case_id stringlengths 23 53 | design stringclasses 10
values | family stringclasses 39
values | invariant stringclasses 34
values | is_failure bool 2
classes | naive_detail stringclasses 47
values | naive_held bool 2
classes | prior_art_analogue stringclasses 39
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
naive_hybrid_akm::algorithm_substitution | naive_hybrid_akm | algorithm_substitution | no_silent_downgrade | true | KEM ML-KEM-512 substituted for preferred ML-KEM-768 | false | Dragonblood (weak-group forcing) |
naive_hybrid_akm::ap_flood | naive_hybrid_akm | ap_flood | no_expensive_before_gate | true | AP performed 202 expensive ops before any gate | false | Dragonblood (resource-consumption DoS) |
naive_hybrid_akm::beacon_batch_replay | naive_hybrid_akm | beacon_batch_replay | no_beacon_batch_replay | true | stale/cross-window batched-beacon root replayed (rollback) | false | beacon-batch root replay / state rollback (PQC-era amortized beacon signing) |
naive_hybrid_akm::beacon_forgery | naive_hybrid_akm | beacon_forgery | no_unauth_capability | true | acted on an unauthenticated/forged capability beacon | false | Rogue AP / evil-twin (unauthenticated beacon) |
naive_hybrid_akm::capability_spoof | naive_hybrid_akm | capability_spoof | no_silent_downgrade | true | STA used SAE while AP top is PQC-HYBRID | false | Dragonblood (downgrade) |
naive_hybrid_akm::combiner_downgrade | naive_hybrid_akm | combiner_downgrade | no_combiner_downgrade | true | hybrid key forced to a single component (combiner downgrade) | false | hybrid KEM combiner downgrade / single-component forcing (X-Wing draft-connolly-cfrg-xwing; the historical 'keys_match=ok or hybrid' fudge) |
naive_hybrid_akm::compression_bomb | naive_hybrid_akm | compression_bomb | no_compression_bomb | true | compression bomb inflated without bound (memory DoS) | false | compression/zip bomb on the auth path (PQC large-object compression) |
naive_hybrid_akm::cross_protocol_confusion | naive_hybrid_akm | cross_protocol_confusion | no_cross_protocol_confusion | true | foreign-protocol-domain credential/transcript accepted (cross-protocol confusion) | false | cross-protocol confusion: a PQC credential/transcript minted in protocol-domain A (e.g. TLS/QUIC/IKEv2/EAP/MLS) replayed/presented in protocol-domain B (Wi-Fi) (genuinely-first: no unambiguous transcript-bound protocol-domain label (proto-id + version) folded into the KDF in the multi-protocol PQC era; distinct from wi... |
naive_hybrid_akm::eap_pqc_strip | naive_hybrid_akm | eap_pqc_strip | no_eap_suite_downgrade | true | PQC suite stripped to classical across the EAP relay (suite downgrade) | false | EAP/802.1X PQC-suite strip across the EAP<->4-way relay (cf. Köder et al. arXiv:2601.22892, no downgrade modeling) |
naive_hybrid_akm::fec_downgrade | naive_hybrid_akm | fec_downgrade | no_fec_downgrade | true | forced into a weak/no-FEC fragmentation mode | false | fragmentation/FEC-mode downgrade (PQC large-object loss) |
naive_hybrid_akm::flood_starvation | naive_hybrid_akm | flood_starvation | no_legit_starvation | true | legitimate roamer starved under flood (unbounded tail) | false | anti-clogging starvation / tail-latency DoS (PQC-era) |
naive_hybrid_akm::forced_fallback | naive_hybrid_akm | forced_fallback | no_silent_downgrade | true | implicit AKM fallback accepted | false | Dragonblood (transition-mode downgrade) |
naive_hybrid_akm::fragment_splice | naive_hybrid_akm | fragment_splice | no_partial_transcript | true | accepted spliced/reordered fragmented object | false | FragAttacks (fragment injection) |
naive_hybrid_akm::fragment_swap | naive_hybrid_akm | fragment_swap | no_partial_transcript | true | accepted spliced/reordered fragmented object | false | FragAttacks (mixed fragments) |
naive_hybrid_akm::fragment_truncate | naive_hybrid_akm | fragment_truncate | no_partial_transcript | false | spliced/partial transcript rejected | true | FragAttacks (truncation) — fail-closed control |
naive_hybrid_akm::ft_roam_fs_erosion | naive_hybrid_akm | ft_roam_fs_erosion | no_ft_fs_extension | true | FT roam extends the PQC FS epoch (PMK-R0 compromise exposes roamed sessions) | false | 802.11r FT key-reuse extending the PQC forward-secrecy epoch across roams (genuinely-first: no source links FT key-reuse to PQC FS) |
