prompt listlengths 2 2 | source stringclasses 3
values | severity stringclasses 5
values | category stringclasses 186
values | has_code bool 2
classes | has_poc bool 2
classes | reference_response stringlengths 23 5k | firm stringclasses 26
values | quality_score float64 0 5 | protocol stringclasses 398
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: An erroneous constructor’s argument could block the withdrawReward
### Description
## Email address
simomonica1997@gmail.com
## Handle
s1m0
## Eth address
0x9b3E9e3E4a174d59279FC7cd268e035992412384
## Vulnerability details
The constructor of IncentiveDistribution https://github.com/code-423n4/margins... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | front-running | true | false | ## High: Mont price can be manipulated to earn more rewards
### Description
The `MontRewardManager` contract uses the `quoteExactInputSingle()` function from the Uniswap Quoter to get the USDT price of one unit of MONT.
The problem is that this price can be easily manipulated since it uses the current pool price for ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Validate URL Scheme
### Description
## App Deep Link Handler
The app has a deeplink handler that allows other apps to open URLs inside the app WebView. The `extractParameters` function extracts the URL to be opened from the deeplink; however, it doesn’t properly check if the URL is a valid HTTP URL as demonst... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Inability to remove hooks and Incentive Systems from the Incentive Manager
### Description
**Description:** It is understood that there is currently no mechanism for removing hooks and Incentive Systems from the Incentive Manager to avoid potential sync and notification issues. However, if a bug or some other ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | Initialization | true | false | Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-01-cooler-judging/issues/265
## Found by
hansfriese, Nyx, enckrish, wagmi, yixxas, HollaDieWaldfee, HonorLt, Tricko, Zarf, libratus, simon135, usmannk, Trumpero
## Summary
Making the loan rollable by default gives an unfair early advantage to the borrowers.
## Vulnera... | Sherlock | 4 | Cooler |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | rounding | true | false | ## Low: Small unripe token withdrawals don't decrease BDV and Stalk
### Description
**Description:** For any whitelisted token where `bdvCalc(amountDeposited) < amountDeposited`, a user can deposit that token and then withdraw in small amounts to avoid decreasing BDV and Stalk. This is achieved by exploiting a roundin... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | true | false | ## Medium: Due to extremely short `votingDelay` and `votingPeriod`, governance is practically impossible
### Description
It is practically impossible for enough users to vote within a voting period of 4 seconds from the voting start time.
### Proof of Concept
The problem lies in the `votingDelay` and `votingPeriod` ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: Initialization flaws ✓ Fixed
### Description
For non-upgradeable contracts, the Solidity compiler takes care of chaining the constructor calls of an inheritance hierarchy in the right order; for upgradeable contracts, taking care of initialization is a manual task – and with extensive use of inheritance, it is... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | false | false | ## Medium: `SafeERC20.sol` is imported but not used in the `transferBribes()` function
### Description
_Submitted by jayjonah8, also found by cccz, cmichel, Dravee, gzeon, hyh, IllIllI, leastwood, NoamYakov, and Omik_
In BribeVault.sol the transferBribes() function uses token.transfer() instead of token.safeTransfer.... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | true | false | ## Medium: Using transferFrom instead of transfer
### Description
**Description**
In borrowAssets() when contract is trying to send borrows to user it incorrectly uses transferFrom instead of transfer when transferring borrow tokens from the contract to the user. This implementation error will cause the function to r... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Redundant return
### Description
**Severity**: Informational
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**
SupplySourceHelper.sol - extra line for return ret; is unneeded because ret is already assigned and returning the values it is assigned to by default.
**Recommendation**
Omit the return statement.
