to a breach of Article 5 § 1, irrespective of whether the children were accompanied by their parents or not ( G.B. and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 151; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, § 239). Depending on the circumstances, the Court has found a violation in respect of the children, but not in respect of the accompanying parents in certain cases ( Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, 2010), whereas it also found a violation of Article 5 § 1 in respect of the accompanying parents in other cases ( Nikoghosyan and Others v. Poland, 2022, M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021).","The immigration detention of children and adults with specific vulnerabilities will not be in conformity with Article 5 § 1(f) if the aim pursued by detention can be achieved by other less coercive measures, requiring the domestic authorities to consider alternatives to detention in the light of the specific circumstances of the individual case (as regards children: A.B. and Others v. France, 2016, § 123; Nikoghosyan and Others v. Poland, 2022, § 86; and Rahimi v. Greece, 2011, §§ 108-110; as regards an adult with a medical condition: Yoh- Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, 2011; see also O.M. v. Hungary, 2016, § 53, with a view to the assessment of the vulnerability of the applicant, an LGBTIasylum-seeker, under Article 5 § 1(b)). The authorities' failure to conduct a proper assessment to determine less coercive alternatives to detention has led the Court to find a violation of Article 5 § 1 in respect of children ( Rahimi v. Greece, 2011, §§ 109-110; Popov v. France, 2012, § 119; A.B. and Others v. France, 2016, § 124; H.A and Others v. Greece, 2019, §§ 206-207; M.D. and A.D. v. France, 2021, § 89; Nikoghosyan and Others v. Poland, 2022, §§ 87-88) In certain cases concerning accompanied children, in which the authorities had dismissed the possibility of resorting to a less coercive measure on account of the accompanying parent's actions, the Court found no violation of Article 5 § 1 on the basis that the authorities had effectively investigated whether the detention was A.M. and Others v. France a measure of last resort for which no alternative was available (, 2016, §§ 67-69; R.C. and V.C. v. France, 2016, §§ 55-57). Even where the domestic authorities established that no less coercive measure could be resorted to and the conditions of detention are satisfactory, the detention of migrant children can be justified under Article 5 § 1(f) only for a short period ( M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, § 237; M.H. and S.B. v. Hungary*, 2024, § 76). Where children are detained with an accompanying parent and the detention decision is only issued against the parent, but not the children, the detention of the children is in breach of Article 5 § 1 ( Minasian and Others v. the Republic of Moldova, 2023, §§ 40-42). Detaining children in inappropriate conditions within the meaning of Article 3, may of itself lead to a breach of Article 5 § 1, irrespective of whether the children were accompanied by their parents or not ( G.B. and Others v. Turkey, 2019, § 151; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, § 239). Depending on the circumstances, the Court has found a violation in respect of the children, but not in respect of the accompanying parents in certain cases ( Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, 2010), whereas it also found a violation of Article 5 § 1 in respect of the accompanying parents in other cases ( Nikoghosyan and Others v. Poland, 2022, M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-09-04,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json,apps:10940/17|15977/17,M.H. and S.B. v. Hungary*,10940/17|15977/17,added,"M.H. and S.B. v. Hungary*, nos. 10940/17 and 15977/17, 22 February 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,II.C.3.a,Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention,4,34,36,0.7681,"A.D. v. Malta , 2023",,"For children and adults with specific vulnerabilities to be able to have the benefit of the additional safeguards against arbitrary detention which apply to them, they should have access to an assessment of their vulnerability and be informed about respective procedures (see Thimothawes v. Belgium, 2017, and Abdi Mahamud v. Malta, 2016). Lack of active steps and delays in conducting the vulnerability assessment may be a factor in raising serious doubts as to the authorities'good faith ( Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, 2016; Abdi Mahamud v. Malta, 2016).","For children and adults with specific vulnerabilities to be able to have the benefit of the additional safeguards against arbitrary detention which apply to them, they should have access to an assessment of their vulnerability and be informed about respective procedures (see Thimothawes v. Belgium, 2017, and Abdi Mahamud v. Malta, 2016). An individual is presumed to be a minor - which renders these additional safeguards applicable - if he or she claims to be a minor and there are no indications that this claim is unfounded or unreasonable, until a final age-assessment decision is taken ( A.D. v. Malta, 2023, §§ 74 and 190, and see ""Reception conditions, age-assessment procedures and freedom of movement"" below). Where an individual initially claimed to be an adult and subsequently claims to be a minor, the authorities might have legitimate concerns as to the reliability of the individual's statements that he or she is a minor and thus reasonably refrain from placing the individual in a children's facility immediately after those statements have been made ( M.H. and S.B. v. Hungary*, 2024, § 75). However, the mere fact that an individual initially claimed to be an adult cannot justify dismissing his or her later claim to be a minor without taking appropriate measures to verify his or her age, as there might be understandable reasons prompting a migrant child not to reveal his or her real age, such as not being sure of it or a fear of being separated from a group or an adult relative ( M.H. and S.B. v. Hungary*, 2024, § 75). Lack of active steps and delays in conducting the vulnerability assessment may be a factor in raising serious doubts as to the authorities' good faith ( Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, 2016; Abdi Mahamud v. Malta, 2016). The same holds true if the burden of rebutting the presumption that they are adults is placed on the detained asylum- seekers, as obtaining the necessary evidence to prove their age could be challenging and potentially M.H. and S.B. v. Hungary* impossible (, 2024, §§ 77-80)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-09-04,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json,apps:48883/07,Mathloom v. Greece,48883/07,removed,"Mathloom v. Greece, no. 48883/07, 24 April 2012",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.C.1,Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention : General principles,3,30,32,0.9338,"J.R. and Others v. Greece , 2018|Muhammad Saqawat v. Belgium, 2020","Amuur v. France , 1996|In Nabil and Others v. Hungary , 2015|Mathloom v. Greece , 2012|Muhammad Saqawat v. Belgium , 2020|O.M. v. Hungary , 2016|Suso Musa v. Malta , 2013","Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention allows States to control the liberty of aliens in an immigration context in two different situations: the first limb of that provision permits the detention of an asylum- seeker or other immigrant prior to the State's grant of authorisation to enter (for the second limb, see section "" Restrictions of freedom of movement and detention for purposes of removal "" below). The question as to when the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) ceases to apply, because the individual has been granted formal authorisation to enter or stay, is largely dependent on national law ( Suso Musa v. Malta, 2013, § 97; see also O.M. v. Hungary, 2016, where the detention of the asylum-seeking applicant was consequently examined under Article 5 § 1(b), since domestic law created a more favourable position than required by the Convention, with the result that the Court did not consider it necessary to address the lawfulness of the detention under Article 5 § 1(f); and Muhammad Saqawat v. Belgium, 2020, §§ 47 and 49, as to the impact of EUlaw on domestic law). Such detention must be compatible with the overall purpose and requirements of Article 5, notably its lawfulness, including the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law. However, compliance with domestic law is not sufficient, since a deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still be arbitrary ( Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 67). In the case of massive arrivals of asylum-seekers at State borders, subject to the prohibition of arbitrariness, the lawfulness requirement of Article 5 may be considered generally satisfied by a domestic legal regime that provides, for example, for no more than the name of the authority competent to order deprivation of liberty in a transit zone, the form of the order, its possible grounds and limits, the maximum duration of the confinement and, as required by Article 5 § 4, the applicable avenue of judicial appeal ( Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019, § 162). The requirement of lawfulness was an issue, for example, where the detention was based on an administrative circular ( Amuur v. France, 1996, where the legal basis was not accessible to the public ( Nolan and K. v. Russia, and Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016: readmission agreement) or where no maximum period of detention was laid down in legislation ( Mathloom v. Greece, 2012). In Nabil and Others v. Hungary, 2015, the domestic courts had not duly assessed whether the conditions set out in domestic law for the prolongation of the detention - falling under the second limb of Article 5 § 1(f) - were met.","Detention under the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) must be compatible with the overall purpose and requirements of Article 5, notably its lawfulness, including the obligation to conform to the Saadi v. the United Kingdom substantive and procedural rules of national law ( [GC], 2008, § 67; for an example where the lawfulness requirement was not met, see Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 97-108). While a test of the necessity of the detention is not, as such, required under Article 5 § 1(f), such test may be required under domestic legislation when, for example, transposing EUlaw ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, § 111, and Muhammad Saqawat v. Belgium, 2020, §§ 47-49). In the case of massive arrivals of asylum-seekers at State borders, subject to the prohibition of arbitrariness, the lawfulness requirement of Article 5 may be considered generally satisfied by a domestic legal regime that provides, for example, for no more than the name of the authority competent to order deprivation of liberty in a transit zone, the form of the order, its possible grounds and limits, the maximum duration of the confinement and, as required by Article 5 § 4, the applicable avenue of Z.A. and Others v. Russia judicial appeal ( [GC], 2019, § 162)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-09-04,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json,apps:62116/12,Nabil and Others v. Hungary,62116/12,removed,"Nabil and Others v. Hungary, no. 62116/12, 22 September 2015",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.C.1,Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention : General principles,3,30,32,0.9338,"J.R. and Others v. Greece , 2018|Muhammad Saqawat v. Belgium, 2020","Amuur v. France , 1996|In Nabil and Others v. Hungary , 2015|Mathloom v. Greece , 2012|Muhammad Saqawat v. Belgium , 2020|O.M. v. Hungary , 2016|Suso Musa v. Malta , 2013","Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention allows States to control the liberty of aliens in an immigration context in two different situations: the first limb of that provision permits the detention of an asylum- seeker or other immigrant prior to the State's grant of authorisation to enter (for the second limb, see section "" Restrictions of freedom of movement and detention for purposes of removal "" below). The question as to when the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) ceases to apply, because the individual has been granted formal authorisation to enter or stay, is largely dependent on national law ( Suso Musa v. Malta, 2013, § 97; see also O.M. v. Hungary, 2016, where the detention of the asylum-seeking applicant was consequently examined under Article 5 § 1(b), since domestic law created a more favourable position than required by the Convention, with the result that the Court did not consider it necessary to address the lawfulness of the detention under Article 5 § 1(f); and Muhammad Saqawat v. Belgium, 2020, §§ 47 and 49, as to the impact of EUlaw on domestic law). Such detention must be compatible with the overall purpose and requirements of Article 5, notably its lawfulness, including the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law. However, compliance with domestic law is not sufficient, since a deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still be arbitrary ( Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 67). In the case of massive arrivals of asylum-seekers at State borders, subject to the prohibition of arbitrariness, the lawfulness requirement of Article 5 may be considered generally satisfied by a domestic legal regime that provides, for example, for no more than the name of the authority competent to order deprivation of liberty in a transit zone, the form of the order, its possible grounds and limits, the maximum duration of the confinement and, as required by Article 5 § 4, the applicable avenue of judicial appeal ( Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019, § 162). The requirement of lawfulness was an issue, for example, where the detention was based on an administrative circular ( Amuur v. France, 1996, where the legal basis was not accessible to the public ( Nolan and K. v. Russia, and Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016: readmission agreement) or where no maximum period of detention was laid down in legislation ( Mathloom v. Greece, 2012). In Nabil and Others v. Hungary, 2015, the domestic courts had not duly assessed whether the conditions set out in domestic law for the prolongation of the detention - falling under the second limb of Article 5 § 1(f) - were met.","Detention under the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) must be compatible with the overall purpose and requirements of Article 5, notably its lawfulness, including the obligation to conform to the Saadi v. the United Kingdom substantive and procedural rules of national law ( [GC], 2008, § 67; for an example where the lawfulness requirement was not met, see Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 97-108). While a test of the necessity of the detention is not, as such, required under Article 5 § 1(f), such test may be required under domestic legislation when, for example, transposing EUlaw ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, § 111, and Muhammad Saqawat v. Belgium, 2020, §§ 47-49). In the case of massive arrivals of asylum-seekers at State borders, subject to the prohibition of arbitrariness, the lawfulness requirement of Article 5 may be considered generally satisfied by a domestic legal regime that provides, for example, for no more than the name of the authority competent to order deprivation of liberty in a transit zone, the form of the order, its possible grounds and limits, the maximum duration of the confinement and, as required by Article 5 § 4, the applicable avenue of Z.A. and Others v. Russia judicial appeal ( [GC], 2019, § 162)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-09-04,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json,apps:2512/04,Nolan and K. v. Russia,2512/04,removed,"Nolan and K. v. Russia, no. 2512/04, 12 February 2009",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.C.1,Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention : General principles,3,30,32,0.9338,"J.R. and Others v. Greece , 2018|Muhammad Saqawat v. Belgium, 2020","Amuur v. France , 1996|In Nabil and Others v. Hungary , 2015|Mathloom v. Greece , 2012|Muhammad Saqawat v. Belgium , 2020|O.M. v. Hungary , 2016|Suso Musa v. Malta , 2013","Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention allows States to control the liberty of aliens in an immigration context in two different situations: the first limb of that provision permits the detention of an asylum- seeker or other immigrant prior to the State's grant of authorisation to enter (for the second limb, see section "" Restrictions of freedom of movement and detention for purposes of removal "" below). The question as to when the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) ceases to apply, because the individual has been granted formal authorisation to enter or stay, is largely dependent on national law ( Suso Musa v. Malta, 2013, § 97; see also O.M. v. Hungary, 2016, where the detention of the asylum-seeking applicant was consequently examined under Article 5 § 1(b), since domestic law created a more favourable position than required by the Convention, with the result that the Court did not consider it necessary to address the lawfulness of the detention under Article 5 § 1(f); and Muhammad Saqawat v. Belgium, 2020, §§ 47 and 49, as to the impact of EUlaw on domestic law). Such detention must be compatible with the overall purpose and requirements of Article 5, notably its lawfulness, including the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law. However, compliance with domestic law is not sufficient, since a deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still be arbitrary ( Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 67). In the case of massive arrivals of asylum-seekers at State borders, subject to the prohibition of arbitrariness, the lawfulness requirement of Article 5 may be considered generally satisfied by a domestic legal regime that provides, for example, for no more than the name of the authority competent to order deprivation of liberty in a transit zone, the form of the order, its possible grounds and limits, the maximum duration of the confinement and, as required by Article 5 § 4, the applicable avenue of judicial appeal ( Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC], 2019, § 162). The requirement of lawfulness was an issue, for example, where the detention was based on an administrative circular ( Amuur v. France, 1996, where the legal basis was not accessible to the public ( Nolan and K. v. Russia, and Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016: readmission agreement) or where no maximum period of detention was laid down in legislation ( Mathloom v. Greece, 2012). In Nabil and Others v. Hungary, 2015, the domestic courts had not duly assessed whether the conditions set out in domestic law for the prolongation of the detention - falling under the second limb of Article 5 § 1(f) - were met.","Detention under the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) must be compatible with the overall purpose and requirements of Article 5, notably its lawfulness, including the obligation to conform to the Saadi v. the United Kingdom substantive and procedural rules of national law ( [GC], 2008, § 67; for an example where the lawfulness requirement was not met, see Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 97-108). While a test of the necessity of the detention is not, as such, required under Article 5 § 1(f), such test may be required under domestic legislation when, for example, transposing EUlaw ( J.R. and Others v. Greece, 2018, § 111, and Muhammad Saqawat v. Belgium, 2020, §§ 47-49). In the case of massive arrivals of asylum-seekers at State borders, subject to the prohibition of arbitrariness, the lawfulness requirement of Article 5 may be considered generally satisfied by a domestic legal regime that provides, for example, for no more than the name of the authority competent to order deprivation of liberty in a transit zone, the form of the order, its possible grounds and limits, the maximum duration of the confinement and, as required by Article 5 § 4, the applicable avenue of Z.A. and Others v. Russia judicial appeal ( [GC], 2019, § 162)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-09-04,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json,apps:2512/04,Nolan and K. v. Russia,2512/04,removed,"Nolan and K. v. Russia, no. 2512/04, 12 February 2009",2,paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved,III.E,Article 9,2,95,97,,,,"In so far as a measure relating to the continuation of the applicant's residence in a given State is imposed in connection with the exercise of the right to freedom of religion, such measure may disclose an interference with Article 9 of the Convention (see Nolan and K. v. Russia, 2009, § 62). The enforced departure of lawfully resident foreign religious workers for reasons connected to their religious work has been found to breach Article 9 of the Convention ( Corley and Others v. Russia, 2021, §§ 79-89). Where an individual claimed that on return to his own country he would be impeded in his religious worship, the Court did not rule out the possibility that the responsibility of the returning State might in exceptional circumstances be engaged under Article 9 of the Convention where the person concerned ran a real risk of flagrant violation of that Article in the receiving State, but found that it would be difficult to visualise a case in which a sufficiently flagrant violation of Article 9 would not also involve treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention ( Z and T v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2006, and see M.A.M. v. Switzerland, 2022, § 84).","In so far as a measure relating to the continuation of the applicant's residence in a given State is imposed in connection with the exercise of the right to freedom of religion, such measure may disclose an interference with Article 9 of the Convention (see Nolan and K. v. Russia, 2009, § 62). The enforced departure of lawfully resident foreign religious workers for reasons connected to their religious work has been found to breach Article 9 of the Convention ( Corley and Others v. Russia, 2021, §§ 79-89). Where an individual claimed that on return to his own country he would be impeded in his religious worship, the Court did not rule out the possibility that the responsibility of the returning State might in exceptional circumstances be engaged under Article 9 of the Convention where the person concerned ran a real risk of flagrant violation of that Article in the receiving State, but found that it would be difficult to visualise a case in which a sufficiently flagrant violation of Article 9 would not also involve treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention ( Z and T v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2006, and see M.A.M. v. Switzerland, 2022, § 84)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-09-04,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json,apps:24650/19,O.R. v. Greece,24650/19,added,"O.R. v. Greece, no. 24650/19, 23 January 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.D.2,"Reception conditions, age-assessment procedures and freedom of movement",3,45,47,0.9979,"Camara v. Italy , 2022|M.A. v. Italy her situation and needs as a particularly vulnerable minor in , 2023|O.R. v. Greece , 2024|Others v. France , 2020|Serbia and Slovenia M.D. v. France , 2019","Darboe and Camara v. Italy , 2022|M.A. v. Italy , 2023|M.D. v. France , 2019|N.H. and Others v. France , 2020|N.T.P. and Others v. France , 2018","Article 3 cannot be interpreted as obliging the High Contracting Parties to provide everyone within their jurisdiction with a home ( Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 99). Nor does Article 3 entail any general obligation to give refugees financial assistance to enable them to maintain a certain standard of living ( Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], 2014, § 95). However, asylum-seekers are members of a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection and there exists a broad consensus at the international and European level concerning this need for special protection, as evidenced by the Geneva Convention, the remit and the activities of the UNHCR and the standards set out in the Reception Directive ( M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011, § 251). It may thus raise an issue under Article 3 if the asylum-seekers, including persons intending to lodge an asylum application, are not provided with accommodation and thus forced to live on the streets for months, with no resources or access to sanitary facilities, without any means of providing for their essential needs, in fear of assault from third parties and of expulsion ( ibid., §§ 235-264 and N.H. and Others v. France, 2020, both in respect of adults without health concerns and without children; contrast N.T.P. and Others v. France, 2018, where the applicants had been accommodated in a privately run shelter funded by the authorities and been given food and medical care and the children had been in school, and B.G. and Others v. France, 2020, where the applicants had temporarily stayed in a tented camp set up in a car park, with the authorities having taken measures to improve their material living conditions, in particular ensuring medical care, the children's schooling and their subsequent placement in a flat). States are obliged under Article 3 to protect and to take charge of unaccompanied children, which requires the authorities to identify them as such and to take measures to ensure their placement in adequate accommodation, even if the children do not lodge an asylum application in the respondent State, but intend to do so in another State, or to join family members there (see Khan v. France, 2019, concerning the situation in a makeshift camp in Calais; and Sh.D. and Others v. Greece, Austria, Croatia, Hungary, North Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia, 2019, in respect of the situation in a makeshift camp in Idomeni; see also M.D. v. France, 2019, regarding the reception of an asylum seeker who had identified himself as an unaccompanied minor, but in respect of whose actual age there were doubts). In Rahimi v. Greece, 2011, §§ 87-94, the Court also found a breach of Article 3 because the authorities did not offer the applicant, an unaccompanied child asylum-seeker, any assistance with accommodation following his release from detention. In R.R. and Others v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 48-65, the Court found breaches of Article 3 in view of the conditions to which the applicants were subjected during their stay in a transit zone (see also sections "" Confinement in transit zones and reception centres "" and "" Article 3 of the Convention: General principles "" and "" Children and adults with specific vulnerabilities "" above). The Court has found violations of Article 3 in cases where unaccompanied minor asylum-seekers were placed in reception centres for adults for several months (on account of the length and conditions of stay in Darboe and Camara v. Italy, 2022; on account of the centre, in which the particularly vulnerable applicant allegedly a victim of sexual abuse, was placed for eight months, not being equipped to provide her with appropriate psychological assistance, as well as the national authorities'prolonged inaction regarding her situation and needs as a particularly vulnerable minor in M.A. v. Italy, 2023).","Article 3 cannot be interpreted as obliging the High Contracting Parties to provide everyone within their jurisdiction with a home ( Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2001, § 99). Nor does Article 3 entail any general obligation to give refugees financial assistance to enable them to maintain a certain Tarakhel v. Switzerland standard of living ( [GC], 2014, § 95). However, asylum-seekers are members of a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection and there exists a broad consensus at the international and European level concerning this need for special protection, as evidenced by the Geneva Convention, the remit and the activities of the UNHCR and the standards set out in the Reception Directive ( M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011, § 251). It may thus raise an issue under Article 3 if the asylum-seekers, including persons intending to lodge an asylum application, are not provided with accommodation and thus forced to live on the streets for months, with no resources or access to sanitary facilities, without any means of providing for their ibid. N.H. and essential needs, in fear of assault from third parties and of expulsion (, §§ 235-264 and Others v. France, 2020, both in respect of adults without health concerns and without children, and O.R. v. Greece, 2024, in respect of an unaccompanied child asylum-seeker after he had lodged an N.T.P . and Others v. France asylum application; contrast, 2018, where the applicants had been accommodated in a privately run shelter funded by the authorities and been given food and medical care and the children had been in school, and B.G. and Others v. France, 2020, where the applicants had temporarily stayed in a tented camp set up in a car park, with the authorities having taken measures to improve their material living conditions, in particular ensuring medical care, the children's schooling and their subsequent placement in a flat). States are obliged under Article 3 to protect and to take charge of unaccompanied children, which requires the authorities to identify them as such and to take measures to ensure their placement in adequate accommodation, even if the children do not lodge an asylum application in the respondent State, but intend to do so in another State, or to join family members there (see Khan v. France, 2019, concerning the situation in a makeshift camp in Calais; and Sh.D. and Others v. Greece, Austria, Croatia, Hungary, North Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia M.D. v. France, 2019, in respect of the situation in a makeshift camp in Idomeni; see also, 2019, regarding the reception of an asylum seeker who had identified himself as an unaccompanied minor, but in respect of whose actual age there were doubts). In Rahimi v. Greece, 2011, §§ 87-94, the Court also found a breach of Article 3 because the authorities did not offer the applicant, an unaccompanied child asylum-seeker, any assistance with accommodation following his release from detention. In R.R. and Others v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 48-65, the Court found breaches of Article 3 in view of the conditions to which the applicants were subjected during their stay in a transit zone (see also sections ""Confinement in transit zones and reception centres"" and ""Article 3 of the Convention: General principles"" and ""Children and adults with specific vulnerabilities"" above). The Court has found violations of Article 3 in cases where unaccompanied minor asylum-seekers were placed in reception Darboe and centres for adults for several months (on account of the length and conditions of stay in Camara v. Italy, 2022; on account of the centre, in which the particularly vulnerable applicant allegedly a victim of sexual abuse, was placed for eight months, not being equipped to provide her with appropriate psychological assistance, as well as the national authorities' prolonged inaction regarding M.A. v. Italy her situation and needs as a particularly vulnerable minor in, 2023)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-09-04,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json,apps:56417/19|44245/20,S.S. and Others v. Hungary,56417/19|44245/20,added,"S.S. and Others v. Hungary, nos. 56417/19 and 44245/20, 12 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.A,Summary returns at the border and/or shortly after entry into the territory (“push-backs”),2,17,18,0.9868,"M.H. and Others v. Croatia A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia , 2021|S.S. and Others v. Hungary , 2023","A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia , 2022|Kebe and Others v. Ukraine , 2017|M.H. and Others v. Croatia , 2021","The Court has also examined cases in which border guards prevented persons from entering the respondent State's territory by not allowing them to disembark at a port ( Kebe and Others v. Ukraine, 2017) or at a land border checkpoint ( M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020) and either prevented the applicants from lodging an asylum application or, where they had submitted such applications, refused to accept them and to initiate asylum proceedings. It has also examined a number of cases concerning summary returns (""push - backs"") of migrants and/or asylum - seekers who had entered the respondent State in an unauthorised manner or had tried to do so ( N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020; Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021; D v. Bulgaria, 2021; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021; A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022), under Article 3 alone, under Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention, and/or under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 as well as under Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.","The Court has also examined cases in which border guards prevented persons from entering the Kebe and Others v. Ukraine respondent State's territory at a port (, 2017), at a land border checkpoint ( M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020) or at an airport ( S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023) and either prevented the applicants from lodging an asylum application or, where they had submitted such applications, refused to accept them and to initiate asylum proceedings. It has also examined a number of cases concerning summary returns (""push-backs"") of migrants and/or asylum-seekers who had entered the respondent State in an unauthorised manner or had tried to do so ( N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020; Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021; D v. Bulgaria, 2021; M.H. and Others v. Croatia A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2021;, 2022), under Article 3 alone, under Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention, and/or under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 as well as under Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-09-04,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json,apps:56417/19|44245/20,S.S. and Others v. Hungary,56417/19|44245/20,added,"S.S. and Others v. Hungary, nos. 56417/19 and 44245/20, 12 October 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.A.1,Article 3 of the Convention alone and/or in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention,3,18,19,0.9892,"S.S. and Others v. Hungary , 2023","O.M. and D.S. v. Ukraine , 2022","Where the applicants, who had presented themselves at the border seeking to lodge an asylum application and/or communicating fear for their safety, were removed in a summary manner to the third country from which they had sought to enter the respondent State's territory, the Court applied the principles which it had set out in Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, in respect of the obligations under Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the removal of asylum-seekers to third intermediary countries, without an assessment, by the authorities of the removing State, of the merits of their asylum claim (see section "" Removal to a third country "" below) . The Court found violations of Article 3 of the Convention (as well as, in certain cases, of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3) in these cases ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021; O.M. and D.S. v. Ukraine, 2022; for cases concerning similar factual scenarios, but predating Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, see M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018, and Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014). Where applicants can arguably claim that there is no guarantee that their asylum applications would be seriously examined by the authorities in the neighbouring third country and that their return to their country of origin could violate Article 3 of the Convention, the respondent State is obliged to allow the applicants to remain with its jurisdiction until such time that their claims have been properly reviewed by a competent domestic authority and cannot deny access to its territory to persons presenting themselves at a border checkpoint who allege that they may be subjected to ill-treatment if they remain on the territory of the neighbouring state, unless adequate measures are taken to eliminate such a risk ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 178-179). The Court added that the impugned measures did not fall within the respondent State's strict international legal obligations following from its membership in the European Union and that, consequently, the respondent State was fully responsible under the Convention for the impugned acts. More specifically, the Court found the provisions of European Union law embraced the principle of non-refoulement and applied it to persons who were subjected to border checks before being admitted to the territory of a Member States ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 180-182; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 65-67).","Where the applicants, who had presented themselves at the border seeking to lodge an asylum application and/or communicating fear for their safety, were removed in a summary manner to the third country from which they had sought to enter the respondent State's territory, the Court applied the principles which it had set out in Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, in respect of the obligations under Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the removal of asylum-seekers to third intermediary countries, without an assessment, by the authorities of the removing State, of the merits of their asylum claim (see section ""Removal to a third country"" below). The Court found violations of Article 3 of the Convention (as well as, in certain cases, of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article M.K. and Others v. Poland D.A. and Others v. Poland O.M. and D.S. 3) in these cases (, 2020;, 2021; v. Ukraine, 2022; S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023; for cases concerning similar factual scenarios, but predating Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, see M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018, and Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014), including where domestic law provided that asylum applications could not be lodged at the border crossing point (airport) at which the applicants presented themselves but could only be lodged at a land border transit zone ( S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 62-63). Where applicants can arguably claim that there is no guarantee that their asylum applications would be seriously examined by the authorities in the neighbouring third country and that their return to their country of origin could violate Article 3 of the Convention, the respondent State is obliged to allow the applicants to remain with its jurisdiction until such time that their claims have been properly reviewed by a competent domestic authority and cannot deny access to its territory to persons presenting themselves at a border checkpoint who allege that they may be subjected to ill-treatment if they remain on the territory of the neighbouring state, unless adequate measures are taken to eliminate such a risk ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 178-179). The Court added that the impugned measures did not fall within the respondent State's strict international legal obligations following from its membership in the European Union and that, consequently, the respondent State was fully responsible under the Convention for the impugned acts. More specifically, the Court found the provisions of European Union law embraced the principle of non-refoulement and applied it to persons who were subjected to border checks before being admitted to the territory of a Member States ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 180-182; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 65-67)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-09-04,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json,apps:56417/19|44245/20,S.S. and Others v. Hungary,56417/19|44245/20,added,"S.S. and Others v. Hungary, nos. 56417/19 and 44245/20, 12 October 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.A.2,Article 4 of Protocol No. 4,3,23,24,0.9913,"M.A. and Others v. Latvia 2021|Others v. Italy , 2023|S.S. and Others v. Hungary , 2023","D.A. and Others v. Poland , 2021|J.A. and Others v. Italy , 2023","Where migrants entered the respondent State's territory in an unauthorised manner and, following their apprehension near the border, were provided with access to means of legal entry through the appropriate border procedure, the Court did not apply the aforementioned two-tier test, but instead assessed - in order to determine whether the expulsion was ""collective"" in nature - whether the individuals were afforded, prior to the adoption of expulsion orders, an effective possibility of submitting arguments against their removal and whether there were sufficient guarantees demonstrating that their personal circumstances had been genuinely and individually taken into account ( Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, § 62). Such test is, essentially, similar to the one applied to individuals who present themselves at a point of legal entry, such as a border checkpoint (see M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 204-211, D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-84, and M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69). Whether the requirements of this test are satisfied is a question of fact, which is to be determined by having regard to, in so far as pertinent in a given case, supporting evidence provided by the parties, including as to whether an identification process was conducted and under what conditions (whether persons were trained to conduct interviews, whether information was provided, in a language the individuals understood, about the possibility to lodge an asylum application and to request legal aid, whether interpreters were present, and whether the individuals were able, in practice, to consult lawyers and to lodge asylum applications) as well as to independent reports ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 185; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014, §§ 214-225; Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 245-254; Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, §§ 63-71; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 206-210; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-83; M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69). For an example of a case where individuals, who did not intend to seek asylum in the respondent State, were removed in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 after having been detained for ten days in a ""hotspot"" for the registration and identification of migrants from the moment of their arrival in the respondent State, see J.A. and Others v. Italy, 2023, §§ 47 and 106-116.","Where migrants entered the respondent State's territory in an unauthorised manner and, following their apprehension near the border, were provided with access to means of legal entry through the appropriate border procedure, the Court did not apply the aforementioned two-tier test, but instead assessed - in order to determine whether the expulsion was ""collective"" in nature - whether the individuals were afforded, prior to the adoption of expulsion orders, an effective possibility of submitting arguments against their removal and whether there were sufficient guarantees demonstrating that their personal circumstances had been genuinely and individually taken into account ( Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, § 62). Such test is, essentially, similar to the one applied to individuals who present themselves at a point of legal entry, such as a border M.K. and Others v. Poland D.A. and Others v. Poland checkpoint (see, 2020, §§ 204-211,, 2021, §§ 81-84, and M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69) or at an airport (see S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 48-51, where the Court considered that it did not absolve the authorities of their obligation under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 that the applicants had initially sought to enter the respondent State by using counterfeit documents). Whether the requirements of this test are satisfied is a question of fact, which is to be determined by having regard to, in so far as pertinent in a given case, supporting evidence provided by the parties, including as to whether an identification process was conducted and under what conditions (whether persons were trained to conduct interviews, whether information was provided, in a language the individuals understood, about the possibility to lodge an asylum application and to request legal aid, whether interpreters were present, and whether the individuals were able, in practice, to consult lawyers and to lodge asylum applications) as well as to independent reports ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 185; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014, §§ 214-225; Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 245-254; Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, §§ 63-71; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 206-210; D.A. and Others v. Poland, M.A. and Others v. Latvia 2021, §§ 81-83; (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69). For an example of a case where individuals, who did not intend to seek asylum in the respondent State, were removed in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 after having been detained for ten days in a ""hotspot"" for the registration J.A. and and identification of migrants from the moment of their arrival in the respondent State, see Others v. Italy, 2023, §§ 47 and 106-116."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-09-04,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json,apps:37967/18,Shahzad v. Hungary (no. 2),37967/18,added,"Shahzad v. Hungary (no. 2), no. 37967/18, 5 October 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.C,Transfers preceding the removal and the removal itself,2,,110,,"A.E. and Others v. Italy , 2023|Thuo v. Cyprus , 2017",,,"The Court has found violations of the substantive limb of Article 3 on account of ill-treatment inflicted by public officials in connection with or during the (attempted) deportation process (see A.E. and Others v. Italy, 2023, §§ 91-94, and Shahzad v. Hungary (no. 2), 2023, §§ 72-80). It has also found violations of the procedural limb of Article 3 due to the authorities' failure to investigate effectively the applicants' complaints about alleged ill-treatment in connection with or during the deportation process (see Thuo v. Cyprus, 2017, and Shahzad v. Hungary (no. 2), 2023, §§ 55-65; see also section ""Obligations to prevent harm and to carry out an effective investigation in other migrant-specific situations"" below)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-09-04,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json,apps:18787/17,W.A. and Others v. Italy,18787/17,added,"W.A. and Others v. Italy, no. 18787/17, 16 November 2023",1,citation_field_name_match,citation_updated,II.A.2,Article 4 of Protocol No. 4,3,23,24,0.9913,"M.A. and Others v. Latvia 2021|Others v. Italy , 2023|S.S. and Others v. Hungary , 2023","D.A. and Others v. Poland , 2021|J.A. and Others v. Italy , 2023","Where migrants entered the respondent State's territory in an unauthorised manner and, following their apprehension near the border, were provided with access to means of legal entry through the appropriate border procedure, the Court did not apply the aforementioned two-tier test, but instead assessed - in order to determine whether the expulsion was ""collective"" in nature - whether the individuals were afforded, prior to the adoption of expulsion orders, an effective possibility of submitting arguments against their removal and whether there were sufficient guarantees demonstrating that their personal circumstances had been genuinely and individually taken into account ( Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, § 62). Such test is, essentially, similar to the one applied to individuals who present themselves at a point of legal entry, such as a border checkpoint (see M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 204-211, D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-84, and M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69). Whether the requirements of this test are satisfied is a question of fact, which is to be determined by having regard to, in so far as pertinent in a given case, supporting evidence provided by the parties, including as to whether an identification process was conducted and under what conditions (whether persons were trained to conduct interviews, whether information was provided, in a language the individuals understood, about the possibility to lodge an asylum application and to request legal aid, whether interpreters were present, and whether the individuals were able, in practice, to consult lawyers and to lodge asylum applications) as well as to independent reports ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 185; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014, §§ 214-225; Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 245-254; Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, §§ 63-71; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 206-210; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-83; M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69). For an example of a case where individuals, who did not intend to seek asylum in the respondent State, were removed in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 after having been detained for ten days in a ""hotspot"" for the registration and identification of migrants from the moment of their arrival in the respondent State, see J.A. and Others v. Italy, 2023, §§ 47 and 106-116.","Where migrants entered the respondent State's territory in an unauthorised manner and, following their apprehension near the border, were provided with access to means of legal entry through the appropriate border procedure, the Court did not apply the aforementioned two-tier test, but instead assessed - in order to determine whether the expulsion was ""collective"" in nature - whether the individuals were afforded, prior to the adoption of expulsion orders, an effective possibility of submitting arguments against their removal and whether there were sufficient guarantees demonstrating that their personal circumstances had been genuinely and individually taken into account ( Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, § 62). Such test is, essentially, similar to the one applied to individuals who present themselves at a point of legal entry, such as a border M.K. and Others v. Poland D.A. and Others v. Poland checkpoint (see, 2020, §§ 204-211,, 2021, §§ 81-84, and M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69) or at an airport (see S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 48-51, where the Court considered that it did not absolve the authorities of their obligation under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 that the applicants had initially sought to enter the respondent State by using counterfeit documents). Whether the requirements of this test are satisfied is a question of fact, which is to be determined by having regard to, in so far as pertinent in a given case, supporting evidence provided by the parties, including as to whether an identification process was conducted and under what conditions (whether persons were trained to conduct interviews, whether information was provided, in a language the individuals understood, about the possibility to lodge an asylum application and to request legal aid, whether interpreters were present, and whether the individuals were able, in practice, to consult lawyers and to lodge asylum applications) as well as to independent reports ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 185; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014, §§ 214-225; Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 245-254; Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, §§ 63-71; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 206-210; D.A. and Others v. Poland, M.A. and Others v. Latvia 2021, §§ 81-83; (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69). For an example of a case where individuals, who did not intend to seek asylum in the respondent State, were removed in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 after having been detained for ten days in a ""hotspot"" for the registration J.A. and and identification of migrants from the moment of their arrival in the respondent State, see Others v. Italy, 2023, §§ 47 and 106-116."