'@ Australian Government
AUSTRAC Reporting transactions of
$10,000 and over:
Threshold transaction
reports (TTRs) transaction reports (TTRs) A 'threshold transaction' is the transfer of physical currency (cash) of A$10,000 or more
(or the foreign currency equivalent) as part of providing a designated service. A transfer
can include receiving or paying cash. If you provide a designated service that involves a threshold transaction, you must
report these transfers to AUSTRAC in a threshold transaction report (TTR) within 10
business days. TTRs help us detect, deter and disrupt criminal and terrorist activity. Who must submit TTRs Any business that provides a designated service that involves the transfer of A$10,000
or more (or the foreign currency equivalent) must submit a TTR to AUSTRAC. If you are an affiliate of a remittance network provider (RNP) and the threshold
transaction was made on your RNP's network, they must submit the TTR for you.

Part 3 Reporting obligations
Division 3 Threshold transactions
Section 43
Division 3-Threshold transactions
43 Reports of threshold transactions
Scope
(1) This section applies to a reporting entity if:
(a) the reporting entity commences to provide, or provides, a
designated service to a customer; and
(b) the provision of the service involves a threshold transaction. Report
(2) The reporting entity must, within 10 business days after the day on
which the transaction takes place, give the AUSTRAC CEO a
report of the transaction. (3) A report under subsection (2) must:
(a) be in the approved form; and
(b) contain such information relating to the transaction as is
specified in the AML/CTF Rules. Note 1: For additional rules about reports, see section 244. Note 2: Section 49 deals with the provision of further information, and the
production of documents, by the reporting entity.

Article 24
General principles and information to clients
1. Member States shall require that, when providing investment services or, where appropriate, ancillary services to
clients, an investment firm act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of its clients and
comply, in particular, with the principles set out in this Article and in Article 25.
2. Investment firms which manufacture financial instruments for sale to clients shall ensure that those financial
instruments are designed to meet the needs of an identified target market of end clients within the relevant category
of clients, the strategy for distribution of the financial instruments is compatible with the identified target market, and the
investment firm takes reasonable steps to ensure that the financial instrument is distributed to the identified target
market. An investment firm shall understand the financial instruments they offer or recommend, assess the compatibility of the
financial instruments with the needs of the clients to whom it provides investment services, also taking account of the
identified target market of end clients as referred to in Article 16(3), and ensure that financial instruments are offered or
recommended only when this is in the interest of the client.
3.

Article 25
Assessment of suitability and appropriateness and reporting to clients
1. Member States shall require investment firms to ensure and demonstrate to competent authorities on request that
natural persons giving investment advice or information about financial instruments, investment services or ancillary
services to clients on behalf of the investment firm possess the necessary knowledge and competence to fulfil their
obligations under Article 24 and this Article. Member States shall publish the criteria to be used for assessing such
knowledge and competence. 12.6.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 173/409
2. When providing investment advice or portfolio management the investment firm shall obtain the necessary
information regarding the client's or potential client's knowledge and experience in the investment field relevant to
the specific type of product or service, that person's financial situation including his ability to bear losses, and his
investment objectives including his risk tolerance so as to enable the investment firm to recommend to the client or
potential client the investment services and financial instruments that are suitable for him and, in particular, are in
accordance with his risk tolerance and ability to bear losses.

Explanation: The AU_TTR_THRESHOLD regime regulates the reporting of physical cash transactions exceeding A$10,000 to AUSTRAC (chunk_ids 6dfe4e63b9fb3c74::3bc::1a3f, 254ca2d92d196180::377::d0c6). The EU_MIFID2 regime regulates investment firms' conduct of business, specifically the provision of investment services and the suitability of financial instruments (chunk_ids 28dfda0f6a6539b6::514::0ca0, 28dfda0f6a6539b6::502::1957). The obligations in MIFID2 relate to client suitability, information disclosure, and professional conduct, whereas the obligations in AU_TTR relate to cash transaction reporting thresholds. These are distinct regulatory domains with no overlapping obligations that would create a conflict.


Part 1.6 Interaction with Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act Section 111L
Provisions of this Act that do not apply to bodies corporate registered under the
ACNC Act
Item Column 1 Column 2
Provision(s) Topic
2 section 138 ASIC may direct company to lodge
consolidated constitution
3 section 139 Company must send copy of
constitution to member
4 subsection 142(2), section 146 and Company must notify ASIC of
subsection 146A(2) changes of address
5 (a) sections 180 to 183; and Duties of directors etc. (b) section 185, to the extent that it
relates to sections 180 to 183
6 section 188, to the extent it relates to Responsibility of secretaries and
a provision mentioned in another directors for certain contraventions
item of this table
7 sections 191 to 194 Interests of directors
8 (a) sections 201L and 205A to 205C; Public information about directors
and etc.

Preface | 4
1.6 MAS invites comments from banks and other interested parties. Please refer to Annex A for the list of
questions.
1.7 Please note that all submissions received will be published and attributed to the respective respondent
unless they expressly request MAS not to do so. As such, if respondents would like
(a) their whole submission or part of it (but not their identity), or
(b) their identity along with their whole submission,
to be kept confidential, please expressly state so in the submission to MAS. MAS will only publish
non-anonymous submissions. In addition, MAS reserves the right not to publish any submission
received where MAS considers it not in the public interest to do so, such as where the submission
appears to be libelous or offensive.
1.8 Please submit written comments via email to prudential_policy_dept@mas.gov.sg using the suggested
template by 28 April 2025. Prudential Treatment & Disclosures of Cryptoasset Exposures | 5
2.

Explanation: The evidence from the Australian Corporations Act (Regime A) focuses on the interaction with the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act, detailing specific provisions regarding company constitutions, director duties, and winding up (chunk 0fc4f857c226f510::375::66b5). The evidence from the Monetary Authority of Singapore's Prudential Treatment & Disclosures of Cryptoasset Exposures (Regime B) is a consultation paper inviting comments on prudential standards for cryptoasset exposures and detailing submission procedures (chunk 3d9b3d4849297e91::3c6::7b85). The obligations and topics regulated by the two regimes are distinct; one governs corporate governance and winding up, while the other governs prudential standards for digital assets. There is no specific obligation in the Australian Corporations Act that pushes against a specific obligation in the Singapore MAS Prudential Crypto regime. Therefore, the regimes are in different domains and do not conflict.


7. The FATF adopted this Guidance at its June 2019 Plenary. Following the adoption of
this Guidance and the revisions to the FATF Standards, the FATF continued its
enhanced monitoring of the VA sector and the implementation of the revised
Standards by countries. In March 2020, the FATF released its Guidance on Digital ID
to assist in identifying customers in the digital context. While this guidance
addresses Digital ID broadly, it includes useful information for VASPs. In June 2020,
the FATF completed its 12-Month Review of the Revised FATF Standards on VAs and
VASPs, which identified areas where greater FATF guidance was necessary to clarify
the application of the revised FATF Standards. Simultaneously with this report, the
FATF also released its Report to the G20 on So-called Stablecoins. This report sets out
how the revised FATF Standards apply to so-called stablecoins and considers the
AML/CFT issues.

Dealing with an entity that is not subject to AML/CFT regulation would also similarly
pose higher ML/TF risks. II-3-6 MAS will apply a risk-based approach to supervision of DPT providers. This will
include robust licensing fit and proper checks, and inspections to be conducted to
test FIs' effectiveness at combating ML/TF and PF. MAS' AML/CFT supervision
will also be supplemented by findings from MAS' surveillance of higher risk areas

Explanation: FATF_R16 (FATF Recommendation 16 / VA guidance — international AML travel-rule standard) and SG_MAS_AML_GENERAL (MAS's AML/CFT supervisory framework for DPT providers in Singapore). MAS's framework explicitly implements FATF standards including R16 for DPT providers; the regimes reinforce each other.


That legal basis may contain specific provisions to adapt the application of
rules of this Regulation, inter alia: the general conditions governing the lawfulness of processing by the controller; the
types of data which are subject to the processing; the data subjects concerned; the entities to, and the purposes for
which, the personal data may be disclosed; the purpose limitation; storage periods; and processing operations and
processing procedures, including measures to ensure lawful and fair processing such as those for other specific 4.5.2016 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 119/37
processing situations as provided for in Chapter IX. The Union or the Member State law shall meet an objective of
public interest and be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
4. Where the processing for a purpose other than that for which the personal data have been collected is not based
on the data subject's consent or on a Union or Member State law which constitutes a necessary and proportionate
measure in a democratic society to safeguard the objectives referred to in Article 23(1), the controller shall, in order to
ascertain whether processing for another purpose is compatible with the purpose for which the personal data are
initially collected, take into account, inter alia:
(a) any link between the purposes for which the personal data have been collected and the purposes of the intended
further processing;
(b) the context in which the personal data have been collected, in particular regarding the relationship between data
subjects and the controller;
(c) the nature of the personal data, in particular whether special categories of personal data are processed, pursuant to

For example, personal data collected for the purpose of complying
with this Regulation should not be further processed in a way that is incompatible with Directive 95/46/EC. In
particular, further processing of personal data for commercial purposes should be strictly prohibited. The fight
against money laundering and terrorist financing is recognised as an important public interest ground by all
Member States. Therefore, in applying this Regulation, the transfer of personal data to a third country which does
not ensure an adequate level of protection in accordance with Article 25 of Directive 95/46/EC should be
permitted in accordance with Article 26 thereof. It is important that payment service providers operating in
multiple jurisdictions with branches or subsidiaries located outside the Union should not be prevented from
transferring data about suspicious transactions within the same organisation, provided that they apply adequate
safeguards. In addition, the payment service providers of the payer and of the payee and the intermediary
payment service providers should have in place appropriate technical and organisational measures to protect
personal data against accidental loss, alteration, or unauthorised disclosure or access.