**Fix**: I... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | high | Validation | true | false | ## Severity: High Risk
## Context
- MarketFactory.sol#L79
- MarketFactory.sol#L111
## Description
A minimum net fee was introduced that all markets should comply by such that the protocol earns fees. The protocol fees are computed as `takerFee + makerFee`, but the market factory computes the wrong check. Fee pairs th... | Spearbit | 5 | CLOBER |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: `TokenLocker::getTotalWeightAt` should loop until input `week` not `systemWeek`
### Description
**Description:** `TokenLocker::getTotalWeightAt` should loop until input `week` not `systemWeek`:
The current implementation returns the wrong output when `week < systemWeek` and the previous weekly writes have no... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: `TwabLib::getTwabBetween` can return inaccurate balances if `_startTime` and `_endTime` aren't safely bound
### Description
Here's the documentation of the `TwabLib::getTwabBetween` function:
`TwabLib::getTwabBetween` -function gets called in. Then, `PrizePool::_getVaultUserBalanceAndTotalSupplyTwab` gets... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Old Version of Solidity
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Fixed" by the client. Addressed in: `1b5711852eb242e680482e48a68d93a91767defd`.
Solidity version 0.8.23 is now being used.
**Description:** The contracts currently use the 0.8.8 version of Solidity. Per the [list of known bugs](https://docs.solidi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: payUser fails silently if the bonus was already paid
### Description
In the [`payUser`](https://github.com/jeualvarez/Token-Airdrop/blob/d96202acf6fb5d0305368bac36aa960d455cbffe/contracts/Airdrop.sol#L34) function of the `AirDrop` contract, an [`if`](https://github.com/jeualvarez/Token-Airdrop/blob/d96202ac... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | input-validation | true | false | ## Low: `else` can be omitted in `mintWithTerms`
### Description
`else` can be omitted in `mintWithTerms` since if signature validation failed a revert will occur:
```diff
if (!_verifySignature(signature)) revert SoulBoundToken__InvalidSignature();
- else emit SignatureVerified(msg.sender, signature);
+ ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: Adherence To Specification: `BIT` Holders Might Get Less `MNT`
### Description
**Update**
Fixed in commit [b187163](https://github.com/mantlenetworkio/mantle-token-contracts/commit/b18716323f4054120856247ec5e3c28aa3bdb5da) by removing the numerator and denominator functionality and minting `MNT` tokens 1:1 to... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Potentially insufficient validation for operator transfers ✓ Fixed
### Description
For operator transfers, the current validation does not require the sender to be an operator (as long as the transferred value does not exceed the allowance):
**code/amp-contracts/contracts/Amp.sol:L755-L759**
```
require... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | liquidation | false | false | ## High: Accounting discrepancy in rollover bids
### Description
Discrepancy between balances of `lockedCollateralLedger` and `encumberedCollateralBalances` could lead to accounting errors and unexpected reverts. When a rollover bid is transferred to a new `TermRepoCollateralManager`, `TermAuction` calls `TermRepoColl... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | dos | false | false | ## Low: Incorrect/incomplete NatSpec & comments
### Description
The NatSpec for `LSSVMPair::getAssetRecipient` currently [reads](https://github.com/sudoswap/lssvm2/blob/0967f16fb0f32b0b76f37c09e6acf35ac007225f/src/LSSVMPair.sol#L319) "Returns the address that assets that receives assets when a swap is done with this p... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Multiple Fixed Math Libraries
### Description
## Severity: Low Risk
## Context
- **Files Involved**: `FixedMath.sol`, `Rari: FixedPointMathLib.sol`, `FixedPoint.sol`
## Situation
Three different FixedMath libraries are used in the code. The more libraries are used with duplicate intended purposes, the higher... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: EIP 820 implementation must be updated to EIP 1820
### Description
[EIP 1820](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/pull/1820) has superseded [EIP 820](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/820), the former being the latter’s adaptation for Solidity 0.5, due to [a bug](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/820... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | dos | true | false | ## Low: [35] Resolve newly introduced TODOs
### Description
### Proof of Concept
Using this search command: [https://github.com/search?q=repo%3Acode-423n4%2F2024-03-zksync%20TODO&type=code](https://github.com/search?q=repo%3Acode-423n4%2F2024-03-zksync%20TODO&type=code) we can see that there are more than 22 code fil... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | medium | token | false | true | ## Medium: Checking `bool` return of ERC20 `approve` and `transfer` breaks protocol for mainnet USDT and similar tokens which don't return true
