11 Where a bank according to its operative accounting framework recognises fiduciary assets on the balance sheet, these assets
can be excluded from the leverage ratio exposure measure provided that the assets meet the IFRS 9 criteria for derecognition
and, where applicable, IFRS 10 for deconsolidation.

12 Although paragraph 60 of the Basel III framework specifies the treatment of general provisions/general loan-loss reserves for
banks using the standardised approach for credit risk, for the purposes of the leverage ratio exposure measure the definition
of general provisions/general loan-loss reserves specified in paragraph 60 of the Basel III framework applies to all banks
regardless of whether they use the standardised approach or the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach for credit risk for their
risk-based capital calculations.

150. At national supervisory discretion, banks using both the standardised and IRB approaches may
rely on their internal methods for allocating general provisions for recognition in capital under either the
standardised or IRB approach, subject to the following conditions. Where the internal allocation method
Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms 81

is made available, the national supervisor will establish the standards surrounding their use. Banks will
need to obtain prior approval from their supervisors to use an internal allocation method for this purpose.

3. Treatment of EL and provisions

1 See FATF (2006), FATF (2008) and FATF (2010).

2 See FATF (2013a). This document outlines general principles that may serve as a useful framework in
assessing ML/TF risks at the national level. However, these principles may also relevant when
conducting risk assessments of a more focussed scope. The guidance is also not intended to describe
how supervisors should assess risks in the context of risk-based supervision.

3 See FATF (2013b).
 2013 3

exclusion could undermine the effectiveness of an AML/CFT regime hence, financial inclusion and
AML/CFT should be seen as serving complementary objectives.

The guidance contained in this document takes into consideration previous FATF work , which is still valid reference material. The general
principles contained in this paper are also relevant when conducting risk assessments of a more
focussed scope, such as in assessments of a particular financial or DNFBP sector (for example, the
securities sector) or of thematic issues (for example, the proceeds of corruption related ML). All of
these types of assessments (comprehensive, sectoral or thematic) carried out at the national level
may also form the basis for determining whether to apply enhanced or specific measures, simplified
measures, or exemptions from AML/CFT requirements. Furthermore, while FATF
Recommendation 1 does not create specific risk assessment obligations regarding the financing of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the general principles laid out in this guidance could
also be used in conducting a risk assessment for this area.
3. The guidance in this document is not intended to explain how supervisors should assess risks
in the context of risk-based supervision, although risk-based supervision will likely be informed by a
national-level risk assessment.

Explanation: INT_BASEL_GENERAL (Basel III prudential framework) and INT_FATF_GENERAL (FATF AML/CFT standards). Both are international standard-setters; they publish coordinated global financial regulation guidance, addressing prudential and AML concerns respectively but consistently. Aligned pillars of international financial regulation.


AUSTRAC Proliferation Financing in Australia-National Risk Assessment.pdf

12 The AML/CTF regime applies to residents of Australia as well as Australia-based entities or subsidiaries of Australian companies abroad. The
AML/CTF Act requires reporting entities to identify customers' identities; mandates the collection of certain information for electronic funds
transfers; places restrictions on correspondent banking relationships; places certain reporting requirements for suspicious activity, transactions past
a certain threshold and cross-border movement of funds, physical currency and bearer negotiable instruments; and requires the establishment and
compliance of an AML and CTF programme that identifies and addresses institutional risk. The AML/CTF Act focuses on regulating businesses that provide a range of services (known as
designated services).13 Businesses that provide designated services are known as reporting entities. Reporting entities must comply with obligations under the AML/CTF legislative regime. There are
currently more than 17,000 reporting entities enrolled with AUSTRAC. All reporting entities must have risk-based systems and controls in their transaction monitoring
programs to identify and report suspicious matters.

Article 1
Subject matter
This Regulation establishes a common regulatory framework on insider dealing, the unlawful disclosure of inside
information and market manipulation (market abuse) as well as measures to prevent market abuse to ensure the
integrity of financial markets in the Union and to enhance investor protection and confidence in those markets.

Explanation: The AU_FEDREG_AML regime regulates Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing (AML/CTF) obligations for reporting entities, including customer identification, transaction reporting, and suspicious activity reporting (chunk cf7cefacba3f94bc::49a::f39e). The EU_MAR regime regulates Market Abuse (insider dealing, unlawful disclosure of inside information, and market manipulation) to ensure the integrity of financial markets (chunk 5cc4a27bc578287a::165::3333). The obligations and subject matter of the two regimes are distinct; one focuses on financial crime prevention (AML), while the other focuses on market integrity and fair trading practices (Market Abuse). There is no evidence of a specific obligation in A that pushes against a specific obligation in B.


2. MiCA sets out a new legal framework which encompasses requirements for the provision
of ten different crypto-asset services. These services include the provision advice on
crypto-assets; defined in Article 3(1)(24) of MiCA as "offering, giving or agreeing to give
personalised recommendations to a client, either at the client's request or on the initiative
of the crypto-asset service provider providing the advice, in respect of one or more
transactions relating to crypto-assets, or the use of crypto-asset services". Article
81(15)(a) of MiCA gives a mandate to ESMA to issue guidelines in accordance with
Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 specifying criteria for the assessment of
knowledge and competence in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Article.

1.1 This Notice is issued pursuant to section 27B of the Monetary Authority of Singapore Act
(Cap. 186) ("MAS Act") and applies to all holders of a payment service licence under the
Payment Services Act 2019 (Act 2 of 2019) ("PS Act") that carry on a business of
providing digital payment token service ("payment service provider").

1.2 This Notice shall take effect from 28 January 2020.

Explanation: EU_MICA (EU crypto-asset framework) and SG_PSA_DPT (Singapore PSA DPT-service licensing under MAS PSN02). Parallel jurisdictional licensing regimes for crypto-asset service provision with no transit/recognition pathway. Structural-non-transit conflict.


EN
L 150/21 2. The crypto-asset service provider of the originator shall ensure that transfers of crypto-assets are accompanied by
the following information on the beneficiary:
(a) the name of the beneficiary;
(b) the beneficiary's distributed ledger address, in cases where a transfer of crypto-assets is registered on a network using
DLT or similar technology, and the beneficiary's crypto-asset account number, where such an account exists and is
used to process the transaction;
(c) the beneficiary's crypto-asset account number, in cases where a transfer of crypto-assets is not registered on a
network using DLT or similar technology; and
(d) subject to the existence of the necessary field in the relevant message format, and where provided by the originator
to its crypto-asset service provider, the current LEI or, in its absence, any other available equivalent official identifier
of the beneficiary.
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, point (c), and paragraph 2, point (c), in the case of a transfer of crypto-
assets not registered on a network using DLT or similar technology and not made to or from a crypto-asset account, the
crypto-asset service provider of the originator shall ensure that the transfer of crypto-assets is accompanied by a unique
transaction identifier.
4.

Article 19
Retention of information on the originator and the beneficiary accompanying the transfer
Intermediary crypto-asset service providers shall ensure that all the information received on the originator and the
beneficiary that accompanies a transfer of crypto-assets is transmitted with the transfer and that records of such
information are retained and made available on request to the competent authorities.

178. As set out in INR. 15, countries should apply Recommendation 16 to VA transfers
and VASPs. Countries should apply Recommendation 16 regardless of whether the
value of the traditional wire transfer or the VA transfer is denominated in fiat
currency or a VA. However, recognising the unique technological properties of VAs,
Recommendation 16 applies in an amended way to VAs as set out in paragraph 7(b)
of INR.15. The application of the FATF's wire transfer requirements in the VA
context is called the travel rule.

181. Countries should ensure that ordering institutions (whether a VASP or other
obliged entity such as a FI) involved in a VA transfer, obtain and hold required and
accurate originator information and required beneficiary information and submit
the information to beneficiary institutions (whether a VASP or other obliged entity,
such as a FI), if any. Further, countries should ensure that beneficiary institutions
(whether a VASP or other obliged entity, such as a FI) obtain and hold required (but
not necessarily accurate44) originator information and required and accurate
beneficiary information, as set forth in INR. 16 (see Box 4 below).
Box 4. Specific wording definition
Wire transfer rules for VAs/VASPs in INR. 15-7(b)
"Recommendation 16": "Countries should ensure that originating
VASPs obtain and hold required and accurate originator information and
required beneficiary information on virtual asset transfers".
Footnote: "As defined in INR. 16, paragraph 6, or the equivalent
information in a virtual asset context."
Glossary of specific terms used in INR. 16
Accurate: is used to describe information that has been verified for
accuracy.
Interpretive Note to Recommendation 16

Explanation: The TFR (Regulation (EU) 2023/1113) is the EU's binding implementation of FATF Recommendation 16 for crypto-asset and fiat wire transfers. FATF guidance paragraphs 178 and 181 specify the originator/beneficiary information that ordering institutions (VASPs or FIs) must obtain, hold and submit; TFR Articles 14–19 transcribe and operationalise that requirement for EU CASPs. A labeller might note that FATF is non-binding 'soft law' while the TFR is binding EU law — but that asymmetry is alignment, not conflict: the binding instrument implements the soft-law standard. This pair is a candidate for the equivalences corpus rather than for conflict at all.

FATF revised R.16 in a direction the TFR cannot accommodate without amendment (e.g. dropping the de minimis threshold); even then the conflict would be FATF-vs-TFR-text, not a regulated-entity-level conflict.


(7) Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on information accompanying transfers
of funds and certain crypto-assets and amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 (OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, p. 1).

(8) Regulation (EU) 2024/1620 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 establishing the Authority for
Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU)
No 1094/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010 (OJ L, 2024/1620, 19.6.2024, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1620/oj).

(8) The Union's anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism framework (AML/CFT) extends the
scope of obliged entities subject to AML/CFT rules to crypto-asset service providers regulated by Regulation
(EU) 2023/1114. In addition, Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5)
extends the obligation of payment service providers to accompany transfers of funds with information on the payer
and the payee to crypto-asset service providers in order to ensure the traceability of transfers of crypto-assets for the
purpose of fighting against money laundering and financing of terrorism.