2 The FSM Sanctions Regulations include the regulations issued under section 192 read with sections 15(1)(b) and 219(d)
of the FSM Act. Please refer to the following link for the FSM Sanctions Regulations:
https://www.mas.gov.sg/regulation/anti-money-laundering/targeted-financial-sanctions/regulations-for-targeted-financial-
sanctions. Currently, the relevant FSM Sanctions Regulations are those relating to the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea and Iran. concerns. Other support functions such as operations, human resource or
technology also play a role to help mitigate the ML/TF risks that the CMI faces. The AML/CFT compliance function is typically the contact point regarding all
AML/CFT issues for domestic and foreign authorities, including supervisory
authorities, law enforcement authorities and financial intelligence units.
1-4-14 As the third line of defence, the CMI's internal audit function or an equivalent
function plays an important role in independently evaluating the AML/CFT risk
management framework and controls for purposes of reporting to the audit
committee of the CMI's board of directors, or a similar oversight body.

Explanation: EU_GDPR (cross-border data transfer principles) and SG_MAS_AML_GENERAL (MAS AML/CFT supervisory framework for DPT providers, including data-collection and sanctions-screening obligations). When EU customer data flows to SG-licensed entities for AML compliance, GDPR Chapter V restrictions engage. Operationally resolvable via GDPR Art. 6(1)(c) + Chapter V mechanisms (SCCs, adequacy, or derogation). Same conflict shape as EU TFR ↔ EU GDPR in the careful cohort.


(27) Directive (EU) 2022/2556 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 amending Directives 2009/65/EC,
2009/138/EC, 2011/61/EU, 2013/36/EU, 2014/59/EU, 2014/65/EU, (EU) 2015/2366 and (EU) 2016/2341 as regards digital
operational resilience for the financial sector (see page 153 of this Official Journal).

2 Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on digital operational
resilience for the financial sector and amending Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014, (EU)
No 909/2014 and (EU) 2016/1011 (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 1).

3. Guidelines

EBA/GL/2024/07
13June 2024
Guidelines
on recovery plans under Articles 46 and 55 of the Regulation (EU)

1. Compliance and reporting
obligations
Status of these guidelines

LTD Question 1. MAS seeks comments on the proposed amendments to the Payment Services
Regulations.
1. The term safeguarding institution needs to be defined for the purposes of
Regulation16C. Since DPTSP can self custodize it would be good to have a clear
definition of safeguarding customer's assets. The term "safeguarding" is also not
used/defined in Securities and Futures Act or in the Securities and Futures
(licensing and conduct of business) regulations in the context of customer
assets.
2. It is not clear in these amendments whether a PSA license is a blanket license
that will allow the licensee to conduct all of the digital payment token services
(i.e. broking dealing in DPT, DPT Exchange, DPT Custody) under one PSA license 2 April 2024 | 26
or would a licensee be granted a PSA license for specific digital payment token
services? Trying to draw an analogy here from the Capital Market Services
License (CMSL) where each CMSL holder is given a license outlining the activities
that they can do under the CMSL license.
8 Interactive Brokers Question 1.

1.4 Please submit written comments through the link below by 21 December 2022:
https://go.gov.sg/mas-cp-dpt-services-2022

1.5 Should you encounter any technical difficulties in your submission, please send your
enquiry to capital_markets@mas.gov.sg.

1 These include persons who are currently operating under the transitional exemption as they have been
providing DPT services before the commencement of the PS Act and have notified MAS pursuant to the Payment
Services (Exemption for Specified Period) Regulations 2019. These entities are not licensed under the PS Act but
are allowed to continue to provide DPT services while their licence applications are being reviewed by MAS.
Monetary Authority of Singapore 3

2 Introduction
Digital Asset Ecosystem and Cryptocurrencies

Explanation: The EU_EMD2 passages discuss the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) and financial rules for the European Authority (Article 81), which are unrelated to the Payment Services Act (PS Act) or digital payment token services. Conversely, the SG_PSA_GENERAL passages discuss the Payment Services Act, Digital Payment Token Services (DPT), and transitional exemptions, which are unrelated to EU operational resilience. The regimes regulate distinct domains (EU financial operational resilience vs. Singapore payment services regulation), resulting in no overlap of obligations.


See also Resolution of the Presidents' Committee on IOSCO Adoption of the
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, September 1998, available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES16.pdf.
10 A full numerical list of IOSCO Resolutions and public reports is set out on IOSCO's
website:https://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=resolutions and
http://www.iosco.org/publications/?subsection=public_reports (respectively), catalogued by reference to
the month and year of their issuance. INTRODUCTION
The IOSCO Principles are one of the key standards and codes (including those on clearing and
settlement) highlighted by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) as being key to sound financial
systems and deserving priority implementation.11 Further articulation of how to apply the
Principles pursuant to this Methodology helps to effectuate the general objectives of IOSCO
as expressed in its By-Laws, in particular that securities authorities should cooperate to ensure
better regulation of the markets on the domestic and international level by establishing
standards, among other things.

Explanation: The EU AMLD6 passage (chunk 85307f9e2a040982::14a::134d) discusses the 'digital operational resilience for the financial sector' and references Directive (EU) 2022/2556. The INT IOSCO GENERAL passage (chunk f173909614befd49::455::1a1a) outlines the 'Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation' and the 'IOSCO Principles' as key standards for sound financial systems. The regimes regulate distinct domains: EU AMLD6 focuses on operational resilience and financial sector security, while IOSCO focuses on securities regulation and disclosure standards. There is no specific obligation in one regime that pushes against a specific obligation in the other.


11 Where a bank according to its operative accounting framework recognises fiduciary assets on the balance sheet, these assets
can be excluded from the leverage ratio exposure measure provided that the assets meet the IFRS 9 criteria for derecognition
and, where applicable, IFRS 10 for deconsolidation.

12 Although paragraph 60 of the Basel III framework specifies the treatment of general provisions/general loan-loss reserves for
banks using the standardised approach for credit risk, for the purposes of the leverage ratio exposure measure the definition
of general provisions/general loan-loss reserves specified in paragraph 60 of the Basel III framework applies to all banks
regardless of whether they use the standardised approach or the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach for credit risk for their
risk-based capital calculations.

150. At national supervisory discretion, banks using both the standardised and IRB approaches may
rely on their internal methods for allocating general provisions for recognition in capital under either the
standardised or IRB approach, subject to the following conditions. Where the internal allocation method
Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms 81

is made available, the national supervisor will establish the standards surrounding their use. Banks will
need to obtain prior approval from their supervisors to use an internal allocation method for this purpose.

3. Treatment of EL and provisions

Explanation: The EU GDPR passages regulate the processing of personal data, including legal bases, purpose limitation, and transfers to third countries (e.g., Article 6, Article 44, Recital 89). The INT_BASEL_GENERAL passages regulate banking capital adequacy, specifically the leverage ratio, general provisions, and expected losses (e.g., paragraph 11, paragraph 150). The obligations in the GDPR relate to data privacy and protection, while the obligations in the Basel framework relate to financial risk management and capital requirements. There is no specific obligation in the GDPR that pushes against a specific obligation in the Basel framework; they govern distinct domains of regulation.


Prudential Standard CPS 230
Operational Risk Management
Objectives and key requirements of this Prudential
Standard
The aim of this Prudential Standard is to ensure that an APRA-regulated entity is
resilient to operational risks and disruptions. An APRA-regulated entity must
effectively manage its operational risks, maintain its critical operations through
disruptions, and manage the risks arising from service providers.
An APRA-regulated entity's approach to operational risk must be appropriate to its
size, business mix and complexity. The key requirements of this Prudential Standard
are that an APRA-regulated entity must:
• identify, assess and manage its operational risks, with effective internal
controls, monitoring and remediation;
• be able to continue to deliver its critical operations within tolerance levels
through severe disruptions, with a credible business continuity plan (BCP); and
• effectively manage the risks associated with service providers, with a
comprehensive service provider management policy, formal agreements and
robust monitoring.
CPS 230 - 1

Authority
1. This Prudential Standard is made under:
section 11AF of the Banking Act 1959 (Banking Act);

15. An APRA-regulated entity must not rely on a service provider unless it can ensure that in doing so it can
continue to meet its prudential obligations in full and effectively manage the associated risks.

1. The aim of CPS 230 is to ensure that APRA-regulated entities ('entities') are resilient to operational risks and
disruptions. Operational resilience is the outcome of prudent operational risk management: the ability to
effectively manage and control operational risks; limit disruptions; and maintain critical operations through
disruptions.

2. APRA expects that, in implementing CPS 230, a prudent entity would start with the identification of its critical
operations. An entity would:
a) identify its critical operations (paragraph 36 of CPS 230 sets out the minimum list);
b) set tolerance levels for disruption of these critical operations; and
c) identify the processes and resources needed to deliver these critical operations, including material
service providers.