### Description
Checking `bool` return of ERC20 `approve` and `transfer` breaks protocol for mainnet USDT and similar tokens which [don't return true](https://etherscan.io/tok... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: `harvest` should be triggered before changing Comet Rewards
### Description
Changing Comet Rewards without triggering the `harvest` function could result in the reward token from the previous Comet Rewards contract getting stuck inside `BrrETH`. It is recommended to have an additional boolean parameter that pr... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: Mistaken Bids Can Be Immediately Accepted
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client. The client provided the following explanation:
> It's very unlikely that users will place bids on auctions directly on the contract, as it requires not only to place the bid but also approve Auction co... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: `timestampIncrease` is incorrectly set to 0
### Description
When `_calculateRewardAndDebtDistributionForIlk` is called to calculate accrued interest, it will invoke `interestRateModule.calculateInterestRate` to obtain `borrowRate` and `reserveFactor` for determining the new increased debt and supply rate. Howe... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | dos | false | false | ## Low: Possible DoS preventing Anchor State from being timely updated
### Description
The usual process for updating the Anchor State in the ASR (Anchor State Registry) is implemented as a call from an FDG (Fault Dispute Game) to the ASR. However, such call occurs within a try/catch statement that ignores reverts, re... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Using nested hashes reduces security
### Description
The validator contracts implement an optimized Join-Split verification that uses random \( x_i \) values to verify a proof with only one elliptic curve pairing operation. To compute the \( i \)-th \( x \) value, the validator computes \( i \) hashes on the s... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: Bounties and fees should only be locked for the first 3 months ✓ Addressed
### Description
Bounties are currently locked for the first 3 months after delegation:
**code/contracts/delegation/DelegationService.sol:L315**
```
skaleBalances.lockBounty(shares[i].holder, timeHelpers.addMonths(delegationStarted,... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | signature | true | false | ## Low: Contract accounts and account abstraction wallets face limitations in Cross-Chain proposal creation and voting power utilization
### Description
Multichain governance system allows users to aggregate all their voting power that is distributed across all chains connected to the system (including the hub chain) ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | high | other | false | true | ## High: A malicious staker can delay the increase of any delegator's voteWeight as much as he wants
### Description
When a staker delegates his balance to a delegator, the time duration variable `_weights[delegate].stakeTime` is decreased. However, when undelegating only the balance is decreased. This makes it possib... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | cross-chain | true | false | ## High: In `settlement.cairo::receive_cross_chain_msg` - the `payload_type` can be passed by the user, confusing offchain systems
### Description
### Impact
In `settlement.cairo::receive_cross_chain_msg` - the `payload_type` can be passed by the user, confusing offchain systems.
The `payload_type` parameter is only... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Fairswap interfaces are inconsistent ✓ Fixed
### Description
There are unexpected inconsistencies between the three Fairswap contract interfaces, which may cause issues for composability with external contracts.
### Recommendation
Comment from Lien Protocol:
>
> Implement interface(contracts/Inheritance... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: TokenPayAndSettleIncoming will process incoming transfer with incorrect hash lock
### Description
The `TokenPayAndSettleIncoming` functionality processes incoming transfers from EVM. It implements multiple checks on the expected fields. However, one of these checks is insufficient. The EVM channel checks that... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Prevent code-injection inside `string` fields when emitting `IStory` events or setting `tokenURI` fields
### Description
**Description:** An attack vector which spans the intersection between web3 and web2 is when users can [associate arbitrary metadata strings with NFTs](https://medium.com/zokyo-io/under-the-... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Fees can be any amount
### Description
_Submitted by danb, also found by pauliax_
In `transferBribes`, the fees are user input, rather than calculation using `fee` (state var).
