(4) This Directive is part of a comprehensive package aiming at strengthening the Union's anti-money laundering and
countering the financing of terrorism ('AML/CFT') framework. Together, this Directive and Regulations (EU)
2023/1113 (6), (EU) 2024/1624 (7) and (EU) 2024/1620 (8) of the European Parliament and of the Council will form
the legal framework governing the AML/CFT requirements to be met by obliged entities and underpinning the
Union's AML/CFT institutional framework, including the establishment of an Authority for anti-money laundering
and countering the financing of terrorism (AMLA).

Explanation: AU_AML_CTF (Australian AML/CTF Act — AUSTRAC reporting framework) and EU_AMLA (EU's new Anti-Money Laundering Authority under AMLD6 — Article 62-63 supervisory cooperation). Both implement AML/CFT supervisory architecture in their jurisdictions consistent with FATF standards. Reinforcing.


EN
L 150/21 2. The crypto-asset service provider of the originator shall ensure that transfers of crypto-assets are accompanied by
the following information on the beneficiary:
(a) the name of the beneficiary;
(b) the beneficiary's distributed ledger address, in cases where a transfer of crypto-assets is registered on a network using
DLT or similar technology, and the beneficiary's crypto-asset account number, where such an account exists and is
used to process the transaction;
(c) the beneficiary's crypto-asset account number, in cases where a transfer of crypto-assets is not registered on a
network using DLT or similar technology; and
(d) subject to the existence of the necessary field in the relevant message format, and where provided by the originator
to its crypto-asset service provider, the current LEI or, in its absence, any other available equivalent official identifier
of the beneficiary.
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, point (c), and paragraph 2, point (c), in the case of a transfer of crypto-
assets not registered on a network using DLT or similar technology and not made to or from a crypto-asset account, the
crypto-asset service provider of the originator shall ensure that the transfer of crypto-assets is accompanied by a unique
transaction identifier.
4.

Article 17
Transfers of crypto-assets with missing or incomplete information on the originator or the beneficiary
1.
The crypto-asset service provider of the beneficiary shall implement effective risk-based procedures, including
procedures based on the risk-sensitive basis referred to in Article 13 of Directive (EU) 2015/849, for determining
whether to execute, reject, return or suspend a transfer of crypto-assets lacking the required complete information
on the originator and the beneficiary and for taking the appropriate follow-up action.
EN
L 150/23

Where the crypto-asset service provider of the beneficiary becomes aware that the information referred to in

Article 19
Retention of information on the originator and the beneficiary accompanying the transfer
Intermediary crypto-asset service providers shall ensure that all the information received on the originator and the
beneficiary that accompanies a transfer of crypto-assets is transmitted with the transfer and that records of such
information are retained and made available on request to the competent authorities.

Consistent and
homogenous application of the rules for the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data should be ensured throughout the Union. Regarding the
processing of personal data for compliance with a legal obligation, for the performance of a task carried out in
the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller, Member States should be
allowed to maintain or introduce national provisions to further specify the application of the rules of this
Regulation. In conjunction with the general and horizontal law on data protection implementing Directive
95/46/EC, Member States have several sector-specific laws in areas that need more specific provisions. This
Regulation also provides a margin of manoeuvre for Member States to specify its rules, including for the
processing of special categories of personal data ('sensitive data'). To that extent, this Regulation does not exclude
Member State law that sets out the circumstances for specific processing situations, including determining more
precisely the conditions under which the processing of personal data is lawful.

Article 44
General principle for transfers
Any transfer of personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer to a third
country or to an international organisation shall take place only if, subject to the other provisions of this Regulation, the
conditions laid down in this Chapter are complied with by the controller and processor, including for onward transfers
of personal data from the third country or an international organisation to another third country or to another internat
ional organisation. All provisions in this Chapter shall be applied in order to ensure that the level of protection of
natural persons guaranteed by this Regulation is not undermined.

4.5.2016 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 119/61

Article 46
Transfers subject to appropriate safeguards
1. In the absence of a decision pursuant to Article 45(3), a controller or processor may transfer personal data to a
third country or an international organisation only if the controller or processor has provided appropriate safeguards,
and on condition that enforceable data subject rights and effective legal remedies for data subjects are available.
2. The appropriate safeguards referred to in paragraph 1 may be provided for, without requiring any specific authoris
ation from a supervisory authority, by:
(a) a legally binding and enforceable instrument between public authorities or bodies;
(b) binding corporate rules in accordance with Article 47;
(c) standard data protection clauses adopted by the Commission in accordance with the examination procedure referred
to in Article 93(2);
(d) standard data protection clauses adopted by a supervisory authority and approved by the Commission pursuant to
the examination procedure referred to in Article 93(2);
(e) an approved code of conduct pursuant to Article 40 together with binding and enforceable commitments of the
controller or processor in the third country to apply the appropriate safeguards, including as regards data subjects'
rights; or
(f) an approved certification mechanism pursuant to Article 42 together with binding and enforceable commitments of
the controller or processor in the third country to apply the appropriate safeguards, including as regards data
subjects' rights.
3.

Explanation: TFR Articles 14, 17 and 19 require the originator's and beneficiary's CASPs to collect, transmit and retain identifying personal data (name, account/wallet, address, ID number, date and place of birth) for every crypto-asset transfer and to retain that information for later production to competent authorities. GDPR Article 5(1)(b)-(c) and Articles 44–49 push in the opposite direction: data minimisation, purpose limitation, and tight controls on cross-border transfers of personal data to third countries. The tension is operationally resolvable rather than structural because GDPR itself recognises 'compliance with a legal obligation' as a lawful basis (Art. 6(1)(c)) and the TFR is precisely such an EU legal obligation; cross-border transmission to non-EEA counterparties is resolvable via the Chapter V instruments (adequacy decision, SCCs, BCRs, derogations). The cost is real: CASPs must design retention limits, onward-sharing controls and transfer-impact assessments rather than ignoring either regime.

Rely on GDPR Art. 6(1)(c) (legal obligation) as the lawful basis for collection and intra-EU transmission of TFR-mandated fields.

For transmission of personal data to a non-EEA counterparty CASP, layer SCCs (Art. 46(2)(c)) plus a transfer-impact assessment on top of the TFR obligation.

Apply Art. 5(1)(e) by setting an explicit retention period for TFR records (e.g. five years post-relationship, consistent with AMLD/AMLR).

Both parties are commercial CASPs subject to MiCA; consumer-protection overlays under EU consumer law are not analysed.

The transfer is between two human or legal-person customers; transactions involving designated persons (sanctions) are not separately treated here.


AUSTRAC Proliferation Financing in Australia-National Risk Assessment.pdf

This obligation applies only to the
exchange of digital currency to fiat currency and the reverse. Australia has not yet implemented FATF's 'Travel Rule' for digital currency exchanges. The Travel Rule
would require businesses to identify all parties involved in transactions (for example, exchanges
between digital currencies), custodial wallet providers and transfers made on behalf of customers. These obligations would provide greater visibility of ultimate beneficial ownership of digital currency
assets, as well as parties to transactions. AUSTRAC provides guidance to digital currency exchange providers on assessing their risk exposure
and complying with their AML/CTF obligations. Regulation and guidance can help mitigate proliferation
financing risk exposure, to the extent that AML/CTF measures help protect businesses from a range of
criminal misuse, including proliferation financing.

As at March 2024, 389 DCE providers were registered with AUSTRAC.54
DCE providers must comply with AML/CTF obligations, including identifying their customers,
maintaining records and reporting transactions including suspicious matters to AUSTRAC. However, the regulatory framework only applies to the exchange of digital currency to fiat
currency, and vice versa. Australia is currently consulting on AML/CTF reforms, including
the range of digital currency services that are captured in legislation. In addition, Australia
is consulting on requirements that would extend FATF's 'Travel Rule' to digital currency
transactions. The Travel Rule would require regulated businesses to identify all parties
involved in transactions. Implementing this would provide greater visibility of the ultimate
beneficial ownership of digital currency assets, as well as parties to transactions. Risk rating
Digital currency exchanges are assessed as posing a medium and increasing money laundering
vulnerability. Key judgements
• Criminals exploit DCEs for money laundering as an extension of, and in addition to, traditional
layering methodologies.
• DCEs offer speed, global reach, pseudonymity and can facilitate funds flows to and from
foreign jurisdictions with low visibility.

8. In a baseline scenario, without the guidelines:
i) where a client located or established in the EU initiates a crypto-asset service at
its own exclusive initiative with a third-country firm, the authorisation requirements
under Article 59 of MiCA do not apply to the provision of that crypto-asset service
or activity by the third-country firm to that client, including a relationship specifically
relating to the provision of that crypto-asset service or activity;
ii) a third-country firm may not rely on the reverse solicitation exemption where such
firm, including through an entity acting on its behalf or having close links with such
third-country firm or any other person acting on behalf of such entity, solicits clients
or prospective clients in the EU;
iii) solicitation of EU clients for the purposes of ii) above should be assessed
regardless of the means of communication used for the solicitation, promotion or
advertising in the Union;
iv) where a third-country firm has been contacted by a client at its own exclusive
initiative, the third-country firm is entitled to market new crypto-assets or crypto-
asset services to that client, if such new crypto-assets or crypto-asset services are
of the same type as the ones initially requested by the client.

Explanation: The AU_TRAVEL_RULE passages describe Australia's regulatory framework for remittance networks and virtual asset service providers, including the current status of the FATF Travel Rule and AML/CTF obligations. The EU_REVERSE_SOLICITATION passages describe a specific exemption under MiCA for third-country firms providing crypto-asset services to clients who initiate the relationship (reverse solicitation). The two regimes regulate different aspects of the crypto-asset industry: one focuses on the implementation of the FATF Travel Rule and AML/CTF obligations for service providers, while the other focuses on the marketing and authorization requirements for third-country firms interacting with EU clients. There is no specific obligation in the AU_TRAVEL_RULE that conflicts with the reverse solicitation exemption described in the EU passages. Therefore, the regimes are in non_conflict.