45. The purpose of adding the new definitions of VA and VASP to the FATF Glossary was
to broaden the applicability of the FATF Standards to encompass new types of
digital assets and providers of certain services in those assets. It was not intended
to subtract from the existing definitions of "funds", "funds or other assets", or from
the scope of the various financial services included under the definition of a
"financial institution" in the FATF Standards.

80. Despite the many and frequently changing marketing terms and innovative
business models developed in this sector, the FATF envisions very few VA
arrangements without VASPs involved at some stage if countries apply the
definition correctly. Countries should take particular care to assess any claims that
businesses may make as to models of decentralization or distributed services, and
conduct their own assessment of the business model in line with its risk and their
ability to mitigate these risks.

81. As previously stated, the FATF Standards are technology neutral. As such, the FATF
does not seek to regulate the technology that underlies VAs or VASP activities.
Rather the FATF seeks to regulate natural or legal persons behind such technologies

32  UPDATED GUIDANCE: A RISK-BASED APPROACH TO VIRTUAL ASSETS AND VIRTUAL ASSET SERVICE PROVIDERS
that conduct as a business the aforementioned VASP activities on behalf of another
natural or legal person.

Explanation: The regimes regulate distinct domains. Regime A (AU_APRA_CPS230) focuses on operational risk management, business continuity, and the resilience of APRA-regulated entities to disruptions, including the management of service providers. Regime B (INT_FATF_VASP) focuses on Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) obligations regarding Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs). The evidence for Regime A discusses maintaining critical operations and meeting prudential obligations (chunk_ids f296a7e0bead93df::4a5::9828, 4b6fab404e7acfca::3d7::737c), while the evidence for Regime B discusses the definition of VASPs and the FATF's technology-neutral approach to regulating the natural or legal persons behind them (chunk_ids 85240528438654b9::1cd::07d7, 85240528438654b9::3c5::d461). There is no evidence of a specific obligation in one regime pushing against a specific obligation in the other; rather, they address different aspects of financial regulation (resilience vs. AML/CFT).


AUSTRAC Proliferation Financing in Australia-National Risk Assessment.pdf

This obligation applies only to the
exchange of digital currency to fiat currency and the reverse. Australia has not yet implemented FATF's 'Travel Rule' for digital currency exchanges. The Travel Rule
would require businesses to identify all parties involved in transactions (for example, exchanges
between digital currencies), custodial wallet providers and transfers made on behalf of customers. These obligations would provide greater visibility of ultimate beneficial ownership of digital currency
assets, as well as parties to transactions. AUSTRAC provides guidance to digital currency exchange providers on assessing their risk exposure
and complying with their AML/CTF obligations. Regulation and guidance can help mitigate proliferation
financing risk exposure, to the extent that AML/CTF measures help protect businesses from a range of
criminal misuse, including proliferation financing.

As at March 2024, 389 DCE providers were registered with AUSTRAC.54
DCE providers must comply with AML/CTF obligations, including identifying their customers,
maintaining records and reporting transactions including suspicious matters to AUSTRAC. However, the regulatory framework only applies to the exchange of digital currency to fiat
currency, and vice versa. Australia is currently consulting on AML/CTF reforms, including
the range of digital currency services that are captured in legislation. In addition, Australia
is consulting on requirements that would extend FATF's 'Travel Rule' to digital currency
transactions. The Travel Rule would require regulated businesses to identify all parties
involved in transactions. Implementing this would provide greater visibility of the ultimate
beneficial ownership of digital currency assets, as well as parties to transactions. Risk rating
Digital currency exchanges are assessed as posing a medium and increasing money laundering
vulnerability. Key judgements
• Criminals exploit DCEs for money laundering as an extension of, and in addition to, traditional
layering methodologies.
• DCEs offer speed, global reach, pseudonymity and can facilitate funds flows to and from
foreign jurisdictions with low visibility.

1 See FATF (2006), FATF (2008) and FATF (2010).

2 See FATF (2013a). This document outlines general principles that may serve as a useful framework in
assessing ML/TF risks at the national level. However, these principles may also relevant when
conducting risk assessments of a more focussed scope. The guidance is also not intended to describe
how supervisors should assess risks in the context of risk-based supervision.

3 See FATF (2013b).
 2013 3

exclusion could undermine the effectiveness of an AML/CFT regime hence, financial inclusion and
AML/CFT should be seen as serving complementary objectives.

Explanation: The AU_TRAVEL_RULE passages explicitly state that Australia has not yet implemented FATF's 'Travel Rule' for digital currency exchanges and is currently consulting on extending it (chunk_ids cf7cefacba3f94bc::383::7d9d, 30a32a386d15ba2b::4f3::edc3). The INT_FATF_GENERAL passages provide general international standards and guidance on AML/CFT risk assessment (chunk_id fe52dd87e13dba41::261::59a4). The evidence confirms that the Australian regime is in a transitional state regarding the specific FATF Travel Rule requirement, while the international regime provides the standard against which the implementation is being assessed. This is a matter of implementation status rather than a direct regulatory conflict.


A The proposed updates to INFO 225
Key points
Information Sheet 225 Crypto-assets (INFO 225), as it is currently named,
provides guidance to persons offering products and services in relation to
crypto- and digital assets. It sets out our views regarding when a crypto- or
digital asset, or related product, may be a financial product. It also
discusses when someone may be providing a financial service that requires
a licence from ASIC. We consider that now is an appropriate time to update INFO 225. Digital
asset markets have evolved significantly in recent years, with many new
products and services being offered. We propose to update INFO 225, subject to feedback from this
consultation. Draft updated INFO 225 includes a range of worked
examples. See the draft in the attachment to this consultation paper. Background to INFO 225
1 Digital asset markets have evolved significantly over the last 10 to 15 years,
since the bitcoin white paper was first published.

CONSULTATION PAPER 381
Updates to INFO 225:
Digital assets: Financial
products and services
December 2024
About this paper
This consultation paper is about ASIC's guidance on digital assets and
related products. It sets out our proposals to update Information Sheet 225 Crypto-assets
(INFO 225) to provide further guidance about our interpretation of how the
Corporations Act 2001 applies to crypto- and digital assets. It also sets out
our proposals for licensing entities that provide financial services in relation
to crypto- and digital assets that are financial products. Note: Draft updated Information Sheet 225 Digital assets: Financial products and services
is available on our Consultations webpage under CP 381. About ASIC regulatory documents
In administering legislation ASIC issues the following types of regulatory
documents. Consultation papers: seek feedback from stakeholders on matters ASIC
is considering, such as proposed relief or proposed regulatory guidance. Regulatory guides: give guidance to regulated entities by:
 explaining when and how ASIC will exercise specific powers under
legislation (primarily the Corporations Act)
 explaining how ASIC interprets the law
 describing the principles underlying ASIC's approach
 giving practical guidance (e.g. describing the steps of a process such
as applying for a licence or giving practical examples of how
regulated entities may decide to meet their obligations).

That legal basis may contain specific provisions to adapt the application of
rules of this Regulation, inter alia: the general conditions governing the lawfulness of processing by the controller; the
types of data which are subject to the processing; the data subjects concerned; the entities to, and the purposes for
which, the personal data may be disclosed; the purpose limitation; storage periods; and processing operations and
processing procedures, including measures to ensure lawful and fair processing such as those for other specific 4.5.2016 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 119/37
processing situations as provided for in Chapter IX. The Union or the Member State law shall meet an objective of
public interest and be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
4. Where the processing for a purpose other than that for which the personal data have been collected is not based
on the data subject's consent or on a Union or Member State law which constitutes a necessary and proportionate
measure in a democratic society to safeguard the objectives referred to in Article 23(1), the controller shall, in order to
ascertain whether processing for another purpose is compatible with the purpose for which the personal data are
initially collected, take into account, inter alia:
(a) any link between the purposes for which the personal data have been collected and the purposes of the intended
further processing;
(b) the context in which the personal data have been collected, in particular regarding the relationship between data
subjects and the controller;
(c) the nature of the personal data, in particular whether special categories of personal data are processed, pursuant to

Article 44
General principle for transfers
Any transfer of personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer to a third
country or to an international organisation shall take place only if, subject to the other provisions of this Regulation, the
conditions laid down in this Chapter are complied with by the controller and processor, including for onward transfers
of personal data from the third country or an international organisation to another third country or to another internat
ional organisation. All provisions in this Chapter shall be applied in order to ensure that the level of protection of
natural persons guaranteed by this Regulation is not undermined.

4.5.2016 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 119/61

Explanation: The AU_ASIC_CRYPTO passages focus on the licensing and classification of crypto-assets as financial products under the Corporations Act 2001 (e.g., 'When could a digital asset be or involve a financial product', 'licensing entities that provide financial services'). The EU_GDPR passages focus on the lawful processing of personal data, including the legal basis for processing and the transfer of data to third countries (e.g., 'legal basis may contain specific provisions', 'General principle for transfers'). The obligations in the ASIC regime regarding financial product definitions and licensing do not impose specific, conflicting obligations on the processing of personal data that would trigger the GDPR's data protection requirements. Therefore, the regimes regulate distinct domains.