Currently, `fee` is unused:
[BribeVault.sol#L23](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-02-redacted-cartel/blob/main/contracts/BribeV... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Constant defined by a value that has not yet been published in the documentation
### Description
**Severity**: Medium
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**
In contract utility.move the const EPOCH_SECONDS is supposed to be the time duration of an epoch in seconds. This const will affect the value returned... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | false | false | ## High: Restriction of transfer can be circumvented by using approve + transferFrom
### Description
## Security Advisory
**Severity:** High Risk
**Context:**
- TrancheVault.sol#L494
- FirstLossCover.sol#L271
**Description:**
In TrancheVault and FirstLossCover, transfer is disabled. However, these contract... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | access-control | true | false | ## Low: Missing vesting check in `PerpetualBond::setVestingPeriod`
### Description
Both `YToken` and `PerpetualBond` support reward vesting through a configurable vesting period. The admin can update this period via the `setVestingPeriod` function. However, there is an inconsistency in how the two contracts validate c... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Arbitrary Delete Of Orders
### Description
## Vulnerability in maven.move
In `maven.move`, any user can call `execute_object_operation` with the incorrect `ASSET` generic and pop the order from execution without properly executing it, as the precheck fails and returns false. This allows anyone to stop othe... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | liquidation | false | false | ## High: call to `_payPrefund` may lead to the validator stake being split
### Description
There is an issue at line https://github.com/p2p-org/eth-staking-fee-distributor-contracts/blob/30a7ff78e8285f2eae4ae552efb390aa4453a083/contracts/feeDistributor/ContractWcFeeDistributor.sol#L114 and https://github.com/p2p-org/e... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | input-validation | true | false | ## Low: `swEXIT::setWithdrawRequestMaximum` and `setWithdrawRequestMinimum` lacking validation can lead to a state where `withdrawRequestMinimum > withdrawRequestMaximum`
### Description
Invariant `withdrawRequestMinimum <= withdrawRequestMaximum` must always hold, however this is not checked when new min/max withdraw... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | false | false | ## Medium: User’s Collateral Could Be Arbitrary Allocated to Undesired Strategies
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client. The client provided the following explanation:
> The objective of this upgrade is to take a step forward towards decentralization. As part of this, the allocation functi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | overflow | true | false | ## Medium: Wrong calculation of tokens to transfer will break deposit flow
### Description
The private function `_calculateTokensToTransfer` is used to calculate the amount of tokens to transfer to the user based on the amount of funds deposited. When the cap of the current tier is reached, the function iterates over ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | reentrancy | true | false | ## High: Reentrancy allows any user allowed even one free `HoneyJar` mint to mint the max supply for himself for free
### Description
**Impact:**
High, as the user will steal all `HoneyJar` NFTs, paying nothing
**Likelihood:**
High, as reentrancy is a very common attack vector and easily exploitable
**Description**
... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: SafeMath library asserts instead of reverts
### Description
## Handle
cmichel
## Vulnerability details
## Vulnerability Details
The implementation of SafeMath `assert`s instead of performing a `revert` on failure.
## Impact
An `assert` will consume all gas of the transaction whereas a `revert`/`require... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Lack of Zero Address Validation
### Description
The following function lacks address(0) validation for certain parameters:
* *PaymentCollector::constructor* - `_owner`, `_altt`, `_registry`
* *XPRedeem:constructor* - `_altt` , `_signer`
* *ALTT::constructor* - `initialOwner`
* *StakingVault::init* - `_self`
... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | oracle | false | false | ## Medium: Protocol's Walls / cushion bonds remain active even if heart is not beating
### Description
_Submitted by Trust_
The Walls of the RBS mechanism offer zero slippage swaps at the high and low of the moving average spread. The capacity to be swapped at these prices is usually very large, so it must make sure... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Incorrect Token Amounts Used in add_liquidity()
### Description
Incorrect amount of `token1` is used to transfer funds to the `CurveV1StETHPoolGateway`, resulting in unexpected behaviour. The `add_liquidity()` function on line 108 incorrectly references the amount of `token1` to transfer to the gateway for ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: getPoolOrderStructHash() can be turned into a pure function
### Description
`getPoolOrderStructHash()` encodes and hashes an order to create the `structHash` for EIP 712 signing:
Since `_ORDER_TYPEHASH` and `_PROPERTY_TYPEHASH` are constants, this function does not read from storage.
