conll/text_28.conll

CYBER	O

	O
THREAT	O

	O
ANALYSIS	O

	O
RUSSIA	O


	O
By	O
Insikt	O
Group	O
®	O

	O
February	O
17	O
,	O
2024	O


	O
Russia	O
-	O
Aligned	O
TAG-70	O

	O
Targets	O
European	O
Government	O

	O
and	O
Military	O
Mail	O
Servers	O
in	O

	O
New	O
Espionage	O
Campaign	O


	O
CYBER	O
THREAT	O
ANALYSIS	O


	O
Note	O
:	O
The	O
analysis	O
cut	O
-	O
off	O
date	O
for	O
this	O
report	O
was	O
December	O
11	O
,	O
2023	O
.	O


	O
Executive	O
Summary	O

	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
’s	O
Insikt	O
Group	O
®	O
has	O
observed	O
TAG-70	O
leveraging	O
cross	O
-	O
site	O
scripting	O
(	O
XSS	O
)	O

	O
vulnerabilities	O
against	O
Roundcube	O
webmail	O
servers	O
in	O
Europe	O
,	O
targeting	O
government	O
,	O
military	O
,	O
and	O

	O
national	O
infrastructure	O
-	O
related	O
entities	O
.	O
TAG-70	O
overlaps	O
with	O
activity	O
reported	O
by	O
other	O
security	O

	O
vendors	O
under	O
the	O
aliases	O
Winter	O
Vivern	O
,	O
TA473	O
,	O
and	O
UAC-0114	O
.	O
The	O
group	O
likely	O
conducts	O

	O
cyber	O
-	O
espionage	O
campaigns	O
to	O
serve	O
the	O
interests	O
of	O
Belarus	O
and	O
Russia	O
and	O
has	O
been	O
active	O
since	O
at	O

	O
least	O
December	O
2020	O
,	O
primarily	O
targeting	O
governments	O
in	O
Europe	O
and	O
Central	O
Asia	O
.	O

	O
In	O
their	O
latest	O
campaign	O
,	O
TAG-70	O
likely	O
started	O
exploiting	O
Roundcube	O
webmail	O
servers	O
at	O
the	O
beginning	O

	O
of	O
October	O
2023	O
and	O
continued	O
until	O
at	O
least	O
mid	O
-	O
October	O
.	O
Insikt	O
Group	O
detected	O
at	O
least	O
80	O

	O
organizations	O
targeted	O
in	O
this	O
campaign	O
;	O
the	O
victims	O
were	O
primarily	O
entities	O
in	O
Georgia	O
,	O
Poland	O
,	O
and	O

	O
Ukraine	O
.	O
This	O
campaign	O
has	O
been	O
linked	O
to	O
additional	O
TAG-70	O
activity	O
against	O
Uzbekistan	O
government	O

	O
mail	O
servers	O
,	O
which	O
involved	O
infrastructure	O
reported	O
by	O
Insikt	O
Group	O
in	O
February	O
2023	O
.	O

	O
TAG-70	O
’s	O
targeting	O
of	O
Roundcube	O
webmail	O
servers	O
is	O
only	O
the	O
most	O
recent	O
instance	O
of	O
targeting	O
email	O

	O
software	O
attributed	O
to	O
Russia	O
-	O
aligned	O
threat	O
actor	O
groups	O
.	O
In	O
June	O
2023	O
,	O
Insikt	O
Group	O
discovered	O
that	O

	O
the	O
Russian	O
state	O
-	O
sponsored	O
cyber	O
-	O
espionage	O
group	O
BlueDelta	O
(	O
APT28	O
,	O
Fancy	O
Bear	O
)	O
was	O
targeting	O

	O
vulnerable	O
Roundcube	O
installations	O
across	O
Ukraine	O
and	O
had	O
previously	O
exploited	O
CVE-2023	O
-	O
23397	O
,	O
a	O

	O
critical	O
zero	O
-	O
day	O
vulnerability	O
in	O
Microsoft	O
Outlook	O
in	O
2022	O
.	O
Other	O
well	O
-	O
known	O
Russian	O
threat	O
actor	O

	O
groups	O
,	O
such	O
as	O
Sandworm	O
and	O
BlueBravo	O
(	O
APT29	O
,	O
Midnight	O
Blizzard	O
)	O
,	O
have	O
also	O
previously	O
targeted	O

	O
email	O
solutions	O
in	O
various	O
campaigns	O
(	O
1	O
,	O
2	O
,	O
3	O
)	O
.	O

	O
In	O
the	O
context	O
of	O
the	O
ongoing	O
war	O
in	O
Ukraine	O
,	O
compromised	O
email	O
servers	O
may	O
expose	O
sensitive	O

	O
information	O
regarding	O
Ukraine	O
’s	O
war	O
effort	O
and	O
planning	O
,	O
its	O
relationships	O
and	O
negotiations	O
with	O
its	O

	O
partner	O
countries	O
as	O
it	O
seeks	O
additional	O
military	O
and	O
economic	O
assistance	O
,	O
expose	O
third	O
parties	O

	O
cooperating	O
with	O
the	O
Ukrainian	O
government	O
privately	O
,	O
and	O
reveal	O
fissures	O
within	O
the	O
coalition	O
supporting	O

