{"input": "Less than a week after uncovering Operation SnowMan, the FireEye Dynamic Threat Intelligence cloud has identified another targeted attack campaign-this one exploiting a zero-day vulnerability in Flash.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We are collaborating with Adobe security on this issue.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Adobe has assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2014- 0502 to this vulnerability and released a security bulletin.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As of this blog post, visitors to at least three nonprofit institutions-two of which focus on matters of national security and public policy-were redirected to an exploit server hosting the zero-day exploit.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "visitors to at least three nonprofit institutions", "start": 22, "end": 71}, {"text": "an exploit server hosting the zero-day exploit", "start": 160, "end": 206}], "action": [{"text": "were redirected", "start": 141, "end": 156}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 157, "end": 159}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We're dubbing this attack'' Operation GreedyWonk.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' We believe GreedyWonk may be related to a May 2012 campaign outlined by ShadowServer, based on consistencies in tradecraft (particularly with the websites chosen for this strategic Web compromise), attack infrastructure, and malware configuration properties.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The group behind this campaign appears to have sufficient resources (such as access to zero-day exploits) and a determination to infect visitors to foreign and public policy websites.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The group behind this campaign", "start": 0, "end": 30}, {"text": "visitors to foreign and public policy websites", "start": 136, "end": 182}], "action": [{"text": "infect", "start": 129, "end": 135}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The threat actors likely sought to infect users to these sites for follow-on data theft, including information related to defense and public policy matters.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The threat actors", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "users to these sites", "start": 42, "end": 62}, {"text": "follow-on data theft", "start": 67, "end": 87}], "action": [{"text": "infect", "start": 35, "end": 41}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 63, "end": 66}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On Feb. 13, FireEye identified a zero-day Adobe Flash exploit that affects the latest version of the Flash Player (12.0.0.4 and 11.7.700.261).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Visitors to the Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics (www.piie [.] com) were redirected to an exploit server hosting this Flash zero-day through a hidden iframe.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Visitors to the Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics (www.piie [.] com)", "start": 0, "end": 90}, {"text": "an exploit server hosting this Flash zero-day", "start": 110, "end": 155}, {"text": "a hidden iframe", "start": 164, "end": 179}], "action": [{"text": "were redirected", "start": 91, "end": 106}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 107, "end": 109}, {"text": "through", "start": 156, "end": 163}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We subsequently found that the American Research Center in Egypt (www.arce [.] org) and the Smith Richardson Foundation (www.srf [.] org) also redirected visitors the exploit server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "We subsequently found that the American Research Center in Egypt (www.arce [.] org) and the Smith Richardson Foundation (www.srf [.] org)", "start": 0, "end": 137}, {"text": "visitors", "start": 154, "end": 162}, {"text": "the exploit server", "start": 163, "end": 181}], "action": [{"text": "redirected", "start": 143, "end": 153}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All three organizations are nonprofit institutions; the Peterson Institute and Smith Richardson Foundation engage in national security and public policy issues.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To bypass Windows' Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) protections, this exploit targets computers with any of the following configurations: Users can mitigate the threat by upgrading from Windows XP and updating Java and Office.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "bypass", "start": 3, "end": 9}, {"text": "targets", "start": 87, "end": 94}], "entity": [{"text": "Windows' Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) protections", "start": 10, "end": 72}, {"text": "this exploit", "start": 74, "end": 86}, {"text": "computers with any of the following configurations", "start": 95, "end": 145}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If you have Java 1.6, update Java to the latest 1.7 version.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If you are using an out-of-date Microsoft Office 2007 or 2010, update Microsoft Office to the latest version.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These mitigations do not patch the underlying vulnerability.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "But by breaking the exploit's ASLR-bypass measures, they do prevent the current in-the-wild exploit from functioning.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "GreedyWonk targets a previously unknown vulnerability in Adobe Flash.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The vulnerability permits an attacker to overwrite the vftable pointer of a Flash object to redirect code execution.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an attacker", "start": 26, "end": 37}, {"text": "the vftable pointer of a Flash object", "start": 51, "end": 88}, {"text": "redirect code execution", "start": 92, "end": 115}], "action": [{"text": "overwrite", "start": 41, "end": 50}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 89, "end": 91}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attack uses only known ASLR bypasses.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attack", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "only known ASLR bypasses", "start": 16, "end": 40}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 11, "end": 15}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Details of these techniques are available from our previous blog post on the subject (in the'' Non-ASLR modules'' section).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For Windows XP, the attackers build a return-oriented programming (ROP) chain of MSVCRT (Visual C runtime) gadgets with hard-coded base addresses for English ('' en'') and Chinese ('' zh-cn'' and'' zh-tw'').", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "For", "start": 0, "end": 3}, {"text": "with", "start": 115, "end": 119}], "entity": [{"text": "Windows XP", "start": 4, "end": 14}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 16, "end": 29}, {"text": "a return-oriented programming (ROP) chain of MSVCRT (Visual C runtime) gadgets", "start": 36, "end": 114}, {"text": "hard-coded base addresses for English ('' en'') and Chinese ('' zh-cn'' and'' zh-tw'')", "start": 120, "end": 206}], "action": [{"text": "build", "start": 30, "end": 35}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On Windows 7, the attackers use a hard-coded ROP chain for MSVCR71.dll (Visual C++ runtime) if the user has Java 1.6, and a hard-coded ROP chain for HXDS.dll (Help Data Services Module) if the user has Microsoft Office 2007 or 2010.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "On", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "if", "start": 92, "end": 94}, {"text": "if", "start": 186, "end": 188}], "entity": [{"text": "Windows 7", "start": 3, "end": 12}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 14, "end": 27}, {"text": "a hard-coded ROP chain for MSVCR71.dll (Visual C++ runtime)", "start": 32, "end": 91}, {"text": "the user has Java 1.6", "start": 95, "end": 116}, {"text": "a hard-coded ROP chain for HXDS.dll (Help Data Services Module)", "start": 122, "end": 185}, {"text": "the user has Microsoft Office 2007 or 2010", "start": 189, "end": 231}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 28, "end": 31}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Java 1.6 is no longer supported and does not receive security updates.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition to the MSVCR71.dll ASLR bypass, a variety of widely exploited code-execution vulnerabilities exist in Java 1.6.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "That's why FireEye strongly recommends upgrading to Java 1.7.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Microsoft Office HXDS.dll ASLR bypass was patched at the end of 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "More details about this bypass are addressed by Microsoft's Security Bulletin MS13-106 and an accompanying blog entry.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "FireEye strongly recommends updating Microsoft Office 2007 and 2010 with the latest patches.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The shellcode is downloaded in ActionScript as a GIF image.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The shellcode", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "ActionScript", "start": 31, "end": 43}, {"text": "a GIF image", "start": 47, "end": 58}], "action": [{"text": "is downloaded", "start": 14, "end": 27}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 28, "end": 30}, {"text": "as", "start": 44, "end": 46}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once ROP marks the shellcode as executable using Windows' VirtualProtect function, it downloads an executable via the InternetOpenURLA and InternetReadFile functions.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 83, "end": 85}, {"text": "an executable", "start": 96, "end": 109}, {"text": "the InternetOpenURLA and InternetReadFile functions", "start": 114, "end": 165}], "action": [{"text": "downloads", "start": 86, "end": 95}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 110, "end": 113}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Then it writes the file to disk with CreateFileA and WriteFile functions.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 5, "end": 7}, {"text": "the file", "start": 15, "end": 23}, {"text": "disk", "start": 27, "end": 31}, {"text": "CreateFileA and WriteFile functions", "start": 37, "end": 72}], "action": [{"text": "writes", "start": 8, "end": 14}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 24, "end": 26}, {"text": "with", "start": 32, "end": 36}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Finally, it runs the file using the WinExec function.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 9, "end": 11}, {"text": "the file", "start": 17, "end": 25}, {"text": "the WinExec function", "start": 32, "end": 52}], "action": [{"text": "runs", "start": 12, "end": 16}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 26, "end": 31}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once the exploit succeeds, a PlugX/Kaba remote access tool (RAT) payload with the MD5 hash 507aed81e3106da8c50efb3a045c5e2b is installed on the compromised endpoint.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a PlugX/Kaba remote access tool (RAT) payload with the MD5 hash 507aed81e3106da8c50efb3a045c5e2b", "start": 27, "end": 123}, {"text": "the compromised endpoint", "start": 140, "end": 164}], "action": [{"text": "is installed", "start": 124, "end": 136}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 137, "end": 139}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This PlugX sample was compiled on Feb. 12, one day before we first observed it, indicating that it was deployed specifically for this campaign.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This PlugX payload was configured with the following command-and-control (CnC) domains: Sample callback traffic was as follows: Both java.ns1 [.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This PlugX payload", "start": 0, "end": 18}, {"text": "the following command-and-control (CnC) domains", "start": 39, "end": 86}], "action": [{"text": "was configured", "start": 19, "end": 33}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 34, "end": 38}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] name and adservice.no-ip [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] org resolved to 74.126.177.68 on Feb. 18, 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Passive DNS analysis reveals that the domain wmi.ns01.us previously resolved to 103.246.246.103 between July 4, 2013 and July 15, 2013 and 192.74.246.219 on Feb. 17, 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "java.ns1 [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] name also resolved to 192.74.246.219 on February 18.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Further research uncovered a number of older malware samples connecting to the same domain wmi.ns01 [.] us.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a number of older malware samples", "start": 27, "end": 60}, {"text": "the same domain wmi.ns01 [.] us", "start": 75, "end": 106}], "action": [{"text": "connecting", "start": 61, "end": 71}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 72, "end": 74}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Poison Ivy variants that connected to the domain wmi.ns01 [.] us had the following unique configuration properties: We found a related Poison Ivy sample (MD5 8936c87a08ffa56d19fdb87588e35952) with the same'' java7'' password, which was dropped by an Adobe Flash exploit (CVE-2012-0779).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The Poison Ivy variants", "start": 0, "end": 23}, {"text": "the domain wmi.ns01 [.] us", "start": 42, "end": 68}, {"text": "a related Poison Ivy sample (MD5 8936c87a08ffa56d19fdb87588e35952) with the same'' java7'' password", "start": 129, "end": 228}, {"text": "an Adobe Flash exploit (CVE-2012-0779)", "start": 251, "end": 289}], "action": [{"text": "connected", "start": 29, "end": 38}, {"text": "was dropped", "start": 236, "end": 247}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 39, "end": 41}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this previous incident, visitors to the Center for Defense Information website (www.cdi [.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "visitors to the Center for Defense Information website", "start": 27, "end": 81}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] org-also an organization involved in defense matters-were redirected to an exploit server at 159.54.62.92.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "were redirected", "start": 55, "end": 70}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 71, "end": 73}], "entity": [{"text": "an exploit server at 159.54.62.92", "start": 74, "end": 107}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This exploit server hosted a Flash exploit file named BrightBalls.swf (MD5 1ec5141051776ec9092db92050192758).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This exploit, in turn, dropped the Poison Ivy variant.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This exploit", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "the Poison Ivy variant", "start": 31, "end": 53}], "action": [{"text": "dropped", "start": 23, "end": 30}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition to using the same password'' java7,'' this variant was configured with the mutex with the similar pattern of'' YFds* & ^ff'' and connected to a CnC server at windows.ddns [.] us.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this variant", "start": 50, "end": 62}, {"text": "a CnC server at windows.ddns [.] us", "start": 154, "end": 189}], "action": [{"text": "connected", "start": 141, "end": 150}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 151, "end": 153}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Using passive DNS analysis, we see the domains windows.ddns [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] us and wmi.ns01 [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] us both resolved to 76.73.80.188 in mid-2012.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During another earlier compromise of the same www.cdi.org website, visitors were redirected to a Java exploit test.jar (MD5 7d810e3564c4eb95bcb3d11ce191208e).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "visitors", "start": 67, "end": 75}, {"text": "a Java exploit test.jar (MD5 7d810e3564c4eb95bcb3d11ce191208e)", "start": 95, "end": 157}], "action": [{"text": "were redirected", "start": 76, "end": 91}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 92, "end": 94}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This jar file exploited CVE-2012-0507 and dropped a Poison Ivy payload with the hash (MD5 52aa791a524b61b129344f10b4712f52).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This jar file", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "a Poison Ivy payload with the hash (MD5 52aa791a524b61b129344f10b4712f52)", "start": 50, "end": 123}], "action": [{"text": "dropped", "start": 42, "end": 49}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This Poison Ivy variant connected to a CnC server at ids.ns01 [.] us.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This Poison Ivy variant", "start": 0, "end": 23}, {"text": "a CnC server at ids.ns01 [.] us", "start": 37, "end": 68}], "action": [{"text": "connected", "start": 24, "end": 33}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 34, "end": 36}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The domain ids.ns01 [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] us also overlaps with the domain wmi.ns01 [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] us on the IP 194.183.224.75.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Poison Ivy sample referenced above (MD5 fd69793bd63c44bbb22f9c4d46873252) was delivered via an exploit chain that began with a redirect from the Center for European Policy Studies (www.ceps [.] be).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The Poison Ivy sample referenced above (MD5 fd69793bd63c44bbb22f9c4d46873252)", "start": 0, "end": 77}, {"text": "an exploit chain that began with a redirect from the Center for European Policy Studies (www.ceps [.] be)", "start": 96, "end": 201}], "action": [{"text": "was delivered", "start": 78, "end": 91}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 92, "end": 95}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this case, visitors were redirected from www.ceps [.] be to a Java exploit hosted on shop.fujifilm [.] be.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "visitors", "start": 14, "end": 22}, {"text": "www.ceps [.] be", "start": 44, "end": 59}, {"text": "a Java exploit hosted on shop.fujifilm [.] be", "start": 63, "end": 108}], "action": [{"text": "were redirected", "start": 23, "end": 38}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 39, "end": 43}, {"text": "to", "start": 60, "end": 62}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In what is certainly not a coincidence, we also observed www.arce [.] org (one of the sites redirecting to the current Flash exploit) also redirect visitors to the Java exploit on shop.fujifilm [.] be in 2013.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "www.arce [.] org", "start": 57, "end": 73}, {"text": "the current Flash exploit", "start": 107, "end": 132}, {"text": "visitors", "start": 148, "end": 156}, {"text": "the Java exploit on shop.fujifilm [.] be", "start": 160, "end": 200}, {"text": "2013", "start": 204, "end": 208}], "action": [{"text": "redirecting", "start": 92, "end": 103}, {"text": "redirect", "start": 139, "end": 147}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 104, "end": 106}, {"text": "to", "start": 157, "end": 159}, {"text": "in", "start": 201, "end": 203}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This threat actor clearly seeks out and compromises websites of organizations related to international security policy, defense topics, and other non-profit sociocultural issues.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The actor either maintains persistence on these sites for extended periods of time or is able to re-compromise them periodically.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This actor also has early access to a number of zero-day exploits, including Flash and Java, and deploys a variety of malware families on compromised systems.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This actor", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "a variety of malware families", "start": 105, "end": 134}, {"text": "compromised systems", "start": 138, "end": 157}], "action": [{"text": "deploys", "start": 97, "end": 104}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 135, "end": 137}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Based on these and other observations, we conclude that this actor has the tradecraft abilities and resources to remain a credible threat in at least the mid- term.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The energy sector has become a major focus for targeted attacks and is now among the top five most targeted sectors worldwide.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Companies in the sector are facing a growing risk of having their services interrupted or losing data.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The threat to energy firms is only likely to increase in the coming years as new developments, such as further extensions of smart grids and smart metering expose more infrastructure to the Internet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Equipment that is not connected to the Internet and other networks is not immune to threats and there has already been a number of successful attacks against isolated systems.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Operators of critical infrastructure, as well as energy utility companies, need to be aware of these threats and prepare accordingly.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The threat to energy firms comes from several different sources.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In some cases, espionage from competitors is the primary motive, with data on new projects, exploration and finances being targeted.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Disruption and destruction are the goals of other attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some instances appear to be state sponsored, such as the disruption of the Iranian nuclear program by the Stuxnet worm in 2010, one of the attacks that began this trend.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Others appear to be the work of hacktivists with political or environmental agendas.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Internal attackers, like disgruntled employees, are also a major source of attacks that often lead to service disruption.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The majority of the actors behind these attacks have grown more sophisticated in the way they attack.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During the monitoring period from July 2012 to June 2013, we observed an average of 74 targeted attacks per day globally.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Of these, nine attacks per day targeted the energy sector.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Accounting for 16.3 percent of all attacks, the energy sector was the second most targeted vertical in the last six months of 2012, with only the government/public sector exceeding it with 25.4 percent of all attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The high ranking was mainly due to a major attack against a global oil company, which we observed in September 2012.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, in the first half of 2013 the energy sector continued to attract a high proportion of attacks, ranking in fifth place with 7.6 percent of targeted attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Not all of the attacks analyzed used highly sophisticated tools.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Most of them could have been prevented by following best practice guidelines for protecting the IT infrastructure and the industrial components, indicating that despite high revenues and strategic importance, many energy sector companies are not prioritizing cybersecurity.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The number of targeted cyberattacks in general has risen in the past few years.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition to this, the rate of attack exposure has also risen, with more companies becoming aware of attacks, expecting them and searching for indications of compromise.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is not a new phenomenon, but its importance has grown.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Council on Foreign Relations, a US think tank, reported that energy companies, including oil and gas producers, were often the focus of targeted attacks during summer 2012.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In May 2013 the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) warned of an increase in sabotage attacks against US energy companies located in the Middle East.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The government had tracked multiple attacks and issued a warning together with the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A report by the US Congress supported this picture, stating that many power utilities companies were under constant or daily attack through cyberspace.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Taking into account that successful breaches of critical infrastructures are still rare and that these numbers included generic malware infections, it nevertheless highlights the potential for cyberattacks in the energy sector.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As in most sectors, attackers are often after valuable information.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, we have seen attackers target intellectual property such as technology for photovoltaic research and wind turbines, or data on gas field exploration.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Information such as this is of high value and can generate huge profits for attackers or their sponsors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The same information can also be misused for an act of sabotage.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many power utilities companies fear disruptive attacks the most, regardless of whether it is done by internal or external attackers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The energy sector has a high potential for critical disruption through sabotage attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Any interruption to the power grid would cause substantial chaos and cascading effects resulting in financial loss.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the past there have been quite a few attacks that included targets in the energy sector.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some of these were more focused, like Stuxnet, Duqu, Shamoon/Disttrack and Night Dragon.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Others saw power companies targeted among many other sectors, such as Hidden Lynx, Nitro, Flamer, Net Traveler and Elderwood to name a few.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One of the biggest examples, and a game changer for many organizations, was Stuxnet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This targeted sabotage attack, which is believed to have been aimed against uranium enrichment facilities in Iran, made clear what could be done through cyberattacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is also clear that the energy sector is not exempt from the generic attacks that every company faces, such as ransomware that locks PCs or financial Trojans that attempt to steal passwords and credit card details.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "ransomware", "start": 113, "end": 123}, {"text": "PCs", "start": 135, "end": 138}, {"text": "financial Trojans", "start": 142, "end": 159}, {"text": "passwords and credit card details", "start": 182, "end": 215}], "action": [{"text": "locks", "start": 129, "end": 134}, {"text": "steal", "start": 176, "end": 181}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, such a case happened in May 2013, when a small fuel distribution company in North Carolina fell victim to a cyberheist that transferred US $800,000 from the company's bank account.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Such threats spread broadly and might impact any person, regardless of their employer.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These attackers aim at infecting as many computers as possible in order to maximize their chances of profits.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These attacks can include nonspecific data breaches where employee or customer records get stolen, as happened to the US Department of Energy in July 2013.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "employee or customer records", "start": 58, "end": 86}], "action": [{"text": "stolen", "start": 91, "end": 97}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For this paper we focused on email data from targeted attacks between July 2012 and June 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Even though watering holes are becoming more frequently used in targeted attacks, it is unfortunately quite difficult to reliably map these to individual campaigns.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A blocked drive-by download attempt does not give any indication if it was a targeted attack or just general noise.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In quite a few cases we see the same common malware, like Poison Ivy, being used by generic attackers and by targeted attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In such cases the sole difference between a sophisticated targeted attack and a generic one lies in the person commanding the malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Historically most industrial control systems (ICS) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems were in separated networks not connected to the Internet or any other network.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Unfortunately this security through segregation approach does not fully protect against cyberattacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In reality, networks are rarely completely isolated.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Often some configuration updates are periodically installed or log files are transferred.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If systems are not directly connected, the method of choice for these types of interactions is usually through a USB stick or a non-permanent modem connection, which provides a way into the restricted networks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This allows malware to spread into such isolated networks as demonstrated many times by threats such as Stuxnet.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "malware", "start": 12, "end": 19}, {"text": "such isolated networks", "start": 35, "end": 57}, {"text": "demonstrated many times by threats such as Stuxnet", "start": 61, "end": 111}], "action": [{"text": "spread", "start": 23, "end": 29}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 30, "end": 34}, {"text": "as", "start": 58, "end": 60}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If networks are truly segregated, this would mean that there would be no software updates installed, leaving old vulnerabilities open.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There are also issues around processes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, the revocation lists for digital certificates are seldom updated and therefore certificates which are no longer valid can not be checked properly and would still be accepted.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With the increasing desire for connectivity now reaching industrial plants, many operators have started to connect their ICS to the Internet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "New adapters can bridge to older technology which was never intended to be controlled over the Internet, allowing it to be connected easily.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This allows for efficient centralized monitoring and, to some extent, remote control of equipment.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Depending on the type of machinery controlled through the human-machine interface (HMI) of the ICS, not all modifications are possible.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some systems are physically connected in a pure read-only mode for monitoring.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "And even if they are fully connected, some turbines have physical limitations or emergency systems based on physical effects that can not be overridden by the digital controller.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Thus, not all Hollywood scenarios of open flood gates or turbines that fly through the air are possible.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, sabotage attacks that damage equipment are definitely possible, as has already been demonstrated.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "sabotage attacks", "start": 9, "end": 25}, {"text": "equipment", "start": 38, "end": 47}], "action": [{"text": "damage", "start": 31, "end": 37}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the future, more systems are going to implement the failsafe switches in software, opening up the vector for malware attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An additional source of concern is that some countries have started to open the energy market for smaller private contributors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This means that almost anyone can use mini power plants like water, wind or photovoltaic sites to feed energy back into the power grid.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Often these operators do not have a full IT staff supporting the facilities at hand, which might lead to more vulnerable installations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Furthermore they may deploy new technology which might be untested and contain some unknown vulnerabilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While these smaller sites make up only a small portion of the grid, new decentralized power input feeds are a challenge for the balance of the power grid as well and need to be carefully monitored.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Small outages or changes can have a domino effect for the whole power grid.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To increase the exposure of energy firms even further, sites like SHODAN, which is essentially a search engine for devices, enable anyone to easily find exposed controllers on the Internet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Of course not all of the industrial control systems connected to the Internet are critical systems or even real ones.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some researchers have started to create honey pot systems in order to study the attackers, which have apparently already attracted attackers like the Comment Crew/APT1 group, who have broken into these decoy systems.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Smart grids and smart metering are bringing significant change to the world's power systems.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Experts predict that billions of smart meters and sensors will be installed worldwide over the next ten years.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They enable utility companies to measure energy consumption at a more granular level, creating better flow patterns and enabling different prices for consumption based on the time of day and location.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This development brings new opportunities, as well as new challenges.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As with any connected infrastructure, it is important to secure the network and its endpoint on multiple levels.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There have already been proof of concept attacks that demonstrate how smart meters could be manipulated to send back false information or report incorrect billing IDs, leading to power theft.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "smart meters", "start": 70, "end": 82}, {"text": "send back false information or report incorrect billing IDs, leading to power theft", "start": 107, "end": 190}], "action": [{"text": "be manipulated", "start": 89, "end": 103}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 104, "end": 106}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition to the issue of securing these devices, smart grids will produce a huge amount of data which, depending on regulations, will need to be kept for audits.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some of this data may be sensitive and could raise privacy concerns if not properly protected.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This could easily grow to petabytes of data that needs to be safely stored and managed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is beyond the scope of this paper to address all the challenges associated with smart grids and smart meters.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Symantec has created a dedicated whitepaper for this topic: How to protect critical infrastructure, mitigate fraud and guarantee privacy.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As a member of the CRISALIS project, Symantec is following these developments closely and is helping to secure critical infrastructure together with partners from academia and different industry sectors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There have been numerous cyberattacks against the energy sector over the past few years.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Not all of them were the work of sophisticated attackers; some incidents were just collateral damage caused by malware infections or bad configuration issues.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These incidents highlight the fact that such attacks can happen and that they can have real life consequences.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2013 part of the Austrian and German power grid nearly broke down after a control command was accidentally misdirected.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is believed that a status request command packet, which was broadcast from a German gas company as a test for their newly installed network branch, found its way into the systems of the Austrian energy power control and monitoring network.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once there, the message generated thousands of reply messages, which generated even more data packages, which in turn flooded the control network.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To stop this self-inflicted DDoS attack, part of the monitoring and control network had to be isolated and disconnected.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Fortunately the situation was resolved without any power outages.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2008, Tom Donahue, a senior Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official told a meeting of utility company representatives that cyberattacks had taken out power equipment in multiple cities outside the United States.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "cyberattacks", "start": 129, "end": 141}, {"text": "power equipment in multiple cities outside the United States", "start": 156, "end": 216}], "action": [{"text": "taken out", "start": 146, "end": 155}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In some cases the attacker tried to extort money from the energy companies, threatening them with further blackouts.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2003 the safety monitoring system of the Ohio nuclear power plant apparently went offline for several hours due to a Slammer worm infection.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the safety monitoring system of the Ohio nuclear power plant", "start": 8, "end": 68}, {"text": "offline", "start": 85, "end": 92}, {"text": "several hours", "start": 97, "end": 110}, {"text": "a Slammer worm infection", "start": 118, "end": 142}], "action": [{"text": "went", "start": 80, "end": 84}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 93, "end": 96}, {"text": "due to", "start": 111, "end": 117}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Fortunately the power plant was already offline due to maintenance and the installed secondary backup monitoring system was unaffected by the worm.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Nevertheless the incident raised safety concerns.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At the beginning of 2003 a marine terminal in Venezuela was targeted by a sabotage attack.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a marine terminal in Venezuela", "start": 25, "end": 55}, {"text": "a sabotage attack", "start": 72, "end": 89}], "action": [{"text": "was targeted", "start": 56, "end": 68}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Details of this attack are scarce and vague, but it seems that during a strike an attacking group managed to get access to the SCADA network of the oil tanker loading machinery and overwrote programmable logic controllers (PLCs) with an empty program module.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an attacking group", "start": 79, "end": 97}, {"text": "access to the SCADA network of the oil tanker loading machinery", "start": 113, "end": 176}, {"text": "programmable logic controllers (PLCs)", "start": 191, "end": 228}, {"text": "an empty program module", "start": 234, "end": 257}], "action": [{"text": "get", "start": 109, "end": 112}, {"text": "overwrote", "start": 181, "end": 190}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 229, "end": 233}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This halted machinery, preventing oil tankers from loading for eight hour till the unaffected backup code was reinstalled on the PLCs.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "machinery", "start": 12, "end": 21}, {"text": "oil tankers", "start": 34, "end": 45}, {"text": "loading", "start": 51, "end": 58}, {"text": "eight hour", "start": 63, "end": 73}, {"text": "the unaffected backup code was reinstalled on the PLCs", "start": 79, "end": 133}], "action": [{"text": "halted", "start": 5, "end": 11}, {"text": "preventing", "start": 23, "end": 33}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 46, "end": 50}, {"text": "for", "start": 59, "end": 62}, {"text": "till", "start": 74, "end": 78}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attack was not too sophisticated as it was easily spotted.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A small modification of the PLC code instead would probably have gone unnoticed for a long time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In 2001 an attack took place against California's power distribution center, which controls the flow of electricity across California.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Due to apparently poor security configuration, the attacker was able to compromise two Web servers that were part of a developer network and penetrate further from there.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Fortunately the attackers were stopped before they managed to attack any systems which were tied into the transmission grid for the Western United States.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to Russian officials, the largest natural gas extraction company in the country was successfully attacked in 2000.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers used a Trojan to gain access to the control for the gas pipelines.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attackers", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "a Trojan", "start": 19, "end": 27}, {"text": "gain access to the control for the gas pipelines", "start": 31, "end": 79}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 14, "end": 18}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 28, "end": 30}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Through this switchboard, the flow for individual gas pipelines could have been modified, which would easily have caused widespread disruption.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Aside from these incidents, there have also been a number of more serious and well-documented targeted attacks against the energy sector: The Stuxnet incident and its relatives Duqu, Flamer and Gauss are some of the most talked-about cases of targeted attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As far as we know today, the Stuxnet operation began in November 2005 with the registration of the command and control (C & C) servers used in the attacks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the Stuxnet operation", "start": 25, "end": 46}, {"text": "November 2005", "start": 56, "end": 69}, {"text": "the registration of the command and control (C & C) servers used in the attacks", "start": 75, "end": 154}], "action": [{"text": "began", "start": 47, "end": 52}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 53, "end": 55}, {"text": "with", "start": 70, "end": 74}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first recorded appearance of what we now call Stuxnet version 0.5 was in November 2007.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Since then, a handful of different versions have been found and analyzed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Stuxnet 1.x is based on what is now known as the'' tilded'' platform; whereas Stuxnet 0.5 is based on the Flamer framework.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The code segments and programming style differ, which indicates that two different programming teams were most likely responsible for the different branches of Stuxnet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Thorough investigation into the mechanism and functions of this threat started in July 2010.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Stuxnet is the first known autonomous threat to target and sabotage industrial control systems to such an extent.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Stuxnet", "start": 0, "end": 7}, {"text": "industrial control systems", "start": 68, "end": 94}], "action": [{"text": "target and sabotage", "start": 48, "end": 67}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Stuxnet is a sophisticated piece of malware, which uses seven vulnerabilities to spread and infect its targets.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Stuxnet", "start": 0, "end": 7}, {"text": "seven vulnerabilities", "start": 56, "end": 77}, {"text": "spread and infect its targets", "start": 81, "end": 110}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 51, "end": 55}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 78, "end": 80}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The most notable vulnerability is the Microsoft Windows Shortcut'LNK/PIF' Files Automatic File Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2010-2568), which allows it to auto-execute on USB drives.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Spreading through infected portable media drives allowed it to also infect networks isolated by air gaps that are unreachable from the Internet.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "Spreading", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "infect", "start": 68, "end": 74}], "modifier": [{"text": "through", "start": 10, "end": 17}], "entity": [{"text": "infected portable media drives", "start": 18, "end": 48}, {"text": "it", "start": 57, "end": 59}, {"text": "networks isolated by air gaps that are unreachable from the Internet", "start": 75, "end": 143}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This was most likely the first infection vector used by Stuxnet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, it is able to infect Step7 project files, which are used to control Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 13, "end": 15}, {"text": "Step7 project files, which are used to control Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs)", "start": 34, "end": 118}], "action": [{"text": "infect", "start": 27, "end": 33}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This allowed the worm to infect computers whenever the engineer exchanged the project files.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the worm", "start": 13, "end": 21}, {"text": "computers", "start": 32, "end": 41}, {"text": "the engineer exchanged the project files", "start": 51, "end": 91}], "action": [{"text": "infect", "start": 25, "end": 31}], "modifier": [{"text": "whenever", "start": 42, "end": 50}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Besides this, it also spread through network shares, a printer spooler vulnerability, an old Windows RPC (remote procedure calls) vulnerability and a known password in the WinCC database.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 14, "end": 16}, {"text": "network shares", "start": 37, "end": 51}, {"text": "a printer spooler vulnerability", "start": 53, "end": 84}, {"text": "an old Windows RPC (remote procedure calls) vulnerability", "start": 86, "end": 143}, {"text": "a known password in the WinCC database", "start": 148, "end": 186}], "action": [{"text": "spread", "start": 22, "end": 28}], "modifier": [{"text": "through", "start": 29, "end": 36}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the end, Stuxnet propagated further than its authors probably intended.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have monitored more than 40,000 infected IP addresses in 155 countries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many of those systems are most likely just collateral damage and were not intended to be infected by the attackers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example multiple computers at Chevron were infected by Stuxnet, without any damage being done.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Part of the malware code was signed with stolen digital certificates making it harder to detect by security tools.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Part of the malware code was signed with stolen digital certificates", "start": 0, "end": 68}, {"text": "it", "start": 76, "end": 78}, {"text": "harder to detect by security tools", "start": 79, "end": 113}], "action": [{"text": "making", "start": 69, "end": 75}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To hide its activity even further, Stuxnet executed slightly different infection routines depending on the security software installed on the target.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "To", "start": 0, "end": 2}], "entity": [{"text": "hide its activity even further", "start": 3, "end": 33}, {"text": "Stuxnet", "start": 35, "end": 42}, {"text": "slightly different infection routines depending on the security software installed on the target", "start": 52, "end": 148}], "action": [{"text": "executed", "start": 43, "end": 51}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On the USB drive itself, the malware would hide its own files and even delete itself from it after three successful propagations.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 25, "end": 36}, {"text": "its own files", "start": 48, "end": 61}, {"text": "itself", "start": 78, "end": 84}, {"text": "it", "start": 90, "end": 92}, {"text": "three successful propagations", "start": 99, "end": 128}], "action": [{"text": "hide", "start": 43, "end": 47}, {"text": "delete", "start": 71, "end": 77}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 85, "end": 89}, {"text": "after", "start": 93, "end": 98}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Tricks like these, to make the detection of the malware more difficult, are now frequently used in modern targeted attacks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Tricks like these", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "the detection of the malware", "start": 27, "end": 55}, {"text": "more difficult", "start": 56, "end": 70}], "action": [{"text": "make", "start": 22, "end": 26}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Stuxnet's payload focused on PLCs, which are used to control different industrial components.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The target of the Stuxnet operation is believed to be a uranium enrichment facility in Iran.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The sabotage payload disrupted and partially destroyed the cascaded high frequency gas centrifuges.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The sabotage payload", "start": 0, "end": 20}, {"text": "the cascaded high frequency gas centrifuges", "start": 55, "end": 98}], "action": [{"text": "disrupted and partially destroyed", "start": 21, "end": 54}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The early version of Stuxnet targeted the S7- 417 PLCs and modified its valve settings.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The early version of Stuxnet", "start": 0, "end": 28}, {"text": "the S7- 417 PLCs", "start": 38, "end": 54}, {"text": "its valve settings", "start": 68, "end": 86}], "action": [{"text": "targeted", "start": 29, "end": 37}, {"text": "modified", "start": 59, "end": 67}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Closing the valves at certain points in time would lead to an increase of pressure that could damage the equipment.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The later version of the threat focused on the S7-315 PLCs, manipulating the spinning frequency of the rotating motors.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The later version of the threat", "start": 0, "end": 31}, {"text": "the S7-315 PLCs", "start": 43, "end": 58}, {"text": "the spinning frequency of the rotating motors", "start": 73, "end": 118}], "action": [{"text": "focused", "start": 32, "end": 39}, {"text": "manipulating", "start": 60, "end": 72}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 40, "end": 42}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By speeding the centrifuges up and slowing them down repeatedly, the output quality could be spoiled and the centrifuges themselves could be damaged.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The payload would only become active if the fingerprint in the found PLC setup matched a given configuration setup.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The payload", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "active", "start": 30, "end": 36}, {"text": "the fingerprint in the found PLC setup matched a given configuration setup", "start": 40, "end": 114}], "action": [{"text": "become", "start": 23, "end": 29}], "modifier": [{"text": "if", "start": 37, "end": 39}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This minimized the collateral damage at other facilities and showed that the attackers had in-depth knowledge of the targeted uranium enrichment facilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To avoid detection by personnel monitoring the human machine interface (HMI) of the plant, the threat recorded measurement readings during normal operation and played those back in a loop.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "To", "start": 0, "end": 2}], "entity": [{"text": "avoid detection by personnel monitoring the human machine interface (HMI) of the plant", "start": 3, "end": 89}, {"text": "the threat", "start": 91, "end": 101}, {"text": "measurement readings during normal operation", "start": 111, "end": 155}, {"text": "those back in a loop", "start": 167, "end": 187}], "action": [{"text": "recorded", "start": 102, "end": 110}, {"text": "played", "start": 160, "end": 166}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Operation Night Dragon, which was uncovered in 2010, is a typical example of global oil companies being targeted, but this time not with the aim of disruption in mind.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attacks started in late 2009 and were directed at finding project details and financial information about oil and gas field exploration and bids.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attacks", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "project details and financial information about oil and gas field exploration and bids", "start": 62, "end": 148}], "action": [{"text": "finding", "start": 54, "end": 61}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers started by compromising public facing Web servers through SQL injection and installing Web shells on them.