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240331051847__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-03-31,2024-09-04,31 August 2023,29 February 2024,2023-08-31,2024-02-29,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-03-31__2024-09-04.json,apps:18787/17,W.A. and Others v. Italy,18787/17,added,"W.A. and Others v. Italy, no. 18787/17, 16 November 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,VI.E,Investigative measures to clarify the facts of the case,2,120,125,0.6848,"In W.A. and Others v. Italy , 2023",,"In N.A. v. Finland (revision), 2021, the Court revised and annulled its earlier judgment in that case - in which it had found that the removal of the applicant's father to Iraq had breached Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention - in its entirety and rejected the application as an abuse of the right of individual application under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, after it subsequently came to light that the documents regarding the death of the applicant's father had been forged and that he was alive in Iraq. The Court similarly found that it amounted to an abuse of the right of application where an applicant, who had alleged that his lengthy detention with a view to him being deported to his country of origin had not been justified under Article 5 § 1 (f), had claimed to be of another nationality and had refused to cooperate in order to clarify his identity, while the authorities intending to remove him were in contact over a lengthy period with their counterparts in the alleged country of nationality, and who had also tried to deceive the Court as to his nationality (see Bencheref v. Sweden (dec.), 2017).","In W.A. and Others v. Italy, 2023, the Government submitted that the applicants were not, in fact, and as they alleged, part of a group of persons removed from the respondent State. The Court requested, under Rule A1 §§ 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court, an expert report on facial comparison from the police of another member State to assess whether the applicants, as named in the application forms and depicted in the photographs and video material provided by their representatives, were among the persons removed from the respondent State, in view of the photographs and names of the persons removed provided by the Government."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:2559/23,A.B. and Y.W. v. Malta*,2559/23,added,"A.B. and Y.W. v. Malta*, no. 2559/23, 4 February 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,III.A.3,Procedural aspects,3,69,72,0.9814,"I.M. v. France , 2012|M.K. and Others v. Poland , 2020","A.M. v. the Netherlands M.K. and Others v. Poland , 2016","Where the individual has an ""arguable complaint"" that his removal would expose him to treatment contrary to Article 2 or 3 of the Convention, he must have an effective remedy, in practice as well as in law, at the domestic level in accordance with Article 13 of the Convention, which imperatively requires, inter alia, independent and rigorous scrutiny of any claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 and automatic M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece suspensive effect ( [GC], 2011, § 293: for an overview of the Court's case- law as to the requirements under Article 13 taken in conjunction with Articles 2 or 3 in removal cases, see, in particular, ibid., §§ 286-322; Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, 2009, §§ 107-117; Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France I.M. v. France Chahal v. the United, 2007, §§ 53-67;, 2012; Kingdom [GC], 1996, §§ 147-154; Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2005, § 460). The same principles apply when considering the question of effectiveness of remedies which have to be exhausted for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention in asylum cases ( A.M. v. the Netherlands M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2016, §§ 63 and 65-69; see also, 2020, §§ 142-148 and 212-220, in respect of an immediate removal at a border crossing point). In respect of asylum-seekers the Court has found, in particular, that individuals need to have adequate information about the asylum procedure to be followed and their entitlements in a language they understand, and have access to a reliable communication system with the authorities: the Court also has regard to the availability of interpreters, whether the interviews are conducted by trained staff, whether asylum-seekers have access to legal aid, and requires that asylum-seekers be given the reasons for the decision (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011, §§ 300-302, 304, and 306-310; see also Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, 2009; Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 204; and D v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 120-137).","Where the individual has an ""arguable complaint"" that his removal would expose him to treatment contrary to Article 2 or 3 of the Convention, he must have an effective remedy, in practice as well as in law, at the domestic level in accordance with Article 13 of the Convention, which imperatively requires, inter alia, independent and rigorous scrutiny of any claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 and automatic suspensive effect ( M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011, § 293: for an overview of the Court's case-law as to the requirements under Article 13 taken in conjunction with Articles 2 or 3 in removal cases, see, in particular, ibid., §§ 286-322; Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, 2009, §§ 107-117; Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, 2007, §§ 53-67; I.M. v. France, 2012; Chahal v. the United Kingdom [GC], 1996, §§ 147-154; Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, 2005, § 460). The same principles apply when considering the question of effectiveness of remedies which have to be exhausted for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention in asylum cases ( A.M. v. the Netherlands, 2016, §§ 63 and 65-69; see also M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 142-148 and 212-220, in respect of an immediate removal at a border crossing point). In respect of asylum-seekers the Court has found, in particular, that individuals need to have adequate information about the asylum procedure to be followed and their entitlements in a language they understand, and have access to a reliable communication system with the authorities: the Court also has regard to the availability of interpreters, whether the interviews are conducted by trained staff, whether asylum-seekers have access to legal aid, and requires that asylum-seekers be given the reasons for the decision (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011, §§ 300-302, 304, and 306-310; see also Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, 2009; Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 204; and D v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 120-137). Where an individual has exhausted the relevant remedy against his removal, which did not entail a fresh assessment of the Article 3 risks notwithstanding the competence of the relevant authority, the individual is not required to lodge a (subsequent) asylum application to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of the complaint that the removal, without a fresh risk assessment, would be in breach of Article 3 of the Convention ( A.B. and Y.W. v. Malta*, 2025, §§ 45, 68 and 74)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:15457/20,A.C. v. France*,15457/20,added,"A.C. v. France*, no. 15457/20, 16 January 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.D.2,"Reception conditions, age-assessment procedures and freedom of movement",3,48,51,0.9946,,,"In Darboe and Camara v. Italy, 2022, the Court found Article 8 to be applicable to age-assessment procedures for migrants requesting international protection and claiming to be minors (in respect of requirements for the presumption of minority of individuals claiming to be minors to apply and the duration of its applicability see ""Children and adults with specific vulnerabilities"" above). The age of a person was a means of personal identification and the procedure to assess the age of an individual alleging to be a minor, including its procedural safeguards, was essential in order to guarantee to him or her all the rights deriving from his or her status as a minor, particularly so in view of the importance of age-assessment procedures in the migration context. Determining whether an individual was a minor was the first step to recognising his or her rights and putting into place all necessary care arrangements. If a minor were wrongly identified as an adult, serious measures in breach of his or her rights might be taken (§§ 121-126). While the assessment of an individual's age might be a necessary step in the event of doubt as to his or her minor status, sufficient procedural guarantees had to accompany the procedure including the appointment of a legal representative or guardian, access to a lawyer as well as the informed participation of the person who age was in doubt concerned in the procedure (§§ 142-157). The Court found that the authorities' failure to promptly appoint a legal guardian or representative for the applicant prevented him from duly and effectively submitting an asylum request and that the applicant, although he had stated that he was a minor, had been placed in an overcrowded reception centre for adults for more than four months because the authorities had failed to apply the presumption of minority (this presumption being an inherent element of the protection of the right to respect for private life of a foreign unaccompanied individual declaring to be a minor), and because of shortcomings in the procedural guarantees afforded to the applicant in the age-assessment process (no information as to the type of age-assessment procedure he was undergoing and its possible consequences; no service of the medical report, which failed to indicate a margin of error; and no judicial decision or administrative measure concluding that the applicant was of adult age, which made it impossible for him to lodge an appeal). The Court therefore found a violation of Article 8 on account of the authorities' failure to act with the necessary diligence to comply with their positive obligation to protect the applicant as an unaccompanied minor requesting international protection.","In Darboe and Camara v. Italy, 2022, the Court found Article 8 to be applicable to age-assessment procedures for migrants requesting international protection and claiming to be minors (in respect of requirements for the presumption of minority of individuals claiming to be minors to apply and the duration of its applicability see "" Children and adults with specific vulnerabilities "" above) . The age of a person was a means of personal identification and the procedure to assess the age of an individual alleging to be a minor, including its procedural safeguards, was essential in order to guarantee to him or her all the rights deriving from his or her status as a minor, particularly so in view of the importance of age-assessment procedures in the migration context. Determining whether an individual was a minor was the first step to recognising his or her rights and putting into place all necessary care arrangements. If a minor were wrongly identified as an adult, serious measures in breach of his or her rights might be taken (§§ 121-126). While the assessment of an individual's age might be a necessary step in the event of doubt as to his or her minor status, sufficient procedural guarantees had to accompany the procedure including the appointment of a legal representative or guardian, access to a lawyer as well as the informed participation of the person who age was in doubt concerned in the procedure (§§ 142-157). The Court found that the authorities'failure to promptly appoint a legal guardian or representative for the applicant prevented him from duly and effectively submitting an asylum request and that the applicant, although he had stated that he was a minor, had been placed in an overcrowded reception centre for adults for more than four months because the authorities had failed to apply the presumption of minority (this presumption being an inherent element of the protection of the right to respect for private life of a foreign unaccompanied individual declaring to be a minor), and because of shortcomings in the procedural guarantees afforded to the applicant in the age-assessment process (no information as to the type of age-assessment procedure he was undergoing and its possible consequences; no service of the medical report, which failed to indicate a margin of error; and no judicial decision or administrative measure concluding that the applicant was of adult age, which made it impossible for him to lodge an appeal). The Court therefore found a violation of Article 8 on account of the authorities'failure to act with the necessary diligence to comply with their positive obligation to protect the applicant as an unaccompanied minor requesting international protection. In A.C. v. France *, 2025, the Court found that the domestic authorities'refusal to recognise the applicant, who had not tried to apply for international protection, as an unaccompanied minor, depriving him of the corresponding guarantees provided by law, had breached Article 8, in view of shortcomings in the age-assessment proceedings."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:22283/21,A.D. and Others v. Sweden,22283/21,added,"A.D. and Others v. Sweden, no. 22283/21, 7 May 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.A.1,Scope and substantive aspects of the Court ’ s assessment under Articles 2 and 3 in asylum-related removal cases,3,60,63,0.9965,"A.D. and Others v. Sweden , 2024",,"As regards the distribution of the burden of proof, the Court clarified in J.K. and Others v. Sweden [GC], 2016, §§ 91-98, that it is the shared duty of an asylum-seeker and the immigration authorities to ascertain and evaluate all relevant facts in asylum proceedings. On the one hand, the burden remains on asylum-seekers as regards their own personal circumstances, although the Court recognised that it was important to take into account all of the difficulties which asylum-seekers may encounter in collecting evidence, which frequently makes it necessary to give them the benefit of the doubt when assessing the credibility of their statements and the documents submitted in support thereof. Yet when information is presented which gives strong reasons to question the veracity of an asylum- seeker's submissions, the individual must provide a satisfactory explanation for the alleged inaccuracies in those submissions. Even if the applicant's account of some details may appear somewhat implausible, the Court has considered that this does not necessarily detract from the overall general credibility of the applicant's claim. The Court also recognised that not being assisted by a legal representative, not having access to an interpreter and not speaking the language in which the proceedings were conducted considerably affected the ability of the applicants to present their case ( M.D. and Others v. Russia, 2021, § 92, where the applicants were subsequently assisted by legal representatives and then made substantiated submissions, §§ 93-96). On the other hand, the general situation in another State, including the ability of its public authorities to provide protection, had to be established proprio motu by the competent domestic immigration authorities ( J.K. and Others v. Sweden [GC], 2016, § 98, and see, for example, B and C v. Switzerland, 2020, in respect of the domestic authorities' obligation to assess the availability of State protection against harm emanating from non-State actors and the assessment of the risks of ill-treatment in the country of origin for the applicant as a homosexual person, and M.D. and Others v. Russia, 2021, §§ 97-101, where the applicants' inability to present their case, the fact that they had fled from a war-torn country and the security risks in that country had come to the attention of the domestic courts, which were thus obliged to ascertain and take into consideration information relating to the country of origin from reliable and objective sources and to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the risks the applicants would face upon their forced return).","As regards the distribution of the burden of proof, the Court clarified in J.K. and Others v. Sweden [GC], 2016, §§ 91-98, that it is the shared duty of an asylum-seeker and the immigration authorities to ascertain and evaluate all relevant facts in asylum proceedings. On the one hand, the burden remains on asylum-seekers as regards their own personal circumstances, although the Court recognised that it was important to take into account all of the difficulties which asylum-seekers may encounter in collecting evidence, which frequently makes it necessary to give them the benefit of the doubt when assessing the credibility of their statements and the documents submitted in support thereof. Yet when information is presented which gives strong reasons to question the veracity of an asylum-seeker's submissions, the individual must provide a satisfactory explanation for the alleged inaccuracies in those submissions. Even if the applicant's account of some details may appear somewhat implausible, the Court has considered that this does not necessarily detract from the overall general credibility of the applicant's claim. The Court also recognised that not being assisted by a legal representative, not having access to an interpreter and not speaking the language in which the proceedings were conducted considerably affected the ability of the applicants to present their case ( M.D. and Others v. Russia, 2021, § 92, where the applicants were subsequently assisted by legal representatives and then made substantiated submissions, §§ 93-96). On the other hand, the general situation in another State, including the ability of its public authorities to provide protection, had to be established proprio motu by the competent domestic immigration authorities ( J.K. and Others v. Sweden [GC], 2016, § 98, and see, for example, B and C v. Switzerland, 2020, in respect of the domestic authorities'obligation to assess the availability of State protection against harm emanating from non-State actors and the assessment of the risks of ill-treatment in the country of origin for the applicant as a homosexual person, M.D. and Others v. Russia, 2021, §§ 97-101, where the applicants'inability to present their case, the fact that they had fled from a war-torn country and the security risks in that country had come to the attention of the domestic courts, which were thus obliged to ascertain and take into consideration information relating to the country of origin from reliable and objective sources and to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the risks the applicants would face upon their forced return; and A.D. and Others v. Sweden, 2024, §§ 67-78, where the Court saw no reason to depart from the domestic authorities'assessment as to the ability and willingness of the authorities in the country of origin to provide protection against non-state actors)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:15783/21,A.R.E. v. Greece*,15783/21,added,"A.R.E. v. Greece*, no. 15783/21, 7 January 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.A,Summary returns at the border and/or shortly after entry into the territory (“push - backs”),2,18,21,0.9507,"A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia , 2022|Kebe and Others v. Ukraine , 2017|M.H. and Others v. Croatia , 2021","M.H. and Others v. Croatia A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia , 2021","The Court has also examined cases in which border guards prevented persons from entering the Kebe and Others v. Ukraine respondent State's territory at a port (, 2017), at a land border checkpoint ( M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020) or at an airport ( S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023) and either prevented the applicants from lodging an asylum application or, where they had submitted such applications, refused to accept them and to initiate asylum proceedings. It has also examined a number of cases concerning summary returns (""push-backs"") of migrants and/or asylum-seekers who had entered the respondent State in an unauthorised manner or had tried to do so ( N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020; Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021; D v. Bulgaria, 2021; M.H. and Others v. Croatia A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2021;, 2022), under Article 3 alone, under Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention, and/or under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 as well as under Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.","The Court has also examined cases in which border guards prevented persons from entering the respondent State's territory at a port ( Kebe and Others v. Ukraine, 2017), at a land border checkpoint ( M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020) or at an airport ( S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023) and either prevented the applicants from lodging an asylum application or, where they had submitted such applications, refused to accept them and to initiate asylum proceedings. It has also examined a number of cases concerning summary returns (""push - backs"") of migrants and/or asylum-seekers who had entered the respondent State in an unauthorised manner or had tried to do so ( N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020; Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021; D v. Bulgaria, 2021; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021; A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022), under Article 3 alone, under Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention, and/or under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 as well as under Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4. Where the presence of the applicants on the respondent States territory and/or their alleged removal was disputed, it has to be ascertained whether the applicants furnished prima facie evidence in support of their version of events; if that is the case, the burden of proof should shift to the Government (see N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, §§ 85-88, and M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 268-275 for cases concerning Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, as well as A.R.E. v. Greece*, 2025, §§ 216-221 and 230-267, and G.R.J. v. Greece (dec.), 2024, for cases concerning Article 3 of the Convention)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:15783/21,A.R.E. v. Greece*,15783/21,added,"A.R.E. v. Greece*, no. 15783/21, 7 January 2025",2,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1,Article 3 of the Convention alone and/or in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention,3,21,24,0.9931,"In D v. Bulgaria , 2021",,"So far, the Court has adjudicated only one case concerning a summary return to the country of origin shortly after the applicant's entry into the respondent State's territory ( D v. Bulgaria, 2021). The applicant was part of a group of people, who had entered Bulgaria in an unauthorised manner, hiding inside a truck and wishing to transit through the country en route to Western Europe. The group was not discovered upon entry but only when the truck, having crossed through the Bulgarian territory, sought to cross the border between Bulgaria and Romania. The Romanian officials arrested all passengers, prohibited them from entering Romania and handed them over to Bulgarian officials, who detained them. It applied a two-tier test in respect of the applicant's complaint under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention (§§ 107 and 118): It examined, first, whether the applicant had sought, at least in substance, international protection by expressing to the authorities of the respondent State, prior to his removal, his fears of treatment contrary to Article 3 if he were returned to his country of origin. If the first question were answered in the affirmative, it had to be determined, as a second step, whether the authorities of the respondent State had adequately examined these risks, in a procedure in accordance with the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention, prior to returning him to his country of origin. This requires independent and rigorous scrutiny of the complaint and the possibility of suspending the implementation of the removal pending same (§ 116). In this connection, the Court reiterated the importance of guaranteeing anyone subject to a removal measure the right to obtain sufficient information to enable them to gain effective access to the relevant procedures and to substantiate their complaints (idem). In finding that the applicant had expressed his fears to the Bulgarian border police that he - as a former journalist for a Turkish newspaper and in view of the conditions prevailing in Turkey in the aftermath of the attempted coup d'état - would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if returned to Turkey, the Court did not consider it decisive that the file did not contain a written document by which the applicant had explicitly requested international protection. It had regard to the linguistic obstacles - emphasising the importance of interpretation for accessing asylum procedures -, the lack of involvement of a lawyer, the content of the applicant's statements to the border police, which had not been contested, and the conditions prevailing in Turkey at the relevant time, including in respect of journalists (§§ 120-128). The Court concluded that the Bulgarian authorities, who had hastily returned the applicant to Turkey without instituting proceedings for international protection, had removed him without examining the Article 3 risks he faced and had rendered the available remedies ineffective in practice, in breach of Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention (§§ 129-137).","So far, the Court has adjudicated only few cases concerning a summary return to the country of origin shortly after the applicant's entry into the respondent State's territory ( D v. Bulgaria, 2021; A.R.E. v. Greece*, 2025).In D v. Bulgaria, 2021, the applicant was part of a group of people, who had entered Bulgaria in an unauthorised manner, hiding inside a truck and wishing to transit through the country en route to Western Europe. The group was not discovered upon entry but only when the truck, having crossed through the Bulgarian territory, sought to cross the border between Bulgaria and Romania. The Romanian officials arrested all passengers, prohibited them from entering Romania and handed them over to Bulgarian officials, who detained them. It applied a two-tier test in respect of the applicant's complaint under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention (§§ 107 and 118): It examined, first, whether the applicant had sought, at least in substance, international protection by expressing to the authorities of the respondent State, prior to his removal, his fears of treatment contrary to Article 3 if he were returned to his country of origin. If the first question were answered in the affirmative, it had to be determined, as a second step, whether the authorities of the respondent State had adequately examined these risks, in a procedure in accordance with the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention, prior to returning him to his country of origin. This requires independent and rigorous scrutiny of the complaint and the possibility of suspending the implementation of the removal pending same (§ 116). In this connection, the Court reiterated the importance of guaranteeing anyone subject to a removal measure the right to obtain sufficient information to enable them to gain effective access to the relevant procedures and to substantiate their complaints (idem). In finding that the applicant had expressed his fears to the Bulgarian border police that he - as a former journalist for a Turkish newspaper and in view of the conditions prevailing in Turkey in the aftermath of the attempted coup d'état - would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if returned to Turkey, the Court did not consider it decisive that the file did not contain a written document by which the applicant had explicitly requested international protection. It had regard to the linguistic obstacles - emphasising the importance of interpretation for accessing asylum procedures -, the lack of involvement of a lawyer, the content of the applicant's statements to the border police, which had not been contested, and the conditions prevailing in Turkey at the relevant time, including in respect of journalists (§§ 120-128). The Court concluded that the Bulgarian authorities, who had hastily returned the applicant to Turkey without instituting proceedings for international protection, had removed him without examining the Article 3 risks he faced and had rendered the available remedies ineffective in practice, in breach of Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention (§§ 129-137). In A.R.E. v. Greece*, 2025, the Court found that the Greek authorities had summarily removed the applicant from the Evros region in Greece to Türkiye, ignoring her request for international protection and without assessing the Article 3 risks which she alleged to face, in breach of Article 3 and of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3 (§§ 230-267 and §§ 279-284)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:29295/22,Abo v. Estonia (dec.),29295/22,added,"Abo v. Estonia (dec.), no. 29295/22, 17 September 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.D.3,Nationality,3,95,98,0.9977,,,"Article 8 does not guarantee a right to acquire a particular nationality or citizenship, but an arbitrary denial of citizenship might in certain circumstances raise an issue under Article 8 of the Convention because of the impact of such a denial on the private life of the individual ( Slivenko and Others v. Latvia (dec.) [GC], 2002, § 77; Genovese v. Malta, 2011, § 30). The same holds true for the revocation of citizenship already obtained, with the test requiring an assessment of whether the revocation was arbitrary and of the consequences of revocation were for the applicant (see Ramadan v. Malta, 2016, § 85, with regard to a person who nonetheless remained in the respondent country; and K2 v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2017, who was, while abroad, deprived of citizenship and excluded from the territory of the respondent State because he was considered to be a threat to national security). The relevant principles also apply to the seizure of, and refusal to exchange, passports ( Alpeyeva and Dzhalagoniya v. Russia, 2018, concerning the practice of invalidating passports issued to former Soviet Union Nationals). In Usmanov v. Russia, 2020, the Court recapitulated the various approaches in its case-law in this area and opted for a consequence-based approach to determine whether the annulment of the applicant's citizenship constituted an interference with his rights under Article 8 of the Convention: it examined (i) what the consequences of the impugned measure were for the applicant and then (ii) whether the measure in question was arbitrary (§§ 53 and 58 et seq.). That approach was subsequently also applied in Hashemi and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2022, which concerned the refusal to issue identity cards and thereby to recognise the nationality of children born to refugees in the territory of the respondent State, despite domestic law providing for jus soli (compare and contrast the methodological approach in Johansen v. Denmark (dec.), 2022, § 45).","Article 8 does not guarantee a right to acquire a particular nationality or citizenship, but an arbitrary denial of citizenship might in certain circumstances raise an issue under Article 8 of the Convention because of the impact of such a denial on the private life of the individual ( Slivenko and Others v. Latvia (dec.) [GC], 2002, § 77; Genovese v. Malta, 2011, § 30). The same holds true for the revocation of citizenship already obtained, with the test requiring an assessment of whether the revocation was arbitrary and of the consequences of revocation were for the applicant (see Ramadan v. Malta, 2016, § 85, with regard to a person who nonetheless remained in the respondent country; and K2 v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2017, who was, while abroad, deprived of citizenship and excluded from the territory of the respondent State because he was considered to be a threat to national security). The relevant principles also apply to the seizure of, and refusal to exchange, passports ( Alpeyeva and Dzhalagoniya v. Russia, 2018, concerning the practice of invalidating passports issued to former Soviet Union Nationals). In Usmanov v. Russia, 2020, the Court recapitulated the various approaches in its case-law in this area and opted for a consequence-based approach to determine whether the annulment of the applicant's citizenship constituted an interference with his rights under Article 8 of the Convention: it examined (i) what the consequences of the impugned measure were for the applicant and then (ii) whether the measure in question was arbitrary (§§ 53 and 58 et seq.). That approach was subsequently also applied in Hashemi and Others v. Azerbaijan, 2022, which concerned the refusal to issue identity cards and thereby to recognise the nationality of children born to refugees in the territory of the respondent State, despite domestic law providing for jus soli, as well as in Abo v. Estonia (dec.), 2024 (compare and contrast the methodological approach in Johansen v. Denmark (dec.), 2022, § 45)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:14171/23,Al-Habeeb v. Denmark,14171/23,added,"Al-Habeeb v. Denmark, no. 14171/23, 12 November 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.D.1,Expulsion,3,91,94,0.993,"Al-Habeeb v. Denmark , 2024|P.J. and R.J. v. Switzerland , 2024|Sharafane v. Denmark , 2024|Winther v. Denmark , 2024",,"The Court has applied these criteria in numerous cases since Üner v. the Netherlands [GC], 2006, although the weight to be attached to each criterion will vary according to the specific circumstances of the case ( Maslov v. Austria [GC], 2008, § 70). Importantly, the fact that the offence committed by an applicant was at the more serious end of the criminal spectrum is not in and of itself determinative of a case; rather, it is just one factor which has to be weighed in the balance, together with the other criteria ( Unuane v. the United Kingdom, 2020, § 87). Where an applicant's criminal culpability was excluded on account of his mental illness when the criminal act was perpetrated, this fact should be adequately taken into account as it might have the effect of limiting the weight to be attached to the ""nature and seriousness"" of the offence criterion in the overall balancing of interests and, consequently, the extent to which a State could legitimately rely on the applicant's criminal acts as the basis for the expulsion and ban on re-entry ( Savran v. Denmark [GC], 2021, §§ 193-194). The Court has found that the fact that an adult ""alien"" had been born and had lived all his life in the respondent State from which he was to be expelled did not bar his expulsion ( Kaya v. Germany, 2007, § 64). However, very serious reasons are required to justify expulsion in cases concerning settled migrants, who have lawfully spent all or the major part of their childhood and youth in the host country ( Levakovic v. Denmark, 2018, § 45). In respect of expulsions of young adults who had been convicted Maslov v. Austria A.A. v. the United of criminal offences committed as a juvenile, see [GC], 2008, and Kingdom, 2011. Where there is a significant lapse of time between the denial of the residence permit - or the final decision on the expulsion order - and the actual deportation, the developments during that period of time may be taken into account ( T.C.E. v. Germany, 2018, § 61). In Hasanbasic v. Switzerland, 2013, the Court dealt with a scenario where the refusal of a residence permit and the expulsion order primarily related to the economic well-being of the country, rather than the prevention of disorder and crime. In recent cases concerning expulsion of ""settled migrants"" and Article 8, the Court emphasised that, where the domestic courts have carefully examined the facts, applying the Convention case-law, and adequately balanced the applicant's personal interests against the more general public interest in the case, it is not for the Court to substitute its own assessment of the merits (including, in particular, its own assessment of the factual details of proportionality) for that of the competent national authorities, except where there are strong reasons for doing so ( Savran v. Denmark [GC], 2021, § 189; Ndidi v. the United Kingdom, 2017, § 76; Levakovic v. Denmark, 2018). By contrast, where the domestic courts do not adequately motivate their decisions and examine the proportionality of the expulsion order in a superficial manner, preventing the Court from exercising its subsidiary role, an expulsion based on such decision would breach Article 8 ( I.M. v. Switzerland, 2019; see also M.M. v. Switzerland, 2020, § 54, in respect of the requirement of judicial review of the proportionality of an expulsion order, including in situations where the legislature may seek to suggest situations of ""mandatory"" expulsion). This also holds true where the domestic courts do not take all relevant facts into consideration, such as an applicant's paternity of a child in the respondent State ( Makdoudi v. Belgium, 2020).","The Court has applied these criteria in numerous cases since Üner v. the Netherlands [GC], 2006, although the weight to be attached to each criterion will vary according to the specific circumstances of the case ( Maslov v. Austria [GC], 2008, § 70) and one criterion will not normally be decisive for the outcome of the proportionality assessment ( Al-Habeeb v. Denmark, 2024, § 62; Sharafane v. Denmark, 2024, § 57). Accordingly, the fact that the offence committed by an applicant was at the more serious end of the criminal spectrum is not in and of itself determinative of a case; rather, it is just one factor which has to be weighed in the balance, together with the other criteria ( Unuane v. the United Kingdom, 2020, § 87). Where an applicant's criminal culpability was excluded on account of his mental illness when the criminal act was perpetrated, this fact should be adequately taken into account as it might have the effect of limiting the weight to be attached to the ""nature and seriousness"" of the offence criterion in the overall balancing of interests and, consequently, the extent to which a State could legitimately rely on the applicant's criminal acts as the basis for the expulsion and ban on re-entry ( Savran v. Denmark [GC], 2021, §§ 193-194). Where the length of the re-entry ban might exceptionally be decisive in the assessment of the compatibility of the expulsion order with Article 8, it may be relevant to take into account whether in the future, after the expiry of the time-limited re-entry ban, the expelled person would have prospects of being readmitted to the country: if such a prospect is purely theoretical, it would not be justified to attribute significant weight to the limited duration of the re-entry ban as factor capable of rendering the expulsion compatible with Article 8 ( Winther v. Denmark, 2024, §§ 47-48). The Court has found that the fact that an adult "" alien "" had been born and had lived all his life in the respondent State from which he was to be expelled did not bar his expulsion ( Kaya v. Germany, 2007, § 64). However, very serious reasons are required to justify expulsion in cases concerning settled migrants, who have lawfully spent all or the major part of their childhood and youth in the host country ( Levakovic v. Denmark, 2018, § 45). In respect of expulsions of young adults who had been convicted of criminal offences committed as a juvenile, see Maslov v. Austria [GC], 2008, and A.A. v. the United Kingdom, 2011. Where there is a significant lapse of time between the denial of the residence permit - or the final decision on the expulsion order - and the actual deportation, the developments during that period of time may be taken into account ( T.C.E. v. Germany, 2018, § 61). In Hasanbasic v. Switzerland, 2013, the Court dealt with a scenario where the refusal of a residence permit and the expulsion order primarily related to the economic well-being of the country, rather than the prevention of disorder and crime. In recent cases concerning expulsion of ""settled migrants"" and Article 8, the Court emphasised that, where the domestic courts have carefully examined the facts, applying the Convention case-law, and adequately balanced the applicant's personal interests against the more general public interest in the case, it is not for the Court to substitute its own assessment of the merits (including, in particular, its own assessment of the factual details of proportionality) for that of the competent national authorities, except where there are strong reasons for doing so ( Savran v. Denmark [GC], 2021, § 189; Ndidi v. the United Kingdom, 2017, § 76; Levakovic v. Denmark, 2018). By contrast, where the domestic courts do not adequately motivate their decisions and examine the proportionality of the expulsion order in a superficial manner, preventing the Court from exercising its subsidiary role, an expulsion based on such decision would breach Article 8 ( I.M. v. Switzerland, 2019; see also M.M. v. Switzerland, 2020, § 54, in respect of the requirement of judicial review of the proportionality of an expulsion order, including in situations where the legislature may seek to suggest situations of ""mandatory"" expulsion; and P.J. and R.J. v. Switzerland, 2024, § 55). This also holds true where the domestic courts do not take all relevant facts into consideration, such as an applicant's paternity of a child in the respondent State ( Makdoudi v. Belgium, 2020)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:24607/20,B.A. v. Cyprus,24607/20,added,"B.A. v. Cyprus, no. 24607/20, 2 July 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C.1,Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention : General principles,3,33,36,0.9549,"B.A. v. Cyprus , 2024",,"However, compliance with domestic law is not sufficient, since a deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still be considered arbitrary ( Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 67). In respect of adults with no particular vulnerabilities, detention under Article 5 § 1(f) is not required to be reasonably necessary, for example to prevent the person concerned from committing an offence or fleeing. However, it must not be arbitrary. ""Freedom from arbitrariness"" in the context of the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) means that such detention must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry of the person to the country; the place and conditions of detention should be appropriate, bearing in mind that the measure is applicable not to those who have committed criminal offences but to aliens who, often fearing for their lives, have fled from their own country; and the length of the detention should not Saadi v. the United Kingdom exceed that reasonably required for the purpose pursued ( [GC], 2008, §§ 72-74).","However, compliance with domestic law is not sufficient, since a deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still be considered arbitrary ( Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 67). In respect of adults with no particular vulnerabilities, detention under Article 5 § 1(f) is not required to be reasonably necessary, for example to prevent the person concerned from committing an offence or fleeing. However, it must not be arbitrary. ""Freedom from arbitrariness"" in the context of the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) means that such detention must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry of the person to the country; the place and conditions of detention should be appropriate, bearing in mind that the measure is applicable not to those who have committed criminal offences but to aliens who, often fearing for their lives, have fled from their own country; and the length of the detention should not exceed that reasonably required for the purpose pursued ( Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 72-74). The detention of an asylum-seeker is not closely connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry if it is based on public order or national security grounds (see M.B. v. the Netherlands, 2024, §§ 70-75, where the applicant's immigration detention followed his earlier (pre-trial) criminal detention on terrorism related charges, and B.A. v. Cyprus, 2024, §§ 62-64. See also §§ 65-66 of the latter judgment as an example of the length of detention in itself rendering the detention under the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) arbitrary)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:24607/20,B.A. v. Cyprus,24607/20,added,"B.A. v. Cyprus, no. 24607/20, 2 July 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C.4,Procedural safeguards,3,43,46,0.9785,"Aboya Boa Jean v. Malta , 2019|B.A. v. Cyprus , 2024|G.B. and Others v. Turkey , 2019",,"Article 5 § 4 also secures to persons arrested or detained the right to have the lawfulness of their detention decided ""speedily"" by a court and to have their release ordered if the detention is not lawful ( Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, § 131; in relation to case-law on the ""speediness"" requirement in respect of detention under Article 5 § 1(f), albeit with a view to the second limb of the provision, see also Khudyakova v. Russia, 2009, §§ 92-100; Abdulkhakov v. Russia, 2012, § 214; M.M. v. Bulgaria, 2017). Where the national authorities decide in exceptional circumstances to detain a child and his or her parents in the context of immigration controls, the lawfulness of such detention should be G.B. and Others examined by the national courts with particular expedition and diligence at all levels ( v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 167 and 186). Where an automatic review is not conducted in compliance with the time-limits provided for by domestic law, but nonetheless speedily from an objective point of view, Aboya Boa Jean v. Malta there is no breach of Article 5 § 4 (, 2019).","Article 5 § 4 also secures to persons arrested or detained the right to have the lawfulness of their detention decided ""speedily"" by a court and to have their release ordered if the detention is not lawful ( Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, § 131; in relation to case- law on the ""speediness"" requirement in respect of detention under Article 5 § 1(f), see B.A. v. Cyprus, 2024, §§ 72-75, as an example concerning the first limb of that provision, as well as Khudyakova v. Russia, 2009, §§ 92-100; Abdulkhakov v. Russia, 2012, § 214; and M.M. v. Bulgaria, 2017, with respect to the second limb of the provision). Where the national authorities decide in exceptional circumstances to detain a child and his or her parents in the context of immigration controls, the lawfulness of such detention should be examined by the national courts with particular expedition and diligence at all levels ( G.B. and Others v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 167 and 186). Where an automatic review is not conducted in compliance with the time-limits provided for by domestic law, but nonetheless speedily from an objective point of view, there is no breach of Article 5 § 4 ( Aboya Boa Jean v. Malta, 2019)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:67724/09,C.N. and v. v. France,67724/09,removed,"C.N. and v. v. France, no. 67724/09, 11 October 2012",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_deleted,V.C,Trafficking in human beings,2,118,,,,"C.N. and v. v. France C.N. v. the United Kingdom Rantsev v. Cyprus and , 2012|Chowdury and Others v. Greece , 2017|L.E. v. Greece , 2016|Siliadin v. France , 2005|T.I. and Others v. Greece , 2019","Anumber of cases, dealt with by the Court under Article 4 in the context of trafficking in human beings, concerned foreigners, in connection with domestic servitude ( Siliadin v. France, 2005; C.N. and v. v. France C.N. v. the United Kingdom Rantsev v. Cyprus and, 2012;, 2012), sexual exploitation ( Russia, 2021; L.E. v. Greece, 2016; T.I. and Others v. Greece, 2019), and work in agriculture ( Chowdury and Others v. Greece, 2017).",
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:4239/08,C.N. v. the United Kingdom,4239/08,removed,"C.N. v. the United Kingdom, no. 4239/08, 13 November 2012",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_deleted,V.C,Trafficking in human beings,2,118,,,,"C.N. and v. v. France C.N. v. the United Kingdom Rantsev v. Cyprus and , 2012|Chowdury and Others v. Greece , 2017|L.E. v. Greece , 2016|Siliadin v. France , 2005|T.I. and Others v. Greece , 2019","Anumber of cases, dealt with by the Court under Article 4 in the context of trafficking in human beings, concerned foreigners, in connection with domestic servitude ( Siliadin v. France, 2005; C.N. and v. v. France C.N. v. the United Kingdom Rantsev v. Cyprus and, 2012;, 2012), sexual exploitation ( Russia, 2021; L.E. v. Greece, 2016; T.I. and Others v. Greece, 2019), and work in agriculture ( Chowdury and Others v. Greece, 2017).",
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:21884/15,Chowdury and Others v. Greece,21884/15,removed,"Chowdury and Others v. Greece, no. 21884/15, 30 March 2017",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_deleted,V.C,Trafficking in human beings,2,118,,,,"C.N. and v. v. France C.N. v. the United Kingdom Rantsev v. Cyprus and , 2012|Chowdury and Others v. Greece , 2017|L.E. v. Greece , 2016|Siliadin v. France , 2005|T.I. and Others v. Greece , 2019","Anumber of cases, dealt with by the Court under Article 4 in the context of trafficking in human beings, concerned foreigners, in connection with domestic servitude ( Siliadin v. France, 2005; C.N. and v. v. France C.N. v. the United Kingdom Rantsev v. Cyprus and, 2012;, 2012), sexual exploitation ( Russia, 2021; L.E. v. Greece, 2016; T.I. and Others v. Greece, 2019), and work in agriculture ( Chowdury and Others v. Greece, 2017).",