It can therefore be cha... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Loss Of Boosted Weight When Poking In The Same Boosted Vote Period
### Description
Report type: Smart Contract
Target: https://github.com/alchemix-finance/alchemix-v2-dao/blob/main/src/Voter.sol
Impacts:
- Permanent freezing of unclaimed yield
## Description
## Brief/Intro
The `Voter` contract has an issu... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | rounding | false | false | ## Medium: Incomplete reward transfer due to balance shortfall
### Description
**Severity**: Medium
**Status**: Acknowledged
**Description**
The `_safeRewardsTransfer` function within the `LpNFTPool` contract is designed to transfer reward tokens safely to users, guarding against rounding errors or situations whe... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Vault.blacklistProtocol can revert in emergency
### Description
Vault.blacklistProtocol can revert in emergency, because it tries to withdraw underlying balance from protocol, which can revert for many reasons after it's hacked or paused.
### Impact
Hacked or paused protocol can't be set to blacklist.
###... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Unconstrained Vercel Spending Limits
### Description
Spend monitoring and control mechanisms are not configured in Vercel, creating risk of unexpected charges or potential abuse. Currently, spending is monitored manually on a monthly basis without automated alerts or controls. Automatic controls would provi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: PayoutManager::_initiatePrincipalPayout totalTokensToBurn can be greater than totalSupply due
### Description
## To Roundings
**Severity:** Low Risk
**Context:** (No context files were provided by the reviewer)
**Description:** Due to multiple down roundings, the onchain payout amount can be slightly bi... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | true | false | ## Low: Timestamp Verification Discrepancies Between `RenzoOracle` and `_deposit()` Function
### Description
The issue arises from a mismatch in staleness thresholds: the `RenzoOracle` uses a staleness check of "1 day + 60 seconds," whereas the `_deposit` function uses exactly "1 day." This inconsistency in timestamp ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | cross-chain | false | false | ## Low: Use named imports
### Description
**Description:** Use named imports consistently throughout the codebase.
**Securitize:** Fixed in commit [85ca7bb](https://github.com/securitize-io/bc-securitize-bridge-sc/commit/85ca7bb455cd78921b4f9ad7c48b0cf9eb0470e4).
**Cyfrin:** Verified. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | logic | false | false | ## Low: Price transferred in Dutch auction is calculated price, not bid amount.
### Description
**Description**
In the Auction House contract, in a Dutch auction, if the user places a bid, then the current calculated price is transferred, not their bid.
programs/auction_house/src/methods/make_bid.rs
**Recommendation... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: Race Condition in `removePausable` Function
### Description
This issue has been identified within the [removePausable](https://github.com/Se7en-Seas/cMETH-boring-vault/blob/d6e2d18f45a3e05d749d34966139fc85fc47f7e6/src/base/Roles/Pauser.sol#64) function of the `Pauser` contract.