	O
Ukraine	O
.	O
Furthermore	O
,	O
the	O
targeting	O
of	O
the	O
Iranian	O
embassies	O
in	O
Russia	O
and	O
the	O
Netherlands	O
may	O
be	O

	O
linked	O
to	O
a	O
desire	O
to	O
assess	O
Iran	O
's	O
current	O
diplomatic	O
activities	O
and	O
foreign	O
policy	O
,	O
especially	O
as	O
Russia	O

	O
continues	O
to	O
rely	O
on	O
Iran	O
-	O
provided	O
weapons	O
in	O
Ukraine	O
.	O
Espionage	O
against	O
the	O
Georgian	O
Embassy	O
in	O

	O
Sweden	O
and	O
the	O
Georgian	O
Ministry	O
of	O
Defence	O
is	O
likely	O
to	O
have	O
similar	O
foreign	O
policy	O
-	O
oriented	O

	O
motivations	O
,	O
particularly	O
as	O
Georgia	O
renewed	O
its	O
aspirations	O
for	O
European	O
Union	O
(	O
EU	O
)	O
membership	O
and	O

	O
North	O
Atlantic	O
Treaty	O
Organization	O
(	O
NATO	O
)	O
accession	O
following	O
Russia	O
’s	O
invasion	O
of	O
Ukraine	O
in	O
early	O

	O
2022	O
.	O

	O
Organizations	O
can	O
mitigate	O
the	O
risk	O
of	O
compromise	O
in	O
TAG-70	O
’s	O
Roundcube	O
campaign	O
by	O
ensuring	O
that	O

	O
Roundcube	O
installations	O
are	O
patched	O
and	O
up	O
-	O
to	O
-	O
date	O
,	O
as	O
well	O
as	O
by	O
blocking	O
and	O
hunting	O
for	O
indicators	O

	O
of	O
compromise	O
(	O
IoCs	O
)	O
in	O
their	O
environments	O
(	O
for	O
a	O
list	O
of	O
relevant	O
IoCs	O
,	O
see	O
Appendix	O
A	O
)	O
.	O

	O
Insikt	O
Group	O
followed	O
responsible	O
disclosure	O
procedures	O
in	O
advance	O
of	O
this	O
publication	O
per	O
Recorded	O

	O
Future	O
's	O
notification	O
policy	O
.	O

	O
1	O


	O
CTA	O
-	O
RU-2024	O
-	O
0217	O


	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
®	O
|	O
www.recordedfuture.com	O


	O
CYBER	O
THREAT	O
ANALYSIS	O


	O
Key	O
Findings	O

	O
●	O


	O
●	O


	O
●	O


	O
●	O


	O
●	O


	O
TAG-70	O
’s	O
espionage	O
campaign	O
targeted	O
European	O
government	O
and	O
military	O
mail	O
servers	O
.	O
The	O

	O
campaign	O
has	O
been	O
active	O
since	O
at	O
least	O
December	O
2020	O
,	O
primarily	O
focusing	O
on	O
European	O
and	O

	O
Central	O
Asian	O
governments	O
.	O
TAG-70	O
employs	O
advanced	O
techniques	O
and	O
tools	O
,	O
indicating	O
that	O
a	O

	O
well	O
-	O
funded	O
and	O
skilled	O
threat	O
actor	O
is	O
behind	O
the	O
operation	O
.	O

	O
TAG-70	O
has	O
demonstrated	O
a	O
high	O
level	O
of	O
sophistication	O
in	O
its	O
attack	O
methods	O
.	O
The	O
threat	O
actors	O

	O
leveraged	O
social	O
engineering	O
techniques	O
and	O
exploited	O
cross	O
-	O
site	O
scripting	O
vulnerabilities	O
in	O

	O
Roundcube	O
webmail	O
servers	O
to	O
gain	O
unauthorized	O
access	O
to	O
targeted	O
mail	O
servers	O
,	O
bypassing	O
the	O

	O
defenses	O
of	O
government	O
and	O
military	O
organizations	O
.	O

	O
By	O
infiltrating	O
mail	O
servers	O
,	O
TAG-70	O
aims	O
to	O
collect	O
intelligence	O
on	O
European	O
political	O
and	O
military	O

	O
activities	O
,	O
possibly	O
to	O
gain	O
strategic	O
advantages	O
or	O
undermine	O
European	O
security	O
and	O
alliances	O
.	O

	O
The	O
campaign	O
's	O
intended	O
victims	O
indicate	O
that	O
it	O
has	O
been	O
conducted	O
to	O
serve	O
the	O
interests	O
of	O

	O
Belarus	O
and	O
Russia	O
.	O

	O
This	O
TAG-70	O
campaign	O
has	O
had	O
a	O
significant	O
impact	O
,	O
as	O
the	O
malware	O
may	O
have	O
intruded	O
into	O
email	O

	O
servers	O
in	O
multiple	O
European	O
countries	O
,	O
including	O
Georgia	O
,	O
Poland	O
,	O
and	O
Ukraine	O
.	O
Additionally	O
,	O

	O
Insikt	O
Group	O
detected	O
TAG-70	O
targeting	O
Iran	O
’s	O
embassies	O
in	O
Russia	O
and	O
the	O
Netherlands	O
,	O
which	O
is	O

