{"input": "Over the last 10 months, Kaspersky Lab researchers have analyzed a massive cyber-espionage operation which we call'' Epic Turla''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers behind Epic Turla have infected several hundred computers in more than 45 countries, including government institutions, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attacks are known to have used at least two zero-day exploits: We also observed exploits against older (patched) vulnerabilities, social engineering techniques and watering hole strategies in these attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The primary backdoor used in the Epic attacks is also known as'' WorldCupSec'','' TadjMakhal'','' Wipbot'' or'' Tavdig''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The primary backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 20}, {"text": "the Epic attacks", "start": 29, "end": 45}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 21, "end": 25}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 26, "end": 28}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When G-Data published on Turla/Uroburos back in February, several questions remained unanswered.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One big unknown was the infection vector for Turla (aka Snake or Uroburos).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our analysis indicates that victims are infected via a sophisticated multi-stage attack, which begins with the Epic Turla.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "victims", "start": 28, "end": 35}, {"text": "a sophisticated multi-stage attack", "start": 53, "end": 87}], "action": [{"text": "are infected", "start": 36, "end": 48}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 49, "end": 52}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In time, as the attackers gain confidence, this is upgraded to more sophisticated backdoors, such as the Carbon/Cobra system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this", "start": 43, "end": 47}, {"text": "more sophisticated backdoors", "start": 63, "end": 91}], "action": [{"text": "is upgraded", "start": 48, "end": 59}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 60, "end": 62}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Sometimes, both backdoors are run in tandem, and used to'' rescue'' each other if communications are lost with one of the backdoors.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "both backdoors", "start": 11, "end": 25}, {"text": "tandem", "start": 37, "end": 43}], "action": [{"text": "are run", "start": 26, "end": 33}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 34, "end": 36}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once the attackers obtain the necessary credentials without the victim noticing, they deploy the rootkit and other extreme persistence mechanisms.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 5, "end": 18}, {"text": "the necessary credentials", "start": 26, "end": 51}, {"text": "the victim noticing", "start": 60, "end": 79}, {"text": "they", "start": 81, "end": 85}, {"text": "the rootkit and other extreme persistence mechanisms", "start": 93, "end": 145}], "action": [{"text": "obtain", "start": 19, "end": 25}, {"text": "deploy", "start": 86, "end": 92}], "modifier": [{"text": "without", "start": 52, "end": 59}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attacks are still ongoing as of July 2014, actively targeting users in Europe and the Middle East.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Note: A full analysis of the Epic attacks is available to the Kaspersky Intelligent Services subscribers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Contact: intelreports @kaspersky.com The attacks in this campaign fall into several different categories depending on the vector used in the initial compromise: The attackers use both direct spearphishing and watering hole attacks to infect their victims.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attackers", "start": 161, "end": 174}, {"text": "both direct spearphishing and watering hole attacks", "start": 179, "end": 230}, {"text": "infect their victims", "start": 234, "end": 254}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 175, "end": 178}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 231, "end": 233}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Watering holes (waterholes) are websites of interest to the victims that have been compromised by the attackers and injected to serve malicious code.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "So far we haven't been able to locate any e-mail used against the victims, only the attachments.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The PDF attachments do not show any'' lure'' to the victim when opened, however, the SCR packages sometime show a clean PDF upon successful installation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some of known attachment names used in the spearphishing attacks are: In some cases, these filenames can provide clues about the type of victims the attackers are targeting.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Currently, the Epic attackers run a vast network of watering holes that target visitors with surgical precision.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the Epic attackers", "start": 11, "end": 29}, {"text": "a vast network of watering holes", "start": 34, "end": 66}, {"text": "visitors", "start": 79, "end": 87}, {"text": "surgical precision", "start": 93, "end": 111}], "action": [{"text": "run", "start": 30, "end": 33}, {"text": "target", "start": 72, "end": 78}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 88, "end": 92}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some of the injected websites include: In total, we observed more than 100 injected websites.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Currently, the largest number of injected sites is in Romania.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Here's a statistic on the injected websites: The distribution is obviously not random, and it reflects some of the interests of the attackers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For instance, in Romania many of the infected sites are in the Mures region, while many of the Spanish infected sites belong to local governments (City Hall).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Most of the infected sites use the TYPO3 CMS (see: http: //typo3.org/), which could indicate the attackers are abusing a specific vulnerability in this publishing platform.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Injected websites load a remote JavaScript into the victim's browser: The script'' sitenavigatoin.js'' is a Pinlady-style browser and plugin detection script, which in turn, redirects to a PHP script sometimes called main.php or wreq.php.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Injected websites", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "a remote JavaScript", "start": 23, "end": 42}, {"text": "the victim's browser", "start": 48, "end": 68}], "action": [{"text": "load", "start": 18, "end": 22}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 43, "end": 47}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Sometimes, the attackers register the .JPG", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 11, "end": 24}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "extension with the PHP handler on the server, using'' JPG'' files to run PHP scripts: The main exploitation script'' wreq.php'','' main.php'' or'' main.jpg'' performs a numbers of tasks.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "using", "start": 46, "end": 51}], "entity": [{"text": "'' JPG'' files", "start": 51, "end": 65}, {"text": "run PHP scripts", "start": 69, "end": 84}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 66, "end": 68}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have located several versions of this script which attempt various exploitation mechanisms.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "several versions of this script", "start": 16, "end": 47}, {"text": "various exploitation mechanisms", "start": 62, "end": 93}], "action": [{"text": "attempt", "start": 54, "end": 61}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One version of this script attempts to exploit Internet Explorer versions 6, 7 and 8: Unfortunately, the Internet Explorer exploits have not yet been retrieved.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "One version of this script", "start": 0, "end": 26}, {"text": "Internet Explorer versions 6, 7 and 8", "start": 47, "end": 84}], "action": [{"text": "exploit", "start": 39, "end": 46}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Another more recent version attempts to exploit Oracle Sun Java and Adobe Flash Player: Although the Flash Player exploits couldn't be retrieved, we did manage to obtain the Java exploits: The Java files exploit a popular vulnerability, CVE-2012-1723, in various configurations.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Another more recent version", "start": 0, "end": 27}, {"text": "Oracle Sun Java and Adobe Flash Player", "start": 48, "end": 86}, {"text": "The Java files", "start": 189, "end": 203}, {"text": "a popular vulnerability", "start": 212, "end": 235}, {"text": "CVE-2012-1723", "start": 237, "end": 250}, {"text": "various configurations", "start": 255, "end": 277}], "action": [{"text": "exploit", "start": 40, "end": 47}, {"text": "exploit", "start": 204, "end": 211}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 252, "end": 254}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The payload dropped by these Java exploits is the following: The Java exploit use a special loader that attempts to inject the final Epic backdoor payload into explorer.exe.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The payload", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "Java exploits", "start": 29, "end": 42}, {"text": "The Java exploit", "start": 61, "end": 77}, {"text": "a special loader", "start": 82, "end": 98}, {"text": "the final Epic backdoor payload", "start": 123, "end": 154}, {"text": "explorer.exe", "start": 160, "end": 172}], "action": [{"text": "dropped", "start": 12, "end": 19}, {"text": "use", "start": 78, "end": 81}, {"text": "inject", "start": 116, "end": 122}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 155, "end": 159}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The backdoor extracted from the Java exploits has the following C & C hardcoded inside: This C & C is still online at the moment although it redirects to a currently suspended page at'' hxxp: //busandcoachdirectory.com [.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The backdoor extracted from the Java exploits", "start": 0, "end": 45}, {"text": "the following C & C", "start": 50, "end": 69}], "action": [{"text": "has", "start": 46, "end": 49}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] au''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For a full list of C & C servers, please see the Appendix.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Epic Turla attackers are extremely dynamic in using exploits or different methods depending on what is available at the moment.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Most recently, we observed them using yet another technique coupled with watering hole attacks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "them", "start": 27, "end": 31}, {"text": "yet another technique coupled with watering hole attacks", "start": 38, "end": 94}], "action": [{"text": "using", "start": 32, "end": 37}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This takes advantage of social engineering to trick the user into running a fake Flash Player (MD5: 030f5fdb78bfc1ce7b459d3cc2cf1877): In at least one case, they tried to trick the user into downloading and running a fake Microsoft Security Essentials app (MD5: 89b0f1a3a667e5cd43f5670e12dba411): The fake application is signed by a valid digital certificate from Sysprint AG: This file was distributed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan's website, at'' hxxp: //mfa [.] tj/upload/security.php''.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "takes", "start": 5, "end": 10}, {"text": "trick", "start": 46, "end": 51}, {"text": "trick", "start": 171, "end": 176}, {"text": "was distributed", "start": 387, "end": 402}], "entity": [{"text": "advantage", "start": 11, "end": 20}, {"text": "social engineering", "start": 24, "end": 42}, {"text": "the user", "start": 52, "end": 60}, {"text": "running a fake Flash Player", "start": 66, "end": 93}, {"text": "they", "start": 157, "end": 161}, {"text": "the user", "start": 177, "end": 185}, {"text": "downloading and running a fake Microsoft Security Essentials app", "start": 191, "end": 255}, {"text": "This file", "start": 377, "end": 386}, {"text": "the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan's website", "start": 408, "end": 463}, {"text": "'' hxxp: //mfa [.] tj/upload/security.php''", "start": 467, "end": 510}], "modifier": [{"text": "of", "start": 21, "end": 23}, {"text": "into", "start": 61, "end": 65}, {"text": "into", "start": 186, "end": 190}, {"text": "from", "start": 403, "end": 407}, {"text": "at", "start": 465, "end": 467}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The file is a .NET", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The file", "start": 0, "end": 8}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "application that contains an encrypted resource.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "contains", "start": 17, "end": 25}], "entity": [{"text": "an encrypted resource", "start": 26, "end": 47}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This drops the malicious file with the MD5 7731d42b043865559258464fe1c98513.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "the malicious file with the MD5 7731d42b043865559258464fe1c98513", "start": 11, "end": 75}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 5, "end": 10}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is an Epic backdoor which connects to the following C & Cs, with a generic internal ID of 1156fd22- 3443-4344-c4ffff: A full list with all the C & C server URLs that we recovered from the samples can be found in the technical Appendix.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "an Epic backdoor", "start": 8, "end": 24}, {"text": "the following C & Cs", "start": 43, "end": 63}, {"text": "a generic internal ID of 1156fd22- 3443-4344-c4ffff", "start": 70, "end": 121}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 5, "end": 7}, {"text": "connects", "start": 31, "end": 39}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 40, "end": 42}, {"text": "with", "start": 65, "end": 69}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Epic backdoors are commanded by a huge network of hacked servers that deliver command and control functionality.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The Epic backdoors", "start": 0, "end": 18}, {"text": "a huge network of hacked servers", "start": 36, "end": 68}, {"text": "command and control functionality", "start": 82, "end": 115}], "action": [{"text": "are commanded", "start": 19, "end": 32}, {"text": "deliver", "start": 74, "end": 81}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The huge network commanded by the Epic Turla attackers serves multiple purposes.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The huge network", "start": 0, "end": 16}, {"text": "the Epic Turla attackers", "start": 30, "end": 54}], "action": [{"text": "commanded", "start": 17, "end": 26}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For instance, the motherships function as both exploitation sites and command and control panels for the malware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the motherships", "start": 14, "end": 29}, {"text": "exploitation sites", "start": 47, "end": 65}, {"text": "command and control panels", "start": 70, "end": 96}], "action": [{"text": "function", "start": 30, "end": 38}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 39, "end": 41}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Here's how the big picture looks like: The first level of command and control proxies generally talk to a second level of proxies, which in turn, talk to the'' mothership'' server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The first level of command and control proxies", "start": 39, "end": 85}, {"text": "a second level of proxies", "start": 104, "end": 129}, {"text": "the'' mothership'' server", "start": 154, "end": 179}], "action": [{"text": "talk", "start": 96, "end": 100}, {"text": "talk", "start": 146, "end": 150}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 101, "end": 103}, {"text": "to", "start": 151, "end": 153}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The mothership server is generally a VPS, which runs the Control panel software used to interact with the victims.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The mothership server", "start": 0, "end": 21}, {"text": "the Control panel software", "start": 53, "end": 79}, {"text": "the victims", "start": 102, "end": 113}], "action": [{"text": "runs", "start": 48, "end": 52}, {"text": "interact", "start": 88, "end": 96}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 97, "end": 101}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers operate the mothership using a network of proxies and VPN servers for anonymity reasons.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The mothership also work as the exploitation servers used in the watering hole attacks, delivering Java, IE or fake applications to the victim.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The mothership", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "the exploitation servers", "start": 28, "end": 52}, {"text": "the watering hole attacks", "start": 61, "end": 86}, {"text": "Java, IE or fake applications", "start": 99, "end": 128}, {"text": "the victim", "start": 132, "end": 142}], "action": [{"text": "work", "start": 20, "end": 24}, {"text": "used", "start": 53, "end": 57}, {"text": "delivering", "start": 88, "end": 98}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 25, "end": 27}, {"text": "in", "start": 58, "end": 60}, {"text": "to", "start": 129, "end": 131}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We were able to get a copy of one of the motherships, which provided some insight into the operation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It runs a control panel which is password protected: Once logged into the Control panel, the attackers can see a general overview of the system including the number of interesting potential targets: A very interesting file on the servers is task.css, where the attackers define the IP ranges they are interested in.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 257, "end": 270}, {"text": "the IP ranges they are interested in", "start": 278, "end": 314}], "action": [{"text": "define", "start": 271, "end": 277}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To change the file, they are using the'' Task editor'' from the menu.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Depending on the'' tasks'', they will decide whether to infect the visitors or not.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "they", "start": 28, "end": 32}, {"text": "whether to infect the visitors or not", "start": 45, "end": 82}], "action": [{"text": "decide", "start": 38, "end": 44}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this case, we found they targeted two ranges belonging to: It should be noted though, the fact that the attackers were targeting these ranges doesn't necessarily mean they also got infected.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "they", "start": 23, "end": 27}, {"text": "two ranges", "start": 37, "end": 47}], "action": [{"text": "targeted", "start": 28, "end": 36}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some other unknown IPs were also observed in the targeting schedules.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There is also an'' except.css'' file where attackers log the reasons they didn't try to exploit certain visitors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There are three possible values: These are the'' don't meet the conditions'' reasons observed in the logs: For this first stage of the attack, the threat actor uses a custom backdoor.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the threat actor", "start": 143, "end": 159}, {"text": "a custom backdoor", "start": 165, "end": 182}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 160, "end": 164}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In some cases, the backdoor is packaged together with the CVE-2013-5065 EoP exploit and heavily obfuscated.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the backdoor", "start": 15, "end": 27}], "action": [{"text": "obfuscated", "start": 96, "end": 106}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This makes the analysis more difficult.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The CVE-2013-5065 exploit allows the backdoor to achieve administrator privileges on the system and run unrestricted.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the backdoor", "start": 33, "end": 45}, {"text": "administrator privileges on the system", "start": 57, "end": 95}, {"text": "unrestricted", "start": 104, "end": 116}], "action": [{"text": "achieve", "start": 49, "end": 56}, {"text": "run", "start": 100, "end": 103}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This exploit only works on unpatched Microsoft Windows XP systems.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other known detection names for the backdoor is Trojan.Wipbot (Symantec) or Tavdig.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The main backdoor is about 60KB in size and implements a C & C protocol on top of normal HTTP requests.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The main backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "a C & C protocol", "start": 55, "end": 71}, {"text": "normal HTTP requests", "start": 82, "end": 102}], "action": [{"text": "implements", "start": 44, "end": 54}], "modifier": [{"text": "on top of", "start": 72, "end": 81}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The communication protocol uses requests in the C & C replies, which the malware decrypts and processes.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The communication protocol", "start": 0, "end": 26}, {"text": "requests", "start": 32, "end": 40}, {"text": "the C & C replies", "start": 44, "end": 61}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 69, "end": 80}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 27, "end": 31}, {"text": "decrypts and processes", "start": 81, "end": 103}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 41, "end": 43}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The replies are sent back to the C & C through the same channel.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The replies", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "the C & C", "start": 29, "end": 38}, {"text": "the same channel", "start": 47, "end": 63}], "action": [{"text": "are sent", "start": 12, "end": 20}], "modifier": [{"text": "back to", "start": 21, "end": 28}, {"text": "through", "start": 39, "end": 46}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware behavior is defined by a configuration block.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The configuration block usually contains two hard-coded C & C URLs.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "He have also seen one case where the configuration block contains just one URL.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The configuration can also be updated on the fly by the attackers, via the C & C.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The configuration", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 52, "end": 65}, {"text": "the C & C", "start": 71, "end": 80}], "action": [{"text": "be updated", "start": 27, "end": 37}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 67, "end": 70}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The backdoor attempts to identify the following processes and, if found, it will terminate itself: It contains an internal unique ID, which is used to identify the victim to the C & C.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "the following processes", "start": 34, "end": 57}, {"text": "it", "start": 73, "end": 75}, {"text": "itself", "start": 91, "end": 97}, {"text": "an internal unique ID", "start": 111, "end": 132}, {"text": "the victim", "start": 160, "end": 170}, {"text": "the C & C", "start": 174, "end": 183}], "action": [{"text": "identify", "start": 25, "end": 33}, {"text": "terminate", "start": 81, "end": 90}, {"text": "identify", "start": 151, "end": 159}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 171, "end": 173}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Most samples, especially old ones, have the ID 1156fd22-3443-4344-c4ffff.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once a victim is confirmed as'' interesting'', the attackers upload another Epic backdoor which has a unique ID used to control this specific victim.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a victim", "start": 5, "end": 13}, {"text": "'' interesting''", "start": 29, "end": 45}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 47, "end": 60}, {"text": "another Epic backdoor", "start": 68, "end": 89}, {"text": "this specific victim", "start": 128, "end": 148}], "action": [{"text": "is confirmed", "start": 14, "end": 26}, {"text": "upload", "start": 61, "end": 67}, {"text": "control", "start": 120, "end": 127}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 27, "end": 29}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During the first C & C call, the backdoor sends a pack with the victim's system information.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "During", "start": 0, "end": 6}], "entity": [{"text": "the first C & C call", "start": 7, "end": 27}, {"text": "the backdoor", "start": 29, "end": 41}, {"text": "a pack with the victim's system information", "start": 48, "end": 91}], "action": [{"text": "sends", "start": 42, "end": 47}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All further information sent to the C & C is encrypted with a public key framework, making decryption impossible.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "All further information", "start": 0, "end": 23}, {"text": "the C & C", "start": 32, "end": 41}, {"text": "a public key framework", "start": 60, "end": 82}], "action": [{"text": "sent", "start": 24, "end": 28}, {"text": "is encrypted", "start": 42, "end": 54}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 29, "end": 31}, {"text": "with", "start": 55, "end": 59}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The commands from the C & C are encrypted in a simpler manner and can be decrypted if intercepted because the secret key is hardcoded in the malware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The commands from the C & C", "start": 0, "end": 27}], "action": [{"text": "are encrypted", "start": 28, "end": 41}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Through monitoring, we were able to capture a large amount of commands sent to the victims by the attackers, providing an unique view into this operation.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a large amount of commands", "start": 44, "end": 70}, {"text": "the victims", "start": 79, "end": 90}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 94, "end": 107}], "action": [{"text": "sent", "start": 71, "end": 75}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 76, "end": 78}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Here's a look at one of the encrypted server replies: Once a victim is infected and'' checks in'' with the server, the attackers send a template of commands: Next, the attackers try to move through the victim's network using pre-defined or collected passwords: Listing all .doc", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a victim", "start": 59, "end": 67}, {"text": "the server", "start": 103, "end": 113}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 115, "end": 128}, {"text": "a template of commands", "start": 134, "end": 156}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 164, "end": 177}, {"text": "the victim's network", "start": 198, "end": 218}, {"text": "pre-defined or collected passwords", "start": 225, "end": 259}], "action": [{"text": "is infected", "start": 68, "end": 79}, {"text": "'' checks in''", "start": 83, "end": 97}, {"text": "send", "start": 129, "end": 133}, {"text": "move", "start": 185, "end": 189}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 98, "end": 102}, {"text": "through", "start": 190, "end": 197}, {"text": "using", "start": 219, "end": 224}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "files recursively is also a common'' theme'': In total, we have decoded several hundreds of these command packages delivered to the victims, providing an unique insight into the inner workings of the attackers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition to generic searches, some very specific lookups have been observed as well.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These include searches for: In this case, the attackers were interested to find e-mails related to'' NATO'','' Energy Dialogue within European Unition'' and so on.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 42, "end": 55}, {"text": "e-mails related to'' NATO'','' Energy Dialogue within European Unition'' and so on", "start": 80, "end": 162}], "action": [{"text": "find", "start": 75, "end": 79}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For some of the C & C servers, the attackers implemented RSA encryption for the C & C logs, which makes it impossible to decrypt them.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 31, "end": 44}, {"text": "RSA encryption", "start": 57, "end": 71}, {"text": "the C & C logs", "start": 76, "end": 90}], "action": [{"text": "implemented", "start": 45, "end": 56}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 72, "end": 75}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This scheme was implemented in April 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once a victim is compromised, the attackers upload several tools that are used for lateral movement.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a victim", "start": 5, "end": 13}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 30, "end": 43}, {"text": "several tools that are used for lateral movement", "start": 51, "end": 99}], "action": [{"text": "is compromised", "start": 14, "end": 28}, {"text": "upload", "start": 44, "end": 50}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One such tool observed in the attacks and saved as'' C: \\Documents and Settings\\All users\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\winsvclg.exe'' is: This is a keylogger tool that creates% temp% \\~DFD3O8.tmp.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This", "start": 137, "end": 141}, {"text": "a keylogger tool", "start": 145, "end": 161}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 142, "end": 144}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Note: the filename can change across victims.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On one Central Asian government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs victim system, the filename used was'' adobe32updt.exe''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition to these custom tools, we observed the usage of standard administration utilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For instance, another tool often uploaded by the attackers to the victim's machine is'' winrs.exe'': This is an UPX packed binary, which contains the genuine'' dnsquery.exe'' tool from Microsoft, unpacked MD5: c0c03b71684eb0545ef9182f5f9928ca.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "another tool", "start": 14, "end": 26}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 45, "end": 58}, {"text": "the victim's machine", "start": 62, "end": 82}, {"text": "'' winrs.exe''", "start": 85, "end": 99}], "action": [{"text": "uploaded", "start": 33, "end": 41}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 59, "end": 61}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In several cases, an interesting update has been observed -- a malware from a different, yet related family.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This backdoor is more sophisticated and belongs to the next level of cyber-espionage tools called the'' Carbon system'' or Cobra by the Turla attackers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "the'' Carbon system'' or Cobra", "start": 98, "end": 128}, {"text": "the Turla attackers", "start": 132, "end": 151}], "action": [{"text": "called", "start": 91, "end": 97}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Several plugins for the'' Carbon system'' are known to exist.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Note: the command and control servers www.losguayaberos [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com and thebesttothbrushes [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com have been sinkholed by Kaspersky Lab.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other packages delivered to the victims include: These top level packages deploy both updated Epic backdoors and Turla Carbon system backdoors to confirmed victims, effectively linking the Epic and Turla Carbon operations together.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These top level packages", "start": 49, "end": 73}, {"text": "both updated Epic backdoors and Turla Carbon system backdoors", "start": 81, "end": 142}, {"text": "confirmed victims", "start": 146, "end": 163}], "action": [{"text": "deploy", "start": 74, "end": 80}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 143, "end": 145}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Turla Carbon dropper from these packages has the following properties: This is called internally by the authors'' Carbon System'', part of the'' Cobra'' project, as it can be seen from the debug path inside: This acts as a dropper for the following modules, both 32 and 64 bit: The Carbon system is in essence an extensible platform, very similar to other attack platforms such as the Tilded platform or the Flame platform.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This", "start": 212, "end": 216}, {"text": "a dropper for the following modules", "start": 225, "end": 260}], "action": [{"text": "acts", "start": 217, "end": 221}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 222, "end": 224}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The plugins for the Carbon system can be easily recognized as they always feature at least two exports named: Several Epic backdoors appear to have been designed to work as Carbon system plugins as well-they require a specialized loader to start in victim systems that do not have the Carbon system deployed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some modules have artifacts which indicate the Carbon system is already at version 3.x, although the exact Carbon system version is very rarely seen in samples: The author of the Carbon module above can be also seen in the code, as'' gilg'', which also authored several other Turla modules.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We are planning to cover the Turla Carbon system with more details in a future report.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The payload recovered from one of the mothership servers (at newsforum.servehttp [.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The payload", "start": 0, "end": 11}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com/wordpress/wp-includes/css/img/upload.php, MD5: 4dc22c1695d1f275c3b6e503a1b171f5, Compiled: Thu Sep 06 14:09:55 2012) contains two modules, a loader/injector and a backdoor.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "contains", "start": 123, "end": 131}], "entity": [{"text": "a loader/injector", "start": 145, "end": 162}, {"text": "a backdoor", "start": 167, "end": 177}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Internally, the backdoor is named'' Zagruzchick.dll'': The word'' Zagruzchick'' means'' boot loader'' in Russian.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Control panel for the Epic motherships also sets the language to codepage'' 1251'': Codepage 1251 is commonly used to render Cyrillic characters.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There are other indications that the attackers are not native English language speakers: The sample e9580b6b13822090db018c320e80865f that was delivered to several Epic victims as an upgraded backdoor, has the compilation code page language set to'' LANGRUSSIAN''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The sample e9580b6b13822090db018c320e80865f", "start": 89, "end": 132}, {"text": "several Epic victims", "start": 155, "end": 175}, {"text": "an upgraded backdoor", "start": 179, "end": 199}], "action": [{"text": "was delivered", "start": 138, "end": 151}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 152, "end": 154}, {"text": "as", "start": 176, "end": 178}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The threat actor behind the'' Epic'' operation uses mainly hacked servers to host their proxies.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The hacked servers are controlled through the use of a PHP webshell.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This shell is password protected; the password is checked against an MD5 hash: The MD5'' af3e8be26c63c4dd066935629cf9bac8'' has been solved by Kaspersky Lab as the password'' kenpachi''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In February 2014 we observed the Miniduke threat actor using the same backdoor on their hacked servers, although using a much stronger password.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the Miniduke threat actor", "start": 29, "end": 54}, {"text": "the same backdoor", "start": 61, "end": 78}, {"text": "their hacked servers", "start": 82, "end": 102}], "action": [{"text": "using", "start": 55, "end": 60}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 79, "end": 81}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once again, it is also interesting to point out the usage of Codepage 1251 in the webshell, which is used to render Cyrillic characters.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There appears to be several links between Turla and Miniduke, but we will leave that for a future blogpost.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On some of the C & C servers used in the Epic attacks, we were able to identify detailed victim statistics, which were saved for debugging purposes by the attackers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "detailed victim statistics", "start": 80, "end": 106}, {"text": "debugging purposes", "start": 129, "end": 147}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 151, "end": 164}], "action": [{"text": "were saved", "start": 114, "end": 124}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 125, "end": 128}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is the country distribution for the top 20 affected countries by victim's IP: According to the public information available for the victims' IPs, targets of'' Epic'' belong to the following categories: When G-Data published their Turla paper, there were few details publicly available on how victims get infected with this malware campaign.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our analysis indicates this is a sophisticated multi-stage infection; which begins with Epic Turla.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is used to gain a foothold and validate the high profile victim.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "the high profile victim", "start": 45, "end": 68}], "action": [{"text": "validate", "start": 36, "end": 44}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the victim is interesting, they get upgraded to the Turla Carbon system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "they", "start": 30, "end": 34}, {"text": "the Turla Carbon system", "start": 51, "end": 74}], "action": [{"text": "upgraded", "start": 39, "end": 47}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 48, "end": 50}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Most recently, we observed this attack against a Kaspersky Lab user on August 5, 2014, indicating the operation remains fresh and ongoing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Note: A full analysis of the Epic attacks is available to the Kaspersky Intelligent Services customers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Contact: intelreports @kaspersky.com We would like to add the following at the end of the blogpost, right before the detection names: If you'd like to read more about Turla/Uroburos, here's a few recommendations:", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this day and age of interconnected cloud services and distributed content delivery networks (CDNs), it is important for both CDN service providers and security professionals alike to recognize and understand the risks that these systems can introduce within an modern enterprise.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For organizations within both public and private sectors that leverage CDN platforms to dynamically deliver web content, it is important that the content is also routinely monitored.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Otherwise, malicious third-party content can be loaded into a target organization's website without their knowledge, delivering untold risks to unwitting visitors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The ThreatConnect Intelligence Research Team (TCIRT) recently observed a targeted cross-site scripting (XSS)'' drive-by'' attack that leveraged a single content delivery network resource to distribute a malicious Java applet via nearly all of the major official Government of Afghanistan websites.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a targeted cross-site scripting (XSS)'' drive-by'' attack", "start": 71, "end": 128}, {"text": "a single content delivery network resource", "start": 144, "end": 186}, {"text": "distribute a malicious Java applet via nearly all of the major official Government of Afghanistan websites", "start": 190, "end": 296}], "action": [{"text": "leveraged", "start": 134, "end": 143}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 187, "end": 189}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The compromised CDN resource in question is a JavaScript file hosted at [http:] //cdn.afghanistan [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] af/scripts/gop-script.js The domain cdn.afghanistan [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] af is a legitimate CDN site used by the Afghan Ministry of Communications and IT (MCIT) to host web content that is displayed and used on many official gov.af websites.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The javascript URL ([http:] //cdn.afghanistan [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] af/scripts/gop-script.js) is called from numerous official Afghan Government websites, including the following: It is likely that this javascript URL itself is normally legitimate, but the attackers obtained access to the file and prepended the following malicious JavaScript functions to the beginning of the script: Note that the gov.af websites would not need to be compromised individually for this attack to be delivered to visitors of the sites, because it is the backend CDN infrastructure that is serving up the malicious script.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Judging by the last modified timestamp on the HTTP response of gop-script.js, which is Tue, 16 Dec 2014 08:07:06 GMT, this malicious CDN compromise was very recent in nature.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In fact, it occurred on the very same day that China's Prime Minister Li Keqiang would meet with Abdullah Abdullah, the Chief Executive Officer of Afghanistan in Astana Kazakhstan, they would discuss infrastructure development and bilateral cooperation issues.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Looking at the EXIF metadata of the image of Keqiang meeting with Abdullah that is hosted on the Chinese embassy website we note a Tue, 16 December 2014 07:43:31 modify time as well as the www.news [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] cn watermark in the bottom righthand corner.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This indicates that the image of Keqiang and Abdullah was likely taken and edited sometime prior to 07:43:31.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While it is ambiguous as to which timezone the edits actually took place in (Kazakhstan or China) we assume the date timestamp references GMT because the press release states'' In the afternoon of December 15 local time…'' If we assume the photograph and afternoon meeting took place sometime prior to 13:43 Alma-Ata standard time (+0600) this would closely correspond with a 07:43 GMT time stamp.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The modification of the gop-script.js by the attackers at 08:07:06 GMT likely tracks extremely close to a window of a few hours in which Keqiang met with Abdullah.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is worth mentioning that a similar scenario occurred on June 20th when security researcher PhysicalDrive0 observed a malicious Java file hosted on the Embassy of Greece in Beijing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At the time, a Chinese delegation led by Keqiang was visiting Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras in Athens.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Security researcher R136a1 aka'' thegoldenmessenger'' released a followup blog with detailed analysis of the Greek embassy compromise.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While these two separate events are not directly related, additional research into the status of ministerial and official government websites on or around the dates of notable Chinese delegations and or bilateral meetings may yield additional patterns of interest.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Upon closer inspection of the prepended malicious JavaScript code, one will notice the similarity in the update.javaplug-in [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com naming convention and URL structure to the C2 domain java-se [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com found in the Palo Alto Networks blog post Attacks on East Asia using Google Code for Command and Control and associated with Operation Poisoned Hurricane.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, the malicious document.write driveby URLs listed above both result in 403 Forbidden errors as of December 18, 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While the 403 Forbidden errors may seem like an analytic dead end, the TCIRT also identified a malicious Java applet submission to VirusTotal that confirms the nature of this malicious activity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This Java applet, SHA1: 388E6F41462774268491D1F121F333618C6A2C9A, has no antivirus detections as of December 21st.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The applet contains its malicious class file at the path'' jre7u61windows/x86/Update.class''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This class file downloads and decodes an XOR 0xC8 encoded Windows PE executable payload from [http:] //mfa.gov [.] af/content/images/icon35.png, hosted on the official Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs site, which was also affected by the gop-script XSS.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This class file", "start": 0, "end": 15}, {"text": "an XOR 0xC8 encoded Windows PE executable payload", "start": 38, "end": 87}, {"text": "[http:] //mfa.gov [.] af/content/images/icon35.png", "start": 93, "end": 143}], "action": [{"text": "downloads and decodes", "start": 16, "end": 37}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 88, "end": 92}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Using historic context archived within ThreatConnect, the TCIRT concluded that this Java applet is from the same source code as the applet SHA1: ADC162DD909283097E72FC50B7AB0E04AB8A2BCC, which was previously observed by the TCIRT at the Operation Poisoned Hurricane related URL [http:] //jre7.java-se [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com/java.jar on August 15, 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This applet has the same class path, and downloads an XOR 0xFF encoded payload executable from the URL [https:] //amco- triton.co [.] jp/js/dl/in.jpg.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This applet", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "an XOR 0xFF encoded payload executable", "start": 51, "end": 89}, {"text": "the URL [https:] //amco- triton.co [.] jp/js/dl/in.jpg", "start": 95, "end": 149}], "action": [{"text": "downloads", "start": 41, "end": 50}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 90, "end": 94}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additional indicators and context associated with this particular Java driveby activity can be found in the ThreatConnect Common Community Incident 20140815A: The XOR 0xC8 encoded payload downloaded from [http:] //mfa.gov [.] af/content/images/icon35.png decodes into the Windows PE executable SHA1: This executable is a self-extracting (SFX) Microsoft Cabinet executable that is digitally signed with a valid certificate from'' OnAndOn Information System Co., Ltd.'', serial number'' 1F F7 D8 64 18 1C 55 5E 70 CF DD 3A 59 34 C4 7D''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The XOR 0xC8 encoded payload", "start": 159, "end": 187}, {"text": "[http:] //mfa.gov [.] af/content/images/icon35.png", "start": 204, "end": 254}], "action": [{"text": "downloaded", "start": 188, "end": 198}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 199, "end": 203}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This same certificate was also used to sign the Java applet that downloaded this malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This executable drops the following files: Malicious DLL that loads into the above dllhost.exe, using a similar DLL sideloading technique to that most commonly associated with the PlugX backdoor.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This executable", "start": 0, "end": 15}, {"text": "the following files", "start": 22, "end": 41}, {"text": "Malicious DLL", "start": 43, "end": 56}, {"text": "the above dllhost.exe", "start": 73, "end": 94}, {"text": "a similar DLL sideloading technique to that most commonly associated with the PlugX backdoor", "start": 102, "end": 194}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 16, "end": 21}, {"text": "loads", "start": 62, "end": 67}, {"text": "using", "start": 96, "end": 101}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 68, "end": 72}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This backdoor connects to the faux Oracle Java themed command and control (C2) domain oracle0876634.javaplug-in [.] com.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "the faux Oracle Java themed command and control (C2) domain oracle0876634.javaplug-in [.] com", "start": 26, "end": 119}], "action": [{"text": "connects", "start": 14, "end": 22}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 23, "end": 25}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Note that javaplug-in [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com is the same root domain found in the compromised version of [http:] //cdn.afghanistan [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] af/scripts/gop-script.js as [http:] //update.javaplug- in [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com/o/j.js, confirming that this Java malware is in fact directly associated with the Afghan MCIT CDN XSS compromise.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Full indicators of this activity and a YARA rule to detect the malware certificate can be found in the ThreatConnect Common Community under Incident 20141217A: Afghan Government Java Driveby and signature APTOnAndOncert.yara.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As the US and NATO reduce their troop levels in Afghanistan, China is posturing to fill the gap of influence that the west is leaving behind.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With plans to facilitate multilateral peace talks with the Taliban and establish major transportation projects which aim to bolster the Afghan economy, Beijing has been eyeing Afghanistan as part of its broader South Asian strategy.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By exploiting and co-opting Afghan network infrastructure that is used by multiple ministerial level websites, Chinese intelligence services would be able to widely distribute malicious payloads to a variety of global targets using Afghanistan's government websites as a topical and trusted distribution platform, exploiting a single hidden entry point.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Chinese intelligence services", "start": 111, "end": 140}, {"text": "malicious payloads", "start": 176, "end": 194}, {"text": "a variety of global targets", "start": 198, "end": 225}, {"text": "Afghanistan's government websites as a topical and trusted distribution platform", "start": 232, "end": 312}], "action": [{"text": "distribute", "start": 165, "end": 175}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 195, "end": 197}, {"text": "using", "start": 226, "end": 231}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This being a variant of a typical'' watering-hole'' attack, the attackers will most likely infect victims outside the Afghan government who happened to be browsing any one of the CDN client systems, specifically, partner states involved in the planned troop reduction.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "a variant of a typical'' watering-hole'' attack", "start": 11, "end": 58}], "action": [{"text": "being", "start": 5, "end": 10}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is important to consider that corporate enterprises are not immune to this tactic, and this is not just a technique that is used by APT threat actors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If an enterprise's website leverages a CDN to speed up content delivery, unintended consequences must be anticipated.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Fortunately, modern browsers now implement a security concept called'' Content Security Policy''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As long as the server's response headers are configured properly, third party content may be restricted to originating from a narrow whitelist.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Just as attackers distribute malicious content to users en masse or CDN services distribute web content to users, security professionals must be able to quickly distribute actionable Threat Intelligence in formats readable by both humans and machines.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "ThreatConnect is the industry's first comprehensive Threat Intelligence Platform that enables enterprises to orchestrate the aggregation of Threat Intelligence from multiple sources, use integrated analytics and a robust API that gives enterprises the control to action their own Threat Intelligence, in the cloud and on premises.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Register for a free account now to view the Common Community shares and more.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Two years ago, we published our research into RedOctober, a complex cyber-espionage operation targeting diplomatic embassies worldwide.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We named it RedOctober because we started this investigation in October 2012, an unusually hot month.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After our announcement in January 2013, the RedOctober operation was promptly shut down and the network of C & Cs was dismantled.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As usually happens with these big operations, considering the huge investment and number of resources behind it, they don't just'' go away'' forever.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Normally, the group goes underground for a few months, redesigns the tools and the malware and resume operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "See: Since January 2013, we've been on the lookout for a possible RedOctober comeback.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One possible hit was triggered when we observed Mevade, an unusual piece of malware that appeared late in 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Mevade C & C name styles as well as some other technical similarities indicated a connection to RedOctober, but the link was weak.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It wasn't until August 2014 that we observed something which made us wonder if RedOctober is back for good.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In August 2014, some of our users observed targeted attacks with a variation of CVE-2012-0158 and an unusual set of malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We did a quick analysis of the malware and it immediately stood out because of certain unusual things that are not very common in the APT world.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some of the filenames used in the attacks included: At least one of them immediately reminded us of RedOctober, which used a very similarly named spearphish:'' Diplomatic Car for Sale.doc''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "RedOctober", "start": 100, "end": 110}, {"text": "a very similarly named spearphish:'' Diplomatic Car for Sale.doc''", "start": 123, "end": 189}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 118, "end": 122}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As we started digging into the operation, more details emerged which supported this theory.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Perhaps the most unusual fact was that the Microsoft Office exploit didn't directly write a Windows PE backdoor on disk.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Instead, it writes an encrypted Visual Basic Script and runs it.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 9, "end": 11}, {"text": "an encrypted Visual Basic Script", "start": 19, "end": 51}, {"text": "it", "start": 61, "end": 63}], "action": [{"text": "writes", "start": 12, "end": 18}, {"text": "runs", "start": 56, "end": 60}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This VBScript drops a pair of files on disk-a loader and an encrypted payload.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This VBScript", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "a pair of files", "start": 20, "end": 35}, {"text": "disk", "start": 39, "end": 43}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 14, "end": 19}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 36, "end": 38}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The loader appears to be different every time and internal strings indicate it is'' polymorphically'' generated.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The payload is always encrypted with a unique key, making it impossible to decrypt unless the DLL is available.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The payload", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "a unique key", "start": 37, "end": 49}], "action": [{"text": "is always encrypted", "start": 12, "end": 31}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 32, "end": 36}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We observed several different spear-phishing documents that drop uniquely named payloads.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "several different spear-phishing documents", "start": 12, "end": 54}, {"text": "uniquely named payloads", "start": 65, "end": 88}], "action": [{"text": "drop", "start": 60, "end": 64}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For instance, the'' qPd0aKJu.vbs'' file MD5: E211C2BAD9A83A6A4247EC3959E2A730 drops the following files: The VBS also adds a registry key: HKEYCURRENTUSER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\ setting the key'' bookstore'' to the value'' regsvr32% path% \\ctfmonrn.dll /s'', which ensures the malware runs every time at system boot.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "E211C2BAD9A83A6A4247EC3959E2A730", "start": 45, "end": 77}, {"text": "the following files", "start": 84, "end": 103}, {"text": "The VBS", "start": 105, "end": 112}, {"text": "a registry key: HKEYCURRENTUSER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\", "start": 123, "end": 201}, {"text": "the key'' bookstore''", "start": 210, "end": 231}, {"text": "the value'' regsvr32% path% \\ctfmonrn.dll /s''", "start": 235, "end": 281}, {"text": "the malware runs every time at system boot", "start": 297, "end": 339}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 78, "end": 83}, {"text": "adds", "start": 118, "end": 122}, {"text": "setting", "start": 202, "end": 209}, {"text": "ensures", "start": 289, "end": 296}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 232, "end": 234}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some of the DLL names we observed include: Some of the payload names include: The payload includes an encrypted configuration block which contains information about the C & C sever: The information from the config includes a WebDAV URL which is used for connections, a username and password, two folders on the WebDAV server used to store plugins/modules for the malware and where data from the victim should be uploaded.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an encrypted configuration block", "start": 99, "end": 131}, {"text": "information about the C & C sever", "start": 147, "end": 180}, {"text": "a WebDAV URL", "start": 223, "end": 235}, {"text": "connections", "start": 254, "end": 265}, {"text": "data from the victim", "start": 381, "end": 401}], "action": [{"text": "contains", "start": 138, "end": 146}, {"text": "is used", "start": 242, "end": 249}, {"text": "be uploaded", "start": 409, "end": 420}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 250, "end": 253}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Cloud Atlas implants utilize a rather unusual C & C mechanism.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The Cloud Atlas implants", "start": 0, "end": 24}, {"text": "a rather unusual C & C mechanism", "start": 33, "end": 65}], "action": [{"text": "utilize", "start": 25, "end": 32}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All the malware samples we've seen communicate via HTTPS and WebDav with the same server'' cloudme.com'', a cloud services provider.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "All the malware samples we've seen", "start": 0, "end": 34}, {"text": "HTTPS and WebDav", "start": 51, "end": 67}, {"text": "the same server'' cloudme.com'', a cloud services provider", "start": 73, "end": 131}], "action": [{"text": "communicate", "start": 35, "end": 46}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 47, "end": 50}, {"text": "with", "start": 68, "end": 72}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to their website, CloudMe is owned and operated by CloudMe AB, a company based in Linköping, Sweden.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "(Important note: we do not believe that CloudMe is in any way related to the Cloud Atlas group-the attackers simply create free accounts on this provider and abuse them for command-and-control).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Each malware set we have observed so far communicates with a different CloudMe account though.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Each malware set we have observed so far", "start": 0, "end": 40}, {"text": "a different CloudMe account", "start": 59, "end": 86}], "action": [{"text": "communicates", "start": 41, "end": 53}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 54, "end": 58}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers upload data to the account, which is downloaded by the implant, decrypted and interpreted.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "data", "start": 21, "end": 25}, {"text": "the implant", "start": 65, "end": 76}], "action": [{"text": "is downloaded", "start": 48, "end": 61}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In turn, the malware uploads the replies back to the server via the same mechanism.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 9, "end": 20}, {"text": "the replies", "start": 29, "end": 40}, {"text": "the server", "start": 49, "end": 59}, {"text": "the same mechanism", "start": 64, "end": 82}], "action": [{"text": "uploads", "start": 21, "end": 28}], "modifier": [{"text": "back to", "start": 41, "end": 48}, {"text": "via", "start": 60, "end": 63}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Of course, it should be possible to reconfigure the malware to use any Cloud-based storage service that supports WebDAV.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Here's a look at one such account from CloudMe: The data from the account: The files stored in the randomly named folder were uploaded by the malware and contain various things, such as system information, running processes and current username.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The files stored in the randomly named folder", "start": 75, "end": 120}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 138, "end": 149}, {"text": "various things, such as system information, running processes and current username", "start": 162, "end": 244}], "action": [{"text": "were uploaded", "start": 121, "end": 134}, {"text": "contain", "start": 154, "end": 161}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The data is compressed with LZMA and encrypted with AES, however, the keys are stored in the malware body which makes it possible to decrypt the information from the C & C.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The data", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "LZMA", "start": 28, "end": 32}, {"text": "AES", "start": 52, "end": 55}], "action": [{"text": "is compressed", "start": 9, "end": 22}, {"text": "encrypted", "start": 37, "end": 46}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 23, "end": 27}, {"text": "with", "start": 47, "end": 51}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We previously observed only one other group using a similar method–ItaDuke–that connected to accounts on the cloud provider mydrive.ch.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "only one other group", "start": 23, "end": 43}, {"text": "accounts on the cloud provider mydrive.ch", "start": 93, "end": 134}], "action": [{"text": "connected", "start": 80, "end": 89}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 90, "end": 92}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Just like with RedOctober, the top target of Cloud Atlas is Russia, followed closely by Kazakhstan, according to data from the Kaspersky Security Network (KSN).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Actually, we see an obvious overlap of targets between the two, with subtle differences which closely account for the geopolitical changes in the region that happened during the last two years.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Interestingly, some of the spear-phishing documents between Cloud Atlas and RedOctober seem to exploit the same theme and were used to target the same entity at different times.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "some of the spear-phishing documents between Cloud Atlas and RedOctober", "start": 15, "end": 86}, {"text": "the same theme", "start": 103, "end": 117}, {"text": "the same entity", "start": 142, "end": 157}, {"text": "different times", "start": 161, "end": 176}], "action": [{"text": "exploit", "start": 95, "end": 102}, {"text": "target", "start": 135, "end": 141}], "modifier": [{"text": "at", "start": 158, "end": 160}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Both Cloud Atlas and RedOctober malware implants rely on a similar construct, with a loader and the final payload that is stored encrypted and compressed in an external file.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There are some important differences though, especially in the encryption algorithms used–RC4 in RedOctober vs AES in Cloud Atlas.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The usage of the compression algorithms in Cloud Altas and RedOctober is another interesting similarity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Both malicious programs share the code for LZMA compression algorithm.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In CloudAtlas it is used to compress the logs and to decompress the decrypted payload from the C & C servers, while in Red October the'' scheduler'' plugin uses it to decompress executable payloads from the C & C.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It turns out that the implementation of the algorithm is identical in both malicious modules, however the way it is invoked is a bit different, with additional input sanity checks added to the CloudAtlas version.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Another interesting similarity between the malware families is the configuration of the build system used to compile the binaries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Every binary created using the Microsoft Visual Studio toolchain has a special header that contains information about the number of input object files and version information of the compilers used to create them, the'' Rich'' header called so by the magic string that is used to identify it in the file.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have been able to identify several RedOctober binaries that have'' Rich'' headers describing exactly the same layout of VC 2010 + VC 2008 object files.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although this doesn't necessarily mean that the binaries were created on the same development computer, they were definitely compiled using the same version of the Microsoft Visual Studio up to the build number version and using similar project configuration.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To summarize the similarities between the two: Finally, perhaps the strongest connection comes from targeting.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Based on observations from KSN, some of the victims of RedOctober are also being targeted by CloudAtlas.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "some of the victims of RedOctober", "start": 32, "end": 65}, {"text": "CloudAtlas", "start": 93, "end": 103}], "action": [{"text": "being targeted", "start": 75, "end": 89}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In at least one case, the victim's computer was attacked only twice in the last two years, with only two malicious programs–RedOctober and Cloud Atlas.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These and other details make us believe that CloudAtlas represents a rebirth of the RedOctober attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Following big announcements and public exposures of targeted attack operations, APT groups behave in a predictable manner.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Most Chinese-speaking attackers simply relocate C & C servers to a different place, recompile the malware and carry on as if nothing happened.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Most Chinese-speaking attackers", "start": 0, "end": 31}, {"text": "C & C servers", "start": 48, "end": 61}, {"text": "a different place", "start": 65, "end": 82}], "action": [{"text": "relocate", "start": 39, "end": 47}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 62, "end": 64}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other groups that are more nervous about exposure go in a hibernation mode for months or years.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some may never return using the same tools and techniques.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, when a major cyber-espionage operation is exposed, the attackers are unlikely to completely shut down everything.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They simply go offline for some time, completely reshuffle their tools and return with rejuvenated forces.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We believe this is also the case of RedOctober, which makes a classy return with Cloud Atlas.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Kaspersky products detect the malware from the Cloud Atlas toolset with the following verdicts: Blue Coat Exposes Inception Framework", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers behind the breach of the New York Times' computer network late last year appear to be mounting fresh assaults that leverage new and improved versions of malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The new campaigns mark the first significant stirrings from the group since it went silent in January in the wake of a detailed expose of the group and its exploits-and a retooling of what security researchers believe is a massive spying operation based in China.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The newest campaign uses updated versions of Aumlib and Ixeshe.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Aumlib, which for years has been used in targeted attacks, now encodes certain HTTP communications.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Aumlib", "start": 0, "end": 6}, {"text": "certain HTTP communications", "start": 71, "end": 98}], "action": [{"text": "encodes", "start": 63, "end": 70}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "FireEye researchers spotted the malware when analyzing a recent attempted attack on an organization involved in shaping economic policy.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "And a new version of Ixeshe, which has been in service since 2009 to attack targets in East Asia, uses new network traffic patterns, possibly to evade traditional network security systems.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a new version of Ixeshe", "start": 4, "end": 27}, {"text": "new network traffic patterns", "start": 103, "end": 131}, {"text": "evade traditional network security systems", "start": 145, "end": 187}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 98, "end": 102}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 142, "end": 144}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The updates are significant for both of the longstanding malware families; before this year, Aumlib had not changed since at least May 2011, and Ixeshe had not evolved since at least December 2011.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cybercriminals are constantly evolving and adapting in their attempts to bypass computer network defenses.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "But, larger, more successful threat actors tend to evolve at a slower rate.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As long as these actors regularly achieve their objective (stealing sensitive data), they are not motivated to update or rethink their techniques, tactics, or procedures (TTPs).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These threat actors' tactics follow the same principles of evolution–successful techniques propagate, and unsuccessful ones are abandoned.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Attackers do not change their approach unless an external force or environmental shift compels them to.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As the old saying goes: If it ain't broke, don't fix it.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "So when a larger, successful threat actor changes up tactics, the move always piques our attention.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Naturally, our first priority is ensuring that we detect the new or altered TTPs.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "But we also attempt to figure out why the adversary changed-what broke?-so that we can predict if and when they will change again in the future.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We observed an example of this phenomenon around May.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "About four months after The New York Times publicized an attack on its network, the attackers behind the intrusion deployed updated versions of their Backdoor.APT.Aumlib and Backdoor.APT.Ixeshe malware families.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers behind the intrusion", "start": 80, "end": 114}, {"text": "updated versions of their Backdoor.APT.Aumlib and Backdoor.APT.Ixeshe malware families", "start": 124, "end": 210}], "action": [{"text": "deployed", "start": 115, "end": 123}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The previous versions of Aumlib had not changed since at least May 2011, and Ixeshe had not evolved since at least December 2011.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We can not say for sure whether the attackers were responding to the scrutiny they received in the wake of the episode.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "But we do know the change was sudden.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Akin to turning a battleship, retooling TTPs of large threat actors is formidable.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Such a move requires recoding malware, updating infrastructure, and possibly retraining workers on new processes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following sections detail the changes to Backdoor.APT.Aumlib and Backdoor.APT.Ixeshe.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Aumlib has been used in targeted attacks for years.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Older variants of this malware family generated the following POST request: Data sent via this POST request transmitted in clear text in the following structure: A recently observed malware sample (hash value 832f5e01be536da71d5b3f7e41938cfb) appears to be a modified variant of Aumlib.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Older variants of this malware family", "start": 0, "end": 37}, {"text": "the following POST request", "start": 48, "end": 74}, {"text": "Data", "start": 76, "end": 80}, {"text": "this POST request", "start": 90, "end": 107}], "action": [{"text": "generated", "start": 38, "end": 47}, {"text": "sent", "start": 81, "end": 85}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 86, "end": 89}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The sample, which was deployed against an organization involved in shaping economic policy, was downloaded from the following URL: The sample generated the following traffic: This output reveals the following changes when compared with earlier variants: The POST URI is changed to /bbs/search.asp (as mentioned, earlier Aumlib variants used a POST URI of /bbs/info.asp.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ") The POST body is now encoded.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The POST body", "start": 2, "end": 15}], "action": [{"text": "is now encoded", "start": 16, "end": 30}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additional requests from the sample generated the following traffic: These subtle changes may be enough to circumvent existing IDS signatures designed to detect older variants of the Aumlib family.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The sample 832f5e01be536da71d5b3f7e41938cfb shares code with an older Aumlib variant with the hash cb3dcde34fd9ff0e19381d99b02f9692.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The sample cb3dcde34fd9ff0e19381d99b02f9692 connected to documents [.] myPicture [.] info and www [.] documents [.] myPicture [.] info and as expected generated the a POST request to /bbs/info.asp.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The sample cb3dcde34fd9ff0e19381d99b02f9692", "start": 0, "end": 43}, {"text": "documents [.] myPicture [.] info and www [.] documents [.] myPicture [.] info", "start": 57, "end": 134}, {"text": "a POST request", "start": 165, "end": 179}, {"text": "/bbs/info.asp", "start": 183, "end": 196}], "action": [{"text": "connected", "start": 44, "end": 53}, {"text": "generated", "start": 151, "end": 160}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 54, "end": 56}, {"text": "to", "start": 180, "end": 182}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Ixeshe has been used in targeted attacks since 2009, often against entities in East Asia.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although the network traffic is encoded with a custom Base64 alphabet, the URI pattern has been largely consistent: We analyzed a recent sample that appears to have targeted entities in Taiwan, a target consistent with previous Ixeshe activity.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the network traffic", "start": 9, "end": 28}, {"text": "a custom Base64 alphabet", "start": 45, "end": 69}], "action": [{"text": "is encoded", "start": 29, "end": 39}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 40, "end": 44}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This sample (aa873ed803ca800ce92a39d9a683c644) exhibited network traffic that does not match the earlier pattern and therefore may evade existing network traffic signatures designed to detect Ixeshe related infections.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This sample (aa873ed803ca800ce92a39d9a683c644)", "start": 0, "end": 46}, {"text": "existing network traffic signatures designed to detect Ixeshe related infections", "start": 137, "end": 217}], "action": [{"text": "evade", "start": 131, "end": 136}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Base64-encoded data still contains information including the victim's hostname and IP address but also a'' mark'' or'' campaign tag/code'' that the threat actors use to keep track of their various attacks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The Base64-encoded data", "start": 0, "end": 23}, {"text": "information including the victim's hostname and IP address", "start": 39, "end": 97}], "action": [{"text": "contains", "start": 30, "end": 38}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The mark for this particular attack was [ll65].", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Based on our observations, the most successful threat actors evolve slowly and deliberately.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "So when they do change, pay close attention.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Knowing how attackers' strategy is shifting is crucial to detecting and defending against today's advanced threats.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "But knowing the'' why'' is equally important.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "That additional degree of understanding can help organizations forecast when and how a threat actor might change their behavior-because if you successfully foil their attacks, they probably will.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This entry was posted in Threat Intelligence, Threat Research by Ned Moran and Nart Villeneuve.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Bookmark the permalink.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At the end of April Microsoft announced that a vulnerability in Word was actively being exploited.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This vulnerability occurred in parsing RTF files and was assigned CVE-2014-1761, a thorough analysis of which can be found on the HP Security Research blog.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have since seen multiple cases where this exploit is used to deliver malware and one was particularly interesting as it contained a new variant of MiniDuke (also known as Win32/SandyEva).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this exploit", "start": 40, "end": 52}, {"text": "malware", "start": 72, "end": 79}], "action": [{"text": "deliver", "start": 64, "end": 71}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "MiniDuke was first discussed by Kaspersky in March 2013 in their paper The MiniDuke Mystery: PDF 0- day Government Spy Assembler 0x29A Micro Backdoorand shortly after in a paper by Bitdefender.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some of the characteristics of MiniDuke-such as its small size (20 KB), its crafty use of assembly programming, and the use of zero-day exploits for distribution-made it an intriguing threat.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "MiniDuke", "start": 31, "end": 39}, {"text": "zero-day exploits", "start": 127, "end": 144}, {"text": "distribution", "start": 149, "end": 161}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 120, "end": 123}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 145, "end": 148}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although the backdoor is still quite similar to its previous versions, some important changes were made since last year, the most notable being the introduction of a secondary component written in JScript to contact a C & C server via Twitter.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a secondary component written in JScript", "start": 164, "end": 204}, {"text": "a C & C server", "start": 216, "end": 230}, {"text": "Twitter", "start": 235, "end": 242}], "action": [{"text": "contact", "start": 208, "end": 215}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 231, "end": 234}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The exploit document was named Proposal-Cover-Sheet-English.rtf and is quite bland when compared to the documents that were used in 2013, which were of a political nature.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We received the document on April 8th, only three days after the compilation of the MiniDuke payload, dated April 5th in the PE header.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The payload remains quite small at only 24 KB.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The functionality of the shellcode which is executed by triggering the vulnerability is rather simple and straightforward.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the shellcode", "start": 21, "end": 34}, {"text": "triggering the vulnerability", "start": 56, "end": 84}], "action": [{"text": "is executed", "start": 41, "end": 52}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 53, "end": 55}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After decrypting itself and obtaining the addresses of some functions exported by kernel32.dll, it decrypts and drops the payload in the% TEMP% directory in a file named'' a.l'' which is subsequently loaded by calling kernel32! LoadLibraryA.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 96, "end": 98}, {"text": "the payload", "start": 118, "end": 129}, {"text": "the% TEMP% directory in a file named'' a.l''", "start": 133, "end": 177}, {"text": "calling kernel32! LoadLibraryA", "start": 210, "end": 240}], "action": [{"text": "decrypts and drops", "start": 99, "end": 117}, {"text": "is subsequently loaded", "start": 184, "end": 206}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 130, "end": 132}, {"text": "by", "start": 207, "end": 209}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An interesting thing about the shellcode is that before transferring control to any API function it checks the first bytes of the function in order to detect hooks and debugger breakpoints which may be set by security software and monitoring tools.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 97, "end": 99}, {"text": "hooks and debugger breakpoints which may be set by security software and monitoring tools", "start": 158, "end": 247}], "action": [{"text": "detect", "start": 151, "end": 157}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If any of these are found the shellcode skips the first 5 bytes of the function being called by manually executing prologue instructions (mov edi, edi; push ebp; mov ebp, esp) and then jumping to the function code as illustrated below.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The next graph presents the execution flow of this malware when the exploitation is successful.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As mentioned previously this version of the MiniDuke payload comes with two modules which we refer to as the main module and the TwitterJS module.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once MiniDuke receives control it checks that the host process is not rundll32.exe and whether the current directory is% TEMP%.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If either of those conditions is met the malware assumes it is run for the first time and it proceeds with its installation onto the system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 90, "end": 92}, {"text": "its installation onto the system", "start": 107, "end": 139}], "action": [{"text": "proceeds", "start": 93, "end": 101}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 102, "end": 106}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "MiniDuke gathers information about the system and encrypts its configuration based on that information, a method also used by OSX/Flashback (this process is called watermarking by Bitdefender).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "MiniDuke", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "information about the system", "start": 17, "end": 45}, {"text": "its configuration", "start": 59, "end": 76}, {"text": "that information", "start": 86, "end": 102}], "action": [{"text": "gathers", "start": 9, "end": 16}, {"text": "encrypts", "start": 50, "end": 58}], "modifier": [{"text": "based on", "start": 77, "end": 85}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The end result is that it is impossible to retrieve the configuration of an encrypted payload if analyzing it on a different computer.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "impossible to retrieve", "start": 29, "end": 51}], "entity": [{"text": "the configuration of an encrypted payload", "start": 52, "end": 93}, {"text": "analyzing it on a different computer", "start": 97, "end": 133}], "modifier": [{"text": "if", "start": 94, "end": 96}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The information collected on infection has not changed since the previous version and consists of the following values: Once the encrypted version of the malware is created, it is written into a file in the% ALLUSERSPROFILE% \\Application Data directory.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the encrypted version of the malware", "start": 125, "end": 161}, {"text": "it", "start": 174, "end": 176}, {"text": "a file in the% ALLUSERSPROFILE% \\Application Data directory", "start": 193, "end": 252}], "action": [{"text": "is created", "start": 162, "end": 172}, {"text": "is written", "start": 177, "end": 187}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 188, "end": 192}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The name of the file is randomly picked from the following values (you can find this listing and those of the next screenshots on the VirusRadar description: The filename extension is also picked randomly from the following list: To persist on the infected system after reboots, the malware creates a hidden .LNK file in the'' Startup'' directory pointing to the modified main module.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "persist", "start": 233, "end": 240}, {"text": "creates", "start": 291, "end": 298}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 241, "end": 243}, {"text": "after", "start": 264, "end": 269}, {"text": "in", "start": 318, "end": 320}], "entity": [{"text": "the infected system", "start": 244, "end": 263}, {"text": "reboots", "start": 270, "end": 277}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 279, "end": 290}, {"text": "a hidden .LNK file", "start": 299, "end": 317}, {"text": "the'' Startup'' directory", "start": 321, "end": 346}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The name of the .LNK", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "file is randomly drawn from the following values: The .LNKfile", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The .LNKfile", "start": 50, "end": 62}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "is created using a COM object with the IShellLinkA interface and contains the following command:'' C: \\Windows\\system32\\rundll32.exe% pathtomainmodule%, exportfunction'' Which gives something like:'' C: \\Windows\\system32\\rundll32.exe C: \\DOCUME~1\\ALLUSE~1\\APPLIC~1\\data.cat, IlqUenn''.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "is created", "start": 0, "end": 10}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 11, "end": 16}, {"text": "with", "start": 30, "end": 34}], "entity": [{"text": "a COM object", "start": 17, "end": 29}, {"text": "the IShellLinkA interface", "start": 35, "end": 60}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When the malware is loaded by rundll32.exe and the current directory isn't% TEMP%, the malware starts with gathering the same system information as described in the'' Installation'' section to decrypt configuration information.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 5, "end": 16}, {"text": "rundll32.exe", "start": 30, "end": 42}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 83, "end": 94}, {"text": "the same system information as described in the'' Installation'' section", "start": 117, "end": 189}, {"text": "decrypt configuration information", "start": 193, "end": 226}], "action": [{"text": "is loaded", "start": 17, "end": 26}, {"text": "gathering", "start": 107, "end": 116}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 190, "end": 192}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As with the previous version of MiniDuke, it checks for the presence of the following processes in the system: If any of these are found in the system the configuration information will be decrypted incorrectly, i.e.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "the malware will run on the system without any communication to C & C servers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the configuration data is decrypted correctly, MiniDuke retrieves the Twitter page of @FloydLSchwartz in search of URLs by which to reach C & C server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "MiniDuke", "start": 50, "end": 58}, {"text": "the Twitter page of @FloydLSchwartz", "start": 69, "end": 104}, {"text": "search of URLs by which to reach C & C server", "start": 108, "end": 153}], "action": [{"text": "retrieves", "start": 59, "end": 68}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 105, "end": 107}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It looks for the tag'' X)))'' on the page (MiniDuke was searching for'' uri!'' in previous samples) and if the tag is found it decrypts a URL from the data that follows it.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Twitter account @FloydLSchwartz does exist but has only retweets and no strings with the special tag.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As the next step, MiniDuke gathers the following information from the infected systems: This information is then sent to the C & C server along with the request to download a payload.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "MiniDuke", "start": 18, "end": 26}, {"text": "the following information", "start": 35, "end": 60}, {"text": "the infected systems", "start": 66, "end": 86}, {"text": "This information", "start": 88, "end": 104}, {"text": "the C & C server", "start": 121, "end": 137}, {"text": "download a payload", "start": 164, "end": 182}], "action": [{"text": "gathers", "start": 27, "end": 34}, {"text": "is then sent", "start": 105, "end": 117}, {"text": "request", "start": 153, "end": 160}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 61, "end": 65}, {"text": "to", "start": 118, "end": 120}, {"text": "to", "start": 161, "end": 163}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The final URL used to communicate with the C & C server looks like this: < urlstart > /create.php? < rndparam > = < systeminfo > Those tokens are derived as follows: An example of such a URL is given below: The payload is downloaded in the file named'' fdbywu'' using the urlmon! URLDownloadToFileA API: The downloaded payload is a fake GIF8 file containing encrypted executable.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The final URL", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "communicate with the C & C server", "start": 22, "end": 55}, {"text": "The payload", "start": 207, "end": 218}, {"text": "the file named'' fdbywu''", "start": 236, "end": 261}, {"text": "the urlmon! URLDownloadToFileA API", "start": 268, "end": 302}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 14, "end": 18}, {"text": "is downloaded", "start": 219, "end": 232}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 19, "end": 21}, {"text": "in", "start": 233, "end": 235}, {"text": "using", "start": 262, "end": 267}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware processes the downloaded file in the same way as previous samples of MiniDuke: it verifies the integrity of the file using RSA-2048, then decrypts it, stores in a file and finally executes it.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 91, "end": 93}, {"text": "the integrity of the file", "start": 103, "end": 128}, {"text": "RSA-2048", "start": 135, "end": 143}, {"text": "it", "start": 201, "end": 203}], "action": [{"text": "verifies", "start": 94, "end": 102}, {"text": "executes", "start": 192, "end": 200}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 129, "end": 134}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The RSA-2048 public key to verify integrity of the executable inside the GIF file is the same as in the previous version of MiniDuke.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The RSA-2048 public key", "start": 0, "end": 23}, {"text": "integrity of the executable inside the GIF file", "start": 34, "end": 81}], "action": [{"text": "verify", "start": 27, "end": 33}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the event that MiniDuke is unable to retrieve a C & C URL from this account, it generates a username to search for based on the current date.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The search query changes roughly every seven days and is similar to the backup mechanism in previous versions that was using Google searches.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A Python implementation of the algorithm can be found in Appendix B.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The TwitterJS module is extracted by creating a copy of the Windows DLL cryptdll.dll, injecting a block of code into it and redirecting the exported functions to this code.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "creating", "start": 37, "end": 45}], "entity": [{"text": "a copy of the Windows DLL cryptdll.dll", "start": 46, "end": 84}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Here is how the export address table of the patched binary looks after modifications.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This file is then stored in an Alternate Data Stream (ADS) in NTUSER.DAT in the% USERPROFILE% folder.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This file", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "an Alternate Data Stream (ADS) in NTUSER.DAT in the% USERPROFILE% folder", "start": 28, "end": 100}], "action": [{"text": "is then stored", "start": 10, "end": 24}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 25, "end": 27}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Finally this DLL is registered as the Open command when a drive is open, which has the effect of starting the bot every time the user opens a disk drive.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this DLL", "start": 8, "end": 16}, {"text": "the Open command when a drive is open", "start": 34, "end": 71}, {"text": "the bot", "start": 106, "end": 113}, {"text": "the user opens a disk drive", "start": 125, "end": 152}], "action": [{"text": "is registered", "start": 17, "end": 30}, {"text": "starting", "start": 97, "end": 105}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 31, "end": 33}, {"text": "every time", "start": 114, "end": 124}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Below you can find the content of the init.cmd script used by MiniDuke to install TwitterJS module onto the system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "MiniDuke", "start": 62, "end": 70}, {"text": "TwitterJS module", "start": 82, "end": 98}, {"text": "the system", "start": 104, "end": 114}], "action": [{"text": "install", "start": 74, "end": 81}], "modifier": [{"text": "onto", "start": 99, "end": 103}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When loaded, TwitterJS instantiates the JScript COM object and decrypts a JScript file containing the core logic of the module.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Prior to executing it, MiniDuke applies a light encoding to the script: The next images show the result of two separate obfuscations, we can see that the variables have different values.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "MiniDuke", "start": 23, "end": 31}, {"text": "a light encoding", "start": 40, "end": 56}, {"text": "the script", "start": 60, "end": 70}], "action": [{"text": "applies", "start": 32, "end": 39}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 57, "end": 59}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is probably done to thwart security systems that scan at the entry points of the JScript engine.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "security systems that scan at the entry points of the JScript engine", "start": 32, "end": 100}], "action": [{"text": "thwart", "start": 25, "end": 31}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The purpose of this script is to use Twitter to find a C & C and retrieve JScript code to execute.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this script", "start": 15, "end": 26}, {"text": "Twitter", "start": 37, "end": 44}, {"text": "find a C & C", "start": 48, "end": 60}, {"text": "JScript code to execute", "start": 74, "end": 97}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 33, "end": 36}, {"text": "retrieve", "start": 65, "end": 73}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 45, "end": 47}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It first generates a Twitter user to search for; this search term changes every 7 days and is actually a match to the real account name, not the Twitter account name.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The bot then visits the Twitter profiles returned by the search and looks for links that end with'' .xhtml", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When one is found, it replaces'' .xhtml", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' with'' .php", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' and fetches that link.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Information about the computer is embedded in the Accept HTTP header.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first link on the retrieved page should contain base64 data; the name attribute of the link is used as a rolling XOR key to decrypt the JScript code.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Finally, MiniDuke calculates a hash of the fetched script and compares it with a hardcoded hash in the TwitterJS script.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If they match, the fetched script is executed by calling eval ().", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The code hashing algorithm used by the component looks very much like SHA-1 but outputs different hashes (you can find the complete implementation in Appendix B.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We decided to search for what was changed in the algorithm; one of our working hypotheses was that the algorithm might have been altered to make collisions feasible.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We couldn't find an obvious difference; all the constants and the steps of the algorithm were as expected.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Then we noticed that for short messages only the second 32-bit word was different when compared to the original SHA-1.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By examining how this 2nd word was generated we finally discovered that this was caused by a scope issue.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As shown below the SHA-1 function used a variable named f: the function Z () is then called which also uses a variable named f without the var keyword, causing it to be treated as a global variable rather than local to the function.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The end result is that the value of f is also changed in the SHA-1 function which affects the value of the 2nd word for that round and ultimately the whole hash for long messages.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A likely explanation of how this problem came to be is that the variable names were changed to single letters using an automated tool prior to embedding it in the payload.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The 2 f variables probably had different names in the original script which avoided the issue.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "So this leaves us with two takeaways: 1) The difference in the hashing algorithm was unintentional and 2) Always declare your local variables with the var keyword.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ";-) We generated the list of Twitter search terms for 2013-2014 and checked if any of those were registered.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At the moment only one exists, @AA2ADcAOAA, which is the TwitterJS account that was generated between August 21st and 27th 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This account has no tweets.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In an effort to discover potential victims, we registered the Twitter accounts corresponding to the current week both for the main and TwitterJS components and set up tweets with encrypted URLs so that an infected computer would reach out to our server.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "So far we have received connections via the TwitterJS accounts from four computers located in Belgium, France and the UK.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have contacted national CERTs to notify the affected parties.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We detect the RTF exploit document as Win32/Exploit.CVE-2014-1761.D and the MiniDuke components as Win32/SandyEva.G.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the world of malware threats, only a few rare examples can truly be considered groundbreaking and almost peerless.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "What we have seen in Regin is just such a class of malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Regin is an extremely complex piece of software that can be customized with a wide range of different capabilities which can be deployed depending on the target.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Regin", "start": 0, "end": 5}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is built on a framework that is designed to sustain long-term intelligence-gathering operations by remaining under the radar.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "long-term intelligence-gathering operations", "start": 55, "end": 98}, {"text": "the radar", "start": 118, "end": 127}], "action": [{"text": "sustain", "start": 47, "end": 54}, {"text": "remaining", "start": 102, "end": 111}], "modifier": [{"text": "under", "start": 112, "end": 117}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It goes to extraordinary lengths to conceal itself and its activities on compromised computers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "itself and its activities on compromised computers", "start": 44, "end": 94}], "action": [{"text": "conceal", "start": 36, "end": 43}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Its stealth combines many of the most advanced techniques that we have ever seen in use.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The main purpose of Regin is intelligence gathering and it has been implicated in data collection operations against government organizations, infrastructure operators, businesses, academics, and private individuals.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The main purpose of Regin", "start": 0, "end": 25}, {"text": "intelligence gathering", "start": 29, "end": 51}, {"text": "it", "start": 56, "end": 58}, {"text": "data collection operations against government organizations, infrastructure operators, businesses, academics, and private individuals", "start": 82, "end": 215}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 26, "end": 28}, {"text": "implicated", "start": 68, "end": 78}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 79, "end": 81}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The level of sophistication and complexity of Regin suggests that the development of this threat could have taken well-resourced teams of developers many months or years to develop and maintain.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Regin is a multi-staged, modular threat, meaning that it has a number of components, each depending on others, to perform attack operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This modular approach gives flexibility to the threat operators as they can load custom features tailored to individual targets when required.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some custom payloads are very advanced and exhibit a high degree of expertise in specialist sectors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The modular design also makes analysis of the threat difficult, as all components must be available in order to fully understand it.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The modular design", "start": 0, "end": 18}, {"text": "analysis of the threat difficult", "start": 30, "end": 62}], "action": [{"text": "makes", "start": 24, "end": 29}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This modular approach has been seen in other sophisticated malware families such as Flamer and Weevil (The Mask), while the multi-stage loading architecture is similar to that seen in the Duqu/Stuxnet family of threats.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Regin is different to what are commonly referred to as'' traditional'' advanced persistent threats (APTs), both in its techniques and ultimate purpose.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "APTs typically seek specific information, usually intellectual property.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "APTs", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "specific information, usually intellectual property", "start": 20, "end": 71}], "action": [{"text": "seek", "start": 15, "end": 19}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Regin's purpose is different.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is used for the collection of data and continuous monitoring of targeted organizations or individuals.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "the collection of data", "start": 15, "end": 37}, {"text": "targeted organizations or individuals", "start": 67, "end": 104}], "action": [{"text": "is used", "start": 3, "end": 10}, {"text": "monitoring", "start": 53, "end": 63}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 11, "end": 14}, {"text": "of", "start": 64, "end": 66}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This report provides a technical analysis of Regin based on a number of identified samples and components.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This analysis illustrates Regin's architecture and the many payloads at its disposal.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Regin is a multi-purpose data collection tool which dates back several years.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Symantec first began looking into this threat in the fall of 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Multiple versions of Regin were found in the wild, targeting several corporations, institutions, academics, and individuals.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Regin has a wide range of standard capabilities, particularly around monitoring targets and stealing data.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Regin", "start": 0, "end": 5}, {"text": "targets", "start": 80, "end": 87}, {"text": "data", "start": 101, "end": 105}], "action": [{"text": "monitoring", "start": 69, "end": 79}, {"text": "stealing", "start": 92, "end": 100}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It also has the ability to load custom features tailored to individual targets.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some of Regin's custom payloads point to a high level of specialist knowledge in particular sectors, such as telecoms infrastructure software, on the part of the developers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Regin is capable of installing a large number of additional payloads, some highly customized for the targeted computer.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Regin", "start": 0, "end": 5}, {"text": "a large number of additional payloads", "start": 31, "end": 68}], "action": [{"text": "installing", "start": 20, "end": 30}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The threat's standard capabilities include several remote access Trojan (RAT) features, such as capturing screenshots and taking control of the mouse's point-and-click functions.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The threat's standard capabilities", "start": 0, "end": 34}, {"text": "several remote access Trojan (RAT) features", "start": 43, "end": 86}, {"text": "screenshots", "start": 106, "end": 117}, {"text": "control of the mouse's point-and-click functions", "start": 129, "end": 177}], "action": [{"text": "include", "start": 35, "end": 42}, {"text": "capturing", "start": 96, "end": 105}, {"text": "taking", "start": 122, "end": 128}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Regin is also configured to steal passwords, monitor network traffic, and gather information on processes and memory utilization.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Regin", "start": 0, "end": 5}, {"text": "passwords", "start": 34, "end": 43}, {"text": "network traffic", "start": 53, "end": 68}, {"text": "information on processes and memory utilization", "start": 81, "end": 128}], "action": [{"text": "steal", "start": 28, "end": 33}, {"text": "monitor", "start": 45, "end": 52}, {"text": "gather", "start": 74, "end": 80}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It can also scan for deleted files on an infected computer and retrieve them.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "deleted files on an infected computer", "start": 21, "end": 58}, {"text": "them", "start": 72, "end": 76}], "action": [{"text": "scan", "start": 12, "end": 16}, {"text": "retrieve", "start": 63, "end": 71}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 17, "end": 20}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "More advanced payload modules designed with specific goals in mind were also found in our investigations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, one module was designed to monitor network traffic to Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers, another was designed to collect administration traffic for mobile telephony base station controllers, while another was created specifically for parsing mail from Exchange databases.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "one module", "start": 13, "end": 23}, {"text": "network traffic to Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers", "start": 48, "end": 124}, {"text": "another", "start": 126, "end": 133}, {"text": "administration traffic for mobile telephony base station controllers", "start": 158, "end": 226}, {"text": "another", "start": 234, "end": 241}, {"text": "mail from Exchange databases", "start": 279, "end": 307}], "action": [{"text": "monitor", "start": 40, "end": 47}, {"text": "collect", "start": 150, "end": 157}, {"text": "parsing", "start": 271, "end": 278}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Regin goes to some lengths to hide the data it is stealing.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Regin", "start": 0, "end": 5}, {"text": "the data", "start": 35, "end": 43}, {"text": "it", "start": 44, "end": 46}], "action": [{"text": "hide", "start": 30, "end": 34}, {"text": "is stealing", "start": 47, "end": 58}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Valuable target data is often not written to disk.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Valuable target data", "start": 0, "end": 20}, {"text": "disk", "start": 45, "end": 49}], "action": [{"text": "is often not written", "start": 21, "end": 41}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 42, "end": 44}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In some cases, Symantec was only able to retrieve the threat samples but not the files containing stolen data.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Symantec is aware of two distinct versions of Regin.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Version 1.0 appears to have been used from at least 2008 to 2011.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Version 2.0 has been used from 2013 onwards, though it may have possibly been used earlier.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Version 1.0 appears to have been abruptly withdrawn from circulation in 2011.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Version 1.0 samples found after this date seem to have been improperly removed or were no longer accessible to the attackers for removal.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This report is based primarily on our analysis of Regin version 1.0.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also touch on version 2.0, for which we only recovered 64-bit files.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Symantec has assigned these version identifiers as they are the only two versions that have been acquired.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Regin likely has more than two versions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There may be versions prior to 1.0 and versions between 1.0 and 2.0.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Regin operators do not appear to focus on any specific industry sector.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Regin infections have been observed in a variety of organizations, including private companies, government entities, and research institutes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Infections are also geographically diverse, having been identified mainly in 10 different regions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The infection vector varies among targets.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A reproducible infection vector is unconfirmed at time of writing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Targets may be tricked into visiting spoofed versions of well- known websites and the threat may be installed through a web browser or by exploiting an application.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the threat", "start": 82, "end": 92}, {"text": "a web browser", "start": 118, "end": 131}, {"text": "exploiting an application", "start": 138, "end": 163}], "action": [{"text": "be installed", "start": 97, "end": 109}], "modifier": [{"text": "through", "start": 110, "end": 117}, {"text": "by", "start": 135, "end": 137}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On one computer, log files show that Regin originated from Yahoo! Instant Messenger through an unconfirmed exploit.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Regin", "start": 37, "end": 42}, {"text": "Yahoo! Instant Messenger", "start": 59, "end": 83}, {"text": "an unconfirmed exploit", "start": 92, "end": 114}], "action": [{"text": "originated", "start": 43, "end": 53}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 54, "end": 58}, {"text": "through", "start": 84, "end": 91}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Regin has a six-stage architecture.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The initial stages involve the installation and configuration of the threat's internal services.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The initial stages", "start": 0, "end": 18}, {"text": "the installation and configuration of the threat's internal services", "start": 27, "end": 95}], "action": [{"text": "involve", "start": 19, "end": 26}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The later stages bring Regin's main payloads into play.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This section presents a brief overview of the format and purpose of each stage.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The most interesting stages are the executables and data files stored in Stages 4 and 5.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The initial Stage 1 driver is the only plainly visible code on the computer.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All other stages are stored as encrypted data blobs, as a file or within a non-traditional file storage area such as the registry, extended attributes, or raw sectors at the end of disk.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "All other stages", "start": 0, "end": 16}, {"text": "encrypted data blobs", "start": 31, "end": 51}], "action": [{"text": "are stored", "start": 17, "end": 27}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 28, "end": 30}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Symantec Security Response has not obtained the Regin dropper at the time of writing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Symantec believes that once the dropper is executed on the target's computer, it will install and execute Stage 1.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the dropper", "start": 28, "end": 39}, {"text": "it", "start": 78, "end": 80}, {"text": "Stage 1", "start": 106, "end": 113}], "action": [{"text": "install", "start": 86, "end": 93}, {"text": "execute", "start": 98, "end": 105}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It's likely that Stage 0 is responsible for setting up various extended attributes and/or registry keys and values that hold encoded versions of stages 2, 3, and potentially stages 4 and onwards.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Stage 0", "start": 17, "end": 24}, {"text": "various extended attributes and/or registry keys and values that hold encoded versions of stages 2, 3, and potentially stages 4 and onwards", "start": 55, "end": 194}], "action": [{"text": "setting up", "start": 44, "end": 54}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The dropper could be transient rather than acting as an executable file and may possibly be part of the infection vector exploit code.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Stage 1 is the initial load point for the threat.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Stage 1", "start": 0, "end": 7}, {"text": "the initial load point for the threat", "start": 11, "end": 48}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 8, "end": 10}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There are two known Stage 1 file names: These are kernel drivers that load and execute Stage 2.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "kernel drivers", "start": 50, "end": 64}, {"text": "Stage 2", "start": 87, "end": 94}], "action": [{"text": "load and execute", "start": 70, "end": 86}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These kernel drivers may be registered as a system service or may have an associated registry key to load the driver while the computer is starting up.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "kernel drivers", "start": 6, "end": 20}, {"text": "the driver", "start": 106, "end": 116}], "action": [{"text": "load", "start": 101, "end": 105}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Stage 1 simply reads and executes Stage 2 from a set of NTFS extended attributes.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Stage 1", "start": 0, "end": 7}, {"text": "Stage 2", "start": 34, "end": 41}, {"text": "a set of NTFS extended attributes", "start": 47, "end": 80}], "action": [{"text": "reads and executes", "start": 15, "end": 33}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 42, "end": 46}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If no extended attributes are found, Stage 2 is executed from a set of registry keys.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Stage 2", "start": 37, "end": 44}, {"text": "a set of registry keys", "start": 62, "end": 84}], "action": [{"text": "is executed", "start": 45, "end": 56}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 57, "end": 61}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Stage 2 is a kernel driver that simply extracts, installs and runs Stage 3.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Stage 2", "start": 0, "end": 7}, {"text": "kernel driver", "start": 13, "end": 26}, {"text": "Stage 3", "start": 67, "end": 74}], "action": [{"text": "extracts, installs and runs", "start": 39, "end": 66}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Stage 2 is not stored in the traditional file system, but is encrypted within an extended attribute or a registry key blob.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Stage 2", "start": 0, "end": 7}, {"text": "an extended attribute or a registry key blob", "start": 78, "end": 122}], "action": [{"text": "is encrypted", "start": 58, "end": 70}], "modifier": [{"text": "within", "start": 71, "end": 77}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Stage 2 can be found encrypted in: This stage can also hide running instances of Stage 1.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Stage 2", "start": 0, "end": 7}, {"text": "This stage", "start": 35, "end": 45}, {"text": "running instances of Stage 1", "start": 60, "end": 88}], "action": [{"text": "be found encrypted", "start": 12, "end": 30}, {"text": "hide", "start": 55, "end": 59}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once this happens, there are no remaining plainly visible code artifacts.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Similar to previous stages, Stage 2 finds and loads an encrypted version of Stage 3 from either NTFS extended attributes or a registry key blob.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Stage 2", "start": 28, "end": 35}, {"text": "an encrypted version of Stage 3", "start": 52, "end": 83}, {"text": "either NTFS extended attributes or a registry key blob", "start": 89, "end": 143}], "action": [{"text": "finds and loads", "start": 36, "end": 51}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 84, "end": 88}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Stage 2 can also monitor the state of the threat.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Stage 2", "start": 0, "end": 7}, {"text": "the state of the threat", "start": 25, "end": 48}], "action": [{"text": "monitor", "start": 17, "end": 24}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This stage drops the file msrdc64.dat, which appears to always be 512 bytes in size.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This stage", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "the file msrdc64.dat", "start": 17, "end": 37}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 11, "end": 16}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first two bytes are used and the remaining bytes are set to zero.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The second byte indicates the exclusive maximum number of instances allowed to run, which is set to two.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This means no more than one instance should run at any time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first byte indicates how many instances were run or attempted to run.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Therefore, the potential combinations for the first two bytes are: Stage 3 is a kernel mode DLL and is not stored in the traditional file system.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Instead, this file is encrypted within an extended attribute or registry key blob.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this file", "start": 9, "end": 18}, {"text": "an extended attribute or registry key blob", "start": 39, "end": 81}], "action": [{"text": "is encrypted", "start": 19, "end": 31}], "modifier": [{"text": "within", "start": 32, "end": 38}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Stage 3 can be found in the following locations: The file is six to seven times the size of the driver in Stage 2.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition to loading and executing Stage 4, Stage 3 offers a framework for the higher level stages.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "loading and executing", "start": 15, "end": 36}], "entity": [{"text": "Stage 4", "start": 37, "end": 44}, {"text": "Stage 3", "start": 46, "end": 53}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Stages 3 and above are based on a modular framework of code modules.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These modules offer functions through a private, custom interface.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Each file in stages 3 and above can'' export'' functionality to other parts of Regin.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the case of Stage 3, the following primitives are offered: These primitives are provided through a custom export methodology.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Stage 3 DLL exports a wide range of functionality through a custom export methodology.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The interface used to export functionality does not make use of the traditional Windows DLL export mechanism by name or ordinal.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Exported Regin methods are referenced by a tuple consisting of a major and minor number.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Stage 3 exports hundreds of methods, organized into 12 different major groups.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The numbers used vary across versions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We acquired artifacts using two different numbering schemes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Table 2 is an example listing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With Regin's modular nature, Stage 4 kernel modules and Stage 5 user modules (payloads) can provide functionality and export routines using the same major and minor numbering scheme.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The files for Stage 4, which are loaded by Stage 3, consist of a user-mode orchestrator and multiple kernel payload modules.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The files for Stage 4", "start": 0, "end": 21}, {"text": "Stage 3", "start": 43, "end": 50}], "action": [{"text": "are loaded", "start": 29, "end": 39}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They are stored in two EVFS containers as files: •% System% \\config\\SystemAudit.Evt: Contains Stage 4 kernel drivers, which constitute the kernel mode part of Regin's payload.