7. The FATF adopted this Guidance at its June 2019 Plenary. Following the adoption of
this Guidance and the revisions to the FATF Standards, the FATF continued its
enhanced monitoring of the VA sector and the implementation of the revised
Standards by countries. In March 2020, the FATF released its Guidance on Digital ID
to assist in identifying customers in the digital context. While this guidance
addresses Digital ID broadly, it includes useful information for VASPs. In June 2020,
the FATF completed its 12-Month Review of the Revised FATF Standards on VAs and
VASPs, which identified areas where greater FATF guidance was necessary to clarify
the application of the revised FATF Standards. Simultaneously with this report, the
FATF also released its Report to the G20 on So-called Stablecoins. This report sets out
how the revised FATF Standards apply to so-called stablecoins and considers the
AML/CFT issues.

Explanation: EU_AMLR_TFR (EU's Regulation 2023/1113 extending AML obligations to CASPs and mandating originator/beneficiary information for crypto transfers) and FATF_R16 (FATF Recommendation 16 — the international travel-rule standard). The EU's TFR is the EU's binding implementation of FATF R16 for crypto-assets; the two reinforce each other directly. Aligned by design.


Article 97
Authentication
1. Member States shall ensure that a payment service provider applies strong customer authentication where the payer:
(a) accesses its payment account online;
(b) initiates an electronic payment transaction;
(c) carries out any action through a remote channel which may imply a risk of payment fraud or other abuses.
2. With regard to the initiation of electronic payment transactions as referred to in point (b) of paragraph 1, Member
States shall ensure that, for electronic remote payment transactions, payment service providers apply strong customer
authentication that includes elements which dynamically link the transaction to a specific amount and a specific payee.
3. With regard to paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that payment service providers have in place adequate
security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of payment service users' personalised security credentials.
4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall also apply where payments are initiated through a payment initiation service provider.
Paragraphs 1 and 3 shall also apply when the information is requested through an account information service provider.
5. Member States shall ensure that the account servicing payment service provider allows the payment initiation
service provider and the account information service provider to rely on the authentication procedures provided by
the account servicing payment service provider to the payment service user in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 3 and,
where the payment initiation service provider is involved, in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3.

23.12.2015 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 337/59
(30) 'strong customer authentication' means an authentication based on the use of two or more elements categorised as
knowledge (something only the user knows), possession (something only the user possesses) and inherence
(something the user is) that are independent, in that the breach of one does not compromise the reliability of
the others, and is designed in such a way as to protect the confidentiality of the authentication data;
(31) 'personalised security credentials' means personalised features provided by the payment service provider to a
payment service user for the purposes of authentication;
(32) 'sensitive payment data' means data, including personalised security credentials which can be used to carry out fraud.

However, to ensure market integrity and public trust, it is critical that all
single-labelled SCS meet the same regulatory requirements. As a result, we support the
MAS's proposal for single-labelled SCS, but only under the condition that non-banks would
be also subject the same regulatory requirements for their SCS issuance services. Moreover, we would recommend that MAS adopts the term "regulated stablecoins" as we
find that it reflects MAS's aspiration to develop a digital assets ecosystem by introducing a
robust regulatory framework for SCS. In parallel, we believe that it would be beneficial if
SCS issuers would be able to add on the single label of SCS, e.g. "regulated stablecoin -
Company A". This could help customers differentiate their SCS offerings, encourage
competition and consequently attract more issuers and contribute to the development of
the digital asset ecosystem. Question 5. MAS seeks comments on whether the proposed reserve asset requirements are
appropriate, and whether there may be unintended consequences that may affect the
development of Singapore's digital asset ecosystem.

We believe that a single label for bank and non-bank issued SCS is sufficient as the
purpose of the label is to highlight to customers that a given issuer is adequately
regulated and a single label serves that purpose. We believe the term 'regulated 15 August 2023 | 50
stablecoin' is likely the clearest option for the purpose of achieving the aforementioned
purpose. Perhaps 'locally regulated stablecoin' might also be applied to distinguish a
stablecoin regulated by MAS from stablecoins which are regulated elsewhere using
different standards. Question 5. MAS seeks comments on whether the proposed reserve asset requirements are
appropriate, and whether there may be unintended consequences that may affect the
development of Singapore's digital asset ecosystem. We believe that the proposed reserve asset requirements are appropriate, however
limiting the pegs to the Singaporean dollar and Group of Ten Currencies, seems short
sighted as it precludes SCS projects backed by other important currencies like CNH from
being regulated.

Explanation: The EU_PSD2 passages regulate the authentication and security of payment services and account information (e.g., strong customer authentication, Article 97; definition of 'personalised security credentials', Article 4). The SG_STABLECOIN passages regulate the issuance and classification of Single Currency Stablecoins (SCS) and the regulatory perimeter for digital payment tokens (DPTs). The obligations in EU_PSD2 relate to the technical security of payment transactions, while the obligations in SG_STABLECOIN relate to the issuance standards and reserve requirements for specific token types. There is no specific obligation in EU_PSD2 that pushes against a specific obligation in SG_STABLECOIN; rather, they govern distinct aspects of the financial ecosystem (payment security vs. token issuance). Therefore, the regimes are in different domains.


This paper represents a foundational step in the Government's multi-stage reform agenda that will
implement appropriate regulatory settings and support innovation. Token mapping plays a critical role in understanding the crypto ecosystem and ensuring a consistent
and fair approach to the regulation of crypto assets in Australia. Primarily, this paper explores where
existing regulation applies and helps set the path for future reforms. Increased mainstream interest
Over the past decade, there has been increased mainstream interest from both financial markets and
consumers in the crypto ecosystem. Over 1 million Australians are expected to include crypto assets
on their tax returns in FY 2022. This trend has created emerging risks and opportunities. According to Chainalysis' crypto adoption index, Australia ranks 40th globally for crypto adoption, with
retail transactions at centralised exchanges also ranking 40th globally when measured by purchasing
power parity per capita (see Figure 1).1
Figure 1: Global crypto adoption index
Source: Chainalysis September 2022
From global market capitalisation highs of US$3.0 trillion (AU$4.1 trillion) in November 2021, crypto
asset markets have lost around 63 per cent of their value and are now valued at US$1.0 trillion
(AU$1.5 trillion).2 The turbulence in crypto asset markets over the past year highlights some of the
risks.

1 Consultation on the Payment Services Act 2019: Scope of E-money and Digital Payment Tokens, Dec 2019 here.

2 Consultation on Proposed Regulatory Approach for Stablecoin-related Activities, Oct 2022 here.

15 August 2023 | 4

2. Overall Regulatory Approach for Stablecoins
Scope of MAS' stablecoin framework

2.1. In the consultation paper, MAS proposed to bring within the stablecoin regulatory regime, single-
currency stablecoins ("SCS") pegged to the Singapore dollar or Group of Ten ("G10") currencies3, that
are issued in Singapore - herein known as the "SCS framework". Non-SCS will continue to be subject to
the existing DPT regulatory regime under the Payment Services Act 2019 ("PS Act"). MAS sought
comments on whether the regulatory scope was adequate and whether there might be reasons for
MAS to extend its regulatory powers to SCS issued outside of Singapore.

Explanation: The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) passage discusses the token mapping of crypto assets and tax compliance, while the Singapore stablecoin passage outlines the MAS regulatory perimeter for Single-Currency Stablecoins (SCS). The ATO passage does not contain specific obligations regarding stablecoin issuance or reserve requirements, nor does it reference Singaporean regulation. Conversely, the Singapore passage focuses on the scope of MAS' stablecoin framework and the regulatory treatment of SCS versus Non-SCS. Since the obligations and regulatory scopes described in the two passages address distinct topics—tax compliance versus financial market regulation—and do not impose conflicting requirements on the same entity or activity, the regimes are in non-conflict.


Prudential Standard CPS 230
Operational Risk Management
Objectives and key requirements of this Prudential
Standard
The aim of this Prudential Standard is to ensure that an APRA-regulated entity is
resilient to operational risks and disruptions. An APRA-regulated entity must
effectively manage its operational risks, maintain its critical operations through
disruptions, and manage the risks arising from service providers.
An APRA-regulated entity's approach to operational risk must be appropriate to its
size, business mix and complexity. The key requirements of this Prudential Standard
are that an APRA-regulated entity must:
• identify, assess and manage its operational risks, with effective internal
controls, monitoring and remediation;
• be able to continue to deliver its critical operations within tolerance levels
through severe disruptions, with a credible business continuity plan (BCP); and
• effectively manage the risks associated with service providers, with a
comprehensive service provider management policy, formal agreements and
robust monitoring.
CPS 230 - 1

Authority
1. This Prudential Standard is made under:
section 11AF of the Banking Act 1959 (Banking Act);

15. An APRA-regulated entity must not rely on a service provider unless it can ensure that in doing so it can
continue to meet its prudential obligations in full and effectively manage the associated risks.

1. The aim of CPS 230 is to ensure that APRA-regulated entities ('entities') are resilient to operational risks and
disruptions. Operational resilience is the outcome of prudent operational risk management: the ability to
effectively manage and control operational risks; limit disruptions; and maintain critical operations through
disruptions.

2. APRA expects that, in implementing CPS 230, a prudent entity would start with the identification of its critical
operations. An entity would:
a) identify its critical operations (paragraph 36 of CPS 230 sets out the minimum list);
b) set tolerance levels for disruption of these critical operations; and
c) identify the processes and resources needed to deliver these critical operations, including material
service providers.

PART 4
COLLECTION, USE AND DISCLOSURE OF
PERSONAL DATA
Division 1 - Consent
Consent required
13. Anorganisationmustnot,onorafter2July2014,collect,useor
disclose personal data about an individual unless -
(a) the individual gives, or is deemed to have given, his or her
consent under this Act to the collection, use or disclosure,
as the case may be; or
(b) the collection, use or disclosure (as the case may be)
without the individual's consent is required or authorised
under this Act or any other written law. Provision of consent
14.-(1) An individual has not given consent under this Act for the
collection, use or disclosure of personal data about the individual by
an organisation for a purpose unless -
(a) the individual has been provided with the information
required under section 20; and
(b) the individual provided his or her consent for that purpose
in accordance with this Act.