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attackers", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "public facing Web servers", "start": 38, "end": 63}, {"text": "SQL injection and installing Web shells on them", "start": 72, "end": 119}], "action": [{"text": "compromising", "start": 25, "end": 37}], "modifier": [{"text": "through", "start": 64, "end": 71}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once they had control over the server they used common hacking tools to harvest local passwords, dump password hashes, sniff authentication messages and exploit internal active directory configuration.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "they", "start": 38, "end": 42}, {"text": "local passwords", "start": 80, "end": 95}, {"text": "password hashes", "start": 102, "end": 117}, {"text": "authentication messages", "start": 125, "end": 148}], "action": [{"text": "harvest", "start": 72, "end": 79}, {"text": "dump", "start": 97, "end": 101}, {"text": "sniff", "start": 119, "end": 124}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This allowed them to move on to other internal computers using the gathered passwords.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "them", "start": 13, "end": 17}, {"text": "other internal computers", "start": 32, "end": 56}, {"text": "the gathered passwords", "start": 63, "end": 85}], "action": [{"text": "move", "start": 21, "end": 25}], "modifier": [{"text": "on to", "start": 26, "end": 31}, {"text": "using", "start": 57, "end": 62}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, spear phishing messages were used to compromise additional computers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "spear phishing messages", "start": 13, "end": 36}, {"text": "compromise additional computers", "start": 50, "end": 81}], "action": [{"text": "were used", "start": 37, "end": 46}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 47, "end": 49}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers did not use any zero-day vulnerabilities during their attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Rather they used publicly available tools for each individual job.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On compromised computers a common Backdoor.Trojan was installed that communicated back to the C & C server, allowing remote access to the computer.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "On", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "back to", "start": 82, "end": 89}], "entity": [{"text": "compromised computers", "start": 3, "end": 24}, {"text": "a common Backdoor.Trojan", "start": 25, "end": 49}, {"text": "the C & C server", "start": 90, "end": 106}, {"text": "remote access to the computer", "start": 117, "end": 146}], "action": [{"text": "was installed", "start": 50, "end": 63}, {"text": "communicated", "start": 69, "end": 81}, {"text": "allowing", "start": 108, "end": 116}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This allowed the attacker to find and extract valuable information.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attacker", "start": 13, "end": 25}, {"text": "valuable information", "start": 46, "end": 66}], "action": [{"text": "find", "start": 29, "end": 33}, {"text": "extract", "start": 38, "end": 45}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In August 2012 an extremely destructive cyberattack hit an estimated 30,000 computers at one of the largest oil producers of the world in Saudi Arabia.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The W32.Disttrack malware used in this attack, also known as Shamoon, consists of three components: a dropper, a wiper and a reporter module.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The dropper component is responsible for creating all the required files on the system, registering a service called'' TrkSvr'' in order to start itself with Windows.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The dropper component", "start": 0, "end": 21}, {"text": "all the required files on the system", "start": 50, "end": 86}, {"text": "a service called'' TrkSvr''", "start": 100, "end": 127}, {"text": "itself", "start": 146, "end": 152}, {"text": "Windows", "start": 158, "end": 165}], "action": [{"text": "creating", "start": 41, "end": 49}, {"text": "registering", "start": 88, "end": 99}, {"text": "start", "start": 140, "end": 145}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 153, "end": 157}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It also attempts to copy itself to accessible network shares and execute itself remotely if successfully copied.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "itself", "start": 25, "end": 31}, {"text": "accessible network shares", "start": 35, "end": 60}, {"text": "itself", "start": 73, "end": 79}, {"text": "remotely", "start": 80, "end": 88}, {"text": "successfully copied", "start": 92, "end": 111}], "action": [{"text": "copy", "start": 20, "end": 24}, {"text": "execute", "start": 65, "end": 72}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 32, "end": 34}, {"text": "if", "start": 89, "end": 91}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The wiper component is only activated when a hardcoded configuration date has been passed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This enables a coordinated,'' time bomb'' scenario.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The module then drops a legitimate and digitally signed device driver that provides low level disk access from user space.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The module", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "a legitimate and digitally signed device driver that provides low level disk access from user space", "start": 22, "end": 121}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 16, "end": 21}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware collects file names and starts overwriting them with a JPEG image or 192KB blocks of random data.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "file names", "start": 21, "end": 31}, {"text": "them", "start": 55, "end": 59}, {"text": "a JPEG image or 192KB blocks of random data", "start": 65, "end": 108}], "action": [{"text": "collects", "start": 12, "end": 20}, {"text": "overwriting", "start": 43, "end": 54}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 60, "end": 64}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At the end Disttrack finishes the computer off by wiping the master boot record with the same data.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Disttrack", "start": 11, "end": 20}, {"text": "the master boot record", "start": 57, "end": 79}, {"text": "the same data", "start": 85, "end": 98}], "action": [{"text": "wiping", "start": 50, "end": 56}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 80, "end": 84}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The reporter component is responsible for sending back a HTTP GET request to the C & C server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The reporter component", "start": 0, "end": 22}, {"text": "a HTTP GET request", "start": 55, "end": 73}, {"text": "the C & C server", "start": 77, "end": 93}], "action": [{"text": "sending", "start": 42, "end": 49}], "modifier": [{"text": "back", "start": 50, "end": 54}, {"text": "to", "start": 74, "end": 76}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It reports the domain name, IP address and number of files overwritten.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "the domain name, IP address and number of files overwritten", "start": 11, "end": 70}], "action": [{"text": "reports", "start": 3, "end": 10}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By acquiring user credentials and gaining access to the domain controller the attackers were able to push the malware on to many systems before they triggered the destructive payload.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "acquiring", "start": 3, "end": 12}, {"text": "push", "start": 101, "end": 105}], "entity": [{"text": "user credentials", "start": 13, "end": 29}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 74, "end": 87}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 106, "end": 117}, {"text": "many systems", "start": 124, "end": 136}, {"text": "they triggered the destructive payload", "start": 144, "end": 182}], "modifier": [{"text": "on to", "start": 118, "end": 123}, {"text": "before", "start": 137, "end": 143}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Disttrack's secondary goal may have been to steal valuable information from infected computers, but the main intent was to render the computers unusable by wiping the operating system and master boot record, causing disruption and downtime at the targeted company.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Disttrack", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "valuable information", "start": 50, "end": 70}, {"text": "infected computers", "start": 76, "end": 94}, {"text": "the computers unusable", "start": 130, "end": 152}, {"text": "the operating system and master boot record", "start": 163, "end": 206}], "action": [{"text": "steal", "start": 44, "end": 49}, {"text": "render", "start": 123, "end": 129}, {"text": "wiping", "start": 156, "end": 162}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 71, "end": 75}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although wiping is also frequently used to destroy evidence of the attack and make forensics more difficult.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "wiping", "start": 9, "end": 15}, {"text": "evidence of the attack", "start": 51, "end": 73}, {"text": "forensics", "start": 83, "end": 92}, {"text": "more difficult", "start": 93, "end": 107}], "action": [{"text": "destroy", "start": 43, "end": 50}, {"text": "make", "start": 78, "end": 82}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware does not contain any payload against ICS, like Stuxnet does for PLCs, and is not as sophisticated.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to the company, no computer related with the production or distribution of oil was affected, since the operational network is separated and specially protected.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One group that claimed responsibility for the attack posted on Pastebin that it was an anti-oppression hacker group.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attack was prompted by disappointment with some of the regimes in the Middle East, the group said.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "True or not, this shows that it is not necessarily only state-sponsored attackers who are carrying out disruptive attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Sabotage attacks usually fall into the orbit of hacktivists, who seek attention rather than profit.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some sources reported that the attackers had help from insiders, which would explain the so far unclear infection vector.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Soon after this attack became known, a Qatari gas company was attacked in a similar way.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Spear phishing is, along with watering hole attacks, one of the most common attack vectors used to attack companies.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Spear phishing", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "attack companies", "start": 99, "end": 115}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 91, "end": 95}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 96, "end": 98}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attacks are simple to carry out.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They often follow the same pattern, starting with a reconnaissance phase to gather all publicly available information.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is followed by the incursion phase of breaking in and compromising computers.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "breaking in and compromising", "start": 43, "end": 71}], "entity": [{"text": "computers", "start": 72, "end": 81}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After that comes the discovery phase, where the attacker gathers passwords and maps the internal network.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attacker", "start": 44, "end": 56}, {"text": "passwords", "start": 65, "end": 74}, {"text": "the internal network", "start": 84, "end": 104}], "action": [{"text": "gathers", "start": 57, "end": 64}, {"text": "maps", "start": 79, "end": 83}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The final stage is capture and exfiltration, where the valuable information is copied and sent back to the attacker.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the valuable information", "start": 51, "end": 75}, {"text": "the attacker", "start": 103, "end": 115}], "action": [{"text": "is copied", "start": 76, "end": 85}, {"text": "sent back", "start": 90, "end": 99}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 100, "end": 102}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The last phase may also involve a disruption attack if the goal is sabotage.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For a more detailed analysis of the attack phases, see Appendix C. A spear phishing attack consists of an email with either a malicious attachment or a link to a malicious website.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Such emails are sent in bulk to a handful of key users.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These waves are often repeated till enough people fall for the bait and compromise their computers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For analysis on the social engineering themes used, attack details and attachment types used, see Appendix A.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some of the spear phishing campaigns are smaller in scale and are focused on specific targets.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, on January 1, 2013 a global energy research company was targeted.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A wave of spear phishing emails were sent from two Freemailer accounts to 291 individuals at the targeted company.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "A wave of spear phishing emails", "start": 0, "end": 31}, {"text": "two Freemailer accounts", "start": 47, "end": 70}, {"text": "291 individuals at the targeted company", "start": 74, "end": 113}], "action": [{"text": "were sent", "start": 32, "end": 41}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 42, "end": 46}, {"text": "to", "start": 71, "end": 73}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All receiving email addresses started with a letter between G and R, covering half of the alphabet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Whether there was a second wave of emails using the other half of the alphabet or whether the attackers only got their hands on part of the address book remains unknown.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All emails had either the subject line'' 2013, Obama QE4! Merry Christmas!'' or'' 2013, Obama QE4!''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is common to see spear phishing attacks take place around holidays, as people are receiving more emails during these times and are less likely to perform due diligence while opening them.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All of the emails contained the same Trojan.Dropper disguised as an attachment with the filename AVP.dll.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "All of the emails", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "the same Trojan.Dropper", "start": 28, "end": 51}, {"text": "an attachment with the filename AVP.dll", "start": 65, "end": 104}], "action": [{"text": "contained", "start": 18, "end": 27}, {"text": "disguised", "start": 52, "end": 61}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 62, "end": 64}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware itself drops a malicious Downloader'' clbcatq.dll'' into a newly created'' wuauclt'' directory, posing as Windows update and taking advantage of the DLL search order hijack weakness in order to load the malicious code in Windows.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware itself", "start": 0, "end": 18}, {"text": "a malicious Downloader'' clbcatq.dll''", "start": 25, "end": 63}, {"text": "a newly created'' wuauclt'' directory", "start": 69, "end": 106}, {"text": "Windows update", "start": 118, "end": 132}, {"text": "the malicious code", "start": 211, "end": 229}, {"text": "Windows", "start": 233, "end": 240}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 19, "end": 24}, {"text": "posing", "start": 108, "end": 114}, {"text": "load", "start": 206, "end": 210}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 64, "end": 68}, {"text": "as", "start": 115, "end": 117}, {"text": "in", "start": 230, "end": 232}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The same family of dropper has been used in previous targeted attacks against other sectors, indicating that a group with multiple interests is behind the attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The back door provided full access to the compromised computers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The back door", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "full access to the compromised computers", "start": 23, "end": 63}], "action": [{"text": "provided", "start": 14, "end": 22}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A week later, on January 7, 2013, the group attacked the same company again.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Seventy emails were sent to 58 individuals using either'' 2012-13 NFL Playoffs Schedule'' or'' Re: 2012-13 NFL Playoffs Schedule'' as a subject line.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this wave, the attackers used a similar AVP.dll to the one used before.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In some of the emails, an additional CHM file with an old exploit was used in an effort to maximize the chances of a successful infection.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After this second wave, the attack ceased.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is unknown if the attackers successfully retrieved the information they were seeking, if they installed other back door Trojans or gained passwords that allowed them to directly access the computers, or if they have given up on the target.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "they", "start": 92, "end": 96}, {"text": "other back door Trojans", "start": 107, "end": 130}], "action": [{"text": "installed", "start": 97, "end": 106}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A global oil company, with offices around the world, had been under continuous attack for some time, but in September 2012 we noticed an upsurge in activity, with 34 times more suspicious emails than on average.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This provided a clear indication that something suspicious was going on.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At the end of this wave of emails, a hotel chain, a rental car company and two financial institutions were also targeted by the same attacker.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This may have been an attempt to find further information that could be used in a future social engineering attack against the oil company.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In total, 136 email accounts at the oil company were targeted.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A regional sales manager in Greece received 412 emails over the 12 month period, with 155 different attachments.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A HR person in the same country received the second largest amount of emails with 90 in total.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Seventeen other people were targeted between 70 and 90 times, many in the same region.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The rest of the targeted people received less than five emails each, in what seems to have been an undirected spraying in the hope that at least some would fall for the bait.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Clearly the one person that received the highest volume of emails was deemed to be of high value to the attackers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Possible explanations for the attack could be that a competitor wanted to know more about some upcoming deal or details on the oil field exploration, but this would be highly speculative.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The spear phishing emails came from 234 spoofed addresses.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The spear phishing emails", "start": 0, "end": 25}, {"text": "234 spoofed addresses", "start": 36, "end": 57}], "action": [{"text": "came", "start": 26, "end": 30}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 31, "end": 35}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They were made to appear to be linked to the company in relation to the subject and attachment chosen.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "They", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "appear to be linked to the company in relation to the subject and attachment chosen", "start": 18, "end": 101}], "action": [{"text": "were made", "start": 5, "end": 14}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 15, "end": 17}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many of the emails came from the same country as the main targeted sales manager.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The emails all contained malicious attachments.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The emails all", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "malicious attachments", "start": 25, "end": 46}], "action": [{"text": "contained", "start": 15, "end": 24}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "None of them linked to third party sites for drive-by downloads.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Of the attachments, 1,588 had a .exe", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "extension.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Of those, 842 had a .pdf.exe", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "extension.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware chosen was a variant of the Poison Ivy Trojan Backdoor.Darkmoon and, in some minor cases, Trojan droppers that would download additional malware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware chosen", "start": 0, "end": 18}, {"text": "a variant of the Poison Ivy Trojan Backdoor.Darkmoon", "start": 23, "end": 75}, {"text": "Trojan droppers", "start": 102, "end": 117}, {"text": "additional malware", "start": 138, "end": 156}], "action": [{"text": "was", "start": 19, "end": 22}, {"text": "download", "start": 129, "end": 137}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers did not use any zero-day exploits to drop a payload.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The social engineering messages concentrated mainly around the following two themes: Once installed, the back door would create a registry run key in order to restart with Windows and connect to one of three C & C servers located in Greece.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "installed", "start": 90, "end": 99}, {"text": "create", "start": 121, "end": 127}, {"text": "restart", "start": 159, "end": 166}, {"text": "connect", "start": 184, "end": 191}], "entity": [{"text": "the back door", "start": 101, "end": 114}, {"text": "a registry run key", "start": 128, "end": 146}, {"text": "Windows", "start": 172, "end": 179}, {"text": "one of three C & C servers located in Greece", "start": 195, "end": 239}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 167, "end": 171}, {"text": "to", "start": 192, "end": 194}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The last C & C server has been used since 2010 in similar attacks against other companies.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The last C & C server", "start": 0, "end": 21}, {"text": "2010", "start": 42, "end": 46}, {"text": "similar attacks against other companies", "start": 50, "end": 89}], "action": [{"text": "been used", "start": 26, "end": 35}], "modifier": [{"text": "since", "start": 36, "end": 41}, {"text": "in", "start": 47, "end": 49}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other sub-domains at the same free host and DNS service have been used by other groups to spread malware in the past.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The chosen names of the C & C server domains imitates legitimate services in a bid to be overlooked by the system administrators when checking their logs.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The chosen names of the C & C server domains", "start": 0, "end": 44}, {"text": "legitimate services", "start": 54, "end": 73}, {"text": "be overlooked by the system administrators when checking their logs", "start": 86, "end": 153}], "action": [{"text": "imitates", "start": 45, "end": 53}], "modifier": [{"text": "in a bid to", "start": 74, "end": 85}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The back door provides full remote access to the compromised computers, allowing for extraction of any data.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The back door", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "full remote access", "start": 23, "end": 41}, {"text": "the compromised computers", "start": 45, "end": 70}, {"text": "extraction of any data", "start": 85, "end": 107}], "action": [{"text": "provides", "start": 14, "end": 22}, {"text": "allowing", "start": 72, "end": 80}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 42, "end": 44}, {"text": "for", "start": 81, "end": 84}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is unknown if the attackers succeeded in their goal and if valuable information has been extracted.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attacks did not completely disappear, but the email volume decreased significantly to only a few emails per week afterwards.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As with all targeted attacks, there are many different groups of attackers operating in this field.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These attacks can not be attributed to only one group or geographical region.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have seen individuals, competitors, hacktivist groups and possible state sponsored agents carrying out attacks against energy companies.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some of the attacks have been purely opportunistic, seeking any valuable information available.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other campaigns look like they were planned over a lengthy period and carried out methodically with a clear goal in mind.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers tend to go after valuable information, including maps of new gas fields or research on efficient photovoltaic generators.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This information can be of great value to competitors or nations that want to make progress in the same field.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Another motivation for attackers is to profit from the information stolen by blackmailing the company.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The same information can be used to carry out sabotage attacks designed to disrupt ICSs, as the energy sector is also a primary target for sabotage attacks which will not generate direct profit for the attacker.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A competitor might be interested in generating bad press and bad customer experience for a rival company, in order to win some new clients.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, in January 2013 a group claiming to be related to Anonymous posted access details for what they said were Israeli SCADA systems for power plants and other systems.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Meanwhile,'' Operation Save the Arctic'' targeted multiple oil companies around the globe in protest against drilling plans in the Arctic.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Disgruntled employees are also a source of attacks that should not be underestimated.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With their knowhow about internal critical processes and systems they often know how to inflict serious damage.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They may be able to perform system modifications that could go unnoticed for a long periods.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For all regular client computers, the well-established best practice guidelines apply.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These computers are often the first ones to be attacked.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once compromised, the attacker will use these computers and try to explore deeper into internal networks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Securing and hardening of deployed operating systems with a working strategy for patch deployment is important.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Reoccurring security awareness training can help users to identify social engineering attempts and prevent them from falling victim to them in the first place.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The company can perform penetration testing on Web and network applications but also on ICSs to identify and remedy any vulnerability.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For examples Web applications should be tested against SQL injection attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This can also help confirm if applied polices are followed through, if the patch level is correct on all computers and if systems are compliant.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Companies can monitor the Internet for information about attacks in the same vertical and apply lessons learned where possible.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, different layers of security products can help achieve better overall protection.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Security Information and Event Manager system (SIEM): Using a SIEM can help correlate all related alerts in one place.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This centralized view can be cross referenced with threat intelligence data to generate prioritization and an action plan.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Painting the bigger picture of the overall security state can reveal previously unnoticed attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example failed login attempts on internal servers could indicate a password breach.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This includes logging of critical systems and synchronization of time among multiple systems.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Ingress and egress filtering: Filtering the network traffic with firewalls, content filters and IPS allows the control of data flows.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This can prevent attackers from reaching internal systems.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is important to also monitor outbound traffic, as data exfiltration is a key point for cyberespionage.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It should be noted that with the increased use of cloud services and mobile devices, some traffic might never pass through the company's gateways.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Where traffic blocking is too disruptive at least monitoring should be implemented.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Data loss prevention (DLP): DLP solutions can track the access and flow of critical information and prevent it from leaving the company or encrypt it automatically.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Endpoint protection: Depending on the usage pattern of the computer, different solutions are available to protect the endpoint.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Antivirus solution with proactive detection methods like behavioral analysis and reputation scanning can prevent unknown malware from installing itself.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "HIPS (host based intrusion prevention systems), behavioral lockdown or whitelisting can protect computers from any kind of unwanted tampering without the need of constant updates.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• System protection: For non-standard IT systems, hardening can increase the security.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On industrial systems which are not often updated or that can not be updated, exploitation can be prevented with the help of lockdown solutions like Symantec Critical System Protection (CSP).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Through policies, only trusted system applications are allowed to run.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "ICS should be regularly checked and upgraded if new firmware exists.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Where this is not possible HIPS and behavioral lockdown tools can be used to secure computers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Email filtering: Proper email filtering can prevent many spear phishing attempts from reaching users.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They can help minimize the risk of an untrained user falling for social engineering tricks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• Authentication: Some of the ICS contain hardcoded passwords and, wherever possible, these should be changed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "ICS frequently use weakly authenticated protocols that allow for impersonation attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Where possible those authentication methods should be upgraded or at least closely monitored.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Strong authentication or PKI should be used where applicable.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Industrial control systems (ICS) should be specially protected and monitored.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The control system and control network should be secured.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Where possible, ICS should be separate from the Intranet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Isolating these networks alone is often not enough to protect the control network, but it can make it more difficult for attackers to succeed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For some systems it can make sense to have a plan to quickly disconnect or separate critical machines in the event of a detected cyberattack.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cyberespionage campaigns and sabotage attacks are becoming increasingly common, with countless threat actors attempting to gain a foothold in some of the best protected organizations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At this stage, roughly five targeted attacks per day are being mounted on firms in the energy sector.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These attacks have become increasingly sophisticated, although the capabilities and tactics used by these threat actors vary considerably.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the second half of 2012, the energy sector was the second most targeted with 16 percent of all the targeted attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This strong increase was mainly due to a large scale attack against one global oil company.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the first half of 2013, the energy sector was ranked fifth with 7.6 percent of all attacks focused on this sector.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In general we have observed that attackers are becoming more efficient and focusing on smaller operations that attract less attention.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers tend to go after valuable information–such as maps of a new gas field–but the sector is also a major target for sabotage attacks, which will not generate direct profit for the attacker.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Such disruptive attacks do already happen and may lead to large financial losses.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "State sponsored agents, competitors, internal attackers or hacktivists are the most likely authors of such sabotage attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Fortunately, there have not been many successful sabotage attacks against energy companies to date.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, the increasing number of connected systems and centralized control for ICS systems means that the risk of attacks in the future will increase.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Energy and utility companies need to be aware of these risks and plan accordingly to protect their valuable information as well as their ICS or SCADA networks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Social engineering is an essential part of spear phishing campaigns.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A cleverly chosen, enticing message may prompt the user into opening an attachment.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is evident that most attackers are carefully selecting the themes that they use for their attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some groups use real news stories and copy the text directly from the newspaper websites.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Others try to appeal to personal hobbies in order to get the user's attention.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the energy sector the most commonly used theme for spear phishing emails was money related (e.g.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' Wage Data 2012'') followed by sports related themes (e.g.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' 2012-13 NFL Playoffs Schedule'').", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As an example, the subject line'' Wage Data 2012'' was used in 944 emails, sent from 26 different email addresses to targets in nine different sectors.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "'' Wage Data 2012''", "start": 31, "end": 50}, {"text": "944 emails", "start": 63, "end": 73}, {"text": "26 different email addresses", "start": 85, "end": 113}, {"text": "targets in nine different sectors", "start": 117, "end": 150}], "action": [{"text": "was used", "start": 51, "end": 59}, {"text": "sent", "start": 75, "end": 79}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 60, "end": 62}, {"text": "from", "start": 80, "end": 84}, {"text": "to", "start": 114, "end": 116}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attack was carried out over eight days and used the same infected Microsoft Word document in every instance.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attack", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "the same infected Microsoft Word document", "start": 52, "end": 93}, {"text": "every instance", "start": 97, "end": 111}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 47, "end": 51}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 94, "end": 96}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In general any topic can be used in a social engineering attempt, which makes it even harder for regular users to spot the attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Here are a few examples of subject lines used, listed by category: In the last six month of 2012 the average number of targeted attacks observed per day was 87 (with 14 in the energy sector).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the first six month of 2013 the average number decreased to 60 targeted attacks per day (five in the energy sector).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The spike in August and September 2012 is mostly related to a large scale attack against a global oil company.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The increase in May 2013 was due to multiple attacks against financial services, public sector and IT service organizations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The government and public sector was quantitatively the most attacked sector, with 25.4 percent of all targeted attacks falling in this sector for the last half of 2012 and 24 percent for the first half of 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The energy sector accounted for 7.6 percent of all targeted attacks, making it the fifth most targeted sector in the first six month of 2013.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This was a big decrease from 16.3 percent of all attacks in the last half of 2012, when it was the second most attacked sector.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This spike in 2012 is mainly due to a large attack campaign against a global oil company which took place in September 2012.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On average we saw 18.6 mail accounts being attacked for any given target company in the last half of 2012 (60.7 in the energy sector) and 5.6 email accounts in the first half of 2013 (10 in the energy sector).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Overall, we see a trend of the attacker conducting more focused attacks against fewer individuals.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This generates less noise and the risk of getting noticed or discovered is smaller.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These emails are sent in small bursts and then repeated against a changing target space till enough computers are compromised.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Half of all the attachments analyzed used an extension that would run directly when double clicked.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This old method is still the most common scheme used.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Of all attachments analyzed, 38 percent were .exe", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "and 12 percent were .src", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "files.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In total only 6 percent used double extensions like .pdf.exe", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "to fool the user.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It should also be noted that 23 percent were Microsoft Word documents using some exploit to execute custom code on the computer.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There were also some more exotic extensions used like AutoIt scripts (.au3", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ") and ZX-Edit files (.zed", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "), but these are the exception rather than the rule.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It might be that the attackers tried to bypass some email filtering software by experimenting with different attachment types.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Sometimes even older exploits like the Microsoft DirectX DirectShow Length Record Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE- 2009-1539) in .mp4", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "files are still occasionally used.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This indicates that either not all attackers have the knowhow to use newer exploits that are publicly available or they speculate that the target has not patched all computers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some of the attackers do not seem to be too sophisticated.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example they used'' www.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "[COMPANY-NAME] .com.exe", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' as an attachment name, clearly missing that the'' .com", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' at the end would be sufficient to run it and the additional'' .exe", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' was not needed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To identify a series of targeted attacks that are likely performed by the same individuals, we have used a novel attack attribution methodology named TRIAGE.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Developed by Symantec Research Labs, TRIAGE is data mining software that relies on multi-criteria decision analysis and intelligent data fusion algorithms to reliably link different attacks to the same source.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This framework has been developed in order to automate cyberintelligence tasks and reduce the time needed to get insights into organized cybercrime activities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By enabling rapid analysis of large security data sets, Symantec analysts can then quickly and more efficiently attribute various waves of cyberattacks to a specific attack campaign likely run by the same individuals.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The TRIAGE framework was recently enhanced with novel visualizations thanks to VIS-SENSE, a European research project aiming at developing visual analytics technologies for network security applications.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Since its original conception, TRIAGE has been successfully used to analyze the behavior of cybercriminals involved in various types of Internet attack activities, such as rogue antivirus websites, spam botnets operations, scam campaigns and targeted attacks performed via spear phishing emails.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As with any other targeted attacks, attacks against the energy sector often follow the same pattern.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It can be broken down in different phases of attack.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It should be noted that we have seen attackers modify their behavior and exceptions from the norm and this is possible especially if the target company has special circumstances or security measures in place.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During this phase the attacker tries to learn as much as possible about the targeted organization.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Information sources often include social networks, job posting sites and press releases.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This enables the attacker to learn the contact details of possible target individuals as well as context that can be used in social engineering scenarios.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attacker will often create a list of implemented security software used at the targeted company from whatever information is available.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These investigations often start completely passively without any direct contact with the company, since there are many data sources publicly available.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Subsequently the attacker can use more interaction if needed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some attackers go through all the effort of creating a fake social media account and befriending key employees.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After a period of small talk, to create a false sense of security, such a connection can then be used to pass on an infected document or find out about some key information.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Depending on the targeted location, physical reconnaissance and eavesdropping may also be used.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The actual break-in occurs during this phase.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attacker usually compromises the network by delivering targeted malware to vulnerable systems or employees.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attacker", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "the network", "start": 33, "end": 44}, {"text": "targeted malware", "start": 59, "end": 75}, {"text": "vulnerable systems or employees", "start": 79, "end": 110}], "action": [{"text": "compromises", "start": 21, "end": 32}, {"text": "delivering", "start": 48, "end": 58}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 76, "end": 78}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There are two main avenues of attack.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One is to send spear phishing emails, where a link to a malicious website or a malicious attachment is delivered using social engineering techniques.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "send", "start": 10, "end": 14}, {"text": "is delivered", "start": 100, "end": 112}], "entity": [{"text": "spear phishing emails", "start": 15, "end": 36}, {"text": "a link to a malicious website or a malicious attachment", "start": 44, "end": 99}, {"text": "social engineering techniques", "start": 119, "end": 148}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 113, "end": 118}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The second method, which is gaining traction, is watering hole attacks, where the attacker infects a website that has a high likelihood of being visited by the intended victim.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The second method", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "watering hole attacks", "start": 49, "end": 70}, {"text": "the attacker", "start": 78, "end": 90}, {"text": "a website that has a high likelihood of being visited by the intended victim", "start": 99, "end": 175}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 46, "end": 48}, {"text": "infects", "start": 91, "end": 98}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By using IP address filters before infecting any visitor of such sites, the attacker can reduce the number of infected systems and bring it to a manageable quantity which can be assessed manually at another time.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "using", "start": 3, "end": 8}], "entity": [{"text": "IP address filters", "start": 9, "end": 27}, {"text": "infecting any visitor of such sites", "start": 35, "end": 70}, {"text": "the attacker", "start": 72, "end": 84}], "modifier": [{"text": "before", "start": 28, "end": 34}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some groups carefully plan watering hole attacks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Some groups", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "watering hole attacks", "start": 27, "end": 48}], "action": [{"text": "plan", "start": 22, "end": 26}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example the Hidden Lynx group stopped using a zero-day vulnerability in a large watering hole attack after Microsoft released details on the vulnerability.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This helped to cover their activities and avoid unwanted attention.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A few days later the group resumed the watering hole attack again, this time using a different exploit.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the group", "start": 17, "end": 26}, {"text": "the watering hole attack", "start": 35, "end": 59}, {"text": "a different exploit", "start": 83, "end": 102}], "action": [{"text": "resumed", "start": 27, "end": 34}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 77, "end": 82}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For more difficult targets, man-in-the-middle attacks can be used.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These can be performed either at the same physical location, posing as a genuine Wi-Fi hotspot or through supply chain attacks.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "posing", "start": 61, "end": 67}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 68, "end": 70}], "entity": [{"text": "a genuine Wi-Fi hotspot", "start": 71, "end": 94}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This can enable the attacker to swap an update of legitimate software for a maliciously crafted version.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attacker", "start": 16, "end": 28}, {"text": "an update of legitimate software", "start": 37, "end": 69}, {"text": "a maliciously crafted version", "start": 74, "end": 103}], "action": [{"text": "swap", "start": 32, "end": 36}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 70, "end": 73}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once the victim installs the genuine looking update, the attacker effectively gains control over the computer.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "Once", "start": 0, "end": 4}], "entity": [{"text": "the victim installs the genuine looking update", "start": 5, "end": 51}, {"text": "the attacker", "start": 53, "end": 65}, {"text": "control over the computer", "start": 84, "end": 109}], "action": [{"text": "gains", "start": 78, "end": 83}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Due to the complexity of such an attack, they are rarely used.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Depending on the skills of the attacker and the time available, the attacker might also attack systems at the perimeter, such as Web servers, and try to break in from there.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware used is not always sophisticated.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Sometimes a regular off-the-shelf back door Trojan is used.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a regular off-the-shelf back door Trojan", "start": 10, "end": 50}], "action": [{"text": "is used", "start": 51, "end": 58}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In these cases the person behind the malware orchestrating the commands is what makes the difference between a targeted attack and a broad generic infection.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Having said this, on very unique targets, we will often see the use of a specifically designed piece malware, such as in the case of Stuxnet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Depending on the protection measures implemented by the target, the attackers may also digitally sign their malware creation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the past there have been quite a few cases where code signing certificates were stolen and later misused to sign malware in order to pass it unnoticed to high value targets.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once the attacker has a foothold on one system, the next step is to create a plan for lateral movement through the network until the interesting data is found.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With more specialized teams of attackers, we can often observe that the infected system is first analyzed to ensure that it is of interest to them.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the infected system", "start": 68, "end": 87}, {"text": "ensure that it is of interest to them", "start": 109, "end": 146}], "action": [{"text": "is first analyzed", "start": 88, "end": 105}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 106, "end": 108}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With watering hole attacks especially, it can happen that computers that were not targeted get infected.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Infected computers need to be assessed by the attacker and, if necessary, removed to keep the profile, and with that the chances of exposure, low.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One of the obvious tasks performed by attackers is to install key loggers, dump local credentials, search local storage for saved accounts and sniff the network for passwords.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "attackers", "start": 38, "end": 47}, {"text": "key loggers", "start": 62, "end": 73}, {"text": "local credentials", "start": 80, "end": 97}, {"text": "local storage", "start": 106, "end": 119}, {"text": "saved accounts", "start": 124, "end": 138}, {"text": "the network", "start": 149, "end": 160}, {"text": "passwords", "start": 165, "end": 174}], "action": [{"text": "install", "start": 54, "end": 61}, {"text": "dump", "start": 75, "end": 79}, {"text": "search", "start": 99, "end": 105}, {"text": "sniff", "start": 143, "end": 148}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 120, "end": 123}, {"text": "for", "start": 161, "end": 164}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Any account detail can be useful to them.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Domain administrator passwords are of especially high value, as they can help greatly in moving further through the Intranet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Often small scripts or even manual commands are used to comb through local files and create network mappings.