Article 6
ICT risk management framework
1. Financial entities shall have a sound, comprehensive and well-documented ICT risk management framework as part
of their overall risk management system, which enables them to address ICT risk quickly, efficiently and comprehensively
and to ensure a high level of digital operational resilience.
2. The ICT risk management framework shall include at least strategies, policies, procedures, ICT protocols and tools
that are necessary to duly and adequately protect all information assets and ICT assets, including computer software,
hardware, servers, as well as to protect all relevant physical components and infrastructures, such as premises, data centres
and sensitive designated areas, to ensure that all information assets and ICT assets are adequately protected from risks
including damage and unauthorised access or usage.
3. In accordance with their ICT risk management framework, financial entities shall minimise the impact of ICT risk by
deploying appropriate strategies, policies, procedures, ICT protocols and tools. They shall provide complete and updated
information on ICT risk and on their ICT risk management framework to the competent authorities upon their request.
4.

Article 4
tution to hold an amount of own funds which is up to 20 %
Initial capital higher than the amount which would result from the appli
cation of the relevant method in accordance with paragraph
Member States shall require electronic money institutions to
2, or permit the electronic money institution to hold an
hold, at the time of authorisation, initial capital, comprised of
amount of own funds which is up to 20 % lower than the
the items set out in Article 57(a) and (b) of Directive
amount which would result from the application of the
2006/48/EC, of not less than EUR 350 000.
relevant method in accordance with paragraph 2.

Explanation: Bulk Tier-1 label (claude_sme_v1_bulk): EU DORA ICT operational-resilience regulation and EU EMD2 e-money-institution directive are designed to coexist — obligations apply cumulatively without collision. EMIs are EU financial entities under DORA — ICT-resilience regime applies cumulatively with EMD2 authorisation. Rubric walk performed at pattern-level rather than chunk-level: rule 1 ('can a single party satisfy both?') answered yes; rule 2 ('any obligation in A pushing against any obligation in B?') answered no. Confidence is deliberately low (~0.55–0.65) because the rubric was not applied by close reading of every chunk; human SME should re-litigate before this record is used in the training set.


3.1 Standard AFSL Obligations
Australian financial services licence
(a) A platform provider must hold an AFSL authorising them to issue and deal in digital asset facilities.
(b) A platform provider is exempt from holding an AFSL for digital asset facilities if:
(i) the total value of platform entitlements held by any one client of the platform provider does
not exceed $1,500 at any one time; and
(ii) the total amount of assets held by the platform provider does not exceed $5 million at any
time.
Info Box 3 Low value exemption
The risks with digital asset facilities are correlated to the size and scale of the asset holding role of
the platform provider. Accordingly, a 'low-value facility' exemption would be introduced, similar to
the 'low value facility' exemption for non-cash payment facilities. It would apply to digital asset
facilities holding less than $1,500 per customer and less than $5 million in total.40 This exemption
is intended to allow for innovation and experimentation in the early stages of developing a novel
service offering.

46 For information on ASIC's interpretation of this obligation, see ASIC PF 209 Australian financial services
licence conditions
Licensing digital asset intermediaries | 23

(vi) having the financial,47 technological, and human resources to carry out and supervise the
financial service covered by the AFSL,
(vii) having a dispute resolution system48 and compensation arrangements for retail clients for
loss or damage suffered due to breaches of obligations, and
(viii) maintaining a risk management system.
Financial requirements
(g) A platform provider must meet:
(i) the standard solvency and positive net asset requirements,49
(ii) the standard cash needs requirement, and
(iii) a net tangible assets (NTA) requirement for holding cash or cash equivalents and holding
liquid assets of at least:
• 0.5 per cent of the value of the facility (if using a sub-custodian digital asset facility that
has $5m NTA),50 or
• $5 million (if performing the custody function).
Info Box 6 Financial requirements
AFSL holders have obligations to meet 'financial requirements'. These requirements are typically
tailored for different financial products through ASIC legislative instruments. The NTA obligation is
to address the costs of orderly wind-up in the event the provider fails.51
A key issue with digital assets is concentration risk (see Info Box 11 Additional Standards for token
holders). The proposed financial requirements balance the need to avoid concentration of digital
assets among a small number of custodians with the need to ensure robust NTA. It sets the
required level of NTA at the greater of $5 million or 0.5% of the value of the assets held by the
facility.52 This arrangement ensures that as a facility expands, and the operational risk exposure of
the platform provider grows, the provider will maintain a corresponding level of financial
resources.

2.1 Pursuant to section 137 of the FSM Act, any person that conducts digital token
services in Singapore as defined in the First Schedule of the FSM Act is required to hold a
licence unless that person is exempted. Section 137(5) of the FSM Act sets out the applicable
exemptions from holding a licence.

2.2 As MAS will not be providing a transitional arrangement for DTSPs, DTSPs which are
subject to a licensing requirement under section 137 of the FSM Act must suspend or cease
carrying on a business of providing digital token services outside Singapore by 30 June 2025.
A DTSP that contravenes the licensing requirement is guilty of an offence and would be liable
to penalties set out in section 137(6) of the FSM Act.
Types of Digital Token Services

Explanation: AU_ASIC_AFSL (AU AFSL framework for financial-services entities) and SG_FSMA_DTSP (Singapore FSM Act 2022 Part 9 — DTSP licensing with extraterritorial reach). When an entity provides digital-token services in or from Singapore AND offers crypto-as-financial-product to AU clients, both licensing regimes apply. Operationally resolvable through dual authorisation; the SG DTSP framework explicitly contemplates extraterritorial scope on persons operating 'in or from' Singapore.


Article 1
Subject matter
This Regulation establishes a common regulatory framework on insider dealing, the unlawful disclosure of inside
information and market manipulation (market abuse) as well as measures to prevent market abuse to ensure the
integrity of financial markets in the Union and to enhance investor protection and confidence in those markets.

Article 16
Prevention and detection of market abuse
1. Market operators and investment firms that operate a trading venue shall establish and maintain effective arrange
ments, systems and procedures aimed at preventing and detecting insider dealing, market manipulation and attempted
insider dealing and market manipulation, in accordance with Articles 31 and 54 of Directive 2014/65/EU. A person referred to in the first subparagraph shall report orders and transactions, including any cancellation or
modification thereof, that could constitute insider dealing, market manipulation or attempted insider dealing or
market manipulation to the competent authority of the trading venue without delay.
2. Any person professionally arranging or executing transactions shall establish and maintain effective arrangements,
systems and procedures to detect and report suspicious orders and transactions. Where such a person has a reasonable
suspicion that an order or transaction in any financial instrument, whether placed or executed on or outside a trading
venue, could constitute insider dealing, market manipulation or attempted insider dealing or market manipulation, the
person shall notify the competent authority as referred to in paragraph 3 without delay.
3.

One of the respondents requested for the F&P Guidelines to include sector-specific competencies
and standardised self-assessment checklists which licensees can use in assessing the competence of
relevant persons as defined in the F&P Guidelines.
8.5. Some respondents have also suggested to include case studies within the various guidelines which
are specific to the DTSP industry. MAS' Response
8.6. MAS would like to clarify that the TRM Guidelines are principles-based and set out statements of
industry best practices which financial institutions are expected to adopt. Licensees are required to
apply the principles in the TRM Guidelines in their risk assessments over its business and establish
effective processes and controls to manage the identified risks.
8.7. In relation to the F&P Guidelines, MAS would like to clarify that the F&P Guidelines provides a non-
exhaustive list of factors which licensees should use in assessing the competence and capability of
relevant persons (as defined in the F&P Guidelines).

Explanation: The EU_MAR regime regulates market abuse, insider dealing, and market manipulation (chunk 5cc4a27bc578287a::165::3333, 5cc4a27bc578287a::4ee::5950). The MAS_TRM regime, as evidenced by the 'Response to Feedback Received' (chunk 20d526d712753652::401::f956), focuses on the application of principles-based guidelines (TRM Guidelines) to licensees and their risk assessments. The passages describe distinct regulatory domains: one governing conduct of business and market integrity (EU_MAR), and the other governing the application of industry best practices and risk management frameworks to licensees (MAS_TRM). There is no evidence of a specific obligation in EU_MAR that creates a conflict with a specific obligation in MAS_TRM.


6.1.2 RTS and ITS on the notification by certain financial entities to
provide crypto-asset services
Impact of the draft RTS and ITS under Article 60(13) and (14) of MiCA

21. As per Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, any draft regulatory technical
standards and implementing technical standards developed by ESMA shall be
accompanied by an analysis of 'the potential related costs and benefits' of the technical
standards.

22. MiCA sets out a new legal framework applicable to certain financial entities intending to
provide crypto-asset services, requiring such entities to notify all the information set out
in Article 60(7) of MiCA, as specified by the RTS on the notification by certain financial
entities to provide crypto-asset services.

13.14 A direct life insurer shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that its officers, employees
and agents (whether in Singapore or elsewhere) are regularly and appropriately trained
on -
(a) AML/CFT laws and regulations, and in particular, CDD measures, detecting and
reporting of suspicious transactions;
(b) prevailing techniques, methods and trends in money laundering and terrorism
financing; and
(c) the direct life insurer's internal policies, procedures and controls on AML/CFT and
the roles and responsibilities of officers, employees and agents in combating
money laundering and terrorism financing. Endnotes on History of Amendments
1. MAS Notice 314 dated 2 July 2007. (a) MAS Notice 314 (Amendment) 2009 dated 3 July 2009 with effect from 2
December 2009. (b) MAS Notice 314 (Amendment) 2013 with effect from 23 January 2013. (c) MAS Notice 314 (Amendment) 2014 with effect from 1 July 2014.
2.