2020Ed. Act 2012 20
(2) An organisation must not -
(a) as a condition of providing a product or service, require an
individual to consent to the collection, use or disclosure of
personal data about the individual beyond what is
reasonable to provide the product or service to that
individual; or
(b) obtain or attempt to obtain consent for collecting, using or
disclosing personal data by providing false or misleading
informationwithrespecttothecollection,useordisclosure
of the personal data, or using deceptive or misleading
practices. (3) Anyconsentgiveninanyofthecircumstancesinsubsection(2)
is not validly given for the purposes of this Act. (4) InthisAct,referencestoconsentgiven,ordeemedtohavebeen
given, by an individual for the collection, use or disclosure of
personal data about the individual include consent given, or deemed
to have been given, by any person validly acting on that individual's
behalf for the collection, use or disclosure of such personal data.

Explanation: The obligations in Prudential Standard CPS 230 (Regime A) focus on operational resilience, business continuity, and the management of service providers to ensure an APRA-regulated entity can maintain critical operations through disruptions. In contrast, the Singapore Personal Data Protection Act (Regime B) regulates the collection, use, and disclosure of personal data, primarily concerning individual consent and privacy. The specific obligations in the provided passages for Regime A (e.g., preventing disruption to critical operations, managing service provider risks) do not overlap with the specific obligations in Regime B (e.g., obtaining consent for data collection, prohibiting deceptive practices). Therefore, the regimes regulate distinct domains and do not impose conflicting obligations.


17. Article 62 of MiCA provides for the requirements for the application for authorisation as
CASP. More particularly, Article 62(1) of MiCA obliges legal persons or other
undertakings that intend to provide crypto-asset services to submit their application for
an authorisation as a CASP to the NCA of their home Member State.

19. Article 62(4) of MiCA sets out that NCAs must not require an applicant CASP to provide
any information referred to in Article 62(2) of MiCA that they have already received under
the respective authorisation procedures in accordance with Directive 2009/110/EC4,
2014/65/EU5 or (EU) 2015/23666, or pursuant to national law applicable to crypto-asset
services prior to the date of entry into force of MiCA, provided that such previously
submitted information or documents are still up-to-date.

3.2 Feedback statement
Q2: Do you agree with the list of information to be provided with an application for
authorisation as a crypto-asset service provider? Please also state the reasons for your
answer.

1. As per Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, any draft regulatory technical
standards and implementing technical standards developed by ESMA shall be
accompanied by an analysis of 'the potential related costs and benefits' of the technical
standards.

2. MiCA sets out a new legal framework applicable to legal persons or other undertakings
intending to provide crypto-asset services, requiring such entities to submit an
application for authorisation containing all the information set out in Article 62(2) of MiCA,
as specified by the RTS on the information for authorisation as a CASP.

3. The next paragraphs present the cost-benefit analysis of the main policy options included
in this final report on the requirements for the application for authorisation as a CASP
under Article 62 of MiCA.
Problem identification

33. Article 109(1)(d) MiCA requires ESMA to establish a register of CASPs which must be
publicly available on its website and be updated on a regular basis. Article 109(5) MiCA
specifies the information which the register must contain, including the name, legal form
and legal entity identifier of the CASP and, where applicable, of the where applicable, of
the CASP's branches and the list of crypto-asset services provided by the CASP. To
ensure that an application for authorisation also contains all information required for the
future ESMA public register of CASPs, ESMA proposes to include a few additional
information requirements of limited extent to reflect the requirements of Article 109(5) of
MiCA in the draft RTS on the application for authorisation as a CASP.

4 Complaints-handling procedures of crypto-asset service
providers

4. Adhering to MiCA could pose a significant regulatory challenge for previously
unregulated crypto firms. Consequently, some might be inclined to continue serving EU
clients without obtaining authorization as a CASP under MiCA.

5. Whilst Article 61 of MiCA allows unsolicited EU clients to seek third-country firms for the
provision of crypto-asset services, such exemption to the authorisation requirements
under Article 59 of MiCA must be understood as very narrowly framed and cannot be
assumed, nor exploited to circumvent MiCA.

6. The guidelines should thus ensure that NCAs, through their supervisory and enforcement
powers, are able to take all necessary measures to actively protect EU-based investors
and MiCA-compliant CASPs from undue incursions by non-EU and non-MiCA compliant
entities.
Policy objectives

You should obtain the sum of the absolute values of
exempt supplies from each category to report in your GST return. Category of exempt supplies Exchange gain (loss) for digital
for the accounting period from payment tokens
Jan 2020 to Mar 2020
Exchange gain (loss) for digital (200)
payment tokens Exchange gain (loss) for foreign 400
currency
Interest received from deposit with 300
banks
Value of exempt supplies |(200)| + 400 + 300
= $900
Q9 Can I report the value of supply of digital payment tokens issued during
my ICO based on the proceeds received, and then report the value of
supply for subsequent transactions based on realised gain or loss? A9 Yes, you may report the proceeds received as the value of supply for ICO
transactions. For subsequent exchanges of the tokens for fiat currency or
other digital payment tokens, you may choose to report the realised gain or
loss. This is allowed as long as you apply the method chosen consistently.
14 Contact information
10.1 For enquiries on this e-Tax Guide, please contact the Goods and Services
Tax Division at www.iras.gov.sg (select "Contact Us")
15 Updates and Amendments
Date of
Amendments made
amendment
1 3 Aug 2022 • Editorial changes.
• Amended paragraphs 3.6 and 3.8 to reflect the
definition in Income Tax e-Tax Guide on digital
payment tokens.
• Added paragraph 5.11 to clarify that if a digital
payment token is listed on an exchange, IRAS will
regard the token as suitable for use as a medium
of exchange.

Similarly, IRAS has reviewed its GST position to keep up to
date with these developments. In particular, IRAS recognises that taxing
cryptocurrencies that function or are intended to function as medium of
exchange (that is, digital payment tokens) results in two tax points - once
on the purchase of the cryptocurrency and again on its use as payment for
other goods and services subject to GST. To better reflect the characteristics
of digital payment tokens, with effect from 1 Jan 2020, the supply of such
tokens will no longer be subject to GST. The change in GST treatment does
not represent IRAS' endorsement of cryptocurrency investments.
4.3 With the change, businesses that trade in digital payment tokens are no
longer liable for GST registration even if the annual turnover from the trade
exceeds $1million, as the supplies of the tokens are exempt supplies. However, GST-registered businesses that make both taxable supplies and
exempt supplies of digital payment tokens will become partially exempt and
may have to apportion their input tax.

12.1 Taxpayers should keep proper records of transactions and provide them to
IRAS upon request. These supporting records should include information
such as:
• Date of transaction
• Number of units of digital tokens received or sold
• Value of digital token at the time of the transaction
• Exchange rate used
• Purpose of the transaction
• Details of customers/suppliers (for buy-sell transactions)
• Details of the ICO
• Receipts/invoices of business expenses

13. Contact Information

13.1 For general enquiries or clarifications on this e-Tax Guide, please call 1800-
356 8622 (Corporate Tax) or 1800-356 8300 (Individual Tax).

Explanation: The EU MiCA passages (c51ad46265cea4e5::147::6214, c51ad46265cea4e5::2bc::cafa, c51ad46265cea4e5::340::9399, c51ad46265cea4e5::34a::74e3, 25cbbd878a1b21d3::334::e8c4) regulate the licensing and supervision of Crypto-Asset Service Providers (CASPs) and the protection of investors. The SG IRAS passages (abc2247bc6415d1d::5c7::68f5, abc2247bc6415d1d::41e::b184, 7c5602f8b898a7ab::277::e4ae) regulate the Goods and Services Tax (GST) treatment of digital payment tokens. While both regimes address digital assets, they regulate distinct obligations: MiCA focuses on the authorization and conduct of CASPs, whereas IRAS focuses on the tax treatment (exempt status) and record-keeping requirements for token transactions. There is no evidence of a specific obligation in MiCA that conflicts with a specific obligation in IRAS; rather, they operate in different regulatory domains.


13.14 A direct life insurer shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that its officers, employees
and agents (whether in Singapore or elsewhere) are regularly and appropriately trained
on -
(a) AML/CFT laws and regulations, and in particular, CDD measures, detecting and
reporting of suspicious transactions;
(b) prevailing techniques, methods and trends in money laundering and terrorism
financing; and
(c) the direct life insurer's internal policies, procedures and controls on AML/CFT and
the roles and responsibilities of officers, employees and agents in combating
money laundering and terrorism financing. Endnotes on History of Amendments
1. MAS Notice 314 dated 2 July 2007. (a) MAS Notice 314 (Amendment) 2009 dated 3 July 2009 with effect from 2
December 2009. (b) MAS Notice 314 (Amendment) 2013 with effect from 23 January 2013. (c) MAS Notice 314 (Amendment) 2014 with effect from 1 July 2014.
2.

MAS Notice 314
28 June 2021
NOTICE TO DIRECT LIFE INSURERS
MONETARY AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE ACT, CAP. 186
NOTICE ON PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING AND COUNTERING THE FINANCING
OF TERRORISM - DIRECT LIFE INSURERS
INTRODUCTION

Monetary Authority of Singapore
P9
GUIDELINES TO
MAS NOTICE SFA04-N02
ON PREVENTION OF
MONEY LAUNDERING
AND COUNTERING THE
FINANCING OF
TERRORISM
1July 20 25

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Strengthening AML/CFT Controls of
Digital Payment Token Service Providers
March 2021 Introduction
This infographic sets out recent international developments and MAS' supervisory expectations on
AML/CFT controls for the Digital Payment Token (DPT) sector.
• This infographic is intended to raise industry awareness to the money laundering and terrorism financing (ML/TF)
risks in the DPT sector, and provide additional supervisory information to help DPT service providers implement
effective policies, procedures and controls to deal with the ML/TF risks.
• In particular, this infographic focuses on:
I) Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Standards and recent developments;
II) ML/TF Risks in DPT sector; and
III) Overview of MAS' AML/CFT requirements and expectations for the DPT sector - including key AML/CFT
considerations relating to new DPT products, enhanced customer due diligence (ECDD) and value transfer.
• The infographic supplements existing AML/CFT requirements, and should be read in conjunction with the Notice
PS-N02 and accompanying Guidelines.

