Question: What group trained the Republic of Korea army?

Answer: U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group

While these preparations were underway in the North, there were frequent clashes along the 38th parallel, especially at Kaesong and Ongjin, many initiated by the South. <hl> The Republic of Korea Army (ROK Army) was being trained by the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). <hl> On the eve of war, KMAG's commander General William Lynn Roberts voiced utmost confidence in the ROK Army and boasted that any North Korean invasion would merely provide "target practice". For his part, Syngman Rhee repeatedly expressed his desire to conquer the North, including when American diplomat John Foster Dulles visited Korea on 18 June.

While these preparations were underway in the North, there were frequent clashes along the 38th parallel, especially at Kaesong and Ongjin, many initiated by the South. The Republic of Korea Army (ROK Army) was being trained by the <hl> U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group <hl> (KMAG). On the eve of war, KMAG's commander General William Lynn Roberts voiced utmost confidence in the ROK Army and boasted that any North Korean invasion would merely provide "target practice". For his part, Syngman Rhee repeatedly expressed his desire to conquer the North, including when American diplomat John Foster Dulles visited Korea on 18 June.


Question: What general had a lot of confidence in the Republic of Korea's army?

While these preparations were underway in the North, there were frequent clashes along the 38th parallel, especially at Kaesong and Ongjin, many initiated by the South. The Republic of Korea Army (ROK Army) was being trained by the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). On the eve of war, KMAG's commander General William Lynn Roberts voiced utmost confidence in the ROK Army and boasted that any North Korean invasion would merely provide "target practice". For his part, Syngman Rhee repeatedly expressed his desire to conquer the North, including when American diplomat John Foster Dulles visited Korea on 18 June.

Answer: General William Lynn Roberts

While these preparations were underway in the North, there were frequent clashes along the 38th parallel, especially at Kaesong and Ongjin, many initiated by the South. The Republic of Korea Army (ROK Army) was being trained by the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). <hl> On the eve of war, KMAG's commander General William Lynn Roberts voiced utmost confidence in the ROK Army and boasted that any North Korean invasion would merely provide "target practice". <hl> For his part, Syngman Rhee repeatedly expressed his desire to conquer the North, including when American diplomat John Foster Dulles visited Korea on 18 June.

While these preparations were underway in the North, there were frequent clashes along the 38th parallel, especially at Kaesong and Ongjin, many initiated by the South. The Republic of Korea Army (ROK Army) was being trained by the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). On the eve of war, KMAG's commander <hl> General William Lynn Roberts <hl> voiced utmost confidence in the ROK Army and boasted that any North Korean invasion would merely provide "target practice". For his part, Syngman Rhee repeatedly expressed his desire to conquer the North, including when American diplomat John Foster Dulles visited Korea on 18 June.


Question: Who wanted to take over North Korea?

Answer: Syngman Rhee

While these preparations were underway in the North, there were frequent clashes along the 38th parallel, especially at Kaesong and Ongjin, many initiated by the South. The Republic of Korea Army (ROK Army) was being trained by the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). On the eve of war, KMAG's commander General William Lynn Roberts voiced utmost confidence in the ROK Army and boasted that any North Korean invasion would merely provide "target practice". <hl> For his part, Syngman Rhee repeatedly expressed his desire to conquer the North, including when American diplomat John Foster Dulles visited Korea on 18 June. <hl>

While these preparations were underway in the North, there were frequent clashes along the 38th parallel, especially at Kaesong and Ongjin, many initiated by the South. The Republic of Korea Army (ROK Army) was being trained by the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). On the eve of war, KMAG's commander General William Lynn Roberts voiced utmost confidence in the ROK Army and boasted that any North Korean invasion would merely provide "target practice". For his part, <hl> Syngman Rhee <hl> repeatedly expressed his desire to conquer the North, including when American diplomat John Foster Dulles visited Korea on 18 June.


Question: Who was the diplomat that visited Korea?

Answer: John Foster Dulles

While these preparations were underway in the North, there were frequent clashes along the 38th parallel, especially at Kaesong and Ongjin, many initiated by the South. The Republic of Korea Army (ROK Army) was being trained by the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). On the eve of war, KMAG's commander General William Lynn Roberts voiced utmost confidence in the ROK Army and boasted that any North Korean invasion would merely provide "target practice". <hl> For his part, Syngman Rhee repeatedly expressed his desire to conquer the North, including when American diplomat John Foster Dulles visited Korea on 18 June. <hl>

While these preparations were underway in the North, there were frequent clashes along the 38th parallel, especially at Kaesong and Ongjin, many initiated by the South. The Republic of Korea Army (ROK Army) was being trained by the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). On the eve of war, KMAG's commander General William Lynn Roberts voiced utmost confidence in the ROK Army and boasted that any North Korean invasion would merely provide "target practice". For his part, Syngman Rhee repeatedly expressed his desire to conquer the North, including when American diplomat <hl> John Foster Dulles <hl> visited Korea on 18 June.


Question: Who provoked a conflict by crossing the 38th parallel?

At dawn on Sunday, 25 June 1950, the Korean People's Army crossed the 38th parallel behind artillery fire. The KPA justified its assault with the claim that ROK troops had attacked first, and that they were aiming to arrest and execute the "bandit traitor Syngman Rhee". Fighting began on the strategic Ongjin peninsula in the west. There were initial South Korean claims that they had captured the city of Haeju, and this sequence of events has led some scholars to argue that the South Koreans actually fired first.