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "•% System% \\config\\SecurityAudit.Evt: Contains a user mode version of Stage 3.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The files are injected into services.exe.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When the attackers who operated Regin cleaned up compromised computers once they were finished with them, they often failed to remove Stage 4 and 5 artifacts from the system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers who operated Regin", "start": 5, "end": 37}, {"text": "compromised computers", "start": 49, "end": 70}], "action": [{"text": "cleaned up", "start": 38, "end": 48}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Stage 4 also uses the same export methodology described in Stage 3.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Stage 5 consists of the main Regin payload functionality.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The files for Stage 5 are injected into services.exe by Stage 4.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The files for Stage 5", "start": 0, "end": 21}, {"text": "services.exe", "start": 40, "end": 52}, {"text": "Stage 4", "start": 56, "end": 63}], "action": [{"text": "are injected", "start": 22, "end": 34}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 35, "end": 39}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Stage 5 files are EVFS containers containing other files: Regin's payload involves the DLLs contained in the SystemLog.evt EVFS container.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The payload functionality differs depending on the targeted computer.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Custom payload files will likely be delivered for each specific environment.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Example payload functionality seen to date includes: Regin stores data files and payloads on disk in encrypted virtual file system files.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Regin", "start": 53, "end": 58}, {"text": "data files and payloads", "start": 66, "end": 89}, {"text": "disk", "start": 93, "end": 97}, {"text": "encrypted virtual file system files", "start": 101, "end": 136}], "action": [{"text": "stores", "start": 59, "end": 65}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 90, "end": 92}, {"text": "in", "start": 98, "end": 100}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Such files are accessed by the major routines 3Dh.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Files stored inside EVFS containers are encrypted with a variant of RC5, using 64-bit blocks and 20 rounds.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Files stored inside EVFS containers", "start": 0, "end": 35}, {"text": "a variant of RC5", "start": 55, "end": 71}, {"text": "64-bit blocks and 20 rounds", "start": 79, "end": 106}], "action": [{"text": "are encrypted", "start": 36, "end": 49}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 50, "end": 54}, {"text": "using", "start": 73, "end": 78}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The encryption mode is reverse cipher feedback (CFB).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The encryption mode", "start": 0, "end": 19}, {"text": "reverse cipher feedback (CFB)", "start": 23, "end": 52}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 20, "end": 22}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Known extensions for EVFS containers are *.evt and *.imd.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The structure of a container is similar to the FAT file system.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One major difference is that files do not have a name; instead, they're identified using a binary tag.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The tag itself is the concatenation of a major number and a minor number.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The major number typically indicates the major function group that will handle the file.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A container starts with the header in Table 3 (little-endian ordering).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The header is followed by the file entry table (Table 4).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Each file entry is 13h+taglen bytes long.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The sectors follow (Table 5).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A sector of sectsize bytes starts with a DWORD pointing to the next sector (if the file does not fit within single sector), followed by sectsize-4 bytes of payload data.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As explained above, the files are encrypted.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the files", "start": 20, "end": 29}], "action": [{"text": "are encrypted", "start": 30, "end": 43}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other layers of encryption and compression may also be in place, although those would be handled by higher level components.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Regin's C & C operations are extensive.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Regin's C & C operations", "start": 0, "end": 24}, {"text": "extensive", "start": 29, "end": 38}], "action": [{"text": "are", "start": 25, "end": 28}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These backchannel operations are bidirectional, which means either the attackers can initiate communications with compromised computers on the border network or the compromised computers can initiate communications with the attacker.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "backchannel operations", "start": 6, "end": 28}, {"text": "bidirectional", "start": 33, "end": 46}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 67, "end": 80}, {"text": "communications", "start": 94, "end": 108}, {"text": "compromised computers", "start": 114, "end": 135}, {"text": "the border network", "start": 139, "end": 157}, {"text": "the compromised computers", "start": 161, "end": 186}, {"text": "communications", "start": 200, "end": 214}, {"text": "the attacker", "start": 220, "end": 232}], "action": [{"text": "are", "start": 29, "end": 32}, {"text": "initiate", "start": 85, "end": 93}, {"text": "initiate", "start": 191, "end": 199}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 109, "end": 113}, {"text": "on", "start": 136, "end": 138}, {"text": "with", "start": 215, "end": 219}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Furthermore, compromised computers can serve as a proxy for other infections and command and control can also happen in a peer-to-peer fashion.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "compromised computers", "start": 13, "end": 34}, {"text": "a proxy for other infections", "start": 48, "end": 76}, {"text": "command and control", "start": 81, "end": 100}, {"text": "a peer-to-peer fashion", "start": 120, "end": 142}], "action": [{"text": "serve", "start": 39, "end": 44}, {"text": "happen", "start": 110, "end": 116}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 45, "end": 47}, {"text": "in", "start": 117, "end": 119}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All communications are strongly encrypted and can happen in a two-stage fashion where the attacker may contact a compromised computer using one channel to instruct it to begin communications on a different channel.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "All communications", "start": 0, "end": 18}, {"text": "a two-stage fashion", "start": 60, "end": 79}, {"text": "the attacker", "start": 86, "end": 98}, {"text": "a compromised computer", "start": 111, "end": 133}, {"text": "one channel", "start": 140, "end": 151}, {"text": "it", "start": 164, "end": 166}, {"text": "communications", "start": 176, "end": 190}, {"text": "a different channel", "start": 194, "end": 213}], "action": [{"text": "are strongly encrypted", "start": 19, "end": 41}, {"text": "happen", "start": 50, "end": 56}, {"text": "contact", "start": 103, "end": 110}, {"text": "instruct", "start": 155, "end": 163}, {"text": "begin", "start": 170, "end": 175}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 57, "end": 59}, {"text": "using", "start": 134, "end": 139}, {"text": "on", "start": 191, "end": 193}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Four transport protocols are available for C & C: • ICMP: Payload information can be encoded and embedded in lieu of legitimate ICMP/ping data.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Payload information", "start": 58, "end": 77}, {"text": "legitimate ICMP/ping data", "start": 117, "end": 142}], "action": [{"text": "be encoded and embedded", "start": 82, "end": 105}], "modifier": [{"text": "in lieu of", "start": 106, "end": 116}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The string'shit' is scattered in the packet for data validation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, CRC checks use the seed'31337'.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• HTTP: Payload information can be encoded and embedded within cookie data under the names SESSID, SMSWAP, TW, WINKER, TIMESET, LASTVISIT, AST.NETSessionId, PHPSESSID, or phpAdsd.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Payload information", "start": 8, "end": 27}, {"text": "cookie data", "start": 63, "end": 74}], "action": [{"text": "be encoded and embedded", "start": 32, "end": 55}], "modifier": [{"text": "within", "start": 56, "end": 62}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This information can be combined with another cookie for validation under the names USERIDTK, UID, GRID, UID=PREF=ID, TM, utma, LM, TMARK, VERSION, or CURRENT.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The C & C operations are undertaken by various modules, including major groups C373h, 19h, 9, as well as Stage 5 payloads, such as C375h and 1Bh.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The C & C operations", "start": 0, "end": 20}, {"text": "various modules", "start": 39, "end": 54}], "action": [{"text": "are undertaken", "start": 21, "end": 35}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Regin logs data to the ApplicationLog.dat file.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Regin", "start": 0, "end": 5}, {"text": "data", "start": 11, "end": 15}, {"text": "the ApplicationLog.dat file", "start": 19, "end": 46}], "action": [{"text": "logs", "start": 6, "end": 10}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 16, "end": 18}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This file is not an encrypted container, but it is encrypted and compressed.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 45, "end": 47}], "action": [{"text": "is encrypted and compressed", "start": 48, "end": 75}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Regin can be distributed with various payload modules or receive payload modules after infection.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Regin", "start": 0, "end": 5}, {"text": "various payload modules", "start": 30, "end": 53}, {"text": "payload modules", "start": 65, "end": 80}, {"text": "infection", "start": 87, "end": 96}], "action": [{"text": "be distributed", "start": 10, "end": 24}, {"text": "receive", "start": 57, "end": 64}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 25, "end": 29}, {"text": "after", "start": 81, "end": 86}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The extensible nature of Regin and its custom payloads indicate that many additional payloads are likely to exist in order to enhance Regin's capabilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Furthermore, we have found data files accompanying payload modules that have not been recovered.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following table describes the Stage 4 kernel payload modules and Stage 5 user mode payload modules, which we have seen several variants of Regin use.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The IIS web server log stealing module, 27E9h, is an example of a payload module that was installed after the initial infection and was specifically deployed for a particular target.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The IIS web server log", "start": 0, "end": 22}, {"text": "module", "start": 32, "end": 38}, {"text": "27E9h", "start": 40, "end": 45}, {"text": "a payload module", "start": 64, "end": 80}, {"text": "the initial infection", "start": 106, "end": 127}], "action": [{"text": "stealing", "start": 23, "end": 31}, {"text": "was installed", "start": 86, "end": 99}], "modifier": [{"text": "after", "start": 100, "end": 105}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Only a small amount of the 64-bit Regin files have been recovered.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These samples may represent version 2.0 or their differences may possibly be solely specific to 64-bit versions of Regin.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also recovered files from infected computers that may or may not be associated with 64-bit Regin, including several variants of svcsstat.exe, a file that aims to retrieve binary data over pipes or sockets and execute the data.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "svcsstat.exe", "start": 131, "end": 143}, {"text": "a file", "start": 145, "end": 151}, {"text": "binary data", "start": 174, "end": 185}, {"text": "pipes", "start": 191, "end": 196}, {"text": "sockets", "start": 200, "end": 207}, {"text": "the data", "start": 220, "end": 228}], "action": [{"text": "retrieve", "start": 165, "end": 173}, {"text": "execute", "start": 212, "end": 219}], "modifier": [{"text": "over", "start": 186, "end": 190}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The recovered files do not appear to fundamentally vary from their 32-bit counterparts, apart from a few noteworthy differences.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The 32-bit and 64-bit versions of Regin use different file names.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These differences are shown in the first section of this paper as well as in the appendix.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Most importantly, in the 64-bit version of Regin, the names of containers are changed: The 64-bit version of Regin's Stage 1 (wshnetc.dll) is no longer a kernel mode driver, as drivers under 64-bit Windows must be signed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Instead, Stage 1 is a user mode DLL loaded as a Winsock helper when the computer is starting up.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Stage 1", "start": 9, "end": 16}, {"text": "a Winsock helper", "start": 46, "end": 62}, {"text": "the computer is starting up", "start": 68, "end": 95}], "action": [{"text": "loaded", "start": 36, "end": 42}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 43, "end": 45}, {"text": "when", "start": 63, "end": 67}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Rather than loading Stage 2 from an NTFS extended attribute, Stage 1 looks for the last partition (in terms of physical location) on disk and searches for the payload in the raw sectors in this area of the disk.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Stage 1", "start": 61, "end": 68}, {"text": "the last partition (in terms of physical location) on disk", "start": 79, "end": 137}, {"text": "the payload", "start": 155, "end": 166}, {"text": "the raw sectors in this area of the disk", "start": 170, "end": 210}], "action": [{"text": "looks", "start": 69, "end": 74}, {"text": "searches", "start": 142, "end": 150}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 75, "end": 78}, {"text": "for", "start": 151, "end": 154}, {"text": "in", "start": 167, "end": 169}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The 64-bit Regin's Stage 3 has not been recovered.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We believe that it may not exist, as the 32-bit version is a driver.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Stage 4 is an orchestrator just like its 32-bit counterpart and it uses the same major and minor values to export functionality.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "No Stage 5 payload modules have been recovered.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Regin is a highly-complex threat which has been used for large-scale data collection or intelligence gathering campaigns.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Regin", "start": 0, "end": 5}, {"text": "large-scale data collection or intelligence gathering campaigns", "start": 57, "end": 120}], "action": [{"text": "been used", "start": 43, "end": 52}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 53, "end": 56}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The development and operation of this threat would have required a significant investment of time and resources.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Threats of this nature are rare and are only comparable to the Stuxnet/Duqu family of malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The discovery of Regin serves to highlight how significant investments continue to be made into the development of tools for use in intelligence gathering.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many components of Regin have still gone undiscovered and additional functionality and versions may exist.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Symantec and Norton products detect this threat as Backdoor.Regin.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Regin's data files are classified as Stage 5 components and are contained in an EVFS container.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As the data files are stored in a container, they do not have names.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Just like Stage 5 modules, they are referenced by their filetag, which is the aggregation of the major and minor identifiers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The major identifier indicates which major routine group likely handles or creates the file.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Not all data files have been recovered, so the information remains incomplete.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Data files associated with Stage 4 kernel modules have not been recovered Table 8 lists recovered data files used by Stage 5 modules.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The associated modules that supposedly manipulate those data files were not recovered.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following details can be used to help determine whether you have been impacted by this threat.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Blue Coat researchers have uncovered a previously-undocumented, highly automated, and extremely sophisticated framework for performing targeted attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The framework is notable for a number of reasons, including (but not limited to) its use of a cloud-based infrastructure for command-and-control and its use of the WebDAV protocol to send instructions and receive exfiltrated information from compromised systems.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The framework", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "a cloud-based infrastructure", "start": 92, "end": 120}, {"text": "command-and-control", "start": 125, "end": 144}, {"text": "the WebDAV protocol", "start": 160, "end": 179}, {"text": "send instructions", "start": 183, "end": 200}, {"text": "receive exfiltrated information from compromised systems", "start": 205, "end": 261}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 85, "end": 88}, {"text": "use", "start": 153, "end": 156}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 121, "end": 124}, {"text": "to", "start": 180, "end": 182}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Initial malware components were embedded in Rich Text Format (RTF) files.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Exploitation of vulnerabilities in this file format is leveraged to gain remote access to victim's computers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Exploitation of vulnerabilities in this file format", "start": 0, "end": 51}, {"text": "gain remote access to victim's computers", "start": 68, "end": 108}], "action": [{"text": "is leveraged", "start": 52, "end": 64}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 65, "end": 67}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The framework, thus far, has been using the services of a cloud service provider based in Sweden, CloudMe.com, for its main command-and-control infrastructure.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The framework", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "the services of a cloud service provider based in Sweden, CloudMe.com", "start": 40, "end": 109}, {"text": "its main command-and-control infrastructure", "start": 115, "end": 158}], "action": [{"text": "been using", "start": 29, "end": 39}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 111, "end": 114}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Malware payloads designed for a wide array of potential devices, including home routers and mobile devices running iOS, BlackBerryOS or Android, were also recovered during the course of our research.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The framework is designed in such a way that all post-infection communication (i.e. target surveying, configuration updates, malware updates, and data exfiltration) can be performed via the cloud service.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "all post-infection communication (i.e. target surveying, configuration updates, malware updates, and data exfiltration)", "start": 45, "end": 164}, {"text": "the cloud service", "start": 186, "end": 203}], "action": [{"text": "be performed", "start": 169, "end": 181}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 182, "end": 185}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware components of this framework follow a plugin model, where new malware rely on other, previously delivered malware components to interact with the framework.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Initial attacks were largely focused on Russia and a few other Eastern European countries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, we have later seen that attackers are interested in targets all over the globe.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The framework is itself target-agnostic, and seems highly automated.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The operational security exhibited by the attackers is very good-among the best we have seen.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Most interaction between attackers and their infrastructure is performed via a convoluted network of router proxies and rented hosts.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Most interaction between attackers and their infrastructure", "start": 0, "end": 59}, {"text": "a convoluted network of router proxies and rented hosts", "start": 77, "end": 132}], "action": [{"text": "is performed", "start": 60, "end": 72}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 73, "end": 76}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although the attackers have left a few clues, we have been unable to provide attribution with any degree of accuracy.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The use of software vulnerabilities in order to execute malicious software on unsuspecting users' computers is an important parameter to monitor.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This method of attack is not only known to have a considerable success rate, it is also often deployed by resourceful attackers and, as such, marks a threat worth paying attention to.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The use of exploits in document formats like PDF, DOC and RTF is in some ways especially noteworthy.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Documents are commonly exchanged via mail, which make them perfect for email-borne targeted attacks; what is otherwise known as spear phishing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In March, 2014, Microsoft published information about a new vulnerability in Rich Text Format (RTF).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This vulnerability, named CVE-2014-1761 (Microsoft Word RTF Object Confusion), had already been used effectively by attackers at the time of the announcement.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Two previous vulnerabilities in the RTF file format, known as CVE-2010-3333 and CVE-2012-0158, had become, by that time, mainstays of targeted attacks, so we tracked how attackers implemented this new exploit with keen interest.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By late August, we identified a malware espionage operation that used both the CVE-2014-1761 and CVE-2012-0158 vulnerabilities to trigger execution of the malicious payload, and which leveraged a single cloud service as the backbone of its entire visible infrastructure.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When we examined the suspicious documents, it was discovered that they were somewhat anomalous compared to the run-of-the-mill material.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They turned out to belong to a highly advanced and professional targeted attack framework, which utilized a complex series of techniques to survey potential targets.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a highly advanced and professional targeted attack framework", "start": 29, "end": 89}, {"text": "a complex series of techniques", "start": 106, "end": 136}, {"text": "survey potential targets", "start": 140, "end": 164}], "action": [{"text": "utilized", "start": 97, "end": 105}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 137, "end": 139}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Due to the many levels of obfuscation and indirection, we named this the Inception framework; but there ends all similarity with the movie by the same name.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Leonardo DiCaprio is not associated with this investigation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We initially knew little about who the actual targets were; apart from one.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In that particular case we had the actual phishing email, so we knew the apparent recipient–the CEO of a large Russian bank.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "we", "start": 24, "end": 26}, {"text": "the actual phishing email", "start": 31, "end": 56}], "action": [{"text": "had", "start": 27, "end": 30}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The email was apparently sent from'' Mrs. World''; note the Mrs., and not Miss-World.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We soon discovered that our malware repository contained several other, similar documents, but these had come from other sources which did not include the email message, or any identifiable information about the targets.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, the text of the documents covered a variety of topics mostly revolving around Russian issues relating to a variety of business sectors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following pages highlight a representative selection of these documents.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All documents that we have found so far have been rather standard Word documents, of the old 97-2003 compatible format based on OLE2.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Such documents can, and typically do, contain quite a bit of metadata: The name of the document creator; the user who edited it most recently; the name of the company whose copy of Word was used to create the document, et al.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Users can optionally configure Word to remove this metadata when a document is saved, and that's exactly what the creator of these documents did, stripping out this potential source of attribution data.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, Word documents in this format contain additional information, if you know where to look.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All Word documents of this format contain what's known as a File Information Block (FIB).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The FIB contains information about the file's internal structure, and also–to some extent–data on the program used to create the file.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the case of the samples we analyzed, all of the documents were saved using the same build of Microsoft Word from Office14 (better known as Office 2010).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, documents can contain slack space in which old data remains.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, the decoy that came with the attack named'' Organigrama Gobierno Rusia.doc'' contains Visual Basic leftovers indicating that it originally was created on a computer that was configured to be used by a native Spanish speaker, apparently by an advisor at the Spanish Embassy in Moscow.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This document was presumably obtained by the attackers and repurposed for the attack.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This document", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 41, "end": 54}, {"text": "the attack", "start": 74, "end": 84}], "action": [{"text": "was presumably obtained", "start": 14, "end": 37}, {"text": "repurposed", "start": 59, "end": 69}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 70, "end": 73}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Despite the limited information at our disposal about the targets of these attacks, their content reveals some context about who the possible targets may have been.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "First of all, we have the decoy documents which indicate an interest in: We also have a set of phishing mails, which were targeted at: The shellcode used is a pretty standard variant previously used by a number of campaigns typically operating out of China, but with some minor changes.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "we", "start": 14, "end": 16}, {"text": "the decoy documents", "start": 22, "end": 41}, {"text": "We", "start": 73, "end": 75}, {"text": "a set of phishing mails", "start": 86, "end": 109}], "action": [{"text": "have", "start": 17, "end": 21}, {"text": "have", "start": 81, "end": 85}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malicious content is stored inside the document in encoded form, and the shellcode decodes and writes this to disk.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malicious content", "start": 0, "end": 21}, {"text": "the document", "start": 39, "end": 51}, {"text": "encoded form", "start": 55, "end": 67}, {"text": "the shellcode", "start": 73, "end": 86}, {"text": "this", "start": 106, "end": 110}, {"text": "disk", "start": 114, "end": 118}], "action": [{"text": "is stored", "start": 22, "end": 31}, {"text": "writes", "start": 99, "end": 105}], "modifier": [{"text": "inside", "start": 32, "end": 38}, {"text": "in", "start": 52, "end": 54}, {"text": "to", "start": 111, "end": 113}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Upon successful execution this code drops a Word document and a Visual Basic script.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this code", "start": 26, "end": 35}, {"text": "a Word document and a Visual Basic script", "start": 42, "end": 83}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 36, "end": 41}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Word document is displayed to the user to avoid arousing any suspicion while the script is executed in the background.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the script", "start": 81, "end": 91}, {"text": "the background", "start": 107, "end": 121}], "action": [{"text": "is executed", "start": 92, "end": 103}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 104, "end": 106}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Unusual for many exploit campaigns, the names of the dropped files vary; for example HyHa9AJ.vbs, ewRg.vbs, 0QHdN.vbs, etc.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the names of the dropped files", "start": 36, "end": 66}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "–clearly randomized in order to avoid detection by name.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "randomized", "start": 9, "end": 19}], "modifier": [{"text": "in order to", "start": 20, "end": 31}], "entity": [{"text": "avoid detection by name", "start": 32, "end": 55}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The VBScript dropper code is also a little unusual.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It declares a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) object in order to reach components like the registry and file system.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This seems adapted from Microsoft example code, like the one found at http: //msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa387236 (v=vs.85) .aspx", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When the VBSript is run it drops two files to disk.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 24, "end": 26}, {"text": "two files", "start": 33, "end": 42}, {"text": "disk", "start": 46, "end": 50}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 27, "end": 32}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 43, "end": 45}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One is a polymorphed dll file and the other a binary data file with no obvious internal structure.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This data file turns out to be encrypted using AES-256.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This data file", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "AES-256", "start": 47, "end": 54}], "action": [{"text": "be encrypted", "start": 28, "end": 40}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 41, "end": 46}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The files will be installed in several locations: These locations will vary some between operating system versions.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The files", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "several locations", "start": 31, "end": 48}], "action": [{"text": "be installed", "start": 15, "end": 27}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 28, "end": 30}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The VBScript then sets a startup key in the'' HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run'' registry path to execute the DLLs at boot time.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The VBScript", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "a startup key", "start": 23, "end": 36}, {"text": "the'' HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run'' registry path", "start": 40, "end": 112}, {"text": "the DLLs", "start": 124, "end": 132}, {"text": "boot time", "start": 136, "end": 145}], "action": [{"text": "sets", "start": 18, "end": 22}, {"text": "execute", "start": 116, "end": 123}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 37, "end": 39}, {"text": "at", "start": 133, "end": 135}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Regardless of whether the registry launches the DLL or when another malware executable starts the DLL directly, the DLL is launched using regsrv32.exe with the /s (silent) option.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the DLL", "start": 112, "end": 119}, {"text": "regsrv32.exe", "start": 138, "end": 150}, {"text": "the /s (silent) option", "start": 156, "end": 178}], "action": [{"text": "is launched", "start": 120, "end": 131}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 132, "end": 137}, {"text": "with", "start": 151, "end": 155}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The names of these dropped files change from attack to attack.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The one above drops ctfmonrc.dll.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The one above", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "ctfmonrc.dll", "start": 20, "end": 32}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 14, "end": 19}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other names observed were: The encrypted data files are named using random words apparently taken from a dictionary–'' acholias'','' arzner'','' bicorporate'','' crockrell'','' damnatorily'' etc.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Looking at one of the dropped dlls we can see the authors originally called it 95Num3P3gm.dll.polymorphed.dll.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When executed it will rebuild the original dll (95Num3p3gm.dll, presumably), load it from memory and pass over execution.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "load", "start": 77, "end": 81}], "entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 82, "end": 84}, {"text": "memory", "start": 90, "end": 96}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 85, "end": 89}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is hard to describe the polymorphed dlls with any real depth, as there is little consistency between them.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When two nearly identical dlls are encoded using the polymorphic scheme there is very little code in common.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The call graphs are different and key functions have varying number of arguments.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The polymorphing mechanism also generates, and inserts, unique functions all of which make calls to different floating-point operations–all done just to obfuscate the actual decoding process.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The polymorphing mechanism", "start": 0, "end": 26}, {"text": "the actual decoding process", "start": 163, "end": 190}], "action": [{"text": "obfuscate", "start": 153, "end": 162}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The sizes of buffers allocated are also randomized to mask their intent.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "What is common is that somewhere along the execution cycle is one extremely large function (over 200 kb in length) where early in a large allocation is made where the un-obfuscated binary will be placed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The binary is then built from de- obfuscating segments of it that have been dispersed through the'.rdata' section.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The order, size, and locations of these segments vary from build to build but somewhere near the end of the large function there will be a call to a subfunction that loads the PE image into memory, followed by a call to free the PE image allocation from memory.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a call to a subfunction", "start": 137, "end": 160}, {"text": "the PE image", "start": 172, "end": 184}, {"text": "memory", "start": 190, "end": 196}, {"text": "a call", "start": 210, "end": 216}, {"text": "the PE image allocation", "start": 225, "end": 248}, {"text": "memory", "start": 254, "end": 260}], "action": [{"text": "loads", "start": 166, "end": 171}, {"text": "free", "start": 220, "end": 224}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 185, "end": 189}, {"text": "from", "start": 249, "end": 253}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Simply halting execution before this function call permits a researcher to extract the reconstructed DLL from memory.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Here, pausing execution before the call to'loadpefrommemory' reveals the extracted PE at the memory address pointed to by edx.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This reconstructed DLL, once loaded, will decode a configuration structure from its'.data' section which contains three important details: the name of the encrypted data file dropped by the VBScript; the AES key used to decrypt the file; and the name of a unique global mutex to hold while running to prevent multiple instances.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This configuration information is used to load the encrypted file into memory and decrypt it.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This configuration information", "start": 0, "end": 30}, {"text": "the encrypted file", "start": 47, "end": 65}, {"text": "memory", "start": 71, "end": 77}], "action": [{"text": "load", "start": 42, "end": 46}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 66, "end": 70}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This turns out to be yet another dll.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first ordinal exported by this dll is located and then called, passing in the configuration and the name of the encrypted file on disk as parameters.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This last dll is the heart of the threat (originally called q5Byo.dll in this instance.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This file contains the true intent of this campaign.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is designed as a survey tool.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "a survey tool", "start": 18, "end": 31}], "action": [{"text": "is designed", "start": 3, "end": 14}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 15, "end": 17}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The PE file gathers system information including OS version, computer name, user name, user group membership, the process it is running in, locale ID's, as well as system drive and volume information.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The PE file", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "system information", "start": 20, "end": 38}, {"text": "OS version", "start": 49, "end": 59}, {"text": "computer name", "start": 61, "end": 74}, {"text": "user name", "start": 76, "end": 85}, {"text": "user group membership", "start": 87, "end": 108}, {"text": "the process it is running in", "start": 110, "end": 138}, {"text": "locale ID's", "start": 140, "end": 151}, {"text": "system drive and volume information", "start": 164, "end": 199}], "action": [{"text": "gathers", "start": 12, "end": 19}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All of this is encrypted and then sent to cloud storage via WebDAV.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "All of this", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "cloud storage", "start": 42, "end": 55}, {"text": "WebDAV", "start": 60, "end": 66}], "action": [{"text": "is encrypted", "start": 12, "end": 24}, {"text": "sent", "start": 34, "end": 38}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 39, "end": 41}, {"text": "via", "start": 56, "end": 59}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "WebDAV is a communication standard that allows file management over HTTP or HTTPS.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Windows allows WebDAV sessions to be mapped as network resources.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The use of WebDAV as the communication channel is atypical for most malware samples we see.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By using a network resource, the actual web traffic originates from the system itself, and not from the process in which the malware resides.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additionally, once the resource is established, the malware can transfer files to and from the command and control servers using standard file IO commands.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 48, "end": 59}, {"text": "files", "start": 73, "end": 78}, {"text": "the command and control servers", "start": 91, "end": 122}, {"text": "standard file IO commands", "start": 129, "end": 154}], "action": [{"text": "transfer", "start": 64, "end": 72}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 79, "end": 81}, {"text": "from", "start": 86, "end": 90}, {"text": "using", "start": 123, "end": 128}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All the authentication information for the WebDAV session including the URL, folders, path, user name, and password is stored within this last DLL in another AES-encrypted configuration structure in the binary.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A unique path, username, and password were used for each malware instance we've seen in the wild.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This allows the attackers to uniquely identify every targeted attack and track how successful each phishing campaign is.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 12, "end": 25}, {"text": "every targeted attack", "start": 47, "end": 68}], "action": [{"text": "identify", "start": 38, "end": 46}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Also contained within the configuration structure is information on how to name the survey data on the remote file server.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The binary reads from its configuration a string on how to generate the remote filename, and a list of extensions to use.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An example would be'' 1-7d0-8s'', ['' TIF'','' TAR'','' SIT''] which instructs the binary to generate a filename with 1 to 7 numeric digit characters followed by 0 to 8 ASCII letters with one of the three listed extensions such as'' 664gher.TAR''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The survey is then uploaded to the server in a specified folder with the generated name.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The survey", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "the server", "start": 31, "end": 41}, {"text": "a specified folder", "start": 45, "end": 63}, {"text": "the generated name", "start": 69, "end": 87}], "action": [{"text": "is then uploaded", "start": 11, "end": 27}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 28, "end": 30}, {"text": "in", "start": 42, "end": 44}, {"text": "with", "start": 64, "end": 68}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Files are compressed using a modified LZMA-compression and encrypted using AES cipher-block-chaining (CBC) before being uploaded to the cloud server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Files", "start": 0, "end": 5}, {"text": "a modified LZMA-compression", "start": 27, "end": 54}, {"text": "AES cipher-block-chaining (CBC)", "start": 75, "end": 106}, {"text": "the cloud server", "start": 132, "end": 148}], "action": [{"text": "are compressed", "start": 6, "end": 20}, {"text": "encrypted", "start": 59, "end": 68}, {"text": "being uploaded", "start": 114, "end": 128}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 21, "end": 26}, {"text": "using", "start": 69, "end": 74}, {"text": "to", "start": 129, "end": 131}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The binary also checks a separate folder on the cloud service designated to contain new configuration information.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The binary", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "a separate folder on the cloud service designated to contain new configuration information", "start": 23, "end": 113}], "action": [{"text": "checks", "start": 16, "end": 22}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If such a file is present on the server, the malware downloads the new configuration file then deletes it from the server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 41, "end": 52}, {"text": "the new configuration file", "start": 63, "end": 89}, {"text": "it", "start": 103, "end": 105}, {"text": "the server", "start": 111, "end": 121}], "action": [{"text": "downloads", "start": 53, "end": 62}, {"text": "deletes", "start": 95, "end": 102}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 106, "end": 110}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The cloud storage provider in every case we have seen was the Swedish company CloudMe.com, which offers free and paid WebDAV cloud storage.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The URI model used by the malware is http: //webdav.cloudme.com/% username% /CloudDrive/ which is a direct reference to file storage.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It must be noted that the CloudMe service is not actively spreading the malicious content; the attackers are only using it for storing their files.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We notified CloudMe.com about the abuse of their services.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Their CEO, Mr. Daniel Arthursson, was none too happy about this, and was very helpful in our further research.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CloudMe has shared a great deal of log information related to this attack.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These indicate that there are many other accounts (over 100) likely related to this attack system.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have no way of verifying this with absolute certainty, but this is what we regard as a high confidence assumption.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The cloud accounts are not used for one-way communication only.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware also checks configured subfolders for updates; and if these are found they will be downloaded, decrypted and used as appropriate.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "configured subfolders", "start": 24, "end": 45}, {"text": "updates", "start": 50, "end": 57}, {"text": "they", "start": 82, "end": 86}], "action": [{"text": "checks", "start": 17, "end": 23}, {"text": "be downloaded", "start": 92, "end": 105}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 46, "end": 49}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One such case is the franko7046 account, used against the previously mentioned bank CEO.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this account there was hidden another encrypted configuration file which the malware downloaded and decrypted.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "another encrypted configuration file", "start": 33, "end": 69}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 76, "end": 87}], "action": [{"text": "downloaded", "start": 88, "end": 98}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is how we found the depp3353 account.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this new account there was another surprise waiting for us–a download folder with two new encrypted files, 921.bin and 922.bin.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once decrypted, these turned out to be PE executables.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The two new executables are plugins-quite similar to each other and obviously compiled on the same setup.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They are lightweight and intended to pull specific survey information from their target.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "They", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "specific survey information", "start": 42, "end": 69}, {"text": "their target", "start": 75, "end": 87}], "action": [{"text": "pull", "start": 37, "end": 41}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 70, "end": 74}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Of interest, both of the DLLs originally had the same internal name (78wO13YrJ0cB.dll).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Presumably the same PE sanitization script and parameters were used on both.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "None of these plugins contain any means of CnC communication.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Instead, when they are executed they are passed a pointer to a function to use for sending data back home.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "they", "start": 32, "end": 36}, {"text": "a pointer to a function", "start": 48, "end": 71}, {"text": "use for sending data back home", "start": 75, "end": 105}], "action": [{"text": "are passed", "start": 37, "end": 47}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 72, "end": 74}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Neither are they ever written to disk.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They are executed in memory only, and once they have completed the memory is freed.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "They", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "memory", "start": 21, "end": 27}, {"text": "they have completed", "start": 43, "end": 62}, {"text": "the memory", "start": 63, "end": 73}], "action": [{"text": "are executed", "start": 5, "end": 17}, {"text": "is freed", "start": 74, "end": 82}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 18, "end": 20}, {"text": "once", "start": 38, "end": 42}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This makes these modules extremely stealthy, flexible and compatible with multiple toolsets independent of what CnC method is being used.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "921.bin retrieves several datapoints about the infected machine: Domain info; a list of running processes with all loaded modules in each; the list of installed software; and a complete hardware profile of the target machine.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "921.bin", "start": 0, "end": 7}, {"text": "several datapoints", "start": 18, "end": 36}, {"text": "the infected machine", "start": 43, "end": 63}, {"text": "Domain info", "start": 65, "end": 76}, {"text": "a list of running processes with all loaded modules in each", "start": 78, "end": 137}, {"text": "the list of installed software", "start": 139, "end": 169}, {"text": "a complete hardware profile of the target machine", "start": 175, "end": 224}], "action": [{"text": "retrieves", "start": 8, "end": 17}], "modifier": [{"text": "about", "start": 37, "end": 42}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "922.bin compiles a dirwalk–a complete listing of every file path–of each fixed drive.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "922.bin", "start": 0, "end": 7}, {"text": "a dirwalk–a complete listing of every file path–of each fixed drive", "start": 17, "end": 84}], "action": [{"text": "compiles", "start": 8, "end": 16}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All of this information is exfiltrated back via the same WebDAV connection.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "All of this information", "start": 0, "end": 23}, {"text": "the same WebDAV connection", "start": 48, "end": 74}], "action": [{"text": "is exfiltrated", "start": 24, "end": 38}], "modifier": [{"text": "back via", "start": 39, "end": 47}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This model makes it possible to do the intrusion in steps, with verification stages in between; and the files will not be easily found on affected computers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Based on the information gathered from these modules, the attackers appear to move to the next stage of their attack by placing more new components on the WebDAV shares.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Information about these uploads is limited by the fact that we do not have the AES keys to decrypt much of the uploaded data, but we have been able to see some upload patterns.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "What we assume to be third-stage plugins appear on the shares as *.bin files of roughly 72kb.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As with other plugins, these are downloaded and deleted from the share in one go.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "these", "start": 23, "end": 28}, {"text": "the share", "start": 61, "end": 70}, {"text": "one go", "start": 74, "end": 80}], "action": [{"text": "are downloaded", "start": 29, "end": 43}, {"text": "deleted", "start": 48, "end": 55}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 56, "end": 60}, {"text": "in", "start": 71, "end": 73}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, the next day, another *.bin file of the same size will be uploaded to the share.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is a pattern that repeats itself over all live accounts.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It seems that because the plugins exist in memory only, they are injected daily to ensure persistence on victim computers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "they", "start": 56, "end": 60}, {"text": "daily", "start": 74, "end": 79}, {"text": "ensure persistence on victim computers", "start": 83, "end": 121}], "action": [{"text": "are injected", "start": 61, "end": 73}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 80, "end": 82}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our theory is that this malware is a more typical datastealer, and we have observed that after this type of file is planted on the account, encrypted data uploads from compromised users increase.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this malware", "start": 19, "end": 31}, {"text": "a more typical datastealer", "start": 35, "end": 61}, {"text": "encrypted data uploads from compromised users", "start": 140, "end": 185}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 32, "end": 34}, {"text": "increase", "start": 186, "end": 194}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Victims of this attack will connect using the Windows WebDAV redirector, and the HTTP request user-agent string will reflect this.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Victims of this attack", "start": 0, "end": 22}, {"text": "the Windows WebDAV redirector", "start": 42, "end": 71}], "action": [{"text": "connect", "start": 28, "end": 35}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 36, "end": 41}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For Windows XP this will typically be'' Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/5.1.2600'', and for Windows 7 a common user-agent is'' Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/6.1.7601''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Security researchers–and there are a few of them-connect in a variety of ways; first of all, we see a number of connections that are indistinguishable from the way victims connect.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This happens when researchers use lab machines with live internet access to run the malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The only way we can tell these are researchers is because they connect from IP address ranges that are unlikely to be victims; and they also tend to consist of short-lived sessions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some researchers set up scheduled tasks to scan the shares for new updates and malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We see a few variations of these–one typical configuration is where the requests contain a Python-related user-agent string.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Attackers, on the other hand, don't appear to use Windows.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Common across multiple accounts, multiple IP's, and over time, is that the probable attackers have used a HTTP user-agent of'' davfs2/1.4.6 neon/0.29.6''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the probable attackers", "start": 71, "end": 93}, {"text": "a HTTP user-agent of'' davfs2/1.4.6 neon/0.29.6''", "start": 104, "end": 153}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 99, "end": 103}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We know these are not researchers, because we can see malware files being uploaded by them: We have a log fragment in which the attackers uploaded a sequential series of updates (from 1746.bin to 1774.bin) within 1.5 hours on Sept 17th, spread over 27 different accounts and using 27 different IP addresses in the process.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The user-agent string shows that attackers likely have used a client based on the open source davfs2 file system for Linux to mount the WebDAV shares.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This client is used when uploading new malware, but also when the attackers scan their shares for new victim updates, in which case the shares are enumerated by requests in a scheduled manner.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers have used a large number of IP addresses to access the shares.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As mentioned above, there is a rotation scheme in place in which a new IP address will be used after a few minutes of access against CloudMe accounts.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These IP's are distributed widely over geographical locations and service providers, with a heavy bias towards South Korean ranges.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At first we thought these IP's belonged to some commercial proxy service, particularly since several such proxy services also offer IP rotation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, this turned out to be a wrong assumption.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A superficial examination of the proxy IP addresses that connected to CloudMe showed them to be internet-connected devices of various kinds.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many were Korean Tera-EP home routers; but there were several other products represented.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is believed that the attackers were able to compromise these devices based on poor configurations or default credentials.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 20, "end": 33}, {"text": "these devices", "start": 58, "end": 71}, {"text": "poor configurations or default credentials", "start": 81, "end": 123}], "action": [{"text": "compromise", "start": 47, "end": 57}], "modifier": [{"text": "based on", "start": 72, "end": 80}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We were able to do some forensic work on a compromised Tera-EP TE-800 device and discovered another dimension of the attacker's infrastructure.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Under the ramfs mounted partition we found a stripped and statically linked MIPS-el binary named tail-.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Instances of this were also found under the running process list.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "tail- serves as a SOCKS proxy for the attackers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "tail-", "start": 0, "end": 5}, {"text": "a SOCKS proxy", "start": 16, "end": 29}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 34, "end": 47}], "action": [{"text": "serves", "start": 6, "end": 12}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 13, "end": 15}, {"text": "for", "start": 30, "end": 33}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Each sample of the binary we were able to acquire was configured with a unique 32byte blowfish key and a small, encrypted section appended to the end of the binary.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Upon execution the binary uses its hardcoded key to decrypt the configuration section and retrieve the listening port to use for incoming connections.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the binary", "start": 15, "end": 25}, {"text": "the listening port", "start": 99, "end": 117}, {"text": "use for incoming connections", "start": 121, "end": 149}], "action": [{"text": "retrieve", "start": 90, "end": 98}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 118, "end": 120}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This acts as a management interface.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "From here the attackers can request a specific port to be opened as one of the following types: SOCKET, SOCKSS, SOCKAT, SOCKS5, or STATUSPORT.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To prevent anyone else from accessing this service all communication on the management interface is encrypted using the same blowfish key.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This means that the attackers must maintain a list of where each of these implants are installed, as well as what port and key each is configured to use.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 16, "end": 29}, {"text": "a list of where each of these implants are installed, as well as what port and key each is configured to use", "start": 44, "end": 152}], "action": [{"text": "maintain", "start": 35, "end": 43}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This setup makes it difficult to identify embedded devices compromised with this malware by scanning open ports.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the wild we witnessed the attackers connect to the management port and request SOCKSS connections.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This would open the specified port and wait for configuration data, which consists of a domain name (webdav.cloudme.com), the destination port, and a variable length RC4 key, all of which encrypted using the blowfish key.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once received the malware would attempt to connect to the domain name on the specified port and would start tunneling all traffic received from the SOCKSS port to the destination and vise-versa.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 14, "end": 25}, {"text": "the domain name", "start": 54, "end": 69}, {"text": "the specified port", "start": 73, "end": 91}, {"text": "all traffic received from the SOCKSS port", "start": 118, "end": 159}, {"text": "the destination", "start": 163, "end": 178}], "action": [{"text": "connect", "start": 43, "end": 50}, {"text": "tunneling", "start": 108, "end": 117}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 51, "end": 53}, {"text": "on", "start": 70, "end": 72}, {"text": "to", "start": 160, "end": 162}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The communication between the attacker and the SOCKSS is encoded using the RC4 key.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The communication between the attacker and the SOCKSS", "start": 0, "end": 53}, {"text": "the RC4 key", "start": 71, "end": 82}], "action": [{"text": "is encoded", "start": 54, "end": 64}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 65, "end": 70}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The graphic below illustrates a typical session.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The router proxy network provides another layer of indirection masking the attackers' infrastructure.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, because we captured traffic through one of these embedded devices we could identify other parts of their operation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We identified four IP addresses that connected to the proxy malware: This host belongs to a Bulgarian VPS service and would use the router proxy to connect to webdav.cloudme.com.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "four IP addresses", "start": 14, "end": 31}, {"text": "the proxy malware", "start": 50, "end": 67}, {"text": "This host", "start": 69, "end": 78}, {"text": "the router proxy", "start": 128, "end": 144}, {"text": "connect to webdav.cloudme.com", "start": 148, "end": 177}], "action": [{"text": "connected", "start": 37, "end": 46}, {"text": "use", "start": 124, "end": 127}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 47, "end": 49}, {"text": "to", "start": 145, "end": 147}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This host does all scanning of webdav shares for stolen user data, and also uploads new malware components.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This host", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "new malware components", "start": 84, "end": 106}], "action": [{"text": "uploads", "start": 76, "end": 83}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This IP would make connections hourly and poll the status of the router proxy malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This machine is most likely used to track which compromised routers are currently available for use.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Traffic from this IP had a very specific purpose: It unlocked routers for proxying in connection with the sending of phishing emails.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 50, "end": 52}, {"text": "routers", "start": 62, "end": 69}, {"text": "proxying", "start": 74, "end": 82}, {"text": "the sending of phishing emails", "start": 102, "end": 132}], "action": [{"text": "unlocked", "start": 53, "end": 61}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 70, "end": 73}, {"text": "in connection with", "start": 83, "end": 101}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the wild we observed this IP connect to our router on the malware management port and specify a SOCKSS proxy port to be opened.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this IP", "start": 24, "end": 31}, {"text": "our router", "start": 43, "end": 53}, {"text": "the malware management port", "start": 57, "end": 84}], "action": [{"text": "connect", "start": 32, "end": 39}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 40, "end": 42}, {"text": "on", "start": 54, "end": 56}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Immediately after, the newly opened port would be connected to by another IP and used to send phishing emails with malicious attachments.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the newly opened port", "start": 19, "end": 40}, {"text": "another IP", "start": 66, "end": 76}, {"text": "phishing emails with malicious attachments", "start": 94, "end": 136}], "action": [{"text": "be connected", "start": 47, "end": 59}, {"text": "send", "start": 89, "end": 93}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 60, "end": 62}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, later we observed that the Email sender IP at VOLIA vanished and the Unlocker server taking over its role as well.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After a router SOCKSS port was opened by Unlocker, this IP would connect to the opened port and tunnel its email traffic through the router.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this IP", "start": 51, "end": 58}, {"text": "the opened port", "start": 76, "end": 91}, {"text": "its email traffic", "start": 103, "end": 120}, {"text": "the router", "start": 129, "end": 139}], "action": [{"text": "connect", "start": 65, "end": 72}, {"text": "tunnel", "start": 96, "end": 102}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 73, "end": 75}, {"text": "through", "start": 121, "end": 128}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Each of these connections used the correct encryption key, so we know that these accesses came from the attackers and not some opportunistic third party.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Mail proxies: Through our router monitoring we identified two mail proxies used by the attackers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "two mail proxies", "start": 58, "end": 74}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 83, "end": 96}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 75, "end": 79}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We were later notified by Symantec (thanks, guys!) about a third.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These servers were hosted on domains that were registered by the attackers, using domain names clearly meant to look legitimate.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is the only time we have seen attackers register domains in this investigation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The mail proxies were: Registrant WHOIS information seems forged: The connections made from the Ukrainian host to the router were interesting.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After being proxied though the router, each of these would authenticate with one of the dedicated mail proxies and send out phishing attacks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "each of these", "start": 39, "end": 52}, {"text": "phishing attacks", "start": 124, "end": 140}], "action": [{"text": "send", "start": 115, "end": 119}], "modifier": [{"text": "out", "start": 120, "end": 123}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "From captured traffic it appears that the mail proxies have SOCKSv5 services running on obscure high ports.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have documented that the attackers log in to these using apparently randomly generated usernames and passwords, a unique pair for each server.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The mail proxy would then relay the spearphishing mail as seen below.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The mail proxy", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "the spearphishing mail", "start": 32, "end": 54}, {"text": "seen below", "start": 58, "end": 68}], "action": [{"text": "relay", "start": 26, "end": 31}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 55, "end": 57}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This way the attack can be mistaken to come from legitimate businesses and trusted organizations.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attack", "start": 9, "end": 19}, {"text": "come from legitimate businesses and trusted organizations", "start": 39, "end": 96}], "action": [{"text": "be mistaken", "start": 24, "end": 35}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 36, "end": 38}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In some cases the organization from which the phishing email originates would appear to be a known associate to the target.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the organization from which the phishing email originates", "start": 14, "end": 71}, {"text": "be a known associate to the target", "start": 88, "end": 122}], "action": [{"text": "appear", "start": 78, "end": 84}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 85, "end": 87}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The email shown above was one of a number of messages sent to targets in the oil industry.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a number of messages", "start": 33, "end": 53}, {"text": "targets in the oil industry", "start": 62, "end": 89}], "action": [{"text": "sent", "start": 54, "end": 58}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 59, "end": 61}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Investigating the target email addresses, we saw several of these were found in this public document from the World Petroleum Council, including some addresses that are, at the present time, no longer valid.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "And then, the ground shifted again.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One of the spearphishing mails we observed coming through the router network was this one, sent to an address under the gov.py (Government of Paraguay) domain.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "One of the spearphishing mails", "start": 0, "end": 30}, {"text": "the router network", "start": 58, "end": 76}, {"text": "an address under the gov.py (Government of Paraguay) domain", "start": 99, "end": 158}], "action": [{"text": "coming", "start": 43, "end": 49}, {"text": "sent", "start": 91, "end": 95}], "modifier": [{"text": "through", "start": 50, "end": 57}, {"text": "to", "start": 96, "end": 98}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There was no executable attachment in this mail, but instead a link shortened by the URL shortener service bit.ly, with the underlying link pointing to an IP address on a Dutch hosting service.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Clicking that link from a Windows PC only yielded a redirection to the BBC homepages, and using other devices did not give more data.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The bit.ly service does however provide information on the user creating the shortened link, and other links associated with this account.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this case, the user was named nicolatesla53.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The nicolatesla53 account was created in July 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "From Oct 24th to Nov 21st this user created nearly 10000 shortened links–we harvested 9990 unique ones.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Three IP addresses were used for these links: The links themselves were on this format: As far as we were able to tell, there were three main types of actioncode: We have no sample of the actual MMS phishing messages apparently being sent, but we can see the page served when a user clicks a spammed link.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is just a dialogue box asking for the password presumably included in the initial message, and the next stage likely involves download of malicious content.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We were in the middle of harvesting the servers for data on the various action codes when they all were abruptly taken offline; so our data on which mobile operators are targeted is not complete.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We managed to get 66 of a total of 190.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The ones we know of are shown below.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A full breakdown of mobile operators and related links is included in the appendix.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The composition of links created for the various mobile operators is quite interesting, as one can speculate that they represent amount of actual or planned attacks in different countries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With the top three operators being Vodafone, T- Mobile and Proximus (Belgacom) it seems these apparent phishing attacks are less focused on the Russian sphere than the previously discussed malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This map is not complete, though.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It represents only about 35% (66/190) of all mobile operators targeted and 66% (3152/4781) of all phishing links we managed to harvest.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, some operators like Vodafone are global actors, so the map might show an unfair intensity in their HQ locations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The rest of the bit.ly links used the action codes 743 or 1024.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "And now things really get interesting.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By using mobile device HTTP User-Agents we were able to trigger downloads of malware components from some of these links.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Accessing the link from an Android User-Agent initiated a download of an Android installer package named WhatsAppUpdate.apk.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Accessing the link from an Android User-Agent", "start": 0, "end": 45}, {"text": "a download of an Android installer package named WhatsAppUpdate.apk", "start": 56, "end": 123}], "action": [{"text": "initiated", "start": 46, "end": 55}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The package we analyzed was 1.2MB in size.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The apparent main purpose of this malware is to record phone call audio.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this malware", "start": 29, "end": 41}, {"text": "phone call audio", "start": 55, "end": 71}], "action": [{"text": "record", "start": 48, "end": 54}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Recordings are stored as *.mp4 files, and uploaded to the attackers periodically.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Recordings", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "*.mp4 files", "start": 25, "end": 36}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 54, "end": 67}, {"text": "periodically", "start": 68, "end": 80}], "action": [{"text": "are stored", "start": 11, "end": 21}, {"text": "uploaded", "start": 42, "end": 50}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 22, "end": 24}, {"text": "to", "start": 51, "end": 53}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware is able to collect a lot of other information, not all of which is actually used: Through the encrypted C & C protocol, the attackers can issue commands and binary updates to the malware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "a lot of other information", "start": 31, "end": 57}, {"text": "the encrypted C & C protocol", "start": 102, "end": 130}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 132, "end": 145}, {"text": "commands and binary updates", "start": 156, "end": 183}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 187, "end": 198}], "action": [{"text": "collect", "start": 23, "end": 30}, {"text": "issue", "start": 150, "end": 155}], "modifier": [{"text": "Through", "start": 94, "end": 101}, {"text": "to", "start": 184, "end": 186}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It uses a custom DAO/Database scheme which uses accounts belonging to the virtual community Live Journal (livejournal.com) as data stores.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Three such accounts were found hardcoded in the package: The accounts all state that they belong to Iranian users.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is very likely false.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The text in these posts starts first out in cleartext, but quickly turns into unreadable gibberish.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The HTML source code reveals that the encoded portion is encapsulated in blog-index tags: The three accounts contain different configuration blocks pointing to C & C servers apparently located in Poland, Germany and Russia, respectively.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "different configuration blocks", "start": 117, "end": 147}, {"text": "C & C servers apparently located in Poland, Germany and Russia, respectively", "start": 160, "end": 236}], "action": [{"text": "pointing", "start": 148, "end": 156}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 157, "end": 159}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Based on registration data and folder configuration we believe these are legitimate but compromised Joomla servers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "And then an unexpected oddity shows up in the Java source: We were also able to download a similar malware sample (BrowserUpdate.apk) from one of the C & C servers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This sample used different online accounts for its DAO/database functionality, but is otherwise quite similar to the first.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Using an IOS User-Agent triggered the download of a Debian installer package, WhatsAppUpdate.deb, also 1.2Mb in size.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Using an IOS User-Agent", "start": 0, "end": 23}, {"text": "the download of a Debian installer package, WhatsAppUpdate.deb", "start": 34, "end": 96}], "action": [{"text": "triggered", "start": 24, "end": 33}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This application impersonates a Cydia installer, and can only be installed on a jailbroken phone.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This application", "start": 0, "end": 16}, {"text": "a Cydia installer", "start": 30, "end": 47}], "action": [{"text": "impersonates", "start": 17, "end": 29}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once installed, it may collect These data are encrypted and uploaded to an FTP account which is taken from an encrypted configuration file named /usr/bin/cores.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 16, "end": 18}, {"text": "These data", "start": 31, "end": 41}, {"text": "an FTP account", "start": 72, "end": 86}], "action": [{"text": "collect", "start": 23, "end": 30}, {"text": "are encrypted", "start": 42, "end": 55}, {"text": "uploaded", "start": 60, "end": 68}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 69, "end": 71}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this particular case, the FTP account is located on a legitimate (if struggling) hosting service in the UK.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this case, there's another clue: The WhatsAppUpdate project seems derived from an earlier template named SkypeUpdate.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By now, it came as no surprise when we triggered a download with a BlackBerry User-Agent.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The initial download was a Java Applications Descriptor, a text file designed for Over-The-Air installation of Java-based applications.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This JAD file contained the locations of the two Blackberry *.COD binaries which we then could download directly.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The application impersonates a settings utility.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The application", "start": 0, "end": 15}, {"text": "a settings utility", "start": 29, "end": 47}], "action": [{"text": "impersonates", "start": 16, "end": 28}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This collects: Collected data will be uploaded to a DynDNS domain currently hosted on a US webhosting service.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "Collected data", "start": 15, "end": 29}, {"text": "a DynDNS domain currently hosted on a US webhosting service", "start": 50, "end": 109}], "action": [{"text": "collects", "start": 5, "end": 13}, {"text": "be uploaded", "start": 35, "end": 46}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 47, "end": 49}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Since these COD files are also compiled Java code, they are possible to decompile to original source code.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In a similar fashion to the Android version, we find interesting strings there.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This time they are in Arabic: The earliest sample of Inception-related malware we have been able to obtain, was submitted to us in June 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, decoy document metadata shows that it was created late May.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The related cloud account was created just before that.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An examination of the other documents associated with the attacks show that they have been created at a steady pace all through summer and autumn 2014 and attacks are still ongoing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Of interest is also the attackers' activity patterns over the 24h cycle.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The main upload of new components to shares seems to be divided over two high–activity periods: 6:00 -10:00 UTC and 17:00-21:00 UTC.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "No uploads were seen between 23:00 and 05:00 UTC.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is however doubtful how indicative these timeframes are.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To illustrate, we looked into another and more obscure timing factor: The timing of the AES InitVector random seeds.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A random seed is the initial value passed into a pseudo-randomizer function.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware uses the random output to create what is known as an InitVector-a starting point for the AES encryption/decryption function.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The code used in some of the DLLs indicate that the attackers tend to use the C time () function to generate random seeds.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This function returns values of granularity down to seconds.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Thus random seeds, and ultimately the InitVectors, are functions of these quite coarse units of time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The encrypted files uploaded to the WebDAV shares come with their InitVectors stored at the end of the file.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The encrypted files", "start": 0, "end": 19}, {"text": "the WebDAV shares", "start": 32, "end": 49}], "action": [{"text": "uploaded", "start": 20, "end": 28}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 29, "end": 31}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Since we know the time window to be within a few days of the upload time we were able to brute force the time values that would generate the corresponding InitVectors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Thus, we were able to say to the second when the file was created–and most times were identified to be in the range 1500-2200 GMT.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Unfortunately, we had to reject these data.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The file creation times turned out to be hours after the files themselves were uploaded to the WebDAV share.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the files themselves", "start": 53, "end": 73}, {"text": "the WebDAV share", "start": 91, "end": 107}], "action": [{"text": "were uploaded", "start": 74, "end": 87}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 88, "end": 90}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Either the attackers' system clock is wrong or a fixed offset is added to the random seed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Either way, the data can't be trusted; and shows that nothing can be taken at face value.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On at least two occasions during our surveillance of the Inception framework, the malware downloaded something unexpected and wholly different from what we have discussed until now.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 78, "end": 89}, {"text": "something unexpected and wholly different from what we have discussed until now", "start": 101, "end": 180}], "action": [{"text": "downloaded", "start": 90, "end": 100}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These files were downloaded as encrypted *.bin files from the accounts carter0648 and frogs6352.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These files", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "encrypted *.bin files", "start": 31, "end": 52}, {"text": "the accounts carter0648 and frogs6352", "start": 58, "end": 95}], "action": [{"text": "were downloaded", "start": 12, "end": 27}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 28, "end": 30}, {"text": "from", "start": 53, "end": 57}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When decrypted, these turned out to be dropper packages containing one dropper executable clearly created for the Inception framework, and one other, very different executable.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "dropper packages", "start": 39, "end": 55}, {"text": "one dropper executable clearly created for the Inception framework, and one other, very different executable", "start": 67, "end": 175}], "action": [{"text": "containing", "start": 56, "end": 66}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This executable, (sccm.exe, md5 dd8790455109497d49c2fa2442cf16f7) is a classical Chinese APT implant.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is a downloader and remote shell program, designed to connect to a C & C server to interact with the attacker and/or download more malware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "a downloader", "start": 6, "end": 18}, {"text": "remote shell program", "start": 23, "end": 43}, {"text": "a C & C server", "start": 68, "end": 82}, {"text": "interact with the attacker", "start": 86, "end": 112}, {"text": "more malware", "start": 129, "end": 141}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 3, "end": 5}, {"text": "connect", "start": 57, "end": 64}, {"text": "download", "start": 120, "end": 128}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 65, "end": 67}, {"text": "to", "start": 83, "end": 85}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The C & C server in this case is ict32.msname.org.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The C & C server", "start": 0, "end": 16}, {"text": "ict32.msname.org", "start": 33, "end": 49}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 30, "end": 32}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When connecting to this server, sccm.exe issues the following request: This C & C domain is used by many other malwares related to sccm.exe; some of which share obvious connections to the Quarian malware family, a known APT intrusion tool.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "connecting", "start": 5, "end": 15}, {"text": "is used", "start": 89, "end": 96}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 16, "end": 18}], "entity": [{"text": "this server", "start": 19, "end": 30}, {"text": "sccm.exe", "start": 32, "end": 40}, {"text": "This C & C domain", "start": 71, "end": 88}, {"text": "many other malwares related to sccm.exe", "start": 100, "end": 139}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This development was unexpected for several reasons.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "First of all, it apparently breaks the strict, obfuscatory operational security built into the Inception framework.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Inception has the capacity to perform all steps needed for scouting out and exfiltrating data without resorting to traditional hosted command & control.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Inception", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "data", "start": 89, "end": 93}], "action": [{"text": "scouting", "start": 59, "end": 67}, {"text": "exfiltrating", "start": 76, "end": 88}], "modifier": [{"text": "out", "start": 68, "end": 71}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By using a well-understood APT tool and a known malicious C & C domain name, the attackers permit much clearer attribution.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "using", "start": 3, "end": 8}], "entity": [{"text": "a known malicious C & C domain name", "start": 40, "end": 75}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 77, "end": 90}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Another factor which is out of character is the coding style.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All Inception-related malware is written using Visual Studio 2010.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The downloaded sccm.exe is written using Visual C++ 6; and has a PE header compile date of October 2010.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This date can be forged, and indeed, all Inception-related malware has some level of forgery in the compile dates.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, the sccm.exe compile date matches the Quarian developer toolset and coding style to a better degree than the other files distributed through Inception.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Then there is the C & C domain used.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the C & C domain", "start": 14, "end": 30}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 31, "end": 35}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to DomainTools.com the msname.org domain registration timed out September 27th 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It was left inactive and was not renewed until Nov 12th.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This means that the attackers distributed malware that would be out of action for a long time (last distribution of sccm.exe was September 26th).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Because of all this we consider sccm.exe as an unreliable indicator.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is likely to be a red herring purposefully placed on shares where the attackers have seen signs of access by security researchers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At one instance the attackers seem to have slipped up.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Instead of using their scheduled task, they apparently did something manually on a WebDAV share.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is visible because the request came from an apparent attacker IP, but used yet another User-Agent:'' gvfs/1.12.3''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Gvfs is the virtual filesystem for Gnome desktop.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The action on the account was abnormal as well; an apparent file upload: When WebDAV shares are mapped up as drives by the operating system, any action taken by the attacker follows the same pattern as on the attacker's local drive.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the case above, it seems the attacker attempted to edit a new document, which by default is given the name'' Untitled document'' in Gnome.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This might indicate that the attacker's operating system language is Spanish.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Of course, Spanish is one of the world's most widespread languages, so one can not infer much from this.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There is even a small possibility that the phenomenon is a pure artifact; for example that a Spanish-speaking researcher connected to the same account using the same Linux-based setup as the attackers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This attack system shares a number of properties that are somewhat similar with the Red October campaigns detailed by Kaspersky Labs in 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For more information about this see: The'' Red October'' Campaign-An Advanced Cyber Espionage Network Targeting Diplomatic and Government Agencies However, there are also clear differences.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The code is fully rewritten; there appears to be little code overlap, at least in the initial stage malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The coding style is different, with different solutions to programmatic problems, different use of exception handling, and different use of C++ classes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It's hard to believe that the same programmers are responsible for the two code bases.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Red October malware contained linguistic markers that pointed towards Russian speaking attackers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "No such clues have been found in the Inception- related malware; there is a marked difference in the attention to detail and information leakage.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is certainly possible that the same people have organized both Inception and Red October, but there are no clear indications to this effect.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Windows-based malware in this paper generally contains very few noticeable strings apart from what is commonly found in software, and clearly randomized strings.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "What exists–like the word'' polymorphed'' in the early DLL versions-is standard English with few discerning features.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This changes a bit when we look at the mobile malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the Android malware we find Hindi comments in the Java source code.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the Iphone malware we find project paths referencing one'' JohnClerk'', and a few typos like'' conutry''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In one of the Blackberry binaries we find the string'' GodSaveTheQueen'', a rather blunt hint towards Britain, as well as Arabic log strings.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These and other indicators have led us to conclude that the Inception attackers are setting a new standard for deliberate disinformation and red herrings in a malware espionage operation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some clues might have been added by accident, but none of these indicators can be trusted in any way.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Thus we are not going to assume anything about who might be behind these attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The whole Inception setup shows signs of automation and seasoned programming.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The amount of layers used in this scheme to protect the payload of their attack seems excessively paranoid.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Not only is the initial DLL apparently polymorphed using some backend tool–the compile time stamps in the PE header are clearly forged, resources are removed so as not to give away any location information, and import tables are shuffled around, rendering import hashes (aka imphashes) useless.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the initial DLL", "start": 12, "end": 27}, {"text": "some backend tool", "start": 57, "end": 74}], "action": [{"text": "polymorphed", "start": 39, "end": 50}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 51, "end": 56}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The names of the files both when dropped and their original names along with the callback directories, paths and mutexes used all seem to be dynamically generated.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers utilize compromised embedded devices–typically routers- on the Internet as well as multiple dedicated hosting providers and VPN services to mask their identity from the cloud storage provider and others.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attackers", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "compromised embedded devices–typically routers- on the Internet as well as multiple dedicated hosting providers and VPN services", "start": 22, "end": 150}, {"text": "mask their identity from the cloud storage provider and others", "start": 154, "end": 216}], "action": [{"text": "utilize", "start": 14, "end": 21}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 151, "end": 153}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The same router botnet is used as a spreading and management platform for attacks on mobile devices as well.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The same router botnet", "start": 0, "end": 22}, {"text": "a spreading and management platform for attacks on mobile devices", "start": 34, "end": 99}], "action": [{"text": "is used", "start": 23, "end": 30}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 31, "end": 33}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This suggests that this a large campaign and we've only seeing the beginning of it.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Initially many of the targets were located in Russia or related to Russian interests, but as the campaign has evolved we have verified targets in countries all over the world.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is clear that this infrastructure model does not need to be applied solely against a few targets, or even need to be hosted at CloudMe.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The framework is generic, and will work as an attack platform for a multitude of purposes with very little modification.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attribution indicators point in different directions and can't be given much weight.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These attacks can in theory be the creation of nation states or resourceful private entities-we consider it very unlikely that they are performed by one or just a few individuals.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "haarmannsi.cz sanygroup.co.uk ecolines.es blackberry-support.herokuapp.com (DynDNS) The following entities have helped in big and small ways.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Big thanks to all.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also owe a big debt of gratitude to Ryan W. Smith of Blue Coat who helped us tremendously with the analysis of the mobile malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Downloaders, injectors, infostealers Example md5s of files detected with Kaspersky's Virus.Win32.Pioneer.dx and Symantec's Infostealer.Nemim! inf: To ensure only single instance of the module is running, the module verifies if system mutex named «132DF6E» exists.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "ensure", "start": 150, "end": 156}], "entity": [{"text": "only single instance of the module is running", "start": 157, "end": 202}, {"text": "the module", "start": 204, "end": 214}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If it exists the module exits, if not ­the module creates one.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The module implements a method to resist running in virtual environment.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The module", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "a method", "start": 22, "end": 30}, {"text": "resist running in virtual environment", "start": 34, "end": 71}], "action": [{"text": "implements", "start": 11, "end": 21}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 31, "end": 33}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It gets CPU name and identifier from the registry at HKLM\\HARDWARE\\DESCRIPTION\\ System\\CentralProcessor\\0 and collects IP and MAC addresses of local network adapters.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "CPU name and identifier", "start": 8, "end": 31}, {"text": "the registry at HKLM\\HARDWARE\\DESCRIPTION\\ System\\CentralProcessor\\0", "start": 37, "end": 105}, {"text": "IP and MAC addresses of local network adapters", "start": 119, "end": 165}], "action": [{"text": "gets", "start": 3, "end": 7}, {"text": "collects", "start": 110, "end": 118}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 32, "end": 36}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After that it compiles a string describing the system in the following format: « C P U:% CPUNAME% < br > Net card:% IP% (% MACADDR%) < br > ».", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Next it checks if this string contains one of the following substrings: If any of these strings is found, the module terminates.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After that, there is a hardcoded value of 10, which delays further execution of the module for 10 seconds.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Then the module attempts to delete some other, prob- ably older, components which might be present on the system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the module", "start": 5, "end": 15}, {"text": "some other, prob- ably older, components which might be present on the system", "start": 35, "end": 112}], "action": [{"text": "delete", "start": 28, "end": 34}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The list of deleted files includes the following: The next is step is to check if current directory has a file named «U».", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "check", "start": 73, "end": 78}], "entity": [{"text": "if current directory has a file named «U»", "start": 79, "end": 120}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If not, the module proceeds with network communication routine.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "But if this file is found it does some additional checks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If «U» file is older than 180 days, the module wipes the file.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the module", "start": 36, "end": 46}, {"text": "the file", "start": 53, "end": 61}], "action": [{"text": "wipes", "start": 47, "end": 52}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If not, it triggers a special variable that makes module dormant and dis- ables further communication with C & C server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a special variable", "start": 20, "end": 38}, {"text": "module", "start": 50, "end": 56}, {"text": "dormant", "start": 57, "end": 64}], "action": [{"text": "makes", "start": 44, "end": 49}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After all, if the module is ready and allowed to communicate with C & C server it does that in the following manner.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "1.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The module connects to autolace.twilightparadox.com (or automachine. servequake.com) and issues a HTTP GET request with hardcoded User­Agent string: The server response should contain «DEXT87» string which is used to rec- ognize valid response.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The module", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "autolace.twilightparadox.com (or automachine. servequake.com)", "start": 23, "end": 84}, {"text": "a HTTP GET request", "start": 96, "end": 114}, {"text": "hardcoded User­Agent string", "start": 120, "end": 147}, {"text": "«DEXT87» string", "start": 184, "end": 199}, {"text": "rec- ognize valid response", "start": 217, "end": 243}], "action": [{"text": "connects", "start": 11, "end": 19}, {"text": "issues", "start": 89, "end": 95}, {"text": "is used", "start": 206, "end": 213}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 20, "end": 22}, {"text": "with", "start": 115, "end": 119}, {"text": "to", "start": 214, "end": 216}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware locates «DEXT87» and reads the data appended to it.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The appended data should be an IP address in plaintext.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is used a real C & C IP address.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Reading stops when non­digit or dot symbol is found.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Here is an example of shortest possible valid server response: 2.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the real C & C IP address is not valid the module may try to send identical request again but using a different HTTP path: If the C & C IP address is valid, the module issues another HTTP request: The server response can be one of the following: Where < DATASIZE > is a decimal integer that represents length of < DATA > field in bytes; < DATA > is a binary data separated from < DATASIZE > field by semicolon.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the module", "start": 42, "end": 52}, {"text": "identical request", "start": 69, "end": 86}, {"text": "again", "start": 87, "end": 92}, {"text": "a different HTTP path", "start": 103, "end": 124}, {"text": "the module", "start": 160, "end": 170}, {"text": "another HTTP request", "start": 178, "end": 198}], "action": [{"text": "send", "start": 64, "end": 68}, {"text": "issues", "start": 171, "end": 177}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 97, "end": 102}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Please note, that after receiving < DATA >, it is XORed with byte value 0x55 and saved to a disk in a file named «ctfmon.exe» (current directory is used).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 44, "end": 46}, {"text": "byte value 0x55", "start": 61, "end": 76}, {"text": "a disk", "start": 90, "end": 96}, {"text": "a file named «ctfmon.exe»", "start": 100, "end": 125}], "action": [{"text": "is XORed", "start": 47, "end": 55}, {"text": "saved", "start": 81, "end": 86}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 56, "end": 60}, {"text": "to", "start": 87, "end": 89}, {"text": "in", "start": 97, "end": 99}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Upon successful receiving of the file it is started in a new process.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This module is relatively large (455Kb) and comes as a part of WinRar SFX file that drops and starts the module from% APPDATA% \\Microsoft\\Display\\DmaUp3. exe.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "WinRar SFX file", "start": 63, "end": 78}, {"text": "the module", "start": 101, "end": 111}, {"text": "% APPDATA% \\Microsoft\\Display\\DmaUp3. exe", "start": 116, "end": 157}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 84, "end": 89}, {"text": "starts", "start": 94, "end": 100}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 112, "end": 116}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The main purpose of the module is to collect various secrets stored on a local system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the module", "start": 20, "end": 30}, {"text": "various secrets stored on a local system", "start": 45, "end": 85}], "action": [{"text": "collect", "start": 37, "end": 44}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This module is designed not to run on Windows with system default codepage set to Korean.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "From the very beginning this module checks if «bdagent.exe» process is running on current system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this module", "start": 24, "end": 35}, {"text": "if «bdagent.exe» process is running on current system", "start": 43, "end": 96}], "action": [{"text": "checks", "start": 36, "end": 42}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Bdagent.exe is a name for BitDefender Antivirus component.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If it is running, it uses simple AV heuristics evasion technique.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 18, "end": 20}, {"text": "simple AV heuristics evasion technique", "start": 26, "end": 64}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 21, "end": 25}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The code starts a thread that simulates keystrokes of ESC keyboard key and then shows a system modal message box.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The code", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "a thread that simulates keystrokes of ESC keyboard key and then shows a system modal message box", "start": 16, "end": 112}], "action": [{"text": "starts", "start": 9, "end": 15}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Pushing ESC key closes the modal message box.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Right after that keystroke generation thread is terminated and the module continues normal execution as if «bdagent.exe» was not running.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "keystroke generation thread", "start": 17, "end": 44}], "action": [{"text": "is terminated", "start": 45, "end": 58}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Next the module makes sure only one instance of current code is running by checking if system mutex object named «920111215» exists.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the module", "start": 5, "end": 15}, {"text": "only one instance of current code is running", "start": 27, "end": 71}, {"text": "checking if system mutex object named «920111215» exists", "start": 75, "end": 131}], "action": [{"text": "makes sure", "start": 16, "end": 26}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 72, "end": 74}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After that, the mod- ule collects information about current system which includes the following: If the module reveals that current System default codepage is 0412 (Korean) it terminates.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the mod- ule", "start": 12, "end": 24}, {"text": "information about current system which includes the following", "start": 34, "end": 95}], "action": [{"text": "collects", "start": 25, "end": 33}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There is one interesting specifics in Microsoft IntelliForms which reveals attack- er's interests.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "IntelliForms technology keeps login/password information in the registry in encrypted form.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, there is no clear information about the corre- sponding website which requires given login and password.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The only information Intelliforms offers about the place where given login/password should be used is a hash of the webpage URL.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "So far, the attackers can steal logins and pass- words but to understand where they are from they must guess the string which produced given hash.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 8, "end": 21}, {"text": "logins and pass- words", "start": 32, "end": 54}], "action": [{"text": "steal", "start": 26, "end": 31}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They have implemented this logics in the malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When IntelliForms information is stolen the malware tries to check the list of known login page URLs to recover the originating webpage address.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "IntelliForms information", "start": 5, "end": 29}], "action": [{"text": "is stolen", "start": 30, "end": 39}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Here is the list of URLs that are checked by the malware: The list of targeted services includes some local services specifically popular in: The module uses several simple XOR­based algorithms to encrypt embedded string data.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The module", "start": 142, "end": 152}, {"text": "several simple XOR­based algorithms", "start": 158, "end": 193}, {"text": "encrypt embedded string data", "start": 197, "end": 225}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 153, "end": 157}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 194, "end": 196}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "String encryption/decryption functions use the following keys: The module works with all Firefox versions prior to Mozilla Firefox 12.0.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Depend- ing on version of Firefox, it can read Firefox database directly to dump stored se- crets or utilize one Firefox libraries to access the configuration data.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition it makes use of the following Mozilla Firefox libraries depending on Firefox version: When stealing secrets from Firefox and Chrome it uses built­in SQLite library code.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "stealing", "start": 103, "end": 111}], "entity": [{"text": "secrets", "start": 112, "end": 119}, {"text": "Firefox and Chrome", "start": 125, "end": 143}, {"text": "it", "start": 144, "end": 146}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 120, "end": 124}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The module is linked with SQLite version 3.7.5 release candidate 2, release hash ed759d5a9edb3bba5f48f243df47be29e3fe8cd7 dated as 2011­01­28 17:03:50.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After stealing secrets from local system the malware executes some kind of embedded script.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "stealing", "start": 6, "end": 14}, {"text": "executes", "start": 53, "end": 61}], "entity": [{"text": "secrets", "start": 15, "end": 22}, {"text": "local system", "start": 28, "end": 40}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 41, "end": 52}, {"text": "some kind of embedded script", "start": 62, "end": 90}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 23, "end": 27}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is logging all actions to inform the operator what exactly was executed by this variant of the malware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "all actions", "start": 14, "end": 25}, {"text": "inform the operator what exactly was executed by this variant of the malware", "start": 29, "end": 105}], "action": [{"text": "is logging", "start": 3, "end": 13}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 26, "end": 28}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The result of this execution is appended to the stolen data and uploaded to the C & C server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The result of this execution", "start": 0, "end": 28}, {"text": "the C & C server", "start": 76, "end": 92}], "action": [{"text": "uploaded", "start": 64, "end": 72}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 73, "end": 75}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The module uploads all collected information to one of the following URLs via POST request: It's the first time we see .pn", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The module", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "all collected information", "start": 19, "end": 44}, {"text": "one of the following URLs", "start": 48, "end": 73}, {"text": "POST request", "start": 78, "end": 90}], "action": [{"text": "uploads", "start": 11, "end": 18}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 45, "end": 47}, {"text": "via", "start": 74, "end": 77}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "domain used in malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This top level country code domain is quite exotic and is assigned to Pitcairn Islands, which is Overseas ter- ritory of the United Kingdom in the Pacific.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As of 2013 estimated population of Pitcairn Islands is only 56 people.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An official .pn", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "domain costs $100/year from the registry, however .eu.pn", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "domains seem to be given away for free.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware uses fixed User­Agent string: The data is uploaded as a POST request binary in the following format: where < UserId > is hardcoded identifier (i.e.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The data", "start": 42, "end": 50}, {"text": "a POST request binary", "start": 66, "end": 87}, {"text": "the following format", "start": 91, "end": 111}], "action": [{"text": "is uploaded", "start": 51, "end": 62}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 63, "end": 65}, {"text": "in", "start": 88, "end": 90}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "«user2» in current sample) ; < UniqueMachineId > is a 32 characters long hex string which derived from net- work card MAC address; < EncryptionKey > is symmetrical encryption key used to encrypt < UserId > and < GeneralSysInfo > values.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware uses text protocol, which is why potentially binary values of < UserId > and < GeneralSysInfo > are ad- ditionally encoded using Base64 algorithm.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "< GeneralSysInfo > field contains only basic information about the system, i.e.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ": If the server reply contains a keyword «minmei» it continues sending additional in- formation.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 50, "end": 52}, {"text": "additional in- formation", "start": 71, "end": 95}], "action": [{"text": "sending", "start": 63, "end": 70}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "«Minmei» may be a reference to a popular Japanese anime and manga known as «The Super Dimension Fortress Macross».", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A quote from Wikipedia: «Born in Yokohama Chinatown, Japan (though she is of partial Chinese descent) as Linn Minmei, Minmay moved in with her uncle Shaochin (少江) and aunt Feic- hun (慧中) on South Ataria Island in hopes of finding the path to fulfill her dream of becoming a star.» The trojan iterates through running processes and looks for security software basing on executable filenames from the list below.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The trojan", "start": 281, "end": 291}, {"text": "running processes", "start": 309, "end": 326}, {"text": "security software basing on executable filenames from the list below", "start": 341, "end": 409}], "action": [{"text": "iterates", "start": 292, "end": 300}, {"text": "looks", "start": 331, "end": 336}], "modifier": [{"text": "through", "start": 301, "end": 308}, {"text": "for", "start": 337, "end": 340}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the process is found it keeps a record of the software name using short AV Identifier string from the fol- lowing table of rules The malware uses a trick to evade running on a VMware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 132, "end": 143}, {"text": "running on a VMware", "start": 166, "end": 185}], "action": [{"text": "evade", "start": 160, "end": 165}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "First, it checks if cur- rent process is running in WOW64 environment.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 7, "end": 9}, {"text": "if cur- rent process is running in WOW64 environment", "start": 17, "end": 69}], "action": [{"text": "checks", "start": 10, "end": 16}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If yes it does additional port I/O specific to VMWare virtual machine (the VMware hypervisor port: 0x5658; VMware hypervisor magic value: 0x564D5868).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Another method to detect VM en- vironment is to check local network adapter's IP address.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Another method", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "VM en- vironment", "start": 25, "end": 41}, {"text": "local network adapter's IP address", "start": 54, "end": 88}], "action": [{"text": "detect", "start": 18, "end": 24}, {"text": "check", "start": 48, "end": 53}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If it belongs to subnet 192.168.100.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "* then the malware believes it's running in a VM.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If VM is detected the process instantly terminates.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "If", "start": 0, "end": 2}], "entity": [{"text": "VM is detected", "start": 3, "end": 17}, {"text": "the process", "start": 18, "end": 29}], "action": [{"text": "terminates", "start": 40, "end": 50}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Next the malware submits collected information to the C & C server using HTTP GET request and the following URL format: http: // < C2DOMAIN > /bin/readi.php? a1=% STEPID% & a2=% HOSTID% & a3=% SYSINFO% & a4=% AVSOFTID%, where% C2DOMAIN% is one of the following C & C domains:% STEPID% is special text string indicating stage of malware operation.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 5, "end": 16}, {"text": "collected information", "start": 25, "end": 46}, {"text": "the C & C server", "start": 50, "end": 66}, {"text": "HTTP GET request and the following URL format: http: // < C2DOMAIN > /bin/readi.php? a1=% STEPID% & a2=% HOSTID% & a3=% SYSINFO% & a4=% AVSOFTID%, where% C2DOMAIN% is one of the following C & C domains", "start": 73, "end": 274}], "action": [{"text": "submits", "start": 17, "end": 24}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 47, "end": 49}, {"text": "using", "start": 67, "end": 72}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This string varies depending on the local system language and may be one of the following:% HOSTID% is a special value generated from local network card MAC address;% SYSINFO% is a string with general system information (please see description above) ;% AVSOFTID% is a string that contains indexes of AV software names in internal table of AV Identifiers (please see the table above).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Igfxext.exe can download a file and drop it to% APPDATA% \\microsoft\\dis- play\\ctfmon.exe (md5= e8bfb82b0dd5cef46116d61f62c25060).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Igfxext.exe", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "a file", "start": 25, "end": 31}, {"text": "it", "start": 41, "end": 43}, {"text": "% APPDATA% \\microsoft\\dis- play\\ctfmon.exe (md5= e8bfb82b0dd5cef46116d61f62c25060)", "start": 46, "end": 128}], "action": [{"text": "download", "start": 16, "end": 24}, {"text": "drop", "start": 36, "end": 40}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 44, "end": 46}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After execution, the downloaded file drops SMAGENT.EXE (md5 0306f9ae- 7786570139f78e78bc940597) to% APPDATA% \\MICROSOFT\\DISPLAY and ex- ecutes it.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the downloaded file", "start": 17, "end": 36}, {"text": "SMAGENT.EXE (md5 0306f9ae- 7786570139f78e78bc940597)", "start": 43, "end": 95}, {"text": "% APPDATA% \\MICROSOFT\\DISPLAY", "start": 98, "end": 127}, {"text": "it", "start": 143, "end": 145}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 37, "end": 42}, {"text": "ex- ecutes", "start": 132, "end": 142}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 96, "end": 98}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This component is a virus, and is used to selectively infiltrate into other computers via USB or network shares.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This component", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "other computers", "start": 70, "end": 85}, {"text": "USB", "start": 90, "end": 93}, {"text": "network shares", "start": 97, "end": 111}], "action": [{"text": "infiltrate", "start": 54, "end": 64}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 65, "end": 69}, {"text": "via", "start": 86, "end": 89}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A large number of files are detected by Kaspersky Lab scanners as Virus.Win32.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Pioneer.dx.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These files are all legitimate files that have been infected by another Darkhotel component.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These files", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "another Darkhotel component", "start": 64, "end": 91}], "action": [{"text": "been infected", "start": 47, "end": 60}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All of these infected files drop a 63kb self injecting compo- nent.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "All of these infected files", "start": 0, "end": 27}, {"text": "a 63kb self injecting compo- nent", "start": 33, "end": 66}], "action": [{"text": "drop", "start": 28, "end": 32}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This malware is 63kb in size.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is bound to a variety of other software packages that vary in name, but the host package is consistently detected as'' Virus.Win32.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Pioneer.dx''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The igfxext.exe component is dropped to disk and run.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The igfxext.exe component", "start": 0, "end": 25}, {"text": "disk", "start": 40, "end": 44}], "action": [{"text": "is dropped", "start": 26, "end": 36}, {"text": "run", "start": 49, "end": 52}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 37, "end": 39}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It spawns an- other suspended process with its own igfxext.exe image, but decrypts a smaller 32kb executable (cf1319d94f33380622ba000b7d8ad6e9, Trojan­Downloader.