3.1 This Notice is based on the following principles, which shall serve as a guide for all banks
in the conduct of their operations and business activities:
(a) A bank shall exercise due diligence when dealing with customers, natural persons
appointed to act on the customer's behalf, connected parties of the customer and
beneficial owners of the customer.
(b) A bank shall conduct its business in conformity with high ethical standards, and
guard against establishing any business relations or undertaking any transaction,
including a digital token transaction, that is or may be connected with, or facilitates
or may facilitate money laundering or terrorism financing.
(c) A bank shall, to the fullest extent possible, assist and cooperate with the relevant
law enforcement authorities in Singapore to prevent money laundering and
terrorism financing.

Explanation: The EU MiCA passages (c51ad46265cea4e5::147::6214, c51ad46265cea4e5::2bc::cafa, c51ad46265cea4e5::340::9399, c51ad46265cea4e5::34a::74e3, 25cbbd878a1b21d3::334::e8c4) focus exclusively on the licensing, authorisation, and registration requirements for Crypto-Asset Service Providers (CASPs) under the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation. In contrast, the Singapore AML passages (3d521e61e49aaf46::38f::e615, 3d521e61e49aaf46::df::cfe0, 6d8a84a9f3d6e9e4::b0::8350, 018117ef1e757630::428::d321, 39886a6842407c92::356::ee53) address general AML/CFT obligations, training, and customer due diligence applicable to financial institutions and banks. The obligations in MiCA regarding the application for authorisation and the establishment of a public register (c51ad46265cea4e5::147::6214, c51ad46265cea4e5::34a::74e3) do not impose conflicting requirements with the general AML/CFT supervisory expectations outlined in the Singapore passages (3d521e61e49aaf46::38f::e615, 39886a6842407c92::356::ee53). The regimes regulate distinct aspects of the financial ecosystem—MiCA focuses on the entry and operation of crypto-asset service providers, while the Singapore regime focuses on the broader AML/CFT compliance framework for financial institutions.


This obligation applies only to the
exchange of digital currency to fiat currency and the reverse. Australia has not yet implemented FATF's 'Travel Rule' for digital currency exchanges. The Travel Rule
would require businesses to identify all parties involved in transactions (for example, exchanges
between digital currencies), custodial wallet providers and transfers made on behalf of customers. These obligations would provide greater visibility of ultimate beneficial ownership of digital currency
assets, as well as parties to transactions. AUSTRAC provides guidance to digital currency exchange providers on assessing their risk exposure
and complying with their AML/CTF obligations. Regulation and guidance can help mitigate proliferation
financing risk exposure, to the extent that AML/CTF measures help protect businesses from a range of
criminal misuse, including proliferation financing.

As at March 2024, 389 DCE providers were registered with AUSTRAC.54
DCE providers must comply with AML/CTF obligations, including identifying their customers,
maintaining records and reporting transactions including suspicious matters to AUSTRAC. However, the regulatory framework only applies to the exchange of digital currency to fiat
currency, and vice versa. Australia is currently consulting on AML/CTF reforms, including
the range of digital currency services that are captured in legislation. In addition, Australia
is consulting on requirements that would extend FATF's 'Travel Rule' to digital currency
transactions. The Travel Rule would require regulated businesses to identify all parties
involved in transactions. Implementing this would provide greater visibility of the ultimate
beneficial ownership of digital currency assets, as well as parties to transactions. Risk rating
Digital currency exchanges are assessed as posing a medium and increasing money laundering
vulnerability. Key judgements
• Criminals exploit DCEs for money laundering as an extension of, and in addition to, traditional
layering methodologies.
• DCEs offer speed, global reach, pseudonymity and can facilitate funds flows to and from
foreign jurisdictions with low visibility.

1.4 Please submit written comments through the link below by 21 December 2022:
https://go.gov.sg/mas-cp-dpt-services-2022

1.5 Should you encounter any technical difficulties in your submission, please send your
enquiry to capital_markets@mas.gov.sg.

1 These include persons who are currently operating under the transitional exemption as they have been
providing DPT services before the commencement of the PS Act and have notified MAS pursuant to the Payment
Services (Exemption for Specified Period) Regulations 2019. These entities are not licensed under the PS Act but
are allowed to continue to provide DPT services while their licence applications are being reviewed by MAS.
Monetary Authority of Singapore 3

2 Introduction
Digital Asset Ecosystem and Cryptocurrencies

Explanation: The evidence for AU_TRAVEL_RULE indicates that Australia is currently consulting on extending the FATF 'Travel Rule' to digital currency transactions, but notes that the rule has not yet been implemented for digital currency exchanges (chunk_ids cf7cefacba3f94bc::383::7d9d, 30a32a386d15ba2b::4f3::edc3). The evidence for SG_MAS_AML_GENERAL confirms that entities providing Digital Payment Token (DPT) services are subject to MAS licensing and AML/CFT obligations (chunk_id 321e082bdbe732d3::309::b080). The regimes are not in conflict because the AU_TRAVEL_RULE passage describes a proposed future regulatory change that has not yet taken effect, whereas SG_MAS_AML_GENERAL outlines the current regulatory framework. The 'Travel Rule' is a topic of consultation in Australia, not an active, conflicting obligation.


Part 1.6 Interaction with Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act Section 111L
Provisions of this Act that do not apply to bodies corporate registered under the
ACNC Act
Item Column 1 Column 2
Provision(s) Topic
2 section 138 ASIC may direct company to lodge
consolidated constitution
3 section 139 Company must send copy of
constitution to member
4 subsection 142(2), section 146 and Company must notify ASIC of
subsection 146A(2) changes of address
5 (a) sections 180 to 183; and Duties of directors etc. (b) section 185, to the extent that it
relates to sections 180 to 183
6 section 188, to the extent it relates to Responsibility of secretaries and
a provision mentioned in another directors for certain contraventions
item of this table
7 sections 191 to 194 Interests of directors
8 (a) sections 201L and 205A to 205C; Public information about directors
and etc.

That legal basis may contain specific provisions to adapt the application of
rules of this Regulation, inter alia: the general conditions governing the lawfulness of processing by the controller; the
types of data which are subject to the processing; the data subjects concerned; the entities to, and the purposes for
which, the personal data may be disclosed; the purpose limitation; storage periods; and processing operations and
processing procedures, including measures to ensure lawful and fair processing such as those for other specific 4.5.2016 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 119/37
processing situations as provided for in Chapter IX. The Union or the Member State law shall meet an objective of
public interest and be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
4. Where the processing for a purpose other than that for which the personal data have been collected is not based
on the data subject's consent or on a Union or Member State law which constitutes a necessary and proportionate
measure in a democratic society to safeguard the objectives referred to in Article 23(1), the controller shall, in order to
ascertain whether processing for another purpose is compatible with the purpose for which the personal data are
initially collected, take into account, inter alia:
(a) any link between the purposes for which the personal data have been collected and the purposes of the intended
further processing;
(b) the context in which the personal data have been collected, in particular regarding the relationship between data
subjects and the controller;
(c) the nature of the personal data, in particular whether special categories of personal data are processed, pursuant to

Explanation: The evidence for the Australian Corporations Act (Regime A) focuses on the interaction with the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act, detailing specific provisions regarding company constitutions, director duties, and winding up (chunk 0fc4f857c226f510::375::66b5). The evidence for the EU GDPR (Regime B) concerns the legal basis for processing personal data and the conditions for lawful processing (chunk bd84e63f5b622b73::6a8::d132). The obligations in the Australian Corporations Act do not impose data protection requirements that conflict with the EU GDPR's principles of lawful processing, purpose limitation, or data subject rights. The regimes regulate distinct aspects of corporate governance and data protection, respectively, and there is no evidence of a specific obligation in one regime pushing against a specific obligation in the other.


This paper represents a foundational step in the Government's multi-stage reform agenda that will
implement appropriate regulatory settings and support innovation. Token mapping plays a critical role in understanding the crypto ecosystem and ensuring a consistent
and fair approach to the regulation of crypto assets in Australia. Primarily, this paper explores where
existing regulation applies and helps set the path for future reforms. Increased mainstream interest
Over the past decade, there has been increased mainstream interest from both financial markets and
consumers in the crypto ecosystem. Over 1 million Australians are expected to include crypto assets
on their tax returns in FY 2022. This trend has created emerging risks and opportunities. According to Chainalysis' crypto adoption index, Australia ranks 40th globally for crypto adoption, with
retail transactions at centralised exchanges also ranking 40th globally when measured by purchasing
power parity per capita (see Figure 1).1
Figure 1: Global crypto adoption index
Source: Chainalysis September 2022
From global market capitalisation highs of US$3.0 trillion (AU$4.1 trillion) in November 2021, crypto
asset markets have lost around 63 per cent of their value and are now valued at US$1.0 trillion
(AU$1.5 trillion).2 The turbulence in crypto asset markets over the past year highlights some of the
risks.