Answer: Korean People's Army

<hl> At dawn on Sunday, 25 June 1950, the Korean People's Army crossed the 38th parallel behind artillery fire. <hl> The KPA justified its assault with the claim that ROK troops had attacked first, and that they were aiming to arrest and execute the "bandit traitor Syngman Rhee". Fighting began on the strategic Ongjin peninsula in the west. There were initial South Korean claims that they had captured the city of Haeju, and this sequence of events has led some scholars to argue that the South Koreans actually fired first.

At dawn on Sunday, 25 June 1950, the <hl> Korean People's Army <hl> crossed the 38th parallel behind artillery fire. The KPA justified its assault with the claim that ROK troops had attacked first, and that they were aiming to arrest and execute the "bandit traitor Syngman Rhee". Fighting began on the strategic Ongjin peninsula in the west. There were initial South Korean claims that they had captured the city of Haeju, and this sequence of events has led some scholars to argue that the South Koreans actually fired first.


Question: Where did the fighting begin?

Answer: Ongjin peninsula

At dawn on Sunday, 25 June 1950, the Korean People's Army crossed the 38th parallel behind artillery fire. The KPA justified its assault with the claim that ROK troops had attacked first, and that they were aiming to arrest and execute the "bandit traitor Syngman Rhee". <hl> Fighting began on the strategic Ongjin peninsula in the west. <hl> There were initial South Korean claims that they had captured the city of Haeju, and this sequence of events has led some scholars to argue that the South Koreans actually fired first.

At dawn on Sunday, 25 June 1950, the Korean People's Army crossed the 38th parallel behind artillery fire. The KPA justified its assault with the claim that ROK troops had attacked first, and that they were aiming to arrest and execute the "bandit traitor Syngman Rhee". Fighting began on the strategic <hl> Ongjin peninsula <hl> in the west. There were initial South Korean claims that they had captured the city of Haeju, and this sequence of events has led some scholars to argue that the South Koreans actually fired first.


Question: Who claimed to have taken control of Haeju?

Answer: the South Koreans

At dawn on Sunday, 25 June 1950, the Korean People's Army crossed the 38th parallel behind artillery fire. The KPA justified its assault with the claim that ROK troops had attacked first, and that they were aiming to arrest and execute the "bandit traitor Syngman Rhee". Fighting began on the strategic Ongjin peninsula in the west. <hl> There were initial South Korean claims that they had captured the city of Haeju, and this sequence of events has led some scholars to argue that the South Koreans actually fired first. <hl>

At dawn on Sunday, 25 June 1950, the Korean People's Army crossed the 38th parallel behind artillery fire. The KPA justified its assault with the claim that ROK troops had attacked first, and that they were aiming to arrest and execute the "bandit traitor Syngman Rhee". Fighting began on the strategic Ongjin peninsula in the west. There were initial South Korean claims that they had captured the city of Haeju, and this sequence of events has led some scholars to argue that <hl> the South Koreans <hl> actually fired first.


Question: Who questioned the claim that South Korean did not provoke the KPA?

Answer: scholars

At dawn on Sunday, 25 June 1950, the Korean People's Army crossed the 38th parallel behind artillery fire. The KPA justified its assault with the claim that ROK troops had attacked first, and that they were aiming to arrest and execute the "bandit traitor Syngman Rhee". Fighting began on the strategic Ongjin peninsula in the west. <hl> There were initial South Korean claims that they had captured the city of Haeju, and this sequence of events has led some scholars to argue that the South Koreans actually fired first. <hl>

At dawn on Sunday, 25 June 1950, the Korean People's Army crossed the 38th parallel behind artillery fire. The KPA justified its assault with the claim that ROK troops had attacked first, and that they were aiming to arrest and execute the "bandit traitor Syngman Rhee". Fighting began on the strategic Ongjin peninsula in the west. There were initial South Korean claims that they had captured the city of Haeju, and this sequence of events has led some <hl> scholars <hl> to argue that the South Koreans actually fired first.


Question: Who was the Korean People's Army trying to execute?

Answer: Syngman Rhee

At dawn on Sunday, 25 June 1950, the Korean People's Army crossed the 38th parallel behind artillery fire. <hl> The KPA justified its assault with the claim that ROK troops had attacked first, and that they were aiming to arrest and execute the "bandit traitor Syngman Rhee ". <hl> Fighting began on the strategic Ongjin peninsula in the west. There were initial South Korean claims that they had captured the city of Haeju, and this sequence of events has led some scholars to argue that the South Koreans actually fired first.

At dawn on Sunday, 25 June 1950, the Korean People's Army crossed the 38th parallel behind artillery fire. The KPA justified its assault with the claim that ROK troops had attacked first, and that they were aiming to arrest and execute the "bandit traitor <hl> Syngman Rhee <hl>". Fighting began on the strategic Ongjin peninsula in the west. There were initial South Korean claims that they had captured the city of Haeju, and this sequence of events has led some scholars to argue that the South Koreans actually fired first.

The KPA justified its assault with the claim that ROK troops had attacked first, and that they were aiming to arrest and execute the "bandit traitor <hl> Syngman Rhee <hl> ".