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:34210/19,D.H. and Others v. Sweden,34210/19,added,"D.H. and Others v. Sweden, no. 34210/19, 25 July 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B,Access for the purposes of family reunification,2,8,8,0.9955,"In B.F. and Others v. Switzerland , 2023|Okubamichael Debru v. Sweden , 2024|S.F. v. Finland , 2024|The Court subsequently reached similar findings in D.H. and Others v. Sweden , 2024",,"In, 2023, the Court examined, for the first time, a case where the family reunification of (certain) recognised refugees was made subject to a requirement of non- reliance on social assistance under domestic law. The applicants, who were all recognised as refugees within the meaning of the 1951 Convention, were granted provisional admission rather than asylum, in line with domestic law, since the grounds for their refugee status arose following their departure from their countries of origin and as a result of their own actions, namely their illegal exit from those countries. Reiterating, inter alia, that there was consensus at international and European level that refugees needed to have the benefit of a more favourable family reunification procedure than other aliens, the Court considered that the particularly vulnerable situation in which refugees sur place find themselves - notably, the insurmountable obstacles to their being reunited with their family members in their country of origin, given that they now face a risk of ill-treatment there - needed to be adequately taken into account in the application of a condition (such as the requirement of non- reliance on social assistance) to their family reunification requests, with insurmountable obstacles to enjoying family life in the country of origin progressively assuming greater importance in the fair- balance assessment as time passed. The requirement of non-reliance on social assistance (which under domestic law applied to family reunification requests of refugees granted provisional admission rather than asylum) thus needed to be applied with sufficient flexibility, as one element of the comprehensive and individualised fair-balance assessment. In two of the four applications at hand, the Court found that the gainfully employed applicants had done all that could reasonably be expected of them to earn a living and to cover their and their family members' expenses. In a third case, the Court was not satisfied that the Federal Administrative Court had sufficiently examined whether the applicant's health would enable her to work, at least to a certain extent, and consequently whether the impugned requirement needed to be applied with flexibility in view of her health. In respect those three applications, the Court thus found a violation of Article 8. By contrast, the Court found no violation of Article 8 as regards the fourth case, considering that the Federal Administrative Court had not overstepped its margin of appreciation when it took the applicant's lack of initiative in improving Dabo v. Sweden, her financial situation into account when balancing the competing interests. In the Court dealt with a related but distinct question: the domestic law of the respondent State provided that refugees were exempt from having to fulfil a maintenance requirement if they applied for family reunification within three months of being granted refugee status, whereas such maintenance requirement applied if a request for family reunification was introduced at a later stage (in line with a possibility afforded under the third subparagraph of Article 12(1) of the of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification). The Court found that the refusal of the family reunification request, because the applicant had introduced it outside of that three-month time-limit in a manner which was not ""objectively excusable"" meaning he had to but failed to meet the maintenance requirement, did not breach Article 8 of the Convention. In this respect, the Court also noted that the domestic authorities had established that the applicant could lodge a fresh request for family reunification at any time and that he had had good prospects of being able to fulfil the maintenance requirement in the future in view of his profession: noting that he had not yet found employment, the Court considered that it could not be concluded that he had done all that could reasonably be expected of him to earn sufficient income to cover his and his family's expenses.","In B.F. and Others v. Switzerland, 2023, the Court examined, for the first time, a case where the family reunification of (certain) recognised refugees was made subject to a requirement of non-reliance on social assistance under domestic law. The applicants, who were all recognised as refugees within the meaning of the 1951 Convention, were granted provisional admission rather than asylum, in line with domestic law, since the grounds for their refugee status arose following their departure from their countries of origin and as a result of their own actions, namely their illegal exit from those countries. Reiterating, inter alia, that there was consensus at international and European level that refugees needed to have the benefit of a more favourable family reunification procedure than other aliens, the Court considered that the particularly vulnerable situation in which refugees sur place find themselves - notably, the insurmountable obstacles to their being reunited with their family members in their country of origin, given that they now face a risk of ill-treatment there - needed to be adequately taken into account in the application of a condition (such as the requirement of non-reliance on social assistance) to their family reunification requests, with insurmountable obstacles to enjoying family life in the country of origin progressively assuming greater importance in the fair-balance assessment as time passed. The requirement of non-reliance on social assistance (which under domestic law applied to family reunification requests of refugees granted provisional admission rather than asylum) thus needed to be applied with sufficient flexibility, as one element of the comprehensive and individualised fair-balance assessment. In two of the four applications at hand, the Court found that the gainfully employed applicants had done all that could reasonably be expected of them to earn a living and to cover their and their family members'expenses. In a third case, the Court was not satisfied that the Federal Administrative Court had sufficiently examined whether the applicant's health would enable her to work, at least to a certain extent, and consequently whether the impugned requirement needed to be applied with flexibility in view of her health. In respect those three applications, the Court thus found a violation of Article 8. By contrast, the Court found no violation of Article 8 as regards the fourth case, considering that the Federal Administrative Court had not overstepped its margin of appreciation when it took the applicant's lack of initiative in improving her financial situation into account when balancing the competing interests. In Dabo v. Sweden, the Court dealt with a related but distinct question: the domestic law of the respondent State provided that refugees were exempt from having to fulfil a maintenance requirement if they applied for family reunification within three months of being granted refugee status, whereas such maintenance requirement applied if a request for family reunification was introduced at a later stage (in line with a possibility afforded under the third subparagraph of Article 12(1) of the of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification). The Court found that the refusal of the family reunification request, because the applicant had introduced it outside of that three-month time-limit in a manner which was not ""objectively excusable"" meaning he had to but failed to meet the maintenance requirement, did not breach Article 8 of the Convention. In this respect, the Court also noted that the domestic authorities had established that the applicant could lodge a fresh request for family reunification at any time and that he had had good prospects of being able to fulfil the maintenance requirement in the future in view of his profession: noting that he had not yet found employment, the Court considered that it could not be concluded that he had done all that could reasonably be expected of him to earn sufficient income to cover his and his family's expenses. The Court subsequently reached similar findings in D.H. and Others v. Sweden, 2024, and Okubamichael Debru v. Sweden, 2024, and S.F. v. Finland, 2024."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:9568/22,F.O. and G.H. v. Belgium (dec.),9568/22,added,"F.O. and G.H. v. Belgium (dec.), no. 9568/22, 16 April 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,VI.C,Absence of an imminent risk of removal,2,123,126,0.9487,,,"In removal cases, in which the applicant no longer faces any risk, at the moment or for a considerable time to come, of being expelled and in which he has the opportunity to challenge any new expulsion order before the national authorities and if necessary before the Court, the Court normally finds that it is no longer justified to continue to examine the application within the meaning of Article 37 § 1(c) of the Convention and strikes it out of its list of cases, unless there are special circumstances relating to respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requiring the continued examination of the application (see Khan v. Germany [GC], 2016). After the Court has struck an application out of its list of cases, it can at any time decide to restore it to the list if it considers that the circumstances justify such a course, in accordance with Article 37 § 2 of the Convention.","In removal cases, in which the applicant no longer faces any risk, at the moment or for a considerable time to come, of being expelled and in which he has the opportunity to challenge any new expulsion order before the national authorities and if necessary before the Court, the Court normally finds that it is no longer justified to continue to examine the application within the meaning of Article 37 § 1(c) of the Convention and strikes it out of its list of cases, unless there are special circumstances relating to respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requiring the continued examination of the application (see Khan v. Germany [GC], 2016). After the Court has struck an application out of its list of cases, it can at any time decide to restore it to the list if it considers that the circumstances justify such a course, in accordance with Article 37 § 2 of the Convention. Where domestic law provides for two separate decisions - one refusing the application for international protection and one subsequently ordering expulsion - and the latter decision can be challenged with a remedy that has automatic suspensive effect, the individual lacks victim status to complain that his impending expulsion would be contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, if his application for international protection has been refused but his expulsion has not yet been ordered (see F.O. and G.H. v. Belgium (dec.), 2024, §§ 31-40)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:15067/21,G.R.J. v. Greece (dec.),15067/21,added,"G.R.J. v. Greece (dec.), no. 15067/21, 3 December 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.A,Summary returns at the border and/or shortly after entry into the territory (“push - backs”),2,18,21,0.9507,"A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia , 2022|Kebe and Others v. Ukraine , 2017|M.H. and Others v. Croatia , 2021","M.H. and Others v. Croatia A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia , 2021","The Court has also examined cases in which border guards prevented persons from entering the Kebe and Others v. Ukraine respondent State's territory at a port (, 2017), at a land border checkpoint ( M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020) or at an airport ( S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023) and either prevented the applicants from lodging an asylum application or, where they had submitted such applications, refused to accept them and to initiate asylum proceedings. It has also examined a number of cases concerning summary returns (""push-backs"") of migrants and/or asylum-seekers who had entered the respondent State in an unauthorised manner or had tried to do so ( N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020; Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021; D v. Bulgaria, 2021; M.H. and Others v. Croatia A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2021;, 2022), under Article 3 alone, under Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention, and/or under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 as well as under Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.","The Court has also examined cases in which border guards prevented persons from entering the respondent State's territory at a port ( Kebe and Others v. Ukraine, 2017), at a land border checkpoint ( M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020) or at an airport ( S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023) and either prevented the applicants from lodging an asylum application or, where they had submitted such applications, refused to accept them and to initiate asylum proceedings. It has also examined a number of cases concerning summary returns (""push - backs"") of migrants and/or asylum-seekers who had entered the respondent State in an unauthorised manner or had tried to do so ( N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020; Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021; D v. Bulgaria, 2021; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021; A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022), under Article 3 alone, under Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention, and/or under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 as well as under Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4. Where the presence of the applicants on the respondent States territory and/or their alleged removal was disputed, it has to be ascertained whether the applicants furnished prima facie evidence in support of their version of events; if that is the case, the burden of proof should shift to the Government (see N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, §§ 85-88, and M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 268-275 for cases concerning Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, as well as A.R.E. v. Greece*, 2025, §§ 216-221 and 230-267, and G.R.J. v. Greece (dec.), 2024, for cases concerning Article 3 of the Convention)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:13337/19,H.T. v. Germany and Greece,13337/19,added,"H.T. v. Germany and Greece, no. 13337/19, 15 October 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1,Article 3 of the Convention alone and/or in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention,3,19,22,0.9914,"H.T. v. Germany and Greece , 2024|O.M. and D.S. v. Ukraine , 2022|Sherov and Others v. Poland , 2024",,"Where the applicants, who had presented themselves at the border seeking to lodge an asylum application and/or communicating fear for their safety, were removed in a summary manner to the third country from which they had sought to enter the respondent State's territory, the Court applied the principles which it had set out in Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, in respect of the obligations under Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the removal of asylum-seekers to third intermediary countries, without an assessment, by the authorities of the removing State, of the merits of their asylum claim (see section ""Removal to a third country"" below). The Court found violations of Article 3 of the Convention (as well as, in certain cases, of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article M.K. and Others v. Poland D.A. and Others v. Poland O.M. and D.S. 3) in these cases (, 2020;, 2021; v. Ukraine, 2022; S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023; for cases concerning similar factual scenarios, but predating Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, see M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018, and Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014), including where domestic law provided that asylum applications could not be lodged at the border crossing point (airport) at which the applicants presented themselves but could only be lodged at a land border transit zone ( S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 62-63). Where applicants can arguably claim that there is no guarantee that their asylum applications would be seriously examined by the authorities in the neighbouring third country and that their return to their country of origin could violate Article 3 of the Convention, the respondent State is obliged to allow the applicants to remain with its jurisdiction until such time that their claims have been properly reviewed by a competent domestic authority and cannot deny access to its territory to persons presenting themselves at a border checkpoint who allege that they may be subjected to ill-treatment if they remain on the territory of the neighbouring state, unless adequate measures are taken to eliminate such a risk ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 178-179). The Court added that the impugned measures did not fall within the respondent State's strict international legal obligations following from its membership in the European Union and that, consequently, the respondent State was fully responsible under the Convention for the impugned acts. More specifically, the Court found the provisions of European Union law embraced the principle of non-refoulement and applied it to persons who were subjected to border checks before being admitted to the territory of a Member States ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 180-182; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 65-67).","Where the applicants, who had presented themselves at the border seeking to lodge an asylum application and/or communicating fear for their safety, were removed in a summary manner to a third country, the Court applied the principles which it had set out in Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, in respect of the obligations under Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the removal of asylum-seekers to third intermediary countries, without an assessment, by the authorities of the removing State, of the merits of their asylum claim (see section "" Removal to a third country "" below) . The Court found violations of Article 3 of the Convention (as well as, in certain cases, of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3) in these cases ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021; O.M. and D.S. v. Ukraine, 2022; S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023; Sherov and Others v. Poland, 2024; H.T. v. Germany and Greece, 2024, in respect of a removal from one EUmember State to another on the basis of a bilateral agreement; see also "" Interception, rescue operations and summary returns (""push - backs"") at sea "" above; for cases concerning similar factual scenarios, but predating Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, see M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018, and Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014), including where domestic law provided that asylum applications could not be lodged at the border crossing point (airport) at which the applicants presented themselves but could only be lodged at a land border transit zone ( S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 62-63). Where applicants can arguably claim that there is no guarantee that their asylum applications would be seriously examined by the authorities in the neighbouring third country and that their return to their country of origin could violate Article 3 of the Convention, the respondent State is obliged to allow the applicants to remain with its jurisdiction until such time that their claims have been properly reviewed by a competent domestic authority and cannot deny access to its territory to persons presenting themselves at a border checkpoint who allege that they may be subjected to ill-treatment if they remain on the territory of the neighbouring state, unless adequate measures are taken to eliminate such a risk ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 178-179). The Court added that the impugned measures did not fall within the respondent State's strict international legal obligations following from its membership in the European Union and that, consequently, the respondent State was fully responsible under the Convention for the impugned acts. More specifically, the Court found the provisions of European Union law embraced the principle of non-refoulement and applied it to persons who were subjected to border checks before being admitted to the territory of a Member States ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 180-182; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 65-67)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:13337/19,H.T. v. Germany and Greece,13337/19,added,"H.T. v. Germany and Greece, no. 13337/19, 15 October 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,IV.D,Agreement to “assisted voluntary return”,2,112,115,0.575,"H.T. v. Germany and Greece , 2024|It reached a similar conclusion in M.D. and Others v. Hungary , 2024|M.A. v. Belgium , 2020",,"In, 2020, the Court found that the applicant, against whom there was an enforceable removal order and who was held with a view to deportation and accompanied by the police to the airplane, had not waived his Article 3 rights and had not lost his victim status by signing a ""voluntary return"" document at the airport, without the assistance of an interpreter (§§ 60-61).","Where an individual alleges to have been expelled in breach of Article 3 and the respondent State submitted that he had signed a ""voluntary return"" document, the Court questioned whether the rights guaranteed by Article 3 could be waived at all and found that the requirements of an effective waiver were, in any event, not met ( M.A. v. Belgium, 2020, §§ 60-61; H.T. v. Germany and Greece, 2024, § 119). It reached a similar conclusion in M.D. and Others v. Hungary, 2024, in a case concerning Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 (§ 44)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:44051/20,Kumari v. the Netherlands (dec.),44051/20,added,"Kumari v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 44051/20, 19 November 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B,Access for the purposes of family reunification,2,,12,,,,,"In Martinez Alvarado v. the Netherlands, 2024, the Court restated the principles in which ""additional elements of dependency"" over and above normal emotional ties amou nt to ""family life"" within the meaning of Article 8 between parents and adult children or between adult siblings, noting that an individualised review of the relationship at issue and other relevant circumstances of the case was required and that the exist ence of ""family life"" on the basis of ""additional elements of dependency"" will often be the result of a combination of elements (§§ 35-44). It found that the relationship between the applicant, a severely disabled adult man, and his adult sisters, who lived in the respondent State and on whose care and support the applicant had relied for years, constituted ""family life"" and that the refusal to grant the applicant a residence permit on the basis of family reunification had breached Article 8 in view of the inadequate assessment carried out by the domestic authorities. Conversely, the Court found that the existence of ""additional elements of dependency"" between the applicant and her adult son living in the respondent State had not been demonstrated in Kumari v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2024."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:71545/12,L.E. v. Greece,71545/12,removed,"L.E. v. Greece, no. 71545/12, 21 January 2016",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_deleted,V.C,Trafficking in human beings,2,118,,,,"C.N. and v. v. France C.N. v. the United Kingdom Rantsev v. Cyprus and , 2012|Chowdury and Others v. Greece , 2017|L.E. v. Greece , 2016|Siliadin v. France , 2005|T.I. and Others v. Greece , 2019","Anumber of cases, dealt with by the Court under Article 4 in the context of trafficking in human beings, concerned foreigners, in connection with domestic servitude ( Siliadin v. France, 2005; C.N. and v. v. France C.N. v. the United Kingdom Rantsev v. Cyprus and, 2012;, 2012), sexual exploitation ( Russia, 2021; L.E. v. Greece, 2016; T.I. and Others v. Greece, 2019), and work in agriculture ( Chowdury and Others v. Greece, 2017).",
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:20183/21,Lazăr v. Romania,20183/21,added,"Lazăr v. Romania, no. 20183/21, 9 April 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.A.5,Extradition,3,79,82,0.9976,"Matthews and Johnson v. Romania , 2024|ăr v. Romania , 2024",,"Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two- Sanchez - stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. Adistinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving ""whole life prisoners"" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez - Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2022, Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, 2023, and Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), 2023.","Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two-stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. Adistinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving ""whole life prisoners"" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2022, Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, 2023, Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), 2023, Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, and Lazăr v. Romania, 2024."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:20183/21,Lazăr v. Romania,20183/21,added,"Lazăr v. Romania, no. 20183/21, 9 April 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.A,Restrictions of freedom of movement and detention for purposes of removal,2,103,106,0.978,"Auad v. Bulgaria , 2011|Azimov v. Russia , 2012|Matthews and Johnson v. Romania , 2024|ăr v. Romania , 2024",,"The indication of an interim measure by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see section ""Rule 39/Interim measures"" below) does not in itself have any bearing on whether the deprivation of liberty to which that individual may be subject complies with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, 2007, § 74). Where the respondent States refrained from deporting applicants in compliance with the interim measure indicated by the Court, the Court was, in a number of cases, prepared to accept that deportation or extradition proceedings were temporarily suspended but nevertheless were ""in progress"", and that therefore no violation of Article 5 § 1(f) had occurred (see Azimov v. Russia, 2013, § 170). At the same time, the suspension of the domestic proceedings due to the indication of an interim measure by the Court should not result in a situation where the applicant languishes in prison for an unreasonably long period ( ibid., § 171). Article 5 § 1(f) does not contain maximum time-limits; the question whether the length of deportation proceedings could affect the lawfulness of detention under this provision thus depends solely on the Auad v. Bulgaria J.N. v. the United Kingdom particular circumstances of each case (, 2011, § 128, and, 2016). However, where fixed time-limits exist, a failure to comply with them may be relevant to the question of ""lawfulness"", as detention exceeding the period permitted by domestic law is unlikely to Komissarov v. the Czech Republic be considered to be ""in accordance with the law"" (, 2022, §§ 50-52). The Court has also held that automatic judicial review of immigration detention is not an essential requirement of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( J.N. v. the United Kingdom, 2016, § 96). Where the authorities make efforts to organise removal to a third country in view of an interim measure indicated by the Court, detention may fall within the scope of Article 5 § 1(f) ( M and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 73).","The indication of an interim measure by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see section "" Rule 39/Interim measures "" below) does not in itself have any bearing on whether the deprivation of liberty to which that individual may be subject complies with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, 2007, § 74). Where the respondent States refrained from deporting or extraditing applicants in compliance with the interim measure indicated by the Court, the Court was, in a number of cases, prepared to accept that deportation or extradition proceedings were temporarily suspended but nevertheless were ""in progress"", and that therefore the detention had been justified under Article 5 § 1(f) (see Azimov v. Russia, 2013, § 170, and Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, § 128). At the same time, the suspension of the domestic proceedings due to the indication of an interim measure by the Court should not result in a situation where the applicant languishes in prison for an unreasonably long period ( Azimov v. Russia, 2012, § 171, and Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, § 128). Article 5 § 1(f) does not contain maximum time-limits; the question whether the length of deportation proceedings could affect the lawfulness of detention under this provision thus depends solely on the particular circumstances of each case ( Auad v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 128, and J.N. v. the United Kingdom, 2016). However, where fixed time- limits exist, a failure to comply with them may be relevant to the question of ""lawfulness"", as detention exceeding the period permitted by domestic law is unlikely to be considered to b e ""in accordance with the law"" ( Komissarov v. the Czech Republic, 2022, §§ 50-52). The Court has also held that automatic judicial review of immigration detention is not an essential requirement of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( J.N. v. the United Kingdom, 2016, § 96). Where the authorities make efforts to organise removal to a third country in view of an interim measure indicated by the Court, detention may fall within the scope of Article 5 § 1(f) ( M and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 73). The individual's rearrest and detention, with a view to his extradition after the Court had lifted an interim measure in his case, was found to have been justified under Article 5 § 1(f) in Lazăr v. Romania, 2024, §§ 102-111."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:39090/20,M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus,39090/20,added,"M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus, no. 39090/20, 8 October 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.E,"Interception, rescue operations and summary returns (“push - backs”) at sea",2,,17,,"In M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus , 2024",,,"In M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus, 2024, the applicants, Syrian nationals, were intercepted by the Cypriot coastguard in Cypriot territorial waters and removed to Lebanon on board a vessel flying the Cypriot flag, without their asylum claims being processed and without an assessment whether they risked a lack of access to an effective asylum procedure in Lebanon, of the living conditions of asylum-seekers there or of the risk of refoulement. The Court found violations of Article 3, of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 as well as of Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with both of the aforementioned provisions on account of the applicants'removal. The Court also found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the applicants'treatment by the Cypriot authorities over the two days during which they had remained on their boat without being allowed to disembark."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:39090/20,M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus,39090/20,added,"M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus, no. 39090/20, 8 October 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1,Article 3 of the Convention alone and/or in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention,3,20,23,0.9973,"M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus , 2024|M.K. and Others v. Poland , 2020",,"To determine whether individuals sought to request asylum and/or communicated fear for their safety in the event of removal to the authorities of the respondent State, the Court has regard not only to the records of the border guards, but also to the applicant's account, supporting documents as well as to reports regarding the situation at the border, where these indicate the existence of a systemic practice of misrepresenting statements given by asylum-seekers in official notes and/or concerns regarding access to the territory and asylum procedure, to the conditions prevailing in the country of origin and/or the third country as well as to the applicants' submissions in their previous M.A. and Others v. Lithuania M.K. and Others v. Poland cases before the Court (, 2018, §§ 107-113;, 2020, §§ 174-177; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 60-63; O.M. and D.S. v. Ukraine, 2022, §§ 85-91; D v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 120-128; Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, §§ 123-136; M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 51-56). Individuals do not have to explicitly request asylum, nor does the wish to apply for asylum need to be expressed in a particular form ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 133; M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 108-109; D v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 120-128). In this connection, the Court has emphasised the importance of interpretation for accessing asylum procedures as well as of training officials enabling them to detect and to understand asylum requests ( M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 108-109; D v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 124-126). It has also considered the lack of involvement of a lawyer ( D v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 125).","To determine whether individuals sought to request asylum and/or communicated fear for their safety in the event of removal to the authorities of the respondent State, the Court has regard not only to the records of the border guards, but also to the applicant's account, supporting documents as well as to reports regarding the situation at the border, where these indicate the existence of a systemic practice of misrepresenting statements given by asylum-seekers in official notes and/or concerns regarding access to the territory and asylum procedure, to the conditions prevailing in the country of origin and/or the third country as well as to the applicants'submissions in their previous cases before the Court ( M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 107-113; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 174-177; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 60-63; O.M. and D.S. v. Ukraine, 2022, §§ 85-91; D v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 120-128; Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, §§ 123-136; M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 51-56; M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus, 2024, §§ 82-88). Individuals do not have to explicitly request asylum, nor does the wish to apply for asylum need to be expressed in a particular form ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 133; M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 108-109; D v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 120-128). In this connection, the Court has emphasised the importance of interpretation for accessing asylum procedures as well as of training officials enabling them to detect and to understand asylum requests ( M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018, §§ 108-109; D v. Bulgaria, 2021, §§ 124-126). It has also considered the lack of involvement of a lawyer ( D v. Bulgaria, 2021, § 125)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:39090/20,M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus,39090/20,added,"M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus, no. 39090/20, 8 October 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.2,Article 4 of Protocol No. 4,3,23,26,0.9892,"M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus , 2024",,"In its case-law on Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 on summary returns and related scenarios, the Court N.D. and N.T. has distinguished a number of factual situations and the relevant tests to be applied. In v. Spain [GC], 2020, §§ 201 and 209-211, the Court set out a two-tier test to determine compliance with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 in cases where individuals cross a land border in an unauthorised manner and are expelled summarily, a test which has been applied in all later cases presenting precisely the same scenario ( Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 59 et seq .; and M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 294 et seq .; A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 112-123): Firstly, it has to be taken into account whether the State provided genuine and effective access to means of legal entry, in particular border procedures, to allow all persons who face persecution to submit an application for protection, based in particular on Article 3, under conditions which ensure that the application is processed in a manner consistent with international norms including the Convention. Secondly, where the State provided such access but an applicant did not make use of it, it has to be considered whether there were cogent reasons for not doing so which were based on objective facts for which the State was responsible. The absence of such cogent reasons could lead to this being regarded as the consequence of the applicants' own conduct, justifying the lack of individual identification. The burden of proof for showing that the applicants did have genuine and effective access to procedures for legal entry is on the respondent State and all cases decided thus far turned on whether the State had satisfied that burden of proof (location of the border crossing points, modalities for lodging applications there, availability of interpreters/legal assistance enabling asylum-seekers to be informed of their rights and information showing that applications had actually been made at those border points: compare N.D. a nd N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, §§ 212-217; A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 116-122, and contrast Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 63-67; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 295-304).","In its case-law on Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 on summary returns and related scenarios, the Court has distinguished a number of factual situations and the relevant tests to be applied. In N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, §§ 201 and 209-211, the Court set out a two-tier test to determine compliance with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 in cases where individuals cross a land border in an unauthorised manner and are expelled summarily, a test which has been applied in all later cases presenting precisely the same scenario ( Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 59 et seq .; and M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 294 et seq .; A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 112-123): Firstly, it has to be taken into account whether the State provided genuine and effective access to means of legal entry, in particular border procedures, to allow all persons who face persecution to submit an application for protection, based in particular on Article 3, under conditions which ensure that the application is processed in a manner consistent with international norms including the Convention. Secondly, where the State provided such access but an applicant did not make use of it, it has to be considered whether there were cogent reasons for not doing so which were based on objective facts for which the State was responsible. The absence of such cogent reasons could lead to this being regarded as the consequence of the applicants'own conduct, justifying the lack of individual identification. The burden of proof for showing that the applicants did have genuine and effective access to procedures for legal entry is on the respondent State and all cases decided thus far turned on whether the State had satisfied that burden of proof (location of the border crossing points, modalities for lodging applications there, availability of interpreters/legal assistance enabling asylum-seekers to be informed of their rights and information showing that applications had actually been made at those border points: compare N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, §§ 212-217; A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 116-122, and contrast Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 63-67; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 295-304). An entry visa subject to financial and other requirements does not constitute a genuine and effective means of legal entry for individuals trying to seek asylum ( M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus, 2024, § 118)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:71008/16,M.B. v. the Netherlands,71008/16,added,"M.B. v. the Netherlands, no. 71008/16, 23 April 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.C.1,Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention : General principles,3,31,34,0.9863,,,"Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention allows States to control the liberty of aliens in an immigration context in two different situations: the first limb of that provision permits the detention of an asylum- seeker or other immigrant prior to the State's grant of authorisation to enter (for the second limb, see section ""Restrictions of freedom of movement and detention for purposes of removal"" below). The question as to when the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) ceases to apply, because the individual has been granted formal authorisation to enter or stay, is largely dependent on national law ( Suso Musa v. Malta, 2013, § 97). Where domestic law authorises the entry or stay pending an asylum application, the detention of an asylum-seeker may under certain circumstances be authorised under Article 5 § 1 (b) of the Convention ( O.M. v. Hungary, 2016).","Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention allows States to control the liberty of aliens in an immigration context in two different situations: the first limb of that provision permits the detention of an asylum-seeker or other immigrant prior to the State's grant of authorisation to enter (for the second limb, see section "" Restrictions of freedom of movement and detention for purposes of removal "" below). The question as to when the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) ceases to apply, because the individual has been granted formal authorisation to enter or stay, is largely dependent on national law ( Suso Musa v. Malta, 2013, § 97; see also M.B. v. the Netherlands, 2024, §§ 63-69, for an example of the transposition of EUlaw into domestic law). Where domestic law authorises the entry or stay pending an asylum application, the detention of an asylum-seeker may under certain circumstances be authorised under Article 5 § 1 (b) of the Convention ( O.M. v. Hungary, 2016)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:71008/16,M.B. v. the Netherlands,71008/16,added,"M.B. v. the Netherlands, no. 71008/16, 23 April 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C.1,Article 5 § 1(f) of the Convention : General principles,3,33,36,0.9549,"B.A. v. Cyprus , 2024",,"However, compliance with domestic law is not sufficient, since a deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still be considered arbitrary ( Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 67). In respect of adults with no particular vulnerabilities, detention under Article 5 § 1(f) is not required to be reasonably necessary, for example to prevent the person concerned from committing an offence or fleeing. However, it must not be arbitrary. ""Freedom from arbitrariness"" in the context of the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) means that such detention must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry of the person to the country; the place and conditions of detention should be appropriate, bearing in mind that the measure is applicable not to those who have committed criminal offences but to aliens who, often fearing for their lives, have fled from their own country; and the length of the detention should not Saadi v. the United Kingdom exceed that reasonably required for the purpose pursued ( [GC], 2008, §§ 72-74).","However, compliance with domestic law is not sufficient, since a deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still be considered arbitrary ( Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, § 67). In respect of adults with no particular vulnerabilities, detention under Article 5 § 1(f) is not required to be reasonably necessary, for example to prevent the person concerned from committing an offence or fleeing. However, it must not be arbitrary. ""Freedom from arbitrariness"" in the context of the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) means that such detention must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry of the person to the country; the place and conditions of detention should be appropriate, bearing in mind that the measure is applicable not to those who have committed criminal offences but to aliens who, often fearing for their lives, have fled from their own country; and the length of the detention should not exceed that reasonably required for the purpose pursued ( Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2008, §§ 72-74). The detention of an asylum-seeker is not closely connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry if it is based on public order or national security grounds (see M.B. v. the Netherlands, 2024, §§ 70-75, where the applicant's immigration detention followed his earlier (pre-trial) criminal detention on terrorism related charges, and B.A. v. Cyprus, 2024, §§ 62-64. See also §§ 65-66 of the latter judgment as an example of the length of detention in itself rendering the detention under the first limb of Article 5 § 1(f) arbitrary)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:60778/19,M.D. and Others v. Hungary,60778/19,added,"M.D. and Others v. Hungary, no. 60778/19, 19 September 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.A.2,Article 4 of Protocol No. 4,3,24,27,0.9951,"D.A. and Others v. Poland , 2021|J.A. and Others v. Italy , 2023|M.D. and Others v. Hungary , 2024|Sherov and Others v. Poland , 2024","M.A. and Others v. Latvia 2021|Others v. Italy , 2023","Where migrants entered the respondent State's territory in an unauthorised manner and, following their apprehension near the border, were provided with access to means of legal entry through the appropriate border procedure, the Court did not apply the aforementioned two-tier test, but instead assessed - in order to determine whether the expulsion was ""collective"" in nature - whether the individuals were afforded, prior to the adoption of expulsion orders, an effective possibility of submitting arguments against their removal and whether there were sufficient guarantees demonstrating that their personal circumstances had been genuinely and individually taken into account ( Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, § 62). Such test is, essentially, similar to the one applied to individuals who present themselves at a point of legal entry, such as a border M.K. and Others v. Poland D.A. and Others v. Poland checkpoint (see, 2020, §§ 204-211,, 2021, §§ 81-84, and M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69) or at an airport (see S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 48-51, where the Court considered that it did not absolve the authorities of their obligation under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 that the applicants had initially sought to enter the respondent State by using counterfeit documents). Whether the requirements of this test are satisfied is a question of fact, which is to be determined by having regard to, in so far as pertinent in a given case, supporting evidence provided by the parties, including as to whether an identification process was conducted and under what conditions (whether persons were trained to conduct interviews, whether information was provided, in a language the individuals understood, about the possibility to lodge an asylum application and to request legal aid, whether interpreters were present, and whether the individuals were able, in practice, to consult lawyers and to lodge asylum applications) as well as to independent reports ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 185; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014, §§ 214-225; Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 245-254; Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, §§ 63-71; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 206-210; D.A. and Others v. Poland, M.A. and Others v. Latvia 2021, §§ 81-83; (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69). For an example of a case where individuals, who did not intend to seek asylum in the respondent State, were removed in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 after having been detained for ten days in a ""hotspot"" for the registration J.A. and and identification of migrants from the moment of their arrival in the respondent State, see Others v. Italy, 2023, §§ 47 and 106-116.","Where migrants entered the respondent State's territory in an unauthorised manner and, following their apprehension near the border, were provided with access to means of legal entry through the appropriate border procedure, the Court did not apply the aforementioned two-tier test, but instead assessed - in order to determine whether the expulsion was ""collective"" in nature - whether the individuals were afforded, prior to the adoption of expulsion orders, an effective possibility of submitting arguments against their removal and whether there were sufficient guarantees demonstrating that their personal circumstances had been genuinely and individually taken into account ( Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, § 62). Such test is, essentially, similar to the one applied to individuals who present themselves at a point of legal entry, such as a border checkpoint (see M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 204-211, D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-84, M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69, and Sherov and Others v. Poland, 2024, §§ 59-61) or at an airport (see S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 48-51, where the Court considered that it did not absolve the authorities of their obligation under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 that the applicants had initially sought to enter the respondent State by using counterfeit documents). Whether the requirements of this test are satisfied is a question of fact, which is to be determined by having regard to, in so far as pertinent in a given case, supporting evidence provided by the parties, including as to whether an identification process was conducted and under what conditions (whether persons were trained to conduct interviews, whether information was provided, in a language the individuals understood, about the possibility to lodge an asylum application and to request legal aid, whether interpreters were present, and whether the individuals were able, in practice, to consult lawyers and to lodge asylum applications) as well as to independent reports ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 185; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014, §§ 214-225; Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 245-254; Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, §§ 63-71; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 206-210; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-83; M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69). For an example of individuals, who lodged asylum applications, being removed to a third country without a valid decision, in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, see M.D. and Others v. Hungary, 2024. For an example of a case where individuals, who did not intend to seek asylum in the respondent State, were removed in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 after having been detained for ten days in a ""hotspot"" for the registration and identification of migrants from the moment of their arrival in the respondent State, see J.A. and Others v. Italy, 2023, §§ 47 and 106-116."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:60778/19,M.D. and Others v. Hungary,60778/19,added,"M.D. and Others v. Hungary, no. 60778/19, 19 September 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,IV.D,Agreement to “assisted voluntary return”,2,112,115,0.575,"H.T. v. Germany and Greece , 2024|It reached a similar conclusion in M.D. and Others v. Hungary , 2024|M.A. v. Belgium , 2020",,"In, 2020, the Court found that the applicant, against whom there was an enforceable removal order and who was held with a view to deportation and accompanied by the police to the airplane, had not waived his Article 3 rights and had not lost his victim status by signing a ""voluntary return"" document at the airport, without the assistance of an interpreter (§§ 60-61).","Where an individual alleges to have been expelled in breach of Article 3 and the respondent State submitted that he had signed a ""voluntary return"" document, the Court questioned whether the rights guaranteed by Article 3 could be waived at all and found that the requirements of an effective waiver were, in any event, not met ( M.A. v. Belgium, 2020, §§ 60-61; H.T. v. Germany and Greece, 2024, § 119). It reached a similar conclusion in M.D. and Others v. Hungary, 2024, in a case concerning Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 (§ 44)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:4470/21,Martinez Alvarado v. the Netherlands,4470/21,added,"Martinez Alvarado v. the Netherlands, no. 4470/21, 10 December 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B,Access for the purposes of family reunification,2,,12,,,,,"In Martinez Alvarado v. the Netherlands, 2024, the Court restated the principles in which ""additional elements of dependency"" over and above normal emotional ties amou nt to ""family life"" within the meaning of Article 8 between parents and adult children or between adult siblings, noting that an individualised review of the relationship at issue and other relevant circumstances of the case was required and that the exist ence of ""family life"" on the basis of ""additional elements of dependency"" will often be the result of a combination of elements (§§ 35-44). It found that the relationship between the applicant, a severely disabled adult man, and his adult sisters, who lived in the respondent State and on whose care and support the applicant had relied for years, constituted ""family life"" and that the refusal to grant the applicant a residence permit on the basis of family reunification had breached Article 8 in view of the inadequate assessment carried out by the domestic authorities. Conversely, the Court found that the existence of ""additional elements of dependency"" between the applicant and her adult son living in the respondent State had not been demonstrated in Kumari v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2024."