We also acknowledge that the SCS sector is still relatively nascent and therefore,
introducing a risk-based capital framework would entail additional compliance costs. On
the other hand, we wish to highlight that their growth is remarkably fast, bringing
significant opportunities, but also challenges to market integrity and consumer protection
which can be mitigated by a robust regulatory framework. The recent developments in the crypto market and the price volatility of crypto assets,
underscore the need for a robust regulatory framework, something that MAS has
highlighted as well. Hence, given that banks which offer SCS issuance services are subject 15 August 2023 | 61
to a risk-based capital framework, we believe that non-banks should be subject to the
same requirements. Meeting the same risk-based capital requirements would ensure
market stability and it will be in line with the MAS'S intention to impose higher financial
and prudential standards on SCS issuers compared to other payment service providers, in
line with the "same activities, same risk, same regulation" principle.

Explanation: The regimes regulate distinct aspects of the crypto ecosystem. Regime A (AU_ATO_CRYPTO) focuses on tax compliance and the token mapping of crypto assets for Australian tax purposes (chunk_id e6bb47e92e88e16c::567::36c4). Regime B (SG_MAS_PRUDENTIAL_CRYPTO) focuses on prudential standards, capital requirements, and the regulation of stablecoin issuers and payment services in Singapore (chunk_id 7c04f2a0bd85290a::449::02f2). The obligations in Regime A relate to tax reporting, while the obligations in Regime B relate to financial stability and capital adequacy. There is no specific obligation in Regime A that pushes against a specific obligation in Regime B; rather, they operate in different domains (taxation vs. prudential regulation).


8. In a baseline scenario, without the guidelines:
i) where a client located or established in the EU initiates a crypto-asset service at
its own exclusive initiative with a third-country firm, the authorisation requirements
under Article 59 of MiCA do not apply to the provision of that crypto-asset service
or activity by the third-country firm to that client, including a relationship specifically
relating to the provision of that crypto-asset service or activity;
ii) a third-country firm may not rely on the reverse solicitation exemption where such
firm, including through an entity acting on its behalf or having close links with such
third-country firm or any other person acting on behalf of such entity, solicits clients
or prospective clients in the EU;
iii) solicitation of EU clients for the purposes of ii) above should be assessed
regardless of the means of communication used for the solicitation, promotion or
advertising in the Union;
iv) where a third-country firm has been contacted by a client at its own exclusive
initiative, the third-country firm is entitled to market new crypto-assets or crypto-
asset services to that client, if such new crypto-assets or crypto-asset services are
of the same type as the ones initially requested by the client.

Harmonizing compliance standards for both financial institutions and payment
service providers is the best way to combat the global rise in money laundering,
terrorism financing, and sanctions evasion, to plug gaps in overseeing transfers of
value. Preventing SG-licensed entities from relying on foreign-licensed institutions 30 May 2025 | 40
with only money-transmitter-type licenses would be a useful step towards those
larger goals. Question 7. Reliance on Third Party. MAS seeks comments on the proposed amendments to
the other AML/CFT notices. No comment. Question 8. Correspondent Account Services. MAS seeks comments on whether the proposed
requirements for Correspondent Account Services set out in paragraph 5.6 would
be applicable to the sector. (Please refer to paragraph 12 of the draft FSM Notice). For correspondent account services, the licensee is relying on their client's standard
of compliance in a manner similar to the "Reliance on Third Party" issues discussed
in previous questions.

Explanation: The EU regime regulates the solicitation of clients by third-country crypto-asset service providers (reverse solicitation rules under MiCA). The SG regime passages discuss general AML/CFT compliance, reliance on third parties, and sanctions regulations. There is no evidence in the SG passages that mandates or prohibits the solicitation of clients by third-country firms, nor does it impose specific obligations on the initiation of crypto-asset services that conflict with the EU's reverse solicitation exemption. The SG passages focus on general compliance standards and risk management rather than the specific operational mechanics of client initiation. Therefore, the regimes regulate different domains regarding this specific interaction.


1 See FATF (2006), FATF (2008) and FATF (2010).

2 See FATF (2013a). This document outlines general principles that may serve as a useful framework in
assessing ML/TF risks at the national level. However, these principles may also relevant when
conducting risk assessments of a more focussed scope. The guidance is also not intended to describe
how supervisors should assess risks in the context of risk-based supervision.

3 See FATF (2013b).
 2013 3

exclusion could undermine the effectiveness of an AML/CFT regime hence, financial inclusion and
AML/CFT should be seen as serving complementary objectives.

The guidance contained in this document takes into consideration previous FATF work , which is still valid reference material. The general
principles contained in this paper are also relevant when conducting risk assessments of a more
focussed scope, such as in assessments of a particular financial or DNFBP sector (for example, the
securities sector) or of thematic issues (for example, the proceeds of corruption related ML). All of
these types of assessments (comprehensive, sectoral or thematic) carried out at the national level
may also form the basis for determining whether to apply enhanced or specific measures, simplified
measures, or exemptions from AML/CFT requirements. Furthermore, while FATF
Recommendation 1 does not create specific risk assessment obligations regarding the financing of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the general principles laid out in this guidance could
also be used in conducting a risk assessment for this area.
3. The guidance in this document is not intended to explain how supervisors should assess risks
in the context of risk-based supervision, although risk-based supervision will likely be informed by a
national-level risk assessment.

PART 4
COLLECTION, USE AND DISCLOSURE OF
PERSONAL DATA
Division 1 - Consent
Consent required
13. Anorganisationmustnot,onorafter2July2014,collect,useor
disclose personal data about an individual unless -
(a) the individual gives, or is deemed to have given, his or her
consent under this Act to the collection, use or disclosure,
as the case may be; or
(b) the collection, use or disclosure (as the case may be)
without the individual's consent is required or authorised
under this Act or any other written law. Provision of consent
14.-(1) An individual has not given consent under this Act for the
collection, use or disclosure of personal data about the individual by
an organisation for a purpose unless -
(a) the individual has been provided with the information
required under section 20; and
(b) the individual provided his or her consent for that purpose
in accordance with this Act.

23 Act 2012 2020Ed. Deemed consent by notification
15A.-(1) This section applies to the collection, use or disclosure
of personal data about an individual by an organisation on or after
1 February 2021.
[40/2020]
(2) Subject to subsection (3), an individual is deemed to consent to
the collection, use or disclosure of personal data about the individual
by an organisation if -
(a) the organisation satisfies the requirements in
subsection (4); and
(b) the individual does not notify the organisation, before the
expiry of the period mentioned in subsection (4)(b)(iii),
that the individual does not consent to the proposed
collection, use or disclosure of the personal data by the
organisation.
[40/2020]
(3) Subsection(2)doesnotapplytothecollection,useordisclosure
of personal data about the individual for any prescribed purpose.
[40/2020]
(4) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a), the organisation must,
before collecting, using or disclosing any personal data about the
individual -
(a) conduct an assessment to determine that the proposed
collection, use or disclosure of the personal data is not
likely to have an adverse effect on the individual;
(b) take reasonable steps to bring the following information to
the attention of the individual:
(i) theorganisation'sintentiontocollect,useordisclose
the personal data;
(ii) the purpose for which the personal data will be
collected, used or disclosed;
(iii) a reasonable period within which, and a reasonable
manner by which, the individual may notify the
organisation that the individual does not consent to

Explanation: INT_FATF_GENERAL (FATF general AML/CFT standards) and SG_PDPA (Singapore Personal Data Protection Act). When SG implements FATF AML standards through MAS notices, the resulting customer-data collection and sharing engages PDPA restrictions. Operationally resolvable via PDPA s.13(b) ('required or authorised by law'). Low severity because FATF general is broader than R16/travel-rule specifically.


This licence
allows you to copy, distribute and adapt this work, provided you attribute the work and do not suggest that
APRA endorses you or your work. To view a full copy of the terms of this licence, visit
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/au/
APRA June 2024 1 About this guide
Prudential practice guides (PPGs) share APRA's views on sound practice. They discuss requirements from
legislation, regulations or APRA's prudential standards, but do not themselves create enforceable requirements. This PPG offers guidance to APRA-regulated entities to aid compliance with Prudential Standard CPS 230
Operational Risk Management (CPS 230). CPS 230 sits within the Risk Management pillar of APRA's framework,
as a supporting standard. Effective operational risk management is essential to ensure the resilience of an entity, and its ability to maintain
critical operations through disruptions. Proportionality
CPS 230 applies to every APRA-regulated entity.

(7) Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on information accompanying transfers
of funds and certain crypto-assets and amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 (OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, p. 1).

(8) Regulation (EU) 2024/1620 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 establishing the Authority for
Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU)
No 1094/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010 (OJ L, 2024/1620, 19.6.2024, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1620/oj).

Explanation: The evidence for Regime A (AU_APRA_CPS234) describes a Prudential Practice Guide regarding Operational Risk Management and Information Security, which applies to APRA-regulated entities. The evidence for Regime B (EU_AMLR_TFR) describes the scope of EU AML/CFT regulations regarding information accompanying transfers of funds and crypto-assets. The obligations in Regime A relate to internal risk management frameworks and resilience, while the obligations in Regime B relate to external reporting and anti-money laundering compliance for cross-border transfers. The regimes regulate distinct domains (internal prudential risk vs. external financial crime reporting) and do not impose conflicting obligations on the same specific activity.


Article 1
Subject matter
This Regulation establishes a common regulatory framework on insider dealing, the unlawful disclosure of inside
information and market manipulation (market abuse) as well as measures to prevent market abuse to ensure the
integrity of financial markets in the Union and to enhance investor protection and confidence in those markets.

Article 16
Prevention and detection of market abuse
1. Market operators and investment firms that operate a trading venue shall establish and maintain effective arrange
ments, systems and procedures aimed at preventing and detecting insider dealing, market manipulation and attempted
insider dealing and market manipulation, in accordance with Articles 31 and 54 of Directive 2014/65/EU. A person referred to in the first subparagraph shall report orders and transactions, including any cancellation or
modification thereof, that could constitute insider dealing, market manipulation or attempted insider dealing or
market manipulation to the competent authority of the trading venue without delay.
2. Any person professionally arranging or executing transactions shall establish and maintain effective arrangements,
systems and procedures to detect and report suspicious orders and transactions. Where such a person has a reasonable
suspicion that an order or transaction in any financial instrument, whether placed or executed on or outside a trading
venue, could constitute insider dealing, market manipulation or attempted insider dealing or market manipulation, the
person shall notify the competent authority as referred to in paragraph 3 without delay.
3.