	O
notable	O
given	O
Iran	O
’s	O
support	O
of	O
Russia	O
’s	O
war	O
effort	O
in	O
Ukraine	O
.	O
TAG-70s	O
actions	O
highlight	O
the	O

	O
widespread	O
nature	O
of	O
the	O
campaign	O
and	O
its	O
implications	O
for	O
national	O
security	O
.	O

	O
TAG-70	O
’s	O
ability	O
to	O
compromise	O
mail	O
servers	O
poses	O
a	O
significant	O
risk	O
,	O
as	O
it	O
enables	O
the	O
theft	O
of	O

	O
sensitive	O
information	O
and	O
manipulation	O
of	O
communication	O
channels	O
.	O


	O
Background	O

	O
In	O
February	O
2023	O
,	O
CERT	O
-	O
UA	O
reported	O
details	O
of	O
TAG-70	O
activity	O
in	O
which	O
the	O
threat	O
actors	O
created	O
a	O

	O
spoofed	O
website	O
of	O
the	O
Ministry	O
of	O
Foreign	O
Affairs	O
of	O
Ukraine	O
.	O
The	O
site	O
lured	O
users	O
to	O
download	O

	O
malicious	O
software	O
for	O
"	O
scanning	O
infected	O
PCs	O
for	O
viruses	O
"	O
.	O

	O
Insikt	O
Group	O
detected	O
TAG-70	O
conducting	O
website	O
impersonation	O
attacks	O
in	O
February	O
2023	O
.	O
In	O
this	O

	O
activity	O
,	O
TAG-70	O
appended	O
a	O
domain	O
with	O
legitimate	O
domains	O
of	O
multiple	O
Eastern	O
European	O
government	O

	O
websites	O
to	O
deliver	O
script	O
-	O
based	O
malware	O
.	O

	O
In	O
March	O
2023	O
,	O
Proofpoint	O
reported	O
a	O
new	O
campaign	O
in	O
which	O
TAG-70	O
exploited	O
publicly	O
facing	O
Zimbra	O

	O
webmail	O
portals	O
via	O
CVE-2022	O
-	O
27926	O
.	O
This	O
activity	O
aimed	O
to	O
gain	O
access	O
to	O
the	O
emails	O
of	O
military	O
,	O

	O
government	O
,	O
and	O
diplomatic	O
organizations	O
across	O
Europe	O
involved	O
in	O
the	O
Russia	O
-	O
Ukraine	O
War	O
.	O

	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
highlighted	O
TAG-70	O
domain	O
registrations	O
and	O
suspected	O
phishing	O
lure	O
material	O
linked	O
to	O

	O
these	O
domains	O
in	O
April	O
2023	O
.	O

	O
On	O
October	O
25	O
,	O
2023	O
,	O
ESET	O
detailed	O
an	O
XSS	O
zero	O
-	O
day	O
CVE-2023	O
-	O
5631	O
,	O
used	O
by	O
TAG-70	O
to	O
exploit	O

	O
vulnerable	O
Roundcube	O
webmail	O
servers	O
.	O
The	O
vulnerability	O
enabled	O
the	O
attackers	O
to	O
list	O
and	O
exfiltrate	O


	O
2	O


	O
CTA	O
-	O
RU-2024	O
-	O
0217	O


	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
®	O
|	O
www.recordedfuture.com	O


	O
CYBER	O
THREAT	O
ANALYSIS	O


	O
content	O
from	O
victims	O
'	O
mailboxes	O
with	O
no	O
interaction	O
from	O
the	O
victim	O
required	O
other	O
than	O
opening	O
an	O

	O
infected	O
email	O
.	O


	O
Threat	O
Analysis	O

	O
Beginning	O
March	O
16	O
,	O
2023	O
,	O
Insikt	O
Group	O
used	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
Network	O
Intelligence	O
to	O
detect	O
suspicious	O

	O
activity	O
from	O
a	O
victim	O
IP	O
address	O
belonging	O
to	O
the	O
Center	O
for	O
Economic	O
Research	O
and	O
Reforms	O
of	O

	O
Uzbekistan	O
.	O
The	O
victim	O
IP	O
address	O
was	O
observed	O
communicating	O
with	O
the	O
domain	O
bugiplaysec[.]com	O

	O
over	O
TCP	O
port	O
443	O
,	O
which	O
at	O
the	O
time	O
resolved	O
to	O
IP	O
address	O
176.97.66[.]57	O
.	O
This	O
data	O
was	O
then	O
likely	O

	O
relayed	O
to	O
command	O
and	O
control	O
(	O
C2	O
)	O
IP	O
address	O
198.50.170[.]72	O
on	O
TCP	O
port	O
7662	O
.	O
It	O
is	O
suspected	O
that	O

	O
TAG-70	O
administered	O
198.50.170[.]72	O
via	O
Tor	O
,	O
as	O
shown	O
in	O
Figure	O
1	O
.	O
CERT	O
-	O
UA	O
attributed	O
the	O
domain	O

	O
bugiplaysec[.]com	O
to	O
TAG-70	O
in	O
February	O
2023	O
.	O

	O
Insikt	O
Group	O
observed	O
similar	O
activity	O
between	O
an	O
IP	O
address	O
registered	O
to	O
the	O
Embassy	O
of	O
the	O
Republic	O