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "an- other suspended process", "start": 10, "end": 37}, {"text": "its own igfxext.exe image", "start": 43, "end": 68}], "action": [{"text": "spawns", "start": 3, "end": 9}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 38, "end": 42}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Win32.Agent.xwge) from its .data", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "section in memory with a simple xor 0xbb.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The running process overwrites the igfxext.exe image in the suspended process with this smaller chunk of code.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The running process", "start": 0, "end": 19}, {"text": "the igfxext.exe image", "start": 31, "end": 52}, {"text": "the suspended process", "start": 56, "end": 77}, {"text": "this smaller chunk of code", "start": 83, "end": 109}], "action": [{"text": "overwrites", "start": 20, "end": 30}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 53, "end": 55}, {"text": "with", "start": 78, "end": 82}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It then resumes the thread in the new process.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This smaller code section maintains similar functionality to the'' worm'' compo- nent: Host package files detected as'' Virus.Win32.Pioneer.dx'' are infected legitimate files, that do not have any self­propagation routines.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Host package files detected as'' Virus.Win32.Pioneer.dx''", "start": 87, "end": 144}, {"text": "infected legitimate files", "start": 149, "end": 174}], "action": [{"text": "are", "start": 145, "end": 148}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is signed with the familiar'''' digital certificate.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This sample is started by code running within svchost.exe on WinXP SP3.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This sample", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "code running within svchost.exe on WinXP SP3", "start": 26, "end": 70}], "action": [{"text": "is started", "start": 12, "end": 22}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It drops a keylogger.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "a keylogger", "start": 9, "end": 20}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 3, "end": 8}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The debug path inside: The dropper above maintains, drops and installs this kernel mode keylogger: Likely, it was developed as a part of a mid­to­late 2009 project: This driver package is built to look like a legitimate low level Microsoft system device.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The dropper above", "start": 23, "end": 40}, {"text": "this kernel mode keylogger", "start": 71, "end": 97}], "action": [{"text": "maintains, drops and installs", "start": 41, "end": 70}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is installed as a system kernel driver'' Ndiskpro'' service, described as a'' Microcode Update Device''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "a system kernel driver'' Ndiskpro'' service", "start": 19, "end": 62}], "action": [{"text": "is installed", "start": 3, "end": 15}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 16, "end": 18}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is somewhat surprising that there is no rootkit functionality hiding this service: When loaded, the NDISKPRO.SYS driver hooks both INT 0x01 and INT 0xff, and retrieves keystroke data directly from port 0x60, the motherboard keyboard con- troller itself.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "loaded", "start": 91, "end": 97}, {"text": "hooks", "start": 123, "end": 128}, {"text": "retrieves", "start": 161, "end": 170}], "entity": [{"text": "the NDISKPRO.SYS driver", "start": 99, "end": 122}, {"text": "both INT 0x01 and INT 0xff", "start": 129, "end": 155}, {"text": "keystroke data", "start": 171, "end": 185}, {"text": "port 0x60, the motherboard keyboard con- troller itself", "start": 200, "end": 255}], "modifier": [{"text": "directly from", "start": 186, "end": 199}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Here we see the local port variables assigned values And here, the ports are directly being read with READPORTUCHAR (0x64) and then READPORTUCHAR (0x60): It buffers, then communicates the data to the running user mode component.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This component then encrypts and writes the retrieved values ondisk to a ran- domly named .tmp, file like ffffz07131101.tmp.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This component", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "the retrieved values ondisk", "start": 40, "end": 67}, {"text": "a ran- domly named .tmp, file like ffffz07131101.tmp", "start": 71, "end": 123}], "action": [{"text": "encrypts", "start": 20, "end": 28}, {"text": "writes", "start": 33, "end": 39}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 68, "end": 70}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This file is located in the same directory as the original dropper, which maintains persistence across reboots with a simple addition to the HKCU run key.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the original dropper", "start": 46, "end": 66}, {"text": "persistence", "start": 84, "end": 95}, {"text": "reboots", "start": 103, "end": 110}, {"text": "a simple addition to the HKCU run key", "start": 116, "end": 153}], "action": [{"text": "maintains", "start": 74, "end": 83}], "modifier": [{"text": "across", "start": 96, "end": 102}, {"text": "with", "start": 111, "end": 115}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Here is debug output demonstrating this component's data retrieval when the letter'' D'' is repeatedly pressed on the keyboard.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Keyscan make and break codes are'' 0x20'' and'' 0xA0'' and for the key press and key release for the'' D'' key.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The'' 0x1D'' value from port 0x64 that you see below is basically an indication that the output buffer is full and the keyboard is locked, so it is safe for the driver to access the key value in port 0x60: These debug messages and code style are duplicates of what chpie posted in the past.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This keylogger module encrypts and stores gathered data in a log file, as men- tioned previously.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This keylogger module", "start": 0, "end": 21}, {"text": "gathered data", "start": 42, "end": 55}, {"text": "a log file", "start": 59, "end": 69}], "action": [{"text": "encrypts", "start": 22, "end": 30}, {"text": "stores", "start": 35, "end": 41}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 56, "end": 58}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Its encryption algorithm is similar to RC4.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Interesting part is that the module randomly generates the key and stores it in an unexpected place: in the middle of the log file name.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Hence, the numeric part of the filename is used as a seed for the pseudorandom number generator.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Rand function is statically linked to insure same results on different computers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Here is the commented RC4 encryption code:", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We believe we're seeing an evolution and development in Iranian-based cyber activity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In years past, Iranian actors primarily committed politically-motivated website defacement and DDoS attacks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Iranian actors", "start": 15, "end": 29}, {"text": "DDoS attacks", "start": 95, "end": 107}], "action": [{"text": "committed", "start": 40, "end": 49}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "More recently, however, suspected Iranian actors have destroyed data on thousands of computers with the Shamoon virus, and they have penetrated the Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), which is used by the U.S. Navy worldwide.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "suspected Iranian actors", "start": 24, "end": 48}, {"text": "data", "start": 64, "end": 68}, {"text": "thousands of computers", "start": 72, "end": 94}, {"text": "the Shamoon virus", "start": 100, "end": 117}], "action": [{"text": "destroyed", "start": 54, "end": 63}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 69, "end": 71}, {"text": "with", "start": 95, "end": 99}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this report, we document the activities of the Ajax Security Team, a hacking group believed to be operating from Iran.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Members of this group have accounts on popular Iranian hacker forums such as ashiyane [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] org and shabgard [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] org, and they have engaged in website defacements under the group name'' AjaxTM'' since 2010.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By 2014, the Ajax Security Team had transitioned from performing defacements (their last defacement was in December 2013) to malware-based espionage, using a methodology consistent with other advanced persistent threat actors in this region.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is unclear if the Ajax Security Team operates in isolation or if they are a part of a larger coordinated effort.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Ajax Security Team itself uses malware tools that do not appear to be publicly available.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have seen this group leverage varied social engineering tactics as a means to lure their targets into infecting themselves with malware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this group", "start": 13, "end": 23}, {"text": "varied social engineering tactics", "start": 33, "end": 66}, {"text": "their targets", "start": 86, "end": 99}, {"text": "infecting themselves with malware", "start": 105, "end": 138}], "action": [{"text": "leverage", "start": 24, "end": 32}, {"text": "lure", "start": 81, "end": 85}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 100, "end": 104}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although we have not observed the use of exploits as a means to infect victims, members of the Ajax Security Team have previously used publicly available exploit code in web site defacement operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In sum, FireEye has recently observed the Ajax Security Team conducting multiple cyber espionage operations against companies in the defense industrial base (DIB) within the Unites States, as well as targeting local Iranian users of anti-censorship technologies that bypass Iran's Internet filtering system.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The transition from patriotic hacking to cyber espionage is not an uncommon phenomenon.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It typically follows an increasing politicization within the hacking community, particularly around geopolitical events.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is followed by increasing links between the hacking community and the state, particularly military and/or intelligence organizations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the late 1990's and early 2000's, a similar transition occurred within the Chinese hacking community.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During that time period, the Chinese hacking community engaged in website defacements and denial of service attacks in conjunction with incidents such as the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the collision of a U.S. spy plane and a Chinese military plane in 2001, and the Japanese Prime Minister's controversial visit to the Yasukuni shrine in 2005.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the Chinese hacking community", "start": 25, "end": 54}, {"text": "denial of service attacks", "start": 90, "end": 115}], "action": [{"text": "engaged", "start": 55, "end": 62}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 63, "end": 65}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Around this time a significant shift in philosophy began to take place.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Members of the Chinese hacking community that participated in such attacks soon found that transitioning to cyber espionage was more rewarding-both in terms of developing a more advanced skill set as well as in monetary remuneration.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One group known as NCPH (Network Crack Program Hacker), whose founding member'' Wicked/Withered Rose'' was a patriotic hacker, made the transition to cyber espionage by founding a'' hacker-for-hire'' group that simultaneously developed an association with the Chinese military.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The group began developing zero-day exploits, rootkits and remote access tools (RATs) -using them in attacks against a variety of targets including the U.S. Department of Defense.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "(One of this group's associates,'' whg'', is still active and is believed to have developed one variant of the PlugX/SOGU malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ") The rationale behind this transition within the Chinese hacking community is nicely summed up in a message by the'' Honker Union of China'' to its members in 2010: What benefit can hacking a Web page bring our country and the people? It is only a form of emotional catharsis, please do not launch any pointless attacks, the real attack is to fatally damage their network or gain access to their sensitive information.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In Iran, the hacking community appears to be undergoing a similar transformation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While a variety of Iranian hacker groups had engaged in politically motivated website defacements, the emergence of the'' Iranian Cyber Army'' in 2009 demonstrated'' a concentrated effort to promote the Iranian government's political narrative online''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They targeted, among others, news organizations, opposition websites and social media.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This marked the beginning of a large- scale cyber offensive against the perceived enemies of the Iranian government.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Foreign news and opposition websites are routinely blocked in Iran, as are the tools that allow users in Iran to bypass these restrictions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One of the key stakeholders in Iran's Internet censorship program is the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), under which the Basij paramilitary organization operates.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Basij formed the Basij Cyber Council and actively recruits hackers in order to develop both defensive and offensive cyber capabilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There is increasing evidence to suggest that the hacker community in Iran is engaged in a transition from politically motivated defacements and denial of service attacks to cyber espionage activities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This model is consistent with the Basij's recruitment of paramilitary volunteer hackers to'' engage in less complex hacking or infiltration operations'' leaving the more technical operations to entities over which they have increasingly direct control.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As such, the capabilities of threat actors operating from Iran have traditionally been considered limited.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, the'' Shamoon'' attacks, which wiped computers in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, indicate an improvement in capabilities.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the'' Shamoon'' attacks", "start": 9, "end": 32}, {"text": "computers in Saudi Arabia and Qatar", "start": 46, "end": 81}], "action": [{"text": "wiped", "start": 40, "end": 45}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "And unsurprisingly, Iran has reportedly increased its efforts to improve offensive capabilities after being targeted by Stuxnet and Flame.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have observed the Ajax Security Team use a variety of vectors to lure targets into installing malicious software and/or revealing login credentials.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the Ajax Security Team", "start": 17, "end": 39}, {"text": "targets", "start": 73, "end": 80}, {"text": "installing malicious software and/or revealing login credentials", "start": 86, "end": 150}], "action": [{"text": "lure", "start": 68, "end": 72}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 81, "end": 85}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These attack vectors include sending email, private messages via social media, fake login pages, and the propagation of anti-censorship software that has been infected with malware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These attack vectors", "start": 0, "end": 20}, {"text": "sending email, private messages via social media, fake login pages, and the propagation of anti-censorship software that has been infected with malware", "start": 29, "end": 180}], "action": [{"text": "include", "start": 21, "end": 28}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During our investigation, we discovered that these attackers sent targeted emails, as well as private messages through social media.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "these attackers", "start": 45, "end": 60}, {"text": "targeted emails, as well as private messages", "start": 66, "end": 110}, {"text": "social media", "start": 119, "end": 131}], "action": [{"text": "sent", "start": 61, "end": 65}], "modifier": [{"text": "through", "start": 111, "end": 118}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, the attackers targeted companies in the DIB using a fake conference page as a lure to trick targets into installing malicious software.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 13, "end": 26}, {"text": "companies in the DIB", "start": 36, "end": 56}, {"text": "a fake conference page as a lure to trick targets into installing malicious software", "start": 63, "end": 147}], "action": [{"text": "targeted", "start": 27, "end": 35}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 57, "end": 62}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers registered the domain'' aeroconf2014 [.] org'' in order to impersonate the IEEE Aerospace conference-the conference's actual domain is aeroconf.org-and sent out an email with the following information: The email encouraged users to visit a fake conference website owned by the attackers: Upon visiting the website, visitors were notified that they must install'' proxy'' software in order to access it, which is actually malware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attackers", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "the domain'' aeroconf2014 [.] org''", "start": 25, "end": 60}, {"text": "impersonate the IEEE Aerospace conference", "start": 73, "end": 114}, {"text": "an email with the following information", "start": 175, "end": 214}], "action": [{"text": "registered", "start": 14, "end": 24}, {"text": "sent", "start": 166, "end": 170}], "modifier": [{"text": "in order to", "start": 61, "end": 72}, {"text": "out", "start": 171, "end": 174}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers have also used phishing attacks, in which they set up Web pages to emulate various services that require security credentials.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attackers", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "phishing attacks", "start": 29, "end": 45}, {"text": "they", "start": 56, "end": 60}, {"text": "Web pages", "start": 68, "end": 77}, {"text": "emulate various services that require security credentials", "start": 81, "end": 139}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 24, "end": 28}, {"text": "set up", "start": 61, "end": 67}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 78, "end": 80}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers tailored these login pages for specific targets in the DIB and spoofed a variety of services such as Outlook Web Access and VPN login pages.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attackers", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "these login pages", "start": 23, "end": 40}, {"text": "specific targets in the DIB", "start": 45, "end": 72}, {"text": "a variety of services such as Outlook Web Access and VPN login pages", "start": 85, "end": 153}], "action": [{"text": "tailored", "start": 14, "end": 22}, {"text": "spoofed", "start": 77, "end": 84}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 41, "end": 44}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If users attempt to login through these fake Web pages, the attackers collect their login credentials.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 56, "end": 69}, {"text": "their login credentials", "start": 78, "end": 101}], "action": [{"text": "collect", "start": 70, "end": 77}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Iran are required to implement filtering technology that censors access to content which the Iranian government deems unacceptable.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This content includes categories such as pornography and political opposition.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In response to these restrictions, Iranians have been increasingly using software that bypasses such filtering technology.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To counter anti-censorship efforts, Iran has attempted to block the use of certain software tools.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2012, researchers found that an anti-censorship tool that is primarily used by Internet users in Iran was bundled with malware and redistributed.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an anti-censorship tool that is primarily used by Internet users in Iran", "start": 32, "end": 104}, {"text": "malware", "start": 122, "end": 129}], "action": [{"text": "was bundled", "start": 105, "end": 116}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 117, "end": 121}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our investigation found that malware-laden versions of legitimate anti-censorship software, such as Psiphon and Ultrasurf, were distributed to users Iran and Persian speaking people around the world.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "malware-laden versions of legitimate anti-censorship software, such as Psiphon and Ultrasurf", "start": 29, "end": 121}, {"text": "users Iran and Persian speaking people around the world", "start": 143, "end": 198}], "action": [{"text": "were distributed", "start": 123, "end": 139}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 140, "end": 142}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have observed the Ajax Security Team use a malware family that they identify simply as'Stealer'.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They deliver this malware as a malicious executable (dropper).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "They", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "this malware", "start": 13, "end": 25}, {"text": "a malicious executable (dropper)", "start": 29, "end": 61}], "action": [{"text": "deliver", "start": 5, "end": 12}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 26, "end": 28}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The executable is a CAB extractor that drops the implant IntelRS.exe.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The executable", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "the implant IntelRS.exe", "start": 45, "end": 68}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 39, "end": 44}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This implant, in turn, drops various other components into C:\\Documents and Settings\\ {USER} \\Application Data\\IntelRapidStart\\.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This implant", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "various other components", "start": 29, "end": 53}, {"text": "C:\\Documents and Settings\\ {USER} \\Application Data\\IntelRapidStart\\", "start": 59, "end": 127}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 23, "end": 28}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 54, "end": 58}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following files are written to disk in this location: The IntelRS.exe is written in .NET", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The following files", "start": 0, "end": 19}, {"text": "disk", "start": 35, "end": 39}, {"text": "this location", "start": 43, "end": 56}], "action": [{"text": "are written", "start": 20, "end": 31}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 32, "end": 34}, {"text": "in", "start": 40, "end": 42}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "and is aptly named'' Stealer'', as it has various data collection modules.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 35, "end": 37}, {"text": "various data collection modules", "start": 42, "end": 73}], "action": [{"text": "has", "start": 38, "end": 41}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It drops and launches AppTransferWiz.dll via the following command: 110 is an ordinal that corresponds to'' StartBypass'' export in AppTransferWiz.dll.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "AppTransferWiz.dll", "start": 22, "end": 40}, {"text": "the following command", "start": 45, "end": 66}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 3, "end": 8}, {"text": "launches", "start": 13, "end": 21}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 41, "end": 44}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Data exfiltration is conducted over FTP by AppTransferWiz.dll, which acts as an FTP client.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Data exfiltration", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "FTP", "start": 36, "end": 39}, {"text": "AppTransferWiz.dll", "start": 43, "end": 61}], "action": [{"text": "is conducted", "start": 18, "end": 30}], "modifier": [{"text": "over", "start": 31, "end": 35}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This DLL is written in Delphi.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There is code to exfiltrate data over HTTP POST as well, but it is unused.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "code", "start": 9, "end": 13}, {"text": "data", "start": 28, "end": 32}, {"text": "HTTP POST", "start": 38, "end": 47}], "action": [{"text": "exfiltrate", "start": 17, "end": 27}], "modifier": [{"text": "over", "start": 33, "end": 37}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also found incomplete code that would perform SFTP and SMTP exfiltration, which could be completed in a future version.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "incomplete code", "start": 14, "end": 29}, {"text": "SFTP and SMTP exfiltration", "start": 49, "end": 75}], "action": [{"text": "perform", "start": 41, "end": 48}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "State is maintained between the stealer component IntelRS.exe and the FTP component AppTransferWiz.DLL using a file from the FTP server'' sqlite3.dll'', as well as a global atom'' SQLiteFinish''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "IntelRS.exe waits in an indefinite loop, until AppTransferWiz.DLL defines this state.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once the state is set, IntelRS.exe proceeds to collect data from various areas in the system as described below: IntelRS.exe loads a Delphi component called DelphiNative.DLL, which implements some additional data theft functionality for the following: The Stealer component uses common techniques to acquire credential data.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "IntelRS.exe", "start": 23, "end": 34}, {"text": "data", "start": 55, "end": 59}, {"text": "various areas in the system as described below", "start": 65, "end": 111}, {"text": "IntelRS.exe", "start": 113, "end": 124}, {"text": "a Delphi component called DelphiNative.DLL", "start": 131, "end": 173}, {"text": "some additional data theft functionality", "start": 192, "end": 232}, {"text": "the following", "start": 237, "end": 250}, {"text": "The Stealer component", "start": 252, "end": 273}, {"text": "common techniques", "start": 279, "end": 296}, {"text": "acquire credential data", "start": 300, "end": 323}], "action": [{"text": "collect", "start": 47, "end": 54}, {"text": "loads", "start": 125, "end": 130}, {"text": "implements", "start": 181, "end": 191}, {"text": "uses", "start": 274, "end": 278}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 60, "end": 64}, {"text": "for", "start": 233, "end": 236}, {"text": "to", "start": 297, "end": 299}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For instance, it loads vaultcli.DLL and uses various APIs shown below to acquire RDP accounts from the Windows vault.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 14, "end": 16}, {"text": "vaultcli.DLL", "start": 23, "end": 35}, {"text": "various APIs shown below", "start": 45, "end": 69}, {"text": "acquire RDP accounts from the Windows vault", "start": 73, "end": 116}], "action": [{"text": "loads", "start": 17, "end": 22}, {"text": "uses", "start": 40, "end": 44}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 70, "end": 72}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Harvested data is encrypted and written to disk on the local host.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Harvested data", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "disk", "start": 43, "end": 47}, {"text": "the local host", "start": 51, "end": 65}], "action": [{"text": "is encrypted", "start": 15, "end": 27}, {"text": "written", "start": 32, "end": 39}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 40, "end": 42}, {"text": "on", "start": 48, "end": 50}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The filenames for these encrypted files follow this naming scheme: The {stolen data type} parameter indicates where the data was harvested from (e.g., a Web browser, an instant messenger application, installed proxy software).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Analysis of the malware indicates that the data is encrypted via a Rijndael cipher implementation; more specifically it uses AES which is a specific set of configurations of Rijndael.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the data", "start": 39, "end": 47}, {"text": "a Rijndael cipher implementation", "start": 65, "end": 97}], "action": [{"text": "is encrypted", "start": 48, "end": 60}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 61, "end": 64}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It uses a key size of 256 bytes and block size of 128 bytes, which conforms to the FIPS-197 specification of AES-256.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It utilizes the passphrase'HavijeBaba' and a salt of'salam! *% #' as an input to PBKDF2 (Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2) to derive the key and initialization vector for the encryption.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This key derivation implementation in .NET", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "is done using the Rfc2898DeriveBytes class.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The passphrase and salt are Persian language words.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Havij'' means'' carrot'','' Baba'' means'' father'', and'' Salam'' is a common greeting that means'' Peace''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We identified 17 droppers during this research, including: The 2009 compile time appears to have been forged, while the 2013 compile times may be legitimate.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In some cases, we found an implant but not the parent dropper.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In total, 22 of the 23 implants that we identified during our research had unique compile times ranging from 2013-10-29 until 2014-03-15.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We identified two implants that were both compiled on 2014-3-15 at 23:16.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These compile times appear to be legitimate and coincide with attempted intrusion activity attributed to these attackers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many of the malicious executables (droppers) that we collected were bundled with legitimate installers for VPN or proxy software.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Many of the malicious executables (droppers) that we collected", "start": 0, "end": 62}, {"text": "legitimate installers for VPN or proxy software", "start": 81, "end": 128}], "action": [{"text": "were bundled", "start": 63, "end": 75}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 76, "end": 80}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Examples include: • 6dc7cc33a3cdcfee6c4edb6c085b869d was bundled with an installer for Ultrasurf Proxy software.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "6dc7cc33a3cdcfee6c4edb6c085b869d", "start": 20, "end": 52}, {"text": "an installer for Ultrasurf Proxy software", "start": 70, "end": 111}], "action": [{"text": "was bundled", "start": 53, "end": 64}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 65, "end": 69}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• 3d26442f06b34df3d5921f89bf680ee9 was bundled with an installer for Gerdoovpn virtual private network software.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "3d26442f06b34df3d5921f89bf680ee9", "start": 2, "end": 34}, {"text": "an installer for Gerdoovpn virtual private network software", "start": 52, "end": 111}], "action": [{"text": "was bundled", "start": 35, "end": 46}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 47, "end": 51}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• 3efd971db6fbae08e96535478888cff9 was bundled with an installer for the Psiphon proxy.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "3efd971db6fbae08e96535478888cff9", "start": 2, "end": 34}, {"text": "an installer for the Psiphon proxy", "start": 52, "end": 86}], "action": [{"text": "was bundled", "start": 35, "end": 46}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 47, "end": 51}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• 288c91d6c0197e99b92c06496921bf2f was bundled with an installer for Proxifier software.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "288c91d6c0197e99b92c06496921bf2f", "start": 2, "end": 34}, {"text": "an installer for Proxifier software", "start": 52, "end": 87}], "action": [{"text": "was bundled", "start": 35, "end": 46}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 47, "end": 51}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These droppers were also designed to visually spoof the appearance of the above applications.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These droppers", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "the appearance of the above applications", "start": 52, "end": 92}], "action": [{"text": "spoof", "start": 46, "end": 51}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These droppers contained icons used in the legitimate installers for these programs.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These droppers", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "icons used in the legitimate installers for these programs", "start": 25, "end": 83}], "action": [{"text": "contained", "start": 15, "end": 24}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Analysis of the PDB strings seen in the implants indicates that there may be more than one developer working on the source code for the Stealer builder.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following two PDB paths were seen in the collection of implants that we collected: These strings indicate that the Stealer source code was stored in two different paths but not necessarily on two different computers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The f:\\Projects\\ path may be from an external storage device such as a thumb drive.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is therefore possible that only one person has access to the source code, but keeps a separate repository on an external storage device.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Alternatively, the different file paths could be the result of two different actors storing their source code in two different locations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In nine of the implants that we collected, we found a consistent portable executable (PE) resource with a SHA256 of 5156aca994ecfcb40458ead8c830cd66469d5f5 a031392898d323a8d7a7f23d3.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This PE resource contains the VSVERSIONINFO.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In layman's terms, this can best be described as the metadata describing the executable file.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This specific PE resource contained the following information: Note the InternalName of'Stealer.exe'.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is the attackers' name for this malware family.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During our research, we recovered two different tools used by the members of the Ajax Security Team in conjunction with targeted intrusion activities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first tool, labeled the'Stealer Builder' was compiled on 2014-04-08.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This compile date may indicate that the group is still active.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Upon executing the'Stealer Builder' the user is presented with an option to load the'Builder' or to'Decrypt' logs generated from a victim and exfiltrated to a command-and-control (CnC) server under the groups' control.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "logs", "start": 109, "end": 113}, {"text": "a command-and-control (CnC) server under the groups' control", "start": 157, "end": 217}], "action": [{"text": "exfiltrated", "start": 142, "end": 153}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 154, "end": 156}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Builder option enables an attacker to configure a new Stealer backdoor.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an attacker", "start": 27, "end": 38}, {"text": "a new Stealer backdoor", "start": 52, "end": 74}], "action": [{"text": "configure", "start": 42, "end": 51}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The user can configure the new backdoor to connect to a specific CnC server with a personalized username and password.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the new backdoor", "start": 23, "end": 39}, {"text": "a specific CnC server", "start": 54, "end": 75}, {"text": "a personalized username and password", "start": 81, "end": 117}], "action": [{"text": "connect", "start": 43, "end": 50}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 51, "end": 53}, {"text": "with", "start": 76, "end": 80}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attacker can bind the backdoor to a legitimate application of his or her choosing, or they can cloak it with an icon designed to make the backdoor appear as though it is a legitimate file.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attacker", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "the backdoor", "start": 22, "end": 34}, {"text": "a legitimate application of his or her choosing", "start": 38, "end": 85}, {"text": "they", "start": 90, "end": 94}, {"text": "it", "start": 105, "end": 107}, {"text": "an icon designed to make the backdoor appear as though it is a legitimate file", "start": 113, "end": 191}], "action": [{"text": "bind", "start": 17, "end": 21}, {"text": "cloak", "start": 99, "end": 104}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 35, "end": 37}, {"text": "with", "start": 108, "end": 112}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also noted that the Builder did not allow the attacker to select a new passphrase or salt used to encrypt the stolen data.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The passphrase'HavijeBaba' and a salt of'salam! *% #' are both hardcoded into the builder.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During testing, we observed that backdoors generated by this Stealer Builder had a timestamp of 2013-12-19.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We had one backdoor in our repository with this same timestamp.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This sample (MD5 1823b77b9ee6296a8b997ffb64d32d21) was configured to exfiltrate data to ultrasms [.] ir.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This sample (MD5 1823b77b9ee6296a8b997ffb64d32d21)", "start": 0, "end": 50}, {"text": "data", "start": 80, "end": 84}, {"text": "ultrasms [.] ir", "start": 88, "end": 103}], "action": [{"text": "exfiltrate", "start": 69, "end": 79}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 85, "end": 87}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The VSVERSIONINFO PE resource mentioned above (SHA256 5156aca994ecfcb40458ead8c830cd66469d5f5 a031392898d323a8d7a7f23d3) is an artifact of the Stealer builder that we recovered.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The builder generates an executable named IntelRapidStart.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "exe.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This executable contains the aforementioned VSVERSIONINFO PE resource.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also recovered a tool designed to encode plaintext into Base64 encoded text or decode Base64 encoded text into plaintext.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Members of the Ajax Security Team likely this use tool to encode the configuration data seen in RapidStartTech.stl files.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As noted above, the RapidStartTech.stl contains the backdoor's FTP credentials, implant name, decoy name, and screenshot interval, along with boolean settings for startup, keylogger, and screenshot plugins.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Encoding and decoding Base64 data is a straightforward task and the standard Linux operating system offers a number of command line tools to achieve this task.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The presence of a Windows-based GUI tool that simplifies encoding and decoding Base64 data indicates that these tools may have been developed for less adept users.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The CnC infrastructure consists of distinct, but linked, clusters that have targeted both the users of anti-censorship tools in Iran as well as defense contractor companies in the U.S.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first cluster contains the domain used in the Aerospace Conference attack as well as the domains used in phishing attacks designed to capture user credentials: The website used in the Aerospace Conference attack was aeroconf2014 [.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the domains", "start": 89, "end": 100}, {"text": "phishing attacks", "start": 109, "end": 125}, {"text": "user credentials", "start": 146, "end": 162}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 101, "end": 105}, {"text": "capture", "start": 138, "end": 145}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 106, "end": 108}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] org, which is registered to info @usa.gov [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] us.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, historical WHOIS information shows that the domain was registered by keyvan.ajaxtm @gmail [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com-the same domain used to register ajaxtm [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] org, the website of the Ajax Security Team.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The same email addresses were used to register variations of domain names associated with popular services provided by companies such as Google, Facebook, Yahoo and LinkedIn.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The second cluster comprises the CnC infrastructure used in the anti-censorship attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The majority of the samples we analyzed connect to intel-update [.] com and update-mirror [.] com, which were registered by james.mateo @aim [.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The majority of the samples we analyzed", "start": 0, "end": 39}, {"text": "intel-update [.] com and update-mirror [.] com", "start": 51, "end": 97}], "action": [{"text": "connect", "start": 40, "end": 47}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 48, "end": 50}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The domain intel-update [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com resolved to the IP address 88.150.227.197, which also hosted domains registered by osshom @yahoo [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com, many of which are consistent with the pattern of registering domains with associations to Google and Yahoo services.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also observed crossover with a sample that connected to both intel- update [.] com and ultrasms [.] ir, which was registered by lvlr98 @gmail [.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a sample", "start": 32, "end": 40}, {"text": "both intel- update [.] com and ultrasms [.] ir", "start": 59, "end": 105}], "action": [{"text": "connected", "start": 46, "end": 55}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 56, "end": 58}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These two clusters are linked by a common IP address (5.9.244.151), which is used by both ns2.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "aeroconf2014 [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] org and office.windows- essentials [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] tk.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A third cluster of activity was found via analysis of 1d4d9f6e6fa1a07cb0a66a9ee06d624a.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This sample is a Stealer variant that connects to the aforementioned intel-update [.] com as well as plugin-adobe [.] com.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This sample", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "the aforementioned intel-update [.] com as well as plugin-adobe [.] com", "start": 50, "end": 121}], "action": [{"text": "connects", "start": 38, "end": 46}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 47, "end": 49}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The domain plugin-adobe [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com resolved to 81.17.28.235.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other domains seen resolving to IP address nearby include the following: Aside from the sample connecting to plugin- adobe [.] com, we have not discovered any malware connecting to these domains.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the sample", "start": 84, "end": 94}, {"text": "plugin- adobe [.] com", "start": 109, "end": 130}], "action": [{"text": "connecting", "start": 95, "end": 105}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 106, "end": 108}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During our investigation, we were able to recover information on 77 victims from one CnC server that we discovered while analyzing malware samples that were disguised as anti-censorship tools.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "malware samples", "start": 131, "end": 146}, {"text": "anti-censorship tools", "start": 170, "end": 191}], "action": [{"text": "were disguised", "start": 152, "end": 166}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 167, "end": 169}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While analyzing the data from the victims, we found that the majority had either their timezone set to'' Iran Standard Time'' or had their language setting set to Persian: The largest concentration of victims is in Iran, based on the premise that Persian language settings and'' Iran Standard Time'' correlate the victim to be geographically located in Iran.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As such, we believe that attackers disguised malware as anti-censorship tools in order to target the users of such tools inside Iran as well as Iranian dissidents outside the country.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "attackers", "start": 25, "end": 34}, {"text": "malware", "start": 45, "end": 52}, {"text": "anti-censorship tools", "start": 56, "end": 77}, {"text": "target the users of such tools inside Iran as well as Iranian dissidents outside the country", "start": 90, "end": 182}], "action": [{"text": "disguised", "start": 35, "end": 44}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 53, "end": 55}, {"text": "in order to", "start": 78, "end": 89}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Ajax Security Team appears to have been formed by personas named'' HUrr! c4nE!'' and'' Cair3x'' in 2010.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Both members were engaged in website defacements prior to the forming of the Ajax Security Team, and both were members of Iranian hacker forums such as ashiyane [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] org and shabgard [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] org.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other members include'' 0day'','' Mohammad PK'' and'' Crim3r''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Ajax Security Team website at ajaxtm [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] org had a Web forum with at least 236 members.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The group published several exploits for content management systems and engaged in defacements.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Initially, the defacements seemed to be motivated by a desire to demonstrate the group's prowess-they even defaced an Iranian government website.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, the group appears to have become increasingly political.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, in a blog post in 2012,'' Cair3x'' announced the targeting of Iran's political opponents.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2013, the Ajax Security Team, and'' HUrr! c4nE!'' in particular, took part in'' #OpIsrael'' and'' #OpUSA''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By early 2014, the Ajax Security Team appears to have dwindled.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There have been no defacements since December 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The website and forum at ajaxtm [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] org operated by'' HUrr! c4nE!'', aka'' k3yv4n'', is no longer active.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' HUrr! c4nE!'' has the most open/documented Internet persona of the Ajax Security Team.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "He registered the ajaxtm [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] org domain name using the email address keyvan.ajaxtm @gmail [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This was also the email address used to register the domain aerospace2014 [.] org, which was used in spear phishing attacks against companies in the U.S. and is linked with malware activity directed at users of anti-censorship tools in Iran.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the domain aerospace2014 [.] org", "start": 49, "end": 81}, {"text": "spear phishing attacks against companies in the U.S.", "start": 101, "end": 153}], "action": [{"text": "was used", "start": 89, "end": 97}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 98, "end": 100}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' HUrr! c4nE!'' features prominently in all the group's activities and defacements.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although there has been a decline in public-facing Ajax Security Team activity, this coincides with an increase in malware activity linked to the group's infrastructure.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The increasing politicization of the Ajax Security Team aligns with the timing of their activities against the perceived enemies of Iran.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition to attacking companies in the U.S., they have targeted domestic users of anti-censorship technology.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While the objectives of this group are consistent with Iran's efforts at controlling political dissent and expanding offensive cyber capabilities, the relationship between this group and the Iranian government remains inconclusive.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, the Ajax Security Team could just be using anti-censorship tools as a lure because they are popular in Iran, in order to engage in activities that would be considered traditional cybercrime.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the Ajax Security Team", "start": 13, "end": 35}, {"text": "anti-censorship tools", "start": 56, "end": 77}, {"text": "a lure", "start": 81, "end": 87}], "action": [{"text": "be using", "start": 47, "end": 55}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 78, "end": 80}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In one case,'' HUrr! c4nE!'', using the email address keyvan.ajaxtm @gmail [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com, has been flagged for possible fraud by an online retailer.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While'' HUrr! c4nE!'' is engaged in operations that align with Iran's political objectives, he may also be dabbling in traditional cybercrime.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This indicates that there is a considerable grey area between the cyber espionage capabilities of Iran's hacker groups and any direct Iranian government or military involvement.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On the spectrum of state responsibility, these attacks align with state-encouraged attacks, which are defined as attacks in which: Third parties control and conduct the attack, but the national government encourages them as a matter of policy.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Recruiting hackers through this model allows Iran to influence their activities, and provides the Iranian government plausible deniability, but a lack of direct control also means that the groups may be unpredictable and engage in unsanctioned attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The increased politicization of the Ajax Security Team, and the transition from nuisance defacements to operations against internal dissidents and foreign targets, coincides with moves by Iran aimed at increasing offensive cyber capabilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While the relationship between actors such as the Ajax Security Team and the Iranian government is unknown, their activities appear to align with Iranian government political objectives.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The capabilities of the Ajax Security Team remain unclear.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This group uses at least one malware family that is not publicly available.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have not directly observed the Ajax Security Team use exploits to deliver malware, but it is unclear if they or other Iranian actors are capable of producing or acquiring exploit code.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While the Ajax Security Team's capabilities remain unclear, we know that their current operations have been somewhat successful as measured by the number of victims seen checking into to an Ajax Security Team controlled CnC server.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We believe that if these actors continue the current pace of their operations they will improve their capabilities in the mid-term.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "FireEye has invented a purpose-built, virtual machine-based security platform that provides real-time threat protection to enterprises and governments worldwide against the next generation of cyber attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These highly sophisticated cyber attacks easily circumvent traditional signature-based defenses, such as next-generation firewalls, IPS, anti-virus, and gateways.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The FireEye Threat Prevention Platform provides real-time, dynamic threat protection without the use of signatures to protect an organization across the primary threat vectors and across the different stages of an attack life cycle.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The core of the FireEye platform is a virtual execution engine, complemented by dynamic threat intelligence, to identify and block cyber attacks in real time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "FireEye has over 1,500 customers across more than 40 countries, including over 100 of the Fortune 500.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We thank Kenneth Geers and Jen Weedon for their support and analysis on these findings.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "by John Scott-Railton and Seth Hardy With the collaboration of Cyber Arabs.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Media coverage: Associated Press, Forbes This report describes a malware attack with circumstantial links to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the interest of highlighting a developing threat, this post analyzes the attack and provides a list of Indicators of Compromise.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A Syrian citizen media group critical of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was recently targeted in a customized digital attack designed to unmask their location.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Syrian group, Raqqah is being Slaughtered Silently (RSS), focuses its advocacy on documenting human rights abuses by ISIS elements occupying the city of Ar- Raqah.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In response, ISIS forces in the city have reportedly targeted the group with house raids, kidnappings, and an alleged assassination.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The group also faces online threats from ISIS and its supporters, including taunts that ISIS is spying on the group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Though we are unable to conclusively attribute the attack to ISIS or its supporters, a link to ISIS is plausible.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware used in the attack differs substantially from campaigns linked to the Syrian regime, and the attack is focused against a group that is an active target of ISIS forces.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As the Syrian Civil War continues, Syrian citizen journalists and nonviolent activists operate in an increasingly unsafe environment.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The regime has never welcomed their work, and has often targeted them for arrest and detention, and a multi-year hacking campaign (see Pro-Regime/Regime Linked Groups).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additionally, not all elements of the Syrian opposition have uniformly supported nonviolent activists and citizen journalists.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "More recently, in areas like Raqqah, nonviolent activists face a new and exceptionally grave threat: ISIS.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A growing number of reports suggest that ISIS is systematically targeting groups that document atrocities, or that communicate with Western media and aid organizations, sometimes under the pretext of finding'' spies''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Ar-Raqqah, the city in which the case study is located, is situated in northern Syria and continues to be a key conflict flashpoint of the Syrian Civil War.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the spring of 2013, Islamists and Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters took over Ar- Raqqah from regime forces.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As ISIS gained momentum, they consolidated their control over the city, edging out FSA- affiliated groups through attacks, summary executions, and kidnappings against a range of groups, including ethnic and religious minorities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During 2014, there were a number of reports-many unconfirmed-that ISIS confiscated smartphones and laptops from captured activists.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to Syrians who experienced these searches and spoke with one of the reports' authors, ISIS sometimes extracts data from confiscated smartphones and laptops to collect information about people and groups they are targeting, as well as to seek evidence of'' un-Islamic'' activities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As ISIS cements their control of Ar-Raqqah and other territories, reports have emerged recently (though not all of them confirmed) suggesting that elements within ISIS are growing increasingly sophisticated at imposing control and targeting opponents using digital methods.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Reports about ISIS targeting Internet cafés have grown increasingly common, and in some cases reports point to the possible use of keyloggers as well as unspecified'' IP sniffers'' to track behaviour in Internet cafes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Nonviolent activists and citizen journalists based in Ar-Raqqah have provided the outside world with much of what we know about how ISIS treats the population.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These activists and journalists face mortal danger for their actions, and reports have emerged of their detention and torture at the hands of ISIS.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As ISIS continues to use social media to push the message that it is welcomed by the population of Ar-Raqqah, groups like Raqqah is being Slaughtered Silently (RSS) provide a compelling counter narrative.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "RSS hasn't escaped ISIS' notice, and the group has been targeted for kidnappings, house raids, and at least one alleged targeted killing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At the time of writing, ISIS is allegedly holding several citizen journalists in Ar-Raqqah.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, RSS is targeted online by ISIS supporters with harassment, including threats to the physical safety of its members.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, ISIS supporters have claimed that ISIS has established a system of CCTV cameras in Ar-Raqqah to observe residents' movements.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While this claim may be a bluff or exaggeration, at least one ISIS supporter has indicated on social media that this system could be used to look for members of RSS.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This section describes a highly targeted attack sent to an e-mail address belonging to RSS.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a highly targeted attack", "start": 23, "end": 47}, {"text": "an e-mail address belonging to RSS", "start": 56, "end": 90}], "action": [{"text": "sent", "start": 48, "end": 52}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 53, "end": 55}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Citizen Lab analyzed this attack with the consent of RSS, which requested that their name be used in this report.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attack took the form of an unsolicited e-mail containing a download link to a decoy file.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attack", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "the form of an unsolicited e-mail containing a download link to a decoy file", "start": 16, "end": 92}], "action": [{"text": "took", "start": 11, "end": 15}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The file contained custom malware that profiled the victim's computer and beaconed its IP address to an e-mail account under the attacker's control.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "custom malware", "start": 19, "end": 33}, {"text": "the victim's computer", "start": 48, "end": 69}, {"text": "its IP address", "start": 83, "end": 97}, {"text": "an e-mail account under the attacker's control", "start": 101, "end": 147}], "action": [{"text": "profiled", "start": 39, "end": 47}, {"text": "beaconed", "start": 74, "end": 82}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 98, "end": 100}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The unsolicited message below was sent to RSS at the end of November 2014 from a Gmail email address.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The unsolicited message below", "start": 0, "end": 29}, {"text": "RSS", "start": 42, "end": 45}, {"text": "the end of November 2014", "start": 49, "end": 73}, {"text": "a Gmail email address", "start": 79, "end": 100}], "action": [{"text": "was sent", "start": 30, "end": 38}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 39, "end": 41}, {"text": "at", "start": 46, "end": 48}, {"text": "from", "start": 74, "end": 78}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The message was carefully worded, and contained references specific to the work and interests of RSS.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Thank you for your efforts to deliver a true picture of the reality of life in Raqqah.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As Syrians residing in Canada we are working with media because we believe in the importance of shedding light on the realities of life in Syria, and Raqqah in particular.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We are preparing a lengthy news report on the realities of life in Raqqah.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We are sharing some information with you with the hope that you will correct it in case it contains errors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have prepared a map of the city of Raqqah, in addition to a preliminary report.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We hope that you have a look at it with them and inform us of any errors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also hope that if you happen to be on Facebook, you could provide us with the account of the person responsible for the campaign, if you don't mind, so that we can communicate with him directly.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "You can see a preliminary copy of the report on this linkhttp: //tempsend [DOT] com/ [Redacted] With all respect [Name Redacted] We are unsure why the attacker specifically mentions Canada in the email lure.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, it is well known that Syria's extensive diaspora (including in Canada) regularly engages in advocacy, sometimes in coordination with groups within Syria.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Thus, the message is not on its face implausible.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, we note that the attacker also attempts to social engineer the identity of individuals working with RSS, by requesting a personal Facebook page.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attacker", "start": 22, "end": 34}, {"text": "the identity of individuals working with RSS", "start": 68, "end": 112}], "action": [{"text": "social engineer", "start": 52, "end": 67}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The custom malware used in this attack infects a user who views the decoy'' slideshow,'' and beacons home with the IP address of the victim's computer and details about his or her system each time the computer restarts.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The custom malware used in this attack", "start": 0, "end": 38}, {"text": "a user who views the decoy'' slideshow,''", "start": 47, "end": 88}, {"text": "home", "start": 101, "end": 105}, {"text": "the IP address of the victim's computer", "start": 111, "end": 150}, {"text": "details about his or her system", "start": 155, "end": 186}, {"text": "time the computer restarts", "start": 192, "end": 218}], "action": [{"text": "infects", "start": 39, "end": 46}, {"text": "beacons", "start": 93, "end": 100}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 106, "end": 110}, {"text": "each", "start": 187, "end": 191}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Unlike Syrian regime-linked malware, it contains no Remote Access Trojan (RAT) functionality, suggesting it is intended for identifying and locating a target.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 105, "end": 107}, {"text": "a target", "start": 149, "end": 157}], "action": [{"text": "identifying and locating", "start": 124, "end": 148}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Further, because the malware sends data captured by the malware to an e-mail address, it does not require that the attackers maintain a command-and-control server online.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 17, "end": 28}, {"text": "data captured by the malware", "start": 35, "end": 63}, {"text": "an e-mail address", "start": 67, "end": 84}], "action": [{"text": "sends", "start": 29, "end": 34}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 64, "end": 66}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This functionality would be especially useful to an adversary unsure of whether it can maintain uninterrupted Internet connectivity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Accessing the link provided in the malicious e-mail sends the user to a .zip", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "file hosted on file-sharing site tempsend.com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At the time of writing the file had been downloaded only 10 times This file is a self-extracting archive with an icon intended to suggest to the victim that it is itself a slideshow.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When run, the file opens a slideshow of Google Earth screen captures to the victim, displaying a series of locations in Syria, and highlighting an'' ISIS HQ'' and other images showing the alleged locations of US airstrikes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Examples of images in the slideshow as follows: When opened, the'' slideshow.zip'' file writes and executes several files:'' AdobeR1.exe'' is malicious, while'' pictures.exe'' is the genuine slideshow displayed to the victim.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "When", "start": 48, "end": 52}], "entity": [{"text": "opened", "start": 53, "end": 59}, {"text": "the'' slideshow.zip'' file", "start": 61, "end": 87}, {"text": "several files", "start": 108, "end": 121}], "action": [{"text": "writes", "start": 88, "end": 94}, {"text": "executes", "start": 99, "end": 107}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When the slideshow is closed both AdobeR1.exe and pictures.exe are deleted.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "When", "start": 0, "end": 4}], "entity": [{"text": "the slideshow is closed", "start": 5, "end": 28}, {"text": "both AdobeR1.exe and pictures.exe", "start": 29, "end": 62}], "action": [{"text": "are deleted", "start": 63, "end": 74}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The AdobeR1 file writes a series of executable files that perform information collection and communication functions, including: The program sequence of data collection and sending is somewhat unusual, with each program performing a single task and communicating via markers left in the registry.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The AdobeR1 file", "start": 0, "end": 16}, {"text": "a series of executable files", "start": 24, "end": 52}, {"text": "information collection", "start": 66, "end": 88}, {"text": "communication", "start": 93, "end": 106}, {"text": "The program sequence of data collection and sending", "start": 129, "end": 180}, {"text": "somewhat unusual", "start": 184, "end": 200}, {"text": "markers", "start": 267, "end": 274}, {"text": "the registry", "start": 283, "end": 295}], "action": [{"text": "writes", "start": 17, "end": 23}, {"text": "perform", "start": 58, "end": 65}, {"text": "is", "start": 181, "end": 183}, {"text": "left", "start": 275, "end": 279}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 280, "end": 282}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Programs appear to make use of the Visual C++ Runtime Library.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "First, the program nvidrv adds itself to autorun: It also creates a series of registry keys that the individual programs use to communicate: Registry keys and programs using them: It then runs GooglUpd, which cleans up the program files if they exist, and runs AdbrRader.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the program nvidrv", "start": 7, "end": 25}, {"text": "itself", "start": 31, "end": 37}, {"text": "autorun", "start": 41, "end": 48}, {"text": "It", "start": 50, "end": 52}, {"text": "a series of registry keys that the individual programs use to communicate", "start": 66, "end": 139}, {"text": "Registry keys", "start": 141, "end": 154}, {"text": "programs", "start": 159, "end": 167}, {"text": "them", "start": 174, "end": 178}, {"text": "It", "start": 180, "end": 182}, {"text": "GooglUpd", "start": 193, "end": 201}, {"text": "the program files", "start": 219, "end": 236}, {"text": "they exist", "start": 240, "end": 250}, {"text": "AdbrRader", "start": 261, "end": 270}], "action": [{"text": "adds", "start": 26, "end": 30}, {"text": "creates", "start": 58, "end": 65}, {"text": "using", "start": 168, "end": 173}, {"text": "runs", "start": 188, "end": 192}, {"text": "cleans up", "start": 209, "end": 218}, {"text": "runs", "start": 256, "end": 260}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 38, "end": 40}, {"text": "if", "start": 237, "end": 239}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "AdbrRader (communicating through registry key'' 2'') writes the file vgadmysadm.tmp with the name of another registry key'' 2'' with startup info.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "AdbrRader", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "the file vgadmysadm.tmp with the name of another registry key'' 2''", "start": 60, "end": 127}, {"text": "startup info", "start": 133, "end": 145}], "action": [{"text": "writes", "start": 53, "end": 59}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 128, "end": 132}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Next, nvidrv runs GoogleUpate, which collects system information and writes it to: Then nvidrv runs nvisdvr (registry key'' 4'') that collects a list of running processes, which are written to: Finally, nvidrv runs svhosts, which tests Internet connectivity by doing a DNS query for windowsupdate.microsoft.com.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "nvidrv", "start": 203, "end": 209}, {"text": "svhosts", "start": 215, "end": 222}, {"text": "Internet connectivity", "start": 236, "end": 257}, {"text": "a DNS query for windowsupdate.microsoft.com", "start": 267, "end": 310}], "action": [{"text": "runs", "start": 210, "end": 214}, {"text": "tests", "start": 230, "end": 235}, {"text": "doing", "start": 261, "end": 266}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It then runs rundl132 if it has not before, by checking whether registry key name'' 6'' is present.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "rundl132", "start": 13, "end": 21}, {"text": "it has not before", "start": 25, "end": 42}, {"text": "whether registry key name'' 6'' is present", "start": 56, "end": 98}], "action": [{"text": "runs", "start": 8, "end": 12}, {"text": "checking", "start": 47, "end": 55}], "modifier": [{"text": "if", "start": 22, "end": 24}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It sets the key to'' 0'' and runs it.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "the key", "start": 8, "end": 15}, {"text": "'' 0''", "start": 18, "end": 24}, {"text": "it", "start": 34, "end": 36}], "action": [{"text": "sets", "start": 3, "end": 7}, {"text": "runs", "start": 29, "end": 33}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 16, "end": 18}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Next,'' rundl132.exe'' performs an HTTP GET request to myexternalip.com and collects the external IP of the infected machine: Next, rundl132 writes: Then rundl132 writes the external IP to: Finally, rundl132 runs AdobeIns, which zips the contents of the win32.tmp folder.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "'' rundl132.exe''", "start": 5, "end": 22}, {"text": "an HTTP GET request", "start": 32, "end": 51}, {"text": "myexternalip.com", "start": 55, "end": 71}, {"text": "the external IP of the infected machine", "start": 85, "end": 124}, {"text": "rundl132", "start": 154, "end": 162}, {"text": "the external IP", "start": 170, "end": 185}, {"text": "rundl132", "start": 199, "end": 207}, {"text": "AdobeIns", "start": 213, "end": 221}, {"text": "the contents of the win32.tmp folder", "start": 234, "end": 270}], "action": [{"text": "performs", "start": 23, "end": 31}, {"text": "collects", "start": 76, "end": 84}, {"text": "writes", "start": 163, "end": 169}, {"text": "runs", "start": 208, "end": 212}, {"text": "zips", "start": 229, "end": 233}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 52, "end": 54}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Program'' AdobeIns.exe'' takes the files written by the other programs and zips them in an encrypted, password- protected file: Data is transmitted by e-mail to an account presumably controlled by the attacker.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Program'' AdobeIns.exe''", "start": 0, "end": 24}, {"text": "them", "start": 80, "end": 84}, {"text": "an encrypted, password- protected file", "start": 88, "end": 126}, {"text": "Data", "start": 128, "end": 132}, {"text": "e-mail", "start": 151, "end": 157}, {"text": "an account presumably controlled by the attacker", "start": 161, "end": 209}], "action": [{"text": "zips", "start": 75, "end": 79}, {"text": "is transmitted", "start": 133, "end": 147}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 85, "end": 87}, {"text": "by", "start": 148, "end": 150}, {"text": "to", "start": 158, "end": 160}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "AdobeIns connects to an account at the online e-mail provider inbox.com via smtp using hardcoded credentials.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "AdobeIns", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "an account", "start": 21, "end": 31}, {"text": "the online e-mail provider inbox.com", "start": 35, "end": 71}, {"text": "smtp", "start": 76, "end": 80}, {"text": "hardcoded credentials", "start": 87, "end": 108}], "action": [{"text": "connects", "start": 9, "end": 17}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 18, "end": 20}, {"text": "at", "start": 32, "end": 34}, {"text": "via", "start": 72, "end": 75}, {"text": "using", "start": 81, "end": 86}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware then sends an e-mail to the same inbox containing the text'' Hello'' and with mxtd file attached.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "an e-mail", "start": 23, "end": 32}, {"text": "the same inbox", "start": 36, "end": 50}], "action": [{"text": "sends", "start": 17, "end": 22}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 33, "end": 35}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "SMTP traffic generated by the malware to inbox.com (with redactions) The malware seen in this case study is unusual as it relies on a half-dozen separate executable files, each with a single task, and each communicating via markers dropped in the Registry.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "markers", "start": 224, "end": 231}, {"text": "the Registry", "start": 243, "end": 255}], "action": [{"text": "dropped", "start": 232, "end": 239}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 240, "end": 242}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware is also interesting because it does not provide remote access, but only sends an e-mail containing the victim's IP address and miscellaneous system information.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "an e-mail containing the victim's IP address and miscellaneous system information", "start": 90, "end": 171}], "action": [{"text": "sends", "start": 84, "end": 89}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware resends the information each time the computer is restarted, but it does not refresh the sent information on restart (which may be a bug).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "the information", "start": 20, "end": 35}, {"text": "time the computer is restarted", "start": 41, "end": 71}], "action": [{"text": "resends", "start": 12, "end": 19}], "modifier": [{"text": "each", "start": 36, "end": 40}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This behaviour strongly suggests that the function of this malware is to serve as a beacon.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this malware", "start": 54, "end": 66}, {"text": "a beacon", "start": 82, "end": 90}], "action": [{"text": "serve", "start": 73, "end": 78}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 79, "end": 81}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The system information could be used to identify processes to exploit in the future, however since the attacker has already triggered the execution of a file on the victim's system, it is surprising that more was not taken, or that a RAT (custom or widely available) was not used.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attacker", "start": 99, "end": 111}, {"text": "the execution of a file on the victim's system", "start": 134, "end": 180}], "action": [{"text": "triggered", "start": 124, "end": 133}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A RAT would have provided much greater access alongside IP information By not providing remote access and other RAT functionality, the program looks less like malware, and may attract less attention from endpoint protection tools and scanners.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the program", "start": 131, "end": 142}, {"text": "less like malware", "start": 149, "end": 166}, {"text": "less attention", "start": 184, "end": 198}], "action": [{"text": "looks", "start": 143, "end": 148}, {"text": "attract", "start": 176, "end": 183}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Detections were low when the file was first submitted to VirusTotal, for example.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It registered only 6/55 detections by anti virus scanners, or a 10% detection rate.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "only 6/55 detections by anti virus scanners, or a 10% detection rate", "start": 14, "end": 82}], "action": [{"text": "registered", "start": 3, "end": 13}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Transmitting the malware via e-mail also provides a degree of obscurity, and has the additional advantage of providing a layer of abstraction between the attacker and the target: there is no need to maintain a RAT command-and-control server.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "Transmitting", "start": 0, "end": 12}], "entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 13, "end": 24}, {"text": "e-mail", "start": 29, "end": 35}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 25, "end": 28}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware transmits autonomously, leaving the material in an inbox for the attacker to collect at a later time.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "the material", "start": 44, "end": 56}, {"text": "an inbox", "start": 60, "end": 68}, {"text": "the attacker to collect at a later time", "start": 73, "end": 112}], "action": [{"text": "transmits", "start": 12, "end": 21}, {"text": "leaving", "start": 36, "end": 43}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 57, "end": 59}, {"text": "for", "start": 69, "end": 72}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware has no obfuscation processes and is not highly technical in its development or interaction with Windows.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Nevertheless, we believe that the author of the program is aware of certain techniques to reduce the visibility of malware on a network, including transmitting data via encrypted e-mail communications.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "reduce", "start": 90, "end": 96}, {"text": "transmitting", "start": 147, "end": 159}], "entity": [{"text": "the visibility of malware on a network", "start": 97, "end": 135}, {"text": "data", "start": 160, "end": 164}, {"text": "encrypted e-mail communications", "start": 169, "end": 200}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 165, "end": 168}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, the attacker has not correctly implemented encrypted e-mail: the malware will not attempt to use a TLS connection in certain cases.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As a result, account login credentials may be readily available in network traffic.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, the malware uses the old PKWARE implementation of zip encryption, which is not particularly secure.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 13, "end": 24}, {"text": "the old PKWARE implementation of zip encryption", "start": 30, "end": 77}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 25, "end": 29}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The password for the zipped file is also present in the binary without encryption or obfuscation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Citizen Lab researchers have developed the Targeted Threat Index (TTI) as a tool to standardize information about the sophistication of targeted threats against civil society groups in our research.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The index captures information about the level of social engineering used ('' Targeting Sophistication''), and adds a Technical Sophistication value for the attack as a multiplier.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This attack, which has little technical sophistication (i.e., it uses no exploits, code obfuscation, or techniques to frustrate reversing, etc.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This attack", "start": 0, "end": 11}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "), nevertheless has carefully developed social engineering in the seeding materials and bait document.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "developed", "start": 30, "end": 39}], "entity": [{"text": "social engineering", "start": 40, "end": 58}, {"text": "the seeding materials and bait document", "start": 62, "end": 101}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 59, "end": 61}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Taken together it rates a 3 for Targeting Sophistication and a 1.25 for Technical Sophistication by our metric, yielding a TTI score of 3.75.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Citizen Lab research using the TTI has found that, despite low levels of technical sophistication, with well-crafted social engineering malware attacks remain highly effective against civil society groups.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "More information is available about the TTI in a recent Usenix Security paper.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There are at least three possible sources for this malware attack: We evaluate each of these possibilities in turn, drawing on the information available to us after almost three years of tracking regime-linked malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Pro-regime malware actors have continually targeted the Syrian opposition with waves of malware since at least late 2011.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Those campaigns have been extensively reported on by a range of groups, including Kaspersky, FireEye, Citizen Lab, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and many others.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Regime-linked malware has a number of common features that typically serve as distinguishing characteristics: Social engineering focusing on the needs and interests of the opposition.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although targeted, the malware seeding often aims at classes of people (e.g., people interested in'shocking' news about a fighter, or'leaked' information about the Assad regime) rather than carefully written spear phishing targeting a single individual or small group.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware seeding", "start": 19, "end": 38}, {"text": "classes of people", "start": 53, "end": 70}], "action": [{"text": "aims", "start": 45, "end": 49}], "modifier": [{"text": "at", "start": 50, "end": 52}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Use of widely available RATs (njRAT, Xtreme Rat, ShadowTech Rat, DarkComet RAT, and Blackshades RAT, among others).", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "Use", "start": 0, "end": 3}], "entity": [{"text": "widely available RATs", "start": 7, "end": 28}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At least one command-and-control server located within Syrian IP space (often from a limited range of addresses).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "At least one command-and-control server", "start": 0, "end": 39}, {"text": "Syrian IP space", "start": 55, "end": 70}], "action": [{"text": "located", "start": 40, "end": 47}], "modifier": [{"text": "within", "start": 48, "end": 54}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Frequent use of Dynamic DNS providers like no-ip.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Use of'' crypters'' to obscure the binary.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "Use", "start": 0, "end": 3}], "entity": [{"text": "'' crypters''", "start": 6, "end": 19}, {"text": "obscure the binary", "start": 23, "end": 41}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 20, "end": 22}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These characteristics are not all present in every sample, but we have typically found one or more in almost every binary we have examined that is Syrian regime-linked.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This malware attack differs from known regime-linked groups in each of these elements.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Not only is it exceptionally targeted, but it is also not a commonly available RAT.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "is", "start": 9, "end": 11}], "entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 12, "end": 14}, {"text": "exceptionally targeted", "start": 15, "end": 37}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Nor does it have RAT functionality.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The function of the malware appears to be: identify and unmask the IP address of target (s), and resend them to the attacker with each reboot.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 16, "end": 27}, {"text": "the IP address of target (s)", "start": 63, "end": 91}, {"text": "them", "start": 104, "end": 108}, {"text": "the attacker", "start": 112, "end": 124}, {"text": "reboot", "start": 135, "end": 141}], "action": [{"text": "identify and unmask", "start": 43, "end": 62}, {"text": "resend", "start": 97, "end": 103}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 109, "end": 111}, {"text": "with each", "start": 125, "end": 134}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, data is sent to an Internet e-mail address, and no crypter is used to obscure the binary.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "data", "start": 13, "end": 17}, {"text": "an Internet e-mail address", "start": 29, "end": 55}], "action": [{"text": "is sent", "start": 18, "end": 25}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 26, "end": 28}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We are aware of only one previous case in Syria in which e-mail was used to transmit data, and that we believed was regime linked.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "e-mail", "start": 57, "end": 63}, {"text": "transmit data", "start": 76, "end": 89}], "action": [{"text": "was used", "start": 64, "end": 72}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 73, "end": 75}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "That incident, observed in 2012, also used hardcoded e-mail to exfiltrate.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "used", "start": 38, "end": 42}], "entity": [{"text": "hardcoded e-mail", "start": 43, "end": 59}, {"text": "exfiltrate", "start": 63, "end": 73}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 60, "end": 62}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, that malware had substantially more functionality than this case: not only did it drop a second stage from a compromised site, but was also included a mechanism for exfiltrating credentials from Facebook and hooking programs like Skype.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 88, "end": 90}, {"text": "a second stage", "start": 96, "end": 110}, {"text": "a compromised site", "start": 116, "end": 134}, {"text": "credentials from Facebook and hooking programs like Skype", "start": 187, "end": 244}], "action": [{"text": "drop", "start": 91, "end": 95}, {"text": "exfiltrating", "start": 174, "end": 186}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 111, "end": 115}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The lack of overlap in Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) between this attack and prior attacks does not rule out Syrian regime-linked attackers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is possible that regime-linked groups are trying a new approach.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, given that known regime-linked groups continued to remain active during the same date range using familiar TTPs, this scenario seems unlikely.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, it would be strange for regime-linked malware groups to undertake significant effort to prepare and send an implant that has significantly less functionality than what they commonly use.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Taken together, we find this evidence supports the hypothesis that familiar regime-linked groups did not conduct the attack.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "RSS operates in territory controlled by ISIS, and has faced extensive targeting by ISIS.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Currently, they appear to be directly targeted by ISIS for kidnappings and other retaliation, including executions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, ISIS supporters have explicitly suggested that the group is under surveillance and actively hunted.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Together this evidence suggests that ISIS has a strong motivation for using social engineering and/or malware to locate the members of RSS.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We think there are several features of the malware attack that align with the needs and constraints of ISIS and its supporters in Ar-Raqqah, more so than other groups, as we understand them.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example: The malware beacons location but does not provide RAT functionality.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 13, "end": 24}, {"text": "location", "start": 33, "end": 41}], "action": [{"text": "beacons", "start": 25, "end": 32}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The seeding attempts to obtain a'private' Facebook identity from RSS through social engineering.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The seeding", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "a'private' Facebook identity", "start": 31, "end": 59}, {"text": "RSS", "start": 65, "end": 68}, {"text": "social engineering", "start": 77, "end": 95}], "action": [{"text": "obtain", "start": 24, "end": 30}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 60, "end": 64}, {"text": "through", "start": 69, "end": 76}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware exfiltrates to an online e-mail account, thus not requiring the attacker to maintain a command-and- control server online.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "an online e-mail account", "start": 27, "end": 51}], "action": [{"text": "exfiltrates", "start": 12, "end": 23}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 24, "end": 26}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The social media activity of members of RSS is often highly public.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Their location and exact membership, however, is secret.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We speculate that if an attacker were interested in maintaining long-term surveillance of the activities of RSS they could have employed a RAT.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, if the attacker were interested in unmasking the location of its targets so they could be physically tracked down, collecting IP data and system info would be a more reasonable approach.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "ISIS or its supporters clearly have a strong interest in the (rudimentary) location tracking of the members of RSS that this malware provides.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Internet connectivity in Raqqah is extremely limited, and some of it is under ISIS control.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Knowing the IP address of a target could quickly narrow down targets to specific locations, and specific Internet services, or Internet cafes in Raqqah.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Given that the identities and locations of RSS members are closely guarded, such information would hold significant intelligence value for ISIS.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Armed with this kind of information, ISIS could physically harm people within Raqqah (and it is also possible that they have the ability to operate in some capacity in border areas of Turkey).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Little is publicly known about the technical capabilities of ISIS and its supporters; however, reports have begun to emerge suggesting that ISIS is interested in expanding its abilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, ISIS has reportedly gained the support of at least one individual with some experience with social engineering and hacking: Junaid Hussain (aka TriCk), a former member of teamp0ison hacking team.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While Mr. Hussain and associates have reportedly made threats against Western governments, it is possible that he or others working with ISIS have quietly supported an effort to identify the targeted organization, which is a highly visible thorn in the side of ISIS.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is possible that the attack is the product of actors working for unknown purposes and targeting RSS.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Given the activities of RSS, however, it is unclear who this might be.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is not possible, for example, to reject the theory that some unknown group within the FSA, or other groups opposing the Assad regime are responsible.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Citizen journalists in Ar-Raqqah were previously critical of arbitrary arrests carried out by non-ISIS groups in 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, it is unclear why those groups, which no longer control Ar-Raqqah, would be interested in RSS in November 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is likely that third party actors, including several intelligence services, are closely monitoring various actors in the conflict through a range of electronic means.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, there is little reason to suggest that they would use a tailored but technically rudimentary attack to target RSS in particular.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After considering each possibility, we find strong but inconclusive circumstantial evidence to support a link to ISIS.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, we are unable to connect this attack directly to ISIS, Mr. Hussain, or other ISIS supporters.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If indeed ISIS or its supporters are responsible, it seems reasonable that such an offensive capability may still be in development.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We hope that publishing this report will draw attention to a new and concerning threat that includes ISIS critics among its targets.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If ISIS is responsible, while this attack targets in-country impediments to ISIS objectives, other targets may include ideological or military adversaries abroad.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Whether or not ISIS is responsible, this attack is likely the work of a non-regime threat actor who may be just beginning to field a still-rudimentary capability in the Syrian conflict.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The entry costs for engaging in malware attacks in a conflict like the Syrian Civil War are low, and made lower by the fact that the rule of law is nonexistent for large parts of the country.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In still other parts (under regime control), malware attacks appear to be state sanctioned.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Citizen Lab research into targeted digital threats against civil society confirms that civil society groups face grave threats from targeted malware attacks, despite being under-resourced to defend against them.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The case highlighted here is no exception: lack of IT and security resources have made it difficult for the Syrian opposition to address targeted and persistent digital threats against them.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, if ISIS is indeed responsible, this case suggests how easy it is for belligerents in a conflict to begin fielding basic offensive digital capabilities, and how quickly the capabilities can be pointed at unarmed civil society groups.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This attack was exceptionally targeted, and clearly reflected the work of an actor familiar with the operations of the targeted organization.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This attack", "start": 0, "end": 11}], "action": [{"text": "was exceptionally targeted", "start": 12, "end": 38}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As most organizations working on issues surrounding Syria are aware, malware delivered with good social engineering is a constant source of danger.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This particular attack can be prevented by not opening files sent by unknown persons.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, many attacks in Syria come from hijacked accounts and impersonate people known to the targets.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Social engineering remains an unsolved problem, and continues to compromise groups throughout the Syrian opposition and their supporters.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This attack reaffirms the dangers posed by social engineering attacks, whether they deliver phishing campaigns or malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The circumstantial evidence of ISIS involvement suggests that groups working on topics that ISIS considers a threat, and their partner organizations and supporters, should urgently examine their security policies and assess the possible risks to their operations, and the consequences of exposure of sensitive information to ISIS.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Even if the link to ISIS turns out to be incorrect, it is possible that this will be a threat in the future.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Individuals and groups at risk can also consult materials in Arabic provided by Cyber Arabs including a series of very accessible videos on digital security.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware files Files dropped by the malware Collected Information Files (unencrypted) Exfiltrated file (encrypted) Registry Keys Acknowledgements: We are grateful to Cyber Arabs and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting for their critical work and assistance.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Special thanks to: several anonymous Syrians, Masashi Crete-Nishihata, Sarah McKune, Morgan Marquis-Boire, Ron Deibert, Bill Marczak, Nart Villeneuve, Irene Poetranto, and Kristen Dennesen.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Support for this research is provided by grants from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Ford Foundation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cyber Squared Inc.'s ThreatConnect Intelligence Research Team (TCIRT) tracks a number of threat groups around the world.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Beginning in the summer of 2013, TCIRT identified a suspected Pakistani-origin threat group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This group was revealed by TCIRT publicly in August 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the months following the disclosure, we identified new activity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cyber Squared partnered with experts at FireEye Labs to examine these new observations in an attempt to discover new research and insight into the group and its Operation'' Arachnophobia''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following report is a product of collaborative research and threat intelligence sharing between Cyber Squared Inc.'s TCIRT and FireEye Labs.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• While we are not conclusively attributing BITTERBUG activity to Tranchulas or a specific Pakistani entity, we can confidently point to many characteristics of a Pakistan-based cyber exploitation effort that is probably directed against Indian targets and/or those who are involved in India-Pakistan issues.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• The threat actors utilized a hosting provider that is a Pakistani-based company with subleased VPS space within the U.S. for command and control (C2).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The threat actors", "start": 2, "end": 19}, {"text": "a hosting provider that is a Pakistani-based company with subleased VPS space within the U.S.", "start": 29, "end": 122}, {"text": "command and control (C2)", "start": 127, "end": 151}], "action": [{"text": "utilized", "start": 20, "end": 28}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 123, "end": 126}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• The customized malware (BITTERBUG) used by these threat actors has only been observed hosted on and communicating with two IP addresses operated by a Pakistan-based hosting provider.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The customized malware (BITTERBUG) used by these threat actors", "start": 2, "end": 64}, {"text": "two IP addresses operated by a Pakistan-based hosting provider", "start": 121, "end": 183}], "action": [{"text": "hosted", "start": 88, "end": 94}, {"text": "communicating", "start": 102, "end": 115}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 95, "end": 97}, {"text": "with", "start": 116, "end": 120}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Early variants of the BITTERBUG malware had build paths containing the strings'' Tranchulas'' and'' umairaziz27''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Tranchulas is the name of a Pakistani security firm; Umair Aziz is the name of a Tranchulas employee.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Following the release of our blog post highlighting this activity and the malware's build strings, the threat actors appear to have modified their binary file paths to make them more generic.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Employees at both the Pakistan-based hosting provider and Tranchulas appear within each others' social networks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On August 2, 2013, the TCIRT published the blog'' Where There is Smoke, There is Fire: South Asian Cyber Espionage Heats Up'' in which TCIRT identified custom malware, later dubbed BITTERBUG by FireEye, suspected to be linked to Pakistani-based exploitation activity directed against Indian entities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We found debug path references to'' Tranchulas'', which is also the name of a Pakistani security company.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Tranchulas claims to support'' national level cyber security programs'' and the development of offensive and defensive cyber capabilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At the time, the incident seemed to be an isolated one for TCIRT, but it was only the beginning.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our suspicions of Tranchulas' involvement in the activity began to mount, based on a series of events that occurred both before and after the release of our blog post.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During the past year, we communicated with Tranchulas and the Pakistan-based hosting provider.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Suspicious responses and oddly similar replies received from both companies to our inquiries, as well as anomalies in their email headers, prompted us to research the companies further.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our research revealed: • The C2 hosting provider (VPSNOC) has likely been conducting business operations from within Pakistan, subleasing infrastructure from U.S. providers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• VPNSOC and Tranchulas employees have maintained some type of undefined relationship given connections via social media.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Both organizations have employed or are affiliated with personnel who have offensive cyber expertise.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• When TCIRT was initially contacted by Tranchulas following our original blog post, they denied any involvement in the activity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Tranchulas maintained that they were being framed, and that they were already aware of the activity prior to both our blog post and our contact.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, inconsistencies in their claims and their responses made such a scenario questionable.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "TCIRT began tracking a set of activity involving a BITTERBUG variant in May 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To our knowledge this customized malware has only ever been observed hosted on and communicating with two command and control nodes: 199.91.173.43 and 199.91.173.45.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this customized malware", "start": 17, "end": 40}, {"text": "two command and control nodes: 199.91.173.43 and 199.91.173.45", "start": 102, "end": 164}], "action": [{"text": "hosted", "start": 69, "end": 75}, {"text": "communicating", "start": 83, "end": 96}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 76, "end": 78}, {"text": "with", "start": 97, "end": 101}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to Whois records, those IP addresses were registered to a web-hosting firm in Kansas City, Missouri.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Based on public records, this organization appears to be a legal entity chartered to conduct business in Missouri.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On July 24, 2013, TCIRT contacted the Kansas City-based hosting provider to notify them of the malicious activities emanating from IP address 199.91.173.43.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The hosting provider subsequently introduced TCIRT to their client VPNSOC, the customer responsible for subleasing the IP address.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Later that day, TCIRT received a response from support @vpsnoc.com providing limited information on the server and related traffic (Figure 2).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When TCIRT sent follow-up communications, VPSNOC did not respond, further increasing our suspicions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While reviewing the metadata of VPSNOC's July 24, 2013 email response, we noticed the email was sent from a +0500 time zone.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This time zone usage is consistent with Pakistan's time zone.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The TCIRT published details of the initial activity in the aforementioned blog post on August 2, 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Four days later on August, 2013, the Tranchulas Chief Executive Officer, Zubair Khan, contacted us regarding the blog post and its subsequent press coverage.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Khan submitted'' ResponseThreatConnect.docx'' as an explanation of the observed activity to both the media and the TCIRT indicating that the debug paths using'' Tranchulas'' and'' umairaziz27'' was'' done by developer of malware to portray wrong impression about Tranchulas and mislead malware analysts''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Notably, Khan included a screenshot of an email message.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The message was reportedly a response from VPSNOC to an email message from Tranchulas sent on July 21, 2013, purportedly to notify VPSNOC of the same malicious activity identified by TCIRT.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, we noted certain anomalies in this message.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As seen in Figure 3 the'' email message'' was'' sent'' to VPSNOC from an unidentified tranchulas.com email address on'' Tue, Jul 21, 2013 at 11:36 PM.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' July 21, 2013 was not a Tuesday and in fact was a Sunday.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The mismatched date suggests that this email message was potentially modified in order to support the claim that Tranchulas was aware of, and had already reported the exploitation activity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "TCIRT speculates that'' Tuesday'' was hastily chosen because our own official notification to VPSNOC was sent on Wednesday the 24th.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, the'' response'' received by Tranchulas is nearly identical to that received by TCIRT.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We believe that Tranchulas may have obtained information about TCIRT's notification to VPSNOC through a pre-established relationship.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The TCIRT responded to Mr. Khan's official explanation with a follow-up inquiry, offering Khan an opportunity to explain the notable date inconsistency within the email screenshot.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The TCIRT also requested that Mr. Khan share the actual email message with the original attached headers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Mr. Khan did not address the TCIRT question, but rather deferred our request to Mr. Hamza Qamar, a Penetration Testing Team Lead at Tranchulas.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On August 15, 2013, three days later, Qamar responded to TCIRT with a brief denial of any modifications to the screenshot (other than email address anonymization) and specifically referred TCIRT back to VPSNOC support (support @vpsnoc.com) for any follow up questions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Astonished by this dismissal and deflection, TCIRT immediately began to explore the relationship between VPSNOC and Tranchulas.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During our research into VPSNOC, we identified that it is actually based in, or conducts partial operations from within, Pakistan.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The company only gives the impression of operating from Kansas City through marketing and the use of leased IP space (Figure 4).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Whois records for vpsnoc.com revealed that the domain was registered by Digital Linx Hosting.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Digital Linx is also a Pakistan-based hosting company (Figure 5).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As seen in Figure 6, the administrative email address is admin @digitallinx.org.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is the same registrant record for the digitallinx.net domain.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The domains digitillinx.org, digitallinx.net, and digitallinx.com share current and historical similarities in their WHOIS records and sitemap.xml files that imply they are all controlled by the same individual or entity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The domain digitallinx.com is registered to Muhammad Naseer Bhatti (Digital Linx Founder) who uses email addresses naseer @digitallinx.com and nbhatti @gmail.com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The domain is also registered to the address 638-F Johar Town, Lahore Pakistan.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The contact telephone number listed on Digital Linx' web site is 925-665-1427 (Figure 6), and is also used in the WHOIS record for defiantmarketing.com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The domain defiantmarketing.com is registered to Abunasar Khan.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The registration lists VPSNOC as the registrant organization, abunasar @yahoo.com as the registration email address, and House 12, Street 21, F-8/1 Islamabad Federal 44000 as the registration address.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Abunasar Khan has been observed using the aliases'' agnosticon'' and'' agnostic''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "From this we were able to locate an advertisement in the Blackhatworld forum from April 2012 posted by agnosticon promoting VPSNOC and identifying it as a subdivision of Digital Linx Hosting (Figure 7).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Though none of this information is surprising, it further suggests that both Bhatti and Abunasar Khan work or worked for Digital Linx and VPSNOC and during that time were both located in Pakistan.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additional research into Abunasar Khan identified several registered domains and fragments of his online presence.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Based on his websites and account information, he appears to have an interest or participated in the Antisec and Anonymous movements (Figure 8).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "He also used'' anony mo us'' in the registration name field of a personal account.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, Abunasar Khan's Google+ profile revealed connections to at least one Tranchulas employee, Hamza Qamar and a Digital Linx employee, Shoaib Riaz.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Hamza Qamar, the Team Lead for Penetration Testing at Tranchulas, with whom TCIRT last spoke.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Visiting Hamza Qamar's Google+ page (Figure 9), the only directly connected person was Abunasar Khan.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At this point, it shows that a probable VPNSOC employee with ties or interests in hacking has an undefined but potentially close relationship with Hamza Qamar, the Penetration Testing employee from Tranchulas.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Qamar indicated on his public LinkedIn profile that he'' engaged in system and enterprise level network and Web application security testing for clients ranging from large federal agencies, DoD, and commercial clients'', though it is unclear which'' DoD'' is referenced (e.g., whether the Pakistani Ministry of Defense or some other nation's defense department).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Tranchulas identifies government (presumably Pakistan's government) as an operational sector for its work.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Tranchulas' offensive cyber initiative services are offered to'' national-level cyber security programs'' indicating commercial demand from'' national-level'' customers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Though Tranchulas brands itself as a multi-national company, with respective addresses within the United Kingdom, the United States, and New Zealand.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We found evidence that these addresses are all associated with either virtual office spaces or address forwarding services.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For further background information on these personas, please see Appendix F: Personas.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following is a summary of the relationships between the hosting organizations and Tranchulas: • VPNSOC IP space was used as command and control nodes for attackers using variants of the BITTERBUG malware that contained build strings that referenced'' Tranchulas'' and a Tranchulas employee.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "VPNSOC IP space", "start": 100, "end": 115}, {"text": "command and control nodes", "start": 128, "end": 153}, {"text": "attackers using variants of the BITTERBUG malware that contained build strings that referenced'' Tranchulas'' and a Tranchulas employee", "start": 158, "end": 293}], "action": [{"text": "was used", "start": 116, "end": 124}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 125, "end": 127}, {"text": "for", "start": 154, "end": 157}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Tranchulas and VPNSOC were in direct communication at some point in July-August 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• VPNSOC is a subsidiary of Digital Linx.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Tranchulas, VPNSOC, Digital Linx were all physically located in Pakistan but maintained virtual presence within the U.S. • Hamza Qamar was an employee of Tranchulas.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Muhammad Naseer Bhatti was the self-proclaimed founder of Digital Linx.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Abunasar Khan was affiliated with AntiSec and VPNSOC.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Digital Linx founder Muhammad Naseer Bhatti had at least a working relationship with VPNSOC employee Abunasar Khan–connected through domain registrations and a common Google+ profile for Shoaib Riaz (another Digital Linx employee).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• VPNSOC employee Abunasar Khan had a direct connection to Tranchulas employee Hamza Qamar through Google+.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Note: A walkthrough of our research is available in Appendices C, D and E. Metadata Analysis: As mentioned earlier, during the email exchanged with Zubair Khan, he sent TCIRT a Microsoft Word document (.docx", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ").", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In reviewing the document metadata for'' ResponseThreatConnect.docx'', TCIRT identified that it contained the creator properties of'' hp.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' TCIRT compared the metadata of two benign BITTERBUG-associated decoy documents from July 2013 and found that both also had the author of'' hp'' (Figure 10).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While the author field of'' hp'' doesn't conclusively prove a relationship, it contributes to the body of circumstantial evidence which links properties of the official Tranchulas response to the properties of decoy documents that were used in conjunction with BITTERBUG targeting campaigns.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "decoy documents", "start": 210, "end": 225}, {"text": "BITTERBUG targeting campaigns", "start": 261, "end": 290}], "action": [{"text": "were used", "start": 231, "end": 240}], "modifier": [{"text": "in conjunction with", "start": 241, "end": 260}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CyberSquared Inc. partnered with FireEye for a second technical review of the malware associated with this activity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "FireEye analyzed the malware, which they call BITTERBUG, and determined it to be a custom backdoor.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "FireEye", "start": 0, "end": 7}, {"text": "it", "start": 72, "end": 74}, {"text": "be a custom backdoor", "start": 78, "end": 98}], "action": [{"text": "determined", "start": 61, "end": 71}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 75, "end": 77}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The backdoor relies on various support components, including the non-malicious, publically available Libcurl for installation, launch, and communications.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "various support components, including the non-malicious, publically available Libcurl", "start": 23, "end": 108}, {"text": "installation, launch, and communications", "start": 113, "end": 153}], "action": [{"text": "relies", "start": 13, "end": 19}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 20, "end": 22}, {"text": "for", "start": 109, "end": 112}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In some variants, BITTERBUG has the ability to automatically target and exfiltrate files with extensions such as .doc, .xls, .pdf, .ppt, .egm, and .xml", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 18, "end": 27}, {"text": "files with extensions such as .doc, .xls, .pdf, .ppt, .egm, and .xml", "start": 83, "end": 151}], "action": [{"text": "target and exfiltrate", "start": 61, "end": 82}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ".", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The full malware report is included in Appendix A: Malware Details.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The earliest evidence of the malware family dates to April 2013, based on the Portable Executable (PE) compile times, with more than 10 BITTERBUG variants observed to date.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The earliest samples of BITTERBUG contain the'' Tranchulas'' debug path (below), as mentioned in the August 2013 TCIRT blog post.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These BITTERBUG variants were probably used in attacks around summer 2013, using possible lures related to the then-recent death of'' Sarabjit Singh'' (an Indian national imprisoned in Pakistan) and an Indian Government pension memorandum.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As stated in the original blog (and raised in the formal Tranchulas response), several binaries contain references to'' Cath'' in the debug path.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is important to note that the'' Cath'' files are support components and not BITTERBUG variants, so it is probable that these were developed by another party but are a required component of the family.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additional BITTERBUG variants were compiled in June and July 2013 that contained different identifiers in the debug paths:'' Cert-India'' (3 samples) and'' umairaziz27'' (1 sample).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The presence of'' umairaziz27'' in a debug path from one sample makes us wonder if this represents an operational security mistake.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The debug path of'' umairaziz27'' led us to Twitter and LinkedIn accounts (on which a matching alias is used) that belong to a Tranchulas employee named Umair Aziz, who identified himself as an Information Security Analyst and graduate of National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One of these samples was probably used in attacks in late summer 2013, using a'' leaked report'' lure which contained a decoy document related to Pakistan's alleged inability to locate Osama Bin Laden.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "One of these samples", "start": 0, "end": 20}, {"text": "a'' leaked report'' lure which contained a decoy document related to Pakistan's alleged inability to locate Osama Bin Laden", "start": 77, "end": 200}], "action": [{"text": "using", "start": 71, "end": 76}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After publication of the TCIRT blog and our communications with Tranchulas occurred in August 2013, no new samples of BITTERBUG or its support components (based on compile times) were identified until September (various support components) and October (a new BITTERBUG variant).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Interestingly, the samples compiled following the blog publication used entirely new and generic debug paths (Figure 11) as well as a compilation tactic to conceal the C2 address from static analysis.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a compilation tactic", "start": 132, "end": 152}, {"text": "the C2 address from static analysis", "start": 164, "end": 199}], "action": [{"text": "conceal", "start": 156, "end": 163}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Between September and December, we observed more variations of BITTERBUG and its support components in terms of packaging, host-based activities, and decoys (or the lack of them) compared to the samples before our blog post.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This could indicate that the threat actors were aware of the blog post and modified their malware and related components to distance them from prior indicators.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Between December 2013 and late March 2014, we observed several new lures used in BITTERBUG self-extracting RAR (SFXRAR) files.