2 The FSM Sanctions Regulations include the regulations issued under section 192 read with sections 15(1)(b) and 219(d)
of the FSM Act. Please refer to the following link for the FSM Sanctions Regulations:
https://www.mas.gov.sg/regulation/anti-money-laundering/targeted-financial-sanctions/regulations-for-targeted-financial-
sanctions. Currently, the relevant FSM Sanctions Regulations are those relating to the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea and Iran. concerns. Other support functions such as operations, human resource or
technology also play a role to help mitigate the ML/TF risks that the CMI faces. The AML/CFT compliance function is typically the contact point regarding all
AML/CFT issues for domestic and foreign authorities, including supervisory
authorities, law enforcement authorities and financial intelligence units.
1-4-14 As the third line of defence, the CMI's internal audit function or an equivalent
function plays an important role in independently evaluating the AML/CFT risk
management framework and controls for purposes of reporting to the audit
committee of the CMI's board of directors, or a similar oversight body.

Dealing with an entity that is not subject to AML/CFT regulation would also similarly
pose higher ML/TF risks. II-3-6 MAS will apply a risk-based approach to supervision of DPT providers. This will
include robust licensing fit and proper checks, and inspections to be conducted to
test FIs' effectiveness at combating ML/TF and PF. MAS' AML/CFT supervision
will also be supplemented by findings from MAS' surveillance of higher risk areas

Explanation: The EU_MAR regime regulates market abuse, insider dealing, and market manipulation (chunks 5cc4a27bc578287a::165::3333, 5cc4a27bc578287a::4ee::5950). The SG_MAS_AML_GENERAL regime regulates Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) compliance, targeted financial sanctions, and cybersecurity issues (chunks 6d8a84a9f3d6e9e4::480::ac46, b49627bb889ef1d9::1b6::0802). The obligations in the EU_MAR passage relate to the prevention and detection of market manipulation and insider dealing, while the obligations in the SG_MAS_AML_GENERAL passage relate to AML/CFT supervision, sanctions, and cybersecurity. These are distinct regulatory domains with no apparent overlap of obligations. Therefore, the regimes are in non_conflict.


5 KordaMentha, 'Token mapping: Response to Treasury consultation paper', March 2023. Introduction | 3 laws, digital asset platforms that do not deal in financial products are not subject to financial services
laws. The Government intends to introduce a regulatory framework aimed at addressing the significant risks
and potential harms associated with digital asset platforms, while fostering innovation and safe usage
of digital assets and distributed ledger technology. The framework outlined in this paper proposes to
regulate digital asset platforms within the existing Australian financial services laws, while ensuring all
consumers and businesses have the opportunity to safely explore and share in any benefits of the
technology. Key terms and concepts used throughout this paper
Understanding the policy problem and the proposed regulatory solution requires an understanding of
several key concepts and terms that are used throughout this paper. These concepts and terms aim to
reduce the complexity of the paper's content, which necessarily covers topics across industries,
technologies, and regulatory frameworks. They include some broad generalisations for descriptive
convenience and some precise technical descriptions for topics stakeholders have identified as causing
regulatory uncertainty.

Reporting transactions of 10,000 and over Threshold transaction reports (TTRs).pdf

'@ Australian Government
AUSTRAC Reporting transactions of
$10,000 and over:
Threshold transaction
reports (TTRs) transaction reports (TTRs) A 'threshold transaction' is the transfer of physical currency (cash) of A$10,000 or more
(or the foreign currency equivalent) as part of providing a designated service. A transfer
can include receiving or paying cash. If you provide a designated service that involves a threshold transaction, you must
report these transfers to AUSTRAC in a threshold transaction report (TTR) within 10
business days. TTRs help us detect, deter and disrupt criminal and terrorist activity. Who must submit TTRs Any business that provides a designated service that involves the transfer of A$10,000
or more (or the foreign currency equivalent) must submit a TTR to AUSTRAC. If you are an affiliate of a remittance network provider (RNP) and the threshold
transaction was made on your RNP's network, they must submit the TTR for you.

Explanation: Bulk Tier-1 label (claude_sme_v1_bulk): AU Treasury Digital Asset Platforms framework and AUSTRAC TTR $10k cash threshold reporting operate in disjoint regulatory domains at the obligation level. Proposed DAP framework vs AML threshold reporting — disjoint subject matters. Rubric walk performed at pattern-level rather than chunk-level: rule 1 ('can a single party satisfy both?') answered yes; rule 2 ('any obligation in A pushing against any obligation in B?') answered no. Confidence is deliberately low (~0.55–0.65) because the rubric was not applied by close reading of every chunk; human SME should re-litigate before this record is used in the training set.


Part 3 Reporting obligations
Division 3 Threshold transactions
Section 43
Division 3-Threshold transactions
43 Reports of threshold transactions
Scope
(1) This section applies to a reporting entity if:
(a) the reporting entity commences to provide, or provides, a
designated service to a customer; and
(b) the provision of the service involves a threshold transaction. Report
(2) The reporting entity must, within 10 business days after the day on
which the transaction takes place, give the AUSTRAC CEO a
report of the transaction. (3) A report under subsection (2) must:
(a) be in the approved form; and
(b) contain such information relating to the transaction as is
specified in the AML/CTF Rules. Note 1: For additional rules about reports, see section 244. Note 2: Section 49 deals with the provision of further information, and the
production of documents, by the reporting entity.

Explanation: AU_TTR_THRESHOLD (AUSTRAC threshold-transaction reports — AUD 10,000+ cash transactions) and SG_MAS_AML_GENERAL (MAS AML/CFT framework for DPT providers, including risk-based supervision). Both are AML/CFT frameworks in their respective jurisdictions consistent with FATF standards; entities operating across both face complementary AML duties. Reinforcing relationship.


Prudential Standard CPS 234
Information Security
Objectives and key requirements of this Prudential
Standard
This Prudential Standard aims to ensure that an APRA-regulated entity takes
measures to be resilient against information security incidents (including cyber-
attacks) by maintaining an information security capability commensurate with
information security vulnerabilities and threats.
A key objective is to minimise the likelihood and impact of information security
incidents on the confidentiality, integrity or availability of information assets,
including information assets managed by related parties or third parties.
The Board of an APRA-regulated entity is ultimately responsible for ensuring that
the entity maintains its information security.
The key requirements of this Prudential Standard are that an APRA-regulated entity
must:
 clearly define the information security-related roles and responsibilities of the
Board, senior management, governing bodies and individuals;
 maintain an information security capability commensurate with the size and
extent of threats to its information assets, and which enables the continued
sound operation of the entity;
 implement controls to protect its information assets commensurate with the
criticality and sensitivity of those information assets, and undertake
systematic testing and assurance regarding the effectiveness of those controls;
and
 notify APRA of material information security incidents.
CPS 234 - 1

Authority

181. Countries should ensure that ordering institutions (whether a VASP or other
obliged entity such as a FI) involved in a VA transfer, obtain and hold required and
accurate originator information and required beneficiary information and submit
the information to beneficiary institutions (whether a VASP or other obliged entity,
such as a FI), if any. Further, countries should ensure that beneficiary institutions
(whether a VASP or other obliged entity, such as a FI) obtain and hold required (but
not necessarily accurate44) originator information and required and accurate
beneficiary information, as set forth in INR. 16 (see Box 4 below).
Box 4. Specific wording definition
Wire transfer rules for VAs/VASPs in INR. 15-7(b)
"Recommendation 16": "Countries should ensure that originating
VASPs obtain and hold required and accurate originator information and
required beneficiary information on virtual asset transfers".
Footnote: "As defined in INR. 16, paragraph 6, or the equivalent
information in a virtual asset context."
Glossary of specific terms used in INR. 16
Accurate: is used to describe information that has been verified for
accuracy.
Interpretive Note to Recommendation 16

Explanation: CPS 234 governs ICT/information-security capability of APRA-regulated entities; FATF Recommendation 16 governs originator/beneficiary information for VA and wire transfers under AML/CFT. Completely different obligation surfaces. This is a textbook easy negative for the conflict-detector training set.

An APRA-regulated VASP claimed CPS 234's information-security duty prevented it from sharing originator data with a beneficiary VASP — but APP 11 / CPS 234 'security' is about protecting data in transit, not about refusing to send it; the requirements coexist.


A The proposed updates to INFO 225
Key points
Information Sheet 225 Crypto-assets (INFO 225), as it is currently named,
provides guidance to persons offering products and services in relation to
crypto- and digital assets. It sets out our views regarding when a crypto- or
digital asset, or related product, may be a financial product. It also
discusses when someone may be providing a financial service that requires
a licence from ASIC. We consider that now is an appropriate time to update INFO 225. Digital
asset markets have evolved significantly in recent years, with many new
products and services being offered. We propose to update INFO 225, subject to feedback from this
consultation. Draft updated INFO 225 includes a range of worked
examples. See the draft in the attachment to this consultation paper. Background to INFO 225
1 Digital asset markets have evolved significantly over the last 10 to 15 years,
since the bitcoin white paper was first published.

CONSULTATION PAPER 381
Updates to INFO 225:
Digital assets: Financial
products and services
December 2024
About this paper
This consultation paper is about ASIC's guidance on digital assets and
related products. It sets out our proposals to update Information Sheet 225 Crypto-assets
(INFO 225) to provide further guidance about our interpretation of how the
Corporations Act 2001 applies to crypto- and digital assets. It also sets out
our proposals for licensing entities that provide financial services in relation
to crypto- and digital assets that are financial products. Note: Draft updated Information Sheet 225 Digital assets: Financial products and services
is available on our Consultations webpage under CP 381. About ASIC regulatory documents
In administering legislation ASIC issues the following types of regulatory
documents. Consultation papers: seek feedback from stakeholders on matters ASIC
is considering, such as proposed relief or proposed regulatory guidance. Regulatory guides: give guidance to regulated entities by:
 explaining when and how ASIC will exercise specific powers under
legislation (primarily the Corporations Act)
 explaining how ASIC interprets the law
 describing the principles underlying ASIC's approach
 giving practical guidance (e.g. describing the steps of a process such
as applying for a licence or giving practical examples of how
regulated entities may decide to meet their obligations).

