prompt listlengths 2 2 | source stringclasses 3
values | severity stringclasses 5
values | category stringclasses 186
values | has_code bool 2
classes | has_poc bool 2
classes | reference_response stringlengths 23 5k | firm stringclasses 26
values | quality_score float64 0 5 | protocol stringclasses 398
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: The callerOrDelegated specification is not followed for CloseTrove
### Description
For all key functions in `BorrowerOperations` users can choose their privileged address to delegate an operation.
- https://github.com/prisma-fi/prisma-contracts/blob/52b26b8a2f1904b048754d5443e08d2144610b92/contracts/dependenci... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: The Tact compiler does not support FunC files with .func extension
### Description
The Tact language compiler considers a source file with the `.func` extension to be a Tact file and appends the `.tact` extension to the filename. As a result, importing a `.func` file throws an exception.
The Tact language doc... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: [02] Wrong telemetry labels for JSON operations in move message server
### Description
The Move message server’s JSON operation handlers (`ExecuteJSON` and potentially `ScriptJSON`) are using incorrect telemetry labels that conflict with their non-JSON counterparts. This makes it impossible to distinguish betw... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | true | false | ## Low: The factory does not check whether the create fees are paid successfully
### Description
The `factory.createERC20DAO` function requires the caller to pay create fees. The code is as follows.
However, in code A, it does not check whether the `call` is successful. If the `call` fails, the `_owner` will not rec... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | liquidation | false | false | ## Low: Most collateral is not directly redeemable by depositors
### Description
The following describes the on-chain situation on December 20, 2021.
The Frax stablecoin has a total supply of 1.5 billion FRAX. Anyone can mint new FRAX tokens by calling `FraxPoolV3.mintFrax` and paying the necessary amount of collater... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: Not using the named return variables when a function returns, wastes deployment gas
### Description
- [Exchange.sol#L540](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-11-non-fungible/blob/main/contracts/Exchange.sol#L540) | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | signature | false | false | ## Low: All Chains Must Be in Sync with Same State
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client. The client provided the following explanation:
> Requiring chain-many signatures has practical shortcomings that worsen with more chains, and thus this was a subjective tradeoff based on our requireme... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | signature | false | false | ## Low: Deposits with Permits Can Be Delayed by Front-Running the Approval
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client. The client provided the following explanation:
> This is a general behavior of ERC2612. We can accept this.
**Description:** When a user calls a function that uses permit sign... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Missing test coverage report
### Description
There is no automated test coverage report for the `protocol` package. Without this report it is impossible to know whether there are parts of the code never executed by the automated tests; so for every change, a full manual test suite has to be executed to make... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | overflow | true | false | ## Gas: Incrementors can be made unchecked
### Description
There exist two instances of incrementors being used which cannot possibly overflow in the codebase.
- **GovNFT.sol#L217:**
```solidity
_tokenId = ++tokenId;
```
- **GovNFT.sol#L296:**
```solidity
splitTokensByIndex[_from][_parentLock.splitCount++]... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Lack of slippage protection leads to loss of protocol funds
### Description
There is no slippage protection while removing liquidity and swap tokens from AMM.
### Impact
Loss of protocol funds which will reduce the yield of users.
### Recommendation
Protocol should implement slippage protection and set dead... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Address Changes Should Use Two-step Procedure
### Description
The critical procedures should be two step process.
See similar findings in previous Code4rena contests for reference:
https://code4rena.com/reports/2022-06-illuminate/#2-critical-changes-should-use-two-step-procedure
### Recommended Mitigation St... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Gauge Voting Misallocation Vulnerability
### Description
The `GaugeController` voting mechanism allows users to allocate weights to different liquidity gauges based on their `veRAACToken` balance. However, the current implementation does not track the total weight allocated by each user, enabling them to exce... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | true | false | ## Medium: Inconsistency between hardcoded gas limit and actual gas left in smart contract execution
### Description
During the execution of a smart contract function `a()` in contract A, an inconsistency was observed between the hardcoded maximum gas limit defined in the code and the actual remaining gas reported by ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: POSSIBLE MISUSE OF HELPER METHODS
### Description
The intention and use of helper methods in Rust, like `unwrap`, is very useful for testing environments because a value is forcibly demanded to get an error (aka `panic!`) if the `Option` the methods is called on doesn't have `Some` value or `Result`. Neverthel... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | storage | true | false | ## Gas: State variables can be packed into fewer storage slots
### Description
If variables occupying the same slot are both written the same function or by the constructor, avoids a separate Gsset (**20000 gas**). Reads of the variables can also be cheaper
*There is 1 instance of this issue:*
https://github.com/cod... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | cross-chain | true | false | ## Medium: Use of `u64` for `price_per_day` and `price_per_month` limits handling tokens with 18 decimals
### Description
### Impact
The use of `u64` for `price_per_day` and `price_per_month` prevents setting rental prices higher than approximately 18 tokens when using tokens with 18 decimals, potentially restricting... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | overflow | true | false | ## Gas: Calculations which won't underflow can be `unchecked`
### Description
According to line 834, `absoluteValue` is at least `>= 2 * FIXED_FEE` (otherwise, the function will revert with `AmountError()`). This implies, that lines 844-847 will never underflow.