When multiple admins execute th... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Restricted External Calls Can Be Made on Behalf of AggregationRouter
### Description
The Aggregation protocol is supposed to integrate with any Curve pool. Given the variety of the pool types within the protocol, this provides users with a significant degree of control. For example, [one of the external calls]... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | high | Validation | true | true |
Neither `SpigotLib.claimRevenue` nor `SpigotLib._claimRevenue` check that the provided `revenueContract` was registered before. If this is not the case, `SpigotLib._claimRevenue` assumes that this is a revenue contract with push payments (because `self.settings[revenueContract].claimFunction` is 0) and just returns th... | Code4rena | 5 | Debt DAO |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | true | false | ## Medium: _executeSwaps ofExecutor.sol doesn’t have a whitelist
### Description
The function `_executeSwaps()` of `Executor.sol` doesn’t have a whitelist, whereas `_executeSwaps()` of `SwapperV2.sol` does have a whitelist. Calling arbitrary addresses is dangerous. For example, unlimited allowances can be set to allow... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | input-validation | false | false | ## Low: Add minimum deposit to mitigate vault manipulation edge cases
### Description
Consider adding basic input/rounding validations to reduce exposure to common ERC4626 vault-manipulation edge cases. In particular: enforce a small minimum deposit (e.g., `>= 1e18` USBD). This check help prevent dust/rounding-based g... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | signature | false | false | ## Medium: Deposits from L1 to L2 using L1CrossDomainMessenger will fail and will not be replayable when L2CrossDomainMessenger is paused
### Description
Deposits from L1 to L2 using L1CrossDomainMessenger will fail and will not be replayable when L2CrossDomainMessenger is paused.
### Impact
Lose of funds for deposit... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Duplicate Utilization of FortaStakingUtils Library
### Description
The project currently replicates the [`FortaStakingUtils`](https://github.com/NethermindEth/forta-staking-vault/blob/ce87cffbf813e27cc83157933760b51fa44a1885/src/utils/FortaStakingUtils.sol) library directly within its codebase instead of lever... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | false | false | ## Low: Not declaring return types in functions with return statements
### Description
Public functions [`delegate`](https://github.com/compound-finance/compound-protocol-alpha/blob/6858417c91921208c0b3ff342b11065c09665b1b/contracts/Governance/Comp.sol#L124) and [`delegateBySig`](https://github.com/compound-finance/co... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | true | false | ## Low: Rarity configuration in SpinLottery leads to `pendingCount` errors
### Description
_Resolved_
In the `SpinLottery.sol` contract, The issue occurs in the `fulfillRandomness()` function where the function relies on the current state of `rarityConfigs[i].active` to determine which rarities should have their pend... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | timing | true | false | ## Low: Optimize away `currentPeriodAmountTemp` variable in `RateLimiter::_addUsedAmount`
### Description
Optimize away `currentPeriodAmountTemp` in `RateLimiter::_addUsedAmount` by for example:
```solidity
function _addUsedAmount(uint256 _usedAmount) internal {
// @audit removed `currentPeriodAmountTemp`
i... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | reentrancy | false | false | ## Medium: A user can call `callOutSigned` without paying for gas by reentering `anyExecute` with Virtual Account
### Description
`Virtual account` can perform external calls during the root chain execution process. If it calls `callOut` at the Arbitrum Branch Bridge Agent, the call `anyExecute` in Root Bridge Agent w... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Lp's liquidity may be lost if re-org happens
### Description
LP holders will remove liquidity and then burn their liquidity position. If re-org happens, malicious users can manipulate the pool's price to cause user's removing liquidity revert. Then LP holders' position will be burned and liquidity will be l... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | false | false | ## Medium: REGISTRY OWNER CAN SET ITSELF AS VOTER OPERATOR
### Description
It was observed that the `owner` could set itself as a `voter_operator`. This functionality violates the principle of least privilege giving the `owner` additional privileges.