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "several new lures", "start": 55, "end": 72}, {"text": "BITTERBUG self-extracting RAR (SFXRAR) files", "start": 81, "end": 125}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 73, "end": 77}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 78, "end": 80}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One from December contained several BITTERBUG variants and used a decoy PDF document (Figure 12) related to the December arrest of Devyani Khobragade, an Indian diplomat in the United States.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "One from December", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "a decoy PDF document (Figure 12) related to the December arrest of Devyani Khobragade, an Indian diplomat in the United States", "start": 64, "end": 190}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 59, "end": 63}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In spring 2014, we observed a SFXRAR file with a filename lure related to the March 2014 disappearance of Malaysis Airlines Flight 370 (cast as a Pakistan-related hijacking).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "we", "start": 16, "end": 18}, {"text": "a SFXRAR file with a filename lure related to the March 2014 disappearance of Malaysis Airlines Flight 370 (cast as a Pakistan-related hijacking)", "start": 28, "end": 173}], "action": [{"text": "observed", "start": 19, "end": 27}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This SFXRAR contained the latest BITTERBUG variant, which had new dependencies on support components.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Interestingly, this SFXRAR's filename was the only lure element related to the MH370 event; it did not contain a decoy document.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this SFXRAR's filename", "start": 15, "end": 37}, {"text": "the only lure element related to the MH370 event", "start": 42, "end": 90}], "action": [{"text": "was", "start": 38, "end": 41}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We provide a more detailed report on this SFX and the related variant in Appendix A: Malware Details.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "BITTERBUG continued to rely on the same network behaviors to communicate with its C2s.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "the same network behaviors", "start": 31, "end": 57}, {"text": "communicate with its C2s", "start": 61, "end": 85}], "action": [{"text": "rely", "start": 23, "end": 27}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 28, "end": 30}, {"text": "to", "start": 58, "end": 60}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Connections to its C2 nodes relied on PHP and used communications that included'' .php? compname='' and'' .php? srs='', as well as direct file/component retrieval from the C2s.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Connections to its C2 nodes", "start": 0, "end": 27}, {"text": "PHP", "start": 38, "end": 41}, {"text": "communications that included'' .php? compname='' and'' .php? srs='', as well as direct file/component retrieval from the C2s", "start": 51, "end": 175}], "action": [{"text": "relied", "start": 28, "end": 34}, {"text": "used", "start": 46, "end": 50}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 35, "end": 37}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Though many of the samples that we have observed use direct IPs for HTTP communications, we have observed more limited use of a No-IP domain.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "many of the samples that we have observed", "start": 7, "end": 48}, {"text": "direct IPs", "start": 53, "end": 63}, {"text": "HTTP communications", "start": 68, "end": 87}, {"text": "we", "start": 89, "end": 91}, {"text": "more limited use of a No-IP domain", "start": 106, "end": 140}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 49, "end": 52}, {"text": "observed", "start": 97, "end": 105}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 64, "end": 67}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Operation Arachnophobia consists of an apparent targeted exploitation campaign, dating back to early 2013, using the BITTERBUG malware family and seemingly directed against entities involved in India-Pakistan issues.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The threat actor appears to have exclusively used VPSNOC, a probable Pakistan-based VPS service provider who leased U.S. hosting services, for both the delivery and C2 phases of attack.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The threat actor", "start": 0, "end": 16}, {"text": "VPSNOC, a probable Pakistan-based VPS service provider who leased U.S. hosting services", "start": 50, "end": 137}, {"text": "both the delivery and C2 phases of attack", "start": 143, "end": 184}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 45, "end": 49}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 139, "end": 142}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Research later identified that a Pakistan-based VPSNOC representative had a social network affiliation with a Tranchulas employee as well as apparent affiliations with the Anonymous and AntiSec movements.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After the August 6, 2013 blog, Tranchulas provided TCIRT and the media an official statement and explanation of BITTERBUG activity, however, this explanation contained discrepancies.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The TCIRT addressed some of these discrepancies with Tranchulas personnel, who were unresponsive, increasing our suspicion of the activity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We later observed BITTERBUG activity following August 2013 with subtle changes that further generalized debug paths.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It was this chain of events that served as a catalyst for extra scrutiny of the activity and collaboration between the ThreatConnect and FireEye Labs teams to share information.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While we are not conclusively attributing BITTERBUG activity to Tranchulas or a specific Pakistani entity, we can confidently point to many characteristics of a Pakistan-based cyber exploitation effort that is probably directed against Indian targets or those who are involved in India-Pakistan issues.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many of the notable characteristics of the BITTERBUG activity suggest that this is indeed part of a Pakistan-based cyber exploitation effort that has apparently attempted to obfuscate its malware characteristics and origins (behind U.S. infrastructure), before and after public disclosure in August 2013.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a Pakistan-based cyber exploitation effort", "start": 98, "end": 140}, {"text": "its malware characteristics", "start": 184, "end": 211}], "action": [{"text": "obfuscate", "start": 174, "end": 183}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On the surface, BITTERBUG serves as an example of how threat actors mask their operations across social, cultural and geographic boundaries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "More importantly, it demonstrates the value of threat intelligence sharing and industry collaboration.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As one organization begins to pull at a thread of evidence and share their findings with another, a larger understanding and shared perspective is revealed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is through this process that a shared awareness emerges into a larger, more comprehensive story that explains what we are seeing and why-ultimately it is this story that better serves us all.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "BITTERBUG is a backdoor executable capable of uploading and downloading files, listing running processes, generating file listings, and automatically transferring selected files to its command and control (C2) server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "a backdoor executable", "start": 13, "end": 34}, {"text": "files", "start": 72, "end": 77}, {"text": "running processes", "start": 87, "end": 104}, {"text": "file listings", "start": 117, "end": 130}, {"text": "selected files", "start": 163, "end": 177}, {"text": "its command and control (C2) server", "start": 181, "end": 216}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 10, "end": 12}, {"text": "uploading", "start": 46, "end": 55}, {"text": "downloading", "start": 60, "end": 71}, {"text": "listing", "start": 79, "end": 86}, {"text": "generating", "start": 106, "end": 116}, {"text": "transferring", "start": 150, "end": 162}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 178, "end": 180}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "BITTERBUG appears to be virtual machine aware and may not execute on a VMWare or VirtualBox VM.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "be virtual machine aware", "start": 21, "end": 45}, {"text": "a VMWare or VirtualBox VM", "start": 69, "end": 94}], "action": [{"text": "appears", "start": 10, "end": 17}, {"text": "not execute", "start": 54, "end": 65}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 18, "end": 20}, {"text": "on", "start": 66, "end": 68}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have observed BITTERBUG installed by a self-extracting RAR archive disguised as a screensaver.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 17, "end": 26}, {"text": "a self-extracting RAR archive", "start": 40, "end": 69}, {"text": "a screensaver", "start": 83, "end": 96}], "action": [{"text": "installed", "start": 27, "end": 36}, {"text": "disguised", "start": 70, "end": 79}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 80, "end": 82}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Upon execution, the self-extracting RAR archive may extract configuration files, dependency DLLs, and the BITTERBUG executable.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the self-extracting RAR archive", "start": 16, "end": 47}, {"text": "configuration files, dependency DLLs, and the BITTERBUG executable", "start": 60, "end": 126}], "action": [{"text": "extract", "start": 52, "end": 59}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The timeline below is of BITTERBUG activity from May 2013 through March 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Upon execution the self-extracting RAR may install < BITTERBUG > .exe and the following DLLs: The self-extracting RAR may install the following benign configuration files: BITTERBUG first may execute the following Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) command to detect the presence of a virtual machine (VM): BITTERBUG then may open recovery.txt and check for the presence of strings VBox or VMware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the self-extracting RAR", "start": 15, "end": 38}, {"text": "< BITTERBUG > .exe and the following DLLs", "start": 51, "end": 92}, {"text": "The self-extracting RAR", "start": 94, "end": 117}, {"text": "the following benign configuration files", "start": 130, "end": 170}, {"text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 172, "end": 181}, {"text": "the following Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) command", "start": 200, "end": 262}, {"text": "detect the presence of a virtual machine (VM)", "start": 266, "end": 311}, {"text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 313, "end": 322}, {"text": "recovery.txt", "start": 337, "end": 349}, {"text": "the presence of strings VBox or VMware", "start": 364, "end": 402}], "action": [{"text": "install", "start": 43, "end": 50}, {"text": "install", "start": 122, "end": 129}, {"text": "execute", "start": 192, "end": 199}, {"text": "open", "start": 332, "end": 336}, {"text": "check", "start": 354, "end": 359}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 263, "end": 265}, {"text": "for", "start": 360, "end": 363}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The backdoor then may enter an infinite sleep loop if recovery.txt contains either one of the aforementioned strings (Example in Figure 13).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "an infinite sleep loop", "start": 28, "end": 50}, {"text": "recovery.txt contains either one of the aforementioned strings (Example in Figure 13)", "start": 54, "end": 139}], "action": [{"text": "enter", "start": 22, "end": 27}], "modifier": [{"text": "if", "start": 51, "end": 53}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Next BITTERBUG typically will beacon to the C2 server by sending the computer name and username of the compromised system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 5, "end": 14}, {"text": "the C2 server", "start": 40, "end": 53}, {"text": "sending the computer name and username of the compromised system", "start": 57, "end": 121}], "action": [{"text": "beacon", "start": 30, "end": 36}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 37, "end": 39}, {"text": "by", "start": 54, "end": 56}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An example beacon request is shown in Figure 14.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "BITTERBUG then may perform an HTTP GET request for the following URI: If the C2 server responds with a filename, the filename received is deleted from% APPDATA% \\Microsoft < FILENAMEFROM C2 >.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "an HTTP GET request for the following URI", "start": 27, "end": 68}, {"text": "the filename received", "start": 113, "end": 134}, {"text": "% APPDATA% \\Microsoft < FILENAMEFROM C2 >", "start": 150, "end": 191}], "action": [{"text": "perform", "start": 19, "end": 26}, {"text": "is deleted", "start": 135, "end": 145}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 146, "end": 150}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The purpose of this command might be to delete older versions of BITTERBUG, although we have not observed this command occurring in the wild.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this command", "start": 15, "end": 27}, {"text": "older versions of BITTERBUG", "start": 47, "end": 74}], "action": [{"text": "delete", "start": 40, "end": 46}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "BITTERBUG then may attempt to download the files listed in Table 1.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "the files listed in Table 1", "start": 39, "end": 66}], "action": [{"text": "download", "start": 30, "end": 38}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The purpose of the first three files is unknown.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The final two files are downloaded to the user's Startup directory and executed at startup in order to maintain persistence.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The final two files", "start": 0, "end": 19}, {"text": "the user's Startup directory", "start": 38, "end": 66}, {"text": "startup", "start": 83, "end": 90}, {"text": "maintain persistence", "start": 103, "end": 123}], "action": [{"text": "are downloaded", "start": 20, "end": 34}, {"text": "executed", "start": 71, "end": 79}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 35, "end": 37}, {"text": "at", "start": 80, "end": 82}, {"text": "in order to", "start": 91, "end": 102}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Next, BITTERBUG may scan through each drive letter and search recursively for files with the following file extensions: BITTERBUG then typically creates a file list containing all documents (excluding those whose filename contains MediaUtils) to the following locations: BITTERBUG may also write a list of all running processes to: Finally, BITTERBUG typically uploads the running process list, document file list, and all documents to the following URI: BITTERBUG may be extracted along with the following embedded files: The malware may create the following files: • The malware typically communicates on TCP port 80: • The malware may perform HTTP requests for the following URIs: We observed other interesting operational security-oriented challenges in the post-blog post samples.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 6, "end": 15}, {"text": "each drive letter", "start": 33, "end": 50}, {"text": "files with the following file extensions", "start": 78, "end": 118}, {"text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 120, "end": 129}, {"text": "a file list containing all documents (excluding those whose filename contains MediaUtils)", "start": 153, "end": 242}, {"text": "the following locations", "start": 246, "end": 269}, {"text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 271, "end": 280}, {"text": "a list of all running processes", "start": 296, "end": 327}, {"text": "BITTERBUG", "start": 341, "end": 350}, {"text": "the running process list, document file list, and all documents", "start": 369, "end": 432}, {"text": "the following URI", "start": 436, "end": 453}, {"text": "The malware", "start": 523, "end": 534}, {"text": "the following files", "start": 546, "end": 565}, {"text": "The malware", "start": 569, "end": 580}, {"text": "TCP port 80", "start": 607, "end": 618}, {"text": "The malware", "start": 622, "end": 633}, {"text": "HTTP requests", "start": 646, "end": 659}, {"text": "the following URIs", "start": 664, "end": 682}], "action": [{"text": "scan", "start": 20, "end": 24}, {"text": "search", "start": 55, "end": 61}, {"text": "creates", "start": 145, "end": 152}, {"text": "write", "start": 290, "end": 295}, {"text": "uploads", "start": 361, "end": 368}, {"text": "create", "start": 539, "end": 545}, {"text": "communicates", "start": 591, "end": 603}, {"text": "perform", "start": 638, "end": 645}], "modifier": [{"text": "through", "start": 25, "end": 32}, {"text": "for", "start": 74, "end": 77}, {"text": "to", "start": 243, "end": 245}, {"text": "to", "start": 433, "end": 435}, {"text": "on", "start": 604, "end": 606}, {"text": "for", "start": 660, "end": 663}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In one case, an actor appeared to manually null out the'' Cert-India'' user directory in one of the file paths (see figures 15 and 16 below) contained in two binaries (support components).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These files shared the same import hash (4e96e86db5a8a025b996aefdc218ff74) and were virtually the same files minus modification to a few bytes in the second sample.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As these samples point to, we also observed use of the C++ Boost libraries, which introduced a new file path to monitor for operational security purposes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We observed at least one case in which files mixed old and new file paths, as seen in the figures 17 and 18 below.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In both cases, it is possible that the actors intentionally did this in an attempt to mislead further research efforts into post-blog samples or cast suspicion on'' Cert-India'' as a more-revealing element.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, analysis of files deployed alongside the nulled-out'' Cert-India'' sample mentioned above revealed a lack of concern over the same string.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Alternatively, these inconsistencies could also indicate sloppy tradecraft and/or teamwork.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "BITTERBUG Hashes BITTERBUG and Support Component Debug Strings (in order of first use) BITTERBUG Import Hashes HTTP Requests BITTERBUG Domain & IPs The Kansas-City-based hosting provider sent an introductory email message on July 24th, 2013 at 1500 CDT and would be received by TCIRT at 1400 EDT and VPSNOC on Thursday July 25th, 2013 at 1200 PKT.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Analysis of the VPSNOC email header indicated that the message was sent on Thursday 25 July at 02:28:41 +0500 GMT, which is consistent with Pakistan's time zone.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Of note, the email message was sent with an X-Originating IP Address of 184.75.214.10 corresponding to a Private Internet Access Canadian proxy.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "VPSNOC's use of this commercial proxy service likely demonstrates the intent to mask the apparent origin of the sender.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These two examples highlight that VPSNOC's inbound and outbound email communications consistently utilized a +0500 Pakistani timezone.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Due to the apparent Pakistani nexus within the BITTERBUG malware and the Pakistan time zone consistently observed within the VPSNOC emails, the TCIRT applied additional scrutiny and research of the content within the Tranchulas'' Response ThreatConnect.docx'' to validate their claims.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the following section we will examine the inconsistencies observed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Within the response we observed the following inconsistencies: Our review of the'' ResponseThreatConnect.docx'' focused in on the email screenshot (Figure 3) image1.png that Khan provided revealing that the date probably had been modified to appear as though they were the first to notify VPSNOC.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Within the official response, Zubair Khan indicated that Tranchulas was'' already aware of this incident ...", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "and contacted hosting company.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' The official response included a screenshot depicting an email sent to VPSNOC from an unidentified (redacted) tranchulas.com email address that was sent on'' Tue, Jul 21, 2013 at 11:36 PM'' with no evidence of the date in which it was received by or responded to by VPSNOC.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This message contained a notable misalignment between the date and day of the week.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "July 21, 2013 was a Sunday, not a Tuesday.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Tuesday'' would have pre-dated our official notification that occurred on Wednesday July 24, 2013, and could indicate that Tranchulas may have obtained insight into the original TCIRT notification through Pakistan- based contacts within VPSNOC.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The TCIRT subsequently responded to Mr. Khan's official explanation with a follow-up inquiry, offering Khan an opportunity to explain the date inconsistency within the email screenshot.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Mr. Khan deferred our request to Mr. Hamza Qamar, a Penetration Testing Team Lead at Tranchulas, who later responded with a simple denial that the email message had not been altered apart from blurring the name of the original sender.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The email screenshot (image1.png) from within the Tranchulas response demonstrated awareness of information that we initially withheld and later released in our blog post: one malware variant that contained a debug string with'' umairaziz27'' the same username as a Tranchulas employee.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Tranchulas message to VPSNOC incorrectly claimed to identify malware on 199.91.173.43 that contained the'' company's name and ...", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "employee's name''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While it is possible that Tranchulas' analysts discovered this variant independent of the blog post, it added to the inconsistent elements of the response and further suggested that the blog post may have inspired its communications with VPSNOC.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We note that we requested additional information such as the'' detailed analysis report'' within the exchange from Tranchulas but did not receive a response.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Tranchulas response indicates that'' Tranchulas' research team was already aware of this incident before publication of this report.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our team contacted hosting company of server to seek an explanation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Considering there are no public references to the identified infrastructure identifying VPSNOC as the'' hosting company''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The only way for Tranchulas to identify VPSNOC as the hosting company was to either have previous insider knowledge of the activity, or to have been privately introduced by the Kansas-City-based service provider to their'' client'' VPSNOC, of which was never mentioned or discussed when we initially exchanged with either the Kansas-City or Pakistan-based hosting providers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Public registration of the 199.91.173.43 reveals the Kansas-City-based hosting provider as the official registrant and owner of the infrastructure.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The only way to know that VPSNOC was subleasing the infrastructure was to obtain this information directly from them.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There was no public reference which would have revealed VPSNOC as the entity which maintained root access to the 199.91.173.43.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Had Tranchulas legitimately conducted an initial victim notification sometime in late July 2013, they would have likely done so through the Kansas-City-based hosting provider and not VPSNOC.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On August 15, 2013, Hamza Qamar's response to TCIRT's follow up inquiry to the observed inconsistencies redirected TCIRT personnel to VPSNOC to obtain an explanation versus attempting to explain the observed day date inconsistency and document properties within the Tranchulas email.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The TCIRT's suspicion mounted when presenting Tranchulas with the opportunity to set the record straight, that Tranchulas could not substantiate their claims, rather deferring the TCIRT inquiry to a third party (VPSNOC).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Within the'' ResponseThreatConnect.docx'' the image'' image1.png'' contains an undated response from VPSNOC to the'' Tue, Jul 21, 2013'' Tranchulas notification.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The undated VPSNOC response that Tranchulas received is nearly identical to the response that TCIRT and the Kansas-City-based service provider obtained on July 24th.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Tranchulas does not include the date or time as to when they obtained a response from VPSNOC.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The TCIRT found it unusual that neither the Kansas-City-based service provider or VPSNOC personnel ever indicated either way that they knew about the activity or had been previously contacted by either party.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When considering all of the inconsistencies, order of events and studying, Gmail webmail layout, similarities of keywords, salutations and closings within the'' Tue, Jul 21, 2013'' Tranchulas notification and the respective VPSNOC response.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The TCIRT grew increasingly suspicious of the exchanges with VPSNOC and subsequent exchanges with Tranchulas personnel.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Analysis of metadata within two benign decoy documents that were originally used within July 2013 BITTERBUG operations, Report.docx and NaxalitesFundedbyPakistan.docx, both maintained the author properties of'' hp''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "two benign decoy documents", "start": 28, "end": 54}, {"text": "July 2013 BITTERBUG operations", "start": 88, "end": 118}], "action": [{"text": "were originally used", "start": 60, "end": 80}], "modifier": [{"text": "within", "start": 81, "end": 87}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In reviewing the document metadata within the'' ResponseThreatConnect.docx'' that was sent from Mr. Zubair Khan on August 6, 2013, the TCIRT also identified that this document maintained the creator properties of'' hp.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' (Figure 10) While the author field of'' hp'' doesn't conclusively prove a relationship, it contributes to a body of circumstantial evidence which matches the document properties of the official Tranchulas response to the document properties that were also found within decoy documents that were bundled with BITTERBUG implants.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to the vpsnoc.com website'' In 2007 five VPS experts decided to invest in their very own private rack space in the heart of Kansas, the United States.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Their aim? To bring service-oriented, quality managed and unmanaged VPS solutions to clients all over the world.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Just 1 year later, after beginning their enterprise on 3 servers they had filled 2 server racks with happy clients receiving quality U.S support.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Their company continued to build momentum.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Whois records for vpsnoc.com indicate that another individual registered the domain and listed Digital Linx Hosting as the registrant organization with a Kansas City-based address, telephone number 925-665-1427, and administrative email address admin @digitallinx.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "org.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is the same registrant record for the digitallinx.net domain.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The digitallinx.net/sitemap.xml and the corresponding Google cache for digitallinx.net/sitemap.xml indiciate that both digitallinx.net and digitallinx.com have shared the same sitemap.xml at the same time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The digitallinx.net/Contact.html identified similar overlaps with data across the .org", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ", .net", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ", and .com", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "domains.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The domain digitallinx.com is registered to Perasona #1.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "He uses email addresses naseer @digitallinx.com and nbhatti @gmail.com as the domain registrant email address, along with address 638-F Johar Town, Lahore Pakistan and telephone 966.548805579.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The DigitalLinx (digitallinx.com) website states that it is'' a web hosting/Web Solutions & Processing Outsourcing Company based in Pakistan''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Open source research of the phone number 925-665-1427 indicates that it is also used within site content as a phone number for defiantmarketing.com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This domain is registered by Persona #2 who uses the aliases'' agnosticon'' and'' agnostic''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Persona #2 lists VPSNOC as the registrant organization, and uses the registration email address of abunasar @yahoo.com with an address of House 12, Street 21, F-8/1 Islamabad Federal 44000.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The domain defiantmarketing.com domain has used ns1.abunasar.net and ns2.abunasar.net for name services.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Within a January 2009 posting to a Debian users forum, Persona #2 sends an email from the abunasar @yahoo.com with a reply-to as abunasar @army.com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Within the post, Persona #2 responds to the question'' Who's using Debian'' listing DigitalLinx, Kansas City MO and the link to digitallinx.com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Also, the seemingly abandoned Twitter profile for Persona #2 is only following the Twitter profile for @VPSNOC.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In an April 2012 post to blackhatworld.com, a user with the alias'' agnosticon'' posted promotional codes for VPSNOC hosting services, engaging with customers, providing them feedback regarding VPS services and thanking them for positive reviews.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Within the posting the user'' agnosticon'' included an image which was an actual advertisement that was hosted at http: //vpsnoc.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "com/order.png.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Within the posted image it states'' VPSNOC is a subdivision of Digital Linx Hosting.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have been in business since 2008''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The posting concludes with'' If you have any further questions/queries please contact us directly at: support @vpsnoc.com'' Muhammad Naseer Bhatti's LinkedIn profile indicates that he is currently the founder for Digital Linx LLC and vBilling (vbilling.org) as well as a consultant for a U.S. company.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Both Bhatti and Digital Linx are listed as the registrants for vbilling.org, v-billing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "com, vgriffins.com and my-server.co, which use P.O.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Box 295658, Riyadh Saudi Arabia as the registration address.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is also the address for two U.S. companies' local operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Bhatti is also listed as the owner of the netblock 46.4.139.224/28.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Both passive DNS sources as well as Robtex highlight this overlapping infrastructure.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "From September 7-9, 2011, Tranchulas in cooperation with the Pakistan National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), offered a Certified Penetration Testing Profession (CPTP) Workshop (Figure 17).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During the workshop, basic penetration techniques and skills were presented.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is likely that CPTP workshops and alignment with NUST have allowed Tranchulas the opportunity to recruit student interns.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Within the CPTP event registration contact information for Muhammad Naseer was listed next to a Tranchulas office number (051- 2871433).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is important to note that Muhammad Naseer Bhatti has been previously known to drop the family name'' Bhatti'' within online correspondence (Figure 18).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In a June 2012 episode of Engineering and Technology Magazine podcast a Mohammed Nasser, Penetration Tester at Tranchulas was interviewed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A Mohammed Nasser may also be directly affiliated with Tranchulas.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This links Tranchulas to a Pakistani employee or consultant also named Muhammad Naseer.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is unknown if this is the same Muhammad Naseer that is associated with VPSNOC's parent company Digital Linx, the Pakistan-based service provider which hosted the original BITTERBUG malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Abunasar Khan also maintains the aliases'' agnosticon'' and'' agnostic'' in addition to the email addresses abunasar @yahoo.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "com and abunasar @army.com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "He has been previously associatedwith VPSNOC & Digital Linx.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An April 2012 Whois registrant record for the domain zeusadnetwork.com includes the first and last name Khan along with the same (925) 665-1427 phone number seen within the Digial Linx Hosting domains.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Khan registered a variety of domains, many of which use his abunasar.net for name services and abunasar.yahoo.com within the Start of Authority (SOA) records.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example a July 2014 record (Figure 19) for defiantmarketing.com and an August 2013 record (Figure 20) for ns2.vpsnoc.com both maintain these references.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Abunasar Khan registered abunasar.net and previously (May 2007) and maintained whitehate.org, which have both been used to demonstrate an affinity for and alignment with AntiSec and Anonymous movements.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The abunasar.net website prominently displays ascii art of the term'' antisec'' with antisec related content'' Blend in.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Get trusted.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Trust nobody.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Own everybody.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Disclose nothing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Destroy everything.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Take back the scene.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' This is a shared affinity that is also reflected amongst with the culture of Tranchulas employees.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The pure.whitehate.org domain has also been previously associated with Khan, examples can be found within #phrack and #darknet IRC sessions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Ironically, in February 2011, Khan's Rootkit.com user profile was compromised revealing his profile's username, password hash, email (abunasar @army.com), and the registration IP address of 202.125.143.67 (Islamabad, Pakistan).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During his registration, Khan specified the name'' anony mo us'' when registering the profile.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As of 16 August 2013, a Pastebin post contained details of a customer database compromise for nowclothing.pk, which included Khan's name, email abunasar @army.com, and cell phone number 03215488881.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Research of the 03215488881 cell phone number yields a user profile'' abunasark'' in an April 2009 posting.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Khan posts pictures of his blue Baleno and includes another phone number 03234764838.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In a secondary profile user'' Ak'' uses the same cell phone number 03215488881 in a 2009 sales posting for a 2004 blue Baleno.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Khan's affinity for Suzuki Baleno cars is made obvious in a May 2009 registration for clubaleno.co.uk that was registered by Khan at VPSNOC using the name services of ns1.abunasar.net and ns2.abunasar.net with a SOA record of abunasar.yahoo.com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Later in a June 2009 posting, Khan using the alias'' agnostic'' attempts to sell the domain clubaleno.co.uk and uses his abunasar @army.com email address as a point of contact.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Khan is also observed using the alias'' agnosticon'' and a Toyota Racing Development avitar within posts to blackhatworld.com and again within a 2011 post where he posts a cpanel error that also includes his'' abunasar'' username within system output.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Google+ profile for Khan reveals established social network links to a Team Lead for Penetration Testing at Tranchulas and a Digital Linx employee Shoaib Riaz who also maintains a social network association with the Digital Linx founder Muhammad Nasser Bhatti.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Tranchulas website states that they provide a range of security services and training to include penetration and offensive cyber initiative (OCI), in which they'' help national level cyber security programs on strategies for managing offensive technical threats''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In a September 2011 YouTube user'' tranchulascert'' posted a video titled'' Tranchulas Cyber Ranges-P @sha ICT Awards 2011'', where they awarded runner up.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Within the video, the cyber ranges were referenced as being developed for'' defense forces'' that were aimed to'' help them in developing offensive and defensive warfare skills'' and'' combating anti-state hackers''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although Tranchulas brands itself as a multi-national company, their respective operating addresses within United Kingdom the United States and New Zealand are all associated with either virtual office spaces or address forwarding services.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Tranchulas website lists its Pakistan address within the 2nd floor of the Evacuee Trust Complex on Sir Agha Khan Road F-5/1 Islamabad 44000.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Evacuee Trust Complex is also known as Software Technology Park 2 or STP2 and hosts a variety of other commercial and government offices.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Tranchulas employee, Hamza Qamar, that handled the response to our inquiry has a public LinkedIn profile that states that he'' Engaged in system and enterprise level network and Web application security testing for clients ranging from large federal agencies, DoD, and commercial clients.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' The profile does not specify if DoD is a reference to the U.S. Department of Defense or another country's Ministry of Defense.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Interestingly, Qamar's Google+ page showed one'' friend'' in his circle despite more than 40 followers, Abunasar Khan a VPSNOC employee.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is likely that Tranchulas provides services to the Pakistani government.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The offensive cyber initiative services offered by Tranchulas is offered to'' national-level cyber security programs'' suggesting a commercial demand from'' national-level'' customers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The stated purpose and intent of the Tranchulas'' Cyber Ranges'' P @sha ICT 2011 awards video suggests the ranges were specifically developed in support of national interests for offensive and defensive purposes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The domain registration by Zubair Khan using an official Pakistani government address with his zubair @tranchulas.com email address indicates that Khan may have or currently maintains a physical address at a location where other Pakistani government officials reside.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Historic Whois registration records for the domains textcrypter.com, taggnation.com, bookadoconline.com and saadiakhan.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "net lists Tranchulas CEO Zubair Khan (zubair @tranchulas.com) as the registrant for the domains.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At the time of registration Khan used the address 15-B, Mehran Block of the Gulshan-e-Jinnah F-5/1 Islamabad Pakistan for the domains.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In an April 2008 Request for Proposals, the Pakistan Public Works Department issued a tender for the Constriction of Government Servant Quarters and Garages at Gulshan-e-Jinnah Complex F-5/1 Islamabad.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Later in May of 2010 within a Pakistani Senate question and answer session, the Gulshan-e-Jinnah Complex was cited under Federal Lodges/Hostels in Islamabad under the control of Pakistan Ministry for Housing and Works.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A December 2010 TheNews Pakistan ran a story that detailed the differential in rents between commoners within Islamabad and Pakistani government officers accommodated at Gulshan-e-Jinnah.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to Google Maps it is approximately 650 meters (8 minute walk) from the Gulshan-e-Jinnah Complex to the Tranchulas offices within the Evacuee Trust Complex.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Within a May 2013 interview Khan specified that he comes from a family with a strong military background.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "He detailed his interest in'' the world of hacking'' grew during his teen years, referencing his father's diplomatic assignment to the Philippines in 2003.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Khan would go on to establish Tranchulas in February 2006 after an independent audit of Pakistani Governments National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Digital Appendix 1 contains additional research collateral collected when conducting Operation Arachnophobia research.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Digital Appendix 2 contains raw email communications.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These .eml", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "files include raw SMTP headers, content and attachments.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Digital Appendix 3 contains screenshots of web content used to conduct analysis.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Digital Appendix 4 contains visualization files that depict relationships and contain metadata associated with our Operation Arachnophobia research.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Original release date: December 19, 2014 Microsoft Windows US-CERT was recently notified by a trusted third party of cyber threat actors using a Server Message Block (SMB) Worm Tool to conduct cyber exploitation activities recently targeting a major entertainment company.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This SMB Worm Tool is equipped with a Listening Implant, Lightweight Backdoor, Proxy Tool, Destructive Hard Drive Tool, and Destructive Target Cleaning Tool.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This SMB Worm Tool", "start": 0, "end": 18}, {"text": "a Listening Implant", "start": 36, "end": 55}, {"text": "Lightweight Backdoor", "start": 57, "end": 77}, {"text": "Proxy Tool", "start": 79, "end": 89}, {"text": "Destructive Hard Drive Tool", "start": 91, "end": 118}, {"text": "Destructive Target Cleaning Tool", "start": 124, "end": 156}], "action": [{"text": "is equipped", "start": 19, "end": 30}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 31, "end": 35}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "SMB Worm Tool: This worm uses a brute force authentication attack to propagate via Windows SMB shares.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This worm", "start": 15, "end": 24}, {"text": "a brute force authentication attack", "start": 30, "end": 65}, {"text": "Windows SMB shares", "start": 83, "end": 101}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 25, "end": 29}, {"text": "propagate", "start": 69, "end": 78}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 79, "end": 82}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It connects home every five minutes to send log data back to command and control (C2) infrastructure if it has successfully spread to other Windows hosts via SMB port 445.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "home", "start": 12, "end": 16}, {"text": "five minutes", "start": 23, "end": 35}, {"text": "log data", "start": 44, "end": 52}, {"text": "command and control (C2) infrastructure", "start": 61, "end": 100}, {"text": "it", "start": 104, "end": 106}, {"text": "other Windows hosts", "start": 134, "end": 153}, {"text": "SMB port 445", "start": 158, "end": 170}], "action": [{"text": "connects", "start": 3, "end": 11}, {"text": "send", "start": 39, "end": 43}, {"text": "spread", "start": 124, "end": 130}], "modifier": [{"text": "every", "start": 17, "end": 22}, {"text": "back to", "start": 53, "end": 60}, {"text": "to", "start": 131, "end": 133}, {"text": "via", "start": 154, "end": 157}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The tool also accepts new scan tasking when it connects to C2.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The tool", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "new scan tasking", "start": 22, "end": 38}, {"text": "it connects to C2", "start": 44, "end": 61}], "action": [{"text": "accepts", "start": 14, "end": 21}], "modifier": [{"text": "when", "start": 39, "end": 43}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There are two main threads: the first thread calls home and sends back logs (a list of successful SMB exploitations), and the second thread attempts to guess passwords for SMB connections.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the first thread", "start": 28, "end": 44}, {"text": "home", "start": 51, "end": 55}, {"text": "logs (a list of successful SMB exploitations)", "start": 71, "end": 116}, {"text": "the second thread", "start": 122, "end": 139}, {"text": "passwords", "start": 158, "end": 167}, {"text": "SMB connections", "start": 172, "end": 187}], "action": [{"text": "calls", "start": 45, "end": 50}, {"text": "sends", "start": 60, "end": 65}, {"text": "guess", "start": 152, "end": 157}], "modifier": [{"text": "back", "start": 66, "end": 70}, {"text": "for", "start": 168, "end": 171}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the password is correctly guessed, a file share is established and file is copied and run on the newly-infected host.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a file share", "start": 38, "end": 50}, {"text": "file", "start": 70, "end": 74}, {"text": "the newly-infected host", "start": 96, "end": 119}], "action": [{"text": "is established", "start": 51, "end": 65}, {"text": "is copied", "start": 75, "end": 84}, {"text": "run", "start": 89, "end": 92}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 93, "end": 95}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Listening Implant: During installation of this tool, a portion of the binaries is decrypted using AES, with a key derived from the phrase'' National Football League.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Additionally, this implant listens for connections on TCP port 195 (for'' sensvc.exe'' and'' msensvc.exe'') and TCP port 444 (for'' netcfg.dll'').", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this implant", "start": 17, "end": 29}, {"text": "connections", "start": 42, "end": 53}, {"text": "TCP port 195 (for'' sensvc.exe'' and'' msensvc.exe'') and TCP port 444 (for'' netcfg.dll'')", "start": 57, "end": 148}], "action": [{"text": "listens", "start": 30, "end": 37}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 38, "end": 41}, {"text": "on", "start": 54, "end": 56}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Each message sent to and from this implant is preceded with its length, then XOR encoded with the byte 0x1F.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Each message", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "this implant", "start": 30, "end": 42}, {"text": "the byte 0x1F", "start": 94, "end": 107}], "action": [{"text": "sent", "start": 13, "end": 17}, {"text": "XOR encoded", "start": 77, "end": 88}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 18, "end": 20}, {"text": "from", "start": 25, "end": 29}, {"text": "with", "start": 89, "end": 93}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Upon initial connection, the victim sends the string,'' HTTP/1.1 GET /dns? \\x00.'' The controller then responds with the string'' 200 www.yahoo.com! \\x00'' (for'' sensvc.exe'' and'' msensvc.exe'') or with the string'' RESPONSE 200 OK!!'' (for'' netcfg.dll'').", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the victim", "start": 25, "end": 35}, {"text": "the string,'' HTTP/1.1 GET /dns? \\x00.''", "start": 42, "end": 82}, {"text": "The controller", "start": 83, "end": 97}, {"text": "the string'' 200 www.yahoo.com! \\x00'' (for'' sensvc.exe'' and'' msensvc.exe'')", "start": 117, "end": 196}, {"text": "the string'' RESPONSE 200 OK!!'' (for'' netcfg.dll'')", "start": 205, "end": 258}], "action": [{"text": "sends", "start": 36, "end": 41}, {"text": "responds", "start": 103, "end": 111}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 112, "end": 116}, {"text": "with", "start": 200, "end": 204}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The controller sends the byte''!'' (0x21) to end the network connection.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The controller", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "the byte''!'' (0x21)", "start": 21, "end": 41}, {"text": "end the network connection", "start": 45, "end": 71}], "action": [{"text": "sends", "start": 15, "end": 20}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 42, "end": 44}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This special message is not preceded with a length or XOR encoded.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Lightweight Backdoor: This is a backdoor listener that is designed as a service DLL.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This", "start": 22, "end": 26}, {"text": "a backdoor listener", "start": 30, "end": 49}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 27, "end": 29}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It includes functionality such as file transfer, system survey, process manipulation, file time matching and proxy capability.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "file transfer", "start": 34, "end": 47}, {"text": "system survey", "start": 49, "end": 62}, {"text": "process manipulation", "start": 64, "end": 84}, {"text": "file time matching", "start": 86, "end": 104}, {"text": "proxy capability", "start": 109, "end": 125}], "action": [{"text": "includes", "start": 3, "end": 11}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The listener can also perform arbitrary code execution and execute commands on the command line.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The listener", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "arbitrary code execution", "start": 30, "end": 54}, {"text": "commands", "start": 67, "end": 75}, {"text": "the command line", "start": 79, "end": 95}], "action": [{"text": "perform", "start": 22, "end": 29}, {"text": "execute", "start": 59, "end": 66}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 76, "end": 78}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This tool includes functionality to open ports in a victim host's firewall and take advantage of universal Plug and Play (UPNP) mechanisms to discover routers and gateway devices, and add port mappings, allowing inbound connections to victim hosts on Network Address Translated (NAT) private networks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This tool", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "ports", "start": 41, "end": 46}, {"text": "a victim host's firewall", "start": 50, "end": 74}, {"text": "routers and gateway devices", "start": 151, "end": 178}, {"text": "port mappings", "start": 188, "end": 201}, {"text": "inbound connections", "start": 212, "end": 231}, {"text": "victim hosts", "start": 235, "end": 247}, {"text": "Network Address Translated (NAT) private networks", "start": 251, "end": 300}], "action": [{"text": "open", "start": 36, "end": 40}, {"text": "discover", "start": 142, "end": 150}, {"text": "add", "start": 184, "end": 187}, {"text": "allowing", "start": 203, "end": 211}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 47, "end": 49}, {"text": "to", "start": 232, "end": 234}, {"text": "on", "start": 248, "end": 250}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There are no callback domains associated with this malware since connections are inbound only on a specified port number.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Proxy Tool: Implants in this malware family are typically loaded via a dropper installed as a service, then configured to listen on TCP port 443.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Implants in this malware family", "start": 12, "end": 43}, {"text": "a dropper", "start": 69, "end": 78}, {"text": "a service", "start": 92, "end": 101}, {"text": "TCP port 443", "start": 132, "end": 144}], "action": [{"text": "are typically loaded", "start": 44, "end": 64}, {"text": "installed", "start": 79, "end": 88}, {"text": "listen", "start": 122, "end": 128}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 65, "end": 68}, {"text": "as", "start": 89, "end": 91}, {"text": "on", "start": 129, "end": 131}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The implant may have an associated configuration file which can contain a configurable port.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This proxy tool has basic backdoor functionality, including the ability to fingerprint the victim machine, run remote commands, perform directory listings, perform process listings, and transfer files.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This proxy tool", "start": 0, "end": 15}, {"text": "basic backdoor functionality", "start": 20, "end": 48}, {"text": "the victim machine", "start": 87, "end": 105}, {"text": "remote commands", "start": 111, "end": 126}, {"text": "directory listings", "start": 136, "end": 154}, {"text": "process listings", "start": 164, "end": 180}, {"text": "files", "start": 195, "end": 200}], "action": [{"text": "has", "start": 16, "end": 19}, {"text": "fingerprint", "start": 75, "end": 86}, {"text": "run", "start": 107, "end": 110}, {"text": "perform", "start": 128, "end": 135}, {"text": "perform", "start": 156, "end": 163}, {"text": "transfer", "start": 186, "end": 194}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Destructive Hard Drive Tool: This tool is a tailored hard-drive wiping tool that is intended to destroy data past the point of recovery and to complicate the victim machine's recovery.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This tool", "start": 29, "end": 38}, {"text": "a tailored hard-drive wiping tool", "start": 42, "end": 75}, {"text": "data", "start": 104, "end": 108}, {"text": "the point of recovery", "start": 114, "end": 135}, {"text": "the victim machine's recovery", "start": 154, "end": 183}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 39, "end": 41}, {"text": "destroy", "start": 96, "end": 103}, {"text": "complicate", "start": 143, "end": 153}], "modifier": [{"text": "past", "start": 109, "end": 113}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the CNE operator has administrator-level privileges on the host, the program will over-write portions of up-to the first four physical drives attached, and over-write the master boot record (MBR) with a program designed to cause further damage if the hard drive is re-booted.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the program", "start": 68, "end": 79}, {"text": "portions of up-to the first four physical drives attached", "start": 96, "end": 153}, {"text": "the master boot record (MBR)", "start": 170, "end": 198}, {"text": "a program designed to cause further damage if the hard drive is re-booted", "start": 204, "end": 277}], "action": [{"text": "over-write", "start": 85, "end": 95}, {"text": "over-write", "start": 159, "end": 169}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 199, "end": 203}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This further results in the victim machine being non-operational with irrecoverable data.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "the victim machine being non-operational with irrecoverable data", "start": 24, "end": 88}], "action": [{"text": "results in", "start": 13, "end": 23}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "(There is a caveat for machines installed with the windows 7 operating system: windows 7 machines will continue to operate in a degraded state with the targeted files destroyed until after reboot, in which the infected MBR then wipes the drive.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the targeted files", "start": 148, "end": 166}, {"text": "the infected MBR", "start": 206, "end": 222}, {"text": "the drive", "start": 234, "end": 243}], "action": [{"text": "destroyed", "start": 167, "end": 176}, {"text": "wipes", "start": 228, "end": 233}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ") If the actor has user-level access, the result includes specific files being deleted and practically irrecoverable, but the victim machine would remain usable.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "specific files", "start": 58, "end": 72}], "action": [{"text": "being deleted", "start": 73, "end": 86}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Destructive Target Cleaning Tool: This tool renders victim machines inoperable by overwriting the Master Boot Record.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This tool", "start": 34, "end": 43}, {"text": "victim machines", "start": 52, "end": 67}, {"text": "inoperable", "start": 68, "end": 78}, {"text": "the Master Boot Record", "start": 94, "end": 116}], "action": [{"text": "renders", "start": 44, "end": 51}, {"text": "overwriting", "start": 82, "end": 93}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The tool is dropped and installed by another executable and consists of three parts: an executable and a dll which contain the destructive components, and an encoded command file that contains the actual destruction commands to be executed.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The tool", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "another executable", "start": 37, "end": 55}, {"text": "an executable and a dll", "start": 85, "end": 108}, {"text": "the destructive components", "start": 123, "end": 149}, {"text": "an encoded command file", "start": 155, "end": 178}, {"text": "the actual destruction commands to be executed", "start": 193, "end": 239}], "action": [{"text": "is dropped and installed", "start": 9, "end": 33}, {"text": "contain", "start": 115, "end": 122}, {"text": "contains", "start": 184, "end": 192}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Network Propagation Wiper: The malware has the ability to propagate throughout the target network via built-in Windows shares.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 27, "end": 38}, {"text": "the target network", "start": 79, "end": 97}, {"text": "built-in Windows shares", "start": 102, "end": 125}], "action": [{"text": "propagate", "start": 58, "end": 67}], "modifier": [{"text": "throughout", "start": 68, "end": 78}, {"text": "via", "start": 98, "end": 101}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Based on the username/password provided in the configuration file and the hostname/IP address of target systems, the malware will access remote network shares in order to upload a copy of the wiper and begin the wiping process on these remote systems.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 113, "end": 124}, {"text": "remote network shares", "start": 137, "end": 158}, {"text": "a copy of the wiper", "start": 178, "end": 197}, {"text": "the wiping process", "start": 208, "end": 226}, {"text": "these remote systems", "start": 230, "end": 250}], "action": [{"text": "access", "start": 130, "end": 136}, {"text": "upload", "start": 171, "end": 177}, {"text": "begin", "start": 202, "end": 207}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 227, "end": 229}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware uses several methods to access shares on the remote systems to begin wiping files.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "shares", "start": 43, "end": 49}, {"text": "the remote systems", "start": 53, "end": 71}, {"text": "files", "start": 88, "end": 93}], "action": [{"text": "access", "start": 36, "end": 42}, {"text": "wiping", "start": 81, "end": 87}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 50, "end": 52}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Checking for existing shares via'' \\\\hostname\\admin $\\system32'' and'' \\\\hostname\\shared $\\system32'' or create a new share'' cmd.exe /q /c net share shared $=% SystemRoot% /GRANT: everyone, FULL''.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "Checking", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "create", "start": 105, "end": 111}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 9, "end": 12}, {"text": "via", "start": 29, "end": 32}], "entity": [{"text": "existing shares", "start": 13, "end": 28}, {"text": "'' \\\\hostname\\admin $\\system32'' and'' \\\\hostname\\shared $\\system32''", "start": 32, "end": 101}, {"text": "a new share'' cmd.exe /q /c net share shared $=% SystemRoot% /GRANT: everyone, FULL''", "start": 112, "end": 197}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once successful, the malware uploads a copy of the wiper file'' taskhostXX.exe'', changes the file-time to match that of the built-in file'' calc.exe'', and starts the remote process.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 17, "end": 28}, {"text": "a copy of the wiper file'' taskhostXX.exe''", "start": 37, "end": 80}, {"text": "the file-time", "start": 90, "end": 103}, {"text": "match that of the built-in file'' calc.exe''", "start": 107, "end": 151}, {"text": "the remote process", "start": 164, "end": 182}], "action": [{"text": "uploads", "start": 29, "end": 36}, {"text": "changes", "start": 82, "end": 89}, {"text": "starts", "start": 157, "end": 163}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 104, "end": 106}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The remote process is started via the command'' cmd.exe /c wmic.exe /node: hostname /user: username /password: pass PROCESS CALL CREATE''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The remote process", "start": 0, "end": 18}, {"text": "the command'' cmd.exe /c wmic.exe /node: hostname /user: username /password: pass PROCESS CALL CREATE''", "start": 34, "end": 137}], "action": [{"text": "is started", "start": 19, "end": 29}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 30, "end": 33}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Hostname, username, and password are then obtained from the configuration file.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Afterwards, the remote network share is removed via'' cmd.exe /q /c net share shared $/delete''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the remote network share", "start": 12, "end": 36}, {"text": "'' cmd.exe /q /c net share shared $/delete''", "start": 51, "end": 95}], "action": [{"text": "is removed", "start": 37, "end": 47}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 48, "end": 51}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once the wiper has been uploaded, the malware reports its status back to one of the four C2 IP addresses.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the wiper", "start": 5, "end": 14}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 34, "end": 45}, {"text": "its status", "start": 54, "end": 64}, {"text": "one of the four C2 IP addresses", "start": 73, "end": 104}], "action": [{"text": "been uploaded", "start": 19, "end": 32}, {"text": "reports", "start": 46, "end": 53}], "modifier": [{"text": "back to", "start": 65, "end": 72}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Technical and strategic mitigation recommendations are included in the Solution section below.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "US-CERT recommends reviewing the Security Tip Handling Destructive Malware #ST13-003.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cyber threat actors are using an SMB worm to conduct cyber exploitation activities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This tool contains five components–a listening implant, lightweight backdoor, proxy tool, destructive hard drive tool, and destructive target cleaning tool.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This tool", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "a listening implant", "start": 35, "end": 54}, {"text": "lightweight backdoor", "start": 56, "end": 76}, {"text": "proxy tool", "start": 78, "end": 88}, {"text": "destructive hard drive tool", "start": 90, "end": 117}, {"text": "destructive target cleaning tool", "start": 123, "end": 155}], "action": [{"text": "contains", "start": 10, "end": 18}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The SMB worm propagates throughout an infected network via brute-force authentication attacks, and connects to a C2 infrastructure.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The SMB worm", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "an infected network", "start": 35, "end": 54}, {"text": "brute-force authentication attacks", "start": 59, "end": 93}, {"text": "a C2 infrastructure", "start": 111, "end": 130}], "action": [{"text": "propagates", "start": 13, "end": 23}, {"text": "connects", "start": 99, "end": 107}], "modifier": [{"text": "throughout", "start": 24, "end": 34}, {"text": "via", "start": 55, "end": 58}, {"text": "to", "start": 108, "end": 110}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Due to the highly destructive functionality of this malware, an organization infected could experience operational impacts including loss of intellectual property and disruption of critical systems.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Users and administrators are recommended to take the following preventive measures to protect their computer networks: Use and maintain anti-virus software–Anti-virus software recognizes and protects your computer against most known viruses.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is important to keep your anti-virus software up-to-date (see Understanding Anti-Virus Software for more information).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Keep your operating system and application software up-to-date–Install software patches so that attackers can't take advantage of known problems or vulnerabilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many operating systems offer automatic updates.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If this option is available, you should enable it (see Understanding Patches for more information).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Review Security Tip Handling Destructive Malware #ST13-003 and evaluate their capabilities encompassing planning, preparation, detection, and response for such an event.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Review Recommended Practices for Control Systems, and Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies (pdf).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following is a list of the Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) that can be added to network security solutions to determine whether they are present on a network.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware has the following characteristics: While the original filename of this file is unknown, it was likely'' diskpartmg16.exe''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This file serves as a dropper.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This file", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "a dropper", "start": 20, "end": 29}], "action": [{"text": "serves", "start": 10, "end": 16}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 17, "end": 19}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It drops destructive malware:'' igfxtrayex.exe''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "destructive malware:'' igfxtrayex.exe''", "start": 9, "end": 48}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 3, "end": 8}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When the dropper file was executed, it started a second instance of itself with'' -i'' as an argument, and then terminated.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the dropper file", "start": 5, "end": 21}, {"text": "it", "start": 36, "end": 38}, {"text": "a second instance of itself", "start": 47, "end": 74}, {"text": "'' -i'' as an argument", "start": 79, "end": 101}], "action": [{"text": "was executed", "start": 22, "end": 34}, {"text": "started", "start": 39, "end": 46}, {"text": "terminated", "start": 112, "end": 122}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 75, "end": 79}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The second instance of the dropper file installed itself as the'' WinsSchMgmt'' service with'' -k'' as a command line argument, started the service, and then terminated.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The second instance of the dropper file", "start": 0, "end": 39}, {"text": "itself", "start": 50, "end": 56}, {"text": "the'' WinsSchMgmt'' service", "start": 60, "end": 87}, {"text": "'' -k'' as a command line argument", "start": 92, "end": 126}, {"text": "the service", "start": 136, "end": 147}], "action": [{"text": "installed", "start": 40, "end": 49}, {"text": "started", "start": 128, "end": 135}, {"text": "terminated", "start": 158, "end": 168}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 57, "end": 59}, {"text": "with", "start": 88, "end": 92}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The'' WinsSchMgmt'' service executed the file with'' -k'' as an argument, which started another instance of the file using'' -s'' as an argument.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The'' WinsSchMgmt'' service", "start": 0, "end": 27}, {"text": "the file", "start": 37, "end": 45}, {"text": "'' -k'' as an argument", "start": 50, "end": 72}, {"text": "another instance of the file", "start": 88, "end": 116}, {"text": "'' -s'' as an argument", "start": 122, "end": 144}], "action": [{"text": "executed", "start": 28, "end": 36}, {"text": "started", "start": 80, "end": 87}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 46, "end": 50}, {"text": "using", "start": 117, "end": 122}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The'' -s'' instance dropped and executed'' igfxtrayex.exe'', created'' netver.dat'', and began generating network traffic over TCP ports 445 and 139 to victim IP addresses.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The'' -s'' instance", "start": 0, "end": 19}, {"text": "'' igfxtrayex.exe''", "start": 40, "end": 59}, {"text": "'' netver.dat''", "start": 68, "end": 83}, {"text": "network traffic", "start": 106, "end": 121}, {"text": "TCP ports 445 and 139", "start": 127, "end": 148}, {"text": "victim IP addresses", "start": 152, "end": 171}], "action": [{"text": "dropped", "start": 20, "end": 27}, {"text": "executed", "start": 32, "end": 40}, {"text": "created", "start": 61, "end": 68}, {"text": "generating", "start": 95, "end": 105}], "modifier": [{"text": "over", "start": 122, "end": 126}, {"text": "to", "start": 149, "end": 151}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is a log file created by the dropper, and appended to as the scans progress.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a log file", "start": 8, "end": 18}, {"text": "the dropper", "start": 30, "end": 41}], "action": [{"text": "created", "start": 19, "end": 26}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It contains what appear to be hostnames, IP addresses, and the number 2.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Entries in the file have the structure'' HOSTNAME | IP Address | 2''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This file is destructive malware: a disk wiper with network beacon capabilities.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This file", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "destructive malware", "start": 13, "end": 32}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 10, "end": 12}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If'' igfxtrayex.exe'' is run with no parameters, it creates and starts a copy of itself with the'' –i'' argument.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 49, "end": 51}, {"text": "a copy of itself", "start": 71, "end": 87}, {"text": "the'' –i'' argument", "start": 93, "end": 112}], "action": [{"text": "creates", "start": 52, "end": 59}, {"text": "starts", "start": 64, "end": 70}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 88, "end": 92}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After 10 minutes, the'' igfxtrayex.exe'' makes three copies of itself and places them in the same directory from which it was executed.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the'' igfxtrayex.exe''", "start": 18, "end": 40}, {"text": "three copies of itself", "start": 47, "end": 69}], "action": [{"text": "makes", "start": 41, "end": 46}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These copies are named according to the format'' taskhostXX.exe'' (where X is a randomly generated ASCII character).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These copies are then executed, each with a different argument (one being'' -m'', one being'' -d'' and the other'' -w'').", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These copies", "start": 0, "end": 12}], "action": [{"text": "are then executed", "start": 13, "end": 30}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Network connection attempts are made to one of three hard-coded IP addresses in a random order to port 8080 or 8000.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Network connection attempts", "start": 0, "end": 27}, {"text": "one of three hard-coded IP addresses", "start": 40, "end": 76}, {"text": "a random order", "start": 80, "end": 94}, {"text": "port 8080 or 8000", "start": 98, "end": 115}], "action": [{"text": "are made", "start": 28, "end": 36}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 37, "end": 39}, {"text": "in", "start": 77, "end": 79}, {"text": "to", "start": 95, "end": 97}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If a connection to the IP address can not be made, it attempts to connect to another of the three IP addresses, until connections to all three IP addresses have been attempted.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 51, "end": 53}, {"text": "another of the three IP addresses", "start": 77, "end": 110}, {"text": "connections to all three IP addresses have been attempted", "start": 118, "end": 175}], "action": [{"text": "connect", "start": 66, "end": 73}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 74, "end": 76}, {"text": "until", "start": 112, "end": 117}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following command-line string is then executed:'' cmd.exe /c net stop MSExchangeIS /y''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A 120-minute (2 hour) sleep command is issued after which the computer is shut down and rebooted.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "A 120-minute (2 hour) sleep command", "start": 0, "end": 35}, {"text": "the computer", "start": 58, "end": 70}], "action": [{"text": "is issued", "start": 36, "end": 45}, {"text": "is shut down and rebooted", "start": 71, "end": 96}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This file, when executed, starts a listener on localhost port 80.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This file", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "a listener", "start": 33, "end": 43}, {"text": "localhost port 80", "start": 47, "end": 64}], "action": [{"text": "starts", "start": 26, "end": 32}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 44, "end": 46}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It has 3 files contained in the resource section; all xor'd with 0x63.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "all", "start": 50, "end": 53}, {"text": "0x63", "start": 65, "end": 69}], "action": [{"text": "xor'd", "start": 54, "end": 59}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 60, "end": 64}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This SYS file is a commercially available tool that allows read/write access to files and raw disk sectors for user mode applications in Windows 2000, XP, 2003, Vista, 2008 (32-bit).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is dropped from resource ID 0x81 of'' igfxtrayex.exe''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "resource ID 0x81 of'' igfxtrayex.exe''", "start": 19, "end": 57}], "action": [{"text": "is dropped", "start": 3, "end": 13}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 14, "end": 18}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This SYS file is a also a commercially available tool that allows read/write access to files and raw disk sectors for user mode applications in Windows 2000, XP, 2003, Vista, 2008 (64-bit).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is dropped from resource ID 0x83 of'' igfxtrayex.exe''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "resource ID 0x83 of'' igfxtrayex.exe''", "start": 19, "end": 57}], "action": [{"text": "is dropped", "start": 3, "end": 13}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 14, "end": 18}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A summary of the C2 IP addresses: Snort signatures: Listening Implant: Lightweight Backdoor: Proxy Tool: Malware associated with the cyber threat actor: Below are potential YARA signatures to detect malware binaries on host machines: Because of the highly destructive functionality of the malware, an organization infected with the malware could experience operational impacts including loss of intellectual property (IP) and disruption of critical systems.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Actual impact to organizations may vary depending on the type and number of systems impacted.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Implement the indicators of compromise within your systems for detection and mitigation purposes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Encourage users to transfer critical files to network shares, to allow for central backed up.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Execute daily backups of all critical systems.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Periodically execute an'' offline'' backup of critical files to removable media.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Establish emergency communications plans should network resources become unavailable.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Isolate any critical networks (including operations networks) from business systems.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Identify critical systems and evaluate the need for having on-hand spares to quickly restore service.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Ensure antivirus is up to date.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Disable credential caching for all desktop devices with particular importance on critical systems such as servers and restrict the number of cached credential for all portable devices to no more than three if possible.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This can be accomplished through a Group Policy Object (GPO).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Disable AutoRun and Autoplay for any removable media device.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Prevent or limit the use of all removable media devices on systems to limit the spread or introduction of malicious software and possible exfiltration data, except where there is a valid business case for use.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This business case must be approved by the organization Chief IT Security Officer, with policy/guidance on how such media should be used.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Consider restricting account privileges.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is our recommendation that all daily operations should be executed using standard user accounts unless administrative privileges are required for that specific function.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Configure all standard user accounts to prevent the execution and installation of any unknown or unauthorized software.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Both standard and administrative accounts should have access only to services required for nominal daily duties, enforcing the concept of separation of duties.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Lastly, disable Web and email capabilities on administrative accounts.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Compromise of admin accounts is one vector that allows malicious activity to become truly persistent in a network environment.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Ensure that password policy rules are enforced and Admin password values are changed periodically.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Consider prohibiting hosts within the production environment or DMZ from sharing an Active Directory enterprise with hosts on other networks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Each environment should have separate forests within Active Directory, with no trust relationships allowed between the forests if at all possible.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If necessary, the trust relationships should be one-way with the low integrity environment trusting the higher integrity environment.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Consider deployment of a coaching page with click through acceptance; these are traditionally deployed in an environment to log the acceptance of network acceptable use policy or to notify users of monitoring.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Coaching pages also provide some measure of protection from automated malicious activity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This occurs because automated malware is normally incapable of physically clicking an acceptance radial button.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Automated malware is traditionally hardcoded to execute, then retrieve commands or additional executables from the Internet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the malware is unable to initiate an active connection, the full train of infection is potentially halted.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The danger still exists that the physical user will authorize access, but through the use of coaching pages, infections can be limited or at least the rate of infection reduced.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Monitor logs -- Maintain and actively monitor a centralized logging solution that keeps track of all anomalous and potentially malicious activity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Ensure that all network operating systems, web browsers, and other related network hardware and software remain updated with all current patches and fixes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Organizations should review Security Tip Handling Destructive Malware #ST13-003 and evaluate their capabilities encompassing planning, preparation, detection, and response for such an event.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Always keep your patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host public services accessible through the firewall, such as HTTP, FTP, mail, and DNS services.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Build host systems, especially critical systems such as servers, with only essential applications and components required to perform the intended function.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Any unused applications or functions should be removed or disabled, if possible, to limit the attack surface of the host.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Implement network segmentation through V-LANs to limit the spread of malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Consider the deployment of Software Restriction Policy set to only allow the execution of approved software (application whitelisting).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Recommend the whitelisting of legitimate executable directories to prevent the execution of potentially malicious binaries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Consider the use of two-factor authentication methods for accessing privileged root level accounts or systems.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Consider deploying a two-factor authentication through a hardened IPsec/VPN gateway with split-tunneling prohibited for secure remote access.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Deny direct Internet access, except through the use of proxies for Enterprise servers and workstations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Perform regular content filtering at the proxies or external firewall points of presence.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Also consider the deployment of an explicit versus transparent proxy policy.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Implement a Secure Socket Layer (SSL) inspection capability to inspect both ingress and egress encrypted network traffic for potential malicious activity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Isolate network services, such as email and Web application servers by utilizing a secure multi-tenant virtualization technology.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This will limit the damage sustained from a compromise or attack of a single network component.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Implement best practice guidance and policy to restrict the use of non-Foundation assets for processing or accessing Foundation-controlled data or systems (e.g., working from home, or using a personal device while at the office).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is difficult to enforce corporate policies, detect intrusions, and conduct forensic analysis or remediate compromises on non-corporate owned devices.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Minimize network exposure for all control system devices.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Control system devices should not directly face the Internet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Place control system networks behind firewalls, and isolate or air gap them from the business network.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Industrial Control System (ICS) -CERT and US-CERT remind organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to taking defensive measures.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "N/A December 19, 2014: Initial Release", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have written about NetTraveler before HERE and HERE.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Earlier this year, we observed an uptick in the number of attacks against Uyghur and Tibetan supporters using an updated version of the NetTraveler backdoor.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Here's an example of a targeted spear-phishing e-mail directed at Uyghur activists in March 2014.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a targeted spear-phishing e-mail", "start": 21, "end": 53}, {"text": "Uyghur activists", "start": 66, "end": 82}, {"text": "March 2014", "start": 86, "end": 96}], "action": [{"text": "directed", "start": 54, "end": 62}], "modifier": [{"text": "at", "start": 63, "end": 65}, {"text": "in", "start": 83, "end": 85}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The e-mail has two attachments, a non-malicious JPG file and a 373 KB Microsoft Word .DOC file.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The e-mail", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "two attachments, a non-malicious JPG file and a 373 KB Microsoft Word .DOC file", "start": 15, "end": 94}], "action": [{"text": "has", "start": 11, "end": 14}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The .DOC", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "file, which in reality is a'' Single File Web Page'' container, also known as'' Web archive file'', appears to have been created on a system using Microsoft Office-Simplified Chinese.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It contains an exploit for the CVE-2012-0158 vulnerability, detected by Kaspersky Lab products as Exploit.MSWord.CVE-2012-0158.db.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If run on a vulnerable version of Microsoft Office, it drops the main module as'' net.exe'' (detected by Kaspersky Lab products as Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Agent.lifr), which in turn installs a number of other files.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 52, "end": 54}, {"text": "the main module", "start": 61, "end": 76}, {"text": "'' net.exe''", "start": 79, "end": 91}, {"text": "a number of other files", "start": 188, "end": 211}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 55, "end": 60}, {"text": "installs", "start": 179, "end": 187}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 77, "end": 79}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The main C & C module is dumped into''% SystemRoot% \\system32\\Windowsupdataney.dll'', (detected by Kaspersky as Trojan- Spy.Win32.TravNet.qfr).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The main C & C module", "start": 0, "end": 21}, {"text": "''% SystemRoot% \\system32\\Windowsupdataney.dll''", "start": 36, "end": 84}], "action": [{"text": "is dumped", "start": 22, "end": 31}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 32, "end": 36}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is registered as a service (named'' Windowsupdata'') through a Windows Batch file named'' DOT.BAT'' (detected by Kaspersky Lab products as Trojan.BAT.Tiny.b): To make sure the malware isn't running multiple times, it uses the mutex'' SD2013 Is Running!'' to mark its presence in the system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "a service (named'' Windowsupdata'')", "start": 20, "end": 55}, {"text": "a Windows Batch file named'' DOT.BAT''", "start": 64, "end": 102}, {"text": "sure", "start": 170, "end": 174}, {"text": "the malware isn't running multiple times", "start": 175, "end": 215}], "action": [{"text": "is registered", "start": 3, "end": 16}, {"text": "make", "start": 165, "end": 169}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 17, "end": 19}, {"text": "through", "start": 56, "end": 63}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other known mutexes used by older and current variants include: The malware configuration file is written to the'' SYSTEM'' folder (as opposed to SYSTEM32) and has a slightly new format compared to'' older'' NetTraveler samples: For the record, here's what an older NetTraveler config file looks like: Obviously, the developers behind NetTraveler have taken steps to try to hide the malware's configuration.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware configuration file", "start": 64, "end": 94}, {"text": "the'' SYSTEM'' folder (as opposed to SYSTEM32)", "start": 109, "end": 155}, {"text": "the developers behind NetTraveler", "start": 313, "end": 346}, {"text": "the malware's configuration", "start": 379, "end": 406}], "action": [{"text": "is written", "start": 95, "end": 105}, {"text": "hide", "start": 374, "end": 378}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 106, "end": 108}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Luckily, the encryption is relatively simple to break.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The algorithm is as follows: Once decrypted, the new config looks like this: One can easily see the command-and-control (C & C) server in the screenshot above, which is'' uyghurinfo [.] com''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the command-and-control (C & C) server", "start": 96, "end": 134}, {"text": "'' uyghurinfo [.] com''", "start": 168, "end": 191}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 166, "end": 168}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We identified several samples using this new encryption scheme.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A list of all the extracted C & C servers can be found below: We recommend blocking all these hosts in your firewall.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This year, the actors behind NetTraveler celebrate 10 years of activity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although the earliest samples we have seen appear to have been compiled in 2005, there are certain indicators that point to 2004 as the year when their activity started.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For 10 years NetTraveler has been targeting various sectors, with a focus on diplomatic, government and military targets.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Most recently, the main focus of interest for cyber-espionage activities revolved around space exploration, nano-technology, energy production, nuclear power, lasers, medicine and communications.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The targeting of Uyghur and Tibetan activists remains a standard component of their activities and we can assume it will stay this way, perhaps for another 10 years.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It's friday afternoon, I had a bit of free time and stumbled across this tweet by PhysicalDrive0 (thx!) two hours ago and thought to give it a try to finally add a new article to this Blog (first of 2014): So, I went to Google to search for the domain of the Embassy of Greece Beijing and added the (allegedly) malicious java file package that was found by PhysicalDrive0: Next, I loaded the 1.jar file into Java Decompiler to get the source code.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It showed, that the functionality is obfuscated in some way, e.g.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "the function csfn (String paramString) decrypts all strings by'' removing'' the numbers of the string parameter: There are some other obfuscation techniques, but they are not important here.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Instead, the following deobfuscated code line in the function init () gives us an idea where the actual payload is located: We can also see, that the java package contains a file named pack, so we open 7-Zip and unpack the file.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A quick view with a PE viewer showed, that it is a x86 PE executable not even encrypted (SHA256: b832e4b5a4829c8df6de7b42c5cb32ef25b5ab59072b4c2a7838404cd0dd5e5f): So, I opened IDA Pro to take a quick look at the functionality.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Together with the strings of the executable, we get a brief idea of what the purpose of this malware is.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The important strings are as follows: Together with the output of IDA Pro, we can see that this malware uses the command line tool cmd.exe for adding several registry keys to Internet Explorer.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this malware", "start": 91, "end": 103}, {"text": "several registry keys", "start": 150, "end": 171}, {"text": "Internet Explorer", "start": 175, "end": 192}], "action": [{"text": "adding", "start": 143, "end": 149}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 172, "end": 174}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It also tries to retrieve possible AntiVirus information by using the COM interface (dc12a687-737f-11cf-884d-00aa004b2e24-> IWbemLocator-> SELECT * FROM AntiVirusProduct).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "possible AntiVirus information", "start": 26, "end": 56}, {"text": "using the COM interface", "start": 60, "end": 83}], "action": [{"text": "retrieve", "start": 17, "end": 25}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 57, "end": 59}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Furthermore, it makes use of the COM to launch an instance of Internet Explorer (d30c1661-cdaf-11d0-8a3e-00c04fc9e26e-> IWebBrowser2), supposedly to contact its C & C server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 13, "end": 15}, {"text": "an instance of Internet Explorer", "start": 47, "end": 79}, {"text": "its C & C server", "start": 157, "end": 173}], "action": [{"text": "launch", "start": 40, "end": 46}, {"text": "contact", "start": 149, "end": 156}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To verify this, we open up Wireshark and run the executable.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As a result, we get the following network information: Also, we see that it downloads some kind of data (Base64 encoded).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 73, "end": 75}, {"text": "some kind of data", "start": 86, "end": 103}], "action": [{"text": "downloads", "start": 76, "end": 85}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "But first, we combine the C & C server and the HTTP request and open the URL in our favorite Browser: As you can see, there is a string named microsoft followed by Base64 encoded data.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Side note: Is there also a Linux equivalent? Next, we copy the Base64 encoded data and go to the following website to let us decode it into a file (because I had the feeling it's just another unencrypted executable): As a result, we get another executable (SHA256: a4863f44f48d1c4c050dd7baad767a86b348dd4d33924acf4e0a3cd40c6ae29f) that was only Base64 encoded and not encrypted in any way: So again, we fire up our PE viewer and take a look at the important strings: Again, we load the executable into IDA Pro and quickly fly over the assembly code to get an idea of the functionality.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once again, it creates several registry entries with the help of the command line tool and creates an instance of the Internet Explorer (CoCreateInstance ()-> d30c1661-cdaf-11d0-8a3e- 00c04fc9e26e) for contacting the C & C server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 12, "end": 14}, {"text": "several registry entries", "start": 23, "end": 47}, {"text": "the help of the command line tool", "start": 53, "end": 86}, {"text": "an instance of the Internet Explorer", "start": 99, "end": 135}, {"text": "the C & C server", "start": 213, "end": 229}], "action": [{"text": "creates", "start": 15, "end": 22}, {"text": "creates", "start": 91, "end": 98}, {"text": "contacting", "start": 202, "end": 212}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 48, "end": 52}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This time, the network information is as follows: From the code we can see, that the sample has also the ability to encode/decode data from/to Base64.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the sample", "start": 81, "end": 91}, {"text": "data", "start": 130, "end": 134}, {"text": "Base64", "start": 143, "end": 149}], "action": [{"text": "encode", "start": 116, "end": 122}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 135, "end": 139}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The dynamic analysis showed the malware sample contacted the C & C server, but wasn't sending any URL parameters (id1, id2).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware sample", "start": 28, "end": 46}, {"text": "the C & C server", "start": 57, "end": 73}], "action": [{"text": "contacted", "start": 47, "end": 56}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Also the server didn't respond ...", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The files can be downloaded here: That's it, have a nice weekend ...", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Most targeted attacks against organizations originate as spear-phish campaigns or watering hole style web driveby attacks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Most targeted attacks against organizations", "start": 0, "end": 43}, {"text": "spear-phish campaigns or watering hole style web driveby attacks", "start": 57, "end": 121}], "action": [{"text": "originate", "start": 44, "end": 53}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 54, "end": 56}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Within the last six months, Invincea has discovered and stopped targeted malvertizing attacks against specific companies -- particularly those in the Defense Industrial Base.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The combination of traditional cyber crime methods (malvertising) with targeted attacks against Defense industrials for theft of IP represents another development in the on-going blending of techniques from cyber crime and advanced threat actors with nation state agendas.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We are tracking an on-going campaign against US Defense companies under the code name Operation DeathClick.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Traditional malvertizing has been an effective but indiscriminate method cyber crime gangs use to compromise endpoints to perpetrate ad fraud, identity fraud, and banking credential theft.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "cyber crime gangs", "start": 73, "end": 90}, {"text": "ad fraud", "start": 133, "end": 141}, {"text": "identity fraud", "start": 143, "end": 157}, {"text": "banking credential theft", "start": 163, "end": 187}], "action": [{"text": "perpetrate", "start": 122, "end": 132}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this new targeted variation of malvertizing, the perpetrators are attacking specific organizations by leveraging real- time ad bidding networks and micro-targeting techniques developed over the last decade in online advertising.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The objective of these micro-targeted attacks against the Defense sector is likely theft of Intellectual Property more than ad fraud and indicates motive and sophistication characteristic of advanced threat actors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Since these attacks were blocked by Invincea prior to compromise of the machine or network, we can not confirm the specific IP the perpetrators are after–only the Tactics, Techniques, and Protocols (TTPs) used which we describe herein, similar to methods used to provide backdoor access and command and control over compromised networks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "methods", "start": 247, "end": 254}, {"text": "backdoor access and command and control over compromised networks", "start": 271, "end": 336}], "action": [{"text": "provide", "start": 263, "end": 270}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While we discovered these attacks across multiple Defense companies, we expect it will not be long, if not already, before other highly targeted segments including Federal, Financial Services, Manufacturing, and HealthCare are victimized with the same micro-targeted malvertising.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The campaign described here does not represent a single flaw, 0-day, or unpatched bug, but rather a significant development in the adversary's capabilities and strategy to leverage legitimate online advertising platforms on well-known ad supported websites via a technique called Real-Time Ad Bidding.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In other words, this problem will not be patched on Tuesday.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "UPDATE: We have updated this document to include a new section on a campaign of distributing CryptoWall ransomware via malvertising.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While the attack vector is the same, we believe this to be motivated by cybercrime rather than theft of IP from Defense companies.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Malvertising has seen meteoric rise in 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Threat actors create a corporate front, advertise on commonly visited sites, then later switch out the landing pages for their ads to pages that host exploit kits, or simply create a temporary redirection from their usual content to the malicious landing page.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Threat actors", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "the landing pages for their ads", "start": 99, "end": 130}, {"text": "pages that host exploit kits", "start": 134, "end": 162}, {"text": "a temporary redirection from their usual content to the malicious landing page", "start": 181, "end": 259}], "action": [{"text": "switch", "start": 88, "end": 94}, {"text": "create", "start": 174, "end": 180}], "modifier": [{"text": "out", "start": 95, "end": 98}, {"text": "to", "start": 131, "end": 133}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These exploit kits are hosted on compromised web servers across the world.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In other words, they leverage legitimate ad-supported popular websites together with compromised websites for hosting exploit landing pages, defeating black-listing techniques.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The lifetime of these ads and landing pages are measured in hours.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the campaign described here, Operation DeathClick, traditional malvertising has been armed with a micro-targeting system using IP address ranges, geographically narrowed down to zip codes, and interests of the user (recorded in cookies) to target specific companies, company types, and user interests/preferences.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "traditional malvertising", "start": 54, "end": 78}, {"text": "a micro-targeting system using IP address ranges, geographically narrowed down to zip codes, and interests of the user (recorded in cookies)", "start": 99, "end": 239}, {"text": "target specific companies, company types, and user interests/preferences", "start": 243, "end": 315}], "action": [{"text": "been armed", "start": 83, "end": 93}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 94, "end": 98}, {"text": "to", "start": 240, "end": 242}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They are employing the tactics of real-time ad bidding to guarantee malicious ad delivery to intended targets of the campaign–building on a decade of work in real-time analytics for online ad placement, but for nefarious purposes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The threat actors redirect their ads for just minutes at a time and then abandon their exploit kit pages forever.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This means that list-based threat intelligence feeds are rendered ineffective.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The domains used do not appear in any proxy blacklist, and the malware droppers delivered by the exploit pages always employ different signatures, evading traditional network and endpoint detection technology.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Ad delivery networks today are not incentivized to address the problem in a credible manner as they derive revenue from the criminal enterprise, while not being held accountable.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Turning a blind eye to the problem is rewarded economically.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Meanwhile the perpetrators are able to use traditional malvertising and ad fraud bots to fund the criminal enterprise.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Without cooperation of ad networks to vet the advertisers working through front companies, this attack vector will go unchecked.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "And now, with the advent of real-time ad bidding, these threat actors have weaponized ad delivery networks to target victims based on: Real-time ad bidding allows advertisers, and by extension, adversaries, to micro-target ad delivery on an extremely granular basis.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "these threat actors", "start": 50, "end": 69}, {"text": "ad delivery networks", "start": 86, "end": 106}, {"text": "target victims", "start": 110, "end": 124}], "action": [{"text": "weaponized", "start": 75, "end": 85}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 107, "end": 109}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, oppressive regimes trying to gather intelligence on activist protests can deliver ads to people getting email from within a specific locality where they are protesting.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Today, it is commonplace for micro-targeting techniques to be used as part of the toolset in legitimate online advertising.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For instance, a defense contractor, trying to win a new omnibus contract, can deliver targeted ads to online news sites frequented by Government program personnel.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The latest software product release can be delivered to Windows users visiting PC Magazine's website.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A local car dealership can sense when someone is in the market for a new car and can deliver advertising to those users, based solely on browsing history.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Now advanced threat actors are able to target an organization directly via micro-targeted malvertising, based solely on their corporate network IP range.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "advanced threat actors", "start": 4, "end": 26}, {"text": "an organization", "start": 46, "end": 61}, {"text": "directly", "start": 62, "end": 70}, {"text": "micro-targeted malvertising", "start": 75, "end": 102}, {"text": "their corporate network IP range", "start": 120, "end": 152}], "action": [{"text": "target", "start": 39, "end": 45}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 71, "end": 74}, {"text": "based solely on", "start": 104, "end": 119}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Thus, it doesn't matter where in the world you point your web browser -- an online video poker room, a fantasy football club homepage, a Pakistani news homepage, or even checking your own webmail at a trusted email provider.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Those ad windows can and are being used to deliver malware if the bidding price is right.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Those ad windows", "start": 0, "end": 16}, {"text": "deliver malware", "start": 43, "end": 58}, {"text": "the bidding price is right", "start": 62, "end": 88}], "action": [{"text": "being used", "start": 29, "end": 39}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 40, "end": 42}, {"text": "if", "start": 59, "end": 61}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Recently, multiple US Defense/Aerospace contractors were targeted by a malvertising campaign.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "multiple US Defense/Aerospace contractors", "start": 10, "end": 51}, {"text": "a malvertising campaign", "start": 69, "end": 92}], "action": [{"text": "were targeted", "start": 52, "end": 65}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These contractors had deployed world-class enterprise security defense in depth approaches to protect their intellectual property.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They had next generation firewalls that relied on threat intelligence feeds to do auto-blocking of known malicious sites.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They had malware interception technology that relied on known bad hashes to prevent malicious downloads.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The multiple proxies in place subscribed to real time feeds of known bad URLs.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They deployed AV at the gateways and on the endpoints.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "But in a two week period, these organizations were hit with dozens of micro-targeted malvertising attacks, each of which would have provided a beachhead for the threat actors from which to compromise the network, if successful.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "these organizations", "start": 26, "end": 45}, {"text": "dozens of micro-targeted malvertising attacks", "start": 60, "end": 105}], "action": [{"text": "were hit", "start": 46, "end": 54}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 55, "end": 59}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In each instance, the attacks were carried out by targeting these Defense contractors directly via real-time ad bidding.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attacks", "start": 18, "end": 29}, {"text": "targeting these Defense contractors directly via real-time ad bidding", "start": 50, "end": 119}], "action": [{"text": "were carried out", "start": 30, "end": 46}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 47, "end": 49}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once targeted, an end user only needed to browse to any website, anywhere in the world, which contained a DoubleClick ad-partner embedded window.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Invincea stopped these attacks on the endpoints by containing the delivered exploits in secure virtual containers, while producing the forensics that led to this discovery.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Next we go in some detail about example attacks perpetrated against the defense firms.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is important to note that the websites we show next that served up targeted malvertising were victims of malvertising campaigns with no knowledge of the malicious ads they were serving up.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These malicious ads were served up by 3rd party networks, who are unwittingly sourcing malicious content.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As we will discuss later, the 3rd party ad networks themselves are falling victim to malicious content campaigns.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A user visited his online fantasy football league homepage at Fleaflicker.com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As soon as the page loaded, a malicious ad delivered a backdoor Trojan via a Java-based exploit.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a malicious ad", "start": 28, "end": 42}, {"text": "a backdoor Trojan", "start": 53, "end": 70}, {"text": "a Java-based exploit", "start": 75, "end": 95}], "action": [{"text": "delivered", "start": 43, "end": 52}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 71, "end": 74}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Figure 1 shows a screenshot of the page that was visited.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "You will notice the two inline ad placements for DoubleClick ad delivery.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware delivered came from a compromised Polish website, and would have installed a generic backdoor Trojan.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "a generic backdoor Trojan", "start": 87, "end": 112}], "action": [{"text": "installed", "start": 77, "end": 86}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Note the prominent ad placements by AdChoice, a DoubleClick affiliate.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Figure 2 shows an event tree of the exploit and malware delivered from an ad by visiting Fleaflicker.com.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the exploit and malware", "start": 32, "end": 55}, {"text": "an ad", "start": 71, "end": 76}, {"text": "visiting Fleaflicker.com", "start": 80, "end": 104}], "action": [{"text": "delivered", "start": 56, "end": 65}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 66, "end": 70}, {"text": "by", "start": 77, "end": 79}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The event tree in Figure 2 taken from Invincea's Threat Management Console shows the exploited Java process dropped a file called fvJcrgR0.exe, and that it likely came from Pubmatic, an ad delivery network that allows for real time bidding to deliver ads.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the exploited Java process", "start": 81, "end": 107}, {"text": "a file called fvJcrgR0.exe", "start": 116, "end": 142}], "action": [{"text": "dropped", "start": 108, "end": 115}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this instance, the Pubmatic server redirected to a Web server in Poland that dropped the malware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a Web server in Poland", "start": 52, "end": 74}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 88, "end": 99}], "action": [{"text": "dropped", "start": 80, "end": 87}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The timeline below shows the exact times and URLs visited.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Note the number of re-directs from Fleaflicker.com to different outside properties in Figure 3.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Invincea Threat Management provides a quick way to search for an MD5 hash on third party sites (see Figure 4).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By clicking the VirusTotal link, the analyst will see the following VirusTotal report in Figure 5: From the VirusTotal report in Figure 5, you will see that this malware is a Trojan backdoor that would likely be used to download additional malware or to provide remote persistent access to the attacker.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this malware", "start": 157, "end": 169}, {"text": "a Trojan backdoor", "start": 173, "end": 190}, {"text": "additional malware", "start": 229, "end": 247}, {"text": "remote persistent access", "start": 262, "end": 286}, {"text": "the attacker", "start": 290, "end": 302}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 170, "end": 172}, {"text": "download", "start": 220, "end": 228}, {"text": "provide", "start": 254, "end": 261}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 287, "end": 289}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An employee at a defense contractor visited a free Texas Poker online game.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Poker site had advertisements on the page, one of which launched a similar attack as seen in before on other websites visited by employees at this firm.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It should be noted that Gpokr.com no longer appears to be serving advertisements from their site.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At the time of the incident, as seen in the logs below, an ad window was previously present.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the event tree shown in Figure 7, you will see that the winning bid redirected to a direct-to-IP site instead of a site via domain name.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Also, above is the first indication of specific executable DLL files.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Searches for these filenames returned zero results on VirusTotal.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This event on September 14 (Figure 8) shows that delivery.first-impression.com redirected directly to an IP address, not a domain name to deliver its malicious payload.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "delivery.first-impression.com", "start": 49, "end": 78}, {"text": "an IP address, not a domain name", "start": 102, "end": 134}, {"text": "deliver its malicious payload", "start": 138, "end": 167}], "action": [{"text": "redirected", "start": 79, "end": 89}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 99, "end": 101}, {"text": "to", "start": 135, "end": 137}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Note the multiple DLL files written to disk and the spawning of rundll32.exe.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At this point, the Invincea-protected host recognized the unauthorized process and reverted itself to a clean state.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In another incident an employee checked their online Earthlink account.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When they replied to an email, a new ad was loaded on a page that attempted to exploit Java.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a new ad", "start": 31, "end": 39}, {"text": "Java", "start": 87, "end": 91}], "action": [{"text": "exploit", "start": 79, "end": 86}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This malvertising was from the same IP address seen in other incidents.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "You will notice the inline advertisements on this page in Figure 9.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The event tree in Figure 10 notes that this was likely a spear-phish attack.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this", "start": 39, "end": 43}, {"text": "a spear-phish attack", "start": 55, "end": 75}], "action": [{"text": "was", "start": 44, "end": 47}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The timeline will show that when the user replied to an email, the ads on the Earthlink page refreshed, dropping the exploit code via Java.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the ads on the Earthlink page", "start": 63, "end": 92}, {"text": "the exploit code", "start": 113, "end": 129}, {"text": "Java", "start": 134, "end": 138}], "action": [{"text": "dropping", "start": 104, "end": 112}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 130, "end": 133}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Note in the timeline in Figure 11, how there was a 7 minute gap between the DoubleClick ad redirect and the delivery.first-impression.com ad.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is an indication that the page was refreshed or the ad was refreshed on the page.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The same exploit IP address from the Gpokr event is present.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This event is the oldest, happening on September 11.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The three examples above are samples of the more than two dozen micro-targeted attacks we have witnessed and blocked as part of Operation DeathClick since mid-September.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Defense Industrial Base customers witnessed micro-targeted malvertising at a rate six times that of comparable private sector companies with similar defense-in-depth capabilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We observed in Operation DeathClick that real-time ad bidding networks are being used by criminal enterprise to target companies with malicious content in order to gain persistent remote access.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "real-time ad bidding networks", "start": 41, "end": 70}, {"text": "criminal enterprise", "start": 89, "end": 108}, {"text": "target companies with malicious content", "start": 112, "end": 151}, {"text": "persistent remote access", "start": 169, "end": 193}], "action": [{"text": "being used", "start": 75, "end": 85}, {"text": "gain", "start": 164, "end": 168}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 109, "end": 111}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In these third-party arrangements, the content is frequently not vetted because billions of impressions are rendered in real-time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Most of the content is legitimate ads.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A small fraction is malicious content linking to landing pages that infect users.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "malicious content", "start": 20, "end": 37}, {"text": "landing pages that infect users", "start": 49, "end": 80}], "action": [{"text": "linking", "start": 38, "end": 45}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 46, "end": 48}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Real-time ad networks are being used, often unwittingly, and some have taken steps to try and combat malicious use of their networks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Online Trust Alliance is one such industry group comprised of major software companies and ad networks working together to try and address this problem.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our goal in this paper is to shed light on the micro-targeting of companies by criminal enterprise employing real-time ad networks, and to aid the industry in collectively addressing this problem.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Real-time ad bidding networks have evolved over the last ten years as a means of micro-targeting customers with advertising content they are more likely to click-on.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "From Wikipedia: Real-time bidding (RTB) refers to the means by which ad inventory is bought and sold on a per- impression basis, via programmatic instantaneous auction, similar to financial markets.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "[1] With real-time bidding, advertising buyers bid on an impression and, if the bid is won, the buyer's ad is instantly displayed on the publisher's site.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "[2] Real-time bidding lets advertisers manage and optimize ads from multiple ad-networks by granting the user access to a multitude of different networks, allowing them to create and launch advertising campaigns, prioritize networks and allocate advertising stock.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Real-time bidding is a dynamic bidding process where each impression is bid for in (near) real time, against a static auction where the impressions are typically bundled in groups of 1,000.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A typical transaction begins with a user visiting a website.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This triggers a bid request that can include various pieces of data such as the user's demographic information, browsing history, location, and the page being loaded.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The request goes from the publisher to an ad exchange, which submits it and the accompanying data to multiple advertisers who automatically submit bids in real time to place their ads.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Advertisers bid on each ad impression as it is served.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The impression goes to the highest bidder and their ad is served on the page.This process is repeated for every ad slot on the page.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Real time bidding transactions typically happen within 100 milliseconds from the moment the ad exchange received the request.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The bidding happens autonomously and advertisers set maximum bids and budgets for an advertising campaign.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The criteria for bidding on particular types of consumers can be very complex, taking into account everything from very detailed behavioral profiles to conversion data.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following infographic summarizes how advanced adversaries are now micro-targeting companies using malvertising.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The marketplace and auction of ads sounds great for actual ads.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "But what if the landing pages that are supposed to be ads are actually malicious PHP pages with embedded malware? The bidding and ad placements work the same, but instead of seeing a flashy ad banner, the highest bidder for the placement serves malware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the highest bidder for the placement", "start": 201, "end": 237}, {"text": "malware", "start": 245, "end": 252}], "action": [{"text": "serves", "start": 238, "end": 244}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The price to win the bid to push malvertising to any page you happen to visit ranges from 45 to 75 cents per impression.