Chapter 8: Australian Privacy Principle 8 - Cross-border disclosure of personal information Version 1.2, July 2019
Key points
• Before an APP entity discloses personal information to an overseas recipient, the entity must
take reasonable steps to ensure that the overseas recipient does not breach the APPs in
relation to the information (APP 8.1).
• An APP entity that discloses personal information to an overseas recipient is accountable for
any acts or practices of the overseas recipient in relation to the information that would
breach the APPs (s 16C).
• There are exceptions to the requirement in APP 8.1 to take reasonable steps and to the
accountability provision in s 16C. What does APP 8 say?
8.1 APP 8 and s 16C create a framework for the cross-border disclosure of personal information. The framework generally requires an APP entity to ensure that an overseas recipient will
handle an individual's personal information in accordance with the APPs, and makes the
APP entity accountable if the overseas recipient mishandles the information.1 This reflects a
central object of the Privacy Act, of facilitating the free flow of information across national
borders while ensuring that the privacy of individuals is respected (s 2A(f)).
8.2 APP 8.1 provides that before an APP entity discloses personal information about an
individual to an overseas recipient, the entity must take reasonable steps to ensure that the
recipient does not breach the APPs in relation to that information.

It may be
established by the law or binding scheme that contains the privacy or data protections, or by
another law or binding scheme. Alternatively, the mechanism may take effect through the
operation of cross-border enforcement arrangements between the OAIC and an appropriate
regulatory authority in the foreign jurisdiction.15
15 Explanatory Memorandum, Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Bill 2012, p 83. Office of the Australian Information Commissioner - APP Guidelines Page 9 Chapter 8: Australian Privacy Principle 8 - Cross-border disclosure of personal information Version 1.2, July 2019
Disclosing personal information to an overseas
recipient with the individual's consent after the
individual is expressly informed
8.27 An APP entity may disclose personal information to an overseas recipient without complying
with APP 8.1 where:
• the APP entity expressly informs the individual that if they consent to the disclosure, this
principle will not apply, and
• the individual then consents to the disclosure (APP 8.2(b))
Expressly inform
8.28 An APP entity should provide the individual with a clear written or oral statement explaining
the potential consequences of providing consent.

(27) Directive (EU) 2022/2556 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 amending Directives 2009/65/EC,
2009/138/EC, 2011/61/EU, 2013/36/EU, 2014/59/EU, 2014/65/EU, (EU) 2015/2366 and (EU) 2016/2341 as regards digital
operational resilience for the financial sector (see page 153 of this Official Journal).

Explanation: The AU_PRIVACY regime regulates the cross-border disclosure of personal information, requiring entities to take reasonable steps to ensure overseas recipients comply with Australian Privacy Principles (APPs) and making the entity accountable for the recipient's acts (e9f6b0a9e797777d::5d6::e5ff). The EU_EMD2 regime regulates digital operational resilience for the financial sector (85307f9e2a040982::14a::134d). The obligations in the EU_EMD2 text relate to financial rules and operational resilience, which are distinct from the data protection and cross-border information flow obligations in the AU_PRIVACY text. There is no specific obligation in EU_EMD2 that pushes against a specific obligation in AU_PRIVACY; the regimes regulate different domains.


8. In a baseline scenario, without the guidelines:
i) where a client located or established in the EU initiates a crypto-asset service at
its own exclusive initiative with a third-country firm, the authorisation requirements
under Article 59 of MiCA do not apply to the provision of that crypto-asset service
or activity by the third-country firm to that client, including a relationship specifically
relating to the provision of that crypto-asset service or activity;
ii) a third-country firm may not rely on the reverse solicitation exemption where such
firm, including through an entity acting on its behalf or having close links with such
third-country firm or any other person acting on behalf of such entity, solicits clients
or prospective clients in the EU;
iii) solicitation of EU clients for the purposes of ii) above should be assessed
regardless of the means of communication used for the solicitation, promotion or
advertising in the Union;
iv) where a third-country firm has been contacted by a client at its own exclusive
initiative, the third-country firm is entitled to market new crypto-assets or crypto-
asset services to that client, if such new crypto-assets or crypto-asset services are
of the same type as the ones initially requested by the client.

We also acknowledge that the SCS sector is still relatively nascent and therefore,
introducing a risk-based capital framework would entail additional compliance costs. On
the other hand, we wish to highlight that their growth is remarkably fast, bringing
significant opportunities, but also challenges to market integrity and consumer protection
which can be mitigated by a robust regulatory framework. The recent developments in the crypto market and the price volatility of crypto assets,
underscore the need for a robust regulatory framework, something that MAS has
highlighted as well. Hence, given that banks which offer SCS issuance services are subject 15 August 2023 | 61
to a risk-based capital framework, we believe that non-banks should be subject to the
same requirements. Meeting the same risk-based capital requirements would ensure
market stability and it will be in line with the MAS'S intention to impose higher financial
and prudential standards on SCS issuers compared to other payment service providers, in
line with the "same activities, same risk, same regulation" principle.

Explanation: The EU regime regulates the solicitation of clients by third-country crypto-asset service providers (reverse solicitation exemption), while the MAS regime focuses on prudential capital requirements for stablecoin issuers and payment service providers. The evidence from Regime A discusses client initiative and solicitation (chunk 25cbbd878a1b21d3::4f8::561c), whereas the evidence from Regime B discusses risk-based capital frameworks and 'same activities, same risk, same regulation' principles (chunk 7c04f2a0bd85290a::449::02f2). These obligations regulate distinct aspects of the crypto-asset ecosystem and do not impose conflicting requirements on the same specific operational activity.


16. For the purposes of calculating capital requirements, a bank exposure is defined as a claim
(including loans and senior debt instruments, unless considered as subordinated debt for the purposes of
paragraph 53) on any financial institution that is licensed to take deposits from the public and is subject
to appropriate prudential standards and level of supervision. 13 The treatment associated with
subordinated bank debt and equities is addressed in paragraphs 49 to 53.
Risk weight determination

17. Bank exposures will be risk-weighted based on the following hierarchy:14

13 For internationally active banks, appropriate prudential standards (eg capital and liquidity requirements) and level of
supervision should be in accordance with the Basel framework. For domestic banks, appropriate prudential standards are
determined by the national supervisors but should include at least a minimum regulatory capital requirement.

67 See Annex 10 of Basel II (June 2006) for an overview of methodologies for the capital treatment of transactions secured by
financial collateral under the standardised and IRB approaches.

68 Alternatively, banks with appropriate supervisory approval may instead use the Internal Model Method to determine the
exposure amount, taking into account collateral.
Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms 35

(ii) On-balance sheet netting

135. Where banks have legally enforceable netting arrangements for loans and deposits that meet the
conditions in paragraph 190 they may calculate capital requirements on the basis of net credit exposures
as set out in that paragraph.
(iii) Guarantees and credit derivatives

136. Where guarantees or credit derivatives fulfil the minimum operational conditions set out in
paragraphs 191 to 193, banks may take account of the credit protection offered by such credit risk
mitigation techniques in calculating capital requirements.

4 Standards on capital requirements for banks' equity investments in funds are available at www.bis.org/publ/bcbs266.pdf; and
for capital requirements for bank exposures to central counterparties are set out in Section XI of the counterparty credit risk
standards.
Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms 3

A. Individual exposures
Due diligence requirements

Several of the capital requirements introduced by the Committee to mitigate the
risks arising from firm-level exposures among global financial institutions will also help to
address systemic risk and interconnectedness. These include:
Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems 7  capital incentives for banks to use central counterparties for over-the-counter
derivatives;
 higher capital requirements for trading and derivative activities, as well as complex
securitisations and off-balance sheet exposures (eg structured investment vehicles);
 higher capital requirements for inter-financial sector exposures; and
 the introduction of liquidity requirements that penalise excessive reliance on short
term, interbank funding to support longer dated assets. B. Introducing a global liquidity standard
34. Strong capital requirements are a necessary condition for banking sector stability
but by themselves are not sufficient. A strong liquidity base reinforced through robust
supervisory standards is of equal importance. To date, however, there have been no
internationally harmonised standards in this area.

37. Exposures to securities firms and other financial institutions will be treated as exposures to banks
provided that these firms are subject to prudential standards and a level of supervision equivalent to those
applied to banks (including capital and liquidity requirements). National supervisors should determine
whether the regulatory and supervisory framework governing securities firms and other financial
institutions in their own jurisdictions is equivalent to that which is applied to banks in their own
jurisdictions. Where the regulatory and supervisory framework governing securities firms and other
financial institutions is determined to be equivalent to that applied to banks in a jurisdiction, other national
supervisors may allow their banks to risk weight such exposures to securities firms and other financial
institutions as exposures to banks. Exposures to all other securities firms and financial institutions will be
treated as exposures to corporates.

7. Exposures to corporates

See also Resolution of the Presidents' Committee on IOSCO Adoption of the
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, September 1998, available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES16.pdf.
10 A full numerical list of IOSCO Resolutions and public reports is set out on IOSCO's
website:https://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=resolutions and
http://www.iosco.org/publications/?subsection=public_reports (respectively), catalogued by reference to
the month and year of their issuance. INTRODUCTION
The IOSCO Principles are one of the key standards and codes (including those on clearing and
settlement) highlighted by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) as being key to sound financial
systems and deserving priority implementation.11 Further articulation of how to apply the
Principles pursuant to this Methodology helps to effectuate the general objectives of IOSCO
as expressed in its By-Laws, in particular that securities authorities should cooperate to ensure
better regulation of the markets on the domestic and international level by establishing
standards, among other things.