Question: Who, along with members of the South Korean government, fled South Korea?

On 27 June, Rhee evacuated from Seoul with some of the government. On 28 June, at 2 am, the South Korean Army blew up the highway bridge across the Han River in an attempt to stop the North Korean army. The bridge was detonated while 4,000 refugees were crossing the bridge, and hundreds were killed. Destroying the bridge also trapped many South Korean military units north of the Han River. In spite of such desperate measures, Seoul fell that same day. A number of South Korean National Assemblymen remained in Seoul when it fell, and forty-eight subsequently pledged allegiance to the North.

Answer: Rhee

<hl> On 27 June, Rhee evacuated from Seoul with some of the government. <hl> On 28 June, at 2 am, the South Korean Army blew up the highway bridge across the Han River in an attempt to stop the North Korean army. The bridge was detonated while 4,000 refugees were crossing the bridge, and hundreds were killed. Destroying the bridge also trapped many South Korean military units north of the Han River. In spite of such desperate measures, Seoul fell that same day. A number of South Korean National Assemblymen remained in Seoul when it fell, and forty-eight subsequently pledged allegiance to the North.

On 27 June, <hl> Rhee <hl> evacuated from Seoul with some of the government. On 28 June, at 2 am, the South Korean Army blew up the highway bridge across the Han River in an attempt to stop the North Korean army. The bridge was detonated while 4,000 refugees were crossing the bridge, and hundreds were killed. Destroying the bridge also trapped many South Korean military units north of the Han River. In spite of such desperate measures, Seoul fell that same day. A number of South Korean National Assemblymen remained in Seoul when it fell, and forty-eight subsequently pledged allegiance to the North.


Question: What bridge were refugees attempting to cross when it was blown up by the South Korean Army?

Answer: Han River

On 27 June, Rhee evacuated from Seoul with some of the government. <hl> On 28 June, at 2 am, the South Korean Army blew up the highway bridge across the Han River in an attempt to stop the North Korean army. <hl> The bridge was detonated while 4,000 refugees were crossing the bridge, and hundreds were killed. Destroying the bridge also trapped many South Korean military units north of the Han River. In spite of such desperate measures, Seoul fell that same day. A number of South Korean National Assemblymen remained in Seoul when it fell, and forty-eight subsequently pledged allegiance to the North.

On 27 June, Rhee evacuated from Seoul with some of the government. On 28 June, at 2 am, the South Korean Army blew up the highway bridge across the <hl> Han River <hl> in an attempt to stop the North Korean army. The bridge was detonated while 4,000 refugees were crossing the bridge, and hundreds were killed. Destroying the bridge also trapped many South Korean military units north of the Han River. In spite of such desperate measures, Seoul fell that same day. A number of South Korean National Assemblymen remained in Seoul when it fell, and forty-eight subsequently pledged allegiance to the North.


Question: How many South Korean National Assemblyman pledged their allegiance to Seoul?

Answer: forty-eight

On 27 June, Rhee evacuated from Seoul with some of the government. On 28 June, at 2 am, the South Korean Army blew up the highway bridge across the Han River in an attempt to stop the North Korean army. The bridge was detonated while 4,000 refugees were crossing the bridge, and hundreds were killed. Destroying the bridge also trapped many South Korean military units north of the Han River. In spite of such desperate measures, Seoul fell that same day. <hl> A number of South Korean National Assemblymen remained in Seoul when it fell, and forty-eight subsequently pledged allegiance to the North. <hl>

On 27 June, Rhee evacuated from Seoul with some of the government. On 28 June, at 2 am, the South Korean Army blew up the highway bridge across the Han River in an attempt to stop the North Korean army. The bridge was detonated while 4,000 refugees were crossing the bridge, and hundreds were killed. Destroying the bridge also trapped many South Korean military units north of the Han River. In spite of such desperate measures, Seoul fell that same day. A number of South Korean National Assemblymen remained in Seoul when it fell, and <hl> forty-eight <hl> subsequently pledged allegiance to the North.


Question: What did South Korea do to cause members of the South Korean military unit to become trapped near the Han River?

Answer: blew up the highway bridge

On 27 June, Rhee evacuated from Seoul with some of the government. <hl> On 28 June, at 2 am, the South Korean Army blew up the highway bridge across the Han River in an attempt to stop the North Korean army. <hl> The bridge was detonated while 4,000 refugees were crossing the bridge, and hundreds were killed. Destroying the bridge also trapped many South Korean military units north of the Han River. In spite of such desperate measures, Seoul fell that same day. A number of South Korean National Assemblymen remained in Seoul when it fell, and forty-eight subsequently pledged allegiance to the North.

On 27 June, Rhee evacuated from Seoul with some of the government. On 28 June, at 2 am, the South Korean Army <hl> blew up the highway bridge <hl> across the Han River in an attempt to stop the North Korean army. The bridge was detonated while 4,000 refugees were crossing the bridge, and hundreds were killed. Destroying the bridge also trapped many South Korean military units north of the Han River. In spite of such desperate measures, Seoul fell that same day. A number of South Korean National Assemblymen remained in Seoul when it fell, and forty-eight subsequently pledged allegiance to the North.


Question: What day was the city of Seoul captured?