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A malicious advertiser on a network may serve crafted, seemingly normal ads, a majority of the time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In fact, the ads are often stolen copies from legitimate advertisers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This establishes the attacker's legitimacy and trust on the ad network.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Of course with real-time ad bidding, he can simply offer up low bids and his content would consistently lose in the marketplace.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "But it is very simple to replace the redirection code to switch from a legitimate ad banner to a drop site that hosts an exploit kit, typically based on Java, Flash, Silverlight, or all three.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "replace", "start": 25, "end": 32}], "entity": [{"text": "the redirection code", "start": 33, "end": 53}, {"text": "switch from a legitimate ad banner to a drop site that hosts an exploit kit, typically based on Java, Flash, Silverlight, or all three", "start": 57, "end": 191}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 54, "end": 56}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once the malvertiser detects that he has several infected hosts, he removes the redirection code and goes back to serving standard ad banners.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "He then'' burns'' his temporary exploit kit drop site, moving his exploits to another location for a new campaign.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This allows the malicious advertiser to perform hit and run attacks, infect whomever he wants at whatever time he wants, and maintain his presence on the advertising marketplace without drawing undue attention to his activities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the sections below, we will provide highlights of the RTB industry, its targeting capabilities, and show how malvertisers have been mis-appropriating RTB networks to deliver malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The RTB ad networks provide significant micro-targeting capabilities that have long been used to serve legitimate content to users more likely to click on them.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the following, we describe these capabilities to show the state of the art in RTB network capabilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The quoted material below are direct quotes from Real Time Bidding service providers linked.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Emphasis added by Invincea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Audience Targeting: Bid on the audiences most valuable to you.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Each impression in the PubMatic auction can be enhanced with first- and third-party data; giving buyers targeting capabilities across display, mobile, tablet and video inventory.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Media buyers can also cookie sync with publisher audiences to incorporate CRM, retargeting and exclusion strategies in their digital advertising.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Buyers have access to proprietary audience segments either directly through Private Marketplace deals or through the open market.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With hundreds of parameters available to you, PubMatic has your best audiences waiting for you.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With PubMatic, buyers are able to access pre-defined vertical or audience packages, seasonal packages, publisher and/or site-specific inventory packages as well as pre-selected publisher packages and pricing available in Private Marketplaces.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' First-Impression Buy-Side offers the granular targeting, tracking, and reporting needed to help our clients make the most of their spend, along with an expert support team to advise when needed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By leveraging real time buying, First-Impression Buy-Side gives media buyers the full control to maximize the value of an impression.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Could Malvertisers Track Exploits and their cost per impression? Yes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many RTB networks provide a control panel to track advertising campaigns in real-time, along with notifications that bids have been won and who exactly was served the malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Below is a URL redirection log from First-Impression.com from a winning bid by a malvertiser.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the URL are parameters such as the type of ad, the type of user-agent string of the ad reader specified (which discloses browser and java versions), whether it is a retargeted ad based off of cookies (this one was not), the price paid, which is 65.4 cents, and the notification to the malvertiser that his malvertising was delivered.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "DoubleClick discusses their targeting capabilities in online documentation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Since they specialize in knowing the location of their ad windows, they market those ad spaces to the actual advertisers and malvertisers, along with targeted demographics about the content pages, the visitors to the sites and more.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To showcase the variety of impression-level data available to buyers, consider the data made available through a connection to DoubleClick Ad Exchange's real-time bidding API.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With ADX, a buyer could consider any of the following data passed from the seller with each impression: • Ad slot parameters: visibility (above or below the fold), size, excluded creative attributes, excluded advertiser URLs, allowed vendor or ad technology.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Geo parameters: country, region, metro, city.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Content parameters: site URL, site language, seller network, vertical or category.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• User parameters: browser, operating system, anonymous cookie (hashed), cookie age.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Just like when considering one type of data, by using the anonymous cookie parameter, buyers can consider first-party retargeting or third-party audience data from a data provider.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, they can go further in the evaluation by looking at more of these parameters.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This helps a buyer learn much more about a particular user and a particular impression, gain a smarter answer to the three essential questions and make a more data-driven decision.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This sounds like a great way to advertise if you are in the marketing industry.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Consider how granularly a person can be targeted if this service is used maliciously.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If not targeted by the desktop, how about on the mobile platform? Twitter's Tailored Audiences just got a little more tailored.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Advertisers can now augment their customer data using mobile advertising IDs and mobile phone numbers as a way to reach existing customers and increase audience size.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In essence, the move is an extension of Twitter's Tailored Audiences for CRM retargeting, which allows advertisers to use hashed non-PII email address to retarget existing customers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "(email addresses are twitter IDs- so you could be targeted for ad delivery based on your account name or known phone number) Twitter also rolled out the ability to target lookalike audiences, a function that seems pretty similar to Facebook's tool of the same name.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Twitter's lookalike modeling uses a proprietary algorithm that examines modeled users looking for similarities related to behaviors, interests, location, demographic attributes and engagement patterns.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Twitter described its enhanced as'' part of improved targeting options to help advertisers reach additional users similar to their existing audiences.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Tailored Audiences, Twitter's seeming answer to the Facebook Exchange (FBX), officially launched back in December after running retargeting and database matching tests in July.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Twitter has appeared to follow Facebook's lead with a number of its recent roll-outs, including site retargeting, CRM targeting and now retargeting via lookalike audiences.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "(Facebook also makes it possible to target users by phone numbers through Custom Audiences.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ") Neustar does provide a real-time bidding ad exchange, but their real market is IP intelligence that they sell to other advertising networks for the purposes of better targeting specific users.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In Europe, laws require that advertising networks allow people to opt out of having tracking cookies, which is how many advertisers used to rely upon for ad campaign targeting.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To get around this, Neustar perfected IP based targeting, which avoids cookies.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They are able to build IP specific browsing profiles based on IP subnets.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In a blog post below, Neustar boasts about their direct to IP range and enterprise advertising.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "How can Neustar IP Intelligence target by IP? While IP intelligence has been around for many years, the ability to effectively target advertising by audience, based on IP is very new.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Neustar IP Intelligence is currently working with select DSP platforms to buy impressions off of the exchanges based on the IP address rather than cookies.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This has only been possible with the recent emergence of real time bidding (RTB).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The secret sauce is in understanding the IP and the methodology necessary for targeting ads appropriately against it.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Is an IP Address like a cookie? No, an IP address only identifies devices on a network.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The IP address does not contain any PII and does not track or store any consumer usage or behavioral information.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "(But IP ranges are registered by IANA, and you can easily know who owns the ranges) Product Specific Questions Q1: How does the process work? The process works exactly like any advertising network.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Instead of buying inventory based on a cookie, Neustar is buying inventory based on an IP address.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We run the targeting specifics against our proprietary database and create a custom IP list to target against.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Neustar has set up relationships with partners that have built the functionality for this to work end-to-end for our advertisers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Neustar offers a full service ad network.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Brand marketers who wish to advertise using IP Audience Targeting can work directly with Neustar to determine custom IP placements, run campaigns, optimization, reporting and billing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Much like any traditional online publisher or online ad network, Neustar manages the entire process.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "How does Neustar deliver its ads? We use industry standard methods for delivering our ads, but what makes our approach special is that we bake in the IP data before delivering the inventory with our network partners, which allows us to target display ad campaigns to a specific business or organization.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We obtain inventory from ad exchanges, but have our own ad server.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Zedo, blamed for recent malvertising via DoubleClick, say they are now trying to protect against malvertisers in this blog here.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Less than a week after this announcement, they published another blog post that describes how they can push advertising to specific platforms, devices, as well as specific markets and networks: Users can now target ads to a specific device when trafficking ads.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An option for'' Device Targeting'' is now available under'' Targeting''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A creative targeted to a specific Device will serve only on that Device.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All major manufacturers/models are supported by this feature.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If a creative is not targeted to any specific device than it will serve on all device.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Apart from device, a user can target various devices based on different categories.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At any given point of time, a user can target multiple manufacturers and categories.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Apart from existing campaign reach report a user can now pull a reach report by creative.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The creative reach report is available along with all the existing parameters and can be pulled by month, week or day.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Creative reach report will show creative wise reach.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It will help to analyze how effective the reach of a creative was.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To be clear, RTB networks are legitimate platforms for displaying ads on ad-supported websites.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They enable micro-targeting of user's interest, delivering content that a viewer would likely want to see.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As we have detailed here, they can also be mis-appropriated unwittingly by malvertisers using these same tools and techniques to target companies with malware for persistent remote access in addition to traditional click fraud, phishing, and identity theft.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "malvertisers", "start": 75, "end": 87}, {"text": "these same tools and techniques", "start": 94, "end": 125}, {"text": "target companies with malware for persistent remote access", "start": 129, "end": 187}, {"text": "traditional click fraud, phishing, and identity theft", "start": 203, "end": 256}], "action": [{"text": "using", "start": 88, "end": 93}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 126, "end": 128}, {"text": "in addition to", "start": 188, "end": 202}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Below are links to RTB providers to learn more.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Invincea has shown logs from a winning malvertising bid in the price range of 65 cents per impression.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "That is one ad, on one page, paid for by the malvertiser's account.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This implies that malvertisers have deep pockets, spending hundreds of dollars on ad impressions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "So how do they get money to spend on these malicious campaigns? Invincea recently saw a malvertiser win a bid and delivered a Java exploit.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a malvertiser", "start": 86, "end": 99}, {"text": "a Java exploit", "start": 124, "end": 138}], "action": [{"text": "delivered", "start": 114, "end": 123}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This exploit copied a fully functional version of Chrome into the Java cache directory, and that version of Chrome launched in the background and proceeded to visit websites and click on specific ad banners.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This exploit", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "a fully functional version of Chrome", "start": 20, "end": 56}, {"text": "the Java cache directory", "start": 62, "end": 86}, {"text": "that version of Chrome", "start": 92, "end": 114}, {"text": "specific ad banners", "start": 187, "end": 206}], "action": [{"text": "copied", "start": 13, "end": 19}, {"text": "click", "start": 178, "end": 183}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 57, "end": 61}, {"text": "on", "start": 184, "end": 186}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is presumed that these ad banners paid revenue via referral bonuses to the malvertiser.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By paying 65 cents to install a background web browser that does nothing but click fraud, the malvertiser is able to reap hundreds if not thousands of dollars in advertising referral income.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a background web browser", "start": 30, "end": 54}, {"text": "click fraud", "start": 77, "end": 88}], "action": [{"text": "does", "start": 60, "end": 64}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is a pretty good return on investment, which in turn allows the malvertiser to fund his micro-targeted malvertising attack campaign.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is ironic, however, that click fraud is what is driving the prices of RTB advertising so high.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Malvertising is not only a danger to end users, but it is a danger to the advertising industry as well.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The image from Figure 14 below shows a log file of Chrome, in this instance, renamed Oajvliewxpge.exe, injected via Java to run in the background.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Invincea detected this attack and killed the infection attempt.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is one instance where the malvertiser wasted his 65 cents.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It should be noted that Invincea is uniquely capable of stopping this type of attack.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The introduction of Chrome as a browser, which is whitelisted by hash across the AV industry, would go unchecked by the AV and whitelisting applications industry.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this instance, the host was almost converted to a click-fraud bot.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the host", "start": 18, "end": 26}, {"text": "a click-fraud bot", "start": 51, "end": 68}], "action": [{"text": "was almost converted", "start": 27, "end": 47}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 48, "end": 50}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "But the malware delivery could have been intended for data exfiltration, banking Trojans, or any other more insidious purpose.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware delivery", "start": 4, "end": 24}, {"text": "data exfiltration", "start": 54, "end": 71}], "action": [{"text": "been intended", "start": 36, "end": 49}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 50, "end": 53}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The ability for advertisers and malvertisers to automatically redirect to self-hosted ad content or exploit pages is driving RTB malvertising.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Invincea has witnessed a rash of exploit kits and landing pages hosted on: In most instances, the landing pages are preconfigured with the exploit kit.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the landing pages", "start": 94, "end": 111}, {"text": "the exploit kit", "start": 135, "end": 150}], "action": [{"text": "are preconfigured", "start": 112, "end": 129}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 130, "end": 134}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malvertiser creates the redirection in his normal ad prior to raising his bids to winning levels.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once several victims are confirmed, those malicious landing pages have the content erased, and the automatic redirection removed to serve'' normal'' ads again.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Figures 17 through 21 in the following are screenshots from Invincea's Threat Management console from various RTB-based malvertising incidents with highlighted URLs for malvertising delivered via RTB ad bidding.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "malvertising", "start": 169, "end": 181}, {"text": "RTB ad bidding", "start": 196, "end": 210}], "action": [{"text": "delivered", "start": 182, "end": 191}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 192, "end": 195}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In September and October of 2014, Invincea saw a sharp spike of malvertising delivering CryptoWall ransomware attacks via Real Time Ad Bidding.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "malvertising", "start": 64, "end": 76}, {"text": "CryptoWall ransomware attacks", "start": 88, "end": 117}, {"text": "Real Time Ad Bidding", "start": 122, "end": 142}], "action": [{"text": "delivering", "start": 77, "end": 87}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 118, "end": 121}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We observed Real Time Ad bidding platforms, including OpenX, GoogleAds, Yahoo, AOL, and first-impression.com, fall victim to the ransomware malvertising scheme by unwittingly delivering the CryptoWall 2.0 ransomware ads.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Real Time Ad bidding platforms, including OpenX, GoogleAds, Yahoo, AOL, and first-impression.com", "start": 12, "end": 108}, {"text": "the CryptoWall 2.0 ransomware ads", "start": 186, "end": 219}], "action": [{"text": "delivering", "start": 175, "end": 185}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Ransomware is a particularly pernicious form of malware that fully encrypts the victim's disk and data files, including remote storage, then demands payment of anywhere from $300 to $1000 in return for the decryption key.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Ransomware", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "the victim's disk and data files, including remote storage", "start": 76, "end": 134}], "action": [{"text": "encrypts", "start": 67, "end": 75}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Users are held hostage from their own work, pictures, personal, and proprietary material.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To learn more about the scourage of ransomware, see this blog.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Based on analysis of Invincea logs in would-be victims targeted by these ads, we have insight into the attacker that is delivering the malicious ads.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attacker", "start": 99, "end": 111}, {"text": "the malicious ads", "start": 131, "end": 148}], "action": [{"text": "is delivering", "start": 117, "end": 130}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to Invincea analysis of ads delivered from first- impression.com, winning ad bids ranging from as low as 30 cents and as high as $1.70, were delivered by a block of unique identifiers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is highly likely that the same attackers are using other RTB ad platforms.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This campaign matches the characteristics described by Proofpoint in its blog in terms of the exploitation methods.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Legitimate ad copy is stolen, 3rd party ad networks used to distribute malware, and popular ad- supported websites displaying the malicious ads that exploit unsuspecting visitors with drive-by web exploits.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "3rd party ad networks", "start": 30, "end": 51}, {"text": "distribute malware", "start": 60, "end": 78}, {"text": "the malicious ads", "start": 126, "end": 143}, {"text": "unsuspecting visitors", "start": 157, "end": 178}, {"text": "drive-by web exploits", "start": 184, "end": 205}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 52, "end": 56}, {"text": "exploit", "start": 149, "end": 156}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 57, "end": 59}, {"text": "with", "start": 179, "end": 183}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Merely visiting any ad-supported site may result in a CryptoWall ransomware infection.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "visiting any ad-supported site", "start": 7, "end": 37}, {"text": "a CryptoWall ransomware infection", "start": 52, "end": 85}], "action": [{"text": "result", "start": 42, "end": 48}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 49, "end": 51}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cryptowall 2.0 utilizes the TOR network to hide its communications, but it quickly encrypts all local files on the disk, and demands bitcoin payment to unlock the files.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Cryptowall 2.0", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "the TOR network", "start": 24, "end": 39}, {"text": "hide its communications", "start": 43, "end": 66}, {"text": "it", "start": 72, "end": 74}, {"text": "all local files on the disk", "start": 92, "end": 119}], "action": [{"text": "utilizes", "start": 15, "end": 23}, {"text": "encrypts", "start": 83, "end": 91}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 40, "end": 42}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many companies have fallen prey to this attack over the past few months, making this one of the most successful Ransomware campaigns to date.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Below is a typical Cryptowall 2 infection as seen in the Invincea Management Server logs.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This winning ad placement ran on sports.yahoo.com–an Alexa Top 4 rated site.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Highlighted in order in Figure 22 is the common filename of obupdat.exe, which has ever changing hashes, followed by the TOR port, and the 3rd party ad platform of first-impression.com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Analysis (Original report): Timeline Analysis (Original Report): Below in Figure 23 is the timeline of the Tor connections and SSL connections employed by CryptoWall.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, you can see the ransom note being written to disk on an infected machine in the audit logs in Figure 24.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the ransom note", "start": 25, "end": 40}, {"text": "disk", "start": 58, "end": 62}, {"text": "an infected machine", "start": 66, "end": 85}], "action": [{"text": "being written", "start": 41, "end": 54}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 55, "end": 57}, {"text": "on", "start": 63, "end": 65}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Figure 25 shows the winning malvertising bid via RTB ad delivery from first-impression.com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Items highlighted in the URL below is userid, and the winning bid price to place malvertising of Cryptowall on sports.yahoo.com, which is 60 cents.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "place", "start": 75, "end": 80}], "entity": [{"text": "malvertising of Cryptowall", "start": 81, "end": 107}, {"text": "sports.yahoo.com", "start": 111, "end": 127}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 108, "end": 110}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In Figure 26 below, we show the unique identifiers for the userID and campaigns to deliver CryptoWall malware that were blocked and audited by Invincea, including the websites that delivered the ads via a third-party ad network over the past month.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To reiterate, neither the websites listed here, nor the 3rd party ad network, necessarily was aware of the malicious ads they were serving to the website visitors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is likely they were not aware without ad screening technology.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In each event above, Invincea blocked an attempt to infect an endpoint with Cryptowall 2.0 and prevented CryptoWall from encrypting the user's file system and holding it hostage.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Had the user not been running Invincea, the attack would likely have been successful, and the only way the user would have had to recover the encrypted files would be to pay the attacker the ransom.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is an effective ransom technique, and one that is paying off well for the attackers, who use the income from the attacks to purchase Real Time Ad Bids on RTB networks to infect more users.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Most RTB ad providers allow for advertisers to host their own ad content.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This allows advertisers to directly collect web impression data of who is hitting which ads, from where, by which IPs, which user- agent strings, and just about anything else you could log about a website visit.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, the advertising network doesn't have to utilize their own disk space to host the image files, the flash videos or other online content.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "RTB networks simply do the auctioneering and redirection to the winning content.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is this weakness in security that malvertisers are taking advantage of.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If ad networks were to switch to a model where all content is actually hosted by them (1st party hosting), in a cloud, then the risk of malvertising would drop dramatically.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The RubiconProject has a Seller's Cloud, which could be a security model for the RTB industry.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is inherently more secure way of hosting ad content.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Operation DeathClick is an active campaign to micro-target companies via malvertising in order to compromise their networks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Operation DeathClick", "start": 0, "end": 20}, {"text": "companies", "start": 59, "end": 68}, {"text": "malvertising", "start": 73, "end": 85}, {"text": "compromise their networks", "start": 98, "end": 123}], "action": [{"text": "micro-target", "start": 46, "end": 58}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 69, "end": 72}, {"text": "in order to", "start": 86, "end": 97}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Unfortunately, the micro-targeting malvertising technique evades almost all network controls and traditional endpoint anti-virus solutions.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the micro-targeting malvertising technique", "start": 15, "end": 57}, {"text": "almost all network controls and traditional endpoint anti-virus solutions", "start": 65, "end": 138}], "action": [{"text": "evades", "start": 58, "end": 64}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Invincea can protect users from this attack type among other targeted and opportunistic web-based threats.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For half the price of a candy bar, attackers have the unprecedented ability to deliver malware to you through your web browser simply because of your IP address space and your industry vertical.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "attackers", "start": 35, "end": 44}, {"text": "malware", "start": 87, "end": 94}, {"text": "you", "start": 98, "end": 101}, {"text": "your web browser", "start": 110, "end": 126}, {"text": "your IP address space and your industry vertical", "start": 145, "end": 193}], "action": [{"text": "deliver", "start": 79, "end": 86}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 95, "end": 97}, {"text": "through", "start": 102, "end": 109}, {"text": "because of", "start": 134, "end": 144}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Most of the attacks featured here were not detected by standard Anti-Virus because the malware hashes constantly change.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Most of the attacks featured here", "start": 0, "end": 33}, {"text": "standard Anti-Virus", "start": 55, "end": 74}, {"text": "the malware hashes constantly change", "start": 83, "end": 119}], "action": [{"text": "were not detected", "start": 34, "end": 51}], "modifier": [{"text": "because", "start": 75, "end": 82}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Web proxy blocking updates, even in real time, will not stop new malvertising landing pages that appear and disappear within minutes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Intelligence feeds from the premier intelligence providers, based on hostname, IP, URL or domain will not be able to block malicious malvertisers quickly enough.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Invincea protected users can simply browse and click anything online without fear of compromise or targeted malvertising attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Non-Invincea users can attempt to OptOut of directed targeting where you can.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "European privacy laws for forcing most ad providers to offer the opt-out service; however, you often have to visit each ad provider individually to choose to opt out.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Note, that opting out merely places a blocking cookie in your browser.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This means that ad providers will not target or retarget based on cookies.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "But as shown above, the new targeted advertising is via IP intelligence.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "10/27: For clarification, Invincea has added additional notes in this version that the websites shown here and the 3rd party real-time ad networks are being used unwittingly and their resources misappropriated by malvertisers to target companies for persistent remote access, click fraud, and other nefarious activities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is not a reflection on these companies, nor the services they provide.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This paper highlights the problem for greater awareness so the industry collectively can combat this problem perhaps with more effective screening at the source prior to displaying ads.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In May 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice charged five Chinese nationals for economic espionage against U.S. corporations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The five known state actors are officers in Unit 61398 of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In response, the Chinese government stated that the claims were'' absurd'' and based on'' fabricated facts''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "China then went even further, stating'' The Chinese government, the Chinese military and their relevant personnel have never engaged or participated in cyber theft of trade secrets.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' We believe that organizations, be they governments or corporations, global or domestic, must keep up the pressure and hold China accountable until lasting change is achieved.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Not only did the U.S. Government offer in its criminal indictment the foundation of evidence designed to prove China's culpability in electronic espionage, but also illustrated that the charges are only the tip of a very large iceberg.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Those reading the indictment should not conclude that the People's Republic of China (PRC) hacking campaign is limited to five soldiers in one military unit, or that they solely target the United States government and corporations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Rather, China's decade-long economic espionage campaign is massive and unrelenting.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Through widespread espionage campaigns, Chinese threat actors are targeting companies and governments in every part of the globe.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At CrowdStrike, we see evidence of this activity first-hand as our services team conducts Incident Response investigations and responds to security breaches at some of the largest organizations around the world.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have first-hand insight into the billions of dollars of intellectual property systematically leaving many of the largest corporations-often times unbeknownst to their executives and boards of directors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The campaign that is the subject of this report further points to espionage activity outside of Unit 61398, and reveals the activities of Unit 61486.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Unit 61486 is the 12th Bureau of the PLA's 3rd General Staff Department (GSD) and is headquartered in Shanghai, China.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The CrowdStrike Intelligence team has been tracking this particular unit since 2012, under the codename PUTTER PANDA, and has documented activity dating back to 2007.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The report identifies Chen Ping, aka cpyy, and the primary location of Unit 61486.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This particular unit is believed to hack into victim companies throughout the world in order to steal corporate trade secrets, primarily relating to the satellite, aerospace and communication industries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With revenues totaling $189.2 billion in 2013, the satellite industry is a prime target for espionage campaigns that result in the theft of high-stakes intellectual property.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While the gains from electronic theft are hard to quantify, stolen information undoubtedly results in an improved competitive edge, reduced research and development timetables, and insight into strategy and vulnerabilities of the targeted organization.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Parts of the PUTTER PANDA toolset and tradecraft have been previously documented, both by CrowdStrike, and in open source, where they are referred to as the MSUpdater group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This report contains details on the tactics, tools, and techniques used by PUTTER PANDA, and provides indicators and signatures that can be leveraged by organizations to protect themselves against this activity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our Global Intelligence Team actively tracks and reports on more than 70 espionage groups, approximately half of which operate out of China and are believed to be tied to the Chinese government.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This report is part of our extensive intelligence library and was made available to our intelligence subscribers in April 2014, prior to the US Government's criminal indictment and China's subsequent refusal to engage in a constructive dialog.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Targeted economic espionage campaigns compromise technological advantage, diminish global competition, and ultimately have no geographic borders.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We believe the U.S. Government indictments and global acknowledgment and awareness are important steps in the right direction.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In support of these efforts, we are making this report available to the public to continue the dialog around this ever-present threat.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CrowdStrike has been tracking the activity of a cyber espionage group operating out of Shanghai, China, with connections to the People's Liberation Army Third General Staff Department (GSD) 12th Bureau Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) 61486, since 2012.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attribution provided in this report points to Chen Ping, aka cpyy (born on May 29, 1979), as an individual responsible for the domain registration for the Command and Control (C2) of PUTTER PANDA malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition to cpyy, the report identifies the primary location of Unit 61486.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "PUTTER PANDA is a determined adversary group, conducting intelligence-gathering operations targeting the Government, Defense, Research, and Technology sectors in the United States, with specific targeting of the US Defense and European satellite and aerospace industries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The PLA's GSD Third Department is generally acknowledged to be China's premier Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) collection and analysis agency, and the 12th Bureau Unit 61486, headquartered in Shanghai, supports China's space surveillance network.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Domains registered by Chen Ping were used to control PUTTER PANDA malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These domains were registered to an address corresponding to the physical location of the Shanghai headquarters of 12th Bureau, specifically Unit 61486.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The report illuminates a wide set of tools in use by the actors, including several Remote Access Tools (RATs).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a wide set of tools", "start": 23, "end": 42}, {"text": "the actors", "start": 53, "end": 63}, {"text": "several Remote Access Tools (RATs)", "start": 75, "end": 109}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 46, "end": 49}], "modifier": [{"text": "including", "start": 65, "end": 74}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The RATs are used by the PUTTER PANDA actors to conduct intelligence-gathering operations with a significant focus on the space technology sector.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The RATs", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "the PUTTER PANDA actors", "start": 21, "end": 44}, {"text": "intelligence-gathering operations", "start": 56, "end": 89}], "action": [{"text": "are used", "start": 9, "end": 17}, {"text": "conduct", "start": 48, "end": 55}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This toolset provides a wide degree of control over a victim system and can provide the opportunity to deploy additional tools at will.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This toolset", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "a wide degree of control over a victim system", "start": 22, "end": 67}, {"text": "additional tools", "start": 110, "end": 126}, {"text": "will", "start": 130, "end": 134}], "action": [{"text": "provides", "start": 13, "end": 21}, {"text": "deploy", "start": 103, "end": 109}], "modifier": [{"text": "at", "start": 127, "end": 129}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They focus their exploits against popular productivity applications such as Adobe Reader and Microsoft Office to deploy custom malware through targeted email attacks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "They", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "custom malware", "start": 120, "end": 134}, {"text": "targeted email attacks", "start": 143, "end": 165}], "action": [{"text": "deploy", "start": 113, "end": 119}], "modifier": [{"text": "through", "start": 135, "end": 142}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This report contains additional details on the tactics, tools, and techniques used by PUTTER PANDA, and provides indicators and signatures that can be leveraged by organizations to protect themselves against this activity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "➔ \u0007Putter Panda is a cyber espionage actor that conducts operations from Shanghai, China, likely on behalf of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) 3rd General Staff Department 12th Bureau Unit 61486.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This unit is supports the space based signals \u0007 intelligence (SIGINT) mission.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "➔ \u0007The 12th Bureau Unit 61486, headquartered in Shanghai, is widely accepted to be China's primary SIGINT collection and analysis agency, supporting China's space surveillance network.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "➔ \u0007This is a determined adversary group, conducting intelligence- gathering operations targeting the Government, Defense, Research, and Technology sectors in the United States, with specific targeting of space, aerospace, and communications.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "➔ \u0007They focus their exploits against popular productivity applications such as Adobe Reader and Microsoft Office to deploy custom malware through targeted email attacks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "\u0007They", "start": 2, "end": 7}, {"text": "custom malware", "start": 123, "end": 137}, {"text": "targeted email attacks", "start": 146, "end": 168}], "action": [{"text": "deploy", "start": 116, "end": 122}], "modifier": [{"text": "through", "start": 138, "end": 145}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "➔ \u0007CrowdStrike identified Chen Ping, aka cpyy, a suspected member of the PLA responsible for procurement of the domains associated with operations conducted by Putter Panda.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "➔ \u0007The group has been operating since at least 2007 and has been observed heavily targeting the US Defense and European satellite and aerospace industries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "➔ \u0007There is infrastructure overlap with Comment Panda, and evidence of interaction between actors tied to both groups.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There are several pieces of evidence to indicate that the activity tracked by CrowdStrike as PUTTER PANDA is attributable to a set of actors based in China, operating on behalf of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Specifically, an actor known as cpyy (Chen Ping) appears to have been involved in a number of historical PUTTER PANDA campaigns, during which time he was likely working in Shanghai within the 12th Bureau, 3rd General Staff Department (GSD).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "PUTTER PANDA has several connections to actors and infrastructure tied to COMMENT PANDA, a group previously attributed to Unit 61398 of the PLA.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although some of the domains used for command and control of the tools described later in this report appear to be legitimate sites that have been compromised in some way, many of them appear to have been originally registered by the operators.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "some of the domains", "start": 9, "end": 28}, {"text": "command and control of the tools described later in this report", "start": 38, "end": 101}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 29, "end": 33}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 34, "end": 37}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Table 1 shows the domains that appear to have been registered by these actors, and the original email address used where known.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The most significant finding is that an actor known as cpyy appears to have registered a significant number of C2 domains.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This actor is discussed in the next section.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many of the domains have had their registrant information changed, likely in an attempt to obfuscate the identity of the operators.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For instance, several domains originally registered by cpyy had their email address updated to van.dehaim @gmail.com around the end of 2009; for siseau.com the change occurred between July 2009 and November 2009, and for vssigma.com, the change occurred between August 2009 and December 2009.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Historical registrant information for anfoundation.us, rwchateau.com, and succourtion.org was not available prior to 2010, but it is likely that these domains were also originally registered to a personally attributable email account.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Similarly, several domains registered to mike.johnsonmj @yahoo.com have had their registrant email updated during March 2014 (see Table 2).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These registrant changes may indicate an increased awareness of operational security (OPSEC) from the PUTTER PANDA actors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The recent changes to the domains shown in Table 2 may indicate that the operators are preparing new campaigns that make use of this infrastructure, or they are attempting to disassociate all these.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although no attributable information was found on the email addresses associated with the domains described above (aside from cpyy and httpchen–see below), several other domains were found to have been registered by some of these addresses.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These are shown in Table 3, and may be used for command and control of PUTTER PANDA tools.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These", "start": 0, "end": 5}, {"text": "command and control of PUTTER PANDA tools", "start": 48, "end": 89}], "action": [{"text": "be used", "start": 36, "end": 43}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 44, "end": 47}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "domains from a single email address, perhaps due to OPSEC concerns or issues with the specific email account.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The subdomains associated with these domains via DNS records, along with some of the domain names themselves, point to some areas of interest for the PUTTER PANDA operators (see also Droppers in the following Technical Analysis section): • Space, satellite, and remote sensing technology (particularly within Europe); • Aerospace, especially European aerospace companies; • Japanese and European telecommunications.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is likely that PUTTER PANDA will continue to attack targets of this nature in future intelligence- gathering operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Based on passive DNS records, several PUTTER PANDA associated domains have resolved to IP address 100.42.216.230: Additionally, several subdomains of ujheadph.com resolved to this IP: Another subdomain of ujheadph.com has been observed in connection with distinctive traffic originating from the 3PARA RAT (described below), making it probable that this domain is also associated with PUTTER PANDA.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The decipherment.net domains resolved to this IP address from 11 October 2012 to at least 25 February 2013, and the botanict.com domain resolved from 11 October 2012 to 24 March 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During part of this timeframe (30 June 2012-30 October 2012), a domain associated with COMMENT PANDA resolved to this same IP address: login.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "aolon1ine.com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additionally, for a brief period in April 2012, update8.firefoxupdata.com also resolved to this IP address.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The use of the same IP address during the same time suggests that there is perhaps some cooperation or shared resources between COMMENT PANDA and PUTTER PANDA.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although not as conclusive as the links to COMMENT PANDA, IP address 31.170.110.163 was associated with VIXEN PANDA domain blog.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "strancorproduct.info from November to December 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In February 2014, this IP address was also associated with PUTTER PANDA domain ske.hfmforum.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While not directly overlapping, this potential infrastructure link is interesting, as VIXEN PANDA has previously displayed TTPs similar to COMMENT PANDA (other CrowdStrike reporting describes VIXEN PANDA malware that extracts C2 commands embedded between delimiters in web content), and has extensively targeted European entities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "11 Several email addresses have been associated with cpyy, who also appears to use the alternate handles cpiyy and cpyy.chen: The cpyy.net domain lists'' Chen Ping'' as the registrant name, which may be cpyy's real name, as this correlates with the initials'' cp'' in'' cpyy''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A personal blog for cpyy was found at http: //cpiyy.blog.163.com/.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The profile on this blog (shown in Figure 2 below) indicates that the user is male, was born on 25 May 1979, and works for the'' military/police'' (其他- 军人/警察).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This blog contains two postings in the'' IT'' category that indicate at least a passing interest in the topics of networking and programming.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A related CSDN profile for user cpiyy indicates that cpyy was working on or studying these topics in 2002 and 2003.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Another personal blog for cpyy (http: //www.tianya.cn/1569234/bbs) appears to have last been updated in 2007.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This states that the user lives in Shanghai, and has a birthdate identical to that in the 163.com blog.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "cpyy was also active on a social networking site called XCar, stating that he lived in Shanghai as early as 2005 through 2007; he said in a post,'' Soldier's duty is to defend the country, as long as our country is safe, our military is excellent'', indicating a feeling of patriotism that could be consistent with someone who chose a military or police-based career.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On the XCar forum, cpyy.chen used a subforum called POLO (hacker slang for'' Volkswagen cars'') to communicate with other users Linxder, peggycat,'' Naturally do not understand romance'' (天生不懂浪漫),'' a wolf'' (一只大灰狼),'' large tile'' (大瓦片),'' winter'' (冬夜),'' chunni'' (春妮), papaya, kukuhaha, Cranbing,'' dusty sub'' (多尘子), z11829,'' ice star harbor'' (冰星港),'' polytechnic Aberdeen'' (理工仔),'' I love pineapple pie'' (我爱菠罗派), and'' she's distant'' in 2007.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although superficially the discussion is about cars, there is a repeated word in the text,'' milk yellow package'' or'' custard package'' or'' yoke package'' (奶黄包).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This could be a hacker slang word, but it is unclear as to the definition.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The conversation alludes to Linxder being the'' teacher'' or'' landlord'' and the other aforementioned users are his'' students''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Linxder references how he has'' found jobs'' for them.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is possible that this is a reference to hacking jobs wrapped up in car metaphors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Linxder is the handle of an actor associated with the likely Shanghai-based COMMENT PANDA group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Linxder, cpyy, and xiaobai have all discussed programming and security related topics on cpyy's site, cpyy.org, which hosted a discussion forum for the 711 Network Security Team (see below).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "cpyy also appears to have a keen interest in photography; his 163.com blog includes several photographs taken by cpyy in the blog postings and albums section.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some of these photographs also appear in a Picasa site (examples are shown in Figures 5 and 6) belonging to a user cpyy.chen.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An album in this site named'' me'' has several shots of what is likely cpyy himself, from 2005, 2006, and 2007, shown to the right: An account on rootkit.com, a popular low-level software security site, existed for user cpyy and was accessed in at least May 2004.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This account was registered with primary email address cpyy @cpyy.net and backup email address cpyy @hotmail.com; it listed a date of birth as 24 May 1979, consistent with cpyy's other profiles.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The IP address 218.242.252.214 was associated with this account; it is owned by the Oriental Cable Network Co., Ltd., an ISP located in Shanghai.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Registration on this forum shows that cpyy had an interest in security-related programming topics, which is backed up by the postings on his personal blog and CSDN account.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One of the sites registered to cpyy was used to host a web-based email service, along with a forum on www.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "cpyy.net.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Both of these services were apparently run by the 711 Network Security Team (711网络安全小组), a group that is now likely defunct, but has previously published security-based articles that have been re-posted on popular Chinese hacking sites such as xfocus.net.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One of these articles, entitled'' IMD-based packet filtering firewall to achieve the principles'', is apparently authored by xiaobai, with email address xiaobai @openfind.com.cn; it was published on the'' GRATEFUL'' (饮水思源) security digest list that is hosted by Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This digest list/bulletin board was also frequented by ClassicWind, an actor possibly linked to the Shanghai-based, PLA-sponsored adversary group COMMENT PANDA, as described in.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This Tipper also indicates that'' the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) aggressively target SJTU and its School of Information Security Engineering (SISE) as a source of research and student recruitment to conduct network offense and defense campaigns'', so it is possible that the 711 Network Security Team members came to the attention of the Chinese state via this institution.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An additional connection to SJTU comes from a C2 domain, checalla.com, used with the 4H RAT in 2008.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This domain was registered to httpchen @gmail.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "com at the time, and this address was also used to make a posting on the GRATEFUL BBS (shown in Figure 7).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The posting indicates that httpchen is located at the 闵行 (Minhang) campus of SJTU and was posting using IP address 58.196.156.15, which is associated with the China Education and Research Network (CERNET), a nationwide network managed by the Chinese Ministry of Education.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It also states that httpchen is studying at the school of Information Security Engineering within SJTU.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Several pieces of evidence indicate that cpyy probably has connections to, or is part of, the Chinese military–specifically the PLA Army.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition to his declaration on his personal blog that he works for the'' military/ police'', and contacts with actors such as Linxder that have been previously associated with hacking units within the PLA, cpyy's Picasa site contains several photographs that hint at military connections.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "First, a monochrome picture from the 大学时代 ('' college'') album posted in February 2007 shows several uniformed individuals: It is not clear whether this picture includes cpyy, or just friends/ associates/relatives.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A picture from the 中学时代 ('' high school'') album posted in February 2007 shows a male–likely cpyy based on the clothing shown in the second picture, which matches the pictures of cpyy shown above–performing exercise in front of a group of likely soldiers and an officer: Although somewhat unclear, pictures from the album 2002年的生日 ('' 2002 birthday''), also posted in February 2007, show the celebrant (likely cpyy) in khaki clothes that are possibly military wear.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The most compelling pictures, however, are found in the 宿舍 and 办公室 albums ('' dormitory'' and'' office'').", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A shot of probably cpyy's dormitory room shows in the background two military hats that appear to be Type 07 PLA Army officer peak hats: 18 This album also contains a shot of the exterior of a building with several large satellite dishes outside: This same building and the satellite dishes also appear in the'' office'' album.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The reflection effects observed on the windows of this building could be due to coatings applied to resist eavesdropping via laser microphones and to increase privacy, which would be consistent with a military installation conducting sensitive work.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Above is an image from the same album of what appears to be a larger dish, in front of the Oriental Pearl Tower, a significant landmark in Shanghai: As mentioned above, checalla.com was used for command and control with the PUTTER PANDA 4H RAT in 2008.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This domain was registered to httpchen @gmail.com, and in May 2009 the domain registration details were updated to include a Registrant Address of'' shanghai yuexiulu 46 45 202 #''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A search for this location reveals an area of Shanghai shown in Figure 8.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Figure 9 shows an enlargement of satellite imagery from within this area, depicting a facility containing several satellite dishes within green areas, sports courts and a large office building.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Satellite imagery from 2009 showing another aspect of this office building, along with a likely vantage point and direction of camera, alongside probably cpyy's photograph from the same angle, is shown in Figure 10: Based on the Shanghai location, and common features, it is highly likely that the location shown above is the same as that photographed by cpyy and shown in the'' office'' and'' dormitory'' albums.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Further confirmation can be found from photos uploaded by a user on Panoramio who tags the image as being located in Chabei, Shanghai, China (31° 17' 18.86'' N 121° 27' 9.83'' E).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This image is exceptionally similar to building shown in cpyy's'' office'' album (see Figure 11 below).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to a public report on the Chinese PLA's General Staff Department (GSD), the 12th Bureau of the 3rd GSD is headquartered in the Zhabei district of Shanghai and'' appears to have a functional mission involving satellites, likely inclusive of intercept of satellite communications and possibly space-based SIGINT collection''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The same report also lists a Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) of 61486 for this bureau.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A webpage published on a Chinese government site detailing theatrical performances involving members of the PLA lists an address of'' 闸北区粤秀路46号'' (46 Yue Xiu Road, Zhabei District) for'' 总参61486部队'' (61486 Forces General Staff).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A search for this location shows an identical area to that shown in Figure 8.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It can therefore be concluded with high confidence that the location shown in cpyy's imagery, along with the satellite images above, is the headquarters of the 12th Bureau, 3rd GSD, Chinese PLA–also known as Unit 61486.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This unit's suspected involvement in'' space surveillance'' and'' intercept of satellite communications'' fits with their observed targeting preferences for Western companies producing technologies in the space and imaging/remote sensing sectors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The size and number of dishes present in the area is also consistent with these activities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Observed build times for the PUTTER PANDA tools described in this report range from 2007 to late 2013, indicating that the actors have conducted several campaigns against their objectives over a period of several years.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A build time analysis of all known samples is shown in Figure 1 below, relative to China time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although this shows that there is some bias in the build time distribution to daylight or working hours in China, which is more significant if a possible three-shift system of hours is considered (0900-1200, 1400-1700, and 2000-2300), this evidence is not conclusive.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There is also some evidence that build times are manipulated by the adversary; for example, the sample with MD5 hash bc4e9dad71b844dd3233cfbbb96c1bd3 has a build time of 18 July 2013, but was supposedly first submitted to VirusTotal on 9 January 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This shows that the attackers–at least in 2013–were aware of some operational security considerations and were likely taking deliberate steps to hide their origins.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There is strong evidence to tie cpyy, an actor who appears to have been involved in historical PUTTER PANDA operations, to the PLA army and a location in Shanghai that is operated by the 12th Bureau, 3rd GSD of the PLA (Unit 61486).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Another actor tied to this activity, httpchen, has declared publically that he was attending the School of Information Security Engineering at SJTU.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This university has previously been posited as a recruiting ground for the PLA to find personnel for its cyber intelligence gathering units, and there is circumstantial evidence linked cpyy to other actors based at SJTU.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Given the evidence outlined above, CrowdStrike attributes the PUTTER PANDA group to PLA Unit 61486 within Shanghai, China with high confidence.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is likely that this organization is staffed in part by current or former students of SJTU, and shares some resources and direction with PLA Unit 61398 (COMMENT PANDA).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Several RATs are used by PUTTER PANDA.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Several RATs", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "PUTTER PANDA", "start": 25, "end": 37}], "action": [{"text": "are used", "start": 13, "end": 21}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The most common of these, the 4H RAT and the 3PARA RAT, have been documented previously by CrowdStrike in previous CrowdStrike Intelligence reporting.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This analysis will be revisited below, along with an examination of two other PUTTER PANDA tools: pngdowner and httpclient.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Two droppers have been associated with the PUTTER PANDA toolset; these are also briefly examined below.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Two droppers", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "the PUTTER PANDA toolset", "start": 39, "end": 63}], "action": [{"text": "been associated", "start": 18, "end": 33}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 34, "end": 38}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This RAT was first analyzed by CrowdStrike in April 2012, but a historical analysis shows that it has been in use since at least 2007 by the PUTTER PANDA actors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A listing of metadata for known samples, including C2 information, is shown in Appendix 1.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The operation of this RAT is described in detail in other CrowdStrike reporting, but is useful to revisit here to highlight the characteristics of the RAT: • C2 occurs over HTTP, after connectivity has been verified by making a distinctive request (to the URI/search? qu= at www.google.com).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "C2", "start": 158, "end": 160}, {"text": "HTTP", "start": 173, "end": 177}, {"text": "connectivity has been verified by making a distinctive request (to the URI/search? qu= at www.google.com)", "start": 185, "end": 290}], "action": [{"text": "occurs", "start": 161, "end": 167}], "modifier": [{"text": "over", "start": 168, "end": 172}, {"text": "after", "start": 179, "end": 184}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• A victim identifier is generated from the infected machine's hard disk serial number, XOR'ed with the key ldd46! yo, and finally nibble-wise encoded as upper-case ASCII characters in the range (A-P)–e.g., the byte value 0x1F becomes'' BP''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "A victim identifier", "start": 2, "end": 21}, {"text": "the infected machine's hard disk serial number", "start": 40, "end": 86}], "action": [{"text": "is generated", "start": 22, "end": 34}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 35, "end": 39}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• A series of HTTP requests characterizes the RAT's C2.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "A series of HTTP requests", "start": 2, "end": 27}, {"text": "the RAT's C2", "start": 42, "end": 54}], "action": [{"text": "characterizes", "start": 28, "end": 41}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The initial beacon uses a request with four parameters (h1, h2, h3, and h4)–as shown in Figure 8–to register the implant with the C2 server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The initial beacon", "start": 0, "end": 18}, {"text": "a request with four parameters (h1, h2, h3, and h4)", "start": 24, "end": 75}, {"text": "register the implant with the C2 server", "start": 100, "end": 139}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 19, "end": 23}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 97, "end": 99}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Communication to and from the C2 server is obfuscated using a 1-byte XOR with the key 0xBE.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Communication to and from the C2 server", "start": 2, "end": 41}, {"text": "a 1-byte XOR with the key 0xBE", "start": 62, "end": 92}], "action": [{"text": "is obfuscated", "start": 42, "end": 55}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 56, "end": 61}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• The commands supported by the RAT enable several capabilities, including: The 3PARA RAT was described in some detail in other CrowdStrike reporting, which examined a DLL-based sample with an exported filename of ssdpsvc.dll.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The commands", "start": 2, "end": 14}, {"text": "the RAT", "start": 28, "end": 35}], "action": [{"text": "supported", "start": 15, "end": 24}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other observed exported filenames are msacem.dll and mrpmsg.dll, although the RAT has also been observed in plain executable (EXE) format.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On startup, the RAT attempts to create a file mapping named & *SDKJfhksdf89*DIUKJDSF & *sdfsdf78sdfsdf.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the RAT", "start": 12, "end": 19}, {"text": "a file mapping named & *SDKJfhksdf89*DIUKJDSF & *sdfsdf78sdfsdf", "start": 39, "end": 102}], "action": [{"text": "create", "start": 32, "end": 38}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is used to prevent multiple instances of the RAT being executed simultaneously.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "prevent multiple instances of the RAT being executed simultaneously", "start": 16, "end": 83}], "action": [{"text": "is used", "start": 5, "end": 12}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 13, "end": 15}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The RAT will then use a byte-wise subtraction- based algorithm (using a hard-coded modulo value) to decode C2 server details consisting of a server hostname and port number, in this example nsc.adomhn. com, port 80.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The RAT", "start": 0, "end": 7}, {"text": "a byte-wise subtraction- based algorithm (using a hard-coded modulo value)", "start": 22, "end": 96}, {"text": "decode C2 server details consisting of a server hostname and port number, in this example nsc.adomhn. com, port 80", "start": 100, "end": 214}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 18, "end": 21}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 97, "end": 99}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The decoding algorithm is illustrated in Figure 10 below.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The key and modulo values vary on a per-sample basis.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Decoded C2 settings, along with sample metadata, are listed in Appendix 2.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The RAT is programmed in C++ using Microsoft Visual Studio, and it makes use of the object-oriented and parallel programming features of this environment; Standard Template Library (STL) objects are used to represent data structures such as strings and lists, and custom objects are used to represent some of the C2 command handlers (e.g., CCommandCMD).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Several threads are used to handle different stages of the C2 protocol, such as receiving data from the server, decrypting data, and processing commands.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "receiving", "start": 80, "end": 89}, {"text": "decrypting", "start": 112, "end": 122}, {"text": "processing", "start": 133, "end": 143}], "entity": [{"text": "data", "start": 90, "end": 94}, {"text": "the server", "start": 100, "end": 110}, {"text": "data", "start": 123, "end": 127}, {"text": "commands", "start": 144, "end": 152}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 95, "end": 99}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Standard Windows primitives such as Events are used to synchronize across these threads, with a shared global structure used to hold state.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once running, the RAT will load a binary representation of a date/time value from a file C: \\RECYCLER\\restore.dat, and it will sleep until after this date/time has passed.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the RAT", "start": 14, "end": 21}, {"text": "a binary representation of a date/time value", "start": 32, "end": 76}, {"text": "a file C: \\RECYCLER\\restore.dat", "start": 82, "end": 113}, {"text": "it", "start": 119, "end": 121}, {"text": "this date/time has passed", "start": 145, "end": 170}], "action": [{"text": "load", "start": 27, "end": 31}, {"text": "sleep", "start": 127, "end": 132}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 77, "end": 81}, {"text": "until after", "start": 133, "end": 144}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Database provides a mechanism for the operators to allow the RAT to remain dormant until a fixed time, perhaps to allow a means of regaining access if other parts of their toolset are removed from a victim system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the RAT", "start": 57, "end": 64}, {"text": "dormant", "start": 75, "end": 82}, {"text": "a fixed time", "start": 89, "end": 101}], "action": [{"text": "remain", "start": 68, "end": 74}], "modifier": [{"text": "until", "start": 83, "end": 88}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As with the 4H RAT, the C2 protocol used by the 3PARA RAT is HTTP based, using both GET and POST requests.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the C2 protocol", "start": 20, "end": 35}, {"text": "the 3PARA RAT", "start": 44, "end": 57}, {"text": "HTTP based", "start": 61, "end": 71}, {"text": "GET", "start": 84, "end": 87}, {"text": "POST requests", "start": 92, "end": 105}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 36, "end": 40}, {"text": "is", "start": 58, "end": 60}, {"text": "using", "start": 73, "end": 78}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An initial request is made to the C2 server (illustrated in Figure 11 above), but the response value is effectively ignored; it is likely that this request serves only as a connectivity check, as further C2 activity will only occur if this first request is successful.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "An initial request", "start": 0, "end": 18}, {"text": "the C2 server", "start": 30, "end": 43}, {"text": "this request", "start": 143, "end": 155}, {"text": "a connectivity check", "start": 171, "end": 191}], "action": [{"text": "is made", "start": 19, "end": 26}, {"text": "serves", "start": 156, "end": 162}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 27, "end": 29}, {"text": "as", "start": 168, "end": 170}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this case, the RAT will transmit some basic victim information to the C2 server along with a 256-byte hash of the hard-coded string HYF54 &% 9 & jkMCXuiS.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the RAT", "start": 14, "end": 21}, {"text": "some basic victim information to the C2 server", "start": 36, "end": 82}, {"text": "a 256-byte hash of the hard-coded string HYF54 &% 9 & jkMCXuiS", "start": 94, "end": 156}], "action": [{"text": "transmit", "start": 27, "end": 35}], "modifier": [{"text": "along with", "start": 83, "end": 93}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is likely that this request functions as a means to authenticate the RAT to the C2 server and register a new victim machine with the controller.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this request", "start": 18, "end": 30}, {"text": "a new victim machine", "start": 106, "end": 126}, {"text": "the controller", "start": 132, "end": 146}], "action": [{"text": "register", "start": 97, "end": 105}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 127, "end": 131}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A sample request and its structure are shown in Figure 12.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If this request is also successful, the RAT will attempt to retrieve tasking from the controller using a further distinctive HTTP request shown in Figure 13, repeating this request every two seconds until valid tasking is returned.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the RAT", "start": 36, "end": 43}, {"text": "tasking", "start": 69, "end": 76}, {"text": "the controller", "start": 82, "end": 96}, {"text": "a further distinctive HTTP request shown in Figure 13", "start": 103, "end": 156}], "action": [{"text": "retrieve", "start": 60, "end": 68}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 77, "end": 81}, {"text": "using", "start": 97, "end": 102}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Returned tasking is decrypted using the DES algorithm in CBC mode with a key derived from the MD5 hash of the string HYF54 &% 9 & jkMCXuiS (as used in the secondary beacon shown above).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If this fails, the RAT will fall back to decoding the data using an 8-byte XOR with a key derived from data returned from the HashData API with the same key string.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Output data produced by tasking instructions is encrypted in the same manner as it was decrypted and sent back to the C2 server via HTTP POST request to a URI of the form /microsoft/errorpost/ default.aspx? ID=, where the ID value is a random number in decimal representation–as with the initial request shown in Figure 4.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Output data produced by tasking instructions", "start": 0, "end": 44}, {"text": "the same manner as it was decrypted", "start": 61, "end": 96}, {"text": "the C2 server", "start": 114, "end": 127}, {"text": "HTTP POST request to a URI of the form /microsoft/errorpost/ default.aspx? ID=", "start": 132, "end": 210}], "action": [{"text": "is encrypted", "start": 45, "end": 57}, {"text": "sent", "start": 101, "end": 105}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 58, "end": 60}, {"text": "back to", "start": 106, "end": 113}, {"text": "via", "start": 128, "end": 131}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The set of commands supported by the RAT is somewhat limited, indicating that perhaps the RAT is intended to be used as a second-stage tool, or as a failsafe means for the attackers to regain basic access to a compromised system (which is consistent with its support for sleeping until a certain date/time).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The set of commands", "start": 0, "end": 19}, {"text": "the RAT", "start": 33, "end": 40}, {"text": "a certain date/time", "start": 286, "end": 305}], "action": [{"text": "supported", "start": 20, "end": 29}, {"text": "sleeping", "start": 271, "end": 279}], "modifier": [{"text": "until", "start": 280, "end": 285}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some of the supported commands are implemented using C++ classes derived from a base CCommand class: •C\u0007 CommandAttribe–Retrieve metadata for files on disk, or set certain attributes such as creation/ modification timestamps.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• CCommandCD–Change the working directory for the current C2 session.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "•C\u0007 CommandCMD–Execute a command, with standard input/output/error redirected over the C2 channel.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• CCommandNOP–List the current working directory.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, other commands are not implemented in this way.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These other commands contain functionality to: • Pause C2 activity for a random time interval.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Shutdown C2 activity and exit.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "•P\u0007 rovide a date and time before which beaconing will not resume, recorded in the file C: \\RECYCLER\\ restore.dat as noted above.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The use of C++ classes that inherit from a base class to carry out some of the tasking commands, along with the use of concurrency features, indicates that the developers of the RAT put some thought into the architecture and design of their tool, although the decision to implement some commands outside of the class-based framework is curious, and may indicate multiple developers worked on the RAT (or a single developer with shifting preferences for his coding style).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The pngdowner malware is a simple tool constructed using Microsoft Visual Studio and implemented via single C++ source code file.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This sample contains a PDB path of Y: \\Visual Studio 2005\\Projects\\branch-downer\\ downer\\Release\\downer.pdb, but other similar paths Z: \\Visual Studio 2005\\Projects\\pngdowner\\Release\\ pngdowner.pdb and Z: \\Visual Studio 2005\\Projects\\downer\\Release\\downer.pdb have also been observed in other samples.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Appendix 3 lists metadata for known pngdowner samples.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Initially, the malware will perform a connectivity check to a hard-coded URL (http: //www.microsoft.com), using a constant user agent Mozilla/4.0 (Compatible; MSIE 6.0;).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 11, "end": 22}, {"text": "a connectivity check", "start": 36, "end": 56}, {"text": "a hard-coded URL (http: //www.microsoft.com)", "start": 60, "end": 104}, {"text": "a constant user agent Mozilla/4.0 (Compatible; MSIE 6.0;)", "start": 112, "end": 169}], "action": [{"text": "perform", "start": 28, "end": 35}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 57, "end": 59}, {"text": "using", "start": 106, "end": 111}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If this request fails, the malware will attempt to extract proxy details and credentials from Windows Protected Storage, and from the IE Credentials Store using publicly known methods15, using the proxy credentials for subsequent requests if they enable outbound HTTP access.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 23, "end": 34}, {"text": "proxy details and credentials", "start": 59, "end": 88}, {"text": "Windows Protected Storage", "start": 94, "end": 119}, {"text": "the IE Credentials Store", "start": 130, "end": 154}, {"text": "publicly known methods15", "start": 161, "end": 185}], "action": [{"text": "extract", "start": 51, "end": 58}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 89, "end": 93}, {"text": "from", "start": 125, "end": 129}, {"text": "using", "start": 155, "end": 160}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An initial request is then made to the hard-coded C2 server and initial URI–forming a URL of the form (in this sample) http: //login.stream-media.net/files/xx11/index.asp? 95027775, where the numerical parameter represents a random integer.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "An initial request", "start": 0, "end": 18}, {"text": "the hard-coded C2 server and initial URI", "start": 35, "end": 75}], "action": [{"text": "is then made", "start": 19, "end": 31}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 32, "end": 34}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A hard-coded user agent of myAgent is used for thisrequest, and subsequent communication with the C2 server.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Content returned from this request to the C2 server will be saved to a file named index.dat in the user's temporary directory (i.e.,% TEMP%).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This file is expected to contain a single line, specifying a URL and a filename.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware will then attempt to download content from the specified URL to the filename within the user's temporary directory, and then execute this file via the WinExec API.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "content", "start": 42, "end": 49}, {"text": "the specified URL", "start": 55, "end": 72}, {"text": "the filename within the user's temporary directory", "start": 76, "end": 126}, {"text": "this file", "start": 145, "end": 154}, {"text": "the WinExec API", "start": 159, "end": 174}], "action": [{"text": "download", "start": 33, "end": 41}, {"text": "execute", "start": 137, "end": 144}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 50, "end": 54}, {"text": "to", "start": 73, "end": 75}, {"text": "via", "start": 155, "end": 158}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If this execution attempt succeeds, a final C2 request will be made–in this case to a URL using the same path as the initial request (and a similarly random parameter), but with a filename of success.asp.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a final C2 request", "start": 36, "end": 54}, {"text": "a URL using the same path as the initial request (and a similarly random parameter)", "start": 84, "end": 167}], "action": [{"text": "be made", "start": 60, "end": 67}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 81, "end": 83}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Content returned from this request will be saved to a file, but then immediately deleted.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Finally, the malware will delete the content saved from the first request, and exit.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 9, "end": 20}, {"text": "the content saved from the first request", "start": 33, "end": 73}], "action": [{"text": "delete", "start": 26, "end": 32}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The limited functionality, and lack of persistence of this tool, implies that it is used only as a simple download- and-execute utility.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 78, "end": 80}, {"text": "a simple download- and-execute utility", "start": 97, "end": 135}], "action": [{"text": "is used", "start": 81, "end": 88}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 94, "end": 96}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although the version mentioned here uses C++, along with Visual Studios Standard Template Library (STL), older versions of the RAT (such as MD5 hash b54e91c234ec0e739ce429f47a317313), built in 2011, use plain C. This suggests that despite the simple nature of the tool, the developers have made some attempts to modify and perhaps modernize the code.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Both versions contain debugging/progress messages such as'' down file success''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although these are not displayed to the victim, they were likely used by the developers as a simple means to verify functionality of their code.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Like pngdowner, the httpclient malware is a simple tool that provides a limited range of functionality and uses HTTP for its C2 channel.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the httpclient malware", "start": 16, "end": 38}, {"text": "HTTP", "start": 112, "end": 116}, {"text": "its C2 channel", "start": 121, "end": 135}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 107, "end": 111}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 117, "end": 120}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This malware also initially performs a connectivity check to www.microsoft.com using the hard-coded user agent Mozilla/4.0 (Compatible; MSIE 6.0;), although in this variant no attempt is made to extract proxy credentials.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This malware", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "a connectivity check", "start": 37, "end": 57}, {"text": "www.microsoft.com", "start": 61, "end": 78}, {"text": "the hard-coded user agent Mozilla/4.0 (Compatible; MSIE 6.0;)", "start": 85, "end": 146}], "action": [{"text": "performs", "start": 28, "end": 36}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 58, "end": 60}, {"text": "using", "start": 79, "end": 84}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware will then connect to its configured C2 infrastructure (file.anyoffice.info) and perform a HTTP request of the form shown in Figure 14 below: Content returned from the C2 server is deobfuscated by XOR'ing the content with a single byte, 0x12.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "its configured C2 infrastructure (file.anyoffice.info)", "start": 33, "end": 87}, {"text": "a HTTP request of the form shown in Figure 14 below", "start": 100, "end": 151}], "action": [{"text": "connect", "start": 22, "end": 29}, {"text": "perform", "start": 92, "end": 99}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 30, "end": 32}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The decoded data is then checked for the string runshell.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If this string is not present, the C2 request is repeated every 0.5 seconds.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the C2 request", "start": 31, "end": 45}, {"text": "0.5 seconds", "start": 64, "end": 75}], "action": [{"text": "is repeated", "start": 46, "end": 57}], "modifier": [{"text": "every", "start": 58, "end": 63}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Otherwise, a shell process is started (i.e., cmd.exe), with input/output redirected over the C2 channel.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a shell process", "start": 11, "end": 26}, {"text": "input/output redirected over the C2 channel", "start": 60, "end": 103}], "action": [{"text": "is started", "start": 27, "end": 37}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 55, "end": 59}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Shell commands from the server are followed by an encoded string $$$, which indicates that the shell session should continue.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the session is ended, two other commands are supported: m2b (upload file) and b2m (download file).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "two other commands", "start": 25, "end": 43}, {"text": "file", "start": 71, "end": 75}, {"text": "file", "start": 95, "end": 99}], "action": [{"text": "are supported", "start": 44, "end": 57}, {"text": "upload", "start": 64, "end": 70}, {"text": "download", "start": 86, "end": 94}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Slight variations on the C2 URLs are used for different phases of the C2 interaction: Given the lack of a persistence mechanism and low level of sophistication, it is likely that httpclient–like pngdowner–is used as a second-stage or supplementary/backup tool.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Appendix 4 lists metadata for observed httpclient samples.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other CrowdStrike reporting describes a dropper used by PUTTER PANDA (abc.scr) to install the 4H RAT.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a dropper", "start": 38, "end": 47}, {"text": "PUTTER PANDA", "start": 56, "end": 68}, {"text": "the 4H RAT", "start": 90, "end": 100}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 48, "end": 52}, {"text": "install", "start": 82, "end": 89}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This dropper uses RC4 to decrypt an embedded payload from data in an embedded resource before writing the payload to disk and executing it.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This dropper", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "the payload", "start": 102, "end": 113}, {"text": "disk", "start": 117, "end": 121}, {"text": "it", "start": 136, "end": 138}], "action": [{"text": "writing", "start": 94, "end": 101}, {"text": "executing", "start": 126, "end": 135}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 114, "end": 116}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Several instances of this dropper have been observed, most commonly in association with the 4H RAT, but also in relation to other tools that will be described in forthcoming reporting.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Another dropper has been observed, exclusively installing the pngdowner malware (example MD5 hash 4c50457c35e2033b3a03fcbb4adac7b7).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Another dropper", "start": 0, "end": 15}, {"text": "the pngdowner malware (example MD5 hash 4c50457c35e2033b3a03fcbb4adac7b7)", "start": 58, "end": 131}], "action": [{"text": "installing", "start": 47, "end": 57}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This dropper is simplistic in nature, and is compiled from a single C++ source code file.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It contains a Word document in plaintext (written to BienvenueaSahajaYogaToulouse.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "doc), along with an executable (Update.exe) and DLL (McUpdate.dll).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The executable and DLL are both contained within the .data", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The executable and DLL", "start": 0, "end": 22}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "section of the dropper, obfuscated with a 16-byte XOR key (consisting of the bytes 0xA0–0xAF).", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "obfuscated", "start": 24, "end": 34}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 35, "end": 39}], "entity": [{"text": "a 16-byte XOR key (consisting of the bytes 0xA0–0xAF)", "start": 40, "end": 93}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Both the document and executable are written to disk and the executed via the ShellExecute API (using the verb'' open'').", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Both the document and executable", "start": 0, "end": 32}, {"text": "disk", "start": 48, "end": 52}, {"text": "the ShellExecute API (using the verb'' open'')", "start": 74, "end": 120}], "action": [{"text": "are written", "start": 33, "end": 44}, {"text": "executed", "start": 61, "end": 69}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 45, "end": 47}, {"text": "via", "start": 70, "end": 73}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The executable is also installed into the ASEP registry key HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\ CurrentVersion\\Run, with a value named McUpdate.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The executable", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "the ASEP registry key HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\ CurrentVersion\\Run", "start": 38, "end": 111}, {"text": "a value named McUpdate", "start": 118, "end": 140}], "action": [{"text": "is also installed", "start": 15, "end": 32}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 33, "end": 37}, {"text": "with", "start": 113, "end": 117}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Finally, the dropper deletes itself via a batch file.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the dropper", "start": 9, "end": 20}, {"text": "itself", "start": 29, "end": 35}, {"text": "a batch file", "start": 40, "end": 52}], "action": [{"text": "deletes", "start": 21, "end": 28}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 36, "end": 39}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The dropped executable (MD5 hash 38a2a6782e1af29ca8cb691cf0d29a0d) primarily aims to inject the specified DLL (McUpdate.dll, MD5 hash 08c7b5501df060ccfc3aa5c8c41b452f) into a process that would normally be accessing the network, likely in order to disguise the malicious activity.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The dropped executable (MD5 hash 38a2a6782e1af29ca8cb691cf0d29a0d)", "start": 0, "end": 66}, {"text": "the specified DLL (McUpdate.dll, MD5 hash 08c7b5501df060ccfc3aa5c8c41b452f)", "start": 92, "end": 167}, {"text": "a process that would normally be accessing the network", "start": 173, "end": 227}, {"text": "the malicious activity", "start": 257, "end": 279}], "action": [{"text": "inject", "start": 85, "end": 91}, {"text": "disguise", "start": 248, "end": 256}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 168, "end": 172}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Module names corresponding to Outlook Express (msinm.exe), Outlook (outlook.exe), Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe), and Firefox (firefox.exe) are used.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If Internet Explorer is used, then the malware will attempt to terminate processes corresponding to two components of Sophos Anti-Virus (SAVAdminService.exe and SavService.exe).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 35, "end": 46}, {"text": "processes corresponding to two components of Sophos Anti-Virus (SAVAdminService.exe and SavService.exe)", "start": 73, "end": 176}], "action": [{"text": "terminate", "start": 63, "end": 72}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Four examples of these droppers were located, using a mixture of decoy PDF and Microsoft Word documents (shown below in Figures 15-18).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "these droppers", "start": 17, "end": 31}, {"text": "a mixture of decoy PDF and Microsoft Word documents", "start": 52, "end": 103}], "action": [{"text": "using", "start": 46, "end": 51}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The common theme throughout these documents is space technology (BienvenueaSahajaYogaToulouse.doc does not follow this trend, but could be targeted at workers at the Toulouse Space Centre, the'' largest space centre in Europe''), indicating that the attackers have a keen interest in this sector, which is also reflected in the choice of name for some of the C2 domains used (see the Attribution section above).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A number of specific and generic detection methods are possible for this RAT, both on a host and on the network.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These are detailed below, and are designed to expand upon the indicators reported in other CrowdStrike reporting.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following Windows registry artifacts are indicative of a compromised host: redacted) The presence of the following file system artifacts is indicative of a compromised host: A file mapping named & *SDKJfhksdf89*DIUKJDSF & *sdfsdf78sdfsdf also indicates the victim machine is compromised with PUTTER PANDA malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition the domains listed in the Appendices and in the Attribution section, the generic signatures below can be used to detect activity from the malware described in this report.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition to the indicators described above, PUTTER PANDA have some distinct generic TTPs: PUTTER PANDA are a determined adversary group who have been operating for several years, conducting intelligence-gathering operations with a significant focus on the space sector.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although some of their tools are simplistic, taken as a whole their toolset provides a wide degree of control over a victim system and can provide the opportunity to deploy additional tools at will.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "their toolset", "start": 62, "end": 75}, {"text": "a wide degree of control over a victim system", "start": 85, "end": 130}, {"text": "additional tools", "start": 173, "end": 189}, {"text": "will", "start": 193, "end": 197}], "action": [{"text": "provides", "start": 76, "end": 84}, {"text": "deploy", "start": 166, "end": 172}], "modifier": [{"text": "at", "start": 190, "end": 192}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Research presented in this report shows that the PUTTER PANDA operators are likely members of the 12th Bureau, 3rd General Staff Department (GSD) of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), operating from the unit's headquarters in Shanghai with MUCD 61486.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Strategic objectives for this unit are likely to include obtaining intellectual property and industrial secrets relating to defense technology, particularly those to help enable the unit's suspect mission to conduct space surveillance, remote sensing, and interception of satellite communications.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "PUTTER PANDA is likely to continue to aggressively target Western entities that hold valuable information or intellectual property relevant to these interests.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The detection and mitigation guidance given in this report will help to minimize the risk of a successful compromise by these actors, and future CrowdStrike reports will examine other elements of the PUTTER PANDA toolset.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence portal provides enterprises with strategic, customized, and actionable intelligence.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Falcon Intelligence enables organizations to prioritize resources by determining targeted versus commodity attacks, saving time and focusing resources on critical threats.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With unprecedented insight into adversary tools, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) and multi-source information channels, analysts can identify pending attacks and automatically feed threat intelligence via API to SIEM and thirdparty security tools.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Access to CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence is geared toward all levels of an organization, from the executivewho needs to understand the business threat and strategic business impact, to the front-line securiyt professional struggling to! ght through an adversary's attack against the enterprise.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence is a web-based intelligence subscription that includes full access to a variety of feature sets, including: CrowdStrike Falcon Host is an endpoint threat detection and response product that identifies unknown malware, detects zero-day threats, and prevents damage from targeted attacks in real-time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Falcon Host is comprised of two core components, the cloud-based management console and the on-premises host-based sensor that continuously monitors threat activity at the endpoint to prevent damage in real-time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Falcon Host leverages a lightweight kernel-mode sensor that shadows, captures, and correlates low- level operating system events to instantly identify the adversary tradecraft and activities through Stateful Execution Inspection (SEI) at the endpoint and Machine Learning in the cloud.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As opposed to focusing on malware signatures, indicators of compromise, exploits, and vulnerabilities, Falcon Host instead identifies mission objectives of the adversary leveraging the Kill Chain model and provides realtime detection by focusing on what the attacker is doing, as opposed to looking nfor a specific, easily changeable indicator used in an attack.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Without performing intrusive and performance- impacting scans of the system, Falcon Host's highly efficient real-time monitoring of all system activity is the only security solution that provides maximum visibility into all adversary activities, including Adversary-in-Motion: reconnaissance, exploitation, privilege escalation, lateral movement, and exfiltration.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Falcon Host delivers insight into past and current attacks not only on a single host, but also across devices and networks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Stateful Execution inspection Stateful Execution Inspection (SEI) tracks execution state and links together various stages of the kill chain, from initial code execution to data exfiltration.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CrowdStrike's Real-time Stateful Execution Engine performs inspection and analysis to understand the full context of a cyber attack.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "SEI is critical to understanding the entire attack life cycle and preventing the damage from advanced malware and targeted attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Existing security technologies that focus solely on malware signatures, incidators of compromise, exploits, and vulnerabilities fail to protect against the majority of attacks as they are blind to the full scope of adversary activity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CrowdStrike is a global provider of security technology and services focused on identifying advanced threats and targeted attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Using big-data technologies, CrowdStrike's next-generation threat protection platform leverages real-time Stateful Execution Inspection (SEI) at the endpoint and Machine Learning in the cloud instead of solely focusing on malware signatures, indicators of compromise, exploits, and vulnerabilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The CrowdStrike Falcon Platform is a combination of big data technologies and endpoint security driven by advanced threat intelligence.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CrowdStrike Falcon enables enterprises to identify unknown malware, detect zero-day threats, pinpoint advanced adversaries and attribution, and prevent damage from targeted attacks in real time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CrowdStrike Services is a wholly owned subsidiary of CrowdStrike responsible for proactively defending against and responding to cyber incidents with pre and post Incident Response services.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CrowdStrike's seasoned team of Cyber Intelligence professionals, Incident Responders, and Malware Researchers consists of a number of internationally recognized authors, speakers, and experts who have worked on some of the most publicized and challenging intrusions and malware attacks in recent years.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The CrowdStrike Services team leverages our Security Operations Center to monitor the full CrowdStrike Falcon Platform and provide cutting-edge advanced adversary intrusion detection services.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The full spectrum of proactive and response services helps customers respond tactically as well as continually mature and strategically evolve Incident Response program capabilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Context Information Security distribute Context Threat Intelligence (CTI) reporting under the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), a method of classifying a document in order to promote the distribution of sensitive information between individuals, organisations or communities in a controlled and trusted way, based on the originator's wishes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The various levels of the TLP are represented by the following colours: Sources may use TLP: RED when information can not be effectively acted upon by additional parties, and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Recipients may not share TLP: RED information with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "TLP: RED information will be passed verbally or in person.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Sources may use TLP: AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted upon, but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organisations involved.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Recipients may only share TLP: AMBER information with members of their own organisation who need to know, and only as widely as necessary to act on that information.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Sources may use TLP: GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organisations as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Recipients may share TLP: GREEN information with peers and partner organisations within their sector or community, but not via publicly accessible channels such as publication or posting publicly on the Internet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Sources may use TLP: WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP: WHITE information may be distributed freely, without restriction.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On 2nd January 2014 a Systems Administrator at the Monju fast breeder reactor facility in Japan noticed suspicious connections emanating from a machine in the control room, coinciding with what was a seemingly routine software update to a free media player.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Among other items, staff training documents and more than 40,000 emails were stored on the machine and thought to be harvested by the attacker.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Among other items, staff training documents and more than 40,000 emails", "start": 0, "end": 71}, {"text": "the attacker", "start": 130, "end": 142}], "action": [{"text": "harvested", "start": 117, "end": 126}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Japanese Atomic Energy Agency is investigating further.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attack appears to have been the result of the attackers having compromised the'GOM Player' update server and having it act as a'watering hole', meaning that machines which access the site are delivered malware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 46, "end": 59}, {"text": "the'GOM Player' update server", "start": 79, "end": 108}, {"text": "it", "start": 120, "end": 122}, {"text": "a'watering hole'", "start": 130, "end": 146}, {"text": "machines which access the site", "start": 161, "end": 191}, {"text": "malware", "start": 206, "end": 213}], "action": [{"text": "compromised", "start": 67, "end": 78}, {"text": "act as", "start": 123, "end": 129}, {"text": "are delivered", "start": 192, "end": 205}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Gom Player originates in South Korea and in some parts of Asia it is a popular alternative to Windows Media Player.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is unclear whether every machine trying to download an update received this malware or whether only machines which fitted a certain profile were infected.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Technical analysis of the implant on the compromised machine has shown it to be a variant of a Trojan which has been in the wild for some years now and continues to be effective.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 71, "end": 73}, {"text": "a variant of a Trojan", "start": 80, "end": 101}], "action": [{"text": "be", "start": 77, "end": 79}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The'Gh0st RAT' has been used extensively in attacks linked to the Chinese state, though it is important to remember that the code is publicly available and can be modified and used by anyone.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The targeting of a Japanese nuclear facility however, is consistent with Chinese state intelligence requirements.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If this is the work of a Chinese group then we feel the targeting may go much further than the Civil Nuclear sector and thus be of interest to the wider Energy Sector and industry as a whole.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In order to inform the Energy Sector and beyond about this attack, we have compiled a technical summary of the attack and have provided a number of Indicators Of Compromise (IOCs) which can be used to aid detection.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is likely that the attackers would redeploy their implant against other targets, albeit with a delivery mechanism more tailored to the location of the intended victims.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Based on open source reporting, it appears that the intrusion took place via the compromise of the GOM Player update server (app.gomlab.com), where attackers may have gained entry via a PHP-based webshell, hidden within an image, present on the host since October 2011.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "compromise", "start": 81, "end": 91}, {"text": "gained", "start": 167, "end": 173}], "entity": [{"text": "the GOM Player update server (app.gomlab.com)", "start": 95, "end": 140}, {"text": "attackers", "start": 148, "end": 157}, {"text": "entry", "start": 174, "end": 179}, {"text": "a PHP-based webshell", "start": 184, "end": 204}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 180, "end": 183}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The observed malicious activity relates to the modification of a file that controls GOM Player updates, spanning the date range 27th December 2013 to 16th January 2014, during which time these alterations are reported to have only manifested themselves for visitors on certain IP ranges; evidence supporting this claim has not yet been made public.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "these alterations", "start": 187, "end": 204}, {"text": "themselves", "start": 242, "end": 252}, {"text": "visitors on certain IP ranges", "start": 257, "end": 286}], "action": [{"text": "manifested", "start": 231, "end": 241}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 253, "end": 256}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If this was indeed the case, then the nature of this attack is certainly more targeted than one that would cover the entire userbase of the GOM Player product, with victims comprising of the Japanese Government in addition to those at the Monju nuclear facility.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The modified file redirected the GOM Player update process to another compromised server (www.fudousankaitori.jp (203.189.101.35)), where a file containing both the legitimate update and the malware was deliver to the victim.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a file containing both the legitimate update and the malware", "start": 138, "end": 198}, {"text": "the victim", "start": 214, "end": 224}], "action": [{"text": "was deliver", "start": 199, "end": 210}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 211, "end": 213}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Deployed to the system via a compressed bundle containing the official GOM Player setup binary and a self-extracting RAR archive containing the malicious files, the malware consists of a number of individual pieces.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "Deployed", "start": 0, "end": 8}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 9, "end": 11}, {"text": "via", "start": 23, "end": 26}], "entity": [{"text": "the system", "start": 12, "end": 22}, {"text": "a compressed bundle containing the official GOM Player setup binary and a self-extracting RAR archive containing the malicious files", "start": 27, "end": 159}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 161, "end": 172}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Upon extraction from the RAR archive, the installer component (0ae82fd94836815a1e8d284ccb75109d) is automatically launched alongside the GOM Player update, distracting victims from the malicious activity taking place.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the installer component (0ae82fd94836815a1e8d284ccb75109d)", "start": 38, "end": 96}, {"text": "the GOM Player update", "start": 133, "end": 154}], "action": [{"text": "is automatically launched", "start": 97, "end": 122}], "modifier": [{"text": "alongside", "start": 123, "end": 132}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The installer component is referred to by the author as'miansha' which, according to an East Asia Cyber Threat Intelligence Researcher, is likely Miǎnshā (免杀), a phrase commonly used by People's Republic of China (PRC) hackers to mean'anti Antivirus detection' or'Antivirus avoidance'; Symantec have named the detection for this code'Backdoor.Miancha', where Miǎnchá (免查, likely shorthand for 免杀查) similarly means'Antivirus avoidance'.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Miǎnshā (免杀)", "start": 146, "end": 158}, {"text": "a phrase commonly used by People's Republic of China (PRC) hackers", "start": 160, "end": 226}, {"text": "'anti Antivirus detection' or'Antivirus avoidance'", "start": 234, "end": 284}, {"text": "Miǎnchá (免查, likely shorthand for 免杀查)", "start": 359, "end": 397}, {"text": "'Antivirus avoidance'", "start": 413, "end": 434}], "action": [{"text": "mean", "start": 230, "end": 234}, {"text": "similarly means", "start": 398, "end": 413}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The installer is responsible for the malware persistence mechanism, adding entries to the registry in the following locations, depending on Windows Version: The installer will also determine the system architecture (32- or 64-bit) and then deobfuscate the relevant loader DLL to the path'C: \\Windows\\temp\\install.ocx', ensuring the malware is launched on system start-up.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The installer", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "responsible for the malware persistence mechanism", "start": 17, "end": 66}, {"text": "entries", "start": 75, "end": 82}, {"text": "the registry", "start": 86, "end": 98}, {"text": "the following locations", "start": 102, "end": 125}, {"text": "The installer", "start": 157, "end": 170}, {"text": "the system architecture (32- or 64-bit)", "start": 191, "end": 230}, {"text": "the relevant loader DLL to the path'C: \\Windows\\temp\\install.ocx'", "start": 252, "end": 317}, {"text": "the malware is launched on system start-up", "start": 328, "end": 370}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 14, "end": 16}, {"text": "adding", "start": 68, "end": 74}, {"text": "determine", "start": 181, "end": 190}, {"text": "deobfuscate", "start": 240, "end": 251}, {"text": "ensuring", "start": 319, "end": 327}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 83, "end": 85}, {"text": "in", "start": 99, "end": 101}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Oddly, this file is padded with null bytes, resulting in a 25 megabyte file.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The main implant code is stored in files named instructions.pdf and instructions64.pdf; not PDF documents but instead DLLs obfuscated with a one-byte XOR with 0x14, similar to the malware loader DLLs.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "DLLs", "start": 118, "end": 122}, {"text": "a one-byte XOR with 0x14", "start": 139, "end": 163}], "action": [{"text": "obfuscated", "start": 123, "end": 133}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 134, "end": 138}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The loader, referred to by the malware author as 壳 (shell), reads and deobfuscates the main implant code which then communicates with the attacker-controlled server at testqweasd.tk (211.43.220.89) on TCP port 443.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The loader", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "the main implant code", "start": 83, "end": 104}, {"text": "the attacker-controlled server at testqweasd.tk (211.43.220.89)", "start": 134, "end": 197}, {"text": "TCP port 443", "start": 201, "end": 213}], "action": [{"text": "reads", "start": 60, "end": 65}, {"text": "deobfuscates", "start": 70, "end": 82}, {"text": "communicates", "start": 116, "end": 128}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 129, "end": 133}, {"text": "on", "start": 198, "end": 200}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The main implant code is referred to as 白加黑 ('Black on White'), a term used in the PRC hacking community to denote the act of Antivirus avoidance through the loading of malicious'black' code via non-malicious or trusted'white' code.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "白加黑 ('Black on White')", "start": 40, "end": 62}, {"text": "a term used in the PRC hacking community", "start": 64, "end": 104}, {"text": "the act of Antivirus avoidance through the loading of malicious'black' code via non-malicious or trusted'white' code", "start": 115, "end": 231}], "action": [{"text": "denote", "start": 108, "end": 114}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is a practice recently illustrated through the deployment of the PlugX trojan, utilising DLL load order hijacking alongside a signed (trusted) executable.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "DLL load order", "start": 94, "end": 108}, {"text": "a signed (trusted) executable", "start": 129, "end": 158}], "action": [{"text": "hijacking", "start": 109, "end": 118}], "modifier": [{"text": "alongside", "start": 119, "end": 128}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Analysis of this malware revealed it to be a variant of the Gh0st RAT, often used by Chinese actors (including those who are state-motivated or directly state-sponsored).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This specific variant shows similarities to that used during the VOHO campaign, where Gh0st RAT was spread via watering hole attacks utilising vulnerable websites belonging to financial services and technology companies.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Gh0st RAT", "start": 86, "end": 95}, {"text": "watering hole attacks utilising vulnerable websites belonging to financial services and technology companies", "start": 111, "end": 219}], "action": [{"text": "was spread", "start": 96, "end": 106}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 107, "end": 110}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Specifically, the initial five bytes of the communications (often used to denote a campaign or victim) are'HTTPS', amended from the original'Gh0st'; the same as the traffic produced by the VOHO Gh0st variant.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition to delivering system-specific details back to the attacker, Gh0st RAT provides the capability to deploy additional malware, enabling the harvesting of sensitive data and enabling the further propagation throughout the infected network.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "delivering", "start": 15, "end": 25}, {"text": "deploy", "start": 109, "end": 115}, {"text": "harvesting", "start": 149, "end": 159}, {"text": "enabling", "start": 182, "end": 190}], "entity": [{"text": "system-specific details", "start": 26, "end": 49}, {"text": "the attacker", "start": 58, "end": 70}, {"text": "Gh0st RAT", "start": 72, "end": 81}, {"text": "additional malware", "start": 116, "end": 134}, {"text": "sensitive data", "start": 163, "end": 177}, {"text": "the further propagation throughout the infected network", "start": 191, "end": 246}], "modifier": [{"text": "back to", "start": 50, "end": 57}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To enable rapid response, the following Snort signature can be deployed: Additionally, the following Yara signature should identify both encoded payloads and the active implant in memory:", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Darkhotel APT is a threat actor possessing a seemingly inconsistent and con- tradictory set of characteristics, some advanced and some fairly rudimentary.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In- hospitably operating for almost a decade, the threat actor is currently active.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The actor's offensive activity can be tied to specific hotel and business center Wi‑Fi and physical connections, some of it is also tied to p2p/file sharing networks, and they have been known to spear-phish targets as well.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "they", "start": 171, "end": 175}, {"text": "targets", "start": 207, "end": 214}], "action": [{"text": "spear-phish", "start": 195, "end": 206}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Darkhotel tools are detected as'' Tapaoux'','' Pioneer'','' Karba'', and'' Nemim'', among other names.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following list presents a set of characteristics for the crew: When unsuspecting guests, including situationally aware corporate executives and high-tech entrepreneurs, travel to a variety of hotels and connect to the internet, they are infected with a rare APT Trojan posing as any one of several major software releases.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "they", "start": 232, "end": 236}, {"text": "a rare APT Trojan", "start": 255, "end": 272}, {"text": "any one of several major software releases", "start": 283, "end": 325}], "action": [{"text": "are infected", "start": 237, "end": 249}, {"text": "posing", "start": 273, "end": 279}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 250, "end": 254}, {"text": "as", "start": 280, "end": 282}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These might be GoogleToolbar, Adobe Flash, Windows Messenger, etc.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This first stage of malware helps the attackers to identify more significant victims, leading to the selective download of more advanced stealing tools.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 34, "end": 47}, {"text": "more significant victims", "start": 60, "end": 84}, {"text": "more advanced stealing tools", "start": 123, "end": 151}], "action": [{"text": "identify", "start": 51, "end": 59}, {"text": "download", "start": 111, "end": 119}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At the hotels, these installs are selectively distributed to targeted individuals.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "these installs", "start": 15, "end": 29}, {"text": "targeted individuals", "start": 61, "end": 81}], "action": [{"text": "are selectively distributed", "start": 30, "end": 57}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 58, "end": 60}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This group of attackers seems to know in advance when these individuals will arrive and depart from their high-end hotels.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "So, the attackers lay in wait until these travelers arrive and connect to the Internet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The FBI issued advisories about similar hotel incidents; Australian government offi- cials produced similar, newsworthy accounts when they were infected.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While an FBI announcement related to attacks on hotel guests overseas appeared in May 2012, related Darkhotel samples were already circulating back in 2007.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "And available Darkhotel server log data records connections as early as Jan 1, 2009.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Addition- ally, seeding p2p networks with widely spread malware and 0-day spear-phishing attacks demonstrate that the Darkhotel APT maintains an effective toolset and a long-running operation behind the questionable hospitality it shows its guests.