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Often small scripts or even manual commands", "start": 0, "end": 43}, {"text": "comb through local files and create network mappings", "start": 56, "end": 108}], "action": [{"text": "are used", "start": 44, "end": 52}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 53, "end": 55}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Simple system commands can help the attacker to learn about installed security tools, saved links to internal platforms and local address books.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attacker", "start": 32, "end": 44}, {"text": "installed security tools, saved links to internal platforms and local address books", "start": 60, "end": 143}], "action": [{"text": "learn", "start": 48, "end": 53}], "modifier": [{"text": "about", "start": 54, "end": 59}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once new systems are identified the attacker will attempt to hop onto them as well.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In some instances they might even use zero-day vulnerabilities to spread further into the network.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "they", "start": 18, "end": 22}, {"text": "zero-day vulnerabilities", "start": 38, "end": 62}, {"text": "spread further into the network", "start": 66, "end": 97}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 34, "end": 37}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 63, "end": 65}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One method which is gaining more relevance is the hijacking of local software distribution systems for further distribution.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "hijacking", "start": 50, "end": 59}], "entity": [{"text": "local software distribution systems", "start": 63, "end": 98}, {"text": "further distribution", "start": 103, "end": 123}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 99, "end": 102}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This can either be proprietary systems, such as the case of Trojan.Jokra in South Korea, or OS-specific, such as hijacking Windows Update, in the case of Flamer.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once the attackers have successfully managed to create and distribute their own package, they can easily infect all connected systems at once.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "they", "start": 89, "end": 93}, {"text": "all connected systems", "start": 112, "end": 133}, {"text": "once", "start": 137, "end": 141}], "action": [{"text": "infect", "start": 105, "end": 111}], "modifier": [{"text": "at", "start": 134, "end": 136}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Especially in cases of wiping attacks, such Trojan.Jokra, this is a very efficient way to disrupt as many computers as possible.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the target is assumed to be in a separated network not connected to the Internet, the malware used might try and autonomously infect removable drives, like USB sticks, or project files for PLCs.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 85, "end": 96}, {"text": "removable drives, like USB sticks, or project files for PLCs", "start": 136, "end": 196}], "action": [{"text": "autonomously infect", "start": 116, "end": 135}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This could allow the malware to be manually introduced to the destination network, without the knowledge of the carrier, essentially jumping air gaps into isolated networks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 17, "end": 28}, {"text": "the destination network", "start": 58, "end": 81}, {"text": "air gaps", "start": 141, "end": 149}, {"text": "isolated networks", "start": 155, "end": 172}], "action": [{"text": "introduced", "start": 44, "end": 54}, {"text": "jumping", "start": 133, "end": 140}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 55, "end": 57}, {"text": "into", "start": 150, "end": 154}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At the end of the discovery phase the attackers should know the internals of the infected networks and have identified systems with interesting data or with connected industrial control systems.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 34, "end": 47}, {"text": "the internals of the infected networks", "start": 60, "end": 98}, {"text": "systems with interesting data or with connected industrial control systems", "start": 119, "end": 193}], "action": [{"text": "know", "start": 55, "end": 59}, {"text": "identified", "start": 108, "end": 118}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The capture and exfiltration phases are not always present.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the sole goal of the attackers is to cause a disruption they may directly jump to a destructive payload.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, in most cases information is extracted first, which in turn allows the sabotage to be constructed more efficiently at a later phase.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this phase the interesting data is gathered and sent back to the attackers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the interesting data", "start": 14, "end": 34}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 64, "end": 77}], "action": [{"text": "is gathered", "start": 35, "end": 46}, {"text": "sent back", "start": 51, "end": 60}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 61, "end": 63}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This can be done with different levels of sophistication.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The simple attacks compress the files and upload them through FTP or through a HTTP POST request to a remote drop server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The simple attacks", "start": 0, "end": 18}, {"text": "the files", "start": 28, "end": 37}, {"text": "them", "start": 49, "end": 53}, {"text": "FTP", "start": 62, "end": 65}, {"text": "a HTTP POST request to a remote drop server", "start": 77, "end": 120}], "action": [{"text": "compress", "start": 19, "end": 27}, {"text": "upload", "start": 42, "end": 48}], "modifier": [{"text": "through", "start": 54, "end": 61}, {"text": "through", "start": 69, "end": 76}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "More sophisticated attackers obfuscate the data by XOR-ing it, encrypting it with proper asymmetric encryption or embedding it into media files using steganography to hide the data from traffic inspection.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "More sophisticated attackers", "start": 0, "end": 28}, {"text": "the data", "start": 39, "end": 47}, {"text": "XOR-ing it, encrypting it with proper asymmetric encryption or embedding it into media files using steganography", "start": 51, "end": 163}, {"text": "hide the data from traffic inspection", "start": 167, "end": 204}], "action": [{"text": "obfuscate", "start": 29, "end": 38}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 48, "end": 50}, {"text": "to", "start": 164, "end": 166}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition to this, the amount of data sent and the timing can be chosen in a smart way.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, some malware samples will send the data in smaller bursts so as not to swamp the network or generate network spikes that might attract attention.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "some malware samples", "start": 13, "end": 33}, {"text": "the data", "start": 44, "end": 52}, {"text": "smaller bursts", "start": 56, "end": 70}, {"text": "not to swamp the network or generate network spikes that might attract attention", "start": 77, "end": 157}], "action": [{"text": "send", "start": 39, "end": 43}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 53, "end": 55}, {"text": "so as", "start": 71, "end": 76}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Since most employees use laptops, the malware can use location awareness to detect if the compromised computer is outside of the corporate network and send the data once it's directly connected to the Internet, such as from a Wi-Fi hotspot at an airport.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 34, "end": 45}, {"text": "location awareness", "start": 54, "end": 72}, {"text": "detect if the compromised computer is outside of the corporate network", "start": 76, "end": 146}, {"text": "the data", "start": 156, "end": 164}, {"text": "it's directly connected to the Internet, such as from a Wi-Fi hotspot at an airport", "start": 170, "end": 253}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 50, "end": 53}, {"text": "send", "start": 151, "end": 155}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 73, "end": 75}, {"text": "once", "start": 165, "end": 169}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This might allow the traffic to bypass perimeter security and receive less scrutiny.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the traffic", "start": 17, "end": 28}, {"text": "perimeter security", "start": 39, "end": 57}, {"text": "less scrutiny", "start": 70, "end": 83}], "action": [{"text": "bypass", "start": 32, "end": 38}, {"text": "receive", "start": 62, "end": 69}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In some instances the infected computer might not have a direct connection to the Internet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In such cases, a previously compromised computer in the DMZ can act as a proxy, forwarding all the collected data.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a previously compromised computer in the DMZ", "start": 15, "end": 59}, {"text": "a proxy", "start": 71, "end": 78}, {"text": "all the collected data", "start": 91, "end": 113}], "action": [{"text": "act", "start": 64, "end": 67}, {"text": "forwarding", "start": 80, "end": 90}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 68, "end": 70}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is when any destructive payload is launched.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the attackers are only after information this phase might not happen at all.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The targets and the goals for disruption attacks can be very different, there is no such thing as one- size-fits-all for disruption attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, Stuxnet was tailored to attack a specific uranium enrichment facility and would not work against a different target.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In recent times, wiper Trojans have been popular in attacks against the energy sector.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware deletes all files on a computer and then deletes the master boot record, rendering the computer unusable.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "all files on a computer", "start": 20, "end": 43}, {"text": "the master boot record", "start": 61, "end": 83}, {"text": "the computer", "start": 95, "end": 107}, {"text": "unusable", "start": 108, "end": 116}], "action": [{"text": "deletes", "start": 12, "end": 19}, {"text": "deletes", "start": 53, "end": 60}, {"text": "rendering", "start": 85, "end": 94}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This can happen on any operating systems and we have seen scripts for different UNIX flavors being used as well.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Depending on the disaster recovery plan in place, these computers can be remotely recovered.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, there may still be an outage while the computers are being restored.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By 2014, the number of Android users has grown to 1.1 billion and the number of Android devices has reached 1.9 billion.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At the same time, enterprises are also embracing Android- based Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) solutions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, in Intel's BYOD program, there are more than 20,000 Android devices across over 800 combinations of Android versions and hardware configurations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although little malware has been found in Google Play, both Android apps and the Android system itself contain vulnerabilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Aggressive ad libraries also leak the user's private information.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Aggressive ad libraries", "start": 0, "end": 23}, {"text": "the user's private information", "start": 34, "end": 64}], "action": [{"text": "leak", "start": 29, "end": 33}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By leveraging all these vulnerabilities, an attacker can conduct more targeted attacks, which we call'' Sidewinder Targeted Attacks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an attacker", "start": 41, "end": 52}, {"text": "more targeted attacks", "start": 65, "end": 86}], "action": [{"text": "conduct", "start": 57, "end": 64}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' In this paper we explain the security risks from such attacks, in which an attacker can intercept and use private information uploaded from ad libraries to precisely locate targeted areas such as a CEO's office or specific conference rooms.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an attacker", "start": 75, "end": 86}, {"text": "private information uploaded from ad libraries", "start": 109, "end": 155}, {"text": "precisely locate targeted areas such as a CEO's office or specific conference rooms", "start": 159, "end": 242}], "action": [{"text": "intercept and use", "start": 91, "end": 108}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 156, "end": 158}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When the target is identified, a'' Sidewinder Targeted Attack'' exploits popular vulnerabilities in ad libraries, such as Javascript-binding-over-HTTP or dynamic- loading-over-HTTP, etc.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is a well-known challenge for an attacker to call Android services from injected native code that doesn't have Android application context.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Here, we explain how attackers can invoke Android services for tasks including taking photos, calling phone numbers, sending SMS, reading from/ writing to the clipboard, etc.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "attackers", "start": 21, "end": 30}, {"text": "Android services", "start": 42, "end": 58}, {"text": "taking photos", "start": 79, "end": 92}, {"text": "calling phone numbers", "start": 94, "end": 115}, {"text": "sending SMS", "start": 117, "end": 128}, {"text": "reading from/ writing to the clipboard", "start": 130, "end": 168}], "action": [{"text": "invoke", "start": 35, "end": 41}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 59, "end": 62}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Furthermore, the attackers can exploit several Android vulnerabilities to get valuable private information or to launch more advanced attacks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 13, "end": 26}, {"text": "several Android vulnerabilities", "start": 39, "end": 70}, {"text": "get valuable private information", "start": 74, "end": 106}, {"text": "launch more advanced attacks", "start": 113, "end": 141}], "action": [{"text": "exploit", "start": 31, "end": 38}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 71, "end": 73}, {"text": "to", "start": 110, "end": 112}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Finally, we show that this threat is not only real but also prevalent due to the popularity of Android ad libraries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We hope this paper kickstarts the conversation on how to better protect the security and privacy in third-party libraries and how to further harden the Android security framework in the future.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To understand the security risks brought by a Sidewinder Targeted Attack, we first explain one possible attack mechanism (illustrated in Figure 1) that is similar to that of Sidewinder missiles.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attacker can hijack the network where the targeted victim resides.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attacker", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "the network where the targeted victim resides", "start": 24, "end": 69}], "action": [{"text": "hijack", "start": 17, "end": 23}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Like an infrared homing system, the attacker then seeks'' emission'' from ad libraries running on the target device to track and lock on it.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once the target is locked on, the attacker can launch advanced persistent attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To minimize detection chances, the attacker can choose to take action on important targets only, ignoring all other devices.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attacker", "start": 31, "end": 43}, {"text": "take action on important targets only", "start": 58, "end": 95}], "action": [{"text": "choose", "start": 48, "end": 54}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 55, "end": 57}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In later sections, we discuss attacking ('' warhead'') and targeting ('' homing'') components in detail and show how a combination of these components can launch powerful and precise attacks on target devices.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a combination of these components", "start": 117, "end": 150}, {"text": "powerful and precise attacks", "start": 162, "end": 190}, {"text": "target devices", "start": 194, "end": 208}], "action": [{"text": "launch", "start": 155, "end": 161}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 191, "end": 193}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Table 1 proposes different attacks that an attacker can launch remotely on target devices through vulnerable ad libraries.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "different attacks", "start": 17, "end": 34}, {"text": "an attacker", "start": 40, "end": 51}, {"text": "remotely", "start": 63, "end": 71}, {"text": "target devices", "start": 75, "end": 89}, {"text": "vulnerable ad libraries", "start": 98, "end": 121}], "action": [{"text": "launch", "start": 56, "end": 62}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 72, "end": 74}, {"text": "through", "start": 90, "end": 97}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Figure 2 shows a proof-of-concept attack control interface.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This attack targets one of the ad libraries described in this paper.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The security risks become obvious by looking at what the attacker can do with this control interface.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The left panel enables the attacker to command the victim's device, including uploading local files, taking pictures, recording audio/video, manipulating the clipboard, sending SMS, dialing numbers, implanting bootkit, or installing the attacker's apps uploaded to Google Play, etc.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The left panel", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "the attacker", "start": 23, "end": 35}, {"text": "command the victim's device", "start": 39, "end": 66}, {"text": "local files", "start": 88, "end": 99}, {"text": "pictures", "start": 108, "end": 116}, {"text": "audio/video", "start": 128, "end": 139}, {"text": "the clipboard", "start": 154, "end": 167}, {"text": "SMS", "start": 177, "end": 180}, {"text": "numbers", "start": 190, "end": 197}, {"text": "bootkit", "start": 210, "end": 217}, {"text": "the attacker's apps uploaded to Google Play", "start": 233, "end": 276}], "action": [{"text": "enables", "start": 15, "end": 22}, {"text": "uploading", "start": 78, "end": 87}, {"text": "taking", "start": 101, "end": 107}, {"text": "recording", "start": 118, "end": 127}, {"text": "manipulating", "start": 141, "end": 153}, {"text": "sending", "start": 169, "end": 176}, {"text": "dialing", "start": 182, "end": 189}, {"text": "implanting", "start": 199, "end": 209}, {"text": "installing", "start": 222, "end": 232}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 36, "end": 38}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The right panel lists all information stolen from the victim's device.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "all information", "start": 22, "end": 37}, {"text": "the victim's device", "start": 50, "end": 69}], "action": [{"text": "stolen", "start": 38, "end": 44}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 45, "end": 49}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this screenshot, the victim's installed app list, clipboard, a photo taken from the back camera, an audio clip, and a video clip have been uploaded, with the GPS location intercepted from the ad library.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the victim's installed app list, clipboard, a photo taken from the back camera, an audio clip, and a video clip", "start": 20, "end": 131}, {"text": "the GPS location", "start": 157, "end": 173}, {"text": "the ad library", "start": 191, "end": 205}], "action": [{"text": "been uploaded", "start": 137, "end": 150}, {"text": "intercepted", "start": 174, "end": 185}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 186, "end": 190}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The panel also pins down the GPS location of the victim's device onto a Google Map widget.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The panel", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "the GPS location of the victim's device", "start": 25, "end": 64}, {"text": "a Google Map widget", "start": 70, "end": 89}], "action": [{"text": "pins", "start": 15, "end": 19}], "modifier": [{"text": "down", "start": 20, "end": 24}, {"text": "onto", "start": 65, "end": 69}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Based on this precise position information, it is easy to identify individuals or groups of'' VIP'' targets by which offices they are in.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this section, we explain in more detail the risks of remote attacks on the Android devices.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Android uses the JavaScript binding method addJavascriptInterface to enable JavaScript code running inside a WebView to access the app's Java methods (also known as the Javascript bridge).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, it is widely known that this feature, if not used carefully, presents a potential security risk when running on Android API 16 (Android 4.1) or below.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As noted by Google:'' Use of this method in a WebView containing untrusted content could allow an attacker to manipulate the host application in unintended ways, executing Java code with the permissions of the host application.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an attacker", "start": 95, "end": 106}, {"text": "the host application", "start": 121, "end": 141}, {"text": "unintended ways", "start": 145, "end": 160}, {"text": "Java code", "start": 172, "end": 181}, {"text": "the permissions of the host application", "start": 187, "end": 226}], "action": [{"text": "manipulate", "start": 110, "end": 120}, {"text": "executing", "start": 162, "end": 171}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 142, "end": 144}, {"text": "with", "start": 182, "end": 186}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' In particular, if an app running on Android API 16 or below uses the JavaScript binding method addJavascriptInterface and loads the content in the WebView over HTTP, an attacker over the network could hijack the HTTP traffic (e.g., through WiFi or DNS hijacking) to inject malicious content into the WebView and to control the host application.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an attacker over the network", "start": 169, "end": 197}, {"text": "the HTTP traffic", "start": 211, "end": 227}, {"text": "WiFi or DNS hijacking", "start": 243, "end": 264}, {"text": "inject malicious content into the WebView", "start": 269, "end": 310}, {"text": "control the host application", "start": 318, "end": 346}], "action": [{"text": "hijack", "start": 204, "end": 210}], "modifier": [{"text": "through", "start": 235, "end": 242}, {"text": "to", "start": 266, "end": 268}, {"text": "to", "start": 315, "end": 317}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Listing 1 is a sample Javascript snippet to execute shell command.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a sample Javascript snippet", "start": 13, "end": 40}, {"text": "shell command", "start": 52, "end": 65}], "action": [{"text": "execute", "start": 44, "end": 51}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We call this the JavaScript-Binding-Over-HTTP (JBOH) vulnerability.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This applies to insecure HTTPS channels as well.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If an app containing such vulnerability has sensitive Android permissions such as access to the camera, a remote attacker could exploit it to perform sensitive tasks such as taking photos or recording video, over the Internet, without consent.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a remote attacker", "start": 104, "end": 121}, {"text": "photos", "start": 181, "end": 187}, {"text": "video", "start": 201, "end": 206}, {"text": "the Internet", "start": 213, "end": 225}, {"text": "consent", "start": 235, "end": 242}], "action": [{"text": "taking", "start": 174, "end": 180}, {"text": "recording", "start": 191, "end": 200}], "modifier": [{"text": "over", "start": 208, "end": 212}, {"text": "without", "start": 227, "end": 234}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Based on the official data in June 2014, ~60% of Android devices are still running API≤16.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Note that API > 16 platforms are not necessarily secure.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the app is targeting at a lower API level, Android will still run it with the lower API level for compatibility reasons.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Figure 3 shows the targeted API of popular Google Play apps, each of which has over 50,000 downloads.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We can see that a large portion of apps are targeting at API≤16.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Starting with Android 4.2 (API > 16), Google introduced the @JavascriptInterface anno- tation to explicitly designate and restrict which public Java methods in the app were accessible from JavaScript running inside a WebView.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, if an ad library uses the @JavascriptInterface annotation to expose security-sensitive interfaces, and uses HTTP to load content in the WebView, it is vulnerable to attacks where an attacker over the network could inject malicious content into the WebView to misuse the interfaces exposed through the JS binding annotation.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an attacker over the network", "start": 188, "end": 216}, {"text": "malicious content", "start": 230, "end": 247}, {"text": "the WebView", "start": 253, "end": 264}, {"text": "misuse the interfaces exposed through the JS binding annotation", "start": 268, "end": 331}], "action": [{"text": "inject", "start": 223, "end": 229}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 248, "end": 252}, {"text": "to", "start": 265, "end": 267}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We call these exposed JS binding annotation interfaces'' JS Sidedoors.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' For example, we found a list of sensitive Javascript interfaces that are publicly ex- posed from certain versions of a real-world ad library: createCalendarEvent, makeCall, postToSocial, sendMail, sendSMS, takeCameraPicture, getGalleryImage, registerMicListener, etc.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Given that this ad library loads ads using HTTP, if the host app has the corresponding permissions (e.g., CALL PHONE), attackers over the network can abuse these interfaces to do malicious things (e.g., utilizing the makeCall interface to dial phone numbers without the user's consent).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "attackers over the network", "start": 119, "end": 145}, {"text": "the makeCall interface", "start": 213, "end": 235}, {"text": "dial phone numbers without the user's consent", "start": 239, "end": 284}], "action": [{"text": "utilizing", "start": 203, "end": 212}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 236, "end": 238}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Similar to JBOH, DEX loading over HTTP or insecure HTTPS (DLOH) is another serious issue raised by ad libraries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the attackers can hijack the communication channels and inject malicious DEX files, they can then control the behaviors of the victim apps.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 3, "end": 16}, {"text": "the communication channels", "start": 28, "end": 54}, {"text": "malicious DEX files", "start": 66, "end": 85}, {"text": "they", "start": 87, "end": 91}, {"text": "the behaviors of the victim apps", "start": 109, "end": 141}], "action": [{"text": "hijack", "start": 21, "end": 27}, {"text": "inject", "start": 59, "end": 65}, {"text": "control", "start": 101, "end": 108}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After getting local access, the attacker can upload private and sensitive files from the victim's device, or modify files that the host app can write to (e.g., the directory of the host app and SD Card with FAT file system).", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "getting", "start": 6, "end": 13}, {"text": "upload", "start": 45, "end": 51}, {"text": "modify", "start": 109, "end": 115}], "entity": [{"text": "local access", "start": 14, "end": 26}, {"text": "the attacker", "start": 28, "end": 40}, {"text": "private and sensitive files", "start": 52, "end": 79}, {"text": "the victim's device", "start": 85, "end": 104}, {"text": "files that the host app can write to", "start": 116, "end": 152}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 80, "end": 84}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To launch more sophisticated attacks like sending SMS or taking pictures, the attackers may use Java reflection to call other APIs from the Javascript bridge.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "sending", "start": 42, "end": 49}, {"text": "taking", "start": 57, "end": 63}], "entity": [{"text": "SMS", "start": 50, "end": 53}, {"text": "pictures", "start": 64, "end": 72}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 74, "end": 87}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It appears this method makes sending SMS easy.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, some other operations require Android context or registering Java callbacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Android context provides an interface to the global information about an app's environment.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many Android functionalities, especially remote call invocations, are encapsulated in the context.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We discuss attacks requiring context in a later section.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this section, we explain attacks that don't need Android context, and discuss their security risks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One direct threat posed by JBOH is to use the JBOH shell (Listing 1) to download exe- cutables and use them to root the device.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "use", "start": 38, "end": 41}, {"text": "use", "start": 99, "end": 102}], "entity": [{"text": "the JBOH shell", "start": 42, "end": 56}, {"text": "download exe- cutables", "start": 72, "end": 94}, {"text": "them", "start": 103, "end": 107}, {"text": "root the device", "start": 111, "end": 126}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 69, "end": 71}, {"text": "to", "start": 108, "end": 110}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Commercial one-touch root apps claim they can root more than 1,000 brands (> 20,000 models).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "towelroot, which exploits a bug found recently in Linux kernel, claims that it can root most new devices released before June 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Thus, as long as attackers can get the JBOH shell, they have the tools to obtain root on most Android phone models.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "they", "start": 51, "end": 55}, {"text": "root", "start": 81, "end": 85}, {"text": "most Android phone models", "start": 89, "end": 114}], "action": [{"text": "obtain", "start": 74, "end": 80}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 86, "end": 88}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Even if the attackers can't obtain root, they can attempt ptrace to control the host app.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "they", "start": 41, "end": 45}, {"text": "ptrace", "start": 58, "end": 64}, {"text": "control the host app", "start": 68, "end": 88}], "action": [{"text": "attempt", "start": 50, "end": 57}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 65, "end": 67}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although only processes with root privilege can ptrace others, child processes are able to ptrace their parents.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Because the shell launched from the Javascript bridge is a child process of the host app, it can ptrace the host app's process.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Note that only apps with android: debuggable set as'' true'' in the manifest can be ptraced, which limits its adoption.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Sending SMS does not require context or user interaction.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A simple call does the job, as shown in Listing 2 To make calls from the Javascript bridge without user consent, we can invoke the telephony service to dial numbers directly via binder, as shown in Listing 3, where phone is the remote Android telephony service and the number 2 represents the second remote call.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "make", "start": 53, "end": 57}, {"text": "invoke", "start": 120, "end": 126}], "entity": [{"text": "calls", "start": 58, "end": 63}, {"text": "the Javascript bridge", "start": 69, "end": 90}, {"text": "user consent", "start": 99, "end": 111}, {"text": "we", "start": 113, "end": 115}, {"text": "the telephony service", "start": 127, "end": 148}, {"text": "dial numbers directly via binder", "start": 152, "end": 184}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 64, "end": 68}, {"text": "without", "start": 91, "end": 98}, {"text": "to", "start": 149, "end": 151}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "s16 is the type marker represents'' 16 bit string,'' and packageName is the host app's package name, where we can obtain from the information posted from the ad libraries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The sequence number of the remote calls can be found in the corresponding Android Interface Definition Language (AIDL) files.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many other Android services can be invoked in the same way, including sending SMS As mentioned, it is more convenient to directly obtain the Android context via the Javascript bridge.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Code in Listing 4, for example, is an easy way to get context from anywhere of the application.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Operations like taking pictures and recording videos need to register Java callbacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers either need to boot a Java VM from the Javascript bridge, or to inject code into the host app's Java VM.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Fortunately, Android Runtime offers another way to load Java Native Interface (JNI) code into the host app using Runtime.load ().", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As shown in Listing 5, an attacker can load executables compiled from JNI code.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an attacker", "start": 23, "end": 34}, {"text": "executables compiled from JNI code", "start": 44, "end": 78}], "action": [{"text": "load", "start": 39, "end": 43}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once loaded, the code can obtain context as described in Listing 4, or call DexClassLoaderload to inject new classes from the attackers' DEX files to register callbacks to take pictures/ record videos.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the code", "start": 13, "end": 21}, {"text": "DexClassLoaderload", "start": 76, "end": 94}, {"text": "inject new classes from the attackers' DEX files to register callbacks to take pictures/ record videos", "start": 98, "end": 200}], "action": [{"text": "call", "start": 71, "end": 75}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 95, "end": 97}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There are other ways to obtain Android context, like reflecting to the private static context variable of WebView.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, without Java VM instances, it's difficult to take pictures and record videos.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After our submission to Black Hat in April 2014, we noticed that MWR was also concurrently and independently working on this issue.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They published a similar mechanism in June 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With the Android context, an attacker can monitor or tamper with the clipboard.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an attacker", "start": 26, "end": 37}, {"text": "the clipboard", "start": 65, "end": 78}], "action": [{"text": "monitor or tamper", "start": 42, "end": 59}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 60, "end": 64}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Android users may perform copy-paste on important text content.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, there are many popular password-management apps in Google Play, enabling the users to click-and-copy passwords and paste them into login forms.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Malicious apps can steal the passwords if they can read the contents on clipboard.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Malicious apps", "start": 0, "end": 14}, {"text": "the passwords", "start": 25, "end": 38}, {"text": "they can read the contents on clipboard", "start": 42, "end": 81}], "action": [{"text": "steal", "start": 19, "end": 24}], "modifier": [{"text": "if", "start": 39, "end": 41}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Android has no permissions restricting apps from accessing the global clipboard.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Any UID has the capability to manipulate clipboard via the API calls in Listing 6: Using these APIs, the attackers can monitor changes to a clipboard and transfer the clipboard contents to some remote server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 101, "end": 114}, {"text": "changes to a clipboard", "start": 127, "end": 149}, {"text": "the clipboard contents", "start": 163, "end": 185}, {"text": "some remote server", "start": 189, "end": 207}], "action": [{"text": "monitor", "start": 119, "end": 126}, {"text": "transfer", "start": 154, "end": 162}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 186, "end": 188}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They can also alter the clipboard content to achieve phishing goals.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "They", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "the clipboard content", "start": 20, "end": 41}, {"text": "achieve phishing goals", "start": 45, "end": 67}], "action": [{"text": "alter", "start": 14, "end": 19}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 42, "end": 44}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, the user may copy a link to visit and the background malicious service can change that link to a phishing site.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the background malicious service", "start": 51, "end": 83}, {"text": "that link", "start": 95, "end": 104}, {"text": "a phishing site", "start": 108, "end": 123}], "action": [{"text": "change", "start": 88, "end": 94}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 105, "end": 107}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have notified Google about this issue.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Android Open Source Project (AOSP) classifies Android permissions into several protec- tion levels:'' normal,'''' dangerous,'''' system,'''' signature'' and'' development'',,.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Dangerous permissions'' may be displayed to the user and require confirmation before pro- ceeding, or some other approach may be taken to avoid the user automatically allowing the use of such facilities.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' In contrast, normal permissions are automatically granted at installation,'' without asking for the user's explicit approval (though the user always has the option to review these permissions before installing)''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If an app requests both dangerous permissions and normal permissions, Android only displays the dangerous per- missions by default.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If an app requests only normal permissions, Android doesn't display any permission to the user.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have found that certain'' normal'' permissions have dangerous security impacts.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, the attackers can manipulate Android home screen icons using two normal permissions: launcher READ SETTINGS and WRITE SETTINGS permissions.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 13, "end": 26}, {"text": "Android home screen icons", "start": 42, "end": 67}, {"text": "two normal permissions: launcher READ SETTINGS and WRITE SETTINGS permissions", "start": 74, "end": 151}], "action": [{"text": "manipulate", "start": 31, "end": 41}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 68, "end": 73}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These two permissions enable an app to query, insert, delete, or modify all launcher configuration settings, including icon insertion or modification.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As a proof-of-concept attack scenario, a malicious app with these two permissions can query/insert/ alter the system icon settings and modify legitimate icons of some security- sensitive apps, such as banking apps, to a phishing website.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a malicious app with these two permissions", "start": 39, "end": 81}, {"text": "the system icon settings", "start": 106, "end": 130}, {"text": "legitimate icons of some security- sensitive apps, such as banking apps", "start": 142, "end": 213}, {"text": "a phishing website", "start": 218, "end": 236}], "action": [{"text": "query/insert/ alter", "start": 86, "end": 105}, {"text": "modify", "start": 135, "end": 141}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 215, "end": 217}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After our notification, Google has patched this vulnerability in Android 4.4.3 and has released the patch to its OEM partners.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, according to Google, by 7 July 2014, 17.9% Android devices are using Android 4.4.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Given that Android 4.4.2 and below has this vulnerability, over 82.1% Android devices are vulnerable.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With the CHANGE WIFI STATE permission, Android processes can change the proxy settings of WIFI networks (not solely the currently connected one).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To do this, the attacker can use the remote calls exposed by WifiManager to obtain the WifiConfiguration objects, then create new proxySettings to replace to a corresponding field.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Note that the proxySettings field is a private Java field not intended to be accessed by other processes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Unfortunately, the flexible and powerful Java reflection mechanism (especially the forName (), getField (), setAccessible () calls) exposes such components to the attackers for arbitrary read or write operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Android audio recording via the MediaRecorder APIs does not need user interaction or consent, which makes it easy to record sound in the background.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On the contrary, taking pictures and recording videos are more challenging.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "First, this requires registering Java callbacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Second, Android warns that'' Preview must be started before you can take a picture''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It seems that taking pictures and recording videos without user notification is impossible.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, security largely depends on the correct implementation and enforcing a flawless implementation is difficult.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On some of the popular phones (models anonymized for security consideration), startPreview () is required to take pictures/record videos; However, it's highly possible that on these devices takePicture () fails to check whether a view has been presented to the user.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Fortunately, we have never witnessed a case where the MediaRecorder can shoot videos without calling setPreviewDisplay.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "But we were able to create and register a dummy SurfaceView to the WindowManager, which made taking photos and videos possible even on devices that properly checked for an existing preview.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With both the GET ACCOUNTS and the USE CREDENTIALS permissions, Android pro- cesses can get secret tokens of services (e.g., Google services) from the AccountManager and use them to authenticate to these services.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "With", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "from", "start": 142, "end": 146}, {"text": "to", "start": 179, "end": 181}], "entity": [{"text": "both the GET ACCOUNTS and the USE CREDENTIALS permissions", "start": 5, "end": 62}, {"text": "Android pro- cesses", "start": 64, "end": 83}, {"text": "secret tokens of services (e.g., Google services)", "start": 92, "end": 141}, {"text": "the AccountManager", "start": 147, "end": 165}, {"text": "them", "start": 174, "end": 178}, {"text": "authenticate to these services", "start": 182, "end": 212}], "action": [{"text": "get", "start": 88, "end": 91}, {"text": "use", "start": 170, "end": 173}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We verified that Android apps with these two permissions can authenticate themselves with the user's Google account, allowing access to Google Play and the ability send app installation requests.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Android apps with these two permissions", "start": 17, "end": 56}, {"text": "themselves", "start": 74, "end": 84}, {"text": "the user's Google account", "start": 90, "end": 115}], "action": [{"text": "authenticate", "start": 61, "end": 73}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 85, "end": 89}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Through the Javascript bridge, attackers can install apps of choice (e.g., an attacker's phishing app) to any devices registered in user's account in the background without user consent.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "attackers", "start": 31, "end": 40}, {"text": "apps of choice (e.g., an attacker's phishing app)", "start": 53, "end": 102}, {"text": "any devices registered in user's account in the background", "start": 106, "end": 164}, {"text": "user consent", "start": 173, "end": 185}], "action": [{"text": "install", "start": 45, "end": 52}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 103, "end": 105}, {"text": "without", "start": 165, "end": 172}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Combined with the launcher modification attack introduced earlier, the attackers can redirect other app icons (e.g., bank or email app icons) to the phishing app and steal the user's login credentials.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 67, "end": 80}, {"text": "other app icons (e.g., bank or email app icons)", "start": 94, "end": 141}, {"text": "the phishing app", "start": 145, "end": 161}, {"text": "the user's login credentials", "start": 172, "end": 200}], "action": [{"text": "redirect", "start": 85, "end": 93}, {"text": "steal", "start": 166, "end": 171}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 142, "end": 144}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this section, we explain the risks of victims' devices being tracked and targeted through ad traffic.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "victims' devices", "start": 41, "end": 57}, {"text": "ad traffic", "start": 93, "end": 103}], "action": [{"text": "being tracked and targeted", "start": 58, "end": 84}], "modifier": [{"text": "through", "start": 85, "end": 92}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is well known that communication via HTTP is prone to hijacking and data tamper- ing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Though ad libraries may not have the incentive to abuse users' private and sensitive data, this is not the case with the attackers eavesdropping or hijacking the HTTP traffic.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attackers", "start": 117, "end": 130}, {"text": "the HTTP traffic", "start": 158, "end": 174}], "action": [{"text": "eavesdropping or hijacking", "start": 131, "end": 157}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Switching to HTTPS may not solve this issue since the HTTPS security relies on a flawless implementation, which is difficult.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, there are cases where the developer failed (intentionally or unintentionally) to check the server's certificate.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We found that some of the most popular ad libraries (see Table 3) have this issue.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We successfully launched Man-in-the- Middle (MITM) attacks and intercepted the data uploaded to the remote server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "We", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "Man-in-the- Middle (MITM) attacks", "start": 25, "end": 58}, {"text": "the data uploaded to the remote server", "start": 75, "end": 113}], "action": [{"text": "launched", "start": 16, "end": 24}, {"text": "intercepted", "start": 63, "end": 74}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Note that even if the ad libraries have a correct and rigorous implementation, the SSL library itself may contain serious vulnerabilities that can be exploited by MITM attacks,.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Almost every ad library uploads local information from Android devices.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Based on our observations, they do so mostly for purposes such as checking for platform compatibility and user interest targeting.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The information most frequently uploaded includes IMEI, Android version, manufacturer, Android ID, device specification, carrier information, host app information, installed app list, etc.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Table 3 lists the info uploaded from the top five popular ad libraries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Listing 7 is a captured packet posted to the remote ad server by one of the ad libraries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is captured from a popular Google Play app.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "From this packet we can tell the device's screen density (d-device-screen-density), screen size (d-device- screen-size), host app's pack- age name (u-appBId), host app's name (u-appDNM) 1, host app's version (u-appVer), user agent (h-user-agent), localization (d-localization), mobile network type (d-netType), screen orientation (d-orientation), and GPS location (u-latlong-accu).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The most important infor- mation is the GPS location, where the victim's latitude, longitude and the location precision are shown.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is reasonable for an ad to obtain this information to improve the ad-serving experience.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, with this information, an attacker can precisely locate the victim and acquire the device's specifications.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an attacker", "start": 32, "end": 43}, {"text": "the victim", "start": 65, "end": 75}, {"text": "the device's specifications", "start": 88, "end": 115}], "action": [{"text": "locate", "start": 58, "end": 64}, {"text": "acquire", "start": 80, "end": 87}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To locate victims effectively, an attacker needs to monitor large-scale network traffic containing such private information.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Unfortunately, several well-known attacks can be used to achieve large-scale monitoring, including DNS hijacking, BGP hijacking, and ARP hijacking in IDC.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "several well-known attacks", "start": 15, "end": 41}, {"text": "large-scale monitoring", "start": 65, "end": 87}], "action": [{"text": "achieve", "start": 57, "end": 64}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this context, DNS hijacking is done to subvert the resolution of Domain Name System (DNS) queries through modifying the behavior of DNS servers so that they serve fake DNS information.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "DNS hijacking", "start": 17, "end": 30}, {"text": "the resolution of Domain Name System (DNS) queries", "start": 50, "end": 100}, {"text": "modifying the behavior of DNS servers so that they serve fake DNS information", "start": 109, "end": 186}], "action": [{"text": "subvert", "start": 42, "end": 49}], "modifier": [{"text": "through", "start": 101, "end": 108}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "DNS hijacking is legally and maliciously used in many situations including traffic management, phishing and censorship.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Attackers successfully compromised many DNS servers, including the ones from Google and Godaddy.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Attackers", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "many DNS servers, including the ones from Google and Godaddy", "start": 35, "end": 95}], "action": [{"text": "compromised", "start": 23, "end": 34}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By DNS hijacking, attackers can effectively access all the traffic to ad servers.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "By", "start": 0, "end": 2}], "entity": [{"text": "DNS hijacking", "start": 3, "end": 16}, {"text": "attackers", "start": 18, "end": 27}, {"text": "all the traffic to ad servers", "start": 51, "end": 80}], "action": [{"text": "access", "start": 44, "end": 50}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "BGP hijacking takes over groups of IP addresses, corrupting Internet routing tables by breaking BGP sessions or injecting fake BGP information.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "BGP hijacking", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "groups of IP addresses", "start": 25, "end": 47}, {"text": "Internet routing tables", "start": 60, "end": 83}, {"text": "breaking BGP sessions or injecting fake BGP information", "start": 87, "end": 142}], "action": [{"text": "takes over", "start": 14, "end": 24}, {"text": "corrupting", "start": 49, "end": 59}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 84, "end": 86}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This enables attackers to monitor all traffic to specific IPs.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "attackers", "start": 13, "end": 22}, {"text": "all traffic to specific IPs", "start": 34, "end": 61}], "action": [{"text": "monitor", "start": 26, "end": 33}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Historically, there were many BGP hijacking attacks that affected YouTube, DNS root servers, Yahoo, and many other important Internet services.