Answer: 28 June

On 27 June, Rhee evacuated from Seoul with some of the government. <hl> On 28 June , at 2 am, the South Korean Army blew up the highway bridge across the Han River in an attempt to stop the North Korean army. <hl> The bridge was detonated while 4,000 refugees were crossing the bridge, and hundreds were killed. Destroying the bridge also trapped many South Korean military units north of the Han River. In spite of such desperate measures, Seoul fell that same day. A number of South Korean National Assemblymen remained in Seoul when it fell, and forty-eight subsequently pledged allegiance to the North.

On 27 June, Rhee evacuated from Seoul with some of the government. On <hl> 28 June <hl>, at 2 am, the South Korean Army blew up the highway bridge across the Han River in an attempt to stop the North Korean army. The bridge was detonated while 4,000 refugees were crossing the bridge, and hundreds were killed. Destroying the bridge also trapped many South Korean military units north of the Han River. In spite of such desperate measures, Seoul fell that same day. A number of South Korean National Assemblymen remained in Seoul when it fell, and forty-eight subsequently pledged allegiance to the North.

On <hl> 28 June <hl> , at 2 am, the South Korean Army blew up the highway bridge across the Han River in an attempt to stop the North Korean army.


Question: What country was believed to provide a counterbalance to China's and the Soviet Union's involvement in Korea?

One facet of the changing attitude toward Korea and whether to get involved was Japan. Especially after the fall of China to the Communists, U.S. East Asian experts saw Japan as the critical counterweight to the Soviet Union and China in the region. While there was no United States policy that dealt with South Korea directly as a national interest, its proximity to Japan increased the importance of South Korea. Said Kim: "The recognition that the security of Japan required a non-hostile Korea led directly to President Truman's decision to intervene... The essential point... is that the American response to the North Korean attack stemmed from considerations of US policy toward Japan."

Answer: Japan

<hl> One facet of the changing attitude toward Korea and whether to get involved was Japan . <hl> Especially after the fall of China to the Communists, U.S. East Asian experts saw Japan as the critical counterweight to the Soviet Union and China in the region. While there was no United States policy that dealt with South Korea directly as a national interest, its proximity to Japan increased the importance of South Korea. Said Kim: "The recognition that the security of Japan required a non-hostile Korea led directly to President Truman's decision to intervene... The essential point... is that the American response to the North Korean attack stemmed from considerations of US policy toward Japan."

One facet of the changing attitude toward Korea and whether to get involved was <hl> Japan <hl>. Especially after the fall of China to the Communists, U.S. East Asian experts saw Japan as the critical counterweight to the Soviet Union and China in the region. While there was no United States policy that dealt with South Korea directly as a national interest, its proximity to Japan increased the importance of South Korea. Said Kim: "The recognition that the security of Japan required a non-hostile Korea led directly to President Truman's decision to intervene... The essential point... is that the American response to the North Korean attack stemmed from considerations of US policy toward Japan."

One facet of the changing attitude toward Korea and whether to get involved was <hl> Japan <hl> .


Question: Which President decided to intervene after realizing that Japan's security would be affected by the hostility in Korea?

Answer: President Truman

One facet of the changing attitude toward Korea and whether to get involved was Japan. Especially after the fall of China to the Communists, U.S. East Asian experts saw Japan as the critical counterweight to the Soviet Union and China in the region. While there was no United States policy that dealt with South Korea directly as a national interest, its proximity to Japan increased the importance of South Korea. <hl> Said Kim: "The recognition that the security of Japan required a non-hostile Korea led directly to President Truman 's decision to intervene... <hl> The essential point... is that the American response to the North Korean attack stemmed from considerations of US policy toward Japan."

One facet of the changing attitude toward Korea and whether to get involved was Japan. Especially after the fall of China to the Communists, U.S. East Asian experts saw Japan as the critical counterweight to the Soviet Union and China in the region. While there was no United States policy that dealt with South Korea directly as a national interest, its proximity to Japan increased the importance of South Korea. Said Kim: "The recognition that the security of Japan required a non-hostile Korea led directly to <hl> President Truman <hl>'s decision to intervene... The essential point... is that the American response to the North Korean attack stemmed from considerations of US policy toward Japan."

Said Kim: "The recognition that the security of Japan required a non-hostile Korea led directly to <hl> President Truman <hl> 's decision to intervene...


Question: Why was South Korea important to the US?

Answer: US policy toward Japan

One facet of the changing attitude toward Korea and whether to get involved was Japan. Especially after the fall of China to the Communists, U.S. East Asian experts saw Japan as the critical counterweight to the Soviet Union and China in the region. While there was no United States policy that dealt with South Korea directly as a national interest, its proximity to Japan increased the importance of South Korea. Said Kim: "The recognition that the security of Japan required a non-hostile Korea led directly to President Truman's decision to intervene... <hl> The essential point... is that the American response to the North Korean attack stemmed from considerations of US policy toward Japan ." <hl>

One facet of the changing attitude toward Korea and whether to get involved was Japan. Especially after the fall of China to the Communists, U.S. East Asian experts saw Japan as the critical counterweight to the Soviet Union and China in the region. While there was no United States policy that dealt with South Korea directly as a national interest, its proximity to Japan increased the importance of South Korea. Said Kim: "The recognition that the security of Japan required a non-hostile Korea led directly to President Truman's decision to intervene... The essential point... is that the American response to the North Korean attack stemmed from considerations of <hl> US policy toward Japan <hl>."

