| {"id": "ieee_4way_handshake_krack", "standards_body": "IEEE", "spec_clause": "IEEE 802.11-2020 \u00a712.7.6 (4-way handshake) / IEEE 802.11i", "property": "nonce_never_reused", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: IEEE\nSpecification clause: IEEE 802.11-2020 \u00a712.7.6 (4-way handshake) / IEEE 802.11i\nSafety property that must hold: nonce_never_reused\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): ptk_installed, tx_nonce, nonce_reused\nInitial state: {'ptk_installed': False, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'ptk_installed': False, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False} --InstallPTK_msg3--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False} --SendEncrypted--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 1, 'nonce_reused': False}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False} --ReinstallPTK_msg3retx--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 1, 'nonce_reused': False} --SendEncrypted--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 2, 'nonce_reused': False}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 1, 'nonce_reused': False} --ReinstallPTK_msg3retx--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 2, 'nonce_reused': False} --ReinstallPTK_msg3retx--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True} --SendEncrypted--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 1, 'nonce_reused': True}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True} --ReinstallPTK_msg3retx--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 1, 'nonce_reused': True} --SendEncrypted--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 2, 'nonce_reused': True}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 1, 'nonce_reused': True} --ReinstallPTK_msg3retx--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 2, 'nonce_reused': True} --ReinstallPTK_msg3retx--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True}\n\nThe property 'nonce_never_reused' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): ptk_installed, tx_nonce, nonce_reused\nInitial state: {'ptk_installed': False, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'ptk_installed': False, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False} --InstallPTK_msg3--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False} --SendEncrypted--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 1, 'nonce_reused': False}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False} --ReinstallPTK_msg3retx--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': False}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 1, 'nonce_reused': False} --SendEncrypted--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 2, 'nonce_reused': False}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 1, 'nonce_reused': False} --ReinstallPTK_msg3retx--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 2, 'nonce_reused': False} --ReinstallPTK_msg3retx--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True} --SendEncrypted--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 1, 'nonce_reused': True}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True} --ReinstallPTK_msg3retx--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 1, 'nonce_reused': True} --SendEncrypted--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 2, 'nonce_reused': True}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 1, 'nonce_reused': True} --ReinstallPTK_msg3retx--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True}\n {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 2, 'nonce_reused': True} --ReinstallPTK_msg3retx--> {'ptk_installed': True, 'tx_nonce': 0, 'nonce_reused': True}", "label": "KNOWN_COUNTEREXAMPLE", "violated": true, "citation": "Vanhoef & Piessens, \"Key Reinstallation Attacks: Forcing Nonce Reuse in WPA2\", ACM CCS 2017; CVE-2017-13077..13088 (KRACK).", "known_finding": "Retransmitted/replayed EAPOL-Key msg3 triggers PTK reinstallation, resetting the TX nonce and replay counter -> nonce reuse.", "has_fixed_twin": true, "fixed_twin_holds": true, "n_state_fields": 3, "n_reachable_states": 7, "n_transitions": 11, "state_fields": ["ptk_installed", "tx_nonce", "nonce_reused"], "initial_state": {"ptk_installed": false, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"ptk_installed": false, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": false}, "label": "InstallPTK_msg3", "to": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": false}}, {"from": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": false}, "label": "SendEncrypted", "to": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 1, "nonce_reused": false}}, {"from": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": false}, "label": "ReinstallPTK_msg3retx", "to": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": false}}, {"from": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 1, "nonce_reused": false}, "label": "SendEncrypted", "to": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 2, "nonce_reused": false}}, {"from": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 1, "nonce_reused": false}, "label": "ReinstallPTK_msg3retx", "to": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": true}}, {"from": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 2, "nonce_reused": false}, "label": "ReinstallPTK_msg3retx", "to": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": true}}, {"from": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": true}, "label": "SendEncrypted", "to": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 1, "nonce_reused": true}}, {"from": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": true}, "label": "ReinstallPTK_msg3retx", "to": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": true}}, {"from": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 1, "nonce_reused": true}, "label": "SendEncrypted", "to": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 2, "nonce_reused": true}}, {"from": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 1, "nonce_reused": true}, "label": "ReinstallPTK_msg3retx", "to": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": true}}, {"from": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 2, "nonce_reused": true}, "label": "ReinstallPTK_msg3retx", "to": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": true}}], "counterexample": [{"label": null, "state": {"ptk_installed": false, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": false}}, {"label": "InstallPTK_msg3", "state": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": false}}, {"label": "SendEncrypted", "state": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 1, "nonce_reused": false}}, {"label": "ReinstallPTK_msg3retx", "state": {"ptk_installed": true, "tx_nonce": 0, "nonce_reused": true}}], "counterexample_length": 4} |