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:4470/21,Martinez Alvarado v. the Netherlands,4470/21,added,"Martinez Alvarado v. the Netherlands, no. 4470/21, 10 December 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B,Access for the purposes of family reunification,2,,13,,,,,"In the context of family reunification, the Court will assess the question whether a relationship between adult family members constituted ""family life"" within the meaning of Article 8 on the basis of all the facts occurring prior to the date that the decision regarding the request for family reunification became final. However, when one of the family members was a minor at the time the request for family reunification was lodged, the Court will assess the question on the existence of ""family life"" based on the situation as it obtained on that date in order to avoid that a child'ages out'pending the proceedings ( Martinez Alvarado v. the Netherlands, 2024, § 45)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:4470/21,Martinez Alvarado v. the Netherlands,4470/21,added,"Martinez Alvarado v. the Netherlands, no. 4470/21, 10 December 2024",3,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.D.1,Expulsion,3,92,95,0.983,"T.C.E. v. Germany , 2018",,"Where foreigners do not qualify as ""settled migrants"", because their presence in the territory of the respondent State was from the outset precarious, unlawful or based on breaches of immigration law, their removal from the respondent State will likely breach Article 8 only in exceptional circumstances (see, for example, Butt v. Norway, 2012, and Alleleh and Others v. Norway, 2022, § 90). The Court also examined cases under Article 8 concerning the denial of - and whether there was a positive obligation to grant - a residence permit to individuals already present in the territory of the Jeunesse v. the Netherlands Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer respondent State (see [GC], 2014; v. the Netherlands, 2006; see also Pormes v. the Netherlands, 2020, in respect of a refusal of a residence permit to alien unlawfully staying in the host State from an early age, who only became T.C.E. v. Germany aware of his precarious immigration status once he was an adult, and, 2018, in respect of a person who had been convicted of criminal offences, as well as Ghadamian v. Switzerland, 2023, in respect of a refusal to issue a residence permit to an elderly alien, resident for 49 years in the respondent State at the time of the final domestic decision, albeit unlawfully for the past sixteen years, on account of an unenforced decision to expel him after his convictions for serious criminal offences).","Where foreigners do not qualify as ""settled migrants"", because their presence in the territory of the respondent State was from the outset precarious, unlawful or based on breaches of immigration law, their removal from the respondent State will likely breach Article 8 only in exceptional circumstances (see, for example, Butt v. Norway, 2012, and Alleleh and Others v. Norway, 2022, § 90). The Court also examined cases under Article 8 concerning the denial of - and whether there was a positive obligation to grant - a residence permit to individuals already present in the territory of the respondent State (see Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], 2014; Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, 2006; see also Pormes v. the Netherlands, 2020, in respect of a refusal of a residence permit to alien unlawfully staying in the host State from an early age, who only became aware of his precarious immigration status once he was an adult; T.C.E. v. Germany, 2018, in respect of a person who had been convicted of criminal offences; Ghadamian v. Switzerland, 2023, in respect of a refusal to issue a residence permit to an elderly alien, resident for 49 years in the respondent State at the time of the final domestic decision, albeit unlawfully for the past sixteen years, on account of an unenforced decision to expel him after his convictions for serious criminal offences; as well as Martinez Alvarado v. the Netherlands, 2024, in respect of the refusal to grant a severely disabled adult man, who was fully dependent on the daily care of others, a residence permit on the basis of family reunification with his adult siblings living in the respondent State, and "" Access for the purposes of family reunification "" above)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:19124/21|20085/21,Matthews and Johnson v. Romania,19124/21|20085/21,added,"Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, nos. 19124/21 and 20085/21, 9 April 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.A.5,Extradition,3,79,82,0.9976,"Matthews and Johnson v. Romania , 2024|ăr v. Romania , 2024",,"Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two- Sanchez - stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. Adistinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving ""whole life prisoners"" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez - Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2022, Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, 2023, and Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), 2023.","Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two-stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. Adistinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving ""whole life prisoners"" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2022, Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, 2023, Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), 2023, Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, and Lazăr v. Romania, 2024."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:19124/21|20085/21,Matthews and Johnson v. Romania,19124/21|20085/21,added,"Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, nos. 19124/21 and 20085/21, 9 April 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.A,Restrictions of freedom of movement and detention for purposes of removal,2,103,106,0.978,"Auad v. Bulgaria , 2011|Azimov v. Russia , 2012|Matthews and Johnson v. Romania , 2024|ăr v. Romania , 2024",,"The indication of an interim measure by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see section ""Rule 39/Interim measures"" below) does not in itself have any bearing on whether the deprivation of liberty to which that individual may be subject complies with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, 2007, § 74). Where the respondent States refrained from deporting applicants in compliance with the interim measure indicated by the Court, the Court was, in a number of cases, prepared to accept that deportation or extradition proceedings were temporarily suspended but nevertheless were ""in progress"", and that therefore no violation of Article 5 § 1(f) had occurred (see Azimov v. Russia, 2013, § 170). At the same time, the suspension of the domestic proceedings due to the indication of an interim measure by the Court should not result in a situation where the applicant languishes in prison for an unreasonably long period ( ibid., § 171). Article 5 § 1(f) does not contain maximum time-limits; the question whether the length of deportation proceedings could affect the lawfulness of detention under this provision thus depends solely on the Auad v. Bulgaria J.N. v. the United Kingdom particular circumstances of each case (, 2011, § 128, and, 2016). However, where fixed time-limits exist, a failure to comply with them may be relevant to the question of ""lawfulness"", as detention exceeding the period permitted by domestic law is unlikely to Komissarov v. the Czech Republic be considered to be ""in accordance with the law"" (, 2022, §§ 50-52). The Court has also held that automatic judicial review of immigration detention is not an essential requirement of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( J.N. v. the United Kingdom, 2016, § 96). Where the authorities make efforts to organise removal to a third country in view of an interim measure indicated by the Court, detention may fall within the scope of Article 5 § 1(f) ( M and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 73).","The indication of an interim measure by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see section "" Rule 39/Interim measures "" below) does not in itself have any bearing on whether the deprivation of liberty to which that individual may be subject complies with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, 2007, § 74). Where the respondent States refrained from deporting or extraditing applicants in compliance with the interim measure indicated by the Court, the Court was, in a number of cases, prepared to accept that deportation or extradition proceedings were temporarily suspended but nevertheless were ""in progress"", and that therefore the detention had been justified under Article 5 § 1(f) (see Azimov v. Russia, 2013, § 170, and Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, § 128). At the same time, the suspension of the domestic proceedings due to the indication of an interim measure by the Court should not result in a situation where the applicant languishes in prison for an unreasonably long period ( Azimov v. Russia, 2012, § 171, and Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, § 128). Article 5 § 1(f) does not contain maximum time-limits; the question whether the length of deportation proceedings could affect the lawfulness of detention under this provision thus depends solely on the particular circumstances of each case ( Auad v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 128, and J.N. v. the United Kingdom, 2016). However, where fixed time- limits exist, a failure to comply with them may be relevant to the question of ""lawfulness"", as detention exceeding the period permitted by domestic law is unlikely to be considered to b e ""in accordance with the law"" ( Komissarov v. the Czech Republic, 2022, §§ 50-52). The Court has also held that automatic judicial review of immigration detention is not an essential requirement of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention ( J.N. v. the United Kingdom, 2016, § 96). Where the authorities make efforts to organise removal to a third country in view of an interim measure indicated by the Court, detention may fall within the scope of Article 5 § 1(f) ( M and Others v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 73). The individual's rearrest and detention, with a view to his extradition after the Court had lifted an interim measure in his case, was found to have been justified under Article 5 § 1(f) in Lazăr v. Romania, 2024, §§ 102-111."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:15117/21|15689/21,Mirzoyan v. the Czech Republic,15117/21|15689/21,added,"Mirzoyan v. the Czech Republic, nos. 15117/21 and 15689/21, 16 May 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,III.D.1,Expulsion,3,93,96,0.7925,,,"In respect of a revocation of a residence permit on the basis of undisclosed information and the existence of sufficient procedural guarantees in the specific context of national security, see Gaspar v. Russia, 2018 (see also S.L. v. Romania (dec.), 2022, in relation to the prohibition, on the basis of an exclusion order based on national security grounds, on a foreign national to enter the country where he had resided lawfully).","In the specific context of national security, the Court has also dealt with cases in which applicants alleged that they had not benefitted from sufficient procedural safeguards in respect of the revocation of a residence permit ( Gaspar v. Russia, 2018), the refusal to extend or to grant a residence permit ( Mirzoyan v. the Czech Republic, 2024) or the prohibition, on the basis of an exclusion order, on a foreign national to enter the country where he had resided lawfully ( S.L. v. Romania (dec.), 2022). In Mirzoyan v. the Czech Republic, 2024, §§ 82-84 the Court found that, in keeping with the principle of harmonious interpretation of the Convention, procedural safeguards under Article 8 had to be interpreted in the light of those provided by Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 (which is not applicable in the absence of an expulsion decision, see "" Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 "" below), insofar as relevant, in cases concerning measures affecting an alien's residence permit in a manner that may potentially lead to his or her expulsion. On the facts of the case, it considered that the domestic court proceedings had offered sufficient guarantees counterbalancing the limitation of the applicant's procedural rights in the proceedings before the administrative authorities and had not deprived him of the opportunity to effectively challenge the executive's assertions that national security and public order were at stake (§§ 87-97)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:49755/18,Okubamichael Debru v. Sweden,49755/18,added,"Okubamichael Debru v. Sweden, no. 49755/18, 25 July 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B,Access for the purposes of family reunification,2,8,8,0.9955,"In B.F. and Others v. Switzerland , 2023|Okubamichael Debru v. Sweden , 2024|S.F. v. Finland , 2024|The Court subsequently reached similar findings in D.H. and Others v. Sweden , 2024",,"In, 2023, the Court examined, for the first time, a case where the family reunification of (certain) recognised refugees was made subject to a requirement of non- reliance on social assistance under domestic law. The applicants, who were all recognised as refugees within the meaning of the 1951 Convention, were granted provisional admission rather than asylum, in line with domestic law, since the grounds for their refugee status arose following their departure from their countries of origin and as a result of their own actions, namely their illegal exit from those countries. Reiterating, inter alia, that there was consensus at international and European level that refugees needed to have the benefit of a more favourable family reunification procedure than other aliens, the Court considered that the particularly vulnerable situation in which refugees sur place find themselves - notably, the insurmountable obstacles to their being reunited with their family members in their country of origin, given that they now face a risk of ill-treatment there - needed to be adequately taken into account in the application of a condition (such as the requirement of non- reliance on social assistance) to their family reunification requests, with insurmountable obstacles to enjoying family life in the country of origin progressively assuming greater importance in the fair- balance assessment as time passed. The requirement of non-reliance on social assistance (which under domestic law applied to family reunification requests of refugees granted provisional admission rather than asylum) thus needed to be applied with sufficient flexibility, as one element of the comprehensive and individualised fair-balance assessment. In two of the four applications at hand, the Court found that the gainfully employed applicants had done all that could reasonably be expected of them to earn a living and to cover their and their family members' expenses. In a third case, the Court was not satisfied that the Federal Administrative Court had sufficiently examined whether the applicant's health would enable her to work, at least to a certain extent, and consequently whether the impugned requirement needed to be applied with flexibility in view of her health. In respect those three applications, the Court thus found a violation of Article 8. By contrast, the Court found no violation of Article 8 as regards the fourth case, considering that the Federal Administrative Court had not overstepped its margin of appreciation when it took the applicant's lack of initiative in improving Dabo v. Sweden, her financial situation into account when balancing the competing interests. In the Court dealt with a related but distinct question: the domestic law of the respondent State provided that refugees were exempt from having to fulfil a maintenance requirement if they applied for family reunification within three months of being granted refugee status, whereas such maintenance requirement applied if a request for family reunification was introduced at a later stage (in line with a possibility afforded under the third subparagraph of Article 12(1) of the of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification). The Court found that the refusal of the family reunification request, because the applicant had introduced it outside of that three-month time-limit in a manner which was not ""objectively excusable"" meaning he had to but failed to meet the maintenance requirement, did not breach Article 8 of the Convention. In this respect, the Court also noted that the domestic authorities had established that the applicant could lodge a fresh request for family reunification at any time and that he had had good prospects of being able to fulfil the maintenance requirement in the future in view of his profession: noting that he had not yet found employment, the Court considered that it could not be concluded that he had done all that could reasonably be expected of him to earn sufficient income to cover his and his family's expenses.","In B.F. and Others v. Switzerland, 2023, the Court examined, for the first time, a case where the family reunification of (certain) recognised refugees was made subject to a requirement of non-reliance on social assistance under domestic law. The applicants, who were all recognised as refugees within the meaning of the 1951 Convention, were granted provisional admission rather than asylum, in line with domestic law, since the grounds for their refugee status arose following their departure from their countries of origin and as a result of their own actions, namely their illegal exit from those countries. Reiterating, inter alia, that there was consensus at international and European level that refugees needed to have the benefit of a more favourable family reunification procedure than other aliens, the Court considered that the particularly vulnerable situation in which refugees sur place find themselves - notably, the insurmountable obstacles to their being reunited with their family members in their country of origin, given that they now face a risk of ill-treatment there - needed to be adequately taken into account in the application of a condition (such as the requirement of non-reliance on social assistance) to their family reunification requests, with insurmountable obstacles to enjoying family life in the country of origin progressively assuming greater importance in the fair-balance assessment as time passed. The requirement of non-reliance on social assistance (which under domestic law applied to family reunification requests of refugees granted provisional admission rather than asylum) thus needed to be applied with sufficient flexibility, as one element of the comprehensive and individualised fair-balance assessment. In two of the four applications at hand, the Court found that the gainfully employed applicants had done all that could reasonably be expected of them to earn a living and to cover their and their family members'expenses. In a third case, the Court was not satisfied that the Federal Administrative Court had sufficiently examined whether the applicant's health would enable her to work, at least to a certain extent, and consequently whether the impugned requirement needed to be applied with flexibility in view of her health. In respect those three applications, the Court thus found a violation of Article 8. By contrast, the Court found no violation of Article 8 as regards the fourth case, considering that the Federal Administrative Court had not overstepped its margin of appreciation when it took the applicant's lack of initiative in improving her financial situation into account when balancing the competing interests. In Dabo v. Sweden, the Court dealt with a related but distinct question: the domestic law of the respondent State provided that refugees were exempt from having to fulfil a maintenance requirement if they applied for family reunification within three months of being granted refugee status, whereas such maintenance requirement applied if a request for family reunification was introduced at a later stage (in line with a possibility afforded under the third subparagraph of Article 12(1) of the of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification). The Court found that the refusal of the family reunification request, because the applicant had introduced it outside of that three-month time-limit in a manner which was not ""objectively excusable"" meaning he had to but failed to meet the maintenance requirement, did not breach Article 8 of the Convention. In this respect, the Court also noted that the domestic authorities had established that the applicant could lodge a fresh request for family reunification at any time and that he had had good prospects of being able to fulfil the maintenance requirement in the future in view of his profession: noting that he had not yet found employment, the Court considered that it could not be concluded that he had done all that could reasonably be expected of him to earn sufficient income to cover his and his family's expenses. The Court subsequently reached similar findings in D.H. and Others v. Sweden, 2024, and Okubamichael Debru v. Sweden, 2024, and S.F. v. Finland, 2024."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:52232/20,P.J. and R.J. v. Switzerland,52232/20,added,"P.J. and R.J. v. Switzerland, no. 52232/20, 17 September 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.D.1,Expulsion,3,91,94,0.993,"Al-Habeeb v. Denmark , 2024|P.J. and R.J. v. Switzerland , 2024|Sharafane v. Denmark , 2024|Winther v. Denmark , 2024",,"The Court has applied these criteria in numerous cases since Üner v. the Netherlands [GC], 2006, although the weight to be attached to each criterion will vary according to the specific circumstances of the case ( Maslov v. Austria [GC], 2008, § 70). Importantly, the fact that the offence committed by an applicant was at the more serious end of the criminal spectrum is not in and of itself determinative of a case; rather, it is just one factor which has to be weighed in the balance, together with the other criteria ( Unuane v. the United Kingdom, 2020, § 87). Where an applicant's criminal culpability was excluded on account of his mental illness when the criminal act was perpetrated, this fact should be adequately taken into account as it might have the effect of limiting the weight to be attached to the ""nature and seriousness"" of the offence criterion in the overall balancing of interests and, consequently, the extent to which a State could legitimately rely on the applicant's criminal acts as the basis for the expulsion and ban on re-entry ( Savran v. Denmark [GC], 2021, §§ 193-194). The Court has found that the fact that an adult ""alien"" had been born and had lived all his life in the respondent State from which he was to be expelled did not bar his expulsion ( Kaya v. Germany, 2007, § 64). However, very serious reasons are required to justify expulsion in cases concerning settled migrants, who have lawfully spent all or the major part of their childhood and youth in the host country ( Levakovic v. Denmark, 2018, § 45). In respect of expulsions of young adults who had been convicted Maslov v. Austria A.A. v. the United of criminal offences committed as a juvenile, see [GC], 2008, and Kingdom, 2011. Where there is a significant lapse of time between the denial of the residence permit - or the final decision on the expulsion order - and the actual deportation, the developments during that period of time may be taken into account ( T.C.E. v. Germany, 2018, § 61). In Hasanbasic v. Switzerland, 2013, the Court dealt with a scenario where the refusal of a residence permit and the expulsion order primarily related to the economic well-being of the country, rather than the prevention of disorder and crime. In recent cases concerning expulsion of ""settled migrants"" and Article 8, the Court emphasised that, where the domestic courts have carefully examined the facts, applying the Convention case-law, and adequately balanced the applicant's personal interests against the more general public interest in the case, it is not for the Court to substitute its own assessment of the merits (including, in particular, its own assessment of the factual details of proportionality) for that of the competent national authorities, except where there are strong reasons for doing so ( Savran v. Denmark [GC], 2021, § 189; Ndidi v. the United Kingdom, 2017, § 76; Levakovic v. Denmark, 2018). By contrast, where the domestic courts do not adequately motivate their decisions and examine the proportionality of the expulsion order in a superficial manner, preventing the Court from exercising its subsidiary role, an expulsion based on such decision would breach Article 8 ( I.M. v. Switzerland, 2019; see also M.M. v. Switzerland, 2020, § 54, in respect of the requirement of judicial review of the proportionality of an expulsion order, including in situations where the legislature may seek to suggest situations of ""mandatory"" expulsion). This also holds true where the domestic courts do not take all relevant facts into consideration, such as an applicant's paternity of a child in the respondent State ( Makdoudi v. Belgium, 2020).","The Court has applied these criteria in numerous cases since Üner v. the Netherlands [GC], 2006, although the weight to be attached to each criterion will vary according to the specific circumstances of the case ( Maslov v. Austria [GC], 2008, § 70) and one criterion will not normally be decisive for the outcome of the proportionality assessment ( Al-Habeeb v. Denmark, 2024, § 62; Sharafane v. Denmark, 2024, § 57). Accordingly, the fact that the offence committed by an applicant was at the more serious end of the criminal spectrum is not in and of itself determinative of a case; rather, it is just one factor which has to be weighed in the balance, together with the other criteria ( Unuane v. the United Kingdom, 2020, § 87). Where an applicant's criminal culpability was excluded on account of his mental illness when the criminal act was perpetrated, this fact should be adequately taken into account as it might have the effect of limiting the weight to be attached to the ""nature and seriousness"" of the offence criterion in the overall balancing of interests and, consequently, the extent to which a State could legitimately rely on the applicant's criminal acts as the basis for the expulsion and ban on re-entry ( Savran v. Denmark [GC], 2021, §§ 193-194). Where the length of the re-entry ban might exceptionally be decisive in the assessment of the compatibility of the expulsion order with Article 8, it may be relevant to take into account whether in the future, after the expiry of the time-limited re-entry ban, the expelled person would have prospects of being readmitted to the country: if such a prospect is purely theoretical, it would not be justified to attribute significant weight to the limited duration of the re-entry ban as factor capable of rendering the expulsion compatible with Article 8 ( Winther v. Denmark, 2024, §§ 47-48). The Court has found that the fact that an adult "" alien "" had been born and had lived all his life in the respondent State from which he was to be expelled did not bar his expulsion ( Kaya v. Germany, 2007, § 64). However, very serious reasons are required to justify expulsion in cases concerning settled migrants, who have lawfully spent all or the major part of their childhood and youth in the host country ( Levakovic v. Denmark, 2018, § 45). In respect of expulsions of young adults who had been convicted of criminal offences committed as a juvenile, see Maslov v. Austria [GC], 2008, and A.A. v. the United Kingdom, 2011. Where there is a significant lapse of time between the denial of the residence permit - or the final decision on the expulsion order - and the actual deportation, the developments during that period of time may be taken into account ( T.C.E. v. Germany, 2018, § 61). In Hasanbasic v. Switzerland, 2013, the Court dealt with a scenario where the refusal of a residence permit and the expulsion order primarily related to the economic well-being of the country, rather than the prevention of disorder and crime. In recent cases concerning expulsion of ""settled migrants"" and Article 8, the Court emphasised that, where the domestic courts have carefully examined the facts, applying the Convention case-law, and adequately balanced the applicant's personal interests against the more general public interest in the case, it is not for the Court to substitute its own assessment of the merits (including, in particular, its own assessment of the factual details of proportionality) for that of the competent national authorities, except where there are strong reasons for doing so ( Savran v. Denmark [GC], 2021, § 189; Ndidi v. the United Kingdom, 2017, § 76; Levakovic v. Denmark, 2018). By contrast, where the domestic courts do not adequately motivate their decisions and examine the proportionality of the expulsion order in a superficial manner, preventing the Court from exercising its subsidiary role, an expulsion based on such decision would breach Article 8 ( I.M. v. Switzerland, 2019; see also M.M. v. Switzerland, 2020, § 54, in respect of the requirement of judicial review of the proportionality of an expulsion order, including in situations where the legislature may seek to suggest situations of ""mandatory"" expulsion; and P.J. and R.J. v. Switzerland, 2024, § 55). This also holds true where the domestic courts do not take all relevant facts into consideration, such as an applicant's paternity of a child in the respondent State ( Makdoudi v. Belgium, 2020)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:35276/20,S.F. v. Finland,35276/20,added,"S.F. v. Finland, no. 35276/20, 8 October 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B,Access for the purposes of family reunification,2,8,8,0.9955,"In B.F. and Others v. Switzerland , 2023|Okubamichael Debru v. Sweden , 2024|S.F. v. Finland , 2024|The Court subsequently reached similar findings in D.H. and Others v. Sweden , 2024",,"In, 2023, the Court examined, for the first time, a case where the family reunification of (certain) recognised refugees was made subject to a requirement of non- reliance on social assistance under domestic law. The applicants, who were all recognised as refugees within the meaning of the 1951 Convention, were granted provisional admission rather than asylum, in line with domestic law, since the grounds for their refugee status arose following their departure from their countries of origin and as a result of their own actions, namely their illegal exit from those countries. Reiterating, inter alia, that there was consensus at international and European level that refugees needed to have the benefit of a more favourable family reunification procedure than other aliens, the Court considered that the particularly vulnerable situation in which refugees sur place find themselves - notably, the insurmountable obstacles to their being reunited with their family members in their country of origin, given that they now face a risk of ill-treatment there - needed to be adequately taken into account in the application of a condition (such as the requirement of non- reliance on social assistance) to their family reunification requests, with insurmountable obstacles to enjoying family life in the country of origin progressively assuming greater importance in the fair- balance assessment as time passed. The requirement of non-reliance on social assistance (which under domestic law applied to family reunification requests of refugees granted provisional admission rather than asylum) thus needed to be applied with sufficient flexibility, as one element of the comprehensive and individualised fair-balance assessment. In two of the four applications at hand, the Court found that the gainfully employed applicants had done all that could reasonably be expected of them to earn a living and to cover their and their family members' expenses. In a third case, the Court was not satisfied that the Federal Administrative Court had sufficiently examined whether the applicant's health would enable her to work, at least to a certain extent, and consequently whether the impugned requirement needed to be applied with flexibility in view of her health. In respect those three applications, the Court thus found a violation of Article 8. By contrast, the Court found no violation of Article 8 as regards the fourth case, considering that the Federal Administrative Court had not overstepped its margin of appreciation when it took the applicant's lack of initiative in improving Dabo v. Sweden, her financial situation into account when balancing the competing interests. In the Court dealt with a related but distinct question: the domestic law of the respondent State provided that refugees were exempt from having to fulfil a maintenance requirement if they applied for family reunification within three months of being granted refugee status, whereas such maintenance requirement applied if a request for family reunification was introduced at a later stage (in line with a possibility afforded under the third subparagraph of Article 12(1) of the of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification). The Court found that the refusal of the family reunification request, because the applicant had introduced it outside of that three-month time-limit in a manner which was not ""objectively excusable"" meaning he had to but failed to meet the maintenance requirement, did not breach Article 8 of the Convention. In this respect, the Court also noted that the domestic authorities had established that the applicant could lodge a fresh request for family reunification at any time and that he had had good prospects of being able to fulfil the maintenance requirement in the future in view of his profession: noting that he had not yet found employment, the Court considered that it could not be concluded that he had done all that could reasonably be expected of him to earn sufficient income to cover his and his family's expenses.","In B.F. and Others v. Switzerland, 2023, the Court examined, for the first time, a case where the family reunification of (certain) recognised refugees was made subject to a requirement of non-reliance on social assistance under domestic law. The applicants, who were all recognised as refugees within the meaning of the 1951 Convention, were granted provisional admission rather than asylum, in line with domestic law, since the grounds for their refugee status arose following their departure from their countries of origin and as a result of their own actions, namely their illegal exit from those countries. Reiterating, inter alia, that there was consensus at international and European level that refugees needed to have the benefit of a more favourable family reunification procedure than other aliens, the Court considered that the particularly vulnerable situation in which refugees sur place find themselves - notably, the insurmountable obstacles to their being reunited with their family members in their country of origin, given that they now face a risk of ill-treatment there - needed to be adequately taken into account in the application of a condition (such as the requirement of non-reliance on social assistance) to their family reunification requests, with insurmountable obstacles to enjoying family life in the country of origin progressively assuming greater importance in the fair-balance assessment as time passed. The requirement of non-reliance on social assistance (which under domestic law applied to family reunification requests of refugees granted provisional admission rather than asylum) thus needed to be applied with sufficient flexibility, as one element of the comprehensive and individualised fair-balance assessment. In two of the four applications at hand, the Court found that the gainfully employed applicants had done all that could reasonably be expected of them to earn a living and to cover their and their family members'expenses. In a third case, the Court was not satisfied that the Federal Administrative Court had sufficiently examined whether the applicant's health would enable her to work, at least to a certain extent, and consequently whether the impugned requirement needed to be applied with flexibility in view of her health. In respect those three applications, the Court thus found a violation of Article 8. By contrast, the Court found no violation of Article 8 as regards the fourth case, considering that the Federal Administrative Court had not overstepped its margin of appreciation when it took the applicant's lack of initiative in improving her financial situation into account when balancing the competing interests. In Dabo v. Sweden, the Court dealt with a related but distinct question: the domestic law of the respondent State provided that refugees were exempt from having to fulfil a maintenance requirement if they applied for family reunification within three months of being granted refugee status, whereas such maintenance requirement applied if a request for family reunification was introduced at a later stage (in line with a possibility afforded under the third subparagraph of Article 12(1) of the of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification). The Court found that the refusal of the family reunification request, because the applicant had introduced it outside of that three-month time-limit in a manner which was not ""objectively excusable"" meaning he had to but failed to meet the maintenance requirement, did not breach Article 8 of the Convention. In this respect, the Court also noted that the domestic authorities had established that the applicant could lodge a fresh request for family reunification at any time and that he had had good prospects of being able to fulfil the maintenance requirement in the future in view of his profession: noting that he had not yet found employment, the Court considered that it could not be concluded that he had done all that could reasonably be expected of him to earn sufficient income to cover his and his family's expenses. The Court subsequently reached similar findings in D.H. and Others v. Sweden, 2024, and Okubamichael Debru v. Sweden, 2024, and S.F. v. Finland, 2024."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:5199/23,Sharafane v. Denmark,5199/23,added,"Sharafane v. Denmark, no. 5199/23, 12 November 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.D.1,Expulsion,3,91,94,0.993,"Al-Habeeb v. Denmark , 2024|P.J. and R.J. v. Switzerland , 2024|Sharafane v. Denmark , 2024|Winther v. Denmark , 2024",,"The Court has applied these criteria in numerous cases since Üner v. the Netherlands [GC], 2006, although the weight to be attached to each criterion will vary according to the specific circumstances of the case ( Maslov v. Austria [GC], 2008, § 70). Importantly, the fact that the offence committed by an applicant was at the more serious end of the criminal spectrum is not in and of itself determinative of a case; rather, it is just one factor which has to be weighed in the balance, together with the other criteria ( Unuane v. the United Kingdom, 2020, § 87). Where an applicant's criminal culpability was excluded on account of his mental illness when the criminal act was perpetrated, this fact should be adequately taken into account as it might have the effect of limiting the weight to be attached to the ""nature and seriousness"" of the offence criterion in the overall balancing of interests and, consequently, the extent to which a State could legitimately rely on the applicant's criminal acts as the basis for the expulsion and ban on re-entry ( Savran v. Denmark [GC], 2021, §§ 193-194). The Court has found that the fact that an adult ""alien"" had been born and had lived all his life in the respondent State from which he was to be expelled did not bar his expulsion ( Kaya v. Germany, 2007, § 64). However, very serious reasons are required to justify expulsion in cases concerning settled migrants, who have lawfully spent all or the major part of their childhood and youth in the host country ( Levakovic v. Denmark, 2018, § 45). In respect of expulsions of young adults who had been convicted Maslov v. Austria A.A. v. the United of criminal offences committed as a juvenile, see [GC], 2008, and Kingdom, 2011. Where there is a significant lapse of time between the denial of the residence permit - or the final decision on the expulsion order - and the actual deportation, the developments during that period of time may be taken into account ( T.C.E. v. Germany, 2018, § 61). In Hasanbasic v. Switzerland, 2013, the Court dealt with a scenario where the refusal of a residence permit and the expulsion order primarily related to the economic well-being of the country, rather than the prevention of disorder and crime. In recent cases concerning expulsion of ""settled migrants"" and Article 8, the Court emphasised that, where the domestic courts have carefully examined the facts, applying the Convention case-law, and adequately balanced the applicant's personal interests against the more general public interest in the case, it is not for the Court to substitute its own assessment of the merits (including, in particular, its own assessment of the factual details of proportionality) for that of the competent national authorities, except where there are strong reasons for doing so ( Savran v. Denmark [GC], 2021, § 189; Ndidi v. the United Kingdom, 2017, § 76; Levakovic v. Denmark, 2018). By contrast, where the domestic courts do not adequately motivate their decisions and examine the proportionality of the expulsion order in a superficial manner, preventing the Court from exercising its subsidiary role, an expulsion based on such decision would breach Article 8 ( I.M. v. Switzerland, 2019; see also M.M. v. Switzerland, 2020, § 54, in respect of the requirement of judicial review of the proportionality of an expulsion order, including in situations where the legislature may seek to suggest situations of ""mandatory"" expulsion). This also holds true where the domestic courts do not take all relevant facts into consideration, such as an applicant's paternity of a child in the respondent State ( Makdoudi v. Belgium, 2020).","The Court has applied these criteria in numerous cases since Üner v. the Netherlands [GC], 2006, although the weight to be attached to each criterion will vary according to the specific circumstances of the case ( Maslov v. Austria [GC], 2008, § 70) and one criterion will not normally be decisive for the outcome of the proportionality assessment ( Al-Habeeb v. Denmark, 2024, § 62; Sharafane v. Denmark, 2024, § 57). Accordingly, the fact that the offence committed by an applicant was at the more serious end of the criminal spectrum is not in and of itself determinative of a case; rather, it is just one factor which has to be weighed in the balance, together with the other criteria ( Unuane v. the United Kingdom, 2020, § 87). Where an applicant's criminal culpability was excluded on account of his mental illness when the criminal act was perpetrated, this fact should be adequately taken into account as it might have the effect of limiting the weight to be attached to the ""nature and seriousness"" of the offence criterion in the overall balancing of interests and, consequently, the extent to which a State could legitimately rely on the applicant's criminal acts as the basis for the expulsion and ban on re-entry ( Savran v. Denmark [GC], 2021, §§ 193-194). Where the length of the re-entry ban might exceptionally be decisive in the assessment of the compatibility of the expulsion order with Article 8, it may be relevant to take into account whether in the future, after the expiry of the time-limited re-entry ban, the expelled person would have prospects of being readmitted to the country: if such a prospect is purely theoretical, it would not be justified to attribute significant weight to the limited duration of the re-entry ban as factor capable of rendering the expulsion compatible with Article 8 ( Winther v. Denmark, 2024, §§ 47-48). The Court has found that the fact that an adult "" alien "" had been born and had lived all his life in the respondent State from which he was to be expelled did not bar his expulsion ( Kaya v. Germany, 2007, § 64). However, very serious reasons are required to justify expulsion in cases concerning settled migrants, who have lawfully spent all or the major part of their childhood and youth in the host country ( Levakovic v. Denmark, 2018, § 45). In respect of expulsions of young adults who had been convicted of criminal offences committed as a juvenile, see Maslov v. Austria [GC], 2008, and A.A. v. the United Kingdom, 2011. Where there is a significant lapse of time between the denial of the residence permit - or the final decision on the expulsion order - and the actual deportation, the developments during that period of time may be taken into account ( T.C.E. v. Germany, 2018, § 61). In Hasanbasic v. Switzerland, 2013, the Court dealt with a scenario where the refusal of a residence permit and the expulsion order primarily related to the economic well-being of the country, rather than the prevention of disorder and crime. In recent cases concerning expulsion of ""settled migrants"" and Article 8, the Court emphasised that, where the domestic courts have carefully examined the facts, applying the Convention case-law, and adequately balanced the applicant's personal interests against the more general public interest in the case, it is not for the Court to substitute its own assessment of the merits (including, in particular, its own assessment of the factual details of proportionality) for that of the competent national authorities, except where there are strong reasons for doing so ( Savran v. Denmark [GC], 2021, § 189; Ndidi v. the United Kingdom, 2017, § 76; Levakovic v. Denmark, 2018). By contrast, where the domestic courts do not adequately motivate their decisions and examine the proportionality of the expulsion order in a superficial manner, preventing the Court from exercising its subsidiary role, an expulsion based on such decision would breach Article 8 ( I.M. v. Switzerland, 2019; see also M.M. v. Switzerland, 2020, § 54, in respect of the requirement of judicial review of the proportionality of an expulsion order, including in situations where the legislature may seek to suggest situations of ""mandatory"" expulsion; and P.J. and R.J. v. Switzerland, 2024, § 55). This also holds true where the domestic courts do not take all relevant facts into consideration, such as an applicant's paternity of a child in the respondent State ( Makdoudi v. Belgium, 2020)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:54029/17,Sherov and Others v. Poland,54029/17,added,"Sherov and Others v. Poland, nos. 54029/17 and 3 others, 4 April 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.1,Article 3 of the Convention alone and/or in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention,3,19,22,0.9914,"H.T. v. Germany and Greece , 2024|O.M. and D.S. v. Ukraine , 2022|Sherov and Others v. Poland , 2024",,"Where the applicants, who had presented themselves at the border seeking to lodge an asylum application and/or communicating fear for their safety, were removed in a summary manner to the third country from which they had sought to enter the respondent State's territory, the Court applied the principles which it had set out in Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, in respect of the obligations under Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the removal of asylum-seekers to third intermediary countries, without an assessment, by the authorities of the removing State, of the merits of their asylum claim (see section ""Removal to a third country"" below). The Court found violations of Article 3 of the Convention (as well as, in certain cases, of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article M.K. and Others v. Poland D.A. and Others v. Poland O.M. and D.S. 3) in these cases (, 2020;, 2021; v. Ukraine, 2022; S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023; for cases concerning similar factual scenarios, but predating Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, see M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018, and Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014), including where domestic law provided that asylum applications could not be lodged at the border crossing point (airport) at which the applicants presented themselves but could only be lodged at a land border transit zone ( S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 62-63). Where applicants can arguably claim that there is no guarantee that their asylum applications would be seriously examined by the authorities in the neighbouring third country and that their return to their country of origin could violate Article 3 of the Convention, the respondent State is obliged to allow the applicants to remain with its jurisdiction until such time that their claims have been properly reviewed by a competent domestic authority and cannot deny access to its territory to persons presenting themselves at a border checkpoint who allege that they may be subjected to ill-treatment if they remain on the territory of the neighbouring state, unless adequate measures are taken to eliminate such a risk ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 178-179). The Court added that the impugned measures did not fall within the respondent State's strict international legal obligations following from its membership in the European Union and that, consequently, the respondent State was fully responsible under the Convention for the impugned acts. More specifically, the Court found the provisions of European Union law embraced the principle of non-refoulement and applied it to persons who were subjected to border checks before being admitted to the territory of a Member States ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 180-182; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 65-67).","Where the applicants, who had presented themselves at the border seeking to lodge an asylum application and/or communicating fear for their safety, were removed in a summary manner to a third country, the Court applied the principles which it had set out in Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, in respect of the obligations under Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the removal of asylum-seekers to third intermediary countries, without an assessment, by the authorities of the removing State, of the merits of their asylum claim (see section "" Removal to a third country "" below) . The Court found violations of Article 3 of the Convention (as well as, in certain cases, of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3) in these cases ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021; O.M. and D.S. v. Ukraine, 2022; S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023; Sherov and Others v. Poland, 2024; H.T. v. Germany and Greece, 2024, in respect of a removal from one EUmember State to another on the basis of a bilateral agreement; see also "" Interception, rescue operations and summary returns (""push - backs"") at sea "" above; for cases concerning similar factual scenarios, but predating Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], 2019, see M.A. and Others v. Lithuania, 2018, and Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014), including where domestic law provided that asylum applications could not be lodged at the border crossing point (airport) at which the applicants presented themselves but could only be lodged at a land border transit zone ( S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 62-63). Where applicants can arguably claim that there is no guarantee that their asylum applications would be seriously examined by the authorities in the neighbouring third country and that their return to their country of origin could violate Article 3 of the Convention, the respondent State is obliged to allow the applicants to remain with its jurisdiction until such time that their claims have been properly reviewed by a competent domestic authority and cannot deny access to its territory to persons presenting themselves at a border checkpoint who allege that they may be subjected to ill-treatment if they remain on the territory of the neighbouring state, unless adequate measures are taken to eliminate such a risk ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 178-179). The Court added that the impugned measures did not fall within the respondent State's strict international legal obligations following from its membership in the European Union and that, consequently, the respondent State was fully responsible under the Convention for the impugned acts. More specifically, the Court found the provisions of European Union law embraced the principle of non-refoulement and applied it to persons who were subjected to border checks before being admitted to the territory of a Member States ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 180-182; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 65-67)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:54029/17,Sherov and Others v. Poland,54029/17,added,"Sherov and Others v. Poland, nos. 54029/17 and 3 others, 4 April 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.A.2,Article 4 of Protocol No. 4,3,24,27,0.9951,"D.A. and Others v. Poland , 2021|J.A. and Others v. Italy , 2023|M.D. and Others v. Hungary , 2024|Sherov and Others v. Poland , 2024","M.A. and Others v. Latvia 2021|Others v. Italy , 2023","Where migrants entered the respondent State's territory in an unauthorised manner and, following their apprehension near the border, were provided with access to means of legal entry through the appropriate border procedure, the Court did not apply the aforementioned two-tier test, but instead assessed - in order to determine whether the expulsion was ""collective"" in nature - whether the individuals were afforded, prior to the adoption of expulsion orders, an effective possibility of submitting arguments against their removal and whether there were sufficient guarantees demonstrating that their personal circumstances had been genuinely and individually taken into account ( Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, § 62). Such test is, essentially, similar to the one applied to individuals who present themselves at a point of legal entry, such as a border M.K. and Others v. Poland D.A. and Others v. Poland checkpoint (see, 2020, §§ 204-211,, 2021, §§ 81-84, and M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69) or at an airport (see S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 48-51, where the Court considered that it did not absolve the authorities of their obligation under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 that the applicants had initially sought to enter the respondent State by using counterfeit documents). Whether the requirements of this test are satisfied is a question of fact, which is to be determined by having regard to, in so far as pertinent in a given case, supporting evidence provided by the parties, including as to whether an identification process was conducted and under what conditions (whether persons were trained to conduct interviews, whether information was provided, in a language the individuals understood, about the possibility to lodge an asylum application and to request legal aid, whether interpreters were present, and whether the individuals were able, in practice, to consult lawyers and to lodge asylum applications) as well as to independent reports ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 185; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014, §§ 214-225; Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 245-254; Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, §§ 63-71; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 206-210; D.A. and Others v. Poland, M.A. and Others v. Latvia 2021, §§ 81-83; (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69). For an example of a case where individuals, who did not intend to seek asylum in the respondent State, were removed in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 after having been detained for ten days in a ""hotspot"" for the registration J.A. and and identification of migrants from the moment of their arrival in the respondent State, see Others v. Italy, 2023, §§ 47 and 106-116.","Where migrants entered the respondent State's territory in an unauthorised manner and, following their apprehension near the border, were provided with access to means of legal entry through the appropriate border procedure, the Court did not apply the aforementioned two-tier test, but instead assessed - in order to determine whether the expulsion was ""collective"" in nature - whether the individuals were afforded, prior to the adoption of expulsion orders, an effective possibility of submitting arguments against their removal and whether there were sufficient guarantees demonstrating that their personal circumstances had been genuinely and individually taken into account ( Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, § 62). Such test is, essentially, similar to the one applied to individuals who present themselves at a point of legal entry, such as a border checkpoint (see M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 204-211, D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-84, M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69, and Sherov and Others v. Poland, 2024, §§ 59-61) or at an airport (see S.S. and Others v. Hungary, 2023, §§ 48-51, where the Court considered that it did not absolve the authorities of their obligation under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 that the applicants had initially sought to enter the respondent State by using counterfeit documents). Whether the requirements of this test are satisfied is a question of fact, which is to be determined by having regard to, in so far as pertinent in a given case, supporting evidence provided by the parties, including as to whether an identification process was conducted and under what conditions (whether persons were trained to conduct interviews, whether information was provided, in a language the individuals understood, about the possibility to lodge an asylum application and to request legal aid, whether interpreters were present, and whether the individuals were able, in practice, to consult lawyers and to lodge asylum applications) as well as to independent reports ( Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, § 185; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014, §§ 214-225; Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, §§ 245-254; Asady and Others v. Slovakia, 2020, §§ 63-71; M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 206-210; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 81-83; M.A. and Others v. Latvia (dec.), 2022, §§ 67-69). For an example of individuals, who lodged asylum applications, being removed to a third country without a valid decision, in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, see M.D. and Others v. Hungary, 2024. For an example of a case where individuals, who did not intend to seek asylum in the respondent State, were removed in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 after having been detained for ten days in a ""hotspot"" for the registration and identification of migrants from the moment of their arrival in the respondent State, see J.A. and Others v. Italy, 2023, §§ 47 and 106-116."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:73316/01,Siliadin v. France,73316/01,removed,"Siliadin v. France, no. 73316/01, ECHR 2005-VII",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_deleted,V.C,Trafficking in human beings,2,118,,,,"C.N. and v. v. France C.N. v. the United Kingdom Rantsev v. Cyprus and , 2012|Chowdury and Others v. Greece , 2017|L.E. v. Greece , 2016|Siliadin v. France , 2005|T.I. and Others v. Greece , 2019","Anumber of cases, dealt with by the Court under Article 4 in the context of trafficking in human beings, concerned foreigners, in connection with domestic servitude ( Siliadin v. France, 2005; C.N. and v. v. France C.N. v. the United Kingdom Rantsev v. Cyprus and, 2012;, 2012), sexual exploitation ( Russia, 2021; L.E. v. Greece, 2016; T.I. and Others v. Greece, 2019), and work in agriculture ( Chowdury and Others v. Greece, 2017).",