naive_hybrid_akm::group_key_injection | naive_hybrid_akm | group_key_injection | no_group_key_injection | true | replayed/cross-session group-key (GTK/IGTK) install accepted (group-key reinstallation) | false | group-key (GTK/IGTK) reinstallation / cross-session injection (KRACK group variant; genuinely-first: the group-key install is unbound to the PQC pairwise transcript + has no monotonic epoch in the PQC era) |
naive_hybrid_akm::kem_impersonation_no_confirm | naive_hybrid_akm | kem_impersonation_no_confirm | no_unconfirmed_implicit_auth | true | implicit KEM auth installed without confirmation (impersonation accepted) | false | KEMTLS/AuthKEM implicit auth without a key-confirmation gate (Schwabe-Stebila-Wiggers CCS'20; AuthKEM I-D) |
naive_hybrid_akm::krack_retransmission | naive_hybrid_akm | krack_retransmission | no_key_reinstall | true | 1 key reinstall(s) -> nonce/replay reset | false | KRACK (key reinstallation) |
naive_hybrid_akm::length_fingerprint | naive_hybrid_akm | length_fingerprint | no_length_identity_leak | true | on-air fragmentation shape leaks the identity (length fingerprint) | false | PQC fragmentation-shape / on-air length metadata leak (traffic-analysis genus; PQC-size-specific) |
naive_hybrid_akm::mlo_key_crosslink | naive_hybrid_akm | mlo_key_crosslink | no_mlo_crosslink | true | MLO link key reused across links (cross-link) | false | MLO shared-key cross-link reuse (PQC-era) |
naive_hybrid_akm::mlo_misbind | naive_hybrid_akm | mlo_misbind | no_silent_downgrade | true | MLO link bound outside committed link set | false | MLO link substitution (PQC-era) |
naive_hybrid_akm::mtu_downgrade | naive_hybrid_akm | mtu_downgrade | no_mtu_downgrade | true | fragment MTU forced to a pathological value (fragment explosion) | false | forced fragment-MTU downgrade / fragment explosion (PQC large-object) |
naive_hybrid_akm::owe_quantum_recoverable | naive_hybrid_akm | owe_quantum_recoverable | no_owe_quantum_recovery | true | ECDH OWE session key quantum-recoverable (harvest-now-decrypt-later) | false | OWE/Enhanced-Open (RFC 8110) ECDH harvest-now-decrypt-later; no ML-KEM OWE draft exists |
naive_hybrid_akm::policy_substitution | naive_hybrid_akm | policy_substitution | no_policy_downgrade | true | device-class/battery policy silently downgraded | false | Device-class / battery policy downgrade (PQC-era) |
naive_hybrid_akm::recovery_downgrade | naive_hybrid_akm | recovery_downgrade | no_recovery_downgrade | true | replayed/unconfirmed in-place recovery/rekey re-entry accepted (recovery downgrade) | false | in-place PTK rekey / disassoc-recovery re-entry replay or unconfirmed resume (genuinely-first: the recovery transition re-confirms no current transcript root + has no monotonic recovery epoch in the PQC era; distinct from install/roam/resumption surfaces) |
naive_hybrid_akm::resumption_replay | naive_hybrid_akm | resumption_replay | no_zero_rtt_replay | true | 0-RTT resumption token replayed / accepted by a rogue AP | false | 0-RTT resumption replay / cross-AP (PQC-era session resumption; cf. TLS-1.3 0-RTT) |
naive_hybrid_akm::roam_key_reuse | naive_hybrid_akm | roam_key_reuse | no_roam_key_reuse | true | roam key minted for one AP reused at another (cross-AP) | false | cross-AP roam-key reuse (domain-wide fast-roam ticket, PQC-era multi-target) |
naive_hybrid_akm::sig_profile_substitution | naive_hybrid_akm | sig_profile_substitution | no_sig_role_confusion | true | a signature minted for one role was accepted in another (role confusion) | false | cross-role/cross-algorithm signature substitution (transcript-bound signature profiles) |
naive_hybrid_akm::single_family_break | naive_hybrid_akm | single_family_break | no_single_assumption_dependence | true | key exposed by a single math-family break (single-assumption dependence) | false | single-math-family dependence (ML-KEM (+) HQC assumption diversity; HQC standardized NIST 2025) |
naive_hybrid_akm::skipped_reencryption_check | naive_hybrid_akm | skipped_reencryption_check | no_indcca_downgrade | true | tampered ciphertext accepted (FO check skipped -> IND-CPA) | false | skipped Fujisaki-Okamoto re-encryption check -> IND-CCA->IND-CPA downgrade (cf. eprint 2025/450, HQC ref impl) |