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "seeding", "start": 16, "end": 23}], "entity": [{"text": "p2p networks", "start": 24, "end": 36}, {"text": "widely spread malware and 0-day spear-phishing attacks", "start": 42, "end": 96}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 37, "end": 41}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Darkhotel APT's precise malware spread was observed in several hotels' networks, where visitors connecting to the hotel's Wi-Fi were prompted to install software updates to popular software packages.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "visitors connecting to the hotel's Wi-Fi", "start": 91, "end": 131}, {"text": "install software updates to popular software packages", "start": 149, "end": 202}], "action": [{"text": "were prompted", "start": 132, "end": 145}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 146, "end": 148}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Of course, these packages were really installers for Darkhotel APT's backdoors, added to legitimate installers from Adobe and Google.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "these packages", "start": 11, "end": 25}, {"text": "really installers for Darkhotel APT's backdoors", "start": 31, "end": 78}], "action": [{"text": "were", "start": 26, "end": 30}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Digitally signed Darkhotel backdoors were installed alongside the legitimate packages.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Digitally signed Darkhotel backdoors", "start": 0, "end": 36}, {"text": "the legitimate packages", "start": 62, "end": 85}], "action": [{"text": "were installed", "start": 37, "end": 51}], "modifier": [{"text": "alongside", "start": 52, "end": 61}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The most interesting thing about this delivery method is that the hotels require guests to use their last name and room number to login, yet only a few guests received the Darkhotel package.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "only a few guests", "start": 141, "end": 158}, {"text": "the Darkhotel package", "start": 168, "end": 189}], "action": [{"text": "received", "start": 159, "end": 167}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When visiting the same hotels, our honeypot research systems couldn't attract a Darkhotel attack.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This data is inconclusive, but it points to misuse of check-in information.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Darkhotel actor maintained an effective intrusion set at hotel networks, providing ample access to unexpected points of attack over several years.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These staging points also provide the attackers with access to check-in/check-out and identity information of visitors to high-end and luxury hotels.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As a part of an ongoing investigation, our research led us to embedded iframes within hotel networks that redirected individuals' web browsers to phony install- ers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "embedded iframes within hotel networks", "start": 62, "end": 100}, {"text": "individuals' web browsers", "start": 117, "end": 142}, {"text": "phony install- ers", "start": 146, "end": 164}], "action": [{"text": "redirected", "start": 106, "end": 116}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 143, "end": 145}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers were very careful with the placement of these iframes and executables on trusted resources-the hotels' network login portals themselves.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers were also very careful to immediately delete all traces of their tools as soon as an attack was carried out successfully.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attackers", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "all traces of their tools", "start": 59, "end": 84}, {"text": "an attack was carried out successfully", "start": 96, "end": 134}], "action": [{"text": "delete", "start": 52, "end": 58}], "modifier": [{"text": "as soon as", "start": 85, "end": 95}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Those portals are now reviewed, cleaned and undergoing a further review and hardening process.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We observed traces of a couple of these incidents in late 2013 and early 2014 on a victim hotel's network.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers set up the environment and hit their individual targets with precision.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attackers", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "their individual targets", "start": 45, "end": 69}, {"text": "precision", "start": 75, "end": 84}], "action": [{"text": "hit", "start": 41, "end": 44}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 70, "end": 74}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As soon as their target's stay was over and the attack-frame was closed, the attackers deleted their iframe placement and backdoored executables from the hotel network.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 73, "end": 86}, {"text": "their iframe placement and backdoored executables", "start": 95, "end": 144}, {"text": "the hotel network", "start": 150, "end": 167}], "action": [{"text": "deleted", "start": 87, "end": 94}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 145, "end": 149}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers successfully de- leted traces of their work from earlier attacks in another hotel, but their offensive techniques were the same.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attackers", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "traces of their work", "start": 37, "end": 57}, {"text": "earlier attacks in another hotel", "start": 63, "end": 95}], "action": [{"text": "de- leted", "start": 27, "end": 36}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 58, "end": 62}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Outside reports of the same activity at other hotels provide enough data to confirm the same careful operations there.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attack technique blurs the line between a couple of common APT tactics; fairly inaccurate'' watering holes'' or'' strategic web compromises'' and more accurate spearphishing techniques.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this case, the Darkhotel attackers wait for their victim to connect to the Internet over the hotel Wi-Fi or the cable in their room.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There is a very strong likelihood the targets will connect over these resourc- es, and the attackers rely on that likelihood, much like at a watering hole.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "But the attackers also maintain truly precise targeting information over the victim's visit, much like they would know a victim's email address and content interests in a spearphishing attack.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 4, "end": 17}, {"text": "truly precise targeting information", "start": 32, "end": 67}, {"text": "the victim's visit", "start": 73, "end": 91}], "action": [{"text": "maintain", "start": 23, "end": 31}], "modifier": [{"text": "over", "start": 68, "end": 72}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While setting up the attack, the Darkhotel attackers knew the target's expected arrival and departure times, room number, and full name, among other data.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This data enables the attackers to present the malicious iframe precisely to that individual target.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 18, "end": 31}, {"text": "the malicious iframe", "start": 43, "end": 63}, {"text": "that individual target", "start": 77, "end": 99}], "action": [{"text": "present", "start": 35, "end": 42}], "modifier": [{"text": "precisely to", "start": 64, "end": 76}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "So, here we have yet another unique characteristic of this attacker-they employ a loosely certain but highly precise offensive approach.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An example of the Darkhotel APT's indiscriminate malware spreading is dem- onstrated by the way it seeds Japanese p2p sharing sites, where the malware is delivered as a part of a large (approximately 900mb) rar archive.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 96, "end": 98}, {"text": "Japanese p2p sharing sites", "start": 105, "end": 131}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 139, "end": 150}, {"text": "a part of a large (approximately 900mb) rar archive", "start": 167, "end": 218}], "action": [{"text": "seeds", "start": 99, "end": 104}, {"text": "is delivered", "start": 151, "end": 163}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 164, "end": 166}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The archive is also spread over bittorrent, as detailed below.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The archive", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "bittorrent", "start": 32, "end": 42}], "action": [{"text": "is also spread", "start": 12, "end": 26}], "modifier": [{"text": "over", "start": 27, "end": 31}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Darkhotel uses this method to distribute their Karba Trojan.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Darkhotel", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "this method", "start": 15, "end": 26}, {"text": "distribute their Karba Trojan", "start": 30, "end": 59}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 10, "end": 14}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 27, "end": 29}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These Japanese archives, translated for Chinese speaking viewers, appear to be sexual in nature, part of an anime sex/military comic scene, exposing the likely interests of potential targets.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This Darkhotel package was downloaded over 30,000 times in less than six months.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This Darkhotel package", "start": 0, "end": 22}, {"text": "over 30,000 times", "start": 38, "end": 55}, {"text": "less than six months", "start": 59, "end": 79}], "action": [{"text": "was downloaded", "start": 23, "end": 37}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 56, "end": 58}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The p2p bittorrent Darkhotel offering is listed here, posted on 2013.11.22.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It was spread throughout 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This torrent serves up an almost 900 mb file.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The rar archive decompresses to a directory full of encrypted zips, the associated decryptor and a password file for decrypting the zips.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "But what looks like the AxDecrypt.exe decryptor is bound to both the true decryptor and the dropper for the Darkhotel Catch.exe Karba Trojan.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the AxDecrypt.exe decryptor", "start": 20, "end": 47}, {"text": "the dropper for the Darkhotel Catch.exe Karba Trojan", "start": 88, "end": 140}], "action": [{"text": "is bound", "start": 48, "end": 56}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 57, "end": 59}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When a user downloads the torrent and decrypts the zip files, the trojan surrepti- tiously is installed and run on the victim system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the trojan", "start": 62, "end": 72}, {"text": "the victim system", "start": 115, "end": 132}], "action": [{"text": "is installed and run", "start": 91, "end": 111}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 112, "end": 114}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Catch.exe, detected as Backdoor.Win32.Agent.dgrn, communicates with the fol- lowing Darkhotel command and control servers: Other examples of this Darkhotel backdoor bound within a shared torrent include adult content Japanese anime and more.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Catch.exe", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "Backdoor.Win32.Agent.dgrn", "start": 23, "end": 48}, {"text": "the fol- lowing Darkhotel command and control servers", "start": 68, "end": 121}, {"text": "this Darkhotel backdoor", "start": 141, "end": 164}, {"text": "a shared torrent", "start": 178, "end": 194}], "action": [{"text": "detected", "start": 11, "end": 19}, {"text": "communicates", "start": 50, "end": 62}, {"text": "bound", "start": 165, "end": 170}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 20, "end": 22}, {"text": "with", "start": 63, "end": 67}, {"text": "within", "start": 171, "end": 177}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There are tens of thousands of down- loads of these individual torrents.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The associated Darkhotel backdoor was hosted on bittorrent, emule, etc, under a variety of comic names.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The associated Darkhotel backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 33}, {"text": "bittorrent, emule, etc,", "start": 48, "end": 71}, {"text": "a variety of comic names", "start": 78, "end": 102}], "action": [{"text": "was hosted", "start": 34, "end": 44}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 45, "end": 47}, {"text": "under", "start": 72, "end": 77}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Examples include comics and anime offerings.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Related Darkhotel command and control server domains include: Darkhotel campaigns involving typical spear-phished Tapaoux implants publicly appeared in bits and pieces several times over the past five years.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Related Darkhotel command and control server domains", "start": 0, "end": 52}, {"text": "Darkhotel campaigns", "start": 62, "end": 81}, {"text": "typical spear-phished Tapaoux implants", "start": 92, "end": 130}], "action": [{"text": "include", "start": 53, "end": 60}, {"text": "involving", "start": 82, "end": 91}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These subproject efforts targeted defense industrial base (DIB), government, and NGO organizations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Email content on topics like nuclear energy and weaponry capabilities was used as a lure.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Early accounts were posted on contagio describing attacks on NGO organi- zations and government policy makers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This spear-phishing activity continues into 2014.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This spear-phishing activity", "start": 0, "end": 28}, {"text": "2014", "start": 44, "end": 48}], "action": [{"text": "continues", "start": 29, "end": 38}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 39, "end": 43}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attacks follow the typical spear-phishing process and in the past couple of months, exploited systems retrieved downloader executables from web servers like Over the past few years the group has emailed links that redirect targets' brows- ers to Internet Explorer 0-day exploits.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attacks", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "the typical spear-phishing process", "start": 19, "end": 53}, {"text": "exploited systems", "start": 88, "end": 105}, {"text": "downloader executables", "start": 116, "end": 138}, {"text": "web servers", "start": 144, "end": 155}, {"text": "the group", "start": 185, "end": 194}, {"text": "links", "start": 207, "end": 212}, {"text": "targets' brows- ers", "start": 227, "end": 246}, {"text": "Internet Explorer 0-day exploits", "start": 250, "end": 282}], "action": [{"text": "follow", "start": 12, "end": 18}, {"text": "retrieved", "start": 106, "end": 115}, {"text": "emailed", "start": 199, "end": 206}, {"text": "redirect", "start": 218, "end": 226}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 139, "end": 143}, {"text": "to", "start": 247, "end": 249}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Sometimes the attachment itself includes an Adobe 0-day exploit.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attachment itself", "start": 10, "end": 31}, {"text": "an Adobe 0-day exploit", "start": 41, "end": 63}], "action": [{"text": "includes", "start": 32, "end": 40}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This crew occasionally deploys 0-day exploits, but burns them when required.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the past few years, they deployed 0-day spear-phishing attacks targeting Adobe products and Microsoft Internet Explorer, including cve­2010­0188.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "they", "start": 23, "end": 27}, {"text": "0-day spear-phishing attacks", "start": 37, "end": 65}, {"text": "Adobe products and Microsoft Internet Explorer, including cve­2010­0188", "start": 76, "end": 147}], "action": [{"text": "deployed", "start": 28, "end": 36}, {"text": "targeting", "start": 66, "end": 75}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In early 2014, our researchers exposed their use of cve­2014­0497, a Flash 0-day described on Securelist in early February.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The crew spear-phished a set of target systems connected to the Internet through Chinese ISPs, and developed capabilities within the 0-day exploits to handle hardened Windows 8.1 systems.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The crew", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "a set of target systems connected to the Internet through Chinese ISPs", "start": 23, "end": 93}], "action": [{"text": "spear-phished", "start": 9, "end": 22}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It's interesting that the Flash objects were embedded in Korean documents titled'' List of the latest Japanese AV wind and how to use torrents.docx'' (loose English translation).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the Flash objects", "start": 22, "end": 39}, {"text": "Korean documents titled'' List of the latest Japanese AV wind and how to use torrents.docx'' (loose English translation)", "start": 57, "end": 177}], "action": [{"text": "were embedded", "start": 40, "end": 53}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 54, "end": 56}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The dropped downloader (d8137ded710d83e2339a97ee78494c34) delivered malcode similar to the'' Information Stealer'' component functionality summarized below, and detailed in Appendix D.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The dropped downloader (d8137ded710d83e2339a97ee78494c34)", "start": 0, "end": 57}, {"text": "malcode similar to the'' Information Stealer'' component functionality summarized below, and detailed in Appendix D", "start": 68, "end": 183}], "action": [{"text": "delivered", "start": 58, "end": 67}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Darkhotel actors typically sign their backdoors with digital certificates of one kind or another.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, the certificates originally chosen by this crew are very interesting because of their weak keys and likely abuse by attackers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Here is a listing of the certs that were commonly used to sign Darkhotel malcode, requiring advanced mathematical capabilities to factorize the keys at the time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They are not the only certificates used by the group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "More recent activity suggests that the group has stolen certificates to sign their code.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All related cases of signed Darkhotel malware share the same Root Certificate Authority and Intermediate Certificate Authority that issued certificates with weak md5 keys (RSA 512 bits).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We are confident that our Darkhotel threat actor fraudulently duplicated these certificates to sign its malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These keys were not stolen.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many of the certificates were noted in a 2011 Fox­IT post'' RSA­512 Certificates Abused in the Wild''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To further support this speculation please note the non­specific Microsoft Security Advisory below, the Mozilla advisory addressing the issue at the time, and the Entrust responses.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "From Microsoft's security advisory from Thursday, November 10, 2011:'' Microsoft is aware that DigiCert Sdn.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Bhd, a Malaysian subordinate certifica- tion authority (CA) under Entrust and GTE CyberTrust, has issued 22 certifi- cates with weak 512 bit keys.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These weak encryption keys, when broken, could allow an attacker to use the certificates fraudulently to spoof content, perform phishing attacks, or perform man­in­the­middle attacks against all Web browser users including users of Internet Explorer.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an attacker", "start": 53, "end": 64}, {"text": "the certificates", "start": 72, "end": 88}, {"text": "fraudulently", "start": 89, "end": 101}, {"text": "spoof content", "start": 105, "end": 118}, {"text": "perform phishing attacks", "start": 120, "end": 144}, {"text": "perform man­in­the­middle attacks against all Web browser users including users of Internet Explorer", "start": 149, "end": 249}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 68, "end": 71}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 102, "end": 104}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While this is not a vulnerability in a Microsoft product, this issue affects all supported releases of Microsoft Windows.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There is no indication that any certificates were issued fraudulently.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Instead, cryptographically weak keys have allowed some of the certificates to be dupli- cated and used in a fraudulent manner.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Microsoft is providing an update for all supported releases of Microsoft Windows that revokes the trust in DigiCert Sdn.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Bhd.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The update revokes the trust of the following two intermediate CA certificates: Digisign Server ID–(Enrich), issued by Entrust.net Certification Authority (2048) Digisign Server ID (Enrich), issued by GTE CyberTrust Global Root'' From Mozilla's 2011 response:'' While there is no indication they were issued fraudulently, the weak keys have allowed the certificates to be compromised.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Furthermore, certificates from this CA contain several technical issues.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They lack an EKU extension specifying their intended usage and they have been issued without revocation information.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' From Entrust's response:'' There is no evidence that the Digicert Malaysia certificate authorities have been compromised.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Here are some notes on the costs and technical requirements of attacking these certificates.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The computing power required to crack and factor an RSA 512 bit key was $5000 and the period of time required was about 2 weeks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "(see http: //lukenotricks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "blogspot.co.at/2010/03/rsa­512­factoring­service­two­weeks.html) In October 2012, Tom Ritter reported that it would cost about $120­- $150, per- haps even as little as $75.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Going even further back, there was much discussion about the technical meth- ods of cracking these keys: DJ Bernstein's 2001 paper on building a machine reducing the cost of integer factorization with Number Field Sieve techniques, breaking 1024 bit RSA keys.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "RSA's reaction and 2002 statement on whether or not 1024 bit RSA keys are broken:'' NIST offered a table of proposed key sizes for discussion at its key man- agement workshop in November 2001 [7].", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For data that needs to be protected no later than the year 2015, the table indicates that the RSA key size should be at least 1024 bits.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For data that needs to be protected longer, the key size should be at least 2048 bits.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Recent Tapaoux attacks and backdoors include malware signed with strong SHA1/RSA 2048 bit certificates, suggesting certificate theft.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One of the most interesting components that we discovered as a part of this cam- paign was the use of a digitally­signed advanced keylogger.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "One of the most interesting components that we discovered as a part of this cam- paign", "start": 0, "end": 86}, {"text": "the use of a digitally­signed advanced keylogger", "start": 91, "end": 139}], "action": [{"text": "was", "start": 87, "end": 90}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is clean, well­written, kernel level malcode.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The languages of its strings are a mix of English and Korean.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is signed with the familiar'' belinda.jablonski @syniverse.com'' digital certificate.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This keylogger is dropped by code running within svchost.exe on WinXP SP3, which maintains an interesting debug string: It probably was developed as a part of a mid-to-late 2009 project: e: \\project\\2009\\x\\totalsource\\32bit\\ndiskpro\\src\\ioman.c This driver package is built to resemble a legitimate low-level Microsoft system device.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This keylogger", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "code running within svchost.exe on WinXP SP3", "start": 29, "end": 73}, {"text": "This driver package", "start": 245, "end": 264}, {"text": "resemble a legitimate low-level Microsoft system device", "start": 277, "end": 332}], "action": [{"text": "is dropped", "start": 15, "end": 25}, {"text": "is built", "start": 265, "end": 273}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 26, "end": 28}, {"text": "to", "start": 274, "end": 276}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is installed as a system kernel driver'' Ndiskpro'' service, described as a'' Microcode Update Device''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "a system kernel driver'' Ndiskpro'' service", "start": 19, "end": 62}], "action": [{"text": "is installed", "start": 3, "end": 15}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 16, "end": 18}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is slightly surprising that no rootkit functionality hides this service: When loaded, the NDISKPRO.SYS driver hooks both INT 0x01 and INT 0xff, and retrieves keystroke data directly from port 0x60, the motherboard keyboard con- troller itself.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the NDISKPRO.SYS driver", "start": 89, "end": 112}, {"text": "both INT 0x01 and INT 0xff", "start": 119, "end": 145}, {"text": "keystroke data", "start": 161, "end": 175}, {"text": "port 0x60, the motherboard keyboard con- troller itself", "start": 190, "end": 245}], "action": [{"text": "hooks", "start": 113, "end": 118}, {"text": "retrieves", "start": 151, "end": 160}], "modifier": [{"text": "directly from", "start": 176, "end": 189}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It buffers, then communicates logged user data to the running user mode component.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This component then encrypts and writes the retrieved values ondisk to a randomly named .tmp, file like ffffz07131101.tmp.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This component", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "the retrieved values ondisk", "start": 40, "end": 67}, {"text": "a randomly named .tmp, file like ffffz07131101.tmp", "start": 71, "end": 121}], "action": [{"text": "encrypts", "start": 20, "end": 28}, {"text": "writes", "start": 33, "end": 39}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 68, "end": 70}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This file is located in the same directory as the original dropper, which maintains persistence across reboots with a simple addition to the HKCU run key.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the original dropper", "start": 46, "end": 66}, {"text": "persistence", "start": 84, "end": 95}, {"text": "reboots", "start": 103, "end": 110}, {"text": "a simple addition to the HKCU run key", "start": 116, "end": 153}], "action": [{"text": "maintains", "start": 74, "end": 83}], "modifier": [{"text": "across", "start": 96, "end": 102}, {"text": "with", "start": 111, "end": 115}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This keylogger module encrypts and stores gathered data in a log file, as men- tioned previously.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This keylogger module", "start": 0, "end": 21}, {"text": "gathered data", "start": 42, "end": 55}, {"text": "a log file", "start": 59, "end": 69}], "action": [{"text": "encrypts", "start": 22, "end": 30}, {"text": "stores", "start": 35, "end": 41}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 56, "end": 58}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Its encryption algorithm is similar to RC4.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The interesting part is that the module randomly generates the key and stores it in an unexpected place: in the middle of the log file name.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Hence, the numeric part of the filename is used as a seed for the pseudorandom number generator.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The rand function is statically linked to ensure same results on different computers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Darkhotel toolset consists of multiple components that have been slightly modified over time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These tools are dropped by hotel installers spoofing legiti- mate software installers, bound within torrent bundles, or dropped by exploits or hypertext linked from spear-phishing emails.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These tools", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "hotel installers", "start": 27, "end": 43}, {"text": "legiti- mate software installers", "start": 53, "end": 85}, {"text": "torrent bundles", "start": 100, "end": 115}, {"text": "exploits", "start": 131, "end": 139}, {"text": "spear-phishing emails", "start": 165, "end": 186}], "action": [{"text": "are dropped", "start": 12, "end": 23}, {"text": "spoofing", "start": 44, "end": 52}, {"text": "bound", "start": 87, "end": 92}, {"text": "dropped", "start": 120, "end": 127}, {"text": "hypertext linked", "start": 143, "end": 159}], "modifier": [{"text": "within", "start": 93, "end": 99}, {"text": "from", "start": 160, "end": 164}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "More advanced tools, like the keylogger decribed above, are later downloaded to the victim system by one of these implants.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "More advanced tools, like the keylogger decribed above", "start": 0, "end": 54}, {"text": "the victim system", "start": 80, "end": 97}, {"text": "one of these implants", "start": 101, "end": 122}], "action": [{"text": "are later downloaded", "start": 56, "end": 76}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 77, "end": 79}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In a recent case, word docs embed- ded with 0-day flash swf files either dropped these backdoors or downloaded and executed backdoors from remote web servers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "word docs", "start": 18, "end": 27}, {"text": "0-day flash swf files", "start": 44, "end": 65}, {"text": "these backdoors", "start": 81, "end": 96}, {"text": "backdoors", "start": 124, "end": 133}, {"text": "remote web servers", "start": 139, "end": 157}], "action": [{"text": "embed- ded", "start": 28, "end": 38}, {"text": "dropped", "start": 73, "end": 80}, {"text": "downloaded", "start": 100, "end": 110}, {"text": "executed", "start": 115, "end": 123}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 39, "end": 43}, {"text": "from", "start": 134, "end": 138}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These tools pull down the keylog- ger, steal information from the system, or download other tools.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These tools", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "the keylog- ger", "start": 22, "end": 37}, {"text": "information", "start": 45, "end": 56}, {"text": "the system", "start": 62, "end": 72}, {"text": "other tools", "start": 86, "end": 97}], "action": [{"text": "pull down", "start": 12, "end": 21}, {"text": "steal", "start": 39, "end": 44}, {"text": "download", "start": 77, "end": 85}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 57, "end": 61}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The most interesting behaviors of these components include This module is quite small (27Kb) and comes as a part of WinRar SFX file that drops and starts the module from% APPDATA% \\Microsoft\\Crypto\\DES64v7\\msieckc.exe.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "WinRar SFX file", "start": 116, "end": 131}, {"text": "the module", "start": 154, "end": 164}, {"text": "% APPDATA% \\Microsoft\\Crypto\\DES64v7\\msieckc.exe", "start": 169, "end": 217}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 137, "end": 142}, {"text": "starts", "start": 147, "end": 153}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 165, "end": 169}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This module is designed to update malicious components through recurring checks at the C & C server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This module", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "malicious components", "start": 34, "end": 54}, {"text": "recurring checks at the C & C server", "start": 63, "end": 99}], "action": [{"text": "update", "start": 27, "end": 33}], "modifier": [{"text": "through", "start": 55, "end": 62}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is also capable of removing some older components, the names of which are hardcoded in the body of the malware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "some older components", "start": 31, "end": 52}], "action": [{"text": "removing", "start": 22, "end": 30}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The module adds autorun registry settings to enable an automatic start during system boot.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The module", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "autorun registry settings", "start": 16, "end": 41}, {"text": "enable an automatic start during system boot", "start": 45, "end": 89}], "action": [{"text": "adds", "start": 11, "end": 15}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 42, "end": 44}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One of the most interesting functions of this executable is its unusual delay and persistence.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "One of the most interesting functions of this executable", "start": 0, "end": 56}, {"text": "its unusual delay and persistence", "start": 60, "end": 93}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 57, "end": 59}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If a special file exists on the system, the module will not start calling back to C & C server until the special file is 180 days old.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "So, if some other critical malicious component was removed during this period, current module backs up and restores access to the system within 6 months.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "current module", "start": 79, "end": 93}, {"text": "access to the system within 6 months", "start": 116, "end": 152}], "action": [{"text": "backs up and restores", "start": 94, "end": 115}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The component gathers system information and sends it to the Darkhotel com- mand and control servers as detailed in Appendix D. This module is relatively large (455Kb) and comes as a part of a WinRar SFX file that drops and starts the module from% APPDATA% \\Microsoft\\Display\\DmaUp3. exe.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The component", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "system information", "start": 22, "end": 40}, {"text": "it", "start": 51, "end": 53}, {"text": "the Darkhotel com- mand and control servers", "start": 57, "end": 100}, {"text": "a WinRar SFX file", "start": 191, "end": 208}, {"text": "the module", "start": 231, "end": 241}, {"text": "% APPDATA% \\Microsoft\\Display\\DmaUp3. exe", "start": 246, "end": 287}], "action": [{"text": "gathers", "start": 14, "end": 21}, {"text": "sends", "start": 45, "end": 50}, {"text": "drops", "start": 214, "end": 219}, {"text": "starts", "start": 224, "end": 230}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 54, "end": 56}, {"text": "from", "start": 242, "end": 246}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The main purpose of the module is to collect various secrets stored on a lo- cal system and upload them to Darkhotel command and control servers: This module is designed to terminate itself on Windows with the system de- fault codepage set to Korean.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the module", "start": 20, "end": 30}, {"text": "various secrets stored on a lo- cal system", "start": 45, "end": 87}, {"text": "them", "start": 99, "end": 103}, {"text": "Darkhotel command and control servers", "start": 107, "end": 144}, {"text": "This module", "start": 146, "end": 157}, {"text": "itself", "start": 183, "end": 189}, {"text": "Windows with the system de- fault codepage set to Korean", "start": 193, "end": 249}], "action": [{"text": "collect", "start": 37, "end": 44}, {"text": "upload", "start": 92, "end": 98}, {"text": "terminate", "start": 173, "end": 182}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 104, "end": 106}, {"text": "on", "start": 190, "end": 192}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This malware is 220Kb in size.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It was built as MFC framework application with a lot of extra calls that should have complicated the analysis of the sample.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a lot of extra calls", "start": 47, "end": 67}, {"text": "the analysis of the sample", "start": 97, "end": 123}], "action": [{"text": "complicated", "start": 85, "end": 96}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It mim- ics a GUI desktop application but it does not create any visible windows or dialogs to interact with local users.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "a GUI desktop application", "start": 12, "end": 37}], "action": [{"text": "mim- ics", "start": 3, "end": 11}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Trojan collects data about the system and anti­ malware software installed on it, and uploads that data to Darkhotel command and control servers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The Trojan", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "data", "start": 20, "end": 24}, {"text": "the system", "start": 31, "end": 41}, {"text": "anti­ malware software installed on it", "start": 46, "end": 84}, {"text": "that data", "start": 98, "end": 107}, {"text": "Darkhotel command and control servers", "start": 111, "end": 148}], "action": [{"text": "collects", "start": 11, "end": 19}, {"text": "uploads", "start": 90, "end": 97}], "modifier": [{"text": "about", "start": 25, "end": 30}, {"text": "to", "start": 108, "end": 110}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "More technical details are provided in Appendix D. This malware is 63kb in size.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is bound to a variety of other software packages that vary in name, but the host package is consistently detected as'' Virus.Win32.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "a variety of other software packages that vary in name", "start": 15, "end": 69}], "action": [{"text": "is bound", "start": 3, "end": 11}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 12, "end": 14}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Pioneer.dx''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It drops the igfxext.exe'' selective infector'' component to disk and runs it.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "the igfxext.exe'' selective infector'' component", "start": 9, "end": 57}, {"text": "disk", "start": 61, "end": 65}, {"text": "it", "start": 75, "end": 77}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 3, "end": 8}, {"text": "runs", "start": 70, "end": 74}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 58, "end": 60}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This component is a virus, and is used to selectively infiltrate into other comput- ers via USB or network shares.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This component", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "other comput- ers", "start": 70, "end": 87}, {"text": "USB", "start": 92, "end": 95}, {"text": "network shares", "start": 99, "end": 113}], "action": [{"text": "infiltrate", "start": 54, "end": 64}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 65, "end": 69}, {"text": "via", "start": 88, "end": 91}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "First, the virus retrieves all available disks and starting from disk number 4 (D:\\) to disk number 20 (Z:\\), finds executable files and infects them.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the virus", "start": 7, "end": 16}, {"text": "all available disks", "start": 27, "end": 46}, {"text": "executable files", "start": 116, "end": 132}, {"text": "them", "start": 145, "end": 149}], "action": [{"text": "retrieves", "start": 17, "end": 26}, {"text": "finds", "start": 110, "end": 115}, {"text": "infects", "start": 137, "end": 144}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The code simply brute forces the list of mapped removable drives.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The code", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "the list of mapped removable drives", "start": 29, "end": 64}], "action": [{"text": "brute forces", "start": 16, "end": 28}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During its infection routine, the infector changes the entrypoint of executable files, creates an .rdat section, and inserts a small loader in the section, then puts its main payload in the overlay.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the infector", "start": 30, "end": 42}, {"text": "the entrypoint of executable files", "start": 51, "end": 85}, {"text": "an .rdat section", "start": 95, "end": 111}, {"text": "a small loader", "start": 125, "end": 139}, {"text": "the section", "start": 143, "end": 154}, {"text": "its main payload", "start": 166, "end": 182}, {"text": "the overlay", "start": 186, "end": 197}], "action": [{"text": "changes", "start": 43, "end": 50}, {"text": "creates", "start": 87, "end": 94}, {"text": "inserts", "start": 117, "end": 124}, {"text": "puts", "start": 161, "end": 165}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 140, "end": 142}, {"text": "in", "start": 183, "end": 185}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Every infected file has functionality described in Trojan­Dropper & Injector section, so it can collect information about the comput- er, send it to the C2 and download other Darkhotel components as commanded.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Every infected file", "start": 0, "end": 19}, {"text": "functionality described in Trojan­Dropper & Injector section", "start": 24, "end": 84}, {"text": "it", "start": 89, "end": 91}, {"text": "information about the comput- er", "start": 104, "end": 136}, {"text": "it", "start": 143, "end": 145}, {"text": "the C2", "start": 149, "end": 155}, {"text": "other Darkhotel components", "start": 169, "end": 195}, {"text": "commanded", "start": 199, "end": 208}], "action": [{"text": "has", "start": 20, "end": 23}, {"text": "collect", "start": 96, "end": 103}, {"text": "send", "start": 138, "end": 142}, {"text": "download", "start": 160, "end": 168}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 146, "end": 148}, {"text": "as", "start": 196, "end": 198}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Observed downloaded components are signed with a familiar expired certificate from www.esupplychain.com.tw, issued by Cybertrust SureServer CA.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Again, further technical details are provided in Appendix D. Almost every backdoor in this set maintains an internal campaign code or id, used in initial c2 communications as described above.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Almost every backdoor in this set", "start": 61, "end": 94}, {"text": "an internal campaign code or id, used in initial c2 communications as described above", "start": 105, "end": 190}], "action": [{"text": "maintains", "start": 95, "end": 104}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some IDs appear to be related to geographic interests, others do not seem obvious.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We gathered a list of Darkhotel campaign IDs shown below.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Internal IDs and c2 resources overlap across these com- ponents, there is no pattern of distribution according to connectback resources.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The most common id is'' DEXT87'': This infrastructure team appears to employ a lesser skillset than top notch campaigns, maintaining weak server configurations with limited monitoring and defensive reactions, and making some simple mistakes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, they are ef- fective at maintaining a fully available infrastructure to support new and existing infections.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Overall, victims in our sinkhole logs and KSN data were found across the globe, with the majority in Japan, Taiwan, China, Russia, Korea and Hong Kong.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following C & C domains have been sinkholed and redirected to the Kaspersky Sinkhole Server Our Kaspersky Security Network detected Darkhotel infections across thousands of machines, mostly related to the Darkhotel p2p campaigns.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These geolocation estimates probably provide the most accurate picture of where Darkhotel activity is occurring.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Here is a pie chart to better visualize the proportions of attack activity throughout the world.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As you can see, over 90% of it occurs in the top five countries: Japan, followed by Taiwan, China, Russia and Korea.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Because the operators very actively build up new command and control serv- ers, it is difficult to sinkhole enough domains to get an accurate overall picture of victim system location based on this data.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the operators", "start": 8, "end": 21}, {"text": "new command and control serv- ers", "start": 45, "end": 78}], "action": [{"text": "build up", "start": 36, "end": 44}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Also, many researcher systems are connected to the sinkholed domains.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, this graph of current sinkhole callbacks presents a low confidence distribution of victim geolocation, with India, Japan, Ireland, Korea, China and Taiwan in the top slots.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Removing India and Ireland, the set more closely matches our KSN data.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many of these c2s maintain a common directory path that serves a ddrlog.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Many of these c2s", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "a common directory path that serves a ddrlog", "start": 27, "end": 71}], "action": [{"text": "maintain", "start": 18, "end": 26}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The ddrlogs appear to maintain callback data that the attackers want to set aside in error logs.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many of the callback URLs have errors, many are from unwanted IP ranges, and others are clearly unwanted researcher sandbox system callbacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A description of the detailed connectback URL values and their xor/base64 encoding scheme is included in the'' Interesting Malware Trojan.Win32.Karba.e'' technical notes in Appendix D. The Darkhotel c2 maintain these directory structures to store and serve ddrlog content: The following structures appear to be common across servers, but do not pro- duce ddrlog and do not maintain an /error/ directory: Two ddrlog files report entries starting January 1, 2009 at 9:16 a.m. All of the logs maintain a significant number of entries, almost 50,000, with a simple stamp'' B'' or'' L''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The Darkhotel c2", "start": 185, "end": 201}, {"text": "these directory structures", "start": 211, "end": 237}, {"text": "store and serve ddrlog content", "start": 241, "end": 271}], "action": [{"text": "maintain", "start": 202, "end": 210}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 238, "end": 240}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Those records are formatted in the following manner: Only 120 IP addresses perform the'' B'' checkin, and 90% of these are from the range 150.70.97.x.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This entire range is owned by Trend Micro in Tokyo, JP.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A handful of the remaining addresses, like 222.150.70.228, appear to come from other ranges owned by Trend Micro in JP.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One outlier comes from an El Sal- vadoran ISP, and another is connected to a Japanese ISP.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Approximately 20,000 IP addresses perform the'' L'' checkin.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other ddrlogs may include'' A'' tags as well.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The'' A'' tag labels unwanted checkins from untargeted locations, like Hungary and Italy.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The'' B'' tag labels unwanted checkins from Trend Micro IP ranges.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The'' L'' tag labels unwanted checkins from a variety of ranges, but includes odd IP like the loopback address, 127.0.0.1, clearly an error.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Entries in these logs include callback URLs that have spaces and unusual charac- ters that do not conform to the required base64 character dictionary.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Typical main page: For begatrendstone.com, we have the following directory structure: The group encrypts victim data on their servers with single user/passkey combi- nations across multiple victims.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The group", "start": 86, "end": 95}, {"text": "victim data", "start": 105, "end": 116}, {"text": "their servers", "start": 120, "end": 133}, {"text": "single user/passkey combi- nations across multiple victims", "start": 139, "end": 197}], "action": [{"text": "encrypts", "start": 96, "end": 104}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 117, "end": 119}, {"text": "with", "start": 134, "end": 138}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When an unauthorized user attempts to access a Darkhotel web interface for victim management without the correct passkey, the html page and table layout renders properly, but all the data values on the page are returned as garbled ciphertext.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "New victim systems appear to be systematically vetted.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "New victim systems", "start": 0, "end": 18}], "action": [{"text": "be systematically vetted", "start": 29, "end": 53}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers maintain a web interface to vet these new victim systems.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attackers", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "a web interface", "start": 23, "end": 38}, {"text": "vet these new victim systems", "start": 42, "end": 70}], "action": [{"text": "maintain", "start": 14, "end": 22}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 39, "end": 41}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers first and foremost list and sort victim systems according to their latest c2 check­in.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attackers", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "victim systems", "start": 47, "end": 61}, {"text": "their latest c2 check­in", "start": 75, "end": 99}], "action": [{"text": "list and sort", "start": 33, "end": 46}], "modifier": [{"text": "according to", "start": 62, "end": 74}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Collected data probably is presented in order of importance: Here is an example of one of these web pages: Clearly, some automated analysis activity involving researchers' sandbox tools are filling up these logs.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "From June 2013 to April 2014 (approximately an 11 month period), in only 15 ddrlog files, we observe almost 7,000 connections from research sandbox systems.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The network connections provide a1= through a3= values identifying a QEMU based sandbox, all sourced from only 485 WAN IP ad- dresses.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Under 30 lan IPs are recorded, all in the same 172.16.2.14­126 range.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This system (s) uses a'' Dave'' user account and'' HOME­OFF­D5F0AC'' Windows system name.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These characteristics correspond with network activity generated by GFI Soft- ware's'' CWsandbox'' tools, now owned by'' ThreatTrack Security''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For the past seven years, a strong threat actor named Darkhotel, also known as Tapaoux, has carried out a number of successful attacks against a wide range of victims from around the world.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It employs methods and techniques which go well beyond typical cybercriminal behavior.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Darkhotel crew's skillset allows it to launch interesting cryptographical at- tacks, for instance factoring 512 bit RSA keys.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Its use of 0-days is another indica- tor of a strong threat actor.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The targeting of top executives from various large companies around the world during their stay at certain'' Dark Hotels'' is one of the most interesting aspects of this operation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The exact method of targeting is still unknown-for instance, why some people are targeted while others are not.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The fact that most of the time the victims are top executives indicates the attackers have knowledge of their victims whereabouts, including name and place of stay.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This paints a dark, dangerous web in which unsuspecting travelers can easily fall.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While the exact reason why some hotels function as an attacker vector are unknown, certain suspicions ex- ist, indicating possibly a much larger compromise.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We are still investigating this aspect of the operation and will publish more information in the future.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A further interesting trait is the deployment of multiple types of campaigns, both targeted and botnet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is becoming more and more common on the APT scene, where targeted attacks are used to compromise high profile victims and botnet style operations are used for massive surveillance or performing other tasks such as launching DDoS attacks on hostile parties or simply upgrading victims to more sophisticated espionage tools.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "targeted attacks", "start": 62, "end": 78}, {"text": "high profile victims", "start": 102, "end": 122}, {"text": "botnet style operations", "start": 127, "end": 150}, {"text": "massive surveillance", "start": 164, "end": 184}, {"text": "DDoS attacks", "start": 229, "end": 241}, {"text": "hostile parties", "start": 245, "end": 260}, {"text": "victims", "start": 281, "end": 288}, {"text": "more sophisticated espionage tools", "start": 292, "end": 326}], "action": [{"text": "compromise", "start": 91, "end": 101}, {"text": "are used", "start": 151, "end": 159}, {"text": "launching", "start": 219, "end": 228}, {"text": "upgrading", "start": 271, "end": 280}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 160, "end": 163}, {"text": "on", "start": 242, "end": 244}, {"text": "to", "start": 289, "end": 291}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We expect the Darkhotel crew to continue their activities against DIB, Govern- ment and NGO sectors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The appendix released with this paper provides technical indicators of compromise which should help victims identify the malicious traffic and enable targets to protect themselves better against attack.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Complex malware known as Regin is the suspected technology behind sophisticated cyberattacks conducted by U.S. and British intelligence agencies on the European Union and a Belgian telecommunications company, according to security industry sources and technical analysis conducted by The Intercept.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Regin was found on infected internal computer systems and email servers at Belgacom, a partly state-owned Belgian phone and internet provider, following reports last year that the company was targeted in a top-secret surveillance operation carried out by British spy agency Government Communications Headquarters, industry sources told The Intercept.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Regin", "start": 0, "end": 5}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware, which steals data from infected systems and disguises itself as legitimate Microsoft software, has also been identified on the same European Union computer systems that were targeted for surveillance by the National Security Agency.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "data", "start": 26, "end": 30}, {"text": "infected systems", "start": 36, "end": 52}, {"text": "itself", "start": 67, "end": 73}, {"text": "legitimate Microsoft software", "start": 77, "end": 106}], "action": [{"text": "steals", "start": 19, "end": 25}, {"text": "disguises", "start": 57, "end": 66}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 31, "end": 35}, {"text": "as", "start": 74, "end": 76}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The hacking operations against Belgacom and the European Union were first revealed last year through documents leaked by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The specific malware used in the attacks has never been disclosed, however.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Regin malware, whose existence was first reported by the security firm Symantec on Sunday, is among the most sophisticated ever discovered by researchers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Symantec compared Regin to Stuxnet, a state-sponsored malware program developed by the U.S. and Israel to sabotage computers at an Iranian nuclear facility.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Sources familiar with internal investigations at Belgacom and the European Union have confirmed to The Intercept that the Regin malware was found on their systems after they were compromised, linking the spy tool to the secret GCHQ and NSA operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Ronald Prins, a security expert whose company Fox IT was hired to remove the malware from Belgacom's networks, told The Intercept that it was'' the most sophisticated malware'' he had ever studied.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Having analyzed this malware and looked at the [previously published] Snowden documents,'' Prins said,'' I'm convinced Regin is used by British and American intelligence services.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' A spokesman for Belgacom declined to comment specifically about the Regin revelations, but said that the company had shared'' every element about the attack'' with a federal prosecutor in Belgium who is conducting a criminal investigation into the intrusion.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' It's impossible for us to comment on this,'' said Jan Margot, a spokesman for Belgacom.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' It's always been clear to us the malware was highly sophisticated, but ever since the clean-up this whole story belongs to the past for us.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' In a hacking mission codenamed Operation Socialist, GCHQ gained access to Belgacom's internal systems in 2010 by targeting engineers at the company.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "GCHQ", "start": 55, "end": 59}, {"text": "access to Belgacom's internal systems", "start": 67, "end": 104}], "action": [{"text": "gained", "start": 60, "end": 66}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The agency secretly installed so-called malware'' implants'' on the employees' computers by sending their internet connection to a fake LinkedIn page.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malicious LinkedIn page launched a malware attack, infecting the employees' computers and giving the spies total control of their systems, allowing GCHQ to get deep inside Belgacom's networks to steal data.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a malware attack", "start": 37, "end": 53}, {"text": "the employees' computers", "start": 65, "end": 89}, {"text": "total control of their systems", "start": 111, "end": 141}, {"text": "GCHQ", "start": 152, "end": 156}, {"text": "data", "start": 205, "end": 209}], "action": [{"text": "infecting", "start": 55, "end": 64}, {"text": "giving", "start": 94, "end": 100}, {"text": "steal", "start": 199, "end": 204}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The implants allowed GCHQ to conduct surveillance of internal Belgacom company communications and gave British spies the ability to gather data from the company's network and customers, which include the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Council.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The implants", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "surveillance of internal Belgacom company communications", "start": 37, "end": 93}, {"text": "data", "start": 139, "end": 143}], "action": [{"text": "conduct", "start": 29, "end": 36}, {"text": "gather", "start": 132, "end": 138}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The software implants used in this case were part of the suite of malware now known as Regin.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One of the keys to Regin is its stealth: To avoid detection and frustrate analysis, malware used in such operations frequently adhere to a modular design.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "avoid", "start": 44, "end": 49}, {"text": "frustrate", "start": 64, "end": 73}], "entity": [{"text": "detection", "start": 50, "end": 59}, {"text": "analysis", "start": 74, "end": 82}, {"text": "malware", "start": 84, "end": 91}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This involves the deployment of the malware in stages, making it more difficult to analyze and mitigating certain risks of being caught.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Based on an analysis of the malware samples, Regin appears to have been developed over the course of more than a decade; The Intercept has identified traces of its components dating back as far as 2003.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Regin was mentioned at a recent Hack.lu conference in Luxembourg, and Symantec's report on Sunday said the firm had identified Regin on infected systems operated by private companies, government entities, and research institutes in countries such as Russia, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Ireland, Belgium, and Iran.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The use of hacking techniques and malware in state-sponsored espionage has been publicly documented over the last few years: China has been linked to extensive cyber espionage, and recently the Russian government was also alleged to have been behind a cyber attack on the White House.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Regin further demonstrates that Western intelligence agencies are also involved in covert cyberespionage.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "GCHQ declined to comment for this story.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The agency issued its standard response to inquiries, saying that'' it is longstanding policy that we do not comment on intelligence matters'' and'' all of GCHQ's work is carried out in accordance with a strict legal and policy framework, which ensures that our activities are authorised, necessary and proportionate.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' The NSA said in a statement,'' We are not going to comment on The Intercept's speculation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' The Intercept has obtained samples of the malware from sources in the security community and is making it available for public download in an effort to encourage further research and analysis.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "(To download the malware, click here.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The file is encrypted; to access it on your machine use the password'' infected.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'') What follows is a brief technical analysis of Regin conducted by The Intercept's computer security staff.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Regin is an extremely complex, multi-faceted piece of work and this is by no means a definitive analysis.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the coming weeks, The Intercept will publish more details about Regin and the infiltration of Belgacom as part of an investigation in partnership with Belgian and Dutch newspapers De Standaard and NRC Handelsblad.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In Nordic mythology, the name Regin is associated with a violent dwarf who is corrupted by greed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is unclear how the Regin malware first got its name, but the name appeared for the first time on the VirusTotal website on March 9th 2011.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Der Spiegel reported that, according to Snowden documents, the computer networks of the European Union were infiltrated by the NSA in the months before the first discovery of Regin.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Industry sources familiar with the European Parliament intrusion told The Intercept that such attacks were conducted through the use of Regin and provided samples of its code.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This discovery, the sources said, may have been what brought Regin to the wider attention of security vendors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Also on March 9th 2011, Microsoft added related entries to its Malware Encyclopedia: Two more variants of Regin have been added to the Encyclopedia, Regin.B and Regin.C.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Microsoft appears to detect the 64-bit variants of Regin as Prax.A and Prax.B.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "None of the Regin/Prax entries are provided with any sort of summary or technical information.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following Regin components have been identified: The first stage are drivers which act as loaders for a second stage.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The first stage", "start": 53, "end": 68}, {"text": "loaders for a second stage", "start": 94, "end": 120}], "action": [{"text": "act as", "start": 87, "end": 93}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They have an encrypted block which points to the location of the 2nd stage payload.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On NTFS, that is an Extended Attribute Stream; on FAT, they use the registry to store the body.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When started, this stage simply loads and executes Stage 2.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this stage", "start": 14, "end": 24}, {"text": "Stage 2", "start": 51, "end": 58}], "action": [{"text": "loads and executes", "start": 32, "end": 50}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Regin loaders that are disguised as Microsoft drivers with names such as: Mimicking Microsoft drivers allows the loaders to better disguise their presence on the system and appear less suspicious to host intrusion detection systems.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The Regin loaders", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "Microsoft drivers", "start": 40, "end": 57}, {"text": "Microsoft drivers", "start": 88, "end": 105}, {"text": "the loaders", "start": 113, "end": 124}, {"text": "their presence on the system", "start": 144, "end": 172}, {"text": "less suspicious", "start": 184, "end": 199}, {"text": "host intrusion detection systems", "start": 203, "end": 235}], "action": [{"text": "are disguised as", "start": 23, "end": 39}, {"text": "Mimicking", "start": 78, "end": 87}, {"text": "disguise", "start": 135, "end": 143}, {"text": "appear", "start": 177, "end": 183}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 200, "end": 202}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When launched, it cleans traces of the initial loader, loads the next part of the toolkit and monitors its execution.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 15, "end": 17}, {"text": "traces of the initial loader", "start": 25, "end": 53}, {"text": "the next part of the toolkit", "start": 61, "end": 89}, {"text": "its execution", "start": 103, "end": 116}], "action": [{"text": "cleans", "start": 18, "end": 24}, {"text": "loads", "start": 55, "end": 60}, {"text": "monitors", "start": 94, "end": 102}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On failure, Stage 2 is able to disinfect the compromised device.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "On", "start": 0, "end": 2}], "entity": [{"text": "failure", "start": 3, "end": 10}, {"text": "Stage 2", "start": 12, "end": 19}, {"text": "the compromised device", "start": 41, "end": 63}], "action": [{"text": "disinfect", "start": 31, "end": 40}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware zeroes out its PE (Portable Executable, the Windows executable format) headers in memory, replacing'' MZ'' with its own magic marker 0xfedcbafe.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "its PE (Portable Executable, the Windows executable format) headers in memory", "start": 23, "end": 100}, {"text": "'' MZ''", "start": 111, "end": 118}, {"text": "its own magic marker 0xfedcbafe", "start": 124, "end": 155}], "action": [{"text": "zeroes out", "start": 12, "end": 22}, {"text": "replacing", "start": 102, "end": 111}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 119, "end": 123}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This component consists of a service orchestrator working in Windows' kernel.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It initializes the core components of the architecture and loads the next parts of the malware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "the core components of the architecture", "start": 15, "end": 54}, {"text": "the next parts of the malware", "start": 65, "end": 94}], "action": [{"text": "initializes", "start": 3, "end": 14}, {"text": "loads", "start": 59, "end": 64}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This stage is composed of a service orchestrator located in user land, provided with many modules which are loaded dynamically as needed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These modules can include data collectors, a self-defense engine which detects if attempts to detect the toolkit occur, functionality for encrypted communications, network capture programs, and remote controllers of different kinds.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These modules", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "data collectors", "start": 26, "end": 41}, {"text": "a self-defense engine", "start": 43, "end": 64}, {"text": "attempts to detect the toolkit", "start": 82, "end": 112}, {"text": "communications", "start": 148, "end": 162}, {"text": "network capture programs", "start": 164, "end": 188}, {"text": "remote controllers of different kinds", "start": 194, "end": 231}], "action": [{"text": "include", "start": 18, "end": 25}, {"text": "detects", "start": 71, "end": 78}, {"text": "encrypted", "start": 138, "end": 147}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Intercept's investigation revealed a sample uploaded on VirusTotal on March 14th 2012 that presents the unique 0xfedcbafe header, which is a sign that it might have been loaded by a Regin driver and it appears to provide stealth functionality for the tool kit.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a sample", "start": 39, "end": 47}, {"text": "a Regin driver", "start": 184, "end": 198}, {"text": "it", "start": 203, "end": 205}, {"text": "stealth functionality", "start": 225, "end": 246}, {"text": "the tool kit", "start": 251, "end": 263}], "action": [{"text": "loaded", "start": 174, "end": 180}, {"text": "provide", "start": 217, "end": 224}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 247, "end": 250}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In order to access information stored in the computer's memory, programs use objects that reference specific locations in memory called pointers.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "access", "start": 12, "end": 18}], "entity": [{"text": "information stored in the computer's memory", "start": 19, "end": 62}, {"text": "programs", "start": 64, "end": 72}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This binary file contains some of such pointers initialized, which corroborates the hypothesis that the file was dumped from memory during a forensic analysis of a compromised system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the file", "start": 100, "end": 108}, {"text": "memory", "start": 125, "end": 131}], "action": [{"text": "was dumped", "start": 109, "end": 119}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 120, "end": 124}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The sample has the following SHA256 hash: This sample gives a sense of the sophistication of the actors and the length of the precautions they have been taking in order to operate as stealthily as possible.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When a Windows kernel driver needs to allocate memory to store some type of data, it creates so called kernel pools.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Such memory allocations have specific headers and tags that are used to identify the type of objects contained within the block.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example such tags could be Proc, Thrd or File, which respectively indicate that the given block would contain a process, thread or file object structure.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When performing forensic analysis of a computer's memory, it is common to use a technique called pool scanning to parse the kernel memory, enumerate such kernel pools, identify the type of content and extract it.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Just like Regin loader drivers, this driver repeatedly uses the generic'' Ddk'' tag with ExAllocatePoolWithTag () when allocating all kernel pools: The generic tag which is used throughout the operating system when a proper tag is not specified.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This makes it more difficult for forensic analysts to find any useful information when doing pool scanning, since all its memory allocations will mix with many generic others.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, when freeing memory using ExFreePool (), the driver zeroes the content, probably to avoid leaving traces in pool memory.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the driver", "start": 54, "end": 64}, {"text": "the content", "start": 72, "end": 83}, {"text": "leaving traces in pool memory", "start": 103, "end": 132}], "action": [{"text": "zeroes", "start": 65, "end": 71}, {"text": "avoid", "start": 97, "end": 102}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The driver also contains routines to check for specific builds of the Windows kernel in use, including very old versions such as for Windows NT4 Terminal Server and Windows 2000, and then adapts its behavior accordingly.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The driver", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "specific builds of the Windows kernel in use", "start": 47, "end": 91}, {"text": "its behavior", "start": 195, "end": 207}], "action": [{"text": "check for", "start": 37, "end": 46}, {"text": "adapts", "start": 188, "end": 194}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Windows kernel drivers operate on different levels of priority, from the lowest PASSIVELEVEL to the highest HIGHLEVEL.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This level is used by the processor to know what service give execution priority to and to make sure that the system doesn't try to allocate used resources which could result in a crash.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This Regin driver recurrently checks that the current IRQL (Interrupt Request Level) is set to PASSIVELEVEL using the KeGetCurrentIrql () function in many parts of the code, probably in order to operate as silently as possible and to prevent possible IRQL confusion.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This Regin driver", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "the current IRQL (Interrupt Request Level)", "start": 42, "end": 84}], "action": [{"text": "checks", "start": 30, "end": 36}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This technique is another example of the level of precaution the developers took while designing this malware framework.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Upon execution of the unload routine (located at 0xFDEFA04A), the driver performs a long sequence of steps to remove remaining traces and artifacts.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the driver", "start": 62, "end": 72}, {"text": "remaining traces and artifacts", "start": 117, "end": 147}], "action": [{"text": "remove", "start": 110, "end": 116}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In an interview given to the Belgian magazine MondiaalNiews, Fabrice Clément, head of security of Belgacom, said that the company first identified the attack on June 21, 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the same interview Clément says that the computers targeted by the attackers included staff workstations as well as email servers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These statements confirm the timing and techniques used in the attack.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "From previously identified Regin samples, The Intercept developed unique signatures which could identify this toolkit.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A zip archive with a sample identified as Regin/Prax was found in VirusTotal, a free, online website which allows people to submit files to be scanned by several anti-virus products.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The zip archive was submitted on 2013-06-21 07:58:37 UTC from Belgium, the date identified by Clément.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Sources familiar with the Belgacom intrusion told The Intercept that this sample was uploaded by a systems administrator at the company, who discovered the malware and uploaded it in an attempt to research what type of malware it was.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The archive contains: Along with other files The Intercept found the output of a forensic tool, GetThis, which is being run on target systems looking for malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "From the content of the GetThis.log file, we can see that a sample called'' svcsstat.exe'' and located in C: \\Windows\\System32\\ was collected and a copy of it was stored.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware in question is'' 0001000000000C1Csvcsstat.exesample''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is a 64bit variant of the first stage Regin loader aforementioned.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The archive also contains the output of ProcMon,'' Process Monitor'', a system monitoring tool distributed by Microsoft and commonly used in forensics and intrusion analysis.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This file identifies the infected system and provides a variety of interesting information about the network.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For instance: The following environment variable shows that the system was provided with a Microsoft SQL server and a Microsoft Exchange server, indicating that it might one of the compromised corporate mail server Fabrice Clément mentioned to Mondiaal News: Below is a list of hashes for the files The Intercept is making available for download.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Given that that it has been over a year since the Belgacom operation was publicly outed, The Intercept considers it likely that the GCHQ/NSA has replaced their toolkit and no current operations will be affected by the publication of these samples.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In February 2014, the experts of the G DATA SecurityLabs published an analysis of Uroburos, the rootkit with Russian roots.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We explained that a link exists between Uroburos and the Agent.BTZ malware, which was responsible for'' the most significant breach of U.S. military computers ever.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Nine months later, after the buzz around Uroburos, aka Snake or Turla, we now identified a new generation of Agent.BTZ.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We dubbed it ComRAT and, by now, analyzed two versions of the threat (v3.25 and v3.26).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As reported earlier this year, Agent.BTZ used the same encoding key and the installation log file name as Uroburos.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "ComRAT, in its version 3.25, shows the same behavior.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Furthermore, the attackers also shared a C & C domain.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 13, "end": 26}, {"text": "a C & C domain", "start": 39, "end": 53}], "action": [{"text": "shared", "start": 32, "end": 38}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The latest version of ComRAT known to us (v3.26) uses a new key and does not create the installation log file, in order to complicate the analysis and to disguise the link between the two cases.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "ComRAT", "start": 22, "end": 28}, {"text": "the analysis", "start": 134, "end": 146}], "action": [{"text": "complicate", "start": 123, "end": 133}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Another very interesting fact: the attackers use COM Object hijacking, the same persistence mechanism as COMpfun, which we described recently.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 31, "end": 44}, {"text": "the same persistence mechanism", "start": 71, "end": 101}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 45, "end": 48}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Taken everything into consideration, the indications we saw during our analyzes lead to the supposition that the group behind Agent.BTZ and Uroburos is still active and is pursuing the Agent.BTZ path once more to improve and change the RAT.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The analyzed file is the latest version we identified: v3.26.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The version identification is described in the chapter'' Log files''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The major difference between this version and the older version (s) will be described there.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first task of the malware is to install the file credprov.tlb in% APPDATA% \\Microsoft\\.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 18, "end": 29}, {"text": "the file credprov.tlb", "start": 44, "end": 65}, {"text": "% APPDATA% \\Microsoft\\", "start": 68, "end": 90}], "action": [{"text": "install", "start": 36, "end": 43}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 66, "end": 68}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This file is the main payload of the malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The dropper executes the following command in order to install a second file: The second file is shdocw.tlp.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The dropper", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "a second file", "start": 63, "end": 76}], "action": [{"text": "install", "start": 55, "end": 62}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The two files are Microsoft Windows dynamic libraries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To be started during the boot process of the infected machine, the malware creates the following registry key: This registry key is used to associate the library shdocvw.tlp to the object 42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1 as previously explained in the article about COMpfun.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "started", "start": 6, "end": 13}, {"text": "creates", "start": 75, "end": 82}], "modifier": [{"text": "during", "start": 14, "end": 20}], "entity": [{"text": "the boot process of the infected machine", "start": 21, "end": 61}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 63, "end": 74}, {"text": "the following registry key", "start": 83, "end": 109}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The purpose is to load the library into each and every process executed on the infected system.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "load", "start": 18, "end": 22}], "entity": [{"text": "the library", "start": 23, "end": 34}, {"text": "each and every process executed on the infected system", "start": 40, "end": 94}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 35, "end": 39}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the version of the malware is older than 3.26, the dropper creates an additional file called winview.ocx.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the dropper", "start": 50, "end": 61}, {"text": "an additional file called winview.ocx", "start": 70, "end": 107}], "action": [{"text": "creates", "start": 62, "end": 69}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We noticed that the file name is still the same as the file name used by Agent.BTZ in the past.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The file is xored with the following obfuscation key (used by both, Uroburos and Agent.BTZ): Here is the decoded log file content: We can notice that the malware checks if an older version is installed on the system and if this is the case, the dropper removes the older version.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The file", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "the following obfuscation key", "start": 23, "end": 52}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 150, "end": 161}, {"text": "if an older version is installed on the system", "start": 169, "end": 215}, {"text": "the dropper", "start": 241, "end": 252}, {"text": "the older version", "start": 261, "end": 278}], "action": [{"text": "is xored", "start": 9, "end": 17}, {"text": "checks", "start": 162, "end": 168}, {"text": "removes", "start": 253, "end": 260}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 18, "end": 22}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In contrast to this, in our Uroburos analysis, we found out that Uroburos does not install itself in case a version of Agent.BTZ was found on a system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Uroburos", "start": 65, "end": 73}, {"text": "itself", "start": 91, "end": 97}, {"text": "a version of Agent.BTZ", "start": 106, "end": 128}, {"text": "a system", "start": 142, "end": 150}], "action": [{"text": "does not install", "start": 74, "end": 90}, {"text": "was found", "start": 129, "end": 138}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 139, "end": 141}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During the startup of the infected machine, the shdocvw.tlp library is loaded into all processes.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the shdocvw.tlp library", "start": 44, "end": 67}, {"text": "all processes", "start": 83, "end": 96}], "action": [{"text": "is loaded", "start": 68, "end": 77}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 78, "end": 82}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the process is explorer.exe, this library will load the other library called credprov.tlb.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this library", "start": 32, "end": 44}, {"text": "the other library called credprov.tlb", "start": 55, "end": 92}], "action": [{"text": "will load", "start": 45, "end": 54}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This library is the real payload.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Its features are common for a Remote Administration Tool (RAT): ComRAT's communication to the command and control server is performed by the browser process and not by explorer.exe in order to avoid being blocked by a firewall on the system or any additional security products.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "ComRAT's communication to the command and control server", "start": 64, "end": 120}, {"text": "the browser process", "start": 137, "end": 156}, {"text": "being blocked by a firewall on the system or any additional security products", "start": 199, "end": 276}], "action": [{"text": "is performed", "start": 121, "end": 133}, {"text": "avoid", "start": 193, "end": 198}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The communication between the processes is performed by named pipe.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The communication between the processes", "start": 0, "end": 39}, {"text": "named pipe", "start": 56, "end": 66}], "action": [{"text": "is performed", "start": 40, "end": 52}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Two log files are created during the malware execution: mskfp32.ocx and msvcrtd.tlb.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Two log files", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "the malware execution", "start": 33, "end": 54}, {"text": "mskfp32.ocx and msvcrtd.tlb", "start": 56, "end": 83}], "action": [{"text": "are created", "start": 14, "end": 25}], "modifier": [{"text": "during", "start": 26, "end": 32}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the malware version is older than 3.26, the xored key is the same as the dropper key.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Concerning the version 3.26, the malware uses a new non-ASCII key.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Here is an example of decoded log file for the version 3.26: We can identify the version of the malware thanks to the PVer flag.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The command and control server information is stored in the registry, not in an XML, and encoded: For example, in the analyzed sample the CC is: weather-online.hopto.org.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The command and control server information", "start": 0, "end": 42}, {"text": "the registry", "start": 56, "end": 68}], "action": [{"text": "is stored", "start": 43, "end": 52}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 53, "end": 55}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This domain is far from unknown, as it has been mentioned in BAE System's Uroburos (aka Snake) analysis paper as C & C server domain for the Uroburos malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Another connection between the cases.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the malware version in lower than 3.26, the XML log file contains the command and control server information: Let us summarize the similarities and differences between Agent.BTZ, Uroburos and ComRAT as far as we can: Some parts of the code are exactly the same (appears to be copy & paste).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the XML log file", "start": 43, "end": 59}, {"text": "the command and control server information", "start": 69, "end": 111}], "action": [{"text": "contains", "start": 60, "end": 68}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "That is the reason why the sample is detected as Uroburos (aka Turla).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The same code was used by Agent.BTZ and also the dll loaded into userland during the Uroburos analysis.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Command and control server domains are shared between Uroburos and ComRAT.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Command and control server domains", "start": 0, "end": 34}, {"text": "Uroburos and ComRAT", "start": 54, "end": 73}], "action": [{"text": "are shared", "start": 35, "end": 45}], "modifier": [{"text": "between", "start": 46, "end": 53}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In version 3.26, the author changed the key and remove the known file name.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This action can be an indication for the developer's effort to hide this connection.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The main difference is the design.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Agent.BTZ is a common RAT, a simple library executed on an infected machine.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Agent.BTZ", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "a common RAT", "start": 13, "end": 25}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 10, "end": 12}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "ComRAT is more complex and cleverer.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware is loaded into each and every process of the infected machine and the main part (payload) of the malware is only executed in explorer.exe.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "each and every process of the infected machine", "start": 27, "end": 73}, {"text": "the main part (payload) of the malware", "start": 78, "end": 116}, {"text": "explorer.exe", "start": 137, "end": 149}], "action": [{"text": "is loaded", "start": 12, "end": 21}, {"text": "is only executed", "start": 117, "end": 133}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 22, "end": 26}, {"text": "in", "start": 134, "end": 136}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Furthermore, the C & C communication blends into the usual browser traffic and the malware communicates to the browser by named pipe.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the C & C communication", "start": 13, "end": 36}, {"text": "the usual browser traffic", "start": 49, "end": 74}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 79, "end": 90}, {"text": "the browser", "start": 107, "end": 118}, {"text": "named pipe", "start": 122, "end": 132}], "action": [{"text": "blends", "start": 37, "end": 43}, {"text": "communicates", "start": 91, "end": 103}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 44, "end": 48}, {"text": "to", "start": 104, "end": 106}, {"text": "by", "start": 119, "end": 121}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is by far a more complex userland design than Agent.BTZ.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These differences, mainly the more complex design, lead us to give this malware a new name.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The analyzed dropper of v3.25 has a compilation date of February 6th 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The more recent dropper of v3.26, which has all the mentioned changes implemented, reveals a compilation date of January 3rd 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We suspect that this date is spoofed in order to disguise that this is in fact a newer version.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this date", "start": 16, "end": 25}], "action": [{"text": "is spoofed", "start": 26, "end": 36}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This analysis shows that even after the Uroburos publication in February 2014, the group behind this piece of malware seems to be still active.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In any case, the ComRAT developers implemented new mechanisms, changed keys, removed log files to hide their activities and tried to disguise the connections between the RAT ComRAT, the rootkit Uroburos and the RAT Agent.BTZ as much as possible.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, we can still follow the evolution of the malware by comparing the versions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The persistence mechanism discovered in October 2014 makes it possible to intrude into a system in a really discreet manner and we estimate that other actors will use the same persistence mechanism in the near future.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We will definitely keep our ears and eyes open and continue analyzing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Repressive nation-states have long monitored telecommunica- tions to keep tabs on political dissent.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Internet and online social networks, however, pose novel technical challenges to this practice, even as they open up new domains for surveil- lance.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We analyze an extensive collection of suspicious files and links targeting activists, opposition members, and non- governmental organizations in the Middle East over the past several years.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We find that these artifacts reflect efforts to at- tack targets' devices for the purposes of eavesdropping, stealing information, and/or unmasking anonymous users.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We describe attack campaigns we have observed in Bahrain, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates, investigating attackers, tools, and tech- niques.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition to off-the-shelf remote access trojans and the use of third-party IP-tracking services, we identify commer- cial spyware marketed exclusively to governments, including Gamma's FinSpy and Hacking Team's Remote Control Sys- tem (RCS).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We describe their use in Bahrain and the UAE, and map out the potential broader scope of this activity by conduct- ing global scans of the corresponding command-and-control (C & C) servers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Finally, we frame the real-world consequences of these campaigns via strong circumstantial evidence linking hacking to arrests, interrogations, and imprisonment.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Computer security research devotes extensive efforts to pro- tecting individuals against indiscriminate, large-scale attacks such as those used by cybercriminals.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Recently, the prob- lem of protecting institutions against targeted attacks conducted by nation-states (so-called'' Advanced Persistent Threats'') has likewise elicited significant research interest.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Where these two problem domains intersect, however-targeted cyber attacks by nation-states against individuals-has received virtually no sig- nificant, methodical research attention to date.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This new prob- lem space poses challenges that are both technically complex and of significant real-world importance.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this work we undertake to characterize the emergent prob- lem space of nation-state Internet attacks against individuals engaged in pro-democracy or opposition movements.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While we lack the data to do so in a fully comprehensive fashion, we provide extensive detail from both technical and operational perspectives as seen in three countries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We view such character- izations as the fundamental first step necessary for the rigorous, scientific pursuit of a new problem space.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For our study we draw upon several years of research we have conducted into cases from Bahrain, Syria and the United Arab Emirates.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We frame the nature of these attacks, and the technology and infrastructure used to conduct them, in the con- text of their impacts on real people.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We hope in the process to inspire additional research efforts addressing the difficult prob- lem of how to adequately protect individuals with very limited resources facing powerful adversaries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As an illustration of this phenomenon, consider the follow- ing anecdote, pieced together from public reports and court documents.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At dawn on 3/12/13, police raided the house of 17-year- old Ali Al-Shofa, confiscated his laptop and phone, and took him into custody.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "He was charged with referring to Bahrain's King as a'' dictator'' () and'' fallen one'' () on a pseudonymous Twitter account, @alkawarahnews.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Accord- ing to court documents, Bahrain's Cyber Crime Unit had linked an IP address registered in his father's name to the account on 12/9/12.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Operators of @alkawarahnews later forwarded a suspicious private message to one of the authors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The message was received on 12/8/12 on a Facebook account linked to the Twitter handle, and contained a link to a protest video, purport- edly sent by an anti-government individual.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The link redirected through iplogger.org, a service that records the IP address of anyone who clicks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Analytics for the link indicate that it had been clicked once from inside Bahrain.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On 6/25/13, Ali was sentenced to one year in prison.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Ali's case is an example of the larger phenomenon we in- vestigate: attacks against activists, dissidents, trade unionists, human rights campaigners, journalists, and members of NGOs (henceforth'' targets'') in the Middle East.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attacks we have documented usually involve the use of malicious links or e-mail attachments, designed to obtain information from a device.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attacks we have documented", "start": 0, "end": 30}, {"text": "the use of malicious links or e-mail attachments", "start": 47, "end": 95}, {"text": "information", "start": 116, "end": 127}, {"text": "a device", "start": 133, "end": 141}], "action": [{"text": "involve", "start": 39, "end": 46}, {"text": "obtain", "start": 109, "end": 115}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 128, "end": 132}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On the one hand, we have observed attacks using a wide range of off-the-shelf spyware, as well as publicly available third-party services, like iplogger.org.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "attacks", "start": 34, "end": 41}, {"text": "a wide range of off-the-shelf spyware, as well as publicly available third-party services, like iplogger.org", "start": 48, "end": 156}], "action": [{"text": "using", "start": 42, "end": 47}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On the other hand, some at- tacks use so-called'' lawful intercept'' trojans and related equip- ment, purportedly sold exclusively to governments by compa- nies like Gamma International and Hacking Team.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "some at- tacks", "start": 19, "end": 33}, {"text": "so-called'' lawful intercept'' trojans", "start": 38, "end": 76}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 34, "end": 37}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The lat- ter advertises that governments need its technology to'' look through their target's eyes'' rather than rely solely on'' passive monitoring''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Overall, the attacks we document are rarely technically novel.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In fact, we suspect that the majority of at- tacks could be substantially limited via well-known security practices, settings, and software updates.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Yet, the attacks are noteworthy for their careful social engineering, their links to governments, and their real-world impact.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attacks", "start": 5, "end": 16}], "action": [{"text": "careful social engineering", "start": 42, "end": 68}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We obtained the majority of our artifacts by encouraging in- dividuals who might be targeted by governments to provide us with suspicious files and unsolicited links, especially from un- familiar senders.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While this process has provided a rich set of artifacts to analyze, it does not permit us to claim our dataset is representative.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our analysis links these attacks with a common class of ac- tor: an attacker whose behavior, choice of target, or use of in- formation obtained in the attack, aligns with the interests of a government.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In some cases, such as Ali's, the attackers appear to be governments themselves; in other cases, they appear in- stead to be pro-government actors, ranging from patriotic, not necessarily skilled volunteers to cyber mercenaries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The phe- nomenon has been identified before, such as in Libya, when the fall of Gaddafi's regime revealed direct government ties to hacking during the 2011 Civil War.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We make the following contributions: • We analyze the technology associated with targeted at- tacks (e.g., malicious links, spyware), and trace it back to its programmers and manufacturers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While the attacks are not novel-and indeed often involve technology used by the cybercrime underground-they are significant be- cause they have a real-world impact and visibility, and are connected to governments.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, we often find amateurish mistakes in either the attacker's technology or operations, indicating that energy spent countering these threats can realize significant benefits.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We do not, how- ever, conclude that all nation-state attacks or attackers are incompetent, and we suspect that some attacks have evaded our detection.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• When possible, we empirically characterize the attacks and technology we have observed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We map out global use of two commercial hacking tools by governments by searching through Internet scan data using fingerprints for command-and-control (C & C) servers derived from our spyware analysis.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• We develop strong evidence tying attacks to govern- ment sponsors and corporate suppliers, countering de- nials, sometimes energetic and sometimes indirect, of such involvement [,,,], in contrast to denials or claims of a corporate'' oversight'' board.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our scan- ning suggests use of'' lawful intercept'' trojans by 11 ad- ditional countries considered governed by'' authoritarian regimes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' We believe that activists and journalists in such countries may experience harassment or consequences to life or liberty from government surveillance.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Finally, we do not explore potential defenses appropriate for protecting the target population in this work.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We believe that to do so in a sufficiently well-grounded, meaningful manner first requires developing an understanding of the targets' knowledge of security issues, their posture regarding how they currently protect themselves, and the resources (including potentially ed- ucation) that they can draw upon.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To this end, we are now con- ducting (with IRB approval) in-depth interviews with potential targets along with systematic examination of their Internet de- vices in order to develop such an understanding.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the past decades, a rich body of academic work has grown to document and understand government Internet censorship, in- cluding nationwide censorship campaigns like the Great Fire- wall of China [,,].", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Research on governmental Internet surveillance and activities like law-enforcement interception is a comparatively smaller area.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some academic work looks at government use of devices to enable censorship, such as key- word blacklists for Chinese chat clients, or the Green Dam censorware that was to be deployed on all new computers sold in China.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We are aware of only limited previous work looking at advanced threat actors targeting activists with hack- ing, though this work has not always been able to establish ev- idence of government connections.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Platforms used by potential targets, such as GMail, Twitter, and Facebook increasingly make transport- layer encryption the default, obscuring communications from most network surveillance.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This use of encryption, along with the global nature of many social movements, and the role of diaspora groups, likely makes hacking increasingly attractive, especially to states who are unable to request or compel content from these platforms.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Indeed, the increasing use of encryption and the global nature of targets have both been cited by pur- veyors of'' lawful intercept'' trojans in their marketing materi- als [,].", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In one notable case in 2009, UAE telecom firm Eti- salat distributed a system update to its then 145,000 BlackBerry subscribers that contained spyware to read encrypted Black- Berry e-mail from the device.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The spyware was discovered when the update drastically slowed users' phones.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In con- trast to country-scale distribution, our work looks at this kind of pro-government and government-linked surveillance through highly targeted attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The term APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) refers to a sophisticated cyber-attacker who persistently attempts to tar- get an individual or group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Work outside the academic community tracking government cyberattacks typically falls under this umbrella.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There has been significant work on APT outside the academic community, especially among se- curity professionals, threat intelligence companies, and human rights groups.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Much of this work has focused on suspected government-on-government or government-on-corporation cy- ber attacks [,].", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Meanwhile, a small but growing body of this research deals with attacks carried out by governments against opposition and activist groups operating within, as well as outside their borders.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One of the most notable cases is GhostNet, a large-scale cyber espionage campaign against the Tibetan independence movement [,].", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other work avoids drawing conclusions about the attackers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our study is based on extensive analysis of malicious files and suspect communications relevant to the activities of targeted groups in Bahrain, Syria, and the UAE, as documented in Ta- ble 1.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A number of the attacks had significant real-world impli- cations, per Table 2.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In many cases, we keep our descriptions somewhat imprecise to avoid potential leakage of target identi- ties.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We began our work when contacted by individuals con- cerned that a government might have targeted them for cyber- attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As we became more acquainted with the targeted com- munities, in some cases we contacted targeted groups directly; in others, we reached out to individuals with connections to tar- geted groups, who allowed us to examine their communications with the groups.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For Bahrain and Syria, the work encompassed 10,000s of e-mails and instant messages.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For the UAE, the vol- ume is several thousand communications.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This following sections outline recent targeted hacking cam- paigns in Bahrain, Syria and the UAE.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These cases have a com- mon theme: attacks against targets' computers and devices with malicious files and links.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In some cases the attackers employed expensive and'' government exclusive'' malware, while in other cases, attackers used cheap and readily available RATs.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 14, "end": 27}, {"text": "expensive and'' government exclusive'' malware", "start": 37, "end": 83}, {"text": "attackers", "start": 107, "end": 116}, {"text": "cheap and readily available RATs", "start": 122, "end": 154}], "action": [{"text": "employed", "start": 28, "end": 36}, {"text": "used", "start": 117, "end": 121}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Across these cases we find that clever social engineering often plays a central role, which is strong evidence of a well-informed ad- versary.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "clever social engineering", "start": 32, "end": 57}, {"text": "a central role", "start": 70, "end": 84}], "action": [{"text": "plays", "start": 64, "end": 69}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also, however, frequently find technical and op- erational errors by the attackers that enable us to link attacks to governments.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In general, the attacks we find are not well- detected by anti-virus programs.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attacks", "start": 12, "end": 23}, {"text": "anti-virus programs", "start": 58, "end": 77}], "action": [{"text": "are not well- detected", "start": 32, "end": 54}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 55, "end": 57}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have analyzed two attack campaigns in the context of Bahrain, where the government has been pursuing a crackdown against an Arab-Spring inspired uprising since 2/14/2011.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first involved malicious e-mails containing FinSpy, a'' lawful intercept'' trojan sold exclusively to governments.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The first", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "malicious e-mails containing FinSpy, a'' lawful intercept'' trojan sold exclusively to governments", "start": 19, "end": 117}], "action": [{"text": "involved", "start": 10, "end": 18}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The second involved specially crafted IP spy links and e-mails de- signed to reveal the IP addresses of operators of pseudonymous accounts.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The second", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "specially crafted IP spy links and e-mails", "start": 20, "end": 62}, {"text": "the IP addresses of operators of pseudonymous accounts", "start": 84, "end": 138}], "action": [{"text": "involved", "start": 11, "end": 19}, {"text": "reveal", "start": 77, "end": 83}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some individuals who apparently clicked on these links were later arrested, including Ali (cf.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "§1), whose click appears to have been used against him in court.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While both campaigns point back to the government, we have not as yet identified overlap between the campaigns; targets of FinSpy appeared to reside mainly outside Bahrain, whereas the IP spy links targeted those mainly inside the country.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We examine each campaign in turn.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Beginning in April 2012, the authors received 5 suspicious e-mails from US and UK-based activists and journalists working on Bahrain.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We found that some of the attachments contained a PE (.exe) file designed to appear as an image.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "some of the attachments", "start": 14, "end": 37}, {"text": "a PE (.exe) file designed to appear as an image", "start": 48, "end": 95}], "action": [{"text": "contained", "start": 38, "end": 47}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Their filenames contained a Uni- code right-to-left override (RLO) character, causing Windows to render a filename such as gpj.1bajaR.exe instead as exe.Rajab1.jpg.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Their filenames", "start": 0, "end": 15}, {"text": "a Uni- code right-to-left override (RLO) character", "start": 26, "end": 76}, {"text": "Windows to render a filename such as gpj.1bajaR.exe instead as exe.Rajab1.jpg", "start": 86, "end": 163}], "action": [{"text": "contained", "start": 16, "end": 25}, {"text": "causing", "start": 78, "end": 85}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The other .rar files contained a Word document with an embedded ASCII-encoded PE file containing a custom macro set to automatically run upon document startup.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The other .rar files", "start": 0, "end": 20}, {"text": "a Word document with an embedded ASCII-encoded PE file", "start": 31, "end": 85}, {"text": "a custom macro set", "start": 97, "end": 115}, {"text": "document startup", "start": 142, "end": 158}], "action": [{"text": "contained", "start": 21, "end": 30}, {"text": "automatically run", "start": 119, "end": 136}], "modifier": [{"text": "upon", "start": 137, "end": 141}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Under default security settings, Office disables all unsigned macros, so that a user who opens the document will only see an informational message that the macro has been disabled.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Thus, this attack was apparently designed with the belief or hope that targets would have reduced security settings.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Identification as FinSpy: By running the sample using Windows Virtual PC, we found the following string in mem- ory: y: \\lsvnbranches\\finspyv4.01\\finspyv2\\.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This string suggests FinSpy, a product of Gamma Inter- national.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The executables used virtualized obfusca- tion, which appeared to be custom-designed.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The executables", "start": 0, "end": 15}, {"text": "virtualized obfusca- tion", "start": 21, "end": 46}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 16, "end": 20}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We de- vised a fingerprint for the obfuscater and located a structurally similar executable by searching a large malware database.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This executable contained a similar string, except it identi- fied itself as FinSpy v3.00, and attempted to connect to tiger.gamma-international.de, a domain registered to Gamma International GmbH.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This executable", "start": 0, "end": 15}, {"text": "tiger.gamma-international.de, a domain registered to Gamma International GmbH", "start": 119, "end": 196}], "action": [{"text": "connect", "start": 108, "end": 115}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 116, "end": 118}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Analysis of capabilities: We found that the spyware has a modular design, and can download additional modules from a command & control (C & C) server, including password cap- ture (from over 20 applications) and recording of screenshots, Skype chat, file transfers, and input from the computer's micro- phone and webcam.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the spyware", "start": 40, "end": 51}, {"text": "additional modules", "start": 91, "end": 109}, {"text": "a command & control (C & C) server", "start": 115, "end": 149}, {"text": "password cap- ture (from over 20 applications)", "start": 161, "end": 207}, {"text": "recording of screenshots", "start": 212, "end": 236}, {"text": "Skype chat", "start": 238, "end": 248}, {"text": "file transfers", "start": 250, "end": 264}, {"text": "input from", "start": 270, "end": 280}, {"text": "the computer's micro- phone", "start": 281, "end": 308}, {"text": "webcam", "start": 313, "end": 319}], "action": [{"text": "download", "start": 82, "end": 90}, {"text": "including", "start": 151, "end": 160}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 110, "end": 114}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To exfiltrate data back to the C & C server, a module encrypts and writes it to disk in a special folder.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "exfiltrate", "start": 3, "end": 13}, {"text": "encrypts", "start": 54, "end": 62}, {"text": "writes", "start": 67, "end": 73}], "entity": [{"text": "data", "start": 14, "end": 18}, {"text": "the C & C server", "start": 27, "end": 43}, {"text": "a module", "start": 45, "end": 53}, {"text": "it", "start": 74, "end": 76}, {"text": "disk in a special folder", "start": 80, "end": 104}], "modifier": [{"text": "back to", "start": 19, "end": 26}, {"text": "to", "start": 77, "end": 79}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The spyware period- ically probes this folder for files that match a certain naming convention, then sends them to the C & C server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The spyware", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "this folder", "start": 34, "end": 45}, {"text": "files that match a certain naming convention", "start": 50, "end": 94}, {"text": "them", "start": 107, "end": 111}, {"text": "the C & C server", "start": 115, "end": 131}], "action": [{"text": "probes", "start": 27, "end": 33}, {"text": "sends", "start": 101, "end": 106}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 46, "end": 49}, {"text": "to", "start": 112, "end": 114}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It then over- writes the files, renames them several times, and deletes them, in an apparent effort to frustrate forensic analysis.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "the files", "start": 21, "end": 30}, {"text": "them", "start": 40, "end": 44}, {"text": "several times", "start": 45, "end": 58}, {"text": "them", "start": 72, "end": 76}, {"text": "forensic analysis", "start": 113, "end": 130}], "action": [{"text": "over- writes", "start": 8, "end": 20}, {"text": "renames", "start": 32, "end": 39}, {"text": "deletes", "start": 64, "end": 71}, {"text": "frustrate", "start": 103, "end": 112}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Analysis of encryption: Because the malware employed myriad known anti-debugging and anti-analysis techniques, it thwarted our attempts to attach debuggers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 32, "end": 43}, {"text": "myriad known anti-debugging and anti-analysis techniques", "start": 53, "end": 109}, {"text": "it", "start": 111, "end": 113}, {"text": "our attempts to attach debuggers", "start": 123, "end": 155}], "action": [{"text": "employed", "start": 44, "end": 52}, {"text": "thwarted", "start": 114, "end": 122}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Since it did not in- clude anti-VM code, we ran it in TEMU, an x86 emulator de- signed for malware analysis.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "TEMU captures instruction- level execution traces and provides support for taint-tracking.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We found that FinSpy encrypts data using a custom imple- mentation of AES-256-CBC.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "FinSpy", "start": 14, "end": 20}, {"text": "data", "start": 30, "end": 34}, {"text": "a custom imple- mentation of AES-256-CBC", "start": 41, "end": 81}], "action": [{"text": "encrypts", "start": 21, "end": 29}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 35, "end": 40}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The 32 byte AES key and 16 byte IV are generated by repeatedly reading the low-order-4-bytes of the Windows clock.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The 32 byte AES key and 16 byte IV", "start": 0, "end": 34}, {"text": "repeatedly reading the low-order-4-bytes of the Windows clock", "start": 52, "end": 113}], "action": [{"text": "are generated", "start": 35, "end": 48}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 49, "end": 51}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The key and IV are encrypted using an em- bedded RSA-2048 public key, and stored in the same file as the data.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The key and IV", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "an em- bedded RSA-2048 public key", "start": 35, "end": 68}], "action": [{"text": "are encrypted", "start": 15, "end": 28}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 29, "end": 34}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The private key presumably resides on the C & C server.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The weak AES keys make decryption of the data straightfor- ward.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We wrote a program that generally can find these keys in under an hour, exploiting the fact that many of the system clock readings occur within the same clock-update quantum.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, FinSpy's AES code fails to encrypt the last block of data if less than the AES block size of 128 bits, leaving trail- ing plaintext.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Finally, FinSpy's wire protocol for C & C commu- nication uses the same type of encryption, and thus is subject to the same brute force attack on AES keys.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "FinSpy's wire protocol for C & C commu- nication", "start": 9, "end": 57}, {"text": "the same type of encryption", "start": 63, "end": 90}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 58, "end": 62}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While we suspect FinSpy's cryptographic deficiencies reflect bugs, it is also con- ceivable that the cryptography was deliberately weakened to facilitate one government monitoring the surveillance of oth- ers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "C & C server: The samples communicated with 77.69.140.194, which belongs to a subscriber of Batelco, Bahrain's main ISP.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The samples", "start": 14, "end": 25}, {"text": "77.69.140.194", "start": 44, "end": 57}], "action": [{"text": "communicated", "start": 26, "end": 38}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 39, "end": 43}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Analyzing network traffic between our infected VM and the C & C server revealed that the server used a global IPID, which allowed us to infer server activity by its progression.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In response to our preliminary work an executive at Gamma told the press that Bahrain's FinSpy server was merely a proxy and the real server could have been anywhere, as part of a claim that the Bahrain FinSpy deployment could have been associ- ated with another government.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, a proxy would show gaps in a global IPID as it forwarded traffic; our frequent observation of strictly consecutive IPIDs thus contradicts this statement.