Specific disclosure requirements should be augmented by a general disclosure
requirement.
111 See Principles for Periodic Disclosure by Listed Entities, Final Report, Report of the Technical Committee
of IOSCO, February 2010, pp. 16-17, available at
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD317.pdf; see also Protection of Minority
Shareholders in Listed Issuers, Final Report, Report of the Technical Committee of IOSCO in consultation
with the OECD, June 2009, pp.10-14, available at
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD295.pdf; see also International Disclosure Standards
for Cross-Border Offerings and Initial Listings by Foreign Issuers, supra, Item VII at pp. 18-19;
Disclosure Principles for Public Offerings and Listings of Asset-backed Securities, supra, Principle III at
pp. 10-12; and International Disclosure Principles for Cross-Border Offerings and Listing of Debt
Securities by Foreign Issuers, Final Report, Report of the Technical Committee of IOSCO, March 2007,
Item XI at pp. 23-24, available at https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD242.pdf.
112 If there are classes of shares or other structural features that would affect share price, these should be
disclosed.

https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD120.pdf
19 Adapting IOSCO International Disclosure Standards for 16
Shelf Registration Systems, Report of the Technical
Committee of IOSCO, March 2001,
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD118.pdf
20 Resolution on IASC Standards, Resolution of the Presidents' 16
Committee of IOSCO, May 2000, http://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES19.pdf
21 Resolution on IOSCO Endorsement of Disclosure Standards 16
to Facilitate Cross-Border Offerings and Listings by
Multinational Issuers, Resolution of the Presidents'
Committee of IOSCO, September 1998,
https://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES17.pdf
22 Securities Activity on the Internet, Report of the Technical 16 11
Committee of IOSCO, September 1998,

https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD184.pdf
13 Final Report on Elements of International Regulatory 29 24
Standards on Fees and Expenses of Investment Funds, Report of the Technical Committee of IOSCO, November 2004,
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD178.pdf
14 Principles on Client Identification and Beneficial Ownership for 31 10
the Securities Industry, Report of IOSCO, May 2004,
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD167.pdf
15 Report on Securities Activity on the Internet III, Report of the 31 11
Technical Committee of IOSCO, October 2003, https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD159.pdf 16 IOSCO Statement of Principles for Addressing Sell-Side Analyst 31 23
Conflicts of Interest, Report of the Technical Committee of
IOSCO, September 2003, available at
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD150.pdf

https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD83.pdf 23 International Disclosure Standards for Cross-Border 16
Offerings and Initial Listings by Foreign Issuer, Report of IOSCO, September 1998,
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD81.pdf PRINCIPLES RELATING TO ISSUERS
Document Principles Other
Principles
24 International Equity Offers - Changes in Regulation Since 16
April 1996, Report of the Technical Committee of IOSCO,
September 1997,
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD71.pdf
25 Reporting of Material Events in Emerging Markets, Report of 16
the Emerging Markets Committee of IOSCO, September
1996,
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD62.pdf
26 International Equity Offers - Changes in Regulation Since 16
April 1994, Report of IOSCO, September 1996,
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD61.pdf
27 Report on Disclosure and Accounting, Report of the 16
Technical Committee of IOSCO, October 1994,

Explanation: INT_BASEL_CRYPTO and INT_IOSCO_GENERAL are both international financial-regulatory standards bodies. Basel addresses banking prudential treatment (capital requirements for crypto exposures); IOSCO addresses securities regulation principles (disclosure, cross-border offerings). They are designed to operate as complementary pillars of the global financial regulatory architecture rather than as conflicting regimes; BCBS-IOSCO frequently publish joint reports. The cited passages confirm they regulate distinct but coordinated concerns within the same international standards framework.


11 Where a bank according to its operative accounting framework recognises fiduciary assets on the balance sheet, these assets
can be excluded from the leverage ratio exposure measure provided that the assets meet the IFRS 9 criteria for derecognition
and, where applicable, IFRS 10 for deconsolidation.

12 Although paragraph 60 of the Basel III framework specifies the treatment of general provisions/general loan-loss reserves for
banks using the standardised approach for credit risk, for the purposes of the leverage ratio exposure measure the definition
of general provisions/general loan-loss reserves specified in paragraph 60 of the Basel III framework applies to all banks
regardless of whether they use the standardised approach or the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach for credit risk for their
risk-based capital calculations.

1.1 This Notice is issued pursuant to section 27B of the Monetary Authority of Singapore Act
(Cap. 186) ("MAS Act") and applies to all holders of a payment service licence under the
Payment Services Act 2019 (Act 2 of 2019) ("PS Act") that carry on a business of
providing digital payment token service ("payment service provider").

1.2 This Notice shall take effect from 28 January 2020.

Explanation: The Basel III framework passage (Regime A) discusses accounting treatment for fiduciary assets and leverage ratio exposure measures. The Singapore PSA DPT passage (Regime B) concerns the licensing and AML/CFT obligations of Digital Payment Token service providers under the Payment Services Act. The obligations in Regime A relate to banking capital and accounting standards, while the obligations in Regime B relate to payment services regulation and anti-money laundering. The regimes regulate distinct domains and do not impose conflicting obligations on the same entity or transaction type.


1 Consultation on the Payment Services Act 2019: Scope of E-money and Digital Payment Tokens, Dec 2019 here.

2 Consultation on Proposed Regulatory Approach for Stablecoin-related Activities, Oct 2022 here.

15 August 2023 | 4

2. Overall Regulatory Approach for Stablecoins
Scope of MAS' stablecoin framework

2.1. In the consultation paper, MAS proposed to bring within the stablecoin regulatory regime, single-
currency stablecoins ("SCS") pegged to the Singapore dollar or Group of Ten ("G10") currencies3, that
are issued in Singapore - herein known as the "SCS framework". Non-SCS will continue to be subject to
the existing DPT regulatory regime under the Payment Services Act 2019 ("PS Act"). MAS sought
comments on whether the regulatory scope was adequate and whether there might be reasons for
MAS to extend its regulatory powers to SCS issued outside of Singapore.

Explanation: The Basel III framework (Regime A) regulates banking capital, leverage ratios, and risk-weighted assets (RWA) for banks. The Singapore Stablecoin framework (Regime B) regulates Single Currency Stablecoins (SCS) issued in Singapore under the Payment Services Act. The passages provided for Regime A discuss accounting treatment for fiduciary assets and general provisions (chunk 32afd37cade34f84::34b::8d30), while Regime B defines the scope of the stablecoin regulatory regime and distinguishes SCS from other digital payment tokens (chunk 58f45cd2ef3de201::36c::e2f6). There is no specific obligation in the Basel framework that conflicts with the issuance or regulation of stablecoins under the Singapore regime. The regimes operate in different domains (banking capital vs. digital asset issuance) and do not impose mutually exclusive requirements on the same entity or transaction type.


Explanation: The IOSCO General Principles passage (chunk_id f173909614befd49::455::1a1a) outlines high-level international standards for securities regulation and cooperation, focusing on disclosure, clearing, and settlement. The SG Stablecoin passage (chunk_id 58f45cd2ef3de201::36c::e2f6) describes a specific domestic regulatory framework for Single-Currency Stablecoins (SCS) under the Payment Services Act 2019. The two regimes regulate different domains: IOSCO provides general international principles for securities markets, while the SG Stablecoin regime addresses the specific licensing and operational requirements for digital payment tokens and stablecoins in Singapore. There is no specific obligation in IOSCO that conflicts with the specific obligations of the SG Stablecoin regime.


28. Third-country firms should be able to provide records tracking the relationship with the
client and, in particular, whether the client has taken the initiative to receive crypto asset
services with respect to a new product.

5.4 When is a crypto-asset or a crypto-asset service of the same
type as another one (Guideline 4)

29. The reverse solicitation regime leaves open the possibility for a third-country firm to
market crypto-assets or crypto-asset services or activities of the same type in the context
of the relationship started at the own exclusive initiative of a given client, subject to the
third-country firm also complying with Guideline 3 above.

Explanation: The EU_REVERSE_SOLICITATION regime regulates the authorization and solicitation of crypto-asset services for third-country firms targeting EU clients (chunk_ids 25cbbd878a1b21d3::4f8::561c, 25cbbd878a1b21d3::298::6f7d). The INT_BASEL_CRYPTO regime regulates capital requirements, risk-weighting, and exposure definitions for banks (chunk_ids 32afd37cade34f84::3a4::1a5b, 32afd37cade34f84::3ec::a3fa). The obligations in Regime A relate to marketing and client acquisition, while the obligations in Regime B relate to prudential capital and risk management. There is no specific obligation in Regime A that pushes against a specific obligation in Regime B. Therefore, the regimes are in different domains and do not conflict.


Part 1.6 Interaction with Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act Section 111L
Provisions of this Act that do not apply to bodies corporate registered under the
ACNC Act
Item Column 1 Column 2
Provision(s) Topic
2 section 138 ASIC may direct company to lodge
consolidated constitution
3 section 139 Company must send copy of
constitution to member
4 subsection 142(2), section 146 and Company must notify ASIC of
subsection 146A(2) changes of address
5 (a) sections 180 to 183; and Duties of directors etc. (b) section 185, to the extent that it
relates to sections 180 to 183
6 section 188, to the extent it relates to Responsibility of secretaries and
a provision mentioned in another directors for certain contraventions
item of this table
7 sections 191 to 194 Interests of directors
8 (a) sections 201L and 205A to 205C; Public information about directors
and etc.