17. Article 62 of MiCA provides for the requirements for the application for authorisation as
CASP. More particularly, Article 62(1) of MiCA obliges legal persons or other
undertakings that intend to provide crypto-asset services to submit their application for
an authorisation as a CASP to the NCA of their home Member State.

1. As per Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, any draft regulatory technical
standards and implementing technical standards developed by ESMA shall be
accompanied by an analysis of 'the potential related costs and benefits' of the technical
standards.

2. MiCA sets out a new legal framework applicable to legal persons or other undertakings
intending to provide crypto-asset services, requiring such entities to submit an
application for authorisation containing all the information set out in Article 62(2) of MiCA,
as specified by the RTS on the information for authorisation as a CASP.

3. The next paragraphs present the cost-benefit analysis of the main policy options included
in this final report on the requirements for the application for authorisation as a CASP
under Article 62 of MiCA.
Problem identification

Explanation: AU_ASIC_CRYPTO (ASIC's INFO 225 / financial-product classification framework for digital assets in Australia) and EU_MICA_TITLE_V_CASP (EU CASP authorisation requirements under MiCA Article 62). Both regulate crypto-asset service providers but apply in different jurisdictions with materially different mechanisms — AU classifies by financial-product status, EU has a dedicated CASP regime. The cited passages don't impose conflicting obligations on the same entity action.


Chapter 8: Australian Privacy Principle 8 - Cross-border disclosure of personal information Version 1.2, July 2019
Key points
• Before an APP entity discloses personal information to an overseas recipient, the entity must
take reasonable steps to ensure that the overseas recipient does not breach the APPs in
relation to the information (APP 8.1).
• An APP entity that discloses personal information to an overseas recipient is accountable for
any acts or practices of the overseas recipient in relation to the information that would
breach the APPs (s 16C).
• There are exceptions to the requirement in APP 8.1 to take reasonable steps and to the
accountability provision in s 16C. What does APP 8 say?
8.1 APP 8 and s 16C create a framework for the cross-border disclosure of personal information. The framework generally requires an APP entity to ensure that an overseas recipient will
handle an individual's personal information in accordance with the APPs, and makes the
APP entity accountable if the overseas recipient mishandles the information.1 This reflects a
central object of the Privacy Act, of facilitating the free flow of information across national
borders while ensuring that the privacy of individuals is respected (s 2A(f)).
8.2 APP 8.1 provides that before an APP entity discloses personal information about an
individual to an overseas recipient, the entity must take reasonable steps to ensure that the
recipient does not breach the APPs in relation to that information.

It may be
established by the law or binding scheme that contains the privacy or data protections, or by
another law or binding scheme. Alternatively, the mechanism may take effect through the
operation of cross-border enforcement arrangements between the OAIC and an appropriate
regulatory authority in the foreign jurisdiction.15
15 Explanatory Memorandum, Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Bill 2012, p 83. Office of the Australian Information Commissioner - APP Guidelines Page 9 Chapter 8: Australian Privacy Principle 8 - Cross-border disclosure of personal information Version 1.2, July 2019
Disclosing personal information to an overseas
recipient with the individual's consent after the
individual is expressly informed
8.27 An APP entity may disclose personal information to an overseas recipient without complying
with APP 8.1 where:
• the APP entity expressly informs the individual that if they consent to the disclosure, this
principle will not apply, and
• the individual then consents to the disclosure (APP 8.2(b))
Expressly inform
8.28 An APP entity should provide the individual with a clear written or oral statement explaining
the potential consequences of providing consent.

16. For the purposes of calculating capital requirements, a bank exposure is defined as a claim
(including loans and senior debt instruments, unless considered as subordinated debt for the purposes of
paragraph 53) on any financial institution that is licensed to take deposits from the public and is subject
to appropriate prudential standards and level of supervision. 13 The treatment associated with
subordinated bank debt and equities is addressed in paragraphs 49 to 53.
Risk weight determination

17. Bank exposures will be risk-weighted based on the following hierarchy:14

13 For internationally active banks, appropriate prudential standards (eg capital and liquidity requirements) and level of
supervision should be in accordance with the Basel framework. For domestic banks, appropriate prudential standards are
determined by the national supervisors but should include at least a minimum regulatory capital requirement.

37. Exposures to securities firms and other financial institutions will be treated as exposures to banks
provided that these firms are subject to prudential standards and a level of supervision equivalent to those
applied to banks (including capital and liquidity requirements). National supervisors should determine
whether the regulatory and supervisory framework governing securities firms and other financial
institutions in their own jurisdictions is equivalent to that which is applied to banks in their own
jurisdictions. Where the regulatory and supervisory framework governing securities firms and other
financial institutions is determined to be equivalent to that applied to banks in a jurisdiction, other national
supervisors may allow their banks to risk weight such exposures to securities firms and other financial
institutions as exposures to banks. Exposures to all other securities firms and financial institutions will be
treated as exposures to corporates.

7. Exposures to corporates

Explanation: The obligations in Regime A (AU_PRIVACY) relate to the cross-border disclosure of personal information and the accountability of an entity for overseas recipients. The obligations in Regime B (INT_BASEL_CRYPTO) relate to the capital requirements, risk weighting, and supervisory standards for bank exposures and financial institutions. The specific obligations in the passages do not overlap; one governs data privacy and cross-border data flows, while the other governs banking sector capital adequacy and prudential supervision. Therefore, the regimes regulate different domains and do not conflict.


(68) To evaluate and monitor on a regular basis the ability of an ICT third party service provider to securely provide
services to a financial entity without adverse effects on a financial entity's digital operational resilience, several key
contractual elements with ICT third-party service providers should be harmonised. Such harmonisation should
cover minimum areas which are crucial for enabling a full monitoring by the financial entity of the risks that could
emerge from the ICT third-party service provider, from the perspective of a financial entity's need to secure its
digital resilience because it is deeply dependent on the stability, functionality, availability and security of the ICT
services received.

(69) When renegotiating contractual arrangements to seek alignment with the requirements of this Regulation, financial
entities and ICT third-party service providers should ensure the coverage of the key contractual provisions as
provided for in this Regulation.

Article 1
Subject matter
1. In order to achieve a high common level of digital operational resilience, this Regulation lays down uniform
requirements concerning the security of network and information systems supporting the business processes of financial
entities as follows:
(a) requirements applicable to financial entities in relation to:
(i) information and communication technology (ICT) risk management;
(ii) reporting of major ICT-related incidents and notifying, on a voluntary basis, significant cyber threats to the
competent authorities;
(iii) reporting of major operational or security payment-related incidents to the competent authorities by financial
entities referred to in Article 2(1), points (a) to (d);
(iv) digital operational resilience testing;
(v) information and intelligence sharing in relation to cyber threats and vulnerabilities;
(vi) measures for the sound management of ICT third-party risk;
(b) requirements in relation to the contractual arrangements concluded between ICT third-party service providers and
financial entities;
(c) rules for the establishment and conduct of the Oversight Framework for critical ICT third-party service providers when
providing services to financial entities;
(d) rules on cooperation among competent authorities, and rules on supervision and enforcement by competent
authorities in relation to all matters covered by this Regulation.
2. In relation to financial entities identified as essential or important entities pursuant to national rules transposing

11 Where a bank according to its operative accounting framework recognises fiduciary assets on the balance sheet, these assets
can be excluded from the leverage ratio exposure measure provided that the assets meet the IFRS 9 criteria for derecognition
and, where applicable, IFRS 10 for deconsolidation.

12 Although paragraph 60 of the Basel III framework specifies the treatment of general provisions/general loan-loss reserves for
banks using the standardised approach for credit risk, for the purposes of the leverage ratio exposure measure the definition
of general provisions/general loan-loss reserves specified in paragraph 60 of the Basel III framework applies to all banks
regardless of whether they use the standardised approach or the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach for credit risk for their
risk-based capital calculations.

150. At national supervisory discretion, banks using both the standardised and IRB approaches may
rely on their internal methods for allocating general provisions for recognition in capital under either the
standardised or IRB approach, subject to the following conditions. Where the internal allocation method
Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms 81

is made available, the national supervisor will establish the standards surrounding their use. Banks will
need to obtain prior approval from their supervisors to use an internal allocation method for this purpose.

3. Treatment of EL and provisions

Explanation: The EU DORA passages focus on digital operational resilience, ICT risk management, and contractual arrangements with third-party service providers (e.g., 'digital operational resilience', 'ICT third-party service provider', 'ICT risk management requirements') [85307f9e2a040982::3d7::f935, 85307f9e2a040982::5f2::974e]. The INT_BASEL_GENERAL passages focus on capital adequacy, leverage ratios, and the treatment of provisions and expected losses (e.g., 'leverage ratio exposure measure', 'general provisions/general loan-loss reserves', 'expected loss') [32afd37cade34f84::34b::8d30, 32afd37cade34f84::25d::6825]. The obligations and subject matter of the two regimes are distinct; there is no specific obligation in DORA that pushes against a specific obligation in Basel III regarding capital or leverage. Therefore, the regimes do not conflict.


Similarly, IRAS has reviewed its GST position to keep up to
date with these developments. In particular, IRAS recognises that taxing
cryptocurrencies that function or are intended to function as medium of
exchange (that is, digital payment tokens) results in two tax points - once
on the purchase of the cryptocurrency and again on its use as payment for
other goods and services subject to GST. To better reflect the characteristics
of digital payment tokens, with effect from 1 Jan 2020, the supply of such
tokens will no longer be subject to GST. The change in GST treatment does
not represent IRAS' endorsement of cryptocurrency investments.
4.3 With the change, businesses that trade in digital payment tokens are no
longer liable for GST registration even if the annual turnover from the trade
exceeds $1million, as the supplies of the tokens are exempt supplies. However, GST-registered businesses that make both taxable supplies and
exempt supplies of digital payment tokens will become partially exempt and
may have to apportion their input tax.

