---
license:
- apache-2.0
- cc-by-4.0
- isc
pretty_name: hw-verify
size_categories:
- n<1K
task_categories:
- text-classification
- token-classification
tags:
- hardware
- verilog
- rtl
- constant-time
- side-channel
- masking
- formal-verification
- security
- certificates
configs:
- config_name: rtl_constant_time
  data_files:
  - split: test
    path: data/rtl_constant_time.jsonl
- config_name: masking_probes
  data_files:
  - split: test
    path: data/masking_probes.jsonl
- config_name: patch_certificates
  data_files:
  - split: test
    path: data/patch_certificates.jsonl
---

# hw-verify — a hardware-security verification dataset with controls

**Every positive example ships beside a deliberately broken counterpart, so a model or tool is graded against controls instead of against itself.**

[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/licence-per--record-blue.svg)](#licence)
[![Records](https://img.shields.io/badge/records-49-brightgreen.svg)](#splits)
[![Splits](https://img.shields.io/badge/splits-3-informational.svg)](#splits)
[![Reproducible](https://img.shields.io/badge/build-byte--reproducible-success.svg)](#provenance)

**Try the checker that generated this data:**
[🔒 hw-verify Space](https://huggingface.co/spaces/nickh007/hw-verify) — paste Verilog,
get a verdict, in your browser, no install.

## Install

```bash
pip install datasets
```

## 30-second quickstart

```python
from datasets import load_dataset

rtl = load_dataset("nickh007/hw-verify", "rtl_constant_time", split="test")
print(rtl.num_rows, "records,", len(rtl.column_names), "fields")

scored = rtl.filter(lambda r: r["scored"])
print(scored[0]["module"], scored[0]["label"])
```

```console
27 records, 12 fields
barrett_ct CONSTANT_TIME
```

The result that motivates the whole corpus — probes a dependence-only tool would flag:

```python
masking = load_dataset("nickh007/hw-verify", "masking_probes", split="test")
uniformity_only = masking.filter(lambda r: r["certificate"] == "uniformity")
print(len(uniformity_only), "probes certified ONLY by uniformity")
```

```console
2 probes certified ONLY by uniformity
```

## Why this exists

Security datasets in this area are almost always one-sided: a pile of vulnerable
examples. A classifier that answers "vulnerable" for everything scores 100% on such a
corpus, and nobody notices.

Every split here is **matched**. The RTL split pairs each constant-time design with a
leaky twin of *identical module interface*. The masking split includes three gadgets
that genuinely recombine a secret. The patch split includes a fix that blocks only one
witness and a fix that rejects everything. If your method cannot separate the halves of
a pair, its accuracy number means nothing.

## Provenance

Every record is **computed, not transcribed**. `build.py` reads the actual fixture
sources, runs the actual masking prover over every probe, and runs the actual solver to
produce the patch certificates. Re-running it reproduces the committed files byte for
byte, and a test asserts that — so the data cannot silently drift from the code that
produced it.

```bash
python build.py --check    # fails if the committed data is stale
```

The tools that generated it are open: [`ctbench`](https://github.com/nickharris808/ctbench),
[`ct-mask`](https://github.com/nickharris808/ct-mask), [`patchproof`](https://github.com/nickharris808/patchproof).

## Splits

### `rtl_constant_time` — 27 records

Verilog-2001 fixtures. 18 scored across 8 matched pairs, plus 9 unscored files kept for
context (fault-detection and secret-residue designs whose observable is a data output,
so grading them under a *timing* task would be a category error).

| Field | Type | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `file` | string | fixture file name |
| `module` | string | top-level module name |
| `source` | string | complete Verilog-2001 source |
| `scored` | bool | part of the graded task |
| `label` | string \| null | `CONSTANT_TIME`, `LEAKY`, or null when unscored |
| `observation` | string \| null | completion signal the label is about |
| `secrets` | list[string] | inputs declared secret — **never inferred** |
| `pair` | string \| null | matched-pair group |
| `role` | string \| null | `positive`, `negative`, `repaired`, `out_of_remit` |
| `note` | string | what the fixture demonstrates |
| `reason` | string \| null | why an unscored fixture is unscored |
| `license` | string | `CC-BY-4.0`, or `ISC` for the picorv32 derivatives |

**The out-of-remit control.** `barrett_buggy.v` is genuinely constant-time and
*functionally wrong* — a miscalibrated Barrett shift makes **62,206 of 65,536**
coefficients disagree with the reference. A timing tool that flags it is crying wolf.
It is labelled `role: out_of_remit` and it exists to separate serious methods from
pattern-matchers.