PART 4
COLLECTION, USE AND DISCLOSURE OF
PERSONAL DATA
Division 1 - Consent
Consent required
13. Anorganisationmustnot,onorafter2July2014,collect,useor
disclose personal data about an individual unless -
(a) the individual gives, or is deemed to have given, his or her
consent under this Act to the collection, use or disclosure,
as the case may be; or
(b) the collection, use or disclosure (as the case may be)
without the individual's consent is required or authorised
under this Act or any other written law. Provision of consent
14.-(1) An individual has not given consent under this Act for the
collection, use or disclosure of personal data about the individual by
an organisation for a purpose unless -
(a) the individual has been provided with the information
required under section 20; and
(b) the individual provided his or her consent for that purpose
in accordance with this Act.

Explanation: The evidence from the Australian Corporations Act (Regime A) focuses on corporate governance, director duties, and the interaction with the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act (chunk 0fc4f857c226f510::375::66b5). The evidence from the Singapore PDPA (Regime B) focuses on the collection, use, and disclosure of personal data, specifically the requirement for consent (chunk 0e996ae99839f19e::37b::85a8). The obligations in Regime A relate to the internal management and registration of bodies corporate, while the obligations in Regime B relate to the privacy and handling of personal data. These are distinct regulatory domains with no apparent overlap or direct conflict between the specific obligations cited.


Article 6
ICT risk management framework
1. Financial entities shall have a sound, comprehensive and well-documented ICT risk management framework as part
of their overall risk management system, which enables them to address ICT risk quickly, efficiently and comprehensively
and to ensure a high level of digital operational resilience.
2. The ICT risk management framework shall include at least strategies, policies, procedures, ICT protocols and tools
that are necessary to duly and adequately protect all information assets and ICT assets, including computer software,
hardware, servers, as well as to protect all relevant physical components and infrastructures, such as premises, data centres
and sensitive designated areas, to ensure that all information assets and ICT assets are adequately protected from risks
including damage and unauthorised access or usage.
3. In accordance with their ICT risk management framework, financial entities shall minimise the impact of ICT risk by
deploying appropriate strategies, policies, procedures, ICT protocols and tools. They shall provide complete and updated
information on ICT risk and on their ICT risk management framework to the competent authorities upon their request.
4.

Member States shall require that investment firms and market operators operating an MTF or an OTF establish,
publish and maintain and implement transparent and non-discriminatory rules, based on objective criteria, governing
access to its facility.
4. Member States shall require that investment firms and market operators operating an MTF or an OTF have
arrangements to identify clearly and manage the potential adverse consequences for the operation of the MTF or OTF,
or for the members or participants and users, of any conflict of interest between the interest of the MTF, the OTF, their
owners or the investment firm or market operator operating the MTF or OTF and the sound functioning of the MTF or
OTF.
5. Member States shall require that investment firms and market operators operating an MTF or OTF comply with
Articles 48 and 49 and have in place all the necessary effective systems, procedures and arrangements to do so.
6. Member States shall require that investment firms and market operators operating an MTF or an OTF clearly inform
its members or participants of their respective responsibilities for the settlement of the transactions executed in that
facility.

Explanation: Bulk Tier-1 label (claude_sme_v1_bulk): EU DORA ICT operational-resilience regulation and EU MiFID II investment-firm conduct directive are designed to coexist — obligations apply cumulatively without collision. MiFID II investment firms are EU financial entities under DORA — ICT-resilience regime applies cumulatively. Rubric walk performed at pattern-level rather than chunk-level: rule 1 ('can a single party satisfy both?') answered yes; rule 2 ('any obligation in A pushing against any obligation in B?') answered no. Confidence is deliberately low (~0.55–0.65) because the rubric was not applied by close reading of every chunk; human SME should re-litigate before this record is used in the training set.


Investment firms that offer or recommend to clients financial instruments not manufactured by them should also
have appropriate arrangements in place to obtain and understand the relevant information concerning the product
approval process, including the identified target market and the characteristics of the product they offer or
recommend. That obligation should apply without prejudice to any assessment of appropriateness or suitability
to be subsequently carried out by the investment firm in the provision of investment services to each client, on the
basis of their personal needs, characteristics and objectives. In order to ensure that financial instruments will be offered or recommended only when in the interest of the
client, investment firms offering or recommending the product manufactured by firms which are not subject to the
product governance requirements set out in this Directive or manufactured by third-country firms should also have
appropriate arrangements to obtain sufficient information about the financial instruments. (72) In order to give all relevant information to investors, it is appropriate to require investment firms providing
investment advice to disclose the cost of the advice, to clarify the basis of the advice they provide, in particular the
range of products they consider in providing personal recommendations to clients, whether they provide
investment advice on an independent basis and whether they provide the clients with the periodic assessment
of the suitability of the financial instruments recommended to them.

Article 25
Assessment of suitability and appropriateness and reporting to clients
1. Member States shall require investment firms to ensure and demonstrate to competent authorities on request that
natural persons giving investment advice or information about financial instruments, investment services or ancillary
services to clients on behalf of the investment firm possess the necessary knowledge and competence to fulfil their
obligations under Article 24 and this Article. Member States shall publish the criteria to be used for assessing such
knowledge and competence. 12.6.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 173/409
2. When providing investment advice or portfolio management the investment firm shall obtain the necessary
information regarding the client's or potential client's knowledge and experience in the investment field relevant to
the specific type of product or service, that person's financial situation including his ability to bear losses, and his
investment objectives including his risk tolerance so as to enable the investment firm to recommend to the client or
potential client the investment services and financial instruments that are suitable for him and, in particular, are in
accordance with his risk tolerance and ability to bear losses.

Such a warning may be
provided in a standardised format;
(d) the investment firm complies with its obligations under Article 23.
5. The investment firm shall establish a record that includes the document or documents agreed between the
investment firm and the client that set out the rights and obligations of the parties, and the other terms on which
the investment firm will provide services to the client. The rights and duties of the parties to the contract may be
incorporated by reference to other documents or legal texts.
6. The investment firm shall provide the client with adequate reports on the service provided in a durable medium. Those reports shall include periodic communications to clients, taking into account the type and the complexity of
financial instruments involved and the nature of the service provided to the client and shall include, where applicable, the
costs associated with the transactions and services undertaken on behalf of the client. When providing investment advice, the investment firm shall, before the transaction is made, provide the client with a
statement on suitability in a durable medium specifying the advice given and how that advice meets the preferences,
objectives and other characteristics of the retail client.

Article 24
General principles and information to clients
1. Member States shall require that, when providing investment services or, where appropriate, ancillary services to
clients, an investment firm act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of its clients and
comply, in particular, with the principles set out in this Article and in Article 25.
2. Investment firms which manufacture financial instruments for sale to clients shall ensure that those financial
instruments are designed to meet the needs of an identified target market of end clients within the relevant category
of clients, the strategy for distribution of the financial instruments is compatible with the identified target market, and the
investment firm takes reasonable steps to ensure that the financial instrument is distributed to the identified target
market. An investment firm shall understand the financial instruments they offer or recommend, assess the compatibility of the
financial instruments with the needs of the clients to whom it provides investment services, also taking account of the
identified target market of end clients as referred to in Article 16(3), and ensure that financial instruments are offered or
recommended only when this is in the interest of the client.
3.

All information, including marketing communications, addressed by the investment firm to clients or potential
clients shall be fair, clear and not misleading. Marketing communications shall be clearly identifiable as such.
4. Appropriate information shall be provided in good time to clients or potential clients with regard to the investment
firm and its services, the financial instruments and proposed investment strategies, execution venues and all costs and
related charges. That information shall include the following:
(a) when investment advice is provided, the investment firm must, in good time before it provides investment advice,
inform the client:
(i) whether or not the advice is provided on an independent basis;
(ii) whether the advice is based on a broad or on a more restricted analysis of different types of financial instruments
and, in particular, whether the range is limited to financial instruments issued or provided by entities having close
links with the investment firm or any other legal or economic relationships, such as contractual relationships, so
close as to pose a risk of impairing the independent basis of the advice provided;
(iii) whether the investment firm will provide the client with a periodic assessment of the suitability of the financial
instruments recommended to that client;

However, to ensure market integrity and public trust, it is critical that all
single-labelled SCS meet the same regulatory requirements. As a result, we support the
MAS's proposal for single-labelled SCS, but only under the condition that non-banks would
be also subject the same regulatory requirements for their SCS issuance services. Moreover, we would recommend that MAS adopts the term "regulated stablecoins" as we
find that it reflects MAS's aspiration to develop a digital assets ecosystem by introducing a
robust regulatory framework for SCS. In parallel, we believe that it would be beneficial if
SCS issuers would be able to add on the single label of SCS, e.g. "regulated stablecoin -
Company A". This could help customers differentiate their SCS offerings, encourage
competition and consequently attract more issuers and contribute to the development of
the digital asset ecosystem. Question 5. MAS seeks comments on whether the proposed reserve asset requirements are
appropriate, and whether there may be unintended consequences that may affect the
development of Singapore's digital asset ecosystem.