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20240904075051__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2024-09-04,2025-06-02,29 February 2024,28 February 2025,2024-02-29,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2024-09-04__2025-06-02.json,apps:9588/21,Winther v. Denmark,9588/21,added,"Winther v. Denmark, no. 9588/21, 12 November 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.D.1,Expulsion,3,91,94,0.993,"Al-Habeeb v. Denmark , 2024|P.J. and R.J. v. Switzerland , 2024|Sharafane v. Denmark , 2024|Winther v. Denmark , 2024",,"The Court has applied these criteria in numerous cases since Üner v. the Netherlands [GC], 2006, although the weight to be attached to each criterion will vary according to the specific circumstances of the case ( Maslov v. Austria [GC], 2008, § 70). Importantly, the fact that the offence committed by an applicant was at the more serious end of the criminal spectrum is not in and of itself determinative of a case; rather, it is just one factor which has to be weighed in the balance, together with the other criteria ( Unuane v. the United Kingdom, 2020, § 87). Where an applicant's criminal culpability was excluded on account of his mental illness when the criminal act was perpetrated, this fact should be adequately taken into account as it might have the effect of limiting the weight to be attached to the ""nature and seriousness"" of the offence criterion in the overall balancing of interests and, consequently, the extent to which a State could legitimately rely on the applicant's criminal acts as the basis for the expulsion and ban on re-entry ( Savran v. Denmark [GC], 2021, §§ 193-194). The Court has found that the fact that an adult ""alien"" had been born and had lived all his life in the respondent State from which he was to be expelled did not bar his expulsion ( Kaya v. Germany, 2007, § 64). However, very serious reasons are required to justify expulsion in cases concerning settled migrants, who have lawfully spent all or the major part of their childhood and youth in the host country ( Levakovic v. Denmark, 2018, § 45). In respect of expulsions of young adults who had been convicted Maslov v. Austria A.A. v. the United of criminal offences committed as a juvenile, see [GC], 2008, and Kingdom, 2011. Where there is a significant lapse of time between the denial of the residence permit - or the final decision on the expulsion order - and the actual deportation, the developments during that period of time may be taken into account ( T.C.E. v. Germany, 2018, § 61). In Hasanbasic v. Switzerland, 2013, the Court dealt with a scenario where the refusal of a residence permit and the expulsion order primarily related to the economic well-being of the country, rather than the prevention of disorder and crime. In recent cases concerning expulsion of ""settled migrants"" and Article 8, the Court emphasised that, where the domestic courts have carefully examined the facts, applying the Convention case-law, and adequately balanced the applicant's personal interests against the more general public interest in the case, it is not for the Court to substitute its own assessment of the merits (including, in particular, its own assessment of the factual details of proportionality) for that of the competent national authorities, except where there are strong reasons for doing so ( Savran v. Denmark [GC], 2021, § 189; Ndidi v. the United Kingdom, 2017, § 76; Levakovic v. Denmark, 2018). By contrast, where the domestic courts do not adequately motivate their decisions and examine the proportionality of the expulsion order in a superficial manner, preventing the Court from exercising its subsidiary role, an expulsion based on such decision would breach Article 8 ( I.M. v. Switzerland, 2019; see also M.M. v. Switzerland, 2020, § 54, in respect of the requirement of judicial review of the proportionality of an expulsion order, including in situations where the legislature may seek to suggest situations of ""mandatory"" expulsion). This also holds true where the domestic courts do not take all relevant facts into consideration, such as an applicant's paternity of a child in the respondent State ( Makdoudi v. Belgium, 2020).","The Court has applied these criteria in numerous cases since Üner v. the Netherlands [GC], 2006, although the weight to be attached to each criterion will vary according to the specific circumstances of the case ( Maslov v. Austria [GC], 2008, § 70) and one criterion will not normally be decisive for the outcome of the proportionality assessment ( Al-Habeeb v. Denmark, 2024, § 62; Sharafane v. Denmark, 2024, § 57). Accordingly, the fact that the offence committed by an applicant was at the more serious end of the criminal spectrum is not in and of itself determinative of a case; rather, it is just one factor which has to be weighed in the balance, together with the other criteria ( Unuane v. the United Kingdom, 2020, § 87). Where an applicant's criminal culpability was excluded on account of his mental illness when the criminal act was perpetrated, this fact should be adequately taken into account as it might have the effect of limiting the weight to be attached to the ""nature and seriousness"" of the offence criterion in the overall balancing of interests and, consequently, the extent to which a State could legitimately rely on the applicant's criminal acts as the basis for the expulsion and ban on re-entry ( Savran v. Denmark [GC], 2021, §§ 193-194). Where the length of the re-entry ban might exceptionally be decisive in the assessment of the compatibility of the expulsion order with Article 8, it may be relevant to take into account whether in the future, after the expiry of the time-limited re-entry ban, the expelled person would have prospects of being readmitted to the country: if such a prospect is purely theoretical, it would not be justified to attribute significant weight to the limited duration of the re-entry ban as factor capable of rendering the expulsion compatible with Article 8 ( Winther v. Denmark, 2024, §§ 47-48). The Court has found that the fact that an adult "" alien "" had been born and had lived all his life in the respondent State from which he was to be expelled did not bar his expulsion ( Kaya v. Germany, 2007, § 64). However, very serious reasons are required to justify expulsion in cases concerning settled migrants, who have lawfully spent all or the major part of their childhood and youth in the host country ( Levakovic v. Denmark, 2018, § 45). In respect of expulsions of young adults who had been convicted of criminal offences committed as a juvenile, see Maslov v. Austria [GC], 2008, and A.A. v. the United Kingdom, 2011. Where there is a significant lapse of time between the denial of the residence permit - or the final decision on the expulsion order - and the actual deportation, the developments during that period of time may be taken into account ( T.C.E. v. Germany, 2018, § 61). In Hasanbasic v. Switzerland, 2013, the Court dealt with a scenario where the refusal of a residence permit and the expulsion order primarily related to the economic well-being of the country, rather than the prevention of disorder and crime. In recent cases concerning expulsion of ""settled migrants"" and Article 8, the Court emphasised that, where the domestic courts have carefully examined the facts, applying the Convention case-law, and adequately balanced the applicant's personal interests against the more general public interest in the case, it is not for the Court to substitute its own assessment of the merits (including, in particular, its own assessment of the factual details of proportionality) for that of the competent national authorities, except where there are strong reasons for doing so ( Savran v. Denmark [GC], 2021, § 189; Ndidi v. the United Kingdom, 2017, § 76; Levakovic v. Denmark, 2018). By contrast, where the domestic courts do not adequately motivate their decisions and examine the proportionality of the expulsion order in a superficial manner, preventing the Court from exercising its subsidiary role, an expulsion based on such decision would breach Article 8 ( I.M. v. Switzerland, 2019; see also M.M. v. Switzerland, 2020, § 54, in respect of the requirement of judicial review of the proportionality of an expulsion order, including in situations where the legislature may seek to suggest situations of ""mandatory"" expulsion; and P.J. and R.J. v. Switzerland, 2024, § 55). This also holds true where the domestic courts do not take all relevant facts into consideration, such as an applicant's paternity of a child in the respondent State ( Makdoudi v. Belgium, 2020)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20251122094224__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2025-06-02,2025-11-22,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2025-06-02__2025-11-22.json,apps:4662/22,Ali v. Serbia,4662/22,added,"Ali v. Serbia, no. 4662/22, 25 March 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.A.5,Extradition,3,80,81,0.9778,"Ali v. Serbia , 2025",,"Extradition by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question would, if extradited, face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the receiving country ( Soering v. the United Kingdom, 1989, §§ 88-91). The same level of scrutiny applies to all claims of a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 regardless of the legal basis for the removal (whether extradition or expulsion, Khasanov and Rakhmanov v. Russia [GC], 2022, § 94). There may be cases where a State grants an extradition request in which the individual, who has applied for asylum, is charged with politically motivated crimes (see Mamazhonov v. Russia, 2014), or where extradition concerns an individual recognised as a refugee in another country ( M.G. v. Bulgaria, 2014).","Extradition by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question would, if extradited, face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the receiving country ( Soering v. the United Kingdom, 1989, §§ 88-91). The same level of scrutiny applies to all claims of a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 regardless of the legal basis for the removal (whether extradition or expulsion, Khasanov and Rakhmanov v. Russia [GC], 2022, § 94). There may be cases where a State grants an extradition request in which the individual, who has applied for asylum, is charged with politically motivated crimes (see Mamazhonov v. Russia, 2014; see also Ali v. Serbia, 2025, where the domestic authorities failed to examine the risk of politically motivated ill-treatment which the applicant had alleged), or where extradition concerns an individual recognised as a refugee in another country ( M.G. v. Bulgaria, 2014)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20251122094224__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2025-06-02,2025-11-22,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2025-06-02__2025-11-22.json,apps:22776/18,Almukhlas and Al-Maliki v. Greece,22776/18,added,"Almukhlas and Al-Maliki v. Greece, no. 22776/18, 25 March 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.E,"Interception, rescue operations and summary returns (“push - backs”) at sea",2,19,20,0.9835,"Convention. In Almukhlas and Al-Maliki v. Greece , 2025",,"In Alkhatib and Others v. Greece, 2024, a member of the applicants'family, who was travelling in a boat with other migrants with a view to illegally entering Greece, sustained a serious gunshot wound as a result of shots fired by the coast guard. The Court found, in the first place, a violation of the procedural limb of Article 2 given the ineffective investigation: on account of the numerous shortcomings it had, inter alia, been impossible to determine whether or not the use of potentially lethal force had been justified in the particular circumstances of the case. Secondly, with respect to the substantive limb of Article 2, the Court found that the respondent State had failed to comply with its obligation to put in place an adequate legal and administrative framework governing the use of potentially lethal force in maritime surveillance operations: it found that the coast guard, who could have presumed the presence of passengers hidden on board of the boat, had not exercised due care to minimise the use of lethal force and the possible risks to life and concluded that the Government had not demonstrated that the use of force had been ""absolutely necessary"" within the meaning of Article 2 § 2 of the Convention.","In Alkhatib and Others v. Greece, 2024, a member of the applicants'family, who was travelling in a boat with other migrants with a view to illegally entering Greece, sustained a serious gunshot wound as a result of shots fired by the coast guard. The Court found, in the first place, a violation of the procedural limb of Article 2 given the ineffective investigation: on account of the numerous shortcomings it had, inter alia, been impossible to determine whether or not the use of potentially lethal force had been justified in the particular circumstances of the case. Secondly, with respect to the substantive limb of Article 2, the Court found that the respondent State had failed to comply with its obligation to put in place an adequate legal and administrative framework governing the use of potentially lethal force in maritime surveillance operations: it found that the coast guard, who could have presumed the presence of passengers hidden on board of the boat, had not exercised due care to minimise the use of lethal force and the possible risks to life and concluded that the Government had not demonstrated that the use of force had been ""absolutely necessary"" within the meaning of Article 2 § 2 of the Convention. In Almukhlas and Al-Maliki v. Greece, 2025, where a minor, who had been hiding on a boat transporting migrants, was hit by a bullet fired by a coastguard at one of the skippers during an operation to intercept the boat, the Court found a violation of the procedural limb of Article 2 as well as of the substantive limb (planning and conduct of the interception)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20251122094224__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2025-06-02,2025-11-22,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2025-06-02__2025-11-22.json,apps:48302/21,Demirci v. Hungary,48302/21,added,"Demirci v. Hungary, no. 48302/21, 6 May 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B,Access for the purposes of family reunification,2,12,12,0.9908,"Demirci v. Hungary , 2025",,"In Martinez Alvarado v. the Netherlands, 2024, the Court restated the principles in which ""additional elements of dependency"" over and above normal emotional ties amou nt to ""family life"" within the meaning of Article 8 between parents and adult children or between adult siblings, noting that an individualised review of the relationship at issue and other relevant circumstances of the case was required and that the exist ence of ""family life"" on the basis of ""additional elements of dependency"" will often be the result of a combination of elements (§§ 35-44). It found that the relationship between the applicant, a severely disabled adult man, and his adult sisters, who lived in the respondent State and on whose care and support the applicant had relied for years, constituted ""family life"" and that the refusal to grant the applicant a residence permit on the basis of family reunification had breached Article 8 in view of the inadequate assessment carried out by the domestic authorities. Conversely, the Court found that the existence of ""additional elements of dependency"" between the applicant and her adult son living in the respondent State had not been demonstrated in Kumari v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2024.","In Martinez Alvarado v. the Netherlands, 2024, the Court restated the principles in which ""additional elements of dependency"" over and above normal emotional ties amount to ""family life"" within the meaning of Article 8 between parents and adult children or between adult siblings, noting that an individualised review of the relationship at issue and other relevant circumstances of the case was required and that the existence of ""family life"" on the basis of ""additional elements of dependency"" will often be the result of a combination of elements (§§ 35-44). It found that the relationship between the applicant, a severely disabled adult man, and his adult sisters, who lived in the respondent State and on whose care and support the applicant had relied for years, constituted ""family life"" and that the refusal to grant the applicant a residence permit on the basis of family reunification had breached Article 8 in view of the inadequate assessment carried out by the domestic authorities. Conversely, the Court found that the existence of ""additional elements of dependency"" between the applicant and her adult son living in the respondent State had not been demonstrated in Kumari v. the Netherlands (dec.), 2024 ( for an expulsion case in which the Court found that ""additional elements of dependency"" had not been shown to exist, see Demirci v. Hungary, 2025, § 74)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20251122094224__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2025-06-02,2025-11-22,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2025-06-02__2025-11-22.json,apps:47836/21,F.B. v. Belgium,47836/21,added,"F.B. v. Belgium, no. 47836/21, 6 March 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.D.2,"Reception conditions, age-assessment procedures and freedom of movement",3,51,52,0.9969,"In A.C. v. France , 2025|In F.B. v. Belgium , 2025",,"In Darboe and Camara v. Italy, 2022, the Court found Article 8 to be applicable to age-assessment procedures for migrants requesting international protection and claiming to be minors (in respect of requirements for the presumption of minority of individuals claiming to be minors to apply and the duration of its applicability see "" Children and adults with specific vulnerabilities "" above) . The age of a person was a means of personal identification and the procedure to assess the age of an individual alleging to be a minor, including its procedural safeguards, was essential in order to guarantee to him or her all the rights deriving from his or her status as a minor, particularly so in view of the importance of age-assessment procedures in the migration context. Determining whether an individual was a minor was the first step to recognising his or her rights and putting into place all necessary care arrangements. If a minor were wrongly identified as an adult, serious measures in breach of his or her rights might be taken (§§ 121-126). While the assessment of an individual's age might be a necessary step in the event of doubt as to his or her minor status, sufficient procedural guarantees had to accompany the procedure including the appointment of a legal representative or guardian, access to a lawyer as well as the informed participation of the person who age was in doubt concerned in the procedure (§§ 142-157). The Court found that the authorities'failure to promptly appoint a legal guardian or representative for the applicant prevented him from duly and effectively submitting an asylum request and that the applicant, although he had stated that he was a minor, had been placed in an overcrowded reception centre for adults for more than four months because the authorities had failed to apply the presumption of minority (this presumption being an inherent element of the protection of the right to respect for private life of a foreign unaccompanied individual declaring to be a minor), and because of shortcomings in the procedural guarantees afforded to the applicant in the age-assessment process (no information as to the type of age-assessment procedure he was undergoing and its possible consequences; no service of the medical report, which failed to indicate a margin of error; and no judicial decision or administrative measure concluding that the applicant was of adult age, which made it impossible for him to lodge an appeal). The Court therefore found a violation of Article 8 on account of the authorities'failure to act with the necessary diligence to comply with their positive obligation to protect the applicant as an unaccompanied minor requesting international protection. In A.C. v. France *, 2025, the Court found that the domestic authorities'refusal to recognise the applicant, who had not tried to apply for international protection, as an unaccompanied minor, depriving him of the corresponding guarantees provided by law, had breached Article 8, in view of shortcomings in the age-assessment proceedings.","In Darboe and Camara v. Italy, 2022, the Court found Article 8 to be applicable to age-assessment procedures for migrants requesting international protection and claiming to be minors (in respect of requirements for the presumption of minority of individuals claiming to be minors to apply and the duration of its applicability see "" Children and adults with specific vulnerabilities "" above) . The age of a person was a means of personal identification and the procedure to assess the age of an individual alleging to be a minor, including its procedural safeguards, was essential in order to guarantee to him or her all the rights deriving from his or her status as a minor, particularly so in view of the importance of age-assessment procedures in the migration context. Determining whether an individual was a minor was the first step to recognising his or her rights and putting into place all necessary care arrangements. If a minor were wrongly identified as an adult, serious measures in breach of his or her rights might be taken (§§ 121-126). While the assessment of an individual's age might be a necessary step in the event of doubt as to his or her minor status, sufficient procedural guarantees had to accompany the procedure including the appointment of a legal representative or guardian, access to a lawyer as well as the informed participation of the person who age was in doubt concerned in the procedure (§§ 142-157). The Court found that the authorities'failure to promptly appoint a legal guardian or representative for the applicant prevented him from duly and effectively submitting an asylum request and that the applicant, although he had stated that he was a minor, had been placed in an overcrowded reception centre for adults for more than four months because the authorities had failed to apply the presumption of minority (this presumption being an inherent element of the protection of the right to respect for private life of a foreign unaccompanied individual declaring to be a minor), and because of shortcomings in the procedural guarantees afforded to the applicant in the age-assessment process (no information as to the type of age-assessment procedure he was undergoing and its possible consequences; no service of the medical report, which failed to indicate a margin of error; and no judicial decision or administrative measure concluding that the applicant was of adult age, which made it impossible for him to lodge an appeal). The Court therefore found a violation of Article 8 on account of the authorities'failure to act with the necessary diligence to comply with their positive obligation to protect the applicant as an unaccompanied minor requesting international protection. In A.C. v. France, 2025, the Court found that the domestic authorities'refusal to recognise the applicant, who had not tried to apply for international protection, as an unaccompanied minor, depriving him of the corresponding guarantees provided by law, had breached Article 8, in view of shortcomings in the age-assessment proceedings. In F.B. v. Belgium, 2025, the Court found a violation of Article 8 on account of the shortcomings in the procedural guarantees afforded to the asylum-seeking applicant in the age-assessment procedure, the outcome of which had led the authorities to cease taking charge of her as an unaccompanied minor (§§ 87-94)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20251122094224__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2025-06-02,2025-11-22,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2025-06-02__2025-11-22.json,apps:46084/21,H.Q. and Others v. Hungary,46084/21,added,"H.Q. and Others v. Hungary, nos. 46084/21 and 2 others, 24 June 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,II.A.1.2,Article 4 of Protocol No. 4,4,26,27,0.9827,"H.Q. and Others v. Hungary , 2025",,"In its case-law on Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 on summary returns and related scenarios, the Court has distinguished a number of factual situations and the relevant tests to be applied. In N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, §§ 201 and 209-211, the Court set out a two-tier test to determine compliance with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 in cases where individuals cross a land border in an unauthorised manner and are expelled summarily, a test which has been applied in all later cases presenting precisely the same scenario ( Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 59 et seq .; and M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 294 et seq .; A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 112-123): Firstly, it has to be taken into account whether the State provided genuine and effective access to means of legal entry, in particular border procedures, to allow all persons who face persecution to submit an application for protection, based in particular on Article 3, under conditions which ensure that the application is processed in a manner consistent with international norms including the Convention. Secondly, where the State provided such access but an applicant did not make use of it, it has to be considered whether there were cogent reasons for not doing so which were based on objective facts for which the State was responsible. The absence of such cogent reasons could lead to this being regarded as the consequence of the applicants'own conduct, justifying the lack of individual identification. The burden of proof for showing that the applicants did have genuine and effective access to procedures for legal entry is on the respondent State and all cases decided thus far turned on whether the State had satisfied that burden of proof (location of the border crossing points, modalities for lodging applications there, availability of interpreters/legal assistance enabling asylum-seekers to be informed of their rights and information showing that applications had actually been made at those border points: compare N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, §§ 212-217; A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 116-122, and contrast Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 63-67; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 295-304). An entry visa subject to financial and other requirements does not constitute a genuine and effective means of legal entry for individuals trying to seek asylum ( M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus, 2024, § 118).","In its case-law on Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 on summary returns and related scenarios, the Court has distinguished a number of factual situations and the relevant tests to be applied. In N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, §§ 201 and 209-211, the Court set out a two-tier test to determine compliance with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 in cases where individuals cross a land border in an unauthorised manner and are expelled summarily, a test which has been applied in all later cases presenting precisely the same scenario ( Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 59 et seq .; and M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 294 et seq .; A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 112-123): Firstly, it has to be taken into account whether the State provided genuine and effective access to means of legal entry, in particular border procedures, to allow all persons who face persecution to submit an application for protection, based in particular on Article 3, under conditions which ensure that the application is processed in a manner consistent with international norms including the Convention. Secondly, where the State provided such access but an applicant did not make use of it, it has to be considered whether there were cogent reasons for not doing so which were based on objective facts for which the State was responsible. The absence of such cogent reasons could lead to this being regarded as the consequence of the applicants'own conduct, justifying the lack of individual identification. The burden of proof for showing that the applicants did have genuine and effective access to procedures for legal entry is on the respondent State and all cases decided thus far turned on whether the State had satisfied that burden of proof (location of the border crossing points, modalities for lodging applications there, availability of interpreters/legal assistance enabling asylum-seekers to be informed of their rights and information showing that applications had actually been made at those border points: compare N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], 2020, §§ 212-217; A.A. and Others v. North Macedonia, 2022, §§ 116-122, and contrast Shahzad v. Hungary, 2021, §§ 63-67; M.H. and Others v. Croatia, 2021, §§ 295-304). An entry visa subject to financial and other requirements does not constitute a genuine and effective means of legal entry for individuals trying to seek asylum ( M.A. and Z.R. v. Cyprus, 2024, § 118). Apreliminary procedure was found not to constitute a genuine and effective access to a means of legal entry when it required an individual, who wishes to apply for international protection in the respondent State, to first submit a declaration of intent in person at one of the respondent State's embass ies after which the competent authorities could decide to issue a travel document allowing the individual to enter the respondent State 's territory for the purposes of applying for international protection there ( H.Q. and Others v. Hungary, 2025, §§ 117-124)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20251122094224__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2025-06-02,2025-11-22,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2025-06-02__2025-11-22.json,apps:46084/21,H.Q. and Others v. Hungary,46084/21,added,"H.Q. and Others v. Hungary, nos. 46084/21 and 2 others, 24 June 2025",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A.3,Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention and/or Article 4 of Protocol No. 4,3,29,30,0.9985,"H.Q. and Others v. Hungary , 2025",,"Where the individual has an ""arguable complaint"" that his removal would expose him to treatment contrary to Article 2 or 3 of the Convention, he must have an effective remedy, in practice as well as in law, at the domestic level in accordance with Article 13 of the Convention, which imperatively requires, inter alia, independent and rigorous scrutiny of any claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 and automatic suspensive effect (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011, § 293, M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 142-148 and 212-220, and section "" Procedural aspects "" below) . As regards Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, the Court has made a distinction depending on whether the applicants had, at least, an arguable complaint under Article 2 or 3 of the Convention in respect of risks they faced upon their removal. Where the applicants did have such arguable claim and they had been effectively prevented from applying for asylum and had not had access to a remedy with automatic suspensive effect, the Court found a violation of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol No 4 ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 219-220; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 89-90; Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, §§ 201-207; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014, §§ 240-243). By contrast, the lack of suspensive effect of a removal decision does not in itself constitute a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 4 of Protocol No 4, where an applicant does not allege that there is a real risk of a violation of the rights guaranteed by Articles 2 or 3 in the destination country ( Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, § 281). In such situation the Convention does not impose an absolute obligation on a State to guarantee an automatically suspensive remedy, but requires that the person concerned should have an effective possibility of challenging the expulsion decision by having a sufficiently thorough examination of his or her complaints carried out by an independent and impartial domestic forum ( Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, § 279; Moustahi v. France, 2020, §§ 156-164).","Where the individual has an ""arguable complaint"" that his removal would expose him to treatment contrary to Article 2 or 3 of the Convention, he must have an effective remedy, in practice as well as in law, at the domestic level in accordance with Article 13 of the Convention, which imperatively requires, inter alia, independent and rigorous scrutiny of any claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 and automatic suspensive effect (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], 2011, § 293, M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 142-148 and 212-220, and section "" Procedural aspects "" below) . As regards Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, the Court has made a distinction depending on whether the applicants had, at least, an arguable complaint under Article 2 or 3 of the Convention in respect of risks they faced upon their removal. Where the applicants did have such arguable claim and they had been effectively prevented from applying for asylum and had not had access to a remedy with automatic suspensive effect, the Court found a violation of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol No 4 ( M.K. and Others v. Poland, 2020, §§ 219-220; D.A. and Others v. Poland, 2021, §§ 89-90; H.Q. and Others v. Hungary, 2025, §§ 154-160; Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 2012, §§ 201-207; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, 2014, §§ 240-243). By contrast, the lack of suspensive effect of a removal decision does not in itself constitute a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 4 of Protocol No 4, where an applicant does not allege that there is a real risk of a violation of the rights guaranteed by Articles 2 or 3 in the destination country ( Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, § 281). In such situation the Convention does not impose an absolute obligation on a State to guarantee an automatically suspensive remedy, but requires that the person concerned should have an effective possibility of challenging the expulsion decision by having a sufficiently thorough examination of his or her complaints carried out by an independent and impartial domestic forum ( Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], 2016, § 279; Moustahi v. France, 2020, §§ 156-164)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20251122094224__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2025-06-02,2025-11-22,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2025-06-02__2025-11-22.json,apps:46084/21,H.Q. and Others v. Hungary,46084/21,added,"H.Q. and Others v. Hungary, nos. 46084/21 and 2 others, 24 June 2025",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.G,Article 4 of Protocol No. 4,2,102,103,0.9938,"H.Q. and Others v. Hungary , 2025",,"Apart from summary returns at sea (see section "" Interception, rescue operations and summary returns (""push - backs"")"" above) at or near borders described above (see section "" Summary returns at the border and/or shortly after entry into the territory (""push - backs"")"" above), the Court has dealt with collective expulsions of aliens who had been present in the territory of the respondent State (asylum-seekers in Čonka v. Belgium, 2002, and Sultani v. France, 2007; migrants in Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], 2014, § 170), irrespective of whether they were lawfully resident in the respondent State or not. In Čonka v. Belgium, 2002, and Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], 2014, in which the Court found violations of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, the individuals targeted for expulsion in each case had the same origin (Roma families from Slovakia in the former and Georgian nationals in the latter).","Apart from summary returns at sea (see section "" Interception, rescue operations and summary returns (""push - backs"")"" above) at or near borders described above (see section "" Summary returns at the border and/or shortly after entry into the territory (""push - backs"")"" above), the Court has dealt with collective expulsions of aliens who had been present in the territory of the respondent State (asylum-seekers in Čonka v. Belgium, 2002, Sultani v. France, 2007, and H.Q. and Others v. Hungary, 2025, §§ 115-116; migrants in Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], 2014, § 170), irrespective of whether they were lawfully resident in the respondent State or not. In Čonka v. Belgium, 2002, and Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], 2014, in which the Court found violations of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, the individuals targeted for expulsion in each case had the same origin (Roma families from Slovakia in the former and Georgian nationals in the latter)."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20251122094224__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2025-06-02,2025-11-22,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2025-06-02__2025-11-22.json,apps:35950/20,Hasani v. Sweden,35950/20,added,"Hasani v. Sweden, no. 35950/20, 6 March 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,V.D,Obligations to prevent (self-)harm and to carry out an effective investigation in other migrant-specific situations,2,,124,,"In Hasani v. Sweden , 2025",,,"In Hasani v. Sweden, 2025, the Court examined a complaint under Article 2 of the Convention about the domestic authorities' alleged failure to protect the life of an asylum -seeker suffering from mental health problems, who committed suicide, while he was living in an accommodation for people in need of assistance which had been provided by the authorities, after his asylum application had been rejected at first-instance level. The Court found that, while the individual had previously attempted to commit suicide, there had been no signs of mental distress or suicidal tendencies in the days prior to the suicide, and hence no reason to consider that the authorities knew or ought to have known that there was a real and immediate risk of suicide which would have triggered positive obligations on the part of the authorities to take operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising (§§ 69-77). As regards cases the removal of an individual who threatened to commit suicide, see section "" Transfers preceding the removal and the removal itself "" above."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20251122094224__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2025-06-02,2025-11-22,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2025-06-02__2025-11-22.json,apps:56532/22,Hayes and Others v. the United Kingdom,56532/22,added,"Hayes and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 56532/22 and 2 others, 1 July 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.A.5,Extradition,3,82,83,0.9935,,,"Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two-stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. Adistinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving ""whole life prisoners"" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2022, Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, 2023, Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), 2023, Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, and Lazăr v. Romania, 2024.","Where an individual may face life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, a two-stage test is to be applied to determine the compliance of the extradition with Article 3 ( Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, §§ 95-99): At the first stage, it must be established whether the applicant has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited and convicted, there is a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this regard, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that such a penalty would be imposed. Such a risk will more readily be established if the applicant faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If the said risk is established under the first limb of the inquiry, then the relevant authorities of the sending State must establish, prior to authorising extradition, that there exists in the requesting State a mechanism of sentence review which allows those competent authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant and that such progress towards rehabilitation has been made during the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. In other words, it must be ascertained whether, as from the moment of sentencing, there is a review mechanism in place allowing the consideration of the prisoner's progress towards rehabilitation, or any other ground for release, based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances. Adistinction cannot be drawn between the domestic and extra-territorial contexts as regards the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 threshold. Importantly, however, the availability of the procedural safeguards afforded to serving ""whole life prisoners"" in the legal system of the requesting State is not a prerequisite for compliance by the sending Contracting State with Article 3. Applying this test in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2022, to a situation where the applicant did not face a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in the State requesting his extradition, the Court found that the applicant had not adduced evidence showing that he ran a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole (§§ 100-110). It arrived at the same finding in McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], 2022, Bijan Balahan v. Sweden, 2023, Carvajal Barrios v. Spain (dec.), 2023, Matthews and Johnson v. Romania, 2024, and Lazăr v. Romania, 2024. The Court examined the second stage of the aforementioned test for the first time in Hayes and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2025, where it found that compassionate release constituted a review mechanism which satisfied the requirements of that stage of the test."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20251122094224__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2025-06-02,2025-11-22,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2025-06-02__2025-11-22.json,apps:63386/16,Mansouri v. Italy [GC] (dec.),63386/16,added,"Mansouri v. Italy [GC] (dec.), no. 63386/16, 29 April 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.C,Transfers preceding the removal and the removal itself,2,,115,,,,,"In Mansouri v. Italy [GC] (dec.), 2025, the Court dealt with complaints concerning the lawfulness and conditions of a Tunisian national's confinement on board of an Italian cruise ship used to return him to Tunisia on the basis of an order refusing him entry to Italy. The Court found that the respondent State had exercised jurisdiction over the applicant (§§ 47-51) and that the impugned acts of the ship's captain were attributable to the respondent State (§§ 57-61). However, the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of his complaints under Article 5 and the minimum threshold to engage Article 3 had not been met."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20251122094224__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2025-06-02,2025-11-22,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2025-06-02__2025-11-22.json,apps:21660/18,S.S. and Others v. Italy (dec.),21660/18,added,"S.S. and Others v. Italy (dec.), no. 21660/18, 20 May 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.E,"Interception, rescue operations and summary returns (“push - backs”) at sea",2,,18,,,,,"In S.S. and Others v. Italy (dec.), 2025, the Italian authorities had received a distress signal from a vessel transporting migrants on the high seas off the Libyan coast and informed the competent Libyan authority, following which a Libyan ship rescued the survivors. The Court found that the respondent did not have effective control ratione loci over the area in which the applicants were intercepted and that the mere fact that the Rome Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre had informed the competent Libyan authority, following which a Libyan ship rescued the survivors according to the obligations under international maritime law, did not engage Italy's extraterritorial jurisdiction ratione personae by virtue of State agent authority and control."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20251122094224__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2025-06-02,2025-11-22,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2025-06-02__2025-11-22.json,apps:5212/23,Siles Cabrera v. Spain,5212/23,added,"Siles Cabrera v. Spain, no. 5212/23, 17 July 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,section_moved_modified,III.C.D,Article 8,3,95,96,0.9885,"Siles Cabrera v. Spain , 2025",,"Where foreigners do not qualify as ""settled migrants"", because their presence in the territory of the respondent State was from the outset precarious, unlawful or based on breaches of immigration law, their removal from the respondent State will likely breach Article 8 only in exceptional circumstances (see, for example, Butt v. Norway, 2012, and Alleleh and Others v. Norway, 2022, § 90). The Court also examined cases under Article 8 concerning the denial of - and whether there was a positive obligation to grant - a residence permit to individuals already present in the territory of the respondent State (see Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], 2014; Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, 2006; see also Pormes v. the Netherlands, 2020, in respect of a refusal of a residence permit to alien unlawfully staying in the host State from an early age, who only became aware of his precarious immigration status once he was an adult; T.C.E. v. Germany, 2018, in respect of a person who had been convicted of criminal offences; Ghadamian v. Switzerland, 2023, in respect of a refusal to issue a residence permit to an elderly alien, resident for 49 years in the respondent State at the time of the final domestic decision, albeit unlawfully for the past sixteen years, on account of an unenforced decision to expel him after his convictions for serious criminal offences; as well as Martinez Alvarado v. the Netherlands, 2024, in respect of the refusal to grant a severely disabled adult man, who was fully dependent on the daily care of others, a residence permit on the basis of family reunification with his adult siblings living in the respondent State, and "" Access for the purposes of family reunification "" above).","Where foreigners do not qualify as ""settled migrants"", because their presence in the territory of the respondent State was from the outset precarious, unlawful or based on breaches of immigration law, their removal from the respondent State will likely breach Article 8 only in exceptional circumstances (see, for example, Butt v. Norway, 2012, and Alleleh and Others v. Norway, 2022, § 90). The Court also examined cases under Article 8 concerning the denial of - and whether there was a positive obligation to grant - a residence permit to individuals already present in the territory of the respondent State (see Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], 2014; Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, 2006; see also Pormes v. the Netherlands, 2020, in respect of a refusal of a residence permit to alien unlawfully staying in the host State from an early age, who only became aware of his precarious immigration status once he was an adult; T.C.E. v. Germany, 2018, in respect of a person who had been convicted of criminal offences; Ghadamian v. Switzerland, 2023, in respect of a refusal to issue a residence permit to an elderly alien, resident for 49 years in the respondent State at the time of the final domestic decision, albeit unlawfully for the past sixteen years, on account of an unenforced decision to expel him after his convictions for serious criminal offences; Siles Cabrera v. Spain, 2025, in respect of the refusal to grant the father of a disabled child a residence permit for exceptional reasons (social integration) on account of his failure to satisfy the criterion of ""sufficient means of subsistence"" by other means than the welfare benefits he was receiving; a s well as Martinez Alvarado v. the Netherlands, 2024, in respect of the refusal to grant a severely disabled adult man, who was fully dependent on the daily care of others, a residence permit on the basis of family reunification with his adult siblings living in the respondent State, and "" Access for the purposes of family reunification "" above )."