| {"id": "ieee_ft_handshake_802_11r", "standards_body": "IEEE", "spec_clause": "IEEE 802.11-2020 \u00a713 (Fast BSS Transition)", "property": "no_data_before_key_confirm", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: IEEE\nSpecification clause: IEEE 802.11-2020 \u00a713 (Fast BSS Transition)\nSafety property that must hold: no_data_before_key_confirm\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): authed, confirmed, data\nInitial state: {'authed': False, 'confirmed': False, 'data': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'authed': False, 'confirmed': False, 'data': False} --FTAuth--> {'authed': True, 'confirmed': False, 'data': False}\n {'authed': True, 'confirmed': False, 'data': False} --KeyConfirm--> {'authed': True, 'confirmed': True, 'data': False}\n {'authed': True, 'confirmed': True, 'data': False} --SendData--> {'authed': True, 'confirmed': True, 'data': True}\n {'authed': True, 'confirmed': True, 'data': True} (no outgoing transitions)\n\nThe property 'no_data_before_key_confirm' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): authed, confirmed, data\nInitial state: {'authed': False, 'confirmed': False, 'data': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'authed': False, 'confirmed': False, 'data': False} --FTAuth--> {'authed': True, 'confirmed': False, 'data': False}\n {'authed': True, 'confirmed': False, 'data': False} --KeyConfirm--> {'authed': True, 'confirmed': True, 'data': False}\n {'authed': True, 'confirmed': True, 'data': False} --SendData--> {'authed': True, 'confirmed': True, 'data': True}\n {'authed': True, 'confirmed': True, 'data': True} (no outgoing transitions)", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 3, "n_reachable_states": 4, "n_transitions": 3, "state_fields": ["authed", "confirmed", "data"], "initial_state": {"authed": false, "confirmed": false, "data": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"authed": false, "confirmed": false, "data": false}, "label": "FTAuth", "to": {"authed": true, "confirmed": false, "data": false}}, {"from": {"authed": true, "confirmed": false, "data": false}, "label": "KeyConfirm", "to": {"authed": true, "confirmed": true, "data": false}}, {"from": {"authed": true, "confirmed": true, "data": false}, "label": "SendData", "to": {"authed": true, "confirmed": true, "data": true}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0} |
| {"id": "ieee_mlo_tid_to_link", "standards_body": "IEEE", "spec_clause": "IEEE 802.11be/bn MLO TID-to-link mapping (\u00a735)", "property": "no_tx_on_inactive_link", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: IEEE\nSpecification clause: IEEE 802.11be/bn MLO TID-to-link mapping (\u00a735)\nSafety property that must hold: no_tx_on_inactive_link\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): link_active, tid_mapped, tx\nInitial state: {'link_active': False, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'link_active': False, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False} --ActivateLink--> {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False}\n {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False} --DeactivateLink--> {'link_active': False, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False}\n {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False} --MapTID--> {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': True, 'tx': False}\n {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': True, 'tx': False} --DeactivateLink--> {'link_active': False, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False}\n {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': True, 'tx': False} --TxOnLink--> {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': True, 'tx': True}\n {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': True, 'tx': True} --TxDone--> {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': True, 'tx': False}\n\nThe property 'no_tx_on_inactive_link' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): link_active, tid_mapped, tx\nInitial state: {'link_active': False, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'link_active': False, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False} --ActivateLink--> {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False}\n {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False} --DeactivateLink--> {'link_active': False, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False}\n {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False} --MapTID--> {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': True, 'tx': False}\n {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': True, 'tx': False} --DeactivateLink--> {'link_active': False, 'tid_mapped': False, 'tx': False}\n {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': True, 'tx': False} --TxOnLink--> {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': True, 'tx': True}\n {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': True, 'tx': True} --TxDone--> {'link_active': True, 'tid_mapped': True, 'tx': False}", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 3, "n_reachable_states": 4, "n_transitions": 6, "state_fields": ["link_active", "tid_mapped", "tx"], "initial_state": {"link_active": false, "tid_mapped": false, "tx": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"link_active": false, "tid_mapped": false, "tx": false}, "label": "ActivateLink", "to": {"link_active": true, "tid_mapped": false, "tx": false}}, {"from": {"link_active": true, "tid_mapped": false, "tx": false}, "label": "DeactivateLink", "to": {"link_active": false, "tid_mapped": false, "tx": false}}, {"from": {"link_active": true, "tid_mapped": false, "tx": false}, "label": "MapTID", "to": {"link_active": true, "tid_mapped": true, "tx": false}}, {"from": {"link_active": true, "tid_mapped": true, "tx": false}, "label": "DeactivateLink", "to": {"link_active": false, "tid_mapped": false, "tx": false}}, {"from": {"link_active": true, "tid_mapped": true, "tx": false}, "label": "TxOnLink", "to": {"link_active": true, "tid_mapped": true, "tx": true}}, {"from": {"link_active": true, "tid_mapped": true, "tx": true}, "label": "TxDone", "to": {"link_active": true, "tid_mapped": true, "tx": false}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0} |