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Exploitation of captured data: Since we suspected the spy- ware operator would likely seek to exploit captured credentials, particularly those associated with Bahraini activist organiza- tions, we worked with Bahrain Watch, an activist organization inside Bahrain.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Bahrain Watch established a fake login page on their website and provided us with a username and pass- word.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "From a clean VM, we logged in using these credentials, saving the password in Mozilla Firefox.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We then infected the VM with FinSpy and allowed it to connect to the Bahrain C & C server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 48, "end": 50}, {"text": "the Bahrain C & C server", "start": 65, "end": 89}], "action": [{"text": "connect", "start": 54, "end": 61}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 62, "end": 64}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Bahrain Watch's website logs revealed a subsequent hit from 89.148.0.41-made however to the site's home- page, rather than its login page-coming shortly after we had infected the VM.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Decrypting packet captures of the spyware's activity, we found that our VM sent the password to the server exactly one minute earlier: The URL provided to the server did not include the path to the login page, which was inaccessible from the home- page.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This omission reflects the fact that the Firefox password database stores only domain names, not full login page URLs, for each password.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Repeating the experiment again yielded a hit from the same IP address within a minute.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We inspected Bahrain Watch's logs, which showed no subsequent (or previ- ous) activity from that address, nor any instances of the same User Agent string.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In an IP spy attack, the attacker aims to discover the IP address of a victim who is typically the opera- tor of a pseudonymous social media or e-mail account.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attacker", "start": 21, "end": 33}, {"text": "the IP address of a victim who is typically the opera- tor of a pseudonymous social media or e-mail account", "start": 51, "end": 158}], "action": [{"text": "discover", "start": 42, "end": 50}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The at- tacker sends the pseudonymous account a link to a webpage or an e-mail containing an embedded remote image, using one of many freely-available services.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The at- tacker", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "the pseudonymous account a link to a webpage or an e-mail containing an embedded remote image", "start": 21, "end": 114}, {"text": "one of many freely-available services", "start": 122, "end": 159}], "action": [{"text": "sends", "start": 15, "end": 20}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 116, "end": 121}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When the victim clicks on the link or opens the e-mail, their IP address is revealed to the at- tacker.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "their IP address", "start": 56, "end": 72}, {"text": "the at- tacker", "start": 88, "end": 102}], "action": [{"text": "is revealed", "start": 73, "end": 84}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 85, "end": 87}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attacker then discovers the victim's identity from their ISP.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In one case we identified legal documents that pro- vided a circumstantial link between such a spy link and a sub- sequent arrest.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Figure 2 illustrates the larger ecosystem of these attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers appear to represent a single entity, as the activity all connects back to accounts that sent links shortened using a par- ticular user account al9mood on the bit.ly URL shortening service.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Recall Ali Faisal Al-Shufa (discussed in Section 1), who was accused of sending insulting tweets from an account @alkawarahnews (Al Kawarah News in Figure 2).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An op- erator of the account forwarded us a suspicious private message sent to the Al Kawarah News Facebook account from Red Sky.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Red Sky was purportedly arrested on 10/17/12, was convicted of insulting the King on his Twitter account @RedSky446, and was sentenced to four months prison.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When released, he found that the passwords for his Twitter, Facebook, and e-mail accounts had been changed, and did not know how to recover his accounts.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The message that Red Sky's account sent to Al Kawarah News included a link shortened using Google's goo.gl ser- vice.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We used the goo.gl API to access analytics for the link, finding that it unshortened to iplogger.org/25SX and was created on 12/8/12.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The link had received only one click, which came from Bahrain with the referrer www.facebook.com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Ali's case files contained a request from the Public Prose- cution for information on an IP address that it had linked to Al Kawarah News about 22 hours after the link was created.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Court documents indicate that ISP data linked the IP address to Ali, and on this basis he was sentenced to one year in prison.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Red Sky also targeted M in Figure 2.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "M recalled click- ing on a link from Red Sky while using an Internet connec- tion from one of the houses in M's village.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The house was raided by police on 3/12/13, who were looking for the sub- scriber of the house's internet connection.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Police questioning revolved around Tweets that referred to Bahrain's King as a'' cursed one.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Red Sky had earlier targeted other users with IP spy links shortened using the al9mood bit.ly account.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Red Sky", "start": 3, "end": 10}, {"text": "other users", "start": 32, "end": 43}, {"text": "IP spy links shortened using the al9mood bit.ly account", "start": 49, "end": 104}], "action": [{"text": "targeted", "start": 23, "end": 31}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 44, "end": 48}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attack on Jehad Abdulla is noteworthy, as the ac- count's activity aligned with communities typically critical of Bahrain's opposition.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, the account also directly crit- icized the King on occasion, in one case referring to him as'' weak'' and'' stingy.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' An account linked to al9mood sent Je- had Abdulla an IP spy link on 10/2/12 in a public message.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "An account linked to al9mood", "start": 3, "end": 31}, {"text": "Je- had Abdulla", "start": 37, "end": 52}, {"text": "an IP spy link", "start": 53, "end": 67}, {"text": "10/2/12", "start": 71, "end": 78}, {"text": "a public message", "start": 82, "end": 98}], "action": [{"text": "sent", "start": 32, "end": 36}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 68, "end": 70}, {"text": "in", "start": 79, "end": 81}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On 10/16/12, Salman Darwish was arrested for insulting the King using the Jehad Abdulla account.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "He was sentenced to one month in prison, partly on the basis of his confession.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Salman's father claims that police denied Salman food, drink, and medi- cal care.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Another account linked to al9mood targeted @YLUBH, the Twitter account of Yokogawa Union, a trade union at the Bahraini branch of a Japanese company.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "@YLUBH received at least three IP spy links in late 2012, sent via public Twitter mes sages.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "@YLUBH", "start": 0, "end": 6}, {"text": "at least three IP spy links", "start": 16, "end": 43}, {"text": "late 2012", "start": 47, "end": 56}], "action": [{"text": "received", "start": 7, "end": 15}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 44, "end": 46}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Yokogawa fired the leader of the trade union, Sami Ab- dulaziz Hassan, on 3/23/13.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It later emerged that Sami was indeed the operator of the @YLUBH account, and that the police had called him in for questioning in relation to its tweets.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Use of embedded remote images: We identified several targets who received spoofed e-mails containing embedded remote images.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "several targets", "start": 45, "end": 60}, {"text": "spoofed e-mails containing embedded remote images", "start": 74, "end": 123}], "action": [{"text": "received", "start": 65, "end": 73}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Figure 2 shows two such cases, Maryam and Sayed Yousif.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attacker sent the e-mails using ReadNotify.com, which records the user's IP address upon their mail client downloading the remote image.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attacker", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "the e-mails", "start": 18, "end": 29}, {"text": "ReadNotify.com", "start": 36, "end": 50}, {"text": "the user's IP address", "start": 66, "end": 87}, {"text": "their mail client downloading the remote image", "start": 93, "end": 139}], "action": [{"text": "sent", "start": 13, "end": 17}, {"text": "records", "start": 58, "end": 65}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 30, "end": 35}, {"text": "upon", "start": 88, "end": 92}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While ReadNotify.com forbids spoofing in their TOS, the service has a vulnerability known to the attackers (and which we confirmed) that allows spoofing the From address by directly setting the parameters on a submission form on their website.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have not found evidence suggesting this vulnerabil- ity is publicly known, but it appears clear that the attacker ex- ploited it, as the web form adds a X-Mai1er: RNwebmail header not added when sending through ReadNotify.com's other supported methods.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The header appeared in each e-mail the targets forwarded to us.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When spoofing using this method, the original sender ad- dress still appears in X-Sender and other headers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Accord- ing to these, the e-mails received by the targets all came from fatoomah85 @gmail.com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A link sent in one of these e- mails was connected to the al9mood bit.ly account.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In monitoring accounts connected to al9mood, we counted more than 200 IP spy links in Twitter messages and public Facebook posts.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Attackers often used (1) accounts of promi- nent or trusted but jailed individuals like'' Red Sky,'' (2) fake personas (e.g., attractive women or fake job seekers when tar- geting a labor union), or (3) impersonations of legitimate ac- counts.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Attackers", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "(1) accounts of promi- nent or trusted but jailed individuals like'' Red Sky,'' (2) fake personas (e.g., attractive women or fake job seekers when tar- geting a labor union), or (3) impersonations of legitimate ac- counts", "start": 21, "end": 242}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 16, "end": 20}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In one particularly clever tactic, attackers exploited Twitter's default font, for example substituting a lowercase'' l'' with an uppercase'' I'' or switching vowels (e.g.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "from'' a'' to an'' e'') to create at-a-glance identical usernames.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, malicious accounts tended to quickly delete IP spy tweets sent via (public) mentions, and frequently change profile names.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The use of RATs against the opposition has been a well- documented feature of the Syrian Civil War since the first re- ports were published in early 2012 [,,,,].", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The phenomenon is widespread, and in our experience, most mem- bers of the opposition know that some hacking is taking place.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As summarized in Table 3, the attacks often include fake or ma- liciously packaged security tools; intriguing, or ideological, or movement-relevant content (e.g. lists of wanted persons).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attacks", "start": 26, "end": 37}, {"text": "fake or ma- liciously packaged security tools; intriguing, or ideological, or movement-relevant content (e.g. lists of wanted persons)", "start": 52, "end": 186}], "action": [{"text": "include", "start": 44, "end": 51}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The seeding techniques and bait files suggest a good understanding of the opposition's needs, fears and behavior, coupled with ba- sic familiarity with off-the-shelf RATs.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In some cases attacks occur in a context that points to a more direct connection to one of the belligerents: the Syrian opposition has regularly ob- served that detainees' accounts begin seeding malware shortly after their arrest by government forces.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Researchers and security professionals have already profiled many of these RATs, including DarkComet [,], Black- shades Remote Controller, Xtreme RAT, njRAT, and ShadowTech.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some are available for purchase by any- one, in contrast to'' government only'' FinSpy and RCS.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For ex- ample, Xtreme RAT retails for e350, while a version of Black- shades lists for e40.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Others, like DarkComet, are free.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have also observed cracked versions of these RATs on Arabic- language hacker forums, making them available with little ef- fort and no payment trail.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While the RATs are cheaper and less sophisticated than FinSpy and RCS, they share the same ba- sic functionality, including screen capture, keylogging, remote monitoring of webcams and microphones, remote shell, and file exfiltration.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the same ba- sic functionality", "start": 82, "end": 112}, {"text": "screen capture", "start": 124, "end": 138}, {"text": "keylogging", "start": 140, "end": 150}, {"text": "remote monitoring of", "start": 152, "end": 172}, {"text": "webcams", "start": 173, "end": 180}, {"text": "microphones", "start": 185, "end": 196}, {"text": "remote shell", "start": 198, "end": 210}, {"text": "file exfiltration", "start": 216, "end": 233}], "action": [{"text": "including", "start": 114, "end": 123}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the most common attack sequence we observed, illus- trated with three examples in Figure 3, the attacker seeds mal- ware via private chat messages, posts in opposition-controlled social media groups, or e-mail.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attacker", "start": 95, "end": 107}, {"text": "mal- ware", "start": 114, "end": 123}, {"text": "private chat messages, posts in opposition-controlled social media groups, or e-mail", "start": 128, "end": 212}], "action": [{"text": "seeds", "start": 108, "end": 113}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 124, "end": 127}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These techniques often limit the world-visibility of malicious files and links, slowing their detection by common AV products.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These techniques", "start": 0, "end": 16}, {"text": "their detection by common AV products", "start": 88, "end": 125}], "action": [{"text": "slowing", "start": 80, "end": 87}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Typically, targets receive either (1) a PE in a .zip or .rar, (2) a file download link, or (3) a link that will trigger a drive-by download.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "targets", "start": 11, "end": 18}, {"text": "either (1) a PE in a .zip or .rar, (2) a file download link, or (3) a link that will trigger a drive-by download", "start": 27, "end": 139}], "action": [{"text": "receive", "start": 19, "end": 26}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The messages usually include text, often in Arabic, that attempts to persuade the target to execute the file or click the link.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The messages", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "text, often in Arabic, that attempts to persuade the target to execute the file or click the link", "start": 29, "end": 126}], "action": [{"text": "include", "start": 21, "end": 28}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first attacks in Figure 3 date to 2012, and use bait files with a DarkComet RAT payload.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The first attacks", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "bait files with a DarkComet RAT payload", "start": 52, "end": 91}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 48, "end": 51}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These attacks share the same C & C, 216.6.0.28, a Syrian IP address belonging to the Syr- ian Telecommunications Establishment, and publicly reported as a C & C of Syrian malware since February 2012.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These attacks", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "the same C & C, 216.6.0.28, a Syrian IP address belonging to the Syr- ian Telecommunications Establishment, and publicly reported as a C & C of Syrian malware since February 2012", "start": 20, "end": 198}], "action": [{"text": "share", "start": 14, "end": 19}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first bait file presents to the victim as a PDF containing infor- mation about a planned uprising in Aleppo.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The first bait file", "start": 0, "end": 19}, {"text": "the victim", "start": 32, "end": 42}, {"text": "a PDF containing infor- mation about a planned uprising in Aleppo", "start": 46, "end": 111}], "action": [{"text": "presents", "start": 20, "end": 28}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 29, "end": 31}, {"text": "as", "start": 43, "end": 45}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In fact the file is a Windows Screensaver (.scr", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the file", "start": 8, "end": 16}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ") that masquerades as a PDF using Unicode RLO, rendering a name such as'' .fdp.scr", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "masquerades", "start": 7, "end": 18}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 19, "end": 21}, {"text": "using", "start": 28, "end": 33}], "entity": [{"text": "a PDF", "start": 22, "end": 27}, {"text": "Unicode RLO", "start": 34, "end": 45}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' dis- play to the victim as'' .rcs.pdf", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ".", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' The second bait file is a dummy program containing DarkComet while masquerading as a Skype call encryption program, playing to opposition para- noia about government backdoors in common software.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The second bait file", "start": 3, "end": 23}, {"text": "a Skype call encryption program", "start": 86, "end": 117}], "action": [{"text": "masquerading", "start": 70, "end": 82}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 83, "end": 85}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The third attack in Figure 3, observed in October 2013, entices tar- gets with e-mails purporting to contain or link to videos about the current conflict, infecting victims with Xtreme RAT, and using the C & C tn1.linkpc.net.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The third attack", "start": 0, "end": 16}, {"text": "tar- gets", "start": 64, "end": 73}, {"text": "e-mails purporting to contain or link to videos about the current conflict", "start": 79, "end": 153}, {"text": "victims", "start": 165, "end": 172}, {"text": "Xtreme RAT", "start": 178, "end": 188}, {"text": "the C & C tn1.linkpc.net", "start": 200, "end": 224}], "action": [{"text": "entices", "start": 56, "end": 63}, {"text": "infecting", "start": 155, "end": 164}, {"text": "using", "start": 194, "end": 199}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 74, "end": 78}, {"text": "with", "start": 173, "end": 177}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For seeding, the attackers typically use compromised ac- counts (including those of arrested individuals) or fake iden- tities masquerading as pro-opposition.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "For", "start": 0, "end": 3}], "entity": [{"text": "seeding", "start": 4, "end": 11}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 13, "end": 26}, {"text": "compromised ac- counts (including those of arrested individuals) or fake iden- tities masquerading as pro-opposition", "start": 41, "end": 157}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 37, "end": 40}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our illustration shows in abstract terms the use of Victim A's account to seed mal- ware ('' Aleppo Plan'') via (say) Skype messages to Victim (s) Bn.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the cases of Opp.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Member C and NGO Worker D (here, actual victims, not abstract), targeting was by e-mail from domains apparently belonging to opposition groups, in- dicating a potential compromise.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "targeting", "start": 64, "end": 73}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 78, "end": 80}], "entity": [{"text": "e-mail from domains apparently belonging to opposition groups, in- dicating a potential compromise", "start": 81, "end": 179}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One domain remains active, hosting a website of the Salafist Al-Nusra front, while the other appears dormant.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Opp. Member C received a malicious file as an e-mail attachment, while NGO Worker D was sent a shortened link (url [.] no/Uu5) to a download from a directory of Mrconstrucciones [.] net, a site that may have been com- promised.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Opp. Member C", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "a malicious file", "start": 23, "end": 39}, {"text": "an e-mail attachment", "start": 43, "end": 63}, {"text": "NGO Worker D", "start": 71, "end": 83}, {"text": "a shortened link (url [.] no/Uu5) to a download from a directory of Mrconstrucciones [.] net", "start": 93, "end": 185}], "action": [{"text": "received", "start": 14, "end": 22}, {"text": "was sent", "start": 84, "end": 92}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 40, "end": 42}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Both attacks resulted in an Xtreme RAT infection.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Both attacks", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "an Xtreme RAT infection", "start": 25, "end": 48}], "action": [{"text": "resulted", "start": 13, "end": 21}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 22, "end": 24}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Interestingly, in the case of the fake Skype encryption the deception extended to a YouTube video from'' IT Se- curity Lab'' demonstrating the program's purported ca- pabilities, as well as a website promoting the tool, skype- encryption.sytes.net.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers also constructed a ba- sic, faux GUI for their'' Encryption'' program (see Figure 4).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The fake GUI has a number of non-functional buttons like'' En- crypt'' and'' DeCrypt,'' which generate fake prompts.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While dis- tracted by this meaningless interaction, the victim's machine is infected with DarkComet 3.3 [,].", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "While", "start": 0, "end": 5}, {"text": "with", "start": 85, "end": 89}], "entity": [{"text": "dis- tracted by this meaningless interaction", "start": 6, "end": 50}, {"text": "the victim's machine", "start": 52, "end": 72}, {"text": "DarkComet 3.3", "start": 90, "end": 103}], "action": [{"text": "is infected", "start": 73, "end": 84}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Anecdotally, campaign volume appears to track significant events in the ongoing conflict.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, campaigns dwin- dled and then rebounded within hours after Syria's 2012 Inter- net shutdown.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Similarly, activity observed by the authors also dwindled prior to expectation of US-led military action against Syrian government targets in September 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once this option appeared to be off the table, the volume of new samples and campaigns we observed again increased, includ- ing the recent targeting of NGO workers per Figure 3.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We are aware of only a negligible number of cases of the opposition using similar RATs against Syrian Government supporters, al- though evidence exists of other kinds of electronic attacks by third parties.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The logistics and activities of Syria's numerous opposition groups are intentionally concealed from public view to protect both their efficacy, and the lives of people participating in them.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Nevertheless, Syrian opposition members are generally familiar with stories off digital compro- mises of high-profile figures, including those entrusted with the most sensitive roles, as well as rank-and-file members.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Com- promise of operational security poses a documented threat to life both for victims of electronic compromise, and to family members and associates.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Syrian conflict is ongoing, making it difficult to assem- ble comprehensive evidence of linkages between government actors and malware campaigns.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Moreover, many individuals whose identities have been compromised are in prison or oth- erwise disappeared, and thus unable to relate the evidence pre- sented to them during interrogation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Still, strong circumstantial evidence links the use of RATs, phishing, and government ac- tivity, which we briefly summarize here: (1) many Syrians have recounted to journalists and the authors how interrogators con- fronted them with material from their computers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example: The policeman told me,'' Do you remember when you were talking to your friend and you told him you had something wrong [sic] and paid a lot of money? At that time we were taking information from your laptop.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' (2) Syrian activists have supplied cases to international journal- ists, where arrests are quickly followed by the social me- dia accounts of detained individuals seeding malware to contact lists (Figure 3).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "(3) Finally, despite the notoriety of the attack campaigns, including mention of C & C IPs in international me- dia, the Syrian government has made no public statements about these campaigns nor acted to shut down the servers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Beyond the ongoing challenges of attribution, these malware campaigns have a tangible impact on the Syrian opposition, and generally align with the interests of the Syrian government's propaganda operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The case of Abdul Razzaq Tlass, a leader in the Free Syrian Army, is illustrative of the potential uses of such campaigns.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2012 a string of videos emerged showing Tlass sexting and engaged in lewd activity in front of a webcam.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While he denied the videos, the harm to his rep- utation was substantial and he was eventually replaced.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While the UAE has experienced no recent uprising or politi- cal unrest, it has nevertheless cracked down on its opposition, concurrent with the Arab Spring.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first attacks we observed in the UAE involved a government-grade'' lawful interception'' trojan known as Re- mote Control System (RCS), sold by the Italian company Hack- ing Team.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The first attacks", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "a government-grade'' lawful interception'' trojan known as Re- mote Control System (RCS), sold by the Italian company Hack- ing Team", "start": 50, "end": 182}], "action": [{"text": "involved", "start": 41, "end": 49}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The associated C & C server indicated direct UAE government involvement.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Over time, we stopped receiving RCS samples from UAE targets, and instead observed a shift to the use of off-the-shelf RATs, and possible involvement of cyber-mercenary groups.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, poor attacker operational security .allowed", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "us to link most observed attacks together.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "UAE activist Ahmed Mansoor (per Figure 5), impris- oned from April to November 2011 after signing an online pro- democracy petition, received an e-mail purportedly from'' Arabic Wikileaks'' in July 2012.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "He opened the associated at- tachment,'' veryimportant.doc,'' and saw what he described as'' scrambled letters''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "He forwarded us the e-mail for investiga- tion.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attachment exploited CVE-2010-3333, an RTF pars- ing vulnerability in Microsoft Office.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The document did not contain any bait content, and part of the malformed RTF that triggered the exploit was displayed in the document.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The exploit loaded shellcode that downloaded a second stage from ar-24.com, which in turn downloaded spyware from ar-24.com.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The exploit", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "shellcode", "start": 19, "end": 28}, {"text": "a second stage", "start": 45, "end": 59}, {"text": "ar-24.com", "start": 65, "end": 74}, {"text": "spyware", "start": 101, "end": 108}, {"text": "ar-24.com", "start": 114, "end": 123}], "action": [{"text": "loaded", "start": 12, "end": 18}, {"text": "downloaded", "start": 34, "end": 44}, {"text": "downloaded", "start": 90, "end": 100}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 60, "end": 64}, {"text": "from", "start": 109, "end": 113}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We denote this combination as the 3-Stage Ex- ploit Kit in Figure 5.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The C & C server also ran on ar-24.com.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The C & C server", "start": 0, "end": 16}, {"text": "ar-24.com", "start": 29, "end": 38}], "action": [{"text": "ran", "start": 22, "end": 25}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 26, "end": 28}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When we ob- tained the sample in July 2012, ar-24.com resolved to an IP address on Linode, a hosting provider.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Three months later, it resolved to a UAE address belonging to the Royal Group, an organization linked to the UAE government; it is chaired by Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al-Nayhan, a member of the UAE ruling family and a son of the founder of the UAE.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Identification as RCS: We identified strings in memory that matched those in a Symantec analysis of RCS (also known as DaVinci or Crisis), a product of the Italian com- pany Hacking Team.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also located a structurally sim- ilar Word document via VirusTotal.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The document used the same exploit and attempted to download a second stage from rcs-demo.hackingteam.it, which was unavailable at the time of testing.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The document", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "a second stage", "start": 61, "end": 75}, {"text": "rcs-demo.hackingteam.it", "start": 81, "end": 104}], "action": [{"text": "download", "start": 52, "end": 60}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 76, "end": 80}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Analysis of capabilities: RCS has a suite of functionality largely similar to FinSpy.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One difference was in the vectors used to install the spyware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the vectors", "start": 22, "end": 33}, {"text": "the spyware", "start": 50, "end": 61}], "action": [{"text": "install", "start": 42, "end": 49}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We located additional samples (see § 5), some of which were embedded in a .jar file that installs an OS-appropriate version of RCS (Windows or OSX), option- ally using an exploit.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a .jar file", "start": 72, "end": 83}, {"text": "an OS-appropriate version of RCS", "start": 98, "end": 130}], "action": [{"text": "installs", "start": 89, "end": 97}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If embedded as an applet, and no exploit is present, Java displays a security warning and asks the user whether they authorize the installation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also saw instances of the 3-Stage Exploit Kit where the first stage contained a Flash exploit; in some cases, we could obtain all stages and confirm that these installed RCS.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "these", "start": 157, "end": 162}, {"text": "RCS", "start": 173, "end": 176}], "action": [{"text": "installed", "start": 163, "end": 172}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some samples were packed with the MPress packer, and some Windows samples were obfuscated to look like the PuTTY SSH client.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "some Windows samples", "start": 53, "end": 73}, {"text": "look like the PuTTY SSH client", "start": 93, "end": 123}], "action": [{"text": "were obfuscated", "start": 74, "end": 89}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 90, "end": 92}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Another difference is in persistence.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, the RCS sample sent to Ahmed adds a Run registry key, whereas the FinSpy samples used in Bahrain overwrite the hard disk's boot sector to modify the boot process; the spyware is loaded be- fore the OS, and injects itself into OS processes as they start.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the RCS sample sent to Ahmed", "start": 13, "end": 41}, {"text": "a Run registry key", "start": 47, "end": 65}, {"text": "the FinSpy samples used in Bahrain", "start": 75, "end": 109}, {"text": "the hard disk's boot sector", "start": 120, "end": 147}, {"text": "the boot process", "start": 158, "end": 174}, {"text": "the spyware", "start": 176, "end": 187}, {"text": "the OS", "start": 207, "end": 213}, {"text": "itself", "start": 227, "end": 233}, {"text": "OS processes", "start": 239, "end": 251}, {"text": "they start", "start": 255, "end": 265}], "action": [{"text": "adds", "start": 42, "end": 46}, {"text": "overwrite", "start": 110, "end": 119}, {"text": "modify", "start": 151, "end": 157}, {"text": "is loaded", "start": 188, "end": 197}, {"text": "injects", "start": 219, "end": 226}], "modifier": [{"text": "be- fore", "start": 198, "end": 206}, {"text": "into", "start": 234, "end": 238}, {"text": "as", "start": 252, "end": 254}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The RCS samples we examined also had the ability to propa- gate to other devices, including into inactive VMWare virtual machines by modifying the disk image, onto USB flash drives, and onto Windows Mobile phones.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The RCS samples we examined", "start": 0, "end": 27}, {"text": "other devices", "start": 67, "end": 80}, {"text": "inactive VMWare virtual machines", "start": 97, "end": 129}, {"text": "modifying the disk image", "start": 133, "end": 157}, {"text": "USB flash drives", "start": 164, "end": 180}, {"text": "Windows Mobile phones", "start": 191, "end": 212}], "action": [{"text": "propa- gate", "start": 52, "end": 63}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 64, "end": 66}, {"text": "into", "start": 92, "end": 96}, {"text": "by", "start": 130, "end": 132}, {"text": "onto", "start": 159, "end": 163}, {"text": "onto", "start": 186, "end": 190}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We did not observe similar capabilities in the FinSpy samples we examined.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Exploitation of captured data: When Ahmed Mansoor re- ceived the RCS document, he opened it, infecting his computer (Figure 5).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Ahmed subsequently noted several suspicious ac- cesses to his GMail account using IMAP.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "ac- cesses", "start": 44, "end": 54}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 55, "end": 57}, {"text": "using", "start": 76, "end": 81}], "entity": [{"text": "his GMail account", "start": 58, "end": 75}, {"text": "IMAP", "start": 82, "end": 86}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Even after he changed his password, the accesses continued.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "Even after", "start": 0, "end": 10}], "entity": [{"text": "he changed his password", "start": 11, "end": 34}, {"text": "the accesses", "start": 36, "end": 48}], "action": [{"text": "continued", "start": 49, "end": 58}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While corresponding with Ahmed on his compromised account, an author of this pa- per discovered that the attackers had installed an application- specific password in Ahmed's GMail account, a secondary password that they apparently used to access his account even after he changed his main password.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a secondary password", "start": 189, "end": 209}, {"text": "they", "start": 215, "end": 219}, {"text": "access his account", "start": 239, "end": 257}, {"text": "he changed his main password", "start": 269, "end": 297}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 231, "end": 235}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 236, "end": 238}, {"text": "even after", "start": 258, "end": 268}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The suspicious accesses stopped after removal of the application-specific password.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Two weeks after this correspondence with Ahmed, one of us (Author in Figure 5) received a targeted e-mail with a link to a file hosted on Google Docs containing a commercial off-the- shelf RAT, Xtreme RAT.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "one of us", "start": 48, "end": 57}, {"text": "a targeted e-mail with a link to a file hosted on Google Docs containing a commercial off-the- shelf RAT, Xtreme RAT", "start": 88, "end": 204}], "action": [{"text": "received", "start": 79, "end": 87}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The e-mail was sent from the UAE's timezone (as well as of other countries) and contained the terms'' veryimportant'' and'' wikileaks'', just like in the e-mail re- ceived by Ahmed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The instance of Xtreme RAT sent to Author used owner.no-ip.biz for its C & C, one of the domains men- tioned in a report published by Norman about a year-long cam- paign of cyberattacks on Israeli and Palestinian targets carried out by a group that Norman was unable to identify.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The instance of Xtreme RAT sent to Author", "start": 0, "end": 41}, {"text": "owner.no-ip.biz", "start": 47, "end": 62}, {"text": "its C & C", "start": 67, "end": 76}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 42, "end": 46}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 63, "end": 66}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Three months after Author was targeted, Ahmed received an e-mail containing an attachment with Xtreme RAT that talked to the same C & C server (Figure 5), suggesting that the attackers who infected Ahmed with RCS may have provided a list of interest- ing e-mail addresses to another group for further targeting.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Ahmed", "start": 40, "end": 45}, {"text": "an e-mail containing an attachment", "start": 55, "end": 89}, {"text": "Xtreme RAT", "start": 95, "end": 105}, {"text": "the same C & C server", "start": 121, "end": 142}], "action": [{"text": "received", "start": 46, "end": 54}, {"text": "talked", "start": 111, "end": 117}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 90, "end": 94}, {"text": "to", "start": 118, "end": 120}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Possible consequences: Shortly after he was targeted, Ahmed says he was physically assaulted twice by an attacker who appeared able to track Ahmed's location.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "He also re- ports that his car was stolen, a large sum of money disappeared from his bank account, and his passport was confiscated.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "He believes these consequences are part of a government in- timidation campaign against him, but we did not uncover any direct links to his infection.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "(Interestingly, spyware subse- quently sent to others has used bait content about Ahmed.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "spyware subse- quently sent to others", "start": 16, "end": 53}, {"text": "bait content about Ahmed", "start": 63, "end": 87}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 58, "end": 62}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ") Further attacks: In October 2012, UAE Journalist A and Human Rights activist B (per Figure 6) forwarded us suspi- cious e-mails they had received that contained a Word docu- ment corresponding to the first stage of 3-Stage Exploit Kit (Figure 5).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "suspi- cious e-mails", "start": 109, "end": 129}, {"text": "they", "start": 130, "end": 134}, {"text": "that contained a Word docu- ment corresponding to the first stage of 3-Stage Exploit Kit", "start": 148, "end": 236}], "action": [{"text": "received", "start": 139, "end": 147}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attachment contained an embedded Flash file that exploited a vulnerability fixed in Adobe Flash 11.4, loading shell code to download a second stage from faddeha.com.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an embedded Flash file that exploited a vulnerability fixed in Adobe Flash 11.4", "start": 25, "end": 104}, {"text": "shell code", "start": 114, "end": 124}, {"text": "a second stage", "start": 137, "end": 151}, {"text": "faddeha.com", "start": 157, "end": 168}], "action": [{"text": "loading", "start": 106, "end": 113}, {"text": "download", "start": 128, "end": 136}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 152, "end": 156}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We were unable to obtain the second stage or the ultimate pay- load, as the website was unavailable at the time of testing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, the exploit kit appears indicative of Hacking Team involvement.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A page on faddeha.com found in Google's cache contained an embedded .jar", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "with the same applet class (WebEnhancer) as those observed in other .jar", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "files that we found to contain RCS.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We found a file that VirusTotal had downloaded from faddeha.com, which appeared to be a re- mote access toolkit known as SpyNet, available for general pur- chase for 50 Euros.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The SpyNet sample communicated with the C & C hamas.sytes.net.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The SpyNet sample", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "the C & C hamas.sytes.net", "start": 36, "end": 61}], "action": [{"text": "communicated", "start": 18, "end": 30}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 31, "end": 35}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "SpyNet Packing: We found another instance of the first stage of the 3-Stage Exploit Kit on VirusTotal.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The exploit downloaded a second stage, which in turn downloaded a sam- ple of SpyNet from maile-s.com.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The exploit", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "a second stage", "start": 23, "end": 37}, {"text": "a sam- ple of SpyNet", "start": 64, "end": 84}, {"text": "maile-s.com", "start": 90, "end": 101}], "action": [{"text": "downloaded", "start": 12, "end": 22}, {"text": "downloaded", "start": 53, "end": 63}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 85, "end": 89}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This sample of SpyNet communicated with the same C & C hamas.sytes.net.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This sample of SpyNet", "start": 0, "end": 21}, {"text": "the same C & C hamas.sytes.net", "start": 40, "end": 70}], "action": [{"text": "communicated", "start": 22, "end": 34}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 35, "end": 39}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The sample was packed using ASProtect.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When run, the sample unpacks a compiled Visual Basic project that loads, via the RunPE method, an executable packed with UPX.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a compiled Visual Basic project", "start": 29, "end": 60}, {"text": "the RunPE method", "start": 77, "end": 93}, {"text": "an executable packed with UPX", "start": 95, "end": 124}], "action": [{"text": "loads", "start": 66, "end": 71}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 73, "end": 76}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Finally, this executable unpacks SpyNet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "SpyNet's GUI only offers an option to pack with UPX, suggesting that the attack- ers specially added the other layers of packing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In some cases, the Visual Basic project bears the name NoWayTech, which appears to be an underground RunPE tool, while others are named SpyVisual, which we have been unable to trace to any public underground tools, and thus also may reflect customiza- tion by the attacker.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The SpyVisual projects contain the string c: \\Users\\Zain\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\OLE1EmbedStrm.wav, which we used as the fingerprint VB Packer in Figure 6.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cedar Key attack: The same VB Packer was used in an attack on Relative of political detainee D and H.R.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "activist E in Figure 6.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These individuals received e-mails containing a link to a web page hosted on cedarkeyrv.com impersonat- ing YouTube.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These individuals", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "e-mails containing a link to a web page hosted on cedarkeyrv.com impersonat- ing YouTube", "start": 27, "end": 115}], "action": [{"text": "received", "start": 18, "end": 26}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Loading the page greeted the target with'' Video loading please wait.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ".", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ".", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' The page redirected to a YouTube video a few seconds later, but first loaded a Java exploit -a known vulnerability with no patch at the time that the e-mails were sent.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The page", "start": 3, "end": 11}, {"text": "a Java exploit", "start": 80, "end": 94}], "action": [{"text": "loaded", "start": 73, "end": 79}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Oracle released a patch 12 hours after activists began receiving these links.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The cedarkeyrv.com domain is associated with an RV park in Cedar Key, Florida.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The website's hosting company told us that the site had apparently suffered a compromise, but did not have further details.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The exploit used in the attack appears to have been origi- nally posted by a Kuwaiti user, njq8, on an Arabic-language exploit sharing site.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We contacted njq8, who told us that he had obtained the exploit elsewhere and modified it prior to posting.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attack downloaded an instance of SpyNet from isteeler.com (which from our inspection did not appear to have any legitimate content), which used the C & C storge.myftp.org.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attack", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "an instance of SpyNet", "start": 22, "end": 43}, {"text": "isteeler.com", "start": 49, "end": 61}, {"text": "the C & C storge.myftp.org", "start": 148, "end": 174}], "action": [{"text": "downloaded", "start": 11, "end": 21}, {"text": "used", "start": 143, "end": 147}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 44, "end": 48}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This same C & C occurred in an- other attack (Figure 6) targeting Relative of political detainee D; in that case, the payload was a freely-available RAT known as njRAT, written by the same njq8 as the exploit-poster dis- cussed above.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, we did not find any other evidence suggesting njq8's involvement in either attack.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "More SpyNet attacks: The domain hamas.sytes.net, which we previously saw used by two SpyNet sam- ples, resolved to 67.205.79.177.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Historically, dreems.no-ip.ca also resolved to this address.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An unidentified dropper using this C & C targeted Journalist F; a SpyNet attack on Relative of political detainee D also used this C & C.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "An unidentified dropper", "start": 0, "end": 23}, {"text": "this C & C", "start": 30, "end": 40}, {"text": "a SpyNet attack on Relative of political detainee D", "start": 64, "end": 115}, {"text": "this C & C", "start": 126, "end": 136}], "action": [{"text": "using", "start": 24, "end": 29}, {"text": "used", "start": 121, "end": 125}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In that latter case, the sample arrived via e-mail in a .rar attachment that contained an .scr file disguised as a Word document.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the sample", "start": 21, "end": 31}, {"text": "e-mail", "start": 44, "end": 50}, {"text": "a .rar attachment", "start": 54, "end": 71}, {"text": "an .scr file", "start": 87, "end": 99}, {"text": "a Word document", "start": 113, "end": 128}], "action": [{"text": "arrived", "start": 32, "end": 39}, {"text": "disguised", "start": 100, "end": 109}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 40, "end": 43}, {"text": "in", "start": 51, "end": 53}, {"text": "as", "start": 110, "end": 112}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The .scr file was a self-extracting archive that decompressed and ran both the bait document and the payload.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The .scr file", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "both the bait document and the payload", "start": 70, "end": 108}], "action": [{"text": "ran", "start": 66, "end": 69}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The SMTP source of the e-mail was webmail.upload.bz.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Appin: In early 2013 UAE H.R.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "activist E forwarded nu- merous documents that included a particular CVE-2012-0158 exploit for Microsoft Word.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In all, these totaled 17 distinct hashes of documents, and 10 distinct hashes of payloads (some documents that differed in their hash downloaded the same pay- load).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "some documents that differed in their hash", "start": 91, "end": 133}, {"text": "the same pay- load", "start": 145, "end": 163}], "action": [{"text": "downloaded", "start": 134, "end": 144}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The exploits primarily downloaded instances of SpyNet from upload.bz, which for the most part communicated with C & C at sn.all-google.com.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The exploits", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "instances of SpyNet", "start": 34, "end": 53}, {"text": "upload.bz", "start": 59, "end": 68}, {"text": "C & C at sn.all-google.com", "start": 112, "end": 138}], "action": [{"text": "downloaded", "start": 23, "end": 33}, {"text": "communicated", "start": 94, "end": 106}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 54, "end": 58}, {"text": "with", "start": 107, "end": 111}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This domain was also used for C & C in other attacks, including that on Journalist C. Two of the other CVE-2012-0158 exploits down- loaded DarkComet from www.getmedia.us and www.technopenta.com after posting system infor- mation to random123.site11.com.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This domain", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "C & C in other attacks", "start": 30, "end": 52}, {"text": "Two of the other CVE-2012-0158 exploits", "start": 86, "end": 125}, {"text": "DarkComet", "start": 139, "end": 148}, {"text": "www.getmedia.us and www.technopenta.com", "start": 154, "end": 193}, {"text": "system infor- mation", "start": 208, "end": 228}, {"text": "random123.site11.com", "start": 232, "end": 252}], "action": [{"text": "was also used", "start": 12, "end": 25}, {"text": "down- loaded", "start": 126, "end": 138}, {"text": "posting", "start": 200, "end": 207}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 26, "end": 29}, {"text": "from", "start": 149, "end": 153}, {"text": "to", "start": 229, "end": 231}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All three domains match those used by an Indian cybermercenary group said to be linked to Appin Security Group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The former two domains hosted content other than spyware (i.e., they may have been compromised).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We alerted the owner of www.getmedia.us, who removed the payloads.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The samples we received afforded us an opportunity to em- pirically characterize the use of FinFisher and Hacking Team around the world, enabling us to assess their prevalence, and identify other country cases that may warrant future investiga- tion.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We analyzed the samples and the behavior of their C & C servers to develop indicators (fingerprints) for how the servers respond to certain types of requests.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We then scanned the full Internet IPv4 address space ('' /0'') for these, along with prob- ing results found by past scans.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In many cases we do not release the full details of our fingerprints to avoid compromising what may be legitimate investigations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Identifying and linking servers: We developed a number of fingerprints for identifying FinSpy servers using HTTP- based probing as well as FinSpy's custom TLV-based proto- col. We leveraged quirks such as specific non-compliance with RFC 2616, responses to certain types of invalid data, and the presence of signatures such as the bizarre'' Hallo Steffi'' that Guarnieri identified from Bahraini FinSpy C & C servers [,].", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "See Appendix A for details.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We then exhaus- tively scanned the Internet looking for matches to these finger- prints.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Gamma documentation advertises that an operator of FinSpy can obscure the location of the C & C server (called the mas- ter) by setting up a proxy known as a relay.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an operator of FinSpy", "start": 36, "end": 57}, {"text": "the location of the C & C server (called the mas- ter)", "start": 70, "end": 124}, {"text": "setting up a proxy known as a relay", "start": 128, "end": 163}], "action": [{"text": "obscure", "start": 62, "end": 69}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 125, "end": 127}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In Spring 2013 we noticed FinSpy servers now issuing 302 Redirects to google.com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, we noticed anomalies: for ex- ample, servers in India were redirecting to the Latvian ver- sion of Google google.lv.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We suspect that the server in India was a relay forwarding to a master in Latvia.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Be- cause the master served as a proxy for Google, we could uncover its IP address using a Google feature that prints a user's IP address for the query'' IP address.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' We created an additional fingerprint based on the proxying behavior and is- sued GET /search? q=ip+address & nord=1 requests to servers We note some interesting master locations in Table 4.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Server locations: In all, our fingerprints matched 92 dis- tinct IP addresses in 35 different countries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Probing these on 8/8/13 revealed 22 distinct addresses still responding, sited in: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Ethiopia, Germany, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Macedonia, Mex- ico, Romania, Serbia, Turkmenistan, and the United States.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We found servers responding to a number of our fingerprints, sug- gesting either that some servers lag in their updates, or a con- certed effort to vary the behavior of FinSpy servers to make detection harder.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We found: (1) 3 IP addresses in ranges registered to Gamma.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "(2) Servers in 3 IP ranges explicitly registered to govern- ment agencies: Turkmenistan's Ministry of Communications, Qatar's State Security Bureau, and the Bulgarian Council of Ministers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "(3) 3 additional IP addresses in Bahrain, all in Batelco.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "(4) Servers in 7 countries with governments classified as'' authoritarian regimes'' by The Economist: Bahrain, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Qatar, Turkmenistan, UAE, Vietnam.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additional FinSpy samples: In parallel to our scanning, we obtained 9 samples of FinSpy by writing YARA rules for the'' malware hunting'' feature of VirusTotal Intelligence.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This feature sends us all newly-submitted samples that match our signatures.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We located a version of FinSpy that does not use the normal FinSpy handshake, but instead uses a protocol based on HTTP POST requests for communication with the C & C server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a version of FinSpy", "start": 11, "end": 30}, {"text": "a protocol based on HTTP POST requests", "start": 95, "end": 133}, {"text": "communication with the C & C server", "start": 138, "end": 173}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 90, "end": 94}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 134, "end": 137}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This did not appear to be an older or newer ver- sion of the protocol, suggesting that our scan results may not reveal the full scope of FinSpy C & C servers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Perhaps, the HTTP POST protocol was only delivered to a specific Gamma customer to meet a requirement.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We began by analyzing the UAE RCS sample from Ahmed and 6 samples obtained from VirusTotal by searching for AV re- sults containing the strings'' DaVinci'' and'' RCS.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' At the time, several AV vendors had added detection for RCS based on a sample analyzed by Dr.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Web and the UAE RCS sample sent to Ahmed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also similarly obtained and analyzed sam- ples of FSBSpy, a piece of malware that can report system information, upload screenshots, and drop and execute more malware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a piece of malware", "start": 61, "end": 79}, {"text": "system information", "start": 96, "end": 114}, {"text": "screenshots", "start": 123, "end": 134}, {"text": "more malware", "start": 157, "end": 169}], "action": [{"text": "report", "start": 89, "end": 95}, {"text": "upload", "start": 116, "end": 122}, {"text": "drop and execute", "start": 140, "end": 156}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Based on these samples, we devised YARA signa- tures that yielded 23 additional samples of structurally similar malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Fingerprints: We probed the C & C servers of the RCS and FSBSpy samples, and found that they responded in a distinc- tive way to HTTP requests, and returned distinctive SSL cer- tificates.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We searched sources including Shodan, 5 Internet Census service probes, and Critical.IO scanning data for the observed distinctive HTTP behavior.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We searched for the dis- tinctive SSL certificates in two Internet Census service probes, and SSL certificate scans from ZMap.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also contacted a team at TU Munich, who applied our fingerprints to their SSL scanning data.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Across all of these sources, we obtained 31,345 indicator hits reflecting 555 IP addresses in 48 coun- tries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One SSL certificate returned by 175 of the servers was issued by'' /CN=RCS Certification Authority /O=HT srl,'' apparently referring to the name of the spyware and the company.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Servers for 5 of our FSBSpy samples and 2 of our RCS samples re- sponded with this type of certificate.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some servers returned these certificates in chains that in- cluded another distinctive certificate.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We found 175 distinct IP addresses (including the C & C's for 5 of our FSBSpy samples and 2 of our RCS samples) responded with this second type of certificate.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We devised two more indicators: one that matched 125 IP addresses, including 7 of our FSBSpy samples' C & C's, and one that matched 2 IP addresses, in Italy and Kazakhstan.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Server locations: On 11/4/13 we probed all of the IP ad- dresses that we collected, finding 166 active addresses match- ing one of our fingerprints in 29 different countries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We sum- marize the top providers and countries in Table 5.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The prevalence of active servers either located in the USA or hosted by Linode is striking, and seems to indicate a pervasive use of out-of-country web hosting and VPS services.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, we found: (1) 3 IP addresses on a /28 named'' HT public subnet'' that is registered to the CFO of Hacking Team.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The domain hackingteam.it resolves to an address in this range.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "(2) An address belonging to Omantel, a majority-state-owned telecom in Oman.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This address was un- reachable when we probed it; a researcher pointed us to an FS- BSpy sample that contained an Arabic-language bait document about Omani poetry, which talked to a C & C in the UK.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an FS- BSpy sample", "start": 77, "end": 95}, {"text": "an Arabic-language bait document about Omani poetry", "start": 111, "end": 162}, {"text": "a C & C in the UK", "start": 180, "end": 197}], "action": [{"text": "contained", "start": 101, "end": 110}, {"text": "talked", "start": 170, "end": 176}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 177, "end": 179}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "(3) 7 IP addresses belonging to Maroc Telecom.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Moroccan journal- ists at Mamfakinch.com were previously targeted by RCS in 2012.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "(4) Overall, servers in 8 countries with governments deemed'' authoritarian regimes'': Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, UAE, Uzbekistan.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Link to Hacking Team: All active servers match- ing one of our signatures also responded peculiarly when queried with particular ill-formed HTTP requests, respond- ing with'' HTTP1/1 400 Bad request'' (should be'' HTTP/1.1'') and a body of'' Detected error: HTTP code 400''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Googling for this response yielded a GitHub project em-http-server, a Ruby-based webserver.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The project's author is listed as Alberto Ornaghi, a software architect at Hacking Team.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We suspect that the Hacking Team C & C server code may incorporate code from this project.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Links between servers: We identified many cases where several servers hosted by different providers, and in different countries, returned identical SSL certificates matching our fin- gerprints.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also observed 30 active servers used a global IPID.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Only one active server had neither a global IPID nor an SSL certificate matching our fingerprints.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We assessed whether servers returning SSL certificates were forwarding to the servers with global IPIDs by inducing bursts of traffic at the former and monitoring the IPID at the latter.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For 11 servers, we found that the server's activity correlated to bursts sent to other servers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We grouped servers by the SSL certificates they returned, and found that each group forwarded to only a sin- gle server, except for one case where a group forwarded to two different IPs (both in Morocco).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "each group", "start": 73, "end": 83}, {"text": "only a sin- gle server", "start": 97, "end": 119}, {"text": "a group", "start": 147, "end": 154}, {"text": "two different IPs", "start": 168, "end": 185}], "action": [{"text": "forwarded", "start": 84, "end": 93}, {"text": "forwarded", "start": 155, "end": 164}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 94, "end": 96}, {"text": "to", "start": 165, "end": 167}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also found two groups that forwarded to the same address.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "two groups", "start": 14, "end": 24}, {"text": "the same address", "start": 43, "end": 59}], "action": [{"text": "forwarded", "start": 30, "end": 39}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 40, "end": 42}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There was a 1:1 mapping between the remaining 8 addresses and groups.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We refer to a group along with the server (s) it forwards to as a server group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We identified several server groups that may be associated with victims or operators in a certain country.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some of these suggest possible further investigation: Turkey: We identified a group containing 20 servers in 9 countries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Two RCS and 5 FSBSpy samples from VirusTo- tal communicated with various servers in the group.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Two RCS and 5 FSBSpy samples from VirusTo- tal", "start": 0, "end": 46}, {"text": "various servers in the group", "start": 65, "end": 93}], "action": [{"text": "communicated", "start": 47, "end": 59}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 60, "end": 64}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The RCS samples also communicated with domains with lapsed registra- tions, so we registered them to observe incoming traffic.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The RCS samples", "start": 0, "end": 15}, {"text": "domains with lapsed registra- tions", "start": 39, "end": 74}], "action": [{"text": "communicated", "start": 21, "end": 33}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 34, "end": 38}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We ex- clusively received RCS traffic from Turkish IP addresses.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "(RCS traffic is identifiable based on a distinctive user agent and URL in POST requests.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ") A sample of FSBSpy apparently installed from an exploit on a Turkish server talked to one of the servers in this group.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "A sample of FSBSpy", "start": 2, "end": 20}, {"text": "one of the servers in this group", "start": 88, "end": 120}], "action": [{"text": "talked", "start": 78, "end": 84}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 85, "end": 87}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also found server groups containing servers in Uzbek- istan and Kazakhstan; we found FSBSpy samples on Virus- Total uploaded from these countries that communicated with servers in these groups.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "FSBSpy samples on Virus- Total uploaded from these countries", "start": 88, "end": 148}, {"text": "servers in these groups", "start": 172, "end": 195}], "action": [{"text": "communicated", "start": 154, "end": 166}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 167, "end": 171}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the above cases, save Turkey, the country we have identi- fied is classified as an'' authoritarian regime,'' and may be using Hacking Team products against the types of targets we profile in this paper.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the case of Turkey, there are hints that the tool may be employed against dissidents.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Targeted surveillance of individuals conducted by nation-states poses an exceptionally challenging security problem, given the great imbalance of resources and expertise between the victims and the attackers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have sketched the nature of this problem space as reported to us by targeted individuals in three Middle Eastern countries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attacks include spyware for ongoing monitoring and the use of'' IP spy'' links to deanonymize those who voice dissent.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attacks", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "spyware for ongoing monitoring", "start": 20, "end": 50}, {"text": "the use of'' IP spy'' links to deanonymize those who voice dissent", "start": 55, "end": 121}], "action": [{"text": "include", "start": 12, "end": 19}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attacks, while sometimes incorporating effective so- cial engineering, in general lack novel technical elements.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attacks", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "effective so- cial engineering", "start": 43, "end": 73}], "action": [{"text": "incorporating", "start": 29, "end": 42}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In- stead, they employ prepackaged tools developed by vendors or acquired from the cybercrime underground.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This technol- ogy sometimes suffers from what strike us as amateurish mis- takes (multiple serious errors implementing cryptography, bro- ken protocol messages), as does the attackers' employment of it (identifying-information embedded in binaries, C & C servers discoverable via scanning or'' Google hacking'', clusters of at- tack accounts tied by common activity).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some of these errors assisted our efforts to assemble strong circumstantial evidence of governmental origins.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, we mapped out the global use of two'' governmental'' hacking suites, including identify- ing 11 cases in which they appeared to be used in countries governed by'' authoritarian regimes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' We aim with this work to inspire additional research efforts addressing the difficult problem of how to adequately protect individuals with very limited resources facing very powerful adversaries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Open questions include robust, practical detection of targeted attacks designed to exfiltrate data from a victim's computer, as well as detection of and defense against novel at- tack vectors, like tampering with Internet connections to insert malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The task is highly challenging, but the potential stakes are likewise very high.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An opposition member, reflecting on gov- ernment hacking in Libya, speculated as to why some users would execute files even while recognizing them as potentially malicious:'' If we were vulnerable we couldn't care less.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ".", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ".", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "we were desperate to get our voices out.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ".", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ".", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "it was a matter of life or death.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ".", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ".", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "it was just vital to get this information out.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' This work was supported by the National Science Foundation under grants 1223717 and 1237265, and by a Citizen Lab Fel- lowship.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recom- mendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the sponsors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The authors would like to thank the following individuals for their help in various aspects of our analysis: Bernhard Am- man, Collin D. Anderson, Brandon Dixon, Zakir Durumeric, Eva Galperin, Claudio Guarnieri, Drew Hintz, Ralph Holz, Shane Huntley, Andrew Lyons, Mark Schloesser, and Nicholas Weaver.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Previous work by Guarnieri on scanning for FinSpy servers found that in response to a request such as GET/, the Bahraini FinSpy C & C server returns a response with the string'' Hallo Steffi''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Guarnieri searched a database of such responses compiled by the Critical.IO Internet scanning project, locating 11 additional servers in 10 countries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We refer to this fingerprint as α1.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Concurrent with this ef- fort, we devised our own fingerprint β1 that tested three as- pects of the handshake between a FinSpy infectee and a Fin- Spy C & C server, which follows a custom TLV-based protocol running on ports such as 22, 53, 80, and 443.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We conducted targeted scanning of several countries using β1, and also con- firmed Guarnieri's findings for those servers still reachable af- ter he published his findings.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We observed a trend: changes in HTTP response behavior by FinFisher after publication of findings about the software.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In July 2012, for example, after a post about Bahraini FinSpy samples, servers closed the TCP connection in response to a GET/or HEAD/request (although servers continued to behave consistently with β1.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other changes followed later in 2012, including a new response to GET/requests that in- cluded an imperfect copy of an Apache server's HTTP response (the Date header used UTC rather than GMT).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We fingerprinted this error as α2, and later in 2012 fingerprinted other distinctive behavior in response to GET/requests as α3.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Subsequent scans of /0 for α2 and α3, and five service probes of the Internet Census for α1 through α3, located several additional servers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In Feburary 2013 we identified and finger- printed new HTTP response behavior with α4 and modified β1 to produce β2, which tests only two of the three aspects of the FinSpy handshake (the third test of β1 was broken when Fin- Spy servers were updated to accept types of invalid data they had previously rejected).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As of 3/13/13, all servers that matched any α fingerprint matched β2.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our clients often ask us to assess the threat Russia poses in cyberspace.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Russia has long been a whispered frontrunner among capable nations for performing sophisticated network operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This perception is due in part to the Russian government's alleged involvement in the cyber attacks accompanying its invasion of Georgia in 2008, as well as the rampant speculation that Moscow was behind a major U.S. Department of Defense network compromise, also in 2008.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These rumored activities, combined with a dearth of hard evidence, have made Russia into something of a phantom in cyberspace.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this paper we discuss a threat group whose malware is already fairly well-known in the cybersecurity community.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This group, unlike the China-based threat actors we track, does not appear to conduct widespread intellectual property theft for economic gain.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Nor have we observed the group steal and profit from financial account information.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The activity that we profile in this paper appears to be the work of a skilled team of developers and operators collecting intelligence on defense and geopolitical issues–intelligence that would only be useful to a government.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We believe that this is an advanced persistent threat (APT) group engaged in espionage against political and military targets including the country of Georgia, Eastern European governments and militaries, and European security organizations since at least 2007.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They compile malware samples with Russian language settings during working hours consistent with the time zone of Russia's major cities, including Moscow and St. Petersburg.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While we don't have pictures of a building, personas to reveal, or a government agency to name, what we do have is evidence of long- standing, focused operations that indicate a government sponsor–specifically, a government based in Moscow.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We are tracking this group as APT28.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "APT28 targets insider information related to governments, militaries, and security organizations that would likely benefit the Russian government.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Malware compile times suggest that APT28 developers have consistently updated their tools over the last seven years.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Since 2007, APT28 has systematically evolved its malware, using flexible and lasting platforms indicative of plans for long-term use.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The coding practices evident in the group's malware suggest both a high level of skill and an interest in complicating reverse engineering efforts.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Malware compile times suggest that APT28 developers have consistently updated their tools over the last seven years.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• APT28 malware, in particular the family of modular backdoors that we call CHOPSTICK, indicates a formal code development environment.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Such an environment would almost certainly be required to track and define the various modules that can be included in the backdoor at compile time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• APT28 tailors implants for specific victim environments.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They steal data by configuring their implants to send data out of the network using a victim network's mail server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "They", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "data", "start": 11, "end": 15}, {"text": "their implants", "start": 31, "end": 45}, {"text": "data", "start": 54, "end": 58}, {"text": "the network", "start": 66, "end": 77}, {"text": "a victim network's mail server", "start": 84, "end": 114}], "action": [{"text": "steal", "start": 5, "end": 10}, {"text": "send", "start": 49, "end": 53}], "modifier": [{"text": "out of", "start": 59, "end": 65}, {"text": "using", "start": 78, "end": 83}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Several of APT28's malware samples contain counter- analysis capabilities including runtime checks to identify an analysis environment, obfuscated strings unpacked at runtime, and the inclusion of unused machine instructions to slow analysis.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Several of APT28's malware samples", "start": 2, "end": 36}, {"text": "counter- analysis capabilities", "start": 45, "end": 75}, {"text": "runtime checks", "start": 86, "end": 100}, {"text": "an analysis environment", "start": 113, "end": 136}, {"text": "obfuscated strings", "start": 138, "end": 156}, {"text": "runtime", "start": 169, "end": 176}, {"text": "inclusion of unused machine instructions", "start": 186, "end": 226}, {"text": "analysis", "start": 235, "end": 243}], "action": [{"text": "contain", "start": 37, "end": 44}, {"text": "identify", "start": 104, "end": 112}, {"text": "unpacked", "start": 157, "end": 165}, {"text": "slow", "start": 230, "end": 234}], "modifier": [{"text": "at", "start": 166, "end": 168}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Indicators in APT28's malware suggest that the group consists of Russian speakers operating during business hours in Russia's major cities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "More than half of the malware samples with Portable Executable (PE) resources that we have attributed to APT28 included Russian language settings (as opposed to neutral or English settings), suggesting that a significant portion of APT28 malware was compiled in a Russian language build environment consistently over the course of six years (2007 to 2013).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Over 96% of the malware samples we have attributed to APT28 were compiled between Monday and Friday.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "More than 89% were compiled between 8AM and 6PM in the UTC+4 time zone, which parallels the working hours in Moscow and St. Petersburg.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These samples had compile dates ranging from mid-2007 to September 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Three themes in APT28's targeting clearly reflect areas of specific interest to an Eastern European government, most likely the Russian government.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many of APT28's targets align generally with interests that are typical of any government.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, three themes in APT28's targeting clearly reflects areas of specific interest to an Eastern European government, most likely the Russian government.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These include the Caucasus (especially the Georgian government), Eastern European governments and militaries, and specific security organizations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "APT28 uses spearphishing emails to target its victims, a common tactic in which the threat group crafts its emails to mention specific topics (lures) relevant to recipients.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "APT28", "start": 0, "end": 5}, {"text": "spearphishing emails", "start": 11, "end": 31}, {"text": "target its victims", "start": 35, "end": 53}, {"text": "the threat group", "start": 80, "end": 96}, {"text": "its emails", "start": 104, "end": 114}, {"text": "mention specific topics (lures) relevant to recipients", "start": 118, "end": 172}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 6, "end": 10}, {"text": "crafts", "start": 97, "end": 103}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 32, "end": 34}, {"text": "to", "start": 115, "end": 117}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This increases the likelihood that recipients will believe that the email is legitimate and will be interested in opening the message, opening any attached files, or clicking on a link in the body of the email.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Since spearphishing lures are tailored to the recipients whose accounts APT28 hopes to breach, the subjects of the lures provide clues as to APT28's targets and interests.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, if the group's lures repeatedly refer to the Caucasus, then this most likely indicates that APT28 is trying to gain access to the accounts of individuals whose work pertains to the Caucasus.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Similarly, APT28's practice of registering domains that mimic those of legitimate news, politics, or other websites indicates topics that are relevant to APT28's targets.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We identified three themes in APT28's lures and registered domains, which together are particularly relevant to the Russian government.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition to these themes, we have seen APT28 target a range of political and military organizations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We assess that the work of these organizations serves nation state governments.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Caucasus, a region that includes Chechnya and other Russian republics and the independent states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, continues to experience political unrest.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Georgian government's posture and ties to the West are a frequent source of Moscow's frustration, particularly after the 2008 war.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Overall, issues in the Caucasus likely serve as focal points for Russian intelligence collection efforts.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Since 2011, APT28 has used lures written in Georgian that are probably intended to target Georgian government agencies or citizens.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "APT28", "start": 12, "end": 17}, {"text": "lures written in Georgian", "start": 27, "end": 52}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 22, "end": 26}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "APT28 is likely seeking information on Georgia's security and diplomatic postures.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Specifically, the group has targeted the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and the Ministry of Defense (MOD).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also observed efforts to target a journalist working on issues in the Caucasus and a controversial Chechen news site.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "APT28 made at least two specific attempts to target the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The MIA harbors sensitive information about the inner workings of Georgia's security operations, the country's engagement in multilateral institutions, and the government's communications backbone.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is responsible for: APT28 made at least two specific attempts to target the MIA.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In one case, we identified an APT28 lure from mid-2013 that referenced MIA-related topics and employed malware that attempted to disguise its activity as legitimate MIA email traffic.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "malware", "start": 103, "end": 110}, {"text": "its activity", "start": 138, "end": 150}, {"text": "legitimate MIA email traffic", "start": 154, "end": 182}], "action": [{"text": "disguise", "start": 129, "end": 137}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 151, "end": 153}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The lure consisted of a weaponized Excel file that presented a decoy document containing a list of Georgian driver's license numbers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a weaponized Excel file", "start": 22, "end": 45}, {"text": "a decoy document containing a list of Georgian driver's license numbers", "start": 61, "end": 132}], "action": [{"text": "presented", "start": 51, "end": 60}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The backdoor attempted to establish a connection to a Georgian MIA mail server and communicate via MIA email addresses ending with'' @mia.ge.gov''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "a connection to a Georgian MIA mail server", "start": 36, "end": 78}, {"text": "MIA email addresses ending with'' @mia.ge.gov''", "start": 99, "end": 146}], "action": [{"text": "establish", "start": 26, "end": 35}, {"text": "communicate", "start": 83, "end": 94}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 95, "end": 98}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once connected to the mail server, APT28's backdoor sent an email message using a subject line related to driver's licenses (in Georgian), and attached a file containing system reconnaissance information.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "APT28's backdoor", "start": 35, "end": 51}, {"text": "an email message using a subject line related to driver's licenses (in Georgian)", "start": 57, "end": 137}, {"text": "a file containing system reconnaissance information", "start": 152, "end": 203}], "action": [{"text": "sent", "start": 52, "end": 56}, {"text": "attached", "start": 143, "end": 151}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This tactic could allow APT28 to obtain data from the MIA's network through a less-monitored route, limiting the MIA network security department's abilities to detect the traffic.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "APT28", "start": 24, "end": 29}, {"text": "data", "start": 40, "end": 44}, {"text": "the MIA's network", "start": 50, "end": 67}, {"text": "a less-monitored route", "start": 76, "end": 98}, {"text": "the MIA network security department's abilities to detect the traffic", "start": 109, "end": 178}], "action": [{"text": "obtain", "start": 33, "end": 39}, {"text": "limiting", "start": 100, "end": 108}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 45, "end": 49}, {"text": "through", "start": 68, "end": 75}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the second example of MIA targeting, an APT28 lure used an information technology-themed decoy document that included references to the Windows domain'' MIA Users\\Ortachala…'' (Figure 1).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an APT28 lure", "start": 40, "end": 53}, {"text": "an information technology-themed decoy document that included references to the Windows domain'' MIA Users\\Ortachala…'' (Figure 1)", "start": 59, "end": 189}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 54, "end": 58}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This probably referred to the MIA facility in the Ortachala district of Tbilisi, Georgia's capital city.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The decoy document also contains metadata listing'' MIA'' as the company name and'' Beka Nozadze'' as an author, a possible reference to a system administrator in Tbilisi.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The decoy document", "start": 0, "end": 18}, {"text": "metadata listing'' MIA'' as the company name and'' Beka Nozadze'' as an author", "start": 33, "end": 111}], "action": [{"text": "contains", "start": 24, "end": 32}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The text of the document purports to provide domain and user group setup information for internal Windows XP and Windows 7 systems.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The text of the document", "start": 0, "end": 24}, {"text": "provide domain and user group setup information for internal Windows XP and Windows 7 systems", "start": 37, "end": 130}], "action": [{"text": "purports", "start": 25, "end": 33}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 34, "end": 36}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "APT28 possibly crafted this document to appear legitimate to all MIA system users and intended to breach the MIA network specifically using the embedded malware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "APT28", "start": 0, "end": 5}, {"text": "this document", "start": 23, "end": 36}, {"text": "appear legitimate to all MIA system users", "start": 40, "end": 81}], "action": [{"text": "crafted", "start": 15, "end": 22}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 37, "end": 39}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "APT28 also appeared to target Georgia's MOD along with a U.S. defense contractor that was training the Georgian military.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "APT28 used a lure document that installed a SOURFACE downloader (further discussed in the Malware section) and contained a listing of birthdays for members of a working group between the Georgian MOD and the U.S. defense contractor.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "APT28", "start": 0, "end": 5}, {"text": "a lure document", "start": 11, "end": 26}, {"text": "a SOURFACE downloader", "start": 42, "end": 63}, {"text": "a listing of birthdays for members of a working group between the Georgian MOD and the U.S. defense contractor", "start": 121, "end": 231}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 6, "end": 10}, {"text": "installed", "start": 32, "end": 41}, {"text": "contained", "start": 111, "end": 120}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The U.S. contractor was involved in a working group to advise the MOD and Georgian Armed Forces, assess Georgia's military capabilities, and develop a military training program for the country.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We believe that APT28's targeting of the MOD aligns with Russian threat perceptions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The growing U.S.-Georgian military relationship has been a source of angst for Russia.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Georgia and Russia severed diplomatic relations following the Russia-Georgia War in 2008, and Georgia has since sought to align itself more closely with western security organizations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additionally, in June 2014, despite Russia's vocal objections, Georgia, along with Ukraine and Moldova, signed association accords with the EU.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This move placed all three countries more firmly in the EU's political, economic, and security spheres of influence.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Georgian military security issues, particularly with regard to U.S. cooperation and NATO, provide a strong incentive for Russian state-sponsored threat actors to steal information that sheds light on these topics.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Targeting journalists could provide APT28 and its sponsors with a way to monitor public opinion, identify dissidents, spread disinformation, or facilitate further targeting.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Another one of APT28's lures appeared to target a specific journalist covering issues in the Caucasus region.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Another one of APT28's lures", "start": 0, "end": 28}, {"text": "a specific journalist covering issues in the Caucasus region", "start": 48, "end": 108}], "action": [{"text": "target", "start": 41, "end": 47}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In late 2013, APT28 used a lure that contained a letter addressing a journalist by his first name and claiming to originate from a'' Chief Coordinator'' in Reason Magazine's'' Caucasian Issues Department''-a division that does not appear to exist.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "APT28", "start": 14, "end": 19}, {"text": "a lure that contained a letter addressing a journalist by his first name and claiming to originate from a'' Chief Coordinator'' in Reason Magazine's'' Caucasian Issues Department''-a division that does not appear to exist", "start": 25, "end": 246}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 20, "end": 24}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "(Reason Magazine is a US-based magazine) The letter welcomed the individual as a contributor and requested topic ideas and identification information in order to establish him at the magazine.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the background, the decoy document installed a SOURFACE backdoor on the victim's system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the decoy document", "start": 19, "end": 37}, {"text": "a SOURFACE backdoor", "start": 48, "end": 67}, {"text": "the victim's system", "start": 71, "end": 90}], "action": [{"text": "installed", "start": 38, "end": 47}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 68, "end": 70}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The body of the letter suggests that APT28 actors are able to read at least two languages–Russian and English.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The grammar of the letter also indicates that English is not the author's first language, despite it purportedly originating from a US-based magazine.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This implies that Russian may be the APT28 author's preferred language.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Targeting journalists could provide APT28 and its sponsors with a way to monitor public opinion, identify dissidents, spread disinformation, or facilitate further targeting.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Several other nation states are suspected of targeting journalists and dissidents to monitor their activity, including China and Iran., Journalists in the Caucasus working on Caucasus independence issues would be a prime target for intelligence collection for Moscow.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Journalists critical of the Kremlin have long been targets of surveillance and harassment, and a number of governments and human rights organizations have publicly criticized the government for its treatment of journalists and its increasing consolidation of control over the media.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have seen APT28 register at least two domains mimicking the domains of legitimate organizations in the Caucasus, as shown in the table below.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "APT28", "start": 13, "end": 18}, {"text": "at least two domains mimicking the domains of legitimate organizations in the Caucasus", "start": 28, "end": 114}], "action": [{"text": "register", "start": 19, "end": 27}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One APT28 domain imitated a key Chechen-focused news website, while the other appeared to target members of the Armenian military by hosting a fake login page.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "One APT28 domain", "start": 0, "end": 16}, {"text": "a key Chechen-focused news website", "start": 26, "end": 60}, {"text": "the other", "start": 68, "end": 77}, {"text": "members of the Armenian military", "start": 97, "end": 129}, {"text": "hosting a fake login page", "start": 133, "end": 158}], "action": [{"text": "imitated", "start": 17, "end": 25}, {"text": "target", "start": 90, "end": 96}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 130, "end": 132}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Of particular note, the Kavkaz Center is a Chechen-run website designed to present an alternative view to the long-running conflict between Russia and Chechen separatists.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2004 and 2013, Russia's Foreign Minister voiced his displeasure that a Swedish company continues to host the Kavkaz Center website.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Eastern European countries' political and military postures are traditionally core Russian government interests.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Kremlin has long regarded the former Soviet Republics and satellite states as in its sphere of economic, political, and military interest.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Over the past two decades, as many of these states joined NATO and the EU, Russia has attempted to regain its influence in the region.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many of APT28's targets parallel this continued focus on Eastern European governments and militaries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have evidence that APT28 made at least two attempts to compromise Eastern European government organizations: • In a late 2013 incident, a FireEye device deployed at an Eastern European Ministry of Foreign Affairs detected APT28 malware in the client's network.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• More recently, in August 2014 APT28 used a lure (Figure 3) about hostilities surrounding a Malaysia Airlines flight downed in Ukraine in a probable attempt to compromise the Polish government.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "APT28", "start": 32, "end": 37}, {"text": "a lure (Figure 3) about hostilities surrounding a Malaysia Airlines flight downed in Ukraine", "start": 43, "end": 135}, {"text": "a probable attempt to compromise the Polish government", "start": 139, "end": 193}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 38, "end": 42}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 136, "end": 138}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A SOURFACE sample employed in the same Malaysia Airlines lure was referenced by a Polish computer security company in a blog post.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "A SOURFACE sample", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "the same Malaysia Airlines lure", "start": 30, "end": 61}], "action": [{"text": "employed", "start": 18, "end": 26}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 27, "end": 29}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Polish security company indicated that the sample was'' sent to the government,'' presumably the Polish government, given the company's location and visibility.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have evidence that APT28 made at least two attempts to compromise Eastern European government organizations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "APT28 has registered domains similar to those of legitimate Eastern European news sites and governments, listed in Table 2.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "APT28", "start": 0, "end": 5}, {"text": "domains similar to those of legitimate Eastern European news sites and governments", "start": 21, "end": 103}], "action": [{"text": "registered", "start": 10, "end": 20}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These domain registrations not only suggest that APT28 is interested in Eastern European political affairs, but also that the group targets Eastern European governments directly.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, APT28 used one domain for command and control sessions (baltichost [.] org) that was themed after the Baltic Host exercises.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "APT28", "start": 13, "end": 18}, {"text": "one domain for command and control sessions (baltichost [.] org) that was themed after the Baltic Host exercises", "start": 24, "end": 136}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 19, "end": 23}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Baltic Host is a multinational logistics planning exercise, hosted annually since 2009 by one of the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, all three of which are on Russia's border) on a rotational basis.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In June 2014, this event was integrated with a larger U.S. Army training event, and focused on exercises to improve interoperability with regional allies and partners., This domain registration suggests that APT28 sought to target individuals either participating in the exercises or interested in Baltic military and security matters.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Such targets would potentially provide APT28 with sensitive tactical and strategic intelligence concerning regional military capabilities and relationships.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These exercises are a particular point of interest in Moscow: pro- Kremlin press cited Russia's interpretation of these military exercises and NATO's involvement as a'' sign of aggression,'' and Russia's Foreign Minister publicly stated that the exercise was'' a demonstration of hostile intention.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' APT28's lures and domain registrations also demonstrate their interest in NATO and other European security organizations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "NATO remains a chief Russian adversary, or in the words of Russia's 2010 military doctrine, a'' main external military danger'' particularly as it moves'' closer to the borders of the Russian Federation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' As the traditional western counterweight to the Soviet Union, Russia regards NATO, particularly NATO's eastward expansion, as a threat to Russia's strategic stability.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "APT28 also registered a domain name imitating the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), an intergovernmental organization that has cited widespread fraud in numerous Russian state elections.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Insider information about NATO, the OSCE and other security organizations would inform Russian political and military policy.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Several of the domains APT28 registered imitated NATO domain names, including those of NATO Special Operations Headquarters and the NATO Future Forces Exhibition.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Several of the domains APT28 registered", "start": 0, "end": 39}, {"text": "NATO domain names", "start": 49, "end": 66}], "action": [{"text": "imitated", "start": 40, "end": 48}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also observed a user that we suspect works for NATO HQ submit an APT28 sample to VirusTotal, probably as a result of receiving a suspicious email.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "APT28 also demonstrated an interest in defense attaches working in European countries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We identified an APT28 lure containing a decoy document with a list of British officers and U.S. and Canadian military attachés in London.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an APT28 lure", "start": 14, "end": 27}, {"text": "a decoy document with a list of British officers and U.S. and Canadian military attachés in London", "start": 39, "end": 137}], "action": [{"text": "containing", "start": 28, "end": 38}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Finally, APT28 used a lure that contained an apparent non-public listing of contact information for defense attachés in the'' Ankara Military Attaché Corps (AMAC),'' which appears to be a professional organization of defense attachés in Turkey.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "APT28", "start": 9, "end": 14}, {"text": "a lure that contained an apparent non-public listing of contact information for defense attachés in the'' Ankara Military Attaché Corps (AMAC),''", "start": 20, "end": 165}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 15, "end": 19}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition to targeting European security organizations and governments, it appears that APT28 is targeting attendees of European defense exhibitions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some of the APT28- registered domains imitated those of defense events held in Europe, such as the Farnborough Airshow 2014, EuroNaval 2014, EUROSATORY 2014, and the Counter Terror Expo.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Some of the APT28- registered domains", "start": 0, "end": 37}, {"text": "those of defense events held in Europe", "start": 47, "end": 85}], "action": [{"text": "imitated", "start": 38, "end": 46}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In September 2014, APT28 registered a domain (smigroup- online.co [.] uk) that appeared to mimic that for the SMi Group, a company that plans events for the'' Defence, Security, Energy, Utilities, Finance and Pharmaceutical sectors.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "APT28", "start": 19, "end": 24}, {"text": "a domain (smigroup- online.co [.] uk) that appeared to mimic that for the SMi Group", "start": 36, "end": 119}], "action": [{"text": "registered", "start": 25, "end": 35}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Among other events, the SMi Group is currently planning a military satellite communications event for November 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Targeting organizations and professionals involved in these defense events would likely provide APT28 with an opportunity to procure intelligence pertaining to new defense technologies, as well as the victim organizations' operations, communications, and future plans.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "APT28 has targeted a variety of organizations that fall outside of the three themes we highlighted above.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, we are not profiling all of APT28's targets with the same detail because they are not particularly indicative of a specific sponsor's interests.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They do indicate parallel areas of interest to many governments and do not run counter to Russian state interests.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other probable APT28 targets that we have identified: Our analysis of some of the group's more commonly used tools indicates that APT28 has been systematically updating their malware since 2007.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "APT28's tools are suggestive of the group's skills, ambitions, and identity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our analysis of some of the group's more commonly used tools indicates that APT28 has been systematically updating their tools since 2007.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "APT28 is most likely supported by a group of developers creating tools intended for long-term use and versatility, who make an effort to obfuscate their activity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This suggests that APT28 receives direct ongoing financial and other resources from a well-established organization, most likely a nation state government.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "APT28's malware settings suggest that the developers have done the majority of their work in a Russian language build environment during Russian business hours, which suggests that the Russian government is APT28's sponsor.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some of APT28's more commonly used tools are the SOURFACE downloader, its second stage backdoor EVILTOSS, and a modular family of implants that we call CHOPSTICK.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Some of APT28's more commonly used tools", "start": 0, "end": 40}, {"text": "the SOURFACE downloader", "start": 45, "end": 68}, {"text": "its second stage backdoor EVILTOSS", "start": 70, "end": 104}, {"text": "a modular family of implants that we call CHOPSTICK", "start": 110, "end": 161}], "action": [{"text": "are", "start": 41, "end": 44}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• SOURFACE: This downloader is typically called Sofacy within the cyber security community.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However because we have observed the name'' Sofacy'' used to refer to APT28 malware generally (to include the SOURFACE dropper, EVILTOSS, CHOPSTICK, and the credential harvester OLDBAIT), we are using the name SOURFACE to precisely refer to a specific downloader.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the name SOURFACE", "start": 201, "end": 218}, {"text": "a specific downloader", "start": 241, "end": 262}], "action": [{"text": "refer", "start": 232, "end": 237}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 238, "end": 240}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This downloader obtains a second-stage backdoor from a C2 server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This downloader", "start": 0, "end": 15}, {"text": "a second-stage backdoor", "start": 24, "end": 47}, {"text": "a C2 server", "start": 53, "end": 64}], "action": [{"text": "obtains", "start": 16, "end": 23}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 48, "end": 52}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CORESHELL is an updated version of SOURFACE.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• EVILTOSS: This backdoor has been delivered through the SOURFACE downloader to gain system access for reconnaissance, monitoring, credential theft, and shellcode execution.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This backdoor", "start": 12, "end": 25}, {"text": "the SOURFACE downloader", "start": 53, "end": 76}, {"text": "system access", "start": 85, "end": 98}, {"text": "reconnaissance", "start": 103, "end": 117}, {"text": "monitoring", "start": 119, "end": 129}, {"text": "credential theft", "start": 131, "end": 147}, {"text": "shellcode execution", "start": 153, "end": 172}], "action": [{"text": "been delivered", "start": 30, "end": 44}, {"text": "gain", "start": 80, "end": 84}], "modifier": [{"text": "through", "start": 45, "end": 52}, {"text": "for", "start": 99, "end": 102}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• CHOPSTICK: This is a modular implant compiled from a software framework that provides tailored functionality and flexibility.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A number of the malware variants that we profile below, especially the CHOPSTICK family, demonstrate formal coding practices indicative of methodical, diligent programmers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The modularity of CHOPSTICK alone, with its flexible and lasting platform, demonstrates planning for long-term use and versatility.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have also noted that APT28 tailors implants to their target environments, configuring them to use local network resources such as email servers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "them", "start": 89, "end": 93}, {"text": "local network resources such as email servers", "start": 101, "end": 146}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 97, "end": 100}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "APT28 has attempted to obfuscate their code and implement counter-analysis techniques: • One of the latest samples of CORESHELL includes counter-reverse engineering tactics via unused machine instructions.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "APT28", "start": 0, "end": 5}, {"text": "their code", "start": 33, "end": 43}, {"text": "counter-analysis techniques", "start": 58, "end": 85}, {"text": "One of the latest samples of CORESHELL", "start": 89, "end": 127}, {"text": "counter-reverse engineering tactics", "start": 137, "end": 172}, {"text": "unused machine instructions", "start": 177, "end": 204}], "action": [{"text": "obfuscate", "start": 23, "end": 32}, {"text": "implement", "start": 48, "end": 57}, {"text": "includes", "start": 128, "end": 136}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 173, "end": 176}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This would hinder static analysis of CORESHELL behavior by creating a large amount of unnecessary noise in the disassembly.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "static analysis of CORESHELL behavior", "start": 18, "end": 55}, {"text": "creating a large amount of unnecessary noise in the disassembly", "start": 59, "end": 122}], "action": [{"text": "hinder", "start": 11, "end": 17}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 56, "end": 58}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• A number of CORESHELL droppers also conduct runtime checks, attempting to determine if they are executing in an analysis environment, and if so, they do not trigger their payloads.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "A number of CORESHELL droppers", "start": 2, "end": 32}, {"text": "runtime checks", "start": 46, "end": 60}, {"text": "if they are executing in an analysis environment", "start": 86, "end": 134}], "action": [{"text": "conduct", "start": 38, "end": 45}, {"text": "determine", "start": 76, "end": 85}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Many samples across the SOURFACE/ CORESHELL, CHOPSTICK, and EVILTOSS malware families obfuscate strings that are decoded at runtime.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Many samples across the SOURFACE/ CORESHELL, CHOPSTICK, and EVILTOSS malware families", "start": 2, "end": 87}, {"text": "strings that are decoded at runtime", "start": 98, "end": 133}], "action": [{"text": "obfuscate", "start": 88, "end": 97}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Two of the malware families (SOURFACE/CORESHELL and EVILTOSS) use the same decryption sequence and similar algorithms for string encoding and decoding.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Two of the malware families (SOURFACE/CORESHELL and EVILTOSS)", "start": 0, "end": 61}, {"text": "the same decryption sequence and similar algorithms", "start": 66, "end": 117}, {"text": "string encoding and decoding", "start": 122, "end": 150}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 62, "end": 65}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 118, "end": 121}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These families encode their strings at compile time using a custom stream cipher.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These families", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "their strings", "start": 22, "end": 35}, {"text": "compile time", "start": 39, "end": 51}, {"text": "a custom stream cipher", "start": 58, "end": 80}], "action": [{"text": "encode", "start": 15, "end": 21}], "modifier": [{"text": "at", "start": 36, "end": 38}, {"text": "using", "start": 52, "end": 57}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "From a high level, these ciphers share a similar design across the malware families but differ slightly in the internal arithmetic operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• APT28 has employed RSA encryption to protect files and stolen information moved from the victim's network to the controller.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "APT28", "start": 2, "end": 7}, {"text": "RSA encryption", "start": 21, "end": 35}, {"text": "protect files and stolen information moved from the victim's network to the controller", "start": 39, "end": 125}], "action": [{"text": "employed", "start": 12, "end": 20}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 36, "end": 38}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "APT28 has made incremental and systematic changes to the SOURFACE downloader and its surrounding ecosystem since as early as 2007.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These changes indicate a long-standing and dedicated development effort behind APT28.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have observed samples of the SOURFACE downloader compiled between 2007 and 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We call SOURFACE (samples are frequently named netids.dll) a first stage downloader because its primary job is to retrieve a second stage payload from a C2 server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "SOURFACE", "start": 8, "end": 16}, {"text": "a second stage payload", "start": 123, "end": 145}, {"text": "a C2 server", "start": 151, "end": 162}], "action": [{"text": "retrieve", "start": 114, "end": 122}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 146, "end": 150}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Until 2013, the SOURFACE downloader used hard-coded IP addresses for C2 communications, whereas the future CORESHELL samples use domains.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the SOURFACE downloader", "start": 12, "end": 35}, {"text": "hard-coded IP addresses", "start": 41, "end": 64}, {"text": "C2 communications", "start": 69, "end": 86}, {"text": "the future CORESHELL samples", "start": 96, "end": 124}, {"text": "domains", "start": 129, "end": 136}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 36, "end": 40}, {"text": "use", "start": 125, "end": 128}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 65, "end": 68}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "First, a malware family is a collection of malware in which each sample shares a significant amount of code with all of the others.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There are exceptions: for example, some files contain public and standard code libraries that we do not take into consideration when making a family determination.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A malware ecosystem is a group of malware families that work together to perform the same objective.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Perhaps the simplest and most typical ecosystem is a dropper and a backdoor that are used together.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They may not share the same code structure, but they are related because one drops and installs the other.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "one", "start": 73, "end": 76}, {"text": "the other", "start": 96, "end": 105}], "action": [{"text": "drops and installs", "start": 77, "end": 95}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The ecosystem surrounding the SOURFACE downloader frequently consists of a dropper, which installs SOURFACE.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a dropper", "start": 73, "end": 82}, {"text": "SOURFACE", "start": 99, "end": 107}], "action": [{"text": "installs", "start": 90, "end": 98}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The SOURFACE downloader then receives another dropper from its C2 server, and this second dropper installs a second stage backdoor, which is usually EVILTOSS.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The SOURFACE downloader", "start": 0, "end": 23}, {"text": "another dropper", "start": 38, "end": 53}, {"text": "its C2 server", "start": 59, "end": 72}, {"text": "this second dropper", "start": 78, "end": 97}, {"text": "a second stage backdoor", "start": 107, "end": 130}], "action": [{"text": "receives", "start": 29, "end": 37}, {"text": "installs", "start": 98, "end": 106}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 54, "end": 58}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In April 2013, based on compile time, the group began to make significant alterations to the SOURFACE downloader.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They started by changing the compiled DLL name to'' coreshell.dll'' and making minor changes to the network communications, as seen in Figure 7.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The hostname, volume serial number and OS version data are encoded in the new URL format.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As seen in the table below, the SOURFACE/ CORESHELL developers also made other modifications that changed the exported function name and file size over time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In April 2013, based on compile time, the group began to make significant alterations to the SOURFACE downloader.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Variants of the SOURFACE second stage backdoor, EVILTOSS, share some code similarities with SOURFACE.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, it contains more capabilities, including the ability to provide access to the file system and registry, enumerate network resources, create processes, log keystrokes, access stored credentials, and execute shellcode.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 9, "end": 11}, {"text": "access to the file system and registry", "start": 73, "end": 111}, {"text": "network resources", "start": 123, "end": 140}, {"text": "processes", "start": 149, "end": 158}, {"text": "keystrokes", "start": 164, "end": 174}, {"text": "stored credentials", "start": 183, "end": 201}, {"text": "shellcode", "start": 215, "end": 224}], "action": [{"text": "provide", "start": 65, "end": 72}, {"text": "enumerate", "start": 113, "end": 122}, {"text": "create", "start": 142, "end": 148}, {"text": "log", "start": 160, "end": 163}, {"text": "access", "start": 176, "end": 182}, {"text": "execute", "start": 207, "end": 214}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The backdoor encrypts data that it uploads with an RSA public key.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "data", "start": 22, "end": 26}, {"text": "it", "start": 32, "end": 34}, {"text": "an RSA public key", "start": 48, "end": 65}], "action": [{"text": "encrypts", "start": 13, "end": 21}, {"text": "uploads", "start": 35, "end": 42}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 43, "end": 47}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many of its variants we have seen are named netui.dll.