naive_hybrid_akm::stale_credential_replay | naive_hybrid_akm | stale_credential_replay | no_stale_credential | true | acted on a stale/forged cached AP credential | false | cached-credential / signature replay (PQC-era airtime cache) |
naive_hybrid_akm::suite_rollback | naive_hybrid_akm | suite_rollback | no_suite_rollback | true | rolled-back/unconfirmed crypto-agility suite rotation accepted (suite rollback) | false | crypto-agility suite/credential ROTATION over the deployment lifetime rolled back to a retired suite or rotated without confirmation (genuinely-first: the deliberate suite-rotation transition re-confirms no current transcript over the new suite identity + has no monotonic suite epoch; distinct from initial negotiation/... |
naive_pqc_eaptls::algorithm_substitution | naive_pqc_eaptls | algorithm_substitution | no_silent_downgrade | true | KEM ML-KEM-512 substituted for preferred ML-KEM-768 | false | Dragonblood (weak-group forcing) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::ap_flood | naive_pqc_eaptls | ap_flood | no_expensive_before_gate | true | AP performed 202 expensive ops before any gate | false | Dragonblood (resource-consumption DoS) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::beacon_batch_replay | naive_pqc_eaptls | beacon_batch_replay | no_beacon_batch_replay | true | stale/cross-window batched-beacon root replayed (rollback) | false | beacon-batch root replay / state rollback (PQC-era amortized beacon signing) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::beacon_forgery | naive_pqc_eaptls | beacon_forgery | no_unauth_capability | true | acted on an unauthenticated/forged capability beacon | false | Rogue AP / evil-twin (unauthenticated beacon) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::capability_spoof | naive_pqc_eaptls | capability_spoof | no_silent_downgrade | true | STA used SAE while AP top is PQC-EAP-TLS | false | Dragonblood (downgrade) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::combiner_downgrade | naive_pqc_eaptls | combiner_downgrade | no_combiner_downgrade | true | hybrid key forced to a single component (combiner downgrade) | false | hybrid KEM combiner downgrade / single-component forcing (X-Wing draft-connolly-cfrg-xwing; the historical 'keys_match=ok or hybrid' fudge) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::compression_bomb | naive_pqc_eaptls | compression_bomb | no_compression_bomb | true | compression bomb inflated without bound (memory DoS) | false | compression/zip bomb on the auth path (PQC large-object compression) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::cross_protocol_confusion | naive_pqc_eaptls | cross_protocol_confusion | no_cross_protocol_confusion | true | foreign-protocol-domain credential/transcript accepted (cross-protocol confusion) | false | cross-protocol confusion: a PQC credential/transcript minted in protocol-domain A (e.g. TLS/QUIC/IKEv2/EAP/MLS) replayed/presented in protocol-domain B (Wi-Fi) (genuinely-first: no unambiguous transcript-bound protocol-domain label (proto-id + version) folded into the KDF in the multi-protocol PQC era; distinct from wi... |
naive_pqc_eaptls::eap_method_downgrade | naive_pqc_eaptls | eap_method_downgrade | no_eap_method_downgrade | true | enterprise EAP method / certificate-capsule downgraded | false | EAP-TLS legacy-method forcing / cert substitution (PQC-era) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::eap_pqc_strip | naive_pqc_eaptls | eap_pqc_strip | no_eap_suite_downgrade | true | PQC suite stripped to classical across the EAP relay (suite downgrade) | false | EAP/802.1X PQC-suite strip across the EAP<->4-way relay (cf. Köder et al. arXiv:2601.22892, no downgrade modeling) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::fec_downgrade | naive_pqc_eaptls | fec_downgrade | no_fec_downgrade | true | forced into a weak/no-FEC fragmentation mode | false | fragmentation/FEC-mode downgrade (PQC large-object loss) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::flood_starvation | naive_pqc_eaptls | flood_starvation | no_legit_starvation | true | legitimate roamer starved under flood (unbounded tail) | false | anti-clogging starvation / tail-latency DoS (PQC-era) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::forced_fallback | naive_pqc_eaptls | forced_fallback | no_silent_downgrade | true | implicit AKM fallback accepted | false | Dragonblood (transition-mode downgrade) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::fragment_splice | naive_pqc_eaptls | fragment_splice | no_partial_transcript | true | accepted spliced/reordered fragmented object | false | FragAttacks (fragment injection) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::fragment_swap | naive_pqc_eaptls | fragment_swap | no_partial_transcript | true | accepted spliced/reordered fragmented object | false | FragAttacks (mixed fragments) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::fragment_truncate | naive_pqc_eaptls | fragment_truncate | no_partial_transcript | false | spliced/partial transcript rejected | true | FragAttacks (truncation) — fail-closed control |
naive_pqc_eaptls::ft_roam_fs_erosion | naive_pqc_eaptls | ft_roam_fs_erosion | no_ft_fs_extension | true | FT roam extends the PQC FS epoch (PMK-R0 compromise exposes roamed sessions) | false | 802.11r FT key-reuse extending the PQC forward-secrecy epoch across roams (genuinely-first: no source links FT key-reuse to PQC FS) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::group_key_injection | naive_pqc_eaptls | group_key_injection | no_group_key_injection | true | replayed/cross-session group-key (GTK/IGTK) install accepted (group-key reinstallation) | false | group-key (GTK/IGTK) reinstallation / cross-session injection (KRACK group variant; genuinely-first: the group-key install is unbound to the PQC pairwise transcript + has no monotonic epoch in the PQC era) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::kem_impersonation_no_confirm | naive_pqc_eaptls | kem_impersonation_no_confirm | no_unconfirmed_implicit_auth | true | implicit KEM auth installed without confirmation (impersonation accepted) | false | KEMTLS/AuthKEM implicit auth without a key-confirmation gate (Schwabe-Stebila-Wiggers CCS'20; AuthKEM I-D) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::krack_retransmission | naive_pqc_eaptls | krack_retransmission | no_key_reinstall | true | 1 key reinstall(s) -> nonce/replay reset | false | KRACK (key reinstallation) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::length_fingerprint | naive_pqc_eaptls | length_fingerprint | no_length_identity_leak | true | on-air fragmentation shape leaks the identity (length fingerprint) | false | PQC fragmentation-shape / on-air length metadata leak (traffic-analysis genus; PQC-size-specific) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::mtu_downgrade | naive_pqc_eaptls | mtu_downgrade | no_mtu_downgrade | true | fragment MTU forced to a pathological value (fragment explosion) | false | forced fragment-MTU downgrade / fragment explosion (PQC large-object) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::owe_quantum_recoverable | naive_pqc_eaptls | owe_quantum_recoverable | no_owe_quantum_recovery | true | ECDH OWE session key quantum-recoverable (harvest-now-decrypt-later) | false | OWE/Enhanced-Open (RFC 8110) ECDH harvest-now-decrypt-later; no ML-KEM OWE draft exists |
naive_pqc_eaptls::policy_substitution | naive_pqc_eaptls | policy_substitution | no_policy_downgrade | true | device-class/battery policy silently downgraded | false | Device-class / battery policy downgrade (PQC-era) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::recovery_downgrade | naive_pqc_eaptls | recovery_downgrade | no_recovery_downgrade | true | replayed/unconfirmed in-place recovery/rekey re-entry accepted (recovery downgrade) | false | in-place PTK rekey / disassoc-recovery re-entry replay or unconfirmed resume (genuinely-first: the recovery transition re-confirms no current transcript root + has no monotonic recovery epoch in the PQC era; distinct from install/roam/resumption surfaces) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::resumption_replay | naive_pqc_eaptls | resumption_replay | no_zero_rtt_replay | true | 0-RTT resumption token replayed / accepted by a rogue AP | false | 0-RTT resumption replay / cross-AP (PQC-era session