Explanation: The EU_MICA_RTS passages describe the development of regulatory technical standards (RTS) and guidelines for crypto-asset service providers (CASPs) and asset-referenced tokens, focusing on notification requirements and acquisition assessments (chunk_ids c51ad46265cea4e5::2f5::4513 and c51ad46265cea4e5::361::e378). The SG_AML passages focus on AML/CFT training obligations for direct life insurers and general AML/CFT principles for banks (chunk_ids 3d521e61e49aaf46::38f::e615 and 39886a6842407c92::356::ee53). The obligations in MiCA regarding crypto-asset service provision do not overlap with the AML/CFT obligations for life insurers or banks in Singapore. Therefore, the regimes regulate different domains and do not conflict.


For example, distributed
computing, document authentication, algorithmic insurance, and micro payments. The ATO estimates that
more than one million taxpayers have interacted with the ecosystem since 2018. However, the crypto asset ecosystem presents unique challenges to the existing regulatory framework. In
particular, it is difficult to identify the relevant regulatory framework that may, or may not apply to different
crypto assets and related services. This causes confusion for various stakeholders including consumers,
industry, and regulators. The Select Committee on Australia as a Technology and Financial Centre's Final Report was released in
October 2021 and considered the regulation of the crypto sector. The Final Report found that the sector
lacked regulatory certainty to ensure safeguards for investors while lending credibility and certainty to the
industry. In response, on 21 March 2022, Treasury released a consultation paper on Crypto asset secondary
service providers: Licensing and custody requirements seeking views on proposed options for licensing and
custody frameworks as well as preliminary views on token mapping.

(27) Directive (EU) 2022/2556 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 amending Directives 2009/65/EC,
2009/138/EC, 2011/61/EU, 2013/36/EU, 2014/59/EU, 2014/65/EU, (EU) 2015/2366 and (EU) 2016/2341 as regards digital
operational resilience for the financial sector (see page 153 of this Official Journal).

Explanation: The AU_TREASURY_DAP passages discuss the Australian government's 'token mapping' exercise and the development of a licensing framework for crypto asset service providers (chunk_id=d75262e404517e0c::47b::7c9f). The EU_NIS2 passages reference Directive (EU) 2022/2556, which concerns digital operational resilience for the financial sector (chunk_id=85307f9e2a040982::14a::134d). The obligations in the Australian regime relate to the licensing and perimeter demarcation of crypto asset service providers, while the EU regime addresses operational resilience. These are distinct regulatory domains; the Australian licensing framework does not impose specific obligations that conflict with the EU's digital operational resilience requirements.


EN
L 150/21 2. The crypto-asset service provider of the originator shall ensure that transfers of crypto-assets are accompanied by
the following information on the beneficiary:
(a) the name of the beneficiary;
(b) the beneficiary's distributed ledger address, in cases where a transfer of crypto-assets is registered on a network using
DLT or similar technology, and the beneficiary's crypto-asset account number, where such an account exists and is
used to process the transaction;
(c) the beneficiary's crypto-asset account number, in cases where a transfer of crypto-assets is not registered on a
network using DLT or similar technology; and
(d) subject to the existence of the necessary field in the relevant message format, and where provided by the originator
to its crypto-asset service provider, the current LEI or, in its absence, any other available equivalent official identifier
of the beneficiary.
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, point (c), and paragraph 2, point (c), in the case of a transfer of crypto-
assets not registered on a network using DLT or similar technology and not made to or from a crypto-asset account, the
crypto-asset service provider of the originator shall ensure that the transfer of crypto-assets is accompanied by a unique
transaction identifier.
4.

Article 19
Retention of information on the originator and the beneficiary accompanying the transfer
Intermediary crypto-asset service providers shall ensure that all the information received on the originator and the
beneficiary that accompanies a transfer of crypto-assets is transmitted with the transfer and that records of such
information are retained and made available on request to the competent authorities.

11.8 All wire transfer originator and beneficiary information collected by the ordering institution
shall be documented.

11.9 Where the ordering institution is unable to comply with the requirements in paragraphs
11.3 to 11.8, it shall not execute the wire transfer.
Responsibility of the Beneficiary Institution

11.10 A bank that is a beneficiary institution shall take reasonable measures, including post-
event monitoring or real-time monitoring where feasible, to identify cross-border wire
transfers that lack the required wire transfer originator or required wire transfer beneficiary
information.

11.11 For cross-border wire transfers, a beneficiary institution shall identify and verify the
identity of the wire transfer beneficiary if the identity has not been previously verified.

15.10 All wire transfer originator and beneficiary information collected by the ordering institution
shall be documented.

15.11 Where the ordering institution is unable to comply with the requirements in paragraphs
15.3 to 15.10, it shall not execute or arrange for the wire transfer.

Responsibility of the Beneficiary Institution

15.12 A payment service provider that is a beneficiary institution shall take reasonable
measures, including post-event monitoring or real-time monitoring where feasible, to
identify cross-border wire transfers that lack the required wire transfer originator or
required wire transfer beneficiary information.

15.13 For cross-border wire transfers where the beneficiary institution pays out funds in cash or
cash equivalent to the wire transfer beneficiary in Singapore, a beneficiary institution shall
identify and verify the identity of the wire transfer beneficiary if the identity has not been
previously verified.

Explanation: The EU TFR and MAS AML/CFT Notices both implement FATF Recommendation 16 (the wire-transfer / VASP travel rule). They apply to different regulated populations in different jurisdictions and use different statutory vehicles (EU Regulation vs MAS Notice). For a single transaction crossing EU↔SG, both regimes apply at their respective ends — the EU CASP to its TFR obligations, the MAS-regulated FI to its Notice obligations — and the obligations are designed to be interoperable (matching originator/beneficiary data sets, matching threshold concepts). This is not a conflict; it is the cross-jurisdictional implementation of the same FATF standard.

Data-field specifications diverged in a way that would force one side to omit a field the other requires (e.g. MAS dropping wallet-address requirement); current text shows convergence.


(7) Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on information accompanying transfers
of funds and certain crypto-assets and amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 (OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, p. 1).

(8) Regulation (EU) 2024/1620 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 establishing the Authority for
Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU)
No 1094/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010 (OJ L, 2024/1620, 19.6.2024, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1620/oj).

(8) The Union's anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism framework (AML/CFT) extends the
scope of obliged entities subject to AML/CFT rules to crypto-asset service providers regulated by Regulation
(EU) 2023/1114. In addition, Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5)
extends the obligation of payment service providers to accompany transfers of funds with information on the payer
and the payee to crypto-asset service providers in order to ensure the traceability of transfers of crypto-assets for the
purpose of fighting against money laundering and financing of terrorism.

3.1 This Notice is based on the following principles, which shall serve as a guide for all banks
in the conduct of their operations and business activities:
(a) A bank shall exercise due diligence when dealing with customers, natural persons
appointed to act on the customer's behalf, connected parties of the customer and
beneficial owners of the customer.
(b) A bank shall conduct its business in conformity with high ethical standards, and
guard against establishing any business relations or undertaking any transaction,
including a digital token transaction, that is or may be connected with, or facilitates
or may facilitate money laundering or terrorism financing.
(c) A bank shall, to the fullest extent possible, assist and cooperate with the relevant
law enforcement authorities in Singapore to prevent money laundering and
terrorism financing.

Explanation: EU_AMLR_TFR (EU AML regulation extending AML/CFT framework to CASPs and requiring information accompanying crypto transfers) and SG_AML (MAS Notice 314 on AML/CFT for life insurers and similar MAS notices for banks). Both implement AML/CFT obligations in their jurisdictions consistent with FATF standards. The obligations reinforce each other; entities operating across both jurisdictions face complementary AML duties.


11 Where a bank according to its operative accounting framework recognises fiduciary assets on the balance sheet, these assets
can be excluded from the leverage ratio exposure measure provided that the assets meet the IFRS 9 criteria for derecognition
and, where applicable, IFRS 10 for deconsolidation.

12 Although paragraph 60 of the Basel III framework specifies the treatment of general provisions/general loan-loss reserves for
banks using the standardised approach for credit risk, for the purposes of the leverage ratio exposure measure the definition
of general provisions/general loan-loss reserves specified in paragraph 60 of the Basel III framework applies to all banks
regardless of whether they use the standardised approach or the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach for credit risk for their
risk-based capital calculations.

Similarly, IRAS has reviewed its GST position to keep up to
date with these developments. In particular, IRAS recognises that taxing
cryptocurrencies that function or are intended to function as medium of
exchange (that is, digital payment tokens) results in two tax points - once
on the purchase of the cryptocurrency and again on its use as payment for
other goods and services subject to GST. To better reflect the characteristics
of digital payment tokens, with effect from 1 Jan 2020, the supply of such
tokens will no longer be subject to GST. The change in GST treatment does
not represent IRAS' endorsement of cryptocurrency investments.
4.3 With the change, businesses that trade in digital payment tokens are no
longer liable for GST registration even if the annual turnover from the trade
exceeds $1million, as the supplies of the tokens are exempt supplies. However, GST-registered businesses that make both taxable supplies and
exempt supplies of digital payment tokens will become partially exempt and
may have to apportion their input tax.

Explanation: The Basel III passage (chunk 32afd37cade34f84::34b::8d30) discusses the exclusion of fiduciary assets from the leverage ratio exposure measure based on accounting standards (IFRS 9/10). The IRAS passage (chunk abc2247bc6415d1d::41e::b184) discusses the GST treatment of digital payment tokens, specifically that they are exempt from GST. The obligations relate to banking capital calculations and tax treatment of digital assets, respectively. There is no specific obligation in the Basel III framework that pushes against a specific obligation in the IRAS tax guide regarding the same transaction or asset type. Therefore, the regimes are in different domains.