e19a063de5b3,Immigration,20250602002516__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,20251122094224__guide_immigration_eng.pdf,2025-06-02,2025-11-22,28 February 2025,31 August 2025,2025-02-28,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e19a063de5b3/diff_2025-06-02__2025-11-22.json,apps:45240/22,Sumbayev v. Georgia (dec.),45240/22,added,"Sumbayev v. Georgia (dec.), no. 45240/22, 24 June 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.A.5,Extradition,3,85,86,0.9869,,,"In Ansari v. Portugal (dec.), 2023, the Court dealt with the scenario where the applicant had been extradited following diplomatic assurances, which were later allegedly not complied with and the domestic courts of the respondent State later revoked the extradition decision because the authorities of the State to which the applicant had been extradited had prosecuted him on charges other than those in respect of which the extradition had been authorised. The applicant was detained in the State to which he had been extradited when he lodged his application to the Court, by which he complained that the authorities of the respondent State had not taken the necessary measures to help him return to the respondent State or to ensure that the diplomatic assurances were complied with. The Court found that the domestic authorities had taken the measures at their disposal to follow up on the applicant's allegations (see also Boumediiene and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), 2008, where the applicants, who had been handed over by the authorities of the respondent State to USforces and were later detained in Guantanamo Bay, alleged that the authorities of the respondent State had failed to enforce judicial decisions ordering the authorities to protect the rights, and obtain the return, of the applicants).","In Ansari v. Portugal (dec.), 2023, the Court dealt with the scenario where the applicant had been extradited following diplomatic assurances, which were later allegedly not complied with and the domestic courts of the respondent State later revoked the extradition decision because the authorities of the State to which the applicant had been extradited had prosecuted him on charges other than those in respect of which the extradition had been authorised. The applicant was detained in the State to which he had been extradited when he lodged his application to the Court, by which he complained that the authorities of the respondent State had not taken the necessary measures to help him return to the respondent State or to ensure that the diplomatic assurances were complied with. The Court found that the domestic authorities had taken the measures at their disposal to follow up on the applicant's allegations (see also Boumediiene and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (dec.), 2008, where the applicants, who had been handed over by the authorities of the respondent State to USforces and were later detained in Guantanamo Bay, alleged that the authorities of the respondent State had failed to enforce judicial decisions ordering the authorities to protect the rights, and obtain the return, of the applicants). In Sumbayev v. Georgia (dec.), 2025, the Court dealt with a scenario where the extraditing State received requests to give its consent to the bringing of new criminal charges against the applicant in the State to which he had already been extradited: as the competent authorities of the extraditing State were not intending to examine these post-extradition requests, the Court considered that the applicant could not assert a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20230923165352__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20240409195909__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:22515/14,Bryan and Others v. Russia,22515/14,added,"Bryan and Others v. Russia, no. 22515/14, 27 June 2023",1,citation_field_name_match,citation_updated,I.B.§4,ii. Margin of appreciation,4,13,13,0.9934,"Others v. Russia , 2012","Budayeva and Others v. Russia , 2008|Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia , 2012","In assessing whether the respondent State had complied with the positive obligation under Article 2, the Court must consider the particular circumstances of the case, such as the domestic legality of the authorities'acts or omissions, the domestic decision-making process, including the appropriate investigations and studies, and the complexity of the issue, especially where conflicting Convention interests are involved ( Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 136; Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 161; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 101).","In assessing whether the respondent State had complied with the positive obligation under Article 2, the Court must consider the particular circumstances of the case, such as the domestic legality of the authorities' acts or omissions, the domestic decision-making process, including the appropriate investigations and studies, and the complexity of the issue, especially where conflicting Budayeva and Others v . Russia Kolyadenko and Convention interests are involved (, 2008, § 136; Others v. Russia, 2012, § 161; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 101)."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20230923165352__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20240409195909__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:9988/13,Ecodefence and Others v. Russia,9988/13,added,"Ecodefence and Others v. Russia, nos. 9988/13 and 60 others, 14 June 2022",1,citation_field_name_match,citation_updated,I.B.§4,ii. Margin of appreciation,4,13,13,0.9934,"Others v. Russia , 2012","Budayeva and Others v. Russia , 2008|Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia , 2012","In assessing whether the respondent State had complied with the positive obligation under Article 2, the Court must consider the particular circumstances of the case, such as the domestic legality of the authorities'acts or omissions, the domestic decision-making process, including the appropriate investigations and studies, and the complexity of the issue, especially where conflicting Convention interests are involved ( Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 136; Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 161; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 101).","In assessing whether the respondent State had complied with the positive obligation under Article 2, the Court must consider the particular circumstances of the case, such as the domestic legality of the authorities' acts or omissions, the domestic decision-making process, including the appropriate investigations and studies, and the complexity of the issue, especially where conflicting Budayeva and Others v . Russia Kolyadenko and Convention interests are involved (, 2008, § 136; Others v. Russia, 2012, § 161; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 101)."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20230923165352__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20240409195909__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2024-04-09,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2023-09-23__2024-04-09.json,apps:38948/10|8954/17,Sakskoburggotski and Chrobok v. Bulgaria,38948/10|8954/17,added,"Sakskoburggotski and Chrobok v. Bulgaria, nos. 38948/10 and 8954/17, 7 September 2021",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,III,Proceedings brought by individuals against environmental protection measures,2,56,56,0.589,"De Geouffre de la Pradelle v. France , 1992|De Mortemart v. France Sakskoburggotski and Chrobok v. Bulgaria 2005|Posti and Rahko v. Finland , 2002","In the case of Dimopulos v. Turkey , 2019","In the case of Dimopulos v. Turkey, 2019, § 39, the applicant had filed with the domestic courts an action seeking recognition of her ownership rights by adverse possession over land listed as a "" nature conservation site "". The domestic court had dismissed the action on the grounds that pursuant to a law which had come into force after the action had been filed, nature conservation sites could no longer be acquired by adverse possession. In the framework of the examination of the applicant's complaint of a violation of her right to a fair trial, the Court pointed out that environmental protection was a general-interest ground that could justify the retroactive application of new legislation to live proceedings (it nonetheless found a violation of Article 6 § 1 in the light of the circumstances of the case).","Article 6 § 1 may apply where measures to protect the environment affect an individual's civil rights, such as the right to protection of property. Applicants consequently benefit from a practical and effective right of access to a tribunal ( De Geouffre de la Pradelle v. France, 1992, §§ 27-35; Posti and Rahko v. Finland, 2002, §§ 52-66; Geffre v. France (dec.), 2003; Alatulkkila and Others v. Finland, De Mortemart v. France Sakskoburggotski and Chrobok v. Bulgaria 2005, §§ 49-54; (dec.), 2017;, 2021, §§ 271-275; see also the decision in the case of CRASH 2000 OOD and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), 2013, where the Court pointed out, in the context of the foundation of a national park, that the Convention did not guarantee access to a tribunal to challenge general policy decisions)."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20240409195909__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-06-04,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json,apps:39371/20,Duarte Aghostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Others (dec.) [GC],39371/20,added,"Duarte Aghostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Others (dec.) [GC], no. 39371/20, 9 April 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,§2.§4,Article 1 of the Convention,4,1,3,0.7155,,"Brincat and Others v. Malta , 2014|Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia , 2012|M. Özel and Others v. Turkey , 2015","The positive obligation on States to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within their jurisdiction resulting from the first sentence of the first paragraph of Article 2, applies in the context of any activity, whether public or not, in which the right to life may be at stake. The Court added that clarification in the framework of an environmental case, namely Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 71, in which a methane explosion in April 1993 in a rubbish tip in a suburb of Istanbul had caused a landslide which had buried slum housing on lower-lying land; thirty-nine persons had Budayeva and Others lost their lives, including nine members of the applicant's family (see also v. Russia, 2008, § 130; Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 158; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 101; M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015, § 170).","The Court examined this question in the context of an application lodged by six young Portuguese nationals living in Portugal, against that State and thirty-two other States Parties, who complained of violations of their rights as guaranteed by Articles 2, 3, 8 and 14 of the Convention owing to the existing, and serious future, impacts of climate change ( Duarte Aghostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Others (dec.) [GC], 2024). Leaving open the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the context of more localised transboundary environmental harm (§ 167), the Court held that although the applicants fell within Portugal's (territorial) jurisdiction - which it deduced from the fact that they lived in that country (§ 178; see also Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], 2024, §§ 287 and 443) -, they did not come within the jurisdiction of the thirty-two other respondent States. In this respect, having pointed out the lack of territorial jurisdiction and noted that the applicants' situation did not correspond to any of the first three exceptions set out in paragraph 1 above, it held that there were also no ""special features"" to the case capable of establishing these States' jurisdiction . The applicants argued that the extraterritorial jurisdiction of these States was established, in that, in the exceptional circumstances of the application, their emissions and/or failures to regulate/limit their emissions produced effects outside their territories. The Court acknowledged certain aspects of climate change that had been emphasised in this context by the applicants: 1. States have ultimate control over public and private activities based on their territories that produce greenhouse gas emissions; 2. albeit complex and multi-layered, there is a certain causal relationship between public and private activities based on a State's territories that produce greenhouse gas emissions and the adverse impact on the rights and well-being of people residing outside its borders and thus outside the remit of that State's democratic process ; climate change is a global phenomenon, and each State bears its share of responsibility for the global challenges generated by climate change and has a role to play in finding appropriate solutions; 3. the problem of climate change is of a truly existential nature for humankind, in a way that sets it apart from other cause-and-effect situations. Nonetheless, the Court held that these considerations could not in themselves serve as a basis for creating by way of judicial interpretation a novel ground for extraterritorial jurisdiction or as justification for expanding on the existing ones. Addressing all of the arguments put forward by the applicants, it concluded more generally that there were no grounds in the Convention for the extension, by way of judicial interpretation, of the respondent States' extraterritorial jurisdiction in the manner requested by the applicants ( Duarte Aghostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Others (dec.) [GC], 2024, §§ 179-214)."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20240409195909__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-06-04,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json,apps:63543/09,Durdaj and Others v. Albania,63543/09,added,"Durdaj and Others v. Albania, nos. 63543/09 and 3 others, 7 November 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A,Applicability,3,2,5,0.9574,"Durdaj and Others v. Albania , 2023",,"The positive obligation to protect life applies a fortiori to industrial activities, which are dangerous by their very nature ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 71; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 130); Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 158; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 101). Beyond the operation of a household refuse tip at issue in Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, the following have been deemed to be hazardous industrial activities:  the mode of management of a reservoir located in a monsoon-influenced region, including releasing water in a period of heavy rainfall, had caused flooding in part of a conurbation in August 2001 ( Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 164);  a series of atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons carried out by the British authorities on Christmas Island at the end of the 1950s, during which military personnel had been exposed to radiation ( L.C.B. v. United Kingdom, 1998, as mentioned in Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2012, § 80);  toxic emissions from a fertiliser factory ( Guerra and Others v. Italy, 1998, as mentioned in Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 80);  exposure to toxic substances such as asbestos at a workplace which was run by a public corporation owned and controlled by the Government ( Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 81).  secret production of composite solid rocket fuel under the auspices of the State Intelligence Service ( Mučibabić v. Serbia, 2016, §§ 126-127).","The positive obligation to protect life applies a fortiori to industrial activities, which are dangerous by their very nature ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 71; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 130); Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 158; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 101). Beyond the operation of a household refuse tip at issue in Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, the following have been deemed to be hazardous industrial activities: ▪ the mode of management of a reservoir located in a monsoon-influenced region, including releasing water in a period of heavy rainfall, had caused flooding in part of a conurbation in August 2001 ( Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 164); ▪ a series of atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons carried out by the British authorities on Christmas Island at the end of the 1950s, during which military personnel had been exposed to radiation ( L.C.B. v. United Kingdom, 1998, as mentioned in Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2012, § 80); ▪ toxic emissions from a fertiliser factory ( Guerra and Others v. Italy, 1998, as mentioned in Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 80); ▪ exposure to toxic substances such as asbestos at a workplace which was run by a public corporation owned and controlled by the Government ( Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 81); ▪ secret production of composite solid rocket fuel under the auspices of the State Intelligence Service ( Mučibabić v. Serbia, 2016, §§ 126-127); ▪ the management of a weapon decommissioning facility ( Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023, § 260). The Court held that the complaints concerning the alleged failures of a State to combat climate change fell into the category of cases concerning an activity which, by its very nature, was capable of putting an individual's life at risk. It pointed, in particular, to the findings of the intergovernmental panel of experts on climate change, which stated that anthropogenic climate change, particularly through increased frequency and severity of extreme events, increased heat-related human mortality ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC] (2024, §§ 508-510)."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20240409195909__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-06-04,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json,apps:63543/09,Durdaj and Others v. Albania,63543/09,added,"Durdaj and Others v. Albania, nos. 63543/09 and 3 others, 7 November 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.2,Procedural limb,4,22,26,0.985,"Durdaj and Others v. Albania , 2023",,"Where lives have been lost in circumstances potentially engaging the responsibility of the State, Article 2 entails a duty for the State to ensure, by all means at its disposal, an adequate response - judicial or otherwise - so that the legislative and administrative framework set up to protect the right to life is properly implemented and any breaches of that right are repressed and punished ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 91; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 138; Smaltini v. Italy (dec.), 2015, § 52).","Where lives have been lost in circumstances potentially engaging the responsibility of the State, Article 2 entails a duty for the State to ensure, by all means at its disposal, an adequate response - judicial or otherwise - so that the legislative and administrative framework set up to protect the right to life is properly implemented and any breaches of that right are repressed and punished ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 91; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 138; Smaltini v. Italy (dec.), 2015, § 52; Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023, § 183)."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20240409195909__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-06-04,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json,apps:63543/09,Durdaj and Others v. Albania,63543/09,added,"Durdaj and Others v. Albania, nos. 63543/09 and 3 others, 7 November 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B.c,Examples,4,,37,,"In the case of Durdaj and Others v. Albania , 2023",,,"In the case of Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023, §§ 183-238, a 2008 explosion in a facility for dismantling military weapons had caused twenty-six deaths and injured more than three hundred people. The Court held that the investigation, which had been launched immediately after the explosion, had been adequate in that it had generally succeeded in establishing the circumstances and relevant facts, and had identified those responsible for it, and the applicants had been granted access to the investigation to the extent necessary to safeguard their legitimate interests. With regard to the subsequent judicial proceedings the Court noted that although none of individuals identified as responsible at the close of the investigation had been ultimately convicted of homicide, all the offences for which the main accused were convicted had been related to the incident and their convictions had specifically referred to causing death and injuries to multiple persons, so that they related to life-endangering acts and to the protection of the right to life within the meaning of Article"
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20240409195909__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-06-04,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json,apps:42749/19,Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye,42749/19,added,"Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, no. 42749/19, 21 November 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A,Applicability,3,3,6,0.9182,"Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye , 2023",,"The obligation to protect life also applies where the right to life is under threat from a natural disaster and the danger is imminent and clearly identifiable. For example:  mudslides which had killed persons in Russia in July 2000 ( Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 137 and 142);  an earthquake which had killed 17,480 persons and injured 43,953 more in Turkey in August 1999 ( M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015, §§ 170-171).","The obligation to protect life also applies where the right to life is under threat from a natural disaster and the danger is imminent and clearly identifiable. For example: ▪ mudslides which had killed persons in Russia in July 2000 ( Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 137 and 142); ▪ earthquakes in the regions of Izmit (in 1999) and Van (in 2011) which had caused numerous deaths ( M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015, §§ 170-171); Istanbullu and Ayden v. Turkey (dec.), 2015, § 31; Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, 2023, § 114-115)."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20240409195909__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-06-04,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json,apps:42749/19,Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye,42749/19,added,"Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, no. 42749/19, 21 November 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B,Content of the positive obligation to protect life,3,,11,,"Ayden v. Turkey , 2015|Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye , 2023",,,"It also requires, where an individual has sustained life-threatening injuries or in the event of death, that the State set up an effective judicial system capable of establishing the facts, holding accountable those at fault and providing appropriate redress to the victim ( Istanbullu and Ayden v. Turkey (dec.), 2015, § 32; Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, 2023, § 126). Article 2 of the Convention will not be satisfied if the protection machinery provided for by domestic law exists only in theory: above all, it must also operate effectively in practice, which requires a prompt examination of the case without unnecessary delays of the cases submitted to the competent authorities ( Istanbullu and (dec.) Ayden v. Turkey, 2015, § 34; Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, 2023, § 151)."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20240409195909__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-06-04,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json,apps:42749/19,Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye,42749/19,added,"Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, no. 42749/19, 21 November 2023",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.c,Examples,4,30,35,0.9166,"In the case of Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye , 2023",,"In M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015, §§ 192-200, criminal proceedings had been commenced for the deaths in issue against the property developers responsible for the buildings which had collapsed and against certain individuals directly involved in their construction, and the applicants had been able to take part in the proceedings. Five persons had been prosecuted. The Court nevertheless noted that the length of proceedings - twelve years - had not satisfied the requirement of prompt examination of the case without unnecessary delays. It also noted that the proceedings had been conducted in such a way that only two of the accused had finally been declared responsible for the events, the other three having benefited from the statute of limitation. The Court also noted that in the absence of the prior administrative authorisation required under domestic law, despite all the applicants' requests, no criminal investigation had been instigated against the public officials whose shortcomings and failures in supervising and inspecting the buildings which had collapsed might otherwise have been established.","In M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015, §§ 192-200, concerning an earthquake which had caused multiple deaths in the Izmit region in 1999, criminal proceedings had been brought for the deaths in issue against the property developers responsible for the buildings which had collapsed and against certain individuals directly involved in their construction, and the applicants had been able to take part in the proceedings. Five persons had been prosecuted. The Court nevertheless noted that the length of proceedings - twelve years - had not satisfied the requirement of prompt examination of the case without unnecessary delays. It also noted that the proceedings had been conducted in such a way that only two of the accused had finally been declared responsible for the events, the other three having benefited from the statute of limitation. The Court also noted that in the absence of the prior administrative authorisation required under domestic law, despite all the applicants'requests, no criminal investigation had been instigated against the public officials whose shortcomings and failures in supervising and inspecting the buildings which had collapsed might otherwise have been established. In the case of Istanbullu and Ayden v. Turkey (dec.), 2015, § 36-43, concerning the same earthquake, the applicants complained about the conduct of the criminal proceedings opened following their relatives' deaths under the rubbles of the building in which they lived, and the lack of effectiveness of the Turkish judicial system. The criminal proceedings that had been brought against the technical officer with responsibility for construction of the building and the property developer had ended with the former's acquittal on the grounds that he was not liable for defects in the construction, and by the finding that the proceedings had become time-barred in respect of the latter, on account of the judicial authorities' lack of due promptness . The Court noted that the long period of inactivity on the part of the domestic courts had made it impossible for criminal proceedings to establish whether the property developer had committed an offence. Nonetheless, it considered that there was nothing that undermined the capacity of the existing civil remedies to establish liability in the deaths of the applicants'' relatives . It concluded that, whatever the shortcomings in the criminal proceedings opened in the case, the domestic law provided the applicants with civil remedies that were capable of fulfilling the State's obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to set up an effective judicial system capable of providing an appropriate response to their relatives' deaths, and that the application was therefore manifestly ill-founded. In the case of Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, 2023, §§ 142-137, concerning an earthquake in the Van region in 2011, the Court, examining an application brought by family members of an individual who had been buried when a hotel collapsed, concluded that the domestic law had provided the applicants with a remedy capable of satisfying the respondent State's obligation to put in place an effective judicial system by which an appropriate legal response could be given to their relative's death in the circumstances of the case. In this connection, the Court emphasised that the State was required to afford the applicants a remedy by which to have established the potential liability of the authorities in question and to obtain compensation where appropriate. Under Turkish law this remedy took the form of an action before the administrative courts ruling with full jurisdiction. The applicants had pursued that avenue. The administrative court had ruled that the Ministry for the Environment and Urban Planning and the Van municipal authorities had not properly inspected the hotel construction project and building work, and that the Turkish public body for disaster management had neither conducted the necessary investigation into the disaster, nor carried out a timely inspection following a previous earthquake. It had therefore awarded them EUR 71,694 in compensation, which the Court found to be appropriate and sufficient redress in the circumstances of the case. The Court also took account of the fact that a criminal investigation had been opened a few days after the building's collapse, in the course of which an independent expert re port had been commissioned, and at the close of which the main person responsible had been identified - the operator of the hotel -, before being prosecuted and convicted for wilful negligence occasioning deaths. It noted that the criminal courts had found, in particular, that the hotel building had not complied with anti-seismic regulations; that extensions had been added to the hotel without authorisation, thereby compromising the building's structure; that the defendant had continued to operate the hotel in spite of the first earthquake, which had weakened the structure; and that he had thus acted in a wilfully negligent fashion. It concluded that the matter of compliance with safety standards had therefore been duly examined by the judicial authorities and had given rise to criminal investigations. Although the criminal proceedings had been considerably delayed and were still pending, in spite of the authorities' duty of diligence and expedition in conducting the investigation and the judicial proceedings, the Cour held that this had not prevented the facts and liability from being established, and that there was nothing to indicate that the criminal courts had been prepared to allow life-endangering offences to go unpunished. It also found that, given the administrative court's decision, the failure to prosecute the officials whom the applicants considered to be liable had not precluded the establishment of the administrative authorities' respective liabilities for the death of the applicants' family membe r, or the compensation awarded to them in that respect."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20240409195909__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-06-04,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json,apps:20793/07|29240/07,Istanbullu and Ayden v. Turkey (dec.),20793/07|29240/07,added,"Istanbullu and Ayden v. Turkey (dec.), nos. 20793/07 and 29240/07, 29 September 2015",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A,Applicability,3,3,6,0.9182,"Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye , 2023",,"The obligation to protect life also applies where the right to life is under threat from a natural disaster and the danger is imminent and clearly identifiable. For example:  mudslides which had killed persons in Russia in July 2000 ( Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 137 and 142);  an earthquake which had killed 17,480 persons and injured 43,953 more in Turkey in August 1999 ( M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015, §§ 170-171).","The obligation to protect life also applies where the right to life is under threat from a natural disaster and the danger is imminent and clearly identifiable. For example: ▪ mudslides which had killed persons in Russia in July 2000 ( Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 137 and 142); ▪ earthquakes in the regions of Izmit (in 1999) and Van (in 2011) which had caused numerous deaths ( M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015, §§ 170-171); Istanbullu and Ayden v. Turkey (dec.), 2015, § 31; Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, 2023, § 114-115)."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20240409195909__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-06-04,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json,apps:20793/07|29240/07,Istanbullu and Ayden v. Turkey (dec.),20793/07|29240/07,added,"Istanbullu and Ayden v. Turkey (dec.), nos. 20793/07 and 29240/07, 29 September 2015",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B,Content of the positive obligation to protect life,3,,10,,"Brincat and Others v. Malta , 2014",,,"The positive obligation arising from Article 2 entails above all a primary duty to put in place a legislative and administrative framework designed to provide effective deterrence against threats to the right to life, in particular by means of the criminal law ( Öneryıldız and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2004, §§ 89-90; Istanbullu and Ayden v. Turkey (dec.), 2015, § 32; see, however, the judgment in Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 112, in which the Court stated that this primary duty did not rule out the possibility, a priori, that in certain specific circumstances, in the absence of the relevant legal provisions, the positive obligations may be fulfilled in practice."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20240409195909__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-06-04,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json,apps:20793/07|29240/07,Istanbullu and Ayden v. Turkey (dec.),20793/07|29240/07,added,"Istanbullu and Ayden v. Turkey (dec.), nos. 20793/07 and 29240/07, 29 September 2015",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B,Content of the positive obligation to protect life,3,,11,,"Ayden v. Turkey , 2015|Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye , 2023",,,"It also requires, where an individual has sustained life-threatening injuries or in the event of death, that the State set up an effective judicial system capable of establishing the facts, holding accountable those at fault and providing appropriate redress to the victim ( Istanbullu and Ayden v. Turkey (dec.), 2015, § 32; Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, 2023, § 126). Article 2 of the Convention will not be satisfied if the protection machinery provided for by domestic law exists only in theory: above all, it must also operate effectively in practice, which requires a prompt examination of the case without unnecessary delays of the cases submitted to the competent authorities ( Istanbullu and (dec.) Ayden v. Turkey, 2015, § 34; Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, 2023, § 151)."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20240409195909__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-06-04,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json,apps:20793/07|29240/07,Istanbullu and Ayden v. Turkey (dec.),20793/07|29240/07,added,"Istanbullu and Ayden v. Turkey (dec.), nos. 20793/07 and 29240/07, 29 September 2015",4,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.c,Examples,4,30,35,0.9166,"In the case of Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye , 2023",,"In M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015, §§ 192-200, criminal proceedings had been commenced for the deaths in issue against the property developers responsible for the buildings which had collapsed and against certain individuals directly involved in their construction, and the applicants had been able to take part in the proceedings. Five persons had been prosecuted. The Court nevertheless noted that the length of proceedings - twelve years - had not satisfied the requirement of prompt examination of the case without unnecessary delays. It also noted that the proceedings had been conducted in such a way that only two of the accused had finally been declared responsible for the events, the other three having benefited from the statute of limitation. The Court also noted that in the absence of the prior administrative authorisation required under domestic law, despite all the applicants' requests, no criminal investigation had been instigated against the public officials whose shortcomings and failures in supervising and inspecting the buildings which had collapsed might otherwise have been established.","In M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015, §§ 192-200, concerning an earthquake which had caused multiple deaths in the Izmit region in 1999, criminal proceedings had been brought for the deaths in issue against the property developers responsible for the buildings which had collapsed and against certain individuals directly involved in their construction, and the applicants had been able to take part in the proceedings. Five persons had been prosecuted. The Court nevertheless noted that the length of proceedings - twelve years - had not satisfied the requirement of prompt examination of the case without unnecessary delays. It also noted that the proceedings had been conducted in such a way that only two of the accused had finally been declared responsible for the events, the other three having benefited from the statute of limitation. The Court also noted that in the absence of the prior administrative authorisation required under domestic law, despite all the applicants'requests, no criminal investigation had been instigated against the public officials whose shortcomings and failures in supervising and inspecting the buildings which had collapsed might otherwise have been established. In the case of Istanbullu and Ayden v. Turkey (dec.), 2015, § 36-43, concerning the same earthquake, the applicants complained about the conduct of the criminal proceedings opened following their relatives' deaths under the rubbles of the building in which they lived, and the lack of effectiveness of the Turkish judicial system. The criminal proceedings that had been brought against the technical officer with responsibility for construction of the building and the property developer had ended with the former's acquittal on the grounds that he was not liable for defects in the construction, and by the finding that the proceedings had become time-barred in respect of the latter, on account of the judicial authorities' lack of due promptness . The Court noted that the long period of inactivity on the part of the domestic courts had made it impossible for criminal proceedings to establish whether the property developer had committed an offence. Nonetheless, it considered that there was nothing that undermined the capacity of the existing civil remedies to establish liability in the deaths of the applicants'' relatives . It concluded that, whatever the shortcomings in the criminal proceedings opened in the case, the domestic law provided the applicants with civil remedies that were capable of fulfilling the State's obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to set up an effective judicial system capable of providing an appropriate response to their relatives' deaths, and that the application was therefore manifestly ill-founded. In the case of Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, 2023, §§ 142-137, concerning an earthquake in the Van region in 2011, the Court, examining an application brought by family members of an individual who had been buried when a hotel collapsed, concluded that the domestic law had provided the applicants with a remedy capable of satisfying the respondent State's obligation to put in place an effective judicial system by which an appropriate legal response could be given to their relative's death in the circumstances of the case. In this connection, the Court emphasised that the State was required to afford the applicants a remedy by which to have established the potential liability of the authorities in question and to obtain compensation where appropriate. Under Turkish law this remedy took the form of an action before the administrative courts ruling with full jurisdiction. The applicants had pursued that avenue. The administrative court had ruled that the Ministry for the Environment and Urban Planning and the Van municipal authorities had not properly inspected the hotel construction project and building work, and that the Turkish public body for disaster management had neither conducted the necessary investigation into the disaster, nor carried out a timely inspection following a previous earthquake. It had therefore awarded them EUR 71,694 in compensation, which the Court found to be appropriate and sufficient redress in the circumstances of the case. The Court also took account of the fact that a criminal investigation had been opened a few days after the building's collapse, in the course of which an independent expert re port had been commissioned, and at the close of which the main person responsible had been identified - the operator of the hotel -, before being prosecuted and convicted for wilful negligence occasioning deaths. It noted that the criminal courts had found, in particular, that the hotel building had not complied with anti-seismic regulations; that extensions had been added to the hotel without authorisation, thereby compromising the building's structure; that the defendant had continued to operate the hotel in spite of the first earthquake, which had weakened the structure; and that he had thus acted in a wilfully negligent fashion. It concluded that the matter of compliance with safety standards had therefore been duly examined by the judicial authorities and had given rise to criminal investigations. Although the criminal proceedings had been considerably delayed and were still pending, in spite of the authorities' duty of diligence and expedition in conducting the investigation and the judicial proceedings, the Cour held that this had not prevented the facts and liability from being established, and that there was nothing to indicate that the criminal courts had been prepared to allow life-endangering offences to go unpunished. It also found that, given the administrative court's decision, the failure to prosecute the officials whom the applicants considered to be liable had not precluded the establishment of the administrative authorities' respective liabilities for the death of the applicants' family membe r, or the compensation awarded to them in that respect."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20240409195909__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-06-04,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json,apps:53600/20,Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC],53600/20,added,"Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, 9 April 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A,Applicability,3,2,5,0.9574,"Durdaj and Others v. Albania , 2023",,"The positive obligation to protect life applies a fortiori to industrial activities, which are dangerous by their very nature ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 71; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 130); Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 158; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 101). Beyond the operation of a household refuse tip at issue in Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, the following have been deemed to be hazardous industrial activities:  the mode of management of a reservoir located in a monsoon-influenced region, including releasing water in a period of heavy rainfall, had caused flooding in part of a conurbation in August 2001 ( Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 164);  a series of atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons carried out by the British authorities on Christmas Island at the end of the 1950s, during which military personnel had been exposed to radiation ( L.C.B. v. United Kingdom, 1998, as mentioned in Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2012, § 80);  toxic emissions from a fertiliser factory ( Guerra and Others v. Italy, 1998, as mentioned in Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 80);  exposure to toxic substances such as asbestos at a workplace which was run by a public corporation owned and controlled by the Government ( Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 81).  secret production of composite solid rocket fuel under the auspices of the State Intelligence Service ( Mučibabić v. Serbia, 2016, §§ 126-127).","The positive obligation to protect life applies a fortiori to industrial activities, which are dangerous by their very nature ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 71; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 130); Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 158; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 101). Beyond the operation of a household refuse tip at issue in Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, the following have been deemed to be hazardous industrial activities: ▪ the mode of management of a reservoir located in a monsoon-influenced region, including releasing water in a period of heavy rainfall, had caused flooding in part of a conurbation in August 2001 ( Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 164); ▪ a series of atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons carried out by the British authorities on Christmas Island at the end of the 1950s, during which military personnel had been exposed to radiation ( L.C.B. v. United Kingdom, 1998, as mentioned in Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2012, § 80); ▪ toxic emissions from a fertiliser factory ( Guerra and Others v. Italy, 1998, as mentioned in Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 80); ▪ exposure to toxic substances such as asbestos at a workplace which was run by a public corporation owned and controlled by the Government ( Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 81); ▪ secret production of composite solid rocket fuel under the auspices of the State Intelligence Service ( Mučibabić v. Serbia, 2016, §§ 126-127); ▪ the management of a weapon decommissioning facility ( Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023, § 260). The Court held that the complaints concerning the alleged failures of a State to combat climate change fell into the category of cases concerning an activity which, by its very nature, was capable of putting an individual's life at risk. It pointed, in particular, to the findings of the intergovernmental panel of experts on climate change, which stated that anthropogenic climate change, particularly through increased frequency and severity of extreme events, increased heat-related human mortality ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC] (2024, §§ 508-510)."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20240409195909__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-06-04,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json,apps:53600/20,Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC],53600/20,added,"Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, 9 April 2024",2,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,I.A,Applicability,3,4,7,0.7723,"Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia , 2012",,"In the field of the environment, as in other spheres, Article 2 applies not only where actions or omissions on the part of the State have led to a person's death, but also where there has been no Kolyadenko and Others death but a person has obviously been exposed to a risk to his or her life ( v. Russia, 2012, §§ 151-155 and 191; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 146). However, that risk must be ""serious"" ( Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 82), and ""real and immediate"" ( Fadeyeva v. Russia (dec.), 2003; Ledyayeva and Others v. Russia (dec.), 2004).","In the field of the environment, as in other spheres, Article 2 applies not only where actions or omissions on the part of the State have led to a person's death, but also where there has been no death but a person has obviously been exposed to a risk to his or her life ( Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, §§ 151-155 and 191; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 146). However, that risk to life must be "" serious "" ( Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 82), and "" real and immediate "" ( Fadeyeva v. Russia (dec.), 2003; Ledyayeva and Others v. Russia (dec.), 2004, or - with particular regard to complaints of State action and/or inaction in the context of climate change - "" real and imminent"" ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC] (2024, §§ 511 et 513). The term ""real"" risk corresponds to the requirement of the existence of a serious, genuine and sufficiently ascertainable threat to life. The ""imminence"" of such a risk entails an element of physical proximity of the threat ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC] (2024, § 512). In the context of climate change, such risk to life in the climate-change context must be understood in the light of the fact that there is a grave risk of inevitability and irreversibility of the adverse effects of climate change, the occurrences of which are most likely to increase in frequency and gravity. Thus, the ""real and imminent"" test may be understood as referring to a serious, genuine and su fficiently ascertainable threat to life, containing an element of material and temporal proximity of the threat to the harm complained of by the applicant. This also implies that where the victim status of an individual applicant has been established in accordance with the criteria set out in paragraph 231 below, it will be possible to assume that the serious risk of a significant decline in a person's life expectancy owing to climate change should also trigger the applicability of Article 2 ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC] (2024, § 513)."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20240409195909__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-06-04,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2024-04-09__2025-06-04.json,apps:53600/20,Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC],53600/20,added,"Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, 9 April 2024",3,paragraph_text_name_match,reformulation,§2.§4,Article 1 of the Convention,4,1,3,0.7155,,"Brincat and Others v. Malta , 2014|Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia , 2012|M. Özel and Others v. Turkey , 2015","The positive obligation on States to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within their jurisdiction resulting from the first sentence of the first paragraph of Article 2, applies in the context of any activity, whether public or not, in which the right to life may be at stake. The Court added that clarification in the framework of an environmental case, namely Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 71, in which a methane explosion in April 1993 in a rubbish tip in a suburb of Istanbul had caused a landslide which had buried slum housing on lower-lying land; thirty-nine persons had Budayeva and Others lost their lives, including nine members of the applicant's family (see also v. Russia, 2008, § 130; Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 158; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 101; M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, 2015, § 170).","The Court examined this question in the context of an application lodged by six young Portuguese nationals living in Portugal, against that State and thirty-two other States Parties, who complained of violations of their rights as guaranteed by Articles 2, 3, 8 and 14 of the Convention owing to the existing, and serious future, impacts of climate change ( Duarte Aghostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Others (dec.) [GC], 2024). Leaving open the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the context of more localised transboundary environmental harm (§ 167), the Court held that although the applicants fell within Portugal's (territorial) jurisdiction - which it deduced from the fact that they lived in that country (§ 178; see also Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], 2024, §§ 287 and 443) -, they did not come within the jurisdiction of the thirty-two other respondent States. In this respect, having pointed out the lack of territorial jurisdiction and noted that the applicants' situation did not correspond to any of the first three exceptions set out in paragraph 1 above, it held that there were also no ""special features"" to the case capable of establishing these States' jurisdiction . The applicants argued that the extraterritorial jurisdiction of these States was established, in that, in the exceptional circumstances of the application, their emissions and/or failures to regulate/limit their emissions produced effects outside their territories. The Court acknowledged certain aspects of climate change that had been emphasised in this context by the applicants: 1. States have ultimate control over public and private activities based on their territories that produce greenhouse gas emissions; 2. albeit complex and multi-layered, there is a certain causal relationship between public and private activities based on a State's territories that produce greenhouse gas emissions and the adverse impact on the rights and well-being of people residing outside its borders and thus outside the remit of that State's democratic process ; climate change is a global phenomenon, and each State bears its share of responsibility for the global challenges generated by climate change and has a role to play in finding appropriate solutions; 3. the problem of climate change is of a truly existential nature for humankind, in a way that sets it apart from other cause-and-effect situations. Nonetheless, the Court held that these considerations could not in themselves serve as a basis for creating by way of judicial interpretation a novel ground for extraterritorial jurisdiction or as justification for expanding on the existing ones. Addressing all of the arguments put forward by the applicants, it concluded more generally that there were no grounds in the Convention for the extension, by way of judicial interpretation, of the respondent States' extraterritorial jurisdiction in the manner requested by the applicants ( Duarte Aghostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Others (dec.) [GC], 2024, §§ 179-214)."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20251212192207__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-12,31 August 2024,17 September 2025,2024-08-31,2025-09-17,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-12.json,apps:51567/14,Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy,51567/14,added,"Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy, nos. 51567/14 and 3 others, 30 January 2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A,Applicability,3,5,5,0.9808,"Errico v. Italy , 2025|The positive obligation to protect life also applies in the context of polluting activities that take place outside any legal framework. This is clear from the case of Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy , 2025",,"The positive obligation to protect life applies a fortiori to industrial activities, which are dangerous by their very nature ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 71; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 130); Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 158; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 101). Beyond the operation of a household refuse tip at issue in Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, the following have been deemed to be hazardous industrial activities: ▪ the mode of management of a reservoir located in a monsoon-influenced region, including releasing water in a period of heavy rainfall, had caused flooding in part of a conurbation in August 2001 ( Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 164); ▪ a series of atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons carried out by the British authorities on Christmas Island at the end of the 1950s, during which military personnel had been exposed to radiation ( L.C.B. v. United Kingdom, 1998, as mentioned in Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2012, § 80); ▪ toxic emissions from a fertiliser factory ( Guerra and Others v. Italy, 1998, as mentioned in Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 80); ▪ exposure to toxic substances such as asbestos at a workplace which was run by a public corporation owned and controlled by the Government ( Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 81); ▪ secret production of composite solid rocket fuel under the auspices of the State Intelligence Service ( Mučibabić v. Serbia, 2016, §§ 126-127); ▪ the management of a weapon decommissioning facility ( Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023, § 260). The Court held that the complaints concerning the alleged failures of a State to combat climate change fell into the category of cases concerning an activity which, by its very nature, was capable of putting an individual's life at risk. It pointed, in particular, to the findings of the intergovernmental panel of experts on climate change, which stated that anthropogenic climate change, particularly through increased frequency and severity of extreme events, increased heat-related human mortality ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC] (2024, §§ 508-510).","The positive obligation to protect life applies a fortiori in the context of industrial activities, which are dangerous by their very nature ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 71; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 130); Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 158; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 101; L.F. and Others v. Italy, § 107, 2025). Beyond the operation of a household refuse tip at issue in Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, the following have been deemed to be hazardous industrial activities: ▪ the mode of management of a reservoir located in a monsoon-influenced region, including releasing water in a period of heavy rainfall, had caused flooding in part of a conurbation in August 2001 ( Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 164); ▪ a series of atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons carried out by the British authorities on Christmas Island at the end of the 1950s, during which military personnel had been exposed to radiation ( L.C.B. v. United Kingdom, 1998, as mentioned in Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2012, § 80); ▪ toxic emissions from a fertiliser factory ( Guerra and Others v. Italy, 1998, as mentioned in Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 80); ▪ exposure to toxic substances such as asbestos at a workplace which was run by a public corporation owned and controlled by the Government ( Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 81); or by a private metallurgical company ( Laterza and D'Errico v. Italy, 2025, § 38). ▪ secret production of composite solid rocket fuel under the auspices of the State Intelligence Service ( Mučibabić v. Serbia, 2016, §§ 126-127); ▪ the management of a weapon decommissioning facility ( Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023, § 260). The positive obligation to protect life also applies in the context of polluting activities that take place outside any legal framework. This is clear from the case of Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy, 2025, §§ 384-392, concerning the illegal dumping and burying of hazardous waste on private land in the Campania region ( "" Terra del Fuochi "" ); the Court emphasised, in particular, that these were inherently dangerous activities which could pose a risk to human life. The Court has also held that the complaints concerning the alleged failures of a State to combat climate change fell into the category of cases concerning an activity which, by its very nature, was capable of putting an individual's life at risk. It pointed, in particular, to the findings of the intergovernmental panel of experts on climate change, which stated that anthropogenic climate change, particularly through increased frequency and severity of extreme events, increased heat-related human mortality ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC] (2024, §§ 508-510)."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20251212192207__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-12,31 August 2024,17 September 2025,2024-08-31,2025-09-17,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-12.json,apps:51567/14,Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy,51567/14,added,"Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy, nos. 51567/14 and 3 others, 30 January 2025",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A,Applicability,3,7,7,0.935,"Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy , 2025",,"In the field of the environment, as in other spheres, Article 2 applies not only where actions or omissions on the part of the State have led to a person's death, but also where there has been no death but a person has obviously been exposed to a risk to his or her life ( Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, §§ 151-155 and 191; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 146). However, that risk to life must be "" serious "" ( Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 82), and "" real and immediate "" ( Fadeyeva v. Russia (dec.), 2003; Ledyayeva and Others v. Russia (dec.), 2004, or - with particular regard to complaints of State action and/or inaction in the context of climate change - "" real and imminent"" ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC] (2024, §§ 511 et 513). The term ""real"" risk corresponds to the requirement of the existence of a serious, genuine and sufficiently ascertainable threat to life. The ""imminence"" of such a risk entails an element of physical proximity of the threat ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC] (2024, § 512). In the context of climate change, such risk to life in the climate-change context must be understood in the light of the fact that there is a grave risk of inevitability and irreversibility of the adverse effects of climate change, the occurrences of which are most likely to increase in frequency and gravity. Thus, the ""real and imminent"" test may be understood as referring to a serious, genuine and su fficiently ascertainable threat to life, containing an element of material and temporal proximity of the threat to the harm complained of by the applicant. This also implies that where the victim status of an individual applicant has been established in accordance with the criteria set out in paragraph 231 below, it will be possible to assume that the serious risk of a significant decline in a person's life expectancy owing to climate change should also trigger the applicability of Article 2 ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC] (2024, § 513).","In the field of the environment, as in other spheres, Article 2 applies not only where actions or omissions on the part of the State have led to a person's death, but also where there has been no death but a person has obviously been exposed to a risk to his or her life ( Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, §§ 151-155 and 191; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 146). However, that risk to life must be "" serious "" ( Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 82), and "" real and immediate "" ( Fadeyeva v. Russia (dec.), 2003; Ledyayeva and Others v. Russia (dec.), 2004, or - with particular regard to complaints of State action and/or inaction in the context of climate change - "" real and imminent"" ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC] (2024, §§ 511 et 513). The term ""real"" risk corresponds to the requirement of the existence of a serious, genuine and sufficiently ascertainable threat to life. The ""imminence"" of such a risk entails an element of physical proximity ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC] (2024, § 512) and temporal proximity ( Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy, 2025, §§ 377 and 390) of the threat. In order to conclude that there existed a sufficiently serious, genuine and ascertainable risk in the case of Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy, 2025, § 390, concerning the large-scale illegal dumping, burying and incineration of waste on private land in the Campania region over many years ("" Terra del Fuochi"" ), the Court had regard to the fact that the authorities had been aware of the particular nature of the pollution phenomenon at issue and the conduct giving rise to it. It found the risk to be ""imminent"", given the applicants'residence, over a considerable period of time, in municipalities identified by the State authorities as being affected by this pollution phenomenon, which had been ongoing, omnipresent and unavoidable. It held that, since the applicants had been exposed to this type of risk, it was not necessary or appropriate to require that they demonstrate a proven link between the exposure to an identifiable type of pollution or even harmful substance and the onset of a specific life- threatening illness or death."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20251212192207__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-12,31 August 2024,17 September 2025,2024-08-31,2025-09-17,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-12.json,apps:51567/14,Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy,51567/14,added,"Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy, nos. 51567/14 and 3 others, 30 January 2025",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A,Applicability,3,8,8,0.9469,"Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy , 2025",,"The Court must also consider whether the authorities knew or ought to have known, at the material time, that the applicant had been exposed to a mortal danger ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 101 ; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, §§ 105-106).","The Court must also consider whether the authorities knew or ought to have known, at the material time, that the applicant had been exposed to a mortal danger ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 101 ; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, §§ 105-106; and Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy, 2025, § 378)."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20251212192207__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-12,31 August 2024,17 September 2025,2024-08-31,2025-09-17,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-12.json,apps:51567/14,Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy,51567/14,added,"Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy, nos. 51567/14 and 3 others, 30 January 2025",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B,Content of the positive obligation to protect life,3,,10,,"Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy , 2025",,,"The scope of the obligations incumbent upon the State authorities in a given context depends on the origin of the threat, the kind of risks concerned and the extent to which one or the other risk is susceptible to mitigation ( Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy, 2025, § 394)."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20251212192207__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-12,31 August 2024,17 September 2025,2024-08-31,2025-09-17,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-12.json,apps:51567/14,Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy,51567/14,added,"Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy, nos. 51567/14 and 3 others, 30 January 2025",5,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B,Content of the positive obligation to protect life,3,10,11,0.9919,"Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy , 2025",,"The positive obligation arising from Article 2 entails above all a primary duty to put in place a legislative and administrative framework designed to provide effective deterrence against threats to the right to life, in particular by means of the criminal law ( Öneryıldız and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2004, §§ 89-90; Istanbullu and Ayden v. Turkey (dec.), 2015, § 32; see, however, the judgment in Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 112, in which the Court stated that this primary duty did not rule out the possibility, a priori, that in certain specific circumstances, in the absence of the relevant legal provisions, the positive obligations may be fulfilled in practice.","The positive obligation arising from Article 2 entails above all a primary duty to put in place a legislative and administrative framework designed to provide effective deterrence against threats to the right to life, in particular by means of the criminal law ( Öneryıldız and Others v. Turkey [GC], 2004, §§ 89-90; Istanbullu and Ayden v. Turkey (dec.), 2015, § 32; Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy, 2025, § 380); see, however, the judgment in Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 112, in which the Court stated that this primary duty did not rule out the possibility, a priori, that in certain specific circumstances, in the absence of the relevant legal provisions, the positive obligations may be fulfilled in practice."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20251212192207__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-12,31 August 2024,17 September 2025,2024-08-31,2025-09-17,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-12.json,apps:51567/14,Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy,51567/14,added,"Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy, nos. 51567/14 and 3 others, 30 January 2025",6,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.1,Substantive limb,4,12,13,0.9627,"Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy , 2025",,"The Court must consider whether, given the circumstances of the case, the State did all that could have been required of it to prevent the applicant's life from being "" avoidably put at risk "" ( L.C.B. v. United Kingdom, 1998, § 36).","The Court must consider whether, given the circumstances of the case, the State did all that could have been required of it to prevent the applicant's life from being "" avoidably put at risk "" ( L.C.B. v. United Kingdom, 1998, § 36; Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy, 2025, § 379)."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20251212192207__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-12,31 August 2024,17 September 2025,2024-08-31,2025-09-17,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-12.json,apps:51567/14,Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy,51567/14,added,"Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy, nos. 51567/14 and 3 others, 30 January 2025",7,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.a,Principles i. Preventive regulations,4,13,14,0.9942,"Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy , 2025",,"In the particular context of dangerous activities, special emphasis must be placed on regulations geared to the special features of the activity in question, particularly with regard to the level of the potential risk to human lives ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 90; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 132; Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 158; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 101). Such preventive regulations should govern the licensing, setting up, operation, security and supervision of the activity and must make it compulsory for all those concerned to take practical measures to ensure the effective protection of citizens whose lives might be endangered by the inherent risks ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 90; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 132; Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 158; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 101). Preventive regulations must, in particular, guarantee the public's right to information ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, §§ 90 and 108; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 132 and 152-155; Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, §§ 159, 177, 181-182 and 185; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, §§ 101 and 113-114), thus enabling them to assess the risks to which they are exposed. It transpires from the judgments cited that in the sphere of hazardous activities and foreseeable natural disasters such right to information is reinforced by the obligation on States spontaneously to provide the relevant information to persons exposed to a mortal risk (see also L.C.B. v. United Kingdom, 1998, §§ 38-41).","In the particular context of dangerous activities, special emphasis must be placed on regulations geared to the special features of the activity in question, particularly with regard to the level of the potential risk to human lives ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 90; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 132; Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 158; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 101). Such preventive regulations should govern the licensing, setting up, operation, security and supervision of the activity and must make it compulsory for all those concerned to take practical measures to ensure the effective protection of citizens whose lives might be endangered by the inherent risks ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 90; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 132; Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 158; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 101). Preventive regulations must, in particular, guarantee the public's right to information ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, §§ 90 and 108; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, §§ 132 and §§ 152-155; Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, §§ 159, 177, 181-182 and 185; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, §§ 101 and 113-114; Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy, 2025, § 382), thus enabling them to assess the risks to which they are exposed. It transpires from the judgments cited that in the sphere of hazardous activities and foreseeable natural disasters such right to information is reinforced by the obligation on States spontaneously to provide the relevant information to persons exposed to a mortal risk (see Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy, 2025, §§ 454-48 ; see also L.C.B. v. United Kingdom, 1998, §§ 38-41)."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20251212192207__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-12,31 August 2024,17 September 2025,2024-08-31,2025-09-17,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-12.json,apps:51567/14,Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy,51567/14,added,"Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy, nos. 51567/14 and 3 others, 30 January 2025",8,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.B.b,Examples,4,,27,,"In the case of Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy , 2025",,,"In the case of Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy, 2025, §§ 394-468, concerning the large-scale illegal dumping, burying and incineration of waste on private land in the Campania region ("" Terra del Fuochi"" ), the Court held that, in this context, the authorities had been, first and foremost, under a duty to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the pollution phenomenon at issue, namely by identifying the affected areas and the nature and extent of the contamination in question, and then to take action in order to manage any risk revealed. They were further expected to investigate the impact of this pollution phenomenon on the health of individuals living in areas affected by it. At the same time, the authorities could have reasonably been expected to take action to combat the conduct giving rise to the pollution phenomenon, namely the illegal dumping, burying and incineration of waste. They were also under an obligation to provide individuals living in areas affected by the pollution phenomenon with timely information enabling them to assess risks to their health and lives. Reiterating that national authorities enjoyed a wide latitude in their choice of specific practical measures, the Court specified that it was within its sphere of competence to assess whether the authorities had approached the problem with the required diligence, given the nature and seriousness of the threat at issue. In this respect, the Court stressed that the timeliness of the authorities'response was of primordial importance, adding that the nature and seriousness of the threat required a systematic, coordinated, and comprehensive response on the part of the authorities. Noting shortcomings by the State on each of the above points, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20251212192207__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-12,31 August 2024,17 September 2025,2024-08-31,2025-09-17,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-12.json,apps:51567/14,Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy,51567/14,added,"Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy, nos. 51567/14 and 3 others, 30 January 2025",9,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.B.§4,ii. Specific measures and margin of appreciation,4,16,17,0.9898,"Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy , 2025",,"The choice of the specific measures is, in principle, a matter that falls within the State's margin of appreciation. In particular, since there are different avenues to ensure Convention rights, and even if the State has failed to apply one particular measure provided by domestic law, it may still fulfil its positive duty by other means. In this respect, an impossible or disproportionate burden must not be imposed on the authorities without consideration being given, in particular, to the operational choices which they must make in terms of priorities and resources; this results from the wide margin of appreciation States enjoy in difficult social and technical spheres ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 107; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 134-135; Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 160; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 101).","The choice of the specific measures is, in principle, a matter that falls within the State's margin of appreciation. In particular, since there are different avenues to ensure Convention rights, and even if the State has failed to apply one particular measure provided by domestic law, it may still fulfil its positive duty by other means. In this respect, an impossible or disproportionate burden must not be imposed on the authorities without consideration being given, in particular, to the operational choices which they must make in terms of priorities and resources; this results from the wide margin of appreciation States enjoy in difficult social and technical spheres ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 107; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 134-135; Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 160; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 101; Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy, 2025, §§ 381 and 396)."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20251212192207__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-12,31 August 2024,17 September 2025,2024-08-31,2025-09-17,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-12.json,apps:52854/18,L.F. and Others v. Italy,52854/18,added,"L.F. and Others v. Italy, no. 52854/18, 6 May 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A,Applicability,3,5,5,0.9808,"Errico v. Italy , 2025|The positive obligation to protect life also applies in the context of polluting activities that take place outside any legal framework. This is clear from the case of Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy , 2025",,"The positive obligation to protect life applies a fortiori to industrial activities, which are dangerous by their very nature ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 71; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 130); Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 158; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 101). Beyond the operation of a household refuse tip at issue in Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, the following have been deemed to be hazardous industrial activities: ▪ the mode of management of a reservoir located in a monsoon-influenced region, including releasing water in a period of heavy rainfall, had caused flooding in part of a conurbation in August 2001 ( Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 164); ▪ a series of atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons carried out by the British authorities on Christmas Island at the end of the 1950s, during which military personnel had been exposed to radiation ( L.C.B. v. United Kingdom, 1998, as mentioned in Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2012, § 80); ▪ toxic emissions from a fertiliser factory ( Guerra and Others v. Italy, 1998, as mentioned in Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 80); ▪ exposure to toxic substances such as asbestos at a workplace which was run by a public corporation owned and controlled by the Government ( Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 81); ▪ secret production of composite solid rocket fuel under the auspices of the State Intelligence Service ( Mučibabić v. Serbia, 2016, §§ 126-127); ▪ the management of a weapon decommissioning facility ( Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023, § 260). The Court held that the complaints concerning the alleged failures of a State to combat climate change fell into the category of cases concerning an activity which, by its very nature, was capable of putting an individual's life at risk. It pointed, in particular, to the findings of the intergovernmental panel of experts on climate change, which stated that anthropogenic climate change, particularly through increased frequency and severity of extreme events, increased heat-related human mortality ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC] (2024, §§ 508-510).","The positive obligation to protect life applies a fortiori in the context of industrial activities, which are dangerous by their very nature ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 71; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 130); Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 158; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 101; L.F. and Others v. Italy, § 107, 2025). Beyond the operation of a household refuse tip at issue in Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, the following have been deemed to be hazardous industrial activities: ▪ the mode of management of a reservoir located in a monsoon-influenced region, including releasing water in a period of heavy rainfall, had caused flooding in part of a conurbation in August 2001 ( Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 164); ▪ a series of atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons carried out by the British authorities on Christmas Island at the end of the 1950s, during which military personnel had been exposed to radiation ( L.C.B. v. United Kingdom, 1998, as mentioned in Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2012, § 80); ▪ toxic emissions from a fertiliser factory ( Guerra and Others v. Italy, 1998, as mentioned in Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 80); ▪ exposure to toxic substances such as asbestos at a workplace which was run by a public corporation owned and controlled by the Government ( Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 81); or by a private metallurgical company ( Laterza and D'Errico v. Italy, 2025, § 38). ▪ secret production of composite solid rocket fuel under the auspices of the State Intelligence Service ( Mučibabić v. Serbia, 2016, §§ 126-127); ▪ the management of a weapon decommissioning facility ( Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023, § 260). The positive obligation to protect life also applies in the context of polluting activities that take place outside any legal framework. This is clear from the case of Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy, 2025, §§ 384-392, concerning the illegal dumping and burying of hazardous waste on private land in the Campania region ( "" Terra del Fuochi "" ); the Court emphasised, in particular, that these were inherently dangerous activities which could pose a risk to human life. The Court has also held that the complaints concerning the alleged failures of a State to combat climate change fell into the category of cases concerning an activity which, by its very nature, was capable of putting an individual's life at risk. It pointed, in particular, to the findings of the intergovernmental panel of experts on climate change, which stated that anthropogenic climate change, particularly through increased frequency and severity of extreme events, increased heat-related human mortality ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC] (2024, §§ 508-510)."