In the worst case scenario, `absoluteValue = 2 * FIXED_... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Incomplete Docstrings
### Description
Throughout the codebase, multiple instances of incomplete docstrings were identified:
* In `IHookEvents.sol`, the [`HookSwap`](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/uniswap-hooks/blob/087974776fb7285ec844ca090eab860bd8430a11/src/interfaces/IHookEvents.sol#L15-L22), [`HookFee`](... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | signature | false | false | ## Low: Interfaces do not Match the Source Code
### Description
Within the Anzen protocol v2, a suite of interfaces is provided in the `/src/interfaces/` directory to define contract specifications. However, it was discovered that none of the contract implementations are inheriting from those interfaces. This oversigh... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | initialization | false | false | ## Medium: Loss of pending messages (if any) in case removeConnectedChain is called
### Description
_Submitted by hubble_
If there are any unprocessed messages to be executed or processed, while removeConnectedChain is called, then they may be stuck from getting processed on the other end.
If these messages have tran... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | cross-chain | true | false | ## Medium: 21] Failure to transfer the base asset to the recipient
### Description
**Severity:** Medium
**Path:** fuel-bridge/packages/message-predicates/contract-message-predicate/script_asm.rs#L54, fuel-bridge/packages/fungible-token/bridge-fungible-token/src/main.sw#L336-L348
**Description:**
The transaction scr... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Wrong minimum net fee check
### Description
A minimum net fee was introduced that all markets should comply by such that the protocol earns fees. The protocol fees are computed as `takerFee + makerFee`, but the market factory computes the wrong check. Fee pairs that should be accepted are currently not accept... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | flash-loan | true | true | ## Low: `CollateralMigrator` reverts when pre-existing funds are used for flash loan fees
### Description
The flow for migrating collateral between two markets is as follows:
1. The end user calls `CollateralMigrator::migrateCollateral` with the required swap parameters.
2. `CollateralMigrator` takes a flash loan fro... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Incorrect information in redeem-documentation
### Description
**Description:** Currently, the protocol documentation file `03-Fund-Flows` section `B.Redeeming` states that in order to execute `redeem`, `benefactor` must send USDB to the `USDBMinting` contract. However, this is not implemented in the code. The ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Users Who Queue Withdrawal Before A Slashing Event Disadvantage Users Who Queue After And Eventually Leads To Loss Of Funds For Them
### Description
### Finding description and impact
Lets take the scenario where the HYPE to KHYPE exchange is `1 KHYPE = 1.5 KHYPE`.
At this point, let’s assume that there are... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | false | false | ## Gas: Using `calldata` instead of `memory` for read-only arguments in external functions saves gas
### Description
When a function with a memory array is called externally, the `abi.decode()` step has to use a for-loop to copy each index of the calldata to the memory index. Each iteration of this for-loop costs at l... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Claiming original allocation without staking rewards can lead to total loss of rewards
### Description
The Usual staking contract (UsualSP) has a vulnerability where users who claim their original vested allocation without first claiming their staking rewards can lose all accumulated rewards. This occurs beca... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | oracle | true | false | ## Gas: `internal` functions only called once can be inlined to save gas
### Description
Not inlining costs **20 to 40 gas** because of two extra `JUMP` instructions and additional stack operations needed for function calls.