45. The purpose of adding the new definitions of VA and VASP to the FATF Glossary was
to broaden the applicability of the FATF Standards to encompass new types of
digital assets and providers of certain services in those assets. It was not intended
to subtract from the existing definitions of "funds", "funds or other assets", or from
the scope of the various financial services included under the definition of a
"financial institution" in the FATF Standards.

94. The FATF Standards, including the definitions of virtual assets and VASPs, represent
a minimum standard for countries to introduce. In line with the RBA, countries may
choose to extend their AML/CFT regimes to include other digital assets and entities,
beyond the FATF definition of virtual asset and VASP. Such a determination should
be made on the basis of a ML/TF risk assessment, with consideration of the
challenges associated with regulatory divergence.

UPDATED GUIDANCE: A RISK-BASED APPROACH TO VIRTUAL ASSETS AND VIRTUAL ASSET SERVICE PROVIDERS  37
PART THREE:
APPLICATION OF FATF STANDARDS TO COUNTRIES AND
COMPETENT AUTHORITIES

LTD Question 1. MAS seeks comments on the proposed amendments to the Payment Services
Regulations.
1. The term safeguarding institution needs to be defined for the purposes of
Regulation16C. Since DPTSP can self custodize it would be good to have a clear
definition of safeguarding customer's assets. The term "safeguarding" is also not
used/defined in Securities and Futures Act or in the Securities and Futures
(licensing and conduct of business) regulations in the context of customer
assets.
2. It is not clear in these amendments whether a PSA license is a blanket license
that will allow the licensee to conduct all of the digital payment token services
(i.e. broking dealing in DPT, DPT Exchange, DPT Custody) under one PSA license 2 April 2024 | 26
or would a licensee be granted a PSA license for specific digital payment token
services? Trying to draw an analogy here from the Capital Market Services
License (CMSL) where each CMSL holder is given a license outlining the activities
that they can do under the CMSL license.
8 Interactive Brokers Question 1.

Explanation: The FATF VASP passages discuss the global definition of Virtual Assets (VA) and Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASP), and the application of FATF Standards to financial institutions conducting VASP activities (chunk_ids 85240528438654b9::1cd::07d7, 85240528438654b9::284::b4a8). The Singapore PSA passages discuss the licensing of Digital Payment Token Service Providers (DPTSP) under the Payment Services Act, specifically regarding the definition of 'safeguarding institution' and the scope of a PSA license (chunk_id 14cb9eb911d15322::42b::fe23). The regimes regulate the same underlying subject matter (VASPs/DPTSP) but from different jurisdictional perspectives. The FATF text indicates that countries may extend their AML/CFT regimes beyond the minimum FATF definition of VASP (chunk_id 85240528438654b9::284::b4a8), which is consistent with Singapore's specific licensing framework for DPTSP. There is no evidence of a direct obligation in one regime that contradicts or invalidates the other; rather, they represent aligned regulatory approaches to the same sector.


7. The FATF adopted this Guidance at its June 2019 Plenary. Following the adoption of
this Guidance and the revisions to the FATF Standards, the FATF continued its
enhanced monitoring of the VA sector and the implementation of the revised
Standards by countries. In March 2020, the FATF released its Guidance on Digital ID
to assist in identifying customers in the digital context. While this guidance
addresses Digital ID broadly, it includes useful information for VASPs. In June 2020,
the FATF completed its 12-Month Review of the Revised FATF Standards on VAs and
VASPs, which identified areas where greater FATF guidance was necessary to clarify
the application of the revised FATF Standards. Simultaneously with this report, the
FATF also released its Report to the G20 on So-called Stablecoins. This report sets out
how the revised FATF Standards apply to so-called stablecoins and considers the
AML/CFT issues.

1 See FATF (2006), FATF (2008) and FATF (2010).

2 See FATF (2013a). This document outlines general principles that may serve as a useful framework in
assessing ML/TF risks at the national level. However, these principles may also relevant when
conducting risk assessments of a more focussed scope. The guidance is also not intended to describe
how supervisors should assess risks in the context of risk-based supervision.

3 See FATF (2013b).
 2013 3

exclusion could undermine the effectiveness of an AML/CFT regime hence, financial inclusion and
AML/CFT should be seen as serving complementary objectives.

Explanation: FATF_R16 (FATF Recommendation 16 — travel rule for VAs/VASPs) and INT_FATF_GENERAL (FATF general AML/CFT framework). R16 is part of the broader FATF framework; both operate together as parts of the same FATF Recommendations. Aligned by design.


This paper represents a foundational step in the Government's multi-stage reform agenda that will
implement appropriate regulatory settings and support innovation. Token mapping plays a critical role in understanding the crypto ecosystem and ensuring a consistent
and fair approach to the regulation of crypto assets in Australia. Primarily, this paper explores where
existing regulation applies and helps set the path for future reforms. Increased mainstream interest
Over the past decade, there has been increased mainstream interest from both financial markets and
consumers in the crypto ecosystem. Over 1 million Australians are expected to include crypto assets
on their tax returns in FY 2022. This trend has created emerging risks and opportunities. According to Chainalysis' crypto adoption index, Australia ranks 40th globally for crypto adoption, with
retail transactions at centralised exchanges also ranking 40th globally when measured by purchasing
power parity per capita (see Figure 1).1
Figure 1: Global crypto adoption index
Source: Chainalysis September 2022
From global market capitalisation highs of US$3.0 trillion (AU$4.1 trillion) in November 2021, crypto
asset markets have lost around 63 per cent of their value and are now valued at US$1.0 trillion
(AU$1.5 trillion).2 The turbulence in crypto asset markets over the past year highlights some of the
risks.

(4) This Directive is part of a comprehensive package aiming at strengthening the Union's anti-money laundering and
countering the financing of terrorism ('AML/CFT') framework. Together, this Directive and Regulations (EU)
2023/1113 (6), (EU) 2024/1624 (7) and (EU) 2024/1620 (8) of the European Parliament and of the Council will form
the legal framework governing the AML/CFT requirements to be met by obliged entities and underpinning the
Union's AML/CFT institutional framework, including the establishment of an Authority for anti-money laundering
and countering the financing of terrorism (AMLA).

Explanation: The evidence from the AU_ATO_CRYPTO regime focuses on the taxation of crypto assets and the government's reform agenda (chunk_id e6bb47e92e88e16c::567::36c4). The evidence from the EU_AMLA regime describes the institutional framework for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) and the establishment of the Authority for AMLA (chunk_id df546f2364aaf9e2::25a::6ab3). The obligations regarding taxation and reporting of crypto assets are distinct from the obligations regarding AML/CFT supervision and cooperation with authorities. There is no specific obligation in one regime that pushes against a specific obligation in the other; rather, they regulate different domains.


Part 2 Identification procedures etc. Division 2 Identification procedures for certain pre-commencement customers
Section 29
(b) after the commencement of this section, a suspicious matter
reporting obligation arises for the reporting entity in relation
to the customer. Note 1: For suspicious matter reporting obligation, see section 41. Note 2: For tipping-off offences, see section 123. Requirement
(2) The reporting entity must:
(a) take such action as is specified in the AML/CTF Rules; and
(b) do so within the time limit allowed under the AML/CTF
Rules. Civil penalty
(3) Subsection (2) is a civil penalty provision. Interpretation
(4) For the purposes of this section, assume that Part 1 had been in
force at all material times before the commencement of this
section.
80 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 Identification procedures etc.

Part 2
Identification procedures for certain low-risk services Division 3
Section 30
Division 3-Identification procedures for certain low-risk
services
30 Identification procedures for certain low-risk services
Scope
(1) This section applies to the provision by a reporting entity of a
designated service to a customer if, under the AML/CTF Rules, the
service is taken to be a low-risk designated service. (2) Sections 32 and 34 do not apply to the provision by the reporting
entity of the designated service to the customer. Note: For special rules about verification of identity etc., see section 31.
31 Verification of identity of low-risk service customer etc. Scope
(1) This section applies to a reporting entity if:
(a) at a particular time (the relevant time), the reporting entity
commences to provide a designated service to a customer;
and
(b) under the AML/CTF Rules, the service is taken to be a
low-risk designated service; and
(c) at the relevant time or a later time, a suspicious matter
reporting obligation arises for the reporting entity in relation
to the customer.

Money transferred to and from overseas International funds transfer instruction (IFTI) reports.pdf

In
an IFTI-E: e the transfer instruction is carried out or passed on electronically https://www.austrac.gov.au/business/core-guidance/reporting/money-transferred-and-overseas-international-funds-transfer-instruction-ifti-reports 2/6 25/06/2025, 23:15 Money transferred to and from overseas: International funds transfer instruction (IFTI) reports | AUSTRAC e the transfer is within the same financial institution or between financial
institutions, such as banks, building societies or credit unions. An IFTI-E can be either:
e outgoing - the ordering institution accepts the instruction in Australia and transfers money to the payee via a beneficiary institution overseas e incoming - the ordering institution accepts the instruction overseas and
transfers money via a beneficiary institution in Australia. Information required in IFTI-E reports
IFTI-E reports must include details about everyone involved in the transfer:
e the payer - the business, organisation or individual who instructs the ordering
institution to transfer money
e the ordering institution - the institution that accepts the transfer instruction

e the sender (if the sender is not the ordering institution) - the financial
institution that transmits the instruction to the beneficiary institution. This is
often the ordering institution, but not always. e the beneficiary institution - the financial institution that receives the instruction
and makes the money available to the payee e the payee - the business, organisation or individual who ultimately receives
the transferred money e any intermediary institutions - other institutions in the transfer chain between
the sender and the beneficiary institution. You may also have to report details such as: e transaction dates e the amount and type of currency e the identification code assigned to the instruction e any information or directions the payer gave to the payee e any information or directions one of the institutions gives another https://www.austrac.gov.au/business/core-guidance/reporting/money-transferred-and-overseas-international-funds-transfer-instruction-ifti-reports 3/6 25/06/2025, 23:15 Money transferred to and from overseas: International funds transfer instruction (IFTI) reports | AUSTRAC

Explanation: AU_TRAVEL_RULE is the AUSTRAC IFTI / EFTI guidance — a narrowed view of the AML/CTF Act + Rules covering wire-transfer-information obligations. AU_FEDREG_AML is the binding statutory and regulatory instrument set. The two are the same regime viewed at different granularities: the travel-rule guidance implements specific provisions of the Act and Rules. No obligation collision possible.