e751e8063f8b,Environment,20250604023920__guide_environment_eng.pdf,20251212192207__guide_environment_eng.pdf,2025-06-04,2025-12-12,31 August 2024,17 September 2025,2024-08-31,2025-09-17,anas-diff-dataset/e751e8063f8b/diff_2025-06-04__2025-12-12.json,apps:30336/22,Laterza and D'Errico v. Italy,30336/22,added,"Laterza and D'Errico v. Italy, no. 30336/22, 27 March2025",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,I.A,Applicability,3,5,5,0.9808,"Errico v. Italy , 2025|The positive obligation to protect life also applies in the context of polluting activities that take place outside any legal framework. This is clear from the case of Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy , 2025",,"The positive obligation to protect life applies a fortiori to industrial activities, which are dangerous by their very nature ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 71; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 130); Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 158; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 101). Beyond the operation of a household refuse tip at issue in Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, the following have been deemed to be hazardous industrial activities: ▪ the mode of management of a reservoir located in a monsoon-influenced region, including releasing water in a period of heavy rainfall, had caused flooding in part of a conurbation in August 2001 ( Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 164); ▪ a series of atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons carried out by the British authorities on Christmas Island at the end of the 1950s, during which military personnel had been exposed to radiation ( L.C.B. v. United Kingdom, 1998, as mentioned in Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2012, § 80); ▪ toxic emissions from a fertiliser factory ( Guerra and Others v. Italy, 1998, as mentioned in Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 80); ▪ exposure to toxic substances such as asbestos at a workplace which was run by a public corporation owned and controlled by the Government ( Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 81); ▪ secret production of composite solid rocket fuel under the auspices of the State Intelligence Service ( Mučibabić v. Serbia, 2016, §§ 126-127); ▪ the management of a weapon decommissioning facility ( Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023, § 260). The Court held that the complaints concerning the alleged failures of a State to combat climate change fell into the category of cases concerning an activity which, by its very nature, was capable of putting an individual's life at risk. It pointed, in particular, to the findings of the intergovernmental panel of experts on climate change, which stated that anthropogenic climate change, particularly through increased frequency and severity of extreme events, increased heat-related human mortality ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC] (2024, §§ 508-510).","The positive obligation to protect life applies a fortiori in the context of industrial activities, which are dangerous by their very nature ( Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, § 71; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, 2008, § 130); Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 158; Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 101; L.F. and Others v. Italy, § 107, 2025). Beyond the operation of a household refuse tip at issue in Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], 2004, the following have been deemed to be hazardous industrial activities: ▪ the mode of management of a reservoir located in a monsoon-influenced region, including releasing water in a period of heavy rainfall, had caused flooding in part of a conurbation in August 2001 ( Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, 2012, § 164); ▪ a series of atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons carried out by the British authorities on Christmas Island at the end of the 1950s, during which military personnel had been exposed to radiation ( L.C.B. v. United Kingdom, 1998, as mentioned in Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2012, § 80); ▪ toxic emissions from a fertiliser factory ( Guerra and Others v. Italy, 1998, as mentioned in Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 80); ▪ exposure to toxic substances such as asbestos at a workplace which was run by a public corporation owned and controlled by the Government ( Brincat and Others v. Malta, 2014, § 81); or by a private metallurgical company ( Laterza and D'Errico v. Italy, 2025, § 38). ▪ secret production of composite solid rocket fuel under the auspices of the State Intelligence Service ( Mučibabić v. Serbia, 2016, §§ 126-127); ▪ the management of a weapon decommissioning facility ( Durdaj and Others v. Albania, 2023, § 260). The positive obligation to protect life also applies in the context of polluting activities that take place outside any legal framework. This is clear from the case of Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy, 2025, §§ 384-392, concerning the illegal dumping and burying of hazardous waste on private land in the Campania region ( "" Terra del Fuochi "" ); the Court emphasised, in particular, that these were inherently dangerous activities which could pose a risk to human life. The Court has also held that the complaints concerning the alleged failures of a State to combat climate change fell into the category of cases concerning an activity which, by its very nature, was capable of putting an individual's life at risk. It pointed, in particular, to the findings of the intergovernmental panel of experts on climate change, which stated that anthropogenic climate change, particularly through increased frequency and severity of extreme events, increased heat-related human mortality ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC] (2024, §§ 508-510)."
e8704f851a2b,Article 15,20230923094342__guide_art_15_eng.pdf,20250708224035__guide_art_15_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2025-07-08,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e8704f851a2b/diff_2023-09-23__2025-07-08.json,apps:59/17,Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye,59/17,added,"Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, no. 59/17, 23 April 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.A,“ ...war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation... ”,2,13,13,0.992,"Domenjoud v. France , 2024|ın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye , 2024|şkin v. Turkey , 2020","şkin v. Turkey, 2020","The Court has held that terrorism in Northern Ireland met the standard of a public emergency, since for a number of years it represented a ""particularly far -reaching and acute danger for the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, the institutions of the six counties [of Northern Ireland] and the lives of the province 's inhabitants"" ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, §§ 205 and 212; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 48; Marshall v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2001). So, too, did PKKterrorist activity in South-East Turkey ( Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, § 70) and the imminent threat of serious terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom after 11 September 2001 ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 181), and the attempted military coup in Turkey in 2016 ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 91-93; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 75-77; this observation was repeated in, for example, Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 88; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 73-74; Pişkin v. Turkey, 2020, § 59 ; Atilla Taş v. Turkey, 2021, § 83). The requirement of imminence is not, however, to be interpreted so narrowly as to require a State to wait for disaster to strike before taking measures to deal with it ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 177).","The Court has held that terrorism in Northern Ireland met the standard of a public emergency, since for a number of years it represented a ""particularly far -reaching and acute danger for the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, the institutions of the six counties [of Northern Ireland] and the lives of the province 's inhabitants"" ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, §§ 205 and 212; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 48; Marshall v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2001). So, too, did PKKterrorist activity in South-East Turkey ( Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, § 70), the imminent threat of serious terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom after 11 September 2001 ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 181), the several terrorist attacks in France between 2015 and 2017 ( Domenjoud v. France, 2024, § 150), and the attempted military coup in Turkey in 2016 ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 91-93; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 75-77; this observation was repeated in, for example, Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 88; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 73-74; Pişkin v. Turkey, 2020, § 59 ; Atilla Taş v. Turkey, 2021, § 83; Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, 2024, § 90). The requirement of imminence is not, however, to be interpreted so narrowly as to require a State to wait for disaster to strike before taking measures to deal with it ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 177)."
e8704f851a2b,Article 15,20230923094342__guide_art_15_eng.pdf,20250708224035__guide_art_15_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2025-07-08,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e8704f851a2b/diff_2023-09-23__2025-07-08.json,apps:59/17,Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye,59/17,added,"Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, no. 59/17, 23 April 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B,“ ...measures ... strictly required by the exigencies of the situation... ”,2,,30,,"ın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye , 2024",,,"In Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, 2024, a judge serving at the United Nations International Residual Mechanisms for Criminal Tribunals had, despite his diplomatic immunity, been arrested and detained pending his trial. The Court found that the measure could not be regarded as strictly required by the exigencies of the attempted coup d'état of 15 July 2016 which gave rise to the state of emergency. In particular, the Court was not convinced that the domestic courts'failure to assess the applicant's diplomatic immunity, up until the trial court pronounced itself on the merits of the case and convicted the applicant, could be regarded as strictly required by the exigencies of the attempted coup d'état of 15 July 2016 which gave rise to the state of emergency (§ 130)."
e8704f851a2b,Article 15,20230923094342__guide_art_15_eng.pdf,20250708224035__guide_art_15_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2025-07-08,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e8704f851a2b/diff_2023-09-23__2025-07-08.json,apps:59/17,Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye,59/17,added,"Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, no. 59/17, 23 April 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B,“ ...measures ... strictly required by the exigencies of the situation... ”,2,21,21,0.9606,"Domenjoud v. France , 2024|ın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye , 2024",,"Nevertheless, the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect: the Court is empowered to rule on whether the States have gone beyond the ""extent strictly required by the exigencies"" of the crisis ( ibid. ). T o assess whether the measures taken were ""strictly required by the exigencies of the situation and consistent with the other obligations under international law"", the Court examines the complaints on the merits ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 94; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 78; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 88).","Nevertheless, the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect: the Court is empowered to rule on whether the States have gone beyond the ""extent strictly required by the exigencies"" of the crisis ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom ; Domenjoud v. France, 2024, § 144). To assess whether the measures taken were ""strictly required by the exigencies of the situa tion and consistent with the other obligations under international law"", the Court examines the complaints on the merits ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 94; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 78; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 88; Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, 2024, § 90)."
e8704f851a2b,Article 15,20230923094342__guide_art_15_eng.pdf,20250708224035__guide_art_15_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2025-07-08,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e8704f851a2b/diff_2023-09-23__2025-07-08.json,apps:59/17,Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye,59/17,added,"Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, no. 59/17, 23 April 2024",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C,“ ...provided that such measures are not inconsistent with [the High Contracting Party ’ s] other obligations under international law”,2,,37,,"ın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye , 2024",,,"In Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, 2024, the Court extended the caveat of ""other obligations under international law"", within the meaning of Article 15, to obligations arising from diplomatic immunity, in the context of an international judge's pre-trial detention (§ 130) and searches of his residence and person (§ 144), which could not be justified under this provision."
e8704f851a2b,Article 15,20230923094342__guide_art_15_eng.pdf,20250708224035__guide_art_15_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2025-07-08,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e8704f851a2b/diff_2023-09-23__2025-07-08.json,apps:34749/16|79607/17,Domenjoud v. France,34749/16|79607/17,added,"Domenjoud v. France, nos. 34749/16 and 79607/17, 16 May 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.A,“ ...war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation... ”,2,12,12,0.9975,"Domenjoud v. France , 2024",,"Generally the Convention organs have deferred to the national authorities'assessment as to whether such an exceptional situation exists. As the Court stated in Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, § 207): ""it falls in the first place to each Contracting State, with its responsibility for'the life of [its] nation ', to determine whether that life is threatened by a'public emergency '"". By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of the derogations necessary to avert it. Accordingly, in this matter a wide margin of appreciation should be left to the national authorities. Nevertheless, the Court had emphasised that States do not enjoy an unlimited discretion in this respect. The domestic margin of appreciation is accompanied by European supervision ( Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 43; Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 91; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 75).","Generally the Convention organs have deferred to the national authorities'assessment as to whether such an exceptional situation exists. As the Court stated in Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, § 207): ""it falls in the first place to each Contracting State, with its responsibility for'the life of [its] nation ', to determine whether that life is threatened by a'public emergency '"". By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of the derogations necessary to avert it. Accordingly, in this matter a wide margin of appreciation should be left to the national authorities. Nevertheless, the Court had emphasised that States do not enjoy an unlimited discretion in this respect. The domestic margin of appreciation is accompanied by European supervision ( Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 43; Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 91; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 75; Domenjoud v. France, 2024, § 145)."
e8704f851a2b,Article 15,20230923094342__guide_art_15_eng.pdf,20250708224035__guide_art_15_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2025-07-08,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e8704f851a2b/diff_2023-09-23__2025-07-08.json,apps:34749/16|79607/17,Domenjoud v. France,34749/16|79607/17,added,"Domenjoud v. France, nos. 34749/16 and 79607/17, 16 May 2024",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,II.A,“ ...war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation... ”,2,13,13,0.992,"Domenjoud v. France , 2024|ın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye , 2024|şkin v. Turkey , 2020","şkin v. Turkey, 2020","The Court has held that terrorism in Northern Ireland met the standard of a public emergency, since for a number of years it represented a ""particularly far -reaching and acute danger for the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, the institutions of the six counties [of Northern Ireland] and the lives of the province 's inhabitants"" ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, §§ 205 and 212; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 48; Marshall v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2001). So, too, did PKKterrorist activity in South-East Turkey ( Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, § 70) and the imminent threat of serious terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom after 11 September 2001 ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 181), and the attempted military coup in Turkey in 2016 ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 91-93; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 75-77; this observation was repeated in, for example, Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 88; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 73-74; Pişkin v. Turkey, 2020, § 59 ; Atilla Taş v. Turkey, 2021, § 83). The requirement of imminence is not, however, to be interpreted so narrowly as to require a State to wait for disaster to strike before taking measures to deal with it ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 177).","The Court has held that terrorism in Northern Ireland met the standard of a public emergency, since for a number of years it represented a ""particularly far -reaching and acute danger for the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, the institutions of the six counties [of Northern Ireland] and the lives of the province 's inhabitants"" ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, §§ 205 and 212; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 48; Marshall v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 2001). So, too, did PKKterrorist activity in South-East Turkey ( Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, § 70), the imminent threat of serious terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom after 11 September 2001 ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 181), the several terrorist attacks in France between 2015 and 2017 ( Domenjoud v. France, 2024, § 150), and the attempted military coup in Turkey in 2016 ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 91-93; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 75-77; this observation was repeated in, for example, Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 88; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 73-74; Pişkin v. Turkey, 2020, § 59 ; Atilla Taş v. Turkey, 2021, § 83; Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, 2024, § 90). The requirement of imminence is not, however, to be interpreted so narrowly as to require a State to wait for disaster to strike before taking measures to deal with it ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 177)."
e8704f851a2b,Article 15,20230923094342__guide_art_15_eng.pdf,20250708224035__guide_art_15_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2025-07-08,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e8704f851a2b/diff_2023-09-23__2025-07-08.json,apps:34749/16|79607/17,Domenjoud v. France,34749/16|79607/17,added,"Domenjoud v. France, nos. 34749/16 and 79607/17, 16 May 2024",3,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.B,“ ...measures ... strictly required by the exigencies of the situation... ”,2,,26,,"State. The case of Domenjoud v. France , 2024",,,"To be deemed ""strictly required by the situation"" within the meaning of Article 15 § 1, the measure must be covered by the derogation notified by the State. The case of Domenjoud v. France, 2024 concerned a preventive home-curfew order issued under state-of-emergency legislation in view of a potential participation in violent actions during the COP21 summit. The Court assessed whether the derogating measures had been strictly required in the light of the reasons for the derogation. In the information transmitted to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe pursuant to Article 15 § 3, the Government had indicated that the state of emergency had been dec lared ""to prevent the commission of further terrorist attacks"" ( § 154). The Court found that, in the absence of any individual and detailed assessment of the second applicant's behaviour or actions, the Government had not convincingly shown that his placement under home curfew had been ordered with the aim of combatting terrorism. Therefore, the measure in issue had not been strictly necessary to fulfil the aim pursued by the exercise of the right of derogation (§ 155)."
e8704f851a2b,Article 15,20230923094342__guide_art_15_eng.pdf,20250708224035__guide_art_15_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2025-07-08,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e8704f851a2b/diff_2023-09-23__2025-07-08.json,apps:34749/16|79607/17,Domenjoud v. France,34749/16|79607/17,added,"Domenjoud v. France, nos. 34749/16 and 79607/17, 16 May 2024",4,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B,“ ...measures ... strictly required by the exigencies of the situation... ”,2,21,21,0.9606,"Domenjoud v. France , 2024|ın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye , 2024",,"Nevertheless, the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect: the Court is empowered to rule on whether the States have gone beyond the ""extent strictly required by the exigencies"" of the crisis ( ibid. ). T o assess whether the measures taken were ""strictly required by the exigencies of the situation and consistent with the other obligations under international law"", the Court examines the complaints on the merits ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 94; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 78; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 88).","Nevertheless, the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect: the Court is empowered to rule on whether the States have gone beyond the ""extent strictly required by the exigencies"" of the crisis ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom ; Domenjoud v. France, 2024, § 144). To assess whether the measures taken were ""strictly required by the exigencies of the situa tion and consistent with the other obligations under international law"", the Court examines the complaints on the merits ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 94; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 78; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, § 88; Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, 2024, § 90)."
e8704f851a2b,Article 15,20230923094342__guide_art_15_eng.pdf,20250708224035__guide_art_15_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2025-07-08,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e8704f851a2b/diff_2023-09-23__2025-07-08.json,apps:34749/16|79607/17,Domenjoud v. France,34749/16|79607/17,added,"Domenjoud v. France, nos. 34749/16 and 79607/17, 16 May 2024",5,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.B,“ ...measures ... strictly required by the exigencies of the situation... ”,2,24,24,0.999,"Domenjoud v. France , 2024",,"This involves the Court considering matters such as: ▪ whether ordinary laws would have been sufficient to meet the danger caused by the public emergency ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 36; Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, § 212); ▪ whether the measures are a genuine response to an emergency situation ( Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 51; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, § 118); ▪ whether the measures were used for the purpose for which they were granted ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 38); ▪ whether the Government are able to show that there is a sufficient connection between the individual case and the derogation relied on (see, implicitly, Vedat Şorli v. Turkey, 2021, § 46 - concerning an insult to the head of State); ▪ whether the derogation is limited in scope and the reasons advanced in support of it ( Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 66); ▪ whether the need for the derogation was kept under review ( ibid., § 54); ▪ any attenuation in the measures imposed ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, § 220); ▪ whether the measures were subject to safeguards ( ibid., §§ 216-219; Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 37; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, §§ 61-65; Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, §§ 79-84); ▪ the importance of the right at stake, and the broader purpose of judicial control over interferences with that right ( ibid., § 76); ▪ whether judicial control of the measures was practicable ( ibid., § 78; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 59); ▪ the proportionality of the measures and whether they involved any unjustifiable discrimination ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 190); whether they were "" lawful "" and were effected "" in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law "" ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 140 and 213; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 119 and 183); ▪ whether legal certainty is not compromised by a judicial interpretation running counter to the applicable statutory provisions ( Baş v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 151-153). Thus, for example, the Court has found that an interpretation of the legal concept of "" in flagrante delicto "" - allowing judges to be detained without the prior lifting of their immunity, a guarantee of their independence - that expanded the scope of that concept ""so that judges suspected of belonging to a criminal association are deprived of the judicial protection afforded by Turkish law to members of the judiciary"" was such as to "" [negate] the procedural safeguards which members of the judiciary are afforded in order to protect them from interference by the executive"" ( ibid. ); ▪ whether the minimum requirements of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention regarding the ""reasonableness"" of a suspicion justifying an individual' s detention are satisfied ( Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 147-149; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 176-196; Baş v. Turkey, 2020, § 200); ▪ whether the court decided ""speedily"" on the lawfulness of detention within the meaning of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention ( Baş v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 216 and 230), including the Constitutional Court ( Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 176-196); and ▪ the views of any national courts which have considered the question ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 93 and 140; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 77 and 119; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, § 146). If the highest domestic court in a Contracting State has reached the conclusion that the measures were not strictly required, the Court will be justified in reaching a contrary conclusion only if satisfied that the national court had misinterpreted or misapplied Article 15 or the Court's jurisprudence under that Article, or reached a conclusion which was manifestly unreasonable ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 174).","This involves the Court considering matters such as: ▪ whether ordinary laws would have been sufficient to meet the danger caused by the public emergency ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 36; Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, § 212); ▪ whether the measures are a genuine response to an emergency situation ( Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 51; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, § 118); ▪ whether the measures were used for the purpose for which they were granted ( Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 38 ; Domenjoud v. France, 2024, § 154); ▪ whether the Government are able to show that there is a sufficient connection between the individual case and the derogation relied on ( Domenjoud v. France, 2024, § 154; see also, implicitly, Vedat Şorli v. Turkey, 2021, § 46 - concerning an insult to the head of State); ▪ whether the derogation is limited in scope and the reasons advanced in support of it ( Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 66); ▪ whether the need for the derogation was kept under review ( ibid., § 54); ▪ any attenuation in the measures imposed ( Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 1978, § 220); ▪ whether the measures were subject to safeguards ( ibid., §§ 216-219; Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1961, § 37; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, §§ 61-65; Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, §§ 79-84); ▪ the importance of the right at stake, and the broader purpose of judicial control over interferences with that right ( ibid., § 76); ▪ whether judicial control of the measures was practicable ( ibid., § 78; 3 Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 1993, § 59); ▪ the proportionality of the measures and whether they involved any unjustifiable discrimination ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 190); whether they were "" lawful "" and were effected "" in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law "" ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 140 and 213; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 119 and 183); ▪ whether legal certainty is not compromised by a judicial interpretation running counter to the applicable statutory provisions ( Baş v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 151-153). Thus, for example, the Court has found that an interpretation of the legal concept of "" in flagrante delicto "" - allowing judges to be detained without the prior lifting of their immunity, a guarantee of their independence - that expanded the scope of that concept ""so that judges suspected of belonging to a criminal association are deprived of the judicial protection afforded by Turkish law to members of the judiciary"" was such as to "" [negate] the procedural safeguards which members of the judiciary are afforded in order to protect them from interference by the executive"" ( ibid. ); ▪ whether the minimum requirements of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention regarding the ""reasonableness"" of a suspicion justifying an individual' s detention are satisfied ( Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 147-149; Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 176-196; Baş v. Turkey, 2020, § 200); ▪ whether the court decided ""speedily"" on the lawfulness of detention within the meaning of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention ( Baş v. Turkey, 2020, §§ 216 and 230), including the Constitutional Court ( Kavala v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 176-196); and ▪ the views of any national courts which have considered the question ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 93 and 140; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, §§ 77 and 119; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, 2019, § 146). If the highest domestic court in a Contracting State has reached the conclusion that the measures were not strictly required, the Court will be justified in reaching a contrary conclusion only if satisfied that the national court had misinterpreted or misapplied Article 15 or the Court's jurisprudence under that Article, or reached a conclusion which was manifestly unreasonable ( A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 2009, § 174)."
e8704f851a2b,Article 15,20230923094342__guide_art_15_eng.pdf,20250708224035__guide_art_15_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2025-07-08,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e8704f851a2b/diff_2023-09-23__2025-07-08.json,apps:34749/16|79607/17,Domenjoud v. France,34749/16|79607/17,added,"Domenjoud v. France, nos. 34749/16 and 79607/17, 16 May 2024",6,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV,Article 15 § 3: the notification requirements,1,45,48,0.9893,"Domenjoud v. France , 2024",,"The Court has jurisdiction to examine of its own motion whether a notification by a State complies with the formal requirements provided in Article 15 § 3 - namely, keeping the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures taken by way of derogation from the Convention and the reasons for them - even if that issue has not been raised by any of the parties ( Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, §§ 85-86).","The Court has jurisdiction to examine of its own motion whether a notification by a State complies with the formal requirements provided in Article 15 § 3 - namely, keeping the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures taken by way of derogation from the Convention and the reasons for them - even if that issue has not been raised by any of the parties ( Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996, §§ 85-86; Domenjoud v. France, 2024, §§ 147-148)."
e8704f851a2b,Article 15,20230923094342__guide_art_15_eng.pdf,20250708224035__guide_art_15_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2025-07-08,31 August 2023,28 February 2025,2023-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/e8704f851a2b/diff_2023-09-23__2025-07-08.json,apps:34749/16|79607/17,Domenjoud v. France,34749/16|79607/17,added,"Domenjoud v. France, nos. 34749/16 and 79607/17, 16 May 2024",7,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV,Article 15 § 3: the notification requirements,1,46,49,0.9852,"Domenjoud v. France , 2024",,"The Court has accepted that this formal condition was observed even where the notice of derogation did not explicitly mention which Articles of the Convention were concerned, in cases where the parties had not raised any objections in that regard ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 89; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 73; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 100-102).","The Court has accepted that this formal condition was observed even where the notice of derogation did not explicitly mention which Articles of the Convention were concerned, in cases where the parties had not raised any objections in that regard ( Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, 2018, § 89; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, 2018, § 73; Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, 2021, §§ 100-102; Domenjoud v. France, 2024, § 151)."
ed0ed05ac958,Article 46,20230911235919__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,20240216163759__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-02-16,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-16.json,apps:38263/08,Georgia v. Russia (II) (just satisfaction) [GC],38263/08,added,"Georgia v. Russia (II) (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 38263/08, 28 April 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,I.C,Continued obligation to execute under Article 46 in case of cessation of membership,2,,11,,,,,"The Court expressly acknowledged this continued obligation to execute when it noted in a subsequent inter-State case that Article 46 required that the Committee of Ministers set forth an effective mechanism for the implementation of the Court's judgment s also in cases against a State which has ceased to be a party to the Convention. It observed in that connection that the Committee of Ministers continued to supervise the execution of its judgments against the Russian Federation, and the Russian Federation was required, pursuant to Article 46 § 1 of the Convention, to implement them, despite the cessation of its membership of the Council of Europe ( Georgia v. Russia (II) (just satisfaction) [GC], 2023, § 46)."
ed0ed05ac958,Article 46,20230911235919__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,20240216163759__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-02-16,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-16.json,apps:36418/20,Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 3),36418/20,added,"Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 3), no. 36418/20, 6 June 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,IV.A.1.§4,ii. The procedural (effective investigation) aspect,4,45,47,0.9941,,,"However, in some circumstances it has also indicated that it considered it inevitable that a new, independent, investigation should take place under Article 46. That investigation should be in the light of the terms of the Court's judgment and with due regard to its conclusions in respect of the failures of the investigation to date ( Abuyeva and Others v. Russia, 2010, § 240) 7 . Where the domestic investigation is still open, the Court may consider it appropriate to specify certain essential steps that should now be taken, for example evaluating in light of all the known facts the actions of State agents who used lethal force, and granting the next-of-kin access to key documents ( Gasangusenov v. Russia, 2021, § 102).","However, in some circumstances it has also indicated that it considered it inevitable that a new, independent, investigation should take place under Article 46. That investigation should be in the light of the terms of the Court's judgment and with due regard to its conclusions in respect of the failures of the investigation to date ( Abuyeva and Others v. Russia, 2010, § 240; Navalnyy v. Russia (no. 3), 2023, § 167) . Where the domestic investigation is still open, the Court may consider it appropriate to specify certain essential steps that should now be taken, for example evaluating in light of all the known facts the actions of State agents who used lethal force, and granting the next-of-kin access to key documents ( Gasangusenov v. Russia, 2021, § 102)."
ed0ed05ac958,Article 46,20230911235919__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,20240216163759__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,2023-09-11,2024-02-16,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2023-09-11__2024-02-16.json,apps:61365/16,S.E. v. Serbia,61365/16,added,"S.E. v. Serbia, no. 61365/16, 11 July 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.A.1.l,Article 2 of Protocol No. 4,4,,107,,"S.E. v. Serbia , 2023",,,"In a case concerning freedom of movement under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, the Court observed that the State's prolonged failure to implement its own domestic law allowing a travel document to be issued to recognised refugees and to persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and adopt regulations as a precondition for it, amounted to a structural problem. It was incumbent on the Committee of Ministers to address the issue of what may be required of the respondent Government by way of compliance, through both individual and general measures, given that that judgment should have effects ext ending beyond the confines of that particular case. In the Court's view, the respondent State had to take all appropriate statutory and operational measures to complete the pertinent legislative framework and implementing regulations to provide the effective right to leave the territory, and the possibility for any individual in a similar situation to that in which the applicant had found himself to access the procedure to apply for and obtain a travel document ( S.E. v. Serbia, 2023, § 98)."
ed0ed05ac958,Article 46,20240216163759__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,2024-02-16,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-02-16__2024-09-30.json,apps:12427/22,A.D. v. Malta,12427/22,added,"A.D. v. Malta, no. 12427/22, 17 October 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.A.1.c,Article 5,4,,87,,"A.D. v. Malta , 2023",,,"In another case which concerned immigration detention ( A.D. v. Malta, 2023), the Court considered that the problems detected could subsequently give rise to numerous other well-founded applications which were a threat to the future effectiveness of the Convention system. It consequently held that general measures at national level were undoubtedly called for in execution of that judgment. As regards the violation of Article 5 § 1 on account, inter alia, of the lack of legal basis surrounding detention for health considerations, it noted that concerns had already been raised by the CPT and the Commissioner. It thus called on the Government to ensure a legal basis in domestic law for any such detention, in conformity with the general principle of legal certainty (§§ 209-210 - see also above for the general measures indicated under Article 3 in the same case)."
ed0ed05ac958,Article 46,20240216163759__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,2024-02-16,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-02-16__2024-09-30.json,apps:33234/12,Al Nashiri v. Romania,33234/12,added,"Al Nashiri v. Romania, no. 33234/12, 31 May 2018",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.A.1.a,Article 2 i. The substantive aspect,4,45,45,0.9667,"Al Nashiri v. Romania , 2018|Al- Hawsawi v. Lithuania , 2024",,"In cases where there was a risk of a violation of the applicants'right to life, on account of expulsion - actual or threatened - to a country where they faced the death penalty or other circumstances which would be in violation of Article 2, the Court has indicated that the respondent State should take all possible steps to obtain an assurance from the relevant State authorities of the non-application the death penalty ( Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 171; Al Nashiri v. Poland, 2014, § 589) .","In cases where there was a risk of a violation of the applicants'right to life, on account of expulsion - actual or threatened - to a country where they faced the death penalty or other circumstances which would be in violation of Article 2, the Court has indicated that the respondent State should take all possible steps to obtain an assurance from the relevant State authorities of the non-application of the death penalty ( Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 171; in the context of extraordinary renditions, see Al Nashiri v. Poland, 2014, § 589; Al Nashiri v. Romania, 2018, § 739; Al- Hawsawi v. Lithuania, 2024, § 276) 6 ."
ed0ed05ac958,Article 46,20240216163759__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,2024-02-16,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-02-16__2024-09-30.json,apps:6383/17,Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania,6383/17,added,"Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania, no. 6383/17, 16 January 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.A.1.b,Article 3 i. Substantive: expulsion,4,,56,,"Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania , 2024",,,"In the context of an extraordinary rendition case, the Court found that, by enabling the applicant's transfer to another CIAdetention site, the respondent State had exposed him to a foreseeable risk of continued secret, incommunicado and otherwise arbitrary detention (in breach of Article 5), as well as to further ill-treatment and conditions of detention, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. While the Court was mindful of the fact that the respondent State had already sought assistance and judicial cooperation from the USauthorities, it considered that the respondent State was under an obligation to take the necessary individual measures to redress as far as possible the violations found, which required that the respondent State attempted to make further representations to the USauthorities with a view to removing or, at the very least seeking to limit, as far as possible, the effects of these violations ( Al-Hawsawi v. Lithuania, 2024, § 277).  Preventing torture, inhuman and degrading treatment"
ed0ed05ac958,Article 46,20240216163759__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,2024-02-16,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-02-16__2024-09-30.json,apps:3324/19,Mehmet Zeki Doğan v. Türkiye (No. 2),3324/19,added,"Mehmet Zeki Doğan v. Türkiye (No. 2), no. 3324/19, 13 February 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.B.1,Article 35 § 2 (b),3,36,37,0.9793,,,"The determination of the existence of a ""new issue"" very much depends on the specific circumstances of a given case, and distinctions between cases are not always clear-cut. So, for instance, in Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2) [GC], 2009, the Court found that it was competent to examine a complaint that the domestic court in question had dismissed an application to reopen proceedings following the Court's judgment. The Court relied mainly on the fact that the grounds for dismissing the application were new and therefore constituted relevant new information capable of giving rise to a fresh violation of the Convention (§ 65). It further took into account the fact that the Committee of Ministers had ended its supervision of the execution of the Court's judgment without taking into account the refusal to reopen as it had not been informed of that decision. The Court considered that, from that standpoint also, the refusal in issue constituted a new fact (§ 67). Similarly, in Emre v. Switzerland (no. 2), 2011, the Court found that a new domestic judgment given following the reopening of the case and in which the domestic court had proceeded to carry out a new balancing of interests, constituted a new fact. It also observed in this respect that the execution procedure before the Committee of Ministers had not yet commenced (cited in Egmez v. Cyprus (dec.), 2012, §§ 54-56).","The determination of the existence of a ""new issue"" very much depends on the specific circumstances of a given case, and distinctions between cases are not always clear-cut. So, for instance, in Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2) [GC], 2009, the Court found that it was competent to examine a complaint that the domestic court in question had dismissed an application to reopen proceedings following the Court's judgment. The Court relied mainly on the fact that the grounds for dismissing the application were new and therefore constituted relevant new information capable of giving rise to a fresh violation of the Convention (§ 65). It further took into account the fact that the Committee of Ministers had ended its supervision of the execution of the Court's judgment without taking into account the refusal to reopen as it had not been informed of that decision. The Court considered that, from that standpoint also, the refusal in issue constituted a new fact (§ 67). Similarly, in Emre v. Switzerland (no. 2), 2011, the Court found that a new domestic judgment given following the reopening of the case and in which the domestic court had proceeded to carry out a new balancing of interests, constituted a new fact. It also observed in this respect that the execution procedure before the Committee of Ministers had not yet commenced (cited in Egmez v. Cyprus (dec.), 2012, §§ 54-56). In another case ( Mehmet Zeki Doğan v. Türkiye (No. 2), 2024), the Court found that the process of the determination of the criminal charge against the applicant in newly reopened proceedings had been revived because of the fresh assessment carried out by the trial court. This necessarily entailed a ""new issue"" which had not been de cided by the Court's previous judgment in respect of the applicant. Accordingly, the Court declared itself competent to examine the applicant's new complaint concerning the alleged unfairness of the reopened criminal proceedings (§ 57)."
ed0ed05ac958,Article 46,20240216163759__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,2024-02-16,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-02-16__2024-09-30.json,name:ukraine v russia re crimea gc::2024,Ukraine v. Russia (Re Crimea) [GC],,added,"Ukraine v. Russia (Re Crimea) [GC], 25 June 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,IV.A.1.i,Article 18 in conjunction with Articles 5 and,4,100,107,0.9057,,,"In other cases relating to Article 18 the Court has indicated that general measures to be taken by the respondent State must focus, as a matter of priority, on the protection of critics of the government, civil society activists and human-rights defenders against arbitrary arrest and detention. The measures to be taken must ensure the eradication of retaliatory prosecutions and misuse of criminal law against this group of individuals and the non-repetition of similar practices in the future ( Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, §§ 223-228).","In other cases relating to Article 18 the Court has indicated that general measures to be taken by the respondent State must focus, as a matter of priority, on the protection of critics of the government, civil society activists and human-rights defenders against arbitrary arrest and detention. The measures to be taken must ensure the eradication of retaliatory prosecutions and misuse of criminal law against this group of individuals and the non-repetition of similar practices in the future ( Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, 2018, §§ 223-228). In Ukraine v. Russia (Re Crimea) [GC], 2024, among the multiple findings of violations of the Convention by the respondent State the Court found, as regards the transfer of prisoners from Crimea to penal institutions located within Russia, an administrative practice in violation of the right to respect for family life. Under Article 18, the Court established that in relation to Ukrainian ""political prisoners"", their rights under Article 8 (and other provisions) had been restricted predominantly for the ulterior purpose of punishing and silencing those who opposed to Russia's occupation of Ukraine. This finding led it to indicate that the relevant prisoners must be returned safely as soon as possible from Russia (§§ 1386-7 and operative provision D1)."
ed0ed05ac958,Article 46,20240216163759__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,2024-02-16,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-02-16__2024-09-30.json,name:verein klimaseniorinnen schweiz and others v switzerland gc::2024,Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC],,added,"Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], 9 April 2024",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.A,Supervision of compliance,2,29,30,0.9701,,,"Given the variety of means available to achieve restitutio in integrum and the nature of the issues involved, in the exercise of its competence under Article 46 § 2 of the Convention, the Committee of Ministers is considered to be better placed than the Court to assess the specific measures to be taken. It is thus for the Committee of Ministers to supervise, on the basis of the information provided by the respondent State and with due regard to the applicant's evolving situation, the adoption of such measures that are feasible, timely, adequate and sufficient to ensure the maximum possible reparation for the violations found by the Court ( Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2019, § 155).","Given the variety of means available to achieve restitutio in integrum and the nature of the issues involved, in the exercise of its competence under Article 46 § 2 of the Convention, the Committee of Ministers is considered to be better placed than the Court to assess the specific measures to be taken. This is well illustrated by the Court's climate change judgment in which it said that, in view of the complexity and the nature of the issues involved, it was unable to be detailed or prescriptive as regards any measures to be implemented in order to effectively comply with the judgment ( Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], 2024, § 657). It is thus for the Committee of Ministers to supervise, on the basis of the information provided by the respondent State and with due regard to the applicant's evolving situation, the adoption of such measures that are feasible, timely, adequate and sufficient to ensure the maximum possible reparation for the violations found by the Court ( Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan [GC], 2019, § 155)."
ed0ed05ac958,Article 46,20240216163759__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,2024-02-16,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-02-16__2024-09-30.json,apps:50849/21,Wałęsa v. Poland,50849/21,added,"Wałęsa v. Poland, no. 50849/21, 23 November 2023",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,II.C.2.a,What are they for?,4,,22,,"ęsa v. Poland , 2023",,,"The dual purpose of the pilot judgment procedure therefore is, on the one hand, to reduce the threat to the effective functioning of the Convention system and, on the other, to facilitate the most speedy and effective resolution of a dysfunction affecting the protection of Convention rights in the national legal order. By incorporating into the process of execution of the pilot judgment the interests of all other existing or potential victims of the systemic problem identified, the procedure aims to afford proper relief to all actual and potential victims of that dysfunction, as well as to the particular applicant(s) in the pilot case (for a recent and detailed summary of the principles deriving from the Court's case-law as regards pilot judgments, see Wałęsa v. Poland, 2023, §§ 314-318)."