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "ARP hijacking (or spoofing) in IDC is done to hijack the traffic to the ad server in the IDC where the ad server locates through fake ARP packets.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "ARP hijacking (or spoofing) in IDC", "start": 0, "end": 34}, {"text": "the traffic to the ad server in the IDC where the ad server locates through fake ARP packets", "start": 53, "end": 145}], "action": [{"text": "hijack", "start": 46, "end": 52}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Attackers may rent servers close to the target servers, and use fake ARP packets to direct all the traffic to go through the hijacking servers first for monitoring and hijacking.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Attackers", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "fake ARP packets", "start": 64, "end": 80}, {"text": "direct all the traffic to go through the hijacking servers first for monitoring and hijacking", "start": 84, "end": 177}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 60, "end": 63}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 81, "end": 83}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "ARP hijacking is a well-known approach used in network attacks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "ARP hijacking", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "a well-known approach used in network attacks", "start": 17, "end": 62}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 14, "end": 16}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Using the large-scale traffic intercepted from the above methods, attackers can iden- tify potential victims based on information leakage such as GPS location described in Sec- tion 4.2.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "Using", "start": 0, "end": 5}, {"text": "based on", "start": 109, "end": 117}], "entity": [{"text": "the large-scale traffic intercepted from the above methods", "start": 6, "end": 64}, {"text": "attackers", "start": 66, "end": 75}, {"text": "potential victims", "start": 91, "end": 108}, {"text": "information leakage such as GPS location described in Sec- tion 4.2", "start": 118, "end": 185}], "action": [{"text": "iden- tify", "start": 80, "end": 90}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After that, they can inject exploits only into the targeted traffic to launch further attacks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "they", "start": 12, "end": 16}, {"text": "exploits", "start": 28, "end": 36}, {"text": "the targeted traffic", "start": 47, "end": 67}, {"text": "launch further attacks", "start": 71, "end": 93}], "action": [{"text": "inject", "start": 21, "end": 27}], "modifier": [{"text": "only into", "start": 37, "end": 46}, {"text": "to", "start": 68, "end": 70}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Attackers keep a low profile by allowing all other irrelevant network traffic to pass without being modified.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Attackers", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "a low profile", "start": 15, "end": 28}, {"text": "allowing all other irrelevant network traffic to pass without being modified", "start": 32, "end": 108}], "action": [{"text": "keep", "start": 10, "end": 14}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 29, "end": 31}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We used the FireEye Mobile Threat Prevention (MTP) engine to analyze all of the ~73,000 popular apps from Google Play with more than 50,000 downloads, and identified 93 ad libraries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The detailed ad library inclusion statistics are shown in Figure 4.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Seventy-one% of the apps contain at least one ad library, 35% have at least two ad libraries, and 22.25% include at least three ad libraries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The largest ad inclusion number is 35.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Since Google is cautious about the security of the products it directly controls, we exclude Google Ad from the following discussion.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For security considerations, in this paper we anonymize the names of the other 92 ad libraries, using Ad1, Ad2, ...", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ", Ad92 to refer to them, where the subscripts represent the rankings of how many apps include the ad libraries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The top five popular ad libraries' inclusion and download statistics are listed in Table 2.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We analyzed the 92 ad libraries found in the popular Google Play apps, and summa- rized the communication channel vulnerabilities in Table 3.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Combined with the uploaded information column we can learn about the data the attackers can obtain.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Fifty-seven of the 92 ad libraries in the popular Google Play apps have the JBOH issue.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Specifically, four of the top five ad libraries are subject to this problem (shown in Table 2).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Seven of the 92 ad libraries are prone to DLOH attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Particularly, some versions of Ad5 in Table 3 have this problem.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The affected Google Play apps number and the accumulated download counts are listed in Table 4.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the current golden age of Android ad libraries, Sidewinder Targeted Attacks can target victims using info leakage and other vulnerabilities of ad libraries to get valuable, sensitive information.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Sidewinder Targeted Attacks", "start": 51, "end": 78}, {"text": "victims", "start": 90, "end": 97}, {"text": "info leakage and other vulnerabilities of ad libraries", "start": 104, "end": 158}, {"text": "get valuable, sensitive information", "start": 162, "end": 197}], "action": [{"text": "target", "start": 83, "end": 89}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 98, "end": 103}, {"text": "to", "start": 159, "end": 161}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Millions of users are still under the threat of Sidewinder Targeted Attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "First we need to improve the security and privacy protection of ad libraries.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, we encourage ad libraries' publishers to use HTTPS with proper SSL certificate validation, and to properly encrypt network traffic.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They also need to be cautious about which privileged interfaces are exposed to the ad providers, in case of malicious ads or attackers hijacking the communication channels.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "malicious ads or attackers", "start": 108, "end": 134}, {"text": "the communication channels", "start": 145, "end": 171}], "action": [{"text": "hijacking", "start": 135, "end": 144}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Meanwhile, Google itself needs to further harden the security framework.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This may prove difficult because: 1.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Android is a complex system.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Any sub- component's vulnerability may impact the security of the whole system.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Fragmentation makes the situation even more challenging.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "2.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The trade-off between usability, performance and security always matters, and market demand frequently dictates that security comes last.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many Android developers do not even understand how to program securely (as shown in the JBOH issue).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "3.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many security patches are not back-ported to old versions of Android (like the launcher settings problem described earlier), even though older versions are widely used.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "4.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There is always information asymmetry in the development chain.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, it usually takes several months for vendors to apply security patches after Google releases them.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Albeit challenging, we hope that this work can kickstart a conversation, both on improved security and privacy protection in third-party libraries and on a hardened Android security framework.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "FireEye has invented a purpose-built, virtual machine-based security platform that provides real-time threat protection to enterprises and governments worldwide against the next generation of cyber attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These highly sophisticated cyber attacks easily circumvent traditional signature-based defenses, such as next-generation firewalls, IPS, anti-virus, and gateways.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The FireEye Threat Prevention Platform provides real-time, dynamic threat protection without the use of signatures to protect an organization across the primary threat vectors and across the different stages of an attack life cycle.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The core of the FireEye platform is a virtual execution engine, complemented by dynamic threat intelligence, to identify and block cyber attacks in real time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "FireEye has over 1,900 customers across more than 60 countries, including over 130 of the Fortune 500.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A few days ago we detected a watering hole campaign in a website owned by one big industrial company.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The website is related to software used for simulation and system engineering in a wide range of industries, including automotive, aerospace, and manufacturing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attackers were able to compromise the website and include code that loaded a malicious Javascript file from a remote server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attackers", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "the website", "start": 38, "end": 49}, {"text": "code", "start": 62, "end": 66}, {"text": "a malicious Javascript file", "start": 79, "end": 106}, {"text": "a remote server", "start": 112, "end": 127}], "action": [{"text": "compromise", "start": 27, "end": 37}, {"text": "loaded", "start": 72, "end": 78}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 107, "end": 111}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This Javascript file is a framework for reconnaissance that the attackers call'' Scanbox'' and includes some of the techniques we described in a previous blog post: The Scanbox framework first configures the remote C & C server that it will use and collects a small amount of information about the victim that is visiting the compromised website including: Resulting in something like this: Before sending the information to the C & C server, Scanbox encodes and encrypts the data with the following function: Producing the following request: If we decrypt the data it translates to: After the first request, the framework contains several plugins to extract different information from the victim.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This Javascript file", "start": 0, "end": 20}, {"text": "a framework for reconnaissance", "start": 24, "end": 54}, {"text": "The Scanbox framework", "start": 165, "end": 186}, {"text": "the remote C & C server that it will use", "start": 204, "end": 244}, {"text": "a small amount of information", "start": 258, "end": 287}, {"text": "the victim that is visiting the compromised website", "start": 294, "end": 345}, {"text": "the information", "start": 406, "end": 421}, {"text": "the C & C server", "start": 425, "end": 441}, {"text": "Scanbox", "start": 443, "end": 450}, {"text": "the data", "start": 472, "end": 480}, {"text": "the following function", "start": 486, "end": 508}, {"text": "the framework", "start": 609, "end": 622}, {"text": "different information", "start": 659, "end": 680}, {"text": "the victim", "start": 686, "end": 696}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 21, "end": 23}, {"text": "configures", "start": 193, "end": 203}, {"text": "collects", "start": 249, "end": 257}, {"text": "sending", "start": 398, "end": 405}, {"text": "encodes", "start": 451, "end": 458}, {"text": "encrypts", "start": 463, "end": 471}, {"text": "extract", "start": 651, "end": 658}], "modifier": [{"text": "about", "start": 288, "end": 293}, {"text": "to", "start": 422, "end": 424}, {"text": "with", "start": 481, "end": 485}, {"text": "from", "start": 681, "end": 685}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While the user is browsing the compromised website, all keystrokes are being recorded and sent to the C & C periodically.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "all keystrokes", "start": 52, "end": 66}, {"text": "the C & C", "start": 98, "end": 107}, {"text": "periodically", "start": 108, "end": 120}], "action": [{"text": "being recorded", "start": 71, "end": 85}, {"text": "sent", "start": 90, "end": 94}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 95, "end": 97}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It will also send keystrokes when the user submits web forms that can potentially include passwords and other sensitive data.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "keystrokes", "start": 18, "end": 28}, {"text": "the user submits web forms that can potentially include passwords and other sensitive data", "start": 34, "end": 124}], "action": [{"text": "send", "start": 13, "end": 17}], "modifier": [{"text": "when", "start": 29, "end": 33}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As we have seen, this is a very powerful framework that gives attackers a lot of insight into the potential targets that will help them launching future attacks against them.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have also seen several Metasploit-produced exploits that target different versions of Java in the same IP address that hosts the Scanbox framework (122.10.9 [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] 109).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We recommend you look for this type of activity against the following machines in your network:", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In late December 2011, CrowdStrike, Inc. received three binary executable files that were suspected of having been involved in a sophisticted attack against a large Fortune 500 company.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The files were analyzed to understand first if they were in fact malicious, and the level of sophistication of the samples.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The samples were clearly malicious and varied in sophistication.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All three samples provided remote access to the attacker, via two Command and Control (C2) servers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "All three samples", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "remote access", "start": 27, "end": 40}, {"text": "the attacker", "start": 44, "end": 56}, {"text": "two Command and Control (C2) servers", "start": 62, "end": 98}], "action": [{"text": "provided", "start": 18, "end": 26}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 41, "end": 43}, {"text": "via", "start": 58, "end": 61}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One sample is typical of what is commonly referred to as a'dropper' because its primary purpose is to write a malicious component to disk and connect it to the targeted hosts operating system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "One sample", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "a malicious component", "start": 108, "end": 129}, {"text": "disk", "start": 133, "end": 137}], "action": [{"text": "write", "start": 102, "end": 107}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 130, "end": 132}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malicious component in this case is what is commonly referred to as a Remote Access Tool (RAT), this RAT is manifested as a Dynamic Link Library (DLL) installed as a service.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a Dynamic Link Library (DLL)", "start": 126, "end": 154}, {"text": "a service", "start": 168, "end": 177}], "action": [{"text": "installed", "start": 155, "end": 164}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 165, "end": 167}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The second sample analyzed is a dual use tool that can function both as a post exploitation tool used to infect other systems, download additional tools, remove log data, and itself be used as a backdoor.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a post exploitation tool", "start": 72, "end": 96}, {"text": "other systems", "start": 112, "end": 125}, {"text": "additional tools", "start": 136, "end": 152}, {"text": "log data", "start": 161, "end": 169}, {"text": "itself", "start": 175, "end": 181}, {"text": "a backdoor", "start": 193, "end": 203}], "action": [{"text": "infect", "start": 105, "end": 111}, {"text": "download", "start": 127, "end": 135}, {"text": "remove", "start": 154, "end": 160}, {"text": "be used", "start": 182, "end": 189}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 190, "end": 192}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The third sample was a sophisticated implant that in addition to having multiple communication capabilities, and the ability to act as a relay for other infected hosts, utilized a kernel mode driver that can hide aspects of the tool from user-mode tools.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The third sample", "start": 0, "end": 16}, {"text": "multiple communication capabilities", "start": 72, "end": 107}, {"text": "a relay for other infected hosts", "start": 135, "end": 167}, {"text": "a kernel mode driver", "start": 178, "end": 198}, {"text": "aspects of the tool", "start": 213, "end": 232}, {"text": "user-mode tools", "start": 238, "end": 253}], "action": [{"text": "having", "start": 65, "end": 71}, {"text": "act", "start": 128, "end": 131}, {"text": "utilized", "start": 169, "end": 177}, {"text": "hide", "start": 208, "end": 212}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 132, "end": 134}, {"text": "from", "start": 233, "end": 237}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This third component is likely used for long-term implantation and intelligence gathering.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This third component", "start": 0, "end": 20}, {"text": "intelligence gathering", "start": 67, "end": 89}], "action": [{"text": "is likely used", "start": 21, "end": 35}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 36, "end": 39}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some AV engines occasionally identify this sample as Derusbi Trojan.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CrowdStrike Intelligence Team has seen Trojans from 8 different builder variants of this RAT, including 64-bit versions, used in targeted attacks in 2011 against Defense, Energy/Power, and Chemical Industries in US and Japan.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All of these samples reflect common toolmarks and tradecraft consistent with Chinese based actors who target various strategic interests of the United States including High Tech/Heavy Industry, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), State/Federal Government, Defense Industrial Base (DIB), and organizations with vast economic interests.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This report contains an in-depth technical analysis of the samples, detection/remediation/mitigation information, attribution intelligence, and a conclusion aimed at providing the reader with a synopsis of the report.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The executable 14c04f88dc97aef3e9b516ef208a2bf5 is commonly referred to as a'dropper', which is designed with the purpose of extracting from itself a malicious payload and to initialize and install it into a targeted system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The executable 14c04f88dc97aef3e9b516ef208a2bf5", "start": 0, "end": 47}, {"text": "itself", "start": 141, "end": 147}, {"text": "a malicious payload", "start": 148, "end": 167}, {"text": "it", "start": 198, "end": 200}, {"text": "a targeted system", "start": 206, "end": 223}], "action": [{"text": "extracting", "start": 125, "end": 135}, {"text": "initialize and install", "start": 175, "end": 197}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 136, "end": 140}, {"text": "into", "start": 201, "end": 205}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this case, the malicious payload is a Dynamic-Link Library (DLL), which enables an attacker to have full control of the system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malicious payload", "start": 14, "end": 35}, {"text": "an attacker", "start": 83, "end": 94}, {"text": "have full control of the system", "start": 98, "end": 129}], "action": [{"text": "enables", "start": 75, "end": 82}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 95, "end": 97}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This code appears to have been compiled on Wednesday May 4th, 2011 at 11:04:24 A.M. UTC (equivalent to early evening time in China).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Note that the timestamp is in UTC, however the relative time of day in China is provided for the benefit of the reader.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The sample first resolves several library functions provided by Microsoft using the LoadLibrary () and GetProcAddress () Application Programming Interfaces (APIs).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The sample", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "several library functions provided by Microsoft", "start": 26, "end": 73}, {"text": "the LoadLibrary () and GetProcAddress () Application Programming Interfaces (APIs)", "start": 80, "end": 162}], "action": [{"text": "resolves", "start": 17, "end": 25}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 74, "end": 79}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The imported function names are not encrypted; however, the function name is minutely obfuscated by a simple single character substitution: The dropper invokes the SHGetSpecialFolderPath () API supplying a Constant Special Item ID List (CSIDL) of'CSIDLCOMMONDOCUMENTS' to identify the destination folder for the malicious DLL payload.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The dropper", "start": 140, "end": 151}, {"text": "the SHGetSpecialFolderPath () API", "start": 160, "end": 193}], "action": [{"text": "invokes", "start": 152, "end": 159}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The CSIDL in this case pints to:'' The file system directory that contains documents that are common to all users.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A typical path is C: \\Documents and Settings\\All Users\\Documents.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' The dropper attempts to write the malicious payload to one of the following names, using the first available name in this set: The dropper sets the creation and last written timestamp of the newly created file to the date 2007-03-07 00:00:00; this allows the newly created malicious DLL to blend in with other system files.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The dropper", "start": 3, "end": 14}, {"text": "the malicious payload", "start": 33, "end": 54}, {"text": "one of the following names", "start": 58, "end": 84}, {"text": "the first available name in this set", "start": 92, "end": 128}, {"text": "The dropper", "start": 130, "end": 141}, {"text": "the creation and last written timestamp of the newly created file", "start": 147, "end": 212}, {"text": "the date 2007-03-07 00:00:00", "start": 216, "end": 244}, {"text": "the newly created malicious DLL", "start": 258, "end": 289}, {"text": "other system files", "start": 307, "end": 325}], "action": [{"text": "write", "start": 27, "end": 32}, {"text": "sets", "start": 142, "end": 146}, {"text": "blend in", "start": 293, "end": 301}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 55, "end": 57}, {"text": "using", "start": 86, "end": 91}, {"text": "to", "start": 213, "end": 215}, {"text": "with", "start": 302, "end": 306}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is meant to prevent identification during disk forensics using a common investigative technique called a forensic analysis timeline.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "identification", "start": 25, "end": 39}, {"text": "disk forensics", "start": 47, "end": 61}], "action": [{"text": "prevent", "start": 17, "end": 24}], "modifier": [{"text": "during", "start": 40, "end": 46}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This date is specified in the dropper code and does not change across multiple infections.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malicious DLL file that is dropped is hidden in a resource of the dropper binary.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malicious DLL file that is dropped", "start": 0, "end": 38}, {"text": "a resource of the dropper binary", "start": 52, "end": 84}], "action": [{"text": "is hidden", "start": 39, "end": 48}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 49, "end": 51}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is a relatively common technique used by malware dropper files to optimize the number of files required to infect a machine.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The resource language of the malicious DLL is set to'' Chinese (Simplified)'', this is a compiler artifact which indicates the language setting on the compiler used by the person who built the binary was set to'' Chinese (Simplified)'' at the time the dropper was compiled.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The'MZ' header which denotes a binary executable file of the dropped DLL is initially obfuscated.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When the dropper writes the file to disk, the first byte of the file is'Z' which prevents the file from executing or being detected as an executable by many defensive tools.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the dropper", "start": 5, "end": 16}, {"text": "the file", "start": 24, "end": 32}, {"text": "disk", "start": 36, "end": 40}, {"text": "the first byte of the file is'Z'", "start": 42, "end": 74}, {"text": "the file", "start": 90, "end": 98}, {"text": "being detected as an executable by many defensive tools", "start": 117, "end": 172}], "action": [{"text": "writes", "start": 17, "end": 23}, {"text": "prevents", "start": 81, "end": 89}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 33, "end": 35}, {"text": "from", "start": 99, "end": 103}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The dropper subsequently opens the dropped file and corrects the header by writing the'M' over the first byte, allowing the file to be executed.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The dropper", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "the dropped file", "start": 31, "end": 47}, {"text": "the header", "start": 61, "end": 71}, {"text": "writing the'M' over the first byte", "start": 75, "end": 109}], "action": [{"text": "opens", "start": 25, "end": 30}, {"text": "corrects", "start": 52, "end": 60}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 72, "end": 74}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A subroutine to decompress the dropped file is present as'dead code' (code that is not used) in the binary.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This subroutine will be invoked on the already closed file handle of the dropped file in the present code version.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Since the dropped resource is not compressed, the routine fails.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This indicates a low sophistication modification to the original dropper code to make it work with an uncompressed source.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The final step the dropper performs is to load the dropped DLL into its own process space; it then resolves the export'OpenINFOPerformanceData' from the DLL and invokes it with the dropped DLL's filename as parameter.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the dropper", "start": 15, "end": 26}, {"text": "the dropped DLL", "start": 47, "end": 62}, {"text": "its own process space", "start": 68, "end": 89}], "action": [{"text": "load", "start": 42, "end": 46}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 63, "end": 67}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This export then implements the actual install logic to maintain persistence and invoke the main routine.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This export", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "the actual install logic", "start": 28, "end": 52}, {"text": "maintain persistence", "start": 56, "end": 76}], "action": [{"text": "implements", "start": 17, "end": 27}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 53, "end": 55}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The dropper binary contains an icon resource that resembles the'Google Chrome' browser icon, the re- source language is set to'' Chinese (Simplified)'', which is consistent with the builder of the tool systems language set to Chinese.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The use of the Chrome icon may indicate a possible attempt to socially engineer the intended victim into thinking the dropper was a legitimate file associated with Google.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The use of the Chrome icon", "start": 0, "end": 26}, {"text": "the intended victim", "start": 80, "end": 99}, {"text": "thinking the dropper was a legitimate file associated with Google", "start": 105, "end": 170}], "action": [{"text": "socially engineer", "start": 62, "end": 79}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 100, "end": 104}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This sample is a'backdoor' which is the DLL dropped by the dropper sample file with an MD5 of 14c04f88dc97aef3e9b516ef208a2bf5.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This sample", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "a'backdoor'", "start": 15, "end": 26}, {"text": "the DLL", "start": 36, "end": 43}, {"text": "the dropper sample file", "start": 55, "end": 78}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 12, "end": 14}, {"text": "dropped", "start": 44, "end": 51}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This code appears to have been compiled on Wednesday May 4th, 2011 at 10:48:19 A.M. UTC (equivalent to early evening time in China).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is instantiated when it is mapped into the process space of its dropped file, and its' export named'OpenINFOPerformanceData' is called.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 24, "end": 26}, {"text": "the process space of its dropped file", "start": 42, "end": 79}], "action": [{"text": "is mapped", "start": 27, "end": 36}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 37, "end": 41}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This export first attempts to stop a service called'' msupdate'', which is not a known Microsoft Windows service despite the appearance.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the service is present, the malware replaces its previous instances or versions of this backdoor.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 27, "end": 38}, {"text": "its previous instances or versions of this backdoor", "start": 48, "end": 99}], "action": [{"text": "replaces", "start": 39, "end": 47}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After attempting to disable the existing service, the malware tries to install itself as a service with that same name.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 50, "end": 61}, {"text": "itself", "start": 79, "end": 85}, {"text": "a service with that same name", "start": 89, "end": 118}], "action": [{"text": "install", "start": 71, "end": 78}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 86, "end": 88}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During installation, the sample attempts to use documented APIs such as OpenSCManager () and CreateService () to initialize itself as a persistent Windows service.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the sample", "start": 21, "end": 31}, {"text": "documented APIs such as OpenSCManager () and CreateService ()", "start": 48, "end": 109}, {"text": "initialize itself as a persistent Windows service", "start": 113, "end": 162}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 44, "end": 47}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 110, "end": 112}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As a precaution, the sample writes settings directly to the Windows Registry to accomplish the same goal if installing the service with the documented APIs fails.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the sample", "start": 17, "end": 27}, {"text": "settings", "start": 35, "end": 43}, {"text": "the Windows Registry", "start": 56, "end": 76}], "action": [{"text": "writes", "start": 28, "end": 34}], "modifier": [{"text": "directly to", "start": 44, "end": 55}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The registry change creates the following key: Following this, the subroutine will set the value of the'ServiceDLL' to the module handle of the DLL.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The registry change", "start": 0, "end": 19}, {"text": "the following key", "start": 28, "end": 45}, {"text": "the subroutine", "start": 63, "end": 77}, {"text": "the value of the'ServiceDLL'", "start": 87, "end": 115}, {"text": "the module handle of the DLL", "start": 119, "end": 147}], "action": [{"text": "creates", "start": 20, "end": 27}, {"text": "set", "start": 83, "end": 86}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 116, "end": 118}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The next key to be changed is: HKEYLOCALMACHINE\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Svchost, which will have the'msupdate' key set to'msupdate'.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The next key", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "the'msupdate' key", "start": 123, "end": 140}, {"text": "'msupdate'", "start": 147, "end": 157}], "action": [{"text": "be changed", "start": 16, "end": 26}, {"text": "set", "start": 141, "end": 144}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 145, "end": 147}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The export'CollectW3PerfData' is registered as the main function of the DLL.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The export'CollectW3PerfData'", "start": 0, "end": 29}, {"text": "the main function of the DLL", "start": 47, "end": 75}], "action": [{"text": "is registered", "start": 30, "end": 43}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 44, "end": 46}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the installation of the new service is successful, the sample then starts the new service and exits.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the sample", "start": 54, "end": 64}, {"text": "the new service", "start": 77, "end": 92}], "action": [{"text": "starts", "start": 70, "end": 76}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the installation fails, the sample spawns a new process using rundll32.exe, this executable will instantiate the DLL and can call a specific exported function.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the sample", "start": 27, "end": 37}, {"text": "a new process", "start": 45, "end": 58}, {"text": "rundll32.exe", "start": 65, "end": 77}], "action": [{"text": "spawns", "start": 38, "end": 44}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 59, "end": 64}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the case of installation failure, rundll32.exe calls the main functions export'CollectW3PerfData'.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The rundll32.exe is instantiated with a new NULL Security Identifier (SID) (S-1-0-0) with permissions set to grant all access to the file.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "permissions", "start": 90, "end": 101}, {"text": "grant all access to the file", "start": 109, "end": 137}], "action": [{"text": "set", "start": 102, "end": 105}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 106, "end": 108}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This allows any user to have complete control over the machine, as rundll32.exe is frequently launched by tasks such as changing the time, wallpaper, or other system settings.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "any user", "start": 12, "end": 20}, {"text": "have complete control over the machine", "start": 24, "end": 62}], "action": [{"text": "allows", "start": 5, "end": 11}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 21, "end": 23}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This means that after cleaning up the components dropped by the malware, the system remains vulnerable to local attacks by simply overwriting the legitimate rundll32.exe executable with a malicious version and await it's automatic execution by the Operating System.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "cleaning up", "start": 22, "end": 33}, {"text": "remains", "start": 84, "end": 91}], "entity": [{"text": "the components dropped by the malware", "start": 34, "end": 71}, {"text": "the system", "start": 73, "end": 83}, {"text": "vulnerable to local attacks", "start": 92, "end": 119}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The main entry point to the DLL is named'CollectW3PerfData', as it first creates and displays a fake Window with class'' NOD32% d'' where% d is replaced with a pseudo-random number.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This may be an attempt to fool some automated dynamic analysis or anti-malware software into believing this is the legitimate ESET AV software.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "fool", "start": 26, "end": 30}], "entity": [{"text": "some automated dynamic analysis or anti-malware software", "start": 31, "end": 87}, {"text": "believing this is the legitimate ESET AV software", "start": 93, "end": 142}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 88, "end": 92}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The window is however not visible and implements no specific functionality.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After creating this window, the routine starts the main thread that eventually initiates calling out to the Command and Control (C2).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the routine", "start": 28, "end": 39}, {"text": "calling out to the Command and Control (C2)", "start": 89, "end": 132}], "action": [{"text": "initiates", "start": 79, "end": 88}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In order to accomplish this task, the newly created thread initializes networking APIs using WSAStartup () and resolves some other APIs dynamically using LoadLibrary () and GetProcAddress ().", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once the proper API's have been resolved, the sample then assigns a NULL SID to the rundll32.exe executable and sets the current process' Window Station to'' winsta0'', which enables the sample to access the real user's desktop if started as service.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the sample", "start": 183, "end": 193}, {"text": "the real user's desktop", "start": 204, "end": 227}, {"text": "started as service", "start": 231, "end": 249}], "action": [{"text": "access", "start": 197, "end": 203}], "modifier": [{"text": "if", "start": 228, "end": 230}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The communication to the C2 is handled by a while () loop, with each successive connection attempt causing the loop to invoke the Windows Sleep () API for a time interval of 2 seconds, exponentially increasing in length up to 1024 seconds (17 minutes) and then restarting back to 2 seconds.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The communication to the C2", "start": 0, "end": 27}, {"text": "a while () loop", "start": 42, "end": 57}], "action": [{"text": "is handled", "start": 28, "end": 38}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 39, "end": 41}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The C2 location in this sample is statically defined as 1.9.5.38:443 (Malaysia: Tmnet, Telekom Malaysia Bhd).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While ther is'dead code' that will download the C2 location from an HTTP URL that could be defined in the binary, using the User-Agent string'' Google'', this code is not activated due to the format of the stat- ically defined C2 location using an IP address.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Thus the sample will only attempt to connect directly using a raw socket to the C2 located at 1.9.5.38:443.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the sample", "start": 5, "end": 15}, {"text": "a raw socket", "start": 60, "end": 72}, {"text": "the C2 located at 1.9.5.38:443", "start": 76, "end": 106}], "action": [{"text": "connect", "start": 37, "end": 44}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 54, "end": 59}, {"text": "to", "start": 73, "end": 75}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This indicates the use of a'boiler plate code' or a builder software package that automates the creation of the malicious sample.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malicious sample sends an initial beacon to the C2 that includes the following information: The beacon is encrypted using an XOR/ADD loop using the statically defined key 0x1C and sent to the C2.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malicious sample", "start": 0, "end": 20}, {"text": "an initial beacon", "start": 27, "end": 44}, {"text": "the C2", "start": 48, "end": 54}, {"text": "The beacon", "start": 96, "end": 106}, {"text": "an XOR/ADD loop using the statically defined key 0x1C", "start": 126, "end": 179}, {"text": "the C2", "start": 192, "end": 198}], "action": [{"text": "sends", "start": 21, "end": 26}, {"text": "is encrypted", "start": 107, "end": 119}, {"text": "sent", "start": 184, "end": 188}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 45, "end": 47}, {"text": "using", "start": 120, "end": 125}, {"text": "to", "start": 189, "end": 191}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following python function can be used to decode the beacon stings: After sending the initial beacon, the routine loops receiving incoming commands and executes them in sequence.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "sending", "start": 77, "end": 84}, {"text": "receiving", "start": 123, "end": 132}, {"text": "executes", "start": 155, "end": 163}], "entity": [{"text": "the initial beacon", "start": 85, "end": 103}, {"text": "the routine", "start": 105, "end": 116}, {"text": "incoming commands", "start": 133, "end": 150}, {"text": "them", "start": 164, "end": 168}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When a connection can successfully be established to the C2 server, the sleep timer is reset to two seconds for the next attempt.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The network protocol used by this sample resembles a'Type-Length-Value' layout in both directions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Each 16 byte request header consists of: Zero or more of specified bytes of additional payload then follows the header.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This inbound payload is received unconditionally and regardless of command type into a fixed-size stack buffer of 408 bytes size.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This inbound payload", "start": 0, "end": 20}], "action": [{"text": "is received", "start": 21, "end": 32}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Providing additional payload of any larger size will result in a trivial exploitable stack buffer overflow that allows arbitrary code execution due to the absence of any security features.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, exploitation of this vulnerability is unnecessary due to the already available unauthenticated command execution capabilities of this backdoor.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Certain commands initiate a second connection to the C2 in a separate thread using the same network protocol but providing a different request command identifier than for the initial beacon.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The primary aim of this backdoor is remote desktop control functionality comparable to VNC or Remote Desktop over a custom protocol.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The primary aim of this backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 32}, {"text": "remote desktop control functionality comparable to VNC or Remote Desktop over a custom protocol", "start": 36, "end": 131}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 33, "end": 35}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It allows the adversary to view the main desktop graphically and control the keyboard and mouse.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the adversary", "start": 10, "end": 23}, {"text": "the main desktop", "start": 32, "end": 48}, {"text": "graphically", "start": 49, "end": 60}, {"text": "the keyboard", "start": 73, "end": 85}, {"text": "mouse", "start": 90, "end": 95}], "action": [{"text": "view", "start": 27, "end": 31}, {"text": "control", "start": 65, "end": 72}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This remote control functionality is implemented as separate messages for mouse clicks, pressed keys, etc.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This remote control functionality", "start": 0, "end": 33}, {"text": "separate messages for mouse clicks, pressed keys, etc.", "start": 52, "end": 106}], "action": [{"text": "is implemented", "start": 34, "end": 48}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 49, "end": 51}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "using command identifiers 0x20000002 to 0x20000019.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 0, "end": 5}], "entity": [{"text": "command identifiers 0x20000002 to 0x20000019", "start": 6, "end": 50}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The command 0x22000001 initiates continuous transmission of screen captures to the C2.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The command 0x22000001", "start": 0, "end": 22}, {"text": "continuous transmission of screen captures to the C2", "start": 33, "end": 85}], "action": [{"text": "initiates", "start": 23, "end": 32}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The screen captures are created using a series of Microsoft Windows Graphic Device Interface (GDI) API calls culminating in a call to GetDIBits ().", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The screen captures", "start": 0, "end": 19}, {"text": "a series of Microsoft Windows Graphic Device Interface (GDI) API calls culminating in a call to GetDIBits ()", "start": 38, "end": 146}], "action": [{"text": "are created", "start": 20, "end": 31}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 32, "end": 37}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Command 0x20000001 exits the backdoor and 0x20000000 is issued to completely remove the backdoor from the system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "0x20000000", "start": 42, "end": 52}, {"text": "the backdoor", "start": 84, "end": 96}, {"text": "the system", "start": 102, "end": 112}], "action": [{"text": "remove", "start": 77, "end": 83}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 97, "end": 101}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When command 0x23000004 is received, a temporary new user'' DomainUser'' with password'' Dom4! nU- serP4ss'' is created and added to the local Administrators group.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a temporary new user'' DomainUser'' with password'' Dom4! nU- serP4ss''", "start": 37, "end": 108}, {"text": "the local Administrators group", "start": 133, "end": 163}], "action": [{"text": "is created", "start": 109, "end": 119}, {"text": "added", "start": 124, "end": 129}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 130, "end": 132}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The backdoor is then started under that account and the user is deleted.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "that account", "start": 35, "end": 47}, {"text": "the user", "start": 52, "end": 60}], "action": [{"text": "is then started", "start": 13, "end": 28}, {"text": "is deleted", "start": 61, "end": 71}], "modifier": [{"text": "under", "start": 29, "end": 34}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It would appear this technique is meant to obfuscate the activities of the malicious sample by masking the process creator's user name to appear to be a generic domain user.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this technique", "start": 16, "end": 30}, {"text": "the activities of the malicious sample", "start": 53, "end": 91}, {"text": "masking the process creator's user name to appear to be a generic domain user", "start": 95, "end": 172}], "action": [{"text": "obfuscate", "start": 43, "end": 52}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 92, "end": 94}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Note that such an account does not normally exist in an Active Directory environment.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additionally, the primary C2 connection allows for requests to start additional connections to the C2 imple- menting the following functionality: This sample is typical of a post exploitation tool; it is written in .NET", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "2.0.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This code appears to have been compiled on Thursday May 26th, 2011 at 10:21:44 A.M. UTC (early evening time in China).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The backdoor functionality can be instantiated either directly from the command line or through commands issued over a network based protocol via the C2.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "commands", "start": 96, "end": 104}, {"text": "a network based protocol", "start": 117, "end": 141}, {"text": "the C2", "start": 146, "end": 152}], "action": [{"text": "issued", "start": 105, "end": 111}], "modifier": [{"text": "over", "start": 112, "end": 116}, {"text": "via", "start": 142, "end": 145}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If no arguments are given, a connection to the C2 is initiated to the stati- cally defined IP address.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a connection to the C2", "start": 27, "end": 49}, {"text": "the stati- cally defined IP address", "start": 66, "end": 101}], "action": [{"text": "is initiated", "start": 50, "end": 62}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 63, "end": 65}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The command line options support post exploitation capabilities such as changing file timestamps, forensic mitigation, privilege escalation, launching the executable, and specifying a specific C2.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The command line options", "start": 0, "end": 24}, {"text": "changing file timestamps", "start": 72, "end": 96}, {"text": "forensic mitigation", "start": 98, "end": 117}, {"text": "privilege escalation", "start": 119, "end": 139}, {"text": "launching the executable", "start": 141, "end": 165}, {"text": "specifying a specific C2", "start": 171, "end": 195}], "action": [{"text": "support", "start": 25, "end": 32}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One interesting command line option allows the backdoor to filter the contents of specified files to remove content using a regular expression (regex).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the backdoor", "start": 43, "end": 55}, {"text": "the contents of specified files", "start": 66, "end": 97}, {"text": "content", "start": 108, "end": 115}, {"text": "a regular expression (regex)", "start": 122, "end": 150}], "action": [{"text": "filter", "start": 59, "end": 65}, {"text": "remove", "start": 101, "end": 107}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 116, "end": 121}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This command then modifies the creation, modification, and last access timestamps of the modified file to conceal the content modifications.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This command", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "the creation, modification, and last access timestamps of the modified file", "start": 27, "end": 102}, {"text": "conceal the content modifications", "start": 106, "end": 139}], "action": [{"text": "modifies", "start": 18, "end": 26}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 103, "end": 105}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A detailed listing of command line arguments can be viewed in Appendix A.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This activity is generally associated with log cleaning to com- plicate a forensic investigation.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This activity", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "log cleaning to com- plicate a forensic investigation", "start": 43, "end": 96}], "action": [{"text": "is generally associated", "start": 14, "end": 37}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 38, "end": 42}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The sample contains an embedded IP address for C2 that is stored in an encrypted format as a string re- source: The first two bytes of this string represent the base 16 length of the encrypted string, in this case,'' 0x14''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Following this is a base64 encoded string of the specified length.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once this string has been decoded using base64, the result is then XOR'd with the fixed value of 0xAA yielding the decoded IP address 202.86.190.3:80 (Hong Kong: TeleOne (HK) Limited).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There are three components to the protocol: Authentication is accomplished using a 32 byte packet, this packet consists of: An example authentication packet sent to the C2 is located in Appendix E. After sending the initial authentication packet, the sample verifies that the first four bytes of the response is equal to a statically defined value, in this sample the value is: 0x16030100.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Authentication", "start": 44, "end": 58}, {"text": "a 32 byte packet", "start": 81, "end": 97}, {"text": "An example authentication packet", "start": 124, "end": 156}, {"text": "the C2", "start": 165, "end": 171}, {"text": "the initial authentication packet", "start": 212, "end": 245}, {"text": "the sample", "start": 247, "end": 257}, {"text": "the first four bytes of the response is equal to a statically defined value", "start": 272, "end": 347}], "action": [{"text": "is accomplished", "start": 59, "end": 74}, {"text": "sent", "start": 157, "end": 161}, {"text": "sending", "start": 204, "end": 211}, {"text": "verifies", "start": 258, "end": 266}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 75, "end": 80}, {"text": "to", "start": 162, "end": 164}, {"text": "that", "start": 267, "end": 271}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition, an 8 byte key is sent to the client which is then RC4 encrypted using the random number generated in step 2 from above as the password.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an 8 byte key", "start": 13, "end": 26}, {"text": "the client", "start": 38, "end": 48}], "action": [{"text": "is sent", "start": 27, "end": 34}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 35, "end": 37}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This value is then transformed using a simple algorithm in Appendix F into a 32 byte array.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first 16 bytes of this array are then used as the KEY and the second 16 bytes are used as the IV for setting up AES encryption which is then used to encrypt and decrypt any further communications.