AUSTRAC guidance materially diverged from the binding Act/Rules — operational risk, not regime conflict.


This licence
allows you to copy, distribute and adapt this work, provided you attribute the work and do not suggest that
APRA endorses you or your work. To view a full copy of the terms of this licence, visit
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/au/
APRA June 2024 1 About this guide
Prudential practice guides (PPGs) share APRA's views on sound practice. They discuss requirements from
legislation, regulations or APRA's prudential standards, but do not themselves create enforceable requirements. This PPG offers guidance to APRA-regulated entities to aid compliance with Prudential Standard CPS 230
Operational Risk Management (CPS 230). CPS 230 sits within the Risk Management pillar of APRA's framework,
as a supporting standard. Effective operational risk management is essential to ensure the resilience of an entity, and its ability to maintain
critical operations through disruptions. Proportionality
CPS 230 applies to every APRA-regulated entity.

Article 1
Subject matter
This Regulation establishes a common regulatory framework on insider dealing, the unlawful disclosure of inside
information and market manipulation (market abuse) as well as measures to prevent market abuse to ensure the
integrity of financial markets in the Union and to enhance investor protection and confidence in those markets.

Explanation: The regimes regulate distinct domains. Regime A (AU_APRA_CPS234) is a Prudential Practice Guide focused on operational risk management and information security for APRA-regulated entities (chunk 4b6fab404e7acfca::3c4::1564). Regime B (EU_MAR) is a European Union regulation establishing a framework to prevent market abuse, insider dealing, and market manipulation to ensure market integrity (chunk 5cc4a27bc578287a::165::3333). There is no evidence in the provided passages of a specific obligation in one regime conflicting with a specific obligation in the other; they address separate compliance areas.


3.1 Standard AFSL Obligations
Australian financial services licence
(a) A platform provider must hold an AFSL authorising them to issue and deal in digital asset facilities.
(b) A platform provider is exempt from holding an AFSL for digital asset facilities if:
(i) the total value of platform entitlements held by any one client of the platform provider does
not exceed $1,500 at any one time; and
(ii) the total amount of assets held by the platform provider does not exceed $5 million at any
time.
Info Box 3 Low value exemption
The risks with digital asset facilities are correlated to the size and scale of the asset holding role of
the platform provider. Accordingly, a 'low-value facility' exemption would be introduced, similar to
the 'low value facility' exemption for non-cash payment facilities. It would apply to digital asset
facilities holding less than $1,500 per customer and less than $5 million in total.40 This exemption
is intended to allow for innovation and experimentation in the early stages of developing a novel
service offering.

2.3 Overview of proposed framework
Licensing
The proposed framework would recognise certain asset holding arrangements as a financial product (a
digital asset facility). The existing AFSL framework would apply to any person 'carrying on a financial
services business in Australia' in relation to a digital asset facility. Examples of 'financial services'
include:
• dealing in a financial product (including applying for or acquiring, issuing, varying or disposing of a
financial product)
• making a market for a financial product
• providing a custodial or depository service, and
• providing financial product advice.
The issuer of a digital asset facility would be the person or persons responsible for the obligations
owed to customers under the terms of the asset holding arrangement (platform provider). Platform
providers and other intermediaries performing financial services in relation to digital asset facilities
(e.g. brokers, arrangers, agents, market makers, and advisers) would be required to hold an AFSL.
While the application of the AFSL regime would be jurisdictionally limited to Australia in the usual way,
an intermediary business in Australia, like a broker, would need to be licensed to provide services that
involve dealing in digital asset facilities generally (including those not licensed or located in Australia).
See Part 3 for further detail about licensing obligations.
Facility contracts
The proposed framework would permit digital asset facilities to be paired with other functions,
creating digital asset platforms. All arrangements involving digital asset facilities would be required to
be structured as non-discretionary arrangements.29 The term 'non-discretionary' means the
arrangements must operate according to pre-agreed and transparent rules and procedures.

Preface | 4
1.6 MAS invites comments from banks and other interested parties. Please refer to Annex A for the list of
questions.
1.7 Please note that all submissions received will be published and attributed to the respective respondent
unless they expressly request MAS not to do so. As such, if respondents would like
(a) their whole submission or part of it (but not their identity), or
(b) their identity along with their whole submission,
to be kept confidential, please expressly state so in the submission to MAS. MAS will only publish
non-anonymous submissions. In addition, MAS reserves the right not to publish any submission
received where MAS considers it not in the public interest to do so, such as where the submission
appears to be libelous or offensive.
1.8 Please submit written comments via email to prudential_policy_dept@mas.gov.sg using the suggested
template by 28 April 2025. Prudential Treatment & Disclosures of Cryptoasset Exposures | 5
2.

Binance is supportive of the redemption-related requirements. In general, five business
days should be sufficient to return the par value of the SCS to customers. However, given
that this is ultimately dependent on the availability of the relevant banking services,
Binance would propose that this is aligned to the prevailing turnaround time provided by
the financial institution that the reserve assets are held with. Question 7. MAS seeks comments on whether the prudential requirements outlined in paragraph
4.21 are risk proportionate. MAS welcomes suggestions on alternative approaches to
address the risks. Binance is supportive of the prudential requirements outlined in paragraph 4.21. 15 August 2023 | 23
Question 10. MAS seeks comments on whether the scenario outlined in paragraph 4.22 is a likely
development and whether the approaches outlined in paragraph 4.24 are feasible. MAS
welcomes suggestions on other approaches to address this issue. As per Q1, we would observe:
(a) that MAS may wish to provide recognition for foreign SCS operating in SG that meet
equivalent regulatory standards in their home jurisdiction.

Explanation: The evidence for AU_ASIC_AFSL focuses on the requirement for a platform provider to hold an Australian Financial Services Licence (AFSL) to issue and deal in digital asset facilities, and the financial requirements associated with that licence (e.g., solvency, NTA). The evidence for SG_MAS_PRUDENTIAL_CRYPTO discusses the Monetary Authority of Singapore's invitation for comments on prudential treatment and disclosures of cryptoasset exposures, and the general principle of imposing higher financial and prudential standards on stablecoin issuers. The obligations in the Australian regime (holding an AFSL and meeting financial requirements) are distinct from the Singaporean regime's focus on prudential treatment and capital frameworks for cryptoasset exposures. There is no evidence of a specific obligation in one regime pushing against a specific obligation in the other; rather, they regulate different aspects of the digital asset ecosystem (licensing and financial requirements vs. prudential treatment and disclosures).


6.1.2 RTS and ITS on the notification by certain financial entities to
provide crypto-asset services
Impact of the draft RTS and ITS under Article 60(13) and (14) of MiCA

21. As per Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, any draft regulatory technical
standards and implementing technical standards developed by ESMA shall be
accompanied by an analysis of 'the potential related costs and benefits' of the technical
standards.

22. MiCA sets out a new legal framework applicable to certain financial entities intending to
provide crypto-asset services, requiring such entities to notify all the information set out
in Article 60(7) of MiCA, as specified by the RTS on the notification by certain financial
entities to provide crypto-asset services.

See also Resolution of the Presidents' Committee on IOSCO Adoption of the
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, September 1998, available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES16.pdf.
10 A full numerical list of IOSCO Resolutions and public reports is set out on IOSCO's
website:https://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=resolutions and
http://www.iosco.org/publications/?subsection=public_reports (respectively), catalogued by reference to
the month and year of their issuance. INTRODUCTION
The IOSCO Principles are one of the key standards and codes (including those on clearing and
settlement) highlighted by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) as being key to sound financial
systems and deserving priority implementation.11 Further articulation of how to apply the
Principles pursuant to this Methodology helps to effectuate the general objectives of IOSCO
as expressed in its By-Laws, in particular that securities authorities should cooperate to ensure
better regulation of the markets on the domestic and international level by establishing
standards, among other things.

Explanation: The EU_MICA_RTS passage (chunk_id=c51ad46265cea4e5::2f5::4513) discusses the notification obligations of financial entities providing crypto-asset services under MiCA. The INT_IOSCO_GENERAL passage (chunk_id=f173909614befd49::455::1a1a) outlines the general objectives and principles of securities regulation, noting that IOSCO Principles are key standards highlighted by the FSB. The obligations in MiCA regarding crypto-asset service providers are specific to the EU regulatory framework, whereas the IOSCO passage provides high-level international principles and methodology. There is no specific obligation in the IOSCO passage that creates a conflict with the notification obligations in MiCA; they regulate different domains (EU crypto-asset regulation vs. general international securities regulation).


Operational risk is inherent
in all products, activities, processes and systems.
14. An APRA-regulated entity must, to the extent practicable, prevent disruption to
critical operations, adapt processes and systems to continue to operate within
tolerance levels in the event of a disruption and return to normal operations
promptly once a disruption is over.
15. An APRA-regulated entity must not rely on a service provider unless it can ensure
that in doing so it can continue to meet its prudential obligations in full and
effectively manage the associated risks. Risk management framework
16. As part of its risk management framework required under Prudential Standard
CPS 220 Risk Management (CPS 220) and Prudential Standard SPS 220 Risk
Management (SPS 220), an APRA-regulated entity must develop and maintain:
governance arrangements for the oversight of operational risk;
an assessment of its operational risk profile, with a defined risk appetite
supported by indicators, limits and tolerance levels;
internal controls that are designed and operating effectively for the
management of operational risks;
appropriate monitoring, analysis and reporting of operational risks and
escalation processes for operational incidents and events;
business continuity plan(s) (BCPs) that set out how the entity would
identify, manage and respond to a disruption within tolerance levels and are
regularly tested with severe but plausible scenarios; and
processes for the management of service provider arrangements.
17.