resumption; cf. TLS-1.3 0-RTT) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::roam_key_reuse | naive_pqc_eaptls | roam_key_reuse | no_roam_key_reuse | true | roam key minted for one AP reused at another (cross-AP) | false | cross-AP roam-key reuse (domain-wide fast-roam ticket, PQC-era multi-target) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::sig_profile_substitution | naive_pqc_eaptls | sig_profile_substitution | no_sig_role_confusion | true | a signature minted for one role was accepted in another (role confusion) | false | cross-role/cross-algorithm signature substitution (transcript-bound signature profiles) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::single_family_break | naive_pqc_eaptls | single_family_break | no_single_assumption_dependence | true | key exposed by a single math-family break (single-assumption dependence) | false | single-math-family dependence (ML-KEM (+) HQC assumption diversity; HQC standardized NIST 2025) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::skipped_reencryption_check | naive_pqc_eaptls | skipped_reencryption_check | no_indcca_downgrade | true | tampered ciphertext accepted (FO check skipped -> IND-CPA) | false | skipped Fujisaki-Okamoto re-encryption check -> IND-CCA->IND-CPA downgrade (cf. eprint 2025/450, HQC ref impl) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::stale_credential_replay | naive_pqc_eaptls | stale_credential_replay | no_stale_credential | true | acted on a stale/forged cached AP credential | false | cached-credential / signature replay (PQC-era airtime cache) |
naive_pqc_eaptls::suite_rollback | naive_pqc_eaptls | suite_rollback | no_suite_rollback | true | rolled-back/unconfirmed crypto-agility suite rotation accepted (suite rollback) | false | crypto-agility suite/credential ROTATION over the deployment lifetime rolled back to a retired suite or rotated without confirmation (genuinely-first: the deliberate suite-rotation transition re-confirms no current transcript over the new suite identity + has no monotonic suite epoch; distinct from initial negotiation/... |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::algorithm_substitution | naive_pqc_fast_roam | algorithm_substitution | no_silent_downgrade | true | KEM ML-KEM-512 substituted for preferred ML-KEM-768 | false | Dragonblood (weak-group forcing) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::ap_flood | naive_pqc_fast_roam | ap_flood | no_expensive_before_gate | true | AP performed 202 expensive ops before any gate | false | Dragonblood (resource-consumption DoS) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::beacon_batch_replay | naive_pqc_fast_roam | beacon_batch_replay | no_beacon_batch_replay | true | stale/cross-window batched-beacon root replayed (rollback) | false | beacon-batch root replay / state rollback (PQC-era amortized beacon signing) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::beacon_forgery | naive_pqc_fast_roam | beacon_forgery | no_unauth_capability | true | acted on an unauthenticated/forged capability beacon | false | Rogue AP / evil-twin (unauthenticated beacon) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::capability_spoof | naive_pqc_fast_roam | capability_spoof | no_silent_downgrade | true | STA used SAE while AP top is PQC-FT | false | Dragonblood (downgrade) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::combiner_downgrade | naive_pqc_fast_roam | combiner_downgrade | no_combiner_downgrade | true | hybrid key forced to a single component (combiner downgrade) | false | hybrid KEM combiner downgrade / single-component forcing (X-Wing draft-connolly-cfrg-xwing; the historical 'keys_match=ok or hybrid' fudge) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::compression_bomb | naive_pqc_fast_roam | compression_bomb | no_compression_bomb | true | compression bomb inflated without bound (memory DoS) | false | compression/zip bomb on the auth path (PQC large-object compression) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::cross_protocol_confusion | naive_pqc_fast_roam | cross_protocol_confusion | no_cross_protocol_confusion | true | foreign-protocol-domain credential/transcript accepted (cross-protocol confusion) | false | cross-protocol