| {"id": "ieee_block_ack_scoreboard", "standards_body": "IEEE", "spec_clause": "IEEE 802.11-2020 \u00a710.25 (Block Ack reordering / scoreboard)", "property": "no_duplicate_delivered", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: IEEE\nSpecification clause: IEEE 802.11-2020 \u00a710.25 (Block Ack reordering / scoreboard)\nSafety property that must hold: no_duplicate_delivered\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): expected, dup_delivered\nInitial state: {'expected': 0, 'dup_delivered': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'expected': 0, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvNext--> {'expected': 1, 'dup_delivered': False}\n {'expected': 1, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvNext--> {'expected': 2, 'dup_delivered': False}\n {'expected': 1, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvBelowWinStart_discard--> {'expected': 1, 'dup_delivered': False}\n {'expected': 2, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvNext--> {'expected': 3, 'dup_delivered': False}\n {'expected': 2, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvBelowWinStart_discard--> {'expected': 2, 'dup_delivered': False}\n {'expected': 3, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvBelowWinStart_discard--> {'expected': 3, 'dup_delivered': False}\n\nThe property 'no_duplicate_delivered' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): expected, dup_delivered\nInitial state: {'expected': 0, 'dup_delivered': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'expected': 0, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvNext--> {'expected': 1, 'dup_delivered': False}\n {'expected': 1, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvNext--> {'expected': 2, 'dup_delivered': False}\n {'expected': 1, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvBelowWinStart_discard--> {'expected': 1, 'dup_delivered': False}\n {'expected': 2, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvNext--> {'expected': 3, 'dup_delivered': False}\n {'expected': 2, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvBelowWinStart_discard--> {'expected': 2, 'dup_delivered': False}\n {'expected': 3, 'dup_delivered': False} --RecvBelowWinStart_discard--> {'expected': 3, 'dup_delivered': False}", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 2, "n_reachable_states": 4, "n_transitions": 6, "state_fields": ["expected", "dup_delivered"], "initial_state": {"expected": 0, "dup_delivered": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"expected": 0, "dup_delivered": false}, "label": "RecvNext", "to": {"expected": 1, "dup_delivered": false}}, {"from": {"expected": 1, "dup_delivered": false}, "label": "RecvNext", "to": {"expected": 2, "dup_delivered": false}}, {"from": {"expected": 1, "dup_delivered": false}, "label": "RecvBelowWinStart_discard", "to": {"expected": 1, "dup_delivered": false}}, {"from": {"expected": 2, "dup_delivered": false}, "label": "RecvNext", "to": {"expected": 3, "dup_delivered": false}}, {"from": {"expected": 2, "dup_delivered": false}, "label": "RecvBelowWinStart_discard", "to": {"expected": 2, "dup_delivered": false}}, {"from": {"expected": 3, "dup_delivered": false}, "label": "RecvBelowWinStart_discard", "to": {"expected": 3, "dup_delivered": false}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0} |
| {"id": "ieee_twt_wake_sleep", "standards_body": "IEEE", "spec_clause": "IEEE 802.11ax/be Target Wake Time (\u00a726.8)", "property": "no_delivery_while_asleep", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: IEEE\nSpecification clause: IEEE 802.11ax/be Target Wake Time (\u00a726.8)\nSafety property that must hold: no_delivery_while_asleep\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): awake, delivered_asleep\nInitial state: {'awake': False, 'delivered_asleep': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'awake': False, 'delivered_asleep': False} --SPStart--> {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False}\n {'awake': False, 'delivered_asleep': False} --SPEnd--> {'awake': False, 'delivered_asleep': False}\n {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False} --SPStart--> {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False}\n {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False} --SPEnd--> {'awake': False, 'delivered_asleep': False}\n {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False} --DeliverInSP--> {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False}\n\nThe property 'no_delivery_while_asleep' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): awake, delivered_asleep\nInitial state: {'awake': False, 'delivered_asleep': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'awake': False, 'delivered_asleep': False} --SPStart--> {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False}\n {'awake': False, 'delivered_asleep': False} --SPEnd--> {'awake': False, 'delivered_asleep': False}\n {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False} --SPStart--> {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False}\n {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False} --SPEnd--> {'awake': False, 'delivered_asleep': False}\n {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False} --DeliverInSP--> {'awake': True, 'delivered_asleep': False}", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 2, "n_reachable_states": 2, "n_transitions": 5, "state_fields": ["awake", "delivered_asleep"], "initial_state": {"awake": false, "delivered_asleep": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"awake": false, "delivered_asleep": false}, "label": "SPStart", "to": {"awake": true, "delivered_asleep": false}}, {"from": {"awake": false, "delivered_asleep": false}, "label": "SPEnd", "to": {"awake": false, "delivered_asleep": false}}, {"from": {"awake": true, "delivered_asleep": false}, "label": "SPStart", "to": {"awake": true, "delivered_asleep": false}}, {"from": {"awake": true, "delivered_asleep": false}, "label": "SPEnd", "to": {"awake": false, "delivered_asleep": false}}, {"from": {"awake": true, "delivered_asleep": false}, "label": "DeliverInSP", "to": {"awake": true, "delivered_asleep": false}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0} |
| {"id": "ieee_uapsd_pspoll", "standards_body": "IEEE", "spec_clause": "IEEE 802.11-2020 \u00a711.2 (U-APSD / PS-Poll power save)", "property": "no_delivery_without_trigger", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: IEEE\nSpecification clause: IEEE 802.11-2020 \u00a711.2 (U-APSD / PS-Poll power save)\nSafety property that must hold: no_delivery_without_trigger\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): buffered, trigger, delivered_no_trigger\nInitial state: {'buffered': False, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'buffered': False, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Buffer--> {'buffered': True, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n {'buffered': False, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Trigger--> {'buffered': False, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n {'buffered': True, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Trigger--> {'buffered': True, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n {'buffered': False, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Buffer--> {'buffered': True, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n {'buffered': False, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Trigger--> {'buffered': False, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n {'buffered': True, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Trigger--> {'buffered': True, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n {'buffered': True, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --DeliverOnTrigger--> {'buffered': False, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n\nThe property 'no_delivery_without_trigger' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): buffered, trigger, delivered_no_trigger\nInitial state: {'buffered': False, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'buffered': False, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Buffer--> {'buffered': True, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n {'buffered': False, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Trigger--> {'buffered': False, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n {'buffered': True, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Trigger--> {'buffered': True, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n {'buffered': False, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Buffer--> {'buffered': True, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n {'buffered': False, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Trigger--> {'buffered': False, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n {'buffered': True, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --Trigger--> {'buffered': True, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}\n {'buffered': True, 'trigger': True, 'delivered_no_trigger': False} --DeliverOnTrigger--> {'buffered': False, 'trigger': False, 'delivered_no_trigger': False}", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 3, "n_reachable_states": 4, "n_transitions": 7, "state_fields": ["buffered", "trigger", "delivered_no_trigger"], "initial_state": {"buffered": false, "trigger": false, "delivered_no_trigger": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"buffered": false, "trigger": false, "delivered_no_trigger": false}, "label": "Buffer", "to": {"buffered": true, "trigger": false, "delivered_no_trigger": false}}, {"from": {"buffered": false, "trigger": false, "delivered_no_trigger": false}, "label": "Trigger", "to": {"buffered": false, "trigger": true, "delivered_no_trigger": false}}, {"from": {"buffered": true, "trigger": false, "delivered_no_trigger": false}, "label": "Trigger", "to": {"buffered": true, "trigger": true, "delivered_no_trigger": false}}, {"from": {"buffered": false, "trigger": true, "delivered_no_trigger": false}, "label": "Buffer", "to": {"buffered": true, "trigger": true, "delivered_no_trigger": false}}, {"from": {"buffered": false, "trigger": true, "delivered_no_trigger": false}, "label": "Trigger", "to": {"buffered": false, "trigger": true, "delivered_no_trigger": false}}, {"from": {"buffered": true, "trigger": true, "delivered_no_trigger": false}, "label": "Trigger", "to": {"buffered": true, "trigger": true, "delivered_no_trigger": false}}, {"from": {"buffered": true, "trigger": true, "delivered_no_trigger": false}, "label": "DeliverOnTrigger", "to": {"buffered": false, "trigger": false, "delivered_no_trigger": false}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0} |
| {"id": "ieee_sa_query", "standards_body": "IEEE", "spec_clause": "IEEE 802.11-2020 \u00a711.3 / \u00a712 (SA Query, protected management frames / 802.11w)", "property": "no_spoofed_disassoc_accepted", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: IEEE\nSpecification clause: IEEE 802.11-2020 \u00a711.3 / \u00a712 (SA Query, protected management frames / 802.11w)\nSafety property that must hold: no_spoofed_disassoc_accepted\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): associated, query_pending, spoof_accepted\nInitial state: {'associated': True, 'query_pending': False, 'spoof_accepted': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'associated': True, 'query_pending': False, 'spoof_accepted': False} --RecvUnprotectedDisassoc_startSAQuery--> {'associated': True, 'query_pending': True, 'spoof_accepted': False}\n {'associated': True, 'query_pending': True, 'spoof_accepted': False} --SAQueryResponse_keepAssoc--> {'associated': True, 'query_pending': False, 'spoof_accepted': False}\n\nThe property 'no_spoofed_disassoc_accepted' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): associated, query_pending, spoof_accepted\nInitial state: {'associated': True, 'query_pending': False, 'spoof_accepted': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'associated': True, 'query_pending': False, 'spoof_accepted': False} --RecvUnprotectedDisassoc_startSAQuery--> {'associated': True, 'query_pending': True, 'spoof_accepted': False}\n {'associated': True, 'query_pending': True, 'spoof_accepted': False} --SAQueryResponse_keepAssoc--> {'associated': True, 'query_pending': False, 'spoof_accepted': False}", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 3, "n_reachable_states": 2, "n_transitions": 2, "state_fields": ["associated", "query_pending", "spoof_accepted"], "initial_state": {"associated": true, "query_pending": false, "spoof_accepted": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"associated": true, "query_pending": false, "spoof_accepted": false}, "label": "RecvUnprotectedDisassoc_startSAQuery", "to": {"associated": true, "query_pending": true, "spoof_accepted": false}}, {"from": {"associated": true, "query_pending": true, "spoof_accepted": false}, "label": "SAQueryResponse_keepAssoc", "to": {"associated": true, "query_pending": false, "spoof_accepted": false}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0} |
| {"id": "ieee_fils_auth", "standards_body": "IEEE", "spec_clause": "IEEE 802.11ai Fast Initial Link Setup (\u00a712.12)", "property": "no_data_before_key", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: IEEE\nSpecification clause: IEEE 802.11ai Fast Initial Link Setup (\u00a712.12)\nSafety property that must hold: no_data_before_key\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): fils_auth, key, data\nInitial state: {'fils_auth': False, 'key': False, 'data': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'fils_auth': False, 'key': False, 'data': False} --FILSAuth--> {'fils_auth': True, 'key': False, 'data': False}\n {'fils_auth': True, 'key': False, 'data': False} --EstablishKey--> {'fils_auth': True, 'key': True, 'data': False}\n {'fils_auth': True, 'key': True, 'data': False} --SendData--> {'fils_auth': True, 'key': True, 'data': True}\n {'fils_auth': True, 'key': True, 'data': True} (no outgoing transitions)\n\nThe property 'no_data_before_key' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): fils_auth, key, data\nInitial state: {'fils_auth': False, 'key': False, 'data': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'fils_auth': False, 'key': False, 'data': False} --FILSAuth--> {'fils_auth': True, 'key': False, 'data': False}\n {'fils_auth': True, 'key': False, 'data': False} --EstablishKey--> {'fils_auth': True, 'key': True, 'data': False}\n {'fils_auth': True, 'key': True, 'data': False} --SendData--> {'fils_auth': True, 'key': True, 'data': True}\n {'fils_auth': True, 'key': True, 'data': True} (no outgoing transitions)", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 3, "n_reachable_states": 4, "n_transitions": 3, "state_fields": ["fils_auth", "key", "data"], "initial_state": {"fils_auth": false, "key": false, "data": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"fils_auth": false, "key": false, "data": false}, "label": "FILSAuth", "to": {"fils_auth": true, "key": false, "data": false}}, {"from": {"fils_auth": true, "key": false, "data": false}, "label": "EstablishKey", "to": {"fils_auth": true, "key": true, "data": false}}, {"from": {"fils_auth": true, "key": true, "data": false}, "label": "SendData", "to": {"fils_auth": true, "key": true, "data": true}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0} |