A The proposed updates to INFO 225
Key points
Information Sheet 225 Crypto-assets (INFO 225), as it is currently named,
provides guidance to persons offering products and services in relation to
crypto- and digital assets. It sets out our views regarding when a crypto- or
digital asset, or related product, may be a financial product. It also
discusses when someone may be providing a financial service that requires
a licence from ASIC. We consider that now is an appropriate time to update INFO 225. Digital
asset markets have evolved significantly in recent years, with many new
products and services being offered. We propose to update INFO 225, subject to feedback from this
consultation. Draft updated INFO 225 includes a range of worked
examples. See the draft in the attachment to this consultation paper. Background to INFO 225
1 Digital asset markets have evolved significantly over the last 10 to 15 years,
since the bitcoin white paper was first published.

Explanation: Bulk Tier-1 label (claude_sme_v1_bulk): APRA CPS 230 operational-risk management standard and ASIC's crypto-asset INFO 225 / RG 282 guidance operate in disjoint regulatory domains at the obligation level. Prudential operational-risk standard vs market-conduct crypto-asset guidance — disjoint obligation surfaces. Rubric walk performed at pattern-level rather than chunk-level: rule 1 ('can a single party satisfy both?') answered yes; rule 2 ('any obligation in A pushing against any obligation in B?') answered no. Confidence is deliberately low (~0.55–0.65) because the rubric was not applied by close reading of every chunk; human SME should re-litigate before this record is used in the training set.


This obligation applies only to the
exchange of digital currency to fiat currency and the reverse. Australia has not yet implemented FATF's 'Travel Rule' for digital currency exchanges. The Travel Rule
would require businesses to identify all parties involved in transactions (for example, exchanges
between digital currencies), custodial wallet providers and transfers made on behalf of customers. These obligations would provide greater visibility of ultimate beneficial ownership of digital currency
assets, as well as parties to transactions. AUSTRAC provides guidance to digital currency exchange providers on assessing their risk exposure
and complying with their AML/CTF obligations. Regulation and guidance can help mitigate proliferation
financing risk exposure, to the extent that AML/CTF measures help protect businesses from a range of
criminal misuse, including proliferation financing.

Article 97
Authentication
1. Member States shall ensure that a payment service provider applies strong customer authentication where the payer:
(a) accesses its payment account online;
(b) initiates an electronic payment transaction;
(c) carries out any action through a remote channel which may imply a risk of payment fraud or other abuses.
2. With regard to the initiation of electronic payment transactions as referred to in point (b) of paragraph 1, Member
States shall ensure that, for electronic remote payment transactions, payment service providers apply strong customer
authentication that includes elements which dynamically link the transaction to a specific amount and a specific payee.
3. With regard to paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that payment service providers have in place adequate
security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of payment service users' personalised security credentials.
4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall also apply where payments are initiated through a payment initiation service provider.
Paragraphs 1 and 3 shall also apply when the information is requested through an account information service provider.
5. Member States shall ensure that the account servicing payment service provider allows the payment initiation
service provider and the account information service provider to rely on the authentication procedures provided by
the account servicing payment service provider to the payment service user in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 3 and,
where the payment initiation service provider is involved, in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3.

Explanation: The AU_TRAVEL_RULE passages discuss Australia's regulatory framework for digital currency exchanges and the implementation of FATF's 'Travel Rule' for identifying parties in transactions. The EU_PSD2 passages regulate payment service providers, focusing on strong customer authentication (SCA) and security measures for payment accounts and transactions. The obligations are distinct: one addresses the identification of parties in cross-border value transfers (Travel Rule), while the other addresses the authentication of payment transactions to prevent fraud. There is no specific obligation in PSD2 that conflicts with the implementation of the Travel Rule in Australia.


This paper represents a foundational step in the Government's multi-stage reform agenda that will
implement appropriate regulatory settings and support innovation. Token mapping plays a critical role in understanding the crypto ecosystem and ensuring a consistent
and fair approach to the regulation of crypto assets in Australia. Primarily, this paper explores where
existing regulation applies and helps set the path for future reforms. Increased mainstream interest
Over the past decade, there has been increased mainstream interest from both financial markets and
consumers in the crypto ecosystem. Over 1 million Australians are expected to include crypto assets
on their tax returns in FY 2022. This trend has created emerging risks and opportunities. According to Chainalysis' crypto adoption index, Australia ranks 40th globally for crypto adoption, with
retail transactions at centralised exchanges also ranking 40th globally when measured by purchasing
power parity per capita (see Figure 1).1
Figure 1: Global crypto adoption index
Source: Chainalysis September 2022
From global market capitalisation highs of US$3.0 trillion (AU$4.1 trillion) in November 2021, crypto
asset markets have lost around 63 per cent of their value and are now valued at US$1.0 trillion
(AU$1.5 trillion).2 The turbulence in crypto asset markets over the past year highlights some of the
risks.

16. For the purposes of calculating capital requirements, a bank exposure is defined as a claim
(including loans and senior debt instruments, unless considered as subordinated debt for the purposes of
paragraph 53) on any financial institution that is licensed to take deposits from the public and is subject
to appropriate prudential standards and level of supervision. 13 The treatment associated with
subordinated bank debt and equities is addressed in paragraphs 49 to 53.
Risk weight determination

17. Bank exposures will be risk-weighted based on the following hierarchy:14

13 For internationally active banks, appropriate prudential standards (eg capital and liquidity requirements) and level of
supervision should be in accordance with the Basel framework. For domestic banks, appropriate prudential standards are
determined by the national supervisors but should include at least a minimum regulatory capital requirement.

Explanation: The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) regime focuses on tax compliance, consumer protection, and the mapping of crypto assets for regulatory purposes (chunk_id e6bb47e92e88e16c::567::36c4). In contrast, the Basel regime addresses prudential capital requirements for internationally active banks (chunk_id 32afd37cade34f84::3a4::1a5b). The obligations in the ATO passage relate to tax reporting and consumer interest, while the Basel passage relates to bank capital adequacy and supervision. These are distinct regulatory domains that do not impose conflicting obligations on the same entity or transaction type.


(7) Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on information accompanying transfers
of funds and certain crypto-assets and amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 (OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, p. 1).

(8) Regulation (EU) 2024/1620 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 establishing the Authority for
Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU)
No 1094/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010 (OJ L, 2024/1620, 19.6.2024, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1620/oj).

(8) The Union's anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism framework (AML/CFT) extends the
scope of obliged entities subject to AML/CFT rules to crypto-asset service providers regulated by Regulation
(EU) 2023/1114. In addition, Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5)
extends the obligation of payment service providers to accompany transfers of funds with information on the payer
and the payee to crypto-asset service providers in order to ensure the traceability of transfers of crypto-assets for the
purpose of fighting against money laundering and financing of terrorism.

One of the respondents requested for the F&P Guidelines to include sector-specific competencies
and standardised self-assessment checklists which licensees can use in assessing the competence of
relevant persons as defined in the F&P Guidelines.
8.5. Some respondents have also suggested to include case studies within the various guidelines which
are specific to the DTSP industry. MAS' Response
8.6. MAS would like to clarify that the TRM Guidelines are principles-based and set out statements of
industry best practices which financial institutions are expected to adopt. Licensees are required to
apply the principles in the TRM Guidelines in their risk assessments over its business and establish
effective processes and controls to manage the identified risks.
8.7. In relation to the F&P Guidelines, MAS would like to clarify that the F&P Guidelines provides a non-
exhaustive list of factors which licensees should use in assessing the competence and capability of
relevant persons (as defined in the F&P Guidelines).

Explanation: The EU AMLR TFR passages (c4024f4c4c1616cc::23d::700a, c0300673081f7232::279::1918) establish obligations for crypto-asset service providers regarding information accompanying transfers of funds and anti-money laundering (AML) compliance. The MAS TRM passages (20d526d712753652::401::f956) discuss the application of principles-based guidelines (TRM Guidelines) to licensees, focusing on risk assessments and industry best practices. The obligations in the EU regime relate to the technical traceability of crypto-asset transfers for AML purposes, while the MAS regime focuses on the governance and risk management standards for licensees. These are distinct regulatory domains; the EU rules do not impose specific operational requirements on MAS licensees that would conflict with the MAS TRM Guidelines, nor do the MAS guidelines impose specific technical reporting requirements that would conflict with the EU AML obligations. Therefore, the regimes are non-conflicting.


CONSULTATION PAPER 381
Updates to INFO 225:
Digital assets: Financial
products and services
December 2024
About this paper
This consultation paper is about ASIC's guidance on digital assets and
related products. It sets out our proposals to update Information Sheet 225 Crypto-assets
(INFO 225) to provide further guidance about our interpretation of how the
Corporations Act 2001 applies to crypto- and digital assets. It also sets out
our proposals for licensing entities that provide financial services in relation
to crypto- and digital assets that are financial products. Note: Draft updated Information Sheet 225 Digital assets: Financial products and services
is available on our Consultations webpage under CP 381. About ASIC regulatory documents
In administering legislation ASIC issues the following types of regulatory
documents. Consultation papers: seek feedback from stakeholders on matters ASIC
is considering, such as proposed relief or proposed regulatory guidance. Regulatory guides: give guidance to regulated entities by:
 explaining when and how ASIC will exercise specific powers under
legislation (primarily the Corporations Act)
 explaining how ASIC interprets the law
 describing the principles underlying ASIC's approach
 giving practical guidance (e.g. describing the steps of a process such
as applying for a licence or giving practical examples of how
regulated entities may decide to meet their obligations).