The essential point... is that the American response to the North Korean attack stemmed from considerations of <hl> US policy toward Japan <hl> ."


Question: What affected America's response to the situation in South Korea?

Answer: US policy toward Japan

One facet of the changing attitude toward Korea and whether to get involved was Japan. Especially after the fall of China to the Communists, U.S. East Asian experts saw Japan as the critical counterweight to the Soviet Union and China in the region. While there was no United States policy that dealt with South Korea directly as a national interest, its proximity to Japan increased the importance of South Korea. Said Kim: "The recognition that the security of Japan required a non-hostile Korea led directly to President Truman's decision to intervene... <hl> The essential point... is that the American response to the North Korean attack stemmed from considerations of US policy toward Japan ." <hl>

One facet of the changing attitude toward Korea and whether to get involved was Japan. Especially after the fall of China to the Communists, U.S. East Asian experts saw Japan as the critical counterweight to the Soviet Union and China in the region. While there was no United States policy that dealt with South Korea directly as a national interest, its proximity to Japan increased the importance of South Korea. Said Kim: "The recognition that the security of Japan required a non-hostile Korea led directly to President Truman's decision to intervene... The essential point... is that the American response to the North Korean attack stemmed from considerations of <hl> US policy toward Japan <hl>."

The essential point... is that the American response to the North Korean attack stemmed from considerations of <hl> US policy toward Japan <hl> ."


Question: What was the Truman administration concerned about that was preventing them from getting involved in the Korean conflict?

A major consideration was the possible Soviet reaction in the event that the US intervened. The Truman administration was fretful that a war in Korea was a diversionary assault that would escalate to a general war in Europe once the United States committed in Korea. At the same time, "[t]here was no suggestion from anyone that the United Nations or the United States could back away from [the conflict]". Yugoslavia–a possible Soviet target because of the Tito-Stalin Split—was vital to the defense of Italy and Greece, and the country was first on the list of the National Security Council's post-North Korea invasion list of "chief danger spots". Truman believed if aggression went unchecked a chain reaction would be initiated that would marginalize the United Nations and encourage Communist aggression elsewhere. The UN Security Council approved the use of force to help the South Koreans and the US immediately began using what air and naval forces that were in the area to that end. The Administration still refrained from committing on the ground because some advisers believed the North Koreans could be stopped by air and naval power alone.

Answer: Soviet reaction

<hl> A major consideration was the possible Soviet reaction in the event that the US intervened. <hl> The Truman administration was fretful that a war in Korea was a diversionary assault that would escalate to a general war in Europe once the United States committed in Korea. At the same time, "[t]here was no suggestion from anyone that the United Nations or the United States could back away from [the conflict]". Yugoslavia–a possible Soviet target because of the Tito-Stalin Split—was vital to the defense of Italy and Greece, and the country was first on the list of the National Security Council's post-North Korea invasion list of "chief danger spots". Truman believed if aggression went unchecked a chain reaction would be initiated that would marginalize the United Nations and encourage Communist aggression elsewhere. The UN Security Council approved the use of force to help the South Koreans and the US immediately began using what air and naval forces that were in the area to that end. The Administration still refrained from committing on the ground because some advisers believed the North Koreans could be stopped by air and naval power alone.

A major consideration was the possible <hl> Soviet reaction <hl> in the event that the US intervened. The Truman administration was fretful that a war in Korea was a diversionary assault that would escalate to a general war in Europe once the United States committed in Korea. At the same time, "[t]here was no suggestion from anyone that the United Nations or the United States could back away from [the conflict]". Yugoslavia–a possible Soviet target because of the Tito-Stalin Split—was vital to the defense of Italy and Greece, and the country was first on the list of the National Security Council's post-North Korea invasion list of "chief danger spots". Truman believed if aggression went unchecked a chain reaction would be initiated that would marginalize the United Nations and encourage Communist aggression elsewhere. The UN Security Council approved the use of force to help the South Koreans and the US immediately began using what air and naval forces that were in the area to that end. The Administration still refrained from committing on the ground because some advisers believed the North Koreans could be stopped by air and naval power alone.


Question: What agency approved the use of force in South Korea?

Answer: The UN Security Council

A major consideration was the possible Soviet reaction in the event that the US intervened. The Truman administration was fretful that a war in Korea was a diversionary assault that would escalate to a general war in Europe once the United States committed in Korea. At the same time, "[t]here was no suggestion from anyone that the United Nations or the United States could back away from [the conflict]". Yugoslavia–a possible Soviet target because of the Tito-Stalin Split—was vital to the defense of Italy and Greece, and the country was first on the list of the National Security Council's post-North Korea invasion list of "chief danger spots". Truman believed if aggression went unchecked a chain reaction would be initiated that would marginalize the United Nations and encourage Communist aggression elsewhere. <hl> The UN Security Council approved the use of force to help the South Koreans and the US immediately began using what air and naval forces that were in the area to that end. <hl> The Administration still refrained from committing on the ground because some advisers believed the North Koreans could be stopped by air and naval power alone.