	O
of	O
Uzbekistan	O
in	O
Ukraine	O
and	O
a	O
previously	O
reported	O
C2	O
domain	O
,	O
ocsp	O
-	O
reloads[.]com	O
,	O
which	O
resolved	O
to	O

	O
IP	O
address	O
38.180.2[.]23	O
.	O
This	O
additional	O
C2	O
likely	O
forwarded	O
the	O
data	O
it	O
received	O
to	O
IP	O
address	O

	O
86.105.18[.]113	O
on	O
TCP	O
port	O
1194	O
and	O
TAG-70	O
likely	O
connected	O
to	O
the	O
C2	O
via	O
Tor	O
,	O
also	O
shown	O
in	O
Figure	O
1	O
.	O


	O
Figure	O
1	O
:	O
TAG-70	O
operational	O
infrastructure	O
in	O
March	O
2023	O
(	O
Source	O
:	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
)	O


	O
Malware	O
Analysis	O

	O
On	O
July	O
27	O
,	O
2023	O
,	O
a	O
new	O
TAG-70	O
domain	O
,	O
hitsbitsx[.]com	O
,	O
resolved	O
to	O
IP	O
address	O
176.97.66[.]57	O
.	O
Insikt	O

	O
Group	O
also	O
detected	O
this	O
domain	O
in	O
a	O
JavaScript	O
-	O
based	O
malware	O
sample	O
uploaded	O
to	O
a	O
malware	O

	O
repository	O
,	O
shown	O
in	O
Figure	O
2	O
:	O
SHA256	O
:	O

	O
ea22b3e9ecdfd06fae74483deb9ef0245aefdc72f99120ae6525c0eaf37de32e	O
.	O

	O
The	O
discovered	O
JavaScript	O
malware	O
matches	O
the	O
second	O
-	O
stage	O
loader	O
used	O
in	O
TAG-70	O
’s	O
previous	O

	O
Roundcube	O
exploitation	O
described	O
by	O
ESET	O
.	O
This	O
JavaScript	O
is	O
loaded	O
via	O
XSS	O
from	O
a	O
malicious	O
email	O

	O
and	O
is	O
used	O
to	O
decode	O
a	O
Base64	O
-	O
encoded	O
JavaScript	O
payload	O
(	O
jsBodyBase64	O
)	O
.	O
The	O
payload	O
is	O
then	O

	O
inserted	O
into	O
the	O
Document	O
Object	O
Model	O
(	O
DOM	O
)	O
of	O
the	O
Roundcube	O
webpage	O
within	O
a	O
newly	O
created	O

	O
3	O


	O
CTA	O
-	O
RU-2024	O
-	O
0217	O


	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
®	O
|	O
www.recordedfuture.com	O


	O
CYBER	O
THREAT	O
ANALYSIS	O


	O
script	O
tag	O
.	O


	O
Figure	O
2	O
:	O
Second	O
-	O
stage	O
JavaScript	O
loader	O
(	O
Source	O
:	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
)	O


	O
The	O
content	O
of	O
the	O
JavaScript	O
payload	O
,	O
jsBodyBase64	O
,	O
shown	O
in	O
Figure	O
3	O
,	O
suggests	O
the	O
actors	O
were	O

	O
targeting	O
the	O
Georgian	O
Ministry	O
of	O
Defence	O
domain	O
mail[.]mod[.]gov[.]ge	O
.	O
The	O
structure	O
of	O
this	O
payload	O

	O
overlaps	O
with	O
the	O
one	O
described	O
in	O
ESET	O
’s	O
report	O
;	O
however	O
,	O
its	O
functionality	O
differs	O
:	O
instead	O
of	O
exfiltrating	O

	O
the	O
contents	O
of	O
the	O
victim	O
’s	O
mailbox	O
,	O
it	O
logs	O
the	O
user	O
out	O
of	O
Roundcube	O
and	O
presents	O
them	O
with	O
a	O
new	O

	O
sign	O
-	O
in	O
window	O
.	O
When	O
the	O
victim	O
submits	O
their	O
credentials	O
,	O
their	O
account	O
name	O
,	O
username	O
,	O
and	O

	O
password	O
are	O
sent	O
to	O
the	O
C2	O
server	O
,	O
and	O
they	O
are	O
then	O
logged	O
into	O
Roundcube	O
.	O


	O
4	O


	O
CTA	O
-	O
RU-2024	O
-	O
0217	O


	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
®	O
|	O
www.recordedfuture.com	O


	O
CYBER	O
THREAT	O
ANALYSIS	O


	O
Figure	O
3	O
:	O
Abbreviated	O
decoded	O
Base64	O
JavaScript	O
payload	O
containing	O
C2	O
domain	O
,	O
victim	O
mail	O
server	O
,	O
and	O
credential	O
exfiltration	O

	O
code	O
(	O
Source	O
:	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
)	O


	O
Insikt	O
Group	O
also	O
identified	O
a	O
related	O
JavaScript	O
sample	O
from	O
November	O
2022	O
:	O
SHA256	O
:	O

	O
6800357ec3092c56aab17720897c29bb389f70cb49223b289ea5365314199a26	O
.	O
This	O
older	O
sample	O