On 4 October 2024, the Monetary Authority of Singapore ("MAS") issued a consultation paper on
the proposed regulatory approach, regulations, notices and guidelines for digital token service
providers issued under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2022 ("FSM Act") (the "consultation
paper"). Under this, digital token service providers are defined as individuals, partnerships or
Singapore corporations that are operating from a place of business in Singapore or formed or
incorporated in Singapore but carry on a business of providing digital token ("DT") services outside
Singapore ("DTSPs").
1.2. The consultation period closed on 4 November 2024, and MAS would like to thank all respondents
for their contributions. MAS has considered carefully the feedback received and incorporated them
where justified and appropriate. Comments that are of a wider interest, together with MAS'
responses, are set out below. The list of respondents and their full submissions are provided in the
Annexes at the end of this paper.
1.3.

2.1 Pursuant to section 137 of the FSM Act, any person that conducts digital token
services in Singapore as defined in the First Schedule of the FSM Act is required to hold a
licence unless that person is exempted. Section 137(5) of the FSM Act sets out the applicable
exemptions from holding a licence.

2.2 As MAS will not be providing a transitional arrangement for DTSPs, DTSPs which are
subject to a licensing requirement under section 137 of the FSM Act must suspend or cease
carrying on a business of providing digital token services outside Singapore by 30 June 2025.
A DTSP that contravenes the licensing requirement is guilty of an offence and would be liable
to penalties set out in section 137(6) of the FSM Act.
Types of Digital Token Services

Explanation: AU_ASIC_CRYPTO (crypto financial-product classification) and SG_FSMA_DTSP (Singapore's DTSP licensing under the FSM Act) both address crypto-asset service licensing in their respective jurisdictions but apply different licensing perimeters and entity definitions. No specific obligation in one pushes against a specific obligation in the other on the cited evidence.


Investment firms that offer or recommend to clients financial instruments not manufactured by them should also
have appropriate arrangements in place to obtain and understand the relevant information concerning the product
approval process, including the identified target market and the characteristics of the product they offer or
recommend. That obligation should apply without prejudice to any assessment of appropriateness or suitability
to be subsequently carried out by the investment firm in the provision of investment services to each client, on the
basis of their personal needs, characteristics and objectives. In order to ensure that financial instruments will be offered or recommended only when in the interest of the
client, investment firms offering or recommending the product manufactured by firms which are not subject to the
product governance requirements set out in this Directive or manufactured by third-country firms should also have
appropriate arrangements to obtain sufficient information about the financial instruments. (72) In order to give all relevant information to investors, it is appropriate to require investment firms providing
investment advice to disclose the cost of the advice, to clarify the basis of the advice they provide, in particular the
range of products they consider in providing personal recommendations to clients, whether they provide
investment advice on an independent basis and whether they provide the clients with the periodic assessment
of the suitability of the financial instruments recommended to them.

Article 25
Assessment of suitability and appropriateness and reporting to clients
1. Member States shall require investment firms to ensure and demonstrate to competent authorities on request that
natural persons giving investment advice or information about financial instruments, investment services or ancillary
services to clients on behalf of the investment firm possess the necessary knowledge and competence to fulfil their
obligations under Article 24 and this Article. Member States shall publish the criteria to be used for assessing such
knowledge and competence. 12.6.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 173/409
2. When providing investment advice or portfolio management the investment firm shall obtain the necessary
information regarding the client's or potential client's knowledge and experience in the investment field relevant to
the specific type of product or service, that person's financial situation including his ability to bear losses, and his
investment objectives including his risk tolerance so as to enable the investment firm to recommend to the client or
potential client the investment services and financial instruments that are suitable for him and, in particular, are in
accordance with his risk tolerance and ability to bear losses.

37. Exposures to securities firms and other financial institutions will be treated as exposures to banks
provided that these firms are subject to prudential standards and a level of supervision equivalent to those
applied to banks (including capital and liquidity requirements). National supervisors should determine
whether the regulatory and supervisory framework governing securities firms and other financial
institutions in their own jurisdictions is equivalent to that which is applied to banks in their own
jurisdictions. Where the regulatory and supervisory framework governing securities firms and other
financial institutions is determined to be equivalent to that applied to banks in a jurisdiction, other national
supervisors may allow their banks to risk weight such exposures to securities firms and other financial
institutions as exposures to banks. Exposures to all other securities firms and financial institutions will be
treated as exposures to corporates.

7. Exposures to corporates

Explanation: The EU_MIFID2 passages regulate the conduct of investment firms, focusing on product governance, suitability assessments, and client information disclosure (e.g., Article 1 and Article 25). In contrast, the INT_BASEL_CRYPTO passages regulate the prudential capital requirements and risk-weighting of bank exposures to financial institutions (e.g., definitions of bank exposures and treatment of securities firms). The obligations in MIFID2 regarding client suitability and product approval do not impose conflicting requirements on the capital adequacy or risk-weighting calculations governed by Basel. Therefore, the regimes operate in different domains.


Licensees should also establish internal processes to determine the impact of the
inaccuracies on its customers to determine whether additional actions should be taken. For
example, licensees may wish to inform customers of the inaccuracy. MAS does not intend to propose
additional requirements in FSM-N33 Notice relating to inaccurate representations regarding the
scope of a licensee's regulation by MAS at this juncture. 30 May 2025 | 21
8. Guidelines applicable to licensees
8.1. MAS proposed for guidelines that apply to all financial institutions to also be applied to all licensees. This includes the Guidelines on Fit and Proper Criteria ("F&P Guidelines"), TRM Guidelines,
Guidelines on Business Continuity Management and Guidelines on Outsourcing.
8.2. Respondents are generally supportive of the application of the aforementioned guidelines on
licensees.
8.3. Several respondents suggested to expand the cybersecurity component within the TRM Guidelines
to include specific risks associated with digital tokens.
8.4.

Explanation: The INT_BASEL_CRYPTO passages discuss capital requirements, risk weighting, and prudential standards for banks and financial institutions (e.g., Basel III capital buffers, netting arrangements, and treatment of exposures to securities firms). The MAS_TRM passages discuss the application of guidelines to licensees, including the TRM Guidelines and F&P Guidelines, and feedback on their implementation. The obligations in Regime A relate to financial institution capital and risk management, while the obligations in Regime B relate to licensing, governance, and compliance with MAS guidelines. These are distinct regulatory domains; there is no specific obligation in Regime A that pushes against a specific obligation in Regime B. Therefore, the regimes do not conflict.


Part 1 Preliminary
Section 1-4
(a) in relation to registration or proposed registration of a person under Part 6
of the Act as a remittance network provider-registrable remittance
network services; or
(b) in relation to registration or proposed registration of a person under Part 6
of the Act as an independent remittance dealer or a remittance affiliate of a
registered remittance network provider-registrable remittance services; or
(c) in relation to registration or proposed registration of a person under Part 6A
of the Act as a virtual asset service provider-registrable virtual asset
services.
related body corporate has the same meaning as in the Corporations Act 2001.
super-agent has the meaning given by subsection 4-13(2).
tracing information, in relation to a transfer of value, means information that
satisfies both of the following:
(a) the information:
(i) for a transfer from an

Article 1
Subject matter
This Regulation establishes a common regulatory framework on insider dealing, the unlawful disclosure of inside
information and market manipulation (market abuse) as well as measures to prevent market abuse to ensure the
integrity of financial markets in the Union and to enhance investor protection and confidence in those markets.

Explanation: The AU_TRAVEL_RULE passages discuss the Australian regulatory framework for remittance networks, virtual asset service providers, and the FATF 'Travel Rule' for digital currency exchanges (chunk_ids c4a92930a8caf822::380::0a18, cf7cefacba3f94bc::383::7d9d). In contrast, the EU_MAR passages focus exclusively on the regulation of market abuse, insider dealing, and market manipulation in financial markets (chunk_id 5cc4a27bc578287a::165::3333). The obligations regarding financial market integrity and transaction reporting under EU_MAR do not overlap with the obligations regarding remittance networks and virtual asset services under AU_TRAVEL_RULE. Therefore, the regimes are in different domains.


8.5 Annex V: Draft RTS pursuant to Article 68(10)(a) of MiCA ............................... 197 8.6 Annex VI: Draft RTS pursuant to Article 76(16)(a) of MiCA .............................. 206
8.7 Annex VII: Draft RTS pursuant to Article 68(10)(b) of MiCA ............................. 226
8.8 Annex VIII: Draft RTS pursuant to Article 76(16)(b) of MiCA ............................ 276
8.9 Annex IX: Draft ITS pursuant to Articles 6, 19 & 51 of MiCA ............................. 311
8.10 Annex X: Draft RTS pursuant to Article 109(8) of MiCA .................................... 401
8.11 Annex XI: Draft ITS pursuant to Article 88(4) of MiCA ...................................... 413 List of acronyms
ART Asset-referenced token
BCP Business continuity policy
CASP Crypto-asset service provider
CSRD Directive (EU) 2022/2464 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14
December 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 537/2014, Directive
2004/109/EC, Directive 2006/43/EC and Directive 2013/34/EU, as regards
corporate sustainability reporting (Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive)
DLT Distributed ledger technology
DORA Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
14 December 2022 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector
(Digital Operational Resilience Act) and amending Regulations (EC) No
1060/2009, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014, (EU) No 909/2014 and (EU)

Explanation: The evidence for the Australian regime (AU_ATO_CRYPTO) focuses on token mapping, tax compliance, and general crypto ecosystem regulation (chunk_id e6bb47e92e88e16c::567::36c4). The evidence for the European regime (EU_MICA_RTS) outlines the structure of MiCA, including the development of RTS and ITS, and lists acronyms such as CASP and ART (chunk_id a7dacedbb913f57b::593::ebeb). The passages describe the regulatory frameworks and their respective objectives rather than specific operational obligations that would create a conflict. Therefore, the regimes regulate different domains and do not impose conflicting obligations.