confusion: a PQC credential/transcript minted in protocol-domain A (e.g. TLS/QUIC/IKEv2/EAP/MLS) replayed/presented in protocol-domain B (Wi-Fi) (genuinely-first: no unambiguous transcript-bound protocol-domain label (proto-id + version) folded into the KDF in the multi-protocol PQC era; distinct from wi... |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::eap_pqc_strip | naive_pqc_fast_roam | eap_pqc_strip | no_eap_suite_downgrade | true | PQC suite stripped to classical across the EAP relay (suite downgrade) | false | EAP/802.1X PQC-suite strip across the EAP<->4-way relay (cf. Köder et al. arXiv:2601.22892, no downgrade modeling) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::fec_downgrade | naive_pqc_fast_roam | fec_downgrade | no_fec_downgrade | true | forced into a weak/no-FEC fragmentation mode | false | fragmentation/FEC-mode downgrade (PQC large-object loss) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::flood_starvation | naive_pqc_fast_roam | flood_starvation | no_legit_starvation | true | legitimate roamer starved under flood (unbounded tail) | false | anti-clogging starvation / tail-latency DoS (PQC-era) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::forced_fallback | naive_pqc_fast_roam | forced_fallback | no_silent_downgrade | true | implicit AKM fallback accepted | false | Dragonblood (transition-mode downgrade) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::fragment_splice | naive_pqc_fast_roam | fragment_splice | no_partial_transcript | true | accepted spliced/reordered fragmented object | false | FragAttacks (fragment injection) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::fragment_swap | naive_pqc_fast_roam | fragment_swap | no_partial_transcript | true | accepted spliced/reordered fragmented object | false | FragAttacks (mixed fragments) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::fragment_truncate | naive_pqc_fast_roam | fragment_truncate | no_partial_transcript | false | spliced/partial transcript rejected | true | FragAttacks (truncation) — fail-closed control |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::ft_roam_fs_erosion | naive_pqc_fast_roam | ft_roam_fs_erosion | no_ft_fs_extension | true | FT roam extends the PQC FS epoch (PMK-R0 compromise exposes roamed sessions) | false | 802.11r FT key-reuse extending the PQC forward-secrecy epoch across roams (genuinely-first: no source links FT key-reuse to PQC FS) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::group_key_injection | naive_pqc_fast_roam | group_key_injection | no_group_key_injection | true | replayed/cross-session group-key (GTK/IGTK) install accepted (group-key reinstallation) | false | group-key (GTK/IGTK) reinstallation / cross-session injection (KRACK group variant; genuinely-first: the group-key install is unbound to the PQC pairwise transcript + has no monotonic epoch in the PQC era) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::kem_impersonation_no_confirm | naive_pqc_fast_roam | kem_impersonation_no_confirm | no_unconfirmed_implicit_auth | true | implicit KEM auth installed without confirmation (impersonation accepted) | false | KEMTLS/AuthKEM implicit auth without a key-confirmation gate (Schwabe-Stebila-Wiggers CCS'20; AuthKEM I-D) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::krack_retransmission | naive_pqc_fast_roam | krack_retransmission | no_key_reinstall | true | 1 key reinstall(s) -> nonce/replay reset | false | KRACK (key reinstallation) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::length_fingerprint | naive_pqc_fast_roam | length_fingerprint | no_length_identity_leak | true | on-air fragmentation shape leaks the identity (length fingerprint) | false | PQC fragmentation-shape / on-air length metadata leak (traffic-analysis genus; PQC-size-specific) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::mtu_downgrade | naive_pqc_fast_roam | mtu_downgrade | no_mtu_downgrade | true | fragment MTU forced to a pathological value (fragment explosion) | false | forced fragment-MTU downgrade / fragment explosion (PQC large-object) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::owe_quantum_recoverable | naive_pqc_fast_roam | owe_quantum_recoverable | no_owe_quantum_recovery | true | ECDH OWE session key quantum-recoverable (harvest-now-decrypt-later) | false | OWE/Enhanced-Open (RFC 8110) ECDH harvest-now-decrypt-later; no ML-KEM OWE draft exists |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::policy_substitution | naive_pqc_fast_roam | policy_substitution | no_policy_downgrade | true | device-class/battery policy silently downgraded | false | Device-class / battery policy downgrade (PQC-era) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::recovery_downgrade | naive_pqc_fast_roam | recovery_downgrade | no_recovery_downgrade | true | replayed/unconfirmed in-place recovery/rekey re-entry accepted (recovery downgrade) | false | in-place PTK rekey / disassoc-recovery re-entry replay or unconfirmed resume (genuinely-first: the recovery transition re-confirms no current transcript root + has no monotonic recovery epoch in the PQC era; distinct from install/roam/resumption surfaces) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::resumption_replay | naive_pqc_fast_roam | resumption_replay | no_zero_rtt_replay | true | 0-RTT resumption token replayed / accepted by a rogue AP | false | 0-RTT resumption replay / cross-AP (PQC-era session resumption; cf. TLS-1.3 0-RTT) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::roam_key_reuse | naive_pqc_fast_roam | roam_key_reuse | no_roam_key_reuse | true | roam key minted for one AP reused at another (cross-AP) | false | cross-AP roam-key reuse (domain-wide fast-roam ticket, PQC-era multi-target) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::roam_ticket_replay | naive_pqc_fast_roam | roam_ticket_replay | no_roam_replay | true | roam ticket replay accepted | false | 802.11r FT (ticket/PMK replay) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::sig_profile_substitution | naive_pqc_fast_roam | sig_profile_substitution | no_sig_role_confusion | true | a signature minted for one role was accepted in another (role confusion) | false | cross-role/cross-algorithm signature substitution (transcript-bound signature profiles) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::single_family_break | naive_pqc_fast_roam | single_family_break | no_single_assumption_dependence | true | key exposed by a single math-family break (single-assumption dependence) | false | single-math-family dependence (ML-KEM (+) HQC assumption diversity; HQC standardized NIST 2025) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::skipped_reencryption_check | naive_pqc_fast_roam | skipped_reencryption_check | no_indcca_downgrade | true | tampered ciphertext accepted (FO check skipped -> IND-CPA) | false | skipped Fujisaki-Okamoto re-encryption check -> IND-CCA->IND-CPA downgrade (cf. eprint 2025/450, HQC ref impl) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::stale_credential_replay | naive_pqc_fast_roam | stale_credential_replay | no_stale_credential | true | acted on a stale/forged cached AP credential | false | cached-credential / signature replay (PQC-era airtime cache) |
naive_pqc_fast_roam::suite_rollback | naive_pqc_fast_roam | suite_rollback | no_suite_rollback | true | rolled-back/unconfirmed crypto-agility suite rotation accepted (suite rollback) | false | crypto-agility suite/credential ROTATION over the deployment lifetime rolled back to a retired suite or rotated without confirmation (genuinely-first: the deliberate suite-rotation transition re-confirms no current transcript over the new suite identity + has no monotonic suite epoch; distinct from initial negotiation/... |
naive_pqc_fils::algorithm_substitution | naive_pqc_fils | algorithm_substitution | no_silent_downgrade | true | KEM ML-KEM-512 substituted for preferred ML-KEM-768 | false | Dragonblood (weak-group forcing) |
naive_pqc_fils::ap_flood | naive_pqc_fils | ap_flood | no_expensive_before_gate | true | AP performed 202 expensive ops before any gate | false | Dragonblood (resource-consumption DoS) |
naive_pqc_fils::beacon_batch_replay | naive_pqc_fils | beacon_batch_replay | no_beacon_batch_replay | true | stale/cross-window batched-beacon root replayed (rollback) | false | beacon-batch root replay / state rollback (PQC-era amortized beacon signing) |
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