*There are 5 instances of this issue:*
https://github.com/with-backed/papr/blob/1933da2e38f... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | overflow | true | false | ## Low: Large priority fee relative to one-for-zero swap amounts will cause `CompensationPriceFinder::getOneForZero` to underflow
### Description
**Description:** Swaps over zero liquidity can push the square root price to any arbitrary tick and are allowed by Uniswap; however, such top-of-block one-for-zero swaps are... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Deprecated Libraries in Use
### Description
During the security review, it was noted that the code of the file `src/utils/SafeMath.sol` was extracted from an older version of the popular OpenZeppelin library.
### Recommendation
As a general best-security practice, it is highly advisable to consistently review... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | front-running | true | true |
This issue will demonstrate how the current implementation of `swapSource()` and `retry()` goes directly against Chainlink's Security Consideration of **Not re-requesting randomness** (https://docs.chain.link/vrf/v2/security#do-not-re-request-randomness).
### Note
For clarity it is assumed that after `swapSource()` ... | Code4rena | 3 | Wenwin |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: [05] Non-utilized `isPrivateDepositPoolAdded` variable in the Distributor contract
### Description
In the Distributor contract, there is a `isPrivateDepositPoolAdded` variable that is supposed to track if a reward pool index attached to private deposit pools is known in the contract i.e, it’s the same emulator... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Missing event and timelock for critical parameter change
### Description
Events help non-contract tools to track changes, and events prevent users from being surprised by changes
*There are 3 instances of this issue:* | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: Prefer explicit unsigned integer sizes
### Description
**Description:** Prefer explicit unsigned integer sizes:
**Securitize:** Fixed in commit [26c5bb0](https://github.com/securitize-io/dstoken/commit/26c5bb05676233ca0c5caa1d9b02fd98360ad4e7).
**Cyfrin:** Verified. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | token | false | true |
Traders will not be able to:
1. Initiate a market order
2. Add margin
3. Add to position
4. initiate limit order
If USDT is set as the margin asset and protocol is deployed on Ethereum.
(Note: this issue was submitted after consulting with the sponsor even though currently there are no plans to deploy the platf... | Code4rena | 4 | Tigris Trade |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | access-control | true | false | ## Medium: `fastTrackProposalExecution` should only be callable when `TemporalGovernor` is paused
### Description
The function `fastTrackProposalExecution` is supposed to be used by the `TemporalGovernor` owner during periods of emergency, when the contract is paused to fast track a certain proposal (queue and execute... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | storage | true | false | ## High: Instant withdrawals in priority pool can result in loss of funds for StakingProxy contract
### Description
**Description:** When instant withdrawals are enabled in the priority pool, `staker` can permanently lose funds when withdrawing through the `StakingProxy` contract. The issue occurs because the withdraw... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Use delete consistently
### Description
Consider using `delete` instead of [`= 0;` in `CidNFT.remove`](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-canto-identity/blob/dff8e74c54471f5f3b84c217848234d474477d82/src/CidNFT.sol#L284) similar to how delete is used [here](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-01-canto-identit... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | true | false | ## Medium: `LiquidStakingToken._minGasLimit()` Is Set to Zero
### Description
When sending slow messages using `_sendSlowSyncMessage()`, `_minGasLimit()` is used:
```solidity
function _sendSlowSyncMessage(
address,
uint256 _value,
uint256,
bytes memory _data
) internal override {
bytes memory message = abi.... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | dos | false | false | ## Medium: Using `transferFrom` on ERC721 tokens
### Description
_Submitted by shw_
In the function `awardExternalERC721` of contract `PrizePool`, when awarding external ERC721 tokens to the winners, the `transferFrom` keyword is used instead of `safeTransferFrom`. If any winner is a contract and is not aware of inco... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | signature | false | false | ## Low: Signatures can be reused between different chains
### Description
In `RWIPStaking.unstake`, the signature's hash does not include the current `chain.id`. If the protocol is deployed on multiple chains, a signature from one chain can also be reused on other chains, even if a user is supposed to be authorized on... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | high | liquidation | true | true |
[contracts/contract/MinipoolManager.sol#L374](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-12-gogopool/blob/aec9928d8bdce8a5a4efe45f54c39d4fc7313731/contracts/contract/MinipoolManager.sol#L374)
Node operators can manipulate the assigned high water to be higher than the actual.
### Proof of Concept
The protocol rewards node o... | Code4rena | 5 | GoGoPool |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | access-control | true | false | ## Low: Inherited `AccessControlUpgradeable` functions bypass some validation checks
### Description
The `GlobalRegistryService` contract implements custom wrapper functions (`addOperator()`, `revokeOperator()`, `changeAdmin()`) with additional safety checks and event emissions on top of OpenZeppelin's `AccessControlU... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | oracle | true | false | ## Medium: settle() asyncFee is left in the KeepFactory and is not transfer to the keeper.