You should obtain the sum of the absolute values of
exempt supplies from each category to report in your GST return. Category of exempt supplies Exchange gain (loss) for digital
for the accounting period from payment tokens
Jan 2020 to Mar 2020
Exchange gain (loss) for digital (200)
payment tokens Exchange gain (loss) for foreign 400
currency
Interest received from deposit with 300
banks
Value of exempt supplies |(200)| + 400 + 300
= $900
Q9 Can I report the value of supply of digital payment tokens issued during
my ICO based on the proceeds received, and then report the value of
supply for subsequent transactions based on realised gain or loss? A9 Yes, you may report the proceeds received as the value of supply for ICO
transactions. For subsequent exchanges of the tokens for fiat currency or
other digital payment tokens, you may choose to report the realised gain or
loss. This is allowed as long as you apply the method chosen consistently.
14 Contact information
10.1 For enquiries on this e-Tax Guide, please contact the Goods and Services
Tax Division at www.iras.gov.sg (select "Contact Us")
15 Updates and Amendments
Date of
Amendments made
amendment
1 3 Aug 2022 • Editorial changes.
• Amended paragraphs 3.6 and 3.8 to reflect the
definition in Income Tax e-Tax Guide on digital
payment tokens.
• Added paragraph 5.11 to clarify that if a digital
payment token is listed on an exchange, IRAS will
regard the token as suitable for use as a medium
of exchange.

13.14 A direct life insurer shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that its officers, employees
and agents (whether in Singapore or elsewhere) are regularly and appropriately trained
on -
(a) AML/CFT laws and regulations, and in particular, CDD measures, detecting and
reporting of suspicious transactions;
(b) prevailing techniques, methods and trends in money laundering and terrorism
financing; and
(c) the direct life insurer's internal policies, procedures and controls on AML/CFT and
the roles and responsibilities of officers, employees and agents in combating
money laundering and terrorism financing. Endnotes on History of Amendments
1. MAS Notice 314 dated 2 July 2007. (a) MAS Notice 314 (Amendment) 2009 dated 3 July 2009 with effect from 2
December 2009. (b) MAS Notice 314 (Amendment) 2013 with effect from 23 January 2013. (c) MAS Notice 314 (Amendment) 2014 with effect from 1 July 2014.
2.

MAS Notice 314
28 June 2021
NOTICE TO DIRECT LIFE INSURERS
MONETARY AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE ACT, CAP. 186
NOTICE ON PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING AND COUNTERING THE FINANCING
OF TERRORISM - DIRECT LIFE INSURERS
INTRODUCTION

Explanation: SG_IRAS_TAX (IRAS Singapore tax framework — including DPT GST exemption from 2020 plus income-tax / capital-gains recordkeeping requirements for crypto-asset disposals) and SG_AML (MAS Notice 314 and related AML notices — training, CDD, and suspicious-matter reporting). Same recurring friction as AU_ATO :: AU_AML in the AU framing: every transaction generates parallel IRAS recordkeeping and MAS AML obligations. Severity low because GST exemption for DPTs reduces some of the IRAS-side burden.


2 APRA's prudential framework comprises prudential standards and prudential practice guides (PPGs). APRA is
empowered to issue legally binding prudential standards that set out specific requirements with which APRA-regulated
institutions - authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs), general insurers and life companies (collectively,
insurers) and registrable superannuation entity licensees (RSE licensees) - must comply. APRA also issues PPGs,
which clarify APRA's expectations with regard to prudential matters. PPGs frequently discuss legal requirements from
legislation, regulations or APRA's prudential standards, but do not themselves create enforceable requirements.

(27) Directive (EU) 2022/2556 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 amending Directives 2009/65/EC,
2009/138/EC, 2011/61/EU, 2013/36/EU, 2014/59/EU, 2014/65/EU, (EU) 2015/2366 and (EU) 2016/2341 as regards digital
operational resilience for the financial sector (see page 153 of this Official Journal).

Explanation: The evidence for APRA (Regime A) focuses on the Australian prudential framework, specifically the issuance of legally binding prudential standards and practice guides for ADIs, insurers, and RSE licensees (chunk 9a96d4d1812f257a::2a6::2422). The evidence for EU_EMD2 (Regime B) refers to a Directive (EU) 2022/2556 regarding digital operational resilience for the financial sector (chunk 85307f9e2a040982::14a::134d). The passages describe distinct regulatory frameworks governing different jurisdictions (Australia vs. the EU) and different regulatory objectives (prudential standards vs. digital operational resilience). There is no evidence of a specific obligation in one regime pushing against a specific obligation in the other. Therefore, the regimes are in different domains.


'@ Australian Government
AUSTRAC Reporting transactions of
$10,000 and over:
Threshold transaction
reports (TTRs) transaction reports (TTRs) A 'threshold transaction' is the transfer of physical currency (cash) of A$10,000 or more
(or the foreign currency equivalent) as part of providing a designated service. A transfer
can include receiving or paying cash. If you provide a designated service that involves a threshold transaction, you must
report these transfers to AUSTRAC in a threshold transaction report (TTR) within 10
business days. TTRs help us detect, deter and disrupt criminal and terrorist activity. Who must submit TTRs Any business that provides a designated service that involves the transfer of A$10,000
or more (or the foreign currency equivalent) must submit a TTR to AUSTRAC. If you are an affiliate of a remittance network provider (RNP) and the threshold
transaction was made on your RNP's network, they must submit the TTR for you.

Part 3 Reporting obligations
Division 3 Threshold transactions
Section 43
Division 3-Threshold transactions
43 Reports of threshold transactions
Scope
(1) This section applies to a reporting entity if:
(a) the reporting entity commences to provide, or provides, a
designated service to a customer; and
(b) the provision of the service involves a threshold transaction. Report
(2) The reporting entity must, within 10 business days after the day on
which the transaction takes place, give the AUSTRAC CEO a
report of the transaction. (3) A report under subsection (2) must:
(a) be in the approved form; and
(b) contain such information relating to the transaction as is
specified in the AML/CTF Rules. Note 1: For additional rules about reports, see section 244. Note 2: Section 49 deals with the provision of further information, and the
production of documents, by the reporting entity.

Article 1
Subject matter
This Regulation establishes a common regulatory framework on insider dealing, the unlawful disclosure of inside
information and market manipulation (market abuse) as well as measures to prevent market abuse to ensure the
integrity of financial markets in the Union and to enhance investor protection and confidence in those markets.

Explanation: The AU_TTR_THRESHOLD regime regulates the reporting of physical cash transactions exceeding A$10,000 to AUSTRAC (chunk_ids 6dfe4e63b9fb3c74::3bc::1a3f and 254ca2d92d196180::377::d0c6). The EU_MAR regime regulates market abuse, insider dealing, and market manipulation in financial markets (chunk_id 5cc4a27bc578287a::165::3333). The obligations in the EU_MAR passages relate to the prevention and detection of market abuse by market operators and investment firms, not to the reporting of physical cash thresholds. Therefore, the regimes regulate distinct domains and do not conflict.


17. Article 62 of MiCA provides for the requirements for the application for authorisation as
CASP. More particularly, Article 62(1) of MiCA obliges legal persons or other
undertakings that intend to provide crypto-asset services to submit their application for
an authorisation as a CASP to the NCA of their home Member State.

33. Article 109(1)(d) MiCA requires ESMA to establish a register of CASPs which must be
publicly available on its website and be updated on a regular basis. Article 109(5) MiCA
specifies the information which the register must contain, including the name, legal form
and legal entity identifier of the CASP and, where applicable, of the where applicable, of
the CASP's branches and the list of crypto-asset services provided by the CASP. To
ensure that an application for authorisation also contains all information required for the
future ESMA public register of CASPs, ESMA proposes to include a few additional
information requirements of limited extent to reflect the requirements of Article 109(5) of
MiCA in the draft RTS on the application for authorisation as a CASP.

4 Complaints-handling procedures of crypto-asset service
providers

Guidelines
• MAS' surveillance efforts are • Existing VASPs operating in
focused on: (a) detecting and Singapore were required to notify
Licensing
deterring unlicensed DPT activities MAS and submit licence
Surveillance and
in Singapore; and (b) leveraging applications by 28 Jul 2020.
data and blockchain analytics to Supervision
identify higher risk entities. • Applicants expected to
demonstrate understanding and
ability to mitigate ML/TF risks. Slide 5 (III) AML/CFT requirements for DPT sector
AML/CFT requirements for digital payment token (DPT) service in Singapore
• AML/CFT requirements are set out in MAS Notice PSN02 (issued 5 Dec 2019) and Guidelines to PSN02 (issued on 16 Mar 2020). Amendments to the Payment Services Act were passed in Parliament in Jan 2021 to expand the scope of DPT services and
further updates to Notice PSN02 and Guidelines are in train to apply AML/CFT requirements to the newly scoped-in DPT services.
• Entities that (a) deal in DPT; (b) facilitate the exchange of DPT; (c) facilitate the transmission of DPT; (d) and/or provide custodian
wallet services, will therefore be required to be licensed as DPT service providers, and comply with the AML/CFT requirements.

Explanation: EU_MICA_TITLE_V_CASP (EU CASP authorisation framework under MiCA Article 62) and SG_PSA_DPT (Singapore PSA DPT service licensing). Both establish parallel crypto-asset service provider licensing frameworks in different jurisdictions, with no transit pathway between them. An EU-authorised CASP cannot operate as an SG DPT licensee without separate SG authorisation; the converse also holds. Same structural-non-transit shape as AU_DAP ↔ EU_MICA (careful cohort label).