A major consideration was the possible Soviet reaction in the event that the US intervened. The Truman administration was fretful that a war in Korea was a diversionary assault that would escalate to a general war in Europe once the United States committed in Korea. At the same time, "[t]here was no suggestion from anyone that the United Nations or the United States could back away from [the conflict]". Yugoslavia–a possible Soviet target because of the Tito-Stalin Split—was vital to the defense of Italy and Greece, and the country was first on the list of the National Security Council's post-North Korea invasion list of "chief danger spots". Truman believed if aggression went unchecked a chain reaction would be initiated that would marginalize the United Nations and encourage Communist aggression elsewhere. <hl> The UN Security Council <hl> approved the use of force to help the South Koreans and the US immediately began using what air and naval forces that were in the area to that end. The Administration still refrained from committing on the ground because some advisers believed the North Koreans could be stopped by air and naval power alone.


Question: Why did the US not send in ground troops after the United Nations approved the use of force?

Answer: advisers believed the North Koreans could be stopped by air and naval power

A major consideration was the possible Soviet reaction in the event that the US intervened. The Truman administration was fretful that a war in Korea was a diversionary assault that would escalate to a general war in Europe once the United States committed in Korea. At the same time, "[t]here was no suggestion from anyone that the United Nations or the United States could back away from [the conflict]". Yugoslavia–a possible Soviet target because of the Tito-Stalin Split—was vital to the defense of Italy and Greece, and the country was first on the list of the National Security Council's post-North Korea invasion list of "chief danger spots". Truman believed if aggression went unchecked a chain reaction would be initiated that would marginalize the United Nations and encourage Communist aggression elsewhere. The UN Security Council approved the use of force to help the South Koreans and the US immediately began using what air and naval forces that were in the area to that end. <hl> The Administration still refrained from committing on the ground because some advisers believed the North Koreans could be stopped by air and naval power alone. <hl>

A major consideration was the possible Soviet reaction in the event that the US intervened. The Truman administration was fretful that a war in Korea was a diversionary assault that would escalate to a general war in Europe once the United States committed in Korea. At the same time, "[t]here was no suggestion from anyone that the United Nations or the United States could back away from [the conflict]". Yugoslavia–a possible Soviet target because of the Tito-Stalin Split—was vital to the defense of Italy and Greece, and the country was first on the list of the National Security Council's post-North Korea invasion list of "chief danger spots". Truman believed if aggression went unchecked a chain reaction would be initiated that would marginalize the United Nations and encourage Communist aggression elsewhere. The UN Security Council approved the use of force to help the South Koreans and the US immediately began using what air and naval forces that were in the area to that end. The Administration still refrained from committing on the ground because some <hl> advisers believed the North Koreans could be stopped by air and naval power <hl> alone.


Question: Who believed that if the issues in Korea were not dealt with the communist aggression would spread?

Answer: Truman

A major consideration was the possible Soviet reaction in the event that the US intervened. <hl> The Truman administration was fretful that a war in Korea was a diversionary assault that would escalate to a general war in Europe once the United States committed in Korea. <hl> At the same time, "[t]here was no suggestion from anyone that the United Nations or the United States could back away from [the conflict]". Yugoslavia–a possible Soviet target because of the Tito-Stalin Split—was vital to the defense of Italy and Greece, and the country was first on the list of the National Security Council's post-North Korea invasion list of "chief danger spots". Truman believed if aggression went unchecked a chain reaction would be initiated that would marginalize the United Nations and encourage Communist aggression elsewhere. The UN Security Council approved the use of force to help the South Koreans and the US immediately began using what air and naval forces that were in the area to that end. The Administration still refrained from committing on the ground because some advisers believed the North Koreans could be stopped by air and naval power alone.

A major consideration was the possible Soviet reaction in the event that the US intervened. The <hl> Truman <hl> administration was fretful that a war in Korea was a diversionary assault that would escalate to a general war in Europe once the United States committed in Korea. At the same time, "[t]here was no suggestion from anyone that the United Nations or the United States could back away from [the conflict]". Yugoslavia–a possible Soviet target because of the Tito-Stalin Split—was vital to the defense of Italy and Greece, and the country was first on the list of the National Security Council's post-North Korea invasion list of "chief danger spots". Truman believed if aggression went unchecked a chain reaction would be initiated that would marginalize the United Nations and encourage Communist aggression elsewhere. The UN Security Council approved the use of force to help the South Koreans and the US immediately began using what air and naval forces that were in the area to that end. The Administration still refrained from committing on the ground because some advisers believed the North Koreans could be stopped by air and naval power alone.


Question: What resources did the US devote to South Korea after the Security Council approved engaging in an armed conflict?

Answer: air and naval forces

A major consideration was the possible Soviet reaction in the event that the US intervened. The Truman administration was fretful that a war in Korea was a diversionary assault that would escalate to a general war in Europe once the United States committed in Korea. At the same time, "[t]here was no suggestion from anyone that the United Nations or the United States could back away from [the conflict]". Yugoslavia–a possible Soviet target because of the Tito-Stalin Split—was vital to the defense of Italy and Greece, and the country was first on the list of the National Security Council's post-North Korea invasion list of "chief danger spots". Truman believed if aggression went unchecked a chain reaction would be initiated that would marginalize the United Nations and encourage Communist aggression elsewhere. <hl> The UN Security Council approved the use of force to help the South Koreans and the US immediately began using what air and naval forces that were in the area to that end. <hl> The Administration still refrained from committing on the ground because some advisers believed the North Koreans could be stopped by air and naval power alone.