### Description
After KeeperFactory.settle() executes successfully, `asyncFee` goes to the factory, not to `keeper`.
### Impact
`asyncFee` is locked in the contract.
### Recommendation
```diff
function settle(bytes32[] memor... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Passing the wrong value to `_burn()` function
### Description
The agent will call `topOff()` function in `OmoVault.sol` contract to transfer the asset to users who have filled the requests to redeem.
The user shares are still not burned yet. `topOff()` will burn them here
```solidity
File: OmoVault.sol
453:... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | false | false | ## High: Bids Can Be Blocked By Sending Option To Liquidator
### Description
It is possible to prevent liquidations by frontrunning an `executeBid()` call. To provide context, liquidations through the `DutchAuction.sol` contract are integral to the proper operation of the Derive protocol. This is primarily due to thei... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: stakingContext.auraBooster.deposit boolean return value not handled in Boosted3TokenPoolUtils.sol
### Description
stakingContext.auraBooster.deposit boolean return value not handled in Boosted3TokenPoolUtils.sol
### Impact
Notional -> AuraBooster -> BaseRewardPool
Without handling the boolean value explit... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: updateGameTakeRate() does not have an upper bound
### Description
`updateGameTakeRate()` calculates the percentage of `gameFee` given to the treasury after every game. This value can be updated, and in the function, `updateGameTakeRate()`, there is no limit to what the new rate can be.
Cap the limit to a max... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | cross-chain | false | false | ## Medium: Incorrect Parameters Passed to permitWitnessTransferFrom
### Description
The [`PERMIT2_ORDER_TYPE` variable](https://github.com/across-protocol/contracts/blob/108be77c29a3861c64bdf66209ac6735a6a87090/contracts/erc7683/ERC7683Across.sol#L67) stores the witness data type string, which is supposed to be passed... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | true | false | ## High: HatsSignerGate + MultiHatsSignerGate: more than maxSignatures can be claimed which leads to DOS in reconcileSignerCount
### Description
The `HatsSignerGate.claimSigner` and `MultiHatsSignerGate.claimSigner` functions allow users to become signers.
It is important that both functions do not allow that there e... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Possible Sybil Attack Circumventing Purchase Whitelist
### Description
**Update**
The client provided the following explanation:
> Decided to accept the risk without engaging in special efforts to control it
**File(s) affected:**`IFFixedSale.sol`
**Description:** We want to raise awareness of the fact that ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | cyfrin_structured | low | token | true | false | ## Low: Static `gasLimit` will result in overpayment
### Description
Since [unspent gas is not refunded](https://docs.chain.link/ccip/best-practices#setting-gaslimit), Chainlink recommends carefully setting the `gasLimit` within the `extraArgs` parameter to avoid overpaying for execution.
In [`BridgeCCIP::send`](http... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | token | false | false | ## Low: The current minter status is not checked
### Description
Status can be changed to the same one here https://github.com/vibexyz/vibe-contract/blob/d08057edbaf83b00d94dcaca2a05e3c44a45e4d9/contracts/tokens/VibeERC721.sol#L64.
### Recommendation
We recommend adding a check that the new status differs from the pr... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Inconsistent FirstLossCover.isSufficient check in PoolFeeManager
### Description
Admin accounts accrue fees in the PoolFeeManager contract whenever a profit distribution is made. These functions only allow each of the admin accounts to withdraw fees that are in excess of the first loss cover's max liquidity. T... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: Ensure on-chain that cache is synced
### Description
_Submitted by GreyArt, also found by WatchPug_
#### Impact
Currently, many core operations (like `NestedFactory.create()`, `NestedFactory.swapTokenForTokens()`) are dependent on the assumption that the cache is synced before these functions are executed ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: User might be unfairly liquidated after L2 Sequencer grace period
### Description
User might be unfairly liquidated after L2 Sequencer grace period.
### Impact
User might be unfairly liquidated after L2 Sequencer grace period. | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | signature | false | false | ## Medium: Proposers would choose to avoid higher tier by exploiting non-randomness of parameter used in getMinTier()
### Description
The issue exists for both `MainnetTierProvider.sol` and `TestnetTierProvider.sol`. For this report, we shall concentrate only on describing it via `MainnetTierProvider.sol`.