	O
was	O
hosted	O
on	O
the	O
domain	O
bugiplaysec[.]com	O
,	O
used	O
the	O
same	O
JavaScript	O
loader	O
technique	O
,	O
and	O
had	O
a	O

	O
similar	O
credential	O
exfiltration	O
payload	O
.	O
The	O
content	O
within	O
the	O
payload	O
suggests	O
that	O
it	O
was	O
used	O
to	O

	O
target	O
the	O
Ukrainian	O
Ministry	O
of	O
Defence	O
,	O
as	O
shown	O
in	O
Figure	O
4	O
.	O


	O
5	O


	O
CTA	O
-	O
RU-2024	O
-	O
0217	O


	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
®	O
|	O
www.recordedfuture.com	O


	O
CYBER	O
THREAT	O
ANALYSIS	O


	O
Figure	O
4	O
:	O
Abbreviated	O
decoded	O
Base64	O
JavaScript	O
payload	O
containing	O
C2	O
domain	O
,	O
victim	O
mail	O
server	O
,	O
and	O
credential	O
exfiltration	O

	O
code	O
from	O
JavaScript	O
sample	O
from	O
November	O
2022	O
(	O
Source	O
:	O
urlscan	O
)	O


	O
6	O


	O
CTA	O
-	O
RU-2024	O
-	O
0217	O


	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
®	O
|	O
www.recordedfuture.com	O


	O
CYBER	O
THREAT	O
ANALYSIS	O


	O
Malicious	O
Infrastructure	O
Analysis	O

	O
Hosting	O
history	O
for	O
the	O
domain	O
hitsbitsx[.]com	O
,	O
detailed	O
in	O
Table	O
1	O
,	O
shows	O
that	O
on	O
September	O
25	O
,	O
2023	O
,	O

	O
the	O
domain	O
was	O
moved	O
from	O
IP	O
address	O
176.97.66[.]57	O
to	O
IP	O
address	O
38.180.3[.]57	O
.	O

	O
IP	O
Address	O


	O
Date	O
From	O


	O
Date	O
To	O


	O
176.97.76[.]118	O


	O
2023	O
-	O
04	O
-	O
12	O


	O
2023	O
-	O
07	O
-	O
17	O


	O
176.97.66[.]57	O


	O
2023	O
-	O
07	O
-	O
17	O


	O
2023	O
-	O
09	O
-	O
25	O


	O
38.180.3[.]57	O


	O
2023	O
-	O
09	O
-	O
25	O


	O
Table	O
1	O
:	O
Hosting	O
history	O
for	O
hitsbitsx[.]com	O
(	O
Source	O
:	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
)	O


	O
Analysis	O
of	O
the	O
server	O
banners	O
returned	O
from	O
38.180.3[.]57	O
showed	O
the	O
use	O
of	O
uncommon	O
HTTP	O

	O
banners	O
hosted	O
on	O
TCP	O
ports	O
80	O
and	O
443	O
beginning	O
September	O
2023	O
.	O
IP	O
address	O
38.180.76[.]31	O

	O
returned	O
the	O
same	O
HTTP	O
banners	O
(	O
shown	O
in	O
Table	O
2	O
)	O
and	O
resides	O
on	O
the	O
same	O
autonomous	O
system	O
,	O