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "EVILTOSS variants may use the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) to send stolen data in an attachment named'' detaluri. dat''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "EVILTOSS variants", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)", "start": 26, "end": 66}, {"text": "send stolen data in an attachment named'' detaluri. dat''", "start": 70, "end": 127}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 22, "end": 25}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 67, "end": 69}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The backdoor attaches this file to a preformatted email and sends it out through a victim's mail server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "this file", "start": 22, "end": 31}, {"text": "a preformatted email", "start": 35, "end": 55}, {"text": "it", "start": 66, "end": 68}, {"text": "a victim's mail server", "start": 81, "end": 103}], "action": [{"text": "attaches", "start": 13, "end": 21}, {"text": "sends", "start": 60, "end": 65}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 32, "end": 34}, {"text": "out", "start": 69, "end": 72}, {"text": "through", "start": 73, "end": 80}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Interestingly, we found an antivirus report from 2004 detailing what appears to be an early variant of EVILTOSS.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The backdoor was installed alongside the NATO-themed decoy document depicted in Figure 8.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "the NATO-themed decoy document depicted in Figure 8", "start": 37, "end": 88}], "action": [{"text": "was installed", "start": 13, "end": 26}], "modifier": [{"text": "alongside", "start": 27, "end": 36}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The backdoor sent data via SMTP to natosmtp @mail [.] ru and received its tasking via POP from natopop @mail [.] ru.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "data", "start": 18, "end": 22}, {"text": "SMTP", "start": 27, "end": 31}, {"text": "natosmtp @mail [.] ru", "start": 35, "end": 56}, {"text": "its tasking", "start": 70, "end": 81}, {"text": "POP", "start": 86, "end": 89}, {"text": "natopop @mail [.] ru", "start": 95, "end": 115}], "action": [{"text": "sent", "start": 13, "end": 17}, {"text": "received", "start": 61, "end": 69}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 23, "end": 26}, {"text": "to", "start": 32, "end": 34}, {"text": "via", "start": 82, "end": 85}, {"text": "from", "start": 90, "end": 94}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although we have not conclusively attributed this sample to APT28, it does suggest the possibility that APT28 has been operating since as early as 2004.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A modular development framework suggests the group has had an organized development effort since as early as 2007.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During our research, we discovered that APT28 uses a backdoor developed using a modular framework.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "APT28", "start": 40, "end": 45}, {"text": "a backdoor developed using a modular framework", "start": 51, "end": 97}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 46, "end": 50}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We call this backdoor CHOPSTICK, a somewhat ironic name that comes from our semi-random name generator.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The modular design allows flexible options for compiling variants with different capabilities as needed, as well as deploying additional capabilities at runtime.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This allows the developers to make targeted implants, including only the capabilities and protocols necessary for a specific environment.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Such a modular framework suggests the group has had an organized development effort since as early as 2007.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A formal development environment, in which code is versioned and well-organized, would almost certainly be required to track and define the various modules that can be included in the backdoor at compile time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CHOPSTICK variants may move messages and information using at least three methods: 1.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Communications with a C2 server using HTTP.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Communications with a C2 server", "start": 0, "end": 31}, {"text": "HTTP", "start": 38, "end": 42}], "action": [{"text": "using", "start": 32, "end": 37}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These protocols are covered in more detail in Appendix D. 2.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Email sent through a specified mail server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Email", "start": 0, "end": 5}, {"text": "a specified mail server", "start": 19, "end": 42}], "action": [{"text": "sent", "start": 6, "end": 10}], "modifier": [{"text": "through", "start": 11, "end": 18}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One CHOPSTICK v1 variant contained modules and functions for collecting keystroke logs, Microsoft Office documents, and PGP files.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "One CHOPSTICK v1 variant", "start": 0, "end": 24}, {"text": "keystroke logs", "start": 72, "end": 86}, {"text": "Microsoft Office documents", "start": 88, "end": 114}, {"text": "PGP files", "start": 120, "end": 129}], "action": [{"text": "collecting", "start": 61, "end": 71}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The monitoring for new files of interest is performed by a'' Directory Observer'' module.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The monitoring for new files of interest", "start": 0, "end": 40}, {"text": "a'' Directory Observer'' module", "start": 57, "end": 88}], "action": [{"text": "is performed", "start": 41, "end": 53}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In one sample this information was intended to be sent via SMTP using a Georgian MIA mail server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this information", "start": 14, "end": 30}, {"text": "SMTP", "start": 59, "end": 63}, {"text": "a Georgian MIA mail server", "start": 70, "end": 96}], "action": [{"text": "be sent", "start": 47, "end": 54}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 55, "end": 58}, {"text": "using", "start": 64, "end": 69}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It used one of four embedded sender email addresses (@mia.gov.ge) to send files via email to another email address on the same mail server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "one of four embedded sender email addresses (@mia.gov.ge)", "start": 8, "end": 65}, {"text": "send files via email to another email address on the same mail server", "start": 69, "end": 138}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 3, "end": 7}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 66, "end": 68}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All information required for the email was hardcoded in the backdoor.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "3.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Local copying to defeat closed networks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One variant of CHOPSTICK focuses on apparent air gap/closed network capabilities by routing messages between local directories, the registry and USB drives.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "One variant of CHOPSTICK", "start": 0, "end": 24}, {"text": "messages", "start": 92, "end": 100}, {"text": "local directories, the registry and USB drives", "start": 109, "end": 155}], "action": [{"text": "routing", "start": 84, "end": 91}], "modifier": [{"text": "between", "start": 101, "end": 108}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During our research into APT28's malware, we noted two details consistent across malware samples.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first was that APT28 had consistently compiled Russian language settings into their malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The second was that malware compile times from 2007 to 2014 corresponded to normal business hours in the UTC + 4 time zone, which includes major Russian cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "PE resources include language information that can be helpful if a developer wants to show user interface items in a specific language.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Non-default language settings packaged with PE resources are dependent on the developer's build environment.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Each PE resource includes a'' locale'' identifier with a language ID'' composed of a primary language identifier indicating the language and a sublanguage identifier indicating the country/region.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' At the time of the writing of this paper, we had identified 103 malware samples that were both attributed to APT28 and contained PE resources.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Table 5 shows the locale identifiers with associated language and country/region for these samples.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The samples with Russian language settings were compiled between late 2007 and late 2013, as depicted in Figure 9.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This consistency over a long timeframe suggests that the developers of APT28 malware were using a build environment with Russian language settings at least some of the time and made no effort to obscure this detail.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Overall, the locale IDs suggest that APT28 developers can operate in both Russian and English.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Of the 140 malware samples that we have attributed to APT28 so far, over 89% were compiled between 0400 and 1400 UTC time, as depicted in Figure 10.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Over 96% were compiled between Monday and Friday.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This parallels the working hours in UTC+0400 (that is, compile times begin about 8AM and end about 6PM in this time zone).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This time zone includes major Russian cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We started researching APT28 based on activity we observed on our clients' networks, similar to other targeted threat groups we have identified over time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We assess that APT28 is most likely sponsored by the Russian government.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We summarize our key observations about APT28 in Figure 11 below.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "APT28's characteristics-their targeting, malware, language, and working hours-have led us to conclude that we are tracking a focused, long- standing espionage effort.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Given the available data, we assess that APT28's work is sponsored by the Russian government.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We use the term'' threat group'' to refer to actors who work together to target and penetrate networks of interest.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These individuals may share the same set of tasks, coordinate targets, and share tools and methodology.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They work together to gain access to their targets and steal data.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "They", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "access to their targets", "start": 27, "end": 50}, {"text": "data", "start": 61, "end": 65}], "action": [{"text": "gain", "start": 22, "end": 26}, {"text": "steal", "start": 55, "end": 60}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The art of attributing disparate intrusion activities to the same threat group is not always simple.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Different groups may use similar intrusion methodologies and common tools, particularly those that are widely available on the Internet, such as pwdump, HTran, or Gh0st RAT.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There may be overlaps between groups caused by the sharing of malware or exploits they have authored, or even the sharing of personnel.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Individual threat actors may move between groups either temporarily or permanently.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A threat actor may also be a private citizen who is hired by multiple groups.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Multiple groups, on occasion, compromise the same target within the same timeframe.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Distinguishing one threat group from another is possible with enough information, analytical experience, and tools to piece it all together.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We can analyze multiple incidents and tell by the evidence left behind that a given incident was the result of one threat group and not another.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Threat actors leave behind various forensic details.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They may send spear phishing emails from a specific IP address or email address.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "They", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "spear phishing emails", "start": 14, "end": 35}, {"text": "a specific IP address or email address", "start": 41, "end": 79}], "action": [{"text": "send", "start": 9, "end": 13}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 36, "end": 40}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Their emails may contain certain patterns; files have specific names, MD5 hashes, timestamps, custom functions, and encryption algorithms.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Their backdoors may have command and control IP addresses or domain names embedded.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These are just a few examples of the myriad of forensic details that we consider when distinguishing one threat group from another.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At the most basic level, we say that two intrusion events are attributed to the same group when we have collected enough indicators to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the same actor or group of actors were involved.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We track all of the indicators and significant linkages associated with identified threat groups in a proprietary database that comprises millions of nodes and linkages between them.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this way, we can always go back and answer'' why'' we associated cyber threat activity with a particular group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "SOURFACE is a downloader that obtains a second stage backdoor from a C2 server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "SOURFACE", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "a downloader", "start": 12, "end": 24}, {"text": "a second stage backdoor", "start": 38, "end": 61}, {"text": "a C2 server", "start": 67, "end": 78}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 9, "end": 11}, {"text": "obtains", "start": 30, "end": 37}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 62, "end": 66}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Over time the downloader has evolved and the newer versions, usually compiled with the DLL name'coreshell.dll', are distinct enough from the older versions that we refer to it as SOURFACE/CORESHELL or simply CORESHELL.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This appendix focuses on these newer versions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CORESHELL uses two threads to communicate with its C2 server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "CORESHELL", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "two threads", "start": 15, "end": 26}, {"text": "communicate with its C2 server", "start": 30, "end": 60}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 10, "end": 14}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 27, "end": 29}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first thread sends beacons that contain the process listing of the compromised host.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The first thread", "start": 0, "end": 16}, {"text": "beacons that contain the process listing of the compromised host", "start": 23, "end": 87}], "action": [{"text": "sends", "start": 17, "end": 22}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The second thread is responsible for downloading and executing stage two payloads.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The second thread", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "stage two payloads", "start": 63, "end": 81}], "action": [{"text": "downloading", "start": 37, "end": 48}, {"text": "executing", "start": 53, "end": 62}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Messages are sent using HTTP POST requests whose bodies contain encrypted and Base64 encoded data.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Messages", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "HTTP POST requests", "start": 24, "end": 42}, {"text": "encrypted and Base64 encoded data", "start": 64, "end": 97}], "action": [{"text": "are sent", "start": 9, "end": 17}, {"text": "contain", "start": 56, "end": 63}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 18, "end": 23}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The encryption algorithm is a custom stream cipher using a six-byte key.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Commands from the controller to the CORESHELL implant are encrypted using another stream cipher but this time using an eight-byte key.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Commands from the controller to the CORESHELL implant", "start": 0, "end": 53}, {"text": "another stream cipher but this time using an eight-byte key", "start": 74, "end": 133}], "action": [{"text": "are encrypted", "start": 54, "end": 67}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 68, "end": 73}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CORESHELL has used the same user agent string ('' MSIE 8.0'') that SOURFACE previously used, but in more recent samples CORESHELL uses the default Internet Explorer user agent string obtained from the system.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Figure 11 shows an example POST request.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When Base64 decoded, the POST content looks like this: The key used to encrypt the message is six bytes long and is appended to the end of the message.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this is example the key would be: 30 ac e5 21 e4 a6.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When the message is decrypted, the resulting plaintext is: The following table contains a breakdown of each of the field's C2 message.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Commands are sent from the C2 server to the CORESHELL backdoor in HTTP responses to the POST requests.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Commands", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "the C2 server", "start": 23, "end": 36}, {"text": "the CORESHELL backdoor", "start": 40, "end": 62}, {"text": "HTTP responses to the POST requests", "start": 66, "end": 101}], "action": [{"text": "are sent", "start": 9, "end": 17}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 18, "end": 22}, {"text": "to", "start": 37, "end": 39}, {"text": "in", "start": 63, "end": 65}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The command is identified by the NULL terminated UNICODE string'' OK'' (O\\x00\\K\\x00\\x00\\ x00).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The command is Base64 encoded and immediately follows the'' OK'' string.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Figure 12 shows a sample CORESHELL command: The Base64 decoded string is: The following table contains a description of each field in the command message: When the above command'' 10 41 70 41 10 42 33…'' is decrypted using the key'' 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01'' the following command message is produced: The implant supports the following four command identifiers from the controller as seen in Table 8.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first byte of the command message specifies the command type and is immediately followed by the PE or shellcode to be executed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this example the command byte is 04 indicating the following bytes are shellcode.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the command byte was 01, 02, or 03 the following bytes would be a DLL or EXE that would be written to disk and executed.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a DLL or EXE", "start": 67, "end": 79}, {"text": "disk", "start": 105, "end": 109}], "action": [{"text": "be written", "start": 91, "end": 101}, {"text": "executed", "start": 114, "end": 122}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 102, "end": 104}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CHOPSTICK is a backdoor that uses a modularized, object-oriented framework written in C++.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "CHOPSTICK", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "a backdoor", "start": 13, "end": 23}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 10, "end": 12}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This framework allows for a diverse set of capabilities across malware variants sharing a common code base.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CHOPSTICK may communicate with external servers using SMTP or HTTP.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "CHOPSTICK", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "external servers", "start": 31, "end": 47}, {"text": "SMTP or HTTP", "start": 54, "end": 66}], "action": [{"text": "communicate", "start": 14, "end": 25}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 26, "end": 30}, {"text": "using", "start": 48, "end": 53}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This appendix documents variants using HTTP communications.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first time CHOPSTICK is executed, it may encrypt and store configuration data in the Registry key HKU\\S-1-5-19Classes\\Software\\Microsoft\\MediaPlayer\\ {E6696105-E63E-4EF1-939E- 15DDD83B669A} \\chnnl.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 38, "end": 40}, {"text": "configuration data", "start": 63, "end": 81}, {"text": "the Registry key HKU\\S-1-5-19Classes\\Software\\Microsoft\\MediaPlayer\\ {E6696105-E63E-4EF1-939E- 15DDD83B669A} \\chnnl", "start": 85, "end": 200}], "action": [{"text": "encrypt and store", "start": 45, "end": 62}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 82, "end": 84}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The user HKU\\S-1-5-19 corresponds to the LOCALSERVICE account SID.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The configuration block is encrypted using RC4 encryption.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The configuration block", "start": 0, "end": 23}, {"text": "RC4 encryption", "start": 43, "end": 57}], "action": [{"text": "is encrypted", "start": 24, "end": 36}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 37, "end": 42}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The key is a combination of a 50-byte static key and a four-byte salt value randomly generated at runtime.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The static key is derived from opcodes in the backdoor.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CHOPSTICK collects detailed information from the host including the Windows version, CPU architecture, Windows Firewall state, User Account Control (UAC) configuration settings on Windows Vista and above and Internet Explorer settings.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "CHOPSTICK", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "detailed information", "start": 19, "end": 39}, {"text": "the host", "start": 45, "end": 53}, {"text": "the Windows version", "start": 64, "end": 83}, {"text": "CPU architecture", "start": 85, "end": 101}, {"text": "Windows Firewall state", "start": 103, "end": 125}, {"text": "User Account Control (UAC) configuration settings on Windows Vista and above", "start": 127, "end": 203}, {"text": "Internet Explorer settings", "start": 208, "end": 234}], "action": [{"text": "collects", "start": 10, "end": 18}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 40, "end": 44}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It also tests for the installation of specific security products (Table 9) and applications (Table 10).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "the installation of specific security products (Table 9) and applications (Table 10)", "start": 18, "end": 102}], "action": [{"text": "tests", "start": 8, "end": 13}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 14, "end": 17}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After collecting host information, CHOPSTICK creates a hidden file that may be named% ALLUSERSPROFILE% \\edg6EF885E2.tmp for temporary storage and creates a Windows mailslot with the name'' checkmesv5555''.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "collecting", "start": 6, "end": 16}, {"text": "creates", "start": 45, "end": 52}, {"text": "creates", "start": 146, "end": 153}], "entity": [{"text": "host information", "start": 17, "end": 33}, {"text": "CHOPSTICK", "start": 35, "end": 44}, {"text": "a hidden file that may be named% ALLUSERSPROFILE% \\edg6EF885E2.tmp", "start": 53, "end": 119}, {"text": "temporary storage", "start": 124, "end": 141}, {"text": "a Windows mailslot", "start": 154, "end": 172}, {"text": "the name'' checkmesv5555''", "start": 178, "end": 204}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 120, "end": 123}, {"text": "with", "start": 173, "end": 177}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Its usage of a Windows mailslot would potentially allow external binaries to write data to the'' checkmesv5555'' mailslot, possibly allowing CHOPSTICK to encrypt and store output from other malware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "external binaries", "start": 56, "end": 73}, {"text": "data", "start": 83, "end": 87}, {"text": "the'' checkmesv5555'' mailslot", "start": 91, "end": 121}, {"text": "CHOPSTICK", "start": 141, "end": 150}, {"text": "output from other malware", "start": 172, "end": 197}], "action": [{"text": "write", "start": 77, "end": 82}, {"text": "encrypt", "start": 154, "end": 161}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 88, "end": 90}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It creates a thread that records user activity on the host, capturing desktop screenshots in JPEG format, tracks current window focus, collects keystrokes, and scrapes window contents (text, context menus, etc.).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "a thread", "start": 11, "end": 19}, {"text": "user activity on the host", "start": 33, "end": 58}, {"text": "desktop screenshots", "start": 70, "end": 89}, {"text": "JPEG format", "start": 93, "end": 104}, {"text": "current window focus", "start": 113, "end": 133}, {"text": "keystrokes", "start": 144, "end": 154}, {"text": "window contents (text, context menus, etc.)", "start": 168, "end": 211}], "action": [{"text": "creates", "start": 3, "end": 10}, {"text": "records", "start": 25, "end": 32}, {"text": "capturing", "start": 60, "end": 69}, {"text": "tracks", "start": 106, "end": 112}, {"text": "collects", "start": 135, "end": 143}, {"text": "scrapes", "start": 160, "end": 167}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 90, "end": 92}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "User activity is captured once every 500 milliseconds and logged in an HTML-like format.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "User activity", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "once", "start": 26, "end": 30}, {"text": "500 milliseconds", "start": 37, "end": 53}, {"text": "an HTML-like format", "start": 68, "end": 87}], "action": [{"text": "is captured", "start": 14, "end": 25}, {"text": "logged", "start": 58, "end": 64}], "modifier": [{"text": "every", "start": 31, "end": 36}, {"text": "in", "start": 65, "end": 67}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The thread writes user activity log messages to the'' checkmesv5555'' mailslot in plain text.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The thread", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "user activity log messages", "start": 18, "end": 44}, {"text": "the'' checkmesv5555'' mailslot", "start": 48, "end": 78}, {"text": "plain text", "start": 82, "end": 92}], "action": [{"text": "writes", "start": 11, "end": 17}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 45, "end": 47}, {"text": "in", "start": 79, "end": 81}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CHOPSTICK reads messages from the mailslot, encrypts them using RC4, and then stores the encrypted message in an edg6EF885E2.tmp temporary file.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "CHOPSTICK", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "messages", "start": 16, "end": 24}, {"text": "the mailslot", "start": 30, "end": 42}, {"text": "them", "start": 53, "end": 57}, {"text": "RC4", "start": 64, "end": 67}, {"text": "the encrypted message", "start": 85, "end": 106}, {"text": "an edg6EF885E2.tmp temporary file", "start": 110, "end": 143}], "action": [{"text": "reads", "start": 10, "end": 15}, {"text": "encrypts", "start": 44, "end": 52}, {"text": "stores", "start": 78, "end": 84}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 25, "end": 29}, {"text": "using", "start": 58, "end": 63}, {"text": "in", "start": 107, "end": 109}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The RC4 encryption used here also uses a 50- byte static key plus four-byte random salt value.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After approximately 60 seconds of execution time, CHOPSTICK begins communicating with one of its C2 servers over HTTP.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "CHOPSTICK", "start": 50, "end": 59}, {"text": "one of its C2 servers", "start": 86, "end": 107}, {"text": "HTTP", "start": 113, "end": 117}], "action": [{"text": "communicating", "start": 67, "end": 80}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 81, "end": 85}, {"text": "over", "start": 108, "end": 112}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After sending an initial HTTP GET request it uploads the file contents of edg6EF885E2. tmp to the C2 server using HTTP POST requests.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "sending", "start": 6, "end": 13}, {"text": "uploads", "start": 45, "end": 52}], "entity": [{"text": "an initial HTTP GET request", "start": 14, "end": 41}, {"text": "it", "start": 42, "end": 44}, {"text": "the file contents of edg6EF885E2. tmp", "start": 53, "end": 90}, {"text": "the C2 server", "start": 94, "end": 107}, {"text": "HTTP POST requests", "start": 114, "end": 132}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 91, "end": 93}, {"text": "using", "start": 108, "end": 113}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It does not wait for a response from the server to begin uploading.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once the contents of edg6EF885E2.tmp are uploaded, CHOPSTICK deletes the file.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the contents of edg6EF885E2.tmp", "start": 5, "end": 36}, {"text": "CHOPSTICK", "start": 51, "end": 60}, {"text": "the file", "start": 69, "end": 77}], "action": [{"text": "are uploaded", "start": 37, "end": 49}, {"text": "deletes", "start": 61, "end": 68}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Figure 13 below contains an example of an HTTP POST request uploading a segment from edg6EF885E2.tmp.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an HTTP POST request", "start": 39, "end": 59}, {"text": "a segment from edg6EF885E2.tmp", "start": 70, "end": 100}], "action": [{"text": "uploading", "start": 60, "end": 69}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CHOPSTICK uses a URL-safe Base64 encoding, using an alphabet that substitutes'' +'' and''/'' for''-'' and'''', respectively.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "CHOPSTICK", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "a URL-safe Base64 encoding", "start": 15, "end": 41}, {"text": "an alphabet that substitutes'' +'' and''/'' for''-'' and'''', respectively", "start": 49, "end": 123}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 10, "end": 14}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 43, "end": 48}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Each HTTP request contains multiple Base64 encoded URL parameters, however only one parameter contains information encoded by the malware ('' ai='') and the rest of the URL parameters appear to be randomly generated per request.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CHOPSTICK encrypts an 11-byte sequence in the'' ai='' parameter.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "CHOPSTICK", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "an 11-byte sequence", "start": 19, "end": 38}, {"text": "the'' ai='' parameter", "start": 42, "end": 63}], "action": [{"text": "encrypts", "start": 10, "end": 18}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 39, "end": 41}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The purpose of this parameter appears to be to uniquely identify the particular instance of the backdoor to the C2 server.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "identify", "start": 56, "end": 64}], "entity": [{"text": "the particular instance of the backdoor", "start": 65, "end": 104}, {"text": "the C2 server", "start": 108, "end": 121}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 105, "end": 107}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Base64 encoded text of this parameter begins with a number of randomly generated alphabetical characters presumably intended to prevent people from Base64 decoding the whole string without some knowledge of how the malware family works.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first four bytes of the message are an XOR key for the remainder of the data.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once decrypted using the XOR key, an 11-byte sequence is revealed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first seven bytes are static, and are hard-coded in CHOPSTICK, while the last four bytes appear to be unique.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The message body of the POST request is also Base64 encoded.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The message body of the POST request", "start": 0, "end": 36}], "action": [{"text": "is also Base64 encoded", "start": 37, "end": 59}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This encoded string is also prefixed with random characters designed to break the output of a Base64 decode operation on the entire string.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first 15 bytes of the decoded message body comprise another 11-byte sequence similar to the sequence stored in the'' ai='' parameter as described above.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Decrypting these bytes yields another static seven-byte sequence, followed by four unique bytes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The remainder of the message body consists of the RC4 encrypted data containing the HTML-formatted user activity log, edg6EF885E2.tmp.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After uploading edg6EF885E2.tmp, CHOPSTICK continues to query its C2 servers for commands using HTTP GET requests.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "uploading", "start": 6, "end": 15}, {"text": "query", "start": 56, "end": 61}], "entity": [{"text": "edg6EF885E2.tmp", "start": 16, "end": 31}, {"text": "CHOPSTICK", "start": 33, "end": 42}, {"text": "its C2 servers", "start": 62, "end": 76}, {"text": "commands", "start": 81, "end": 89}, {"text": "HTTP GET requests", "start": 96, "end": 113}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 77, "end": 80}, {"text": "using", "start": 90, "end": 95}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware contains code which allows it to load or memory-map external modules that export the following functions: SendRawPacket, GetRawPacket, InitializeExp, DestroyExp, IsActiveChannel, GetChannelInfo, SetChannelInfo, Run, GetModuleInfo, GiveMessage, and TakeMessage.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 39, "end": 41}, {"text": "external modules that export the following functions: SendRawPacket, GetRawPacket, InitializeExp, DestroyExp, IsActiveChannel, GetChannelInfo, SetChannelInfo, Run, GetModuleInfo, GiveMessage, and TakeMessage", "start": 64, "end": 271}], "action": [{"text": "load", "start": 45, "end": 49}, {"text": "memory-map", "start": 53, "end": 63}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CHOPSTICK backdoors are compiled within a modularized development framework.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This means that two separate CHOPSTICK backdoors may contain vastly different functionality, depending on which modules were included at compile time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The modules that are included in an instance of CHOPSTICK may be reported to the C2 server as part of POST messages.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The modules that are included in an instance of CHOPSTICK", "start": 0, "end": 57}, {"text": "the C2 server", "start": 77, "end": 90}, {"text": "part of POST messages", "start": 94, "end": 115}], "action": [{"text": "be reported", "start": 62, "end": 73}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 74, "end": 76}, {"text": "as", "start": 91, "end": 93}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Figure 14 includes an example from a CHOPSTICK v1 variant: To decode the POST content, the first step is to remove characters from the Base64 string (the number of characters to remove may vary between different communication channels).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the example from Figure 14, the number of characters removed is seven.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once these characters are removed the decoded (but still encrypted) text looks like this: The first two words ('' 72 11'' and'' fd 22'') are checksums that are used to validate the message.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The first two words ('' 72 11'' and'' fd 22'')", "start": 90, "end": 136}, {"text": "the message", "start": 177, "end": 188}], "action": [{"text": "validate", "start": 168, "end": 176}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The next 4 bytes'' f8 dc 33 9e'' are a salt value that is appended to the end of an RC4 key.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once decrypted, the message looks like the following: The strings'' V4MGNxZWlvcmhjOG9yZQ'' and'' = < < \\xee'' are hardcoded in the implant.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The module information starts at offset 0x20 with the string'' 01 00 00'' and is formatted as follows: The modules included in this CHOPSTICK v1 implant are: Our determination of a CHOPSTICK'' v1'' versus'' v2'' is based on the self-identification of the kernel ID and associated modules.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Compare the list of CHOPSTICK v1 modules in Table 12 with the list of modules in an example CHOPSTICK v2 variant in Table 13: The kernel IDs 0x0001 and 0x0002 indicate different versions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The corresponding modules in each backdoor also are consistently identified with 0x01 and 0x02, respectively, in the second byte.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In both variants the modules with keystroke log, file system access, and command shell capabilities have the consistent identifiers 0x10, 0x11, and 0x13, respectively, in the first byte.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This suggests that the first byte in the module ID identifies the module type whereas the second byte identifies the kernel version.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The kernel sends commands to each module using its module ID.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The commands that each module understands are likely consistent from build to build.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Table 14 and Table 15 show examples of commands that each module understands.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "OLDBAIT is a credential harvester that installs itself in% ALLUSERPROFILE% \\\\Application Data\\ Microsoft\\MediaPlayer\\updatewindws.exe.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "OLDBAIT", "start": 0, "end": 7}, {"text": "a credential harvester", "start": 11, "end": 33}, {"text": "itself", "start": 48, "end": 54}, {"text": "% ALLUSERPROFILE% \\\\Application Data\\ Microsoft\\MediaPlayer\\updatewindws.exe", "start": 57, "end": 133}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 8, "end": 10}, {"text": "installs", "start": 39, "end": 47}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 55, "end": 57}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There is a missing space in the MediaPlayer directory and the filename is missing the'o' character.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Both the internal strings and logic are obfuscated and are unpacked at startup.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Both the internal strings and logic", "start": 0, "end": 35}], "action": [{"text": "are obfuscated", "start": 36, "end": 50}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Credentials for the following applications are collected: Both email and HTTP can be used to send out the collected credentials.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Credentials for the following applications", "start": 0, "end": 42}, {"text": "email", "start": 63, "end": 68}, {"text": "HTTP", "start": 73, "end": 77}, {"text": "send out the collected credentials", "start": 93, "end": 127}], "action": [{"text": "are collected", "start": 43, "end": 56}, {"text": "be used", "start": 82, "end": 89}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 90, "end": 92}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Sample HTTP traffic is displayed in Figure 15.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "OLDBAIT handles APIs very similarly to SOURFACE and EVILTOSS.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There is a setup routine that loads the imports into a table and all API calls reference an index to this table.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In SOURFACE and EVILTOSS the table is stored in a global variable while in OLDBAIT this table is allocated at runtime and a pointer is passed between functions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cyber espionage has been a hot topic through the last years.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Computer attacks known as'' APT'' (Advanced Persistent Threat) have become widely reported and emphasized by the media, damages are now considered as real and strategic trends are moving in cyber defense.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "AIRBUS Defence & Space–CyberSecurity unit responds to such attacks for its customers every day, developing a complete range of solutions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Today, we decided to release publicly information on a specific group of APT attackers known as'' Pitty Tiger''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This information comes directly from investigations led by our Threat Intelligence.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Pitty Tiger is a group of attackers that have been active since at least 2011.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They have targeted private companies in several sectors, such as defense and telecommunications, but also at least one government.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have been able to track down this group of attackers and can provide detailed information about them.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We were able to collect and reveal their'' malware arsenal''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also analyzed their technical organization.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our investigations indicate that Pitty Tiger has not used any 0day vulnerability so far, rather they prefer using custom malware, developed for the group's exclusive usage.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our discoveries indicate that Pitty Tiger is a group of attackers with the ability to stay under the radar, yet still not as mature as other groups of attackers we monitor.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Pitty Tiger is probably not a state-sponsored group of attackers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They lack the experience and financial support that one would expect from state-sponsored attackers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We suppose this group is opportunistic and sells its services to probable competitors of their targets in the private sector.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have been able to leverage several attackers profiles, showing that the Pitty Tiger group is fairly small compared to other APT groups, which is probably why we saw them work on a very limited amount of targets.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At the end of this report, we provide indicators of compromise to help people detect current Pitty Tiger attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "APT attacks follow what we call the'' APT kill chain''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The kill chain describes briefly the way attackers do perform their actions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It can be summarized by the following scheme: The reconnaissance phase commences when an attacker selects a new target and involves the acquisition of information about that target.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There is very little information available about this phase, and there is little data about it.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The only way to collect information about this phase would be to already monitor all attackers' actions at this step, which is hardly feasible.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The longer the attackers spend time in attempting to understand their target and its online presence, the easier it will be to find efficient ways to penetrate that company's systems.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This reconnaissance phase is both about finding information to break into the targeted network successfully and about searching for data which could help to accelerate sensitive information isolation (like the name of a key employee for example).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This phase mostly relies on open sources from the Internet: social networks, press releases, white papers, corporate websites, search engines, but also on some active tools like vulnerability scanners etc.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At this stage, the APT attackers have a solid knowledge of their target and its key employees.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers have everything they need to start looking for an entry point to the company's network and establish one or several permanent backdoors into the environment.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attackers", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "one or several permanent backdoors", "start": 115, "end": 149}, {"text": "the environment", "start": 155, "end": 170}], "action": [{"text": "establish", "start": 105, "end": 114}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 150, "end": 154}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers mostly rely on two techniques here to infect one or several computers, usually workstations, inside the target's network: spear phishing and drive-by downloads.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attackers", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "spear phishing and drive-by downloads", "start": 136, "end": 173}], "action": [{"text": "rely", "start": 21, "end": 25}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 26, "end": 28}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Spear phishing can be described as targeted e-mail phishing.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Spear phishing", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "targeted e-mail phishing", "start": 35, "end": 59}], "action": [{"text": "be described", "start": 19, "end": 31}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 32, "end": 34}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In a spear phishing scheme, attackers send very few e-mails to targeted people.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "In", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "to", "start": 60, "end": 62}], "entity": [{"text": "a spear phishing scheme", "start": 3, "end": 26}, {"text": "attackers", "start": 28, "end": 37}, {"text": "very few e-mails", "start": 43, "end": 59}, {"text": "targeted people", "start": 63, "end": 78}], "action": [{"text": "send", "start": 38, "end": 42}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In fact, they can even send just a single e-mail.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The trick is to target the right victim and provide it with the right content, so that they will click on a link leading to drive-by download of a malware, or open an attached file which will infect their computer.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "target", "start": 16, "end": 22}, {"text": "provide", "start": 44, "end": 51}, {"text": "click", "start": 97, "end": 102}, {"text": "open", "start": 159, "end": 163}], "entity": [{"text": "the right victim", "start": 23, "end": 39}, {"text": "it", "start": 52, "end": 54}, {"text": "the right content", "start": 60, "end": 77}, {"text": "they", "start": 87, "end": 91}, {"text": "a link leading to drive-by download of a malware", "start": 106, "end": 154}, {"text": "an attached file which will infect their computer", "start": 164, "end": 213}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 55, "end": 59}, {"text": "on", "start": 103, "end": 105}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some groups of attackers also use'' watering hole'' techniques to successfully compromise their targets.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Some groups of attackers", "start": 0, "end": 24}, {"text": "'' watering hole'' techniques", "start": 33, "end": 62}, {"text": "successfully compromise their targets", "start": 66, "end": 103}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 30, "end": 33}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 63, "end": 65}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To build a watering hole attack, attackers do compromise the website of a third party, generally a supplier of the target, which is typically visited by a specific group of professionals and very likely by the target.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "To", "start": 0, "end": 2}], "entity": [{"text": "build a watering hole attack", "start": 3, "end": 31}, {"text": "attackers", "start": 33, "end": 42}, {"text": "the website of a third party, generally a supplier of the target, which is typically visited by a specific group of professionals and very likely by the target", "start": 57, "end": 216}], "action": [{"text": "compromise", "start": 46, "end": 56}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Every visitor of the compromised third party is then infected.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Every visitor of the compromised third party", "start": 0, "end": 44}], "action": [{"text": "is then infected", "start": 45, "end": 61}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The method has one major drawback: it will also infect third parties who visit the website.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Attackers have developed ways to avoid this.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If their reconnaissance phase has been done effectively, they already know all IP ranges used by the target company.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It just takes a few lines of code in the infecting script to only compromise visitors coming from the target IP ranges.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "compromise", "start": 66, "end": 76}], "entity": [{"text": "visitors coming from the target IP ranges", "start": 77, "end": 118}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Direct attacks against servers of the target can also be a way to penetrate the target's network.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Attackers have gained access to one or several machines inside the target's corporate network.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Attackers", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "access to one or several machines inside the target's corporate network", "start": 22, "end": 93}], "action": [{"text": "gained", "start": 15, "end": 21}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They need to install several different backdoors in order to be able to always access the network.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "They", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "several different backdoors", "start": 21, "end": 48}, {"text": "be able to always access the network", "start": 61, "end": 97}], "action": [{"text": "install", "start": 13, "end": 20}], "modifier": [{"text": "in order to", "start": 49, "end": 60}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In case one backdoor falls, there will be others.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As soon as the attackers are sure they have enough access, they start looking for two things: intellectual property (or anything else they want to know or steal) in alignment with predefined mission objectives, and a means of privilege escalation to facilitate lateral movement within the compromised environment.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "they", "start": 59, "end": 63}, {"text": "intellectual property (or anything else they want to know or steal) in alignment with predefined mission objectives", "start": 94, "end": 209}, {"text": "a means of privilege escalation to facilitate lateral movement within the compromised environment", "start": 215, "end": 312}], "action": [{"text": "looking", "start": 70, "end": 77}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 78, "end": 81}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It generally does not take long before the attackers gain domain administrator privileges and dump all the Active Directory content.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 39, "end": 52}, {"text": "domain administrator privileges", "start": 58, "end": 89}, {"text": "all the Active Directory content", "start": 99, "end": 131}], "action": [{"text": "gain", "start": 53, "end": 57}, {"text": "dump", "start": 94, "end": 98}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They use lateral moves between machines inside the network, and look for everything they need.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This step is very hard to detect, since they only use valid credentials and legitimate administration tools such as PsExec.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Data exfiltration is the last step before the attackers loop to the lateral moves step, in a never-ending circle of prolonged access and information theft.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Data exfiltration", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "the last step", "start": 21, "end": 34}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 18, "end": 20}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They generally create archive files containing the content they want to exfiltrate, which are then sent to the attackers by using a remote administration tool (RAT) or transfer protocols such as FTP and HTTP.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "They", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "archive files containing the content they want to exfiltrate", "start": 22, "end": 82}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 107, "end": 120}, {"text": "using a remote administration tool (RAT) or transfer protocols such as FTP and HTTP", "start": 124, "end": 207}], "action": [{"text": "create", "start": 15, "end": 21}, {"text": "are then sent", "start": 90, "end": 103}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 104, "end": 106}, {"text": "by", "start": 121, "end": 123}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This phase is not the end of an APT attack.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers loop to the access strengthening/lateral moves stage and generally keep stealing more information and stay inside the network for more data gathering.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attackers", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "more information", "start": 95, "end": 111}, {"text": "the network", "start": 128, "end": 139}, {"text": "more data gathering", "start": 144, "end": 163}], "action": [{"text": "stealing", "start": 86, "end": 94}, {"text": "stay", "start": 116, "end": 120}], "modifier": [{"text": "inside", "start": 121, "end": 127}, {"text": "for", "start": 140, "end": 143}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For more information about all the APT phases, please refer to our APT Kill Chain blog post serie.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During our regular investigations on APT cases, one particular variant of malware caught our attention, because we had not faced it before.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We decided to spend some time to investigate around this malware and found out that it was used exclusively by a single group of attackers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This malware family is known as'' PittyTiger'' by the anti-virus research community.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We discovered this malware sample in June 2014, leading to a command & control (c & c) server still in activity.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this malware sample", "start": 14, "end": 33}, {"text": "a command & control (c & c) server still in activity", "start": 59, "end": 111}], "action": [{"text": "leading", "start": 48, "end": 55}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 56, "end": 58}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our researches around this particular malware family revealed the'' Pitty Tiger'' group has been active since 2011, yet we found other publications which could probably be attributed to the same group of attacker back in 2010.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This group uses other malware and tools during their APT operations, in addition to the PittyTiger RAT.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A variant of the infamous Gh0st RAT dubbed'' Paladin'' has been used repeatedly by the PT group, together with other RATs which seem to be developed exclusively for the PT group:'' MM RAT'' (aka Troj/Goldsun-B), and'' CT RAT''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Another variant of Gh0st RAT named'' Leo'' has been found inactive on a c & c server.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also found another malware, named'' Troj/ReRol.A''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This one is also used by the group to infect workstations, collect system information, and install more malware on the infected computer.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This one", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "workstations", "start": 45, "end": 57}, {"text": "system information", "start": 67, "end": 85}, {"text": "more malware", "start": 99, "end": 111}, {"text": "the infected computer", "start": 115, "end": 136}], "action": [{"text": "infect", "start": 38, "end": 44}, {"text": "collect", "start": 59, "end": 66}, {"text": "install", "start": 91, "end": 98}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 112, "end": 114}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It acts as a first stage downloader and system data collector often used in the initial compromise of the Pitty Tiger campaigns, generally embedded in Microsoft Office documents.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "a first stage downloader", "start": 11, "end": 35}, {"text": "system data collector", "start": 40, "end": 61}, {"text": "Microsoft Office documents", "start": 151, "end": 177}], "action": [{"text": "acts", "start": 3, "end": 7}, {"text": "embedded", "start": 139, "end": 147}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 8, "end": 10}, {"text": "in", "start": 148, "end": 150}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Thanks to server's misconfigurations, we managed to get information from three c & c servers used by this group of attackers, which provided us with insight from the end of 2013 to the beginning of July 2014.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "three c & c servers", "start": 73, "end": 92}, {"text": "this group of attackers", "start": 101, "end": 124}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 93, "end": 97}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our investigation has been focused on the data we could get from these c & c servers but also on the Pitty Tiger environment.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This whitepaper aims to expose the view we have on the group, especially on their infrastructure and capabilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We hope this publication will bring further counter analysis from the research community to enrich the global common threat knowledge.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Pitty Tiger, like most other APT groups, use spear phishing e-mails extensively in order to gain an initial foothold within the targeted environment.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Pitty Tiger", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "spear phishing e-mails", "start": 45, "end": 67}, {"text": "extensively", "start": 68, "end": 79}, {"text": "gain an initial foothold within the targeted environment", "start": 92, "end": 148}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 41, "end": 44}], "modifier": [{"text": "in order to", "start": 80, "end": 91}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have been able to find a spear phishing e-mail crafted by the attackers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a spear phishing e-mail", "start": 26, "end": 49}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 61, "end": 74}], "action": [{"text": "crafted", "start": 50, "end": 57}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This e-mail spoofed the identity of an employee of a targeted company: The attached file is a Microsoft Office Word document triggering CVE-2014-1761 to infect the computer it is sent to: While this example looks very'' amateur'' for a spear phishing attempt, we suppose the group has conducted more advanced spear phishing campaigns, based on the fact that we found infected Word documents showing content stolen from victims of the group.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This e-mail", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "the identity of an employee of a targeted company", "start": 20, "end": 69}, {"text": "a Microsoft Office Word document", "start": 92, "end": 124}, {"text": "CVE-2014-1761", "start": 136, "end": 149}, {"text": "infect the computer it is sent to", "start": 153, "end": 186}, {"text": "the group", "start": 271, "end": 280}, {"text": "more advanced spear phishing campaigns", "start": 295, "end": 333}, {"text": "content", "start": 399, "end": 406}, {"text": "victims of the group", "start": 419, "end": 439}], "action": [{"text": "spoofed", "start": 12, "end": 19}, {"text": "triggering", "start": 125, "end": 135}, {"text": "conducted", "start": 285, "end": 294}, {"text": "stolen", "start": 407, "end": 413}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 150, "end": 152}, {"text": "from", "start": 414, "end": 418}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These documents were infecting the system with Troj/ReRol.A malware, which we will detail later in this report.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These documents", "start": 0, "end": 15}, {"text": "the system", "start": 31, "end": 41}, {"text": "Troj/ReRol.A malware", "start": 47, "end": 67}], "action": [{"text": "were infecting", "start": 16, "end": 30}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 42, "end": 46}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This could mean that the Pitty Tiger group is using stolen material as spear phishing content either to target other persons in the compromised company, or to target other persons in a competitor's company, or more generally to compromise another target.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the Pitty Tiger group", "start": 21, "end": 42}, {"text": "stolen material", "start": 52, "end": 67}, {"text": "spear phishing content", "start": 71, "end": 93}], "action": [{"text": "is using", "start": 43, "end": 51}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 68, "end": 70}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Pitty Tiger also seem to use fake Microsoft Office Excel content, yet we could only find empty content delivering once again the Troj/ReRol.A malware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Pitty Tiger", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "fake Microsoft Office Excel content", "start": 29, "end": 64}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 25, "end": 28}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although we have not been able to find evidences of any attack aimed at exploiting vulnerabilities on the group's targets servers, we have been able to record several vulnerability scanning launched from one c & c server straight to the targets.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "vulnerability scanning", "start": 167, "end": 189}, {"text": "one c & c server", "start": 204, "end": 220}, {"text": "the targets", "start": 233, "end": 244}], "action": [{"text": "launched", "start": 190, "end": 198}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 199, "end": 203}, {"text": "straight to", "start": 221, "end": 232}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers have been using different vulnerability scanners aimed at their targets.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attackers", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "different vulnerability scanners aimed at their targets", "start": 30, "end": 85}], "action": [{"text": "been using", "start": 19, "end": 29}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While some targets have been scanned with'' generic'' vulnerability scanning tools like HScan or Fluxay and port scanners like Nmap, some other targets have been scanned for very specific vulnerabilities, like a ZyWALL vulnerability or a FORTINET product.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "some targets", "start": 6, "end": 18}, {"text": "'' generic'' vulnerability scanning tools like HScan or Fluxay and port scanners like Nmap", "start": 41, "end": 131}, {"text": "some other targets", "start": 133, "end": 151}, {"text": "very specific vulnerabilities, like a ZyWALL vulnerability or a FORTINET product", "start": 174, "end": 254}], "action": [{"text": "been scanned", "start": 24, "end": 36}, {"text": "been scanned", "start": 157, "end": 169}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 37, "end": 41}, {"text": "for", "start": 170, "end": 173}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have also been able to testify that the Pitty Tiger group has successfully collected information on some of their targets by exploiting the HeartBleed bug.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the Pitty Tiger group", "start": 39, "end": 60}, {"text": "information on some of their targets", "start": 88, "end": 124}, {"text": "exploiting the HeartBleed bug", "start": 128, "end": 157}], "action": [{"text": "collected", "start": 78, "end": 87}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 125, "end": 127}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This vulnerability which exists on some old versions of OpenSSL allows attackers to collect data from chunks of memory from the targeted machine.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "attackers", "start": 71, "end": 80}, {"text": "data", "start": 92, "end": 96}, {"text": "chunks of memory from the targeted machine", "start": 102, "end": 144}], "action": [{"text": "collect", "start": 84, "end": 91}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 97, "end": 101}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It allowed the Pitty Tiger group to get admin credentials from at least one target, for example.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the Pitty Tiger group", "start": 11, "end": 32}, {"text": "admin credentials", "start": 40, "end": 57}, {"text": "at least one target", "start": 63, "end": 82}], "action": [{"text": "get", "start": 36, "end": 39}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 58, "end": 62}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Running automated vulnerability scanners on whole ranges of IP addresses used by the targets or on several domains is a very noisy way to collect information and find server vulnerabilities.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "Running", "start": 0, "end": 7}, {"text": "collect", "start": 138, "end": 145}, {"text": "find", "start": 162, "end": 166}], "entity": [{"text": "automated vulnerability scanners", "start": 8, "end": 40}, {"text": "whole ranges of IP addresses used by the targets", "start": 44, "end": 92}, {"text": "several domains", "start": 99, "end": 114}, {"text": "information", "start": 146, "end": 157}, {"text": "server vulnerabilities", "start": 167, "end": 189}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 41, "end": 43}, {"text": "on", "start": 96, "end": 98}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We would advocate that this method is unwise when you want to stay furtive, and doing it from a c & c server is very surprising, to say the least.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While the Pitty Tiger group is experienced on some aspects on its running APT campaigns, it definitely lacks some maturity here.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One of the favorite methods used by the Pitty Tiger group to infect users is to use a Microsoft Office Word document which exploits a specific vulnerability.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the Pitty Tiger group", "start": 36, "end": 57}, {"text": "infect users", "start": 61, "end": 73}, {"text": "a Microsoft Office Word document which exploits a specific vulnerability", "start": 84, "end": 156}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 58, "end": 60}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 80, "end": 83}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The payload infecting the system is malware known as'' Troj/ReRol.A''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The payload", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "the system", "start": 22, "end": 32}], "action": [{"text": "infecting", "start": 12, "end": 21}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is generally the first step of the initial compromise for Pitty Tiger campaigns.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have been able to find one such document used by that group of attacker, exploiting CVE- 2012-0158, an old critical vulnerability impacting Microsoft Office and corrected by Microsoft's MS12-027 fix in April 2012.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "one such document used by that group of attacker", "start": 26, "end": 74}, {"text": "CVE- 2012-0158, an old critical vulnerability impacting Microsoft Office and corrected by Microsoft's MS12-027 fix in April 2012", "start": 87, "end": 215}], "action": [{"text": "exploiting", "start": 76, "end": 86}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This vulnerability affects Microsoft Office versions up to Office 2010.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also found one RTF document embedding CVE-2014-1761, which is a more recent exploit.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "one RTF document", "start": 14, "end": 30}, {"text": "CVE-2014-1761", "start": 41, "end": 54}], "action": [{"text": "embedding", "start": 31, "end": 40}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We discovered several different documents spreading this malware by triggering CVE-2012-0158 vulnerability, yet we could not share them in this report, since these documents contain information about victims of the Pitty Tiger group.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "several different documents", "start": 14, "end": 41}, {"text": "this malware", "start": 52, "end": 64}, {"text": "triggering CVE-2012-0158 vulnerability", "start": 68, "end": 106}], "action": [{"text": "spreading", "start": 42, "end": 51}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 65, "end": 67}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The discovery of this'' old'' vulnerability exploitation in June 2014 could mean that the Pitty Tiger group has no direct access to 0day exploits, or not enough budgets to buy some.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It could also mean they use their low range exploit by default because it is working on their targets and is sufficient to compromise their workstations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Word document we initially found was probably a'' test'' document used by the group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When opened, it shows a single line written in Chinese language, which can be translated as'' Hello!'' When successfully triggered, the exploit infects the host by dropping and executing a file named'' svohost.exe'' in the temporary folder of the currently logged-in user: This binary is'' Troj/ReRol.A'' according to Sophos naming convention.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the exploit", "start": 132, "end": 143}, {"text": "the host", "start": 152, "end": 160}, {"text": "a file named'' svohost.exe''", "start": 187, "end": 215}, {"text": "the temporary folder of the currently logged-in user", "start": 219, "end": 271}], "action": [{"text": "infects", "start": 144, "end": 151}, {"text": "dropping", "start": 164, "end": 172}, {"text": "executing", "start": 177, "end": 186}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 216, "end": 218}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It immediately triggers alarms on our sandbox: The binary drops a copy of itself in the Application Data folder of the currently logged-in user: The malware initiates a communication to time.windows.com to check for connectivity, and then communicates with the c & c server at mac.avstore.com.tw.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The binary", "start": 47, "end": 57}, {"text": "a copy of itself", "start": 64, "end": 80}, {"text": "the Application Data folder of the currently logged-in user", "start": 84, "end": 143}, {"text": "The malware", "start": 145, "end": 156}, {"text": "a communication", "start": 167, "end": 182}, {"text": "time.windows.com", "start": 186, "end": 202}, {"text": "connectivity", "start": 216, "end": 228}, {"text": "the c & c server", "start": 257, "end": 273}, {"text": "mac.avstore.com.tw", "start": 277, "end": 295}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 58, "end": 63}, {"text": "initiates", "start": 157, "end": 166}, {"text": "check", "start": 206, "end": 211}, {"text": "communicates", "start": 239, "end": 251}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 81, "end": 83}, {"text": "to", "start": 183, "end": 185}, {"text": "for", "start": 212, "end": 215}, {"text": "with", "start": 252, "end": 256}, {"text": "at", "start": 274, "end": 276}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Very few variants of Troj/ReRol.A are public.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The variants we have seen did use that same User- Agent: The persistence mechanism used by the malware is the creation of a registry key named'' Shell'' containing the path to the malware on the infected system: The payload of this malware is used to collect information on the newly infected host, and send it back to the c & c server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The persistence mechanism", "start": 57, "end": 82}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 91, "end": 102}, {"text": "the creation of a registry key named'' Shell'' containing the path to the malware on the infected system", "start": 106, "end": 210}, {"text": "The payload of this malware", "start": 212, "end": 239}, {"text": "collect information on the newly infected host", "start": 251, "end": 297}, {"text": "it", "start": 308, "end": 310}, {"text": "the c & c server", "start": 319, "end": 335}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 83, "end": 87}, {"text": "is", "start": 103, "end": 105}, {"text": "is used", "start": 240, "end": 247}, {"text": "send", "start": 303, "end": 307}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 248, "end": 250}, {"text": "back to", "start": 311, "end": 318}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It can also download and execute binaries.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "binaries", "start": 33, "end": 41}], "action": [{"text": "download", "start": 12, "end": 20}, {"text": "execute", "start": 25, "end": 32}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The data sent in the POST request has a 0x11 bytes header consisting of a fixed-value byte (0xc3) followed by a 0x10 bytes encryption key.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The data", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "the POST request", "start": 17, "end": 33}], "action": [{"text": "sent", "start": 9, "end": 13}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 14, "end": 16}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The data following the header is encrypted using RC4 with the previous key.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The data following the header", "start": 0, "end": 29}, {"text": "RC4", "start": 49, "end": 52}, {"text": "the previous key", "start": 58, "end": 74}], "action": [{"text": "is encrypted", "start": 30, "end": 42}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 43, "end": 48}, {"text": "with", "start": 53, "end": 57}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once the data is deciphered, the last byte of the clear text should also be 0xc3.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have been able to decrypt the communications and confirmed what is transmitted to the c & c server.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Here is an anonymized sample of communication showing information collected by the malware: This information is very useful for an attacker: it shows all software installed on the system, and running services.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "information", "start": 54, "end": 65}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 79, "end": 90}, {"text": "it", "start": 141, "end": 143}, {"text": "all software installed on the system", "start": 150, "end": 186}, {"text": "running services", "start": 192, "end": 208}], "action": [{"text": "collected", "start": 66, "end": 75}, {"text": "shows", "start": 144, "end": 149}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once this data has been transferred to the c & c server, it responds by sending additional malware to execute on the machine.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this data", "start": 5, "end": 14}, {"text": "the c & c server", "start": 39, "end": 55}, {"text": "it", "start": 57, "end": 59}, {"text": "additional malware to execute on the machine", "start": 80, "end": 124}], "action": [{"text": "been transferred", "start": 19, "end": 35}, {"text": "sending", "start": 72, "end": 79}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 36, "end": 38}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The c & c part consists of two files: The dr.asp registers the following keywords: These two binaries were no longer available on the server.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, we found various files which could have been used as'' 32.exe'' in the past: The 322.exe file is a legitimate, Chinese, calc.exe tool.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It might have been used by the attackers to perform tests.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The 3 others binaries are RATs, which will be detailed in the next parts.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This RAT is the origin of the attackers' group name.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' PittyTiger'' is a mutex used by the malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Pitty Tiger'' is also a string transmitted in the network communications of the RAT, as you will see in this chapter.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware, when running in our sandbox, triggers the following alarms: The binary drops two files in'' C: \\Windows\\System32'': The'' qmgrxp.exe'' binary is a simple copy of the original binary.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The binary", "start": 73, "end": 83}, {"text": "two files", "start": 90, "end": 99}, {"text": "'' C: \\Windows\\System32''", "start": 102, "end": 127}, {"text": "The'' qmgrxp.exe'' binary", "start": 129, "end": 154}, {"text": "a simple copy of the original binary", "start": 158, "end": 194}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 84, "end": 89}, {"text": "is", "start": 155, "end": 157}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 100, "end": 102}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It drops the'' packet64.dll'', and injects it in'' explorer.exe''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "the'' packet64.dll''", "start": 9, "end": 29}, {"text": "it", "start": 43, "end": 45}, {"text": "'' explorer.exe''", "start": 48, "end": 65}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 3, "end": 8}, {"text": "injects", "start": 35, "end": 42}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 46, "end": 48}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When executed, a mutex called'' PittyTiger'' is created.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a mutex called'' PittyTiger''", "start": 15, "end": 44}], "action": [{"text": "is created", "start": 45, "end": 55}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Persistence is achieved by adding the path to the binary to the WinlogonUserInit key: The'' packet64.dll'' is the main payload of the RAT.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Persistence", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "adding the path to the binary to the WinlogonUserInit key", "start": 27, "end": 84}], "action": [{"text": "is achieved", "start": 12, "end": 23}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 24, "end": 26}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After being injected, it starts sending its Hello packet to its c & c server: All the requests sent to the c & c contains the string'' /FC001/'' followed by the bot id.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 22, "end": 24}, {"text": "its Hello packet", "start": 40, "end": 56}, {"text": "its c & c server", "start": 60, "end": 76}, {"text": "All the requests", "start": 78, "end": 94}, {"text": "the c & c", "start": 103, "end": 112}], "action": [{"text": "sending", "start": 32, "end": 39}, {"text": "sent", "start": 95, "end": 99}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 57, "end": 59}, {"text": "to", "start": 100, "end": 102}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This id consists of the infected computer name followed by a dash and the lower word of the disk serial id.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The data sent is simply encoded using base64, there is no cipher at all.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The data sent", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "base64", "start": 38, "end": 44}], "action": [{"text": "is simply encoded", "start": 14, "end": 31}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 32, "end": 37}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The hello packet, once decoded, looks like the following: Our sample had 3 c & c servers configured: The following commands are implemented: Regarding the controller part, we found two different versions: The interface handling both Pitty TIGER and CT connections is very interesting.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Our sample", "start": 58, "end": 68}, {"text": "3 c & c servers", "start": 73, "end": 88}, {"text": "The following commands", "start": 101, "end": 123}], "action": [{"text": "configured", "start": 89, "end": 99}, {"text": "are implemented", "start": 124, "end": 139}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have been able to confirm that the author of those two families of malware is the same person, as will be seen in the next chapter about'' CT RAT''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This remote administration tool is often used by the Pitty Tiger group.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This remote administration tool", "start": 0, "end": 31}, {"text": "the Pitty Tiger group", "start": 49, "end": 70}], "action": [{"text": "is often used", "start": 32, "end": 45}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have been able to acquire both the client and the server parts.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We found two instances of the same binary with different names–32mm.exe and mm32.exe.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This RAT seems to be an evolution of PittyTiger, since a specific server binary we found could handle both requests from CT and PittyTiger, and was indicated as compatible with PittyTiger.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Moreover, the same commands are implemented in both RATs.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the same commands", "start": 10, "end": 27}, {"text": "both RATs", "start": 47, "end": 56}], "action": [{"text": "are implemented", "start": 28, "end": 43}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 44, "end": 46}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Unsurprisingly, when running in our sandbox, the RAT triggers the same alarms as PittyTiger: The binary drops two files in'' C: \\Program Files\\Internet Explorer'': The'' ieupdate.exe'' is a simple binary to inject the DLL into'' explorer.exe''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The binary", "start": 93, "end": 103}, {"text": "two files", "start": 110, "end": 119}, {"text": "'' C: \\Program Files\\Internet Explorer''", "start": 122, "end": 162}, {"text": "The'' ieupdate.exe''", "start": 164, "end": 184}, {"text": "the DLL", "start": 214, "end": 221}, {"text": "'' explorer.exe''", "start": 226, "end": 243}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 104, "end": 109}, {"text": "inject", "start": 207, "end": 213}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 120, "end": 122}, {"text": "into", "start": 222, "end": 226}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Persistence is achieved via the following registry key: After injection, the RAT sends a first login packet to its c & c: The RAT communication is performed through HTTP requests.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Persistence", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "the following registry key", "start": 28, "end": 54}, {"text": "the RAT", "start": 73, "end": 80}, {"text": "a first login packet", "start": 87, "end": 107}, {"text": "its c & c", "start": 111, "end": 120}, {"text": "The RAT communication", "start": 122, "end": 143}, {"text": "HTTP requests", "start": 165, "end": 178}], "action": [{"text": "is achieved", "start": 12, "end": 23}, {"text": "sends", "start": 81, "end": 86}, {"text": "is performed", "start": 144, "end": 156}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 24, "end": 27}, {"text": "to", "start": 108, "end": 110}, {"text": "through", "start": 157, "end": 164}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The data is sent encrypted with RC4, and base64-encoded.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The data", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "encrypted with RC4, and base64-encoded", "start": 17, "end": 55}], "action": [{"text": "is sent", "start": 9, "end": 16}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The RC4 key is the Unicode form of the requested URL.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Login packet contains the following string, after decoding and deciphering: It contains the computer name, the user name, the internal IP address, the OS version, the RAT internal version and the Language ID of the system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 80, "end": 82}, {"text": "the computer name", "start": 92, "end": 109}, {"text": "the user name", "start": 111, "end": 124}, {"text": "the internal IP address", "start": 126, "end": 149}, {"text": "the OS version", "start": 151, "end": 165}, {"text": "the RAT internal version", "start": 167, "end": 191}, {"text": "the Language ID of the system", "start": 196, "end": 225}], "action": [{"text": "contains", "start": 83, "end": 91}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The RAT can then receive commands from its c & c.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The RAT", "start": 0, "end": 7}, {"text": "commands", "start": 25, "end": 33}, {"text": "its c & c", "start": 39, "end": 48}], "action": [{"text": "receive", "start": 17, "end": 24}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 34, "end": 38}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Usual RAT features are implemented: Regarding the configuration, our sample communicates with'' sop.avstore.com.tw'', and contains the string'' Nov 13 2013'', which should be a version identifier.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "our sample", "start": 65, "end": 75}, {"text": "'' sop.avstore.com.tw''", "start": 93, "end": 116}], "action": [{"text": "communicates", "start": 76, "end": 88}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 89, "end": 93}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The c & c part is a Windows binary written in .NET", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ".", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We found 2 versions: The About form gives the name of the developer (s): The version of the controller which can handle both PittyTiger and CT shows the same author (s): As these screenshots show, the switch between PittyTiger and CT was probably in the last semester of 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The text can be translated, thanks to Google Translate, as: Further discussion about this author is provided in subsequent sections.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We named this malware'' MM RAT'' at the beginning of our investigation, before we found an existing name for it,'' Troj/Goldsun-B'' according to Sophos.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is another remote administration tool often used by the Pitty Tiger crew.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "another remote administration tool", "start": 8, "end": 42}, {"text": "the Pitty Tiger crew", "start": 57, "end": 77}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 49, "end": 53}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have been able to acquire both a client and server part for it.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The binary we found is named 3200.exe, and triggers the following alarms in our sandbox: The'' release.tmp'' file is dropped on the system: The binary is also copied to the user's'' Application Data'' directory, and injects the'' release.tmp'' file in'' explorer.exe''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The'' release.tmp'' file", "start": 89, "end": 113}, {"text": "the system", "start": 128, "end": 138}, {"text": "The binary", "start": 140, "end": 150}, {"text": "the user's'' Application Data'' directory", "start": 169, "end": 210}, {"text": "the'' release.tmp'' file", "start": 224, "end": 248}, {"text": "'' explorer.exe''", "start": 251, "end": 268}], "action": [{"text": "is dropped", "start": 114, "end": 124}, {"text": "is also copied", "start": 151, "end": 165}, {"text": "injects", "start": 216, "end": 223}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 125, "end": 127}, {"text": "to", "start": 166, "end": 168}, {"text": "in", "start": 249, "end": 251}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Persistence is achieved by adding the path to the binary to the Winlogon Shell key: The RAT embeds its own DNS server IP addresses to make the c & c domain names resolutions.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Persistence", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "adding the path to the binary to the Winlogon Shell key", "start": 27, "end": 82}, {"text": "The RAT", "start": 84, "end": 91}, {"text": "its own DNS server IP addresses", "start": 99, "end": 130}, {"text": "make the c & c domain names resolutions", "start": 134, "end": 173}], "action": [{"text": "is achieved", "start": 12, "end": 23}, {"text": "embeds", "start": 92, "end": 98}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 24, "end": 26}, {"text": "to", "start": 131, "end": 133}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These addresses are listed below: It starts resolving its domains after injection, and immediately sends requests.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 34, "end": 36}, {"text": "its domains", "start": 54, "end": 65}, {"text": "injection", "start": 72, "end": 81}, {"text": "requests", "start": 105, "end": 113}], "action": [{"text": "resolving", "start": 44, "end": 53}, {"text": "sends", "start": 99, "end": 104}], "modifier": [{"text": "after", "start": 66, "end": 71}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "First requests are used to check for updates (GET request on /httpdocs/update/update.ini).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "requests", "start": 6, "end": 14}, {"text": "check for updates (GET request on /httpdocs/update/update.ini)", "start": 27, "end": 89}], "action": [{"text": "are used", "start": 15, "end": 23}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 24, "end": 26}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A Hello packet is then sent: The bot then repeatedly sends GET requests on'' /httpdocs/mm/ < botid > /ComMand.sec'' to retrieve remote commands.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "A Hello packet", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "The bot", "start": 29, "end": 36}, {"text": "GET requests", "start": 59, "end": 71}, {"text": "'' /httpdocs/mm/ < botid > /ComMand.sec''", "start": 74, "end": 115}, {"text": "remote commands", "start": 128, "end": 143}], "action": [{"text": "is then sent", "start": 15, "end": 27}, {"text": "sends", "start": 53, "end": 58}, {"text": "retrieve", "start": 119, "end": 127}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 72, "end": 74}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The communication protocol is quite simple: GET requests are used to receive data from the c & c, and POST requests to send data.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "GET requests", "start": 44, "end": 56}, {"text": "receive data from the c & c", "start": 69, "end": 96}, {"text": "POST requests", "start": 102, "end": 115}, {"text": "data", "start": 124, "end": 128}], "action": [{"text": "are used", "start": 57, "end": 65}, {"text": "send", "start": 119, "end": 123}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 66, "end": 68}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In POST commands, the CGI name represents the command.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "In", "start": 0, "end": 2}], "entity": [{"text": "POST commands", "start": 3, "end": 16}, {"text": "the CGI name", "start": 18, "end": 30}, {"text": "the command", "start": 42, "end": 53}], "action": [{"text": "represents", "start": 31, "end": 41}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following features are implemented: The following CGI files can be requested by the bot: The configuration is stored locally in a file called'' schmup.sys''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The following CGI files", "start": 40, "end": 63}, {"text": "the bot", "start": 84, "end": 91}], "action": [{"text": "be requested", "start": 68, "end": 80}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The file is ciphered using RC4, using the MD5 hash of'' rEdstArs'' as the key.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The file", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "RC4", "start": 27, "end": 30}, {"text": "the MD5 hash of'' rEdstArs'' as the key", "start": 38, "end": 77}], "action": [{"text": "is ciphered", "start": 9, "end": 20}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 21, "end": 26}, {"text": "using", "start": 32, "end": 37}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our sample uses'' mca.avstore.com.tw'','' star.yamn.net'' and'' bz.kimoo.com.tw'' as c & c servers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Our sample", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "'' mca.avstore.com.tw'','' star.yamn.net'' and'' bz.kimoo.com.tw''", "start": 15, "end": 81}, {"text": "c & c servers", "start": 85, "end": 98}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 11, "end": 15}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 82, "end": 84}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It contains the'' 1.6.0'' version number, and uses the password'' 9ol.8ik,'' to authenticate with the bots.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Unlike others c & c binaries, the c & c part of this RAT does not have a graphical interface, but can be remotely requested to manage the bots.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the c & c part of this RAT", "start": 30, "end": 56}, {"text": "manage the bots", "start": 127, "end": 142}], "action": [{"text": "be remotely requested", "start": 102, "end": 123}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 124, "end": 126}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Furthermore, no authentication is required to send commands to the c & c (but you need to know the configured password to interact with the bots).", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "send", "start": 46, "end": 50}], "entity": [{"text": "commands", "start": 51, "end": 59}, {"text": "the c & c", "start": 63, "end": 72}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 60, "end": 62}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The management protocol is the same as the bots protocol, with different CGI files: The bots' answers to remote commands can be retrieved by requesting the'' Reply.sec'' file (e.g.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "GET /httpdocs/mm/ < botid > /Reply.sec) These network patterns might ring bells in some researcher's minds.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The network communication used by this binary are the same as those used by the Enfal malware, which has been used in the past by the Lurid group (APT attackers) and by other threat actors in China.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An examination of the code did not reveal code similarities with the Enfal malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We do not currently know why this malware uses the same patterns to communicate.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this malware", "start": 29, "end": 41}, {"text": "the same patterns", "start": 47, "end": 64}, {"text": "communicate", "start": 68, "end": 79}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 42, "end": 46}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 65, "end": 67}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is another remote administration tool used by the Pitty Tiger group.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "another remote administration tool", "start": 8, "end": 42}, {"text": "the Pitty Tiger group", "start": 51, "end": 72}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 43, "end": 47}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have been able to get both a client and server part of it.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The binary we found was dropped by a malicious Word document.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The binary we found", "start": 0, "end": 19}, {"text": "a malicious Word document", "start": 35, "end": 60}], "action": [{"text": "was dropped", "start": 20, "end": 31}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following alarms are triggered in the sandbox: The shellcode contained in the Word file drops the following file, and executes it: This one drops in turn the following file: This tmp file is then copied to'' C: \\Windows\\system32\\Nwsapagentex.dll'' and registered as a service called'' Nwsapagent''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The shellcode contained in the Word file", "start": 51, "end": 91}, {"text": "the following file", "start": 98, "end": 116}, {"text": "it", "start": 131, "end": 133}, {"text": "This one", "start": 135, "end": 143}, {"text": "the following file", "start": 158, "end": 176}, {"text": "This tmp file", "start": 178, "end": 191}, {"text": "'' C: \\Windows\\system32\\Nwsapagentex.dll''", "start": 209, "end": 251}, {"text": "a service called'' Nwsapagent''", "start": 270, "end": 301}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 92, "end": 97}, {"text": "executes", "start": 122, "end": 130}, {"text": "drops", "start": 144, "end": 149}, {"text": "is then copied", "start": 192, "end": 206}, {"text": "registered", "start": 256, "end": 266}], "modifier": [{"text": "in turn", "start": 150, "end": 157}, {"text": "to", "start": 207, "end": 209}, {"text": "as", "start": 267, "end": 269}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This malware is a variant of the infamous Gh0st RAT.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our specific sample uses'' ssss0'' instead of the usual'' Gh0st'' header for network communications.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The commands ID used in the communication protocol have also changed, but the features are quite the same.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The configuration is directly embedded in the binary, and deciphered at runtime.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Up to 5 c & c servers can be configured, but our sample only had one:'' ey.avstore.com.tw:53''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Up to 5 c & c servers", "start": 0, "end": 21}], "action": [{"text": "be configured", "start": 26, "end": 39}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' EY'' could stand for'' Ernst & Young''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It would not be very surprising, since a lot of different attack groups do use anti-virus vendors or other big company's names to try to look more legitimate.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Pitty Tiger is no exception, as detailed later in this report.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also found two c & c binaries, claiming to be versions 2.1 and 2.2 of the Paladin RAT controller.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Version 2.1 answers to the'' ssss0'' header, while version 2.2 uses the classical'' Gh0st'' header.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additionally to the Paladin RAT, we found another variant of Gh0st RAT, named'' Leo''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although we have found it on a c & c server of the group, there is no evidence that is has been used by the group, in opposition to Paladin which is used often by Pitty Tiger.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Moreover, the built malware we found in the same folder was configured to connect to a local IP address, probably for testing purposes.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the built malware we found in the same folder", "start": 10, "end": 55}, {"text": "a local IP address", "start": 85, "end": 103}], "action": [{"text": "connect", "start": 74, "end": 81}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 82, "end": 84}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our investigation has focused on three particular c & c servers used by the group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These c & c servers, unlike the other c & cs used by the group, have been misconfigured.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once parsed and dumped, it provided us with more insight.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We found several domains used by the Pitty Tiger group, the most interesting ones being detailed in this chapter.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Pitty Tiger, like other APT attackers, often use anti-virus'' familiar names'' when registering domains or creating subdomains.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some examples can be avstore.com.tw, sophos.skypetm.com.tw, symantecs.com.tw, trendmicro.org.tw etc.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The registration information for this domain has been the same since 2013-06-04: This information has been used to register another domain, skypetm.com.tw, which has also been used by the Pitty Tiger group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Our research also led us to the discovery of four different malware families connected to subdomains of avstore.com.tw: This domain has shown two different WHOIS entries through time: The most recent registration information is also used for avstore.com.tw.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Six malware families have been identified as communicating with subdomains of skypetm.com.tw: Avstore.com.tw and skypetm.com.tw have 4 malware families in common, communicating to subdomains of both domains: Some domains registered by the group are very old.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Six malware families", "start": 0, "end": 20}, {"text": "subdomains of skypetm.com.tw", "start": 64, "end": 92}, {"text": "4 malware families", "start": 133, "end": 151}, {"text": "subdomains of both domains", "start": 180, "end": 206}], "action": [{"text": "communicating", "start": 45, "end": 58}, {"text": "communicating", "start": 163, "end": 176}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 59, "end": 63}, {"text": "to", "start": 177, "end": 179}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There is an increase in the registrations from 2010 on.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All the e-mail addresses used are connected to the Pitty Tiger group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Mapping the victims of such a targeted campaign is not an easy task.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have found the Pitty Tiger group to be very active against one particular private company from the defense industry and one academic network of a government,, yet we think it was done to be used as a proxy for some of the group's operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have also found some connections from other companies to the c & c servers, yet we did not find evidence that they were real victims.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These alleged victims do work in different sectors and are located mostly in European countries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It might be surprising to see a company specialized in web development here, yet it has built websites for interesting potential targets.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We suspect Pitty Tiger to use this compromise to spear phish other companies which are in commercial relation with this web development company.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Pitty Tiger", "start": 11, "end": 22}, {"text": "other companies which are in commercial relation with this web development company", "start": 61, "end": 143}], "action": [{"text": "spear phish", "start": 49, "end": 60}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have to mention that we only had access to three of the several attackers' servers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Therefore, we suppose the Pitty Tiger group could have more targets than what we could confirm.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also found a lot of vulnerability scanners launched by the attackers at different targets, yet there was no sign of compromise.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "vulnerability scanners", "start": 23, "end": 45}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 58, "end": 71}, {"text": "different targets", "start": 75, "end": 92}], "action": [{"text": "launched", "start": 46, "end": 54}], "modifier": [{"text": "at", "start": 72, "end": 74}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During the course of our investigations, we discovered a RAR archive on the attacker's server containing 5 Word documents and one small C source code.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These documents belong to the defense company which has been compromised.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to the name of the files and the general feel of the archive, we do think it was extracted by the attackers to'' show'' someone what kind of data they could get from the compromise of that particular target.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 84, "end": 86}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 104, "end": 117}, {"text": "'' show'' someone what kind of data they could get from the compromise of that particular target", "start": 120, "end": 216}], "action": [{"text": "was extracted", "start": 87, "end": 100}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 118, "end": 120}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The documents were still exhibiting comments from various users, showing it was an ongoing work and not old documents.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Interestingly enough, we saw a part of these documents appear on Virus-Total, with an additional'' gift'' from the attackers, a payload dropping a malware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a payload", "start": 126, "end": 135}, {"text": "a malware", "start": 145, "end": 154}], "action": [{"text": "dropping", "start": 136, "end": 144}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There are only two options we can think of here:  Someone from the same company has been targeted with this document.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Someone from the same company", "start": 51, "end": 80}, {"text": "this document", "start": 104, "end": 117}], "action": [{"text": "been targeted", "start": 85, "end": 98}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 99, "end": 103}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": " Someone from another company has been targeted with this document.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Someone from another company", "start": 2, "end": 30}, {"text": "this document", "start": 54, "end": 67}], "action": [{"text": "been targeted", "start": 35, "end": 48}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 49, "end": 53}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This other company could be a partner or competitor.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Since we were unable to determine the intended use of this specific document, we can only suppose that it could be used to provide commercial advantages to competitors of that company, or used by a foreign state.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During our investigation, we found out interesting information about the Pitty Tiger group itself.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After analyzing the various collected elements, we have tried to draw a portrait of this particular threat.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have been able to get all the RDP connections logs to one c & c server: These connections are either VPS or dynamic IP addresses, mostly from China.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A computer named CHMXY-PC connected to the c & c via RDP with IP address 58.61.40.5.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "A computer named CHMXY-PC", "start": 0, "end": 25}, {"text": "the c & c", "start": 39, "end": 48}, {"text": "RDP", "start": 53, "end": 56}, {"text": "IP address 58.61.40.5", "start": 62, "end": 83}], "action": [{"text": "connected", "start": 26, "end": 35}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 36, "end": 38}, {"text": "via", "start": 49, "end": 52}, {"text": "with", "start": 57, "end": 61}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The IP is in an ADSL dynamic pool in the Gangzhou area (Guangdong province): A few connections to the c & c were done by a computer named TIEWEISHIPC with IP address 27.16.139.143.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "A few connections to the c & c", "start": 77, "end": 107}, {"text": "a computer named TIEWEISHIPC with IP address 27.16.139.143", "start": 121, "end": 179}], "action": [{"text": "were done", "start": 108, "end": 117}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This IP address belongs to an ADSL dynamic pool in the Wuhan area (Hubei's provincial capital).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some connections to the c & c originated from a computer named FLY-THINK with several IP addresses, all located in Fuqing (Fujian province).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Some connections to the c & c", "start": 0, "end": 29}, {"text": "a computer named FLY-THINK with several IP addresses, all located in Fuqing (Fujian province)", "start": 46, "end": 139}], "action": [{"text": "originated", "start": 30, "end": 40}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 41, "end": 45}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The IP addresses are in an ADSL dynamic pool: Most of the connections to the c & c server were coming from a computer named 50PZ80C- 1DFDCB8 with several IP addresses.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Most of the connections to the c & c server", "start": 46, "end": 89}, {"text": "a computer named 50PZ80C- 1DFDCB8 with several IP addresses", "start": 107, "end": 166}], "action": [{"text": "were coming", "start": 90, "end": 101}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 102, "end": 106}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There are 11 IP addresses from Chinese dynamic ADSL ranges: 9 from Fuqing (Fujian province), one from Fuzhou (Fujian's province capital) and one from Nanchang (Jiangxi's province capital).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The last one came from a VPS instance located in Los Angeles (California, USA) but purchased by a China based VPS provider XeVPS which belong to the AS38197 (Sun Network Hong Kong Limited).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The two computers FLY-THINK and 50PZ80C-1DFDCB8 have used distinct IP addresses to connect to the c & c, yet some of these IP addresses come from the same IP range: We mapped these RDP connections to have a graphical view: We found that a member of this group of attackers used some tools on his own system, for testing purposes.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The two computers FLY-THINK and 50PZ80C-1DFDCB8", "start": 0, "end": 47}, {"text": "distinct IP addresses", "start": 58, "end": 79}, {"text": "connect to the c & c", "start": 83, "end": 103}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 53, "end": 57}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 80, "end": 82}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This information was still available when we got access to the c & c server.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "He launched some tests with the CT RAT we exposed earlier: Here we can see a user'' Toot'' from a machine named'' toot-2a601225a8'' logging in the CT RAT and executing some commands.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a user'' Toot''", "start": 75, "end": 90}, {"text": "some commands", "start": 168, "end": 181}], "action": [{"text": "executing", "start": 158, "end": 167}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The c & c IP address, 198.100.113.27, can be seen there.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other log files showed that'' Toot'' is using virtual machines for his tests.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We can also see the system: Microsoft Windows XP SP3.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The'' P'' field is the language ID.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "1028 means'' Chinese traditional''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have also seen tests run by'' toot'' with a language ID of 2052, which is'' Chinese simplified''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The'' M'' field is probably used for versioning.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is a hardcoded string in the binary.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After these tests, we could see some real connections to a victim using this RAT.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "some real connections to a victim", "start": 32, "end": 65}, {"text": "this RAT", "start": 72, "end": 80}], "action": [{"text": "using", "start": 66, "end": 71}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Here is a follow-up of the commands launched by the bot controller, in a standard command-line shell: The attacker goes on like this, using his tools, and then ends the communication with this RAT on that computer.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Please note that at this point, the attacker has at least the privileges of a local administrator, since he is allowed to write content in the system32 folder of a Windows XP system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attacker", "start": 32, "end": 44}, {"text": "the privileges of a local administrator", "start": 58, "end": 97}, {"text": "he", "start": 105, "end": 107}, {"text": "content", "start": 128, "end": 135}, {"text": "the system32 folder of a Windows XP system", "start": 139, "end": 181}], "action": [{"text": "has", "start": 45, "end": 48}, {"text": "write", "start": 122, "end": 127}], "modifier": [{"text": "at least", "start": 49, "end": 57}, {"text": "in", "start": 136, "end": 138}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "He could also gain the credentials to a sensitive e-mail account.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "He", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "the credentials to a sensitive e-mail account", "start": 19, "end": 64}], "action": [{"text": "gain", "start": 14, "end": 18}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition to all information already shown, we saw Toot connect to an account on a cloud service named'' Baidu Drive''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The e-mail address linked to this account is dyanmips @qq.com (QQ-ID: 2589315828).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We could find traces of two other e-mail accounts associated to Toot, ciscodyanmips @qq.com (QQ ID: 204156335) and ciscodynamips @qq.com (QQ ID: 1878836793).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We did not find more information about user'' Toot'', yet we miss Chinese language capabilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The controller part of CT RAT/PittyTiger RAT revealed the following'' about'' information, once translated from Chinese to English language: CT console (compatible pittytiger) v1.3 2013.12 by Trees and snow We believe this translation of the author's name might not be accurate due to the use of automated translation tools.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Moreover, we have strong suspicions that there is not a single individual nicknamed'' Trees and snow'' but rather two programmers nicknamed'' Trees'' and'' Snow''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Trees'' could also be'' Cold''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We noticed that the symbol for this word is translated differently according to the context it is used in.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once again, we lack Chinese language skills.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We identify the two nicknames on the current campaign as Automn Snow (秋雪) and Cold Air Kiss (风吻寒).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While we are confident that these people are indeed the developers of both PittyTiger and CT RAT malware, we are not sure they belong to the PittyTiger group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These developers might just have been hired to develop these RATs.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They might also just be selling it to the PittyTiger group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There is no trace of usage from other attacking groups, we believe the PittyTiger RAT is exclusively used by this group of attackers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to indicators we gathered and threat activities profiling we have some hypothesis on the way the group is conducting its operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have strong evidence of a bot operator position.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We identify one nickname for this position, the user known as TooT.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As we did not see other nickname, we think that TooT is one person and not a group of persons.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also identified a malware development position.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We identified two nicknames for this position on the current campaign, Automn Snow (秋雪) and Cold Air Kiss (风吻寒).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Yet we are unsure that they belong to the group, they might just be a third party providing or selling their malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have a strong suspicion of a coordinator position, which coordinates the bot operator, provides him with some logistics support (weaponized document, tools…) and reviews the programmers work.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This position could imply a communication channel with another manager.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We named this position'Chen', in relation with several references of this common Chinese name in c & c WHOIS and other investigation materials.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have some suspicion of a customer relationship manager position that may act as an interface between a customer and Chen.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We named this position'Lilly'.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The c & c servers used by the attackers revealed a lot of interesting files stored in various folders: This is quite the usual arsenal for a group of APT attackers: What is rare to find is the controller part of those tools.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The c & c servers", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 26, "end": 39}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 18, "end": 22}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have been lucky enough to get the controller part of Pitty Tiger and CT RAT, and even to get a kind of hybrid controller made for CT RAT but also supporting Pitty Tiger.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We suppose that the CT RAT is the new evolution of Pitty Tiger and that it will replace Pitty Tiger in the following months.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The presence of a Chinese version of'' calc.exe'', the official calculator provided in Microsoft Windows, is interesting.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Not only is it one more indicator of a probable Chinese origin, but also an indicator that this server was probably used as a test base, in addition to being operational and controlling infected machines from different targets.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this server", "start": 91, "end": 102}, {"text": "infected machines from different targets", "start": 186, "end": 226}], "action": [{"text": "controlling", "start": 174, "end": 185}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition to those tools, we found some interesting scripts.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A script named ipc.bat uses a file named user.txt to try to brute-force a shared folder access: The user.txt file contains thousands of lines, each one being a couple of one particular username and one password attempt: This user.txt file has been anonymized, yet we wanted to give you the feel for it.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a file named user.txt", "start": 28, "end": 49}, {"text": "a shared folder access", "start": 72, "end": 94}], "action": [{"text": "brute-force", "start": 60, "end": 71}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This file is 67320 lines long, and uses 5610 different passwords for each of 12 users contained in this file.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The user names are clearly the result from a user enumeration and are dedicated to a particular French victim.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The passwords listed in this file are either build from several campaigns or from the current campaign.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A lot of passwords are related to the targeted company and might be previous passwords from users.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have also discovered a pack of files which can be used to trigger an Internet Explorer vulnerability (CVE-2014-0322).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The date of these files, namely Tope.swf and index.html, was 2014/02/18, a few days after the revelation of existing exploits in the wild used in APT attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We do not know if the Pitty Tiger group used this exploit or not, but found no trace indicating they did.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A lot of different attackers seem to have used that vulnerability since.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Determining who is exactly behind an APT campaign is difficult.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We tried to extract different technical indicators, together with contextual elements.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Information relating to the tools used by the attackers has been leveraged for attribution: The IP addresses used for the hosting of the c & c domains are mainly located in Taipei (Taïwan) and Hong Kong City (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, PRC): Most RDP connections to the c & c infrastructure come from Chinese IP ranges in Fuqing (Fujian province, PRC).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The IP addresses", "start": 92, "end": 108}, {"text": "the hosting of the c & c domains", "start": 118, "end": 150}, {"text": "Most RDP connections to the c & c infrastructure", "start": 256, "end": 304}, {"text": "Chinese IP ranges in Fuqing (Fujian province, PRC)", "start": 315, "end": 365}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 109, "end": 113}, {"text": "come", "start": 305, "end": 309}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 114, "end": 117}, {"text": "from", "start": 310, "end": 314}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Yet some IP addresses in the USA and in Hong Kong have also been found; All the items listed in this chapter are strong indicators that the attackers might be Chinese.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Pitty Tiger is a group of attackers that have been active since at least 2011.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Pitty Tiger is effective and mature in the use of targeted malware, the use of known exploits to infect computers with their malware and the creation of an infrastructure to efficiently conduct APT attacks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Pitty Tiger", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "computers", "start": 104, "end": 113}, {"text": "their malware", "start": 119, "end": 132}], "action": [{"text": "infect", "start": 97, "end": 103}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 114, "end": 118}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They are quite unprofessional in their way of using their infrastructure: they do launch vulnerability scanners directly from a c & c server and also use their connection for personal activities (downloading pornographic material for example, as we have seen a whole folder on a c & c server full of xxx torrent links).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "they", "start": 74, "end": 78}, {"text": "vulnerability scanners", "start": 89, "end": 111}, {"text": "a c & c server", "start": 126, "end": 140}], "action": [{"text": "launch", "start": 82, "end": 88}], "modifier": [{"text": "directly from", "start": 112, "end": 125}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Pitty Tiger is probably not a state-sponsored group of attackers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers lack the experience and financial support that one would expect from state-sponsored attackers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We suppose this group is opportunistic and sells its services to probable competitors of their targets in the private sector.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One governmental network has been targeted by the group, yet we do not have any evidence of the purpose of this attack.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We suppose this particular attack has been executed to provide a usable bounce for the group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The campaign we studied has been largely focused on one particular target.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We suspect the Pitty Tiger group to work according to an opportunistic business model: this group might offer its services to third parties from the private sector.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This group seems to be very small compared to other APT groups.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have leveraged several profiles and could identify some attackers to a certain extent.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We believe this group might keep working as it is now, with limited budgets, or grow to extend its attacking campaign capabilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This list of indicators is provided in order to help people detect Pitty Tiger APT campaign.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Domains used by the Pitty Tiger group: (please note several subdomains are used, as seen in the report)", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}