A major consideration was the possible Soviet reaction in the event that the US intervened. The Truman administration was fretful that a war in Korea was a diversionary assault that would escalate to a general war in Europe once the United States committed in Korea. At the same time, "[t]here was no suggestion from anyone that the United Nations or the United States could back away from [the conflict]". Yugoslavia–a possible Soviet target because of the Tito-Stalin Split—was vital to the defense of Italy and Greece, and the country was first on the list of the National Security Council's post-North Korea invasion list of "chief danger spots". Truman believed if aggression went unchecked a chain reaction would be initiated that would marginalize the United Nations and encourage Communist aggression elsewhere. The UN Security Council approved the use of force to help the South Koreans and the US immediately began using what <hl> air and naval forces <hl> that were in the area to that end. The Administration still refrained from committing on the ground because some advisers believed the North Koreans could be stopped by air and naval power alone.


Question: Who condemned the actions of North Korea?

On 25 June 1950, the United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea, with UN Security Council Resolution 82. The Soviet Union, a veto-wielding power, had boycotted the Council meetings since January 1950, protesting that the Republic of China (Taiwan), not the People's Republic of China, held a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. After debating the matter, the Security Council, on 27 June 1950, published Resolution 83 recommending member states provide military assistance to the Republic of Korea. On 27 June President Truman ordered U.S. air and sea forces to help the South Korean regime. On 4 July the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister accused the United States of starting armed intervention on behalf of South Korea.

Answer: United Nations Security Council

<hl> On 25 June 1950, the United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea, with UN Security Council Resolution 82. <hl> The Soviet Union, a veto-wielding power, had boycotted the Council meetings since January 1950, protesting that the Republic of China (Taiwan), not the People's Republic of China, held a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. After debating the matter, the Security Council, on 27 June 1950, published Resolution 83 recommending member states provide military assistance to the Republic of Korea. On 27 June President Truman ordered U.S. air and sea forces to help the South Korean regime. On 4 July the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister accused the United States of starting armed intervention on behalf of South Korea.

On 25 June 1950, the <hl> United Nations Security Council <hl> unanimously condemned the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea, with UN Security Council Resolution 82. The Soviet Union, a veto-wielding power, had boycotted the Council meetings since January 1950, protesting that the Republic of China (Taiwan), not the People's Republic of China, held a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. After debating the matter, the Security Council, on 27 June 1950, published Resolution 83 recommending member states provide military assistance to the Republic of Korea. On 27 June President Truman ordered U.S. air and sea forces to help the South Korean regime. On 4 July the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister accused the United States of starting armed intervention on behalf of South Korea.


Question: Which permanent member of the UN Security Council boycotted council meetings in protest of Taiwan's seat in the United Nations?

Answer: Soviet Union

On 25 June 1950, the United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea, with UN Security Council Resolution 82. <hl> The Soviet Union , a veto-wielding power, had boycotted the Council meetings since January 1950, protesting that the Republic of China (Taiwan), not the People's Republic of China, held a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. <hl> After debating the matter, the Security Council, on 27 June 1950, published Resolution 83 recommending member states provide military assistance to the Republic of Korea. On 27 June President Truman ordered U.S. air and sea forces to help the South Korean regime. On 4 July the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister accused the United States of starting armed intervention on behalf of South Korea.

On 25 June 1950, the United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea, with UN Security Council Resolution 82. The <hl> Soviet Union <hl>, a veto-wielding power, had boycotted the Council meetings since January 1950, protesting that the Republic of China (Taiwan), not the People's Republic of China, held a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. After debating the matter, the Security Council, on 27 June 1950, published Resolution 83 recommending member states provide military assistance to the Republic of Korea. On 27 June President Truman ordered U.S. air and sea forces to help the South Korean regime. On 4 July the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister accused the United States of starting armed intervention on behalf of South Korea.

The <hl> Soviet Union <hl> , a veto-wielding power, had boycotted the Council meetings since January 1950, protesting that the Republic of China (Taiwan), not the People's Republic of China, held a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.


Question: What resolution encouraged Security Council Members to send military assistance to the Republic of Korea?

Answer: Resolution 83

On 25 June 1950, the United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea, with UN Security Council Resolution 82. The Soviet Union, a veto-wielding power, had boycotted the Council meetings since January 1950, protesting that the Republic of China (Taiwan), not the People's Republic of China, held a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. <hl> After debating the matter, the Security Council, on 27 June 1950, published Resolution 83 recommending member states provide military assistance to the Republic of Korea. <hl> On 27 June President Truman ordered U.S. air and sea forces to help the South Korean regime. On 4 July the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister accused the United States of starting armed intervention on behalf of South Korea.

On 25 June 1950, the United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea, with UN Security Council Resolution 82. The Soviet Union, a veto-wielding power, had boycotted the Council meetings since January 1950, protesting that the Republic of China (Taiwan), not the People's Republic of China, held a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. After debating the matter, the Security Council, on 27 June 1950, published <hl> Resolution 83 <hl> recommending member states provide military assistance to the Republic of Korea. On 27 June President Truman ordered U.S. air and sea forces to help the South Korean regime. On 4 July the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister accused the United States of starting armed intervention on behalf of South Korea.