	O
AS9009	O
.	O

	O
HTTP	O
Server	O
Banners	O

	O
38.180.3[.]57	O

	O
Port	O
80	O


	O
Port	O
443	O


	O
HTTP/1.1	O
200	O
OK	O

	O
Server	O
:	O
nginx/1.25.2	O

	O
Date	O
:	O
<	O
REDACTED	O
>	O

	O
Content	O
-	O
Type	O
:	O
text	O
/	O
html	O

	O
Content	O
-	O
Length	O
:	O
615	O

	O
Last	O
-	O
Modified	O
:	O
Tue	O
,	O
15	O
Aug	O
2023	O
19:25:11	O
GMT	O

	O
Connection	O
:	O
keep	O
-	O
alive	O

	O
ETag	O
:	O
"	O
64dbd117	O
-	O
267	O
"	O

	O
Accept	O
-	O
Ranges	O
:	O
bytes	O


	O
HTTP/1.1	O
403	O
Forbidden	O

	O
Server	O
:	O
nginx/1.25.2	O

	O
Date	O
:	O
<	O
REDACTED	O
>	O

	O
Content	O
-	O
Type	O
:	O
text	O
/	O
html	O

	O
Content	O
-	O
Length	O
:	O
153	O

	O
Connection	O
:	O
keep	O
-	O
alive	O


	O
38.180.76[.]31	O

	O
Port	O
80	O


	O
Port	O
443	O


	O
HTTP/1.1	O
200	O
OK	O

	O
Server	O
:	O
nginx/1.25.2	O

	O
Date	O
:	O
<	O
REDACTED	O
>	O

	O
Content	O
-	O
Type	O
:	O
text	O
/	O
html	O

	O
Content	O
-	O
Length	O
:	O
615	O

	O
Last	O
-	O
Modified	O
:	O
Tue	O
,	O
15	O
Aug	O
2023	O
19:25:11	O
GMT	O

	O
Connection	O
:	O
keep	O
-	O
alive	O

	O
ETag	O
:	O
"	O
64dbd117	O
-	O
267	O
"	O

	O
Accept	O
-	O
Ranges	O
:	O
bytes	O


	O
HTTP/1.1	O
403	O
Forbidden	O

	O
Server	O
:	O
nginx/1.25.2	O

	O
Date	O
:	O
<	O
REDACTED	O
>	O

	O
Content	O
-	O
Type	O
:	O
text	O
/	O
html	O

	O
Content	O
-	O
Length	O
:	O
153	O

	O
Connection	O
:	O
keep	O
-	O
alive	O


	O
Table	O
2	O
:	O
Server	O
banners	O
from	O
38.180.3[.]57	O
and	O
38.180.76[.]31	O
(	O
Source	O
:	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
)	O


	O
7	O


	O
CTA	O
-	O
RU-2024	O
-	O
0217	O


	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
®	O
|	O
www.recordedfuture.com	O


	O
CYBER	O
THREAT	O
ANALYSIS	O


	O
The	O
domain	O
recsecas[.]com	O
resolved	O
to	O
38.180.76[.]31	O
from	O
late	O
September	O
2023	O
and	O
was	O
used	O
in	O

	O
TAG-70	O
’s	O
exploitation	O
of	O
Roundcube	O
webmail	O
servers	O
,	O
as	O
reported	O
by	O
ESET	O
in	O
October	O
2023	O
.	O
Previously	O
,	O

	O
in	O
June	O
2023	O
,	O
the	O
domain	O
resolved	O
to	O
IP	O
address	O
176.97.76[.]129	O
.	O
Historical	O
server	O
banners	O
for	O

	O
176.97.76[.]129	O
were	O
similar	O
to	O
those	O
detailed	O
in	O
Table	O
2	O
,	O
with	O
the	O
exception	O
that	O
TCP	O
port	O
80	O
was	O
also	O

	O
returning	O
an	O
HTTP	O
403	O
Forbidden	O
page	O
in	O
addition	O
to	O
TCP	O
port	O
443	O
.	O

	O
During	O
the	O
aforementioned	O
Roundcube	O
campaign	O
,	O
TAG-70	O
used	O
an	O
infrastructure	O
configuration	O
similar	O
to	O

	O
the	O
one	O
detected	O
by	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
in	O
March	O
(	O
Figure	O
1	O
)	O
.	O
However	O
,	O
Insikt	O
Group	O
identified	O
a	O
second	O
C2	O

	O
server	O
within	O
the	O
Roundcube	O
relay	O
chain	O
,	O
which	O
utilized	O
TCP	O
port	O
443	O
(	O
as	O
shown	O
in	O
Figure	O
5	O
)	O
rather	O
than	O

	O
a	O
static	O
high	O
ephemeral	O
port	O
.	O
As	O
in	O
the	O
March	O
campaign	O
,	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
observed	O
TAG-70	O

	O
communicating	O
with	O
the	O
upstream	O
C2	O
via	O
Tor	O
to	O
obfuscate	O
their	O
true	O
location	O
.	O


	O
Figure	O
5	O
:	O
TAG-70	O
operational	O
infrastructure	O
in	O
October	O
2023	O
(	O
Source	O
:	O
ESET	O
&	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
)	O


	O
In	O
this	O
campaign	O
,	O
TAG-70	O
began	O
exploiting	O
Roundcube	O
webmail	O
servers	O
at	O
the	O
beginning	O
of	O
October	O

	O
2023	O
and	O
continued	O
until	O
at	O
least	O
mid	O
-	O
October	O
.	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
detected	O
TAG-70	O
targeting	O
at	O
least	O
80	O

	O
separate	O
organizations	O
,	O
primarily	O
focusing	O
on	O
entities	O
in	O
Ukraine	O
,	O
Georgia	O
,	O
and	O
Poland	O
,	O
as	O
shown	O
in	O

	O
Figure	O
6	O
.	O

	O
Notably	O
,	O
there	O
were	O
some	O
victims	O
outside	O
of	O
these	O
countries	O
,	O
such	O
as	O
the	O
Embassy	O
of	O
Iran	O
in	O
Moscow	O
,	O

	O
the	O
Embassy	O
of	O
Iran	O
in	O
the	O
Netherlands	O
,	O
and	O
the	O
Embassy	O
of	O
Georgia	O
in	O
Sweden	O
.	O


	O
8	O


	O
CTA	O
-	O
RU-2024	O
-	O
0217	O


	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
®	O
|	O
www.recordedfuture.com	O


	O
CYBER	O
THREAT	O
ANALYSIS	O


	O
Figure	O
6	O
:	O
Geographic	O
spread	O
of	O
victims	O
of	O
TAG-70s	O
Roundcube	O
exploit	O
in	O
October	O
2023	O
(	O
Source	O
:	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
)	O


	O
TAG-70	O
predominantly	O
targeted	O
government	O
and	O
military	O
webmail	O
servers	O
;	O
however	O
,	O
the	O
group	O
also	O

	O
targeted	O
the	O
transport	O
and	O
education	O
sectors	O
along	O
with	O
chemical	O
and	O
biological	O
research	O