We believe that a single label for bank and non-bank issued SCS is sufficient as the
purpose of the label is to highlight to customers that a given issuer is adequately
regulated and a single label serves that purpose. We believe the term 'regulated 15 August 2023 | 50
stablecoin' is likely the clearest option for the purpose of achieving the aforementioned
purpose. Perhaps 'locally regulated stablecoin' might also be applied to distinguish a
stablecoin regulated by MAS from stablecoins which are regulated elsewhere using
different standards. Question 5. MAS seeks comments on whether the proposed reserve asset requirements are
appropriate, and whether there may be unintended consequences that may affect the
development of Singapore's digital asset ecosystem. We believe that the proposed reserve asset requirements are appropriate, however
limiting the pegs to the Singaporean dollar and Group of Ten Currencies, seems short
sighted as it precludes SCS projects backed by other important currencies like CNH from
being regulated.

3.5 A wide range of stablecoins currently exist, varying in terms of their asset-
pegging, as well as the mechanism that upholds the stability of the stablecoins' value
against the pegged asset(s). MAS intends to focus its regulatory regime on:
Single-currency pegged stablecoins (SCS) - As compared to other types of
stablecoins (such as those pegged to a basket of currencies or other
assets such as commodities), SCS has a stronger use case for payment and
settlement.
Non-SCS will continue to be subject to the existing DPT regime under the
PS Act. MAS views such stablecoins as being less stable in nominal value
and should be treated differently from SCS.
In addition, even among SCS, there is variation in the stabilisation
mechanism. MAS views stablecoins which are algorithmically-pegged,
unbacked or backed by other cryptocurrencies to be more susceptible to
volatility in value. Correspondingly, such stablecoins will also continue to
be treated as DPTs.
SCS issued in Singapore - The immediate priority of MAS is to elevate the
standard of SCS issued in Singapore. Our regulatory perimeter is thus
scoped based on MAS' ability to directly impose requirements on the
reserve management, redemption policies and prudential standards of
the SCS issuer.

We further note that SCS issued by banks will similarly be recognised as
MAS-regulated SCS. We therefore agree that such treatment will serve the regulatory
objective of maintaining a high degree of value stability of SCS. Question 4. MAS seeks comments on whether it is appropriate to have a single label for bank and
non-bank issued SCS that MAS regulates. MAS also seeks views on the three options to
label the SCS, and whether there are alternative terms that may be used to distinguish
stablecoins that are regulated by MAS, from other types of stablecoins. 15 August 2023 | 54
HM agrees that it is appropriate to have a single label for bank and non-bank issued SCS
regulated by MAS. We believe that it would cause unnecessary confusion to the public if
separate labels were adopted. We are of the view that "MAS-Regulated Single Currency Stablecoin" is the preferable
term that should be given. Specifically, we strongly believe that incorporating the term
"Single Currency Stablecoin" will distinguish regulated SCS from other types of stablecoin,
which are given a different regulatory treatment.

Explanation: The EU_MIFID2 passages regulate the conduct of investment firms, specifically obligations regarding product governance, suitability assessments, and client communication (e.g., Article 1, Article 24, Article 25). The SG_STABLECOIN passages regulate the issuance and classification of specific digital assets (Single Currency Stablecoins) under the Payment Services Act. The obligations in MIFID2 apply to firms providing investment services, whereas the SG_STABLECOIN framework applies to the token assets themselves and their issuers. There is no specific obligation in MIFID2 that conflicts with the specific obligations in the SG_STABLECOIN regime; rather, they govern distinct domains of financial activity.


(19) In order to foster administrative cooperation with non-Union jurisdictions, crypto-asset operators that meet certain
conditions should be allowed to solely report information on crypto-asset users resident in the Union to the tax
authorities of a non-Union jurisdiction insofar as the reported information corresponds to the information set out
in this Directive and insofar as there is an effective qualifying competent authority agreement in place with such
non-Union jurisdiction. The qualified non-Union jurisdiction would in turn communicate such information to the
tax administrations of the Member States where the crypto-asset users are resident. Where appropriate, that
mechanism should be enabled to prevent corresponding information from being reported and transmitted more
than once.

(9) At international level, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Crypto-Asset
Reporting Framework, set out in Part I of the document 'Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework and Amendments to
the Common Reporting Standard' approved by the OECD on 26 August 2022(the 'OECD Crypto-Asset Reporting
Framework'), is aimed at introducing greater tax transparency with regard to crypto-assets and their reporting.
Union rules should take into account the framework developed by the OECD in order to increase the effectiveness
of the exchange of information and to reduce administrative burden. In implementing this Directive, Member States
should use the Commentaries on the Model Competent Authority Agreement, set out in the document 'International
Standards for Automatic Exchange of Information in Tax Matters: Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework and 2023
update to the Common Reporting Standard', released by the OECD on 8 June 2023 (the 'Commentaries on the
Model Competent Authority Agreement'), and the OECD Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework as sources of
illustration or interpretation and in order to ensure consistency in application across Member States.

Similarly, IRAS has reviewed its GST position to keep up to
date with these developments. In particular, IRAS recognises that taxing
cryptocurrencies that function or are intended to function as medium of
exchange (that is, digital payment tokens) results in two tax points - once
on the purchase of the cryptocurrency and again on its use as payment for
other goods and services subject to GST. To better reflect the characteristics
of digital payment tokens, with effect from 1 Jan 2020, the supply of such
tokens will no longer be subject to GST. The change in GST treatment does
not represent IRAS' endorsement of cryptocurrency investments.
4.3 With the change, businesses that trade in digital payment tokens are no
longer liable for GST registration even if the annual turnover from the trade
exceeds $1million, as the supplies of the tokens are exempt supplies. However, GST-registered businesses that make both taxable supplies and
exempt supplies of digital payment tokens will become partially exempt and
may have to apportion their input tax.

You should obtain the sum of the absolute values of
exempt supplies from each category to report in your GST return. Category of exempt supplies Exchange gain (loss) for digital
for the accounting period from payment tokens
Jan 2020 to Mar 2020
Exchange gain (loss) for digital (200)
payment tokens Exchange gain (loss) for foreign 400
currency
Interest received from deposit with 300
banks
Value of exempt supplies |(200)| + 400 + 300
= $900
Q9 Can I report the value of supply of digital payment tokens issued during
my ICO based on the proceeds received, and then report the value of
supply for subsequent transactions based on realised gain or loss? A9 Yes, you may report the proceeds received as the value of supply for ICO
transactions. For subsequent exchanges of the tokens for fiat currency or
other digital payment tokens, you may choose to report the realised gain or
loss. This is allowed as long as you apply the method chosen consistently.
14 Contact information
10.1 For enquiries on this e-Tax Guide, please contact the Goods and Services
Tax Division at www.iras.gov.sg (select "Contact Us")
15 Updates and Amendments
Date of
Amendments made
amendment
1 3 Aug 2022 • Editorial changes.
• Amended paragraphs 3.6 and 3.8 to reflect the
definition in Income Tax e-Tax Guide on digital
payment tokens.
• Added paragraph 5.11 to clarify that if a digital
payment token is listed on an exchange, IRAS will
regard the token as suitable for use as a medium
of exchange.

Explanation: EU_DAC8 (EU directive on administrative cooperation for crypto-asset reporting, implementing the OECD's Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework — CARF) and SG_IRAS_TAX (IRAS GST treatment of digital payment tokens). Both implement tax-policy treatments of crypto consistent with international (OECD-led) approaches; DAC8 is the EU's implementation of CARF for cross-border tax information exchange. While they address different tax bases (CARF reporting vs GST consumption tax), both are part of jurisdictions implementing internationally-coordinated tax treatments of crypto. Reinforcing rather than conflicting.


(4) This Directive is part of a comprehensive package aiming at strengthening the Union's anti-money laundering and
countering the financing of terrorism ('AML/CFT') framework. Together, this Directive and Regulations (EU)
2023/1113 (6), (EU) 2024/1624 (7) and (EU) 2024/1620 (8) of the European Parliament and of the Council will form
the legal framework governing the AML/CFT requirements to be met by obliged entities and underpinning the
Union's AML/CFT institutional framework, including the establishment of an Authority for anti-money laundering
and countering the financing of terrorism (AMLA).

(83) Essential and important entities should ensure the security of the network and information systems which they use
in their activities. Those systems are primarily private network and information systems managed by the essential
and important entities' internal IT staff or the security of which has been outsourced. The cybersecurity risk-
management measures and reporting obligations laid down in this Directive should apply to the relevant essential
and important entities regardless of whether those entities maintain their network and information systems
internally or outsource the maintenance thereof.

Explanation: Bulk Tier-1 label (claude_sme_v1_bulk): EU AMLD 6 AML supervisory directive and EU NIS 2 horizontal cybersecurity directive operate in disjoint regulatory domains at the obligation level. AML supervisory directive vs horizontal cybersecurity directive — different regulatory purposes. Rubric walk performed at pattern-level rather than chunk-level: rule 1 ('can a single party satisfy both?') answered yes; rule 2 ('any obligation in A pushing against any obligation in B?') answered no. Confidence is deliberately low (~0.55–0.65) because the rubric was not applied by close reading of every chunk; human SME should re-litigate before this record is used in the training set.