Question: Who accused the United States of beginning an armed intervention in South Korea?

Answer: the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister

On 25 June 1950, the United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea, with UN Security Council Resolution 82. The Soviet Union, a veto-wielding power, had boycotted the Council meetings since January 1950, protesting that the Republic of China (Taiwan), not the People's Republic of China, held a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. After debating the matter, the Security Council, on 27 June 1950, published Resolution 83 recommending member states provide military assistance to the Republic of Korea. On 27 June President Truman ordered U.S. air and sea forces to help the South Korean regime. <hl> On 4 July the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister accused the United States of starting armed intervention on behalf of South Korea. <hl>

On 25 June 1950, the United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea, with UN Security Council Resolution 82. The Soviet Union, a veto-wielding power, had boycotted the Council meetings since January 1950, protesting that the Republic of China (Taiwan), not the People's Republic of China, held a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. After debating the matter, the Security Council, on 27 June 1950, published Resolution 83 recommending member states provide military assistance to the Republic of Korea. On 27 June President Truman ordered U.S. air and sea forces to help the South Korean regime. On 4 July <hl> the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister <hl> accused the United States of starting armed intervention on behalf of South Korea.


Question: What did UN Security Council Resolution 82 accomplish?

Answer: condemned the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea

<hl> On 25 June 1950, the United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea , with UN Security Council Resolution 82. <hl> The Soviet Union, a veto-wielding power, had boycotted the Council meetings since January 1950, protesting that the Republic of China (Taiwan), not the People's Republic of China, held a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. After debating the matter, the Security Council, on 27 June 1950, published Resolution 83 recommending member states provide military assistance to the Republic of Korea. On 27 June President Truman ordered U.S. air and sea forces to help the South Korean regime. On 4 July the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister accused the United States of starting armed intervention on behalf of South Korea.

On 25 June 1950, the United Nations Security Council unanimously <hl> condemned the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea <hl>, with UN Security Council Resolution 82. The Soviet Union, a veto-wielding power, had boycotted the Council meetings since January 1950, protesting that the Republic of China (Taiwan), not the People's Republic of China, held a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. After debating the matter, the Security Council, on 27 June 1950, published Resolution 83 recommending member states provide military assistance to the Republic of Korea. On 27 June President Truman ordered U.S. air and sea forces to help the South Korean regime. On 4 July the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister accused the United States of starting armed intervention on behalf of South Korea.

On 25 June 1950, the United Nations Security Council unanimously <hl> condemned the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea <hl> , with UN Security Council Resolution 82.


Question: What country challenged the legitimacy of the Korean War?

The Soviet Union challenged the legitimacy of the war for several reasons. The ROK Army intelligence upon which Resolution 83 was based came from U.S. Intelligence; North Korea was not invited as a sitting temporary member of the UN, which violated UN Charter Article 32; and the Korean conflict was beyond the UN Charter's scope, because the initial north–south border fighting was classed as a civil war. Because the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council at the time, legal scholars posited that deciding upon an action of this type required the unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

Answer: Soviet Union

<hl> The Soviet Union challenged the legitimacy of the war for several reasons. <hl> The ROK Army intelligence upon which Resolution 83 was based came from U.S. Intelligence; North Korea was not invited as a sitting temporary member of the UN, which violated UN Charter Article 32; and the Korean conflict was beyond the UN Charter's scope, because the initial north–south border fighting was classed as a civil war. Because the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council at the time, legal scholars posited that deciding upon an action of this type required the unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

The <hl> Soviet Union <hl> challenged the legitimacy of the war for several reasons. The ROK Army intelligence upon which Resolution 83 was based came from U.S. Intelligence; North Korea was not invited as a sitting temporary member of the UN, which violated UN Charter Article 32; and the Korean conflict was beyond the UN Charter's scope, because the initial north–south border fighting was classed as a civil war. Because the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council at the time, legal scholars posited that deciding upon an action of this type required the unanimous vote of the five permanent members.


Question: Where did the intelligence information that led to the passage of Resolution 83 come from?

Answer: U.S. Intelligence

The Soviet Union challenged the legitimacy of the war for several reasons. <hl> The ROK Army intelligence upon which Resolution 83 was based came from U.S. Intelligence ; North Korea was not invited as a sitting temporary member of the UN, which violated UN Charter Article 32; and the Korean conflict was beyond the UN Charter's scope, because the initial north–south border fighting was classed as a civil war. <hl> Because the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council at the time, legal scholars posited that deciding upon an action of this type required the unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

The Soviet Union challenged the legitimacy of the war for several reasons. The ROK Army intelligence upon which Resolution 83 was based came from <hl> U.S. Intelligence <hl>; North Korea was not invited as a sitting temporary member of the UN, which violated UN Charter Article 32; and the Korean conflict was beyond the UN Charter's scope, because the initial north–south border fighting was classed as a civil war. Because the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council at the time, legal scholars posited that deciding upon an action of this type required the unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

The ROK Army intelligence upon which Resolution 83 was based came from <hl> U.S. Intelligence <hl> ; North Korea was not invited as a sitting temporary member of the UN, which violated UN Charter Article 32; and the Korean conflict was beyond the UN Charter's scope, because the initial north–south border fighting was classed as a civil war.