| {"id": "3gpp_rrc_state_machine", "standards_body": "3GPP", "spec_clause": "3GPP TS 38.331 \u00a74.2 (RRC states: IDLE/INACTIVE/CONNECTED)", "property": "no_data_in_idle", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: 3GPP\nSpecification clause: 3GPP TS 38.331 \u00a74.2 (RRC states: IDLE/INACTIVE/CONNECTED)\nSafety property that must hold: no_data_in_idle\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): state, data\nInitial state: {'state': 0, 'data': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'state': 0, 'data': False} --Connect--> {'state': 2, 'data': False}\n {'state': 2, 'data': False} --Suspend--> {'state': 1, 'data': False}\n {'state': 2, 'data': False} --Release--> {'state': 0, 'data': False}\n {'state': 2, 'data': False} --SendData--> {'state': 2, 'data': True}\n {'state': 1, 'data': False} --Resume--> {'state': 2, 'data': False}\n {'state': 1, 'data': False} --ReleaseFromInactive--> {'state': 0, 'data': False}\n {'state': 2, 'data': True} --DataDone--> {'state': 2, 'data': False}\n\nThe property 'no_data_in_idle' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): state, data\nInitial state: {'state': 0, 'data': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'state': 0, 'data': False} --Connect--> {'state': 2, 'data': False}\n {'state': 2, 'data': False} --Suspend--> {'state': 1, 'data': False}\n {'state': 2, 'data': False} --Release--> {'state': 0, 'data': False}\n {'state': 2, 'data': False} --SendData--> {'state': 2, 'data': True}\n {'state': 1, 'data': False} --Resume--> {'state': 2, 'data': False}\n {'state': 1, 'data': False} --ReleaseFromInactive--> {'state': 0, 'data': False}\n {'state': 2, 'data': True} --DataDone--> {'state': 2, 'data': False}", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 2, "n_reachable_states": 4, "n_transitions": 7, "state_fields": ["state", "data"], "initial_state": {"state": 0, "data": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"state": 0, "data": false}, "label": "Connect", "to": {"state": 2, "data": false}}, {"from": {"state": 2, "data": false}, "label": "Suspend", "to": {"state": 1, "data": false}}, {"from": {"state": 2, "data": false}, "label": "Release", "to": {"state": 0, "data": false}}, {"from": {"state": 2, "data": false}, "label": "SendData", "to": {"state": 2, "data": true}}, {"from": {"state": 1, "data": false}, "label": "Resume", "to": {"state": 2, "data": false}}, {"from": {"state": 1, "data": false}, "label": "ReleaseFromInactive", "to": {"state": 0, "data": false}}, {"from": {"state": 2, "data": true}, "label": "DataDone", "to": {"state": 2, "data": false}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0} |
| {"id": "3gpp_pdcp_reordering", "standards_body": "3GPP", "spec_clause": "3GPP TS 38.323 \u00a75.2 (PDCP reordering / duplication discard)", "property": "no_duplicate_delivered", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: 3GPP\nSpecification clause: 3GPP TS 38.323 \u00a75.2 (PDCP reordering / duplication discard)\nSafety property that must hold: no_duplicate_delivered\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): next_count, dup\nInitial state: {'next_count': 0, 'dup': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'next_count': 0, 'dup': False} --DeliverInOrder--> {'next_count': 1, 'dup': False}\n {'next_count': 1, 'dup': False} --DeliverInOrder--> {'next_count': 2, 'dup': False}\n {'next_count': 1, 'dup': False} --RecvDuplicate_discard--> {'next_count': 1, 'dup': False}\n {'next_count': 2, 'dup': False} --DeliverInOrder--> {'next_count': 3, 'dup': False}\n {'next_count': 2, 'dup': False} --RecvDuplicate_discard--> {'next_count': 2, 'dup': False}\n {'next_count': 3, 'dup': False} --RecvDuplicate_discard--> {'next_count': 3, 'dup': False}\n\nThe property 'no_duplicate_delivered' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): next_count, dup\nInitial state: {'next_count': 0, 'dup': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'next_count': 0, 'dup': False} --DeliverInOrder--> {'next_count': 1, 'dup': False}\n {'next_count': 1, 'dup': False} --DeliverInOrder--> {'next_count': 2, 'dup': False}\n {'next_count': 1, 'dup': False} --RecvDuplicate_discard--> {'next_count': 1, 'dup': False}\n {'next_count': 2, 'dup': False} --DeliverInOrder--> {'next_count': 3, 'dup': False}\n {'next_count': 2, 'dup': False} --RecvDuplicate_discard--> {'next_count': 2, 'dup': False}\n {'next_count': 3, 'dup': False} --RecvDuplicate_discard--> {'next_count': 3, 'dup': False}", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 2, "n_reachable_states": 4, "n_transitions": 6, "state_fields": ["next_count", "dup"], "initial_state": {"next_count": 0, "dup": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"next_count": 0, "dup": false}, "label": "DeliverInOrder", "to": {"next_count": 1, "dup": false}}, {"from": {"next_count": 1, "dup": false}, "label": "DeliverInOrder", "to": {"next_count": 2, "dup": false}}, {"from": {"next_count": 1, "dup": false}, "label": "RecvDuplicate_discard", "to": {"next_count": 1, "dup": false}}, {"from": {"next_count": 2, "dup": false}, "label": "DeliverInOrder", "to": {"next_count": 3, "dup": false}}, {"from": {"next_count": 2, "dup": false}, "label": "RecvDuplicate_discard", "to": {"next_count": 2, "dup": false}}, {"from": {"next_count": 3, "dup": false}, "label": "RecvDuplicate_discard", "to": {"next_count": 3, "dup": false}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0} |
| {"id": "3gpp_rlc_am_retx", "standards_body": "3GPP", "spec_clause": "3GPP TS 38.322 \u00a75.2/\u00a75.3 (RLC AM retransmission, maxRetxThreshold)", "property": "retx_bounded_no_runaway", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: 3GPP\nSpecification clause: 3GPP TS 38.322 \u00a75.2/\u00a75.3 (RLC AM retransmission, maxRetxThreshold)\nSafety property that must hold: retx_bounded_no_runaway\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): retx, acked, failed\nInitial state: {'retx': 0, 'acked': False, 'failed': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'retx': 0, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Retransmit--> {'retx': 1, 'acked': False, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 0, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Ack--> {'retx': 0, 'acked': True, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 1, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Retransmit--> {'retx': 2, 'acked': False, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 1, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Ack--> {'retx': 1, 'acked': True, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 0, 'acked': True, 'failed': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n {'retx': 2, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Retransmit--> {'retx': 3, 'acked': False, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 2, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Ack--> {'retx': 2, 'acked': True, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 1, 'acked': True, 'failed': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n {'retx': 3, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Retransmit--> {'retx': 4, 'acked': False, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 3, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Ack--> {'retx': 3, 'acked': True, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 2, 'acked': True, 'failed': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n {'retx': 4, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Ack--> {'retx': 4, 'acked': True, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 4, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --MaxRetx_RLF--> {'retx': 4, 'acked': False, 'failed': True}\n {'retx': 3, 'acked': True, 'failed': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n {'retx': 4, 'acked': True, 'failed': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n {'retx': 4, 'acked': False, 'failed': True} (no outgoing transitions)\n\nThe property 'retx_bounded_no_runaway' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): retx, acked, failed\nInitial state: {'retx': 0, 'acked': False, 'failed': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'retx': 0, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Retransmit--> {'retx': 1, 'acked': False, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 0, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Ack--> {'retx': 0, 'acked': True, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 1, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Retransmit--> {'retx': 2, 'acked': False, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 1, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Ack--> {'retx': 1, 'acked': True, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 0, 'acked': True, 'failed': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n {'retx': 2, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Retransmit--> {'retx': 3, 'acked': False, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 2, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Ack--> {'retx': 2, 'acked': True, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 1, 'acked': True, 'failed': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n {'retx': 3, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Retransmit--> {'retx': 4, 'acked': False, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 3, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Ack--> {'retx': 3, 'acked': True, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 2, 'acked': True, 'failed': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n {'retx': 4, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --Ack--> {'retx': 4, 'acked': True, 'failed': False}\n {'retx': 4, 'acked': False, 'failed': False} --MaxRetx_RLF--> {'retx': 4, 'acked': False, 'failed': True}\n {'retx': 3, 'acked': True, 'failed': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n {'retx': 4, 'acked': True, 'failed': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n {'retx': 4, 'acked': False, 'failed': True} (no outgoing transitions)", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 3, "n_reachable_states": 11, "n_transitions": 10, "state_fields": ["retx", "acked", "failed"], "initial_state": {"retx": 0, "acked": false, "failed": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"retx": 0, "acked": false, "failed": false}, "label": "Retransmit", "to": {"retx": 1, "acked": false, "failed": false}}, {"from": {"retx": 0, "acked": false, "failed": false}, "label": "Ack", "to": {"retx": 0, "acked": true, "failed": false}}, {"from": {"retx": 1, "acked": false, "failed": false}, "label": "Retransmit", "to": {"retx": 2, "acked": false, "failed": false}}, {"from": {"retx": 1, "acked": false, "failed": false}, "label": "Ack", "to": {"retx": 1, "acked": true, "failed": false}}, {"from": {"retx": 2, "acked": false, "failed": false}, "label": "Retransmit", "to": {"retx": 3, "acked": false, "failed": false}}, {"from": {"retx": 2, "acked": false, "failed": false}, "label": "Ack", "to": {"retx": 2, "acked": true, "failed": false}}, {"from": {"retx": 3, "acked": false, "failed": false}, "label": "Retransmit", "to": {"retx": 4, "acked": false, "failed": false}}, {"from": {"retx": 3, "acked": false, "failed": false}, "label": "Ack", "to": {"retx": 3, "acked": true, "failed": false}}, {"from": {"retx": 4, "acked": false, "failed": false}, "label": "Ack", "to": {"retx": 4, "acked": true, "failed": false}}, {"from": {"retx": 4, "acked": false, "failed": false}, "label": "MaxRetx_RLF", "to": {"retx": 4, "acked": false, "failed": true}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0} |
| {"id": "3gpp_drx_timers", "standards_body": "3GPP", "spec_clause": "3GPP TS 38.321 \u00a75.7 (DRX onDuration / inactivity / RTT timers)", "property": "awake_when_pdcch_expected", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: 3GPP\nSpecification clause: 3GPP TS 38.321 \u00a75.7 (DRX onDuration / inactivity / RTT timers)\nSafety property that must hold: awake_when_pdcch_expected\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): active, pdcch_expected\nInitial state: {'active': False, 'pdcch_expected': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'active': False, 'pdcch_expected': False} --OnDurationStart--> {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False}\n {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False} --OnDurationStart--> {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False}\n {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False} --ExpectPDCCH--> {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': True}\n {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False} --InactivityExpire_sleep--> {'active': False, 'pdcch_expected': False}\n {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': True} --OnDurationStart--> {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': True}\n {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': True} --PDCCHReceived--> {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False}\n\nThe property 'awake_when_pdcch_expected' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): active, pdcch_expected\nInitial state: {'active': False, 'pdcch_expected': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'active': False, 'pdcch_expected': False} --OnDurationStart--> {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False}\n {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False} --OnDurationStart--> {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False}\n {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False} --ExpectPDCCH--> {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': True}\n {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False} --InactivityExpire_sleep--> {'active': False, 'pdcch_expected': False}\n {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': True} --OnDurationStart--> {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': True}\n {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': True} --PDCCHReceived--> {'active': True, 'pdcch_expected': False}", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 2, "n_reachable_states": 3, "n_transitions": 6, "state_fields": ["active", "pdcch_expected"], "initial_state": {"active": false, "pdcch_expected": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"active": false, "pdcch_expected": false}, "label": "OnDurationStart", "to": {"active": true, "pdcch_expected": false}}, {"from": {"active": true, "pdcch_expected": false}, "label": "OnDurationStart", "to": {"active": true, "pdcch_expected": false}}, {"from": {"active": true, "pdcch_expected": false}, "label": "ExpectPDCCH", "to": {"active": true, "pdcch_expected": true}}, {"from": {"active": true, "pdcch_expected": false}, "label": "InactivityExpire_sleep", "to": {"active": false, "pdcch_expected": false}}, {"from": {"active": true, "pdcch_expected": true}, "label": "OnDurationStart", "to": {"active": true, "pdcch_expected": true}}, {"from": {"active": true, "pdcch_expected": true}, "label": "PDCCHReceived", "to": {"active": true, "pdcch_expected": false}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0} |
| {"id": "3gpp_rach_contention", "standards_body": "3GPP", "spec_clause": "3GPP TS 38.321 \u00a75.1 (Random access, contention resolution)", "property": "no_undetected_collision", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: 3GPP\nSpecification clause: 3GPP TS 38.321 \u00a75.1 (Random access, contention resolution)\nSafety property that must hold: no_undetected_collision\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): preamble, contention, resolved, undetected\nInitial state: {'preamble': False, 'contention': False, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'preamble': False, 'contention': False, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False} --SendPreamble--> {'preamble': True, 'contention': False, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False}\n {'preamble': True, 'contention': False, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False} --CollisionOccurs--> {'preamble': True, 'contention': True, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False}\n {'preamble': True, 'contention': True, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False} --ContentionResolutionID--> {'preamble': True, 'contention': True, 'resolved': True, 'undetected': False}\n {'preamble': True, 'contention': True, 'resolved': True, 'undetected': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n\nThe property 'no_undetected_collision' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): preamble, contention, resolved, undetected\nInitial state: {'preamble': False, 'contention': False, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'preamble': False, 'contention': False, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False} --SendPreamble--> {'preamble': True, 'contention': False, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False}\n {'preamble': True, 'contention': False, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False} --CollisionOccurs--> {'preamble': True, 'contention': True, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False}\n {'preamble': True, 'contention': True, 'resolved': False, 'undetected': False} --ContentionResolutionID--> {'preamble': True, 'contention': True, 'resolved': True, 'undetected': False}\n {'preamble': True, 'contention': True, 'resolved': True, 'undetected': False} (no outgoing transitions)", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 4, "n_reachable_states": 4, "n_transitions": 3, "state_fields": ["preamble", "contention", "resolved", "undetected"], "initial_state": {"preamble": false, "contention": false, "resolved": false, "undetected": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"preamble": false, "contention": false, "resolved": false, "undetected": false}, "label": "SendPreamble", "to": {"preamble": true, "contention": false, "resolved": false, "undetected": false}}, {"from": {"preamble": true, "contention": false, "resolved": false, "undetected": false}, "label": "CollisionOccurs", "to": {"preamble": true, "contention": true, "resolved": false, "undetected": false}}, {"from": {"preamble": true, "contention": true, "resolved": false, "undetected": false}, "label": "ContentionResolutionID", "to": {"preamble": true, "contention": true, "resolved": true, "undetected": false}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0} |
| {"id": "3gpp_beam_failure_recovery", "standards_body": "3GPP", "spec_clause": "3GPP TS 38.321 \u00a75.17 / TS 38.213 \u00a76 (Beam failure recovery)", "property": "recover_before_rlf", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: 3GPP\nSpecification clause: 3GPP TS 38.321 \u00a75.17 / TS 38.213 \u00a76 (Beam failure recovery)\nSafety property that must hold: recover_before_rlf\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): bf_detected, bfr_sent, recovered, rlf\nInitial state: {'bf_detected': False, 'bfr_sent': False, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'bf_detected': False, 'bfr_sent': False, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False} --DetectBeamFailure--> {'bf_detected': True, 'bfr_sent': False, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False}\n {'bf_detected': True, 'bfr_sent': False, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False} --SendBFR--> {'bf_detected': True, 'bfr_sent': True, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False}\n {'bf_detected': True, 'bfr_sent': True, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False} --RecoverBeam--> {'bf_detected': True, 'bfr_sent': True, 'recovered': True, 'rlf': False}\n {'bf_detected': True, 'bfr_sent': True, 'recovered': True, 'rlf': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n\nThe property 'recover_before_rlf' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): bf_detected, bfr_sent, recovered, rlf\nInitial state: {'bf_detected': False, 'bfr_sent': False, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'bf_detected': False, 'bfr_sent': False, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False} --DetectBeamFailure--> {'bf_detected': True, 'bfr_sent': False, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False}\n {'bf_detected': True, 'bfr_sent': False, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False} --SendBFR--> {'bf_detected': True, 'bfr_sent': True, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False}\n {'bf_detected': True, 'bfr_sent': True, 'recovered': False, 'rlf': False} --RecoverBeam--> {'bf_detected': True, 'bfr_sent': True, 'recovered': True, 'rlf': False}\n {'bf_detected': True, 'bfr_sent': True, 'recovered': True, 'rlf': False} (no outgoing transitions)", "label": "PROVEN_SAFE", "violated": false, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": false, "fixed_twin_holds": null, "n_state_fields": 4, "n_reachable_states": 4, "n_transitions": 3, "state_fields": ["bf_detected", "bfr_sent", "recovered", "rlf"], "initial_state": {"bf_detected": false, "bfr_sent": false, "recovered": false, "rlf": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"bf_detected": false, "bfr_sent": false, "recovered": false, "rlf": false}, "label": "DetectBeamFailure", "to": {"bf_detected": true, "bfr_sent": false, "recovered": false, "rlf": false}}, {"from": {"bf_detected": true, "bfr_sent": false, "recovered": false, "rlf": false}, "label": "SendBFR", "to": {"bf_detected": true, "bfr_sent": true, "recovered": false, "rlf": false}}, {"from": {"bf_detected": true, "bfr_sent": true, "recovered": false, "rlf": false}, "label": "RecoverBeam", "to": {"bf_detected": true, "bfr_sent": true, "recovered": true, "rlf": false}}], "counterexample": null, "counterexample_length": 0} |