ed0ed05ac958,Article 46,20240216163759__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,2024-02-16,2024-09-30,31 August 2023,31 August 2024,2023-08-31,2024-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-02-16__2024-09-30.json,apps:50849/21,Wałęsa v. Poland,50849/21,added,"Wałęsa v. Poland, no. 50849/21, 23 November 2023",2,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.A.1.d,Article 6,4,90,96,0.9681,"ęsa v. Poland , 2023",,"The Court returned to this issue shortly afterwards in Advance Pharma sp. z o.o v. Poland, 2022. It observed that the continued operation of the judicial appointments authority in its current form was perpetuating the systemic dysfunction within the domestic judicial system, leading to further aggravation of the rule of law crisis in that country. As for the consequences for final judgments delivered by judicial formations including judges who had been appointed under the 2017 rules, the Court noted that one option would be for the respondent State to take general measures based on the position adopted by the Supreme Court when it issued an important ruling on the matter in early 2020 (cited in the judgment at § 127). However, it would ultimately be for the domestic authorities to draw the necessary conclusions from the European Court's reasoning and to take measures to resolve the problems at the root of the violations established and to prevent similar violations in future (see §§ 364-366).","The Court returned to this issue shortly afterwards in Advance Pharma sp. z o.o v. Poland, 2022. It observed that the continued operation of the judicial appointments authority in its current form was perpetuating the systemic dysfunction within the domestic judicial system, leading to further aggravation of the rule of law crisis in that country. As for the consequences for final judgments delivered by judicial formations including judges who had been appointed under the 2017 rules, the Court noted that one option would be for the respondent State to take general measures based on the position adopted by the Supreme Court when it issued an important ruling on the matter in early 2020 (cited in the judgment at § 127). However, it would ultimately be for the domestic authorities to draw the necessary conclusions from the European Court's reasoning and to take measures to resolve the problems at the root of the violations established and to prevent similar violations in future (see §§ 364-366). Given the respondent State's lack of response to these cases and its conduct in the execution of the judgments concerning the independence of the judiciary, the Court considered itself compelled to apply the pilot-judgment procedure in a subsequent case and to give more detailed indications as to general measures to be taken in respect of the systemic problem identified in these cases ( Wałęsa v. Poland, 2023, §§ 326-32 and points 6-7 of the operative part)."
ed0ed05ac958,Article 46,20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json,apps:2705/20,Beley v. Ukraine,2705/20,added,"Beley v. Ukraine, no. 2705/20, 19 December 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,III.B.1,Article 35 § 2 (b),3,40,40,0.9912,"Beley v. Ukraine , 2024",,"As regards the specific context of a continuing violation of a Convention right following adoption of a judgment in which the Court has found a violation of that right during a certain period of time, it is not unusual for the Court to examine a second application concerning a violation of that right in the subsequent period ( Ivan ţ oc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 87 ). In such cases, the ""new issue"" results from the continuation of the violation that formed the basis of the Court' s initial decision. The examination by the Court in the second application is, however, confined to the new periods concerned and any new complaints invoked in this respect ( Juri š i ć v. Croatia (No. 2), 2022, § 30). For example, in Ivan ţ oc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, the Court concluded that the question of the prolongation of the applicants'arbitrary detention between 8 July 2004 [the date of the Court's initial judgment finding, inter alia, a violation of Article 5] and 2 and 4 June 2007 respectively fell within its jurisdiction (§ 93-96). In Wasserman v. Russia (no. 2), 2008, the Court accepted jurisdiction of a new complaint which concerned a further period of almost two years after its initial judgment of non-enforcement of a domestic decision in the applicant's favour (§§ 36-37). Similarly, in Juri š i ć v. Croatia (No. 2), 2022, the Court declared itself competent to examine the new decisions on the applicant's contact orders with his minor child adopted by the domestic authorities after the Court's initial judgment (§§ 32-33). In Ş tefan-Gabriel Mocanu and Others v. Romania, 2023, the Court first noted that the Committee of Ministers had closed its supervision of the execution of its previous judgment concerning the ineffective investigation into allegations made by the (heirs of) victims of the repression of antigovernment protests in Bucharest in June 1990. It went on to note that the High Court's conclusions concerning the irregularity of the indictment, the quashing of the prosecution proceedings, the exclusion of all the evidence examined and the referral of the case back to the prosecuting authorities, all of which occurred after the closure of the supervision process by the Committee of Ministers, constituted ""new elements"" in relation to its previous judgment : consequently, the Court declared itself competent to examine the new complaints relating to the continuation of the investigation into the events in question. The Court concluded by finding a new violation in respect of new developments which occurred in the investigation after its first judgment (§§ 37-38, 42-43, 57).","As regards the specific context of a continuing violation of a Convention right following adoption of a judgment in which the Court has found a violation of that right during a certain period of time, it is not unusual for the Court to examine a second application concerning a violation of that right in the subsequent period ( Ivan ţ oc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, § 87 ). In such cases, the ""new issue"" results from the continuation of the vi olation that formed the basis of the Court's initial decision. The examination by the Court in the second application is, however, confined to the new periods concerned and any new complaints invoked in this respect ( Juri š i ć v. Croatia (No. 2), 2022, § 30). For example, in Ivan ţ oc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 2011, the Court concluded that the question of the prolongation of the applicants'arbitrary detention between 8 July 2004 [the date of the Court's initial judgment finding, inter alia, a violation of Article 5] and 2 and 4 June 2007 respectively fell within its jurisdiction (§ 93-96). In Wasserman v. Russia (no. 2), 2008, the Court accepted jurisdiction of a new complaint which concerned a further period of almost two years after its initial judgment of non-enforcement of a domestic decision in the applicant's favour (§§ 36-37). Similarly, in Juri š i ć v. Croatia (No. 2), 2022, the Court declared itself competent to examine the new decisions on the applicant's contact orders with his minor child adopted by the domestic authorities after the Court's initial judgment (§§ 32-33). In Ş tefan-Gabriel Mocanu and Others v. Romania, 2023, the Court first noted that the Committee of Ministers had closed its supervision of the execution of its previous judgment concerning the ineffective investigation into allegations made by the (heirs of) victims of the repression of antigovernment protests in Bucharest in June 1990. It went on to note that the High Court's conclusions concerning the irregularity of the indictment, the quashing of the prosecution proceedings, the exclusion of all the evidence examined and the referral of the case back to the prosecuting authorities, all of which occurred after the closure of the supervision process by the Committee of Ministers, constituted ""new elements"" in relation to its previous judgment : consequently, the Court declared itself competent to examine the new complaints relating to the continuation of the investigation into the events in question. The Court concluded by finding a new violation in respect of new developments which occurred in the investigation after its first judgment (§§ 37-38, 42-43, 57). Similarly, in Beley v. Ukraine, 2024, the Court declared admissible a second complaint from the applicant that the ongoing investigation into acts of torture perpetrated by the police against him was ineffective. The Court had previously established, in a judgment in 2019, that the applicant had been tortured and that the authorities had failed to investigate the matter effectively. Since the second application referred to the investigative steps taken after the 2019 judgment, the Court considered that the complaint was within its jurisdiction as it concerned new factual developments giving rise to new legal issues (§§ 33-39)."
ed0ed05ac958,Article 46,20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json,apps:51567/14,Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy*,51567/14,added,"Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy*, no. 51567/14, 30 January 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,II.C.2.i,Procedural significance - disposal of similar cases,4,26,26,0.9927,,,"In general, three types of approach can be identified in the Court's case-law for the timescale of adoption of general measures. Where the Court has previously identified the problem giving rise to the violation but repetitive cases have continued to come to the Court, it has observed that the lengthy delay thus far demonstrated the need for a timetable and indicated that timetable in the pilot judgment ( Greens and M.T. v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 115). In other cases, the Court has also considered that a reasonable time-limit was warranted for the adoption of the measures, given the importance and urgency of the matter and the fundamental nature of the right at stake, but did not find it appropriate to indicate a specific time frame, indicating that given the nature of the problem the Government should take the appropriate steps as soon as possible ( Varga and Others v. Hungary, 2015, § 112). Finally, the Court has also considered that, having regard to the importance and urgency of the problem identified and the fundamental nature of the rights in question, a reasonable deadline had to be set for the implementation of the general measures. However, it concluded that it was not for the Court to set such a deadline at that stage; the Committee of Ministers was better placed to do so. The Court nevertheless set a period of six months for the respondent Government to provide, in cooperation with the Committee of Ministers, a precise timetable for the implementation of the appropriate general measures ( Rezmives and others v. Romania, 2017, § 126).","In general, three types of approach can be identified in the Court's case-law for the timescale of adoption of general measures. Where the Court has previously identified the problem giving rise to the violation but repetitive cases have continued to come to the Court, it has observed that the lengthy delay thus far demonstrated the need for a timetable and indicated that timetable in the pilot judgment ( Greens and M.T. v. the United Kingdom, 2010, § 115). Similarly, where the judgment concerns a long standing and serious problem that requires to be urgently addressed, the Court has set a time-limit for the implementation of the indicated measures, such as the two-year limit in Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy *, 2025, § 501 and operative provision no. 15 (see further under Article 2 below). In other cases, the Court has also considered that a reasonable time-limit was warranted for the adoption of the measures, given the importance and urgency of the matter and the fundamental nature of the right at stake, but did not find it appropriate to indicate a specific time frame, indicating that given the nature of the problem the Government should take the appropriate steps as soon as possible ( Varga and Others v. Hungary, 2015, § 112). Finally, the Court has also considered that, having regard to the importance and urgency of the problem identified and the fundamental nature of the rights in question, a reasonable deadline had to be set for the implementation of the general measures. However, it concluded that it was not for the Court to set such a deadline at that stage; the Committee of Ministers was better placed to do so. The Court nevertheless set a period of six months for the respondent Government to provide, in cooperation with the Committee of Ministers, a precise timetable for the implementation of the appropriate general measures ( Rezmives and others v. Romania, 2017, § 126)."
ed0ed05ac958,Article 46,20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json,apps:51567/14,Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy*,51567/14,added,"Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy*, no. 51567/14, 30 January 2025",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,IV.A.1.a,Article 2 i. The substantive aspect,4,,46,,,,,"In Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy *, 2025 the Court also examined the severe risks to health caused by the years-long problem of the illegal disposal of hazardous waste in the Campania region of Italy, finding that the risks were such as to render Article 2 applicable and to engage the State's obligation to protect the lives of the population of the affected areas. The Court found that the Government had failed to demonstrate that the State had done all that could have been required of it to protect the applicants'lives and it decided to apply the pilot judgment procedure and to specify a range of general measures to be taken by the State within two years of the judgment becoming final. In particular, it indicated that a systematic, coordinated and comprehensive response was required and recommended that a comprehensive strategy be drawn up with prior consultation of relevant stakeholders. Further points regarding the content and scope of the strategy, its implementation and updating over time and regular reporting on the measures taken under it were also made. The judgment also calls for the creation of an independent mechanism to monitor the implementation and impact of the strategy and compliance with the timeframe. The Court also called for transparency so that the affected population could be informed, via a single public information platform, about the risks to health. These recommendations were integrated into the operative provisions of the judgment (ibid, §§ 490-501 and operative provision no. 15)."
ed0ed05ac958,Article 46,20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json,apps:27849/15|33358/15,Drozdyk and Mikula v. Ukraine,27849/15|33358/15,added,"Drozdyk and Mikula v. Ukraine, nos.27849/15 and 33358/15, 24 October 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_updated,IV.A.1.k,Article 1 of Protocol No. 1,4,113,114,0.9346,"Pintar and Others v. Slovenia , 2021|The case of Drozdyk and Mikula v. Ukraine , 2024","Pintar and Others v. Slovenia, 2021","In a case in which the violation was due to the absence of procedural safeguards, with the result that those affected by an interference with their property rights (cancellation of shares and bonds) could not effectively challenge the measures taken by the national authorities, the Court underlined that it was essential to give the applicants an avenue towards effective legal protection. This should be done as soon as it became possible (after the conclusion of pending constitutional proceedings). Given that a period of several years had passed since the interference occurred, the Court further stressed the importance of avoiding any further unnecessary delays in the determination of the applicants'claims ( Pintar and Others v. Slovenia, 2021, § 114).","In a case in which the violation was due to the absence of procedural safeguards, with the result that those affected by an interference with their property rights (cancellation of shares and bonds) could not effectively challenge the measures taken by the national authorities, the Court underlined that it was essential to give the applicants an avenue towards effective legal protection. This should be done as soon as it became possible (after the conclusion of pending constitutional proceedings). Given that a period of several years had passed since the interference occurred, the Court further stressed the importance of avoiding any further unnecessary delays in the determination of the applicants'claims ( Pintar and Others v. Slovenia, 2021, § 114). under Article 46 about appropriate forms of redress for a violation of property rights. The case of Drozdyk and Mikula v. Ukraine, 2024, concerned the invalidation of the applicants'title to plots of land adjoining the railway line, the domestic courts accepting the argument of the railway company that it was the owner of the plots in question as they were within the railway protection zone. The Court found that the interference with the applicants'possessions, who had received no compensation, constituted a disproportionate burden on them. In making its award for pecuniary damage, the Court indicated that the respondent State should ensure full restitution of the applicants'titles, through reopening of the domestic proceedings if necessary. Alternatively, it should pay them compensation, or transfer comparable property to them (§ 62 and operative provision 5(a))."
ed0ed05ac958,Article 46,20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json,apps:1766/23,J.B. and Others v. Malta,1766/23,added,"J.B. and Others v. Malta, no. 1766/23, 22 October 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,IV.A.1.c,Article 5,4,87,88,0.9122,"J.B. and Others v. Malta , 2024",,"In another case which concerned immigration detention ( A.D. v. Malta, 2023), the Court considered that the problems detected could subsequently give rise to numerous other well-founded applications which were a threat to the future effectiveness of the Convention system. It consequently held that general measures at national level were undoubtedly called for in execution of that judgment. As regards the violation of Article 5 § 1 on account, inter alia, of the lack of legal basis surrounding detention for health considerations, it noted that concerns had already been raised by the CPT and the Commissioner. It thus called on the Government to ensure a legal basis in domestic law for any such detention, in conformity with the general principle of legal certainty (§§ 209-210 - see also above for the general measures indicated under Article 3 in the same case).","In another case which concerned immigration detention ( A.D. v. Malta, 2023), the Court considered that the problems detected could subsequently give rise to numerous other well-founded applications which were a threat to the future effectiveness of the Convention system. It consequently held that general measures at national level were undoubtedly called for in execution of that judgment. As regards the violation of Article 5 § 1 on account, inter alia, of the lack of legal basis surrounding detention for health considerations, it noted that concerns had already been raised by the CPT and the Commissioner. It thus called on the Government to ensure a legal basis in domestic law for any such detention, in conformity with the general principle of legal certainty (§§ 209-210 - see also above for the general measures indicated under Article 3 in the same case). Later, in J.B. and Others v. Malta, 2024, the Court upheld a complaint that the Immigration Appeals Board (IAB) and its members did not meet the Convention requirements of independence from the executive. The judgment outlines the shortcomings of the IABincluding as regards the process for appointment of the members, the professional criteria for appointment, the relatively short term of office and possibility of reappointment, few guarantees against outside pressure and the absence of safeguards against dismissal. Under Article 46, the Court called on the Government to introduce legislation to ensure that the IABsatisfies the Convention requirements of independence and impartiality ( J.B. and Others v. Malta, 2024, §§ 150-155, 167)."
ed0ed05ac958,Article 46,20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json,apps:32514/22,Petrović and Others v. Croatia*,32514/22,added,"Petrović and Others v. Croatia*, nos. 32514/22 and 2 others, 14 January 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C.1.c,When are they included? – Indications under Article 46 in respect of a structural problem (general measures),4,19,19,0.9159,"ć v. Serbia , 2013",,"Where the Court has found that the violation of the Convention is occurring or likely to occur in similar situations, it has observed that general measures at the national level were undoubtedly called for and that those measures should take into consideration the entire group of individuals affected by the practice found to be in breach. Furthermore, the measures should be such as to remedy the Court's finding of a violation in respect of a general practice, so that the system established by the Convention is not compromised by a large number of repetitive applications stemming from the same cause ( Baybaşin v. the Netherlands, 2006, § 79, Yüksel Yal çı nkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, § 418).","Where the Court has found that the violation of the Convention is occurring or likely to occur in similar situations, it has observed that general measures at the national level were undoubtedly called for and that those measures should take into consideration the entire group of individuals affected by the practice found to be in breach. Furthermore, the measures should be such as to remedy the Court's finding of a violation in respect of a general practice, so that the system established by the Convention is not compromised by a large number of repetitive applications stemming from the same cause ( Baybaşin v. the Netherlands, 2006, § 79, Yüksel Yal çı nkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, § 418). in order to resolve the shortcoming in the domestic legal order identified in the case. See for example the similar cases of Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia, 2013 and Petrović and Others v. Croatia *, 2025, both of which involved complaints by parents that the true fate of their babies, said to have died in hospital soon after birth, had not been definitively ascertained. In each judgment, the Court indicated that the respondent State must, within one year, take appropriate measures, preferably by a lex specialis, to put in place a mechanism to provide redress to parents in the same situation as the applicants. It further specified that the mechanism should be under independent supervision and have adequate powers to provide credible answers regarding the fate of the babies, and to award compensation as appropriate (§ 92 and § 171, respectively)."
ed0ed05ac958,Article 46,20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json,apps:3339/23,Ryaska v. Ukraine,3339/23,added,"Ryaska v. Ukraine, no. 3339/23, 10 October 2024",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C.2.i,Procedural significance - disposal of similar cases,4,28,28,0.9618,"In Ryaska v. Ukraine , 2024|Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine , 2009",,"Where the Court has resumed its examination of similar applications in the context of a pilot judgment and the execution process for that judgment has failed to eliminate the root cause of the systemic problem, the Court has found that this reexamination of all pending similar applications can be incapable of achieving its intended purpose. In Burmych and Others v. Ukraine, 2017 (§§ 176-199), the Court found that pending and future cases were part and parcel of the process of execution of the pilot judgment. Recalling that the legal issues under the Convention had been already resolved in the pilot judgment, the Court proceeded to strike the pending similar cases out of its list. It considered that their resolution, including individual measures of redress, had to be encompassed by the general measures of execution to be put in place by the respondent State under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers. No useful purpose would be served, in terms of the aims of the Convention, by the Court continuing to deal with these cases. The Court did however recall that it retained the power to take the applications up again (Article 37 § 2), and indicated that it might reassess the situation within two years to determine if it should do so ( Burmych and Others v. Ukraine, 2017, § 223).","Where the Court has resumed its examination of similar applications in the context of a pilot judgment and the execution process for that judgment has failed to eliminate the root cause of the systemic problem, the Court has found that this reexamination of all pending similar applications can be incapable of achieving its intended purpose. In Burmych and Others v. Ukraine, 2017 (§§ 176-199), the Court found that pending and future cases were part and parcel of the process of execution of the pilot judgment, Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine, 2009. Recalling that the legal issues under the Convention had been already resolved in the pilot judgment, the Court proceeded to strike the pending similar cases out of its list and to transmit them to the Committee of Ministers. It considered that their resolution, including individual measures of redress, had to be encompassed by the general measures of execution to be put in place by the respondent State under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers. No useful purpose would be served, in terms of the aims of the Convention, by the Court continuing to deal with these cases. The Court did however recall that it retained the power to take the applications up again (Article 37 § 2), and indicated that it might reassess the situation within two years to determine if it should do so ( Burmych and Others v. Ukraine, 2017, § 223). In Ryaska v. Ukraine, 2024 the Court clarified the scope of its ruling in Burmych. Since Burmych the Court had distinguished between cases covered by Burmych (the non-enforcement of monetary awards) and those involving the non-enforcement of non-pecuniary civil obligations with the latter type of case being taken to judgment from 2020. However, the Court noted that the Burmych judgment had not expressly distinguished between pecuniary and non-pecuniary obligations, the applications struck out by Burmych had included non-pecuniary obligations and the ongoing execution process covered both categories of case. The Court considering that the practice of distinguishing cases involving non-pecuniary obligations (and thus taking those to judgment) did not serve any useful purpose, it concluded that such cases should be dealt with in accordance with the procedure followed in Burmych, namely struck out and transmitted to the Committee of Ministers ( ibid ., §§ 36-45) ."
ed0ed05ac958,Article 46,20240930065341__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,20250918162301__guide_art_46_eng.pdf,2024-09-30,2025-09-18,31 August 2024,28 February 2025,2024-08-31,2025-02-28,anas-diff-dataset/ed0ed05ac958/diff_2024-09-30__2025-09-18.json,apps:21794/08,Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia,21794/08,added,"Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia, no. 21794/08, 26 March 2013",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,citation_added,II.C.1.c,When are they included? – Indications under Article 46 in respect of a structural problem (general measures),4,19,19,0.9159,"ć v. Serbia , 2013",,"Where the Court has found that the violation of the Convention is occurring or likely to occur in similar situations, it has observed that general measures at the national level were undoubtedly called for and that those measures should take into consideration the entire group of individuals affected by the practice found to be in breach. Furthermore, the measures should be such as to remedy the Court's finding of a violation in respect of a general practice, so that the system established by the Convention is not compromised by a large number of repetitive applications stemming from the same cause ( Baybaşin v. the Netherlands, 2006, § 79, Yüksel Yal çı nkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, § 418).","Where the Court has found that the violation of the Convention is occurring or likely to occur in similar situations, it has observed that general measures at the national level were undoubtedly called for and that those measures should take into consideration the entire group of individuals affected by the practice found to be in breach. Furthermore, the measures should be such as to remedy the Court's finding of a violation in respect of a general practice, so that the system established by the Convention is not compromised by a large number of repetitive applications stemming from the same cause ( Baybaşin v. the Netherlands, 2006, § 79, Yüksel Yal çı nkaya v. Türkiye [GC], 2023, § 418). in order to resolve the shortcoming in the domestic legal order identified in the case. See for example the similar cases of Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia, 2013 and Petrović and Others v. Croatia *, 2025, both of which involved complaints by parents that the true fate of their babies, said to have died in hospital soon after birth, had not been definitively ascertained. In each judgment, the Court indicated that the respondent State must, within one year, take appropriate measures, preferably by a lex specialis, to put in place a mechanism to provide redress to parents in the same situation as the applicants. It further specified that the mechanism should be under independent supervision and have adequate powers to provide credible answers regarding the fate of the babies, and to award compensation as appropriate (§ 92 and § 171, respectively)."
ee9a61e98635,Article 2 Protocol 7,20240409193253__guide_art_2_protocol_7_eng.pdf,20251126012610__guide_art_2_protocol_7_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-26,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/ee9a61e98635/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-26.json,apps:37957/14,Ftiti v. Greece*,37957/14,added,"Ftiti v. Greece*, no. 37957/14, 26 August 2025",1,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,I.A.1,“Criminal offence ”,4,4,4,0.9862,,"Zaicevs v. Latvia , 2007","According to the Court's case-law, the concept of ""criminal offence"" in Article 2 § 1 of Protocol No. 7 corresponds to that of ""criminal charge"" in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention ( Gurepka v. Ukraine, 2005, § 55; Zaicevs v. Latvia, 2007, § 53; Kamburov v. Bulgaria, 2009, § 22; Stanchev v. Bulgaria, 2009, § 44; Kindlhofer v. Austria, 2021, § 30; Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, §§ 111 and 140). Accordingly, the classifi cation of proceedings as ""criminal"" for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention would be equally pertinent to the classification under Article 2 of Protocol No. 7.","According to the Court's case-law, the concept of ""criminal offence"" in Article 2 § 1 of Protocol No. 7 corresponds to that of ""criminal charge"" in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention ( Gurepka v. Ukraine, 2005, § 55; Kamburov v. Bulgaria, 2009, § 22; Stanchev v. Bulgaria, 2009, § 44; Kindlhofer v. Austria, 2021, § 30; Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], 2023, §§ 111 and 140; Ftiti v. Greece *, 2025, § 29). Accordingly, the classification of proceedings as ""criminal"" for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention would be equally pertinent to the classification under Article 2 of Protocol No. 7."
ee9a61e98635,Article 2 Protocol 7,20240409193253__guide_art_2_protocol_7_eng.pdf,20251126012610__guide_art_2_protocol_7_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-26,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/ee9a61e98635/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-26.json,apps:37957/14,Ftiti v. Greece*,37957/14,added,"Ftiti v. Greece*, no. 37957/14, 26 August 2025",2,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,I.B.2,Margin of appreciation in organising the system of appeal,4,16,16,0.9906,,"Gurepka v. Ukraine , 2005","The Court has reiterated that States in principle enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in determining how the right secured by Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 is to be exercised ( Krombach v. France, 2001, § 96; Gurepka v. Ukraine, 2005, § 59; Galstyan v. Armenia, 2007, § 125; Natsvlishvili and Togonidze v. Georgia, 2014, § 96; Shvydka v. Ukraine, 2014, § 48; Ruslan Yakovenko v. Ukraine, 2015, § 76; Rostovtsev v. Ukraine, 2017, § 27; Y.B. v. Russia, 2021, § 40). In other words, Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 leaves the modalities of the right, and the grounds upon which it may be exercised, to be determined by domestic law.","The Court has reiterated that States in principle enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in determining how the right secured by Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 is to be exercised ( Krombach v. France, 2001, § 96; Galstyan v. Armenia, 2007, § 125; Natsvlishvili and Togonidze v. Georgia, 2014, § 96; Shvydka v. Ukraine, 2014, § 48; Ruslan Yakovenko v. Ukraine, 2015, § 76; Rostovtsev v. Ukraine, 2017, § 27; Y.B. v. Russia, 2021, § 40; Ftiti v. Greece *, 2025, § 30). In other words, Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 leaves the modalities of the right, and the grounds upon which it may be exercised, to be determined by domestic law."
ee9a61e98635,Article 2 Protocol 7,20240409193253__guide_art_2_protocol_7_eng.pdf,20251126012610__guide_art_2_protocol_7_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-26,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/ee9a61e98635/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-26.json,apps:37957/14,Ftiti v. Greece*,37957/14,added,"Ftiti v. Greece*, no. 37957/14, 26 August 2025",3,paragraph_text_name_match,citation_removed,I.B.2,Margin of appreciation in organising the system of appeal,4,17,17,0.9903,,"Gurepka v. Ukraine , 2005|Müller v. Austria , 2006","States may therefore, on the one hand, determine that the scope of the higher tribunal's review of a conviction or sentence would encompass both points of fact and law, or be confined solely to points of law ( Krombach v. France, 2001, § 96; Müller v. Austria, 2006, § 25; Shvydka v. Ukraine, 2014, § 49; Rostovtsev v. Ukraine, 2017, § 27; Y.B. v. Russia, 2021, § 40). Furthermore, a defendant wishing to appeal may sometimes be required to seek permission to do so and, in certain cases, the application for leave to appeal itself may be regarded as an adequate form of review within the scope of Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 7 . However, any restrictions contained in domestic legislation on the exercise of the right enshrined in Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 must, by analogy with the right of access to a court guaranteed by Article 6 § 1, pursue a legitimate aim and not infringe the very essence of that right ( Krombach v. France, 2001, § 96; Gurepka v. Ukraine, 2005, § 59; Galstyan v. Armenia, 2007, § 125; Shvydka v. Ukraine, 2014, § 49; Ruslan Yakovenko v. Ukraine, 2015, § 78; Rostovtsev v. Ukraine, 2017, § 27; Y.B. v. Russia, 2021, § 40).","States may therefore, on the one hand, determine that the scope of the higher tribunal's review of a conviction or sentence would encompass both points of fact and law, or be confined solely to points of law ( Krombach v. France, 2001, § 96; Shvydka v. Ukraine, 2014, § 49; Rostovtsev v. Ukraine, 2017, § 27; Y.B. v. Russia, 2021, § 40; Ftiti v. Greece *, 2025, § 30). Furthermore, a defendant wishing to appeal may sometimes be required to seek permission to do so and, in certain cases, the application for leave to appeal itself may be regarded as an adequate form of review within the scope of Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 7 . However, any restrictions contained in domestic legislation on the exercise of the right enshrined in Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 must, by analogy with the right of access to a court guaranteed by Article 6 § 1, pursue a legitimate aim and not infringe the very essence of that right ( Krombach v. France, 2001, § 96; Galstyan v. Armenia, 2007, § 125; Shvydka v. Ukraine, 2014, § 49; Ruslan Yakovenko v. Ukraine, 2015, § 78; Rostovtsev v. Ukraine, 2017, § 27; Y.B. v. Russia, 2021, § 40; Ftiti v. Greece *, 2025, § 30)."
ee9a61e98635,Article 2 Protocol 7,20240409193253__guide_art_2_protocol_7_eng.pdf,20251126012610__guide_art_2_protocol_7_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-26,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/ee9a61e98635/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-26.json,apps:37957/14,Ftiti v. Greece*,37957/14,added,"Ftiti v. Greece*, no. 37957/14, 26 August 2025",4,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.B.3,Effectiveness of the review,4,19,19,0.9821,,,"Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 mostly regulates institutional matters, such as accessibility of the court of appeal or the scope of the review exercised by such court ( Shvydka v. Ukraine, 2014, § 49; Ruslan Yakovenko v. Ukraine, 2015, § 77; Fırat v. Greece, 2017, § 37).","Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 mostly regulates institutional matters, such as accessibility of the court of appeal or the scope of the review exercised by such court ( Shvydka v. Ukraine, 2014, § 49; Ruslan Yakovenko v. Ukraine, 2015, § 77; Fırat v. Greece, 2017, § 37; Ftiti v. Greece *, 2025, § 30)."
ee9a61e98635,Article 2 Protocol 7,20240409193253__guide_art_2_protocol_7_eng.pdf,20251126012610__guide_art_2_protocol_7_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-26,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/ee9a61e98635/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-26.json,apps:37957/14,Ftiti v. Greece*,37957/14,added,"Ftiti v. Greece*, no. 37957/14, 26 August 2025",5,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.B.3,Effectiveness of the review,4,20,20,0.8696,,,"Where the right to a review under Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 exists, it should be effective ( Shvydka v. Ukraine, 2014, § 50): in order for the review to be effective, it must be independent of any discretionary action by the authorities and must be directly available to those concerned ( Gurepka v. Ukraine, 2005, § 59).","Where the right to a review under Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 exists, it should be effective ( Shvydka v. Ukraine, 2014, § 50; Ftiti v. Greece *, 2025, § 33): in order for the review to be effective, it must be independent of any discretionary action by the authorities and must be directly available to those concerned ( Gurepka v. Ukraine, 2005, § 59). The availability of a compensation procedure for individuals, who have served a sentence which has later been quashed, does not render the appeal effective, as it fails to meet the requirement of promptness in such cases ( Ftiti v. Greece *, 2025, § 32)."
ee9a61e98635,Article 2 Protocol 7,20240409193253__guide_art_2_protocol_7_eng.pdf,20251126012610__guide_art_2_protocol_7_eng.pdf,2024-04-09,2025-11-26,29 February 2024,31 August 2025,2024-02-29,2025-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/ee9a61e98635/diff_2024-04-09__2025-11-26.json,apps:37957/14,Ftiti v. Greece*,37957/14,added,"Ftiti v. Greece*, no. 37957/14, 26 August 2025",6,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,I.B.3,Effectiveness of the review,4,25,25,0.9663,,,"By contrast, in Fırat v. Greece, 2017, §§ 39-46, where the applicant, a Turkish national who had been charged with smuggling irregular migrants, had no ties with Greece and had not been resident in that country, the Court did not consider that the mere lack of a suspensive effect of the appeal against the first-instance judgment was counter to Article 2 of Protocol No. 7. The Court noted that by the operation of domestic law, the applicant would have been entitled to conditional release after the appeal court judgment and provided that he had served a certain portion of his sentence, which was not the case in the present case. The Court therefore concluded that the applicant's exercise of his right to appeal did not come at the cost of his liberty. The Court therefore found no violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention.","The absence of suspensive effect of an appeal does not inherently breach Article 2 of Protocol No. 7, provided that the exercise of the right of appeal does not come at the cost of the individual's liberty ( Ftiti v. Greece *, 2025, § 31). In Fırat v. Greece, 2017, §§ 39-46, where the applicant, a Turkish national who had been charged with smuggling irregular migrants, had no ties with Greece and had not been resident in that country, the Court did not consider that the mere lack of a suspensive effect of the appeal against the first-instance judgment was counter to Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 . The Court noted that by the operation of domestic law, the applicant would have been entitled to conditional release after the appeal court judgment and provided that he had served a certain portion of his sentence, which was not the case in the present case. The Court therefore concluded that the applicant's exercise of his right to appeal did not come at the cost of his liberty. The Court therefore found no violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention. By contrast in Ftiti v. Greece *, 2025, § 38-42, the national authorities failed to hold an appeal hearing for nearly six years during which time the applicant had already served the minimum duration of his sentence and been granted conditional release. The Court concluded that, after the applicant had already served three-fifths of his sentence and been granted early release, the review was unable to address any deficiencies in the lower court's decision in an effective manner, which amounted to a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention."
f1175c0d1e5c,Article 1 Protocol 7,20230923162513__guide_art_1_protocol_7_eng.pdf,20231206112814__guide_art_1_protocol_7_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-12-06,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/f1175c0d1e5c/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json,apps:14594/07,Berdzenishvili and Others v. Russia,14594/07,added,"Berdzenishvili and Others v. Russia, no. 14594/07 and 6 others, 20 December 2016",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.E.b,Article 13 of the Convention (right to an effective remedy),4,,79,,"In the case of Berdzenishvili and Others v. Russia , 2016",,,"In the case of Berdzenishvili and Others v. Russia, 2016, §§ 124 and 129, the applicants relied on Article 13 of the Convention in combination with Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 in complaining that they had not had an effective remedy by which to challenge the legality of their removal. After finding no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 on the ground that some applicants had failed to prove that they had been residing lawfully in the country and that others had not been expelled, the Court found that it did not have sufficient evidence to conclude that the applicants had an arguable complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 such that it could examineir the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention."
f1175c0d1e5c,Article 1 Protocol 7,20230923162513__guide_art_1_protocol_7_eng.pdf,20231206112814__guide_art_1_protocol_7_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-12-06,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/f1175c0d1e5c/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json,apps:23038/15,Gaspar v. Russia,23038/15,added,"Gaspar v. Russia, no. 23038/15, 12 June 2018",1,citation_field_name_match|paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.E.a,Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for one ’ s private and/or family life) taken alone or together with Article 13 of the Convention (right to an effective remedy),4,,75,,"Baltaji v. Bulgaria , 2011|Gaspar v. Russia , 2018|Kaushal and Others v. Bulgaria , 2010|Lupsa v. Romania , 2006",,,"In certain cases, in complaining about a lack of procedural safeguards in proceedings which led to their removal from their country of residence, applicants have relied on Article 8 of the Convention taken alone ( Baltaji v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 20, and Lupsa v. Romania, 2006, § 19) or together with Article 13 of the Convention ( Kaushal and Others v. Bulgaria, 2010, §§ 18 and 35). In these cases the Court examined the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention by verifying either whether the interference with the right to respect for private and family life was based on a law which satisfied the conditions of quality ( Lupsa v. Romania, 2006, § 42, and Kaushal and Others v. Bulgaria, 2010, §33, Baltaji v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 38) or whether it was necessary in a democratic society ( Gaspar v. Russia, 2018, § 43, and Liu v. Russia (no. 2), 2011, § 85). It also found a violation of Article 13 of the Convention when it noted that the national courts had not carried out an adequate review of the proportionality of the measure in question ( Kaushal and Others v. Bulgaria, 2010, § 41). The Court then examined the applicants'allegations from the angle of Article 1 of Protocol No. 7."
f1175c0d1e5c,Article 1 Protocol 7,20230923162513__guide_art_1_protocol_7_eng.pdf,20231206112814__guide_art_1_protocol_7_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-12-06,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/f1175c0d1e5c/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json,apps:29157/09,Liu v. Russia (no. 2),29157/09,added,"Liu v. Russia (no. 2), no 29157/09, 26 July 2011",1,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.E.a,Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for one ’ s private and/or family life) taken alone or together with Article 13 of the Convention (right to an effective remedy),4,,75,,"Baltaji v. Bulgaria , 2011|Gaspar v. Russia , 2018|Kaushal and Others v. Bulgaria , 2010|Lupsa v. Romania , 2006",,,"In certain cases, in complaining about a lack of procedural safeguards in proceedings which led to their removal from their country of residence, applicants have relied on Article 8 of the Convention taken alone ( Baltaji v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 20, and Lupsa v. Romania, 2006, § 19) or together with Article 13 of the Convention ( Kaushal and Others v. Bulgaria, 2010, §§ 18 and 35). In these cases the Court examined the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention by verifying either whether the interference with the right to respect for private and family life was based on a law which satisfied the conditions of quality ( Lupsa v. Romania, 2006, § 42, and Kaushal and Others v. Bulgaria, 2010, §33, Baltaji v. Bulgaria, 2011, § 38) or whether it was necessary in a democratic society ( Gaspar v. Russia, 2018, § 43, and Liu v. Russia (no. 2), 2011, § 85). It also found a violation of Article 13 of the Convention when it noted that the national courts had not carried out an adequate review of the proportionality of the measure in question ( Kaushal and Others v. Bulgaria, 2010, § 41). The Court then examined the applicants'allegations from the angle of Article 1 of Protocol No. 7."
f1175c0d1e5c,Article 1 Protocol 7,20230923162513__guide_art_1_protocol_7_eng.pdf,20231206112814__guide_art_1_protocol_7_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-12-06,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/f1175c0d1e5c/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json,apps:1103/16,Poklykayew v. Poland*,1103/16,added,"Poklykayew v. Poland*, no. 1103/16, 22 June 2023",1,paragraph_text_name_match,minor_edit,III.C,To be represented before the competent authority,2,68,66,0.8889,,,"In the case of Muhammad and Muhammad v. Romania [GC], 2020, §§ 154-155, the Court clarified, referring to Article 1 § 1 (c) of Protocol No. 7, that aliens must be able to obtain representation before the competent authority for the purposes of the decision on their expulsion. This implies that provisions of domestic law should afford an effective possibility of representation in such cases.","In the case of Muhammad and Muhammad v. Romania [GC], 2020, §§ 154-155, the Court clarified, referring to Article 1 § 1 (c) of Protocol No. 7, that aliens must be able to obtain representation before the competent authority for the purposes of the decision on their expulsion. This implies that provisions of domestic law should afford an effective possibility of representation in such cases. In the case of Poklykayew v. Poland * (2023, §§ 75 and 76), where it examined the possibility for the applicant to be represented in the proceedings as a factor counterbalancing the limitation of his right of access to documents in the file, the Court took into account the fact that the national authorities had not provided him with a list of lawyers who held security clearance."
f1175c0d1e5c,Article 1 Protocol 7,20230923162513__guide_art_1_protocol_7_eng.pdf,20231206112814__guide_art_1_protocol_7_eng.pdf,2023-09-23,2023-12-06,28 February 2023,31 August 2023,2023-02-28,2023-08-31,anas-diff-dataset/f1175c0d1e5c/diff_2023-09-23__2023-12-06.json,apps:1103/16,Poklykayew v. Poland*,1103/16,added,"Poklykayew v. Poland*, no. 1103/16, 22 June 2023",2,paragraph_text_name_match,paragraph_added,III.E.b,Article 13 of the Convention (right to an effective remedy),4,,80,,,,,"In some cases, in addition to Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 applicants have relied on Article 13 of the Convention to complain that they had not had appropriate procedural safeguards in proceedings leading to their removal. Different approaches have been taken by the Court. In the case of Ljatifi v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2018, § 45, the Court took the view that, in view of the finding of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 as a result of the failure of the domestic courts properly to scrutinise whether the impugned order had been issued on genuine national security grounds, it was not necessary to examine whether there had also been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention. More recently, invoking its position as ""master of the char acterisation to be given in law to the facts"" ( Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], 2018, §§ 113-115 and 126), the Court found it appropriate to examine the applicants'allegations only under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention ( Muhammad and Muhammad v. Romania [GC], 2020, § 88, and Poklykayew v. Poland *, 2023, § 42-43)."