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "AES encryption", "start": 116, "end": 130}, {"text": "any further communications", "start": 173, "end": 199}], "action": [{"text": "encrypt and decrypt", "start": 153, "end": 172}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Beacon, this is typical of this type of malicious sample, it allows the operator to separate various infected hosts in a targeted campaign.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The beacon for this sample is formatted as XML and consists of: An example of an unencrypted beacon: Command handling loop, this is a loop structure that will process and execute commands sent by the C2.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Command handling loop", "start": 101, "end": 122}, {"text": "commands sent by the C2", "start": 179, "end": 202}], "action": [{"text": "process and execute", "start": 159, "end": 178}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware sends and receives a heartbeat/keepalive packet every 2 minutes.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "a heartbeat/keepalive packet", "start": 31, "end": 59}, {"text": "2 minutes", "start": 66, "end": 75}], "action": [{"text": "sends", "start": 12, "end": 17}, {"text": "receives", "start": 22, "end": 30}], "modifier": [{"text": "every", "start": 60, "end": 65}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The command format is derived from a structure consisting of: These fields are received as a sequence of serialized .NET", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "objects in the order specified.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A detailed description of the possible values for commands is in Appendix D. It is important to note that the order in which the application defines them is not the same order as they appear to be coming over the network.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Examples of implemented commands include download and upload files, installing new .NET assemblies, calling methods on those assemblies, connecting to new C2 servers and executing processes.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "download", "start": 41, "end": 49}, {"text": "upload", "start": 54, "end": 60}, {"text": "installing", "start": 68, "end": 78}, {"text": "calling", "start": 100, "end": 107}, {"text": "connecting", "start": 137, "end": 147}, {"text": "executing", "start": 170, "end": 179}], "entity": [{"text": "files", "start": 61, "end": 66}, {"text": "new .NET assemblies", "start": 79, "end": 98}, {"text": "methods", "start": 108, "end": 115}, {"text": "those assemblies", "start": 119, "end": 135}, {"text": "new C2 servers", "start": 151, "end": 165}, {"text": "processes", "start": 180, "end": 189}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 116, "end": 118}, {"text": "to", "start": 148, "end": 150}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This sample is a sophisticated backdoor which implements several communications protocols and was developed in C++.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This sample", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "a sophisticated backdoor", "start": 15, "end": 39}, {"text": "several communications protocols", "start": 57, "end": 89}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 12, "end": 14}, {"text": "implements", "start": 46, "end": 56}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This binary is compiled with the /GS flag using Visual Studio 2010, enabling stack buffer overflow detection.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This code appears to have been compiled on Sunday October 30, 2011 at 12:43:33 P.M. UTC (late evening time in China).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The code contains several Run Time Type Information (RTTI) artifacts that indicate most of the C++ class names were prefixed with the string'' PCC'' in the original source code.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Variants of this Trojan are sometimes detected under the name'Derusbi' by Microsoft, Trend, Sophos and Symantec AV engines.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This sample is a DLL which can be registered as a service and is used to drop a kernel driver and provide an interactive command line shell to the C2.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This sample", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "a DLL", "start": 15, "end": 20}, {"text": "a service", "start": 48, "end": 57}, {"text": "a kernel driver", "start": 78, "end": 93}, {"text": "an interactive command line shell", "start": 106, "end": 139}, {"text": "the C2", "start": 143, "end": 149}], "action": [{"text": "be registered", "start": 31, "end": 44}, {"text": "drop", "start": 73, "end": 77}, {"text": "provide", "start": 98, "end": 105}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 45, "end": 47}, {"text": "to", "start": 140, "end": 142}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It also is able to bypass User Account Control (UAC) to install itself by using the'sysprep.exe' Microsoft Windows executable provided by the targeted system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "User Account Control (UAC)", "start": 26, "end": 52}, {"text": "install itself by using the'sysprep.exe' Microsoft Windows executable provided by the targeted system", "start": 56, "end": 157}], "action": [{"text": "bypass", "start": 19, "end": 25}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 53, "end": 55}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The steps it takes to install itself onto a system are as follows: 2.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After it copies itself, it will modify the creation time, last access time and last modification time to the current system time when the copy was made but with the year changed to 2005.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 6, "end": 8}, {"text": "itself", "start": 16, "end": 22}, {"text": "it", "start": 24, "end": 26}, {"text": "the creation time, last access time and last modification time", "start": 39, "end": 101}, {"text": "the current system time when the copy was made but with the year changed to 2005", "start": 105, "end": 185}], "action": [{"text": "copies", "start": 9, "end": 15}, {"text": "modify", "start": 32, "end": 38}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 102, "end": 104}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "3.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Adds itself as a service name from the backdoor's configuration under HKEYLOCAL MACHINE\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\ < service >'' This defaults to'' wuauserv'', the legitimate Windows Update service, in the given binary's default configuration.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "Adds", "start": 0, "end": 4}], "entity": [{"text": "itself", "start": 5, "end": 11}, {"text": "a service name", "start": 15, "end": 29}, {"text": "the backdoor's configuration", "start": 35, "end": 63}, {"text": "HKEYLOCAL MACHINE\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services\\\\ < service >''", "start": 70, "end": 140}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 12, "end": 14}, {"text": "from", "start": 30, "end": 34}, {"text": "under", "start": 64, "end": 69}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "4.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Adds itself to list of services started by'netsvc' using the service name'helpsvc'.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "Adds", "start": 0, "end": 4}], "entity": [{"text": "itself", "start": 5, "end": 11}, {"text": "list of services started by'netsvc'", "start": 15, "end": 50}, {"text": "the service name'helpsvc'", "start": 57, "end": 82}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 12, "end": 14}, {"text": "using", "start": 51, "end": 56}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "5.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If McAfee AV is installed, creates a copy of regsvr32.exe named Update.exe and then schedules the copy to be deleted on reboot using the well documented MoveFileExA API.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "creates", "start": 27, "end": 34}, {"text": "schedules", "start": 84, "end": 93}], "entity": [{"text": "a copy of regsvr32.exe named Update.exe", "start": 35, "end": 74}, {"text": "the copy", "start": 94, "end": 102}, {"text": "be deleted on reboot", "start": 106, "end": 126}, {"text": "the well documented MoveFileExA API", "start": 133, "end": 168}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 103, "end": 105}, {"text": "using", "start": 127, "end": 132}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "6.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It then calls either the original or copy of regsvr32.exe with the parameters /s /u and the path to the copy of itself it made in Step 1.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The /u parameter means'' uninstall'', which calls DllUnregisterServer, this is an unsophisticated method of DLL entry point obfuscation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "7.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "DllUnregisterServer installs the driver and initiates the backdoor component.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The sample is capable of'dropping' an embedded/encrypted kernel driver.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The sample", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "an embedded/encrypted kernel driver", "start": 35, "end": 70}], "action": [{"text": "'dropping'", "start": 24, "end": 34}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the process'' ZhuDongFangYu.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "exe'' is running (AntiVirus360 program from the Chinese'Quihoo 360 Technology Co., LTD' 360), or the username of the DLL's host process context is not'SYSTEM', the driver is not written to disk.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Barring the two aforementioned conditions, the sample decrypts the kernel driver to: Following the decryption and writing of the driver to disk, it is loaded using the ZwLoadDriver () API.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "writing", "start": 114, "end": 121}, {"text": "is loaded", "start": 148, "end": 157}], "entity": [{"text": "the driver", "start": 125, "end": 135}, {"text": "disk", "start": 139, "end": 143}, {"text": "it", "start": 145, "end": 147}, {"text": "the ZwLoadDriver () API", "start": 164, "end": 187}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 136, "end": 138}, {"text": "using", "start": 158, "end": 163}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The driv- er is encrypted with a simple four byte XOR key value of 0x2E885Df3; after decryption the file has the MD5 hash of dae6b9b3b8e39b08b10a51a6457444d8.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The driv- er", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "a simple four byte XOR key value of 0x2E885Df3", "start": 31, "end": 77}], "action": [{"text": "is encrypted", "start": 13, "end": 25}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 26, "end": 30}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware contains a dynamic configuration stored in the Registry under and loads a default configuration embedded into the binary if such a configuration is not found.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The way this default configuration is loaded and parsed indicates that this malware has been built with a'builder' that takes a template sample and lets an unsophisticated user specify a configuration without recompiling any code.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the current service name matches a set of pre-defined service names that legitimately exist in Windows, the backdoor then loads the original service's DLL into the address space with LoadLibrary and invokes the ServiceMain export.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the backdoor", "start": 107, "end": 119}, {"text": "the original service's DLL", "start": 131, "end": 157}, {"text": "the address space", "start": 163, "end": 180}, {"text": "LoadLibrary", "start": 186, "end": 197}], "action": [{"text": "loads", "start": 125, "end": 130}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 158, "end": 162}, {"text": "with", "start": 181, "end": 185}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This effectively hijacks the original service's entry while retaining its functionality.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While there is code in the binary that allows downloading a list of C2 servers from an HTTP URL, the default configuration present specifies 202.86.190.3:80 as a C2 to use, this is the same Hong Kong C2 server as the one used by the post exploitation .NET", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "downloading", "start": 46, "end": 57}, {"text": "specifies", "start": 131, "end": 140}], "entity": [{"text": "a list of C2 servers", "start": 58, "end": 78}, {"text": "an HTTP URL", "start": 84, "end": 95}, {"text": "the default configuration present", "start": 97, "end": 130}, {"text": "202.86.190.3:80", "start": 141, "end": 156}, {"text": "a C2", "start": 160, "end": 164}, {"text": "use", "start": 168, "end": 171}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 79, "end": 83}, {"text": "as", "start": 157, "end": 159}, {"text": "to", "start": 165, "end": 167}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "tool.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware has three distinct C2 protocols two of which can be transmitted over HTTP proxies and one can be bundled in two different'dual' modes (see 3.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "three distinct C2 protocols", "start": 16, "end": 43}], "action": [{"text": "has", "start": 12, "end": 15}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "), totaling 7 distinct supported C2 mechanisms.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The con- figuration contains the C2 protocol to be used or optionally a self-configuration mode in which the malware attempts the different C2 protocols in a pre-defined order.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The con- figuration", "start": 0, "end": 19}, {"text": "the C2 protocol to be used", "start": 29, "end": 55}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 105, "end": 116}, {"text": "the different C2 protocols", "start": 126, "end": 152}, {"text": "a pre-defined order", "start": 156, "end": 175}], "action": [{"text": "contains", "start": 20, "end": 28}, {"text": "attempts", "start": 117, "end": 125}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 153, "end": 155}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In self-configuration, a connection via a proxy is attempted if the system wide Internet Explorer settings specify such a proxy.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The configuration found in this sample is set to automatic self-configuration, resulting in the following mechanisms being tried in this order: 1.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Proprietary binary header (optionally over an HTTP Proxy using CONNECT mechanism); this protocol consists of 64 random bytes being sent to the C2.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "64 random bytes", "start": 109, "end": 124}, {"text": "the C2", "start": 139, "end": 145}], "action": [{"text": "being sent", "start": 125, "end": 135}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 136, "end": 138}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The C2 then responds with 64 bytes where the first four bytes must match the first four sent bytes to establish a connection successfully.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The remaining bytes are discarded.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Interestingly, the malware stores the first four bytes rotated right by seven bits and compares that value to the seven bits rotated right version of the server's response, effectively neutralizing the rotation's effect; the purpose of this is unclear.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "2.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A long-running HTTP POST request to the path'' /forum/login.cgi'' with a statically defined HTTP request string including HTTP headers (optionally over a HTTP Proxy using CONNECT).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware requires the response to start with'' HTTP/1.0 200'' or'' HTTP/1.1 200'' and an absence of a'' Connection: close'' header.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This one HTTP connection will be used for bi-directional communications, sending chunks of POST payload and receiving chunks of the response, interleaved.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "sending", "start": 73, "end": 80}, {"text": "receiving", "start": 108, "end": 117}], "entity": [{"text": "chunks of POST payload", "start": 81, "end": 103}, {"text": "chunks of the response", "start": 118, "end": 140}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "3.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Two long-running HTTP requests to the same C2 (optionally over an HTTP Proxy with original request verb), one GET request to'' /Photos/Query.cgi? loginid='' followed by a random number and one POST request to'' /Catelog/login1.cgi''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The GET request serves as a down-stream channel while the POST request serves as a upstream channel.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The GET request", "start": 0, "end": 15}, {"text": "a down-stream channel", "start": 26, "end": 47}, {"text": "the POST request", "start": 54, "end": 70}, {"text": "a upstream channel", "start": 81, "end": 99}], "action": [{"text": "serves", "start": 16, "end": 22}, {"text": "serves", "start": 71, "end": 77}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 23, "end": 25}, {"text": "as", "start": 78, "end": 80}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This demonstrates an attempt to use the most efficient communication channel first, falling back to more legitimate appearing channels as required in order to appear Request For Comment (RFC) compliant with the HTTP protocol.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additionally, the malware contains a custom DNS client implementation that will use the system's configured DNS server to tunnel C2 traffic over legitimate DNS.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 14, "end": 25}, {"text": "a custom DNS client implementation", "start": 35, "end": 69}, {"text": "the system's configured DNS server", "start": 84, "end": 118}, {"text": "C2 traffic", "start": 129, "end": 139}, {"text": "legitimate DNS", "start": 145, "end": 159}], "action": [{"text": "contains", "start": 26, "end": 34}, {"text": "use", "start": 80, "end": 83}, {"text": "tunnel", "start": 122, "end": 128}], "modifier": [{"text": "over", "start": 140, "end": 144}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Since this C2 mechanism is not attempted in self-configuration and was not configured for this binary, analysis was left out due to time constraints.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After establishing any of the aforementioned channels for arbitrary binary data exchange, the malware will start sending and receiving compressed binary blobs via the channel of choice.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 90, "end": 101}, {"text": "compressed binary blobs", "start": 135, "end": 158}, {"text": "the channel of choice", "start": 163, "end": 184}], "action": [{"text": "sending", "start": 113, "end": 120}, {"text": "receiving", "start": 125, "end": 134}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 159, "end": 162}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The C2's binary data blobs are compressed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "No further encryption of the data takes place.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All C2 transport implementations contain code for accepting and handling server-side connections of the respective protocols.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, this code does not appear to be invoked.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It appears that the author of this code shares the library that implements these transports for the client with the C2 server.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The main backdoor thread then reads commands from the chosen C2 protocol and passes them on to any of the following registered handler classes based upon a command ID.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The main backdoor thread", "start": 0, "end": 24}, {"text": "commands", "start": 36, "end": 44}, {"text": "the chosen C2 protocol", "start": 50, "end": 72}], "action": [{"text": "reads", "start": 30, "end": 35}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 45, "end": 49}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The handler class is responsible for parsing the remainder of the command.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This handler class for command ID 8 implements generic directory and file browsing using FindFirstFileW () and FindNextFileW () APIs, as well as reading and writing arbitrary files via C2 commands, thus enabling upload and download of arbitrary files.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This handler class for command ID 8", "start": 0, "end": 35}, {"text": "generic directory and file browsing", "start": 47, "end": 82}, {"text": "FindFirstFileW () and FindNextFileW () APIs", "start": 89, "end": 132}, {"text": "arbitrary files", "start": 165, "end": 180}, {"text": "C2 commands", "start": 185, "end": 196}, {"text": "arbitrary files", "start": 235, "end": 250}], "action": [{"text": "implements", "start": 36, "end": 46}, {"text": "reading", "start": 145, "end": 152}, {"text": "writing", "start": 157, "end": 164}, {"text": "upload", "start": 212, "end": 218}, {"text": "download", "start": 223, "end": 231}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 83, "end": 88}, {"text": "via", "start": 181, "end": 184}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is typically seen in RATs for searching specific files to exfiltrate.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "RATs", "start": 26, "end": 30}, {"text": "specific files", "start": 45, "end": 59}], "action": [{"text": "searching", "start": 35, "end": 44}, {"text": "exfiltrate", "start": 63, "end": 73}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Additionally, this class implements launching of specified executable files via the CreateProcess () API.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this class", "start": 14, "end": 24}, {"text": "specified executable files", "start": 49, "end": 75}, {"text": "the CreateProcess () API", "start": 80, "end": 104}], "action": [{"text": "launching", "start": 36, "end": 45}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 76, "end": 79}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This handler class implements a generic TCP proxy.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This handler class", "start": 0, "end": 18}, {"text": "a generic TCP proxy", "start": 30, "end": 49}], "action": [{"text": "implements", "start": 19, "end": 29}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It supports establishing TCP connections to other hosts and also listening for incoming connections.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "TCP connections", "start": 25, "end": 40}, {"text": "other hosts", "start": 44, "end": 55}, {"text": "incoming connections", "start": 79, "end": 99}], "action": [{"text": "establishing", "start": 12, "end": 24}, {"text": "listening", "start": 65, "end": 74}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 41, "end": 43}, {"text": "for", "start": 75, "end": 78}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The incoming connection contents are forwarded to the C2 and data from the C2 is passed on to connections.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The incoming connection contents", "start": 0, "end": 32}, {"text": "the C2", "start": 50, "end": 56}, {"text": "data from the C2", "start": 61, "end": 77}, {"text": "connections", "start": 94, "end": 105}], "action": [{"text": "are forwarded", "start": 33, "end": 46}, {"text": "is passed", "start": 78, "end": 87}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 47, "end": 49}, {"text": "on to", "start": 88, "end": 93}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It supports up to 1024 parallel connections.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware is capable of gathering various pieces of information from the system, triggered by a command ID 10.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "various pieces of information", "start": 36, "end": 65}, {"text": "the system", "start": 71, "end": 81}], "action": [{"text": "gathering", "start": 26, "end": 35}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 66, "end": 70}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The capabilities include recovering authentication credentials from various system and client storage such as Mozilla Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Remote Access Service (RAS).", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "recovering", "start": 25, "end": 35}], "entity": [{"text": "authentication credentials", "start": 36, "end": 62}, {"text": "various system and client storage such as Mozilla Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Remote Access Service (RAS)", "start": 68, "end": 177}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 63, "end": 67}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This class also supports gathering intelligence on the infected system including identifying security tools by their process name, proxy accounts, and version numbers for the Operating System (OS) and Internet Explorer.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This class", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "intelligence on the infected system", "start": 35, "end": 70}, {"text": "security tools", "start": 93, "end": 107}, {"text": "their process name", "start": 111, "end": 129}, {"text": "proxy accounts", "start": 131, "end": 145}, {"text": "version numbers for the Operating System (OS)", "start": 151, "end": 196}, {"text": "Internet Explorer", "start": 201, "end": 218}], "action": [{"text": "gathering", "start": 25, "end": 34}, {"text": "identifying", "start": 81, "end": 92}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 108, "end": 110}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This handler class provides the attacker with the ability to manage system components including start/stop/delete system services, enumerate/alter registry keys, and manage running processes.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This handler class", "start": 0, "end": 18}, {"text": "system components", "start": 68, "end": 85}, {"text": "system services", "start": 114, "end": 129}, {"text": "registry keys", "start": 147, "end": 160}, {"text": "running processes", "start": 173, "end": 190}], "action": [{"text": "manage", "start": 61, "end": 67}, {"text": "start", "start": 96, "end": 101}, {"text": "stop", "start": 102, "end": 106}, {"text": "delete", "start": 107, "end": 113}, {"text": "enumerate", "start": 131, "end": 140}, {"text": "alter", "start": 141, "end": 146}, {"text": "manage", "start": 166, "end": 172}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This class also provides the ability for the attacker to take a screen shot of the users desktop.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This class", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "a screen shot of the users desktop", "start": 62, "end": 96}], "action": [{"text": "take", "start": 57, "end": 61}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This handler class uses the command ID 5 and implements an interactive command line shell accessible from the C2 server, containing a series of built-in commands.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This handler class", "start": 0, "end": 18}, {"text": "an interactive command line shell accessible from the C2 server", "start": 56, "end": 119}], "action": [{"text": "implements", "start": 45, "end": 55}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the input is not in this list of built-in commands, the malware attempts to invoke cmd.exe in the background, launching a command or command line utility already present on the system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 55, "end": 66}, {"text": "cmd.exe", "start": 86, "end": 93}, {"text": "the background", "start": 97, "end": 111}, {"text": "a command or command line utility already present on the system", "start": 123, "end": 186}], "action": [{"text": "invoke", "start": 79, "end": 85}, {"text": "launching", "start": 113, "end": 122}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 94, "end": 96}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The standard output channel of that command is provided back to the C2.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The standard output channel of that command", "start": 0, "end": 43}, {"text": "the C2", "start": 64, "end": 70}], "action": [{"text": "is provided", "start": 44, "end": 55}], "modifier": [{"text": "back to", "start": 56, "end": 63}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The supported built-in commands are: The only command that is implemented directly in the main backdoor thread as a subprocedure call and not via a generic command handler class is command ID 256.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This command results in the DLL deleting itself and terminating the backdoor process.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the DLL", "start": 24, "end": 31}, {"text": "itself", "start": 41, "end": 47}, {"text": "the backdoor process", "start": 64, "end": 84}], "action": [{"text": "deleting", "start": 32, "end": 40}, {"text": "terminating", "start": 52, "end": 63}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This sample is a packed 32-bit kernel driver extracted by the aforementioned DLL with an MD5 hash of: de7500fc1065a081180841f32f06a537, this sample will only function on a Windows 32-bit kernel.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This code appears to have been compiled on Sunday October 9, 2011 at 4:50:31 P.M. UTC (very early morning time of Monday, October 10 in China).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This section describes how the driver performs its initialization routine.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The driver begins by opening a named event in the BaseNamedObjects object directory with the name {8CB2ff21-0166-4cf1-BD8F-E190BC7902DC} using the Windows API ZwOpenEvent ().", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The driver", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "a named event", "start": 29, "end": 42}, {"text": "the BaseNamedObjects object directory", "start": 46, "end": 83}, {"text": "the name {8CB2ff21-0166-4cf1-BD8F-E190BC7902DC}", "start": 89, "end": 136}, {"text": "the Windows API ZwOpenEvent ()", "start": 143, "end": 173}], "action": [{"text": "opening", "start": 21, "end": 28}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 43, "end": 45}, {"text": "with", "start": 84, "end": 88}, {"text": "using", "start": 137, "end": 142}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the event already exists, the driver fails to load, presumably to avoid a multiple instances of itself.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the driver", "start": 29, "end": 39}, {"text": "multiple instances of itself", "start": 77, "end": 105}], "action": [{"text": "avoid", "start": 69, "end": 74}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the event does not exist, the driver then creates it using the Windows API ZwCreateEvent ().", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the driver", "start": 29, "end": 39}, {"text": "it", "start": 53, "end": 55}, {"text": "the Windows API ZwCreateEvent ()", "start": 62, "end": 94}], "action": [{"text": "creates", "start": 45, "end": 52}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 56, "end": 61}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Windows API for creating events (ZwCreateEvent (), or CreateEvent () in user mode) already provides the ability to'' create-or-open'' an event, so the use of an initial ZwOpenEvent is superfluous and indicative of relatively limited Windows API knowledge of the author of that part of the code.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is interesting to note that some of the hex digits in the object name are mixed case which is potentially indicative of the code being re-appropriated from another source.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The second component of the entry point performs an anti-debugging technique, calling the function KdDisableDebugger (), which allows the driver to disable usage of the built-in Windows kernel debugging facility that is used by popular kernel debuggers KD and WinDbg.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The second component of the entry point", "start": 0, "end": 39}, {"text": "an anti-debugging technique", "start": 49, "end": 76}, {"text": "the function KdDisableDebugger ()", "start": 86, "end": 119}, {"text": "the driver", "start": 134, "end": 144}, {"text": "usage of the built-in Windows kernel debugging facility that is used by popular kernel debuggers KD and WinDbg", "start": 156, "end": 266}], "action": [{"text": "performs", "start": 40, "end": 48}, {"text": "calling", "start": 78, "end": 85}, {"text": "disable", "start": 148, "end": 155}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Tools such as Syser Debugger, or debugging through a virtual machine are unaffected by this technique.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The sample, rather than importing the KdDisableDebugger () API using conventional methods, looks up the API through MmGetSystemRoutineAddress () instead.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "All of the other APIs used by the driver are imported normally, so this is not a technique to hide import APIs used throughout the driver.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Searching Google for'' MmGetSystemRoutineAddress'' and'' KdDisableDebugger'' results in dozens of Chinese language blogs which explain how to use this technique to'' Disable WinDbg''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The final step of the entry point is to begin hooking the system, which is done by two helper functions-one is designed to hook the system call table, while the other hooks the network stack.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The final step of the entry point", "start": 0, "end": 33}, {"text": "the system", "start": 54, "end": 64}, {"text": "one", "start": 104, "end": 107}, {"text": "the system call table", "start": 128, "end": 149}, {"text": "the other", "start": 157, "end": 166}, {"text": "the network stack", "start": 173, "end": 190}], "action": [{"text": "hooking", "start": 46, "end": 53}, {"text": "hook", "start": 123, "end": 127}, {"text": "hooks", "start": 167, "end": 172}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The network stack hooking first queries the OS version using RtlGetVersion () or PsGetVersion ().", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The network stack hooking", "start": 0, "end": 25}, {"text": "the OS version", "start": 40, "end": 54}, {"text": "RtlGetVersion () or PsGetVersion ()", "start": 61, "end": 96}], "action": [{"text": "queries", "start": 32, "end": 39}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 55, "end": 60}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Checking the version is necessary because Windows versions beginning with Vista utilize a redesigned TCP/IP net- work stack, most hooking operations will require a different implementation for these versions.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On versions prior to Windows Vista, the TCP/IP driver creates a \\Device\\Tcp device object through which most network requests are piped through.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On Vista and later, TCP/IP has been split up into multiple components, and IP connection enumeration, which this driver is targeting, is managed by \\Device\\nsiproxy instead.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In either case, the driver obtains the device object by using IoGetDeviceObjectPointer () and hooks Major Function 14 the IRPMJDEVICECONTROL, as this is the function through which all Input Output ConTroLls (IOCTLs) are sent, such as the IOCTL for querying active IP connections.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the driver", "start": 16, "end": 26}, {"text": "Major Function 14 the IRPMJDEVICECONTROL", "start": 100, "end": 140}], "action": [{"text": "hooks", "start": 94, "end": 99}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The NSI hook, targets IOCTL 0x12001B, which is used by NsiGetObjectAllParameters () in nsi.dll when users typically run commands such as netstat.exe or use any of the IP Helper APIs in iphlpapi.dll.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The purpose of the hook is to scan the list of active connections returned to the user, and hide any such connection currently bound to a local TCP port in the range between 40000 and 45000.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the hook", "start": 15, "end": 23}, {"text": "the list of active connections returned to the user", "start": 35, "end": 86}, {"text": "any such connection currently bound to a local TCP port in the range between 40000 and 45000", "start": 97, "end": 189}], "action": [{"text": "scan", "start": 30, "end": 34}, {"text": "hide", "start": 92, "end": 96}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The hooking is performed by creating a new completion routine associated with any IRPMJDEVICECONTROL IRP that matches the IOCTL, attaching to the target process, performing several memory copies to hide the entry, and detaching.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The hooking", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "creating a new completion routine associated with any IRPMJDEVICECONTROL IRP that matches the IOCTL, attaching to the target process, performing several memory copies to hide the entry, and detaching", "start": 28, "end": 227}], "action": [{"text": "is performed", "start": 12, "end": 24}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 25, "end": 27}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This functionality is nearly identical to the code posted by Edward Sun (aka cardmagic, sunmy1 @sina.com, onlyonejazz @hotmail.com, cardcian @mail.ustc.edu.cn, QQ #28025945) from Hefei, Anhui province (Nanjing Military District) on July 8, 2007, then a China-based researcher at Trend Micro (now working at Kingsoft Chinese AV Company; LinkedIn profile page: http: //www.linkedin.com/profile/view? id=84082731) at http: //forum.eviloctal.com/viewthread.php? action=printable & tid=29604 (See Appendix G).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CrowdStrike has no information connecting Mr. Sun to this intrusion activity, his code appears to have been appropriated by the actor to add similar functionality to their code.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The TCP hook works almost identically to the NSI hook, though instead hooking IOCTL 0x120003 (IOCTL TCPQUERYINFORMATIONEX).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The TCP hook", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "IOCTL 0x120003 (IOCTL TCPQUERYINFORMATIONEX)", "start": 78, "end": 122}], "action": [{"text": "hooking", "start": 70, "end": 77}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This IOCTL has the exact same functionality as the NSI specific IOCTL.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This IOCTL was the mechanism used on Windows versions prior to Windows Vista.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This hook also filters any connections listening on TCP ports in the range between 40000 and 45000.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This hook", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "any connections listening on TCP ports in the range between 40000 and 45000", "start": 23, "end": 98}], "action": [{"text": "filters", "start": 15, "end": 22}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The system call hooking targets three functions: ZwSaveKey (), ZwQueryValueKey (), and ZwEnumerateValueKey ().", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The unpacked kernel driver sample hooks these functions by reading the second DWORD at each of these exported functions.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The unpacked kernel driver sample", "start": 0, "end": 33}, {"text": "these functions", "start": 40, "end": 55}, {"text": "reading the second DWORD at each of these exported functions", "start": 59, "end": 119}], "action": [{"text": "hooks", "start": 34, "end": 39}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 56, "end": 58}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Because the system call stub uses the EAX register as an index for the system call ID, and a'' mov eax, imm32'' instruction'' instruction is used, this second DWORD will match the system call ID.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It then adds this index to the value of KeServiceDescriptorTable.Base, which is the exported kernel variable (on 32-bit Windows only) which directly points to the system call table.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is one of the simplest ways to do a system call hook, but will not work on 64-bit Windows as this variable is not exported in addition to the protection provided by Microsoft PatchGuard.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The system call hook is then performed by first allocating a Memory Descriptor List (MDL) using the Windows API IoAllocateMdl (), and associating the MDL to a non-paged buffer using MmBuildMdlForNonPagedPool ().", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The system call hook", "start": 0, "end": 20}, {"text": "first allocating a Memory Descriptor List (MDL) using the Windows API IoAllocateMdl (), and associating the MDL to a non-paged buffer using MmBuildMdlForNonPagedPool ()", "start": 42, "end": 210}], "action": [{"text": "is then performed", "start": 21, "end": 38}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 39, "end": 41}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once the MDL is associated to the non-paged buffer, the sample locks the underlying pages using the Windows API MmProbeAndLockPages ().", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Instead of hooking the entry in the table directly, which is easily detectable, the driver uses the LDASM open-source disassembly engine to analyze the function that is being pointed to by the table, and applying a Detours-style hook directly in the code.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the driver", "start": 80, "end": 90}, {"text": "a Detours-style hook", "start": 213, "end": 233}, {"text": "the code", "start": 246, "end": 254}], "action": [{"text": "applying", "start": 204, "end": 212}], "modifier": [{"text": "directly in", "start": 234, "end": 245}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It uses the standard'' mov cr0, eax'' technique, turning off the Write Protect (WP) bit as it does this.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When the hook is installed, it writes a special DWORD value,'KDTR', which allows it to prevent double-hooking or badly-hooking the system call, during unhooking, this value is also checked.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the ZwSaveKey () hook, access to \\\\REGISTRY\\\\MACHINE\\\\SYSTEM is blocked.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "RegSaveKey () which is the user-mode implementation of the kernel ZwSaveKey () API, is typically used when performing an offline backup of a particular registry key.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "hook is the ZwQueryValueValue () hook, which looks for'' Parameters'' key of a service within the registry at \\\\REGISTRY\\\\MACHINE\\\\SYSTEM\\\\ControlSet001\\\\Services\\\\.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It then checks for the values of the'' ServiceDll'' and'' Security'' keys, in the latter case it applies an XOR on the data with the value 127.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "the values of the'' ServiceDll'' and'' Security'' keys", "start": 19, "end": 73}, {"text": "it", "start": 94, "end": 96}, {"text": "an XOR", "start": 105, "end": 111}, {"text": "the data", "start": 115, "end": 123}, {"text": "the value 127", "start": 129, "end": 142}], "action": [{"text": "checks", "start": 8, "end": 14}, {"text": "applies", "start": 97, "end": 104}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 15, "end": 18}, {"text": "on", "start": 112, "end": 114}, {"text": "with", "start": 124, "end": 128}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The user-mode component of this malware is a service called'' msupdate'', this driver is attempting to hide the service.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this driver", "start": 74, "end": 85}, {"text": "the service", "start": 108, "end": 119}], "action": [{"text": "hide", "start": 103, "end": 107}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The user-mode service stores configuration data in the'' Security'' subkey of the RPC registry key, this component will obfuscate the user-mode configuration data.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The driver does not make any efforts to hide its own key, nor does it specifically check for'' RPC'' before'' Security'', which can lead to random data being obfuscated.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The final hook, ZwEnumerateValueKey (), is similar in structure to the ZwQueryValueHook key, due to the fact that these APIs provide almost identical functionality when it comes to reading registry values.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the registry hooking code of the driver, a call is made to ObReferenceObjectByHandle ().", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "In", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "to", "start": 59, "end": 61}], "entity": [{"text": "the registry hooking code of the driver", "start": 3, "end": 42}, {"text": "a call", "start": 44, "end": 50}, {"text": "ObReferenceObjectByHandle ()", "start": 62, "end": 90}], "action": [{"text": "is made", "start": 51, "end": 58}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This allows the driver to receive the'CMKEYOBJECT' which is then used with ObQueryNameString () to get the key/value path.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, no call to ObDereferenceObject () is ever made, which means that all registry objects being sent to these APIs are eventually leaked.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the registry hook, it was noticed that'' CurrentControlSet001'' was used as the target, if the target machine was using a'' last known good'' configuration, or a roaming hardware profile, the registry hook would not function as intended.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is the reason the Microsoft implemented a symbolic link to \\\\CurrentControlSet which ensures that regardless of the machines configuration any request will access the correct registry key.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This threat actor leaves several key fingerprints which can be used to identify compromised systems.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These digital fingerprints are unique to this adversary for this campaign.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following network signatures are designed for the popular Open Source IDS called Snort.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These signature can be ported to other formats upon request.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The following file system artifacts are indicative of a compromised host: The following Windows Registry artifacts are indicative of a compromised host: The backdoor may be detected by several different Anti-Virus products under a signature with the name: Attribution in the cyber domain is always a tricky subject when relying solely on malicious samples.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Compiler artifacts and language settings can of course be deliberately masked or spoofed.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "CrowdStrike uses a unique approach of comprehensive threat analysis in order to decipher attributable components.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Based on the corroborating evidence discovered in the course of this analysis, it appears there are numerous indications that this is a Chinese-speaking actor.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "ZhuDongFangYu.exe is a component of 360 360􀆔􀆔􀆔􀆔, a Chinese security product available from http: //www.360.cn/.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is particularly relevant in this case because the backdoor DLL sample with an MD5 of de7500fc1065a081180841f32f06a537 specifically avoids installing the kernel driver on a system running this tool.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the backdoor DLL sample with an MD5 of de7500fc1065a081180841f32f06a537", "start": 51, "end": 122}, {"text": "installing the kernel driver on a system running this tool", "start": 143, "end": 201}], "action": [{"text": "avoids", "start": 136, "end": 142}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Speculatively this may be because this security product detects this rootkit, or the author was attempting to prevent accidental infection on systems running this Anti-Virus product.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The obfuscation of the KdDisableDebugger () function call is seen on several Chinese language forums, and can be seen being reused in several code samples on those forums.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As previously mentioned there is no advantage associated with using this call obfuscation, and appears to be reused for no apparent reason other than the attackers have copied code directly from forum code.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While the various network hooking techniques used in the kernel driver may appear novel or well researched, upon close inspection it is actually a line-for-line copy of an existing post from the now-offline'rootkit.com' by a Chinese language developer.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the various network hooking techniques", "start": 6, "end": 44}, {"text": "the kernel driver", "start": 53, "end": 70}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 45, "end": 49}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 50, "end": 52}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This post is currently mirrored on dozens of Chinese hacking websites.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Similarly the system call hooking is less impressive after searching for'' IoAllocateMdl'' and'' cr0'' (bbs.pediy.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "com/showthread.php? t=77467 perform system call hooking through MDLs.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "perform", "start": 28, "end": 35}], "entity": [{"text": "system call hooking", "start": 36, "end": 55}, {"text": "MDLs", "start": 64, "end": 68}], "modifier": [{"text": "through", "start": 56, "end": 63}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The ldasm inline hooking is also repeated in numerous postings to Chinese forums.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One particular website (http: //read.pudn.com/downloads197/sourcecode/windows/sys- tem/927802/CCRootkit/RootkitSys/HookSSDT.c.htm) had an almost identical ldasm loop that tried to identify the exact same code sequences.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Open source research of the 4 innocuous kernel APIs'' ZwSaveKey ZwQueryValueKey ZwEnumerateValueKey IoAllocateMdl'', in concert leads directly to a Chinese website that has a cached rootkit performing similar hooks on the same 3 registry related APIs.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a cached rootkit", "start": 173, "end": 189}, {"text": "similar hooks", "start": 201, "end": 214}, {"text": "the same 3 registry related APIs", "start": 218, "end": 250}], "action": [{"text": "performing", "start": 190, "end": 200}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 215, "end": 217}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While the driver does not use pool tags for most of its allocations, it does utilize them in the networking hooking code, much like the examples found on the Chinese language forums.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This sample uses pool tags:'tnet,' and'KDTR'.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although the meaning of the KDTR tag is not obvious, we assess with high confidence that this is a shortened version of:'' Kernel DeTouR'', which coincides with the matching functionality of the detour-style inline hook.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The driver code (MD5: dae6b9b3b8e39b08b10a51a6457444d8) appears to be a combination of various code that is easily searchable on the Internet, and almost always attributed to Chinese language forums and websites.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The system call hooking parts of the code appear to be identical to the HookSSDT.c code authored by Steven Lai'embedlinux' and utilized in what the author titled'CC Rootkit' on on August 4, 2008 who's email address is hqulyc @126.com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This user has a QQ identity of: 5054-3533, QQ is a popular instant messaging chat client used almost exclusively in China.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "His real name according to his QQ profile (http: //user.qzone.qq.com/50543533) appears to be Steven Lai.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "He was is 28 years old (born September 5, 1983) and lives in Xiamen, Fujian province (Nanjing Military Region).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "According to his profile, he has worked at Xiamen XOCECO New Technic Co., Ltd. (http: //www.likego.com/en/about.asp), a company that builds audio/video systems for transportation systems.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Mr. Lai is not being identified as the actor, his code however was used by whomever built the kernel driver utilized by the backdoor and for this reason we are providing the background on this individual.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The samples involved in this incident are typical of attacks commonly associated with the People's Republic of China (PRC).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These code samples have a variety of Tools, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) that are used to track and identify specific adversary groups.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The sophistication of the actor responsible this incident is difficult to quantify without visibility into the activities that transpired on the victims network.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The ability to conduct Incident Response (IR) including forensics, and log analysis, greatly augments this visibility into these aspects of the incident.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some indications as to the adversaries' capabilities can be derived from the captured samples alone.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The dropper code (MD5: 14c04f88dc97aef3e9b516ef208a2bf5) does not utilize any techniques that are unique or unusual, and is consistent with tools, techniques, and procedures of attacks targeting proprietary information and generally attributed to the PRC.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The presence of dead code and its replacement by a more simple obfuscation method to hide the to-be-dropped dll binary file indicates code reuse on the attacker side.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The'dead code' utilizes a more sophisticated compression algorithm provided by a third party which was rendered useless for some reason.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This may have been a result of the attacker modifying an existing tool, or unknowingly using a re-purposed tool.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The dropper resources indicate the compiler used to build the tool was running on a system that utilized the Chinese'' Simple'' language pack and was built on Wednesday May 4th, 2011 at 11:04:24 A.M. UTC (early evening time in China).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While this can be deliberately spoofed as a'false flag' other indicators including the C2 are consistent with this having been the work of a Chinese speaking actor.