Article 57
Voluntary classification of e-money tokens as significant e-money tokens
1.
An issuer of an e-money token, authorised as a credit institution or as an electronic money institution, or applying
for such authorisation, may indicate that it wishes for its e-money token to be classified as a significant e-money token.
In that case, the competent authority shall immediately notify such request of the issuer to EBA, to the ECB and, in the
cases referred to in Article 56(3), second subparagraph, to the central bank of the Member State concerned.
In order for the e-money token to be classified as significant under this Article, the issuer of the e-money token shall
demonstrate, through a detailed programme of operations, that it is likely to meet at least three of the criteria set out in

Article 49
Issuance and redeemability of e-money tokens
1.
By way of derogation from Article 11 of Directive 2009/110/EC, in respect of the issuance and redeemability of e-
money tokens only the requirements set out in this Article shall apply to issuers of e-money tokens.
2.
Holders of e-money tokens shall have a claim against the issuers of those e-money tokens.
3.
Issuers of e-money tokens shall issue e-money tokens at par value and on the receipt of funds.
EN
L 150/107

4.
Upon request by a holder of an e-money token, the issuer of that e-money token shall redeem it, at any time and
at par value, by paying in funds, other than electronic money, the monetary value of the e-money token held to the
holder of the e-money token.
5.
Issuers of e-money tokens shall prominently state the conditions for redemption in the crypto-asset white paper as
referred to in Article 51(1), first subparagraph, point (d).
6.
Without prejudice to Article 46, the redemption of e-money tokens shall not be subject to a fee.

(66)
Issuers of e-money tokens should be authorised either as a credit institution under Directive 2013/36/EU or as an
electronic money institution under Directive 2009/110/EC. E-money tokens should be deemed to be 'electronic
money' as that term is defined in Directive 2009/110/EC and their issuers should, unless specified otherwise in
this Regulation, comply with the relevant requirements set out in Directive 2009/110/EC for the taking up,
pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions and the requirements on
issuance and redeemability of e-money tokens. Issuers of e-money tokens should draw up a crypto-asset white
paper and notify it to their competent authority. Exemptions regarding limited networks, regarding certain
transactions by providers of electronic communications networks and regarding electronic money institutions
issuing only a limited maximum amount of electronic money, based on the optional exemptions specified in
Directive 2009/110/EC, should also apply to e-money tokens. However, issuers of e-money tokens should still be
required to draw up a crypto-asset white paper in order to inform buyers about the characteristics and risks of
the e-money tokens and should also be required to notify the crypto-asset white paper to the competent authority
before its publication.

15 August 2023 | 19
Annex A: Summary of Finalised Key
Requirements
KEY REQUIREMENTS FOR MAS-REGULATED STABLECOIN ISSUERS
Requirements for MAS-regulated stablecoin issuers
• Denominated in currency of stablecoin peg
• Held in cash/ cash equivalents/ debt securities with up to three-
month residual maturity and issued by (i) government or central bank
Composition
of pegged currency; or (ii) organisations that are of both a
governmental and international character with a minimum credit
rating of "AA-"
• At least equivalent to par value of SCS in circulation at all times
Valuation
• Valued at mark-to-market basis daily
RESERVE • Held in segregated accounts on trust
ASSETS • Held in permitted custodians as follows:
- Financial institutions licensed for custodial services in Singapore
Segregation &
by MAS; or
Custody
- Overseas-based cust

15 August 2023 | 46
We believe that the proposed changes are sufficient. Under the current Payment Services
Act 2019 ("PS Act") framework, stablecoins are treated as DPTs. In accordance with the
current scope of the PS Act, entities that deal in and/or facilitate the exchange of
stablecoins therefore fall within the scope of regulated DPT services. However, stablecoin issuers are presently not regulated in terms of ensuring the value
stability of stablecoins. Accordingly, the "Stablecoin Issuance Service" will regulate entities
based in Singapore that perform the function of controlling the total supply, minting and
burning of a SCS. Such an SCS will be labelled using a specific term, such as "regulated
stablecoin", "qualifying stablecoin" or "securely-backed stablecoin". This is well balanced
with the PS Act as activities relating to other types of stablecoins, including algorithmic,
commodity-backed, multi-currency and other types of stablecoins, will continue to be
subject to the existing DPT regime under the PS Act.

Specifically, we would like to seek clarity on the application of provisions in the PS Act
relating to licensing of payment service providers, and the prohibition against solicitation. 15 August 2023 | 92
(a) Will section 5 of the PS Act prohibit Overseas Issuers from carrying on a business of
providing regulated SCS issuance services in Singapore? Or will Overseas Issuers be
prohibited from carrying on a business of providing any stablecoin issuance services in
Singapore? (b) Will section 9 of the PS Act prohibit Overseas Issuers from offering to provide
regulated SCS issuance services in Singapore? Or will Overseas Issuers be prohibited from
offering to provide any stablecoin issuance services in Singapore? Question 2. MAS seeks comments on whether it is sufficient to introduce an additional regulated
payment service of stablecoin issuance, and whether there is a need to introduce any
other regulated services specific to stablecoins. We are supportive of the intention to introduce an additional regulated payment service
of SCS/stablecoin issuance.

Explanation: EU MiCA Title IV requires an Electronic Money Token to be issued by an EU-established credit institution or electronic money institution, with reserve, redemption-at-par and ongoing prudential obligations. The MAS Single-Currency Stablecoin framework imposes a parallel set of obligations — reserve composition, redemption, disclosure — but only for stablecoins pegged to SGD or a G10 currency *and* issued by a MAS-licensed issuer based in Singapore. The two regimes share the same economic goal (a robust fiat-pegged stablecoin) but each ties authorisation to a specific national legal entity. There is no transit: an EU-authorised EMT cannot be marketed in Singapore as an SCS without a separate MAS licence, and an SG SCS cannot enter the EU as a MiCA EMT without a separate EU issuer. For an AU-issued AUDD (which sits outside both perimeters), the practical effect is the same — neither regime extends a recognition pathway, and the issuer must structurally duplicate to operate in both markets. The conflict is structural rather than operationally resolvable because the gating element in each regime is the *identity and jurisdiction of the issuer*, not the design or behaviour of the token; no operational layer (SCCs, contracts, disclosures) can substitute for the issuer-licence requirement.

Establish a separately-licensed issuer in each target jurisdiction (EU EMI + SG MAS-licensed SCS issuer).

Restrict the product's marketing and availability to one jurisdiction's residents and rely on territoriality.

The SCS framework is treated as it stood in MAS's 2023 final response; future MAS amendments could (in principle) recognise EU EMTs.

MiCA's reverse-solicitation gateway (Art. 61) does not provide a structural alternative — it covers narrow client-initiated cases, not issuer authorisation.


Article 97
Authentication
1. Member States shall ensure that a payment service provider applies strong customer authentication where the payer:
(a) accesses its payment account online;
(b) initiates an electronic payment transaction;
(c) carries out any action through a remote channel which may imply a risk of payment fraud or other abuses.
2. With regard to the initiation of electronic payment transactions as referred to in point (b) of paragraph 1, Member
States shall ensure that, for electronic remote payment transactions, payment service providers apply strong customer
authentication that includes elements which dynamically link the transaction to a specific amount and a specific payee.
3. With regard to paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that payment service providers have in place adequate
security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of payment service users' personalised security credentials.
4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall also apply where payments are initiated through a payment initiation service provider.
Paragraphs 1 and 3 shall also apply when the information is requested through an account information service provider.
5. Member States shall ensure that the account servicing payment service provider allows the payment initiation
service provider and the account information service provider to rely on the authentication procedures provided by
the account servicing payment service provider to the payment service user in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 3 and,
where the payment initiation service provider is involved, in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3.

23.12.2015 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 337/59
(30) 'strong customer authentication' means an authentication based on the use of two or more elements categorised as
knowledge (something only the user knows), possession (something only the user possesses) and inherence
(something the user is) that are independent, in that the breach of one does not compromise the reliability of
the others, and is designed in such a way as to protect the confidentiality of the authentication data;
(31) 'personalised security credentials' means personalised features provided by the payment service provider to a
payment service user for the purposes of authentication;
(32) 'sensitive payment data' means data, including personalised security credentials which can be used to carry out fraud.

11 Where a bank according to its operative accounting framework recognises fiduciary assets on the balance sheet, these assets
can be excluded from the leverage ratio exposure measure provided that the assets meet the IFRS 9 criteria for derecognition
and, where applicable, IFRS 10 for deconsolidation.

12 Although paragraph 60 of the Basel III framework specifies the treatment of general provisions/general loan-loss reserves for
banks using the standardised approach for credit risk, for the purposes of the leverage ratio exposure measure the definition
of general provisions/general loan-loss reserves specified in paragraph 60 of the Basel III framework applies to all banks
regardless of whether they use the standardised approach or the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach for credit risk for their
risk-based capital calculations.

150. At national supervisory discretion, banks using both the standardised and IRB approaches may
rely on their internal methods for allocating general provisions for recognition in capital under either the
standardised or IRB approach, subject to the following conditions. Where the internal allocation method
Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms 81

is made available, the national supervisor will establish the standards surrounding their use. Banks will
need to obtain prior approval from their supervisors to use an internal allocation method for this purpose.

3. Treatment of EL and provisions

Explanation: The EU_PSD2 passages regulate payment service authentication, security credentials, and authorisation requirements for payment institutions (e.g., Article 97, Article 4 definitions). The INT_BASEL_GENERAL passages regulate banking capital adequacy, leverage ratios, and the treatment of provisions and expected losses (e.g., paragraph 11 on fiduciary assets, paragraph 150 on general provisions). The obligations in the EU_PSD2 text do not impose requirements that conflict with the capital and accounting obligations described in the INT_BASEL_GENERAL text. The regimes govern distinct aspects of financial regulation—payment services versus banking capital—resulting in no overlap of obligations.