Code Location
-------------
### Recommendation
**SOLVED**: The `Oc... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | high | token | true | true | ## High: Attacker can potentially inflate total deposit room in vault group to near infinity
### Description
The `VaultControllerStrategy::deposit` function increases `totalDepositRoom` based on the difference between `maxDeposits` (from Chainlink) and `vaultMaxDeposits`, but fails to update `vaultMaxDeposits` afterwa... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | initialization | true | false | ## High: Uninitialized Price Precision
### Description
## Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability stems from the uninitialized precision field in the `Price` structure returned by `ChainedPriceSource.getPrice`. This uninitialized field results in inaccurate price calculations and the dissemination of incorrect price... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | true | false | ## Low: Risky use of toggle functions
### Description
The codebase uses a toggle function, `togglePauseStatus`, to pause and unpause a market. This function is error-prone because setting a pause status on a market depends on the market’s current state. Multiple uncoordinated pauses could result in a failure to pause ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | dos | true | false | ## Low: incorrect length check in `_setIntermediateCovariance` will DOS manual setting of `intermediateCovarianceStates` after pool initialization
### Description
The UpdateWeightRunner provides a function (`setIntermediateValuesManually`) that allows the QuantAMM admin to manually set the intermediate variables of a ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | token | false | false | ## High: Unhandled return value of transfer in transferOut() of Pools.sol
### Description
## Handle
0xRajeev
## Vulnerability details
## Impact
ERC20 implementations are not always consistent. Some implementations of transfer and transferFrom could return ‘false’ on failure instead of reverting. It is safer to wr... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | token | false | false | ## High: Rewards compounded in AaveStrategy are unredeemable
### Description
The AaveStrategy contract is designed to:
1. Receive depositor's ERC20 tokens from yieldBox
2. Deposit those tokens into an AAVE lending pool
3. Allow anyone to call `compound()`, which:
a. Claims AAVE rewards from the `incentivesContro... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | initialization | true | false | ## High: Wallet initialize frontrun
### Description
**Severity**
**Impact:** High, attack to secretly own new wallets of other users
**Likelihood:** Medium, frontrun required
**Description**
The deploy script does 2 transactions to deploy a wallet:
1. deploy contract
2. call initialize() (which accepts the first ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | front-running | false | false | ## High: Anyone Can Arbitrarily Mint Fungible Tokens In `VaderPoolV2.mintFungible()`
### Description
_Submitted by leastwood_
#### Impact
The `mintFungible()` function is callable by any user that wishes to mint liquidity pool fungible tokens. The protocol expects a user to first approve the contract as a spender be... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | dos | false | false | ## Low: [L-03]
### Description
[L-03] Comptroller.sol#allMarkets: an unbounded loop on array can lead to DoS
CToken[] public allMarkets; in contract ComptrollerV3Storage is an array where there are just pushes. No upper bound, no pop.
As this array can grow quite large, the transaction’s gas cost could exceed the bloc... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | signature | true | false | ## Low: Lack of proper normalization in secp256r1 curve verifier leads to signature malleability
### Description
In ECDSA, a signature is composed of two values, `r` and `s`, derived from the message hash and the signer's private key. The malleability issue stems from the fact that for any valid signature `(r, s)`, th... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: Failed calls to GTC method donate_account cause permanent locking of the remaining neurons
### Description
The implementation of the GTC method `donate_account` calls `AccountState::transfer` to transfer the neurons in an account to a predefined custodian account.
```rust
let neuron_ids = self.neuron_ids.clon... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | overflow | true | true | ## High: A multiplication over�low allows an attacker to block the tally
### Description
Every day, delegates can vote for a new Basis total supply. If a malicious delegate votes for an arbitrarily large supply increase, they can block the tally by triggering a multiplication overflow.
A delegate can vote for a new ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: `UlyssesToken.setWeights(...)` can cause user loss of assets on vault deposits/withdrawals
### Description
The [ERC-4626](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4626) paradigm of deposit/mint and withdraw/redeem, where a **single** underlying asset amount can always be converted to a number of vault shares and ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | cross-chain | false | false | ## Medium: No way to cancel `l1 -< l2` messages
### Description
There is no api to allow cancellation of `l1->l2` messages. In the event of an issue in the Kakarot contracts, this will result in the fee being permanently lost since the user has no ability to reclaim the funds.
As we can see there are only functions ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: IMPROPER ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
### Description
The smart contracts, in scope, do not implement granular access control. All the privileged functionality is assigned to one role. This could lead to serious consequences if, for example, a malicious admin decides to take over the platform.