### `masking_probes` — 17 records

One record per **probe wire** of every bundled masked gadget, with the certificate that
discharged it. Probe-level rather than gadget-level because the interesting datum is
*which* certificate covered *which* wire.

| Field | Type | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `gadget` | string | gadget name |
| `gadget_expected` / `gadget_verdict` | string | `SECURE` or `LEAKY` |
| `probe` | string | the internal wire an adversary probes |
| `secure` | bool | whether this probe is certified |
| `certificate` | string \| null | `dependence`, `uniformity`, or null if neither applies |
| `refreshed_by` | string \| null | the fresh mask, for a uniformity certificate |
| `touches_shares` | string (JSON) | secret → shares the probe depends on |
| `secret_classes` | int | classes in the modelled-leakage enumeration |
| `mean_invariant` / `distribution_invariant` | bool | **two separate determinations** |
| `model` | string | the leakage model the verdict is stated under |

**The result that motivates the tool:** two `dom_and` probes certify **only** by
uniformity. They touch *both* shares of an operand — so a dependence-only analysis
flags them — and are perfectly secure because a fresh mask always flips them.

Note that `mean_invariant` and `distribution_invariant` are recorded *separately*. For
`dom_and` the mean is invariant and the distribution is **not**. A first-order verdict
is a statement about the first moment, and the data says so rather than letting you
assume more.

### `patch_certificates` — 5 records

Modelled bounds-check defect classes, with exploit witnesses and replayable elimination
certificates.

| Field | Type | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `defect_class` | string | `A`, `B`, `C`, or a `*-badfix` / `*-vacuous` demo |
| `title` | string | one-line description of the defect shape |
| `is_demo` | bool | true for the deliberately-wrong demonstrations |
| `verdict` | string | `COMPLETE`, `INCOMPLETE`, or `VACUOUS` |
| `widths` / `total_width` | string (JSON) / int | declared machine widths |
| `exploit_witness` | string (JSON) \| null | an input the *original* guard admits that violates safety |
| `incompleteness_witness` | string (JSON) \| null | an input the *corrected* guard still admits |
| `violating_region_measure` | int \| null | exact count, when the space is small enough to enumerate |
| `bit_precise_leg` | bool | discharged at the declared machine widths |
| `elimination_certificate` | string (JSON) \| null | Farkas multipliers |
| `certificate_replays_without_solver` | bool \| null | re-checked by integer arithmetic alone |
| `legs_agree` | bool \| null | bit-precise and elimination legs concur |
| `strictly_stronger_than_unsound_guard` | bool \| null | the fix implies the original guard *and* rejects more, so the elimination is non-vacuous |
| `out_of_model` | string (JSON) | defect shapes a `COMPLETE` verdict does **not** cover |

## Baseline

`data/baseline.json` holds a reference result for the RTL split from the bundled
cone-of-influence checker: **18/18 correct, 8/8 pairs separated, sound, out-of-remit
control passed**. It is a baseline, not a strong tool — it reasons about syntax rather
than semantics and will over-report on designs where a secret reaches a completion
signal by a path never taken.

## Usage

```python
from datasets import load_dataset

rtl = load_dataset("nickh007/hw-verify", "rtl_constant_time", split="test")
scored = rtl.filter(lambda r: r["scored"])
print(scored[0]["module"], scored[0]["label"])

masking = load_dataset("nickh007/hw-verify", "masking_probes", split="test")
uniformity_only = masking.filter(lambda r: r["certificate"] == "uniformity")
print(len(uniformity_only), "probes a dependence-only tool would flag")
```

## Scoring — do not use plain accuracy

The two error directions are not equally bad, and the reference implementation ranks
accordingly:

| Outcome | Meaning | Weight |
|---|---|---|
| **unsound** | said safe, is leaky | ships a vulnerability — dominates the ranking |
| **imprecise** | said leaky, is safe | costs engineering time |
| **abstained** | returned `UNKNOWN` | neither correct nor unsound |

`pip install ctbench` gives you `ctbench score`, `ctbench validate`, and
`ctbench leaderboard`, which implement exactly this rule.