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The dropped DLL (MD5: 47619fca20895abc83807321cbb80a3d) itself contains functionality that is typical of a Remote Access Tool (RAT) which are commonly used by PRC based actors in data exfiltration attacks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The dropped DLL (MD5: 47619fca20895abc83807321cbb80a3d) itself", "start": 0, "end": 62}, {"text": "functionality that is typical of a Remote Access Tool (RAT)", "start": 72, "end": 131}, {"text": "PRC based actors", "start": 159, "end": 175}, {"text": "data exfiltration attacks", "start": 179, "end": 204}], "action": [{"text": "contains", "start": 63, "end": 71}, {"text": "used", "start": 151, "end": 155}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 176, "end": 178}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The code quality is not impressive, and contains a trivial stack buffer overflow vulnerability.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Despite the buf- fer overflow, the C2 channel lacks any command authenication or encryption, apart from the initial beacon encryption/obfuscation using a statically compiled XOR key.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The sample uses TCP port 443 for commu- nication, but makes no attempt to mimic the SSL protocol typically used on that port number, which would provide enhanced Operational Security (OPSEC).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This code appears to have been compiled on Wednes- day May 4th, 2011 at 10:48:19 A.M. UTC (early evening time in China).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The post exploitation tool (MD5: 2dce7fc3f52a692d8a84a0c182519133) is a dual-use tool, it can be dropped and executed by a client-side exploit, or the adversary can launch it using a variety of command line options.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 87, "end": 89}, {"text": "a client-side exploit", "start": 121, "end": 142}, {"text": "the adversary", "start": 147, "end": 160}, {"text": "it", "start": 172, "end": 174}, {"text": "a variety of command line options", "start": 181, "end": 214}], "action": [{"text": "be dropped", "start": 94, "end": 104}, {"text": "executed", "start": 109, "end": 117}, {"text": "launch", "start": 165, "end": 171}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 175, "end": 180}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This tool is built in Microsoft .NET", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "framework, which is typically an indication of a less sophis- ticated attacker, because .NET", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "is easier to develop in but requires the .NET", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "framework be present on the victim machine.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The tool appears to have been compiled on Thursday May 26th, 2011 at 10:21:44 A.M. UTC (early evening time in China).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The sample utilizes the AES cryptographic algorithm to protect its C2 communications.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The sample", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "the AES cryptographic algorithm", "start": 20, "end": 51}, {"text": "protect its C2 communications", "start": 55, "end": 84}], "action": [{"text": "utilizes", "start": 11, "end": 19}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 52, "end": 54}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This DLL is a moderately sophisticated backdoor with several well designed communication mechanisms not typically seen in these types of implants.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This DLL", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "a moderately sophisticated backdoor", "start": 12, "end": 47}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 9, "end": 11}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The code base for the sample was developed in C++.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The code appears to have been compiled on Sunday October 30, 2011 at 12:43:33 P.M. UTC (late evening time in China).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This sample has multiple communication capabilities available that makes it far more versatile and stealthy.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This sample", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "multiple communication capabilities available", "start": 16, "end": 61}], "action": [{"text": "has", "start": 12, "end": 15}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It implements relatively well thought out protocols including HTTP and DNS.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "relatively well thought out protocols including HTTP and DNS", "start": 14, "end": 74}], "action": [{"text": "implements", "start": 3, "end": 13}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The tool has the ability to automatically down select the most effective communication channel once it has been instantiated, which can help avoid detection from solutions like DNS blacklisting and RFC protocol enforcement.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The tool", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "the most effective communication channel", "start": 54, "end": 94}, {"text": "it has been instantiated", "start": 100, "end": 124}, {"text": "detection from solutions like DNS blacklisting and RFC protocol enforcement", "start": 147, "end": 222}], "action": [{"text": "select", "start": 47, "end": 53}, {"text": "avoid", "start": 141, "end": 146}], "modifier": [{"text": "once", "start": 95, "end": 99}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The DLL itself contains traces of the original C++ class names that were utilized in the source code, which in general were prefixed with'PCC'.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The sample supports the ability to act as a generic proxy, this may be intended to proxy C2 traffic for other infected machines in order to minimize the number of systems communicating to the C2, thus enhancing OPSEC.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The sample", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "a generic proxy", "start": 42, "end": 57}, {"text": "C2 traffic", "start": 89, "end": 99}, {"text": "other infected machines", "start": 104, "end": 127}, {"text": "minimize the number of systems communicating to the C2", "start": 140, "end": 194}], "action": [{"text": "act", "start": 35, "end": 38}, {"text": "proxy", "start": 83, "end": 88}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 39, "end": 41}, {"text": "for", "start": 100, "end": 103}, {"text": "in order to", "start": 128, "end": 139}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The sample contains'dead code' which appears to be command and control server classes, this is likely an indicator that the C2 client which would communicate with this sample shares the same communications library which was compiled into this sample.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the C2 client which would communicate with this sample", "start": 120, "end": 174}, {"text": "the same communications library which was compiled into this sample", "start": 182, "end": 249}], "action": [{"text": "shares", "start": 175, "end": 181}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The kernel driver component dropped by the Backdoor DLL bears many tool marks associating it with the CCRootkit package publicly by Steven Lai (a/k/a embedlinux).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The kernel driver component", "start": 0, "end": 27}, {"text": "the Backdoor DLL", "start": 39, "end": 55}], "action": [{"text": "dropped", "start": 28, "end": 35}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This kernel mode rootkit implements several hooking techniques that are aimed at preventing a system administrator from detecting the backdoor DLL.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This kernel mode rootkit", "start": 0, "end": 24}, {"text": "several hooking techniques", "start": 36, "end": 62}, {"text": "a system administrator", "start": 92, "end": 114}, {"text": "detecting the backdoor DLL", "start": 120, "end": 146}], "action": [{"text": "implements", "start": 25, "end": 35}, {"text": "preventing", "start": 81, "end": 91}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 115, "end": 119}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The implementation of these techniques has some unique idiosyncrasies that permit direct attribution to the source code Steven Lai posted.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This driver attempts to hide a wide swath of TCP ports (40000-45000) for an unknown reason, however it is suspected that this may relate to the potential network relaying capability alluded to for the backdoor dll.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This driver", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "a wide swath of TCP ports (40000-45000)", "start": 29, "end": 68}, {"text": "an unknown reason", "start": 73, "end": 90}], "action": [{"text": "hide", "start": 24, "end": 28}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 69, "end": 72}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The kernel driver component dropped by the Backdoor DLL bears many tool marks associating it with the CCRootkit package publicly by Steven Lai (a/k/a embedlinux).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The kernel driver component", "start": 0, "end": 27}, {"text": "the Backdoor DLL", "start": 39, "end": 55}], "action": [{"text": "dropped", "start": 28, "end": 35}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This kernel mode rootkit implements several hooking techniques that are aimed at preventing a system administrator from detecting the backdoor DLL.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This kernel mode rootkit", "start": 0, "end": 24}, {"text": "several hooking techniques", "start": 36, "end": 62}, {"text": "a system administrator", "start": 92, "end": 114}, {"text": "detecting the backdoor DLL", "start": 120, "end": 146}], "action": [{"text": "implements", "start": 25, "end": 35}, {"text": "preventing", "start": 81, "end": 91}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 115, "end": 119}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The implementation of these techniques has some unique idiosyncrasies that permit direct attribution to the source code Steven Lai posted.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This driver attempts to hide a wide swath of TCP ports (40000-45000) for an unknown reason, however it is suspected that this may relate to the potential network relaying capability alluded to for the backdoor dll.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This driver", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "a wide swath of TCP ports (40000-45000)", "start": 29, "end": 68}, {"text": "an unknown reason", "start": 73, "end": 90}], "action": [{"text": "hide", "start": 24, "end": 28}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 69, "end": 72}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Implemented values for cmdID are as follows: cmdType can be one of the following (Interesting commands explained in detail): string0 can have one of the following values dependant upon command id and type.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "cardmagic writes: Windows Vista has changed alot on network module, many old port hiding materials are no longer usable.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this post, I will share with you a simple code to hide port under Vista, hope it is useful for some guys.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Actually under Windows Vista, netstat.exe will call InternalGetTcpTable2 which is exported by Iphlpapi.dll to list all open ports, then InternalGetTcpTable2 will transfer control to NsiAllocateAndGetTable which is exported by nsi.dll, and finally nsi.dll involve NsiEnumerateObjectsAllParametersEx to interact with kernel mode module of NSI -- nsiproxy.sys.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "nsiproxy.sys is almost like a wrapper of netio.sys, it will then call internal subroutines of netio.sys.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Here, we will use a relatively easy way --'' NSI Kernel Module Dispatch Routine Hook'' to demonstrate the specified port hiding uner Vista.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Dispatch routine hook is an old topic, this time, we will apply this method to nsiproxy.sys.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Please focus on how to handle the content filtering of NSI:) Check the following code (Notice: I only tested it under Windows Vista RTM 32bit):", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One of the questions which comes up in the months after big security whitepaper disclosures is: where are they now? In other words, what happened to the operators, tools, and infrastructure which was revealed in the reports, blog-posts, and press interviews.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Did they continue on as before, did they re-build the disclosed infrastructure and tools, did they go away and get jobs in another line of work? In some cases, the disclosure had little, if any impact on the operation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, after the McAfee ShadyRAT report in 2011, there was absolutely no change in the attacks from the group behind this.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, when Mandiant released their APT1 report in 2013, there was a noticeable reduction in activity from the group–and much of the tools and infrastructure has not been seen since.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the September 2010 issue of Foreign Affairs magazine, former US Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn discussed a cyber-attack which happened two years previously on the DoD's classified computer networks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Lynn described how a foreign intelligence agency planted malicious code on the networks with the aim of transferring data to servers under their control.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The article included the now oft-quoted phrase'digital beachhead' to describe what was undoubtedly a significant compromise of US military systems.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Further reports in the press kept the story alive in 2011, but since then this threat has received remarkably little attention.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, the operation behind the attacks has continued with little modification to the tools and techniques, in spite of the widespread attention a few years ago.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They use highly sophisticated malware tools to maintain persistent access to their targets.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "They", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "persistent access to their targets", "start": 56, "end": 90}], "action": [{"text": "maintain", "start": 47, "end": 55}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These tools can be used for covert communications in a number of different modes, some of which present significant challenges for traditional security technologies to detect.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "These tools", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "covert communications", "start": 28, "end": 49}, {"text": "a number of different modes", "start": 53, "end": 80}, {"text": "some of which", "start": 82, "end": 95}, {"text": "significant challenges for traditional security technologies to detect", "start": 104, "end": 174}], "action": [{"text": "be used", "start": 16, "end": 23}, {"text": "present", "start": 96, "end": 103}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 24, "end": 27}, {"text": "in", "start": 50, "end": 52}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There are some threats which come and go, whilst there are others which are permanent features of the landscape.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this paper, we describe the tools and techniques of one of the most sophisticated and persistent threats we track.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We hope this will help victims identify intrusions and understand their need to improve defences.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Cyber security is a collaborative effort–the operation described in this paper again raises the bar for the security community in their efforts to keep up with the attackers in cyber-space.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When antivirus back-end classification platforms can not identify a malware family for an analysed malicious sample, they assign generic names, such as'' Trojan Horse'' or'' Agent''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The variant letters are also assigned automatically, by using hexavigesimal (or Base26) notation.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "That is, the variant letters are auto-assigned starting from'' A'', followed with'' B'', and so on until'' Z''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Next comes'' AA'','' AB'' and so on, until'' ZZ''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After that, the variant letters start from'' AAA'','' AAB'' and so on, until'' ZZZ''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Back in 2008 an unknown malicious file was discovered and auto-classified as'' Agent.BTZ'', meaning it was registered as unknown malicious sample #1,898 in an anti-virus classification system.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It wasn't given an actual name, only a generic one.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Meanwhile, internally the authors behind this malware were using their own naming systems-with specific titles for their file components and projects such as'' snake'','' uroburos'','' sengoku'', and'' snark'' used to denote variants of their framework.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A recent report from German security company GData described a sample from the'' uroburos'' variant of this framework.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Their report revealed the complex nature of this malware family, and showed that the operation behind'' Agent.BTZ'' has continued.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As a result of this disclosure, we are also releasing our own technical analysis of the threat, including a timeline of known samples, known Command-and-Control (C & C) servers, and other indicators to aid investigators in discovering attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Reverse engineering of recent malware samples shows these to be much more advanced variants of Agent.BTZ, though still sharing many similarities and encryption methods with the original.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Further investigation allowed us to locate related samples compiled between 2006 and 2014, and spanning across several distinctive generations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first section of this report gives an overview of the samples collected, where they were reported and the timelines derived from their analysis.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Snake's architecture turned out to be quite interesting.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have identified two distinct variants, both highly flexible but with two different techniques for establishing and maintaining a presence on the target system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "two distinct variants", "start": 19, "end": 40}, {"text": "a presence", "start": 130, "end": 140}, {"text": "the target system", "start": 144, "end": 161}], "action": [{"text": "establishing and maintaining", "start": 101, "end": 129}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 141, "end": 143}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In general, its operation relies on kernel mode drivers, making it a rootkit.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is designed to covertly install a backdoor on a compromised system, hide the presence of its components, provide a communication mechanism with its C & C servers, and enable an effective data exfiltration mechanism.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "a backdoor", "start": 35, "end": 45}, {"text": "a compromised system", "start": 49, "end": 69}, {"text": "the presence of its components", "start": 76, "end": 106}, {"text": "a communication mechanism with its C & C servers", "start": 116, "end": 164}, {"text": "an effective data exfiltration mechanism", "start": 177, "end": 217}], "action": [{"text": "covertly install", "start": 18, "end": 34}, {"text": "hide", "start": 71, "end": 75}, {"text": "provide", "start": 108, "end": 115}, {"text": "enable", "start": 170, "end": 176}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 46, "end": 48}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At the same time, Snake exposed a flexibility to conduct its operations by engaging these noticeably different architectures.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In the first model, the network communications are carried out from the userland-i.e.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the network communications", "start": 20, "end": 46}, {"text": "the userland", "start": 68, "end": 80}], "action": [{"text": "are carried out", "start": 47, "end": 62}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 63, "end": 67}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "the area of the computer system where application software executes.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In another model, the network communications are handled by a kernel mode driver-i.e.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the network communications", "start": 18, "end": 44}, {"text": "a kernel mode driver", "start": 60, "end": 80}], "action": [{"text": "are handled", "start": 45, "end": 56}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "the area where lower level system code such as device drivers run.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The choice of what architecture should be used may depend on a specific target's environment, allowing the Snake operators to choose the most suitable architecture to be deployed.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The choice of what architecture should be used", "start": 0, "end": 46}, {"text": "a specific target's environment", "start": 61, "end": 92}], "action": [{"text": "depend on", "start": 51, "end": 60}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In both architectures there is a kernel mode driver installed and a usermode DLL injected by the driver into the system processes.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a kernel mode driver", "start": 31, "end": 51}, {"text": "a usermode DLL", "start": 66, "end": 80}, {"text": "the driver", "start": 93, "end": 103}, {"text": "the system processes", "start": 109, "end": 129}], "action": [{"text": "installed", "start": 52, "end": 61}, {"text": "injected", "start": 81, "end": 89}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 104, "end": 108}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In both architectures, there is both 32-bit and 64-bit code involved.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In order to distinguish between these architectures, we will call them the usermode-centric and the kernel-centric architectures respectively.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The remainder of this report gives a detailed explanation of how the two Snake architectures embed themselves in the target system and communicate with the outside world.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have also provided a set of technical indicators in the Appendix to enable organisations and the security research community to identify compromises.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In total we have collected over 100 unique files related to this espionage toolkit.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Many of these were submitted to online malware analysis websites by victims and investigators over several years.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In many cases the source country information of the submission is available.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These allow us to visualise the distribution of countries where this malware has been seen: Whilst this view is likely to only be the tip of the iceberg, it does give us an initial insight into the profile of targets for the Snake operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other useful visualisations of the operations come from the compile timestamps.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Below is shown a table with a count of the number of files in our sample set from recent years.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Two samples compiled in late January 2014 show that this activity is ongoing.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Plotting the day of the week in which the samples were compiled shows a now familiar pattern for analysts of modern cyber-attacks.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The creators of the malware operate a working week, just like any other professional.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The single sample in our set which was compiled on a Saturday is an outlier, but doesn't alter the conclusion.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Similarly, plotting the hour of the day in which the samples were compiled reveals another human pattern–the working day.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This has been adjusted to UTC+4 to show a possible fit to the operators' local time.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The usermode-centric architecture of Snake is known to have been used from 2011 till 2014, with the most recent sample compiled on January 28, 2014.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With this architecture, the Snake driver is mainly used to load the DLL module into the usermode processes, and then use that module for the communications.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the Snake driver", "start": 24, "end": 40}, {"text": "the DLL module", "start": 64, "end": 78}, {"text": "the usermode processes", "start": 84, "end": 106}, {"text": "that module", "start": 121, "end": 132}, {"text": "the communications", "start": 137, "end": 155}], "action": [{"text": "load", "start": 59, "end": 63}, {"text": "use", "start": 117, "end": 120}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 79, "end": 83}, {"text": "for", "start": 133, "end": 136}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One of the analysed samples exposed multiple debug messages and source control check-in logs.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is not clear why those messages were allowed in the deployed driver-possibly an operational security lapse.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, they give some insight into the internal structure of the source code.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, the analysed driver gave away the following source file names: The source control check-in log examples, showing the names of the developers to be'vlad' and'gilg': It also exposed the project name of this particular variant as'sengoku': Now it's time to execute the driver and see what it does.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When first executed, the driver creates device named \\Device\\vstor32 with a symbolic link \\DosDevices\\vstor32.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the driver", "start": 21, "end": 31}, {"text": "device named \\Device\\vstor32", "start": 40, "end": 68}, {"text": "a symbolic link \\DosDevices\\vstor32", "start": 74, "end": 109}], "action": [{"text": "creates", "start": 32, "end": 39}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 69, "end": 73}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This device is used for userland/kernel communications.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This device", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "userland/kernel communications", "start": 24, "end": 54}], "action": [{"text": "is used", "start": 12, "end": 19}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 20, "end": 23}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Next, it drops a DLL into the% windows% directory-the DLL is carried in the body of the driver as a binary chunk with XOR 0xAA applied on top of it, so the driver decrypts it first.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 6, "end": 8}, {"text": "a DLL", "start": 15, "end": 20}, {"text": "the% windows% directory", "start": 26, "end": 49}, {"text": "XOR 0xAA", "start": 118, "end": 126}, {"text": "it", "start": 145, "end": 147}], "action": [{"text": "drops", "start": 9, "end": 14}, {"text": "applied", "start": 127, "end": 134}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 21, "end": 25}, {"text": "on top of", "start": 135, "end": 144}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Depending on the variant, the DLL is dropped either under a random name or a hard-coded name, such as mscpx32n.dll.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the DLL", "start": 26, "end": 33}, {"text": "a random name or a hard-coded name", "start": 58, "end": 92}], "action": [{"text": "is dropped", "start": 34, "end": 44}], "modifier": [{"text": "under", "start": 52, "end": 57}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The purpose of this DLL is to be injected into the user-mode processes.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this DLL", "start": 15, "end": 23}, {"text": "the user-mode processes", "start": 47, "end": 70}], "action": [{"text": "be injected", "start": 30, "end": 41}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 42, "end": 46}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some variants of Snake carry the DLL modules that can be installed as a service, to be run within taskhost.exe or services.exe processes.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "DLL modules", "start": 33, "end": 44}, {"text": "a service", "start": 70, "end": 79}, {"text": "taskhost.exe or services.exe processes", "start": 98, "end": 136}], "action": [{"text": "be installed", "start": 54, "end": 66}, {"text": "be run", "start": 84, "end": 90}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 67, "end": 69}, {"text": "within", "start": 91, "end": 97}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Next, the driver sets up the hooks for the following kernel-mode APIs: After that, it calls PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine () in order to be notified whenever a new process is started.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the driver", "start": 6, "end": 16}, {"text": "the hooks", "start": 25, "end": 34}, {"text": "the following kernel-mode APIs", "start": 39, "end": 69}, {"text": "it", "start": 83, "end": 85}, {"text": "PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine ()", "start": 92, "end": 126}, {"text": "a new process is started", "start": 160, "end": 184}], "action": [{"text": "sets up", "start": 17, "end": 24}, {"text": "calls", "start": 86, "end": 91}, {"text": "be notified", "start": 139, "end": 150}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 35, "end": 38}, {"text": "whenever", "start": 151, "end": 159}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The handlers of the hooks above along with the notification callback allow Snake to stay persistent on a system, being able to infect any newly created processes, and restore its driver file in case it gets deleted.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Snake", "start": 75, "end": 80}, {"text": "persistent on a system", "start": 89, "end": 111}, {"text": "any newly created processes", "start": 134, "end": 161}, {"text": "its driver file", "start": 175, "end": 190}, {"text": "it gets deleted", "start": 199, "end": 214}], "action": [{"text": "stay", "start": 84, "end": 88}, {"text": "infect", "start": 127, "end": 133}, {"text": "restore", "start": 167, "end": 174}], "modifier": [{"text": "in case", "start": 191, "end": 198}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Another set of hooks it sets is designed to hide the presence of the Snake components on the system: The driver then watches for all userland processes to see if they load any web pages.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Another set of hooks", "start": 0, "end": 20}, {"text": "it", "start": 21, "end": 23}, {"text": "the presence of the Snake components on the system", "start": 49, "end": 99}, {"text": "The driver", "start": 101, "end": 111}, {"text": "all userland processes", "start": 129, "end": 151}, {"text": "see if they load any web pages", "start": 155, "end": 185}], "action": [{"text": "sets", "start": 24, "end": 28}, {"text": "hide", "start": 44, "end": 48}, {"text": "watches", "start": 117, "end": 124}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 125, "end": 128}, {"text": "to", "start": 152, "end": 154}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As long as the user is not using the Internet, Snake stays dormant too, as there is no process that communicates with the web servers.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "As long as", "start": 0, "end": 10}], "entity": [{"text": "the user is not using the Internet", "start": 11, "end": 45}, {"text": "Snake", "start": 47, "end": 52}, {"text": "dormant", "start": 59, "end": 66}], "action": [{"text": "stays", "start": 53, "end": 58}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, as soon as the user goes online, the driver intercepts that event and then immediately injects the malicious DLL module into the process that initiated connection (the browser).", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "as soon as", "start": 9, "end": 19}, {"text": "into", "start": 129, "end": 133}], "entity": [{"text": "the user goes online", "start": 20, "end": 40}, {"text": "the driver", "start": 42, "end": 52}, {"text": "that event", "start": 64, "end": 74}, {"text": "the malicious DLL module", "start": 104, "end": 128}, {"text": "the process that initiated connection", "start": 134, "end": 171}], "action": [{"text": "intercepts", "start": 53, "end": 63}, {"text": "injects", "start": 96, "end": 103}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once injected, the module initiates polling from one of the hard-coded C & C servers.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the module", "start": 15, "end": 25}, {"text": "polling", "start": 36, "end": 43}, {"text": "one of the hard-coded C & C servers", "start": 49, "end": 84}], "action": [{"text": "initiates", "start": 26, "end": 35}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 44, "end": 48}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The purpose of this behaviour is to blend Snake's traffic with the browser traffic, bypassing the firewalls, and keeping a low profile at the same time.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this behaviour", "start": 15, "end": 29}, {"text": "Snake's traffic", "start": 42, "end": 57}, {"text": "the browser traffic", "start": 63, "end": 82}, {"text": "the firewalls", "start": 94, "end": 107}, {"text": "a low profile", "start": 121, "end": 134}], "action": [{"text": "blend", "start": 36, "end": 41}, {"text": "bypassing", "start": 84, "end": 93}, {"text": "keeping", "start": 113, "end": 120}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 58, "end": 62}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By communicating from within a process that also communicates, even a technically savvy user will find it challenging to detect Snake traffic among legitimate traffic.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The reason behind such difficulty is because modern web pages often fetch pages from the different web servers, including such data as additional scripts, CSS templates, advertising contents, analytics data, blogs, social networking data, etc.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When intercepted with the purpose of analysis, such traffic may literally represent itself hundreds of DNS and HTTP requests made when a popular website, such as a news website is open.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Hiding a few DNS/HTTP requests among busy network traffic allows Snake rootkit to stay unnoticed.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "Hiding", "start": 0, "end": 6}, {"text": "stay", "start": 82, "end": 86}], "entity": [{"text": "a few DNS/HTTP requests", "start": 7, "end": 30}, {"text": "busy network traffic", "start": 37, "end": 57}, {"text": "Snake rootkit", "start": 65, "end": 78}, {"text": "unnoticed", "start": 87, "end": 96}], "modifier": [{"text": "among", "start": 31, "end": 36}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In order to test Snake's communications with the C & C servers, and still being able to clearly distinguish its traffic, a small tool was built to generate GET request to a web server running on the analysed system.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The tool was named as chrome.exe in order to trigger the malware communications.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As long as the test tool named chrome.exe did not make any requests, its memory stayed pristine.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "There were no injections made by the driver.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As soon as the tool made its first GET requests, the driver immediately injected a malicious DLL module in it, and that module started producing the following traffic: ↓ The domain names of the C & C servers it relies on are hard-coded in the body of the malware.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the driver", "start": 49, "end": 59}, {"text": "a malicious DLL module", "start": 81, "end": 103}, {"text": "it", "start": 107, "end": 109}, {"text": "that module", "start": 115, "end": 126}, {"text": "producing the following traffic", "start": 135, "end": 166}, {"text": "The domain names of the C & C servers", "start": 170, "end": 207}, {"text": "it", "start": 208, "end": 210}], "action": [{"text": "injected", "start": 72, "end": 80}, {"text": "started", "start": 127, "end": 134}, {"text": "relies on", "start": 211, "end": 220}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 104, "end": 106}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some examples are given below, and a full list of known domains is given in the Appendix D: As seen in the traffic dump above, the malware first resolves the domain name of its C & C.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 127, "end": 138}, {"text": "the domain name of its C & C", "start": 154, "end": 182}], "action": [{"text": "resolves", "start": 145, "end": 153}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Next, it fetches a file /D/pub.txt, and expects the server to respond with a string'' 1'', acknowledging it's active: Once acknowledged, it asks the server for a command, and the server returns a new command to execute: The command it receives from C & C above (swim.onlinewebshop.net) is encrypted.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 6, "end": 8}, {"text": "a file /D/pub.txt", "start": 17, "end": 34}, {"text": "the server to respond with a string'' 1'', acknowledging it's active", "start": 48, "end": 116}, {"text": "it", "start": 137, "end": 139}, {"text": "the server", "start": 145, "end": 155}, {"text": "a command", "start": 160, "end": 169}, {"text": "the server", "start": 175, "end": 185}, {"text": "a new command to execute", "start": 194, "end": 218}, {"text": "The command", "start": 220, "end": 231}, {"text": "it", "start": 232, "end": 234}, {"text": "C & C", "start": 249, "end": 254}], "action": [{"text": "fetches", "start": 9, "end": 16}, {"text": "expects", "start": 40, "end": 47}, {"text": "asks", "start": 140, "end": 144}, {"text": "returns", "start": 186, "end": 193}, {"text": "receives", "start": 235, "end": 243}, {"text": "is encrypted", "start": 286, "end": 298}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 156, "end": 159}, {"text": "from", "start": 244, "end": 248}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In order to decrypt it, the malware first applies the XOR mask to the bytes that start from offset 0x40: An identical XOR mask was also used by Agent.BTZ.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "decrypt", "start": 12, "end": 19}, {"text": "applies", "start": 42, "end": 49}], "entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 20, "end": 22}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 24, "end": 35}, {"text": "the XOR mask", "start": 50, "end": 62}, {"text": "the bytes that start from offset 0x40", "start": 66, "end": 103}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 63, "end": 65}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Next, it calculates and confirms a CRC32 checksum within the command, further decrypts the data by using the Number Theory Library (NTL), and makes sure the command is destined to the current host by matching the ID field in it.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 6, "end": 8}, {"text": "a CRC32 checksum", "start": 33, "end": 49}, {"text": "the command", "start": 57, "end": 68}, {"text": "the data", "start": 87, "end": 95}, {"text": "using the Number Theory Library (NTL)", "start": 99, "end": 136}, {"text": "the command is destined to the current host", "start": 153, "end": 196}, {"text": "matching the ID field in it", "start": 200, "end": 227}], "action": [{"text": "calculates and confirms", "start": 9, "end": 32}, {"text": "decrypts", "start": 78, "end": 86}, {"text": "makes sure", "start": 142, "end": 152}], "modifier": [{"text": "within", "start": 50, "end": 56}, {"text": "by", "start": 96, "end": 98}, {"text": "by", "start": 197, "end": 199}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once decrypted, the malware interprets the received command, as reflected in the malware log below (the new C & C server address is highlighted in it): After that, the malware connects to the new C & C, asking it for another command: The command it receives is called UpLoad, so it uploads all the collected logs to the server, and then cleans out those logs: The files it uploads are stored inside its home directory% windows%\\$NtUninstallQ [random] $, where [random] is a random number.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 16, "end": 27}, {"text": "the received command", "start": 39, "end": 59}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 164, "end": 175}, {"text": "the new C & C", "start": 188, "end": 201}, {"text": "it", "start": 210, "end": 212}, {"text": "another command", "start": 217, "end": 232}, {"text": "The command", "start": 234, "end": 245}, {"text": "it", "start": 246, "end": 248}, {"text": "it", "start": 279, "end": 281}, {"text": "all the collected logs", "start": 290, "end": 312}, {"text": "the server", "start": 316, "end": 326}, {"text": "those logs", "start": 348, "end": 358}, {"text": "The files", "start": 360, "end": 369}, {"text": "it", "start": 370, "end": 372}], "action": [{"text": "interprets", "start": 28, "end": 38}, {"text": "connects", "start": 176, "end": 184}, {"text": "asking", "start": 203, "end": 209}, {"text": "receives", "start": 249, "end": 257}, {"text": "uploads", "start": 282, "end": 289}, {"text": "cleans out", "start": 337, "end": 347}, {"text": "uploads", "start": 373, "end": 380}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 185, "end": 187}, {"text": "for", "start": 213, "end": 216}, {"text": "to", "start": 313, "end": 315}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, Snake's home directory could be C: \\WINDOWS\\ $NtUninstallQ812589 $.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The files within that directory are used by the rootkit to store configuration and log data.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The files within that directory", "start": 0, "end": 31}, {"text": "rootkit", "start": 48, "end": 55}, {"text": "configuration and log data", "start": 65, "end": 91}], "action": [{"text": "are used", "start": 32, "end": 40}, {"text": "store", "start": 59, "end": 64}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When decrypted with the same XOR key that was used by Agent.BTZ, these files expose the following contents: Analysis of the sample reveals that it supports 3 modes of fetching C & C commands.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 144, "end": 146}, {"text": "3 modes of fetching C & C commands", "start": 156, "end": 190}], "action": [{"text": "supports", "start": 147, "end": 155}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• In the first mode, it relies on Windows Internet (WinINet) APIs, such as HttpOpenRequest (), HttpSendRequest (), InternetReadFile (), etc.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 21, "end": 23}, {"text": "Windows Internet (WinINet) APIs, such as HttpOpenRequest (), HttpSendRequest (), InternetReadFile (), etc", "start": 34, "end": 139}], "action": [{"text": "relies on", "start": 24, "end": 33}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• In the second mode, it uses Windows Sockets 2 (Winsock) APIs, such as WSAStartup (), socket (), connect (), send (), etc.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 22, "end": 24}, {"text": "Windows Sockets 2 (Winsock) APIs, such as WSAStartup (), socket (), connect (), send (), etc", "start": 30, "end": 122}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 25, "end": 29}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "• In the third mode, it works in the'pipe server' mode, when it passes the web requests it is interested in (as a client) to the pipe server that runs within Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) and/or Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe) processes.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 21, "end": 23}, {"text": "the'pipe server' mode", "start": 33, "end": 54}, {"text": "it", "start": 61, "end": 63}, {"text": "the web requests it is interested in (as a client)", "start": 71, "end": 121}, {"text": "the pipe server that runs within Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) and/or Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe) processes", "start": 125, "end": 239}], "action": [{"text": "works", "start": 24, "end": 29}, {"text": "passes", "start": 64, "end": 70}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 30, "end": 32}, {"text": "to", "start": 122, "end": 124}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Memory pipes is a common mechanism for Inter-Process Communications (IPC).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When the pipe server reads such requests from the pipes, it performs the web request on behalf of a client by using WinINet APIs, so it effectively serves as a proxy.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The diagram below demonstrates the last,'pipe server' mode of Snake operation: The diagram illustrates the operation steps 1-4: 1 First, the malicious driver with the embedded DLL module injects that DLL into a system process, such as services.exe; once loaded, the DLL will function in the'pipe server' mode.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malicious driver with the embedded DLL module", "start": 137, "end": 186}, {"text": "that DLL", "start": 195, "end": 203}, {"text": "a system process, such as services.exe", "start": 209, "end": 247}, {"text": "the DLL", "start": 262, "end": 269}, {"text": "the'pipe server' mode", "start": 287, "end": 308}], "action": [{"text": "injects", "start": 187, "end": 194}, {"text": "function", "start": 275, "end": 283}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 204, "end": 208}, {"text": "in", "start": 284, "end": 286}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "2 As soon as the driver detects a usermode process that goes online (e.g. a browser), it will inject malicious DLL module into it; depending on the operational mode, the DLL may start communicating with C & C directly.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the driver", "start": 13, "end": 23}, {"text": "a usermode process that goes online (e.g. a browser)", "start": 32, "end": 84}, {"text": "it", "start": 86, "end": 88}, {"text": "malicious DLL module", "start": 101, "end": 121}, {"text": "it", "start": 127, "end": 129}, {"text": "the DLL", "start": 166, "end": 173}, {"text": "communicating with C & C directly", "start": 184, "end": 217}], "action": [{"text": "detects", "start": 24, "end": 31}, {"text": "inject", "start": 94, "end": 100}, {"text": "start", "start": 178, "end": 183}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 122, "end": 126}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "3 In the'pipe mode' of operation, the injected DLL will start communicating with the pipe server by sending messages into the established inter-process communication pipes.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the injected DLL", "start": 34, "end": 50}, {"text": "communicating with the pipe server", "start": 62, "end": 96}, {"text": "messages", "start": 108, "end": 116}, {"text": "the established inter-process communication pipes", "start": 122, "end": 171}], "action": [{"text": "start", "start": 56, "end": 61}, {"text": "sending", "start": 100, "end": 107}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 117, "end": 121}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "4 Once the task of communication with C & C is delegated to the pipe server, it will start communicating with the C & C, bypassing the host-based firewalls that keep an infected system process in a white-list.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the task of communication with C & C", "start": 7, "end": 43}, {"text": "the pipe server", "start": 60, "end": 75}, {"text": "it", "start": 77, "end": 79}, {"text": "communicating with the C & C", "start": 91, "end": 119}, {"text": "the host-based firewalls that keep an infected system process in a white-list", "start": 131, "end": 208}], "action": [{"text": "is delegated", "start": 44, "end": 56}, {"text": "start", "start": 85, "end": 90}, {"text": "bypassing", "start": 121, "end": 130}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 57, "end": 59}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The reason behind the pipes usage is to'legitimise' the outbound web requests, forcing them to originate from the host firewall- friendly system services.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the pipes usage", "start": 18, "end": 33}, {"text": "the outbound web requests", "start": 52, "end": 77}], "action": [{"text": "'legitimise'", "start": 39, "end": 51}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Pipe server is a special mode of the injected DLL.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In order to switch into that mode, a dedicated thread is spawned to listen for IPC messages received through the pipes.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a dedicated thread", "start": 35, "end": 53}, {"text": "IPC messages received through the pipes", "start": 79, "end": 118}], "action": [{"text": "is spawned", "start": 54, "end": 64}, {"text": "listen", "start": 68, "end": 74}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 75, "end": 78}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The memory pipes used by Snake are named as: Apart from GET/POST requests, the pipe clients (infected usermode processes) may also ask the pipe server to perform other operations on their behalf, such as saving data into a temporary file, copy/delete files, save configuration data into the registry under the aforementioned ShellCore value.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "GET", "start": 56, "end": 59}, {"text": "POST requests", "start": 60, "end": 73}, {"text": "the pipe clients (infected usermode processes)", "start": 75, "end": 121}, {"text": "the pipe server", "start": 135, "end": 150}, {"text": "data", "start": 211, "end": 215}, {"text": "a temporary file", "start": 221, "end": 237}, {"text": "files", "start": 251, "end": 256}, {"text": "configuration data", "start": 263, "end": 281}, {"text": "the registry", "start": 287, "end": 299}, {"text": "the aforementioned ShellCore value", "start": 306, "end": 340}], "action": [{"text": "ask", "start": 131, "end": 134}, {"text": "perform", "start": 154, "end": 161}, {"text": "saving", "start": 204, "end": 210}, {"text": "copy", "start": 239, "end": 243}, {"text": "delete", "start": 244, "end": 250}, {"text": "save", "start": 258, "end": 262}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 216, "end": 220}, {"text": "into", "start": 282, "end": 286}, {"text": "under", "start": 300, "end": 305}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This delegation of tasks is designed to keep infected processes under the radar of the behavioural analysis tools for as long as possible.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This delegation of tasks", "start": 0, "end": 24}, {"text": "infected processes", "start": 45, "end": 63}, {"text": "the radar of the behavioural analysis tools", "start": 70, "end": 113}, {"text": "as long as possible", "start": 118, "end": 137}], "action": [{"text": "keep", "start": 40, "end": 44}], "modifier": [{"text": "under", "start": 64, "end": 69}, {"text": "for", "start": 114, "end": 117}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Another reason is to overcome account restrictions imposed on a browser process in order to be able to write into files/registry.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "overcome", "start": 21, "end": 29}, {"text": "write", "start": 103, "end": 108}], "entity": [{"text": "account restrictions imposed on a browser process", "start": 30, "end": 79}, {"text": "files", "start": 114, "end": 119}, {"text": "registry", "start": 120, "end": 128}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 109, "end": 113}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To delegate different types of tasks, the clients send messages to the pipe server using the following task identification headers: The usermode component of Snake communicates with its kernel-mode driver via a device called \\\\.\\vstor32 (created under kernel as \\Device\\vstor32).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the clients", "start": 38, "end": 49}, {"text": "messages", "start": 55, "end": 63}, {"text": "the pipe server", "start": 67, "end": 82}, {"text": "the following task identification headers", "start": 89, "end": 130}, {"text": "The usermode component of Snake", "start": 132, "end": 163}, {"text": "its kernel-mode driver", "start": 182, "end": 204}, {"text": "a device called \\\\.\\vstor32 (created under kernel as \\Device\\vstor32)", "start": 209, "end": 278}], "action": [{"text": "send", "start": 50, "end": 54}, {"text": "communicates", "start": 164, "end": 176}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 64, "end": 66}, {"text": "using", "start": 83, "end": 88}, {"text": "with", "start": 177, "end": 181}, {"text": "via", "start": 205, "end": 208}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In its communication protocol with the driver it uses the IOCTL code of 0x222038.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To write data, it opens the device with CreateFile ('' \\\\.\\vstor32''), then calls DeviceIoControl () API on its handle with IOCTL code of 0x222038.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "write", "start": 3, "end": 8}, {"text": "opens", "start": 18, "end": 23}, {"text": "calls", "start": 76, "end": 81}], "entity": [{"text": "data", "start": 9, "end": 13}, {"text": "it", "start": 15, "end": 17}, {"text": "the device", "start": 24, "end": 34}, {"text": "CreateFile ('' \\\\.\\vstor32'')", "start": 40, "end": 69}, {"text": "DeviceIoControl () API", "start": 82, "end": 104}, {"text": "its handle", "start": 108, "end": 118}, {"text": "IOCTL code of 0x222038", "start": 124, "end": 146}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 35, "end": 39}, {"text": "on", "start": 105, "end": 107}, {"text": "with", "start": 119, "end": 123}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Configuration parameters along with the initial set of domain names are hard-coded within the body of the DLL.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the initial set of domain names", "start": 36, "end": 67}, {"text": "the body of the DLL", "start": 90, "end": 109}], "action": [{"text": "are hard-coded", "start": 68, "end": 82}], "modifier": [{"text": "within", "start": 83, "end": 89}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, the data appears to be defined in the structures, so it is very likely the DLL could be generated by a stand-alone builder that'patches' the DLL with the new/updated list of C & C.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Analysis of the commands performed by the malware suggests the following capabilities: Together, these commands provide complete backdoor functionality, allowing remote attacker full control over the compromised system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the commands", "start": 12, "end": 24}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 38, "end": 49}, {"text": "these commands", "start": 97, "end": 111}, {"text": "complete backdoor functionality", "start": 120, "end": 151}, {"text": "remote attacker", "start": 162, "end": 177}, {"text": "full control over the compromised system", "start": 178, "end": 218}], "action": [{"text": "performed", "start": 25, "end": 34}, {"text": "provide", "start": 112, "end": 119}, {"text": "allowing", "start": 153, "end": 161}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The ability to update the driver and then rely on its communication capabilities means that the components of Snake are flexible, making possible the existence of the hybrid (kernel-centric and usermode-centric) architectures.