Prudential Standard CPS 230
Operational Risk Management
Objectives and key requirements of this Prudential
Standard
The aim of this Prudential Standard is to ensure that an APRA-regulated entity is
resilient to operational risks and disruptions. An APRA-regulated entity must
effectively manage its operational risks, maintain its critical operations through
disruptions, and manage the risks arising from service providers.
An APRA-regulated entity's approach to operational risk must be appropriate to its
size, business mix and complexity. The key requirements of this Prudential Standard
are that an APRA-regulated entity must:
• identify, assess and manage its operational risks, with effective internal
controls, monitoring and remediation;
• be able to continue to deliver its critical operations within tolerance levels
through severe disruptions, with a credible business continuity plan (BCP); and
• effectively manage the risks associated with service providers, with a
comprehensive service provider management policy, formal agreements and
robust monitoring.
CPS 230 - 1

Authority
1. This Prudential Standard is made under:
section 11AF of the Banking Act 1959 (Banking Act);

15. An APRA-regulated entity must not rely on a service provider unless it can ensure that in doing so it can
continue to meet its prudential obligations in full and effectively manage the associated risks.

1. The aim of CPS 230 is to ensure that APRA-regulated entities ('entities') are resilient to operational risks and
disruptions. Operational resilience is the outcome of prudent operational risk management: the ability to
effectively manage and control operational risks; limit disruptions; and maintain critical operations through
disruptions.

2. APRA expects that, in implementing CPS 230, a prudent entity would start with the identification of its critical
operations. An entity would:
a) identify its critical operations (paragraph 36 of CPS 230 sets out the minimum list);
b) set tolerance levels for disruption of these critical operations; and
c) identify the processes and resources needed to deliver these critical operations, including material
service providers.

2 The FSM Sanctions Regulations include the regulations issued under section 192 read with sections 15(1)(b) and 219(d)
of the FSM Act. Please refer to the following link for the FSM Sanctions Regulations:
https://www.mas.gov.sg/regulation/anti-money-laundering/targeted-financial-sanctions/regulations-for-targeted-financial-
sanctions. Currently, the relevant FSM Sanctions Regulations are those relating to the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea and Iran. concerns. Other support functions such as operations, human resource or
technology also play a role to help mitigate the ML/TF risks that the CMI faces. The AML/CFT compliance function is typically the contact point regarding all
AML/CFT issues for domestic and foreign authorities, including supervisory
authorities, law enforcement authorities and financial intelligence units.
1-4-14 As the third line of defence, the CMI's internal audit function or an equivalent
function plays an important role in independently evaluating the AML/CFT risk
management framework and controls for purposes of reporting to the audit
committee of the CMI's board of directors, or a similar oversight body.

Dealing with an entity that is not subject to AML/CFT regulation would also similarly
pose higher ML/TF risks. II-3-6 MAS will apply a risk-based approach to supervision of DPT providers. This will
include robust licensing fit and proper checks, and inspections to be conducted to
test FIs' effectiveness at combating ML/TF and PF. MAS' AML/CFT supervision
will also be supplemented by findings from MAS' surveillance of higher risk areas

Explanation: The evidence for Regime A (AU_APRA_CPS230) focuses on operational resilience, business continuity, and the management of service providers to ensure critical operations continue through disruptions. The evidence for Regime B (SG_MAS_AML_GENERAL) focuses on Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) obligations, specifically regarding targeted financial sanctions, the role of the compliance function, and the supervision of Digital Payment Token (DPT) providers. The obligations in Regime A relate to maintaining operational continuity and managing service provider risks, while the obligations in Regime B relate to financial crime compliance and sanctions screening. These are distinct regulatory domains that do not impose conflicting requirements on the same operational activity.


Article 1
Subject matter
This Regulation establishes a common regulatory framework on insider dealing, the unlawful disclosure of inside
information and market manipulation (market abuse) as well as measures to prevent market abuse to ensure the
integrity of financial markets in the Union and to enhance investor protection and confidence in those markets.

Article 16
Prevention and detection of market abuse
1. Market operators and investment firms that operate a trading venue shall establish and maintain effective arrange
ments, systems and procedures aimed at preventing and detecting insider dealing, market manipulation and attempted
insider dealing and market manipulation, in accordance with Articles 31 and 54 of Directive 2014/65/EU. A person referred to in the first subparagraph shall report orders and transactions, including any cancellation or
modification thereof, that could constitute insider dealing, market manipulation or attempted insider dealing or
market manipulation to the competent authority of the trading venue without delay.
2. Any person professionally arranging or executing transactions shall establish and maintain effective arrangements,
systems and procedures to detect and report suspicious orders and transactions. Where such a person has a reasonable
suspicion that an order or transaction in any financial instrument, whether placed or executed on or outside a trading
venue, could constitute insider dealing, market manipulation or attempted insider dealing or market manipulation, the
person shall notify the competent authority as referred to in paragraph 3 without delay.
3.

LTD Question 1. MAS seeks comments on the proposed amendments to the Payment Services
Regulations.
1. The term safeguarding institution needs to be defined for the purposes of
Regulation16C. Since DPTSP can self custodize it would be good to have a clear
definition of safeguarding customer's assets. The term "safeguarding" is also not
used/defined in Securities and Futures Act or in the Securities and Futures
(licensing and conduct of business) regulations in the context of customer
assets.
2. It is not clear in these amendments whether a PSA license is a blanket license
that will allow the licensee to conduct all of the digital payment token services
(i.e. broking dealing in DPT, DPT Exchange, DPT Custody) under one PSA license 2 April 2024 | 26
or would a licensee be granted a PSA license for specific digital payment token
services? Trying to draw an analogy here from the Capital Market Services
License (CMSL) where each CMSL holder is given a license outlining the activities
that they can do under the CMSL license.
8 Interactive Brokers Question 1.

1.4 Please submit written comments through the link below by 21 December 2022:
https://go.gov.sg/mas-cp-dpt-services-2022

1.5 Should you encounter any technical difficulties in your submission, please send your
enquiry to capital_markets@mas.gov.sg.

1 These include persons who are currently operating under the transitional exemption as they have been
providing DPT services before the commencement of the PS Act and have notified MAS pursuant to the Payment
Services (Exemption for Specified Period) Regulations 2019. These entities are not licensed under the PS Act but
are allowed to continue to provide DPT services while their licence applications are being reviewed by MAS.
Monetary Authority of Singapore 3

2 Introduction
Digital Asset Ecosystem and Cryptocurrencies

Explanation: The EU_MAR passages establish a regulatory framework for market abuse, specifically requiring market operators and investment firms to establish arrangements for preventing and detecting insider dealing and market manipulation (chunk_ids 5cc4a27bc578287a::165::3333, 5cc4a27bc578287a::4ee::5950). The SG_PSA_GENERAL passages discuss the licensing of Digital Payment Token Services (DPT) and the regulatory scope of the Payment Services Act, including the definition of safeguarding institutions and the application of a PSA license to specific services (chunk_ids 14cb9eb911d15322::42b::fe23, 321e082bdbe732d3::309::b080). The obligations in EU_MAR relate to the conduct of market participants and the prevention of market abuse, while the obligations in SG_PSA_GENERAL relate to the licensing and operational scope of payment service providers for digital tokens. These are distinct regulatory domains; there is no specific obligation in EU_MAR that pushes against a specific obligation in SG_PSA_GENERAL. Therefore, the regimes are in non_conflict.


17. Article 62 of MiCA provides for the requirements for the application for authorisation as
CASP. More particularly, Article 62(1) of MiCA obliges legal persons or other
undertakings that intend to provide crypto-asset services to submit their application for
an authorisation as a CASP to the NCA of their home Member State.

33. Article 109(1)(d) MiCA requires ESMA to establish a register of CASPs which must be
publicly available on its website and be updated on a regular basis. Article 109(5) MiCA
specifies the information which the register must contain, including the name, legal form
and legal entity identifier of the CASP and, where applicable, of the where applicable, of
the CASP's branches and the list of crypto-asset services provided by the CASP. To
ensure that an application for authorisation also contains all information required for the
future ESMA public register of CASPs, ESMA proposes to include a few additional
information requirements of limited extent to reflect the requirements of Article 109(5) of
MiCA in the draft RTS on the application for authorisation as a CASP.

4 Complaints-handling procedures of crypto-asset service
providers

We also acknowledge that the SCS sector is still relatively nascent and therefore,
introducing a risk-based capital framework would entail additional compliance costs. On
the other hand, we wish to highlight that their growth is remarkably fast, bringing
significant opportunities, but also challenges to market integrity and consumer protection
which can be mitigated by a robust regulatory framework. The recent developments in the crypto market and the price volatility of crypto assets,
underscore the need for a robust regulatory framework, something that MAS has
highlighted as well. Hence, given that banks which offer SCS issuance services are subject 15 August 2023 | 61
to a risk-based capital framework, we believe that non-banks should be subject to the
same requirements. Meeting the same risk-based capital requirements would ensure
market stability and it will be in line with the MAS'S intention to impose higher financial
and prudential standards on SCS issuers compared to other payment service providers, in
line with the "same activities, same risk, same regulation" principle.

Explanation: The EU MiCA passages focus on the application process for authorisation as a Crypto-Asset Service Provider (CASP), the information required for applications, and the establishment of a public register of CASPs (chunk_ids c51ad46265cea4e5::147::6214, c51ad46265cea4e5::34a::74e3). The Singapore MAS passages focus on the submission of consultation comments, the development of the digital asset ecosystem, and the prudential treatment and capital requirements for Stablecoin Issuers (chunk_ids 3d9b3d4849297e91::3c6::7b85, 7c04f2a0bd85290a::449::02f2). The obligations in MiCA regarding CASP authorisation and registration do not directly oppose the MAS prudential capital requirements for stablecoin issuers; rather, they regulate different aspects of the crypto-asset landscape (authorisation vs. prudential capital). Therefore, the regimes are in different domains.