The provin... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | solodit_api | medium | other | true | true | Report type: Smart Contract
Target: https://github.com/alchemix-finance/alchemix-v2-dao/blob/main/src/AlchemixGovernor.sol
Impacts:
- Griefing (e.g. no profit motive for an attacker, but damage to the users or the protocol)
## Description
## Details
The `proposalThreshold()` is the number of votes required for a vo... | Immunefi | 4 | Alchemix |
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: No price limit in `zapWETH`
### Description
The `zapWETH` function deposits some WETH to `UniV3TokenizedLp`. If there is too much WETH in `UniV3TokenizedLp`, some WETH will be swapped without a price limit. Furthermore, its caller, `LockZap` contract, does not check slippage. `LockZap` only checks the numbe... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Use a more recent version of Solidity
### Description
### Context
All contracts
### Recommendation
Old version of Solidity is used `0.7.6`, newer version can be used `0.8.17`
### Recommendation
Old version of Solidity is used `0.7.6`, newer version can be used `0.8.17` | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | storage | false | false | ## Medium: Admin of the upgradeable proxy contract of Controller.sol can rug users
### Description
## Lines of code
https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-03-rolla/blob/a06418c9cc847395f3699bdf684a9ac066651ed7/quant-protocol/contracts/Controller.sol#L22-L34
## Vulnerability details
Use of Upgradeable Proxy Contract St... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | liquidation | false | false | ## Low: Reminder to use USD feeds and not USDC to avoid Depeg Risk
### Description
## Context: BAMM.sol#L222
**Description:** While the comment found at BAMM.sol#L222 is most likely a typo, it is worth re-iterating that feeds denominated in USDC can be prone to fluctuations that wouldn't happen to USD-denominated fee... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: User-supplied slippage for decrease orders is ignored
### Description
The user-supplied `minOutputAmount` order parameter for controlling slippage is ignored when a user decreases their position
### Impact
User's orders will have swap impacts applied to them during swaps, resulting in the user getting less t... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Trading external tokens for external tokens is possible
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client. The client provided the following explanation: This is intentional since the NAYM token is an external token, on a technical level. To be able to trade it against other external tokens, we... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | overflow | true | false | ## Gas: Avoid unnecessary use of `SafeMath` operations
### Description
There are a number of instances as outlined below where the use of `SafeMath` operations can be avoided to save gas due to the fact that these values are already validated or otherwise guaranteed to not overflow: | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Exchange Rate Feeds
### Description
Question is if these are creating realistic arbitrages and delays between the prices on SCROLL and the Prices on Mainnet
I'd need to normalize them and find the relative deltas to see if that's the case
- The main question here is: Arbitrage
- Value Leak due to not using Ma... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | overflow | true | false | ## Medium: `getRedemptionHints` will revert if `_maxIterations` is reached
### Description
The function `getRedemptionHints()` in `HintHelpers.sol` is used to find the right hints to pass to `redeemCollateral()`. The number of positions to consider for redemption can be capped to `_maxIterations` to avoid running out ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | false | false | ## Low: Require without message
### Description
In the following functions if revert occurs then user won't receive any information:
https://github.com/lidofinance/curve-merkle-oracle/blob/ae093b308999a564ed3f23d52c6c5dce946dbfa7/contracts/StateProofVerifier.sol#L100
https://github.com/lidofinance/curve-merkle-oracle/... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: Shorted root hash can be brute forced
### Description
Malicious user can brute force proof for case `leaf = _keccak128(abi.encodePacked(address(malicious_user), token.balanceOf(address(this))))` because root hash is shorted:
https://github.com/1inch/cumulative-merkle-drop/tree/96fb63d0cbfea73603e7500961c71e8a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: | Delay Limit Success
### Description
**Description - [PoC1](https://github.com/GuardianAudits/GMX/blob/af740b1972788f429219d1381183c68b244e00d8/test/guardianTestSuite/testPOCS.js#L522) [PoC2](https://github.com/GuardianAudits/GMX/blob/af740b1972788f429219d1381183c68b244e00d8/test/guardianTestSuite/testPOCS.j... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | true | false | ## Low: [24] Incorrect storage gap sizes are not advised
### Description
Multiple instances of this; for example, see [here](https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-07-loopfi/blob/57871f64bdea450c1f04c9a53dc1a78223719164/src/oracle/PendleLPOracle.sol#L17-L45).