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "update", "start": 15, "end": 21}, {"text": "rely on", "start": 42, "end": 49}], "entity": [{"text": "the driver", "start": 22, "end": 32}, {"text": "its communication capabilities", "start": 50, "end": 80}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, the virtual partitions are used by kernel-centric Snake variants, where the kernel-mode driver is responsible for the communications.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the kernel-mode driver", "start": 85, "end": 107}, {"text": "responsible for the communications", "start": 111, "end": 145}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 108, "end": 110}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If such a driver is installed via an update, the usermode component can be instructed to delegate the file upload task to the driver by copying all the necessary logs into the shared virtual partition, physically located on the compromised host and thus, accessible from kernel.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "such a driver", "start": 3, "end": 16}, {"text": "an update", "start": 34, "end": 43}, {"text": "the usermode component", "start": 45, "end": 67}, {"text": "all the necessary logs", "start": 144, "end": 166}, {"text": "the shared virtual partition", "start": 172, "end": 200}], "action": [{"text": "is installed", "start": 17, "end": 29}, {"text": "be instructed", "start": 72, "end": 85}, {"text": "copying", "start": 136, "end": 143}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 30, "end": 33}, {"text": "into", "start": 167, "end": 171}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This particular architecture relies on a kernel-mode driver to carry out the network communications.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a kernel-mode driver", "start": 39, "end": 59}, {"text": "the network communications", "start": 73, "end": 99}], "action": [{"text": "carry out", "start": 63, "end": 72}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The usermode DLLs are still injected into the system processes to perform high-level tasks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The usermode DLLs", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "the system processes", "start": 42, "end": 62}, {"text": "perform high-level tasks", "start": 66, "end": 90}], "action": [{"text": "are still injected", "start": 18, "end": 36}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 37, "end": 41}, {"text": "to", "start": 63, "end": 65}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The delivery mechanism is not known: it may be distributed via a thumb-drive, a phishing email attachment, or be delivered via an exploit across the network (e.g.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 37, "end": 39}, {"text": "a phishing email attachment", "start": 78, "end": 105}, {"text": "an exploit across the network", "start": 127, "end": 156}], "action": [{"text": "be distributed", "start": 44, "end": 58}, {"text": "be delivered", "start": 110, "end": 122}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 59, "end": 62}, {"text": "via", "start": 123, "end": 126}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "by using the reconnaissance tool that is explained later).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Infection starts from a dropper penetrating into the compromised system where it is allowed to run.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Infection", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "a dropper penetrating into the compromised system where it is allowed to run", "start": 22, "end": 98}], "action": [{"text": "starts", "start": 10, "end": 16}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 17, "end": 21}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once executed, the dropper installs the kernel mode driver in a pre-defined location.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "executed", "start": 5, "end": 13}, {"text": "installs", "start": 27, "end": 35}], "entity": [{"text": "the dropper", "start": 15, "end": 26}, {"text": "the kernel mode driver", "start": 36, "end": 58}, {"text": "a pre-defined location", "start": 62, "end": 84}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 59, "end": 61}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The dropper itself is 32-bit, so it will run both on 32-bit and 64-bit Windows OS (in WoW64 mode).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On a 32-bit OS, it will install a 32-bit driver.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "On", "start": 0, "end": 2}], "entity": [{"text": "a 32-bit OS", "start": 3, "end": 14}, {"text": "it", "start": 16, "end": 18}, {"text": "a 32-bit driver", "start": 32, "end": 47}], "action": [{"text": "install", "start": 24, "end": 31}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On a 64-bit OS, it will install a 64-bit driver.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "On", "start": 0, "end": 2}], "entity": [{"text": "a 64-bit OS", "start": 3, "end": 14}, {"text": "it", "start": 16, "end": 18}, {"text": "a 64-bit driver", "start": 32, "end": 47}], "action": [{"text": "install", "start": 24, "end": 31}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The analysed 32-bit dropper creates a driver in the following location: However, different samples may use a different path and driver file name.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The analysed 32-bit dropper", "start": 0, "end": 27}, {"text": "a driver", "start": 36, "end": 44}, {"text": "the following location", "start": 48, "end": 70}], "action": [{"text": "creates", "start": 28, "end": 35}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 45, "end": 47}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, some samples exposed these filenames: fdisk32.sys, A0009547.sys, or Ultra3.sys.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The filename of the dropper could be rknginst.exe or fdiskmon.exe.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once executed, the driver first makes sure it is registered under a pre-defined name, such as Ultra3.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other samples may have a different registration name, such as ~ROOT.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The registration is ensured with creation of the following registry entries: The driver then flags the following events with the notification purposes: The rootkit then places a number of the hooks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The registration", "start": 0, "end": 16}, {"text": "creation of the following registry entries", "start": 33, "end": 75}, {"text": "The driver", "start": 77, "end": 87}, {"text": "the following events", "start": 99, "end": 119}, {"text": "the notification purposes", "start": 125, "end": 150}, {"text": "The rootkit", "start": 152, "end": 163}, {"text": "a number of the hooks", "start": 176, "end": 197}], "action": [{"text": "is ensured", "start": 17, "end": 27}, {"text": "flags", "start": 93, "end": 98}, {"text": "places", "start": 169, "end": 175}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 28, "end": 32}, {"text": "with", "start": 120, "end": 124}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first API it hooks is IoCreateDevice ().", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 14, "end": 16}, {"text": "IoCreateDevice ()", "start": 26, "end": 43}], "action": [{"text": "hooks", "start": 17, "end": 22}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The installed hook handler calls the original API and then checks if the name of the device is netbt or afd.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The installed hook handler", "start": 0, "end": 26}, {"text": "the original API", "start": 33, "end": 49}, {"text": "if the name of the device is netbt or afd", "start": 66, "end": 107}], "action": [{"text": "calls", "start": 27, "end": 32}, {"text": "checks", "start": 59, "end": 65}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If so, it will install a TDI filter driver.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 7, "end": 9}, {"text": "a TDI filter driver", "start": 23, "end": 42}], "action": [{"text": "install", "start": 15, "end": 22}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the device name is Null, Beep, tcpip or Nsiproxy, it will activate itself by enabling its hooks designed to hide the presence of Snake on a system, set up its access control lists and the messaging system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "its hooks", "start": 89, "end": 98}, {"text": "the presence of Snake on a system", "start": 116, "end": 149}], "action": [{"text": "hide", "start": 111, "end": 115}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In order to hide its components, the driver hooks the following APIs: For example, the hook handlers of the registry-related APIs will block access to the registry entries that contain the name of the driver.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "hide", "start": 12, "end": 16}, {"text": "hooks", "start": 44, "end": 49}, {"text": "block", "start": 135, "end": 140}], "entity": [{"text": "its components", "start": 17, "end": 31}, {"text": "the driver", "start": 33, "end": 43}, {"text": "the following APIs", "start": 50, "end": 68}, {"text": "the hook handlers of the registry-related APIs", "start": 83, "end": 129}, {"text": "access to the registry entries that contain the name of the driver", "start": 141, "end": 207}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In one example, the rootkit blocks access to registry entries that contain the strings'' Ultra3'' and'' ~ROOT''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the rootkit", "start": 16, "end": 27}, {"text": "access to registry entries that contain the strings'' Ultra3'' and'' ~ROOT''", "start": 35, "end": 111}], "action": [{"text": "blocks", "start": 28, "end": 34}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The ZwReadFile () hook handler will block access to the home directory where the rootkit keeps its file.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The ZwReadFile () hook handler", "start": 0, "end": 30}, {"text": "access to the home directory where the rootkit keeps its file", "start": 42, "end": 103}], "action": [{"text": "block", "start": 36, "end": 41}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In one of the analysed kernel-centric Snake samples the home directory was hard-coded as% windows%\\$NtUninstallQ817473 $, so it blocked file read access from that directory.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 125, "end": 127}, {"text": "file read access from that directory", "start": 136, "end": 172}], "action": [{"text": "blocked", "start": 128, "end": 135}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The ZwClose () hook handler is used to inject the DLL module into the userland processes.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The ZwClose () hook handler", "start": 0, "end": 27}, {"text": "the DLL module", "start": 46, "end": 60}, {"text": "the userland processes", "start": 66, "end": 88}], "action": [{"text": "inject", "start": 39, "end": 45}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 61, "end": 65}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The hook handler for ZwTerminateProcess () checks if the process being shut down is svchost.exe.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The hook handler for ZwTerminateProcess ()", "start": 0, "end": 42}, {"text": "if the process being shut down is svchost.exe", "start": 50, "end": 95}], "action": [{"text": "checks", "start": 43, "end": 49}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If so, it considers it to be a system shutdown, so it unloads its usermode DLL and deactivates its own network drivers, just like it does when its ZwShutdownSystem () hook handler gets invoked.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 51, "end": 53}, {"text": "its usermode DLL", "start": 62, "end": 78}, {"text": "its own network drivers", "start": 95, "end": 118}], "action": [{"text": "unloads", "start": 54, "end": 61}, {"text": "deactivates", "start": 83, "end": 94}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The ObOpenObjectByName () hook is designed to hide the presence of its virtual partitions (described later).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The ObOpenObjectByName () hook", "start": 0, "end": 30}, {"text": "the presence of its virtual partitions", "start": 51, "end": 89}], "action": [{"text": "hide", "start": 46, "end": 50}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To encrypt data stored on its virtual partitions, the driver sets a hook for another API: To re-infect the usermode process svchost.exe and to re-enable its network drivers, the rootkit hooks these APIs: Snake then proceeds to the task of deep packet inspection and modification.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "encrypt", "start": 3, "end": 10}, {"text": "sets", "start": 61, "end": 65}, {"text": "re-infect", "start": 93, "end": 102}, {"text": "re-enable", "start": 143, "end": 152}, {"text": "hooks", "start": 186, "end": 191}], "entity": [{"text": "data stored on its virtual partitions", "start": 11, "end": 48}, {"text": "the driver", "start": 50, "end": 60}, {"text": "a hook for another API", "start": 66, "end": 88}, {"text": "the usermode process svchost.exe", "start": 103, "end": 135}, {"text": "its network drivers", "start": 153, "end": 172}, {"text": "the rootkit", "start": 174, "end": 185}, {"text": "these APIs", "start": 192, "end": 202}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In order to accomplish it, it registers a callout driver for Windows Filtering Platform (WFP), an architecture first introduced with Windows Vista and nowadays normally used by antivirus and/or intrusion detection systems to inspect/block malicious traffic.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 27, "end": 29}, {"text": "a callout driver for Windows Filtering Platform (WFP)", "start": 40, "end": 93}], "action": [{"text": "registers", "start": 30, "end": 39}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Snake sets filters at the layers FWPMLAYERSTREAMV4 and FWPMLAYERALEFLOWESTABLISHEDV4 in the TCP/ IP stack, so that its callout driver is notified whenever a TCP connection is established by a browser.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "its callout driver", "start": 115, "end": 133}, {"text": "a TCP connection is established by a browser", "start": 155, "end": 199}], "action": [{"text": "is notified", "start": 134, "end": 145}], "modifier": [{"text": "whenever", "start": 146, "end": 154}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When that happens, the rootkit triggers an event named \\BaseNamedObjects\\wininetactivate.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the rootkit", "start": 19, "end": 30}, {"text": "an event named \\BaseNamedObjects\\wininetactivate", "start": 40, "end": 88}], "action": [{"text": "triggers", "start": 31, "end": 39}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When the data arrives, it is intercepted with the FwpsCopyStreamDataToBuffer0 () API, and then scanned for the presence of the hidden commands from C & C.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "When", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "with", "start": 41, "end": 45}, {"text": "for", "start": 103, "end": 106}], "entity": [{"text": "the data arrives", "start": 5, "end": 21}, {"text": "it", "start": 23, "end": 25}, {"text": "the FwpsCopyStreamDataToBuffer0 () API", "start": 46, "end": 84}, {"text": "the presence of the hidden commands from C & C", "start": 107, "end": 153}], "action": [{"text": "is intercepted", "start": 26, "end": 40}, {"text": "scanned", "start": 95, "end": 102}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The driver inspects bidirectional network data on a per stream basis, as it's located right on the stream data path.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The driver", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "bidirectional network data", "start": 20, "end": 46}, {"text": "a per stream basis", "start": 50, "end": 68}], "action": [{"text": "inspects", "start": 11, "end": 19}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 47, "end": 49}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An ability to manipulate data streams is provided with the packet injection logic below, allowing Snake to covertly insert traffic destined to its C & C servers: In order to qualify as a browser, the usermode process must have any of the following names: In addition to WFP, Snake also hooks the Transport Driver Interface (TDI) network routines by setting itself up as a TDI filter driver.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "manipulate", "start": 14, "end": 24}, {"text": "insert", "start": 116, "end": 122}, {"text": "hooks", "start": 286, "end": 291}], "entity": [{"text": "data streams", "start": 25, "end": 37}, {"text": "Snake", "start": 98, "end": 103}, {"text": "traffic destined to its C & C servers", "start": 123, "end": 160}, {"text": "Snake", "start": 275, "end": 280}, {"text": "the Transport Driver Interface (TDI) network routines", "start": 292, "end": 345}, {"text": "setting itself up as a TDI filter driver", "start": 349, "end": 389}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 346, "end": 348}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "TDI is considered deprecated and will be removed in future versions of Microsoft Windows, but it's still supported on Windows 7.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Being registered as a TDI driver on the device stack, Snake hooks TCP calls.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "registered", "start": 6, "end": 16}, {"text": "hooks", "start": 60, "end": 65}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 17, "end": 19}, {"text": "on", "start": 33, "end": 35}], "entity": [{"text": "a TDI driver", "start": 20, "end": 32}, {"text": "the device stack", "start": 36, "end": 52}, {"text": "Snake", "start": 54, "end": 59}, {"text": "TCP calls", "start": 66, "end": 75}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This way it intercepts all requests along with their parameters via IRP (IO request package) hooks.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 9, "end": 11}, {"text": "all requests along with their parameters", "start": 23, "end": 63}, {"text": "IRP (IO request package) hooks", "start": 68, "end": 98}], "action": [{"text": "intercepts", "start": 12, "end": 22}], "modifier": [{"text": "via", "start": 64, "end": 67}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By'sniffing' all the requests, it can now inspect the traffic, looking for and then parsing GET/POST HTTP requests and also SMTP communications, in order to distinguish commands addressed to itself.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 31, "end": 33}, {"text": "the traffic", "start": 50, "end": 61}, {"text": "GET/POST HTTP requests and also SMTP communications", "start": 92, "end": 143}, {"text": "commands addressed to itself", "start": 169, "end": 197}], "action": [{"text": "inspect", "start": 42, "end": 49}, {"text": "looking for and then parsing", "start": 63, "end": 91}, {"text": "distinguish", "start": 157, "end": 168}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the rootkit detects that the OS version is pre-Vista (e.g. Windows XP) or Windows Server 2008 (e.g. Windows Server 2003), it will invoke FwpsStreamInjectAsync0 () API in order to generate outbound requests.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the rootkit", "start": 3, "end": 14}, {"text": "the OS version is pre-Vista (e.g. Windows XP) or Windows Server 2008 (e.g. Windows Server 2003)", "start": 28, "end": 123}, {"text": "it", "start": 125, "end": 127}, {"text": "FwpsStreamInjectAsync0 () API", "start": 140, "end": 169}, {"text": "outbound requests", "start": 191, "end": 208}], "action": [{"text": "detects", "start": 15, "end": 22}, {"text": "invoke", "start": 133, "end": 139}, {"text": "generate", "start": 182, "end": 190}], "modifier": [{"text": "that", "start": 23, "end": 27}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Whenever the client establishes connections, the TDI driver will also'pulse' the \\BaseNamedObjects\\wininetactivate event, just like the WPF driver's component of it, in order to notify the userland service about the event.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "Whenever", "start": 0, "end": 8}], "entity": [{"text": "the client establishes connections", "start": 9, "end": 43}, {"text": "the TDI driver", "start": 45, "end": 59}, {"text": "the \\BaseNamedObjects\\wininetactivate event", "start": 77, "end": 120}], "action": [{"text": "'pulse'", "start": 69, "end": 76}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The data that the driver intercepts, along with the important notifications, is passed to the userland DLL to be processed.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The data", "start": 0, "end": 8}, {"text": "the driver", "start": 14, "end": 24}], "action": [{"text": "intercepts", "start": 25, "end": 35}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the data contains commands from C & C, the DLL module is expected to execute them and report results back to the driver to be delivered back to C & C.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "If", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "back to", "start": 139, "end": 146}], "entity": [{"text": "the data contains commands from C & C", "start": 3, "end": 40}, {"text": "the DLL module", "start": 42, "end": 56}, {"text": "them", "start": 80, "end": 84}, {"text": "the driver", "start": 112, "end": 122}, {"text": "C & C", "start": 147, "end": 152}], "action": [{"text": "execute", "start": 72, "end": 79}, {"text": "be delivered", "start": 126, "end": 138}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For NDIS versions 5.X, Snake rootkit contains code that installs NDIS filter intermediate driver.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "code", "start": 46, "end": 50}, {"text": "NDIS filter intermediate driver", "start": 65, "end": 96}], "action": [{"text": "installs", "start": 56, "end": 64}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This driver is set up above a miniport driver (a driver that communicates with the physical device) and below a protocol driver (a driver that implements a protocol, e.g.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This driver", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "a miniport driver", "start": 28, "end": 45}, {"text": "a protocol driver", "start": 110, "end": 127}], "action": [{"text": "is set up", "start": 12, "end": 21}], "modifier": [{"text": "above", "start": 22, "end": 27}, {"text": "below", "start": 104, "end": 109}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "TCP/IP).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The driver is registered with NdisIMRegisterLayeredMiniport () API.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The driver", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "NdisIMRegisterLayeredMiniport () API", "start": 30, "end": 66}], "action": [{"text": "is registered", "start": 11, "end": 24}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 25, "end": 29}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After that, the drivers hooks the following exports within ndis.sys: The rootkit contains code that installs NDIS filter driver for NDIS 6.0 and above: NDIS filter driver configuration is stored in the registry entry: The driver is registered with NdisFRegisterFilterDriver () API.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the drivers", "start": 12, "end": 23}, {"text": "the following exports", "start": 30, "end": 51}, {"text": "ndis.sys", "start": 59, "end": 67}, {"text": "code", "start": 90, "end": 94}, {"text": "NDIS filter driver for NDIS 6.0 and above", "start": 109, "end": 150}, {"text": "NDIS filter driver configuration", "start": 152, "end": 184}, {"text": "the registry entry", "start": 198, "end": 216}, {"text": "The driver", "start": 218, "end": 228}, {"text": "NdisFRegisterFilterDriver () API", "start": 248, "end": 280}], "action": [{"text": "hooks", "start": 24, "end": 29}, {"text": "installs", "start": 100, "end": 108}, {"text": "is stored", "start": 185, "end": 194}, {"text": "is registered", "start": 229, "end": 242}], "modifier": [{"text": "within", "start": 52, "end": 58}, {"text": "in", "start": 195, "end": 197}, {"text": "with", "start": 243, "end": 247}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After that, the drivers hooks the following exports within ndis.sys (for NDIS 6.0): Another set of exports it attempts to hook in ndis.sys (for NDIS 6.0) is: With the hooks installed, whenever the network adapter driver attempts to register to NDIS, or whenever there is an attempt to install NDIS intermediate driver or NDIS filter driver, the hook handlers will register Snake's own MiniportXxx functions with the NDIS library.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the drivers", "start": 12, "end": 23}, {"text": "the following exports", "start": 30, "end": 51}, {"text": "ndis.sys (for NDIS 6.0)", "start": 59, "end": 82}, {"text": "Another set of exports", "start": 84, "end": 106}, {"text": "it", "start": 107, "end": 109}, {"text": "ndis.sys (for NDIS 6.0)", "start": 130, "end": 153}, {"text": "the hooks", "start": 163, "end": 172}, {"text": "the hook handlers", "start": 341, "end": 358}, {"text": "Snake's own MiniportXxx functions", "start": 373, "end": 406}, {"text": "the NDIS library", "start": 412, "end": 428}], "action": [{"text": "hooks", "start": 24, "end": 29}, {"text": "hook", "start": 122, "end": 126}, {"text": "installed", "start": 173, "end": 182}, {"text": "register", "start": 364, "end": 372}], "modifier": [{"text": "within", "start": 52, "end": 58}, {"text": "in", "start": 127, "end": 129}, {"text": "with", "start": 407, "end": 411}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "With its own miniport handler functions, it can send/receive data by using a private TCP/IP stack, bypassing all firewall hooks, and making its open ports invisible to scanners.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 41, "end": 43}, {"text": "data", "start": 61, "end": 65}, {"text": "using a private TCP/IP stack", "start": 69, "end": 97}, {"text": "all firewall hooks", "start": 109, "end": 127}, {"text": "its open ports", "start": 140, "end": 154}, {"text": "invisible to scanners", "start": 155, "end": 176}], "action": [{"text": "send", "start": 48, "end": 52}, {"text": "receive", "start": 53, "end": 60}, {"text": "bypassing", "start": 99, "end": 108}, {"text": "making", "start": 133, "end": 139}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 66, "end": 68}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Snake rootkit registers itself as Network Driver Interface Specification (NDIS) protocol driver.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The Snake rootkit", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "itself", "start": 28, "end": 34}, {"text": "Network Driver Interface Specification (NDIS) protocol driver", "start": 38, "end": 99}], "action": [{"text": "registers", "start": 18, "end": 27}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 35, "end": 37}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Whenever the underlying miniport driver receives data from the network, it calls NDIS by invoking a data receive indication function NdisMIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists ().", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the underlying miniport driver", "start": 9, "end": 39}, {"text": "data", "start": 49, "end": 53}, {"text": "the network", "start": 59, "end": 70}, {"text": "it", "start": 72, "end": 74}, {"text": "a data receive indication function NdisMIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists ()", "start": 98, "end": 170}], "action": [{"text": "receives", "start": 40, "end": 48}, {"text": "invoking", "start": 89, "end": 97}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 54, "end": 58}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When that happens, NDIS invokes Snake's hook function (ProtocolReceiveNetBufferLists) to process the received data.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "NDIS", "start": 19, "end": 23}, {"text": "Snake's hook function", "start": 32, "end": 53}], "action": [{"text": "invokes", "start": 24, "end": 31}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To send the data back, the protocol driver defines the data in a list of NETBUFFERLIST structures, and then passes them to NDIS by calling NdisSendNetBufferLists ().", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "send", "start": 3, "end": 7}, {"text": "defines", "start": 43, "end": 50}, {"text": "calling", "start": 131, "end": 138}], "entity": [{"text": "the data", "start": 8, "end": 16}, {"text": "the protocol driver", "start": 23, "end": 42}, {"text": "the data", "start": 51, "end": 59}, {"text": "a list of NETBUFFERLIST structures", "start": 63, "end": 97}, {"text": "NdisSendNetBufferLists ()", "start": 139, "end": 164}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 60, "end": 62}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "NDIS, in turn, calls the miniport driver's MiniportSendNetBufferLists () function to forward the data to an underlying miniport driver.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "NDIS", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "the miniport driver's MiniportSendNetBufferLists () function", "start": 21, "end": 81}], "action": [{"text": "calls", "start": 15, "end": 20}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Being able to fully manipulate traffic at 3 different levels (NDIS protocol driver, TDI Driver, and WPF callout driver), Snake is able to'inject' the traffic into existing communications to reach out to external components, and at the same time parse all incoming traffic to detect traffic addressed to itself: As the driver intercepts all connections (e.g.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "manipulate", "start": 20, "end": 30}, {"text": "'inject'", "start": 137, "end": 145}, {"text": "reach out", "start": 190, "end": 199}, {"text": "parse", "start": 245, "end": 250}, {"text": "detect", "start": 275, "end": 281}, {"text": "intercepts", "start": 325, "end": 335}], "entity": [{"text": "traffic", "start": 31, "end": 38}, {"text": "3 different levels (NDIS protocol driver, TDI Driver, and WPF callout driver)", "start": 42, "end": 119}, {"text": "Snake", "start": 121, "end": 126}, {"text": "the traffic", "start": 146, "end": 157}, {"text": "existing communications", "start": 163, "end": 186}, {"text": "external components", "start": 203, "end": 222}, {"text": "all incoming traffic", "start": 251, "end": 271}, {"text": "traffic addressed to itself", "start": 282, "end": 309}, {"text": "the driver", "start": 314, "end": 324}, {"text": "all connections", "start": 336, "end": 351}], "modifier": [{"text": "at", "start": 39, "end": 41}, {"text": "into", "start": 158, "end": 162}, {"text": "to", "start": 200, "end": 202}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "on TDIRECEIVE TDI event or ClientEventReceive () event notification triggered through its TDI Filter Driver), it parses all incoming HTTP and SMTP traffic to see if it can be authenticated as Snake traffic.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 110, "end": 112}, {"text": "all incoming HTTP and SMTP traffic", "start": 120, "end": 154}, {"text": "it", "start": 165, "end": 167}, {"text": "Snake traffic", "start": 192, "end": 205}], "action": [{"text": "parses", "start": 113, "end": 119}, {"text": "be authenticated", "start": 172, "end": 188}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 189, "end": 191}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The authentication is implemented by decrypting the data and making sure it starts with the markers 0xDEADBEAF and 0xC001BA5E (which appear to derive from'DEAD BEEF' and'COOL BASE').", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The authentication", "start": 0, "end": 18}, {"text": "the data", "start": 48, "end": 56}, {"text": "it starts with the markers 0xDEADBEAF and 0xC001BA5E (which appear to derive from'DEAD BEEF' and'COOL BASE')", "start": 73, "end": 181}], "action": [{"text": "is implemented", "start": 19, "end": 33}, {"text": "decrypting", "start": 37, "end": 47}, {"text": "making sure", "start": 61, "end": 72}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Here are specific steps: By observing such behaviour, one might wonder why the driver is expecting HTTP or SMTP clients? Why does it act like HTTP/SMTP server processing client traffic, and serving back normal responses as per the protocol? For example, in HTTP the driver will respond with messages like'' HTTP/1.1 200 OK'' or'' HTTP/1.1 500 Server Error''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the driver", "start": 262, "end": 272}, {"text": "messages like'' HTTP/1.1 200 OK'' or'' HTTP/1.1 500 Server Error''", "start": 291, "end": 357}], "action": [{"text": "respond", "start": 278, "end": 285}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 286, "end": 290}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For SMTP traffic, it communicates back normal SMTP server responses, such as'' 250 Sender OK'','' 503 Bad sequence of commands'', etc.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The reason behind such behaviour is that the driver is acting in this mode like a proxy, routing requests from other infected hosts to a remote C & C server.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the driver", "start": 41, "end": 51}, {"text": "this mode", "start": 65, "end": 74}, {"text": "a proxy", "start": 80, "end": 87}, {"text": "requests from other infected hosts", "start": 97, "end": 131}, {"text": "a remote C & C server", "start": 135, "end": 156}], "action": [{"text": "is acting", "start": 52, "end": 61}, {"text": "routing", "start": 89, "end": 96}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 62, "end": 64}, {"text": "like", "start": 75, "end": 79}, {"text": "to", "start": 132, "end": 134}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Another opportunity this mode unlocks is a peer-to-peer network mode with no centralised C & C.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The infected hosts are capable of transferring the following peer-2-peer commands defining fragment size, reliability parameters, new peer information, peer impersonation flags, etc.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": ": Once the incoming data is authenticated and decrypted, the driver passes it to the DLL by using memory pipes.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the incoming data", "start": 7, "end": 24}], "action": [{"text": "is authenticated and decrypted", "start": 25, "end": 55}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, on HTTP traffic arrival it may send traffic data into a memory pipe \\Device\\NamedPipe\\isapihttp, and then, send a received peer-2-peer command message writepeernfo= [IPADDRESS: PORT] 0fragnoscrambling=Y0 into another memory pipe called \\Device\\NamedPipe\\isapidg.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 37, "end": 39}, {"text": "traffic data", "start": 49, "end": 61}, {"text": "a memory pipe \\Device\\NamedPipe\\isapihttp", "start": 67, "end": 108}, {"text": "a received peer-2-peer command message writepeernfo= [IPADDRESS: PORT] 0fragnoscrambling=Y0", "start": 125, "end": 216}, {"text": "another memory pipe called \\Device\\NamedPipe\\isapidg", "start": 222, "end": 274}], "action": [{"text": "send", "start": 44, "end": 48}, {"text": "send", "start": 120, "end": 124}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 62, "end": 66}, {"text": "into", "start": 217, "end": 221}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In order to log its activity, the driver writes log data into the pipe \\Device\\NamedPipe\\isapilog, so that the DLL could log the data into the log files.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "log", "start": 12, "end": 15}, {"text": "writes", "start": 41, "end": 47}, {"text": "log", "start": 121, "end": 124}], "entity": [{"text": "its activity", "start": 16, "end": 28}, {"text": "the driver", "start": 30, "end": 40}, {"text": "log data", "start": 48, "end": 56}, {"text": "the pipe \\Device\\NamedPipe\\isapilog", "start": 62, "end": 97}, {"text": "the DLL", "start": 107, "end": 114}, {"text": "the data", "start": 125, "end": 133}, {"text": "the log files", "start": 139, "end": 152}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 57, "end": 61}, {"text": "into", "start": 134, "end": 138}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Full list of the named pipes used for communications is provided below: Messages submitted into the pipes are wrapped into the structures.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the named pipes", "start": 13, "end": 28}, {"text": "communications", "start": 38, "end": 52}, {"text": "Messages", "start": 72, "end": 80}, {"text": "the pipes", "start": 96, "end": 105}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 29, "end": 33}, {"text": "submitted", "start": 81, "end": 90}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 34, "end": 37}, {"text": "into", "start": 91, "end": 95}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The structures appear to contain headers to allow the pipe server, that runs within an infected userland module, to identify the messages first and then unwrap the structures accordingly.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the pipe server", "start": 50, "end": 65}, {"text": "the messages", "start": 125, "end": 137}], "action": [{"text": "identify", "start": 116, "end": 124}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, the message headers could be: Once received from the pipes and unwrapped/decoded, the data is then handled by the usermode DLL as per the data intention-whether it's a traffic sniffing task, a peer-2-peer client logic, a logging task, or a task of saving received files into the virtual volumes.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "received", "start": 48, "end": 56}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 57, "end": 61}], "entity": [{"text": "the pipes", "start": 62, "end": 71}, {"text": "the data", "start": 95, "end": 103}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The driver creates virtual file volumes for encrypted storage of its files and configuration data: The volumes are mounted from the virtual file systems RawDisk1 and RawDisk2.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The driver", "start": 0, "end": 10}, {"text": "virtual file volumes", "start": 19, "end": 39}, {"text": "encrypted storage of its files and configuration data", "start": 44, "end": 97}, {"text": "The volumes", "start": 99, "end": 110}, {"text": "the virtual file systems RawDisk1 and RawDisk2", "start": 128, "end": 174}], "action": [{"text": "creates", "start": 11, "end": 18}, {"text": "are mounted", "start": 111, "end": 122}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 40, "end": 43}, {"text": "from", "start": 123, "end": 127}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The first partition is created with the following steps: The hook installed by the rootkit on IofCallDriver () API provides on-the-fly data encryption/decryption whenever that data is written to or read from the volume.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The first partition", "start": 0, "end": 19}, {"text": "the following steps", "start": 36, "end": 55}, {"text": "The hook", "start": 57, "end": 65}, {"text": "the rootkit", "start": 79, "end": 90}, {"text": "IofCallDriver () API", "start": 94, "end": 114}, {"text": "on-the-fly data encryption/decryption", "start": 124, "end": 161}, {"text": "that data", "start": 171, "end": 180}, {"text": "the volume", "start": 208, "end": 218}], "action": [{"text": "is created", "start": 20, "end": 30}, {"text": "installed", "start": 66, "end": 75}, {"text": "provides", "start": 115, "end": 123}, {"text": "is written", "start": 181, "end": 191}, {"text": "read", "start": 198, "end": 202}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 31, "end": 35}, {"text": "on", "start": 91, "end": 93}, {"text": "to", "start": 192, "end": 194}, {"text": "from", "start": 203, "end": 207}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The encryption algorithm is based on CAST-128, with the hard-coded key stored in the rootkit body.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The encryption algorithm", "start": 0, "end": 24}, {"text": "CAST-128", "start": 37, "end": 45}, {"text": "the hard-coded key stored in the rootkit body", "start": 52, "end": 97}], "action": [{"text": "is based", "start": 25, "end": 33}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 34, "end": 36}, {"text": "with", "start": 47, "end": 51}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As a result, whenever the data is saved into the volume Hd1, it will be scrambled on-the-fly, and reflected in the persistent storage file hotfix.dat, which is physically located within the rootkit's'home' directory: Analysis of the hotfix.dat file contents reveals it's a fully encrypted file with flat entropy.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the data", "start": 22, "end": 30}, {"text": "the volume Hd1", "start": 45, "end": 59}, {"text": "it", "start": 61, "end": 63}, {"text": "on-the-fly", "start": 82, "end": 92}, {"text": "in the persistent storage file hotfix.dat", "start": 108, "end": 149}, {"text": "it", "start": 266, "end": 268}, {"text": "a fully encrypted file with flat entropy", "start": 271, "end": 311}], "action": [{"text": "is saved", "start": 31, "end": 39}, {"text": "be scrambled", "start": 69, "end": 81}, {"text": "reflected", "start": 98, "end": 107}, {"text": "'s", "start": 268, "end": 270}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 40, "end": 44}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Thus, it is not possible to reveal the contents of the Snake's volume by accessing the contents of this file (unless the encryption is broken, that is).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Enlisting the contents of the created volume is possible, along with creating files on it: However, as soon as IofCallDriver () hook is removed, the same'dir' command will fail, as with no hook the rootkit can not decrypt the scrambled volume: The second volume \\\\.\\Hd2 is not mapped to a file, so when a computer is switched off, its contents is lost.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Thus, it could be used as a temporary or a cache storage.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The data stored in \\\\.\\Hd2 is encrypted the same way the first volume's data.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The data stored in \\\\.\\Hd2", "start": 0, "end": 26}, {"text": "the same way the first volume's data", "start": 40, "end": 76}], "action": [{"text": "is encrypted", "start": 27, "end": 39}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Both volumes appear to be set up as FAT volumes.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Both volumes", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "FAT volumes", "start": 36, "end": 47}], "action": [{"text": "be set up", "start": 23, "end": 32}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 33, "end": 35}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "An attempt to read the data from these volumes with the code below: This will produce the following results: For \\\\.\\Hd1: For \\\\.\\Hd2: The ability to keep its data on TrueCrypt-like volumes provides Snake with a powerful ability to exchange data with the usermode DLL, as these volumes are accessible both from usermode and kernel mode.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "keep", "start": 150, "end": 154}], "entity": [{"text": "its data", "start": 155, "end": 163}, {"text": "TrueCrypt-like volumes", "start": 167, "end": 189}, {"text": "Snake", "start": 199, "end": 204}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 164, "end": 166}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Static analysis of the code reveals that the Snake driver uses virtual volumes to store its data and additional files on it.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the Snake driver", "start": 41, "end": 57}, {"text": "virtual volumes", "start": 63, "end": 78}, {"text": "its data and additional files", "start": 88, "end": 117}, {"text": "it", "start": 121, "end": 123}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 58, "end": 62}, {"text": "store", "start": 82, "end": 87}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 118, "end": 120}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, it stores its message queue in a file called: The message queue indicates an asynchronous communication model between kernel mode driver and a usermode DLL, e.g.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 13, "end": 15}, {"text": "its message queue", "start": 23, "end": 40}, {"text": "a file called", "start": 44, "end": 57}], "action": [{"text": "stores", "start": 16, "end": 22}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 41, "end": 43}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "to pass commands, configuration parameters, binary images of additional Snake components.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other files that may also be found on the virtual volume are: klog, conlog, dump, rknginst.exe, where rknginst.exe could be the name of the original dropper, and other log files could potentially contain executed command outputs, intercepted keystrokes, and other output logs.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "other log files", "start": 162, "end": 177}, {"text": "executed command outputs", "start": 204, "end": 228}, {"text": "keystrokes", "start": 242, "end": 252}], "action": [{"text": "contain", "start": 196, "end": 203}, {"text": "intercepted", "start": 230, "end": 241}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The 64-bit version of Snake must deal with a number of additional security protections implemented in 64-bit editions of Microsoft Windows, the most significant of which are kernel driver signature validation and Kernel Patch Protection (more commonly known as PatchGuard).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "PatchGuard is a feature of 64-bit Windows which aims to prevent modification of the Windows kernel, something that is often performed by malware attempting to hide itself on an infected system.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Although PatchGuard is successful at preventing kernel patching once initialised, several published bypass approaches exist,.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The technique used by Snake appears to be similar to these approaches.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The driver signing policy enforced by all 64-bit versions of Windows from Vista onwards requires all kernel-mode drivers to be signed with a valid digital signature.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The Snake dropper contains both 32-bit and 64-bit unsigned drivers, and it can successfully load its unsigned 64-bit driver on a 64-bit version of Windows XP–as driver signing is not enforced it does not have to resort to any tricks under this OS version.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 72, "end": 74}, {"text": "its unsigned 64-bit driver", "start": 97, "end": 123}, {"text": "a 64-bit version of Windows XP", "start": 127, "end": 157}], "action": [{"text": "load", "start": 92, "end": 96}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 124, "end": 126}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In this case, in order to ensure the driver is loaded automatically at startup, the dropper can install the 64-bit driver on 64-bit Windows XP in the same way it installs a 32-bit driver on a 32-bit version of Windows XP.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "ensure", "start": 26, "end": 32}, {"text": "install", "start": 96, "end": 103}, {"text": "installs", "start": 162, "end": 170}], "entity": [{"text": "the driver is loaded automatically at startup", "start": 33, "end": 78}, {"text": "the dropper", "start": 80, "end": 91}, {"text": "the 64-bit driver", "start": 104, "end": 121}, {"text": "64-bit Windows XP", "start": 125, "end": 142}, {"text": "it", "start": 159, "end": 161}, {"text": "a 32-bit driver", "start": 171, "end": 186}, {"text": "a 32-bit version of Windows XP", "start": 190, "end": 220}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 122, "end": 124}, {"text": "on", "start": 187, "end": 189}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On 64-bit versions of Windows Vista and above it behaves differently.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "On", "start": 0, "end": 2}], "entity": [{"text": "64-bit versions of Windows Vista and above", "start": 3, "end": 45}, {"text": "it", "start": 46, "end": 48}, {"text": "differently", "start": 57, "end": 68}], "action": [{"text": "behaves", "start": 49, "end": 56}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Firstly, the 64-bit unsigned driver file is created as usual: However, the driver is not registered; what is registered instead is the dropper itself.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the 64-bit unsigned driver file", "start": 9, "end": 40}, {"text": "the dropper itself", "start": 131, "end": 149}], "action": [{"text": "is created", "start": 41, "end": 51}, {"text": "is registered", "start": 106, "end": 119}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "To do that, the dropper first copies itself as: The dropper then registers itself as a service to ensure it starts every time Windows is booted, by creating the values: Now comes the most interesting part: does the dropper manage to load its 64-bit unsigned driver under 64-bit versions of Windows Vista and later versions, such as 64-bit Windows 7/8? The answer: Yes, it does.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the dropper", "start": 12, "end": 23}, {"text": "itself", "start": 37, "end": 43}, {"text": "The dropper", "start": 48, "end": 59}, {"text": "itself", "start": 75, "end": 81}, {"text": "a service", "start": 85, "end": 94}, {"text": "it starts every time Windows is booted", "start": 105, "end": 143}], "action": [{"text": "copies", "start": 30, "end": 36}, {"text": "registers", "start": 65, "end": 74}, {"text": "ensure", "start": 98, "end": 104}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 82, "end": 84}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Does it resort to using bootkit technology, which has been used in the past to bypass protections to load unsigned 64-bit drivers? The answer: No.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Bootkits must overwrite the Master Boot Record (MBR) and antivirus products are well trained to catch that kind of bad behavior.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The masterminds behind Snake rootkit seem to be well aware of this so what they resorted to instead is leveraging a vulnerability in a well-known virtualization product called VirtualBox, a product made by Oracle which is widely used by researchers to analyse malware.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "VirtualBox driver version 1.6.2 was released in June 2, 2008.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Two months later, in August 2008, security researchers reported that its main driver component, which is signed under the entity'' innotek Gmbh'', contained a privilege escalation vulnerability.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In a nutshell, the VirtualBox software installs a driver called VBoxDrv.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The driver is controlled with the Input/Ouput Control Codes (32-bit values called IOCTL) passed along DeviceIoControl () API.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One of the documented transfer methods that the system uses to pass data between the caller of DeviceIoControl () API and the driver itself is called METHODNEITHER.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As per MSDN documentation, METHODNEITHER is a special transfer type when Input/Output Request Packet (IRP) supplies the user-mode virtual addresses of the input and output buffers, without validating or mapping them.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is the responsibility of the driver to validate the addresses sent from user mode in order to make sure those addresses are valid usermode addresses.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The source code of the vulnerable driver (shown below) demonstrates how the integer value of the rc variable is first derived from the input parameters pDevObj (device object) and pIrp (request packet).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Next, that integer value is written into the UserBuffer-an arbitrary address, pointed by the input parameter pIrp (request packet).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As there are no validations made for the UserBuffer an attacker can craft such input parameters that will define address within kernel memory to patch and the data to patch it with: Now that the vulnerable driver can be used as a weapon to patch kernel memory, all the malware needs to do is to patch the content of the variable nt! gCiEnabled, a boolean variable'' Code Integrity Enabled'' that marks whether the system was booted in WinPE mode.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "an attacker", "start": 52, "end": 63}, {"text": "such input parameters that will define address within kernel memory to patch and the data to patch it", "start": 74, "end": 175}, {"text": "the vulnerable driver", "start": 191, "end": 212}, {"text": "a weapon to patch kernel memory", "start": 228, "end": 259}], "action": [{"text": "craft", "start": 68, "end": 73}, {"text": "be used", "start": 217, "end": 224}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 225, "end": 227}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When running in WinPE mode there is no Code Integrity control, therefore by enabling this mode by patching only one bit, Code Integrity verification is disabled so that the unsigned 64-bit driver can be loaded.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Code Integrity verification", "start": 121, "end": 148}, {"text": "the unsigned 64-bit driver", "start": 169, "end": 195}], "action": [{"text": "is disabled", "start": 149, "end": 160}, {"text": "be loaded", "start": 200, "end": 209}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This variable is used within the function SepInitializeCodeIntegrity (), implemented within CI.dll's function CiInitialize () and imported by the NT core (ntoskrnl.exe).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In order to find the variable in kernel memory, the Snake dropper loads a copy of the NT core image (ntoskrnl.exe), locates the import of CI.dll's function CiInitialize (), and then SepInitializeCodeIntegrity () within it.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the Snake dropper", "start": 48, "end": 65}, {"text": "a copy of the NT core image (ntoskrnl.exe)", "start": 72, "end": 114}, {"text": "the import of CI.dll's function CiInitialize ()", "start": 124, "end": 171}, {"text": "SepInitializeCodeIntegrity () within it", "start": 182, "end": 221}], "action": [{"text": "loads", "start": 66, "end": 71}, {"text": "locates", "start": 116, "end": 123}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Then it parses the function's code to locate the offset of the variable.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 5, "end": 7}, {"text": "the function's code", "start": 15, "end": 34}, {"text": "locate the offset of the variable", "start": 38, "end": 71}], "action": [{"text": "parses", "start": 8, "end": 14}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 35, "end": 37}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once located, the content of the variable nt! gCiEnabled is patched in kernel memory and the 64-bit unsigned driver is loaded.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the 64-bit unsigned driver", "start": 89, "end": 115}], "action": [{"text": "is loaded", "start": 116, "end": 125}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This explains why Snake dropper registers itself as a service to start each time Windows starts: in order to install the vulnerable VBox driver first, then pass it a malformed structure to disable Code Integrity control with a DeviceIoControl () API call, and finally, load the driver.