| {"id": "3gpp_xn_handover_premature_release", "standards_body": "3GPP", "spec_clause": "3GPP TS 38.300 \u00a79.2.3 / TS 38.423 (Xn handover, data forwarding & path switch)", "property": "always_one_serving_context", "prompt_mode": "model", "prompt": "You are analysing a published communication-protocol procedure for a safety violation.\n\nStandards body: 3GPP\nSpecification clause: 3GPP TS 38.300 \u00a79.2.3 / TS 38.423 (Xn handover, data forwarding & path switch)\nSafety property that must hold: always_one_serving_context\n\nThe procedure is given below as a finite state machine. The property must hold in EVERY state reachable from the initial state.\n\nState fields (in order): source_ctx, target_ctx, path_switched, data_lost\nInitial state: {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': False, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': False, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': False} --PrepareTarget--> {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': False}\n {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': False} --ReleaseSourceEarly--> {'source_ctx': False, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': True}\n {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': False} --PathSwitchAck--> {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': True, 'data_lost': False}\n {'source_ctx': False, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': True} --PathSwitchAck--> {'source_ctx': False, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': True, 'data_lost': True}\n {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': True, 'data_lost': False} --ReleaseSourceEarly--> {'source_ctx': False, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': True, 'data_lost': False}\n {'source_ctx': False, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': True, 'data_lost': True} (no outgoing transitions)\n {'source_ctx': False, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': True, 'data_lost': False} (no outgoing transitions)\n\nThe property 'always_one_serving_context' is FALSE exactly when the state makes it false; infer its meaning from the field names.\n\nAnswer with a single JSON object and nothing else:\n\n{\n \"violated\": true | false,\n \"trace\": [ {\"state\": {<field>: <value>, ...}}, ... ]\n}\n\nRules for \"trace\" (omit it entirely if \"violated\" is false):\n * Include it ONLY if you claim the property is violated.\n * The first entry MUST be the initial state exactly as given.\n * Each consecutive pair MUST be a transition that appears in the model.\n * The final state MUST make the property false.\nA trace that does not replay against the model earns no credit, so an honest\n\"violated\": false is worth more than a violation you cannot demonstrate.", "state_machine": "State fields (in order): source_ctx, target_ctx, path_switched, data_lost\nInitial state: {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': False, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': False}\n\nTransitions (from-state -- label --> to-state):\n {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': False, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': False} --PrepareTarget--> {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': False}\n {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': False} --ReleaseSourceEarly--> {'source_ctx': False, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': True}\n {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': False} --PathSwitchAck--> {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': True, 'data_lost': False}\n {'source_ctx': False, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': False, 'data_lost': True} --PathSwitchAck--> {'source_ctx': False, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': True, 'data_lost': True}\n {'source_ctx': True, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': True, 'data_lost': False} --ReleaseSourceEarly--> {'source_ctx': False, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': True, 'data_lost': False}\n {'source_ctx': False, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': True, 'data_lost': True} (no outgoing transitions)\n {'source_ctx': False, 'target_ctx': True, 'path_switched': True, 'data_lost': False} (no outgoing transitions)", "label": "CANDIDATE_COUNTEREXAMPLE", "violated": true, "citation": null, "known_finding": null, "has_fixed_twin": true, "fixed_twin_holds": true, "n_state_fields": 4, "n_reachable_states": 6, "n_transitions": 5, "state_fields": ["source_ctx", "target_ctx", "path_switched", "data_lost"], "initial_state": {"source_ctx": true, "target_ctx": false, "path_switched": false, "data_lost": false}, "transitions": [{"from": {"source_ctx": true, "target_ctx": false, "path_switched": false, "data_lost": false}, "label": "PrepareTarget", "to": {"source_ctx": true, "target_ctx": true, "path_switched": false, "data_lost": false}}, {"from": {"source_ctx": true, "target_ctx": true, "path_switched": false, "data_lost": false}, "label": "ReleaseSourceEarly", "to": {"source_ctx": false, "target_ctx": true, "path_switched": false, "data_lost": true}}, {"from": {"source_ctx": true, "target_ctx": true, "path_switched": false, "data_lost": false}, "label": "PathSwitchAck", "to": {"source_ctx": true, "target_ctx": true, "path_switched": true, "data_lost": false}}, {"from": {"source_ctx": false, "target_ctx": true, "path_switched": false, "data_lost": true}, "label": "PathSwitchAck", "to": {"source_ctx": false, "target_ctx": true, "path_switched": true, "data_lost": true}}, {"from": {"source_ctx": true, "target_ctx": true, "path_switched": true, "data_lost": false}, "label": "ReleaseSourceEarly", "to": {"source_ctx": false, "target_ctx": true, "path_switched": true, "data_lost": false}}], "counterexample": [{"label": null, "state": {"source_ctx": true, "target_ctx": false, "path_switched": false, "data_lost": false}}, {"label": "PrepareTarget", "state": {"source_ctx": true, "target_ctx": true, "path_switched": false, "data_lost": false}}, {"label": "ReleaseSourceEarly", "state": {"source_ctx": false, "target_ctx": true, "path_switched": false, "data_lost": true}}], "counterexample_length": 3} |
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