And [here](https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-07-loopfi/blob/... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Use of non-production-ready ABIEncoderV2
### Description
The contracts use the new Solidity ABI encoder, ABIEncoderV2. This experimental encoder is not ready for production. More than 3% of all GitHub issues for the Solidity compiler are related to experimental features, primarily ABIEncoderV2. Several issues ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Improper fee subtraction on transferFrom function
### Description
The `transferFrom` function from the `MEME20.sol` contract subtracts the fees from the `msg.sender` instead of the `to` address as it is designed for. This can have direct implications when attempting to transfer the token through smart contrac... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | oracle | true | false | ## Low: `TokiOracle` can benefit from further documentation
### Description
_Resolved_
Currently, `TokiOracle.md` suggests that users can specify a `twapWindow` of `0` to acquire the spot price from the last stored `lnImpliedRate`. However, in Toki Pools the `lnImpliedRate` changes continuously due to rehypothecation... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | token | true | false | ## Medium: NFTXStakingZap and NFTXMarketplaceZap's transferFromERC721 transfer Cryptokitties to the wrong address
### Description
_Submitted by hyh_
`transferFromERC721(address assetAddr, uint256 tokenId, address to)` should transfer from `msg.sender` to `to`.
It transfers to `address(this)` instead when ERC721 is Cr... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: [2]
### Description
Function SystemContext.setGasPrice() comments are wrong.
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-zksync/blob/21d9a364a4a75adfa6f1e038232d8c0f39858a64/contracts/SystemContext.sol#L64-L68 | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: Interest rate in `LenderCommitmentGroup_Smart` may be easily manipulated by depositing, taking a loan and withdrawing
### Description
`LenderCommitmentGroup_Smart` gets the interest directly from the utilization ratio, which may be gamed and a loan may be taken with lower interest rate at no risk.
### Impact... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | false | false | ## Medium: payer is not tied to msg.sender
### Description
**Severity**: Medium
**Status**: Resolved
**Description**
Bando fulfillment requests have the field “payer”. This field is user imputed and does not necessarily need to reflect the person making the transaction. This means a malicious user can create spam f... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | access-control | true | false | ## High: All tokens can be stolen from `VirtualAccount` due to missing access modifier
### Description
All non-native assets (ERC20 tokens, NFTs, etc.) can be stolen by anyone from a `VirtualAccount` using its [`payableCall(...)`](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-maia/blob/f5ba4de628836b2a29f9b5fff59499690008c463... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: addNewAsset Does Not Mark The Previous Assets As False
### Description
**Severity** - High
**Status** - Resolved
**Description**
When adding new assets in the vault facet all the index tokens are removed first (the old ones) and new ones are added (deletion of allIndexTokens) and then new tokens are pushed... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Solidity compiler optimizations can be problematic
### Description
The LooksRare contracts have enabled optional compiler optimizations in Solidity. There have been several optimization bugs with security implications. Moreover, optimizations are actively being developed. Solidity compiler optimizations are di... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | initialization | true | false | ## High: Initialization upon declaration will not work for " proxied" contracts
### Description
OracleManager and StakingManager are designed to operate behind a delegation proxy, meaning their code will be executed, but their storage will not be directly used. However, both contracts declare and initialize storage va... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | true | false | ## High: TokenStaking.recoverStake allows instant stake undelegation ✓ Addressed
### Description
`TokenStaking.recoverStake` is used to recover stake that has been designated to be undelegated. It contains a single check to ensure that the undelegation period has passed:
**keep-core/contracts/solidity/contracts/Toke... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | other | true | false | ## Medium: Cancellation of Order Does Not Invalidate permitSingle in cancelOrder ✓ Fixed
### Description
In the `cancelOrder` function, the cancellation process does not render the `permitSingle` associated with the order unusable. This omission could allow the `permitSingle` to be reused even after the order has been... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | medium | liquidation | false | false | ## Medium: Users could get some `DOLA` even if they are on liquidation position
### Description
[Market.sol#L566](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-10-inverse/blob/main/src/Market.sol#L566)
Users able to invoke `forceReplenish()` when they are on liquidation position.
### Proof of Concept
On `Market.sol` ==> `forc... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | liquidation | true | false | ## High: Users can get around MaxLTV because of lack of strategyId validation
### Description
When a user withdraws some of their underlying token, there is a check to ensure they still meet the Max LTV requirements. However, they are able to arbitrarily enter any `strategyId` that they would like for this check, whic... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | other | false | false | ## High: Last person to withdraw his tokens might not be able to do this, in Crowdsale (edge case)
### Description
_Submitted by gpersoon_.