### Recommendation... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: FundraisingMultisigTemplate - should use BaseTemplate._createPermissionForTemplate() to assign permissions to itself ✓ Fixed
### Description
The template temporarily assigns permissions to itself to be able to configure parts of the system. This can either be done by calling `acl.createPermission(address(this)... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | flash-loan | false | false | ## Gas: Remove redundant `token` parameter from `DebtToken::maxFlashLoan`, `flashFee`, `flashLoan`
### Description
**Description:** Remove redundant `token` parameter from `DebtToken::maxFlashLoan`, `flashFee`, `flashLoan` - this parameter is useless since `DebtToken` only provides flash loans using its own tokens.
*... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: `blockDelay` only Adds a 1 Min Buffer to Check Changes
### Description
**Update**
The units for blockDelay has been changed to uint256. Fixed in commit `689749987512e5bdd46c14990e242163cede84b4`.
**File(s) affected:**`contracts/proxies/ODSafeManager.sol`, `contracts/SAFEEngine.sol`
**Description:** One of th... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: Redeemer.redeem() for Element withdraws PT to wrong address.
### Description
_Submitted by auditor0517, also found by 0x52, cccz, datapunk, kenzo, and pashov_
Redeemer.redeem() for Element withdraws PT to wrong address.
This might cause a result of loss of PT.
### Proof of Concept
According to the ReadMe.... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: [25] Wrong comments in L1 bridges
### Description
In [L1ERC20Bridge, line 162](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-zksync/blob/72f5f16ed4ba94c7689fe38fcb0b7d27d2a3f135/code/contracts/ethereum/contracts/bridge/L1ERC20Bridge.sol#L162C1-L162C115), the comment says `If the L2 deposit finalization transaction fai... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: IGNORE EXTERNAL CALL FEE
### Description
The `wormhole publishMessage` function is payable. Currently, requires no fees, but that can be changed over time. If the wormhole decides to set a fee greater than 0, all those external calls within the protocol would fail. Hence, leaving the wormhole routers unable... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: Strong trust assumption that Convex will act in good faith
### Description
There are a number of trust assumptions in the protocol that assume that Convex will act in good faith. Specifically, Convex has control over data returned from various functions which could be altered to influence the behavior of the s... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: Unsafe Usage of `ERC20.transfer()` and `ERC20.transferFrom()`
### Description
**Update**
The Fabric team fixed the issue in commit `5241d96`.
**Description:** Not all ERC20 implementations respect the ERC20 standard, multiple adopted tokens do not return any value when executing `ERC20.transfer()` or even `ER... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Missing Docstrings
### Description
Throughout the codebase, multiple instances of missing docstrings were identified. Particularly, in the following files:
* `AdapterStore.sol`
* `Arbitrum_Adapter.sol`
* `Arbitrum_SpokePool.sol`
* `OFTTransportAdapter.sol`
* `OFTTransportAdapterWithStore.sol`
* `Ovm_SpokePool... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | true | false | ## Medium: Block stuffing via transactions with large calldata
### Description
```rust
let tx_size = tx.size();
if total_size
.checked_add(tx_size)
.is_none_or(|new_total_size| new_total_size > proposal_byte_limit)
{
return TrackedTxHeapDrainAction::Skip;
}
```
MonadBFT enforces a maximum size for block proposal... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Unused Arguments In Functions
### Description
It’s been identified that there are some functions which implement some extra arguments that are not being using during these functions. Thus, increasing unnecessarily the complexity of the code.
```
func (s *Service) GetProposalsByStatusOrderByIndex(status t... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | oracle | false | false | ## High: minTokenAmounts_ is useless in new configuration and doesn't provide any real slippage protection
### Description
BLVaultLido#withdraw skims off extra stETH from the user that results from oracle arb. The problem with this is that minTokenAmounts_ no longer provides any slippage protection because it only ens... | 0 |
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