	O
organizations	O
,	O
as	O
shown	O
in	O
Figure	O
7	O
.	O


	O
9	O


	O
CTA	O
-	O
RU-2024	O
-	O
0217	O


	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
®	O
|	O
www.recordedfuture.com	O


	O
CYBER	O
THREAT	O
ANALYSIS	O


	O
Figure	O
7	O
:	O
Spread	O
of	O
victim	O
industries	O
targeted	O
in	O
TAG-70	O
’s	O
Roundcube	O
exploitation	O
campaign	O
October	O
2023	O
(	O
Source	O
:	O
Recorded	O

	O
Future	O
)	O


	O
Figure	O
8	O
:	O
TAG-70	O
’s	O
October	O
2023	O
Roundcube	O
exploitation	O
campaign	O
attack	O
flow	O
(	O
Source	O
:	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
)	O


	O
10	O


	O
CTA	O
-	O
RU-2024	O
-	O
0217	O


	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
®	O
|	O
www.recordedfuture.com	O


	O
CYBER	O
THREAT	O
ANALYSIS	O


	O
Mitigations	O

	O
●	O


	O
●	O


	O
●	O


	O
●	O


	O
●	O


	O
●	O


	O
Strengthen	O
Email	O
Security	O
Measures	O
:	O
Implement	O
advanced	O
email	O
security	O
solutions	O
,	O
such	O
as	O

	O
multi	O
-	O
factor	O
authentication	O
,	O
encryption	O
,	O
and	O
secure	O
email	O
gateways	O
,	O
to	O
protect	O
mail	O
servers	O
from	O

	O
unauthorized	O
access	O
and	O
data	O
breaches	O
.	O

	O
Conduct	O
Regular	O
Security	O
Audits	O
:	O
Regularly	O
audit	O
mail	O
servers	O
to	O
identify	O
vulnerabilities	O
,	O

	O
misconfigurations	O
,	O
and	O
potential	O
entry	O
points	O
for	O
attackers	O
.	O
Address	O
any	O
identified	O
weaknesses	O

	O
promptly	O
to	O
minimize	O
the	O
risk	O
of	O
exploitation	O
.	O

	O
Employee	O
Awareness	O
Training	O
:	O
Provide	O
comprehensive	O
training	O
on	O
email	O
security	O
best	O
practices	O
,	O

	O
including	O
identifying	O
phishing	O
emails	O
,	O
suspicious	O
attachments	O
,	O
and	O
links	O
.	O
Regularly	O
reinforce	O

	O
training	O
to	O
maintain	O
a	O
high	O
level	O
of	O
awareness	O
and	O
vigilance	O
.	O

	O
Implement	O
Network	O
Segmentation	O
:	O
Separate	O
mail	O
servers	O
from	O
other	O
critical	O
systems	O
by	O

	O
implementing	O
network	O
segmentation	O
.	O
This	O
practice	O
limits	O
the	O
lateral	O
movement	O
of	O
threats	O
,	O

	O
preventing	O
a	O
single	O
compromised	O
system	O
from	O
compromising	O
the	O
entire	O
network	O
.	O

	O
Collaborate	O
with	O
Security	O
Vendors	O
and	O
Intelligence	O
Agencies	O
:	O
Establish	O
partnerships	O
with	O

	O
reputable	O
security	O
vendors	O
and	O
intelligence	O
agencies	O
to	O
leverage	O
their	O
expertise	O
and	O
threat	O

	O
intelligence	O
.	O
Regularly	O
exchange	O
information	O
on	O
emerging	O
threats	O
and	O
indicators	O
of	O
compromise	O

	O
to	O
enhance	O
proactive	O
defense	O
measures	O
.	O

	O
Develop	O
Incident	O
Response	O
Plans	O
:	O
Create	O
comprehensive	O
incident	O
response	O
plans	O
that	O
outline	O

	O
clear	O
protocols	O
for	O
detecting	O
,	O
responding	O
to	O
,	O
and	O
recovering	O
from	O
security	O
incidents	O
.	O
Regularly	O

	O
test	O
and	O
refine	O
these	O
plans	O
through	O
simulated	O
exercises	O
to	O
ensure	O
an	O
effective	O
response	O
in	O

	O
real	O
-	O
world	O
scenarios	O
.	O


	O
Outlook	O

	O
This	O
latest	O
campaign	O
by	O
Belarus	O
and	O
Russia	O
-	O
aligned	O
TAG-70	O
,	O
which	O
targets	O
European	O
government	O
and	O

	O
military	O
-	O
owned	O
email	O
servers	O
,	O
suggests	O
a	O
long	O
-	O
term	O
strategic	O
interest	O
in	O
gathering	O
intelligence	O
regarding	O

	O
the	O
war	O
in	O
Ukraine	O
and	O
the	O
evolving	O
foreign	O
policies	O
of	O
regional	O
powers	O
.	O
Belarus	O
and	O
Russia	O
-	O
aligned	O

	O
cyber	O
-	O
espionage	O
groups	O
will	O
almost	O
certainly	O
continue	O
,	O
if	O
not	O
expand	O
,	O
targeting	O
webmail	O
software	O

	O
platforms	O
,	O
including	O
Roundcube	O
,	O
while	O
the	O
conflict	O
in	O
Ukraine	O
continues	O
and	O
while	O
tensions	O
with	O
the	O
EU	O