#### Impact
Suppose a Crowdsale is successful and enough commitments are made before the `marketInfo.endTime`.
Suppose marketStatus.commitmentsTotal == marketInfo.totalTokens -... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | token | false | false | ## High: Token transfers may return false
### Description
There are a lot of token transfers in the code, and most of them are just calling `transfer` or `transferFrom` without checking the return value. Ideally, due to the ERC-20 token standard, these functions should always return `True` or `False` (or revert). If a... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: [01] Early returning in `_blacklist()` and `blacklistConnector` function prevents emission of blacklisted event and blacklistConnector event respectively
### Description
[Link to the blacklist function](https://github.com/code-423n4/2025-05-blackhole/blob/92fff849d3b266e609e6d63478c4164d9f608e91/contracts/Toke... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | false | false | ## Gas: Prefix increments
### Description
Prefix increments are cheaper than postfix increments - `6` gas. This can mean interesting savings in `for` loops.
### Proof of Concept
5 instances:
#### xTRIBE.sol
[unchecked {i++;}](https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-07-swivel/blob/daf72892d8a8d6eaa43b9e7d1924ccb0e612ee3... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | access-control | false | false | ## Low: Role Transfer Not Following Two-Step Pattern
### Description
**Update**
Marked as "Acknowledged" by the client. The client provided the following explanation:
> We have decided against transitioning to Ownable2Step because: |
>
>
> 1. It would break our USDs contract due to the increase in an internal stor... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | gas | other | true | false | ## Gas: Usage of `uints`/`ints` smaller than 32 bytes (256 bits) incurs overhead
### Description
When using elements that are smaller than 32 bytes, your contract’s gas usage may be higher. This is because the EVM operates on 32 bytes at a time. Therefore, if the element is smaller than that, the EVM must use more ope... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: revokeStrategy function can be error-prone
### Description
The function to revoke strategies may cause errors because of issues in its implementation and documentation. Yearn vaults require strategies to generate yields. A strategy can be added or removed and, in certain cases, revoked:
```solidity
@external
... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | false | ## Low: Code Maturity
### Description
## Suggested Changes
1. The `process_withdrawal_asset` and `process_initialize_vault_with_mint` instructions are unutilized and should be removed.
2. There is a potential inconsistency in the value of discriminators utilized in the `vault_core` accounts, where there is a jump be... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | initialization | true | true | ## Low: Miscellaneous Rocket Pool Issues
### Description
This section details miscellaneous findings discovered by the testing team that do not have direct security implications:
1. For the two-stage staking deposit sequence involving `minipool prestake()` and `stake()` functions, the testing team recommends a change... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: User can mint, burn and then re-mint his `Memberships` NFT
### Description
The `mintMemberships` method allows multiple reuses of the same Merkle tree leaf, which means a user can mint, then burn, then mint again. This way he can spam events and also increase `totalMinted` and `totalSupply`. Add a check that f... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | high | dos | false | false | ## High: redeem stake token may be Dos because there is not enough balance in stake pool.
### Description
Funds will be transferred to portfolio vault if the staker stake via `MINT_COLLATERAL`, and be transferred to stake LP Pool if the staker stake via `MINT`. When LP holdrers redeem tokens, all tokens will come from... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | true | false | ## Low: [08] PREIMAGE: Non-zero bytes can end up in `preimageParts` after the tail end of the preimage of an LPP
### Description
In `_extractPreimagePart`, it is possible that non-zero bytes can be stored in the `proposalParts` and then the `preimageParts` because `calldataload` is used to load the next 32 bytes from ... | 0 | ||
[
{
"role": "system",
"content": "You are an expert smart contract security auditor. Analyze the provided Solidity code for vulnerabilities.\n\nFor each finding, output a structured block:\nFINDING | contract: <name> | function: <name> | bug_class: <CWE/category> | confidence: <0-100>\n\nThen provide:\n- desc... | skyward_49k | low | other | false | false | ## Low: Fund Account State Can Be Instantly Updated by Fund Manager
### Description
**Update**
The client acknowledged the issue and provided the following explanation:
> We acknowledge this behavior. The protocol will transition fund manager authority to a multi-sig committee once open-sourcing and governance activa... | 0 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.