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Snake dropper", "start": 18, "end": 31}, {"text": "itself", "start": 42, "end": 48}, {"text": "a service", "start": 52, "end": 61}, {"text": "each time Windows starts", "start": 71, "end": 95}, {"text": "the vulnerable VBox driver", "start": 117, "end": 143}, {"text": "Code Integrity control", "start": 197, "end": 219}, {"text": "a DeviceIoControl () API call", "start": 225, "end": 254}, {"text": "the driver", "start": 274, "end": 284}], "action": [{"text": "registers", "start": 32, "end": 41}, {"text": "start", "start": 65, "end": 70}, {"text": "install", "start": 109, "end": 116}, {"text": "disable", "start": 189, "end": 196}, {"text": "load", "start": 269, "end": 273}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 49, "end": 51}, {"text": "with", "start": 220, "end": 224}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In order to be able to perform the steps above, the dropper must first obtain Administrator privileges.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the dropper", "start": 48, "end": 59}, {"text": "Administrator privileges", "start": 78, "end": 102}], "action": [{"text": "obtain", "start": 71, "end": 77}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It attempts to do this by running MS09-025 and MS10-015 exploits on the target system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "MS09-025 and MS10-015 exploits", "start": 34, "end": 64}, {"text": "the target system", "start": 68, "end": 85}], "action": [{"text": "running", "start": 26, "end": 33}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 65, "end": 67}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These exploits are bundled within the dropper in its resource section as executable files.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other resources embedded within the dropper are the 32-bit and 64-bit builds of its driver, a tool for creating NTFS file systems, and the initial message queue file which is written into the virtual volume.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a tool", "start": 92, "end": 98}, {"text": "NTFS file systems", "start": 112, "end": 129}, {"text": "the initial message queue file", "start": 135, "end": 165}, {"text": "the virtual volume", "start": 188, "end": 206}], "action": [{"text": "creating", "start": 103, "end": 111}, {"text": "is written", "start": 172, "end": 182}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 183, "end": 187}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The message queue file contains configuration data and the libraries that will be injected into usermode processes.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "libraries", "start": 59, "end": 68}, {"text": "usermode processes", "start": 96, "end": 114}], "action": [{"text": "be injected", "start": 79, "end": 90}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 91, "end": 95}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The usermode DLLs injected by the kernel-mode driver into the userland system process (e.g.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The usermode DLLs", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "the kernel-mode driver", "start": 30, "end": 52}, {"text": "the userland system process", "start": 58, "end": 85}], "action": [{"text": "injected", "start": 18, "end": 26}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 53, "end": 57}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "explorer.exe) are: The rkctlWin32.dll/rkctlx64.dll module uses the following hard-coded named pipe for communications: The remote commands it receives appear to be designed to control other components of Snake: The injsnakeWin32.dll/injsnakex64.dll module exports 61 functions.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The rkctlWin32.dll/rkctlx64.dll module", "start": 19, "end": 57}, {"text": "the following hard-coded named pipe", "start": 63, "end": 98}, {"text": "communications", "start": 103, "end": 117}, {"text": "The remote commands", "start": 119, "end": 138}, {"text": "it", "start": 139, "end": 141}, {"text": "other components of Snake", "start": 184, "end": 209}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 58, "end": 62}, {"text": "receives", "start": 142, "end": 150}, {"text": "control", "start": 176, "end": 183}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 99, "end": 102}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is designed to perform the high-level tasks such as: When the DLL activates, it reads configuration parameters from the configuration queue, that the driver creates on a virtual volume.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the DLL", "start": 61, "end": 68}, {"text": "it", "start": 80, "end": 82}, {"text": "configuration parameters", "start": 89, "end": 113}, {"text": "the configuration queue", "start": 119, "end": 142}, {"text": "the driver", "start": 149, "end": 159}, {"text": "a virtual volume", "start": 171, "end": 187}], "action": [{"text": "activates", "start": 69, "end": 78}, {"text": "reads", "start": 83, "end": 88}, {"text": "creates", "start": 160, "end": 167}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 114, "end": 118}, {"text": "on", "start": 168, "end": 170}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One of the parameters defines the pipe name (s) that the DLL should use for its communications.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the pipe name (s)", "start": 30, "end": 47}, {"text": "the DLL", "start": 53, "end": 60}, {"text": "its communications", "start": 76, "end": 94}], "action": [{"text": "use", "start": 68, "end": 71}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 72, "end": 75}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The remote commands received by this Snake DLL module are designed to set up various communication parameters: To post the data, the DLL can use the following User-Agent string'' Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0)''.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The remote commands", "start": 0, "end": 19}, {"text": "this Snake DLL module", "start": 32, "end": 53}, {"text": "the data", "start": 119, "end": 127}, {"text": "the DLL", "start": 129, "end": 136}], "action": [{"text": "received", "start": 20, "end": 28}, {"text": "post", "start": 114, "end": 118}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It may rely on the following Internet Media types (MIME types) for data exfiltration: Request type it uses can either be POST of GET, and C & C server resource name is /default.asp.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "the following Internet Media types (MIME types)", "start": 15, "end": 62}, {"text": "data exfiltration", "start": 67, "end": 84}, {"text": "Request type", "start": 86, "end": 98}, {"text": "it", "start": 99, "end": 101}, {"text": "POST", "start": 121, "end": 125}, {"text": "GET", "start": 129, "end": 132}, {"text": "C & C server resource name", "start": 138, "end": 164}, {"text": "/default.asp", "start": 168, "end": 180}], "action": [{"text": "rely on", "start": 7, "end": 14}, {"text": "uses", "start": 102, "end": 106}, {"text": "be", "start": 118, "end": 120}, {"text": "is", "start": 165, "end": 167}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 63, "end": 66}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One of the Snake components that could have been downloaded from a remote C & C server, was identified as a network reconnaissance tool.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "One of the Snake components", "start": 0, "end": 27}, {"text": "a remote C & C server", "start": 65, "end": 86}, {"text": "a network reconnaissance tool", "start": 106, "end": 135}], "action": [{"text": "been downloaded", "start": 44, "end": 59}, {"text": "was identified", "start": 88, "end": 102}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 60, "end": 64}, {"text": "as", "start": 103, "end": 105}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When run as a command line tool, with its logic defined with the command line switches, this tool enumerates other network hosts and detects what Windows RPC services are enabled at the endpoints.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "When", "start": 0, "end": 4}], "entity": [{"text": "run as a command line tool", "start": 5, "end": 31}, {"text": "this tool", "start": 88, "end": 97}, {"text": "other network hosts", "start": 109, "end": 128}, {"text": "what Windows RPC services are enabled at the endpoints", "start": 141, "end": 195}], "action": [{"text": "enumerates", "start": 98, "end": 108}, {"text": "detects", "start": 133, "end": 140}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It carries a list of interface identifiers associated with the named pipes.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a list of interface identifiers", "start": 11, "end": 42}, {"text": "the named pipes", "start": 59, "end": 74}], "action": [{"text": "associated", "start": 43, "end": 53}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 54, "end": 58}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It then uses these identifiers to write a message to and read a message from the associated named pipes.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "a message", "start": 40, "end": 49}, {"text": "a message", "start": 62, "end": 71}, {"text": "the associated named pipes", "start": 77, "end": 103}], "action": [{"text": "write", "start": 34, "end": 39}, {"text": "read", "start": 57, "end": 61}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 50, "end": 52}, {"text": "from", "start": 72, "end": 76}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By knowing what RPC services are running, it can successfully fingerprint all network hosts by mimicking the Metasploit's logic of OS fingerprinting via SMB.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 42, "end": 44}, {"text": "all network hosts", "start": 74, "end": 91}, {"text": "mimicking the Metasploit's logic of OS fingerprinting via SMB", "start": 95, "end": 156}], "action": [{"text": "fingerprint", "start": 62, "end": 73}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 92, "end": 94}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The fingerprinting allows it to reveal the following characteristics for each host found in the network: The data it retrieves is encrypted and saved into a configuration file% system% \\vtmon.bin.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "it", "start": 26, "end": 28}, {"text": "the following characteristics", "start": 39, "end": 68}, {"text": "each host found in the network", "start": 73, "end": 103}, {"text": "The data", "start": 105, "end": 113}, {"text": "a configuration file% system% \\vtmon.bin", "start": 155, "end": 195}], "action": [{"text": "reveal", "start": 32, "end": 38}, {"text": "is encrypted", "start": 127, "end": 139}, {"text": "saved", "start": 144, "end": 149}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 69, "end": 72}, {"text": "into", "start": 150, "end": 154}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This file is then further encrypted with an NTL-based (Number Theory Library) algorithm and is uploaded by the usermode-centric Snake rootkit to the C & C server, along with other configuration files, such as mtmon.sdb, mtmon32.sdb, gstatsnd.bin, gstat.bin, gstat32.bin, and other log files found in the% windows%\\$NtUninstallQ [random] $directory.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This file", "start": 0, "end": 9}, {"text": "an NTL-based (Number Theory Library) algorithm", "start": 41, "end": 87}, {"text": "the usermode-centric Snake rootkit", "start": 107, "end": 141}, {"text": "the C & C server", "start": 145, "end": 161}, {"text": "other configuration files, such as mtmon.sdb, mtmon32.sdb, gstatsnd.bin, gstat.bin, gstat32.bin, and other log files found in the% windows%\\$NtUninstallQ [random] $directory", "start": 174, "end": 347}], "action": [{"text": "is then further encrypted", "start": 10, "end": 35}, {"text": "is uploaded", "start": 92, "end": 103}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 36, "end": 40}, {"text": "by", "start": 104, "end": 106}, {"text": "to", "start": 142, "end": 144}, {"text": "along with", "start": 163, "end": 173}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By using this function the remote attacker can identify any potentially exploitable hosts located in the same network as the victim.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the remote attacker", "start": 23, "end": 42}, {"text": "any potentially exploitable hosts located in the same network as the victim", "start": 56, "end": 131}], "action": [{"text": "identify", "start": 47, "end": 55}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attacker may then craft an exploit against those hosts, possibly by using the Metasploit framework, and then deliver the generated shellcode back to the reconnaissance tool to be applied against the identified hosts by running the tool with the'expos' switch.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attacker", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "the generated shellcode", "start": 121, "end": 144}, {"text": "the reconnaissance tool", "start": 153, "end": 176}, {"text": "be applied against the identified hosts by running the tool with the'expos' switch", "start": 180, "end": 262}], "action": [{"text": "deliver", "start": 113, "end": 120}], "modifier": [{"text": "back to", "start": 145, "end": 152}, {"text": "to", "start": 177, "end": 179}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "If the tool successfully delivers the payload and exploits the remote host (s), it will replicate the infection across the network, taking control over new hosts, thus repeating the infection cycle all over again and spreading the infection further.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the tool", "start": 3, "end": 11}, {"text": "the payload", "start": 34, "end": 45}, {"text": "the remote host (s)", "start": 59, "end": 78}, {"text": "it", "start": 80, "end": 82}, {"text": "the infection", "start": 98, "end": 111}, {"text": "the network", "start": 119, "end": 130}, {"text": "new hosts", "start": 152, "end": 161}, {"text": "the infection cycle", "start": 178, "end": 197}, {"text": "all over again", "start": 198, "end": 212}, {"text": "the infection", "start": 227, "end": 240}, {"text": "further", "start": 241, "end": 248}], "action": [{"text": "delivers", "start": 25, "end": 33}, {"text": "exploits", "start": 50, "end": 58}, {"text": "replicate", "start": 88, "end": 97}, {"text": "taking control", "start": 132, "end": 146}, {"text": "repeating", "start": 168, "end": 177}, {"text": "spreading", "start": 217, "end": 226}], "modifier": [{"text": "across", "start": 112, "end": 118}, {"text": "over", "start": 147, "end": 151}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Unlike traditional worm techniques, this process is rather manual, but its danger is in the fact that the attacker can flexibly craft new attack methods, adjusting them to the hosts present within the network, thus preying on the weakest (least updated, most vulnerable) victims along its path.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attacker", "start": 102, "end": 114}, {"text": "them", "start": 164, "end": 168}, {"text": "the hosts present within the network", "start": 172, "end": 208}], "action": [{"text": "adjusting", "start": 154, "end": 163}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 169, "end": 171}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As seen from the check-in logs found within one of the recent samples, the time span covers almost 6 years from January 2007 till December 2012, which is aligned with the first reports of Agent.BTZ.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It's worth noting that Agent.BTZ used the same XOR key for its logs as the most recent variants: Log files created by the latest samples of Snake, compiled in 2013 and 2014, were successfully decrypted with the same XOR key.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Agent.BTZ", "start": 23, "end": 32}, {"text": "the same XOR key", "start": 38, "end": 54}, {"text": "its logs", "start": 59, "end": 67}, {"text": "Log files", "start": 97, "end": 106}, {"text": "the latest samples of Snake", "start": 118, "end": 145}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 33, "end": 37}, {"text": "created", "start": 107, "end": 114}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 55, "end": 58}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other similarities include the usage of the virtual partition \\\\.\\Vd1, the temporary file named FA.tmp, usage of files named mswmpdat.tlb, wmcache.nld, winview.ocx.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The cyber-espionage operation behind the Snake rootkit is well established, a sample comiled in January 2006 indicates that the activity would have begun in at least 2005.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is also sophisticated, using complex techniques for evading host defences and providing the attackers covert communication channels.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "complex techniques", "start": 32, "end": 50}, {"text": "evading host defences", "start": 55, "end": 76}, {"text": "the attackers", "start": 91, "end": 104}, {"text": "covert communication channels", "start": 105, "end": 134}], "action": [{"text": "using", "start": 26, "end": 31}, {"text": "providing", "start": 81, "end": 90}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 51, "end": 54}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Toolmarks left behind by the authors'vlad' &'gilg', leave tantalizing clues as to the personas behind this.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "From a technical perspective, Snake demonstrates two very different approaches to the task of building a cyber-espionage toolkit.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One approach is to delegate the network communication engine to usermode code, backed up by a usermode rootkit.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "delegate", "start": 19, "end": 27}], "entity": [{"text": "the network communication engine", "start": 28, "end": 60}, {"text": "usermode code", "start": 64, "end": 77}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 61, "end": 63}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Another approach is to carry out all of the communications from the kernel-mode driver, which is a very challenging task by itself.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "carry out", "start": 23, "end": 32}], "entity": [{"text": "all of the communications", "start": 33, "end": 58}, {"text": "the kernel-mode driver", "start": 64, "end": 86}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 59, "end": 63}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The complexity of the usermode-centric approach is on par with Rustock rootkit-it uses similar techniques.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It's an old well-polished technology that evolved over the years and demonstrated its resilience and survivability under the stress of security counter- measures.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The complexity of the kernel-centric architecture of Snake is quite unique.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This architecture is designed to grant Snake as much flexibility as possible.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When most of the infected hosts are cut off from the outside world, it only needs one host to be connected online.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "When", "start": 0, "end": 4}], "entity": [{"text": "most of the infected hosts are cut off from the outside world", "start": 5, "end": 66}, {"text": "it", "start": 68, "end": 70}, {"text": "one host to be connected online", "start": 82, "end": 113}], "action": [{"text": "only needs", "start": 71, "end": 81}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The traffic is then routed through that host to make external control and data exfiltration still possible.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The traffic", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "that host", "start": 35, "end": 44}, {"text": "external control", "start": 53, "end": 69}, {"text": "data exfiltration", "start": 74, "end": 91}, {"text": "still possible", "start": 92, "end": 106}], "action": [{"text": "is then routed", "start": 12, "end": 26}, {"text": "make", "start": 48, "end": 52}], "modifier": [{"text": "through", "start": 27, "end": 34}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The presence of the reconnaissance tool in the Snake operators' framework suggests the existence of an arsenal of infiltration tools, designed to compromise a system, then find a way to replicate into other hosts, infect them, and spread the infection even further.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The presence of the reconnaissance tool in the Snake operators' framework", "start": 0, "end": 73}, {"text": "the existence of an arsenal of infiltration tools", "start": 83, "end": 132}, {"text": "a system", "start": 157, "end": 165}, {"text": "other hosts", "start": 201, "end": 212}, {"text": "them", "start": 221, "end": 225}, {"text": "the infection", "start": 238, "end": 251}, {"text": "even further", "start": 252, "end": 264}], "action": [{"text": "suggests", "start": 74, "end": 82}, {"text": "compromise", "start": 146, "end": 156}, {"text": "replicate", "start": 186, "end": 195}, {"text": "infect", "start": 214, "end": 220}, {"text": "spread", "start": 231, "end": 237}], "modifier": [{"text": "into", "start": 196, "end": 200}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As demonstrated, the backdoor commands allow Snake to provide remote attackers with full remote access to the compromised system.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the backdoor commands", "start": 17, "end": 38}, {"text": "Snake", "start": 45, "end": 50}, {"text": "remote attackers", "start": 62, "end": 78}, {"text": "full remote access to the compromised system", "start": 84, "end": 128}], "action": [{"text": "allow", "start": 39, "end": 44}, {"text": "provide", "start": 54, "end": 61}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 79, "end": 83}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Its ability to hibernate, staying fully inactive for a number of days, makes its detection during that time very difficult.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "hibernate", "start": 15, "end": 24}, {"text": "staying", "start": 26, "end": 33}, {"text": "makes", "start": 71, "end": 76}], "entity": [{"text": "fully inactive", "start": 34, "end": 48}, {"text": "a number of days", "start": 53, "end": 69}, {"text": "its detection during that time", "start": 77, "end": 107}, {"text": "very difficult", "start": 108, "end": 122}], "modifier": [{"text": "for", "start": 49, "end": 52}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The analysed code suggests that even file system and registry operations can be delegated by an infected module to another module in order to stay unnoticed by behaviour analysis engines of the antivirus products, and to overcome account restrictions of the browser processes so that the injected module could still write into files and into the sensitive registry hives.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "stay", "start": 142, "end": 146}, {"text": "overcome", "start": 221, "end": 229}, {"text": "write", "start": 316, "end": 321}], "entity": [{"text": "unnoticed", "start": 147, "end": 156}, {"text": "behaviour analysis engines of the antivirus products", "start": 160, "end": 212}, {"text": "account restrictions of the browser processes", "start": 230, "end": 275}, {"text": "the injected module", "start": 284, "end": 303}, {"text": "files", "start": 327, "end": 332}, {"text": "the sensitive registry hives", "start": 342, "end": 370}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 157, "end": 159}, {"text": "into", "start": 322, "end": 326}, {"text": "into", "start": 337, "end": 341}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The logs and dumps it creates on the hidden virtual volumes contributes to its stealthiness too.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The logs and dumps", "start": 0, "end": 18}, {"text": "it", "start": 19, "end": 21}, {"text": "the hidden virtual volumes", "start": 33, "end": 59}], "action": [{"text": "creates", "start": 22, "end": 29}], "modifier": [{"text": "on", "start": 30, "end": 32}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A great deal of attention has also been given to keep its network communications as quiet as possible.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "keep", "start": 49, "end": 53}], "entity": [{"text": "its network communications", "start": 54, "end": 80}, {"text": "as quiet as possible", "start": 81, "end": 101}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Its ability to generate malicious traffic whenever the user goes online and start loading the web pages allows it to'blend in' with the legitimate communications.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "generate", "start": 15, "end": 23}, {"text": "'blend in'", "start": 116, "end": 126}], "entity": [{"text": "malicious traffic", "start": 24, "end": 41}, {"text": "the user goes online and start loading the web pages", "start": 51, "end": 103}, {"text": "it", "start": 111, "end": 113}, {"text": "the legitimate communications", "start": 132, "end": 161}], "modifier": [{"text": "whenever", "start": 42, "end": 50}, {"text": "with", "start": 127, "end": 131}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We expect much more will be uncovered by researchers in the coming weeks as the capabilities of this operation are further fleshed out.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, as we implied in the opening section, we view this threat to be a permanent feature of the landscape.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Whether they dismantle this toolset and start from scratch, or continue using tools which have been exposed, remains to be seen.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For their targets though the considerable challenge of keeping secrets safe on sensitive networks will certainly continue for years to come.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Recently, research was published identifying a Tor exit node, located in Russia, that was consistently and maliciously modifying any uncompressed Windows executables downloaded through it.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a Tor exit node", "start": 45, "end": 60}, {"text": "any uncompressed Windows executables downloaded through it", "start": 129, "end": 187}], "action": [{"text": "was consistently and maliciously modifying", "start": 86, "end": 128}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Naturally this piqued our interest, so we decided to peer down the rabbit hole.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Suffice to say, the hole was a lot deeper than we expected! In fact, it went all the way back to the notorious Russian APT family MiniDuke, known to have been used in targeted attacks against NATO and European government agencies.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The malware used in this case is, however, not a version of MiniDuke.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is instead a separate, distinct family of malware that we have since taken to calling OnionDuke.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "But lets start from the beginning.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "When a user attempts to download an executable via the malicious Tor exit node, what they actually receive is an executable'' wrapper'' that embeds both the original executable and a second, malicious executable.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "By using a separate wrapper, the malicious actors are able to bypass any integrity checks the original binary might contain.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "By", "start": 0, "end": 2}], "entity": [{"text": "using a separate wrapper", "start": 3, "end": 27}, {"text": "the malicious actors", "start": 29, "end": 49}, {"text": "any integrity checks the original binary might contain", "start": 69, "end": 123}], "action": [{"text": "bypass", "start": 62, "end": 68}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Upon execution, the wrapper will proceed to write to disk and execute the original executable, thereby tricking the user into believing that everything went fine.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, the wrapper will also write to disk and execute the second executable.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In all the cases we have observed, this malicious executable has been the same binary (SHA1: a75995f94854dea8799650a2f4a97980b71199d2, detected as Trojan-Dropper: W32/OnionDuke.A).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This executable is a dropper containing a PE resource that pretends to be an embedded GIF image file.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This executable", "start": 0, "end": 15}, {"text": "a dropper", "start": 19, "end": 28}, {"text": "a PE resource", "start": 40, "end": 53}, {"text": "be an embedded GIF image file", "start": 71, "end": 100}], "action": [{"text": "is", "start": 16, "end": 18}, {"text": "pretends", "start": 59, "end": 67}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 68, "end": 70}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In reality, the resource is actually an encrypted dynamically linked library (DLL) file.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The dropper will proceed to decrypt this DLL, write it to disk and execute it.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The dropper", "start": 0, "end": 11}, {"text": "decrypt this DLL, write it to disk and execute it", "start": 28, "end": 77}], "action": [{"text": "proceed", "start": 17, "end": 24}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 25, "end": 27}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once executed, the DLL file (SHA1: b491c14d8cfb48636f6095b7b16555e9a575d57f, detected as Backdoor: W32/OnionDuke.B) will decrypt an embedded configuration (shown below) and attempt to connect to hardcoded C & C URLs specified in the configuration data.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the DLL file", "start": 15, "end": 27}, {"text": "hardcoded C & C URLs specified in the configuration data", "start": 195, "end": 251}], "action": [{"text": "connect", "start": 184, "end": 191}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 192, "end": 194}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "From these C & Cs the malware may receive instructions to download and execute additional malicious components.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malware", "start": 18, "end": 29}, {"text": "instructions", "start": 42, "end": 54}, {"text": "additional malicious components", "start": 79, "end": 110}], "action": [{"text": "receive", "start": 34, "end": 41}, {"text": "download and execute", "start": 58, "end": 78}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It should be noted, that we believe all five domains contacted by the malware are innocent websites compromised by the malware operators, not dedicated malicious servers.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Through our research, we have also been able to identify multiple other components of the OnionDuke malware family.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have, for instance, observed components dedicated to stealing login credentials from the victim machine and components dedicated to gathering further information on the compromised system like the presence of antivirus software or a firewall.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "components", "start": 32, "end": 42}, {"text": "login credentials", "start": 65, "end": 82}, {"text": "the victim machine", "start": 88, "end": 106}, {"text": "components", "start": 111, "end": 121}, {"text": "further information on the compromised system like the presence of antivirus software or a firewall", "start": 145, "end": 244}], "action": [{"text": "stealing", "start": 56, "end": 64}, {"text": "gathering", "start": 135, "end": 144}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 83, "end": 87}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Some of these components have been observed being downloaded and executed by the original backdoor process but for other components, we have yet to identify the infection vector.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Some of these components", "start": 0, "end": 24}, {"text": "the original backdoor process", "start": 77, "end": 106}], "action": [{"text": "being downloaded and executed", "start": 44, "end": 73}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Most of these components don't embed their own C & C information but rather communicate with their controllers through the original backdoor process.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Most of these components", "start": 0, "end": 24}, {"text": "their controllers", "start": 93, "end": 110}, {"text": "the original backdoor process", "start": 119, "end": 148}], "action": [{"text": "communicate", "start": 76, "end": 87}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 88, "end": 92}, {"text": "through", "start": 111, "end": 118}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One component, however, is an interesting exception.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This DLL file (SHA1 d433f281cf56015941a1c2cb87066ca62ea1db37, detected as Backdoor: W32/OnionDuke.A) contains among its configuration data a different hardcoded C & C domain, overpict.com and also evidence suggesting that this component may abuse Twitter as an additional C & C channel.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This DLL file", "start": 0, "end": 13}, {"text": "its configuration data", "start": 116, "end": 138}, {"text": "a different hardcoded C & C domain, overpict.com", "start": 139, "end": 187}, {"text": "this component", "start": 222, "end": 236}, {"text": "Twitter", "start": 247, "end": 254}, {"text": "an additional C & C channel", "start": 258, "end": 285}], "action": [{"text": "contains", "start": 101, "end": 109}, {"text": "abuse", "start": 241, "end": 246}], "modifier": [{"text": "among", "start": 110, "end": 115}, {"text": "as", "start": 255, "end": 257}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "What makes the overpict.com domain interesting, is it was originally registered in 2011 with the alias of'' John Kasai''.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Within a two-week window,'' John Kasai'' also registered the following domains: airtravelabroad.com, beijingnewsblog.net, grouptumbler.com, leveldelta.com, nasdaqblog.net, natureinhome.com, nestedmail.com, nostressjob.com, nytunion.com, oilnewsblog.com, sixsquare.net and ustradecomp.com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This is significant because the domains leveldelta.com and grouptumbler.com have previously been identified as C & C domains used by MiniDuke.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the domains leveldelta.com and grouptumbler.com", "start": 28, "end": 75}, {"text": "C & C domains used by MiniDuke", "start": 111, "end": 141}], "action": [{"text": "been identified", "start": 92, "end": 107}], "modifier": [{"text": "as", "start": 108, "end": 110}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This strongly suggests that although OnionDuke and MiniDuke are two separate families of malware, the actors behind them are connected through the use of shared infrastructure.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Based on compilation timestamps and discovery dates of samples we have observed, we believe the OnionDuke operators have been infecting downloaded executables at least since the end of October 2013.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the OnionDuke operators", "start": 92, "end": 115}, {"text": "downloaded executables", "start": 136, "end": 158}, {"text": "the end of October 2013", "start": 174, "end": 197}], "action": [{"text": "been infecting", "start": 121, "end": 135}], "modifier": [{"text": "since", "start": 168, "end": 173}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also have evidence suggesting that, at least since February of 2014, OnionDuke has not only been spread by modifying downloaded executables but also by infecting executables in .torrent files containing pirated software.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "OnionDuke", "start": 72, "end": 81}, {"text": "modifying downloaded executables", "start": 110, "end": 142}, {"text": "infecting executables in .torrent files containing pirated software", "start": 155, "end": 222}], "action": [{"text": "been spread", "start": 95, "end": 106}], "modifier": [{"text": "by", "start": 107, "end": 109}, {"text": "by", "start": 152, "end": 154}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "However, it would seem that the OnionDuke family is much older, both based on older compilation timestamps and also on the fact that some of the embedded configuration data make reference to an apparent version number of 4 suggesting that at least three earlier versions of the family exist.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "During our research, we have also uncovered strong evidence suggesting that OnionDuke has been used in targeted attacks against European government agencies, although we have so far been unable to identify the infection vector (s).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Interestingly, this would suggest two very different targeting strategies.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On one hand is the'' shooting a fly with a cannon'' mass-infection strategy through modified binaries and, on the other, the more surgical targeting traditionally associated with APT operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In any case, although much is still shrouded in mystery and speculation, one thing is certain.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "While using Tor may help you stay anonymous, it does at the same time paint a huge target on your back.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It's never a good idea to download binaries via Tor (or anything else) without encryption.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The problem with Tor is that you have no idea who is maintaining the exit node you are using and what their motives are.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "VPNs (such as our Freedome VPN) will encrypt your connection all the way through the Tor network, so the maintainers of Tor exit nodes will not see your traffic and can't tamper with it.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Samples:", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "On February 11, FireEye identified a zero-day exploit (CVE-2014-0322) being served up from the U.S. Veterans of Foreign Wars' website (vfw [.] org).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "a zero-day exploit (CVE-2014-0322)", "start": 35, "end": 69}, {"text": "the U.S. Veterans of Foreign Wars' website (vfw [.] org)", "start": 91, "end": 147}], "action": [{"text": "being served up", "start": 70, "end": 85}], "modifier": [{"text": "from", "start": 86, "end": 90}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We believe the attack is a strategic Web compromise targeting American military personnel amid a paralyzing snowstorm at the U.S. Capitol in the days leading up to the Presidents Day holiday weekend.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Based on infrastructure overlaps and tradecraft similarities, we believe the actors behind this campaign are associated with two previously identified campaigns (Operation DeputyDog and Operation Ephemeral Hydra).", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This blog post examines the vulnerability and associated attacks, which we have dubbed'' Operation SnowMan.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' After compromising the VFW website, the attackers added an iframe into the beginning of the website's HTML code that loads the attacker's page in the background.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attacker's HTML/JavaScript page runs a Flash object, which orchestrates the remainder of the exploit.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The exploit includes calling back to the IE 10 vulnerability trigger, which is embedded in the JavaScript.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Specifically, visitors to the VFW website were silently redirected through an iframe to the exploit at www. [REDACTED] .com/Data/img/img.html.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "visitors to the VFW website", "start": 14, "end": 41}, {"text": "an iframe", "start": 75, "end": 84}, {"text": "the exploit at www. [REDACTED] .com/Data/img/img.html", "start": 88, "end": 141}], "action": [{"text": "were silently redirected", "start": 42, "end": 66}], "modifier": [{"text": "through", "start": 67, "end": 74}, {"text": "to", "start": 85, "end": 87}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The exploit targets IE 10 with Adobe Flash.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It aborts exploitation if the user is browsing with a different version of IE or has installed Microsoft's Experience Mitigation Toolkit (EMET).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "It", "start": 0, "end": 2}, {"text": "exploitation", "start": 10, "end": 22}, {"text": "the user is browsing with a different version of IE or has installed Microsoft's Experience Mitigation Toolkit (EMET)", "start": 26, "end": 143}], "action": [{"text": "aborts", "start": 3, "end": 9}], "modifier": [{"text": "if", "start": 23, "end": 25}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "So installing EMET or updating to IE 11 prevents this exploit from functioning.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The vulnerability is a previously unknown use-after-free bug in Microsoft Internet Explorer 10.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The vulnerability allows the attacker to modify one byte of memory at an arbitrary address.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the attacker", "start": 25, "end": 37}, {"text": "one byte of memory", "start": 48, "end": 66}, {"text": "an arbitrary address", "start": 70, "end": 90}], "action": [{"text": "modify", "start": 41, "end": 47}], "modifier": [{"text": "at", "start": 67, "end": 69}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attacker uses the vulnerability to do the following: The attacker uses the Microsoft.XMLDOM ActiveX control to load a one-line XML string containing a file path to the EMET DLL.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attacker", "start": 57, "end": 69}, {"text": "the Microsoft.XMLDOM ActiveX control", "start": 75, "end": 111}, {"text": "load a one-line XML string containing a file path to the EMET DLL", "start": 115, "end": 180}], "action": [{"text": "uses", "start": 70, "end": 74}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 112, "end": 114}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Then the exploit code parses the error resulting from the XML load order to determine whether the load failed because the EMET DLL is not present.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The exploit proceeds only if this check determines that the EMET DLL is not present.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Because the vulnerability allows attackers to modify memory to an arbitrary address, the attacker can use it to bypass ASLR.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "attackers", "start": 33, "end": 42}, {"text": "memory", "start": 53, "end": 59}, {"text": "an arbitrary address", "start": 63, "end": 83}, {"text": "the attacker", "start": 85, "end": 97}, {"text": "it", "start": 106, "end": 108}, {"text": "bypass ASLR", "start": 112, "end": 123}], "action": [{"text": "modify", "start": 46, "end": 52}, {"text": "use", "start": 102, "end": 105}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 60, "end": 62}, {"text": "to", "start": 109, "end": 111}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For example, the attacker corrupts a Flash Vector object and then accesses the corrupted object from within Flash to access memory.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We have discussed this technique and other ASLR bypass approaches in our blog.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "One minor difference between the previous approaches and this attack is the heap spray address, which was changed to 0x1a1b2000 in this exploit.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Once the attacker's code has full memory access through the corrupted Flash Vector object, the code searches through loaded libraries gadgets by machine code.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "Once", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "through", "start": 109, "end": 116}, {"text": "by", "start": 142, "end": 144}], "entity": [{"text": "the attacker's code has full memory access through the corrupted Flash Vector object", "start": 5, "end": 89}, {"text": "the code", "start": 91, "end": 99}, {"text": "loaded libraries gadgets", "start": 117, "end": 141}, {"text": "machine code", "start": 145, "end": 157}], "action": [{"text": "searches", "start": 100, "end": 108}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attacker then overwrites the vftable pointer of a flash.Media.Sound () object in memory to point to the pivot and begin ROP.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The attacker", "start": 0, "end": 12}, {"text": "the vftable pointer of a flash.Media.Sound () object", "start": 29, "end": 81}, {"text": "memory", "start": 85, "end": 91}, {"text": "point to the pivot", "start": 95, "end": 113}, {"text": "ROP", "start": 124, "end": 127}], "action": [{"text": "overwrites", "start": 18, "end": 28}, {"text": "begin", "start": 118, "end": 123}], "modifier": [{"text": "in", "start": 82, "end": 84}, {"text": "to", "start": 92, "end": 94}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "After successful exploitation, the code repairs the corrupted Flash Vector and flash.Media.Sound to continue execution.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Subsequently, the malicious Flash code downloads a file containing the dropped malware payload.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "the malicious Flash code", "start": 14, "end": 38}, {"text": "a file containing the dropped malware payload", "start": 49, "end": 94}], "action": [{"text": "downloads", "start": 39, "end": 48}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The beginning of the file is a JPG image; the end of the file (offset 36321) is the payload, encoded with an XOR key of 0×95.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The attacker appends the payload to the shellcode before pivoting to code control.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Then, when the shellcode is executed, the malware creates files'' sqlrenew.txt'' and'' stream.exe''.", "output": {"entities": {"modifier": [{"text": "when", "start": 6, "end": 10}], "entity": [{"text": "the shellcode is executed", "start": 11, "end": 36}, {"text": "the malware", "start": 38, "end": 49}, {"text": "files'' sqlrenew.txt'' and'' stream.exe''", "start": 58, "end": 99}], "action": [{"text": "creates", "start": 50, "end": 57}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The tail of the image file is decoded, and written to these files.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The tail of the image file", "start": 0, "end": 26}, {"text": "these files", "start": 54, "end": 65}], "action": [{"text": "is decoded, and written", "start": 27, "end": 50}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 51, "end": 53}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "'' sqlrenew.txt'' is then executed with the LoadLibraryA Windows API call.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "'' sqlrenew.txt''", "start": 0, "end": 17}, {"text": "the LoadLibraryA Windows API call", "start": 40, "end": 73}], "action": [{"text": "is then executed", "start": 18, "end": 34}], "modifier": [{"text": "with", "start": 35, "end": 39}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "As documented above, this exploit dropped an XOR (0×95) payload that executed a ZxShell backdoor (MD5: 8455bbb9a210ce603a1b646b0d951bce).", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "this exploit", "start": 21, "end": 33}, {"text": "an XOR (0×95) payload", "start": 42, "end": 63}, {"text": "a ZxShell backdoor (MD5: 8455bbb9a210ce603a1b646b0d951bce)", "start": 78, "end": 136}], "action": [{"text": "dropped", "start": 34, "end": 41}, {"text": "executed", "start": 69, "end": 77}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The compile date of the payload was 2014-02-11, and the last modified date of the exploit code was also 2014-02-11.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This suggests that this instantiation of the exploit was very recent and was deployed for this specific strategic Web compromise of the Veterans of Foreign Wars website.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A possible objective in the SnowMan attack is targeting military service members to steal military intelligence.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "In addition to retirees, active military personnel use the VFW website.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "It is probably no coincidence that Monday, Feb. 17, is a U.S. holiday, and much of the U.S. Capitol shut down Thursday amid a severe winter storm.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The ZxShell backdoor is a widely used and publicly available tool used by multiple threat actors linked to cyber espionage operations.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "The ZxShell backdoor", "start": 0, "end": 20}, {"text": "multiple threat actors linked to cyber espionage operations", "start": 74, "end": 133}], "action": [{"text": "used", "start": 66, "end": 70}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This particular variant called back to a command and control server located at newss [.] effers [.] com.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "This particular variant", "start": 0, "end": 23}, {"text": "a command and control server located at newss [.] effers [.] com", "start": 39, "end": 103}], "action": [{"text": "called", "start": 24, "end": 30}], "modifier": [{"text": "back to", "start": 31, "end": 38}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This domain currently resolves to 118.99.60.142.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The domain info [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] flnet [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] org also resolved to this IP address on 2014-02-12.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The info [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] flnet [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] org domain overlaps with icybin [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] flnet [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] org and book [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] flnet [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] org via the previous resolutions to the following IP addresses: We previously observed Gh0stRat samples with the custom packet flag'' HTTPS'' calling back to book [.] flnet [.] org and icybin [.] flnet [.] org.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "Gh0stRat samples with the custom packet flag'' HTTPS''", "start": 89, "end": 143}, {"text": "book [.] flnet [.] org and icybin [.] flnet [.] org", "start": 160, "end": 211}], "action": [{"text": "calling", "start": 144, "end": 151}], "modifier": [{"text": "back to", "start": 152, "end": 159}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The threat actor responsible for Operation DeputyDog also used the'' HTTPS'' version of the Gh0st.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "We also observed another'' HTTPS'' Gh0st variant connecting to a related command and control server at me [.] scieron [.] com.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "another'' HTTPS'' Gh0st variant", "start": 17, "end": 48}, {"text": "a related command and control server at me [.] scieron [.] com", "start": 63, "end": 125}], "action": [{"text": "connecting", "start": 49, "end": 59}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 60, "end": 62}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The me [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] scieron [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com domain previously resolved to 58.64.199.22.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The book [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] flnet [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] org domain also resolved to another IP in the same subnet 58.64.199.0/24.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Specifically, book [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] flnet [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] org previously resolved to 58.64.199.27.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Others domain seen resolving to this same /24 subnet were dll [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] freshdns [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] org, ali [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] blankchair [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com, and cht [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] blankchair [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The domain dll [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] freshdns [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] org resolved to 58.64.199.25.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Both ali [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] blankchair [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com and cht [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] blankchair [.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "] com resolved to 58.64.199.22.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "A number of other related domains resolve to these IPs and other IPs also in this /24 subnet.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "For the purposes of this blog, we've chosen to focus on those domains and IP that relate to the previously discussed DeputyDog and Ephemeral Hydra campaigns.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "You may recall that dll [.] freshdns [.] org, ali [.] blankchair [.] com and cht [.] blankchair [.] com were all linked to both Operation DeputyDog and Operation Ephemeral Hydra.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "dll [.] freshdns [.] org, ali [.] blankchair [.] com and cht [.] blankchair [.] com", "start": 20, "end": 103}, {"text": "both Operation DeputyDog and Operation Ephemeral Hydra", "start": 123, "end": 177}], "action": [{"text": "were all linked", "start": 104, "end": 119}], "modifier": [{"text": "to", "start": 120, "end": 122}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Figure 1 illustrates the infrastructure overlaps and connections we observed between the strategic Web compromise campaign leveraging the VFW's website, the DeputyDog, and the Ephemeral Hydra operations.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Other tradecraft similarities between the actor (s) responsible for this campaign and the actor (s) responsible for the DeputyDog/Ephemeral Hydra campaigns include: We observed many similarities from the exploitation side as well.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "At a high level, this attack and the CVE- 2013-3163 attack both leveraged a Flash file that orchestrated the exploit, and would call back into IE JavaScript to trigger an IE flaw.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "The code within the Flash files from each attack are extremely similar.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "They build ROP chains and shellcode the same way, both choose to corrupt a Flash Vector object, have some identical functions with common typos, and even share the same name.", "output": {"entities": {"entity": [{"text": "They", "start": 0, "end": 4}, {"text": "ROP chains", "start": 11, "end": 21}], "action": [{"text": "build", "start": 5, "end": 10}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "These actors have previously targeted a number of different industries, including: The proven ability to successfully deploy a number of different private and public RATs using zero-day exploits against high-profile targets likely indicates that this actor (s) will continue to operate in the mid to long-term.", "output": {"entities": {"action": [{"text": "deploy", "start": 118, "end": 124}], "entity": [{"text": "a number of different private and public RATs", "start": 125, "end": 170}, {"text": "zero-day exploits", "start": 177, "end": 194}, {"text": "high-profile targets", "start": 203, "end": 223}, {"text": "this actor (s)", "start": 246, "end": 260}], "modifier": [{"text": "using", "start": 171, "end": 176}, {"text": "against", "start": 195, "end": 202}]}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "This entry was posted in Advanced Malware, Exploits, Targeted Attack, Threat Research, Vulnerabilities and tagged 0day, zero-day by Darien Kindlund, Dan Caselden, Xiaobo Chen, Ned Moran and Mike Scott.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}
{"input": "Bookmark the permalink.", "output": {"entities": {}}, "schema": []}