	O
and	O
NATO	O
remain	O
high	O
.	O


	O
11	O


	O
CTA	O
-	O
RU-2024	O
-	O
0217	O


	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
®	O
|	O
www.recordedfuture.com	O


	O
CYBER	O
THREAT	O
ANALYSIS	O


	O
Appendix	O
A	O
—	O
Indicators	O
of	O
Compromise	O

	O
Domains	O
:	O

	O
bugiplaysec[.]com	O

	O
hitsbitsx[.]com	O

	O
ocsp	O
-	O
reloads[.]com	O

	O
recsecas[.]com	O

	O
IP	O
Addresses	O
:	O

	O
38.180.2[.]23	O

	O
38.180.3[.]57	O

	O
38.180.76[.]31	O

	O
86.105.18[.]113	O

	O
176.97.66[.]57	O

	O
176.97.76[.]118	O

	O
176.97.76[.]129	O

	O
198.50.170[.]72	O

	O
Malware	O
Samples	O
(	O
SHA256	O
):	O

	O
6800357ec3092c56aab17720897c29bb389f70cb49223b289ea5365314199a26	O

	O
ea22b3e9ecdfd06fae74483deb9ef0245aefdc72f99120ae6525c0eaf37de32e	O


	O
Appendix	O
B	O
—	O
MITRE	O
ATT&CK	O
Techniques	O

	O
Tactic	O
:	O
Technique	O


	O
ATT&CK	O
Code	O


	O
Initial	O
Access	O
:	O
Phishing	O


	O
T1566	O


	O
Execution	O
:	O
Exploitation	O
for	O
Client	O
Execution	O


	O
T1203	O


	O
Persistence	O
:	O
Valid	O
Accounts	O


	O
T1078	O


	O
Credential	O
Access	O
:	O
Exploitation	O
for	O
Credential	O
Access	O


	O
T1212	O


	O
Credential	O
Access	O
:	O
Input	O
Capture	O


	O
T1056	O


	O
Discovery	O
:	O
File	O
and	O
Directory	O
Discovery	O


	O
T1083	O


	O
Collection	O
:	O
Email	O
Collection	O


	O
T1114	O


	O
Command	O
and	O
Control	O
:	O
Non	O
-	O
Standard	O
Port	O


	O
T1571	O


	O
12	O


	O
CTA	O
-	O
RU-2024	O
-	O
0217	O


	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
®	O
|	O
www.recordedfuture.com	O


	O
CYBER	O
THREAT	O
ANALYSIS	O


	O
Appendix	O
C	O
—	O
Diamond	O
Model	O
of	O
Intrusion	O
Analysis	O


	O
13	O


	O
CTA	O
-	O
RU-2024	O
-	O
0217	O


	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
®	O
|	O
www.recordedfuture.com	O


	O
CYBER	O
THREAT	O
ANALYSIS	O


	O
About	O
Insikt	O
Group	O
®	O

	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
’s	O
Insikt	O
Group	O
,	O
the	O
company	O
’s	O
threat	O
research	O
division	O
,	O
comprises	O

	O
analysts	O
and	O
security	O
researchers	O
with	O
deep	O
government	O
,	O
law	O
enforcement	O
,	O
military	O
,	O
and	O

	O
intelligence	O
agency	O
experience	O
.	O
Their	O
mission	O
is	O
to	O
produce	O
intelligence	O
that	O
reduces	O
risk	O

	O
for	O
clients	O
,	O
enables	O
tangible	O
outcomes	O
,	O
and	O
prevents	O
business	O
disruption	O
.	O


	O
About	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
®	O

	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
is	O
the	O
world	O
’s	O
largest	O
threat	O
intelligence	O
company	O
.	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
’s	O

	O
Intelligence	O
Cloud	O
provides	O
end	O
-	O
to	O
-	O
end	O
intelligence	O
across	O
adversaries	O
,	O
infrastructure	O
,	O

	O
and	O
targets	O
.	O
Indexing	O
the	O
internet	O
across	O
the	O
open	O
web	O
,	O
dark	O
web	O
,	O
and	O
technical	O

	O
sources	O
,	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
provides	O
real	O
-	O
time	O
visibility	O
into	O
an	O
expanding	O
attack	O
surface	O

	O
and	O
threat	O
landscape	O
,	O
empowering	O
clients	O
to	O
act	O
with	O
speed	O
and	O
confidence	O
to	O
reduce	O

	O
risk	O
and	O
securely	O
drive	O
business	O
forward	O
.	O
Headquartered	O
in	O
Boston	O
with	O
offices	O
and	O

	O
employees	O
around	O
the	O
world	O
,	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
works	O
with	O
over	O
1,700	O
businesses	O
and	O

	O
government	O
organizations	O
across	O
more	O
than	O
75	O
countries	O
to	O
provide	O
real	O
-	O
time	O
,	O
unbiased	O
,	O

	O
and	O
actionable	O
intelligence	O
.	O

	O
Learn	O
more	O
at	O
recordedfuture.com	O


	O
14	O


	O
CTA	O
-	O
RU-2024	O
-	O
0217	O


	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
®	O
|	O
www.recordedfuture.com	O