## Scope and limits

- RTL labels concern **completion timing** against declared secrets — not power, EM,
  cache, or microarchitectural channels.
- Masking records are **glitch-free gate-value probing, first order (d=1), 2-share**.
- Patch records are **reachability in modelled bit semantics** — not an RCE claim. The
  `out_of_model` field lists the defect shapes deliberately excluded.
- Secrets are a **specification choice**, recorded per fixture and never inferred from
  source.

<!-- portfolio:start -->
## Part of the hw-verify toolkit

Five open tools, a dataset, and a browser demo for proving security properties of hardware and bounds checks. They share one boundary: **everything open analyses a design you disclose in full.**

| Project | What it does |
|---|---|
| [**Docs & overview**](https://huggingface.co/spaces/nickh007/hw-verify-site) | What the toolkit proves, and what it refuses |
| **▶ [Live demo](https://huggingface.co/spaces/nickh007/hw-verify)** | Try the constant-time checker in your browser — runs the real analyzer via Pyodide |
| [`ctbench`](https://github.com/nickharris808/ctbench) | Matched-pair constant-time RTL benchmark + leaderboard |
| [`patchproof`](https://github.com/nickharris808/patchproof) | Prove a bounds-check fix eliminates *every* violating input |
| [`ct-mask`](https://github.com/nickharris808/ct-mask) | First-order masking verification by two certificates |
| [`hw-verify-mcp`](https://github.com/nickharris808/hw-verify-mcp) | MCP server — all three checkers, callable by AI agents |
| [`ct-audit-action`](https://github.com/nickharris808/ct-audit-action) | GitHub Action — fail a PR on a leaky completion signal |
| **`hw-verify` dataset** (you are here) | 49 records, 3 splits, byte-reproducible from these tools |
| [`hw-verify-static`](https://github.com/nickharris808/hw-verify-static) · [`hw-verify-space`](https://github.com/nickharris808/hw-verify-space) | Source for the live demo (Pyodide) and a fuller Gradio build |

**The commercial boundary.** Proving a property to a third party who never receives the design — a verdict bound to a commitment of a design that stays hidden — is a different problem and a commercial one. It is not in any of these packages.
<!-- portfolio:end -->

## Licence

Per record, in the `license` field, because flattening it would misstate it. Full texts
and the upstream copyright notice are in [`LICENSE-DATA`](LICENSE-DATA):

- **CC-BY-4.0** — RTL fixtures, so they can be copied into papers and slides.
- **ISC** — `pcpi_div.v`, `pcpi_mul.v`, `pcpi_div_wiped.v`, `pcpi_div_halfwipe.v`,
  which derive from the [picorv32](https://github.com/YosysHQ/picorv32) project by
  Claire Wolf and remain under the upstream licence.
- **Apache-2.0** — the masking and patch records, which are outputs of the tools.

## Citation

```bibtex
@misc{hwverify2026,
  title  = {hw-verify: a hardware-security verification dataset with matched controls},
  year   = {2026},
  note   = {Matched-pair RTL, masking probe certificates, and patch-completeness certificates}
}
```

## Contributing

The most valuable contribution is a **new matched pair** for the corpus: a safe design
and a leaky twin with an identical interface, so the pair cannot be won by guessing.
See [ctbench's CONTRIBUTING](https://github.com/nickharris808/ctbench/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md)
— every record here is regenerated from that corpus by `build.py`, so a fixture added
there appears here on the next build.

## The commercial boundary

Everything here concerns designs disclosed in full. Proving a property to a third party
who never receives the design is a different problem — it requires the verdict bound to
a commitment of a design that stays hidden — and that capability is commercial.